Angola MER - June 2023
Angola MER - June 2023
Angola MER - June 2023
and counter-terrorist
financing measures
Angola
Mutual Evaluation Report
June 2023
│1
The Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) was officially established in 1999 in
Arusha, Tanzania through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). As at the date of this Report, ESAAMLG
membership comprises of 20 countries and includes a number of regional and international observers such as
COMESA, Commonwealth Secretariat, East African Community, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units,
FATF, IMF, SADC, United Kingdom, United Nations, UNODC, United States of America, World Bank and World
Customs Organization.
ESAAMLG’s members and observers are committed to the effective implementation and enforcement of
internationally accepted standards against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, in
particular the FATF Recommendations.
For more information about the ESAAMLG, please visit the website: www.esaamlg.org
This document and/or any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,
to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
This assessment was conducted under the responsibility of the ESAAMLG, adopted by the Council of
Ministers through a round robin process in June 2023.
Citing reference:
ESAAMLG (2023), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures - Angola, Second Round
Mutual Evaluation Report, ESAAMLG, Dar es Salaam http://www.esaamlg.org/reports/me.php
OF
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 8
Key Findings 8
Risks and General Situation 10
Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness 10
Priority Actions 14
Effectiveness & Technical Compliance Ratings 15
Chapter 6. SUPERVISION 98
6.1 Key Findings and Recommended Actions 98
6.2 Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision) 99
6.2.1 Licensing, registration and controls preventing criminals and associates from entering
the market 100
6.2.2 Supervisors’ understanding and identification of ML/TF risks 105
6.2.3 Risk-based supervision of compliance with AML/CFT requirements 106
6.2.4 Remedial actions and effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions 108
6.2.5 Impact of supervisory actions on compliance 109
6.2.6 Promoting a clear understanding of AML/CFT obligations and ML/TF risks 109
Executive Summary
1. This Report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place in Angola as at the date of the on-site
visit which took place from 27 June-11 July 2022. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Angola’s AML/CFT system, and provides
recommendations on how the system could be strengthened.
Key Findings
a) Angola’s efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing are relatively recent. Though
a first comprehensive law was adopted in 2011 (but substantially revised in 2020), the
implementation of a preventive system for money laundering and terrorist financing was started
since 2000s. Although some technical compliance requirements remain, the legal framework
underpinning Angola’s AML/CFT system is generally solid.
b) Though Angola has identified its ML/TF risks and the authorities have introduced measures to
strengthen most of the country’s AML/CFT legal and institutional needs, the country has not
developed risk informed national policies and strategies to address identified ML/TF risks. The
NTF and supervision committee have been set up to promote initiation of policies and other
measures. The SIC has been set up as a special investigative LEA to investigate ML, TF and other
crimes. An asset forfeiture unit has been set up in the PGR. All these measures being mostly new
are still to impact in effectively addressing identified ML/TF risks.
c) Although there is a fair and consistent understanding/identification of frequently committed
serious crimes across most competent authorities based on the NRA and different sectoral risk
assessments, the understanding is not in the context of the crimes being potential proceed
generating for ML.
d) Angola’s authorities understanding of TF risk varies among authorities with the intelligence
services and UIF displaying a better understanding while there is a limited understanding by
agencies responsible for TF investigation and prosecution. Angola has not yet identified the sub-
set of NPOs which may be at risk of TF abuse. Reporting entities understanding of TF risk is
largely limited to screening for UN designated terrorist persons and entities and an awareness of
high-risk jurisdictions.
e) The UIF produces fairly good quality financial intelligence which has been used routinely by
LEAs to identify, investigate and prosecute predicate offences to successfully pursue proceeds of
corruption and embezzlement; while ML/TF received attention to some extent and associated
predicate offense to a large consistent which are broadly consistent with Angola’s risk profile.
f) Angola has to a lesser extent investigated and prosecuted ML cases consistent with the country’s
risk profile. This is most evident in the number of ML investigations and prosecutions relating to
corruption, fraud, tax crimes, drug trafficking and smuggling of goods prevailing in Angola
reported and processed is low. The LEAs have a low resources capacity which hinders them from
effectively pursuing ML investigations and prosecutions in line with the country’s risk profile.
g) The authorities demonstrated to some extent that they pursue the confiscation of proceeds of
corruption, as a policy objective. However, there was no demonstration of a similar policy
objective in terms of proceeds of other predicate offences, instrumentalities of crime, property of
corresponding value, assets related to other offences including TF.
h) Angola’s definition of terrorist activities does not encompass all activities defined by the UN,
which could limit Angola’s ability to investigate and prosecute TF. Angola has not prosecuted
any TF cases during the reporting period. Initial TF investigations conducted by PGR appear to
be focused on establishing a base level of criminality rather than exploring for further evidence
of potential TF conduct.
i) Angola has inadequate legal framework and implementation of targeted financial sanctions (TFS)
against terrorist financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF). Implementation of the existing
laws is also at formative stage. Moreover, unlike the largest commercial banks, small to medium
FIs and DNFBPs are yet to effectively implement their TFS obligations. Significant steps have
not been initiated to categorise the NPOs in terms of their vulnerability to TF risk and the
inspection monitoring tool in use for reporting institutions does not include components of risk
exposure to TF.
j) Financial supervisors demonstrated a good understanding of ML at national, sectoral, and
institutional level, but DNFBPs supervisors have limited understanding of the ML risk. The TF
risk is understood at negligible extent by both financial and DNFBPs supervisors. The application
of a risk-based approach to supervision is still at an infancy stage as financial supervisors are just
starting to apply a risk-based approach, and they are faced with human resources constraint.
DNFBP’s supervisors are yet to adopt a risk-based approach to supervision. Although financial
supervisors applied administrative sanctions and remedial actions to a certain extent, there has
been limited impact on FI’s compliance behaviour, attributed to disproportionate sanctions.
DNFBPs supervisors are yet to apply sanctions where breaches are identified.
k) FIs, more especially banks and securities companies generally have a good understanding of ML
risks and AML/CFT obligations including measures for CDD, EDD, record keeping and
suspicious transactions reporting. Banks and securities demonstrated a more robust understanding
of the ML risk they face and were strongest in their defences, compared to other NBFIs. The
appreciation of TF, is however, much less developed. The DNFBP sector has demonstrated low
level of understanding of ML/TF risk and implementation of their AML/CFT obligations. This
could be attributed to low level of supervision by the DNFBP supervisors. VA activities and
VASPs are unregulated in Angola. There is no legal framework providing for regulation of
VASPs, let alone identification and application of sanctions on illegal VASPs.
l) Reporting entities in Angola are required to establish the true identity of beneficial owners when
establishing a business relationship or carrying out an occasional transaction. Basic information
on legal person (companies) is publicly available to a limited extent through OSS. The
information on the registry is not accurate and up to date. Moreover, Angola has not assessed
risks associated with legal persons. There is limited understanding of BO concept amongst the
Competent Authorities as the result BO information is not collected or maintained by such
authorities. However, FIs in order to fulfil their CDD obligation; use their own mechanism to
collect BO information from legal persons that maintain accounts with them. Angola does not
recognise the concept of trusts and other forms of legal arrangements.
m) Angola has generally in place a good legal and institutional framework to cooperate and exchange
information with foreign counterparts in respect of mutual legal assistance (MLA), extradition
and other forms of international cooperation. However, the effectiveness of cooperation is
hindered by lack of an effective case management system, statistics and prioritisation mechanisms
that enables effective monitoring of cases as well as providing and proactively seeking
international cooperation based on the risk profile of the jurisdiction.
2. Angola is exposed to ML threats from proceeds of crime emanating from within and outside the
country through its financial system, real estate sector and cross-border trade. In view of its geographical
position and economic development, the country is also a transit route for illegal drug. Angola has a
sophisticated financial system co-existing with significant use of cash and presence of informal economy.
Angola faces significant domestic ML threats than international sources. While Angola has a significant
exposure to potential foreign proceeds largely because of its sophisticated financial sector with global
reach, the assessors could not find sufficient evidence of foreign proceeds being laundered or used for TF
in the country. By contrast, a significant amount of proceeds generated in Angola are laundered outside of
the country. However, Angola experiences a significant outflow of proceeds channelled through the
financial system while foreign proceeds into Angola are limited. Increasingly, Angola is also becoming a
destination point as well, with a growing market for illicit drugs as a transit country.
3. Angola is less exposed to TF, mostly likely to come from outside perpetrators wishing to use the
country to mobilise resources for use outside in foreign countries which has not been prioritised by the
authorities. Angola has not identified the scale/magnitude of the TF threats and vulnerabilities. The rating
of medium low for TF appears to be well supported.
4. On technical compliance with the FATF Standards, Angola has made various improvements to
its AML/CFT legal framework since its first-round evaluation. On effectiveness, many of the efforts were
made few months before the on-site visit, and while some initiatives are beginning to show results, other
reforms have been too recent or are structural and require will take some time to impact positively on the
effectiveness of the overall AML/CFT system. Changes that were implemented earlier (e.g., asset
recovery reform) have led to an increase in effectiveness, whereas more recent changes (e.g., efforts to
apply risk-based approach, improve AML/CFT supervision, national co-ordination and cooperation and
international cooperation, changes to the AML/CFT law, and the transparency of legal persons) are not
fully implemented to achieve the desired outcomes. The SIC has been set up as a special investigative
LEA to investigate ML, TF and other crimes. An asset forfeiture unit has been set up in the PGR for
tracing and confiscation of illegal property. All these measures being mostly new are still to impact
positively in effectively addressing the identified ML/TF risks. The authorities have not yet demonstrated
through activities that national coordination and cooperation between LEAs, and between the AML/CFT
supervisors are not effective in achieving the desired outcomes in their respective IOs.
Assessment of risk, coordination and policy setting (Chapter 2; IO.1, R.1, 2, 33 & 34)
5. Overall, Angola has an understanding of ML threats and associated ML vulnerability of various
sectors to some extent. The understanding is based on the NRA and sectoral risk assessments conducted
since 2019 as well as implementation of the measures since 2000s. Though Angola has identified its
ML/TF risks and has introduced measures to strengthen most of the country’s AML/CFT legal and
institutional needs, the country has not developed and implemented national policies and strategies
informed by the identified ML/TF risks. The NTF and supervisory committee have been set up to develop
and implement policies and other measures to promote effectiveness across the AML/CFT system.
Although there is consistent understanding/identification of committed serious crimes across most
competent authorities based on the NRA and different sectoral risk assessments, the understanding is not
in the context of the crimes being potential proceed generating for ML. Lack of consideration of the values
of proceeds of crime undermines the relative scale of the proceeds generating predicate offences.
Understanding of TF risks was relatively good among the intelligence agencies than any other public and
private sector institutions as there was no evidence that channels which can be exploited for TF purpose
were adequately considered during the NRA. However, there is some degree of coordination of activities
to combat ML and TF. There is coordination and collaboration of PF, though at early stages of setting up
its activities. Angola has not introduced enhanced measures to address high risk scenarios identified in
the NRA report and designation of NPOs as reporting entities is not supported by the results of any risk
assessment. More still needs to be done in equipping the competent authorities (UIF, PGR, SIC) with
adequate capacities to be able to identify ML and TF cases and the risks associated with both crimes and
the authorities coming up with relevant AML/CFT policies informed by the identified risks.
Financial intelligence, ML investigations, prosecutions and confiscation (Chapter 3; IO.6, 7, 8; R.1,
3, 4, 29–32)
6. The Financial Information Unit (UIF) is the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) of Angola
which is responsible for receipt, request, analysis and evaluation of reports and dissemination of financial
intelligence and other relevant information to the law enforcement agencies. The UIF has autonomy and
operational independence as well as reasonable capacity to perform its core functions and has access to a
wide range of databases to augment its analysis of the different transactions reports it receives from
reporting institutions. The UIF has reasonable capacity to discharge its core functions to assist LEAs to
identify potential criminal proceeds and TF cases. The LEAs obtain and, to some extent, use financial
intelligence and other information to identify and trace criminal property, and support investigations and
prosecutions on allegations of predicate offences and ML particularly in pursuit of the large sums of
misappropriated public funds within several government departments/agencies. The UIF intelligence
reports are based largely on transaction reports from commercial banks due to limited or no reports from
the DNFBPs and some non-bank FIs. The UIF has received limited number of cross-border currency
reports. The UIF has not produced comprehensive strategic reports focused on analysis of typologies and
trends relating to predicate crimes, ML and TF that would support the competent authorities’ operational
needs.
7. Angola has to a low extent investigated and prosecuted ML cases consistent with the country’s
risk profile. Angola has only pursued ML cases on corruption offences, with little attention given to the
other high and medium- high risk offences such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, environmental
crimes and fuel theft. The LEAs have limited understanding and lack capacity to conduct parallel financial
investigations to identify ML cases effectively. Despite the notable use of legal persons in the commission
of some high-profile ML cases, Angola has not investigated, prosecuted or sanctioned any legal person.
Additionally, Angola does not implement alternative measurers in situations where a conviction cannot
be achieved.
8. To some extent, Angola has demonstrated a policy objective to curb ML through confiscation
procedures mostly for corruption. However, this policy objective has manifested in relation to the
recovery of proceeds of corruption-related offences only. There are no tangible efforts by the authorities
to pursue proceeds of other high proceed generating offences. Further, Angola’s recoveries are only
attributed to the implementation of the Voluntary Surrender of Assets mechanism because there is
generally low use of conviction-based confiscation mechanism, and no implementation so far of the non-
conviction-based confiscation. The authorities have not demonstrated adequate efforts to pursue the
restitution of assets that are traced and seized in other jurisdictions. Further, Angola does not adequately
implement measures for the detection and seizure of non/falsely declared BNIs.
Terrorist and proliferation financing (Chapter 4; IO.9, 10, 11; R. 1, 4, 5–8, 30, 31 & 39)
9. Some of the relevant Angolan authorities demonstrated a good understanding of the TF risks
facing the country and have put in place adequate measure mitigate and where necessary, disrupt the TF
activity to some extent. Angola’s criminalization of TF is limited in part due to a narrow legal definition
of terrorism which could negatively impact Angola’s ability to prosecute TF. The country did not report
any TF prosecutions during the reporting period, but did demonstrate some ongoing cases of TF
investigations resulting from coordinated efforts by relevant agencies through joint operations and
information from external sources. However, there has been limited disruption of TF activities where
there were cases which could have resulted in disruption measures being taken.
10. Angola has the legal and institutional framework to implement TF and PF-related UNSCRs
although the framework has limitations particularly in relation to designation without delay. Angola has
adopted an informal mechanism to inform reporting entities of UNSC sanctions updates in a timely
manner, but this mechanism does not always achieve implementation without delay and its legal force
lacks clarity. Authorities could not demonstrate monitoring of implementation of TFS obligations relating
to TF and PF. claimed they monitor for compliance with TFS relating to TF and PF, but did not provide
information to verify this claim. While in practice the domestic and foreign owned/controlled FIs
implement sanctions without delay, NBFIs demonstrated a good understanding of their obligations, while
DNFBPs have a varied awareness of their UNSCRs obligations.
Preventive measures (Chapter 5; IO.4; R.9–23)
11. Law no. 05/20 of January 27 is the main piece of legislation setting out the AML/CFT obligations
for FIs and DNFBPs in Angola. The Act covers all FIs and DNFBPs as per the FATF requirements. Angola
has not yet covered VASPs and no risk assessment had been conducted for the exclusion.
12. FIs generally have a good understanding of ML risks and AML/CFT obligations including
measures for CDD, EDD, record keeping and suspicious transactions reporting. Large and medium
domestic and foreign controlled FIs demonstrated a more robust understanding of the ML risk they face
and were strongest in their defences, compared to smaller FIs. The appreciation of TF, is however, much
less developed.
13. The DNFBP sector has demonstrated low level of understanding of ML/TF risk and their
AML/CFT obligations. This could be attributed to low level of supervision by the DNFBP supervisors.
14. CDD measures are well embedded in the financial sector. FIs apply basic customer due diligence
for low-risk customers and enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers. FIs have a varying
understanding and application of identification of BO. Some FIs (mainly NBFIs and small banks)
highlighted that they obtain and verify information of signatories and directors only. Large banks have
demonstrated that in addition to obtaining and verifying information of signatories and directors, they also
obtain shareholders’ information. However, the identification of shareholders was not standard across all
banks that applied it, as entities used varying percentage shareholding, ranging from 10 percent to 25
percent. In addition, all FIs assume that beneficial owner should be based on percentage ownership of the
company, therefore, there are no measures put in place to determine the BO where there is doubt that the
person with controlling shares is the beneficial owner.
15. The obligation to file STRs on grounds of suspicion that funds are the proceeds of a criminal
activity or are related to TF is generally well understood across the sectors. However, assessors were
concerned that, with the exception of banks, MVTS and exchange bureau, filing of STRs by the other FIs
and DNFBP sector is low.
Supervision (Chapter 6; IO.3; R.14, R.26–28, 34, 35)
16. Financial supervisors namely, the BNA, CMC and ARSEG demonstrated sound application of
market entry requirements including fit and proper tests to ascertain suitability of natural and legal
persons. BOs are also subject to fit and proper tests; however, verification of BOs information is impaired
as reliance is placed on basic information held at One-Stop Shop, Government Gazette and Public
Notaries. Through application of sound market entry requirements, financial supervisors have
successfully prevented criminals and their associates from owning or controlling FIs. DNFBPs
supervisors are yet to institute market entry requirements.
17. Financial supervisors demonstrated a good understanding of ML risks, with limited understanding
of the TF risks by both financial and DNFBPs supervisors. The understanding of the ML risk stemming
from the national and sectoral risk assessments, and partly institutional risk assessments. However,
application of a risk-based approach is at an infancy stage. Financial supervisors are faced with human
resources constraint. Supervisors carried out inspections on FIs under their purview and identified
breaches related to CDD, EDD, and reporting of STRs, as the major areas of concern. Although remedial
actions and sanctions have been applied, they appear disproportionate, yielding limited impact on
compliance behaviour of FIs. Financial supervisors have been successful in promoting understanding of
AML/CFT obligations and the ML risk, with limited focus on the TF risk. On the contrary, DNFBPs
supervisors have limited understanding of ML/TF risks and have done next to nothing in promoting the
understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations in the DNFBPs sector.
Priority Actions
a) Angola should take more actions to promote understanding of ML/TF risks across all stakeholders
to inform implementation the AML/CFT strategy and policies on a risk-based approach. In addition,
the authorities should on a regular basis review and update taking a more systematic, holistic and
in-depth assessment of the NRA to identify emerging ML/TF high risk areas including conducting
risk assessments in relation to informal economy, legal persons, mobile money operators, cross-
border currency transportation and NPOs to ensure that commensurate mitigating controls are put
in place and strengthen AML/CFT policy development consistent with the findings of the NRA.
b) Angola should develop national AML/CFT policies and/or strategies and action plan to address the
identified ML/TF risks. It should also ensure that AML/CFT policies and activities are
implemented on the basis of a national strategy informed by identified and up-to-date ML/TF risks.
c) Angola should prioritise provision of adequate resources to the competent authorities across the
board to enable effective implementation of the AML/CFT measures to achieve the desired
outcomes.
d) UIF and the other competent authorities should maintain comprehensive statistics on the effective
use of the financial intelligence and other information disseminated, investigation, prosecution,
international cooperation and asset recovery issues.
e) The authorities should enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies to identify, investigate
and prosecute TF, ML and associated predicate offences. Particular emphasis should be placed on
enhancing SIC’s and PGR’s capacity and also, ensuring that the relevant authorities are conducting
parallel financial investigation, applying special investigative techniques, the use of provisional
and confiscation measures and prosecutions which should also prioritise confiscations, are aligned
with the risk profile of Angola.
f) Angola should ensure that TF investigation is well integrated into the country’s counter-terrorism
strategy and pursue financial investigations as a matter of course when conducting investigations
on terrorism.
g) Angola should broaden and reorient of ST reporting, analysis, and ML investigations, prosecutions
and asset freezing and confiscation towards the most significant sources of illicit proceeds and
identification of the most common ML methods/techniques in line with its ML/TF risk profile.
h) Angola should develop and operationalise sufficient mechanisms and coordination to implement
UNSCRs relating to TF and PF.
i) Angola should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the NPO sector to better understand the
threats, and vulnerabilities faced by the sector and target NPOs that are exposed to TF abuse without
disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities. The authorities should initiate outreach to
NPOs and their donors to raise awareness based on the identified TF risks.
j) Angola should ensure that the small banks, NBFIs and DNFBPs understand and apply AML/CFT
requirements on a risk-sensitive basis. If Angola is to allow dealing in VAs and have VASPs
operating, then it should have a legal framework to regulate and supervise the sector.
k) Angola should ensure effective AML/CFT supervision/monitoring across all categories of FIs and
DNFBPs on the basis of ML/TF risks profile of the jurisdiction. It should also improve RBS across
all sectors by: (i) adopting a robust risk assessment methodology; (ii) ensuring that the frequency
and intensity of their AML/CFT supervision are guided by risk considerations; and (iii) deepening
the scope of their AML/CFT inspections.
l) Angola should use the process of carrying out a risk assessment and the results, thereafter, to create
a broad-based awareness and understanding of ML/TF risks posed by each of the types of legal
persons created in the country. The authorities should engage more with the reporting entities to
improve on their understanding of BO and BO risks, enhance the collection of BO information and
take measures to ensure the BO information is made available to competent authorities when needed.
m) Angola should actively seek formal and timely MLA for all ML, associated predicate offenses, and
TF in a much greater proportion of the cases that have transnational aspects and actively follow up
on such requests in a timely manner, by developing an overall case management system within the
the Central Authority for international cooperation in criminal matters to streamline and monitor the
timely processing, prioritization, and execution of all incoming MLA and extradition requests by
responsible agencies.
Preface
21. This report summarises the AML/CFT measures in place as at the date of the on-site visit. It
analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of
the AML/CFT system, and recommends how the system could be strengthened.
22. This evaluation was based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and was prepared using the 2013
Methodology. The evaluation was based on information provided by the country, and information
obtained by the evaluation team during its on-site visit to the country from 27th June-11th July 2022.
23. The evaluation was conducted by an assessment team consisting of:
• Didimalang Segaiso, Bank of Botswana, Botswana (Financial Sector Expert),
• Edgar Afonso de Sousa Fortes, Central Bank of Mozambique, Mozambique (Financial
Sector Expert),
• Vilho Nkandi, Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority, Namibia (Financial
Sector Expert).
• Florence Motoa, Lesotho National Development Corporation, Lesotho (Legal Expert),
• Gerrit C. Eiman, Financial Intelligence Centre, Namibia (UIF Expert),
• Jean Phillipo Priminta, Financial Intelligence Authority, Malawi (Law Enforcement
Expert),
• Tiago João Santos e Sousa Lambin, Public Procurement, Real Estate and Construction
Institute, Portugal (Financial Sector Expert and International Cooperation), and
• Michael White, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crimes, United States of America (Law Enforcement Expert)
with the support from the ESAAMLG Secretariat of Messrs Muluken Yirga Dubale (Team Leader),
Joseph Jagada (Principal Expert), Phineas Moloto (Technical Advisor) and Mofokeng Ramakhala (Legal
Expert). The Report was reviewed by Diphat Tembo (Zambia, FIC), Emil Meddy (Ghana, FIU), Kenneth
Ngwarai (Zimbabwe, FIU), Preesha Bissoonauthsing (Mauritius, ICAC), Titus Mulindwa (Uganda, BoU)
and FATF Secretariat.
24. Angola previously underwent an ESAAMLG Mutual Evaluation in 2012, conducted according
to the 2004 FATF Methodology. The 2012 evaluation was published and is available at:
https://www.esaamlg.org/reports/ANGOLA_MUTUAL_EVALUATION_DETAIL_REPORT.pdf.
25. That Mutual Evaluation concluded that the country was compliant with 3 Recommendations;
largely compliant with 9; partially compliant with 18; non-compliant with 18 and non-applicable with
1. Angola was rated largely compliant with 3 of the 16 Core and Key Recommendations. Angola entered
the follow-up process soon after the adoption of its MER in 2012 and exited follow-up in April 20181.
1
https://www.esaamlg.org/reports/Progress%20Report%20Angola-2018.pdf
26. Angola, officially the Republic of Angola, is a country located on the western coast of Southern
Africa, whose territory is bordered to the north by the Republic of the Congo, to the northeast by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the east by Zambia, to the south by Namibia and to the west by the
Atlantic Ocean. The country is divided into 18 provinces, namely Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Cabinda, Cuando
Cubango, Cunene, Huila, Cuanza Sul, Cuanza Norte, Huambo, Luanda, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje,
Moxico, Namibe, Uíge and Zaire. In terms of political-administrative division, as provinces are divided
into Municipalities, Urban Districts, Communes and Neighbourhoods. Luanda is the capital city of the
country and the most populous among the provinces. The official language is Portuguese, which is spoken
with other national languages such as Umbundo, Quimbundo, Kikongo, Nganguela, Tchokwe, Nhaneca,
Fiote, Mbunda, Kwanyama.
27. Angola has an estimated population of 33 million with 33% of the population working and living
in the rural area. Angola’s economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Angola is the largest oil
producer in Sub-Saharan Africa since May 2022. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute
about 50 percent of GDP, more than 70percent of government revenue, and more than a 90percent of the
country’s exports, but the sector experienced challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic as the price
dropped to $42.40/barrel. Angola is an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member
and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Angola has abundant arable land, water,
mineral resources and natural gas. The second most important economic activity in Angola is the diamond
mining industry. Diamonds represent 5 percent of exports is an important source of income for local
communities in mining areas. Angola’s main trading partners are Portugal, China, Brazil, France, Italy,
India, South Africa and the United States. To support its economy, Angola has developed three deep
seaports which makes it important to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Most of
the population relies on agriculture (including subsistence), manufacturing and services but half of the
country’s food is still imported. Angola’s currency is the Kwanza (AOA) with an official exchange rate
of 429 Kwanzas per U.S. dollar as of August 2022.
28. Angola is a low medium income country with a Gross Net Income (GNI) per capita of around
$1,770 (2021). Angola’s economy grew by 0.7% in 2021 after contracting by 5.4% in 2020. The recovery
in the crude oil price from about $55/ barrel in January 2021 to more than $125 a barrel in March 2022
has shored up revenues and improved medium-term growth prospects. GDP is projected to grow by 2.9%
in 2022, and inflation to drop slightly to 23.2% in 2022, following a 15% appreciation of the exchange
rate against the dollar in 2021 and implementation of tight monetary policy. Revenues also benefited from
fiscal reforms, including implementation of value-added tax and excise tax, but high unemployment of
34% has overshadowed efforts to curb poverty, which in 2019 stood at 40.6% of the population.
29. Angola achieved its independence from Portugal on November 11, 1975, then immediately
entered into a civil war for 27 years that ended in 2002 substantially devastated and degraded
infrastructure, destroyed traditionally exporting sectors, such as agriculture, displaced millions of people
and caused widespread impoverishment. The private sector, although it remained active after
independence, was severely affected, as were other areas of the economy. The Constitution of 1975
established a one-party state headed by a president. A new Constitution, essentially an extensively
amended version of the 1975 document, was promulgated in 1992 and provided for a multiparty system
with a directly elected president as the head of state and government, assisted by a prime minister. The
country’s current constitution, promulgated in January 2010, eliminated the post of prime minister, added
the post of vice president, and strengthened the role of the president. Under the 2010 Constitution, the
leader of the majority party in legislative elections automatically becomes president of the country. The
President is Head of State, Head of Government and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The
President also has the exclusive, unrestricted authority to dissolve parliament and call for new elections.
Executive functions are exercised by the President with assistance from the Vice-President, Ministers of
State and Line Ministers, which are in turn assisted by Secretaries of State and Deputy Ministers.
Governors of Angola’s 18 provinces are appointed directly by the President and are responsible for
representing the Central Government in each province and ensuring the normal functioning of the local
administration of the state.
30. The National Assembly is the legislative body of Angola and is composed of 220 members. The
role of the National Assembly is to legislate on matters of internal organization and elect, by absolute
majority of members present, the President of the National Assembly, the Vice-President and Chairs of
the Specialized Commissions. The President promulgates laws approved by the Assembly and signs
Presidential Decrees.
31. Angola is a civil law jurisdiction, where legislation is modelled on the Roman- German law. The
highest courts in Angola’s national judicial system consist of a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, an
Audit Court, and a Supreme Military Court. According to the 2010 Constitution, the President nominates,
and the National Assembly formally elects, all Justices of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and
Audit Court. Courts, in terms of the Constitution, function as independent sovereign bodies, whose main
objective is to ensure compliance with the Constitution, laws, decrees and other legal directives. The
Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
1.1. ML/TF Risks and Scoping of Higher Risk Issues
33. The predicate crimes identified as high proceed-generating in Angola are: embezzlement,
corruption; fraud and tax evasion; drug trafficking; illegal dealing in precious metals and stones,
environmental crimes including wildlife trafficking, human trafficking and illicit trafficking in stolen oil.
Embezzlement and Corruption pose the highest ML risks based on figures and affects all sectors and are
the most reported offence generating proceeds. However, low number of cases in relation to these crimes
were registered. This is because most of these complaints did not result in investigations or those that led
to the opening of an investigation or investigation process were filed under the Amnesty Law approved
in 2015. Angola is a transit point for drug trafficking by national and international criminal groups to
Latin America, Southwest Africa, Namibia, and Europe. The domestic consumption of illicit drugs is also
increasing and there are users of 30% of the incoming drug. In relation to environmental crimes, there is
2
https://bm.usconsulate.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/121/2016/11/INSCR.pdf
considerable practice of poaching protected animals, aiming at the extraction of ivory and skins from
animals such as the Pangolin (widely used for medicinal purposes, especially in the Asia though the
amount being generated and laundered from such crimes was unknown during onsite. There are also
instances of the stealing and trafficking of oils with generated proceeds being channelled to the acquisition
of other goods as a modus operandi for ML. It was observed that most of the proceeds of these crimes are
being generated and laundered in Angola.
34. With regard to ML risk in the sectors, banks, MVTS and real estate followed by the casinos, and
precious stones and metals dealers were considered to pose high ML risk- channels through which most
of the proceeds of crime are laundered. The major vulnerability factors identified were:
• Long and porous borders which include the Atlantic Ocean and inadequate human and financial
resources to support effective controls of the borders, resulting into trade routes for illicit flows of
goods and funds.
• Inadequate specialised/ technical expertise in financial investigations and ML prosecution.
• Lack of implementation of cross-border currency requirements.
• Limited availability of beneficial ownership information.
• Inadequacy of AML/CFT supervision in the FIs and DNFBP sectors.
• Large size of the informal economy and predominant use of cash in financial transactions.
• Lack of reliable infrastructure and training including computerization and modernization of the
Registry and Notary sector, generating vulnerability for the commission of fraud and falsification.
35. The mining sector in general and the diamond sector in particular has weakened by inadequate
controls. Although, the authorities had introduced a Kimberly Process Unit, there were reports of
diamonds and other stones still being smuggled and the proceeds from the sales being brought back to
Angola and laundered. The predominant use of cash and a high unbanked population3 makes tracing of
most transactions impossible providing an opportunity for the laundering of proceeds of crime. Further,
given the current situation of economic crisis, precious stones are being used as a means to obtain foreign
currencies. The reduction in the price of oil and the devaluation of the Kwanza opened the door to the
crisis in Angola.
36. The extent to which Angola is exposed to the risk of TF is determined in a sense that there are no
records of acts of terrorism in Angolan territory. The only known case mentioned in the NRA was about
the six young Angolans who were suspected of being members of the Islamic State and carrying out
preparatory acts of terrorism. An investigation and trial were underway on this particular case during the
onsite visit. However, the NRA concludes that the incidence of Terrorism does not escape the reality
experienced by Angola where there are low levels of terrorist activities, but with increasing levels of
threats taking into account the vulnerabilities of its land and maritime borders due to the existence of
many citizens from areas with a high incidence of terrorist activities; signs of the creation of financial
support infrastructure for the Al-Shabaab and Aqmi terrorist groups; and porous border mainly in the north
and northeast. Angola’s TF risk was assessed from the following parameters:
• That the threat of terrorism or terrorism financing activities from indigenous Angolans is very low
to non-existent.
• That the main threat of TF has been identified to come from immigrants and settlers from
jurisdictions deemed to pose a high risk of terrorist and terrorist financing activities, such as the
Middle East countries, neighbouring countries and the horn of Africa.
3
As at 2021, around 13.7 million have access to banking constituting 39.4% of the total population
(BNA: 2021, Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk: Banking Sector).
• These individuals maintain secluded societies, which are hard to penetrate, and engage in legitimate
business in Angola.
• The secluded, secretive nature of the communities is aided by the informal and cash-based nature
of the economy; hawala systems; use of stores as fronts and dealings and use of relatives to visit
and collect funds.
• As such, these persons can utilise these loopholes and Angola’s porous borders to support terrorist
organisations or activities they are sympathetic to in foreign and in their own jurisdictions.
i) Drug Trafficking, Corruption and Embezzlement and other prevailing offenses – the 2019
NRA concluded that drug trafficking was identified as the prevailing offenses in terms of generating
proceeds for ML. Regarding drug trafficking, the organised criminal groups take advantage of Angola's
geostrategic position for the route of international drug trafficking - between Latin America, Southwest
Africa and Europe. Furthermore, the growing domestic consumption encourages the practice of drug
trafficking nationwide, generating considerable economic benefits that can be used in the practice of ML
crimes, in the country itself or in other jurisdictions. According to the 2019 NRA (as updated in 2021)
and some other open credible sources, there are ML risks identified relating to fraud, corruption relating
to large-scale government construction tenders (and Politically Exposed Persons, PEPs) and the oil
industry in general, tax offenses, human trafficking, illegal trade in diamonds, smuggling of goods and
organised crime which the assessors determined the extent to which the offences could be providing
proceeds to be laundered. The assessors also determined the extent to which the authorities are dealing
with the threats of money laundering schemes out of these predicate offenses. An example of this is the
fraudulent contracts with state oil company Sonangol and related money laundering cases.4 The assessors
further established whether the investigations, prosecutions and confiscations pursued as well as
international cooperation provided or sought in different forms were consistent with Angola’s risk profile
with greater focus on institutions such as customs and border controls.
ii) Cash Intensive Economy– Cash transactions, widely used in Angola, combined with the physical,
cross-border transportation of cash, pose ML/TF risks. In this regard, Scope of the informal economy
(including informal money transfer business) and the steps authorities were taking to bring the informal
money transfer business within the regulatory framework (including determining the extent of financial
inclusion) were also given more focus.
iii) Terrorism Financing- Angola does not appear to have a significant domestic terrorism threat.
4
The country ranked 136 out of 180 in Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index and the
Basel Institute on Governance ranks it in the top 15 riskiest countries with respect to money laundering.
However, the lack of a domestic terrorism threat does not guarantee that a jurisdiction does not experience
a terrorist financing threat, whether that is fundraising or the facilitation of terrorist financing to other
regions. Cash is a prevalent means for terrorist financiers to move funds. Angola’s cash intensive economy
and porous borders as explained above could, therefore, be abused for terrorist financing purposes. The
assessors wanted to understand the threats of terrorist activities by foreign terrorist groups in the country.
In this regard, the assessors sought to determine the sources of the threat of TF and terrorism, i.e., who
were the perpetrators and what methods did they have to raise, move, and use the funds for TF including
the “Turkish School” case. The assessors also wanted to determine whether the authorities understood the
TF risks associated with the NPO sector and whether a TF risk assessment of the sector was done and
NPOs which are vulnerable to possible TF abuse were identified and how the TF risks associated with
such NPOs were being managed. The assessors also determined the extent to which Angola implemented
targeted financial sanctions on TF. The assessors also determined the extent to which Angola implements
targeted financial sanctions on TF including on understanding of TFS measures by the relevant authorities.
iv) Targeted Financial Sanction on PF- The UN has documented how the designated entities and
individuals had generated revenue. Documented typologies include the use of front companies, bulk cash
smuggling by diplomatic officials, obfuscation of funds through currency exchanges, and generation of
revenue through overseas laborers active in infrastructure projects and the IT sector. 5 The assessors also
determined the extent to which Angola implements targeted financial sanctions on PF.
v) Beneficial Ownership – Given Angola’s economy and there are credible sources showing legal
persons were being regularly misused for ML/TF6, the assessors would want to explore to what extent the
authorities are aware of the ML/TF risks associated with beneficial ownership relating to legal persons
and the extent of availability of basic and beneficial ownership information for use by Competent
Authorities. Domestic trusts are not recognised in Angola; therefore, the assessors did not apply a lot of
focus on these. However, the assessors explored the possibility of foreign trusts, or a legal or natural
person in Angola providing services to a foreign trust or acting as a trustee for a foreign trust.
vi) The Banking Sector – Given its materiality and central role in facilitating financial flows in
Angola, as in many other countries, vulnerabilities may be exploited by criminals for ML/TF purposes.
vii) The Money and Value Transfer Service Sector (MVTS) – Based on its potential criminal
exploitation and the development of informal remittances channels, the MVTS sector remains vulnerable
to abuse for ML/TF.
viii) The Gaming Sector- it presents a High risk of facilitating the use of assets derived from criminal
activities, covering the illicit origin of funds movements outside the country or a high volume of currency
circulation and betting values.
ix) The Real Estate Sector – Given the involvement of many different actors (e.g. real estate brokers,
construction companies, etc.) and the substantial level of the estimated unregulated market, vulnerabilities
may exist that can be exploited for criminal purposes, including ML and TF.
x) Precious Stones and Metals Dealers- As for precious stones and metals, the 2021 update on the
NRA concluded that the availability and effectiveness of entry controls and effectiveness in
Supervision/Inspection activities are having high threat and vulnerability for ML, and thus categorised
as High ML risk.
The assessors determined the extent to which the Authorities understand these sectors’ exposure to ML/TF
5
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_171.pdf. See also https://www.38north.org/2021/06/north-koreas-enduring-economic-
and-security-presence-in-africa/
6
https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/224691611679762530-0090022021/original/SOEReformsinAngola.pdf
risks and whether there are any mitigating measures that might be effective in AML/CFT monitoring and
supervision. The Assessors also sought to determine the extent to which the above sectors’ supervisory
authorities apply risk-based supervision and take enforcement measures against non-compliance with
AML/CFT obligations.
39. Angola is an economy, with its anchor in oil, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, trade and
transport industries. The banking industry in Angola accounts for 90% of the total market share of the
financial sector, with the remainder in insurance companies and securities firms. Financial and insurance
activities contribute to around 5% of the country’s GDP (Bank of Angola). The Angola financial system
consists of twenty-six (26) commercial banks, among which six (6) are foreign majority-owned and
twenty (20) locally owned. The banking sector is the most significant sector with a total asset value of
USD39.59 billion as of December 2021, and makes it most vulnerable for ML/TF risks due to the large
volumes and values of transactions (some cross-border) conducted through the banking system.
40. All categories of DNFBPs as defined by the FATF except TCSPs operate in Angola, and are
subject to AML/CFT requirements and monitoring as prescribed under the AML Law 05/2021. The
DNFBP sector has a significant number of informal participants (sector) and a dominance of cash-
intensive businesses which makes it vulnerable to ML/TF risks. The real estate sector has forty (40)
registered agents, but the sector has a large number of unregistered players. Accountants (5195) and
lawyers (5327) are the largest groups among independent accounting and legal professionals. Some big
law firms represent international customers. There are 500 license holders dealing in precious stones and
precious metals. However, the sector has a large number of unregistered/unlicenced dealers. There are
fourteen (14) casinos operating in Angola. Online gaming is also permissible and there are twelve (12)
entities that carry out the activity of exploration of remote online games. TCSPs are also designated to
provide services under the Angolan law but these are not monitored and the authorities could not provide
information on whether they exist or not. VASPs are not yet regulated in Angola.
41. The key structural elements for effective AML/CFT, including political stability, accountability,
independent judiciary and rule of law are generally present in Angola. There is a high level of political
commitment to Angola’s AML/CFT regime. This was demonstrated in several instances, including the
speedy passage of legislations to address strategic deficiencies in the country’s legal regime after the 2012
mutual evaluation, the exit of the country from the FATF ICRG Review process and ESAAMLG’s
enhanced follow-up process, and the conclusion, endorsement and publication of the NRA Report in 2019
and the establishment of the National Task Force and Supervisory Committee. Angola has a capable and
independent judicial system that handle ML/TF cases. However, research undertaken by a number of
international organizations, including the World Bank, point to the lack of transparency and good
governance, and identify corruption as a pervasive problem in Angola as corruption in institutions of
government is still a major concern.
42. As part of an effort to address the deficiencies identified during its last mutual evaluation, Angola
has recently come up with new laws and amendments to existing laws. Institutional changes have been
made to bodies responsible for investigation, prosecution and an administrative asset recovery unit set.
Effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime based on the changes to the legal and institutional frameworks is
still low as the changes are too recent and ongoing.
43. Angola still faces a number of challenges in implementing a full functioning AML/CFT regime.
It has a high occurrence of predicate offences which are proceed generating crimes, a situation which is
further affected by inadequate AML/CFT supervision in most of the sectors. This has had a negative
impact on formal businesses as there is often pilferage of precious stones and metals which are smuggled
and sold extraterritorial, unlawful dealing in foreign currency and facilitation of trafficking pertaining to
different contraband (drugs, human beings, wildlife, high value timber, etc).
44. The informal sector and cash transactions still pose major difficulties for effective implementation
of AML/CFT requirements. Government’s efforts to introduce other forms of payments, like mobile
money, although acknowledged, still do not mitigate much of the ML risks as majority of the population
of Angola still remain unbanked and with no access to banks. Only about 39.4% of adult Angolans have
bank accounts, rising with a small percentage (+ - 5%) when figures of mobile money are included. The
Bank of Angola has embarked on a financial inclusion programme, which is an ongoing exercise to
provide financial services to the broader population of Angola covering from 2023 – 20277. The quick
progress of this exercise is still affected by a strong appetite to use cash by the majority of Angolans.
1.4.1. AML/CFT Strategy
45. The introduction of new laws by Angola to strengthen its legal and institutional framework on
AML/CFT, if effectively implemented can mitigate some of the identified risks. However, the lack of
clear policies and strategies which are guided by identified ML/TF risks, again with no timelines on when
such policies and strategies will be developed, seriously affects prioritisation in addressing the risks and
general effective implementation of any measures currently in place. It is envisaged that with the planning
of its AML/CFT Strategy underway, Angola will be able to address this area.
1.4.2. Legal & Institutional Framework
46. From the time of the adoption of its first MER in August 2012, Angola has been taking steps to
address the legal and institutional deficiencies identified in the report. The enactment of AML Law No
05/2020 improved the criminalisation of ML and TF offences, provides for identification and verification
of BO, widens the scope of sanctions, among other requirements. The 2018 Organic Law that establishes
the UIF of Angola provides more operational independence to the Unit, among other reforms, Law No.
13/2015 which provides for international cooperation are all laws complementing the AML Law No.
05/2020 in creating a stronger AML/CFT legal regime.
47. A number of institutions make up the AML/CFT institutional framework of Angola. At the centre
of these institutions is the Ministry of Finance and the FIU/UIF which, direct and coordinate the
AML/CFT activities. Mainly, the institutions involved in the AML/CFT implementation are ministries
and different agencies which are as follows:
7
Draft National Financial Inclusion Strategy/2023 - 2027
Ministries
a) Ministry of Finance: responsible for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and control of
the budget, administration of state assets, management of the treasury and ensuring internal and external
financial stability of the country.
b) Ministry of Justice: responsible for providing policy advice regarding the implementation of the
legislation mentioned above.
c) Attorney General: responsible for ordering and leading investigations into ML and TF cases.
d) Ministry of Foreign Affairs: responsible for mutual legal assistance issues, international
cooperation, treaty arrangements, and receiving UNSCRs. It facilitates processing of in-bound and
outgoing requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition. It is the custodian of all international
conventions to which Angola is a party.
e) Ministry of Interior: responsible for internal security matters (the National Police) and
specialized police agencies for financial crimes and terrorism. It also administers the Intelligence Services,
Criminal justice and operational agencies.
f) The National Task Force for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism
– the national coordination and cooperation body comprising almost all stakeholders in public sectors
relevant for implementation of AML/CFT matters.
i) Angola National Police (ANP) – Is responsible for public order, protection of people and
property, providing emergency services and national security.
j) Law enforcement agencies including police and other relevant investigative bodies: The
designated law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating ML and FT are: a) the National
Directorate for Preventing and Combating Corruption (DNPCC) within the PGR and b) the SIC (Criminal
Investigations Service) which is a department of the National Police and formed in terms of Law No.
179/2019. The SIC has specialised units which deal with forensics, ballistics, drugs and diamond
investigations, crime analysis and international police cooperation. It regularly participates in strategic
operations involving INTERPOL global initiatives in fighting transnational organised crime. The DNPCC
is the primary investigative unit for ML and corruption-related cases in the PGR. SIC has a power to
investigate ML/TF and associated predicate offences and refer such cases to the PGR for further
instructions. PGR makes an assessment of the case and if there are elements of ML, it refers the case to
DNPCC for investigations. Other bodies, such as the UIF, AGT (General Tax Administration), the
Migration and Foreigners Services (SME), National and External Intelligence Services can provide
information to the investigative authorities.
l) National and External Intelligence and Security Services (SINSE and SIE)– the two agencies
are responsible for intelligence operations in defence and protection of the State. They provide counter
measures on threats to the government and share intelligence information with other agencies of the State,
including with the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Interior, and the office of the Attorney General and UIF.
The two agencies have powers under their respective laws and directives to identify, provide surveillance
and detect ML/TF and other criminal activities.
DNFBPs
q) Gaming Supervision Institute (ISJ)- is responsible for regulating the gaming industry, including
casinos for AML/CFT purposes.
r) Bar Association of Angola (OAA): is responsible for the regulation and supervision of lawyers
for AML/CFT purposes.
s) Accountants Association (OCPCA): is responsible respectively for the regulation and
supervision of accountants for AML/CFT purposes.
t) Notaries: They are public officials integrated in the Ministry of Justice and subject to Law 5/20,
of January 27th in the performance of their public functions.
8
In Portuguese, ‘Serviço Nacional de Recuperação de Activos’.
u) National Housing Institute (INH): Oversight of real estate agents for AML/CFT purposes is
carried out by the National Housing Institute (INH).
v) National Directorate of Mines (Autoridade Nacional de Inspecção Económica e Segurança
Alimentar-ANIESA): Regulates dealers in precious metals and stones for AML/CFT purposes.
w) Financial Information Unit (UIF)- Under Law No. 5/2022, UIF is responsible for supervising
entities without designated AML/CFT supervisory authorities. The Assessment Team found that Trust
and company service providers do not have a designated authorities and therefore the UIF should be the
AML/CFT supervisory authority though the Unit has not carried out any AML/CFT supervision activities
during onsite.
49. The Banking Sector, with a total asset base of USD 39.59 billion, constitutes 5 % of GDP and
is the largest sub-sector of the financial sector and is weighted as being the most important in the context
of Angola, based on its materiality and risk. It consists of 26 banks which are predominantly local majority
controlled. The banking sector is heterogeneous. There is a mixture of public sector owned banks, and
private banks that have foreign and domestic shareholdings. Ownership of private banks appears to be
narrowly distributed among companies and individuals. Salient features of the system include a high
degree of concentration with the three largest banks accounting for around 56 percent of assets, though
there are a large number of smaller banks.9 From 2006 to 2022, the number of commercial banks increased
from 16 to 26, with total banking assets expanding from $10 billion to $39.59 billion. In particular, the
system grew rapidly during the oil boom prior to the global financial crisis, with yearly average asset
growth of over 66 percent. Although most banks are still concentrated in Luanda, some have expanded
rapidly in the provinces. Angolan banks have also expanded overseas with operations in Portugal, Brazil,
Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Namibia and South Africa. Despite the rapid development of the
banking sector, informality remains predominant in the economy and has resulted in the predominance of
cash for the majority of financial transactions. The penetration of the sector in the population is still low
as only about 39.4 percent of the population had a bank account at end-2021.
50. The insurance sector: Almost all insurance companies are licensed to operate life and non-life
businesses. The insurance market consists of 22 players offers 21 life and non-life insurance products and
1 non-life only. There are also 110 insurance brokers and agents and thirty-six (36) pensions fund
management companies. In terms of the size, the general insurance companies dominate the market,
controlling about 95% of the market distantly followed by life insurance which manages a negligible share
(2 to 4%), with Workmen's Accident and Occupational Disease Insurance reaching a total of premiums
amounting 115.586 billion Kwanzas (USD 269.8 Million) in 2020. With regard to the life insurance, the
premiums collected reached around 5,154 billion kwanzas (USD 12.02 Million) in 2020. As for the
Pension Funds, the value of assets in 2019 stood at around 223.92 million Kwanzas (USD 0.5 million).
9
The top five banks include three public sector ones and two private local banks—with sizeable local participation.
51. (a) Foreign Exchange Bureaus, MVTS and Micro Credit Companies – The FOREX and
MVTS in Angola in 2021 consisted of 53 exchange houses, of which 41 had their corporate purpose
extended to provide services for remittances of values, 15 companies providing payment services, 21
Microcredit Companies and 1 Credit Union. Their assets increased by around 23% in 2021, from AOA
24,181.27 million in 2020 to AOA 29,658.18 million in 2021. This increase was mainly associated with
microcredit companies that benefited from the loan granted by the Angolan Risk Capital Active Fund
(FACRA). Exchange offices accounted for the largest share in the sector in 2018 and 2019 (about 52%).
In 2020 and 2021, compared to the institutions that reported, their weight was only 28% and 23%,
respectively. As a result, in 2020 and 2021 the Microcredit Companies represented 64% and 74% of the
sector, respectively, registering an increase of 41%. Remittance Companies represented only 3% in 2021,
reducing their volume by 40%, compared to 2020. In terms of sector and taking into account the
institutions that reported, there was a 23% increase in refers to total Assets.
(b) Securities Market - The securities market in Angola has mainly 13 (thirteen) Investment
companies (Investment Entities and Collective Investment Schemes management companies) and 23
(twenty-three) Stockbrokers (Banks acting as Financial Intermediaries and Broker/dealers companies).
The sector is very small, underdeveloped and contributes about 5% of the financial sector assets.
(c) VASPs: Angola does not have a legal framework in place to supervise VASPs. As such, the extent
of operation of VASPs in Angola is not known.
10
The Angolan NRA dated September 2021 has defined the non-banking financial sector (Exchange bureaus,
Payment Service Providers MVTS, Microcredit companies and Credit Cooperative as Medium-high risk.
11
Collective Investment Schemes Management Companies
52. Overview of the DNFBP Sector: The Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
(DNFBPs) which operate in Angola are casinos, dealers in precious stones and metals, real estate agents,
lawyers, accountants and car dealers, and are subject to AML/CFT supervision and monitoring as
prescribed under the Law No.5/2020. They are licensed or registered by their respective supervisory
authorities. Where there is no direct supervisory authority for a particular sector, this would automatically
fall under the supervision of UIF, until such time that a supervisor has been appointed. However, despite
the AML Law No 5/2020 providing for TCSPs, the authorities were not clear on whether these were in
existence in Angola or not.
a) Casinos and Gaming activities: These are licenced by the ISJ. The ISJ is the AML/CFT
supervisor for both casinos and gaming activities. The sector comprises fourteen (14) casinos, twelve (12)
online games and four (4) sport betting operators. The authorities generally consider casinos as vulnerable
to abuse by criminals.
b) Dealers in Precious Metals and Precious Stones: are regulated by the ANIESA. There are 500
licensed dealers in precious stones and metals. While the authorities informed the assessors of many
instances of illegal dealing in precious stones and precious metals, in its extraction and trading, they also
alluded to the fact that the sector is highly cash intensive, making it highly vulnerable to ML/TF risks14.
c) Legal Practitioners - The legal profession consists of admitted attorneys, notaries, persons
authorised to provide legal advice and lawyers. It is supervised by the Bar Association of Angola (OAA)
and comprises of 5001 licensed lawyers and 326 law firms. Under the AML law, lawyers are designated
as reporting institutions for AML/CFT purposes and engage in business activities (e.g. real estate and
company formation, etc) falling under the scope of the activities subject to AML/CFT obligations under
the FATF Standards. There are only public notaries in Angola.
d) Real Estate Sector- The real estate agents are licenced and supervised for AML/CFT compliance
by the INH. There are 53 registered real estate agents. The sector is considered high risk mainly due to
high participation of unregistered players and its cash intensity nature which provides high levels of
informality.
e) Accountants- Fall under the oversight role of the Organisation of Auditors and Accountants in
Angola, which is a self-regulatory body (SRB). However, membership is not compulsory. There are 5195
accountants and accounting firms with partnerships operating in the private sector.
12
Stock Brokers
13
There is no specific life insurance companies. There are 20 composite companies and 2 general insurance
companies.
14
The Authorities indicated that they carried out what is known as “operação resgate “with the aim of putting an end
to the illicit exploitation of diamonds and reorganising the sector.
f) Trusts and Company Services Providers (TCSPs) – Public sources of information indicate that
there are other company service providers existing in Angola other than lawyers and accountants.15
15
Healy Consultants Group PLC which operates as a CSP in Angola
16
Numbers unknown
17
Unknown during onsite
specified in the FATF Standards for FIs and DNFBPs except for VASPs. The preventive measures
provided include but not limited to obligations of reporting entities to undertake risk assessment, CDD,
STR reporting obligations, tipping off and record retention.
54. The BNA has issued guidelines on the prevention and suppression of ML/TF to the financial
sector under its purview, to assist the sector with the implementation of preventive measures. Another set
of guidelines, establish rules and procedures to be complied with in foreign exchange operations. The
ARSEG, in order to assist insurance companies with the implementation of preventive and control
measures mitigating their risk exposure to involvement in criminal activities, has also issued guidelines
to the sector. At the time of the on-site visit, no AML/CFT guidelines had been issued to the DNFBPs
sector apart from gaming sector.
55. Review of the AML/CFT laws and regulations shows that generally, they are in line with the
requirements of the AML/CFT international standards save to say that there remain some technical
deficiencies (see Recs 9 – 23).
56. The scope of AML/CFT legal framework in relation to FIs and DNFBPs that exist in Angola are
as per the ones designated under the FATF Glossary. In addition, the AML/CFT law covers vendors and
motor vehicle dealers and NPOs under the category of DNFBPs as reporting persons, and these are outside
the scope of the FATF Standards. However, the designation of vendors and motor vehicle dealers as
reporting entities was not based on a comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment.
18
A template table was provided to the authorities to insert the information requested but it was never completed and
had to be eventually deleted.
19
Assessors should describe the supervisory arrangements in place for financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs.
stage in terms of effectively supervising the FIs and all DNFBPs for AML/CFT purposes. Both FIs and
DNFBP supervisors have powers to issue sanctions under the AML Law. VASPs are not regulated, hence
there is no supervision.
Key findings
a) Angola demonstrated a fair understanding of its ML risks, in the regulated sectors and as
relating to crimes which generate high proceeds for laundering (such as corruption and
embezzlement). While authorities seem to understand and identify frequently committed serious
crimes across most competent authorities (based on the NRA and different sectoral risk
assessments), the understanding is more limited with regards to crimes being potential proceed
generating for ML given the very high percentage of the population that is without access to financial
services, and the estimated very high volumes of transactions taking place in cash, unrecorded and
untraceable.
b) The understanding of TF risk varied across the different stakeholders. Angola’s intelligence
services and UIF demonstrated a good understanding of Angola’s TF risks. Other authorities had
a varied understanding of Angola’s TF risks. Moreover, there is low level of understanding on
emerging ML/TF high risk areas including conducting risk assessments in relation to informal
economy, legal persons, mobile money operators, cross-border currency transportation and
NPOs since no proper risk assessment was undertaken on these areas.
c) Though Angola has identified its ML/TF risks and the authorities have introduced measures to
strengthen most of the country’s AML/CFT legal and institutional needs, the country has not developed
risk informed AML/CFT national policies and dedicated strategies to address identified ML/TF risks. As
a result, the priorities, objectives and activities of competent authorities are not aligned with the identified
ML/TF risks.
d) In terms of AML/CFT related activities, Angola set a number of AML/CFT entities – such as the
National Task Force and the Supervision Committee (to promote initiation of policies), and the SIC (a
special investigative LEA to investigate ML, TF and other crimes). Angola also set up an asset forfeiture
unit within the PGR. All these measures are recent and their impact in effectively addressing identified
ML/TF risks - in terms of both at policy and operational level - is yet to be produced.
e) The other areas of coordination and cooperation including on PF between LEAs, and between the
AML/CFT supervisors are not effective as they have not yet coordinated any activities together in their
own sectors.
f) Financial Institutions, DNFBPs and other relevant sectors under the AML/CFT regime of Angola are
fairly aware of the results of the ML risk assessment. However, their level of awareness on TF is still at
embryonic stage.
Recommended Actions
Angola should:
a) Take necessary steps to collect information necessary to assess and understand the ML/TF
scale/magnitude through review of the NRA or any other risk assessment process including risks
from VASPs, legal persons and arrangements and NPOs.
b) Develop a risk informed AML/CFT Strategy and Policy and ensure that competent authorities align
their priorities, objectives, and actions to address the identified ML/TF risks particularly in relation
to (i) application of RBS, (ii) investigation and prosecution of complex predicate offences and ML
cases and (iii) TF.
c) Put in place coordination and collaboration mechanisms/structures for supervision, PF and TF
priorities and activities at operational level.
d) Allocate adequate resources (human, financial and technical) to competent authorities informed by
the ML/TF risks identified and the objectives of the AML/CFT Strategy.
e) Introduce a coordinated and systematic process for collection and maintenance of statistics on
ML/TF activities (e.g., ML/TF investigations, prosecutions, convictions) to be used for the
identification and updating of ML/TF risks and help review the effectiveness of measures in place.
f) Enhance an understanding and awareness of emerging TF risks and intelligence gaps, and take
appropriate action both for the public and private sectors at a national level through targeted
stakeholder engagements centred on the results of the ML/TF risk assessments. Awareness on ML
risk by the DNFBPs should also be enhanced.
g) Encourage financial inclusion as a strategy to reduce ML/TF risks in the informal sector, including
through the use of simplified customer due diligence measures for financial inclusion products that
are exposed to low ML/TF risk as informed by adequate risk assessments.
63. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.1. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.1, 2, 33 and 34,
and elements of R.15.
2.2. Immediate Outcome 1 (Risk, Policy and Coordination)
66. Competent authorities (in particular the UIF, LEAs, PGR, some of the FIs and DNFBPs
supervisors), generally agreed with the NRA conclusions as far as the main proceeds-generating crimes
posing ML threat and the vulnerabilities of the sectors are concerned. There is a shared agreement amongst
competent authorities that embezzlement, corruption, trafficking (in persons, drugs, wildlife), smuggling
of precious minerals and tax evasion are the most frequently committed offences domestically. Given
their nature, authorities recognize that these crimes would also be the highest proceeds generating offences
aiding the commission of ML. Angola shared with the AT examples of abuse of power and public
procurement by a few highly politically connected individuals who unlawfully benefitted from public
funds and acquired significant properties which were laundered within and outside of Angola.
67. The BNA (the AML/CFT supervisor for the banking and other financial sectors), SIC, UIF and
PGR largely agree on the fact that illicit proceeds are being laundered through banks, real estate, second
hand motor vehicle dealers, foreign currency exchange, and casinos though the authorities did not use
tangible sources based on factual information to substantiate on these crimes than corruption and
embezzlement. However, there has been no proper ML/TF risk assessment undertaken on legal persons,
NPOs, VASPs and company service providers (CSPs). Therefore, the ML/TF risks associated to the
misuse of legal persons or arrangements and the sectors are not comprehensively understood. The
understanding of the ML risks is also exacerbated by the high levels of informality as most transactions
are carried out in cash and are not recorded. The understanding of these risks by the authorities could not
be fully assessed as there has not been a clear process of identifying the risks as well as the extent of
proceeds generated.
68. TF risk understanding varies across the different stakeholders with competent authorities
having TF-specific mandate such as SINSE, SIC and the UIF demonstrating a high-level of TF risk
understanding. The agencies shared with the AT examples of when they engage in TF and TF-related
activities which demonstrated a good understanding of TF risks taking place in Angola. This
understanding is largely as a result of information sharing between the intelligence services and the LEAs
including the UIF in relation to TF threats emanating from internal and foreign sources. Overall, Angola
has determined TF as Medium Low. There is no information evidencing similar mechanisms for sharing
of TF threats between these agencies and the rest of the agencies such as supervisors, NPO regulators and
AGT Customs which has led to their respective underdeveloped understanding of TF in Angola and
specially their sectors.
69. The intelligence services work with UIF and other relevant authorities to share information on
potentially high risk persons and TF typologies outside of Angola, but this is not done as part of an
established CFT strategy which limits its potential effectiveness. The authorities were of the view that TF
risk is low but the competent authorities could not demonstrate the basis for this view considering that
their understanding of TF risks was varied (see also IO 9).
70. Overall, the Authorities appreciates the vulnerability created by the lack of adequate resources
across competent authorities for generating large amount of unlawful proceeds and ML as evidenced in
the number of cases being investigated or prosecuted from which assets have either been restrained or
confiscated through successful prosecution. One such concern is the delay in successfully investigating
and prosecuting complex cases of prominent persons due to the need for specialised skills such as forensics
and asset tracing. There is sufficient evidence of exploitation of the weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems
owing to resources constraints; however, Angola has recently improved resources allocation to key
agencies which has evidenced successful investigations/prosecutions and asset recovery involving
complex cases often with significant property laundered outside of Angola.
VA/VASP
71. VA and VASPs are unregulated in Angola. The ML/TF risks associated with VA and VASPs
have not been assessed and are therefore not understood. A Committee was established in May 2022 to
conduct a study on the situation of VAs and VASPs in Angola. However, the study was not completed
during the onsite visit.
20
Art. 13 of Law No. 5/2020
(EDD) requirements when dealing with clients which pose inherent higher risk and apply mitigating
controls. The AML Law further identifies business transactions which pose inherent higher risk
(transactions carried out by PEPs, correspondent banking, cross-border wire transfers, etc) where the FIs
and DNFBPs have to apply EDD. In practice, application of the SDD and EDD measures differed between
FIs and DNFBPs with the former being more developed in following risk differentiated CDD measures
to customers, products/services, delivery channels and geographical risks. At the time of the onsite visit,
the financial sector supervisors had just started applying RBA to monitor compliance and apply
proportionate enforcement measures to ensure compliance. No AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs was
applied at the time of the onsite visit.
2.2.4. Objectives and activities of competent authorities
78. Angola has not demonstrated that the priorities, objectives and activities of its competent
authorities have been developed and implemented consistent with national legislations and policies
in place in the absence of AML/CFT policy/strategy as at the time of the onsite visit. As a result,
Angola could not demonstrate that allocation of resources to combat ML/TF is informed by
priorities, objectives and actions consistent with the identified ML/TF risks. Where competent
authorities produced strategies or explained their priorities, there was varied demonstration of desired
outcomes being pursued and achieved since there is no sufficient information to determine the
implementation efforts i of key AML/CFT agencies were aligned with ML/TF risks and national policies
present.
79. While some ML cases have been identified, the PGR and the LEAs have been more focused on
predicate than ML or TF offences (See IO.7). Angola has not demonstrated that its competent authorities
have set strategic goals which prioritises risk-bases approach to combatting of ML/TF by supervisors and
LEAs. The SIC had just been recently created and most of its work was still in its infancy and has not
demonstrated that it has priorities, objectives and activities informed by the identified ML/TF risks in the
NRA. From discussions with it and case examples described, there were indications that it still needs
capacity building in identifying both ML and TF cases, and where necessary to carry out parallel financial
investigations. While the UIF indicated that it pays special attention to certain predicate crimes deemed
high-risk, these are only partially aligned with Angola’s risk profile. Although the UIF, in its analysis of
transaction reports, gives priority to those that involve embezzlement, its disclosures related to other
prevailing offenses based on the ML/TF risk profile of the jurisdiction are few (See IO6). The impression
created by all relevant authorities was that there was still low appreciation of a high possibility of TF
happening in Angola but not being reported as such or investigated.
80. Supervisory authorities do not have clear set objectives on the approach to RBA to
AML/CFT supervision aligned with the identified ML/TF risks. Financial sector supervisors are at
early stages of applying RBA to AML/CFT supervision. By contrast, DNFBP supervisors are yet to
appreciate their roles for which the effectiveness of applying, priorities, objectives or activities could be
assessed by the AT.
depending on the expertise required during the discussion. The members to NTF are appointed by the
head of their own institutions.
82. The NTF has been successful to a large extent with completion of the NRA and legislative reviews
while it has been successful to some extent at it neared completion of an AML/CFT policy/strategy for
approval by the Committee. The drawbacks for Angola are the absence of AML/CFT strategy/policy or
similar documents which has been developed and implemented against ML/TF/PF and the recent nature
of the key AML/CFT changes both legislative and institutional levels.
83. Competent authorities in Angola have been successful to a large extent to promote cooperation
and collaboration with each other through MoUs at bilateral and multi-agency levels. For instance, the
UIF entered into MoUs with other competent authorities such as the AGT, BNA, SIC, AG’s Office, with
which it shares information through its goAML Platform. UIF has found this to be an effective means of
sharing information with other stakeholders. In addition, the UIF and BNA meet regularly to discuss
AML/CFT strategies and issues raised by FIs.
84. Interagency coordination of LEAs at operational level did not come out as a strong factor used by
the different agencies to fight ML/TF crimes. SIC which is mandated by the law to form multi-agency
teams to investigate major crimes, including ML, did not demonstrate that it was effectively using this
power and no specific cases were provided where this authority had been successfully used. The
cooperation and coordination among SIC, SINSE, SIE and PGR relating to financial intelligence on
ML/TF disseminated by the UIF was not clearly explained. There was often conflicting information
provided relating to the distribution of the reports by the PGR (which receives the reports from UIF) and
the relevant LEAs investigating the cases (see IOs 6 & 8). Generally, there is no effective coordination
of such reports between PGR and other LEAs which carry out investigations and report to it. The only
cooperation which was demonstrated relates to manning of entry and exit points, mostly at major airports
where SIC, AGT, Postal Services, and SME together to fight entry of contraband.
85. Supervisors of FIs and DNFBPs have not yet developed and implemented mechanisms for
cooperation and collaboration on AML/CFT supervision matters at policy and operational levels, except
for the BNA and UIF which meet frequently to exchange information pertaining to FIs. No similar,
mechanisms were place with ARSEG, CMC and other DNFBP AML/CFT supervisors. Given the fact
that DNFBP supervisors have not yet started conducting AML/CFT supervision, Angola should have
prioritised use of coordination structures such as the NTF to drive DNFBP supervision in the country.
86. There is inadequate Coordination on CPF related activities. The National Task Force is the main
coordinating body on CPF. However, coordination among authorities on PF is still at its early stage and
is lacking a more holistic approach.
88. Angola ‘s understanding of ML/TF risks is based on the 2019 NRA. Angola has not come up
with any risk informed AML/CFT policies or strategies but has introduced institutional changes,
including to deal with ML. However, given the recent nature of these changes, it has not yet produced
any positive and tangible impact, which does not allow to assess the effectiveness of the set-up in
place. Considerations has also been given to the limitations resulting from the lack of resources and
training that will enable the proper implementation of the laws and efficient functioning of the new
structures in fighting ML/TF based on the risk profile of the jurisdiction. The inadequacy of effective
interagency cooperation and coordination between supervisory authorities, LEAs and other
stakeholders in the fight against ML and TF as well as PF both at policy and operational level is also
weighted as an important shortcoming. The priorities, objectives and activities of competent
authorities are not aligned to the identified risks owing to the lack of AML/CFT policy/strategy. The
Authorities have taken significant steps to share the results of the NRA and the SARs with the private
sector which demonstrated to large extent awareness of ML risks except for DNFBPs which yet to be
supervised for AML/CFT compliance. The level of awareness on TF risk by the private sector is at
embryonic stage. There is coordination and collaboration of PF, though at early stages of setting up
its activities.
89. Angola has achieved a Low level of effectiveness for Immediate Outcome 1.
Key Findings
Immediate Outcome 6
a) The UIF produced good financial intelligence and other information which the LEAs are satisfied
with as the disseminations which supported efforts to identify persons of interest in the form of key
individuals, companies, banking accounts, flow of suspected funds, and links of subjects resulting in
successful investigations of predicate offences and ML as well as identifying potential TF cases. UIF
uses different sources of information to enrich analysis of STRs/other reports and shares the results
thereof to LEAs, though there are concerns about the overwhelming reports coming from banks as
other reporting entities have either reported limited or have not filed reports.
b) The UIF has been successful to some extent to use multi-task force mechanism for coordinating and
cooperating with domestic agencies and foreign FIUs which has resulted in investigations and
prosecutions of predicate offences specially corruption and ML and TF cases as well asset recovery.
c) LEAs especially PGR and SIC, regularly use financial intelligence and other information to
investigate major proceeds-generating crimes such as corruption to a large extent and have also been
used proactively investigate ML and TF. All this appears consistent with the risk profile of the
country.
d) The UIF responds to most of the requests made by LEAs as well as making spontaneous disclosures
to LEAs from the results of its analysis from the different statutory reports received. This is
demonstrated by 94 cases investigated by LEAs which have resulted in 24 ML concluded cases. To
some extent, the PGR, working closely with SIC, has demonstrated that it has successfully instituted
freezing and confiscation of assets with the UIF contributing the most through the lawful suspension
of bank accounts for confirmation by PGR.
e) The LEAs could not demonstrate the usefulness of studies conducted by the UIF for purposes of
pursuing identification of ML and TF cases for investigation.
f) The UIF requires sufficient resources to pursue fully its core mandate and ensure the security and
confidentiality of the information held by it, though it has human resources and uses goAML platform
for the receipt and analysis of reports for which financial intelligence was produced and used by
LEAs.
g) UIF successfully responds to requests for information from LEAs and makes proactive
disseminations to LEAs whenever it suspects commission of a crime. UIF’s disseminations (either
upon request or spontaneously) led to successful prosecution of about 10 ML cases, referrals to PGR
and intelligence services of suspected TF transactions. It also enables the successful recovery of assets
by PGR.
h) UIF uses to a large extent its powers to freeze suspected transactions at banks and obtain additional
information from reporting entities which has assisted its conduct of analysis relevant for
identification of cases and proceeds of crime.
i) UIF and LEAs (SIC, SINSE, SIE) participated in ad-hoc task forces relating to investigations and
prosecution of serious crimes, which led to successful convictions of some predicate offences and
ML.
Immediate Outcome 7
j) Art.88 of Law 5/20 has stipulated different categories of assets that apply to the different elements
of money laundering. This may pose a challenge in the prosecution of ML cases in situations where
a specific conduct does not correspond with the categories of assets that have been laundered.
k) Angola has demonstrated limited capacity to identify and investigate potential ML cases. As a result,
Angola has investigated 94 ML cases, the majority of which relate to corrupt practices and one case
relates to environmental crimes. The authorities have not investigated ML in relation to other high-
risk predicate offences such as drug trafficking, human trafficking and fuel theft.
l) SIC and PGR are able to investigate ML cases referred by SENRA from its property tracing
investigations. While this is good for enhancing the use of parallel financial investigations, Angola
has not employed parallel financial investigations consistently in order to increase the number of
ML cases that are pursued across the different high proceed-generating offences.
m) The authorities have not demonstrated the ability to identify the different types of ML from the 10
concluded ML cases. As a result, Angola would not be able to apply a RBA and prioritise the
identification, investigation and prosecution of high-risk types of ML. LEAs lack the capacity to
identify, investigate and prosecute ML cases due to lack of material resources such as special tool
kits to investigate complex ML cases; and insufficient number of investigative and prosecution
officers trained on ML.
n) To some extent, the investigation of predicate offences and ML is coordinated among LEAs such as
SIC, PGR and the UIF.
o) Angola does not prioritise the investigation and prosecution of ML offences. This has led to the low
level of prosecution of ML cases (10) in comparison to the number of corrupt-related cases (3224)
and other high-risk predicate offences investigated in the period under review.
p) There is no demonstration that Angolan courts consistently impose effective, proportional and
dissuasive imprisonment sentences for ML convictions in relation to natural persons. Nevertheless,
the courts order convicts to pay compensation to the State for the damage occasioned by the criminal
activities they are convicted of.
q) The authorities do not pursue legal persons that are misused for ML offences, even though some of
the ML cases that the Angolan authorities have investigated involved the misuse of legal persons.
As a result, Angola has not yet sanctioned any legal person for ML or any predicate offence.
r) The authorities do not have alternative measures that they use in situations where they cannot
prosecute ML cases.
s) Angolan law does not allow the inference of intent and knowledge from objective factual
circumstances.
Immediate Outcome 8
t) Angola introduced the Voluntary Surrender of Asset Mechanism (VSOAM) in 2018 to expedite
recovery of funds mostly embezzled from the public funds through corrupt practices. The
mechanism’s operationalisation came into effect in 2019. Within just two years of implementing
VSOAM, the Angolan government has recovered significant proceeds from corruption related
offences (in particular from embezzlement), which is the highest proceeds-generating offence. The
VSOAM serves similar objectives to confiscation and fits the definition of confiscation according
to the FATF Glossary.
u) The authorities demonstrated to some extent that they pursue the confiscation of proceeds of
corruption related offences, as a policy objective. However, there was no demonstration of a similar
policy objective in terms of proceeds of other high risk proceeds-generating predicate offences,
instrumentalities of crime, property of corresponding value, and assets related to other offences
including TF.
v) Officers in SENRA, the specialised agency for asset recovery, are well trained to handle asset
recovery work. However, SENRA lacks adequate human (trained) and other resources in order to
achieve its national mandate.
w) LEAs have limited capacity to conduct financial investigations. This inhibits their ability to identify
assets that represent proceeds of predicate offences during the investigations stage.
x) The authorities are not pursuing the confiscation and restitution of assets that are seized or frozen
abroad. This is due to delays that are experienced in the conclusion of investigations and prosecution
of ML cases in Angola, to which the assets relate. This challenge has resulted in low number of
restitutions of assets laundered and domiciled in foreign jurisdictions.
y) AGT does not pursue confiscation of falsely/non-declared cross-border movement of currency and
BNIs. This leaves travellers who falsely declare currency inadequately sanctioned.
Recommended Actions
Immediate Outcome 6
Angola should:
a) Continue to provide resources to UIF especially budget for expanding the office space, training of staff
and refining ICT systems necessary for analysis and security of information. In addition, increase
resources including training of SIC, PGR and AGT to better use UIF information.
b) Implement feedback and guidance/outreach mechanisms to improve diversity and quality of STRs filed
by high risk NBFIs and DNFBPs.
c) LEAs, particularly SIC, should increase requests for information from the UIF to pursue ML cases.
d) Strengthen feedback mechanisms between UIF and LEAs on disseminations made to initiate or support
LEA’s pursuit of investigations and prosecution ML/TF cases and as asset recovery.
e) Develop the in-depth strategic analysis of UIF’s reports to support LEA’s operational needs.
Immediate Outcome 7
Angola should:
f) Amend its legal framework in line with the requirements of Recommendation 3 in respect of threshold
of predicate offences; the inference of the mental element and the range of assets that are subject to
ML.
g) Enhance the awareness and capacity for all LEAs, as needed, to prioritise and conduct parallel financial
investigations to enable them to detect ML elements in all predicate case investigations.
h) Ensure that all LEAs are adequately resourced with investigative tools kits that would assist them to
investigate complex ML cases.
i) Enhance the pursuit of investigation and prosecution of ML beyond corruption-related ML by focusing
on ML from other high and medium risk proceeds-generating offences. The authorities should use the
results of the NRA to develop policies and manuals to guide LEAs in the investigation and prosecution
of ML from all high and medium-high risk proceed generating predicate offences.
j) Develop a mechanism for maintaining comprehensive statistics, which they can use to track the
effectiveness of the country’s ML investigations and prosecutions in line with the country’s ML risk
profile.
k) Develop a coordination mechanism to enable the LEAs to efficiently identify ML cases and refer such
cases to the relevant ML investigative agency.
l) Train and raise awareness among LEAs on the different types of ML (third party, self-laundering and
stand-alone laundering) to enable them to pursue all types of ML cases according to the risks that they
present.
m) Ensure that competent authorities investigate, prosecute and adequately sanction convicted legal
persons, in ML cases.
n) Ensure there is consistent application of effective, proportional and dissuasive imprisonment sanctions
against natural persons that are convicted of ML.
o) Consider establishing other criminal justice measures for the authorities to implement when it is not
possible to secure an ML conviction.
Immediate Outcome 8
p) All LEAs should pursue the confiscation of proceeds of crime, instrumentalities of crime and property
of corresponding value as a policy objective using all the tools at their disposal, such as, Conviction
and Non-conviction-based confiscations and the VSOAM. The authorities may achieve this, for
instance, by establishing SOPs or internal policies to identify, freeze or seize property; and a
mechanism requiring all LEAs to collaborate with SENRA at the beginning of financial crime
investigations; and embedding the NRA findings in such SOPs).
q) Angola should ensure that SENRA and all LEAs are adequately resourced and receive training on
financial investigations, asset-tracing and confiscation so that they can better support SENRA in its
asset recovery work.
r) LEAs should implement a broad range of asset recovery mechanisms that go beyond the VSOAM,
such as conviction-based and non-conviction-based forfeitures in order to recover assets in cases
where a defendant does not voluntarily disclose or surrender assets.
s) Pursue confiscation of assets located abroad; and prioritise the investigation and prosecution of cases
that relate to assets that are frozen and seized abroad, whose confiscation and restitution depends on
the conclusion and outcome of these court processes in Angola.
t) Ensure that falsely/undeclared currency and BNIs are confiscated as an effective, proportional and
dissuasive sanction.
90. The relevant Immediate Outcomes considered and assessed in this chapter are IO.6-8. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.1, R. 3, R.4 and
R.29-32 and elements of R.2, 8, 9, 15, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39 and 40.
Background
91. Angola has an administrative type of Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), known as “Unidade de
Informação Financeira” (UIF). The UIF has established capacity for receipt and analysis of transactions
reports such as suspicious transactions reports (STRs) and dissemination of financial intelligence and other
information to identify potential investigations of ML, TF and associated predicate offences. The UIF has
embarked on a one-year staff recruitment process in December 2021 for completion in December 2022
which has contributed significantly to improving the analytical capability of the UIF. The UIF receives
reasonable budget for building capacity including funding for ICT relevant for its core mandate.
92. The UIF is a member of the Egmont Group of UIFs (Egmont Group) since June 3, 2014, and
therefore has a wide network of UIFs with which to exchange of information. Further, the UIF also has
signed thirty (30) MOUs with other UIFs in different regions, with the ESAAMLG region being dominant
during the period under review. The UIF has its own premises, with adequate physical access control,
scanners, biometric access, and cameras necessary to ensure protection of the information of the UIF. The
UIF has goAML software system since 2020 which has significantly improved its analytical capability. As
at the time of the onsite mission, the dissemination of financial intelligence products was done manually,
and there has been no instances of breach of confidentiality of the information shared with LEAs. The UIF
is in the process of registering LEAs as stakeholders, a process that is expected to facilitate exchange of
information through the secure system.
93. The Angolan law enforcement authorities21 especially the SIC and PGR use financial
intelligence for predicate offences to a large extent while ML and TF are done to some extent (See
IO.7 and IO.9 for details). The PGR is to some extent using financial intelligence for tracing and
restraining criminal assets from spontaneous and reactive disclosures from the UIF (See IO.8 for
details). The UIF has disseminated financial intelligence and other information spontaneously and
upon request for use by domestic LEAs in fulfilling their respective mandates. The bulk of the
financial intelligence relates to embezzlement and corruption, fraud, and criminal association and
other predicate offences which are to a large extent consistent with the risk profile of Angola (Chp.2
for details). The usefulness of the financial intelligence from the UIF for financial investigations by LEAs
could be traced to investigations conducted, prosecutions made, and criminal asset recoveries as can be
21
SIC, PGR, SINSE, SIE
seen from the cases cited herein. The UIF endeavours to focus on identifying proceeds from transactions
conducted by high-risk situations involving PEPs, criminal individuals and entities, and pursuit of recovery
of unlawfully obtained assets.
94. The UIF has been successful in using the information it obtains through access to public and private
databases, for improving the quality of financial intelligence and other information shared for use by LEAs
in pursuit of major proceeds, ML and TF. These include requests for additional information from reporting
entities including financial records of entities and individuals, LEAs and foreign UIFs at for which the
results of the analysis are shared with relevant LEAs. The usefulness of the UIF disseminations lie in their
contributions to ML/TF investigations in that the information comprises persons of interest in the form of
key individuals, companies, banking accounts, flow of suspected funds, beneficial ownership, and links of
subjects. The table below indicates that while predicate offences, particularly high-risk ones such as
corruption, dominate the use of financial intelligence only about one-third is for ML
95. The information comprises persons of interest in the form of key individuals, companies, banking
account, flow of suspected funds, beneficial ownership, and links of subjects. Moreover, the UIF alerted
SENRA of one (1) case cases that lead to recovery of assets, while five (5) were reported to SENRA by
other LEAs under the VSOAM regime, See IO7 -8 for more details The table below indicates that while
predicate offences dominate the use of financial intelligence, one-third relates ML.
Table 6.2- UIF Spontaneous Disclosures per crime type, (2018 –July 2022)
Percentage of Total crimes
Crime Type Number of crimes disseminated
disseminated
Embezzlement 88 6
Criminal association 151 10
Corruption 88 6
TF 13 1
ML 486 31
Environmental Crimes 36 2
Fraud 369 23
Drug Related Crimes 0 0
Human Trafficking 0 0
Illegal Diamond Dealing 0 0
Other 352 22
Total 1583 100
96. The UIF has been successful in providing financial intelligence and other information upon
request to LEAs. For the period under review, Angolan LEAs22 made ninety-three (93) requests for
financial intelligence (with nearly two-third responded to) relating to cases under investigation with
most of the cases being predicate offences, followed by ML and distantly followed by TF. The PGR
and SIC (table below) are the most requesters of the information from the UIF. The SIC/PGR/SINSE are
working together on investigation of predicate offences, ML and TF using information from themselves
and the UIF. The investigations of SIC are conducted with the guidance of PGR which has assisted in
pursuing high value targeted cases. The total of 36 outstanding requests is attributed to number of factors
22
DNIAP (PGR), PGR/SIC, PGR, SINSE, GABINETE DE SUB PROCURADORA GERAL DA REPÚBLICA
JUNTO SIC, SONANGALP, INSP. ECON. E SEG. ALIMENTAR, CMC, AGT, BANKS
such complexity of the matters, resource constraints on the part of the UIF and waiting for information
from foreign FIUs.
Table 6.3 Requests for information to UIF by LEAs per year, 2017 – 2021
Average Time
YEAR Received Responded to In Process Rejected
2017 6 6 0 0 Within 1 – 15
workings days
2018 16 9 7 0 depending on the
2019 21 6 15 0 complexity of a
2020 15 11 4 0 request.
2021 35 25 10 0
TOTAL 93 57 36 0
97. The LEAs are largely satisfied with the usefulness of the UIF financial intelligence to support
financial investigation mostly due to the fact the information from the UIF contained information
on key individuals, companies, banking account, flow of suspected funds, beneficial ownership, and
links of subjects. The information has been regularly used by the LEAs to initiate or supplement
financial investigations relevant for tracing proceeds of crime, ML and TF. The UIF and national
competent authorities generated intelligence and evidence largely through a multi-task force format in the
investigation and prosecution of proceeds-generating offences including embezzlement, corruption,
criminal association, and tax related crimes. The effectiveness of this approach in the use of UIF
information is evidenced in the successful investigations and prosecution major proceeds of crime and
twenty-four successful ML prosecutions by the PGR in addition to significant asset recovery.
98. The UIF has suspended transactions in terms of the AML law suspected of containing funds
from proceeds of crime for which the prosecutor (PGR) made the final decision on the frozen funds
contributing significantly to restraining of assets and eventually recovery of the assets to some extent.
The suspension of transactions, namely sixty-four (64) by UIF, led to ratification by the PGR followed by
financial investigations of the suspected transactions. Using the UIF information to either initiate or support
investigations, the SIC indicated that it pursued ninety-six (96) ML cases and resulted in fifty (50) criminal
asset freezing’s amounting to Kz 115 billion for the period 2017-2021, though this could not be fully
verified by the AT largely due to challenges of statistics presented by Angola.
99. The statistics provided in the table below demonstrate that the UIF uses its powers under the law
to suspend suspicious transactions resulting in effective use and successes in these cases.
23
Also refer to Table 7.1
Values of Asset Freeze measured in 3,542,54 36,397,2 7,145,56 13,453,3 54,885,8 115,424
Kwanzas 6,739.77 43,743.4 3,417.12 16,882.5 64,432.4 ,535,21
2 9 0 5.3024
SIC Completed Investigations The 96
DINAIP a Division in SIC are
responsible to investigate cases of
corruption under the guidance of PGR)
SIC ongoing Investigations 82825
Cases Filed/Archived 18926
Cases closed with ML Prosecutions 10
Underlying Predicate Offences
Embezzlement, Breach of Plan and Budget Execution Rules
100. The LEAs such as the PRG and SIC indicated that in addition to using the UIF information,
they also used their own powers described in R.31 and R.40 of the Report to obtain information
relevant for investigation and prosecution of ML/TF cases as well as recovery of assets. In addition
to the interactions with the UIF, and PGR the SIC and its different subdivisions (Drug law Enforcement,
Corruption) also make use of financial intelligence from evidence obtained through the execution of
notices in terms of the Criminal Code of 2020. The evidence obtained through these notices generate new
leads and multiple additional requests to supplement evidence and intelligence in cases under investigation.
There were statistics provided by the authorities to demonstrate the extent to which these powers are
applied as sources of intelligence or other information relevant for identifying proceeds of crime, ML and
TF cases.
101. Furthermore, the UIF also uses its international mechanisms (bilateral through MoUs and
multilateral such as Egmont Group of FIUs Secured Web) to access and use information for its own
analysis or on behalf of LEAs and intelligence services in pursuit of cases with transnational elements
particularly in relation to exchange of TF enquiries, investigation of proceeds and ML, and recovery of
assets (See IO.2 for details).
102. The use of financial intelligence and other information by LEAs and intelligence services to
initiate or support pursuits of potential TF cases has been successful in line with the TF risk profile
of Angola. The UIF, the LEAs and the respective branches of the intelligence services have worked
closely together on the disseminations made to them by the FIU and the number of requests they
made to the FIU for financial intelligence relevant to the TF enquiries they contacted (See IO.9 for
details). The UIF received 24 TF-related STRs of which 13 were disseminated to relevant authorities after
initial analysis verified suspicious activity. Three of the TF-related STRs prompted PGR to initiate criminal
investigations. Prior to disseminating STRs to competent authorities, UIF leverages open sources and a
closed source database to identify beneficial owners and enrich the STRs with additional information and
context. The UIF has two analysts, supported by other analysts, who focus on TF and terrorism-related
transaction analysis at a more urgent basis working closely with the PGR, domestic/foreign branches of
intelligence services and SIC. Given the relatively low number of TF-related STR submissions, this
appears largely adequate to analyse these cases. The 13 disseminations were subjected to enquiries by the
LEAs and intelligence services with a view to identifying possible TF cases (See IO.9 for details).
24
USD and Euro values converted.
25
Total relates to overall archived cases relating to ML, of which 22 is from the UIF.
26
Total relates to overall archived cases relating to ML, of which 22 is from the UIF.
103. The main source of information for analysis by UIF is from STRs which are predominantly
from banks of which 99% is focusing on suspected transactions of major proceeds-generating
crimes distantly followed by suspected ML and TF. The notable upward trajectory of STRs in 2021 by
banks is attributed to more guidance and awareness-raising initiatives such as significant onboarding of
banks on the goAML system. Generally, UIF gives feedback to subject entities where its analysis shows
strong indications of actionable intelligence and was shared with relevant LEAs. Regular compliance
meetings and feedback to subject entities on STRS reported and typologies seems to have improved the
quality and volume of reporting especially by the banking sector. The AT determined that insignificant
reporting of STRs in high-risk sectors such as MVTs, real estate agents and DPMS should be urgently
attended to so as they broaden the diversity of information for identifying ML and TF cases. Most
suspicious transaction reports received by the UIF are from commercial banks, with limited reporting
from NBFIs and DNFBPs as shown by a total of 1667 STRs, and 211 SARs received between 2017 –
2021 (See IO.4 for more details).
104. The UIF receives and accesses other statutory reports which are integrated into the analysis of
STRs to identify potential ML and TF cases. The UIF indicated that the additional statutory reports provided
invaluable information and contributed significantly to improved conversion of rate of STRs to financial
intelligence as it enriched the information from reporting institutions.
27
Identification of' Designated Persons Report
28
Cash Transactions Report
29
Cross-border Movements Report
30
Spontaneous Notices -Ordinarily known as Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)
by LEAs to pursue financial crimes and awareness-raising activities by the UIF to the LEAs on the use of
its financial intelligence.
Table 6.7 -Requests for information by UIF from LEAs and Intelligence Services
INFORMATION REQUESTS BY FIU
Requests Responses average of days needed to
YEAR In process
made received receive one response
2017 45 45 0 1-3 business days
2018 107 83 24 1-5 business days
2019 156 96 60 5-15 business days
2020 91 78 13 Less than 5 business days
2021 136 111 25 Less than 15 business days
TOTAL 535 413 122 -
106. Table 6.8 illustrates the information which is available to the UIF to access and enrich the quality
of its financial intelligence. In the main, the databases are available online. The UIF can access online
databases at any time when needed as it is available 24 hours a day. Furthermore, access to manual databases
can be obtained immediately in urgent cases, while in normal circumstances access can be obtained between
1 and 5 business Further, there are ongoing efforts to integrate LEAs into the GoAML platform which will
enhance the quality and efficiency of exchange of information between the UIF and the domestic agencies.
108. The UIF has access to the information on cash couriers held by the AGT obtained at Angola’s
ports of entry and exit. The AGT and UIF have mechanism in place which enables sharing of information
promptly in which the AGT reports immediately the occurrences of both infringements and seizures as
soon as the events happen (IO 8 Table 8.11). In addition, the AGT makes available quarterly, semi-annual,
and annual reports to the UIF for its consideration. Only monthly statistics on cross cash declaration, and
not actual reports, is shared by the AGT with UIF. However, UIF has access to information/reports when
they require.
109. The UIF receives feedback on disclosures from LEAs and PGR on a case-to-case basis often upon
request by the UIF. Some feedback is in the form of case meetings while others are provided formally in a
letter. However, there has been some instances where cases had been closed by LEAs but the UIF had not
received feedback from the LEAs even though exchange of information arrangements between them
requires that such information be brought to the attention of the UIF. In the absence of a more formalised
mechanism for feedback, Angola is to some extent facing challenges of determining the usefulness of
disclosures and responses to requests by UIF. Most disclosures to SIC remain under investigation/pending
owing to a multiplicity of factors including capacity and complexity of cases. Angola is addressing these
challenges through capacity-building and collaboration work throughout the FIU-LEA value-chain.
Table 6.10- SARs from National subject entities and International FIUs 2017 – 2021
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total
SARs
SARs (CE) National 11 36 99 24 49 219
SARs (CE) International 6 43 32 22 18 121
110. Since the overwhelming majority of the STRs emanates from commercial banks with little to no
STRs from NFBIs and DNFBPs, the UIF is not getting sufficient reports which limits the scope of analysis
of suspected proceeds.
111. While the UIF has access to AGT’s cross-border currencies reports, nevertheless the AGT submits
monthly data/information to the UIF for possible analysis as indicated in the table above. The UIF uses
the cross-border currency declaration information in its strategic/typology products which it shares with
the subject entities and LEAs through its website and compliance meetings. The AT noted that except for
some strategic/typology reports, no information evidencing the use of the declarations in supporting
operations of LEAs during the period under review. Except for the limited or absence of STRs from some
NBFIs and DNFBPs, the UIF and LEAs have a respectable the range of information and databases
available for producing financial intelligence and identifying cases for investigating and prosecuting ML
and TF cases. To smoothen access to information, the UIF has MoUs and contact persons with LEAs which
are used as mechanisms to improve speed with which information is exchanged between the UIF and the
LEAs.
Table 6.11- Requests for information by LEAs and responses to requests for information by UIF,
2017 – 2021
Requests/Responses 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total
Requests for information 6 16 21 15 35 93
Responses to requests for 6 9 6 11 25 57
information
Average time for responding Within 1 to 15 working days
114. The table above indicates that the UIF responds to requests for information from LEAs in pursuit
of ML/TF cases including recovering assets to a large extent. In general, just more than two-third of the
requests from LEA are responded by the UIF in respect of financial intelligence and other information
which has been predominantly used to support investigation of major proceeds-generating crimes
especially corruption and to some extent, for ML. Though the FIU had resource challenges at the time of
the onsite visit, the responses were provided within 15 days depending on the nature and complexity of the
request made. There is no information on breakdown of disclosures (spontaneous and upon requests) made
to each LEA and the use of the disclosures for predicate offences and ML for the period under review.
116. The case above demonstrates a successful case of complex investigation, prosecution, and asset
recovery pursuant to use of financial intelligence produced by the UIF from its own sources and foreign
links by LEAs. The table below demonstrates that the PGR used financial intelligence and other
information from UIF to execute freezing orders, forfeitures and confiscations mostly in relation to major
proceeds-generating crimes particularly corruption and to a lesser extent ML cases though the values are
reasonable. The PGR works closely together with SIC and SINSE to identify possible unlawful proceeds
for ML and TF respectively. All requests made to PGR by the UIF to restrain assets have been successfully
endorsed. In total, the UIF information contributed to about 50 criminal asset restraints; however, there
were no evidence from LEAs on the value of assets forfeited to the state arising from financial intelligence
from the UIF.
Table 6.13- Assets Recovery activities by PGR from UIF financial intelligence, 2017 – 2021
UIF products 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total
Number of 4 8 10 21 21 64
Ratifications of
suspended
suspicious
operations PGR
Number of - 7 8 17 18 50
Criminal Asset
Freezing
Values of Asset 3,542,546,73 36,397,243 7,145,56 13,453,316,8 54,885,864,4 115,424,535,21
Freeze measured 9.77 ,743.42 3,417.12 82.59 32.40 5.3031
in Kwanzas
117. The LEAs and UIF have not been able to demonstrate how typology/strategic analysis reports
produced by the UIF have been used to support the operational needs of LEAs.
118. To a large extent, the cooperation and coordination between the UIF and LEAs which occur
based on ‘upon request’ and ‘spontaneous communications’ have culminated in successful
investigations and prosecutions of predicate offences, identification of assets and ML/TF cases. The
exchange of information is facilitated through MoUs and contact persons mechanisms which has allowed
proactive disseminations of products through manual delivery and case briefings depending on the nature
of the case. In addition, the UIF and the LEAs also engage in ad hoc operational task forces which has
31
USD and Euro values converted.
greatly assisted in identifying new cases while also supporting ongoing cases for in a speedily manner.
119. The tables below show interagency cooperation and coordination through UIF Spontaneous
communications which resulted in investigations, prosecutions, seizure of criminal assets and asset
freezing.
Case Box 6.4- 500 Million
This case began in the British UIF (NCA) through a communication of Operation Suspicion sent by a UK
bank, with financial intelligence report sent to the UIF for consideration. As of September 2017, the Angolan
UIF received a request for information from the UK requesting information on the purpose and beneficial
ownership of a TRANSFER OPERATION of USD 500 million, which originates from an account entitled
by the BNA and destination an account entitled by a Sociedade PerfectBit. Ltd. According to the information
provided by the company receiving the operation with the UK authorities, the operation had as objective to
establish a Strategic Investment Fund for financing projects considered strategic for Angola. The PGR with
authority that has the powers to investigate and proceed with the prosecution, received intelligence provided
by the UIF and took the necessary steps to investigate the case. After the indictment, the PGR referred the
case to the court that convicted the defendants involved. The sentence was later upheld by the Supreme
Court (2021) with a conviction on defrauding the government of Angola, embezzlement, and influence
peddling. The funds recovered was USD 500 million.
Grecima's case began through a communication made by the State Intelligence and Security Service to the
Attorney General's Office in which the UIF was brought in for transactional information which assisted in
locating the funds in Angola and Portugal moved by a former Minister who was later charged and convicted
of embezzlement, influence peddling and maladministration which enabled acquisition of movable and
immovable goods including real estate. PGR, SIC, UIF, SME, Civil Aviation, Ports Authority and AGT
collaborated in the successful investigation and prosecution of the case. The outcome of the task force was
that two subject were sentenced by the Supreme Court a combined imprisonment term of 21 years for
embezzlement and 8 years for ML. All assets were forfeited to the State.
120. The cases demonstrates that the UIF has been successful in cooperating and exchanging
intelligence and other information with domestic and foreign agencies in effectively supporting financial
investigations, prosecution and tracing of criminal assets related to major proceeds-generating crimes and
ML.
Background
123. Angola has put in place a fairly solid legal and institutional framework for the investigation and
prosecution of ML. The Criminal Investigations Service (SIC) is the main body responsible for
investigations of predicate offences, while the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) is responsible for
the investigation and prosecution of ML.
124. The Angolan authorities identify and investigate ML cases mainly from information disseminated
by the UIF. In other few cases, the authorities instituted ML investigations based on the information they
received from other sources such as foreign law enforcement authorities, anonymous informants, walk-in
complainants and social media reports.
125. While the LEAs have a fair understanding of the country’s threats and risk profile, the
investigation and prosecution of ML cases is so far only focused on the underlying offence of corruption,
understandably so because it is identified as the predicate offence of highest impact in Angola. However,
the authorities have not identified or pursued the investigation of ML in relation to other high and medium
risk predicate offences such as human trafficking, drug trafficking and dealing in metal and precious
stones.
DNPCC
128. The DNPCC has 12 investigative magistrates based at the PGR Headquarters in Luanda. SIC
investigators stationed in Angola’s 18 provinces also investigate ML cases, but only under the instruction
and supervision of the 12 DNPCC magistrates. Whenever there is a more complex case in any of the
provinces, DNPCC sends some of its 12 magistrates to the provinces to enhance the capacity of the
provincial teams to conduct the required investigations. This is more so because in Angola, there is
requirement to conduct investigations within the province in which the offence is committed. Considering
that Angola has 18 provinces, the 12 DNPCC magistrates are not adequate to supervise and join
investigations in all complex and ML cases that originate from the provinces. The low number of DNPCC
magistrates, coupled by their limited training and lack of training for the majority of PGR magistrates
explains the low level of successful ML investigations registered so far by Angola, as illustrated in Table
7.1 below. Authorities may consider enhancing the capacity of the provincial magistrates to carry out
parallel financial investigations as well as ML investigations, and to direct the SIC on how to conduct ML
investigations in order to foster their effectiveness.
DNIAP
129. DNIAP has 14 magistrates, 34 judicial officers and 6 investigators. All DNIAP magistrates
operate from Luanda, but they collaborate with provincial PGR officers whenever there are investigations
in the provinces that concern DNIAP’s mandate. However, with regard to cases involving PEPs, the
mandate of the provincial PGR magistrates is limited to the collection of evidence. Only DNIAP
magistrates can interrogate the PEPs. This arrangement has the potential of limiting identification of ML
cases as well as slowing down investigation of such cases identified, as the DNIAP has only few officers
to take up this task, in addition to their existing workload at their workstation in Luanda.
130. Further, the PGR has the power to archive cases, including ML cases that are under investigation,
whenever it deems that the available evidence does not establish any prospects of obtaining an ML
conviction. However, the PGR can reopen archived cases for further investigations and prosecution if new
evidence emerges thereafter. As at the time of the assessment, the PGR had 621 magistrates, some of
whom were stationed at the Luanda Central Office and others in the provinces. Out of the 621 magistrates,
10, from DNPCC, are specifically responsible for ML cases. Further, each of the 18 provinces has an
average of 3 to 5 magistrates that have the competence to handle ML cases. These are very few,
considering the wide mandate that PGR magistrates have over the prosecution and investigation of all
cases in Luanda. The provincial magistrates have not received adequate ML training in order to
competently handle the provincial ML cases.
131. Between the years 2017 and 2021, PGR registered 1113 ML cases reported by the UIF,
anonymous reporters, private individuals and other LEAs as illustrated in the Table 7.1 below.
Table 7.1 ML cases identified and investigated
Reported by Reported Reported by Reported Total
UIF by LEAs private anonymously
persons
Cases reported 340 622 128 23 1113
Completed ML 24 38 32 2 96
investigations
133. In the overall, ML cases are identified from reports made by the UIF; the Internal Intelligence
Services (SINSE); the External Intelligence Services (SIE), the media; investigation reports from the
General Tax Administration (AGT), the General Inspectorate of the State Administration (IGAE) and
open sources, as well as anonymous reporters. Furthermore, ML investigations originate from financial
intelligence received from the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC) and foreign
LEAs. Below are examples of cases investigated upon referrals from different sources.
134. In the AAA Seguros case discussed below, an investigation into a complex embezzlement and
ML case arose from a report from the Prosecutor General of Geneva, Switzerland, made to the PGR of
Angola. The report was handled by the SENRA, the Asset Recovery Agency, which facilitated the
freezing of funds identified in Switzerland and also referred the matter to DNIAP to institute ML
investigations.
Case Box 7.2-AAA Seguros, S.A Money Laundering case
The investigation process in this case began with a communication from the Public Prosecutor's Office
to the Canton of Geneva to the PGR of Angola. The communication was in relation to an individual
who requested a bank in Switzerland to transfer more than USD 900,000,000.00 (nine hundred million
US dollars), suspected of money laundering.
The individual is a former manager of the company called AAA, Seguros, S.A., a public company,
initially owned 100% by the Group Sonangol, S.A. (Sonangol, E.P. and Sonangol, P&P). He
simultaneously performed the functions of Risk Management Director of Sonangol, E.P. and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of AAA, Seguros, S.A. In the performance of his duties, he fraudulently
appropriated AAA Seguros, S.A., gradually transferring the shareholdings in his favor.
Predicate Offense
The accused was charged and convicted of crimes of Embezzlement, Tax Fraud and Money
Laundering, and sentenced to the single sentence of 9 years imprisonment. The case was under appeal
as at the time of the assessment.
135. In addition to the AAA Seguros case, SENRA referred two other cases to DNIAP that involved
the misappropriation of government schools by senior government officials. SENRA seized the schools
and handed them back to the Ministry of Education, awaiting the conclusion of the prosecution. This
demonstrates Angola’s ability, though applied in few cases, to identify ML cases from financial and assets
investigations that fall within the scope of SENRA’s asset recovery mandate. Upon making the referral
in the AAA Seguro case, SENRA continued with its asset-tracing and seizure work, while DNIAP carried
out the ML investigation that led to the successful prosecution and conviction of the suspects. This is a
demonstration of an effective parallel financial investigation structure that Angola should consider
enhancing. In the majority of cases observed and the huge backlog of potential cases of ML still under
investigation, the Assessment Team concluded that the capacity to identify potential ML cases and to
pursue ML investigations was still at nascent stage across the designated competent authorities.
136. Nevertheless, the information in the preceding paragraphs shows that Angola has diverse sources
of information from which LEAs can identify ML cases. However, the results from the diverse sources
are very low and they relate only to corruption. The authorities have not registered success in the
identification and conclusion of ML cases from other predicate offences. This once gain underscores the
Angolan LEAs’ general lack of the capacity to identify ML cases, and to employ parallel financial
investigations in order to investigate ML cases as a policy objective. This is evident from the analysis in
the following paragraphs, on the SIC’s power and competence to investigate predicate offences.
The National Directorate for the Combating of Illicit Trafficking in Stones, Precious Metals and
Crimes against the Environment: This Directorate within SIC has the competence to investigate
environmental and illegal mineral exploration crimes. Even though illegal wildlife trafficking and illegal
trafficking of minerals are considered as high proceed-generating offences, no ML case has been
identified and investigated in this regard. The inability by the Directorate to carry out parallel financial
investigations connected to these predicate offences could be contributing to cases of ML pursuant to the
proceeds from these crimes not being identified and investigated. Hence, the Directorate does not explore
how perpetrators deal with proceeds of these crimes due to lack of training on financial investigations and
ML generally. Table 7.3 below illustrates the prevalence of these cases and underscores the lack of
adequate guidance in either policy direction or other strategies by the authorities to deal with the
laundering of the proceeds.
Table 7.2 Number of Cases Investigated Involving Strategic Minerals and the Environment
Nº 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
CRIMINAL OFFENCE
1 48 81 89 84 88
Illicit Possession of Strategic Minerals
The Directorate of Combating of Organized Crime (DCCO): This Directorate is responsible for the
investigation of transnational crimes such as terrorism, trafficking in human organs and human beings,
smuggling and fuel theft. The DCCO investigates these offences only when they are committed within a
transnational and organised crime context.128. Despite the NRA identifying the offences of human
trafficking and theft of fuel as high to medium-high risk criminal activities, there was no indication by the
authorities of how many cases of both types have been identified and investigated. Besides the lack of
statistics pertaining to those predicate offences, the authorities had not investigated any ML cases
premised on these predicate offences. The Directorate lacked the capacity to identify and investigate ML
cases arising from the listed types of cases.
The National Directorate of Combating of Drug Trafficking: This Directorate is responsible for the
investigation of drug trafficking offences. Investigators in this directorate have not received any ML
training. Generally, Angola experiences a high rate of drug trafficking as compared to farming of
Cannabis Sativa or drug consumption. Both Angolan nationals and foreigners perpetrate the trafficking.
Cannabis Sativa is trafficked from Angola to other countries, while heavy drugs come from abroad and
transit through Angola to Europe and other African Countries. In one case, through controlled delivery,
the Directorate intercepted 500grams of cocaine at the Luanda Port. The cocaine had originated from
Belgium. However, the authorities did not explore any ML investigation in this case despite that the
trafficking signified trade and proceed-generation.
138. The Directorate Combating of Drug Trafficking does not conduct parallel financial
investigations. This is because the Directorate lacks the skill and mandate to carry out parallel financial
investigations and trace proceeds of from such activities and possible identification of ML cases.
Consequently, the Directorate has not identified or investigated any ML case in relation to drug
trafficking, and has not made any such case referral to PGR.
139. Further, the authorities indicated that they have a case prioritization strategy whereby,
heavy drugs are investigated by the Central Office in Luanda, while the provincial offices focus on
cannabis sativa cases. However, this strategy has not resulted in any ML investigations arising from
the trafficking of heavy drugs that ordinarily generate significant proceeds. Below is a case example
of how this approach has assisted the authorities to detect drugs, but did not lead to any ML investigation
due to lack of focus on ML cases in this respect.
Case Box 7.3-Criminal Case No. 3020/020-07
On October 25, 2020, an Angolan citizen participated as a mule in this case and was the first to be
arrested in flagrante delicto at the Luanda International Airport. He brought with him, in a covert
manner, 6,013 kg (Six kilograms and thirteen grams) of cocaine, after disembarking from a TAAG
flight from S. Paulo/Brazil. Subsequently, a police officer was also arrested as he was in collaboration
with the mule. His role was to facilitate the mule’s departure from the airport and to arrange
transportation for him. Furthermore, the authorities arrested four more suspects and the master-minder
of the criminal operation. The suspects included two members of staff of the Angola/FAA Armed
Forces - Special Forces and another who was a suspected member of the same criminal association.
PGR filed the case in court on March 25, 2021. However, despite the perpetrators operating this drug
trafficking mission within a criminal syndicate scope, the authorities did not pursue ML investigations.
140. Generally, the LEAs have powers to use a wide range of investigative techniques, (see R. 31)
in identifying and investigating crimes. The authorities illustrated that they can use special
investigative techniques like controlled delivery (See the drug trafficking case study under CI 7.2).
The authorities also demonstrated that they use joint approaches to conduct investigations. The
investigative bodies also get some details on legal persons from the One Stop Shop32 though this does not
include information on BO. The authorities use these powers also to investigate ML cases. However, the
authorities lack sufficient training on ML investigation and prosecution. The authorities also lack
resources for them to develop and procure special investigative toolkits for use in the investigation of
complex ML cases. The authorities use traditional means of investigations which do not assist them to
make progress in the investigation of ML cases. This also explains why Angola has registered little
success in the investigation of ML cases.
3.3.2. Consistency of ML investigations and prosecutions with threats and risk profile, and national
AML policies
141. The ML cases investigated and prosecuted so far are, to a limited extent, consistent with the
Country’s risk profile and National AML/CFT policies. The authorities demonstrated a fair
understanding of the predicate offences that pose high ML risk. The offences are: corruption, drug
trafficking, trafficking of precious stones and minerals and stolen goods. Corruption and its related
offences such as embezzlement and trading in influence, manifest the highest risk. Consistent with this
assessment, the authorities have prioritised allocation of resources to the investigation and prosecution of
corruption cases which, however, does not manifest in an increased or corresponding number of ML
investigations or prosecutions. The table below indicates the number of cases investigated over the period
of 2018 and 2021 by the PGR.
Table 7.3- Breakdown of Predicate Offences and Money Laundering Cases Investigated
Type of crime 2018 2019 2020 2021 Total
Embezzlement 291 362 825 696 2174
Money Laundering 149 119 523 228 1113
Corruption 32 224 343 142 741
Criminal Association 10 22 59 101 192
Influence peddling 1 26 46 87 160
Economic 14 22 79 34 149
Participation in
business
Abuse of trust 4 10 29 64 107
Tax fraud 7 8 58 15 88
Forgery of documents 6 16 51 14 87
Undue receipt of 6 19 15 16 56
advantage
Violation of budget 4 4 9 26 43
executive rules
Abuse of power 4 9 15 12 40
Tax evasion 2 1 22 3 28
Theft 0 1 8 16 25
Trade in fake minerals 0 14 1 1 16
Aggression to the 0 5 3 6 14
environment
142. Table 7.3 above indicates that the authorities investigated a total of 2174 cases of embezzlement,
741 cases of corruption, 160 cases of influence peddling and 149 cases of economic participation in
business. These represent 3224 cases related to corrupt activities investigated during the period under
32
A platform for the registration of businesses in Angola (See IO5).
review. Despite the PGR processing this high number of corruption-related offences, the number of ML
cases investigated and prosecuted in this regard is generally low as demonstrated in the table below.
143. Table 7.4 illustrates that between the years 2018 and 2021, Angola registered 3224 cases
involving corruption related offences. Out of these cases, Angola investigated 94 ML cases, and
concluded the prosecution of 10 ML cases with ML convictions. PGR archived 189 ML cases owing to
insufficiency of evidence. The number of concluded ML cases exhibits that the authorities investigate and
prosecute ML arising from corruption and corruption-related practices such as embezzlement, economic
participation in business and influence peddling to a low extent. Notably, the number of corruption-related
ML investigations and prosecutions (at 2.9%) is negligible, in view of the 3224 corruption related cases
that the authorities had investigated. Further, there was no ML prosecution arising from other high or
medium high-risk predicate offences identified in the NRA such as drug trafficking, counterfeit of
products, tax and fiscal crimes, fuel theft and trafficking and trafficking in precious stones. One case of
ML that had the predicate offence of an environmental crime ended with an acquittal of the ML charge,
due to insufficiency of evidence. The Assessment Team noted during the onsite meetings that following
the completion of the NRA which identified these high proceeds generating offences, Angola did not
come up with a comprehensive AML/CFT policy on how the country can tackle ML offences arising from
these identified offences. The authorities also barely understand the type of ML activities investigated and
prosecuted, save that the activities emanate from corruption-related offences. As a result, the authorities
investigate and prosecute ML types of activities (mostly from embezzlement) to a negligible extent
coupled, with lack of AML/CFT oriented policy on identified threats and risk profile of Angola.
144. According to the NRA findings and confirmation by the authorities, national and international
criminal groups take advantage of Angola’s geostrategic position as the route of international drug
trafficking between Latin America, Southwest Africa and Europe. In order to deal with this problem,
Angolan authorities have invested in training of staff and installation of prevention equipment at the
border posts. Nevertheless, these interventions have not produced any ML investigation or prosecutions
results, primarily because the relevant officers in the Directorate of Combating of Drug Trafficking and
PGR lack adequate training on ML and financial investigations.
145. In addition, the NRA noted the growing domestic consumption of drugs in Angola, indicating a
nationwide domestic trafficking and trade which is likely to be generating large proceeds for laundering
on the part of the traffickers. Nevertheless, there are no ML investigations in this regard. The authorities
expressed that even though drug trafficking is another’s high-risk proceed generating offence, they have
not been able to trace any proceeds of this criminal activity mainly due to the complexities created by
Angola’s cash-based economy which poses challenges to the tracing of money and identification of ML
methods. Nevertheless, SENRA has started collaborating with the Directorate of Combating of Drug
Trafficking in order to ensure that proceeds of drug trafficking are pursued and ML cases identified.
However, as at the time of the onsite, there was no demonstration of any results from this intervention by
SENRA, even though there were a significant number of incidents of drug trafficking as illustrated in the
table and case study below.
Investigative techniques
147. The case studies show the wide investigative techniques that the authorities employ in the
investigation of predicate offences, such as joint investigations, undercover operations and controlled
delivery. What is of concern, however, is the lack of policy direction and capacity by the authorities to
launch financial investigations and identify ML activities from the other high and medium-high risk
offences. Below are cases that exhibit potential of ML aspects but the authorities did not proceed to
investigate them as such.
148. While the approach of prioritising corrupt practices is consistent with the risk profile of the
corruption-related offences, the neglect of the other offences sustains the risks and threats that they pose
to Angola.
149. Generally, the authorities are able to investigate the other high-risk predicate offences as
illustrated in Table 7.3 above. However, in view of the available information, it is clear that the LEAs in
Angola are investigating and prosecuting ML cases in line with the country’s threats and risk profile, only
to a limited extent of corruption. There is no systematic pursuit of ML investigations and prosecution in
all high proceed-generating offences in order to mitigate the ML risks that these offences pose.
152. Furthermore, Angola has pursued the investigation of a ML case that arises from a foreign
predicate offence in the Sodiba case. The authorities expressed that it is uncommon to have such cases
due to the nature of Angola’s economy, which is not an attractive destination for the laundering of
proceeds generated from foreign jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the Sodiba case discussed below indicates
that proceeds were fraudulently generated in another jurisdiction, Germany, but laundered in Angola.
Case Box 7.8-Sodiba Case
Sodiba, an Angolan private company trading in the beverage industry, fraudulently obtained a loan
from a German state-owned bank. The German Bank extended the loan to an Angolan state-owned
bank, which, unknown to the German Bank, merely acted as an intermediary for Sodiba. The German
authorities alerted the Angolan authorities about the fraud. Angolan authorities instituted an
investigation which included ML. The Angolan authorities successfully found details of the people
behind Sodiba through the One Stop Shop platform. Senra has since seized Sodiba, while investigations
are still on-going. The investigations in this case have not focused the Sodiba company.
153. As at the time of the on-site, the authorities had not yet looked at the offence from a foreign
predicate offence perspective and the subsequent laundering of the proceeds. However, the role played by
the National Central Bureau of Interpol (The Interpol Bureau), a department within SIC, involving the
cross-border investigation of the Sodiba case is worth noting. It facilitated Angola’s police-to-police
coordination and cooperation with foreign counterparts during investigations of this high profile case,
contributing to the unravelling of the fraudulent scheme.
154. It is evident, therefore, in view of the information provided so far, that Angola has the ability to
pursue different types of ML, namely self-laundering and foreign-predicate ML, though to a very limited
extent, and unguided by any policy direction because the authorities did not exhibit an understanding of
the different types of ML.
in cases where the convict does not have enough assets to liquidate the compensation amount, Angola
should consider imposing sentences that are not below the minimum threshold of 2 years imprisonment
in order to reflect the seriousness of the ML offence.
157. Further, as noted earlier, Angola has not prosecuted any legal person on a ML offence.
Thus, there are no sanctions recorded in this respect. Therefore, the Assessment Team could not
establish the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions against legal persons in
Angola.
159. To a limited extent, Angola is making progress in enhancing its systems for achieving an
effective identification, investigation and prosecution of ML cases. Further, Angola is identifying,
investigating and prosecuting ML cases in line with the country’s AML/CFT risks but only to a limited
extent. So far, the focus is on ML cases predicated upon corrupt practices that present the highest risk
in Angola. Nevertheless, the number of ML cases pursued in relation to corrupt practices is still low
when compared to the corresponding corruption-related predicate offences that Angola has
investigated over the period under review. Furthermore, Angola is not pursuing the investigation and
prosecution of ML cases in relation to other high and medium proceed-generating offences such as
drug trafficking. Additionally, there is limited understanding and use of parallel financial
investigations by most investigative bodies due to capacity constraints and lack of training. There is
no demonstration that Angola pursues other types of ML apart from self-laundering, owing to the
authorities’ lack of understanding of the different ML types and poor methods of capturing statistics.
Notably, Angola has not pursued any legal person, despite there being evidence of their prevalent use
in high profile ML cases. Additionally, Angola has not demonstrated that it has any working alternative
measures for ML prosecution in cases where a prosecution or conviction is unattainable. In view of
the foregoing, despite the registered successful ML investigation and prosecutions in relation to
corruption cases, Angola has some fundamental shortcomings that need improvement.
160. Angola has achieved a low level of effectiveness for IO.7.
3.4.1. Confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value as a policy objective
161. Confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime is a policy objective in Angola that
the authorities pursue to some extent. Angola prioritises the recovery of proceeds of crime, specifically
corruption, over prosecution, as it has recovered proceeds of corruption in 19 cases yet it has concluded
prosecution of ML in 10 cases.
162. Angola enhanced its asset recovery efforts by enacting asset recovery laws (see Recommendation
4), which provide for conviction-based and non-conviction-based forfeiture. Further, in 2018, Angola
established the National Asset Recovery Service (SENRA) as a specialised agency for asset recovery.
SENRA is a Directorate within the PGR, headed by a director. It is the central authority for asset recovery
in Angola, with powers to identify, seize and confiscate assets. SENRA’s mandate is pursuant to Art.13
of Law 15/18 of 26 December (Law on Coercive Repatriation and Extended Loss of Property). SENRA
became operational in 2019, and it so far operates from the PGR Headquarters in Luanda.
163. SENRA’s total staff complement is very low, considering its national mandate, which requires
collaboration of SENRA officers with the provincial LEAs. It has six prosecutors, five investigators, one
Notary, a Registry officer and one IT engineer. In order to enhance its nationwide operations, SENRA
has focal points in the provincial PGR offices who carry out its mandate in the provinces. Further, SENRA
works with SIC officers whenever there is an asset recovery case across Angola. However, the provincial
officers work under the direction of the SENRA officers based in Luanda, who are too few to supervise
and coordinate the nationwide tasks more efficiently and effectively. Further, all SENRA Magistrates, the
two SIC officers seconded at SENRA and two PGR focal points from two provinces that assist SENRA
in its work have received specialised training in asset tracing or asset forfeiture. However, focal points
placed in the remaining 16 provinces have not received any such training. Thus, it is apparent that Angola
has not yet prioritised the allocation of significant resources to SENRA to ensure that it, together with its
collaborating counterparts such as the focal points and SIC, has the capacity to trace, identify, seize and
recover property across Angola. SENRA’s capacity is too insufficient to pursue asset recovery across all
high and medium-high risk offences in Angola. Further, as at the time of the assessment, SENRA was
developing a new strategy that will ensure SENRA’s presence in the provinces and training of its focal
points. However, SENRA has not started implementing this strategy yet, hence, its effectiveness could
not be determined by the time of this assessment.
164. Since its establishment, SENRA has established administratively another asset recovery
mechanism referred to as the Voluntary Surrender of Assets Mechanism (VSOAM) in February 2019.
Under this mechanism, a defendant initiates the surrender process by making a declaration of assets
obtained illegally from the State that they wish to return to the State. Based on the declaration, SENRA
drafts a declaration agreement, called the “Delivery and Acceptance Agreement” (the Agreement) that is
signed by both the defendant and the SENRA in the presence of a notary. SENRA files the signed
Agreement in court pursuant to Art. 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code for the court’s endorsement. The
Court endorses the Agreement under Art.300 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a testament of the transfer
of ownership title to the State. This process can run before or concurrently with the defendant’s trial, as it
does not bar criminal prosecution and is not dependent on a prior criminal conviction.
165. Notably, the recoveries made under the VSOAM so far are in relation to corrupt practices such
as embezzlement. Further, all of the recoveries of proceeds of crime made by Angola and presented in
this assessment so far are from the VSOAM, and not from conviction-based-confiscations per se.
Table 8.1-SENRA VSOAM Recoveries
Years VSOAM Recovery Offences Amount Recovered Conviction-based
Cases Confiscations
2019-2020 16 Embezzlement; $5billion 0
ML
166. However, mention should be made that the end result of VSOAM ensures the same objective
with confiscation is achieved as the defendant will, through due process of the courts, lose ownership
of the illegally-acquired assets. Ownership is transferred to the State based on a court order that
ratifies the surrender agreement. The Assessment Team considered the objective of the VSOAM
and found that it satisfies the elements of confiscations as outlined in the FATF Glossary’s definition
of confiscation.33 The surrender of assets Agreement, though drawn administratively by SENRA, leads
33
The term confiscation, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of funds or
other assets by order of a competent authority or a court. Confiscation or forfeiture takes place through a judicial or
administrative procedure that transfers the ownership of specified funds or other assets to be transferred to the State.
In this case, the person(s) or entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the
confiscation or forfeiture loses all rights, in principle, to the confiscated or forfeited funds or other assets.
Confiscation or forfeiture orders are usually linked to a criminal conviction or a court decision whereby the
confiscated or forfeited property is determined to have been derived from or intended for use in a violation of the
law.
to permanent deprivation of the assets endorsed by court order. The Agreement does not depend on a
criminal conviction but still qualifies as a confiscation mechanism since FATF does not require that
confiscations should be based on convictions. The FATF Glossary simply states that confiscations “are
usually linked to a criminal conviction”. It does not state that they must be linked to a criminal conviction.
167. However, the authorities did not provide sufficient data to demonstrate that they have used this
mechanism in situations where a defendant volunteered to surrender assets after SENRA had successfully
identified the assets on its own, and not in reliance on the voluntary disclosure of the existence and identity
of such assets by the defendant. There is no evidence of measures that SENRA and other relevant
authorities would follow to ensure that what a defendant has declared and is eventually recovered under
this mechanism represents the true extent of the criminal benefits obtained by the defendant. This then
demands SENRA’s capacity to trace all such assets and verify that what a defendant has declared is the
true extent of criminal benefit, in order to have a meaningful recovery in every case that falls under this
mechanism. Further, authorities have not provided information or evidence to the assessment team on
how third-party interests are protected in this mechanism and how third-party claims would be dealt with.
168. Other than the VSOAM, which at the time of the on-site visit was targeting only corruption-
related offences, there were no recoveries achieved through other asset recovery measures. Such
measures include the non-conviction-based forfeiture, which SENRA and PGR had not yet
implemented. The failure by Angolan LEAs to pursue parallel financial investigations inhibits their
ability to identify and pursue proceeds of high and medium-risk predicate offences for a full ML
investigation. Beyond setting up a framework for implementation of conviction and non-conviction-based
forfeiture, with the exception of SENRA, Angola has not yet implemented any mechanism for the pursuit
of parallel financial investigations by SIC and PGR in general in order to identify and trace benefits from
high-risk offences. Further, the authorities have not demonstrated the systematic and consistent use of the
available asset recovery mechanisms in the recovery of proceeds of other proceed-generating predicate
offences, instrumentalities or property of corresponding value. Thus, Angola has not demonstrated any
policy objective to pursue wholistic and effective recoveries in relation to other offences apart from
corruption related offences; and the use of other recovery tools such as conviction-based confiscation.
169. Notably, the non-conviction-based confiscation recently introduced by Angola is applicable only
to instrumentalities of crime. However, this being a newly introduced mechanism, there has not been any
non-conviction-based forfeiture implemented yet as at the time of this assessment.
170. Nevertheless, Angola has demonstrated that it pursues a wide range of proceeds of crime
manifested in such cases as, money in cash, real property, motor vehicles, machinery and shareholding,
although the scope of such recoveries is only concentrated on corruption so far.
Case Box 8.1-Isabel Dos Santos Case
In this case, the SENRA requested the seizure of assets belonging to Isabel Dos Santos, the daughter
of the Former President of the Republic, Eduardo Dos Santos who was involved in massive
embezzlement of Angolan government funds and ML. The assets were seized by SENRA in countries
such as Portugal, Monaco, Isle of Man and the Netherlands, through mutual legal assistance channels.
Among the seized assets were stocks held in banks, companies, profitable oil and gas, energy and
telecommunication companies, real estate and cash, estimated at nearly USD 1.500.000.000,00.
Investigations are complete, the matter awaiting commencement of prosecution on embezzlement and
ML charges.
3.4.2. Confiscation of proceeds from foreign and domestic predicates, and proceeds located abroad
171. To some extent, the authorities are able to trace, identify and freeze property that is located
both in Angola and in other jurisdictions. Such property constitutes proceeds of domestic predicate
offences laundered both in Angola and other countries such as Portugal and Brazil, among others.
However, there is no demonstration that Angola has put in any structures for the identification or pursuit
of assets connected to Terrorist Financing. The focus is on ML related recoveries premised on corruption
offences.
172. SENRA has pursued recoveries of property domiciled in both Angola and other jurisdictions
through the VSOAM. According to the statistics given for 2019 and 2020, these recoveries were mostly
on assets domiciled in Angola, with a few from foreign jurisdictions. Domestically, SENRA has recovered
over $5 billion of corruption proceeds placed in Angola. The assets recovered under this mechanism are
of significant value, demonstrating VSOAM’s potential for making impactful recoveries of public funds
that Angola loses through corruption. The authorities have demonstrated that this mechanism is a
convenient and efficient tool in the pursuit of proceeds of corruption, as it cuts off litigation time due to
the non-contentious nature of the process.
173. The table below illustrates recoveries made under the VSOAM so far in 16 embezzlement cases.
174. The Table 8.2 above shows that under the VSOAM, Angola has managed to recover some assets
with court’s approval. These, according to the FATF Confiscation definition, constitute final
confiscations. At the time of the on-site visit, recovery agreements in relation to 20 assets to the value of
USD9,170,000 were yet to be approved by the courts. The authorities shared details of the assets that they
recovered or pursued under VSOAM. The assets include high value assets such as big factories, mines,
hotels, resorts, residential houses, business parks or commercial buildings, shares held in Banks and other
businesses, money, water and air vessels. The assets are proceeds of crime in both Angola and foreign
jurisdictions. Below is one of the cases where the authorities made recoveries under the VSOAM.
Case Box 8.2- Case of the Three Towers and the Intercontinental Hotel
Public officials in charge of a public oil concessionaire company, Sonangol, EP diverted public funds
amounting to USD 251,375,882.77 (Two Hundred and Fifty-One Million, Three Hundred and Seventy-
Five Thousand, Eight Hundred and Eighty and Two Dollars and Seventy-Seven Cents). They used the
funds to construct three multi-story buildings, referred to as the Three Towers. Further, they diverted a
total of USD 510,000,000.00 (five hundred and ten million dollars) of public funds which they used for
the construction and furnishing of the Intercontinental Hotel in Luanda, Angola. During investigations,
one of the suspects confessed to have constructed the properties using public funds. He voluntarily
surrendered the properties to the State. The Court endorsed the surrender of the Hotel, while that of the
Three Towers was yet to be finalised by the time of the onsite assessment.
175. Notably, the authorities have shared information on assets recovered and with on-going recovery
process under VSOAM, for the years 2019 and 2020. There were no recoveries made under this
mechanism in the year 2021. The authorities indicated that from the moment of surrender and notarisation
of the agreement, the assets vest fully in the State, which takes control of them immediately. The court
endorsement simply formalises the surrender agreement and change of ownership of such property from
the individual to the State. Nevertheless, this understanding is not consistent with that of a senior pubic
official whose Institution manages some of the recovered assets. He stated that his Institution does not
regard property that is not yet endorsed by the courts as the State’s property.34 Further, as noted under
Recommendation 4.4, Angola manages confiscated assets through the General Vault of Justice, and
financial assets under the IGAPE.
176. Notably, out of the 10 concluded cases on ML discussed under IO 7, there is none in which Angola
has pursued confiscation proceedings to their finality. Angola obtained confiscation orders only in two
cases, i.e. Grecima and AAA Insurance cases at the trial courts. At the time of this assessment, both orders
were under on-going appeal processes. The low number of confiscation orders exhibits Angola’s low
extent in the identification of property that may be subject to confiscation. Therefore, aside from the other
19 cases in which SENRA obtained freezing and seizure orders, and 19 cases of recoveries under
VSOAM, Angola has exhibited limited effectiveness of its conviction-based asset confiscation
framework.
Provisional Orders
177. SENRA and the other LEAs pursue the freezing and seizure of assets to some extent. Between
2020 and 2021, the value of seizures implemented by SENRA was USD 6.773.753.014,7 out of 13 cases;
while the value of assets frozen was USD 6.403.137.148,54 out of 6 cases.
Table 8.3-Freezing and seizure orders obtained by SENRA
2020-2021 Freezing orders Seizure orders
Number of cases 6 13
Amounts USD 6.403.137.148,54 USD 6.773753.014,7
178. SENRA obtained 19 provisional orders between 2020 and 2021. Out of the 19 cases, 6 were
freezing orders while 13 were seizure orders. Notably, out of the 19 cases, only 3 cases are part of the 10
34
Recovered assets will only be state property after a court decision, says Government - Ver Angola - Daily, the best
of Angola.
ML concluded cases, while 16 cases are part of the 94 ML cases that were investigated, as illustrated
under IO 7. This means that the authorities did not implement provisional measures in 78 of the 94 on-
going ML cases. Going by the provided statistics of ongoing ML investigations under IO 7, there is a low
use of provisional measures, which Angola needs to implement in order to avoid the dissipation of assets,
particularly at the onset of criminal investigations. This further reinforces the conclusion that there is very
low use of parallel financial investigations that aid in ensuring early identification of criminal benefits for
freezing, seizure or confiscation purposes.
179. Regarding assets that are traced in foreign jurisdictions, SENRA has, in some cases, obtained
seizure orders from courts in Angola under Law 15/18 and sought their enforcement or execution in the
respective foreign jurisdictions where the assets are located. Angola seeks the execution of such orders
through Mutual Legal Assistance channels. In the AAA Insurance case, Angola managed to freeze money
that the suspect, an Angolan Politically Exposed Person, accumulated fraudulently and laundered in
different foreign jurisdictions as illustrated in Table 8.4 below:
Table 8.4- Money frozen in foreign jurisdictions in the AAA Insurance Case in 2020
COUNTRY MONETARY VALUES
Portugal Euros 20,951,988.20
Luxembourg USD 3,637,885.71
Singapore Euros 42,850,005.94
USD 556,861,150.60
Switzerland USD 1,114,165,175.00
Bermuda USD 213,436,118.09
UAE (Dubai) USD 18,000,000.00
Euros 63,801,994.14
TOTAL USD 1,906,100,329.04
180. Even though Angola has managed to trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime located in other
jurisdictions, the country has not yet recorded any final confiscations of such assets. The only recovery
made in relation to money frozen in a foreign jurisdiction was registered in the United Kingdom. They
are all currently under provisional orders such as freezing and seizure orders. The Tables below also show
assets that are under seizure orders, domiciled in both Angola and foreign jurisdictions for the other years
under review.
181. Notable from the information provided, the authorities effected some seizures pursuant to Art.9
of Law 15/18 while some were pursuant to Art.13 of the same Law. The authorities did not clarify the
circumstances in which they obtain seizure of property in respect of these two provisions. Art.13 defines
the powers of SENRA, which include the power to seize property, while Art.9 is the provision that
stipulates for seizure by court order. Further, the authorities did not indicate how many of these seizures
have resulted into final recovery processes such as the court approved VSOAM as well as the general
confiscation. As such, in the absence of such information, it is not possible to assess whether Angola
makes seizures with a view to confiscation and restitution regarding seizures of assets that are domiciled
in foreign jurisdictions.
183. Nevertheless, apart from this UK case, Angola has not yet registered any other successful
restitution of assets/property located abroad. All of the property currently seized or frozen outside
of Angola is pending the conclusion of confiscation proceedings, after which, the authorities can
commence restitution processes. The authorities have not demonstrated that they make any significant
progress to obtain confiscation orders that Angola can execute or enforce in foreign jurisdictions. The
authorities indicated that this is mainly due to delays by the courts in Angola to finalise trials and issue
confiscation orders. This has not only delayed the recovery of foreign assets but also caused the
management of some of the seized foreign assets to be costly. Angola should consider enacting a law on
non-conviction-based forfeiture of proceeds of crime, through which it may be easier to obtain or execute
forfeiture orders in the foreign jurisdictions and seek restitution as it happened in the “500 Million case”.
3.4.3. Confiscation of falsely or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI
184. Angola implements the declaration system for currency and BNIs at the points of entry and
exit, it does not seek the confiscation falsely or undeclared currency or BNI. The implementation of
the declaration system falls within the mandate of the General Tax Administration (AGT). AGT is
primarily responsible for revenue collection. It also enforces compliance with the laws on the movement
of goods, articles and other items across the Angolan borders in order to combat smuggling of currency
and illicit goods such as drugs, wildlife and forest products. Currency smuggling is prevalent in Angola
through its exit and entry points.
185. The AGT does not have investigative powers, save for the collection of intelligence for tax
administration purposes. Generally, the AGT team works in collaboration with multi-agency teams
comprising Fiscal Customs Police (PFA), SIC, National Directorate for the Combat of Illicit Trafficking
in Stones, Precious Metals and Crimes against the Environment at the points of entry and exit.
186. The PFA attached its officers to the AGT at all points of entry and exit such as airports, land and
sea borders. PFA officers are also present whenever the Postal Services conduct the inspection of inbound
and outbound parcels/courier items. Their mandate is to carry out the law enforcement powers of seizure,
arrest and detention at the points of entry and exit. According to the authorities, Angola faces the problem
of illegal cross-border movement of currency because it is a cash economy. Further, some nationalities
operating businesses in Angola do not use the formal financial institutions to remit funds abroad. Instead,
they use the Hawala system, as well as holding of large cash amounts at their homes. This does not only
expose Angola to unlawful cross-border movement of currency but to the more unregulated movement of
currency. The authorities have since been taking measures to monitor the identified nationalities engaged
in such practices, including more screening measures of those profiled as high risk. Further, along some
of the borderlines, the nationals from Angola and the neighbouring countries who belong to the same
ethnic groups are only divided by a physical border but visit each other frequently. This practice has
created challenges in the effective implementation of cross-border controls on the movement of currency.
187. The authorities identified the border points that have the heaviest traffic of people that pose the
increased risk of undeclared/falsely declared currency. To mitigate the risks, the authorities have
introduced both fixed and mobile scanners at the border points. The authorities enhance mitigating
measures, including addition of personnel at the border points, depending on the risk profile of the country
where the flight or cargo is originating from, and increased training and awareness raising for both the
port and border officials.
188. The authorities could, however, not demonstrate that their understanding of the risk of possible
cross-border movement of currency at the above border posts was being transformed into effective
implementation of the necessary counter-measures as they could not provide the number of cases of
confiscation of currency detected at each of the border posts during the period under review. Pursuant to
this observation, it is not clear how the authorities effectively allocate resources according to the exposure
of risk at each of the border posts, as this is not informed by specific weaknesses identified. The AGT, to
some extent, demonstrated that it had managed to seize considerable amounts of currency under false
declarations within the period under assessment. However, the figures on the seizures made are not
according to each specific border post to enable the assessment team to determine whether there is
effective control at the borders, which might be vulnerable to non-declaration or false declarations of
currency.
189. Upon detection of currency, AGT disseminates currency detection and seizure reports to UIF.
The AGT seizes the detected currency and deposits it into an account at the BNA, awaiting prosecution
of the matter in court. Below are the statistics on currency seizures that were deposited at BNA.
On March 8, 2021, AGT coordinated with other agencies to analyse the risk profile of air travellers. In the
process, the authorities targeted an Angolan national who carried a total sum of EUR 156,888.00 (one
hundred and fifty-six thousand, eight hundred and eighty Euros), camouflaged in hand luggage, in violation
of paragraph 1 of Article 4 of Notice No. 1/16, which regulates the entry and exit of national and foreign
currency. The authorities seized and deposited the money in question in the State's account domiciled at the
BNA, awaiting the application of the measures provided for and punishable by the Foreign Exchange Law
on the basis of which the BNA issued the said Notice no. 1/16. This seizure did not result into the confiscation
of the undeclared currency.
191. Despite the seizures noted in the table above, Angola has not implemented the confiscation of
seized falsely declared currency within the period under review.
192. Further, apart from currency, Angola only started to implement the declaration system on cross-
border movement of BNIs in March/April 2022, outside the period under assessment. Owing to this recent
development, the authorities did not give any information and cases to demonstrate their ability to detect
false declarations of BNIs and seize or confiscate BNIs. Further, the authorities indicated that their scanners
only detect currency and not BNIs. This, coupled with the finding that Angola has not implemented
confiscation of falsely declared currency, indicates that Angola does not use confiscation of currencies and
BNIs as an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction against cross-border movement of currencies
and BNIs.
3.4.4 Consistency of confiscation results with ML/TF risks and national AML/CFT policies and
priorities
193. The confiscation results registered in Angola reflect the country’s risk profile and National
AML/CFT policies and priorities only to a limited extent.
194. SENRA prioritises recoveries in corruption-related cases that generate the highest proceeds in
comparison to other high proceed-generating offences. Among the high proceed-generating offences,
Angola has only focused on proceeds of corruption-related offences (namely embezzlement) through the
seizure and recoveries made so far through the VSOAM and confiscation orders. There are no such
recoveries or confiscations of proceeds of crime registered for the other high and medium risk offences
such as drug trafficking, trafficking of precious stones and minerals, and fuel theft. The statistics provided
in relation to these offences are on the confiscation of contraband or instrumentalities of crime, and not
proceeds of crime.
195. Further, there is no demonstration of any systematic and wholistic pursuit of assets from all high
and medium ML risk offences as the recovery focus has been on proceeds of corruption that were
recovered under both the VSOAM and the conviction-based confiscation (in the Grecima and AAA
Seguros cases). Angola prioritises the recovery of high value assets which so far are obtained from
embezzlement (through corruption practices) as compared to the other high-risk offences, such as human
trafficking, illegal dealing in precious stones, drug trafficking and others, confirmed by the authorities to
be of frequent occurrence.
196. As noted in IO 7, Angola registered many cases on these offences that have not led to ML
prosecutions and also confiscations. In terms of drug trafficking, the authorities target the identification
and confiscation of instrumentalities. There are no efforts to identify and recover proceeds of drug
trafficking, mainly due to lack of capacity to conduct parallel financial investigations and lack of
awareness on ML investigations which aid in proceeds identification, as already established under IO 7.
In order to ensure that proceeds of drug trafficking are identified in such cases, SENRA has entered into
a collaborative arrangement with the National Directorate on Combating Drugs to enhance the
employment of financial investigations at the onset of an investigation. However, this being a recent
intervention, the assessment team could not determine its effectiveness.
197. Therefore, there seems to be a lack of overarching policies and prioritisation that focus on the
mitigating ML/TF risks posed by proceeds of the other high and medium risk offences. Therefore, the
impact of not pursuing recoveries in relation to other medium-high to high-risk offences is that the ML
risks posed by criminals from proceeds of such offences remain unmitigated.
198. In addition, SENRA has not demonstrated that it has the requisite capacity to recover property
through measures such as confiscations, both conviction-based and non-conviction-based. The low
number of successful recoveries outside the VSOAM underscores the finding in IO 7 that most LEAs
exhibit low understanding and use of parallel financial investigations, which aid the identification of
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. As discussed under IO 7, LEAs lack the necessary training and
adequate personnel to carry out parallel financial investigations in order for them to be able to identify
benefits arising from high-risk offences and possible laundering activities of the proceeds.
203. Additionally, Angola has not demonstrated that it implements any measures in terms of TF. In
this vein, the results of confiscations are consistent with ML/TF risks and national AML/CFT policies
and priorities only to a limited extent, i.e. focused on the recovery of proceeds of corruption only.
199. To some extent, Angola has demonstrated that it pursues the recovery of proceeds of crime
as a policy objective through the recoveries it has registered in terms of embezzled public funds
which may have been precipitated by corrupt practices. Angola has used asset confiscation as a
policy objective to combat financial crimes, as evidenced by the bigger number of cases with final
recoveries that SENRA has registered, which surpass the number of concluded ML prosecuted.
Angola, through SENRA, has managed to freeze and seize high value cash and assets both in Angola
and abroad. However, while Angola has made significant seizures and freezing orders in respect of
a wide range and volume of assets, the number of cases in which Angola has implemented seizure
and freezing of assets is relatively low when compared to the number of corruption related cases
(including embezzlement) Angola has investigated.
200. Furthermore, while SENRA has registered some success in the recovery of high value
proceeds of corruption through the VSOAM, there is no similar attention given to instrumentalities
of crime or property of corresponding value. Further, the prioritization of recoveries in corruption-
related ML cases is consistent with the country’s ML/TF risk profile to the extent that corruption
related offences generated the highest proceeds, though the number of cases in which the recoveries
have been made is low when compared to the number of investigated corruption-related predicate
offences. However, there are no recorded recoveries of proceeds of other high and medium proceeds-
generating offences.
201. Additionally, the recoveries registered so far are in the context of the VSOAM, which
depends on the willingness of offenders to make a voluntary declaration of their illicit gains. There
is low level of effectiveness of the other confiscation mechanisms such as conviction-based and non-
conviction-based confiscation, which Angola would have to pursue in cases where there is no
voluntary surrender of assets. The low understanding and use of parallel financial investigations at
the outset of criminal investigations adversely affects the early identification of assets, which resulted
into a low number of confiscations. Additionally, to some extent, Angola has not demonstrated that
it confiscates cash currency that the authorities seize due to false or non-declarations, as an effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanction. Further, Angola has not yet not targeted BNIs that might have
been falsely declared or undeclared. Furthermore, Angola has not yet pursued any provisional
measures on, or confiscation of assets in relation to TF. In essence, the results of recoveries of tainted
property reflect the assessments of ML/TF and national AML/CFT policies and priorities only to a
limited extent, i.e. the recovery of proceeds of corruption related offences under the VSOAM so far.
The observations made above exhibit that major improvements are required in Angola’s asset
recovery system.
202. Angola has achieved a moderate level of effectiveness on IO 8.
Key Findings
Immediate Outcome 9
a) UIF, SINSE and SIE demonstrated a good understanding of the TF risks. SINSE and SIE actively work
to identify potential TF threats to Angola, and TF typologies in other jurisdictions, and share this information
with relevant authorities to enhance TF risk understanding. Authorities utilize information provided by external
sources to initiate TF investigations and build cases with additional relevant information available to advance TF
investigations.
b) Angola has taken some alternative measures when there is an identified TF threat that does not warrant
pursuing a conviction, including visa denials and enhanced surveillance.
c) Due to lack of TF convictions, it was not possible for the Assessors to determine the extent to which
terrorists, terrorist organizations and terrorist financiers are deprived (whether through criminal, civil or
administrative processes) of assets and instrumentalities related to TF activities. The lack of TF convictions is
largely in line with Angola’s TF risk profile.
d) Angola does not have formalized TF cooperation structures or a formal interagency cooperation on TF as
part of a broader CFT and CT strategy. Relevant authorities cooperate on TF cases through established statutory
mechanisms which function adequately but do not have a specific TF focus. Angola’s counterterrorism strategy
was not finalized at time of the on-site.
e) Angola has limited capacity among the LEAs to disrupt a TF offence or identify, track or seize assets
connected with a TF offence, however, the resources dedicated to TF appear reasonable based on Angola’s risk
profile.
f) Initial TF investigations conducted by PGR (DNPCC) focus on establishing whether the facts of the case
constitute a potential TF offense. When this threshold is met, DNPCC forwards the case to DNIAP which appears
to rely on sending rogatory letters to other jurisdictions to gather additional evidence of TF activity without
actively pursuing additional information domestically.
g) Angola’s criminalization of TF has technical deficiencies, notably the inability to infer knowledge and
intent through objective factual circumstances but there was no evidence this has prevented Angola from pursuing
TF investigations and prosecutions.
Immediate Outcome 10
h) Angola does not effectively implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) in terms of UNSCR 1267 and
1373, mainly because of technical deficiencies within the framework of applicable laws and regulations. Its legal
framework creates confusion on when the obligation to implement freezes begins which impacts its effectiveness
(see R.6).
i) Angola’s competent authority to respond to domestic and international requests for designation, does not
also have the responsibility to propose persons or entities to the relevant UNSC Committee for designation.
j) Angola does not always implement TFS without delay. The mechanism for communicating designations
of UNSCR does not always occur without delay.
k) BNA and UIF have issued guidance to assist reporting entities in understanding their obligations as it
relates to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
l) FIs, most NBFIs, and some DNFBPs demonstrated a good understanding of TFS obligations, while other
DNFBPs like DPMS had a limited understanding.
m) Angola has not identified the sub-set of NPOs vulnerable to TF abuse, does not have the capacity to
conduct risk-based supervision of this sector, and is not able to apply focused and proportionate measures to
prevent misuse of NPOs for TF purposes.
Immediate Outcome 11
n) Angola reported no assets were frozen pursuant to UNSC designations during the reporting period despite
an identified PF threat. Angola reported alternative freezing actions were taken absent UNSC designations, but
did not provide adequate information to determine if these measures were relevant to or should have been
conducted in line with UN obligations. Angola established a committee to coordinate Angola’s response to UNSC
1718 sanctions obligations, but this committee does not have a specific focus on PF.
o) The same lack of legal clarity cited in IO.10 also creates confusion on when the legal obligation to
implement freezes begins, which combined with delays in notification limits Angola’s effective implementation
of PF-related TFS. The Angola agencies, FIs and DNFBPs do not adequately implement UNSCRs on combating
PF and this is due to the absence of comprehensive procedures, instructions or mechanisms. The awareness of the
TFS requirements in relation to PF is weak.
p) Reporting institutions had a general understanding of their obligations to implement UN sanctions, but
did not demonstrate an understanding of PF-related sanctions evasion typologies.
q) The legal obligation to comply with PF-related TFS began in 2017 and Angola has not demonstrated that
not all reporting entities are monitored for compliance with these obligations. Supervisory authorities have not
issued PF-specific instructions and guidelines.
Recommended Actions
Immediate Outcome 9
a) Angola should develop and implement formal interagency cooperation among relevant authorities on all
stages of TF cases as part of a national CT strategy which includes CFT as a core pillar, and a corresponding
strategy to mitigate Angola’s TF risks.
b) Relevant LEAs and judicial authorities should develop TF investigative expertise to diminish reliance on
information from external sources to initiate and develop investigations, and operational capacity to identify,
investigate, and prosecute TF cases consistent with Angola’s TF risk profile, notably higher risk TF activities, such
as raising and moving funds to support terrorist activities outside of Angola.
c) PGR should develop and document TF investigative procedures to guide initial investigations to determine
criminality and the following criminal investigations to focus investigations on proactively pursuing all relevant
information to determine if TF activity has occurred.
d) SIC and UIF should enhance cooperation during TF investigations to share information on suspects and
initiate monitoring of financial activities. Angola should enhance its TF knowledge and capacity through
specialized TF trainings targeted among relevant agencies involved in the identification and investigation of TF.
e) Angola should address technical deficiencies in its criminalization of terrorist financing, notably the ability
to infer knowledge and intent through objective factual circumstances.
Immediate Outcome 10
f) Angola should address the remaining technical deficiencies in their legal and institutional framework to clarify
when UN designations come into force domestically and implement targeted financial sanctions related to UN
designations without delay.
g) Angola should identify a competent authority or a court with responsibility for proposing persons or entities to
the relevant UNSC Committee for designation.
h) Competent authorities should conduct targeted outreach to reporting entities, particularly DNFBPs, to inform
them of their obligations to comply with UN sanctions.
i) Competent authorities should identify the sub-set of NPOs which are vulnerable to TF abuse and develop
procedures to conduct targeted risk based supervision of this sector.
j) Angola should develop a strategy and guidelines which establish procedures to take administrative measures
to monitor or disrupt potential TF when cases have been identified while the investigated process is conducted.
k) Angola should ensure that competent authorities have adequate capacity to carry out risk-based supervision
and monitor the activities of NPO for any possible abuse for TF purposes.
Immediate Outcome 11
l) Angola should address the remaining technical deficiencies in their legal and institutional framework to clarify
when UN designations come into force domestically and implement targeted financial sanctions related to UN
designations without delay.
m) Angola’s relevant authorities should improve interagency cooperation with a specific focus on mitigating PF
risks, including studying sanctions evasion typologies and abuse of beneficial ownership loopholes.
n) Supervisory authorities should conduct targeted outreach to reporting entities to inform them of their
obligations to comply with UN sanctions and PF-related sanctions evasion typologies.
o) Angola should develop investigatory processes and procedures to identify all assets held by UN-designated
persons and entities after initial freezing actions are taken and such persons and entities are prevented from
operating or from executing financial transactions related to proliferation.
p) Supervisory authorities should conduct targeted outreach to reporting entities to inform them of their
obligations to comply with UN PF-related sanctions and PF-related sanctions evasion typologies. Angola should
develop clear processes and procedures for monitoring and managing assets frozen pursuant to PF-related sanctions
obligations.
204. The relevant Immediate Outcomes considered and assessed in this chapter are IO.9-11. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R. 1, 4, 5–8, 30, 31
and 39, and elements of R.2, 14, 15, 16, 32, 37, 38 and 40.
the financial activities of suspected persons and entities. Steps were taken to determine that suspected
individuals had no international financial connections, and were not raising revenue for TF purposes. The
breakdown of investigatory responsibilities between competent authorities appears largely effective as
UIF analyses and enriches TF-related STRs, and SIC conducts preliminary investigations, to identify if
cases are worth forwarding to PGR for further investigation. However, it does not appear financial
intelligence is adequately utilized at all phases of investigations, and PGR has limited TF expertise. UIF
disseminates analysis based on STRs but this has not resulted in prosecutions during the reporting period
(See Immediate Outcome 6 for additional information).
208. During the reporting period, UIF received 23 TF-related STRs which resulted in 13 TF-related
disseminations to relevant authorities after initial analysis verified suspicious activity and enriched the
STRs with additional information on the suspects and suspected activities. Three of the TF-related STRs
prompted PGR to initiate criminal investigations. Prior to disseminating STRs to competent authorities,
UIF leverages open sources and a closed source database to identify beneficial owners and enrich the
STRs with additional information and context. UIF has two analysts which focus on TF and terrorism-
related issues. Given the relatively low number of TF-related STR submissions, this appears largely
adequate to analyse these cases.
209. PGR is the prosecuting authority responsible for the ultimate decision on whether or not to refer
any TF case before the court for prosecution. PGR’s National Directorate for Fighting Corruption
(DNPCC) conducts an initial inquiry of all economic crimes cases, including TF. DNPCC has 9 attorneys
supported by 11 technicians. These officials do not have specialized TF-investigative expertise. When
provided a case of potential criminal TF activity, DNPCC conducts a broad initial investigation to
determine if there is sufficient evidence of potential criminal activity to warrant initiating a formal
criminal investigation. In cases involving foreign nationals, DNPCC also works with Angola’s
immigration service to determine the suspect’s immigration status. DNPCC reported it does not have any
internal manuals or procedures which guide the conduct of these initial inquiries into economic crimes
cases. Given the lack of TF expertise and TF-specific procedures, these initial investigations focus on
establishing a base level of criminal activity to pursue further rather than to identify specific TF-related
criminal conduct. Where there is sufficient evidence of criminal TF activity, DNPCC forwards the case
to the National Directorate of Investigation and Criminal Action (DNIAP) to open a criminal case. While
this method of graduated investigations functions adequately, its effectiveness is limited by PGR’s limited
TF expertise. During the reporting period PGR has not handled any standalone terrorism cases, and
therefore has not had the need to conduct a parallel TF investigation along a terrorism investigation.
210. DNIAP has the authority to request financial records from Fis, NBFIs, and select DNFBPs, as
well as to direct SIC to conduct surveillance of a suspect in order to gather potential evidence to build a
criminal case. However, in the TF cases provided, DNIAP did not take these steps. Instead, DNIAP relied
on sending rogatory letters to foreign partners to ascertain if criminal activity occurred in the foreign
jurisdiction or the partners have additional evidence of criminal activity. During the course of its
investigation into the three TF cases, DNIAP determined that one case did not have sufficient evidence
of criminality based on responses provided by foreign partners. This was case archived and can be
reopened if additional information of criminal activity is provided. The other two TF cases are undergoing
ongoing investigation and are awaiting responses to rogatory letters sent to foreign partners for additional
evidence demonstrating criminal activity. This reliance on responses to rogatory letters without using all
means necessary to collect additional evidence domestically limits the effectiveness of DNIAP’s TF
investigations. DNIAP only forwards cases to the courts for prosecution when there is a reasonable
certainty a judge would find it a compelling case of criminality likely to result in sentencing. The ongoing
TF investigations appear to be in line with Angola’s TF risk profile.
211. Angola’s Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) reported three preliminary investigations
into potential TF during the reporting period. SIC initiated these investigations based on
information shared by intelligence services and other sources SIC leverages open-source material
and clandestine sources to develop potential evidence of criminal activity to advance to PGR to
initiate a criminal investigation when warranted. This includes leveraging sources and investigative
techniques to investigate the suspects’ financial activities and connections to ascertain the level of
potential TF activity or TF risk. The three preliminary investigations ultimately determined that the
reported TF activities were not occurring in Angola, and absent a nexus to Angola did not warrant further
investigation by SIC or forwarding to PGR to initiate criminal investigations. SIC did not cooperate with
UIF on these investigations due to the extraterritorial nature of the cases. This appears reasonable, but not
sharing the case details with UIF precludes developing a holistic understanding of potential TF risks and
threats among relevant authorities. During the reporting period, SIC has not dealt with any there had been
no standalone domestic terrorism cases. However, SIC reported that intelligence services and other
sources provide reports and alerts of terrorism activities and typologies being utilized abroad. SIC uses
these reports and alerts to enhance its understanding of terrorist activities and enhance surveillance of said
activities to proactively monitor for similar terrorist activities and typologies being practiced in Angola.
4.2.3 TF investigation integrated with –and supportive of- national strategies
212. Angola does not have a national counter terrorism strategy nor an approved national
AML/CFT strategy. Angola’s ongoing TF investigations and counter terrorism investigations
therefore occur on an ad-hoc basis and are not integrated into a broader counter terrorism strategy.
Interagency cooperation functions adequately along statutorily defined relationships between agencies
when dealing with criminal matters, however the lack of defined TF-specific cooperation and coordination
appears to reduce effectiveness as not all information regarding potential TF and terrorism cases and
activities is shared among all authorities. Certain authorities spoke of a recognition of growing terrorist
and terrorist financing activity in the region and the need to proactively strengthen Angola’s ability to
mitigate these threats. However, not all authorities shared this approach and there was no overall strategy
to guide and coordinate efforts.
213. Angola reported that a Presidential Decree authorized the establishment of a National
Observatory Against Terrorism (NOAT). However, at the time of the on-site, the NOAT had not yet been
established. Terrorism issues are therefore handled by Angola’s National Security Council, but only on
an ad hoc basis. Authorities reported that the National Security Council has not considered policy changes
to mitigate Angola’s TF risks or any operational activities to disrupt TF.
4.2.4 Effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of sanctions
214. The legal regime in Angola provides for TF sanctions that are proportionate and dissuasive (see
Rec 5). However, these have not been tested in practice, as there have not been any prosecutions and
convictions for TF during the reporting period. Therefore, the effectiveness of these sanctions cannot be
determined.
4.2.5 Alternative measures used where TF conviction is not possible (e.g. disruption)
215. Angola did not report the use of alternative disruptive measures during the reporting
period. However, Angola has implemented a number of reforms which have reduced Angola’s
vulnerability to TF although it is not clear that these reforms were guided by a strategy to reduce
Angola’s TF vulnerabilities. This includes reforms to enhance controls on hard currency distributed to
exchange bureau which reduced the scope of this sector and associated parallel market reduce reliance on
cash, formalize the economy, enhance border controls and reduce the amount of hard currency which can
be carried abroad. UIF has the powers to request FIs to suspend accounts if a transaction is suspected to
facilitate TF. However, during the reporting period, there were no cases of suspected TF activities
involving UN designated terrorist organizations which would warrant UIF to initiate such a request as all
TF-related STRs did not involve UN-designated terrorist organizations. Additionally, UIF published
guidance on suspicious indicators of TF to inform reporting entities of potential TF typologies to monitor
for. Reporting entities had a varying level of familiarity with this document and indicators, with banks
demonstrating more familiarity while DNFBPs were less familiar and had less understanding of TF
typologies.
216. Angolan authorities reported that it screens visa applications to prevent potential TF activities.
One example was provided where the brother of a suspected terrorist financier applied for a visa but the
request was denied once the familial relation was determined. Additionally, authorities reported that an
Angolan citizen convicted of TF in a foreign jurisdiction has been under enhanced monitoring since their
return to Angola following the completion of their prison sentence in the foreign jurisdiction. This
demonstrates that Angola takes alternative measures when a TF risk is identified but does not warrant
pursuing a TF conviction. While there was no evidence provided of other alternative measures—such as
deradicalization, deportation, tracing TF, and programs for stakeholders to increase awareness of TF—
being proactively applied to effectively disrupt TF, given Angola’s risk profile, and active efforts to
identify potential terrorist and terrorist financing threats to and within Angola, the lack of said measures
being applied appears reasonable.
of NPOs which could be prone to abuse for TF purposes. The National Directorate for Social Action
(DNAS) within MASFAMU has the authority to monitor NPO financial flows for compliance with
ML/TF requirements. Authorities indicated that within DNAS the Directorate of Community
Development (DDC) has the authority to supervise and sanction NPOs for TF purposes. DDC has not yet
begun conducting risk-based oversight of at-risk NPOs, and is still in the early stages of developing its
supervisory capacity and procedures, as a result Angola is not yet effectively monitoring NPOs at risk of
abuse for TF. UIF and MASFAMU have conducted some initial outreach to NPOs to inform the sector of
potential TF risks and vulnerabilities. The frequency of outreach by MASFAMU to inform NPOs of TF
risks and vulnerabilities could not be determined. The NPOs which the assessment team met with were
not familiar with the TF risks they could be exposed to. They independently applied scrutiny on their
donors and adhered to international due diligence best practices but this was not done with a focus on
identifying potential terrorist financiers.
223. MASFAMU reported that not all NPOs currently comply with reporting obligations and it needs
to conduct a mapping exercise to better understand the composition of the sector. While some NPOs stated
they provide annual reports to MASFAMU, it is not clear what portion of NPOs comply with this
requirement and this reporting is for broader supervision of NPOs and NGOs rather than targeted TF
supervision. Overall, MASFAMU’s understanding of the NPO sector and its supervisory capacity appears
to be in early stages of development with a limited focus and capacity to effectively mitigate TF abuse in
high-risk NPOs.
4.3.3 Deprivation of TF assets and instrumentalities
224. Angola reported no assets were frozen pursuant to UNSCR 1267 designations, and had not
made use of its domestic designation framework to target terrorist financiers in Angola. Relevant
authorities demonstrated a good understanding of the process to respond to UNSCR 1373 requests and to
add persons or entities to Angola’s National List, but at the time of the on-site neither of these measures
have been utilized.
225. While Angola reported measures to investigate TF, the competent authorities did not provide any
specific approach they have adopted to target terrorist assets. Where TF cases are investigated to generate
evidence of criminality, there were no reported efforts to trace or monitor and freeze or seize assets of the
suspected terrorist financiers as provisional measures during the course of the investigations, however,
there is no obligation to do so as the groups involved are not UN-designated terrorist organizations. Where
assets were frozen or accounts suspended, these actions appear to have been taken unilaterally by the
reporting entities which identified suspicious transactions or customers associated with potential TF.
1.1.4 Consistency of measures with overall TF risk profile
226. Angola’s measures on TFS and NPOs are somewhat consistent with the TF risk profile of
the country, but significant gaps remain. Despite the low risk Angola has specialised anti-terrorism
units within SIC and the intelligence services which study potential TF risks and apply counter-
measures in relation to terrorism and terrorist financing activities such as monitoring of persons
from jurisdictions identified as high TF risk. Angola’s authorities advised that they continuously apply
special preventative measures such as intelligence gathering, surveillance and other investigative
techniques as well as sharing of information on terrorism and TF. Angola demonstrated proactive
measures being taken to study regional TF methodologies. This information was shared with competent
authorities to enhance understanding of Angola’s potential exposure to TF abuse. These activities appear
in line with Angola’s TF risk profile, but have not translated into an effective use of TFS and technical
and operational deficiencies appear to limit the effective implementation of TFS. Additionally, despite
the low risk, significant deficiencies remain in Angola’s monitoring of NPOs as the sub-set of high risk
NPOs has not been identified and relevant authorities did not demonstrate a thorough understanding of
how NPOs could be abused for TF purposes or measures to monitor for such activity. Despite these
shortcomings, the measures being taken appear consistent with Angola’s low TF risk profile.
227. Angola has two mechanisms to communicate TF-related UNSC updates to reporting entities.
UIF’s mechanism is intended to communicate updates in a timelier manner, but does not always occur
without delay. There is also confusion on when UN designations come into legal force domestically and
the obligation for reporting entities to implement freezes begins based on technical deficiencies in
Angola’s legal framework. This combined with occasional delays in list update dissemination reduces
Angola’s ability to effectively implement TFS without delay. Angola has not identified the sub-set of
NPOs at risk of TF abuse and does not have the capacity to conduct risk based supervision of this sector.
Angola has not taken measures to deprive suspected terrorist financiers of assets. The measures it has
taken to reduce its TF risk are consistent with Angola’s risk profile but were not taken as part of a
strategy to reduce said risk. Angola has taken measures to reduce its risks but still requires fundamental
improvements to enhance its effectiveness to preventing funds being raised, moved, and used by
terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist financers.
229. Angola’s economy produces minimal military or dual-use nuclear items. Angola has historical
ties with DPRK resulting in military relations and some economic ties. DPRK maintains an Embassy in
Angola and has provided military equipment and training as well as conducting construction projects.
Prior to 2020, Angola hosted one of the largest populations of DPRK laborers in Africa. Angola has less
developed ties with Iran.
4.4.1 Implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing without
delay
230. Angola’s freezing regime to implement TFS related to PF came into force in 2017 through
Angola’s Law on the Prevention and Fight Against Terrorism which also cites PF-related UNSCRs.
The AML Law further establishes the legal obligation to implement targeted financial sanctions
related to PF to reporting entities. These obligations are established by Law 1/2012 “Law About the
Designation and Execution of Legal Acts” which only established freezing obligations pursuant to
UNSCR 1267. Despite an identified PF-risk and other non-TFS measures taken in response to 1718
Committee actions, Angola reported it has not frozen any assets with its freezing regime so it does not
appear this mechanism is being utilized effectively. Reporting entities, other than FIs, had a limited
understanding of PF-related TFS obligations which demonstrated that PF-related TFS are not effectively
implemented without delay.
231. UIF utilizes the same mechanism described in IO.10 to disseminate PF-related UNSC updates to
reporting entities. This creates a cascading deficiency in the implementation of TFS without delay as some
examples provided demonstrated reporting entities at times received UN list updates up to 7 days after
the designation was announced. Additionally, the same confusion described in Recommendation 6 on
when UN designations come into force domestically is also relevant.
4.4.2 Identification of assets and funds held by designated persons/entities and prohibitions
232. At the time of the on-site, no PF-related assets had been frozen pursuant to UN designations
in Angola.
233. The 1718 Committee UN Panel of Experts identified two UN-designated entities operating in
Angola. Authorities did not provide evidence of efforts taken to identify assets and funds held by these
designated entities and corresponding actions taken to prevent them from executing financial transactions
related to proliferation, although Angola’s UNSCR 1718 Implementation Reports claim accounts are
being monitored. This could be due to the limited access to accurate and up to date beneficial ownership
information (see IO.5). This affects the capacity of reporting entities and authorities to identify the use of
legal persons and arrangements to evade sanctions and the effectiveness of the regime by limiting its
ability to identify assets held by designated persons.
234. A Presidential Decree was issued prohibiting economic activities with DPRK persons and a
Committee was established to respond to Angola’s obligations pursuant to UN Sanctions Committees
Angola’s implementation reports to the 1718 Committee reported a number of notices sent to relevant
authorities informing them of the obligations to comply with relevant follow-on resolutions to UNSCR
1718, the contracts of all companies of DPRK origin operating in Angola were terminated, and the
accounts of said companies were being monitored.. However, no information was provided to demonstrate
competent authorities or the Committee have identified assets of designated persons and corresponding
actions to sever any economic ties. Angola’s Customs authorities, LEAs, and intelligence services have
standing interagency task force, Container Control Program (CCP), at the Port of Luanda. CCP screens
all incoming vessels against the UN list, but did not report a positive match during the reporting period.
CCP also did not provide information on any specific efforts taken to strengthen export controls to screen
for dual use items although intelligence services spoke about the need for greater diligence on vessels
entering Angola, including to verify that a vessel is not using a third-party country flag to obfuscate its
DPRK origins.
235. Angola did report on efforts taken to identify and deport DPRK laborers active in Angola. This
resulted in a reported 293 laborers deported from Angola. Angola did not report any proposals or co-
sponsorships of PF-related UN designations.
4.4.3 FIs, DNFBPs and VASPs’ understanding of and compliance with obligations
236. FIs demonstrated a good understanding of their obligations to screen existing and future
clients against UNSC sanctions lists, including those related to PF. However, this knowledge was
limited to basic screening measures and no additional steps to verify UBOs where there may be suspicion
of PF-related sanctions evasion.
237. DNFBPs were generally familiar with UNSC sanctions, but some had limited understanding of
their obligations after receiving UN sanctions lists from their supervisory entity. Some DNFBPs stated a
need for greater training on their obligations and tools to implement. FIs and DNFBPs did not demonstrate
a thorough understanding of potential sanctions evasions techniques which would trigger enhanced due
diligence.
238. UIF published guidance on PF-related obligations in 2022 and sanctions evasion red flags. This
guidance covered broad illicit finance typologies with some specific sanction evasion techniques and
reporting entities demonstrated varied familiarity with the guidance document.
4.4.4 Competent authorities ensuring and monitoring compliance
239. Angola’s UN Sanctions Committee Response Committee is managing the
implementation of UNSCR obligations and reporting on actions taken. While actions were reported
to ensure economic ties were severed, no information was provided to demonstrate the Committee was
monitoring compliance by reporting entities.
240. BNA reported that its on-site and off-site inspections include criteria to verify reporting entities
are implementing PF-related UN sanctions. However, a sample of BNA inspection reports demonstrate
assessing FI compliance with UN PF-related sanctions obligations is not always an inspection criteria.
During the reporting period, BNA stated that no violations of PF-related sanctions obligations were
detected. BNA also stated that it was made aware of assets frozen pursuant to UNSCR 1718, but this was
done indirectly. Supervision and compliance monitoring of PF-related obligations is at an early stage as
it commenced only in 2017, and no sanctions have been applied so far. Supervisors, other than BNA, do
not perform PF-related inspections; supervision is limited to checking how some banks screen against
TFS lists.
241. Select authorities reported working with BNA to verify the UBOs of companies registered by
DPRK persons in Angola. These actions were taken to ensure said companies were not continuing to
operate by changing ownership, but it is not clear if this included UN-designated entities.
242. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 214/13, PGR is the competent authority responsible for managed
assets frozen pursuant to all UNSC sanctions actions. However, PGR was not aware of this responsibility
and was generally unfamiliar with the concept of frozen rather than seized assets. Therefore, it is not clear
if Angola has a mechanism to manage assets frozen pursuant to PF-related UNSCRs.
243. Angola has taken a number of actions to respond to UNSC 1718 obligations, but those actions
were not part of a cohesive counter PF strategy and the focus was not implementing PF-related TFS
obligations. Reporting entities had a general understanding of their obligation to implement PF-related
UN sanctions, but this was largely limited to screening clients against UNSC list updates and not
conducting due diligence to screen for potential sanctions evasion activities. Authorities, other than
BNA, have not yet begun monitoring reporting entities for compliance with PF-related UN sanctions
compliance and there are not clear procedures to manage frozen assets. Angola requires fundamental
improvements to enhance its effectiveness to combat PF.
Key Findings
Financial Institutions
a) Generally, FIs more especially banks and securities companies have demonstrated a good
understanding of ML risks to a larger extent. The understanding of the risk was attributed to the
dissemination of the national risk assessment report to the entities by the supervisors and completion
of own entity risk assessment. Other NBFIs (exchange bureau, MVTS and micro-finance institutions
(MFIs) demonstrated a fair understanding of ML risk. Banks and securities companies have developed
appropriate AML/CFT controls and processes to mitigate risks to a larger extent, while other NBFIs
applied basic AML controls to a lesser extent. Appreciation of TF risk is much less developed across
all FIs.
b) Banks and securities companies demonstrated good understanding on application of EDD and
ongoing due diligence (ODD) better than other FIs and have demonstrated a better application of risk
mitigation measures on high-risk business relationships such as PEPs, high-risk countries, customers
and transactions to a larger extent.
c) CDD and record keeping measures are well understood and are implemented to a larger extent
in the FIs sector, but there is a lack of consistency in the processes for obtaining and verifying beneficial
ownership information, therefore, in some instance there is undue reliance placed on customers’ self-
declarations since there is no reliable independent databases to verify the beneficial owner’s
identification documents. Banks demonstrated a good understanding of BO which has enabled
application of BO measures, though some improvements are required.
d) FIs have put in place systems including automated systems to identify and verify PEPs and
other high-risk customers business relationships and transactions, though international systems do not
in some cases have data on some local PEPs. The FIs use independent sources of information including
from Government gazette and open sources as well as self-declarations to identify and verify PEPs,
though challenges exist in respect of identifying family members and close associates of local PEPs.
e) Banks have put in place proper mechanisms to identify suspicious transactions and the latter
have been reporting majority of suspicious transaction during the last five years, while NBFIs reported
few suspicious transactions. Securities and MFIs have not reported suspicious transactions over the
past five years as they relegate their functions to banks which hold their accounts. Exchange Bureaux
and MVTS reported few suspicious transactions because of limited understanding of what constitutes
a suspicion. Banks have reported few suspicious transactions relating to TF, while NBFIs have reported
no suspicious transaction in relation to TF.
g) DNFBP’s understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations is underdeveloped and mitigating
measures are not risk-based owing to poor supervision.
h) DNFBPs apply basic CDD, however, the measures and mitigating controls applied were not
commensurate with the risk profile of the DNFBP sector, and specially with those of higher risk
business relationships and transactions such as in real estate and dealers in precious metals and
stones. There is no evidence of cases of business refusal, based on incomplete CDD.
i) BO information and ongoing monitoring for high-risk clients are performed to a negligible extent
across the DNFBP sector.
j) There are no STR’s filed by DNFBPs even from high-risk sectors such as real estate and dealers in
precious metals and stones, which is not commensurate with their risk profile. This is attributable
to inadequate or absence of processes and systems for monitoring suspicious transaction.
Recommended Actions
a) Reporting entities (other than banks and securities) should conduct ML/TF institutional risk
assessments relevant for improving ML/TF risk understanding by focusing on customers,
products/services, delivery channels and geographical risks and use the understanding to apply
mitigating controls commensurate to the risks identified.
b) Except for banks, reporting entities should improve their understanding and application of BO of
customers
c) NBFIs should put in place systems and procedures to enable detection and reporting of suspicious
transactions and increase STRs filed to the UIF
d) NBFIs should put in place systems and procedures for identifying individuals and entities on UNSCRs on
TFS on TF and PF.
e) Should VASPs be allowed to operate, Angola should develop ML/TF risks associated with VAs
and apply mitigating measures commensurate with ML/TF risks identified.
DNFBPs
f) DNFBPs should conduct ML/TF institutional risk assessments to understand ML/TF risks
prevalent in their customers, business relationships and transactions and apply commensurate
controls to mitigate identified risks.
g) DNFBPs should develop and implement AML/CFT programs commensurate to risks and size of
business including, appointment of AML/CFT compliance officers, ongoing AML/CFT staff and
board of directors training, AML/CFT policies and procedures, and independent audit functions to
test the AML/CFT system.
h) DNFBPs should develop an understanding of and apply CDD measures particularly EDD, ODD,
BO for high-risk situations and keep accurate, reliable and updated records.
i) DNFBPs should develop and apply robust mitigating controls particularly in relation to PEPs,
STRs, and TFS on TF.
245. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.4. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.9-23, and elements
of R.1, 6, 15 and 29.
Background
246. Law no. 05/20 of January 27 is the main piece of legislation setting out the AML/CFT obligations
for reporting entities in Angola. The Law was enacted on December 23, 2019, and was revised on January
27, 2020. The Law covers all FIs and DNFBPs but does not cover VASPs. Considering the relative
materiality and risk in the context of Angola, the relevant sectors were weighed as follows for focus:
• most heavily weighted - banks, bureau de change, MVTS, dealers in precious metals and stones and
real estate sectors.
• moderately heavily weighted - casinos and securities.
• less heavily weighed – accountants, lawyers, non-deposit taking micro-finance institutions and
mobile money operator.
• insurance sector was not considered since they offer credit-linked life insurance (about 2 %) and
non-life insurance (98%).
247. The findings on IO.4 are based on interviews with and information obtained from the private
sector and public sector representatives such as supervisors, LEAs and UIF. The assessors interviewed
eight banks, one security market participants and Angola Stock Market Exchange, three insurance
participants, three MVTS (one MVTS also offers money exchange and one MVTS offers mobile money),
one bureau de change, two micro-finance institution, one casino, one law firm, one accountant firm, one
real estate agent, two dealers in precious metal and stones participants.
Financial Institutions
249. Banks and securities have demonstrated a good understanding of ML risks and AML/CFT
obligations. Dissemination of the findings of the NRA by the supervisors to financial institutions
contributed to their improved understanding of ML risks. The prevailing risk understanding has also
been attributable to the annual self-risk assessment which are undertaken by institutions as well as other
supervisory actions such as inspections and outreach to FIs. Overall, the methodologies of ML risk
analysis and classification of risk factors are more developed in the banking sector, likewise, level of
understanding of ML risks is most understood in the banking sector than other FIs. Banks cited informal
economy, high prevalence of transacting in cash, fraudulent use of ATM cards and the parallel exchange
market as major ML risks facing the country in general and the sector in particular. Banks also highlighted
corruption and fraud as the most frequently committed offences generating the most proceeds which are
laundered through the sector. The understanding found support in the contents of the suspicious
transactions reported filed by banks to UIF which revealed fraud, unusual cash large transactions and
failure to provide information to support the transaction being some of the main risk concerns. Banks and
securities have also demonstrated good understanding of their AML/CFT obligations as contained in Law
05/20 owing mainly to ML internal risk assessment conducted by entities, dissemination of the NRA and
SRA findings to the supervised entities by supervisors, feedback provided by the supervisors after an
onsite inspection and awareness-raising/training activities by the supervisors and the UIF, and self-
assessment questionnaires conducted by institutions which are further considered by and receive feedback
from the supervisors.
250. MFIs, exchange bureau and MVTS demonstrated a fair understanding of ML risk and AML/CFT
obligations. These sectors indicated that they have not yet conducted entity risk assessment but had
demonstrated a fair understanding of the ML risks based on information gleaned from the NRA and
interactions with their supervisor, as well as day-to-day business operations They attribute the level of
risk and AML/CFT obligations understanding to same actions described earlier for banks.
DNFBPs
251. In general, the DNFBPs showed a relatively low level of understanding of the ML/TF risks
and AML/CFT obligations. Poor level of understanding of ML and TF risks by the DNFBP sector was
attributable to lack of supervisory actions such as awareness-raising on AML/CFT obligations and
compliance monitoring by the DNFBP supervisors. DNFBP representatives met had some basic
knowledge of the most prevalent crimes generating proceeds in Angola - notably, corruption,
embezzlement drug trafficking, human trafficking, tax evasion, wildlife trafficking and illegal dealing in
precious stones and metals. The understanding was developed from the NRA results shared by the UIF.
However, the DNFBP entities have not demonstrated how such knowledge and understanding of risks is
used against ML/TF.
DNFBPs
254. DNFBPs have not demonstrated that they have conducted institutional ML/TF risk
assessment for ML/TF risk understanding and applied commensurate AML/CFT programmes,
policies and procedures for risk mitigation owing to inadequate supervisory activities. The reporting
entities met had recently started implementing improved customer identification measures, though
constrained by the lack of risk understanding, following the instructions or guidelines provided by both
the UIF and some of the supervisors (for example real estate entities, casinos and dealers in precious
metals and stones supervisors). Some DNFBPs stated that their companies do not have written policies
and procedures for preventing or mitigating ML/TF risks
264. Systems and measures to determine whether a customer or BO is a PEP are effective to some
extent. Angola faces a significant risk of ML in relation to corruption and embezzlement of public funds
committed by PEPs as demonstrated in the NRA (See IO.1). FIs demonstrated a good understanding of
PEPs risks including how the risks manifest in business relationships and transactions especially in
relation to businesses. Where a customer or a beneficial owner is determined to be a PEP, banks and large
NBFIs take enhanced due diligence and monitoring measures to a large extent and to a lesser extent by
small NBFIs. Banks and large FIs subject PEP customers to enhanced CDD and ODD measures, enhanced
monitoring, and PEP customers are approved by a senior manager or equivalent structures such as high-
level committee.
265. Banks and larger NBFIs screen customers using automated screening systems such as
World Check, Lexus Nexus, Dow Jones, among others, for identification and verification of PEP
customers including BOs who are PEPs, before establishing a business relationship or conducting
one off transactions. The screening systems have been embedded in the banks’ core banking system and
when a prospective customer’s name is entered in the core banking system, an alert is triggered if the
prospective customer or BO is a PEP. Enhanced CDD measures is conducted on such customers in that
the bank request for proof of source of funds and source of wealth and prospective customers are escalated
to senior manager or a high-risk committee for approval. Since the screening system is embedded to the
bank’s core banking system, on an ongoing basis, the system screens the bank’s customer data against the
PEP system to identify new customers who might have been added in the PEP list. The screening system
is effective as far as internationally recognised PEPs are concerned. The minor challenge with the systems
is that the list does not include some local PEPs and their immediate family members and close associate
(for example; leaders of religious denominations) who are not internationally recognised. To counter the
challenge, banks have indicated that they rely on Government Gazette notices, open sources such media
and social media, self-declarations made by the customer through the questionnaire as well as employee’s
individual knowledge of the customer, to identify and verify the politically exposed status of a customer.
However, the Gazette notices do not list close associates and family member of a PEP, therefore, family
members and close associates of local PEPs are not identified and EDD measures are not applied to such.
266. DNFBPs and smaller NBFIs do not use automatic system for identification of PEPs; as such,
identification of PEPs was made through the questionnaire, where customers declared their PEP
status at onboarding, therefore, placing reliance on customer’s self-declaration. In addition, DNFBPs
and NBFIs rely on list provided through the Government gazette as well as knowledge that the customer
is a PEP. The challenge with this system is that the entities could not identify close associates and family
members of PEPs, therefore DNFBPs and smaller NBFIs do not apply EDD measures on close associates
and family member of PEPs. These segment of NBFIs is not the preferred destination of for high-risk
clients especially PEPs. There is a limited identification of PEPs that are BO, due to limited understanding
of identification of BO, and hence application of EDD is less effective in this area.
customer information including originator and beneficiary information. Banks and MVTS ensure that the
information obtained for both beneficiary and originator is maintained for 10 years (See analysis on record
keeping above). Banks and large MVTS have a good understanding and application of ML risks associated
with cross-border wire transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions, and therefore, apply enhanced CDD on
such customers and business transactions. Small MVTs have limited understanding of risks from high-
risk countries and as a result there are no measures in place to deal with customers from high-risk
countries. Banks have also indicated that they use the same process and systems as described under TFS
to check if the beneficiary is not in the UNSCR sanctions list to ensure that they do not transfer funds to
sanctioned individuals and entities, MVTS also use the internally generated list to check if an applicant
or recipient entity or individual is not in the sanctions list.
280. The DNFBP sector has not submitted any STR, SAR or CTR to the UIF, which is not
consistent with the risk profile of the country and of the specific sectors within the DNFBP sector.
With regards to tipping off obligations, the DNFBP reporting entities met did not provide elements that
could substantiate the existence of polices, internal controls or procedures for STRs identification and
filing and subsequently to comply with tipping-off rules. Most of the DNFBPs were not aware of the
consequences for breaching tipping-off rules in the procedures. In practice, there has not been incidents
of tipping-off violations observed during the period under review because DNFBPs have not reported any
STRs.
283. Overall, Banks and securities have a good understanding of ML risks and AML/CFT
obligations are implemented to a larger extent. Banks and securities showed higher measures in place
than the rest of the FIs. CDD including BO, EDD and ODD are well understood and applied by banks
on high-risk clients and transactions such as those from high-risk jurisdictions, though identification
and verification of CDD measures on BO is limited to some extent. NBFIs demonstrated a fair
understanding of ML risk and AML/CFT obligations are applied to a limited extent. All reporting
entities have demonstrated a limited understanding of TF risks. Measures against TFS and international
and domestic PEPs are well understood and applied by FIs, however, identification and application of
EDD measures for family members and close associates of domestic PEPs is being implemented to a
limited extent. Banks dominate STR submissions. Compliance function by large FIs is well
implemented. The DNFBPs could not effectively demonstrate that they do understand the ML/TF risks,
therefore, this has an impact on the level of implementation of AML/CFT measures and STR reporting
in this sector, more so that even the DNFBP sectors identified as high risk such as dealers in precious
metals and stones and real estate are also not effectively implementing AML/CFT obligations.
284. Angola is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO.4.
Chapter 6. SUPERVISION
Key Findings
a) Financial sector supervisors instituted fair market entry requirements which have to a large
extent enabled them to conduct fit and proper tests at market entry and on an on-going basis in the
event of a change in management or merger and acquisition to prevent criminals and their associates
from penetrating, though some improvements on addressing BO challenges are required. Except for
lawyers and accountants, DNFBP regulators have challenges in implementing market entry
requirements including BO.
b) Financial sector supervisors demonstrated a good understanding of ML at national, sectoral,
and to some extent at institutional level, but demonstrated less developed TF risk understanding. The
DNFBP’s supervisors understand ML/TF risks to a negligible extent.
c) Implementation of RBA is at emerging stage across the supervisors, with BNA a distant ahead.
However, the measures were introduced largely in 2021 which was too closer to the assessment period
bear the desired supervision outcomes. Financial sector supervisors have AML/CFT supervision tools
including risk assessment in place but will require increase in resources including training and funding
to supervise and monitor their entities effectively. DNFBP supervisors have no supervision tools in
place and were yet to conduct supervision activities including inspections.
d) While financial sector supervisors applied remedial actions and/or sanctions for non-
compliance with AML/CFT measures by their respective entities, the enforcement measures were
found to be not proportionate, dissuasive ad effective to impact positively on compliance behaviour.
Furthermore, outreach activities conducted, and guidance provided was narrow to address the specific
areas of high-risk and therefore had not been successful in promoting the understanding of ML/TF risks
across the sectors, though positive impact has been noted in respect of understanding of ML risk and
AML/CFT obligations by FIs.
e) Although financial sector supervisors held industry engagements with FIs in their respective
sectors after the completion of the NRA and the sectoral risk assessments to discuss the outcomes and
provide guidance to FIs on the ML risk they are facing, there has been negligible focus on promoting
the understanding of the TF risk in various sectors by financial supervisors. Industry engagements are
not adequate and frequent to promote the understanding of ML/TF risks as well as AML/CFT
obligations. a. Guidelines on AML/CFT obligations were issued by the UIF to all financial sectors, but
to a negligible extent in respect of the DNBFPs sector. Financial sector supervisors conducted some
outreach to FIs however, outreach to DNFBPs is done to a negligible extent.
f) There are no VAs and VASPs regulatory frameworks, and as such, they are not supervised for
AML/CFT compliance.
Recommended Actions
Financial supervisors:
a) Financial sector supervisors should improve understanding of TF risks by conducting granular
TF risk assessment on inherent risk assessments focusing on clients, products/services, delivery
channels and geographical risks. BNA should complete the refinement of the entity risk assessment
process and apply it to enhance its ML/TF risk understanding of at institutional level.
b) Financial sector supervisors should be provided with adequate resources (human, budget and
technical) and use it to conduct risk-based inspections.
c) Financial sector supervisors should apply proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for
compliance failures and ensure that inspected entities adhere to the timelines set for remediation by
instituting follow-up processes wherever failure to file progress reports occurs.
d) Financial institutions should develop and implement mechanisms including keeping of
statistics and case examples necessary to demonstrate change in compliance behaviour by entities.
e) Financial sector supervisors should develop awareness/outreach programmes and issue
sectoral/thematic guidance based on risks identified including on entity risk assessment, CDD measures
on high-risk scenarios, improving quality and diversity of STRs, screening of entities and individuals
for TFS.
f) Angola should regulate and apply AML/CFT measures on VASPs. Should Angola decide to
prohibit VA activities, the Authorities should implement measures to proactively identify illegal VA
and VASPs activities and apply commensurate sanctions.
DNFBPs Supervisors:
g) Angola should ensure that DNFBPs supervisors institute and apply strong market entry
requirements including conducting fit and proper assessments on BO and key persons to prevent
criminals and their associates from owning or participating in the management and operations of
DNFBPs.
h) DNFBPs supervisors develop improved understanding of ML/TF risks and use it to build
supervision resources and conduct risk-based inspections especially in respect of dealers in precious
stones and metals, real estate agents and casinos.
i) Where non-compliance is identified, DNFBP supervisors should apply commensurate remedial
actions and/or sanctions and ensure post-inspection monitoring mechanisms including follow-ups
where entities do not adhere to remediation agreements.
j) DNFBP supervisors should develop and implement post-inspection monitoring mechanisms which
includes collection of statistics and case examples to demonstrate change in compliance behaviour.
k) DNFBP supervisors should develop awareness/outreach programmes and issue sectoral/thematic
guidance based on risks identified including on entity risk assessment, CDD measures on high-risk
scenarios, improving quality and diversity of STRs, screening of entities and individuals for TFS.
285. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.3. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.14, 15, 26-28, 34,
35 and elements of R.1 and 40.
6.2 Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision)
Team (AT) concentrated on the following supervisors on the grounds also provided below –
a) BNA: The heightened focus is necessitated by banks and MVTS having a large share of financial
flows in Angola and being rated medium-high for ML risk in the 2020 and 2021 sectoral risk assessments
and the 2019 NRA.
b) CMC: The heightened focus on CMC is necessitated by the fact that the significant FIs carrying
out activities regulated by CMC are banks (brokerage agents rated medium-high for ML) along with Asset
Managers, Collective Investment Schemes, Management Companies of Collective Investment Schemes,
Property Appraisers, and Security Brokerage Firms.
c) ARSEG: The less focus on the insurance sector is because of negligible existence of life cover
products in Angola and have been rated as posing insignificant risk for ML/TF.
d) DNFBPs supervisors of the Gaming Sector, the Real Estate Sector, Precious Stones and Metals
Dealers, Lawyers, Auditors and Accountants for the reason that they are also considered vulnerable for
ML, while the TF risk is considered low.
287. The assessment paid little attention toe insurance sector since it is presenting low ML/TF risks in
Angola. Life insurance in Angola is predominantly credit linked, with no saving/investment option, thus
presenting a significantly low risk of ML/TF.
6.2.1 Licensing, registration and controls preventing criminals and associates from entering the
market
Financial Institutions
288. Financial sector supervisors instituted fair market entry requirements which has to a large
extent enabled them to conduct fit and proper tests at market entry and on an on-going basis to
prevent criminals and their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or
controlling interest or holding a management function in FIs. The application of the market entry
procedures has allowed the supervisors to strengthen assessment of fitness and probity at entry as well as
when there are relevant changes in management/key positions of FIs or in the event of a merger and
acquisition including on BO. Information on BOs of foreign origin is verified through embassies and
relevant local law enforcement agencies. In respect of BOs who are Angolans, verification thereof is done
by consulting independent data sources such as the Official Gazette, One-Stop Shop, Criminal
Investigation Directorate (within SIC) and Public Notaries.
289. Consequent to effective implementation of market entry requirements, BNA and CMC have been
successful to a large extent to apply fit and proper requirements as evidenced by the rejections in a number
of applications for licensing after they detected non-compliant issues such as (a) failure to provide
justification as to the source of capital, and source of funds of key persons (b) financial unsoundness, c)
Suspicious ML, d) involvement in criminal activities by key persons.
290. Financial sector supervisors in Angola have functional mechanisms in place to identify unlicensed
institutions/operators which resulted in perpetrators being criminally sanctioned and assets confiscated in
some cases, as expounded further ahead.
291. At the time of onsite visit, there was no policy decision on VASPs in Angola, let alone market
entry requirements for VASPs.
The BNA
292. The BNA has been successful to a large extent through a multidisciplinary approach to
conducting fit and proper assessment at the licensing stage whereof various departments within the
BNA are involved in the licensing process to assess and issue licenses to entities in a manner that
protects the integrity of the sectors it regulates. These are; a) Banking Supervision Department (DSB)
and the Non-Banking Supervision Department (DSN) both concentrating on the assessment of the
viability, financial soundness, operational risks and governance matters; b) Financial Conduct Department
focusing on ML/TF risks and compliance with AML/CFT measures; c) Payment Systems Department
(DSP) concentrating on compliance with payment systems requirements; d) Risk and Compliance
Department (DRC) conducting screening of shareholders, managers, related parties and beneficial owners
against the UNSC sanctions lists; and e) Credit Monitoring Office (GAC) responsible for assessing
compliance with credit obligations in respect of shareholders, managers and related parties as well as
beneficial owners using information held by the Credit Risk Information Centre (CIRC), as well as foreign
counterparts.
293. At market entry, the BNA requires duplex submission of a licensing application with supporting
documentation by a FI seeking a license, via SILIF integrated system as well as delivery of hardcopies to
the BNA premises. The submission of hardcopies is necessitated by the BNA’s quest for document
authentication, particularly criminal record certificates.
294. The BNA requires FIs to submit, amongst others, information on business incorporation,
identification information of key persons35, criminal record certificate, audited financial statements, source
of capital, and source of funds of key persons. In the event of any changes post market entry related to
capital injection, management or merger and acquisition, similar information is required and assessed to
determine fitness and propriety.
295. Upon receipt of a license application, the different departments within the BNA carry out the
assessment of the application focusing on their respective areas of concentration such as business viability
requirements, financial soundness, mitigation of ML/TF risks and operational risks, payment systems
requirement, and suitability of key persons. The assessment of suitability of key persons is focusing mainly
on educational qualifications, criminal linkages, and source of income, amongst others.
296. In the event of a licensing application of a foreign applicant, the BNA has cooperation agreements
in place with other central banks in foreign jurisdictions on which basis information pertaining to fitness
and propriety is obtained ahead of assessing and issuing a license. The same channel is used when the
BNA is assessing the fitness and propriety of key persons of foreign origin. The BNA considers mainly
adverse findings related to non-compliance with regulatory requirements, involvement in any criminal
activities including TF and PF, unjustifiable origin of capital or source of funds, as the basis to decline a
license application.
297. BNA independently verifies information on incorporation of businesses obtained from FIs and
key persons using information contained in the Official Gazette, One-Stop Shop and public Notaries.
Additionally, the BNA verifies information pertaining to criminal linkages using criminal records held by
the Attorney General’s Office and the Criminal Investigation Directorate. Furthermore, the BNA screens
FIs and key persons against the UNSC Sanctions Lists to determine criminal linkages in relation to TF
and PF activities. Post market entry, the BNA applies similar fitness and propriety measures when there
is a change in management or in the event of a merger and acquisition.
298. In the event FIs and key persons are of foreign origin, they are required to submit their applications
and supporting documents through the Angolan consulates in foreign jurisdictions. The BNA does not
accept documentation from foreign jurisdictions that are not received via the consulate in the jurisdiction
where FIs and key persons originate.
299. During the period 2017-2022, the BNA declined 2 (two) license applications in respect of banks
due to lack of business viability and failure to prove the legitimacy of capital and refused market entry to
7 (seven) key persons for failure to meet the fitness and propriety criteria. .
300. In respect of the NBFIs, the BNA during the same period declined 2 (two) license applications,
one for a Micro Credit and another for a Payment Service Provider due to failure to prove the legitimacy
35
Directors, shareholders, beneficial owners, and principal officers
of the source of funds in respect of shareholders and refused entry to 4 (four) key persons. Although the
BNA revoked 24 licenses for NBFIs notably; Exchange Bureaus, Micro Credit and Payment Service
Providers for failure to start operating after licenses were issued and 12 licenses lapsed due to failure to
start operating within a period of 12 (twelve) months, no license of an operating FI has been revoked as
at the time of the onsite.
301. Below is a case example of effective market entry requirements applied by the BNA during May
2020:
Case 3.1
During May 2020, the BNA rejected a request for authorization to set up a banking financial
institution after the BNA uncovered that the majority shareholder (holding 96% of shares) was
implicated in 23 criminal cases in Brazil.
302. Similarly, the BNA prevented a criminal from acquiring shares in a bank whose share capital was
below the capital requirement threshold post market entry as summarized in the below case example:
Case 3.2
The share capital of Bank A was below the capital requirement threshold, which resulted in
interested parties buying shares. As a requirement, one of the interested parties submitted
documentation to enable the BNA to conduct fit and proper assessment. During the fit and proper
assessment, the BNA uncovered that the person buying shares is under investigation by the National
Directorate for the Prevention of Corruption. The BNA therefore prevented the person linked to
corrupt activities from acquiring shares in Bank A.
303. The market entry requirements are largely the same for banks as well as the NBFIs such as MVTs,
Microcredits and Foreign Exchange Bureaus.
304. The BNA identifies unlicensed operators through consumer complaints received via the consumer
complaints department, tipping off, media reports and triggered inspections. Subsequent to identification
of unlicensed institutions, the BNA alerts the public of the unlicensed institutions and applies the measures
such as locate the illegal institutions mostly with the assistance of law enforcement, and if the unlicensed
institutions cannot be located, the cases are referred to the law enforcement for further investigation.
305. During the assessment period, the BNA proactively identified illegal operators and referred the
matters to PGR, which resulted in conviction of offenders and confiscation of assets.
CMC
306. CMC has demonstrated that it takes to a large extent reasonable measures to ensure credible
individuals and entities participate in the securities market. CMC conducts fit and proper tests to
determine suitability of key persons focusing mostly on business incorporation information, educational
qualifications of key persons, criminal linkages, identification information of key persons, certificate of
good standing from the revenue authority, source of funds of key persons, source of starting capital, 6
(six) months financial/bank statement, physical address, contact details and certificate of commercial
registry not older than 6 (six) months.
307. CMC screens both FIs and key persons against the UNSC sanctions lists, Interpol Red List, and
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list, as well as internal PEP list for PEP status of key persons
in addition to public information on individuals who qualify as PEP. In the event of FIs and key persons
of foreign origin, CMC on the basis of existing cooperation agreements requests consent letters from its
counterparts in foreign jurisdictions from where FIs and key persons originate.
308. During the licensing process, CMC consults other competent authorities such as the BNA, UIF,
ARSEG, and Attorney General’s Office for any adverse information related to FIs and key persons,
ARSEG
312. ARSEG conducts fit and proper assessments at market entry and post market entry when there is
a change in management or in the event of a merger or acquisition. In this regard, FIs seeking a license
submit to ARSEG a letter of intent, incorporation documents, source of capital, source of funds of key
persons, governance structure, educational qualification of key persons, identification information of key
person such as copy of ID cards in respect of locals and copy of passports in respect of foreigners, self-
declaration by key persons that they have no criminal records regarding crimes such as theft, robbery,
breach of trust, fraud, embezzlement, fraudulent misrepresentation or any offenses punishable by
imprisonment.
313. ARSEG verifies information submitted by FIs against the Official Gazette, One-Stop Shop on
incorporation of businesses and private investors. ARSEG also verifies criminal linkages with criminal
records held at SIC and Attorney General.
314. During the licensing process, ARSEG consults BNA and CMC prior to issuing of a license on any
useful information for purposes of fitness and propriety test. In the event FIs and key persons originated
from foreign jurisdictions, ARSEG requests letters of consent from its foreign counterparts on the basis
of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on information sharing.
315. During the period 2017 to 2022, ARSEG did not reject any license application. However, ARSEG
has revoked licenses of 6 insurance companies for failure to meet capital requirements, failure to
commence business within the given period, misrepresentation of financial data related to paid-up share
capital, and because of voluntary de-registration.
316. Through tipping off, consumer complaints and media reports, ARSEG identifies unlicensed
institutions and alert the public. ARSEG also make effort to bring those operating unlawful into the
regulated mainstream by encouraging them to apply for licenses. However, no sanctions have been
imposed so far on the unlicensed institutions.
DNFBPs
317. DNFBPs supervisors have procedures and processes in place on licensing and registration
of institutions under their purview, though challenges in implementation persist, with lawyers and
accountants as outliers. However, the application of fit and proper requirements varies largely from one
authority to another. Most of the DNFBPs supervisors have challenges with respect to the determination
of the fitness and propriety of persons owning, controlling or managing entities. None of the DNFBPs
licensing/registration authorities or supervisors implement UNSCRs screening requirements to prevent
designated persons or entities from entering, or continuing in, the market.
318. Angola has a large number of unregistered and unlicensed real estate agents and dealers in
precious stones and metals which pose a high ML/TF risk. No evidence has been provided to demonstrate
measures taken by Angola to address unauthorised real estate agents. Apart from the gaming sector, other
DNFBPs supervisors were unable to provide information on the number of operators as well as the number
of applications received, rejected, or revoked, and reasons thereof.
Institute for Gaming Supervision (ISJ)
319. There are legal requirements for gaming operators in Angola set out in Law n.º 5/16, of 17th May.
These include the requirements for suitability, financial and technical capacity, and fitness in respect of
business premises (game rooms), amongst others.
320. The suitability is demonstrate by presenting several documents, such as business registration, the
public deed of incorporation of the company and any amendments to public deed, exclusivity of the
corporate object for the exploitation of the gaming activity, published in the Public Gazette, tax
identification number, personal and professional identification of shareholders and directors through a
specific form, criminal record certificate of shareholders/partners, directors/managers and employees with
relevant functions in the management of the company and operation of games, declaration attesting that
neither the shareholders nor the companies controlled by it, or companies in which they have been
directors or managers, have been declared insolvent or bankrupt, amongst others.
321. The Presidential Decrees No. 131/20 of 11th May and 141/17 of 23rd June, as well as the
Presidential Decree No. 139/17 of the 22nd June set out the licensing requirements for Casinos and gaming
rooms, games of chance and social games. The owner(s) of a casino is/are only considered suitable if they
have not been convicted of any crime, including the crime considered as predicate offences of money
laundering.
322. The fit and proper assessments are extended to the beneficial owners (of at least five per cent
voting shares), the directors and senior management of a casino. The validity of Casinos licenses varies
from 10 (ten) years to a maximum of 30 (thirty) years. The monitoring of suitability of companies and
natural persons is determined on an on-going basis as per the inspection plan.
323. The National Housing Institute (INH) is responsible for registration and supervision of real estate
agents, and requires criminal record clearance certificate prior to registration, as part of screening process.
The real estate agents are in the business of property sales (commercial and residential) to investors and
individuals, with large value transactions conducted in cash, whose source cannot easily be verified. The
fit and probity assessment is carried out on board members, managers, directors of legal persons, on the
legal persons and on natural persons.
324. The INH is aware of the existence of a significant number of unregistered estate agents operating
in Angola, which they estimate to be more than those that are registered. The screening is not effective
and the majority of the agents remain unregistered. This exposes the sector to high risk as the unregistered
estate agents are not being supervised for compliance with AML/CFT obligations.
325. As at the time of the on-site visit, there were 40 registered real estate agents, 8 construction
companies and 5 developer companies in Angola. Real estate agents apply for license requirement after
every three years.
326. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MINDCOM) is responsible for the licensing and
registration of precious stones and metal dealers, while ANIESA is entrusted with the supervision and
monitoring mandate of precious stones and metal dealers. By the time of the onsite visit the number of
precious stones dealers in Angola stood at 52. The licensing requirements of these dealers are generally
focus on prudential requirements and less so on detecting unsuitable players which can enter the market
and exploit it for criminal activities.
328. In Angola there are 4783 accountants, 4015 accountants’ experts, 8420 probationer accountants
and 143 audit and accounting firms. OCPCA is a professional body which licences and registers qualified
accountants and accountants’ experts, who conduct fit and proper assessment as stated in its statutory law,
and criminal record clearance of prospective members.
329. Despite the inexistence of licensing renewals, the OCPCA has the power to analyse and suspend
the license of the accountant or accountant expert in terms of article 60 of its statute. The accountants are
required to write an entry examination and undergo an internship, before admission to the profession.
However, according to information provided to the AT, the above process neither include due diligence
in compliance with AML/CFT requirements nor does OCPCA ensure that the fitness and propriety of
members is maintained post-registration.
330. In Angola there are only public notaries and no presence of private notaries. There is no (legal)
framework on establishment and regulation of private notaries.
Financial Institutions
331. Financial sector supervisors, particularly the BNA and CMC have a good understanding of
ML risks stemming from the NRA, the Sectoral Risk Assessments and to some extent institutional
risk assessments.
332. After the 2021 Sectoral Risk Assessment, the BNA adopted a risk matrix and assessed entity
specific risks in respect of banking institutions. The banking sector has been rated medium high for ML,
while some individual banks in the sector were rated high, and medium driven largely by risks posed by
proceeds from major proceeds-generating crimes, notably; trafficking in drugs and human beings as well
as corruption, fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, illegal trade in foreign currency (Kinguilas), and the
use of cash, requiring improvements on implementation of controls with regard to PEPs, BO, and cross-
border trade through the findings of the risk assessment, the financial sector supervisors demonstrated
how the proceeds could be laundered through the types of clients, delivery channels, suites of
products/services and risks emanating from high-risk jurisdictions.
333. Despite the BNA’s demonstration of a good understanding of the ML risk at institutional level in
respect of the banking sector, there is room for improving the risk assessment criteria especially in relation
to MVTS, Exchanges and Microcredit to inform consistent risk understanding across its sectors. At the
time of onsite visit, the BNA was in the process of refining and documenting the risk assessment criteria
and the approach for assessing ML/TF risks of the individual NBFIs. At the NBFIs sector level, both the
ML threats and vulnerabilities were rated Medium-high, similar to the banking sector.
334. BNA demonstrated a good understanding of inherent risks of the type of customers,
products/services, distribution channels and exposure to foreign jurisdictions for banks and MVTs as well
as NBFIs (particularly MVTs, and Money Remitters) under its purview which were identified to take
place through cross border transactions at source and destination from high risk jurisdiction, types of
clients such as PEPs and cash-intensive and informal business as well as potential for fraudulent
transactions that could take place if unlicensed or unregistered financial activities were not detected and
addressed proactively. Overall, the BNA concludes that the risk of potential threats taking place is
medium-high for both the banking and MVTS sectors.
335. Regarding TF, the BNA to a limited extent understands factors presenting the TF risk in the
banking and NBFIs sectors it regulates, such as porous borders, cash-intensive and informal sectors, high
capital outflow to foreign jurisdictions through the financial system as posing potential terrorist financing
risks.
336. CMC deployed a risk matrix to assess ML risks facing financial institutions in the securities sector
and concluded the ML risk exposure to be Medium-High. The CMC understands that due to
underdeveloped securities sector in Angola, the sector is less attractive for criminals seeking to maximize
illicit proceeds through the offering. In addition, cross border transactions are very rare which minimizes
external threats in the securities sector. The CMC has limited TF understanding with the sole focus on
screening of clients against the UNSC sanctions lists and the absence of cases on terror attacks as the only
considerations.
337. ARSEG which is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the insurance sector
understands ML risks facing the insurance sector. ARSEG has determined that the ML/TF risk exposure
for life insurance sector is low largely because short-term insurance occupies 98 percent of the premiums
with 2 percent by credit-linked life insurance.
DNFBPs supervisors
338. Overall, DNFBPs Supervisors have limited to no understanding of ML/TF risks in their respective
sectors.
6.2.3 Risk-based supervision of compliance with AML/CFT requirements
339. Overall, financial sector supervisors were found to be at emerging stage of implementing
risk-based supervision frameworks, with BNA a distant ahead. Most risk-based supervision tools were
adopted during 2021/2022 which were too close to the assessment process to bear significant desired
outcomes.
340. DNFBPs supervisors are yet to develop and implement risk-based supervision frameworks
largely due to lack of resources coming from government. The BNA has a dedicated structure
responsible for AML/CFT supervision comprising 14 skilled inspectors who have received dedicated
AML/CFT training. The BNA is in the process of increasing the number of its personnel for improved
supervision coverage of the entities under its purview. The BNA adopted a supervision strategy outlining
the type of data used in the risk matrix to identify entity specific risks which includes the Annual Risk
Survey, Institutional Risk Assessment Reports as well as information obtained from on-site inspections,
amongst others. The supervision strategy further outlines the focus of supervision whereby high-risk
institutions receive greater and frequent coverage as opposed to low-risk institutions. In terms of the BNA
risk-based supervision strategy, institutions rated high or medium high should be inspected annually, while
institutions rated medium should be inspected after every two years. Inspection of low-risk institutions is
limited to offsite, unless there is a trigger which necessitates an onsite inspection.
341. The frequency and intensity of inspections are emerging, though from a low base. After the
adoption of the risk-based supervision strategy, the BNA instituted a supervisory plan/schedule for banks
and NBFIs covering the period 2021/2022 based on the risk ratings of the entities. In terms of the
inspection plan/schedule, BNA scheduled 7 onsite inspections to be conducted on 7 (seven) banks during
2021/2022, all to be conducted before 31 March 2022. However, as at the date of the onsite visit, the BNA
only conducted 3 (three) onsite inspections on 3 (three) high-risk banks and 1 (one) onsite inspection on
a medium risk bank. In terms of the NBFIs, the BNA scheduled 23 (twenty-three) onsite inspections for
the period 2021/2022, but due to staffing limitations, only carried out 9 (nine) onsite inspections out of
the 23(twenty-three) onsite inspections that were scheduled.
Offsite inspections:
342. During the period under review, the BNA in aggregate conducted 105 on-site inspections on banks
and 110 on NBFIs. The BNA also conducted offsite inspections on banks totalling 290, and NBFIs
amounting to 336. However, 99% of these inspections were rule-based focusing on AML/CFT controls
and compliance with the submission of offsite AML/CFT self-assessment questionnaires.
CMC
343. CMC started conducting AML/CFT/CPF risk-based supervision from 2021 following its
improved understanding of the risks as a result of risk-rating of entities through a recently introduced 2021
risk assessment matrix. Prior to this, CMC followed a rule-based approach to AML/CFT supervision
whereby offsite inspections were conducted focusing on self-assessment questionnaires. The table below
indicates 23 risk-based inspections conducted on market intermediaries (banks) during 2021 after CMC
adopted a risk assessment matrix and assessed the ML risk individual institutions under its purview are
facing. This was the beginning of CMC’s application of a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.
344. Inspections conducted by CMC since 2019 are tabulated below:
345. CMC has a dedicated team of qualified inspectors responsible for AML/CFT supervision, which
appears adequate considering the size of institutions under its purview, the less complex securities traded
in the Angolan market, the lower volumes of transactions. The majority of traded securities are
government bonds as compared to shares being traded in the stock market. Additionally, CMC
demonstrated that all onsite inspections that were scheduled for the year 2021/2022 were executed.
DNFBPs
346. The DNFBPs supervisors have no supervision tools and as such, no inspections carried on
DNFBP entities.
36
This is a combination of prudential, market conduct and AML/CFT inspections.
37
These are AML/CFT inspections only.
350. Regarding CMC, a recommendation map was developed to track implementation of remedial
actions by inspected FIs. During the period 2019/2021 CMC noted limited improvement in compliance
behaviour characterized by some of the identified deficiencies not being addressed within the agreed
timeframe. In addition to remedial actions, most sanctions imposed by CMC are prudential related with
only three (3) AML/CFT related sanctions for failure to submit the AML/CFT self-assessment
questionnaire (two sanctions imposed) and failure to submit a STR (one sanction imposed).
351. So far, the AML/CFT breaches identified through inspections by financial supervisors do not have
a criminal element to warrant application of criminal sanctions. However, in the event of a criminal
element, supervisors will follow the existing procedure to refer the matters to competent authorities such
as CID and Attorney General’s Office for further investigation and possible prosecution.
DNFBPs
352. Although DNFBPs supervisors have enforcement powers under the AML Law, neither remedial
actions nor administrative sanctions were imposed since no AML/CFT inspections were conducted as at
the date of onsite visit.
collaboration with the UIF held various industry engagements with banks, collective investment schemes
and brokers focusing on the obligations related to CDD and reporting of STRs, amongst others.
357. BNA has issued guidelines to FIs under its purview, mostly on TFS with emphasis on asset
freezing, so as to promote the understanding of AML/CFT obligations. The majority of guidelines were
issued by the UIF to foster consistent understanding of the ML/TF risks as well as AML/CFT obligations.
358. BNA conducted AML/CFT related outreach to its regulated institutions as tabulated below:
Table 3.7- BNA Outreach Activities
Year Date No. Financial Awareness- Themes
Institutions raising
2018 06/21/2018 29 1 AML/CFT Supervision of Banking Financial Institutions
359. Other supervisors have not issued guidance to improve the understanding of ML/TF risks and
AML/CFT obligations in their respective sectors.
DNFBPs
360. The UIF provided guidance and conducted outreach to DNFBPs in relation to risks and reporting
obligations. None of the DNFBP supervisors have issued guidance nor conducted outreach for its entities.
361. Overall, financial sector regulators have relatively fair market entry requirement
implementation than DNFBPs (with accountants and lawyers as outliers), though challenges on
verification of BO is more pronounced in the DNFBP sector. Financial sector supervisors have a fair
understanding of the ML risks than DNFBPs owing to use of the findings of NRAs, SRAs and entity
assessments. Understanding of TF risks is less developed across the FIs and DNFBPs supervisors.
Implementation of RBA is emerging with BNA a distant ahead while no efforts have been demonstrated
on of DNFBPs by their respective supervisors. Financial sectors have RBA frameworks in place but
are yet fully impact positively on compliance levels by their supervised entities due to the recent nature
of the measures. Remedial actions and sanctions have been applied mostly by BNA but were considered
not proportionate and dissuasive to positive impact on compliance levels. Outreach activities and
guidance issues has to some extent promoted understanding of ML/TF risks and AML/CFT obligations
of FIs while negligible evidence exist for DNFBPs. There is no policy decision nor market entry
requirements on VASPs, though no evidence of existence of VA activities were identified.
Key Findings
a) Information on the creation of legal persons in Angola is publicly available to a negligible extent
despite the fact that there was introduction of an online platform which is exclusive for legal persons that
intent to be created as commercial entities.
b) Angola has not assessed ML/TF risks associated with legal persons created in Angola. As a result,
Competent Authorities could not demonstrate that they identify, assess and understand vulnerabilities
emanating from legal persons created in Angola being misused for ML/TF purposes.
c) Competent authorities are able to access or obtain basic information of legal persons at One Stop
Shop (OSS), for legal persons registered after 2019. However, OSS does not implement measures to ensure
that the information they hold is accurate and up to date.
d) Angola has no legal framework governing collection and maintenance of Beneficial Ownership
(BO) information and there is limited understanding of the concept of BO amongst the authorities.
e) Angola allows registration, conversion and transfer of bearer shares. There are limited mechanisms
in place to prevent the misuse of bearer share for ML and TF.
f) Angola does not recognise the concept of trust and other legal arrangements. Therefore, there is no
legislation that govern legal arrangements of any form.
g) The authorities could not demonstrate that they have imposed effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions against legal persons and natural person that failed to comply with measures for legal
persons and arrangements.
Recommended Actions
a) Angola should ensure that information on creation of legal persons and legal arrangements is publicly
available.
b) Authorities should conduct a ML/TF risk assessment to identify and assess which legal persons are
vulnerable to abuse for ML/TF.
c) Mitigation measures should be developed in line with the potential abuse or risks identified with legal
persons and arrangements for ML/TF.
d) There should be capacity building for officers dealing with registration of legal persons and
arrangements, supervisory and Competent authorities in Angola. The areas of training should focus on
determining beneficial owners in legal persons and arrangements, obtaining and maintenance of BO
information, and the difference between basic and BO information.
e) Authorities should develop a comprehensive mechanism to deal with issuance, conversion and transfer
of bearer shares in line with FATF Standards, to ensure that they are not misused for MF/TF.
f) Authorities should review the current legal framework to ensure a dissuasive and proportionate
sanctions’ regime and take steps in effectively implementing sanctions for non-compliance by legal
persons to provide or update BO information.
g) Angola should develop a legal framework to regulate creation of legal arrangements including trusts,
and adopt mitigating measures requiring trustees to disclose themselves to FIs and DNFBPs when they
engage them.
363. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.5. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.24-25, and
elements of R.1, 10, 37 and 40.
7.2.1 Public availability of information on the creation and types of legal persons and arrangements
364. The information on creation of legal persons, in particular, the formation of companies, is
publicly available through a website38 to a very limited extent. The online platform was introduced in
2019. The online system lists three types of companies that can be created in Angola, namely, a sole
trader, a commercial company and a cooperative. However, the information on this website is limited to
what identification information will be required and the fee payable for each of the commercial entities
that one intends to create in Angola, save that, for corporate partners the required documents would
include minutes of the shareholders, management or administrative decision to authorise incorporation.
Other information which details creation of legal companies can only be obtained in person by visiting
any of the registration offices in Angola. It was further noted that information on the creation of other
types of legal persons, besides companies can be obtained at the Ministry of Justice offices where such
legal persons are licensed, for example information on foundations and associations can be obtained at
Ministry of Social Action, Family and Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU). Information on creation of
financial companies can be obtained at the National Bank of Angola.
365. Angola does not recognise the creation of trusts but the definition of legal arrangement
under Article 3(30) AML Law 5/20 includes express trusts or similar arrangements whether
established in Angola or elsewhere. This Law does not stipulate or provide how activities of trust can
be regulated for the purposes of AML/CFT. However, other than this law there is no publicly available
information on the creation of trust in Angola.
366. Based on the forgoing, it is concluded that information on the creation and types of legal persons
in Angola is publicly available to a negligible extent and information on the creation of express trusts or
similar arrangements in Angola is not available publicly.
7.2.2 Identification, assessment and understanding of ML/TF risks and vulnerabilities of legal
entities
367. Angola has not assessed the Money Laundering or Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) risks
associated with the various types of legal entities created and registered, nor has it identified the
nature of vulnerabilities of misuse of such entities for ML/TF purposes. Nevertheless, during the
onsite the law enforcement agencies revealed that according to their investigations, a number of legal
persons had been misused to perpetrate criminal activities (see IO7). Corruption cases that have been
investigated so far reveal the use of legal persons in public procurements and in fraudulent loan contracts
involving senior public officers hiding behind these legal structures. Therefore, to some extent LEAs have
been exposed to the risk of legal persons being used to commit crimes during their investigations but such
knowledge is not based on specific identification and understanding of the ML/TF risks and vulnerabilities
involved. As a result, the authorities could not demonstrate that investigations and prosecutions instigated
by competent authorities were as a result of the misuse of legal persons created in Angola for ML/TF.
7.2.3 Mitigating measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons and arrangements
368. Angola has not conducted a risk assessment to determine the ML/ TF risk associated with
legal persons therefore, it is not easy to determine whether Angola has taken appropriate mitigating
measures to prevent misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements consistent with specific
identified ML/TF vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, Angola has some measures in place which could be
used to minimise the misuse of legal persons and arrangements, however, such measures are not
comprehensive. For instance, OSS has powers to register legal persons in line with the requirements of
the Law. However, authorities do not have powers to sanction or dissolve entities which have been
38
https://gue.gov.ao.
dormant or not active since incorporation unless they resort to courts of law for that legal person to be
removed from the roll or to be deregistered. In the end. this may be a lengthy and costly process for a
competent authority responsible to administer such a legal person. Moreover, the authorities do not
enforce the requirement that registered legal persons file annual reports/ returns with the relevant
authority.
369. In an effort to promote transparency of legal persons (companies) created in Angola, the country
has introduced online platform that can be accessed by the public. However, the information of entities
registered and created before 2019 is not publicly available. Furthermore, although competent authorities
can access information on legal persons free of charge, the private sector must pay a fee of 16,100
Kwanzas to access the information of entities registered and created before 2019.
370. During the onsite it was noted that authorities were working on a strategic document that would
set up mechanisms on obtaining BO information. This would be a commendable initiative as it was noted
that the authorities across the board have no understanding of the beneficial ownership concept as they
refer to shareholders’ information as beneficial ownership information. This has resulted in Angola not
having a mechanism to obtain and verify beneficial ownership information to ensure transparency of legal
persons and mitigate risks to use legal persons as vehicles for ML/TF.
371. For the companies intending to enter into the financial sector, they need to submit company details
to the Bank of Angola (BNA) before registering with the OSS. The motive behind this is to check basic
information of the legal entity which includes shareholder’s information amongst others, and the
authorities refers to such information as BO information. Further, the Financial Institutions require a client
to submit a company deed which contains the name of the entity, information of directors and
shareholders, address of the entity, structure document of the entity and capital details of the entity when
entering into a business arrangement with the bank. The client is also required to provide certificate of
incorporation of the entity and identification documents of the shareholders and directors. Foreign entities
are subjected to the same requirements as domestic entities, except that the documents should be certified
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and if the documents are not in Portuguese, the documents should be
translated into Portuguese. This to a certain extent provides some information on the business, although
not necessarily on the BO.
372. In addition to the AML Law, FIs have created and adopted their own procedures to identify
beneficial owners when dealing with clients. However, FIs cannot verify the beneficial ownership
information in all cases as Angola does not have a standardised mechanism, like BO registry to obtain
and maintain beneficial ownership information. As a result, FIs rely on the information provided by the
client when opening an account. However, it not mandatory for registered companies to open bank
account unless such company will engage in trade and business activities.
373. Angola regards accountants and lawyers as gatekeepers for preventing the misuse of legal persons
for ML/TF. The accountants and lawyers are mandated to comply with the money laundering law as they
conduct businesses on behalf of client/s. However, there is low understanding of the BO concept amongst
the lawyers and accountants, as a result they do not collect and maintain basic and beneficial ownership
information of their clients. Further, casinos and precious stones dealers only collect the identity document
of the client without any further particulars being obtained. Therefore, little to no effort is made by
DNFBPs as reporting entities to collect and maintain accurate BO information.
374. Angola allows registration, conversion and transfer of bearer shares, and a bearer share can be
converted into nominative shares at the discretion of the Issuer. Therefore, the conversion is not
mandatory as it is up to Issuer whether to convert the bearer shares or not. Also, the bearer shares are only
registered depending on whether the Issuer has the right to know the identity of the holder. This means
that the Issuer might not know the identity of the Holder of the bearer shares. As a result, there are no
measures taken by Authorities to enhance the transparency of holders of bearer shares. Furthermore,
Angola permits nominee directors and shareholders but there are no measures in place to ensure
registration and determination of principal director and shareholder as a mechanism of reducing the risk
of abuse for ML and enhance transparency of legal persons.
375. On legal arrangements, Angola does not register domestic trust and other legal arrangements such
as Trust Company Service Providers (TCPs) but there is no clear prohibition on creation of such legal
arrangements. In addition, Angola allows foreign companies registered in Angola to have foreign trusts
as shareholders, and there are no appropriate mitigating measures in place to enable the identification of
the trustees by reporting entities and competent authorities. As a result, there is a possibility that trusts in
company structures might be used as vehicles for ML and TF.
7.2.4 Timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information on
legal persons
376. The basic information on companies is publicly available to a negligible extent, while basic
information of other legal persons (foundations, organised unions) is not publicly available. As
indicated above, information relating to companies registered before 2019 is still retained manually
unless the company has updated its details. Further, the other legal persons such as foundations and
associations are still registered and maintained manually by MSAFWP. Therefore, the Competent
authorities are able to access basic information of the legal persons on the OSS system for entities
registered from 2019 onwards. However, the competent authorities indicated that they are obliged to make
a written request to the Director OSS for the information on legal persons to be provided.
377. The authorities further indicated that OSS takes 1 to 5 days to provide a response to their request
for basic information for legal persons that are registered after 2019. The process takes longer for legal
persons registered before 2019 as the records are accessed manually. The information is provided free of
charge to the Competent Authorities.
378. The request for basic information by the private sector and general public is treated differently
from the request made by Competent Authorities. OSS request the private sector and the public to submit
a request in writing and the information will be provided at a minimum of 5 days. The information will
be provided also upon payment of a fee of $ 31.40 (16100 Kwanza). As a result, the timelines of which
OSS facilitates access to basic information of legal persons poses challenges as the information takes long
to get it.
379. There is no legal requirement for a registered legal person to maintain registers on basic
information such as on members, directors, or shareholders. Also, OSS does not enforce that a registered
legal person should file updates of changes that occurred within a legal person being change of director,
members or shareholders as required by the Commercial Registry Code. Consequently, there is a high
possibility that the information held at OSS is not adequate and accurate.
380. Also, authorities do not enforce the filing of annual reports and up-to-date information by legal
persons, as a result the information of legal persons available might not be accurate and up to date. OSS
does not enforce requirements on filing of annual reports by legal persons or prescribe a fine or measure
to remove such legal persons from the roll for failure to file annual reports. Therefore, it is difficult to
deal with discrepancy of information held by reporting institutions and OSS. This indicates that the
competent authorities are not getting access to accurate basic information of the legal persons.
Furthermore, where there is a discrepancy of information OSS indicated that it does not have powers to
rectify the register unless the legal person files changes.
381. Further, most of the authorities do not understand the difference between basic (legal ownership)
and BO information of a legal person, Authorities refer to basic information as BO information,
particularly pertaining to shareholders. Currently, OSS collects and maintain information on shareholders
as a result OSS does not have sufficient mechanisms to collect and maintain beneficial ownership
information as required by Law 5/20. As a result, it is highly likely that the Authorities would not be
able to identify BOs in foreign legal persons that hold shares in companies registered in Angola, nor
understand complex structures of such companies.
382. FIs and DNFBPs are required to collect basic and BO information in terms of Law 5/20 but it was
noted during the onsite that majority of the reporting entities did not understand the difference between
basic and BO information. Furthermore, FIs due to a number of reasons cannot verify the accuracy of the
information collected from customers (see IO 4) as well as knowing how to go about doing it.
Consequently, competent authorities have no easy access to BO information and reliable, accurate, up to
date basic information at all times.
7.2.5 Timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information on
legal arrangements
383. Angola does not have a legal framework that creates domestic trusts and other legal
arrangements. However, based on the analysis in core issue 383 above, it is clear that the Angolan laws
do not prohibit creation of trusts hence Law 5/20 imposes some obligations on FIs and DNFBPs when
dealing with activities relating to trusts or similar arrangements. The obligations include enabling access
to basic and BO information on a trust by competent authorities. However, it could not be demonstrated
that competent authorities are able to access this information, if at all any express trusts or similar
arrangements exist in Angola.
386. The information on creation and maintaining of legal persons in Angola is publicly available
to a limited extent. While information on legal arrangements is not available because Angola does not
register legal arrangements, there is no prohibition of such entities. As a result, Angola does not
prohibit foreign companies registered in Angola to have a foreign trust as a shareholder in their
company structures. This is due to the fact that the definition of legal arrangements under AML Law
includes express trusts and foreign trusts. Angola has not assessed the ML/TF risks associated with
the various types of legal entities created and registered nor has it identified the nature of vulnerabilities
leading to misuse of such entities for ML/TF purposes.
387. The competent authorities can access limited basic information of legal persons timely as most
of the information is manual and takes about from 1 to 5 days to be provided. However, reporting
entities and the public must pay a fee of $ 31.40 (16100 Kwanzas) to obtain information of registered
legal persons.
388. Angola permits the registration and transfer of bearer shares. The conversion of such bearer
shares is not mandatory as it is up to the Issuer whether to convert them into ordinary shares or not.
The potential misuse of bearer share for ML/TF is high risk as there is limited preventative measures
in place.
389. The authorities and reporting institutions have no mechanism to verify the information they
collect. Also, the collected information is not accurate as the authorities do not enforce a requirement
for legal persons to file annual reports at the end of each financial year. Moreover, the authorities and
reporting institutions are not always collecting beneficial ownership information of legal persons as
the assumption is that basic information of legal persons serves as beneficial ownership information.
Lastly there is no evidence that sanctions or fines have been applied on any natural person or legal
person for not complying with the respective laws that creates legal persons.
390. Angola is rated as having a Low level of effectiveness for IO.5.
Key Findings
a) Angola provides, to some extent, MLA and extradition in response to international requests.
However, due to lack of a coherent system to keep and maintain a record of requests in order to track
and monitor how they were responded to, made it impossible to determine the usefulness of the
assistance provided or if it has contributed to the resolution of some criminal cases in other
jurisdictions. The information and/or the data provided in the form of tables has been inconsistent,
inaccurate and unreliable to a large extent, indicating a system which is not well coordinated in
attending and/or addressing international cooperation measures.
b) There is an absence of an effective case management system (despite the introduction of a
digital registry in 2019) which hinders the Central Authority capacity not only to prioritize, select and
make requests for assistance, but also to track and monitor all incoming and outgoing requests for
international cooperation.
c) Angola has made requests for MLA and extraditions in a very limited number of instances,
which is inconsistent with Angolan’s risk profile. The authorities have not adequately demonstrated
that seeking international cooperation in the investigation of ML, associated predicate offenses, and
TF is a priority and need major improvements on how they follow up on outgoing requests.
d) The main competent authorities exchange information, using both formal and informal
channels with their foreign counterparts, reasonably consistent with Angola’s risk profile. Most
information is exchanged by the UIF and PGR with their international counterparts or organizations
and it has been increasing since 2018.
e) When requested, the different competent authorities and the financial supervisors provide
international cooperation to some extent. Spontaneous international co-operation has been provided to
some extent.
f) Some basic information on companies can be shared in a timely way as it is publicly available,
but there are challenges with the timeliness for information about most companies registered before
2019, since only recently digital keeping of company records has been initialized. From 2017 Angola
has become more active on requesting BO information to foreign jurisdictions, but still inconsistent
with Angola’s risk profile.
Recommended Actions
Angola should:
a) Actively seek formal and timely MLA for all ML, associated predicate offenses, and TF in a
much greater proportion of the cases that have transnational aspects and actively follow up on such
requests in a timely manner.
b) Establish an efficient case management system in the Attorney-General’s office for the
collection and dissemination of MLA and extradition information including requests made, requests
received, actions taken and quality of the information obtained as well as the duration of the response
in order to improve collection of statistics on international cooperation.
c) Provide the necessary resources (financial, human and technologic) to both AGO/PGR as
Central Authority for international judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the Ministry of Justice
and Human Rights as the Central Authority for international cooperation in all other jurisdictional
matters.
d) Maintain adequate and accurate statistics on all international cooperation requests, to enhance
monitoring of timely execution and internal review processes across all relevant competent authorities.
e) Improve the overall capacity and turnaround time to share and seek basic, legal ownership and
BO information with foreign counterparts.
391. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO.2. The
Recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.36-40 and
elements of R.9, 15, 24, 25 and 32.
8.2 Immediate Outcome 2 (International Cooperation)
Background
392. Angola generally has a legal framework that allows its competent authorities to provide both
formal and informal international cooperation on the principle of reciprocity. The Law n.º 13/2015 of June
19th, on international judicial cooperation in Criminal Matters, combined with the Presidential Decree n.º
221/2017 of September 26th appoints the Attorney General Office (AGO/PGR) as the Central Authority
for international judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights as
the Central Authority for international cooperation in all other jurisdictional matters. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MoFA/MIREX) is the diplomatic channel through which requests for MLA and
extradition are received and dispatched. The context of the Angolan economy is also very complex.
Angola, as other African resource-rich countries, is particularly exposed to capital flight through
embezzlement of export proceeds and export mis-invoicing. One of the main issues undermining Angolan
economy concerns the so called “wealth management services” provided by global banks, law and
accounting firms, wealth management offices and others. The main objective is getting the proceeds
(money) out of Angola and getting the money into foreign bank accounts or assets (what in some cases
would be the laundering of proceeds generated by the commission of predicate offenses to ML, such as
corruption and embezzlement. Therefore, Angola has searched key partners for cooperation such as the
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and the Sub-Region partners, and searched
agreements with key financial players such as Switzerland, Netherlands, UK, USA, China and, for taxes
purposes, even Russia. This framework reinforces the strategic importance of having solid MLA
procedures and other international cooperation mechanisms implemented, as an enormous amount of
Angolan proceeds is being generated or kept in foreign countries.
Rights (MINJUSDH) from the MoFA/MIREX, requesting international cooperation in criminal matters,
are sent to the National Directorate of Justice Administration of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.
Within the scope of its attributions, this ministerial department sends it to the Attorney General's Office
for treatment.
394. Those requests are received by the Office of International Exchange and Cooperation of the
AGO/PGR (GICI) and then sent to the National Investigation and Prosecution Directorate of the
AGO/PGR for execution.
395. Before October 2017, the issues of cooperation in the criminal matters were dealt by the Supreme
Court and the Ministry of Justice, reserving the Attorney General's Office to comply with the requests
396. The process to deal with TF is different from the one used in ML. With regards to “Terrorism
Financing”, the GICI does not directly engage with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For this there is a
“Multisectoral Technical Group for the Creation of the National Observatory Against Terrorism”,
coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. In this regard, international cooperation in matters of
Financing of Terrorism is processed by sending the request from the MoFA/MIREX to the Ministry of
the Interior, as coordinator of the Technical Group, so that it can proceed with the appropriate treatment.
There was not information to demonstrate how the process of handling TF matters was distinct from
dealing with any other offences in Angola.
397. During the onsite assessors noted that the office of Attorney-General had a designated unit
manned by two magistrates and five (5) technicians to process international requests on criminal matters.
Authorities did not provide the relevant trainings undertaken by these officers that would enable them to
efficiently discharge their duties in this unit which is entrusted to handle international cooperation
requests. Furthermore, the assessors established that prior to 2019 requests for international cooperation
were captured in a manual register. Since 2019 the requests are captured electronically. Although
authorities indicated that it would take 6 months to execute a request, this could not be established from
both the manual and electronic register seen by the assessors during the onsite. There was also no evidence
that Angola has mechanisms and/or case management system in place on how international requests are
assessed and prioritised to respond to request for assistance. Thus, some of these identified deficiencies
may have compromised the efficiency of the Angolan international cooperation in criminal matters.
Incoming MLA Requests (AGO/PGR) on ML.
398. Incoming MLA requests on ML appeared to be increasing steadily since 2017 to 2021 as
shown in table 2.1 below. According to the data in this table a total of 60 ML requests were received
out of which 38 appeared to have been executed. It would also appear from this table that each year
requests were executed as within the same year they were received. Surprisingly, a total of 52 request was
still pending execution as at the onsite. Thus, a total of 38 executed ML requests for the period under
review is highly incredible to be relied on.
400. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, assessors could not establish with certainty on
whether the office of AG execute request for assistance the same year they are received as depicted
in the tables provided by authorities. What appears certain is that Angola does not have clear and
comprehensive systems in place to track and monitor requests for international assistance. Hence,
the inconsistent figure, kept and maintained by authorities render the international cooperation system
inefficient. There was also no indication that there are time frames observed nor priority given in granting
requested assistance in line with the country’s risk profile.
401. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also appraised the assessors of the MLA requests, made
through the diplomatic channels, For the period under review, 60 ML requests were received and 26
appear to have been granted. There were also 705 requests for other criminal offences of which 49 requests
for assistance were granted. These numbers once again do not tally with the ones kept and maintained by
the AG as the designated central authority on MLA issues. There was no explanation from Angola why
the provided conflicting data on the same matter. Once again this shows that competent authorities in
Angola cannot ensure that relevant and accurate information is provided to requested foreign jurisdiction
and this can even compromise the quality of assistance provided.
402. No incoming MLA requests on provisional and confiscation measures were brought to the
attention of the assessment team for the period under review.
Extradition
403. The extradition procedure is urgent and comprises the administrative and the judicial phases. The
administrative phase is intended for the consideration of the request for extradition by the Holder of the
Executive Power in order to decide, taking, namely, into account, the guarantees that exist, whether it can
be followed up or if it should be outright dismissed for reasons of political order or of opportunity or
convenience [see Article 22, 47 e 49 of Law 13/2015 of 19.06]. As soon as the request for extradition has
been received the Central Authority, within a maximum period of 20 days submits it to the Holder of the
Executive Power. The Holder of the Executive Power (the President of the Republic of Angola) decides
whether the request must be followed through or whether it must be rejected. The Central Authority must
adopt the necessary measures for the surveillance of the requested person. No further information was
availed on what would trigger deploying administrative phase, and as such, its effectiveness could not be
assessed.
404. On the other hand, the judicial phase is the exclusive competence of the court of 2nd instance in
criminal matters, and is intended to decide, with a hearing of the interested party, on the granting of
extradition based on its formal and fundamental conditions, with no evidence of the facts imputed to the
extradited being admitted.
405. Information on incoming extradition requests on predicate offences from 2017 until 2021 was
provided by the office of Attorney-General. The predicate offenses that originated incoming extradition
requests were fraud (2), corruption and bribery (1), terrorism, including terrorism financing (1). The table
below shows the total of incoming requests received from 2017 until 2021. In the absence of specific year
request on the type of year was received, the assessors assumed that two fraud cases were received in
2019 while terrorism, terrorist financing, as well as, corruption and bribery were received in 2020 and
2021 respectively on. Although the information in the table indicates that in 2019 two cases were rejected,
this does not make sense as in the same year, two cases were responded to. There is also no evidence that
any prosecution was initiated for the rejected cases. Given the inaccuracy of data, assessors could not
establish with certainty the average time Angola takes to respond to extradition requests.
406. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also tendered the number of requests received
through diplomatic channels. The data submitted showed only two cases that were received which relate
to fraud and corruption and there was no indication that it ever received a case on terrorism and terrorist
financing. Once again there is inconsistency in data kept and maintained by these competent authorities
which ordinarily would be complementing or seamlessly coordinating the international cooperation
issues.
407. No information was provided concerning the feedback from foreign authorities about the
quality of the information provided, concerning both MLA and extradition. Thus, in the final
analysis, the assessment team noted that, although Angola received and appeared to have responded
to requests from foreign jurisdictions, this has been done to a limited extent, and this may have been
exacerbated by information gaps and the apparent lack of appropriate mechanisms to keep and maintain
records which resulted to even failure by assessors to determine how constructive and timely the requests
have been responded to.
8.2.2 Seeking timely legal assistance to pursue domestic ML, associated predicates and TF cases
with transnational elements
410. Apart from MLA requests on ML, Angola also indicated to have sought legal assistance for
international cooperation on predicate offences from 2017 until 2021. The Table below shows the total
number per year of all requests made. From this data assessors observed that the main predicate offenses
that originated outgoing MLA requests were participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering
(15), Corruption and bribery (16), fraud (4), illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods (8) and Tax crimes
(1). There is no information on the nature of request sought. There is also no turnaround time on requests
responded to and nothing was said on whether the responses or feedback was appropriate for the matter
under investigation as the case might be. Nevertheless, interviews made during the onsite and some case
study examples (see IO8) show that the country has sought assistance to pursue predicate offences that
are transnational in nature, but the information given does not show whether request were prioritised per
risk profile of the country.
Extradition
411. Despite the fact that the legal framework been in force (through law n.º 15/2013) since 2013,
Angola has sought extradition requests to a limited extent and contrary to its risk profile. Information
provided by the authorities showed that only two requests were issued during the period under scope
(2017-2021), one to Spain and the other to Portugal. Both were related to a predicate offense (corruption
and bribery) and only one of those ended with the extradition of the suspect. No case studies were provided
to illustrate how Angola is using extradition in relation to ML, TF or terrorism.
8.2.3 Providing and Seeking other forms of international cooperation for AML/CFT purposes
412. The authorities have at their disposal a variety of other forms of international cooperation
for AML/CFT purposes. Most of the competent authorities in Angola can provide information to
counterparts using informal channels and bilateral agreements entered between competent
authorities in Angola and counterparts in other jurisdictions.
413. Law Enforcement Agencies: The Angola Revenue Administration (AGT) has, among other
powers, controlling the country's external border and the national customs territory, for fiscal, economic
and society protection purposes, in accordance with the policies defined by the Angolan Executive. In this
sense, AGT has celebrated (15th September 2021) a MoU with the United Nations, represented by the
Office on Drugs and Crime (hereinafter referred to as “UNODC). The main objective is UNODC to assist
and cooperate in the implementation at the normative and operational levels of the relevant United Nations
conventions. The AGT is well positioned to exchange information with its counterparts. AGT has signed
2 MoUs relating to tax information exchange with Portugal (Agreement with the Portuguese Republic on
Mutual Administrative Assistance and Cooperation in Tax Matters, effective on 30 November 2018) and
with the United States of America (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act - FATCA : Angola signed an
intergovernmental agreement with the United States of America to implement the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance – FATCA regime, under which national authorities undertake to report to the US tax
authorities information personal and financial assets of US tax resident citizens who maintain financial
assets domiciled in Angolan financial institutions).
414. AGT has also signed several MoUs relating to International Agreements in Customs Matters with
Namibia, Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, Republic of Zambia, Republic of south Africa,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Portugal, Mozambique, Guiné-Bissau.
Angola is also part of the Convention on Technical Cooperation between the Customs Administrations of
Portuguese-speaking Countries, signed on 26 September 1986; Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance between Portuguese-speaking Customs States, - Prevention, Investigation and Reprimand of
Customs Offenses, signed on 26 September 1986; Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
between Portuguese-speaking Customs States, - Fight against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, signed on 26 September 1986; Convention to Eliminate Double Taxation in
Respect of Income Taxes and to Prevent Fraud and Tax Evasion of the Republic of Portugal, with entry
into force on 22 August 2019 and applicable to tax facts verified after 31 December 2019; Convention to
Eliminate Double Taxation in Respect of Income Taxes and Prevent Fraud and Tax Evasion with the
United Arab Emirates, effective on 28 March 2020 and applicable to tax events occurring after 31
December 2020. However, the authorities did not provide any information that could enable the AT to
determine if the cooperation provided and requested had been for purposes of discharging AML/CFT
requirements.
415. UIF: The Angolan UIF is a member of the Egmont Group of UIFs since 2014. The UIF was able
to demonstrate the informal exchange of information it had undertaken. The UIF also provides assistance
directly to its foreign counterparts through the EGMONT Group Secure Web system by disseminating
information both on request and spontaneously (at a less extent). Furthermore, Angola has celebrated 26
bilateral MoUs with its counterparts.
The table below shows the incoming and outgoing requests received and sent by the Angolan UIF.
Table 2.6-Requests from 2017 to 2021 made by the others jurisdictions (UIFs)
INFORMATION REQUESTS (incoming and outgoing)
RECEIVED FROM THE UIFs SENT FROM THE UIF
YEAR
(counterparts) (OUTGOING)
- RECEIVED/ENTRY FEEDBACK SENT/EXIT FEEDBACK
2017 16 16 9 6
2018 8 7 17 8
2019 16 9 19 6
2020 13 7 16 7
2021 10 7 8 5
TOTAL 63 46 69 32
416. The UIF also provided detailed statistics (broken down per year and per jurisdiction) on incoming
and outgoing requests to or from its counterparts. No information was provided on outgoing and incoming
requests considering the crime typology (ML/TF or predicate offense). The AT considers that Angola
demonstrated the use of international cooperation mechanism to a lesser extent. The statistics provided
showed that the use of international cooperation mechanisms by the UIF are increasing but still not
consistent with the country risk profile. The UIF also demonstrated that it was able to provide assistance
informally and directly to other jurisdictions through the EGMONT Group Secure Web system. The
nature of the cooperation related mainly to the provision of information and identification, tracing and
freezing of assets.
417. Nevertheless, there are good examples of international cooperation between UIF and its
counterparts, as shown below (box n.º 2.1 and 2.2)
This case refers to a former manager of the AAA, Seguros, S.A., a state-owned company, 100% owned by the
Sonangol group, S.A. (Sonangol, E.P. and Sonangol, P&P). The defendant served concurrently as Director of
the Risk Management Department of Sonangol, E.P. and CEO of AAA, Seguros, S.A. While performing such
duties, he unlawfully took ownership of the AAA Seguros S.A. company, by gradually transferring the stakes
on his behalf.
The case was started by means of a report submitted by the Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Geneva to the
central body in charge of criminal affairs in Angola (the Office of the Attorney General) stating that Mr. X
requested from a bank in Switzerland a bank transfer of over USD 900.000.000,00 (nine hundred million United
States dollars), raising suspicion of a money laundering transaction.
In view of such information, the Angolan Attorney General’s office initiated the relevant criminal proceedings
and the related financial and property investigation. The following entities were part of such investigation: The
Criminal Investigation Service, the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Central Bank of Angola (BNA),
Commercial banks, the Angolan Insurance Regulatory and Supervision Agency (ARSEG), the One-Stop-Shop
for establishing a business, the Property, Vehicle and Commercial Registry, the Revenue and Customs
Administration (AGT), the Angolan Maritime and Port Institute and the National Civil Aviation Institute.
On request, commercial banks also surrendered documents used by the defendant to open bank accounts in his
name and in the name of his spouse, relatives and companies to him associated. Two experts from the Angolan
Central Bank (BNA) conducted a thorough examination of the money trail.
As part of the cooperation between the Angolan Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) and the Angolan
Attorney General’s Office (PGR), the PGR requested the UIF for the latter to engage its counterparts in
providing financial intelligence about the defendant, having such counterparts from Singapore and
Luxembourg responded positively.
Assistance was also requested from the UK’s International Anti-Corruption Centre (IACC) which submitted an
intelligence report related to the defendant and the companies he owned in Bermudas which, despite having
third-parties as owners, the bank transactions revealed that the defendant was the beneficial owner of such
companies.
Assistance was also provided by the Attorney-General Offices of Portugal and Switzerland.
Source: Angola UIF/PGR
The FIU of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 10-05-2021 sent the Financial Information Unit – Angola a
request for information in which a European bank was involved, which was owned by a citizen of Angolan
nationality with about 42.5 % of the shares.
However, the freezing of invested funds, as a precautionary measure, was suspected that they originated by
committing a crime of embezzlement in Angola.
The UIF has disseminated intelligence to the National Asset Recovery Service (SENRA) to inform that the seized
funds may be the subject of a request for mutual legal assistance.
The Luxembourg FIU has informed us that, in accordance with the AML/CFT legislation in force in that
jurisdiction, Law 2001 of 12 November, has jurisdiction to order non-execution of transactions relating to the
customer (freezing order). And that the freezing order has no time limit.
The UIF, at the request of the FIU-Luxembourg, disseminated to the SENRA whether it was interested in the
amounts being frozen. If so, the PGR-SNRA had within 3 months to issue a letter rogatory, otherwise failure to
comply with the time limits implies that the freezing order is lifted.
418. SIC: SIC noted the importance of international cooperation in transnational crime and
investigations, in areas such as drug trafficking investigations, human trafficking, precious metals and
precious stones trafficking, amongst others. However, there is no case (or at least no case was provided
to the AT) of ML prosecution or conviction with such crimes as a predicate offense, where a request for
international cooperation was done.
419. SIC incorporates Interpol National Office, which handles all the informal requests for
international cooperation. Though the authorities indicated that the office has at its disposal a case
management system that is used to manage and prioritize the requests received and sent, this could not be
verified as the authorities could not demonstrate how the case management system works.
420. Regarding international cooperation, two channels have been used, which are police cooperation
through Interpol's National Office (for the exchange of information and joint police operations) and
judicial cooperation through the PGR and the Courts (pursuant to Law No. 13/15 of June 19 - Law on
International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and bilateral cooperation agreements). In the cases
presented to the AT, the second channel was used to obtain cooperation from the requested jurisdictions,
mainly by issuing rogatory letters. Although SIC had successful cases of cooperation, none of the cases
presented were related to ML/TF, but to its predicate offenses, mainly drug trafficking. The examples
provided don’t describe how international cooperation contributed to the results.
421. The National Asset Forfeiture Unit – SERNA – is part of the AGO/PGR office. Therefore, it
benefits of the bilateral MoUs celebrated by AGO/PGR. AGO/PGR has celebrated MoUs, for instance,
with the Arab Republic of Egypt, The People’s Republic of China, The Republic of Zambia, the Swiss
Federal Council, Turkey and Portugal.
422. The AGO/PGR is also part of multilateral MoUs such as the MoU celebrated between the AGO’s
offices of the Portuguese speaking countries (CPLP Fora).
423. SERNA has improved its mechanisms of international cooperation with its counterparts.
Nevertheless, Angola is still using these mechanisms only to a lesser extent, giving priority to the most
mediatic or valuable cases. There is no case management system in place nor any other type of procedure
to prioritize the use of the international cooperation tools that are available. The effectiveness of
international cooperation is still not consistent with Angola’s risk profile.
424. Nevertheless, there are some examples of international cooperation between SERNA and its
counterparts, as shown below (Case Boxes 2.3 and 2.4).
39
Case in box 8.3 is the same that was presented in box 8.1, but from the PGR/SERNA point of view.
Portugal and Switzerland, as well as other investigative techniques that allowed the perpetrator to be
charged and pronounced for the crimes of Embezzlement, Tax Fraud and Money Laundering, at first
instance, sentenced to a single sentence of 9 years in effective prison, similarly seized and seized
assets and valuables that were in the bank accounts of the accused plaintiff, wife, children and
companies entitled by him. The case is currently at the appeal stage.
Values achieved through cooperation of the UIF, the IACCC, Portugal and Switzerland. Details
to check in the table below:
COUNTRIES MONETARY VALUES
PORTUGAL Euros 20,951,988.20
LUXEMBOURG USD 3,637,885.71
Euros 42,850,005.94
SINGAPORE
USD 556,861,150.60
SWITZERLAND USD 1,114,165,175.00
BERMUDA USD 213,436,118.09
UAE (DUBAI) USD 18,000,000.00
OVERALL Euros 63,801,994.14
TOTAL USD 1,906,100,329.04
Embezzlement, Document Forgery, Qualified Fraud, Abuse of Trust, Influence Peddling, Economic
Participation in Business and Money Laundering
The processes under analysis refer to a former Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sonangol, E.P,
who is a state-owned oil company responsible for the administration and exploration of oil and natural
gas in Angola.
A consultancy firm established in Malta owned by the defendant concluded a consultancy service
contract, set at EUR 8,500,000.00 (eight million five hundred thousand euros) with Sonangol to
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the oil sector whose payment was fully assumed and
effected by the Ministry of Finance. This was the case before the defendant took over the presidency
of the state-owned company.
Thus, when ascending to the position of PCA of Sonangol, decided to create with his friends a new
consulting firm Y, registered in DUBAI, on behalf of a friend and having as administrator his right
arm, the then Administrator of company X and other companies owned by the defendant, to replace
company X that identified her as shareholder.
The Y company that later became Z was inserted in Sonangol E.P. and began to benefit from public
money.
Company Y issued invoices to Sonangol in the total amount of USD 61,843,004.59 (sixty-one million,
eight hundred and forty-three thousand and four dollars and fifty-nine cents) and Z issued invoices
of USD 69,305,777.95 (sixty-nine million, three hundred and five thousand, seven hundred and
seventy-seven dollars and ninety-five cents), amounting to USD 131,148,782.54 (one hundred and
thirty-one million, one hundred and forty-eight thousand, seven hundred and eighty-two U.S. dollars
and fifty-four cents) these payments were made, disrespecting the internal rules and procedures of
certification and validation of invoices, and the same not having passed through the competent areas
that should be made if the services charged had been actually performed.
His friends, as representatives of Y and Z companies, issued invoices to Sonangol for services not
provided.
The ongoing investigations also found that the defendant, in collusion with other organs of the State
administration, bought diamonds at a price below the market and subsequently sold abroad at
competitive prices in the international market, and the State was injured in about USD 5,000,000.00.
Therefore, to guarantee the payment of USD 5,000,000.00, plus USD 131,148,782.54, we require the
seizure of all assets that the defendant had both in Angola and abroad, even of lawful property,
pursuant to Article 9 of Law No. 15/18 of December 26.
The Public Prosecutor's Office had judicial cooperation from Portugal, the Netherlands and Monaco,
which provided information relevant to the investigation.
It also had the support of the International Anti-Corruption Centre (IACC) in the UK, which sent
intelligence reports allowing the identification of heritage in the UK, more specifically in London and
the Isle of Man.
This information allowed the Public Prosecutor's Office to request from the Supreme Court of Angola
the seizure of the defendant's assets located in Portugal, Monaco, Isle of Man and the Netherlands,
requests deferred.
Based on this arrest, the Public Prosecutor's Office requested its counterparts in Portugal, Monaco,
The Isle of Man and the Netherlands, through international judicial cooperation, to implement the
decision, which was effective.
Having been seized shareholdings in banks, profitable companies in the oil and gas, energy and
telecommunications, real estate, and cash sectors, valued at about USD 1,500,000,000.00.
In this case, we also have the support of national institutions that have provided us with intelligence
information such as the State Intelligence and Security Service (SINSE), The External Intelligence
Service (SIE) and the Financial Information Unit (UIF), as well as information from commercial
banks, Banco Nacional de Angola, Sonangol EP, Ministry of Finance, Angolan Diamond Trading
Society (SODIAM, EP), National Diamond Company (ENDIAMA, EP), Ministries of Mineral
Resources, Oil and Gas, among others.
The investigation is complete, and ready to be sent to court.
425. The two cases provided showed that SENRA/PGR recognize the importance of international co-
operation in what concerns assets recovery issues. Though they represent good examples of co-operation,
both international and domestic, the use of international cooperation instruments is still not consistent
with Angola’s risk profile. Since SENRA initialized its work (created in December 2018 and started to
function in January 2019) it has sent – from 2019 up to 2021 a total of 232 requests – 43 in 2019, 91 in
2020 and 98 in 2021 – and received a total of 162 requests – 13 in 2019, 81 in 2020 and 68 in 2021. No
information was provided by the authorities regarding the nature of the requests and its turnaround time.
426. For supervisors (financial and non-financial), some information was provided on
international cooperation with counterparts. Supervisory authorities have an uneven use of
international cooperation mechanisms for AML and CFT purposes.
427. ARSEG- Agência Angolana de Regulação e Supervisão de Seguros (Angolan Insurance
Regulation and Supervision Agency) is member of IOPS – International Organisation of Pension
Supervisors. and provides life insurance which is considered a low-risk activity. ARSEG has not received
any request to exchange information with foreign supervisory authorities and counterparts in the period
under scope (2017-2021). On the other hand, ARSEG did seek international cooperation by sending out
for requests in 2020 alone. One request was responded to and 3 were still in progress as at the time of the
onsite. The nature and relevance for AML/CFT purpose had not been provide and the time it to for the
request to be responded to was also not provided.
428. ARSEG is able to exchange information with its counterparts, mainly requiring technical
assistance which is stipulated in various MOUs it has entered into with its respective foreign coutnerparts.
A good example is the CISNA MoU, which is the common legal base (beyond the national legislation)
for international cooperation for Southern Africa jurisdictions. Angola, as a member of CISNA,
(Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-Banking Financial Authorities) benefits from the exchange
of information and assists other jurisdictions with information relating to insurance issues.
429. CMC - Comissão do Mercado de Capitais (Securities Market Commission)-CMC is a IOSCO
member and benefits from IOSCO’s multilateral MoU concerning consultation and cooperation and
exchange of information. The CMC enters into international supervisory cooperation agreements, with
the aim of making supervision more effective, bringing it closer to the practices followed by institutions
that perform the same functions in other countries, and combating fraudulent acts of an international
nature. The CMC has 14 International Cooperation Protocols, both bilateral and multilateral. Of the
international protocols which signed, the counterparts that have had the most correspondence with the
CMC have been the CMVM (Portugal, CVM (Brasil), AGMVM (Cabo Verde), FSC (Mauritius) and the
South African Reserve Bank. During the years 2018 to 2021, the CMC made 143 requests to international
and regional entities, and of this amount, 93 were successfully responded to with an average timeframe
of 12 days.
and of these 8, all were successfully responded to with an average timeframe of 8 days. The CMC also
received 8 requests to regional entities, which were all answered. CMC understands and uses both formal
and informal channels to exchange information to a reasonable extent, considering the risk and context of
the securities sector in Angola.
Table 2.9 – International/Regional Technical Assistance (incoming requests)
2018 2019 2020 2021
Requests Internatio Internatio Internatio Internatio
Regional Regional Regional Regional
Received nal nal nal nal
MI MI MI MI MI MI MI MI
S* S* S* S* S* S* S* S*
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Requests
3 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 4
received
Requests
Answere 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 4
d
Unanswe
red 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Requests
Quality
of
Go N/ Go Go Go N/ N/ Go Go N/ Go N/ Go N/ N/ Go
Requests
od A od od od A A od od A od A od A A od
Respond
ed
Average
N/ N/ N/ N/ N/ N/ N/
Respons 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
A A A A A A A
e Time
Total 5 requests 2 requests 3 requests 6 requests
*suitability / ** Market Issues
431. BNA (National Bank of Angola) - The BNA has signed cooperation agreements with several
foreign counterparts, for the exchange of supervision and law enforcement information and other
information for AML/CFT purposes, namely, with the Central Bank of Brazil, Central Bank of Cape
Verde and with the Central Bank of Portugal.
432. In some cases, formal cooperation is preceded by informal cooperation, which is based on the
exchange of correspondence, telephone contacts, videoconferences, face-to-face meetings between
experts from various countries. BNA understand and uses the international cooperation tools, both formal
and informal
433. Regarding the DNFBP supervisors and their foreign counterparts, though interactions, both
formal and informal, do exist in several areas, in what concerns international cooperation related to ML
and TF no information was provided to the AT in order to assess its level of effectiveness.
8.2.4 International exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and
arrangements
434. Angola has legal framework requiring all Financial Institutions and DNFBPs to obtain and
maintain BO information of subject entities (mainly FIs and DNFBPs). However, there is no
procedure on how BO information obtained by these entities can be exchanged with foreign
counter-parts. Further, the institutions have no platform to verify collected information, as there is no
enabling mechanism or standardised process to collect adequate, accurate and up to date for BO.
Nevertheless, competent authorities can obtain and provide basic information on legal persons registered
in Angola to their foreign (international) counterparts, This information can be accessed publicly through
Angola Public Gazette.
435. There are some examples of international cooperation with elements of BO information, being
Angola the requesting country, as shown above in box 8.1. Nevertheless, the absence of statistics or
concrete information on international exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal
persons and arrangements hinders the AT ability to assess if the existing exchange of information was
useful or done in a timely manner.
436. In general, Angola has the legal instruments to enable provision of international cooperation,
including MLA and extradition requests. However, the country has inadequate institutional capacity to
implement the measures for purposes of requesting or providing MLA, extradition and other forms of
cooperation regarding ML, TF and associated predicate crimes. There is no proper case management
system and prioritisation mechanisms to enable a determination to be made on how timely the
authorities have been able to provide MLA and extradition and the quality of the assistance. Angola
has made or received very few MLA and extradition requests on ML. Most of the requests made or
received relate to predicate offences, though in one instance the requests involved a case reminiscent
of TF. Requests from foreign jurisdictions were all rejected as they were not meeting legal
requirements in Angola and there was no evidence that requests to have such cases prosecuted
domestically was ever initiated. This may be attributed to lack of system or mechanism to provide
feedback by the authorities in the event of the extradition requests being granted by requested
jurisdictions. Angola has been granted one extradition request in the period under review and there is
very limited information to demonstrate that it actually pursued extraditions despite its identified
threats on financial crime. Moreover, what was even more concerning was the qualitative and
quantitative information submitted by Angola in the form of tables to demonstrate conclusively how
they have received and sought international cooperation during the period under review. The figures
in the tables have been inconsistent, inaccurate and unreliable to a large extent, indicating a system
which is not well coordinated in attending and/or addressing international cooperation measures.
437. Nevertheless, competent authorities are able to provide basic information of legal persons
registered in Angola with their foreign (international) counterparts though to some extent. Mechanisms
for international exchange of BO information of legal persons and other arrangements are not in place.
438. Angola is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO.2.
TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE
1. This section provides detailed analysis of the level of compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations in their numerical order. It does not include descriptive text on the country situation
or risks, and is limited to the analysis of technical criteria for each Recommendation. It should be read in
conjunction with the Mutual Evaluation Report.
2. Where both the FATF requirements and national laws or regulations remain the same, this report
refers to analysis conducted as part of the previous Mutual Evaluation in 2012. This report is available
from https://www.esaamlg.org/reports/ANGOLA_MUTUAL_EVALUATION_DETAIL_REPORT.pdf.
Recommendation 1 – Assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach
These requirements were added to the FATF Recommendations when they were revised in 2012 and
therefore were not assessed under the 2012 1st Round mutual evaluation of Angola.
OBLIGATIONS AND DECISIONS FOR COUNTRIES
Risk assessment
Criterion 1.1 – (Met)- Article 4, paragraph 1 of the AML Law establishes the requirement to conduct a
risk assessment, at the national level, on order to identify, assess and understand the risks associated with
money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of proliferation of mass destruction
weapons activities in Angola. Angola conducted its first National Risk Assessment (NRA) in 2019 using
a comprehensive ML/TF risk assessment methodology. Additionally, some competent authorities carried
out their own sectoral risk assessments in 2021.
Criterion 1.2 – (Met) The UIF is designated by the Supervisory Committee which responsible for
coordination of national ML/TF risk assessment.
Criterion 1.3– (Met)-As per Art. 4 paragraph. 4 of Law No. 5/20, the risk assessment must be updated
periodically on a three-year basis. Article 5 of the same Law creates the requirement for supervisory
authorities and other relevant entities to carry out sectoral risk assessments which are updated annually.
Some parts of the 2019 NRA were updated through sectoral risk assessments in 2021.
Criterion 1.4 – (Met)- Article 5 of the AML Law establishes the requirement to make the relevant findings
of the NRA to be made available to all subject entities and other entities for which they are pertinent in
order to make them aware of the outcomes of the Assessment. The NRA exercise and development of the
report involved all relevant competent authorities and Self-Regulatory Bodies (SRBs), representatives of
industry associations. These stakeholders were therefore privy to the results of the risk assessment. In
addition to this, the authorities conducted meetings, seminars and workshops during which the results of
the NRA exercise were shared.
Risk mitigation
Criterion 1.5 – (Not Met)- Paragraph 6 of the AML Law establishes the requirement to prepare and
submit an Action Plan to mitigate the identified risk for approval by the Head of Executive Power.
However, such an Action Plan has not been developed. In addition, Angola has not yet developed a risk
informed AML/CFT Policy and/or Strategy which would have guided the authorities to effectively
allocate resources and implement measures to prevent or mitigate ML/TF risks.
Criterion 1.6 – (Non Applicable)- Angola has not applied any exemption from its AML/CFT framework
with respect to activities conducted by FIs or DNFBPs as defined under the FATF Standards.
Criterion 1.9 – (Partly met)- FIs and DNFBPs are subject to AML/CFT supervision and monitoring by
the supervisory authorities to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements as per Article 57 of the
AML Law No.5/2020. However, compliance monitoring is not based on identified risks.
Risk assessment
Criterion 1.10 (a) – (Met)- Article 9, paragraph 5 of the AML Law No. 5/2020 requires FIs and DNFBPs
to document their ML/TF risk assessments, have senior management approval and document the
methodology used for the risk assessments.
Criterion 1.10 (b) – (Met)- Paragraph 5 b) of article 9 of the AML Law No. 5/2020 requires the FIs and
DNFBPs to consider all relevant risk factors before determining the overall risk level and the type and
size appropriate to the mitigation measures to be applied. Article 9, paragraph 1 also establishes specific
criteria to be considered.
Criterion 1.10 (c) – (Met)- Article 9, paragraph 5 c) of the AML Law No. 5/2020 creates the requirement
for a continuous update of the institution’s risks assessments on the analysis.
Criterion 1.10 (d) – (Met)- Article 9, paragraph 5 e) of the AML Law No. 5/2020 provides for the risk
assessment information to be made available for the competent authorities.
Risk Mitigation
Criterion 1.11 – (Met)-
Criterion 1.11 (a) – (Met)- In terms of Section 9(6)(a) of the AML Law No.5/2020, FIs and DNFBPs are
required to develop, adopt and implement a customer acceptance policy, internal rules, programs, policies,
procedures and controls adopted by a management body, to effectively manage and mitigate the risks of
ML/TF.
Criterion 1.11 (b) – (Met)- Article 9, paragraph 6, b) of the AML Law No.5/2020 establishes the
requirement for FIs and DNFBPs to monitor controls and to enhance them if necessary.
Criterion 1.11 (c) – (Met)- Article 9, paragraph 5 c) of the AML Law No.5/2020 establishes the
requirement for FIs and DNFBPs to take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the high risk areas.
Criterion 1.12 – (Met)- Article 13, paragraph 3 a) of the AML Law No.5/2020 establishes that simplified
measures can never take place where there are suspicions of ML/TF/PF. Article 13, paragraph 1
establishes the requirement to identify a demonstrably reduced risk of ML/TF/PF as necessary for subject
entities to simplify due diligence measures.
In its 1st Round MER, Angola was rated partially compliant (formerly R31). The main technical
deficiencies were that UIF had not finalized the signing of the necessary MOUs with all the relevant
authorities to enable effective cooperation in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree 35/11;
the coverage and composition of the AML/CFT task-force composed of the UIF Director and
representatives of relevant ministries do not extend to some of the DNFBPs or their supervising entities;
and there were no MoUs concluded between the BNA or ISS and CMC. The new requirements relate to
cooperation in the context of proliferation financing and compatibility of AML/CFT requirements and
data protection and private rules.
Criterion 2.1 – (Not met) There are no national AML/CFT policies which are informed by identified risks
and are regularly reviewed.
Criterion 2.2 – (Met) The Supervisory Committee and the National Task Force are responsible for
institutional coordination on issues of AML/CFT policies and strategies. Article 34 of the UIF Organic
Statute No. 02/2018 provides for the powers of the Coordinating Board of the Supervisory Committee
and Art 37 of the same Law and Dispatch nº 4340/21 provide for creation of the National Task Force
which technically supports the Supervisory Committee.
Criterion 2.3 – (Met) The Supervisory Committee and the NTF serve as the mechanisms enabling
cooperation, coordination and exchange of information domestically relating to development and
implementation of AML/CFT policies and strategies. The Supervisory Committee is composed of
members consist of high level appointees composed of the Ministers of Interior (who chairs the
Committee), Foreign Affairs, Finance and Justice and Human Rights, Governor of BNA, Secretaries of
the President for Judicial, Economic and Legal Affairs, the UIF (Secretary) and offices represented in the
NTF with the addition of the UIF. Decisions made by the NTF at operational level on assessment of
ML/TF risks and vulnerabilities, drafting and updating of legislation, national strategy and action plans
on AML/CFT are escalated to the Committee which at policy level proposes these decisions to the Council
of Ministers (Cabinet) for consideration.
Criterion 2.4 – (Not Met) There are no mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and coordination amongst
competent authorities to combat the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Criterion 2.5 – (Not Met) There is no co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms in place to ensure the
compatibility of AML/CFT requirements with Data Protection and Privacy rules and other similar
provisions.
Criterion 3.4- (Partly Met)- Art. 82 paragraph 1 (b) and (c) and paragraph 4 of Law No. 5/20, ML crimes
extend to all assets or rights over assets arising from the commission of the crime underlying money
laundering, regardless of their value. However, the reference to the different forms of assets in the
respective elements of ML is problematic as explained on criterion 3.1 above.
Criterion 3.5- (Partly Met)- According to Art. 82(11) of Law 5/20, the proof of the crime of money
laundering does not depend on the conviction of those that commit the predicate offence. However, article
82(6) of the same law states that the offences are not punishable if at the time of their practice, there is no
pursuit of confiscation due to factors such as amnesty, limitation period applicable to criminal procedure,
and a delayed lodging of a complaint relating to the unlawful acts. The authorities explain that amnesty
in relation to, or time limits for the prosecution of the predicate offence would affect the prosecution of
ML that arises from the same underlying offence. The authorities cannot prosecute a person for ML from
a predicate offence that is subject to amnesty, or whose prosecution is statute-barred. This ultimately ties
the prosecution, and thereby, proof of the offence of money laundering to a conviction on the underlying
predicate offence which is not affected by amnesty or time limits.
Criterion 3.6-(Met)-According to Art. 82 of nº 5 of Law 5/20, predicate offences for money laundering
extend to conduct that occurred outside Angola but which would have constituted an offence had it
occurred in Angola.
Criterion 3.7- (Partly Met)-Art 82 (1) of Law No. 05/20 criminalises money laundering by the person
who commits the predicate offence, i.e. who obtains the proceeds of crime. However, the limitations by
the differentiation of assets, advantage and goods as highlighted in criterion 3.1 above apply.
Criterion 3.8- (Not Met)-Angola does not have enabling provision to infer intent from objective
circumstances.
Criterion 3.8- (Not Met)- There is no enabling law to allow knowledge or intent to be inferred from
objective circumstances.
Criterion 3.9 - (Partly Met)- Article 82(1) of Law No. 5/20 provides that the offence of money laundering
is punishable only by imprisonment from 2 to 8 years. The sentence range is within the sentencing ranges
that applies to predicate financial crimes such as fraud and corruption. Additionally, Art.82 of Law
No.05/20 provides that the courts may enhance sentences by 1/3 in cases of aggravated ML, such as that
the defendant is a habitual ML offender or the offence has been committed in the context of an organised
group. Such considerations would lead to punishment that is proportionate and dissuasive. However, the
explanation given by the authorities to Art.82(6) ties the punishment of ML to the outcome or status of
the predicate offence. This would be contrary to the dictates of Criterion 3.5 and would affect the
punishment of ML.
Criterion 3.10 (Partly Met)-Articles 43 and 100 of the Angolan Penal Code provide for a wide range of
criminal and administrative sanctions applicable to legal persons for their involvement in criminal
activities. Legal entities are specifically liable to offences under Law No.5/20 according to Art.86(1) and
are punishable to a fine and/or dissolution as per Art 86(8). Notably, pursuant to Art.86(4), the liability of
the legal persons does not exclude the individual liability of its agents, nor does it depend on their liability.
However, Article 76(2) of Law 5/20 excludes the institution of civil or administrative proceedings to run
in parallel to criminal proceedings in situations where a legal person is prosecuted for both a crime and
misdemeanour that relate to the same facts and legal issue. In such scenarios, a judge may only apply
additional sanctions applicable to the misdemeanour in question. This implies that additional sanctions
would not apply to the crime under such circumstances.
Criterion 3.10 (Met)-Articles 43 and 100 of the Angolan Penal Code provide for a wide range of criminal
and administrative sanctions applicable to legal persons for their involvement in criminal activities. Legal
entities are specifically liable to offences under Law No.5/20 according to Art.86(1) and are punishable
to a fine and/or dissolution as per Art 86(8). Notably, pursuant to Art.86(4), the liability of the legal
persons does not exclude the individual liability of its agents, nor does it depend on their liability.
Criterion 3.11 -(Partly Met)- Article 82 (2) of Law No. 5/20 creates ancillary offences to ML such as
participation, association, conspiracy, attempt, aid, facilitate and guide the commission of any of the ML
conduct is subject to the same punishment applicable to ML under Art.82(1). Punishment in this regard
is subject to applicable mitigating factors as stipulated under the Criminal Code. However, the limitations
noted on C.3.1 and C3.5 would apply.
Criterion 4.1 (a)-(Met)- The Angolan law permits the confiscation of laundered property. Article 2 of
Law 15/18 (Loss of Assets) provides that this Law applies confiscation to all ‘property cases’ in which
the State has been injured. Article 4 of this Law provides for confiscation of assets that have caused a loss
to the State.
Criterion 4.1 (b) (Met)- Art.120(1) of the Penal Code provides for the confiscation of proceeds and
instrumentalities of crime in general, capturing even property intended for use in the commission of a
crime. Art.120(2) goes further to provide for the non-conviction-based confiscation of instrumentalities
of crime.
Criterion 4.1 (c) (Partly Met)- Article 51 of Law 19/17 provides for the confiscation of proceeds of any
offence related to terrorism. Such offences include terrorist financing and terrorist organisations.
However, there is no law that covers the confiscation of instrumentalities of these offences.
Criterion 4.1(d)(Met)- Art.122(4) of the Angolan Penal Code, Law 38/20, provides that in the event that
rewards, rights and if things that are subject to forfeiture to the State are not available or cannot be
appropriated by the State upon forfeiture, a payment of the corresponding value will be made to the State
instead. This would be preceded by a seizure of assets of corresponding value to criminal advantage that
is stipulated under Art.9 of Law 13/18.
Criterion 4.2(a-d) (Mostly met) –
Criterion 4.2 (a)- - Pursuant to Art.13(1) of Law15/18 (Loss of Assets), the National Asset Recovery
Service has the power to identify, trace and seize assets related to crimes, that are located either in the
country or abroad.
Criterion 4.2 (c)- - Art.88(1) of Law 05/20 gives power for carrying out provisional measures such as
the seizure and the freezing of assets or funds, in order to prevent the transaction, transfer or disposal,
before or during the criminal proceeding aimed at the crime of money laundering and terrorist financing.
Additionally, Art.9 (1)(2)&(3) of Law 15/18 (Loss of Assets) gives power to the public prosecutor to
apply for the seizure of a suspect’s assets of corresponding value to that which the State has lost due to a
criminal activity.
Criterion 4.2 (c)- The Angolan law does not stipulate any measures for the LEAs to prevent or void
actions that prejudice the country’s ability to freeze or seize property that may be subject to confiscation.
Criterion 4.2 (d)- The legal framework for Angola provides for a broad range of investigative measures
in support of existing confiscation powers under different pieces of legislation including Art 88 of Law
5/20, Law 15/18, the Criminal Code, the Penal Code. See Rec 31.1-31.4.
Criterion 4.3-(Met)- Third party bona fide rights are protected under Art.88(3) of Law 05/20 on seizures
and freezing of assets. Articles 80 (1)(2) and (3) of Law 5/20 elaborate how a third party can invoke the
bona fide purchaser defence in order to save their interest in any asset that is subject to seizure. In addition,
under Art. 8(3) of Law 15/18 (Loss of Assets), a third party is given an opportunity to prove the lawful
origin of property that has been transferred or gifted to them by a suspect. The same is applicable to
Art.227(4) of Law 39/20. In terms of property that is subject to forfeiture, third party interest in such
property is protected under Art.234(3) of Law 39/20.
Criterion 4.4 (Met) - In terms of Art.4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 324/19 of 7 th November 2019, the
General Vault of Justice manages assets recovered in the context of criminal proceedings, situated either
in Angola or in another country.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly SR II). The main technical deficiencies were that Angolan legislation does
not cover the conduct of mere financing, under any form, of individual terrorists or terrorist organizations.
While criminal liability exists in Angola for FT, it has not also been extended to legal persons.
Criterion 5.1 – (Met)- Angola criminalizes TF in line with the United Nations Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (TF Convention) (Law 19/17, Article 26). While Angola’s
defined terrorist offenses, including intimidation, do not enumerate all offenses listed in the Annex to the
TF Convention, the broad definitions can be interpreted as covering the Annex’s defined terrorist offenses
(Law 19/17, Article 23) and these broad offenses are further specified in separate legislation (Law 38/20
“Penal Code,” Law 17/17, Law 24/15) to cover the range of activities defined as offenses in the Annex to
the TF convention. Acting as an accomplice to and threatening a terrorist act are not specifically captured,
however Angola’s Penal Code establishes both as crimes in the context of any crime (Penal Code Articles
25 and 170). Angola’s TF provisions largely cover the elements set out in Article 2 (1) of the TF
Convention as it provides for the key elements of intent, knowledge, direct or indirect provision or
collection of funds, as well as intention or awareness of the use of funds for terrorist purposes. Unlawful
collection is not cited, but this is captured by criminalization of “any means.”
Criterion 5.2 – (Met)- The TF offense defined in Article 26 of Law 19/17 includes providing and
collecting funds, directly or indirectly, “with the intention or is aware that they may be used in whole or
in part” for terrorist financing. This includes planning and preparation for terrorist groups and crimes as
well as individual terrorists and terrorist groups. Article 26, paragraph 2 establishes that the funds do not
need to be linked to specific acts to be considered terrorist financing.
Criterion 5.2bis – (Met)- Travel anywhere, to include travel of individuals to a State other than their States
of residence or nationality is criminalized (Article 29 paragraph 1). The organization, financing, and
facilitation of a trip “with a view” to joining a terrorist organization (Article 29, paragraph 2) and “with a
view” to the training, providing logistical support, or instruction of others to conduct acts defined as
terrorism and international terrorism (defined by Articles 23 and 24) is also criminalized. This covers the
aspects of “financing the travel of individuals.” Preparatory acts are criminalized (Article 23, paragraph
6) as well as providing and receiving training to conduct terrorist acts (Article 30 paragraph 1).
Criterion 5.3 – (Met)- The definition of assets includes funds from both legitimate and illegitimate
sources (Law 5/20, Article 3, paragraph 1).
Criterion 5.4 – (Met)- The TF offense is not dependent on the funds being linked to a specific terrorist
act or used to commit a terrorist act (Law 19/17, Article 26, paragraph 2).
Criterion 5.5 – (Not Met)- Criterion 5.5 – (Not Met)- Angola’s legal framework does not provide the
ability to infer intent and knowledge through objective factual circumstances. Neither Law 19/17 nor Law
5/20 specifically stipulate that intent and knowledge can be inferred through objective factual
circumstances.
.
Criterion 5.6 – (Mostly Met)- Angola has a sentencing range of 5-15 years for TF (Law 19/17, Article
26), but pecuniary sanctions are not provided for TF cases. This is proportionate to the same sentencing
range for terrorism acts, exceeds the penalty for ML, and appears dissuasive. However, financing of travel
of an individual has a minimum sentence of 3 months and therefore may not always be treated as a
predicate offense.
Criterion 5.7 – (Partly Met) Criminal liability extends to legal persons for all crimes and is not limited
to natural persons acting on their behalf (Penal Code, Article 9). Criminal liability specifically extends to
legal persons when the crimes provided for in Law no 17/19 are committed by “their members, employees
or service providers, representatives or agents or by members of its bodies, acting on their behalf and in
interest” (Law 19/17, Article 3). However, Angolan law precludes parallel civil or administrative
proceedings when a criminal case is being pursued (Law 5/20, Article 76, paragraph 2).
Criterion 5.8 – (Met)- Angola’s Penal Code, Article 20, establishes criminal liability where a criminal
act is attempted without the crime being consummated. The Penal Code extends to the TF offense and
also establishes criminal liability for accomplices and organizing or directing others to commit or attempt
to commit an offense as well as acting as a group with a common purpose to commit a crime.
Criterion 5.9 – (Mostly Met)- All crimes with a penalty exceeding 6 months are considered predicate
offenses. TF has a penalty range of 5 to 15 years so it is captured as a predicate offense. However,
financing an individual to travel for terrorism purposes, Law 19/17 Article 29 paragraph 3, has a maximum
penalty of 4 years, while the minimum sentence, as proscribed in the Penal Code, is 3 months. Financing
travel could therefore be sentenced below 6 months in which case it would not be considered a predicate
offense, but all other TF offenses would be automatically captured as predicate offenses due to the 5 year
minimum penalty.
Criterion 5.10 – (Partly met)- Law 19/17 is applicable to facts practiced abroad (Article 2, paragraph 2).
However, this is limited to when the persons are “found in Angolan territory,” therefore, Angola could
not pursue a conviction in absentia with a follow-on request for extradition.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola has criminalized TF in-line with the TF Convention, and its legal definition of terrorist offenses
captures the activities defined in the TF Convention Annex. Minor deficiencies remain including the lack
of possibility for parallel criminal and civil or administrative proceedings and limits on the
extraterritoriality of the TF offense, and inability to infer intent and knowledge from objective factual
circumstances.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly SR III). The main technical deficiencies were that there was no framework
to implement the requirements on the freezing of funds used for terrorist financing. The other deficiency
related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013
Methodology.
Criterion 6.2(c) – (Partly Met) The National Designation Committee is responsible for responding to
third country designation requests, but there is no statutory timeframe to make a prompt determination,
and the national designation list only needs to be published “within three days” of a designation.
Presidential Decree 214/13 establishes that the National Designation Committee will analyse the
information provided, but there is no legal provision establishing that a decision to designate or not is
determined by based on reasonable grounds.
Criterion 6.2(d) – (Not Met) Presidential Decree 214/13 does not establish that the National Designation
Committee will apply an evidentiary standard of proof of reasonable grounds and that designation
decisions are not conditional upon the existence of a criminal proceeding.
Criterion 6.2(e) – (Not Met) Presidential Decree 214/13 does not provide responsibilities and procedures
for Angola to request other countries to give effect to the actions initiated under its freezing mechanisms.
Criterion 6.5(d) – (Partly Met)- Law 1/12, Article 19 (1) states the obligation to freeze must take place
simultaneously with the publication of the National Designation Committee’s decision to designate a
person or entity. However, pursuant to Article 19 (2) it is not necessary for the National Designation
Committee to publish UN designations in the Official Gazette, instead an extract containing names of
subjects can be published. UIF, as Designation Committee Secretariat responsible for making
communication and notification of designations and other acts, maintains an email distribution list sent to
all supervisory entities and some reporting entities which serves as a mechanism to publish an extract of
persons or entities designated by the UNSC (Presidential Decree 214/13, Article 10 (f)). However, it is
not clear if this communication mechanism brings UN designations into force domestically. UIF and BNA
both maintain guidance on TFS obligations on their webpages, and UIF maintains the comprehensive UN
sanctions list as well.
Criterion 6.5(e) – (Mostly Met)- Law 1/12, Article 29 (b-d) establishes the obligation for all natural and
legal persons to inform UIF and their supervisory entity any assets frozen of designated persons, but this
requirement does not extend to attempted transactions.
Criterion 6.5(f) – (Not Met)- Law 5/20, Article 88 (3) establishes that the seizure or freezing of assets
does not affect the bona fide third parties, but this only applies before or during criminal proceedings
Criterion 6.6. (Not met)
Criterion 6.6. (a)-(e) (Not met) - Angola does not have specific and publicly known procedures to delist
and unfreeze the funds or other assets of persons and entities which do not, or no longer, meet the criteria
for designation for the purposes of UNSCRs 1267/1989 or 1988 and 1373. Presidential Decree 214/13
establishes some mechanisms for de-listing and unfreezing the funds/other assets of persons/entities
which do not, or no longer, meet the designation criteria. It appears these criteria only apply to persons
and entities placed on Angola’s National List and it is not clear how they apply to persons designated
pursuant to UNSCRs 1267/1988 and 1373 and if the criteria are in accordance with procedures adopted
by said Committees. Moreover, the established de-listed mechanisms do not appear applicable to persons
and entities designated pursuant to UNSCR 1373, unless said persons were designated upon nomination
by Angola following addition to Angola’s National List.
Criterion 6.6 (f) (Not Met)-Presidential Decree 214/13 Article 20 establishes the authority to unfreeze
assets that have been wrongly frozen due to having similar names, however it is not clear what publicly
known procedures exist to communicate the procedures for such unfreezing.
Criterion 6.6 (g) (Not Met)-Presidential Decree 214/13 does not establish communication mechanisms of
unfreezing to the financial sector and DNFBPs.
Criterion 6.7-(Met)- In terms of Article 23 of Law No.1/2012, the competent authority may grant specific
exemptions in order to ensure that the basic needs of a designated person, group or entity are met, such as
basic and necessary expenses for the payment of certain types of commissions, expenses or charges for
services, or for extraordinary expenses.
These obligations were added during the revision of the FATF Recommendations in 2012 and were thus
not considered in the framework of the evaluation of Malawi in 2008 under the First Round of MEs.
Criterion 7.1 – (Not Met)- Angola’s obligation to implement PF-related TFS is established by both the
AML Law 5/20 and Law 19/17, but contradictory articles in Laws and Presidential Decrees create
confusion on when the obligation to implement TFS occurs.
Criterion 7.2 – (Partly Met)-
Criterion 7.2(a) – (Partly Met): Law 1/12, Article 17(1) establishes the obligation to freeze “immediately
and without notice” all funds or economic resources of persons and entities designated pursuant to PF-
related sanctions (Law 1/12, Article 84). Pursuant to Law 1/12, Article 4 this obligation applies to all
natural persons in Angola as well all legal persons registered in Angola and operating in Angola. However,
there is no definition of ‘immediately’ under the law.
Criterion 7.2(b) – (Partly Met)-Law 1/12, Article 17 (1) extends the obligation to freeze to all funds or
assets that are owned or possessed—whether wholly or jointly and directly or indirectly, and this
obligation is extended to persons and entities designated pursuant to PF-related sanctions (Law 1/12,
Article 84). Pursuant to Article 17 (2) this includes funds or assets derived or generated from funds or
economic resources owned by designated persons as well as funds or economic resources owned by a
designated person, but this does not include funds or economic resources controlled by a designated
person or the funds or other assets of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of
designated persons or entities.
Criterion 7.2(c) – (Partly Met)- Article 18 of Law no 1/12, establishes the prohibition to “make available
funds or economic resources or other related services, directly or indirectly” to benefit persons, groups,
and entities designated pursuant to PF-related sanctions. This prohibition is not explicitly extended to
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, designated persons or entities.
Criterion 7.2(d) – (Partly Met)- UIF subscribes to UNSC sanctions updates and forwards these updates
to a distribution list of supervisory entities and most reporting entities in its role as Secretariat for the
National Designation Committee. This mechanism does not include guidance on the obligation to take
action under freezing mechanisms. UIF maintains updates to the UNSC sanctions lists on its website, and
guidance about TFS obligations but this guidance does not reference the obligation to report on any
freezing actions taken. BNA has published two directives which inform FIs and NBFIs of their
obligations, but this does not extend to DNFBPs.
Criterion 7.2(e) – (Mostly Met)- Law 1/12, Article 29 (b-d) establishes the obligation for all natural and
legal persons to inform UIF and their supervisory entity any assets frozen (extended to PF-related
sanctions by Law 1/12, Article 84), but this requirement does not extend to attempted transactions.
Criterion 7.2(f) – (Not Met)- Law 5/20, Article 88 (3) establishes that the seizure or freezing of assets
does not affect the bona fide third parties, but this only applies before or during criminal proceedings.
Criterion 7.3 – (Mostly Met)- Law no 1/12 establishes the legal authority for supervisory entities to
conduct the supervision and inspection necessary to fulfil the obligations derived from Law no 1/12
(Articles 32 and 33) which covers PF-related sanctions (Article 84). There is criminal liability for “legal
persons and similar entities” for all crimes provided for in the AML Law, Law 1/12 (Articles 32 and 33),
and Law no 19/17, which covers proliferation financing and establishes a range of administrative penalties
in the event of violations. Specific measures by competent authorities to monitor and ensure compliance
were not provided.
Angola generally implements TFS obligations on PF. However, the lack of legal clarity on when UN
designations come into force domestically is a major deficiency which results in the ‘without delay’
requirements as set out in the FATF Standards not being met. There is no adequate legal authority,
procedures or mechanisms to implement the requirements under Criterion 7.1-5. Also, there is no adequate
guidance on channelling delisting requests through the focal point or use of the standard form for delisting
etc.
In its 1st Round MER, Angola was rated non-compliant with these requirements (formerly SR VIII). The
main technical deficiency was the NPO sector in Angola was not subject to the requirements of SR. VIII.
Angola has not previously been assessed according to the most recent requirements of R.8, as the 1st round
MER pre-dates the 2012 and 2016 adoption of changes to Recommendation 8 and its Interpretive Note.
Taking a risk based approach
Criterion 8.1 – (Not Met)
Criterion 8.1(a) – (Not Met)- The subset of NPOs which fall within Angola’s definition of NPOs have
not been identified pursuant to the legal mandate to do so (Law 5/20, Article 46, paragraphs 1 and 3 a).
Angola’s definition of NPOs aligns closely with the FATF definition (Law 5/20, Article 3, paragraph 26).
Article 45 of the AML Law establishes the duties of NPOs, and Article 46 paragraph b) creates the
requirement to assess which sub-set of NPOs is prone to TF abuse and supervise accordingly.
Angola has established the requirement for the supervisory entity to review the adequacy of legal and
regulatory obligations applicable to NPOs (Law 5/20, Article 45 and 46 paragraph b). However, this
review has not been conducted.
Criterion 8.1(b) – (Not Met)- Angola has not identified the nature of threats posed by terrorist entities to
the NPOs which are at risk as well as how terrorist actors abuse those NPOs.
Criterion 8.1(c) – (Not Met)- Article 45 of the AML Law establishes the duties of NPOs, and Article 46
paragraph b) creates the requirement for the supervisory entity to review the adequacy of legal and
regulatory. obligations applicable to NPOs and paragraph c) creates the requirement to identify best
practices followed by NPOs. However, this review has not been conducted.
Criterion 8.1(d) – (Not Met)- Article 5, paragraph 2 creates the requirement for sectoral risk assessments
to be updated annually, but no sectoral risk assessment has yet been conducted.
encourage NPOs to conduct transactions via regulated financial channels, wherever feasible.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Largely Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R 4). The main deficiency was that there were no requirements in the Law
on the securities and Market Commission for the Securities and Market Commission to exchange
information related to ML and FT. The new R. 9 has not modified the requirements under the former R.4
of the 2004 FATF Methodology and the detailed analysis set out in paragraphs 3.102-3.122 of the 2012
MER still apply.
Criterion 9.1 – (Mostly Met) -Article 19 requires FIs to cooperate and provide information to the UIF,
the supervisory and oversight authorities and, when requested by, provide information on transactions
carried out by customers, also present documents related to the said transactions. The FIs are required to
have systems and instruments that allow them to respond promptly and fully requests for information
submitted by the UIF and by other competent entities.
Information provided by FIs to UIF and competent authorities, for purposes of compliance with the AML
laws does not constitute violation of any duty of secrecy imposed by the law, regulation, or contract, nor
does it imply, to whoever provides them, disciplinary, civil, or criminal liability.
Article 50 of AML Law requires the competent authorities to provide any information, technical
assistance, or any other type of cooperation that may be requested by domestic or foreign authorities and
as required to fulfil the purposes of those authorities. The cooperation referred to includes exchange of
information, investigations, inspections, inquiries, or other reasonable efforts on behalf of the domestic
or foreign authorities, and the competent authorities shall provide all the information it is able to gather
within the powers granted by the current legislation. The competent authorities may, on their own
initiative, share with domestic or foreign authorities information related to money laundering and the
financing of terrorism and proliferation. The competent authorities shall define internal procedures and
means that are adequate, safe, efficient and effective to ensure the receipt, processing, disclosure and
prioritizing of cooperation requests, as well as the timely provision of information to domestic and foreign
authorities.
Article 33(5) requires the correspondent institutions to ensure that the information requested is provided
to them (as it relates to recommendation 13).
There is no legal requirement for sharing of information between FIs, both domestically and
internationally and between FIs which belong to the same group.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R. 5). The main technical deficiencies were related to effectiveness issues
which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 10.1 – (Met) – Article 7 of the AML Law prohibits FIs from opening or maintenance of
anonymous accounts or accounts under fictitious names.
Criterion 10.2 – (Met)– Financial institutions are required to undertake CDD of the client and, if
applicable of its legal representative and beneficial owners when –
(b) carry out occasional transactions: with a value equal to or greater than USD 15 000.00, in national
currency or in another currency, regardless of whether it is a single operation or a pact that is part of
several operations apparently linked. Article 11(1) (b) (i)).
(c) when carrying out occasional electronic transfer of a value equal to or greater than USD 1 000.00
or the equivalent, in national currency or in another foreign currency. Article 11(1) (b) (ii)).
(d) there are suspicions of crimes of money laundering or terrorist financing and proliferation of mass
destruction weapons. Article 11(1) (c).
(e) there are doubts as to the authenticity or conformity of previously acquired customer
identification data. Article 11(1) (d).
Required CDD measures for all customers
Criterion 10.3 – (Met) – Art. 11(2)(a)(ii) and (iii) of AML Law, requires FIs to identify and verify the
identity of clients, beneficial owners and persons who represent them. Article 7 of notice nº 14/20, of the
BNA, establishes the customer due diligence identification and verification requirements for natural
persons and legal persons (for FIs regulated by the National Bank of Angola being banks, MVTS,
exchange bureau and MFIs). Article 8 of Regulation No. 5/2021 of 8 of November has detailed
identification and verification information required for entities regulated by Capital Markets Commission.
The same has also been provided for in the insurance sector under Article 17 (1) of the notice on the
prevention and combat of ML/FT/P in the insurance sector.
Angolan legislation does not allow legal arrangements to be set up in Angola., however, foreign legal
arrangements can operate in Angola by holding share in a legal entity Under such circumstances, FIs are
required to identify and verify the trustees, settlors, and beneficiaries Article (11) (2) (a) (iv) of AML
Law.
Criterion 10.4 – (Met) – Article 11 (2) (a) (i) and 4 of AML Law, requires FIs to identify and verify the
identity of the clients, beneficial owners and the persons that represent them. Article 11 (4) of AML Law
requires the entities subject to this law to also verify that the customers’ representatives are legally entitled
to act in their name or on their behalf. The identification of trusts constituted under foreign law, or other
types of legal arrangements, shall include the identification and verification of the name of the trustees,
settlors, and beneficiaries.
Criterion 10.5 – (Met) – Article 11(1) requires FIs to identify the client and, if applicable, their legal
representatives and beneficial owner, whenever they establish business relationships or carry out
occasional transactions. Article 11(2)(b) requires FIs to identify and verify beneficial owners using
information from credible sources.
Criterion 10.6 – (Met) –Article 11(2) (c) and (d) of AML Law, requires FIs to obtain information on the
purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
Criterion 10.7 – (Mostly Met) – Article 11(2) (f) and (g) of AML Law, requires FIs to conduct ongoing
due diligence on the business relationship. FIs are required to:
(a) maintain a continuous monitoring of the business relationship, to ensure that such operations are
consistent with the knowledge that the FI has of the client, its business and its risk profile;
(b) Article 11 (2) (g) of AML Law, requires FIs to keep information obtained during the business
relationship updated. However, there is no provision to undertake reviews of existing records, particularly
for higher risk categories of customers.
Criterion 10.8 – (Met) – Article 11(2)(d) of the AML Law requires FIs to, obtain information to
understand the nature of the customer’s business, its ownership and control structure, as well as the names
of the members of its management bodies;
Criterion 10.9 – (Mostly Met) – Article 11 (2) (a) (ii) of AML Law requires FIs to identify and verify
customers - in the case of clients who are legal persons, identification is made through the presentation of
an original document or photocopy of the certificate of public deed of incorporation or equivalent
document, business registration certificate, publication in the Official Gazette, permits, valid license
issued by the entity competent authority and the tax identification number. Furthermore, Article 11 (2)(d)
requires FIs obtain information on the names of the members of management of legal persons or legal
arrangements. However, there is no requirement for FIs to identify and verify customers that are legal
persons through the address of the registered office and, if different, a principal place of business.
Criterion 10.10 – (Met) – Article 11(1) of the AML Laws requires FIs to ascertain and verify the identity
of their customers and beneficial owners. The definition of beneficial owner of legal entities is in line
with c. 10.10 as Article 3(9) of the AML Laws defines beneficial owner as (a) the natural person(s) who:
(i) ultimately owns or controls a legal person, and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction
is being conducted;
(ii) exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement, in situations where
ownership or control are exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control other than direct
control;
(iii) ultimately, directly, or indirectly, own or control a company’s capital or the voting rights of a
legal person, other than a company whose shares are traded on a regulated market, subject to reporting
requirements consistent with international standards; and
(iv) exercise or have the right to exercise significant influence over the company or control it
irrespectively of the level of ownership.
(b) For legal entities that manage or distribute funds, the natural person(s) who:
(i) benefit from their assets when the future beneficiaries have already been determined;
(ii) are deemed to be the class of persons in whose main interest the legal person is set up or operates,
when the future beneficiaries have yet to be determined; and
iii) exercise control over the assets of the legal person.
Criterion 10.11 – (Mostly Met) –For identification of trusts constituted under foreign law or other types
of legal arrangements, Article (11) (2) (a) (iv) of AML Law, requires FIs to identify and verify the name
of the trustees, settlors, and beneficiaries. However, there is no requirement to verify the identity of any
other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust, including through a chain of
control or ownership.
Criterion 10.12 – (Met) – Article 35 (1) (a) and (b) of AML Law, requires FIs to identify beneficiaries of
life insurance and other insurance related to investment-
(a) identify insurance policy beneficiaries who are natural persons, legal persons, or entities without
legal personality, by name.
(b) For beneficiaries that are designated by their characteristics, by class or by other means, obtain
sufficient information to be able to know and establish the identity of the final beneficiaries at the time of
the payout.
(c) The verification of the identity of the beneficiary shall occur at the time of the payout (Article
35(4).
Criterion 10.13 – (Met)- Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Notice on the prevention and combat of ML/FT/P
in the insurance sector provides that, If the entities determine that a beneficiary, who is a legal person or
an entity without legal personality, constitutes a higher risk, the enhanced due diligence measures shall
include reasonable measures, to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, and of the beneficiary at the
time of payment of insurance benefits”.
Timing of verification
Criterion 10.14 – (Met) – Article 12 (1) requires FIs to verify the identity of customers and beneficial
owners before establishing the business relationship or before carrying out any occasional transactions.
However, Article 12(2) allows FIs to verify the identity of customers or beneficial owners after the start
of the business relationship provided that:
(a) the FI must complete the identity verification procedures within the reasonable period
determined; (Article 12(4)
(c) the FI has taken adequate measures to manage the risk associated with the situation, namely by
limiting the number, type or amount of operations that can be carried out.
Criterion 10.15 – (Met) – Article 12 (1) of the AML Law requires FIs to verify customer information
before the business relationship is established or before any occasional transaction occurs. However,
article 12(2) requires FIs to verify identity of customers after the business relationship has been
established. The Article provides situations where verification may be delayed being: when it is essential
to avoid interrupting the normal course of business; when there are no provisions otherwise under the
legal or regulatory standards applicable to the activity of the entity subject to this law; when the situation
in question poses a small risk of ML/TF/PF, assuming the entities subject to this law have explicitly
identified such situation; and when the entity subject to this law has adopted adequate measures to manage
the risk associated with the situation, namely by limiting the number, type or amount of transactions that
may be performed.
Existing Customers
Criterion 10.16 – (Met)-Article 11(5) of the AML Laws stipulates that the duty of identification is also
applicable to existing customers, and verification of the identity of said customers will be subject to
regulations issued by the supervisors.
Risk-Based Approach
Criterion 10.17– (Met) – Article 14 (3) and (4) requires FIs to perform enhanced due diligence where the
ML/TF risks are higher.
Criterion 10.18 – (Met) – Article (13) requires FIs to simplify the measures adopted under the duty of
identification and diligence when they identify a demonstrably reduced risk of ML/FT/P in business
relationships, occasional transactions or operations carried out, taking into account, namely, the origin or
destination of the funds, as well as the factors referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of this Law. The
law requires simplified due diligence to be conducted following an adequate risk assessment by the FI or
by the respective supervisory and oversight authorities and to be proportional to the identified reduced
risk factors. In addition, the law outlines circumstances under which simplified due diligence can never
take place which include situations when there are suspicions of ML/TF/P, when enhanced identification
or due diligence measures are to be adopted; and whenever the supervisory authority determines situations
under which simplified due diligence cannot be taken. Furthermore, the law outlines simplified due
diligence measures that FIs can use.
Criterion 10.19 – (Met) – Article 15(1) of AML Law requires FIs to refuse to open an account; refuse to
start the business relationship; refuse to carry out the transaction; and to terminate the business
relationship where an FI is unable to comply with relevant CDD measures. The FIs are required to
consider making a suspicious transaction report in relation to the customer where it is unable to identify
a customer and suspect that the situation might be related to ML/TF/P crime.
Criterion 10.20 – (Met) – Article 18(4) requires FIs not to pursue the CDD process in cases where FIs
form a suspicion of ML/TF/P and reasonably believe that performing the CDD process will tip-off the
customer. FIs are required to communicate in writing to the UIF, the basis of their suspicion and confirm
the suspension of the operation. Article 15(2) requires FIs to consider making a suspicious transaction
report in relation to the customer where it is unable to identify a customer and suspect that the situation
might be related to ML/TF crime.
Recommendation 11 – Record-keeping
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Largely Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R. 10). The main technical deficiency was that there were no requirements
for FIs to keep records beyond the statutory period upon request by a competent authority.
Criterion 11.1– (Met) – Article 16 (1) (b) of the law requires FIs to maintain all necessary records on
transactions, both domestic and international, for at least 10 years following completion of the transaction
or at the end of the business relationship.
Criterion 11.2 – (Met) – The law outlines the documents to be maintained being: copies of documents or
other technological supports proving compliance with the duty of identification and due diligence,
classification of customers; transaction registration, including all original and beneficiary information of
the transaction, to allow the reconstitution of each transaction, in order to provide, if necessary, evidence
in the context of a criminal proceeding; copy of all commercial correspondence exchanged with the client;
copy of reports made by FIs to the UIF and other competent authorities; records of the results of internal
analyses, as well as a record of the grounds for the decision of the subject entities not to report these
outcomes to the UIF or other competent authorities.
Criterion 11.3 – (Met)– Article 16(1) (c) requires FIs to keep transaction register, including all original
and beneficiary information of the transaction, to allow the reconstitution of each transaction, in order to
provide, if necessary, evidence in the context of the criminal proceeding.
Criterion 11.4 – (Met) – Article 16(2) and (4) require FIs to properly store the information in electronic
format or by other means that allow their easy location and immediate access to them by the UIF or other
competent authorities and to make information available to the UIF and other competent authorities.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola meets all the requirements of Recommendation 11.
Angola is rated Complaint with Recommendation 11.
Recommendation 12 – Politically exposed persons
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R 6). The main technical deficiencies were related to effectiveness issues
which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology. In 2012, the FATF
introduced new requirements for domestic PEPs and persons having prominent functions in international
organisations.
Criterion 12.1 – (Met) – Article 14 (5) (a) to (d) of AML Law requires FIs to put in place adequate risk-
based procedures to determine whether the client, or if applicable, representative, or beneficial owner can
be considered a politically exposed person. The law further requires FIs to obtain authorization from the
competent management body of the subject entity before establishing business relationships with such
customers and as well as to streamline and continue the relationships, in the event that the acquisition of
the status of "Politically Exposed Person" is subsequent to the establishment of the business relationship
and establish from the client the origin and destination of the funds involved in the business relationship
or the occasional transaction. The FIs are also required to carry out continuous follow-up of the business
relationship.
Criterion 12.2 – (Met) – Article 14 (5) (a) of AML requires FIs to put in place adequate risk-based
procedures to determine whether the client, or if applicable, representative, or beneficial owner can be
considered a politically exposed person. There is no distinction in Angolan legislation between domestic
and foreign PEPs, therefore, the same requirements, required for foreigners, as mentioned in the above,
apply to domestic PEPs.
Criterion 12.3 – (Met) – The regime described in c.12,1 and 12,2 applies to family members and close
association of PEPs (Article 3 (31) (b) (I to iv).
Criterion 12.4 – (Met) – Article 36 of AML requires FIs to take adequate measures to determine whether
the beneficiaries or, when applicable, the effective beneficiaries of the policy are politically exposed
persons. The law further requires this to be done at time of payment of the execution of the policy. If
beneficiary of a life insurance policy is a PEP, FIs are required to inform the institution’s management
body, before the payout, carry out enhanced due diligence measure. The law requires FIs to submit a
suspicious transaction report to the UIF before the execution of the insurance policy.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R 7). The new FATF Recommendation has added a requirement to prohibit
relationships with shell banks.
Criterion 13.1 – (Mostly Met) – (a) Article 33 (2) (a) and (c) of the AML Law requires FIs to collect
sufficient information about the responding institution, to fully understand the nature of business of these
institutions. The FIs are required to ensure the suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of these institutions,
taking into account the information available in the public domain, their reputation and their quality of
supervision, including whether they have already been subject to an investigation or regulatory action on
ML/TF/P.
(b) Article 33 (2) (b) requires FIs to assess the respondent banks’ internal control procedures, in
preventing ML/TF/P.
(c) FIs are required to obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent
relationships (Article 33 (3).
There is no requirement in law that requires FIs to understand the respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each
institution.
Criterion 13.2 – (Met) – Article 33 (4), requires correspondent banking relationships involving payable-through
accounts, to confirm that the respondent institutions with direct access to the payable-through accounts fulfil the
customer due diligence duty. Article 33(5) requires FIs that provide payable-through accounts to be provide
relevant CDD information upon request to the correspondent bank.
Criterion 13.3 – (Met) – Article 6 of AML Laws prohibits the establishment of shell banks in Angolan
territory. Furthermore, correspondent institutions are prohibited from establishing correspondence
relationships with shell banks and correspondent institutions should avoid establishing correspondence
relationships with other respondent institutions that, admittedly, allow their accounts to be used by shell
banks.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly SR VI). The main technical deficiency was that the BNA had not issued
any regulation requiring the maintenance of a list of agents and the obligation to communicate it to the
BNA. The other shortcomings were related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of
technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology. The FATF introduced new requirements concerning
the identification of providers of money or value transfer services who are not authorised or registered,
and the application of sanctions for failure to comply with these obligations and additional obligations for
MVTS providers which use agents.
Criterion 14.1– (Met)- Payment service providers are considered financial institutions and as such are
subject to authorization and supervision by the Central Bank (Article 3 (1) and Article 102 of Law no.
14/21 RGIF.
Criterion 14.2 – (Met)– BNA identifies unlicensed operators through consumer complaints received via
the consumer complaints department, tipping off, media reports and triggered inspections. Subsequent to
identification of unlicensed institutions, the BNA alerts the public of the unlicensed institutions and
applies the measures such as locate the illegal institutions mostly with the assistance of law enforcement,
and if the unlicensed institutions cannot be located, the cases are referred to the law enforcement for
further investigation. During the assessment period, the BNA proactively identified illegal operators and
referred the matters to PGR, which resulted in conviction of offenders and confiscation of assets.
Furthermore, Law of RGIF provides a range of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to entities that
provide financial activities without prior authorization from the Central Bank which includes
administrative and criminal infraction.
Criterion 14.3 – (Met)– Article 2 (1) (a) and 3 (4) (a) AML Law lists financial institutions as subject
entities and the BNA as a supervisory and inspection authority for financial institutions, respectively.
Consequently, payment service providers are monitored for compliance with the AML Law by the central
bank.
Criterion 14.4 – (Met) –The hiring of a payment agent by a payment service provider is subject to special
registration with the BNA (Article 17 Law 40/20 (Payment System Law); Article 27 Notice no. 07/17).
Criterion 14.5 – (Met)– Payment service providers are required to include agents in their AML/CFT
programs (Article 32 (3) of AML Laws).
Angola has adequate requirements for dealing with regulation and supervision of MVTS and has
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for dealing with any person who carries out MVTS without a
licence or approval from the Central Bank which includes administrative and criminal infraction.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola meets all the requirements of Recommendation 14.
Angola is rated Compliant with Recommendation 14.
In its 1st Round MER, Angola was rated Largely Compliant with these requirements (formerly R.8). The
main technical deficiency was that FIs were not implementing relevant policies to manage the risk of none
face-to-face transactions. The new R.15 focuses on assessing risks related to the use of new technologies,
in general, and imposes a comprehensive set of requirements in relation to virtual asset service providers
(VASPs).
New technologies
Criterion 15.1– (Partly Met) – FIs are required to identify and assess ML/TF/PF risks that may arise due
to, supply of products or operations likely to favor anonymity; the development of new products, services,
distribution mechanisms, payment methods and new commercial practices, the use of new technologies
or in the development phase, both for new products and for existing products (Article 10, AML Law).
However, the country and the FIs (with the exception of large banks) have not demonstrated that they
identify and assess the ML/TF risks associated with development of new products and new business
practices including new delivery mechanisms, and the use of new or developing technologies for both
new and pre-existing products (see IO.4).
Criterion 15.2 – (Met) – The Law requires FIs to conduct their risk assessments prior to the launch or use
of such products, practices and technologies and to take appropriate measures to manage and mitigate the
ML/TF/P risks.
Criterion 15.3 – (a - c) – (Not Met)–There is no provision that requires competent authorities to identify
and assess ML/TF/P risk emerging from virtual asset activities and the activities or operations of virtual
asset service providers (VASP). The Authority has not provided ML/TF/PF risk assessment report for
virtual assets. The Authority has also not elaborated how AML/CFT risk-based approach is applied to
VASP
Criterion 15.4 (a) – (Not Met) – There is no provision that deals with registration of virtual asset service
providers when the VASP is a legal person in the jurisdiction where it is created or when the VASP is a
natural person, in the jurisdiction where its place of business is located.
Criterion 15.4 (b) – (Not Met) – There is no provisions that requires competent authorities to take steps
to prevent criminals or their associates from holding, or being the beneficial owner of, a significant or
controlling interest, or holding a management function in a VASP.
Criterion 15.5 – (Not Met) – There is no provision that requires competent authorities to identify natural
or legal persons that carry out VASP activities without the requisite license or registration. Furthermore,
there are no sanctions for non-compliance.
Criterion 15.6 (a-b) – (Not Met)– there is no designated licensing or registration authority for VASPs.
Criterion 15.8– (Not Met)– VASPs are not regulated, therefore, there are no sanctions for VASPs that
fail to comply with the requirements of the AML Law.
Criterion 15.9 (a - b) – (Not Met) – VASPs are not regulated, therefore, there is no provision that requires
VASPs to comply with requirements set out in recommendation 10 to 21
Criterion 15.9 (b) – (Not Met)– VASPs are not regulated, therefore, there is no provision that requires
VASPs to includes electronic transfers in the message or in the payment form that accompanies the
transfer duly verified information.
Criterion 15.10 – (Not Met)– VASPs are not regulated, therefore, there is no provision that requires
VASPs to comply with requirements for implementing UNSC listings and removal, there is no provision
for guidance to a VASP that may be holding frozen assets.
Criterion 15.11– (Not Met)– There is no provision that requires competent authorities to provide
international cooperation in relation to money laundering, predicate offences and terrorist financing
relating to virtual assets. In addition, there is no requirement for supervisors of VASPs to exchange
information with their foreign counterparts.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly SR VII). The main technical deficiency was that even though FIs in
Angola were using SWIFT for international transfers, they were not required under Law 12/10 to apply
SR VII obligations. The FATF requirements in this area have since been expanded to include requirements
relating to beneficiary information, identification of parties to transfers and the obligations incumbent on
the financial institutions involved, including intermediary financial institutions.
Ordering financial institutions
Criterion 16.1(a-b) – (Met) – Article 30 (1 - 3) of AML Law requires financial institutions whose activity
includes electronic transfers to include in the message or in the payment form that accompanies the
transfer duly verified information for payers and beneficiaries. The information required is in line with
requirement of criterion.
Criterion 16.2 – (Not Met) – Where several individual cross-border wire transfers from a single originator
are bundled in a batch file for transmission to beneficiaries, there is no requirement for FIs to ensure
accurate originator information (including account number or unique transaction number) and full
beneficiary information, that is traceable within the beneficiary country.
Criterion 16.3 – (Non Applicable) – There are no thresholds requirements for purposes of criterion 16.1.
Criterion 16.4 – (Non Applicable) – There are no thresholds requirements for the purposes of this
criterion.
Criterion 16.5 – (Met) – Article 30 (1) of the AML Law, requires FIs whose activities include electronic
transfers to include duly verified information in the message or payment form accompanying the transfer.
the information is required for both the payer and the beneficiary.
Criterion 16.6 – (Met) – For domestic electronic transfers, information about the beneficiary may be
dispensed if granted that it is possible to retrace and reach the payer from his single transaction number
or account number. And on the other hand, if the FI is in position to submit to the FI of the beneficiary of
the transaction or to the competent authorities, in 3 working days, all information to the payer and
beneficiary as required (Article 30 (4) and (5) of the AML Law).
Criterion 16.7 – (Met) – The ordering FIs are required to collect and maintain all information obtained
about the originator and the beneficiary for a period of 10 (ten) years, from the moment the transaction is
carried out or after the end of the business relationship.
Criterion 16. 8 – (Met) – The ordering FIs are not allowed to execute a wire transfer if compliance with
criterion 16.1 -16.7 is not ensured (Article 30 (7) of the AML Law)
Criterion 16.13 – (Partly Met) – Beneficiary FIs should be required to take adequate measures to identify
cross-border wire transfers areas that lack the necessary information about the payer or beneficiary. which
may include post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible, to identify cross-border wire
transfers that lack required originator information or required beneficiary information (Article 31 (1)
AML law). The use of the word “should be” is not appropriate as it does not mandate FIs to undertake the
obligation.
Criterion 16.14 – (Met) – For cross-border electronic transfers in an amount equal to or greater than the
equivalent of USD 1000, the beneficiary FIs are required to verify the identity of the beneficiary, if it has
not been previously verified, and keep the information for a period of at least 10 years (Article 31 (2)
AML Law).
Criterion 16.15 – (Met) – Beneficiary financial institutions are required to have risk-based policies and
procedures in place to determine when and whether transactions should be rejected due to lack of
information referring to the originator or beneficiary (Article 31 (3) AML Law).
Criterion 16.16 –(Met)– Article 30 (1) of AML Law requires FIs whose activities include electronic
transfers to include duly verified information in the message or payment form accompanying the transfer.
Criterion 16.17 – (Met) – Payment service provider that controls either the order or receipt of an
electronic transfer is obliged to take into account all the information from both the ordering and
beneficiary sides in order to determine whether an STR has to be filed; and file an STR in any country
affected by the suspicious wire transfer, and make relevant transaction information available to the
Financial Intelligence Unit.
Criterion 16.18 – (Not Met) – There is no provision creating an obligation for FIs when processing wire
transfers to take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with UNSCR
designations.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non Applicable with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R 9) as there were no third parties and introduced business operating in
Angola. The FATF's new requirements emphasise on the country risk of the third party required to
perform due diligence on the customer.
Criterion 17.1 – (Met) – Article 26 (1) of the AML Law allows FIs to delegate to a third party, under the
terms to be regulated by the respective competent authorities, the duties of identification and diligence in
respect to clients. The Law requires FI that use third parties to comply with CDD measures to maintain
the responsibility for strict compliance with the obligation of identification and due diligence.
Criterion 17.1(a) – (Met) – Article 26 (4) and (3) (a) of AML Law requires FIs that rely on third party
for CDD to ensure that such third parties are able to gather all information and comply with all
identification, due diligence and document keeping procedures that the FIs must comply with.
Criterion 17.1(b) – (Met) – Article 26 (3) (b) of AML Law requires FIs that rely on third parties for CDD
to ensure that such third parties can, when requested, immediately transmit a copy of the identification
and verification of identity data and other relevant documentation about the client, its representative or
beneficial owners who were subject to the identification and due diligence process.
Criterion 17.1(c) – (Met) – Article 26 (2) requires that FIs which delegate such functions to third parties
to make sure that such third parties are regulated, supervised and/or inspected in terms of compliance with
customer due diligence measures and certify that they maintain their official records in accordance with
the Law.
Criterion 17.2 – (Met) – Article 26 (4) of AML Law requires FIs that rely on third party to take into
account the country risk classification when choosing such third parties.
Criterion 17.3 (a - c) – (Not Met) – There are no requirements for FIs that rely on a third party that is part
of the same financial group.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R 15). The main technical deficiencies were related to effectiveness
issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology. The new
Recommendation introduces some new requirements on implementing AML/CFT programmes for
financial groups.
Criterion 18.1 – (Met)
Criterion 18.1(a) –Article 22 (1) (a) of AML Law requires FIs to implement programs to prevent
ML/FT/PF appropriate to the sector of the activity, which include compliance control system, including
the appointment of senior manager.
Criterion 18.1(b)– Article 22 (1) (b) requires FIs to have screening procedures that ensures strict criteria
are applied in hiring employees.
Criterion 18.1(c)– Article 23, AML Law, requires FIs to periodically and adequately provide training to
their employees and management with a view to achieving full compliance with the obligations laid down
in the law regarding prevention of ML/FT/P.
Criterion 18.1(d) –Article 22 (1) (c), AML Law requires FIs to have an independent internal control
structure to test the system for preventing and combating ML/TF/P.
Criterion 18.2(a)– Article 29 (1), AML Law, requires FIs to, in relation to their branches or subsidiaries
in which they have a dominion relationship established in third countries, to apply obligations equivalent
to those provided for in the AML Law.
Criterion 18.2(b)– Article 22 (3) (b) of the AML Law requires FIs as part of a group relationship, to have
measures relating to the provision of information to the audit and compliance functions, at group level,
on clients, accounts, and branch and subsidiaries operations. However, the Law does not require FIs to
provide information and analysis of transactions or activities which appear unusual.
Criterion 18.2(c)– Article 22(3) (d) of AML Law establishes the duty of confidentiality and proper use
of information shared by FIs within the scope of ML/FT/P prevention and fight. However, there are no
Criterion 18.3- (Met) – Article 29 (1) and (3), AML Law requires FIs to, in relation to their branches or
subsidiaries in which they have a dominion relationship established in third countries, apply obligations
equivalent to those provided for in the Angola AML Law. The law further requires that whenever the
requirements regarding the prevention of ML/TF/P existing in a third country are more stringent than
those provided for in the Angolan AML Law, such requirements may apply to branches and subsidiaries
of Angolan financial institutions established in the third country. In addition, if the legislation of the third
country does not allow the application of the measures provided for in the AML Law, FIs must inform
the respective supervisory and oversight authorities of this fact and take additional measures to prevent
the risk of ML/TF/PF.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R21). The main technical deficiencies were that: supervisory authorities
had not yet implemented any measures to transmit information to FIs with regard to the deficiencies in
the AML/CFT systems of other countries and there was no authority to impose counter measures. R.19
strengthens the requirements to be met by countries and FIs in respect of higher-risk countries.
Criterion 19.1 –(Met) –FIs are required to apply enhanced monitoring measures to customers,
proportionate to the risks to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons,
originating in jurisdictions which do not apply international requirements for the prevention of ML/TF/P,
or else apply such measures insufficiently, as determined by the Financial Action Task Force (Article 28
(1) of AML Law).
Criterion 19.2 –(Met) – Article 28(1) (a) and (b) of the AML Laws requires FIs to apply enhanced
monitoring measures to customers, in proportion to the risks, business relationships and transactions with
natural and legal persons, originating in jurisdictions which have weak measures for preventing and
combating ML/TF/P, as determined by the Financial Action Task and by a local competent authority.
Criterion 19.3 – (Met) –UIF regularly publishes on its website jurisdictions identified as high risk
following FATF plenary meetings. In addition, the list of high risk jurisdictions are shared with the
regulators who ultimately share with their supervised entities for implementation.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R13) and Largely Compliant with the former SRIV. The main technical
deficiencies were that: not all predicate offences under Recommendation 1 were covered in the Angolan
Criminal Code. The other deficiencies related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of
technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 20.1- (Partly Met) -FIs must, on their own initiative, immediately report to the Financial
Intelligence Unit, whenever they know or have sufficient reasons to suspect that an operation likely to be
associated with the crime has taken place, is in progress or has been attempted. The transaction may
involve a single transaction or be an integral part of several apparently linked transaction (Article 17 (1)
and (2), AML Laws). The Law has not stated the period within which a suspicious transaction must be
reported.
Criterion 20.2- (Met)- The law requires FIs to report attempted transactions that may be associated with
the commission of ML/TF/P or any other crime and the Law has not prescribed any thresholds.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R14). The new R. 21 has not modified FATF requirements.
Criterion 21.1- (Mostly Met) - Information provided in compliance with the obligations provided for in
the AML Law, by FIs, employees and partners, to the competent authorities, does not constitute breach
of any obligation of secrecy imposed by legislative, regulatory or contractual means, nor do they imply
disciplinary, civil or criminal liability for those providing them (Article 21, AML Law). However, the law
does not mention the need to report in good faith. and the protection is not available in all instances.
Criterion 21.2-(Met)-FIs and the members of the respective governing bodies or, who exercise
management, executive or leadership functions therein, their employees, agents and other persons who
provide them permanent, temporary or occasional services, may not reveal to the customer or third parties
that they have forwarded the legally required reports or that an investigation is in progress (Article 20,
AML Law).
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R12). The main technical deficiencies were that the weaknesses identified in
Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11 were also applicable to DNFBPs covered by Law 34/11. The other
deficiencies related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under
the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 22.1 – (Mostly Met) – The AML law lists DNFBPS as reporting entities and that they should
comply with CDD requirements as described under recommendation 10. Therefore, the short comings
noted at recommendation 10 in particular, deficiencies noted at c10.7 regarding, lack of provision to
undertake reviews of existing records, particularly for higher risk categories of customers, lack of
requirement for FIs to identify and verify customers that are legal persons through the address of the
registered office and, if different, a principal place of business (c10.9) and lack of requirement to verify
the identity of any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust, including
through a chain of control or ownership (c10.11) also apply to DNFPs.
Criterion 22.1(a) – (Article 2 (1) (b) (iv) list gambling, social games, online remote games or similar of
these as subject entities, therefore, the customer due diligence measures set out in the AML Law are
applicable to casinos. Furthermore, Article 39 of AML Law requires entities that carry out gambling
activities, social games, online remote games or similar to any of these, to comply with the duty to identify
the regular attendees and verify their identity at the entrance to the game room, or at the time they purchase
or exchange game tokens or conventional symbols usable to play, in an amount equal to or greater than
the equivalent in national currency, USD 2,500.
Criterion 22.1(b) – Article 2 (1) (b) (v) list real estate brokerage and the purchase and resale of real estate,
real estate agents, real estate developers, as well as building entities that carry out direct sale of real estate
as subject entities, therefore, the customer due diligence measures set out in the AML Law are applicable
to these entities. In addition, Article 42 (3) of AML Law, requires real estate agents to comply with the
identification, diligence and communication measures provided for in the AML Law, whenever they carry
out transactions for their clients relating to the purchase and sale of real estate. Article 42 (4) requires the
provision of customer identification information to apply to buyers and sellers of real estate.
Criterion 22.1(c) – Article 2 (1) (b) (viii) list entities trading in precious metals and stones as subject,
therefore, the customer due diligence measures set out in the AML Law are applicable to these entities.
Article 43 of AML Law requires dealer of precious metals and stones to comply with the identification
and due diligence measures provided for in the AML Law, whenever they carry out cash transactions of
an amount equal to or greater than USD 10,000.00.
Criterion 22.1(d) – Article 2 (1) (b) (i) list accountants, accounting experts, auditors, lawyers and other
independent legal professions, partners of law firms and professional hired by law firms, when acting on
behalf of the client, as subject entities. Consequently, the customer due diligence measures set out in the
AML Law are applicable to these entities, when they carry out transactions for client concerning the
following services: buying and selling of real estate; managing of client money, securities or other assets;
management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organization of contributions for the creation,
operation or management of companies; creating, operating or management of legal persons or
arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.
Criterion 22.1(e) – Article 2 (1) (b) (iii) list service providers to trusts and corporations as subject entities.
Consequently, the customer due diligence measures set out in the AML Law are applicable to these
entities when they provide any of the following services to third parties: acts as agents in the incorporation
of legal persons; acts or exercise the necessary measures for third party to act as a director or secretary of
a company, associate of a partnership or holder of similar position in relation to other legal persons;
provide a registered office, business address, premises or administrative or postal address to a company
or any other legal person or entity without legal personality; act or exercise the necessary measures for a
third party to act as administrator of an explicit trust fund or perform equivalent functions for other types
of entities without legal personality; intervene or take the necessary steps for a third party to act as a
shareholder on behalf of another person.
Criterion 22.2 – (Met) – as indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities and,
therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to record keeping.
Criterion 22.3 – (Met) – as indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities and,
therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to PEPs requirements.
Criterion 22.4 – (Partly Met) – As indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities
and, therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to new technologies
requirements. However, the country and the DNFBPs have not demonstrated that they identify and assess
the ML/TF risks associated with development of new products and new business practices including new
delivery mechanisms, and the use of new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing
products (see IO.4).
Criterion 22.5 – (Non Applicable) – DNFBPs in Angola are not permitted to rely on third parties or
introduced businesses to perform CDD measures on their behalf or to introduce business to them.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R16). The main technical deficiencies were that: the weaknesses identified
in Recommendations 13-15 and 21 were also applicable to the DNFBPs covered by Law 34/11. The other
deficiencies related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under
the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 23.1- (Partly Met)- as indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities and,
therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to duty to report suspicious
transactions. The entities subject to this law shall, on their own initiative, immediately inform the UIF, wherever
they become aware of, suspect, or have sufficient reason to suspect that a transaction took place, is taking place or
has been attempted, which is likely to be associated with the commission of the crime of money laundering and the
financing of terrorism and proliferation, or any other crime (Article 17). Consequently, short comings identified
at criterion 20.1 as it relates to the law not stating the period within which a suspicious transaction must
be reported also apply to DNFBPs.
Criterion 23.2- (Mostly Met) -as indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities and,
therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to internal controls and foreign
branches. The AML law does not have requirements for entities to provide information and analysis of
transactions or activities which appear unusual and no requirements to ensure safeguarding of information
to prevent tipping off, however, important elements of recommendation 18 are in place which are:
appointment of compliance officers, ongoing employee training, an independent internal audit to test the
system
Criterion 23.3-(Met)- As indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities and,
therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates to higher risk countries.
Criterion 23.4-(Mostly Met)- As indicated above, the AML Law includes DNFBPs as subject entities
and, therefore, such are required to comply with the AML Laws as it relates tipping-off and confidentiality
requirements. However, the deficiency noted at recommendation 21 relating to lack of requirement for
protecting FIs which disclose the information in good faith also apply at criterion 23.4.
Criterion 24.1 (Partly Met)– Angola has mechanisms that identify and describe the different types, forms
and basic features of legal persons created in the country. The one-stop shop under the Ministry of Justice
register the following legal persons, companies, associations, cooperatives, organised unions and
foundations. The requirements for creation of a legal person do not stipulate whether the legal person is
mandated to collect beneficial ownership information. However, the basic information of the legal person
is collected when registering the legal person. The information and process of how to create a legal person
is briefly set out on https://gue.gov.ao/portal/ but only covers three types of legal persons: a sole trader, a
commercial company and a cooperative, and does not provide full information on the creation process of
each type.
Criterion 24.2 (Not met)- Angola has not conducted a Risk Assessment to determine the ML/TF risk
associated with all types of legal persons created in the country in line with this criterion.
Criterion 24.3 (Not met)- Code of Commercial Registry does not stipulate if company registry is
mandated to record the basic information of the company which includes company name, proof of
incorporation, legal form and status, the address of the registered office, basic regulating powers, and a
list of directors. However, the OSS online system reflects the basic information of companies created
since 2019. Therefore, the basic information of companies is publicly available to a limited extent.
Criterion 24.4 (Not met)- The AML Act and Code of Commercial Registry does not prescribe the type
of information companies should maintain as set out in criterion 24.3, and if such companies must
maintain shareholders and members register including nature of the voting rights. Further, the AML Act
does not stipulate if such information should be maintained within the country at a location notified to the
company registry.
Criterion 24.5 (Not met)-Angola does not have mechanisms to ensure that some of the information
referred to in criteria 24.3 and 24.4 is accurate and up to date.
Criterion 24.6 ( Met)-– Article 11 (2) (b) of AML law provides that, beneficial owners must be identified
and verified based on information from a credible source. Therefore, the Competent Authorities access
BO information obtained by financial institutions and DNFBPs when conducting Customer Due
Diligence.
Criterion 24.7 (Mostly met)—Under Art. 11(2)(g) of AML Law, FIs are required to Article 11 (2) (g) of
AML Law, requires FIs to keep information obtained during the business relationship updated but not
necessarily accurate.
Criterion 24.8 (Not met)- There are no legal provisions requiring that one or more natural persons
authorised by the company and resident in Angola be accountable to Competent Authorities, for providing
basic and beneficial ownership information, or providing any further assistance. Further, DNFBPs are
also not authorised by companies, and are not accountable to competent authorities for providing basic
and available BO information, and providing further assistance where needed. Lastly there are provisions
prescribing other comparable measures that can be used to ensure co-operation with Competent
Authorities.
Criterion 24.9 (Partly met)-Article 16(1) of the AML Law, stipulates that, entities must retain records for
a period of 10 (ten) years, after the end of the business relationship. However, the Act does not proceed
to prescribe for companies or any person (liquidator, administrators, or other persons involved in the
dissolution of the company) and competent authorities to keep basic and beneficial ownership information
after the company or legal person is dissolved.
Criterion 24.10 (partly Met)-Article 48(a) (access to information about unincorporated entities40) of AML
Act empower competent authorities, in particular law enforcement authorities to obtain timely access to
basic and beneficial ownership information held by the relevant parties.
Criterion 24.11 (Partly met)-Angola permits issuance of bearer shares in terms of Article 3(2) of AML
law and Law no.1/04. Law no. 1/04. Article 56 92) provides that bearer shares can be converted into
nominative shares at the discretion of the Issuer. However, the Act does not prescribe if the conversion is
mandatory, and the holder should notify the company during the conversion process. The Act does not
stipulate if share warrants can be converted into registered shares or comply with other requirements as
set out in this criterion. Therefore, no adequate mechanisms are in place to ensure that bearer shares are
not abused for ML/TF.
40
Unincorporated entities are not defined by the AML Act.
Criterion 24.12 (Not met)-Angola allows the concept of nominee shareholders and nominee directors.
However, do not have the mechanism to prevent the misuse of such concepts in companies.
Criterion 24.13 (Not met)-Articles 74 of AML Law provide for a range of proportionate and dissuasive
administrative and sanctions for persons and legal persons that fail to comply with the requirements of
the Act. However, the sanctions are not specific to criterions under Recommendation 24.
Criterion 24.14 (Not met)-Article 50 of AML Law provides that competent authorities should provide
information, technical assistance and any form of cooperation that may be needed by foreign authorities.
Article 50 (2) of AML Law permits exchange information and carrying out of investigations on behalf of
foreign authorities. Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 50 do not refer to basic and beneficial
ownership information.
Criterion 24.15 (Not met)-Angola does not have a mechanism to monitor the quality of assistance
received from other countries in response to requests for basic and beneficial ownership information.
Criterion 25.1 (Not Applicable)- (a)-(b) Angola does not recognise the legal concept of trusts.
(c) (Not met) - In terms of Article 2 (b) (ii) of Law 05_20 Law on Combating Money Laundering and The
Financing of Terrorism And Proliferation (AML Act), the Act is applicable to trust and company service
providers who operate in Angola. However, there is no obligation for professional trustees to maintain
the information of trust/s for at least five years after the trust cease to exist.
Criterion 25.2 (Not met)-There is no requirement for Trust and Company Service Providers to keep the
information accurate, up to date and to be updated timely.
Criterion 25.3 – Not applicable
Criterion 25.4- Not applicable
Criterion 25.5 (met)-Article 48 of AML Act empower competent authorities, in particular law
enforcement authorities to obtain timely access information held by financial institutions and non-
financial institution (DNFBPs) on beneficial ownership information, the residence of the fund manager
and any assets held or managed by a financial or non-financial institution.
Criterion 25.6 (a) (not applicable)
Criterion 25.6 (b) (Not applicable)
Criterion 25.6 (c) (Not applicable
Criterion 25.7 (Not met)- Articles 72(Z) (bb) of AML does not create an obligation for failure to perform
duties under the Act on professional trustees and company service providers.
Criterion 25.8 (Not met)- There is no legal obligation for professional trustees to maintain the information
collected, as a result Article 73 of AML Law which provides for a blanket of fines is not applicable to
trustees for failure to provide Competent Authorities timely access to information on Trusts.
In its 1st Round MER, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with these requirements (formerly R23).
The main technical deficiency was that BNA were not requiring the application of fit and proper criteria
to managing directors of FIs. ISS and CMC do not require the application of fit and proper criteria to
ascertain the expertise and suitability of the members of the board, auditing body and managing Directors.
The new FATF Recommendation strengthens the principle of supervision and controls using a risk-based
approach.
Criterion 26.1 – (Met)- In terms of Article 3(4)(a) of the AML Law 5/20, the BNA is designated as the
supervisor for the banks and NBFIs, notably; Money Exchanges, MVTs, Payment Service Providers, and
Microcredit institutions. The Angolan Agency for Insurance Regulation is designated as the supervisor
for the insurance and social welfare institutions, while the Capital Market Commission (CMC) is
designated as the supervisor of Securities Brokerage Firms, Brokerage Agents, Market Infrastructures,
Management Company for Collective Investment Schemes, Investment Companies, Collective
Investment Schemes, Expert Property Appraisers of Collective Investment Organizations, Issuers,
Certifying Body for Expert Property Appraisers and External Audit; Pension Funds and their Management
Companies.
Market Entry
Criterion 26.2 – (Met)- Core Principles financial institutions in Angola are required to be licensed and
authorized. In terms of the Law on the General Regime of Financial Institutions (RGIF), all financial
institutions are subject to licensing/authorization by designated supervisory bodies as follow; the BNA is
responsible for licensing/authorizing banks, and non-banking financial institutions linked to financial
brokerage, currency and credit such as Foreign Exchange bureau, MVTS including Payment Service
Providers, microfinance institutions [Article 50 (1) of RGIF]. The ARSEG is responsible for
licensing/authorizing non-banking financial institutions carrying out insurance and social welfare
activities such as insurance and reinsurance companies, Pension Funds and their Management Companies
[Article 102 (1) and (2) and article 3, n.º 1 of the Law n.º 01/00, of February 3rd. - General Law of
Insurance Activity], The CMC is responsible for licensing/authorizing the non-banking financial
institutions in the capital market such as Securities Brokers, investment companies [Article 102 (1) and
(2) and article 24 of the Law º 22/15, 31 August]
Shell banks are prohibited in Angola [Arts. 6 (1) and 72(a) of the AML Law No. 05/2020 prohibits the
establishment of shell banks].
Criterion 26.3 – (Met)-The BNA is mandated in terms of Articles 59 (1) and 61 (1) of the RGIF, to
establish the fitness and propriety of the members of the management and governing bodies of banking
financial institutions at market entry as well as post market entry. Under article 51 (1)(b) of the RGIF the
banking financial institution authorization process involves identification of shareholders, direct and
indirect, natural or legal persons, who hold qualifying shares and the amounts of such shares, including
the identity of the last beneficial owner or beneficial owners, in accordance with the definition provided
in paragraph 9 of article 3 of the AML/CFT Law, or, if there are no qualifying shares, the identification
of all the shareholders. The authorization process shall also contain the document proving suitability of
the founding shareholders, including ultimate beneficial owners, in what is likely to, directly or indirectly,
employ significant influence on the institution's activity, as provided on article 51 (1)(h) of the RGIF.
Under the suitability assessment the BNA must take into account civil, administrative or criminal
proceedings, as well as any other circumstances that, in view of the specific case, may have a significant
impact on the financial strength of the person concerned, as provided in paragraph h), n-.º 3, article 62 of
the RGIF.
Supervisors, notably; BNA, ARSEG and CMC have sound market entry requirements in place to prevent
criminals or their associates from holding (or being the beneficial owner of) a significant or controlling
interest or holding a management function in a financial institution.
Risk-based approach to supervision and monitoring
Criterion 26.4(a) – (Met)- Article 25 of the AML Law confers the mandate on the designated supervisors
of FIs to supervise core principles FIs in line with the core principles, including application of
consolidated group supervision. Additionally, article 213 (1) and (2), of the RGIF, also provides for
consolidated group supervision, taking into account domestic and foreign branches.
Criterion 26.4(b) – (Met)- Article 58 of the AML Law No. 05/20 provides for supervision of FIs and
DNFBPs using a risk-based approach. The FIs and DNFBPs as listed under Article 2 (1) (b) of the AML
Law include MVTS and Foreign Exchange Bureaus, amongst others.
Criterion 26.5(a) – (Met)-In terms of Article 58 (1)(a) of the AML Law No. 05/20, supervisory authorities
are mandated to supervise and oversee compliance with the national measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, taking into account the money laundering,
terrorist financing, and proliferation financing risks identified. Supervisors have begun to apply a risk-
based approach to ensure that the frequency and intensity of supervision is informed by risk profiles of
financial institutions or groups’ risk profiles.
Criterion 26.5(b) – (Met)-In terms of Article 58 (1)(a) of the AML Law No.05/20, supervisory authorities
are mandated to supervise and oversee compliance with the national measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, taking into account the money laundering,
terrorist Financing and proliferation financing risks identified at national level. However, Supervisors
have begun to apply a risk-based approach to ensure that the frequency and intensity of supervision is
informed by risk profiles of financial institutions or groups’ risk profiles.
Criterion 26.5(c) – (Met)- In terms of Article 58 (1)(a) of the AML Law No. 05/20, supervisory
authorities are mandated to supervise and oversee compliance with the national measures for combating
ML/TF/PF, taking into account the Chracteristics of financial institutions or groups, particularly the
diversity and number of financial institutions and the degree of discretion granted to them.
Criterion 26.6 – (Met)- In terms of Article 58 (2) of the AML Law N o.05/20, supervisors should
regularly review the assessment of the risk profile of money laundering, terrorism financing and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of a financial institution or a financial group, including the
risks of default and whenever there are important events or developments in the management and
operations of the institution or that financial group.
In its 1st Round MER, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with these requirements (formerly R29).
The main technical deficiencies were related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of
technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 27.1 – (Met)-Article 57(2) of the AML Law No. 05/2020 confers AML/CFT supervisory
powers on BNA, ARSEG and CMC to supervise financial institutions for compliance with AML/CFT
requirements.
Criterion 27.2 – (Met)-Article 57 (1) of the AML Law supervisors are mandated to conduct inspections
on financial institutions without prior notice and demand information required to monitor compliance
with Anti-Money Laundering, Countering Terrorist and Proliferation Financing.
Criterion 27.3 – (Met) -Supervisors have the powers to compel production of any information relevant to
monitoring compliance in terms of Article 57(1)(b) of the AML Law.
Criterion 27.4 – (Met)-In terms of Article 57 (2)(d) read Articles 73 and 74 of the AML Law, supervisors
have the powers to institute the necessary procedures to apply disciplinary, financial, and other legal
sanctions to the offenses committed.
Weighting and Conclusion
supervisors have the powers to inspect financial institutions without prior notice and demand production
of information required to monitor compliance with the national Anti-Money Laundering, Countering
Terrorist and Proliferation Financing measures, as well as apply sanctions where non-compliance is
detected.
Angola is rated Compliant with Recommendation 27.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R24). The main technical deficiencies were that no implementation of
AML/CFT requirements across all DNFBPs. The new FATF Recommendation strengthens the principle
of supervision and controls using a risk-based approach.
Casinos
Criterion 28.1 – (Met)
Criterion 28.1(a) Under article 13 (1), of the Law n.º 5/16, 17 May – Gaming Activity Law, the opening
of casinos and their operation requires authorization from the Gaming Supervision Body, under the terms
to be regulated by the holder of executive power.
Criterion 28.1(b) Within the gaming legislation the Presidential Decrees n.º 131/20 of 11th May and
141/17 of 23rd June , Presidential decree n.º 139/17 of the 22nd June define the conditions for entities to
candidate for the licensing and exploitation of casinos and gaming rooms, games of chance and social
games. On the requirements for a person or entity to be considered suitable is not having been convicted
for any money laundering predicate offense. The ISJ also conducts fit and proper analysis such as
background screening for past criminal conduct of beneficial owners (of at least five per cent voting
shares), the proposed directors and senior management of a casino. Persons with criminal record for
fraudulent crimes and those that have been civilly and criminally declared responsible, through court
sentences for management malpractices as directors, administrators or managers of a legal collective
person, are prevented from conducting the business of a casino.
Criterion 28.1(c) – Under Art 2(1)(b)(iv) of the AML Law No 05/2020, casinos are designated as
reporting entities to be supervised for compliance with AML/CFT requirements. The Gaming Supervision
Institute is mandated to supervise for AML/CFT (Art. 3(4)(b)(i) of the same law.
DNFBPs other than casinos
Criterion 28.2 – (Met)- Lawyers, accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, real estate agents,
trust and company service providers, management companies, car dealers, are all subject to AML
supervision (Art 2(1)(b) of AML Law No. 14/2013). Article 3(1)(b) (ii-ix) of the same designates
AML/CFT supervisory authorities for the DNFBPs. The Bar Association of Angola is the AML/CFT
supervisory authority for lawyers. The Entity responsible for supervising and inspecting trade activities –
ANIESA (Autoridade Nacional de Inspecção Económica e Segurança Alimentar – is the supervisory
authority for dealers in precious stones and metals. Association of Accountants and Accounting Experts
of Angola (OCPCA) is the supervisory authority for accountants and auditors. The National Housing
Institute (INH) is the Supervisory Authority for real estate agents in Angola. While the state body
responsible for supervising automobile trade is the supervisory authority for vehicle dealers. The UIF
supervises DNFBPs that do not have designated supervisory authorities.
Criterion 28.3 – (Met)- Articles 2 and 3 (4)(b) as read with Art.57 of AML Law N.º 05/2020 require
other categories of DNFBPs to be subjected to systems for monitoring compliance with AML/CFT
requirements.
Criterion 28.4 – (Met)- The designated supervisory authorities (article 3(4) of AML Law No. 5/2020)
have the necessary powers to perform their functions, as provided in Art. 57 of AML Law No. 5/2020.
Criterion 28.4 (a) – (Met)- Article 57(2) of the AML Law No. 05/2020 provides AML/CFT supervisory
powers to the different DNFBP supervisory authorities for compliance with AML/CFT requirements.
Criterion 28.4 (b) – (Mostly Met)- Lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals
and stones regulators have legal requirements for applicants, which include screening them for criminal
records, and fit and propriety tests, though BO requirements are not being pursued.
Criterion 28.4 (c) – (Met)- The supervisory authorities have powers to institute the necessary procedures
to apply disciplinary, financial and other legal sanctions to the offenses committed in terms of Articles 72
and 73 of the AML Law.
Criterion 28.5 (a) – (Met)- The supervisory authorities for DNFBPs should supervise and monitor
compliance with AML/CFT obligations by the respective entities in terms of Article 52 of the AML Law.
Criterion 28.5 (b) – (Met) – Article 58 of the AML Law requires DNFBP supervisors to apply their
supervisory actions in a sensitive manner having regard prevailing risk situations including entity risk
profiles.
Weighting and Conclusion
Except for casinos, there is no specific requirement for regulators of the other DNFBPs to establish BO
when conducting fit and proper tests..
Angola is rated Largely Compliant with Recommendation 28.
In its 1st MER, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of this Recommendation
(formerly R26). The main technical deficiencies were that: UIF was not yet fully operational or adequately
staffed and organized to be able to fulfil its functions; Guidance to supervisory authorities was not
adopted; timely access by the UIF to financial and law enforcement information was not granted as it had
not concluded MoUs with the relevant authorities; the assessment team is not satisfied on UIF’s
operational independence; UIF had not completed the process of implementing a secure IT system capable
of ensuring an adequate level of security and confidentiality of the information it receives. The other
issues were related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under
the 2013 Methodology.
Criterion 29.2(a) – (Met)-The UIF is the central agency for the receipt of suspicious operation reports by
subject entities, supervisory and inspection authorities (See Art. 6 a), c) read with Art 15 of Presidential
Decree no. 2/2018 of 11 January). Subject entities are defined under Articles 2, 3 and 12, read with Art
17 (immediate reporting) of Presidential Decree no. 5/20 of 27 January.
Criterion 29.1 – (Met)-Angola has an administrative financial intelligence unit (UIF) known as “Unidade
de Informação Financeira” –UIF- established since April 2011 by Presidential Decree nº 35/11, of 15th
February 2011. The UIF is currently regulated by Presidential Decree nº 02/18 of 11 January, providing
for the in Organic Statute of the Financial Intelligence Unit and Supervision Committee. UIF is a public,
autonomous, and independent national central unit (as provided for in in Article 4 of Law no 2/18 of 11
January, and defined in Article 3 paragraph 42 of Law no 5/20 of 27 January); derives its purpose (Article
1 paragraph 1, Art 6, and 15 of Presidential Decree nº 02/18 of 11 January as amended by Presidential
Decree nº 02/18 as well as Presidential Decree nº 125/21 of 14 May, read with Article 3 of Law no 5/20
of 27 January).
Criterion 29.2(a) – (Met)-The UIF is the central agency for the receipt of suspicious operation reports by
subject entities, supervisory and inspection authorities (See Art. 6 a), c) read with Art 15 of Presidential
Decree no. 2/2018 of 11 January) -See also Art 61 (1) of Law 2/20. Subject entities are defined under
Articles 2, 3 and 12, read with Art 17 (immediate reporting) of Presidential Decree no. 5/20 of 27 January.
Criterion 29.2(b) –(Met)-The UIF (Art 15 (2) a) Department of Analysis and Typology: - Law 2/18) is
responsible, apart from receiving suspicious operation reports (DOS), also receives Identification of'
Designated Persons Report (DIPD), Cash Transactions Report (DCT), Cross-border Movements Report
(DMT - X-Border), Spontaneous Notices (CE) and other notices that are legally incumbent upon it. Article
17 paragraph 1 and 3 (a-f) Obligation to report Law no 5/20 of 27 January: - subject entities must make
to UIF immediate reports (suspicious transactions/activities) relating to predicate offences, ML/TF/PF as
well as certain cash threshold transactions; also read with Article 31 cross-border-wire transfers, Article
32- Payment service providers-electronic/wire transfers of Law no 5/20 of 27 January.
Criterion 29.3(a) – (Met)-The UIF is legally empowered to require additional data and information from
the subject entities as provided for under Article 6 c) d) and Article 15 paragraph 2 b) of Presidential
Decree 2/18 of 11 January). The UIF also requests information from different institutions to supplement
their analysis, including information from subject entities who possess relevant information even through
they have not filed a particular suspicious operation report.
Criterion 29.3(b) – (Met)-The UIF has the legal power to request from the subject entities, as well from
any other entities, under the terms of the law, elements, or information that it deems relevant for the
exercise of the functions conferred on it (Law no 5/20 of 27 January Article 61 paragraph 2). Read with
Art 9 (1)-(3) (obligation to cooperate and provide information.
Criterion 29.4 (a)– (Met)-The UIF, through its Department of Analysis, and Typologies, is responsible
for receiving; collecting and processing communications, undertakes operational analysis as per (Article
15 paragraph 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January).
Criterion 29.4 (b)– (Mostly Met)-The UIF through its Department of Analysis, and Typologies is
responsible to compile statistics, as well as studying and identifying trends relating to money laundering
and terrorism financing. financing. However, the authorities have not demonstrated the fact that whether
they have conducted strategic analysis as the UIF Typology provided more statistical data as opposed to
trend analysis.
Criterion 29.5 – (Met)-In terms of Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January Article 6 paragraph 1 f and
Law no 5/20 of 27 January Article 50 paragraphs 1-3) the UIF has the power to disseminate information,
as well as the results of analysis, upon request or spontaneously to competent authorities.
Criterion 29.6 (a) – (Met)-The UIF is information is protected as they put in place an information policy
governing the security and confidentiality of information, including procedures for handling, storage,
dissemination, and protection of, and access to, information.
Criterion 29.6 (d) (Met)-All UIF staff members are subject to security vetting and obtain the necessary
clearance levels. They also have the necessary understanding of their responsibilities in handling and
disseminating sensitive and confidential information.
Criterion 29.6 (c) (Met)-The UIF manage control of access to its offices, facilities, information
technology systems and information. Only authorized staff has access to certain areas of work and
biometrics and scanners are used to facilitate control and access.
Criterion 29.7(a) – (Met)-UIF is a public, autonomous, and independent national central unit (as provided
for in in Article 4 of Law no 2/18 of 11 January, and defined in Article 3 paragraph 42 of Law no 5/20 of
27 January); derives its purpose (Article 1 paragraph 1 of Presidential Decree nº 02/18 of 11 January as
amended by Presidential Decree nº 02/18 as well as Presidential Decree nº 125/21 of 14 May, read with
Article 3 of Law no 5/20 of 27 January), its powers and competencies ( UIF-competencies Article 6,
Appointment-Director General Article 8 read with those relating to UIF organizational structure-
competencies (Articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 23 ; its supervisory and
inspection and competent authority mandates (as defined under Articles 3 paragraph 4. b) ix., and
paragraph 5 of Law no 5/20 of 27 January). Article 62 of Law 5/20 reinforces the UIF operational
autonomy to exercise its functions freely without interference. Its operational independent and
autonomously decide on analysis, requests, and disseminations.
Criterion 29.7(b) – (Met)-Article 25 paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree 2/18 of 11 January deals
with Cooperation and exchange of information that may be established between the UIF and national
institutions, to ensure implementation of the duties provided for in this Statute, among others, through the
signing of protocols, The terms and conditions underlying cooperation and information exchange may be
formalized through cooperation and information exchange protocols. Article 26 of Presidential Decree
2/18 of 11 January empowers the UIF to cooperate with other Financial Intelligence Units in the field of
preventing and combating money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation of mass destruction
weapons. The Director General UIF has the power to sign memorandums of understandings with national
and international partners. See Art 62 (4) of law 5/2020.
Criterion 29.7(c) – (Met)-UIF has operational independence and autonomy and undertakes its functions
freely and with the safeguard of any political administrative or private sector influence interference (Law
no 5/20 of 27 January Article 62). The UIF is a separate entity and located in its own building, and at the
time of onsite plans were in the pipeline to shift the UIF to a bigger facility.
Criterion 29.7(d) – (Met)-In terms of Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Presidential Decree nº02/18, the UIF
must be secured and allocated with the resources necessary for the full performance of its functions. The
Financial Intelligence Unit undertakes its functions freely and with the safeguard of any political
administrative or private sector influence interference, which could compromise its operational
independence and autonomy; decides, in particular, autonomously on: the analysis, request, and
dissemination of relevant information; and the signing of cooperation agreements and the exchange of
information with other competent national authorities or with similar foreign units (Law no 5/20 of 27
January Article 62). Art 27 of Law 2/18 makes provision for the UIF Director General to compile its
budget and submit it to the BNA Governor for consideration and for approval by the Board of Directors.
Art 28 makes provision for the approval for UIF unforeseen expenses.
Criterion 29.8– (Met)-UIF is a member of the Egmont Group since June 3, 2014.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola meets most of the requirements under this Recommendation. The authorities have not
demonstrated the fact that whether they have conducted strategic analysis as the UIF Typologies provided
more are statistical data as opposed to trend analysis.
Angola is rated Largely Compliant with Recommendation 29.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Largely Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R27). The main technical deficiencies were related to effectiveness issues
which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013 Methodology. The FATF standards
in this area have been strengthened considerably by including, among other things, requirements for
parallel financial investigations and role of anti-corruption enforcement authorities.
Criterion 30.1– (Met) Pursuant to Articles 67 and 68(2) of Law 22/12, the National Directorate of
Investigations and Prosecutions (DNIAP) has the mandate to investigate a wide range of predicate
offences, including financial and economic crimes that are of a complex nature. The Directorate’s mandate
also extends to money laundering and terrorist financing offences. In terms of ML, DNIAP only
investigates if it involves PEPs. Additionally, Articles 70 and 71 of Law 22/12 establish and empower the
National Directorate for Preventing and Combating Corruption (DNPCC) as a department that
investigates corruption-related offences. DNPCC also investigates ML offences if they do not involve
PEPs.
Criterion 30.2– (Met) Art 3 (21) of Law 05/20 clarifies that investigation in the context of this law means
criminal and financial investigations. Article 3 (6) defines law enforcement authorities as those whose
functions include the investigation of money laundering and its predicate offences, as well as terrorist
financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and asset tracing, identification and
confiscation. Notably, pursuant to Articles 67 and 68(2) of Law 22/12, the National Directorate of
Investigations and Prosecutions has the mandate to investigate a wide range of predicate offences,
including financial and economic crimes. The Directorate’s mandate also extends to money laundering
and terrorist financing offences, which entails that they have the general mandate to conduct parallel
financial investigations as well as financial investigations. to conduct parallel financial investigations.
The other agencies, such as SIC and DNPCC refer matters that fall outside their competence to DNIAP
that has ML/TF investigative powers for further action. (Art. 69 and 71 of Law 22/12). Further, SENRA
has the general powers to conduct financial investigations i.e trace proceeds of crime with a view to
confiscation.
Criterion 30.3– (Met) Angola has designated the National Asset Recovery Service under Article 12 and
13(1) of Law 15/18 as the National Asset Recovery Service empowered to identify, trace and seize assets
related to crimes, that are located either in the country or abroad. Further, Article 88(1) of Law No.5/20
gives power to competent judicial authorities, namely the Attorney General and the criminal police bodies
to carry out provisional measures such as the seizure and the freezing of assets or funds, in order to prevent
the transaction, transfer or disposal, before or during the criminal proceeding aimed at the crime of money
laundering and terrorist financing. Article 1(1) of Law 179/17 empowers the SIC to conduct searches and
seizures which may be ordered by criminal police authorities such as a) Director General; (b) Deputy
General Directors; (c) Directors of the Central Executive Bodies; (d) Provincial Directors; and e)
Municipal Heads. The same search and seizure power is given to the criminal police bodies under Article
3 of the Presidential decree No.2/14.
Criterion 30.4– (Not Met)- Other competent authorities which are not law enforcement authorities do not
have similar powers.
Criterion 30.5– (Met)-Angola has designated the DNPCC within the Attorney General’s Office as the
special directorate for the investigation of corruption, pursuant to Art.72 (e) of Law No.22/12. Art. 72(f)
of Law No.22/12 e empowers the Directorate would have to cooperate with DNIAP Action by furnishing
it with information that has been collected for possible criminal acts. These agencies has, through the
Prosecutor General’s inherent powers, the power to search and seize property pursuant to Art.22(i) and
Art 36(m) of Law 22/12.
Criterion 31.1– (Met) Competent authorities in Angola are able to obtain information relevant to
investigations, prosecutions and related powers. In particular, competent authorities have powers to use
compulsory measures as follows:
(a) Through search and seizure warrants, competent authorities are able to obtain records held by
financial institutions, DNFBPs and other natural and legal persons. Searches apply to both persons and
premises under Art.2 of Law No.2/14. Similar powers exist under Art.213 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
(b) Further, the investigative bodies have general powers to record or obtain witness statements.
(c) In addition, the authorities have the power to seize and obtain evidence on terrorism related
offences such as TF, pursuant to Art.36 of Law No. 19/17. The authorities obtain such evidence through
processes such as a) Voice and image recording; b) breach of banking secrecy; c) Controlled and
supervised deliveries; d) Control of bank accounts; e) Interception of telephone and telematic
communications; f) Covert actions; and g) other means of criminal investigation provided for by law.
Wire-tapping which comprises listening and recording of conversations or electronic
communications is permissible under Art.241 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure, Law 39/2020.
(d) Furthermore, the authorities are empowered to seize and obtain information in accordance with
Art. 3(1) of the Presidential Decree No. 189/17, of 18 August, through search and seizure processes.
Criterion 31.2– (Partly Met) Pursuant to Art.36 of Law No. 19/17 of 25 August, on the Prevention and
Fight against Terrorism, the competent authorities have the power to use a wide range of investigative
techniques. These techniques include; a) Voice and image recording, which is also generally captured in
Articles 2 and 6 of Law 10/20.; (b) breach of banking secrecy; c) Controlled and supervised deliveries; d)
Control of bank accounts; e) Interception of telephone and telematic communications; f) Covert actions;
and g) other means of criminal investigation provided for by law. Additionally, a video surveillance is
possible under Art.5(c) and (d) of Law No. 2/20, of January 22, on Video Surveillance. Further, the
Criminal Police and other authorities are empowered to conduct undercover operations pursuant to
Articles 2 and 6 of Law 10/20 of January. This power applies across all offences. However, it is not clear
whether these powers would apply to ML offences too.
Criterion 31.3– (Mostly Met) Art.19(1), (2) and (3) of Law No.5/20 obliges reporting institutions to
cooperate with UIF and other competent authorities by providing information that relates to business
relationships and transactions with their customers. This provides a mechanism for identifying in a timely
manner, whether a natural or legal person of interest holds or controls accounts. This would be information
that the reporting institution would have collected under customer due diligence protocols as mandated
by Art.11 of Law No.5/20. However, the law does not indicate the parameter for determining “timely
manner” for the provision of such information. This law 05/20, and Law 15/18 (Loss of Assets) on asset
do not require prior notification of the asset identification and location processes to the property holder.
Art.20 of Law 05/20 prohibits reporting institutions from disclosing to their clients or any third parties
that they have transmitted any information to the competent authorities, or that investigations are
underway.
Criterion 31.4– (Met) Pursuant to Art.61(d) of the Law No.5/20, competent authorities carrying out
investigations are able to ask for any relevant information held by the UIF, and the UIF is obligated to
cooperate by providing such information.
Criterion 32.1– (Met) –Angola implements a declaration system for incoming and outgoing cross-border
transportation of currency and BNIs by passengers and travellers pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of Notice
6/2022 issued by the BNA. This is implemented through a declaration form which requires travellers to
declare items including currency and BNIs. . The requirement does not apply to transportation through
mail because Angola does not allow the courier of currency or BNIs through mail.
Criterion 32.2– (Met) – Article 4 of the Regulations N° 002/FIC/2021 of 26/08/2021 Angola requires
passengers and travellers to provide or fill in writing a Customs Declaration Form declaring goods, means
and articles carried by them at the time of their trip. These items include monetary value above USD
10,000 or the equivalent in other currencies.
Criterion 32.3– (Non-Applicable) – Angola uses written declaration system for all travellers.
Criterion 32.4– (Mostly Met) –Upon discovery of a false declaration or failure to declare currency,
designated competent authorities administer an Occurrence Form issued through a Memorandum dated
27-03-2018 to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the
currency and its intended use. The authorities can also ask about the destination of the traveller, proof of
purchase of currency at a commercial bank, or details of the person they purchased it from, in case of a
black-market currency exchange. However, this Occurrence Form does not apply to BNIs too as it only
refers to currency and unlike Notice 6/22, the Occurrence Form does not indicate that currency also refers
to BNIs.
Criterion 32.5– (Mostly Met) – Angola subjects passengers or travellers who make a false declaration to
different sanctions. Art.464 of the Penal Code sets the punishment range between 2 and 8 years
imprisonment. However, if the falsely declared amount does not exceed twice the legally imposed limit,
then the offender would be liable to 1 year imprisonment or a fine of 120 days. For outbound
transportation of currency, one is liable to imprisonment of up to 1 year, or a fine of up to 120 days,
pursuant to Art.465 of the Penal Code. In addition to these punishments, the falsely declared currency is
also liable to both seizure and forfeiture. The forfeiture makes the overall sanctions proportionate and
dissuasive. However, these Penal Code provisions do not indicate that the term currency also refers to
BNI.
Criterion 32.6– (Met) – Article 53(1) of Law 5/20 mandates the AGT to immediately inform the UIF
information on suspicious cross-border movement of currency and BNIs. AGT transmits such information
to UIF through physical letters and emails dispatched within 24 hours of an incident, according to Article
9 of the Regulations N° 002/FIC/2021 of 26/08/2021.
Criterion 32.7– (Met) – Angola has issued a Presidential Degree 234/20 that seeks to ensure that there is
coordination and cooperation between and among (sic) the competent bodies acting at the borders (Art. 1
of Presidential Decree 234/20). Art.2 of this Decree also establishes the legal framework for the
implementation and regulation of the Coordinated Border Management Committee that comprises AGT,
Immigration Services, PGR and Ministry of Transport, among others.
Criterion 32.8– (Partly Met) – Angolan competent authorities are able to stop or restrain currency
whether there is suspicion that an offence has been committed. This is pursuant to Art 5 of BNA Notice
No. 6/22. However, the Notice does not state that the authorities may so stop or restrain the currency in
order to ascertain whether ML/TF evidence may be found.
Criterion 32.9– (Met) – Art.53(3) of Law 5/20 requires the AGT to retain for a period of ten years
information collected in relation to false or undeclared cross border movements. The information includes
the amount of currency or BNIs declared, disclosed or otherwise detected, and the identification data of
the bearer(s). This information should be available to competent authorities whenever requested.
Criterion 32.10– (Met) – Art.5 of Executive Decree No.209 of 19 requires the proper use of information
collected through the declaration system. The Customs Declaration Form must only be used for the
purposes for which it was created, and that is must not be given a different purpose. This requirement
does not restrict either: (i) trade payments between countries for goods and services; or (ii) the freedom
of capital movements, in any way. (Art.7(1) of Executive Decree No.209 of 19.
Criterion 32.11– (Mostly Met) – Articles 464 of the Penal Code stipulates a punishment of between 2 and
8 years imprisonment for Fraudulent Outward Transportation of Currency through physical or bank
transfers. Art.465 of the Penal Code provides for the punishment of up to 1 year, or a fine of up to 120
days, for the offence of Illicit Inward Transportation of Currency. Further, the provisions also stipulate
for the seizure and confiscation of the value of the currency, which is consistent with Recommendation
4. Furthermore, the two provisions stipulate a stiffer sentence for the outward movement of currency and
a less sentence for the inward movement. Notably, the provisions relate to currency only and not BNIs.
Therefore, there are no dissuasive sanctions for persons who fail to declare currency or BNIs, and those
that carry or engage in cross-border transportation of currency or BNIs in relation to ML, TF or predicate
offences.
Angola meets most of the requirements of this Recommendation. There is a declaration system in place
that captures both currency and BNIs. The forfeiture of the falsely declared amount constitutes a
dissuasive sanction, since the imprisonment and fines applicable are relatively lenient.
Angola is rated Largely Compliant with Recommendation 32.
Recommendation 33 – Statistics
Criterion 33.1 (Partly Met)- Pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of the Organic statute of UIF No. 2/2018, the UIF
has powers to compile statistical information in relation to its functions under the Statute and AML Law.
Angola maintains reasonable statistics on STRs received and financial intelligence disseminated
competent authorities since the inception of the UIF. The information enabled the assessors to determine
the nature and extent reports filed by the reporting entities and the results of analysis disseminated. The
BNA, ARSEG and the CMC keeps comprehensive statistics on the number of prudential and AML/CFT
inspections conducted, the violation identified and sanctions issued which enabled the assessors to
determine the extent to which supervision and monitoring is being carried out in Angola. The Authorities
maintain statistics relating to the process of crimes and freezing, seizing and confiscation of criminal
property related to ML and predicated crimes. Further, the Authorities keep statistics relating to ML
investigations and prosecutions which enabled the assessors to determine the extent to which ML cases
are identified and pursued. There has been no TF cases pursued and therefore there can be no statistics in
this regard. Statistics from the SIC, AGT and office of the AG were however not consistent and no
accurate statistics available in relation to ML investigations, prosecutions and convictions. Angola
through the MOF and AGO provided and requested some MLA and dealt with extradition cases. There
is, however, inadequate statistical information kept in respect of international cooperation. The difficulty
of obtaining comprehensive statistics has negatively impacted on the ability of the assessors to determine
the level of effectiveness in respect of IO.2. For instance, the information provided was insufficient to
determine the nature of crimes as well as how many requests were made to or received from foreign
competent authorities.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola maintains statistics on STRs. However, there were discrepancies in statistics between the UIF and
LEAs in relation to intelligence reports. In addition, the information on MLAs and extradition provided
does not indicate the nature of the crimes and as to which foreign authorities were the MLAs provided to
or requested from.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R. 25). The main technical deficiencies were that: the UIF and the
supervisory authorities had not issued guidelines for reporting STRs and provided feedback to the
reporting entities to assist them in applying the AML/CFT framework. The other identified shortcoming
was related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013
Methodology.
Criterion 34.1 – (Met) Article 65 of the AML Law requires the Financial Intelligence Unit to provide
timely feedback to the competent authorities on the referral and outcome of suspicious transactions reports
of ML/TF/P, forwarded by them. In addition, Article 57(2) (e) of the AML Law requires supervisors to
establish guidelines and provide answers to help subject entities to enforce the AML Law and in particular
in the detection and reporting of suspicious transactions. The UIF issued the majority of guidelines to all
financial institutions. Supervisors, notably; the BNA, CMC and ARSEG also issued guidelines and
directives to institutions under their purview to aid the application of national measures on combating
money-laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. Both UIF and supervisors are providing
feedback on inspections conducted as well as hold industry engagement to promote the understanding of
ML/TF risks as well as the national measures on combating money-laundering, terrorist financing and
proliferation financing.
Weighting and Conclusion
Both UIF and supervisors are mandated to give guidance to financial institutions in order to promote the
understanding of the ML/TF risks and the national measures on combating money-laundering, terrorist
financing, and proliferation financing, and such guidance has been provided.
Angola is rated Compliant with Recommendation 34.
Recommendation 35 – Sanctions
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R17). The main technical deficiency was that there was no enforcement
of the sanction regime in Law 12/10 and therefore no effectiveness.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R17). The main technical deficiency was that there was no enforcement
of the sanction regime in Law 12/10 and therefore no effectiveness.
Criterion 35.1 – (Mostly Met)- Angola’s AML Law establishes a range of unlawful transgressions
punishable by both fines and other administrative measures. The defined transgressions apply against FIs
and non-FIs, this definition covers entities considered DNFBPs by FATF, for failure to comply with
AML/CFT obligations relating to R.6 and R8 to 23 (Law 5/20, Article 72). There are separate sanctions
ranges for FIs and DNFBPs (Law 5/20, Article 73). The fines are applicable to both natural and legal
persons. For FIs, if the agent is a legal person, the range of fines is approximately USD85,000-8,500,00.
While for FIs, if the agent is a natural person, the range of fines is approximately USD10,000-2,000,000.
Meanwhile, for non-FIs, the range of fines if the agent is a legal person is approximately USD4,000-
2,000,000, and if the agent is a natural person the range is approximately USD2,000-850,000. Additional
sanctions range from a warning to a definitive ban on the exercise of the profession to which the
transgression occurred or from corporate positions and supervisory functions in FIs and non-FIs. Legal
persons face an additional potential penalty of the loss of illicit profits and goods obtained from criminal
activity (Law 5/20, Article 86, paragraphs 1 & 17).
However, these additional penalties are not applicable to natural persons, so the sanctions provided for
natural persons may not always be proportionate and dissuasive given established maximum fine amounts
for natural persons which limit the ability to ensure that “the fine must, whenever possible, exceed the
economic benefit…withdrawn from the commission of the offense” (Law 5/20, Article 75, paragraph 4).
Criterion 35.2 – (Partly Met)- “persons occupying a position of leadership are subsidiarily responsible
for the payment of fines and indemnities for which the legal person or equivalent is convicted” (Law 5/20,
Article 86, paragraph 11). For natural persons acting as directors or senior management of FIs, the
penalties range from approximately USD 90,000 to USD2,000,000. For natural persons acting as directors
or senior management of non-FIs, the penalties range from approximately USD2,000 to USD900,000.
Additional sanctions range from a warning to a definitive ban on the exercise of the profession to which
the transgression occurred or from corporate positions and supervisory functions in FIs and non-FIs. These
sanctions do not appear proportionate and dissuasive in all circumstances given the maximum range of
the monetary penalties.
Weighting and Conclusion
Angola has a range of sanctions applicable to deal with natural and legal persons that fail to comply with
the AML/CFT requirements of Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23. However, the maximum limits on
monetary penalties do not appear proportionate and dissuasive in all cases as only legal persons face an
additional penalty of the loss of illicit profits and goods obtained through criminal activity.
Angola is rated Partially Compliant with Recommendation 35.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R35 and SR I). The main technical deficiencies were that: the Angolan
legislation has not yet implemented measures to fully give effect to all the terms of the UN Vienna and
Palermo Conventions; although Angola has approved the Law of Designation, implementing regulations
have to be issued for the regular application of the restrictive measures provided for the UNSCRs 1267
and 1373; and the weaknesses identified in Special Recommendations II and III are also applicable here.
The deficiency concerning implementation of targeted financial sanctions is no longer assessed under this
Recommendation but is now covered in R. 6.
Criterion 36.1 – (Met)- Angola is a party to all conventions required in Recommendation 36, namely:
Vienna Convention, Merida Convention, Palermo convention and Suppression of the Terrorism Financing
Convention.
Criterion 36.2 – (Partly Met)-While it is noted that Angolan Legal Framework establishes a range of laws
and mechanisms to implement the provisions of the treaties, the country did not provide specific
clarifications on how the treaties were implemented.
Criterion 37.1 – (Mostly Met) Art.1 of Law 13/15 provides Angola’s basis for international judicial
cooperation with foreign jurisdictions on all unlawful acts whose processes allow for judicial recourse.
Notably, Art.1(2) of Law 13/15 states that Angola will cooperate with foreign judiciary entities on the
basis of Treaties and Conventions that bind Angola. Art.3 of the AML Law has indicated that judicial
bodies in Angola comprise the Attorney General’s office and criminal police bodies. However, the
Angolan authorities did not indicate the average time for handling MLA requests.
Criterion 37.2 – (Mostly Met) Art.22 of Law 13/15 gives power to the President of Angola to designate
a Central Authority for the receipt and processing of requests for cooperation. In terms of Art.1 of the
Presidential Decree n.º221/17, the Attorney General’s office is designated as the central office for
international judicial cooperation in criminal matters.The Authorities indicate that requests for
cooperation are received by the Office of International Exchange and Cooperation of the Attorney
General's Office (GICI) and then sent to the National Investigation and Prosecution Directorate of the
Attorney General's Office (NPDAGO) for execution. The Presidential Decree n.º 221/17, also designates
the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has the Central Authority in all other jurisdictional matters.
When requests are received by the diplomatic channels, they endorsed to the competent central authority
to be duly processed. Article 180 of Law n.º 13/15 Art.180 of Law 13/15 obligates the central authority
to maintain a case management system that contains statistical information in relation to the number and
nature of requests received and sent, as well as the timeliness of the execution of the requests. That means
that both designated authorities have the implement such a system. The procedures for the timely
execution of mutual legal assistance requests are described in the law for both authorities and for each
typology. The authorities have a case management system to register and monitor the progress of each
request. However, this system case mechanism does not prioritize requests.
Criterion 37.3 – (Partly Met) Art.7 of Law 13/15 stipulates grounds for refusal of international
cooperation. The grounds provided in this provision do not constitute unreasonable and unduly restrictive
conditions. However, Art.11 of Law 13/15 suggests that a request may be denied if the offence in question
is a minor offence attracting a maximum sentence of only 3 years. This sounds restrictive since the same
3-year sentence threshold may constitute a misdemeanor yet a high-risk unlawful act in the requesting
country, which needs to be dealt with through cooperation.
Criterion 37.4 – (Not Met) There is no law that stipulates that mutual legal assistance shall be refused on
account of a case being a fiscal matter. Such a condition is not included in Law 13/15. Further, there is no
condition listed in Law 13/15 that cooperation may be refused on account of secrecy or confidentiality
requirements of financial institutions and DNFBPs. However, these two conditions are not stated
expressly anywhere in Angolan Law. Further, there is no law that states that cooperation will override
secrecy and confidentiality requirements of financial and DNFBPs except where the relevant information
that is sought is held in circumstances where legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy
applies.
Criterion 37.5 – (Met) Confidentiality of requests and the information submitted is guaranteed under
Art.147 of Law 13/15. Where it is impossible to execute the request without maintaining the
confidentiality, the Angolan authorities will communicate with the requesting state about the implication,
and the requesting state can resubmit the request.
Criterion 37.6 –(Met) Art.6 of Law 13/15 makes an exception to the dual criminality rule in situations
where the information is being sought for non-coercive actions.
Criterion 37.7– (Partly Met) Art.6 of Law 13/15 stipulates dual criminality as a basis for cooperation.
Notably, there is no requirement under Art.125 of Law 13/15 that the conduct which forms basis for the
request should bear the same name or fall within the same category of offences in both Angola and the
requesting country. The only requirement is that the conduct must be punishable under both the requesting
and requested state Angola may refuse granting cooperation on the basis that the offence does not meet
the maximum threshold of 2 or three years which is considered of law importance under article 11 of law
13/15.
Criterion 37.8–(Met) Art.141 of the Law 13/15 stipulates that investigative techniques and powers
applicable to domestic investigations as permitted by Angolan laws in terms of Recommendation 31 are
also applicable to foreign requests. This includes obtaining evidence and conducting searches, scans,
seizures, expert examinations and analysis under Article 141(2); controlled delivery under Art.160; covert
actions undertaken by foreign authorities in Angola under Art.161 and interception of telecommunication
under Art.162.
Criterion 38.1– (Partly Met)- Angolan authorities are empowered by Art.141(1) and Art.159 of Law
No.13/18 to act on requests from foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize, or confiscate: (a) laundered
property from, (b) proceeds from, (c) instrumentalities used in, or (d) instrumentalities intended for use
in, money laundering, predicate offences, or terrorist financing; or (e) property of corresponding value.
Angola obtains provisional measures without notice, which facilitates expeditious action in obtaining
provisional orders. However, Angola has not demonstrated that it can expeditiously respond to requests
from foreign countries.
Criterion 38.2– (Partly Met)- Pursuant to Art.120 of the Criminal Code, Angola has the authority to
provide assistance to requests for co-operation made on the basis of non-conviction-based confiscation
proceedings and related provisional measures, at a minimum, in circumstances when a perpetrator is
unavailable by reason of death, flight, absence, or the perpetrator is unknown. However, non-conviction-
based confiscation applies to instrumentalities or dangerous products from a crime. The mechanism does
not apply to proceeds of crime. Therefore, Angola cannot offer assistance in this context in relation to
proceeds of crime.
Criterion 38.3– (Met)- Angola has: (a) arrangements for co-ordinating seizure and confiscation actions
with other countries; and (b) mechanisms for managing, and when necessary, disposing of, property
frozen, seized or confiscated. (Art.159 of Law 13/18)
Criterion 38.4– (Met)- Angola has a legal basis to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements that allow
that confiscated goods, capital or property are shared with other States Article 106 (5) of Law 13/15).
Recommendation 39 – Extradition
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Non-Compliant with requirements of this
Recommendation (formerly R. 39 and SRV). The main technical deficiencies were that there were no
specific laws providing for extradition related to ML and FT offenses in Angola; the relevant authorities
needed to follow the rules provided in the agreements signed by Angola, which limits the range of
assistance; there was no provision for specific co-operation mechanisms on extradition; there were no
provisions related to the obligation of cooperation between countries in relation to procedural and
evidentiary aspects in order to ensure the efficiency of the prosecution in the case of refusal of extradition
of nationals; and there were no provisions that explain how extradition requests and proceedings relating
to ML shall be handled without undue delay.
Criterion 39.1– (Mostly Met)-The extradition of foreign citizens is regulated in Law 13/2015 and is
applicable as follows in these instances:
(a) ML and TF are extraditable offences, but may be extraditable where the surrender of the person
requested is only admissible in the case of a crime, even if attempted, punishable by Angolan law and by
the law of the requesting State with a penalty or measure with deprivation of liberty of a maximum
duration of no less than three years. (Art. 32(2) of Law 13/2015).
(b) The extradition process in regulated by Article 24 complemented by Articles 32 to 62 of Law
13/2015. However, there is no case management system, nor mechanisms that enable Angola to prioritise
execution of extradition requests.
(c) Angola does not place the execution of extradition requests under unreasonable or unduly
restrictive conditions. The grounds for refusal of extradition are provided under Arts 7, 8 and 33 of Law
No.13/2015, as example: i) the procedure does not satisfy or does not respect the requirements of
international treaties applicable in the Republic of Angola; ii) there are well-founded reasons to believe
that cooperation is requested in order to pursue or punish a person on account of their nationality, ancestry,
race, sex, language, religion, political or ideological beliefs, education, economic status, social status or
inclusion in a particular social group; iii) regards an act punishable by the death penalty or whenever it is
admitted, with good reason, that torture, inhumane treatment or any other that may result in irreversible
damage to the person's integrity may occur; iv) regards an offense that corresponds to a prison penalty or
a security measure that is perpetual or of indefinite duration.
Criterion 39.2– (Mostly Met)- The country implements extradition measures as follows:
(a) Angola does not extradite its own nationals (art 33(1)(b) of Law 13/2015.
(b) where Angola does not extradite solely on the grounds of nationality, criminal proceedings are
instituted for the facts on which the request is based, being requested its instance criminal proceedings
are instituted for the facts on which the request is based or being requested (art 33(2) of Law 13/2015.
Since criminal proceeding are not instituted at the request of the country seeking extradition there is no
guarantee that the case can be submitted without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request.
Criterion 39.3– (Mostly Met)- Dual criminality is required for extradition where both Angola and a
requesting country criminalise the conduct underlying the offence. However, the deficiency identified in
criterion 39.1(a) is also applicable here.
Criterion 39.4– (Not Met)- There is no specific procedure for simplified extradition, nor a mechanism in
which a person can be extradited using simplified extradition procedures, provided that (s)he relinquishes
formal extradition proceedings freely and voluntarily, or extradition of persons only based in a warrant of
arrest or judgement, or even a mechanism that allows direct transmission of requests for provisional arrests
between appropriate authorities.
In its MER under the First Round of MEs, Angola was rated Partially Compliant with requirements of
this Recommendation (formerly R. 40). The main technical deficiencies were that: except for the MoUs
signed with Namibian and South African UIFs, UIF had not signed MoUs with counterparts in other
neighbouring countries and any other countries providing for the exchange of information with foreign
counterparts; there were no laws, MoUs with neighbouring countries or other type of agreements in force
in Angola which provided that the country should ensure that all their competent authorities were
authorized to conduct inquires on behalf of foreign counterparts; and there are insufficient provisions
related to safeguards in the use of exchanges of information. The other identified shortcomings were
related to effectiveness issues which are not assessed as part of technical compliance under the 2013
Methodology.
General Principles
Criterion 40.1 – (Met) Competent authorities such as the UIF, Attorney General’s office (PGR), Tax
Administration (AGT), Criminal Investigations Service (SIC) are obligated under Art.50(1)(2)(3) and (4)
of Law No.5/20 to cooperate with foreign counterparts in relation to the investigation and inquiries on
money laundering, terrorist financing and all other predicate offences. The cooperation can encompass a
wide range of elements and can be done both spontaneously and upon request. The competent authorities
are obligated to develop internal processes that will ensure efficient and timely processing and execution
of requests for cooperation.
40.2(a) Art 50 of the Law 05/20 forms the legal basis for cooperation.
40.2(b)-(d) Further, Art.50(4) of Law 5/20 mandates the competent authorities to develop internal
processes to ensure effective and efficient receipt, execution, dissemination and prioritisation of requests
for cooperation. The internal processes must also ensure timely return of information to the requesting
foreign authorities. The internal procedures must also touch on the safety of the information received or
handled in the execution of the request.
Criterion 40.3 – (Met) Generally, according to Art.50 f Law 5/20, Angolan competent authorities are not
obligated to cooperate only on the basis of bilateral cooperation agreements with foreign counterparts.
This provision constitutes sufficient legal basis for such cooperation. The SIC is also authorized under
Art.7(2) of Law 179/17 to cooperate with foreign counterparts on the basis of this Law. The authority to
cooperate does not bar the competent authorities to entered into cooperation agreements with their
counterparts. Further, thee UIF too does not need a bilateral agreement in order to cooperate with its
foreign counterparts and is given power to so cooperate under Art 61(1)(e) of Law 05/20. However, the
assessment team did not establish whether the agreements were negotiated and signed in a timely manner.
Nevertheless, the authorities demonstrated that they had negotiated and signed some agreements between
the year 2017 and 2021. In this period, the Attorney - General's Office signed bilateral Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) with Switzerland, Portugal, Cuba, Egypt, Turkey, Brazil, China, Mozambique,
Rwanda and Zambia; b) Reciprocal cooperation agreements with the Community of Portuguese-language
Countries (CPLP), Portuguese-speaking African Countries (PALOPS) and the Southern African
Development. Further, Angola, through the Attorney General’s Office signed multilateral MoUs with the
Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for Southern Africa (ARINSA) and the Africa Prosecutors
Association (APA).
Criterion 40.4 – (Not met)-There is no mechanism for the provision of feedback to foreign counterparts
on the usefulness of information provided though a request for cooperation.
Criterion 40.5 – (Met)-Angola does not prohibit or place unreasonably restrictive conditions for the
provision of assistance on grounds such as:
a) A request for cooperation cannot be refused on the grounds that it relates to tax matters.
b) Professional secrecy or confidentiality
c) The fact that an investigation is in progress is not sufficient grounds for refusing cooperation in the
context of police or customs cooperation or cooperation between UIFs, except in cases where the
provision of information could be detrimental to the conduct of criminal investigations or could jeopardise
personal safety.
d) The nature of the counterpart authority is not sufficient grounds for refusing international cooperation
between the requesting authority and its foreign counterpart.
Criterion 40.6 – (Not met)-Although Angola prohibits through Art. 146 of the Law 13/15 the use of
information outside the purpose that requested it was for in the case of MLA and extradition, there is no
such provision in relation to other forms of cooperation except in the case of the UIF as per Article 31 et
al of Presidential Decree No.2/2018.
Criterion 40.7 – (Mostly Met)-There is no clear mechanism or law for competent authorities to ensure
safety of information within the context of other forms of cooperation. Art.50(4) gives power to competent
authorities to establish internal procedures that will ensure, among others, safety of information that is
shared with counterparts. Further, the competent authorities are placed under the duty to keep confidential
the information that they handle, which would extend to international cooperation. The AGT officers are
under such obligation under Art.86 of Law 21/14 (General Tax Code); Public Prosecutors in all PGR
departments pursuant to Art.128 of Law 22/12. Angola needs to have a clear provision that places the
competent authorities under the duty to keep confidential, all information that they share with foreign
counterparts.
Criterion 40.8 – (Met)-Pursuant to Art. 50(2) of the AML/CFT Law No. 05/20, competent authorities are
able to conduct enquiries on behalf of their foreign counterparts and can share information obtained by
them under the domestic laws.
Criterion 40.9-(Met)-The legal provisions in section 50 (1) and (2) of Law no 5/20 of 27 January (AML
Law) afford an adequate legal basis for the UIF in providing co-operation on money laundering, associated
predicate offences and terrorist financing. Similarly, Article 61(e) of Law no 5/20 of 27 January the UIF
is responsible for cooperation at the international level, with similar bodies under the terms provided for
in this law and in the applicable international cooperation instruments. Article 6 j) of Law 2/218 UIF to
cooperate, within the scope of its, responsibilities, with the competent national entities and with other
financial intelligence units or similar bodies. Law 1/12 of January 12 Article stipulates those competent
national authorities cooperate with the competent foreign authorities for the purposes of investigations or
procedures concerning crimes related to computer systems or data, as well as for the purpose of collecting
evidence, in electronic form, of a crime, in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data
provided for in Law number 22/11.
Criterion 40.10-(Met)- The law neither bars nor makes provision for UIF to provide feedback to foreign
counterparts on the use of information and the outcomes achieved. The provision for this could be made
in a MoU. Being an EGMONT member providing that feedback is done at a regular basis.
Criterion 40.11 –
Criterion 40.11(a-b) – (Met)-The legal provisions in section 50 (1) and (2) of Law no 5/20 of 27 January
(AML Law) afford an adequate legal basis for the UIF in providing co-operation on money laundering,
associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.
Article 50 (1) and (2) of Law no 5/20 of 27 January stipulates that Competent authorities including the
UIF must provide domestic and international authorities with all the information they may obtain under
the powers conferred on them by current legislation. The UIF being a member of EGMONT Group of
UIFs entails that it must have the ability to exchange information without undue restrictions.
Criterion 40.12– (Met)-Article 50 (1) of AML Law requires competent authorities, which includes
supervisory authorities, to provide any information, technical assistance or other form of cooperation that
may be requested by national or foreign authorities and which proves necessary for realization of the
purposes pursued by these authorities. The country has mechanisms in place to enable supervisors to share
supervisory information related to and relevant for AML/CFT purposes, with other foreign financial
supervisors. Article 50(2) states that cooperation include exchange of information, carrying out
investigations, inspections, inquiries or other permissible steps on behalf of national or foreign authorities,
and the competent authorities must provide them with all the information they may obtain under the
powers conferred on them.
Criterion 40.13– (Met)-Under Article 50(3) competent authorities may, on their own initiative,
disseminate to national or foreign authorities information related to ML/TF/P. However, Article 501(3)
does not explicitly mandate supervisors to exchange information held by financial institutions. Article
50(4) requires competent authorities to define adequate, safe, efficient and effective means and procedures
that guarantee the reception, execution, dissemination and prioritization of requests for cooperation, as
well as ensuring a timely return of information to the national and foreign authority. Article 50(3)
competent authorities may, on their own initiative, disseminate to national or foreign authorities
information related to ML/TF/P. BNA has signed several cooperation and information exchange
agreements with different central banks (eg Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Macau, SARB). The Authority
is requested to provided copies of the agreements with different central banks and the RGIF Law.
BNA can exchange domestically available information with foreign counterparts on a reciprocal basis and
in the context of co-operation agreements that the bank has entered into, regarding information necessary
for the supervision of credit institutions and finance companies with head offices in Angola and equivalent
institutions with head offices in those other states. ARSEG, through its membership to Committee of
Insurance, Securities and Non-Bank Financial Supervisors (CISNA), Lusophone Insurance Supervisors
Association (ASEL), International Organisation of Pensions Supervisors (IOPS) and International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), can exchange information on supervision of the sector. The
same happens to CMC as a IOSCO and CISNA member.
Criterion 40.14 (Met)- Financial supervisors can exchange information relevant for AML/CFT purposes,
in particular, with other supervisors that have a shared responsibility for FIs operating in the same group:
(a)– (Met)- CMC As an ordinary member of IOSCO and signatory of the IOSCO MoU, can exchange
information relevant to its supervision with all member jurisdictions of that multilateral cooperation
platform, in addition to establishing with other counterparts, bilateral cooperation agreements.
Furthermore, the CMC, under the IOSCO MoU, can share and request information from IOSCO members,
whether ordinary or godchildren, in a universe of close to 200 countries. ARSEG, through its membership
to Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-Bank Financial Supervisors (CISNA), Lusophone
Insurance Supervisors Association (ASEL), International Organisation of Pensions Supervisors (IOPS)
and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), can exchange information on supervision
of the sector. BNA has signed several cooperation and information exchange agreements with different
central banks (eg Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Macau, SARB). The Authority is requested to provided
copies of the agreements with different central banks and the RGIF Law. BNA can exchange domestically
available information with foreign counterparts on a reciprocal basis and in the context of co-operation
agreements that the bank has entered into, regarding information necessary for the supervision of credit
institutions and finance companies with head offices in Angola and equivalent institutions with head
offices in those other states.
(b)– (Met) -–BNA, ARSEG and CMC can exchange information with other institutions that supervise
banking and the insurance and securities markets, both in the country and abroad. Shared information may
include FI’s business activities, fitness and propriety of managers and the board of directors, BO
information.
(c)– (Met)-Article 57 (2) (f), AML Law, requires supervisory authorities to cooperate and share
information with other competent authorities relating to the prevention of ML/TF/PF. Under Article 50(3)
competent authorities may, on their own initiative, disseminate to national or foreign authorities’
information related to ML/TF/P. However, the Article does not explicitly require supervisors to exchange
AML/CFT information, such as internal AML/CFT procedures and policies of financial institutions,
customer due diligence information, customer files, samples of accounts and transaction information.
Criterion 40.15– (Not met)-Article 50 (2), AML Laws, requires supervisory authorities to carry on
investigations, inspections, inquiries or other permissible steps on behalf of national or foreign authorities.
However, there is no provision that authorises or facilitates the ability of foreign counterparts to conduct
inquiries themselves in Angola, in order to facilitate effective group supervision.
Criterion 40.16– (Partly met)-There is no provision that requires supervisors to ensure that they have
sought authority from the requested financial supervisor before any dissemination of information
exchanged, or use of that information for supervisory and non-supervisory purposes. Article 50(4)
requires competent authorities to define adequate, safe, efficient and effective means and procedures that
guarantee the reception, execution, dissemination and prioritization of requests for cooperation, as well
as ensuring a timely return of information to the national and foreign authority.
Criterion 40.17– (Mostly Met) Art.51(1-3) of Law 05/20 indicate that competent authorities are able to
share domestically found information with their foreign counterparts in relation to money laundering,
predicate offences, terrorist financing and the identification and tracing of tainted property. The same
power is provided under Art.141(1) of Law 13/15. However, the authorities have not provided evidence
yet on the informal channels through which such information is exchanged. Nevertheless, Art. 30(1) of
Law No.13/15 mandates the competent authorities to offer assistance to foreign authorities through
Interpol and other such central bodies for international police cooperation to execute requests that need
urgent attention (without delay). Under Art.30(3) of the same law 13/15, the national authorities are
empowered to execute the requests from their foreign counterpart without transmitting them to the central
authority, unless if the request came from a different foreign competent authority. This suggests Angola’s
ability to use such channels, but the authorities have not demonstrated which central international policing
bodies they are part of to facilitate such exchanges, apart from mentioning the Interpol in this law.
Criterion 40.18– (Partly Met) Art.51 of Law 05/20 and Art 30(1) of Law 13/15 grant the general power
for exchange of information with counterparts and use of general investigative powers. The investigative
powers are sufficiently broad, as discussed under Recommendation 31. These include video surveillance
pursuant to article 5(1)(c) and (d) of the Law 2/20 of 22nd January; and undercover operations under Law
10/20. Further, Angola has signed multiple bilateral and multilateral agreements through which such
information is exchanged within the applicable restrictions on the use of the information.
Criterion 40.19 – (Met) Law enforcement agencies in Angola rely on legal powers and other mechanisms,
such as bilateral and multilateral arrangements to enter into and participate in joint investigative teams
with foreign counterparts in relation to ML, TF and associated predicate offenses. Within SARPCCO’s
investigation cooperation arrangements, there are Simultaneous Joint Operations in which members can
send their police officers to foreign countries or carry out simultaneous investigation at home on the same
matter and provide the information collected to a foreign counterpart.
Criterion 40.20 – (Not met) – There is no legal or regulatory basis which gives authority to the competent
authorities to exchange information indirectly with non-foreign counterparts.
17. Reliance on third LC • No requirements for FIs that rely on a third party of the same
parties group to consider that requirements of criteria 17.1 and 17.2
18. Internal controls LC • No requirements for FIs to provide information and analysis of
and foreign branches transactions or activities which appear unusual and no
and subsidiaries requirements to ensure safeguarding of information to prevent
tipping off,
19. Higher-risk C The criteria are fully met
countries
20. Reporting of PC • The law does not prescribe the period within which a suspicious
suspicious transaction must be reported.
transaction
21. Tipping-off and LC • The law does not adequately provide for protection against
confidentiality information disclosed in good faith.
22. DNFBPs: PC • No provision to undertake reviews of existing records,
Customer due particularly for higher risk categories of customers, lack of
diligence requirement to identify and verify customers that are legal
persons through the address of the registered office and, if
different, a principal place of business, and lack of requirement
to verify the identity of any other natural person exercising
ultimate effective control over the trust, including through a
chain of control or ownership.
• Lack of identification and assessment of ML/TF risks associated
with the development of new products and new business
practices including new delivery mechanisms, and the use of new
or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing
products.
23. DNFBPs: Other PC • No requirement for protecting entities which disclose the
measures information in good faith.
• No requirements for specifying timelines for reporting
suspicious transactions.
24. Transparency NC • The information of creation of legal persons in publicly
and beneficial available to a negligible extend.
ownership of legal • Angola has not conducted ML/TF risk assessment associated
persons to the types of legal persons created in the country.
• There is no standardised mechanism in place to collect and
maintain BO information.
• Basic information collected by OSS and reporting entities is
not accurate and up to date.
• There are no mechanisms to prevent misuse of bearer shares
for ML.
• Legal persons, authorities and natural persons are not required
to maintain the information and records for a period of least five
years after the date of dissolution of the company.
25. Transparency NC • Creation of trusts and other forms of legal arrangements is not
and beneficial permitted in Angola.
ownership of legal • There are no measures in place to regulate trusts form part of
arrangements company structures.
26. Regulation and C The criteria are fully met
supervision of
financial institutions
27. Powers of C The criteria are fully met
supervisors
28. Regulation and LC • No fit and proper requirements performed on lawyers,
supervision of accountants and real estate agents to establish BO.
DNFBPs
29. Financial LC • No strategic analysis conducted.
intelligence units
30. Responsibilities LC • Other than the National Directorate of Investigations and
of law enforcement Prosecutions the other investigative bodies do not appear to
have the power to pursue parallel financial investigations, nor is
and investigative there a mechanism for the referral of such cases to another
authorities empowered investigative agency.
• Angola has not extended the powers under Recommendation 30
to other competent authorities which are not law enforcement
authorities per se, but which have the responsibility for pursuing
financial investigations of predicate offences.
31. Powers of law LC • Law No.5/20 obliges reporting institutions to cooperate with the
enforcement and UIF and other competent authorities by providing information
investigative that relates to their business relationships and transactions with
authorities their customers, but whether the identification can be done in a
timely manner is not stipulated in the law or otherwise.
32. Cash couriers LC • The punishment for false declarations does not apply to
travellers in possession of BNIs.
• Authorities are not empowered to restrain currency for a
reasonable time so as to ascertain if there is evidence of ML/TF.
33. Statistics PC • No adequate statistics kept necessary to review and assess the
effectiveness of the AML/CFT system.
34. Guidance and C The criteria are fully met
feedback
35. Sanctions PC • Angola has a range of sanctions applicable to deal with natural
and legal persons that fail to comply with the AML/CFT
requirements of Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23.
• However, the maximum limits on monetary penalties do not
appear proportionate and dissuasive in all cases as only legal
persons face an additional penalty of the loss of illicit profits
and goods obtained through criminal activity.
36. International PC • While Angola is a party to Vienna, Palermo and Merinda
instruments conventions it has not demonstrated how the provisions of
respective Conventions are fully implemented.
37. Mutual legal PC • Angola has not demonstrated the time within which it processes
assistance foreign requests.
• There is a gap in the law in terms of indicating whether there is
a mechanism for the prioritisation of requests and case
management.
• The MLA law does not expressly state that cooperation would
not be refused on the grounds that an offence relates to a fiscal
matter; and that provision of assistance will breach bank secrecy
and confidentiality requirements.
• Angola may not grant the request on the basis that the offence
does not meet the threshold of a maximum prison term of 3
years which is considered of low importance in terms of Article
11 of Law 13/15.
38. Mutual legal LC • Non-conviction-based confiscation applies to instrumentalities
assistance: freezing or dangerous products from a crime. The mechanism does not
and confiscation apply to proceeds of crime. Therefore, Angola cannot offer
assistance in this context in relation to proceeds of crime.
39. Extradition LC • There is no case management system, nor mechanisms that
enable Angola to prioritise execution of extradition requests.
• Angola cannot extradite a defendant where the sentence will be
less than three years of imprisonment even if both countries
criminalise the conduct underlying the offence.
• There is no specific procedure for simplified extradition, nor a
mechanism in which a person can be extradited using simplified
extradition procedures.
40. Other forms of PC • Lack of feedback on usefulness of information by competent
international authorities.
cooperation • Generalised timelines to respond to a request.
• Absence of authority to competent authorities to exchange
information indirectly with foreign non-counterparts.
Glossary of Acronyms
AGO Attorney General’s Office
AGT General Tax Administration
AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the
Financing Terrorism
ANIESA National Authority for Economic Inspection
and Food Safety
ANP Angola National Police
ARINSA Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network of
Southern Africa
ARSEG Angolan Insurance Regulation and
Supervision Agency
Art Article
BNA National Bank of Angola
BNI Bearer Negotiable Instrument
BO Beneficial Ownership
CBR Correspondent Bank Relationship
CBR Correspondent Banking Relationship
CCP Container Control Programme
CDD Customer Due Diligence
CID Criminal Investigation Directorate
CIRC Credit Risk Information Centre
CISNA Committee of Insurance, Securities and Non-
Bank Financial Supervisors
CMC Capital Markets Commission
CPLP Fora AGO Offices of the Portuguese Speaking
Countries
CSPs Company Service Providers
CTR Cash Transaction Report
DCCO Directorate of Combating of Organized Crime
DDC Directorate of Community Development
DG Director General
DNAS National Directorate for Social Action
DNFBPs Designated Non-Financial Business and
Professions
DNIAP National Directorate of Investigation and
Criminal Action
DNPCC National Directorate for Preventing and
Combating Corruption
DSB Banking Supervision Department
DSN Non-Banking Supervision Department
EDD Enhanced Due Diligence
EFTR Electronic Funds Transfer Report
41
However, the maximum punishment for illegal charging of contributions including taxes by a tax officer is two
years as per Article 365 of the Penal Code and the minimum punishment may be lesser than six months like three
(3) months as per Article 44(1) of the Penal Code. Such type of crime with a corruption element may not therefore
be considered as a predicate offence for ML.
42
The minimum threshold should be six months as per Article 82(4) of the AML Law No.5/2020.
43
The minimum threshold should be six months as per Article 82(4) of the AML Law No.5/2020.
44
The minimum threshold should be six months as per Article 82(4) of the AML Law No.5/2020.