Concepcion v.

Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29,
1989. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on
December 10, 198- was never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario,
she averred that the marriage was a sham and that she has never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the court’s decisions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during
her first marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not the presumption of legitimacy of Jose Gerardo can be impugned by

Concepcion or Almonte
RULING:

 No. A minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy
cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

 The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: “The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.

 Concepcion has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo on the basis of
article 166 (1)(b). Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of
a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

 To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
 husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is
not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

 The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

 To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make
marital intimacy impossible. But during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in
Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. Sexual
union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between
Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

 Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of
marriage that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was
never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her. Ma.
Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.

 In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As
prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is
prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of
law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall
prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of
the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.

 Having only his best interests in mind, The SC upholds the presumption of his legitimacy.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

IMPORTANT NOTES:

VOCABULARY WORDS:
ARTICLE 166 Not applicable when it is that mother that impugned the legitimacy of the child
TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTAL
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant
forged, and contained false entries, to wit:
That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age; her
last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to
order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion
who inherited the estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her
certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on
the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of
Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 171 of the Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family
Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.


ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art.
171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
RULING:

Petition is not meritorious.

 1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies
to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn
Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place. The reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth
Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not
prescribe because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.

First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature
was different from other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that
provide as evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at
54 years of age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to
Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

IMPORTANT NOTES:

VOCABULARY WORDS:
ARTICLE 166 - PRESUMPTION OF LEGITAMCY APPLIES BECAUSE ELIZABETH WAS
MARRIED NOT TO MACADANGDANG, AND IT IS ONLY THE HUSBAND THAT CAN
IMPUGNED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD

Macadangdang v. CA,
G.R. No. L-49542, Sept. 12, 1980
FACTS:
 Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March 1967. Because of the affair, she and her husband allegedly separated.
On October 30, 1967, she gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang.
Elizabeth filed with the CFI a recognition and support against Antonio. The lower court
dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and 256 of the Civil Code.
CA reversed the decision and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio. CA
denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth and
Crispin.
2) Whether or not Elizabeth may institute an action that would bastardized her child without
giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
RULING:

SC held that CA made judgement based on misapprehension of facts and the its finding of facts
contradicted by evidence on record.

Under the Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Elizabeth and Crispin.
Rolando was born only 7 months after the incident took place, and also 7 months after their
alleged separation. The birth of Rolando came more than 180 days following the celebration of
said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between the spouses. The
fact that the child was born in the rented house, normally delivered, and raised normally by the
yaya, according to the testimony of the yaya Patrocinia Avila. If he was otherwise born
prematurely, he would have needed to be placed under special care, attended by a physician.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of
access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one
evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120
days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may
be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.

Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Hence, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to assert the
illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself.
 The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of
either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred
between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the
husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate.

With respect to Article 257, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself,
cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child
is that of the husband.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose
it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.

It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be
unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also
because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be
the chief sufferer thereby.

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility
and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and
above all — her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of
respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This
Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married
men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect
from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families.
This would be a severe assault on morality.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

IMPORTANT NOTES:

VOCABULARY WORDS:
ARTICLE 172 PROOF OF FILIATION; Authenticated Birth Certificate
Montefalcon v. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
FACTS:
 In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and
support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that
her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to
give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed
as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for
Laurence since Laurence was born in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him
regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and
Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Vasquez was
declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons(substituted). The court
ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year,
Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was
granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in
tryingand deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person, aswell as in
awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant." The
appellate court granted Vasquez’s contention.
ISSUES:

 Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

RULING:

 YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under
Article 172, appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a
public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in
default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or
by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Laurence's record of
birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and
filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in
Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it.
Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the
child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is
no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself
a consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
Petitioners were able to prove that
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

IMPORTANT NOTES:

VOCABULARY WORDS:
In Re Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of Tinitigan v. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, Aug.
7, 2017 (citing Calimag v. Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936, July 8, 2015)

FACT: IT WAS THE PUTATIVE FATHER WHO REGISTERED THE LIVE BIRTH CERTIFICATE
WITHOUT THE SIGNATURE OF THE MOTHER

Ruling: it is very important that the mother sign in the certificate of the live birth otherwise
the LCR cannot register the live certificate of the child.
 Arado vs Alcoran
GR No 163362
Facts:

Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their union had no offspring. Nicolas had an
extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13,
1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas’ marriage to Florencia.

Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died subsequently leaving the
properties to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims
entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child has a right to inherit from his father.

HELD: No, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the
same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Anacleto could not
inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter’s last will and testament . Article 838 of the
Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. In Gallanosa v. Arcangel that in
order that a will may take effect, “it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.”
ARTICLE 175
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN MAY ESTABLISH THEIR ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION IN THE SAME WAY
AND ON THE SAME EVIDENCE AS LEGITIMATE CHILDREN. (SEE ARTICLE 172)

THE ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 173,
EXCEPT WHEN THE ACTION IS BASED ON THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172, IN
WHICH CASE THE ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE ALLEGED
PARENT.
SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
 Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant
but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.

Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
o Certificate of Live Birth
o AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
o Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother

Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not
include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock
and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge
his paternity to the child.

Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was
unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father) which states that:

o “Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly

recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express
recognition of paternity.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:

YES. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his
offspring through an admission made in a pubic or private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative father in the private handwritten instrument.
 The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

 ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

 ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws

All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely stated
that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the property owner.

The Court cited the ruling in Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals.

the Court explained that because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of
a baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The canonical
certificate is simply a proof of the fact to which the priest may certify, i.e. the
administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is “no proof of
the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”

Heirs of Roldan v. CA,

G.R. No. 202578, Sept. 27, 2017

FACTS:
 Natalia Magtulis owned an area of 21,739 square meters agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan.

In 1961, Natalia died, leaving the lot to her children Gilberto Roldan and Silvera Roldan, her
two children from her first marriage (Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan) and to
Leopoldo Magtulis, her son with Juna Aguirre. However, Gilberto and his heirs took
possession of the land, to the exclusion of respondents.

On May 19, 2003, respondents filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages against
petitioners.

Petitioners did not yield the property because of the following grounds:
o respondent heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto
o respondent heirs of Leopoldo had no cause of action, given that he was not a
child of Natalia.
But during trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's
share to Gilberto.
Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the RTC
declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third share of the property.
Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver to respondents their equal
share to the produce of the land
Petitioners appealed to CA. They asserted that the RTC could not have considered
Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of Baptism.
Emphasizing that filiation required a high standard of proof, petitioners argued that the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

 Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia
based on his baptismal and marriage certificates
RULING:
 No. Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates.

In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, which referred to our earlier rulings in Berciles v.

Government Service Insurance System and Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, the
Court explained that because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a
baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The canonical
certificate is simply a proof of the fact to which the priest may certify, i.e. the administration of
the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is “no proof of the declarations in
the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct
facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”

 Therefore, to resolve one’s lineage, courts must peruse other pieces of evidence
instead of relying only on a canonical nature. By way of example, we have considered
the combination of testimonial evidence, family fixtures, as well as family books or charts,
alongside the baptismal certificates of the claimants in proving kinship.

 All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which
merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation with the
property owner. Moreover, by virture of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could
not have justly concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a
one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to that of each of her undisputed
legitimate children – Gliberto and Silvela.

As held in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, a baptismal certificate is certainly

not proof of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA
erred in presuming the hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the
legitimate heirs of Natalia.
ARTICLE 172 (Par.2)

Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due
recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required.
Aguilar v. Siasat,
G.R. No. 200169, Jan. 28, 2015
FACTS:
 Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate
and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land.

In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the Bacolod RTC a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Petitioner alleged
that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the decedents, that the titles of the subject
lands were missing and thus, he’s suspecting that someone from Sisat’s Clan could have
stolen the said titles.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of
generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that
the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, who is her aunt.

During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their
son. To prove filiation, he presented the documents (Schools recors, marriage certificate,
ITR, SSS-E1 etc.) to corroborate his claims.

RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed the decision of RTC finding that all of the evidence
presented do not establish evidentiary proof, except the SSS-E1 but still, it failed to provide
clear and convincing evidence.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not the petitioner can prove his filiation to the spouse Aguilar using SSS E-1
(acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) mere proof of open and continuous possession.
RULING:

 YES. The Court grants the Petition.

This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,has held that – (ARTICLE 172 & 173)

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by

 (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement

before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission of

legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court
action is required.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in
resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social

welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.” Too, “(t)he State
as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.”30 (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 175
ARTICLE 172
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

2nd par. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;

Salas v. Matusalem,
G.R. No. 180284, Sept. 11, 2013

Facts: 
Matusalem filed a complaint for Support against Salas. She claimed that Salas is the father of her
son. Salas, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old,
making her believe that he is a widower. Salas rented an apartment where Matusalem stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child.

However, when Matusalem refused the offer of Salas’ family to take the child from her, Salas
abandoned her and their child.

Respondent prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of ₱20k. Salas
denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. He eve described respondent as a woman of loose
morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy.

RTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondent.

Petitioner appealed to CA contending that RTC decided the case without affording him the right
to introduce evidence on his defense; and RTC erred in finding that he is the putative father and
ordering him to give monthly support. CA affiremed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in ruling that Matusalem’s evidence sufficiently proved that
her son is the illegitimate child of Salas.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name
of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him.

If the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.  Neither can such birth certificate
be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation
to the alleged father.

The testimonies of Matusalem and the owner of the apartment unit Salas rented  as to the
circumstances of the birth, Salas’ financial support and his regular visits to her, though replete with
details, do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial" proof of
paternity.

A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition
and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of
the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
ARTICLE 172 Any other means allowed by the Revised Rule of Court and special law.
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
 Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison,
for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her
mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood,
she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of
petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner
supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually
a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

In his answer, FRANCISCO denied petitioner’s claim. FRANCISCO contended that MONINA

had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel,
laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of
damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

ISSUES:

 WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

RULING:

 YES, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight
of [MONINAs] testimonial evidence. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when
she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the
position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina
denounce her filiation.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides
the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and
care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any
particular length of time.

All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the
success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by
 the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more
than mere preponderance of evidence.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25
years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the
“high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action
well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

 As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to

prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs
delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it
must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.60
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
 Angeles v. Maglaya,
G.R. No. 153798, Sept. 2, 2005
FACTS:
 Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petition for letters of administrator
and her appointment as administrator of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.
She claims that she is the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva
Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles, herein petitioner and 2nd wife of Francisco,
they are the surviving heirs of the decedent.

Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building.
Belen opposed this petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be proclaimed
the administrator of Francisco‘s estate. After establishing the circumstances of her
marriage to Francisco (i.e. married before a Judge and ratified two months later in religious
rites; Francisco presented himself to be single that time, Belen attacked the legitimacy of
Corazon, saying that her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has also
failed to present the marriage contract between her parents, Francisco and Genoveva.

Furthermore, Belen averred that she and Francisco legally adopted Concesa Yamat
during their marriage. Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation as
legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the grounds that petitioner‘s
motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1, Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present
opposing evidence, and that respondent has sufficiently established her filiation.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva.

RULING:

The court ruled in the negative.

Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon proof of the factual basis that child‘s
parents were legally married and that his/her conception of birth occurred during the
marriage.
In the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent ‘s
mother Genoveva. No marriage certificate or contract was offered in evidence. No
solemnizing officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never questioned what would
necessarily be a bigamous marriage between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her petition, she
alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving spouse‖ of the decedent.
Respondent also filed a petition against the adoption of Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the
legitimate child of Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption proceedings. Since
the lower court has ruled with finality that she is not legitimate since no proof has been
given as to the marriage of her parents, this petition has become moot and academic. On
the matter of administration, it should be noted that the surviving spouse is preferred over the
next of kin of decedent. Next of kin refers to the heirs.

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in
the record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco
M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles
was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the
claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages
during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva
Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . .

very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth certificate and even her marriage contract.. . .
Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco .Equally inconsequential are
petitioner’s school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and
Genoveva . . . .
FACTS:
 Petitioner Miguela Campos Ong is the surviving spouse of Manuel Ong.  On the other
hand, private respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina
Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. They brought this case to compel Manuel Ong to
recognize them as his illegitimate children and to give them support.
ecause the midwife told Saturnina that the child should carry her surname as she was
not married to Manuel Ong, alias Alfredo Go, the child was therefore registered as
Robert Caballes.
ISSUES:

RULING:

 hold that the evidence in this case sufficiently makes this case fall under the last
paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing that Manuel Ong was the father
of private respondents. In Ilano vs. Court of Appeals,18 this Court held that the phrase
any evidence or proof in the last paragraph of Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision
covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even though insufficient to
constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify
the case under par. 4. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had
illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it
been openly done, would have constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that
private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship and
constitutes evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship was further established
through the testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not
negated by the admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another
man before, because the relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of
Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes.

DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

IMPORTANT NOTES:

VOCABULARY WORDS:


THE PROCEEDING SHALL PROCEED TO GIVE PETITIONER CHANCE TO PROVE
WHETHER THE RECOGNITION IS VOLUNTARY OR COMPOLSURY
TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR
G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008
FACTS:

 On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for

the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent
alleged in the petition that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late
Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein,
Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real
properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which
the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate.
Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100,000 each as
their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them
half the amount she promised. Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000,
petitioner has caused the annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael
Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter
allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the respondent’s and her brothers’
prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the
petition using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las
Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter,
Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is
planning to sell the properties. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit because
respondent failed to state a cause of action. Petitioner reiterated her sole ownership
of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name.
She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.

There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot
be brought after the death of the putative father. The motion was denied by the trial court.
CA affirmed. The CA ruled that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices
for a cause of action, without need to state that she had been recognized and acknowledged
as such. However, respondent still has to prove her allegation and, correspondingly,
petitioner have the right to refute the allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration

sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged
therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had
been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter
RULING:

 Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in

the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate
child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the
 limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.
Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate
child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
Respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel
recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed
she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s
voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
How may illegitimate children establish their illegitimate filiation?

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. (Par. 1, Art. 175, Family Code)

How can the filiation of illegitimate children be proved?

The filiation of illegitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;

2. An admission of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of these evidence, the illegitimate filiation is proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a illegitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Par. 1, Art. 175 in relation
to Art. 172 of the Family Code)

Who may file the action to claim illegitimacy and when may it be filed?

If the action is based on the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or is
based on an admission of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, the action to claim illegitimacy may be brought

(1) by the child during his or her lifetime;

(2) by the child's heirs if the child dies during minority or insanity, within five years from the
death.

If the action is based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
or is based on any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the action must
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Par. 2, Art. 175 in relation to Art. 173 of the
Family Code) This is to give the alleged parent the chance to affirm or contest the filiation of the
child.

What is the difference between voluntary recognition and judicial or compulsory recognition of an
illegitimate child?
Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil
register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no
further court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be
brought during the lifetime of the putative parent.

Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child
of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents. (Tayag vs.
Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008)

If an illegitimate child is voluntary recognized by the father, does he or she need to file an action
to compel recognition during the lifetime of his or her parent?

No. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court
action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent. (Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, No. L-47407, 12 August
1986; Tayag vs. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008)

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. (Eceta vs. Eceta, G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004)
 Abella v. Cabañero,
G.R. No. 206647, Aug. 9, 2017
FACTS:

 Alleging that she is the daughter out of wedlock of her father who is a Chinese national (Pia
Gan) and her mother, Consolacion Basiio, Emelita Basilio Gan filed a petition for correction
of entry in her birth certificate from “Emilita Basilio” to “Emilita Basilio Gan” to reflect the
name which she allege she had been using since her school days. The RTC ordered her to
amend the petition as it sought to correct her name, thus it should be a petition for change of
name; Emelita complied, and it was this amended petition which became the basis for the
RTC to grant her petition for change of name.

The Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals, arguing that since there is no proof that Pia Gan, Emelita’s father,
recognized her as his daughter, there is no basis which would allow her to change her name
from Basilio to Gan.

The Court of Appeals sided with the Republic. It held that pursuant to Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, the petitioner, as an illegitimate child,
may only use the surname of her mother; she may only use the surname of her father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by her father. The CA pointed out that the petitioner
has not adduced any evidence showing that her father had recognized her as his illegitimate
child and, thus, she may not use the surname of her father.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of the father in the absence
of proof that the father recognised the filiation of the illegitimate child.
RULING:

The petition is denied.

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name.”In granting or denying
petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the
sound discretion of the court. x x x What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of
the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.”

After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the
reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she
has been using the name “Emelita Basilio Gan” in all of her records, is not a sufficient or
proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the
enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
then regarding the petitioner’s use of surname provide:
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the
mother.

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was
born out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner’s·birth, either
of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of
her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname
of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed
was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner’s evidence consisted only of her
birth certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage
contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she
is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on
using her father’s surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have
allowed the petitioner to change her name from “Emelita Basilio” to “Emelita Basilio
Gan.”

The petitioner’s reliance on the cases of Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines,Republic of

the Philippines v. Coseteng-Magpayo,[25] and Republic of the Philippines v. Lim to
support her position is misplaced.

In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth certificate was
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate child of her father and
mother. She filed a petition for change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the
surname “Alfon,” her mother’s surname, instead of “Duterte.” The trial court denied the
petition, ratiocinating that under Article 364 of the Civil Code, legitimate children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use
the surname of her mother since Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word “principally”
and not “exclusively” and, hence, there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should
choose to use the mother’s surname to which he or she is legally entitled.

In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a
natural child not acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father.
Thus, the petitioner cannot insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.

In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be followed when the
change sought to be effected in the birth certificate affects the civil status of the
respondent therein from legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his
parents were never legally married; he filed a petition to change his name from “Julian
Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo,” the name appearing in his birth certificate, to
“Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng.” The notice setting the petition for
 hearing was published and, since there was no opposition thereto, the trial court; issued
an order of general default and eventually granted the petition of the respondent therein
by, inter alia, deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of his parents and
correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to “Coseteng.”The Court reversed the trial
court’s decision since the proper remedy would have been to file a petition under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by the respondent
therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be given due course
through an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Court’s
pronouncement in Coseteng-Magpayo finds no application in this case.

Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the petition that was filed
was for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; the petition sought,
among others, is the correction of the surname of the respondent therein from “Yo” to
“Yu.” Further, the respondent therein, although an illegitimate child, had long been using
the surname of her father. It bears stressing that the birth certificate of the respondent
therein indicated that her surname was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a
correction of entry in her birth certificate is appropriate.[29]

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition
for correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner’s birth certificate
indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.
DISPOSITIVE PROVISION:

 Filiation must be established for a child to claim support from a putative father. When
"filiation is beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of obligation." [1] To establish
filiation, an action for compulsory recognition may be filed against the putative father ahead
of an action for support. In the alternative, an action for support may be directly filed, where
the matter of filiation shall be integrated and resolved.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the assailed August 25, 2011 Decision [4] and January 15, 2013
Resolution[5] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02687 be reversed and set aside.

 In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her birth certificate was Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she was a legitimate child of her father and mother. She
filed a petition for change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the surname “Alfon,”
her mother’s surname, instead of “Duterte.” The trial court denied the petition, ratiocinating
that under Article 364 of the Civil Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname
of the father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname of her mother since
Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word “principally” and not “exclusively” and, hence,
there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the mother’s surname to
which he or she is legally entitled.
 Republic v. Magpayo,
G.R. No. 189476, Feb. 2, 2011
FACTS:
 Respondent Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo, son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and
Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng, filed a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng at the RTC. He alleged that his parents were never
married but his certificate of live birth shows that his parents contracted marriage. To support
his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his mother "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage”, academic records from elementary up to
college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng" and the birth certificate of his child
where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and
ordered the Civil Registrar to delete respondent’s certificate of live birth the date of marriage
of his parents, his father’s name and to change his name to surname Coseteng.

The Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the
Supreme Court on pure question of law. The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry
on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the
effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil
status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
ISSUES:

 WON Rule 103 is the applicable remedy where a change in name involves change in
civil status of a person.

RULING:

NO. The valid ground for change of name under Rule 103 are a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In relation to the case at
hand, respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous
to, recognized grounds.

Furthermore, respondent seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. It affects his legal
status. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. Rule 103 would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
The child may choose the surname he/she will use.
GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
FACTS:

Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio lived together as husband and wife for a certain period of time
(notwithstanding Patricio’s previous marriage). Out of this relationship, two (illegitimate) sons were
born. Their relationship eventually turned sour and Grande left for the United States of America, and
brought the kids with her.

Antonio filed a petition for parental authority, custody, and correction/change of surname for their
minor sons before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alongside a pending notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity for the children.

The RTC granted Antonio’s petition and ordered the full custody and change of surnames (from
Grande to Antonio) for his minor sons. Grande appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the
decision and granted only visitorial rights for Antonio instead of full custody for the children.

Unsatisfied with the modified decision, Grande appeals to the Supreme Court and particularly
assailed the change of surname for their 2 minor children. She contends that Article 176 of the
Family Code (as amended under Republic Act 9255) does not grant a father the right to compel the
use of his surname by his illegitimate children. The provision says:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a father can compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children by virtue of
Article 176 of the Family Code as amended in R.A. 9255?

RULING:
No, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children.

Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law with the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

In this case, the particular provision used the word “may,” which shows that the law’s intention is not
to compel an acknowledged illegitimate child to use the surname of his illegitimate father. Under the
rules of statutory construction, the word “may” connotes that the law is merely permissive, and does
not indicate a mandatory meaning.

This means that the law only confers discretion upon the illegitimate child if whether he/she chooses
to use his/her father’s surname or not. Therefore, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by
his illegitimate children.