Ross 2000

The 1995–96 Taiwan Robert S.
Ross
Strait Confrontation
Coercion, Credibility, and the
Use of Force
O
n May 22, 1995, the
White House approved a visa for Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States in
early June to attend his graduate school reunion at Cornell University. The de-
cision to allow Taiwan’s most senior leader to enter the United States reversed
more than twenty-ªve years of U.S. diplomatic precedent and challenged
Clinton administration public policy statements and private reassurances to
Chinese leaders that such a visit was contrary to U.S. policy. Equally impor-
tant, the visa decision followed a three-year evolution of U.S. policy toward
Taiwan. In 1992 the Bush administration, in violation of its pledge in a 1982
U.S.-China arms sales communiqué to reduce the quantity of U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, sold Taiwan 150 F-16 warplanes. In 1994 the Clinton administration re-
vised upward the protocol rules regarding U.S. “unofªcial” treatment of Tai-
wan diplomats, which had for the most part been in effect since 1981. Then the
next year, the administration allowed Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States.
From China’s perspective, Washington seemed determined to continue revis-
ing its Taiwan policy, thus encouraging Taiwan’s leaders to move closer to-
ward a declaration of sovereignty from mainland China. Given China’s
credible forty-ªve-year commitment to use force in retaliation against Taiwan
independence, such a declaration would likely lead to war.
During the ten months following Lee’s visit to Cornell, the United States and
China reopened their difªcult negotiations over U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
The negotiations reached a climax in March 1996, when China displayed a dra-
matic show of force consisting of military exercises and missile tests targeted
near Taiwan, and the United States responded with an equally dramatic de-
ployment of two carrier battle groups. The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation
was the closest the United States and China had come to a crisis since the early
1960s. It was a critical turning point in post–Cold War U.S.-China relations and
Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Research Associate, John King Fairbank
Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University.
A later version of this article will appear in Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Early Post–Cold War
World, Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
[USIP] Press, forthcoming). The author is grateful to USIP for its support of research travel to
China and to Robert Art, Patrick Cronin, Joseph Fewsmith, Steven Goldstein, Ronald Montaperto,
Barry Posen, Alan Romberg, Robert Suettinger, and Allen Whiting for their helpful comments.
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87–123

© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
87
International Security 25:2 88
in the development of the new regional order. The confrontation continues to

inºuence Chinese and American security policies and the bilateral relation-
ships between the United States, China, and Taiwan.
Many scholars have argued that China’s use of force in 1996 coerced the
Clinton administration into reversing the trend toward improving U.S.-Taiwan
relations and into opposing Taiwan independence. They have also argued that
the United States needs to adopt a stronger posture against Chinese policy to-
ward Taiwan.1 This article challenges these views. It argues that both China
and the United States achieved their strategic objectives as a result of the con-
frontation.
The Taiwan Strait confrontation reºected the interaction of Chinese coercive
diplomacy and U.S. deterrence diplomacy. China used coercive diplomacy to
threaten costs until the United States and Taiwan changed their policies.2 The
United States used deterrence diplomacy to communicate to both Chinese and
regional leaders the credibility of its strategic commitments. Washington used
force not to defend its Taiwan policy, but to defend its strategic reputation by
inºuencing perceptions of U.S. resolve.3
1. See, for example, John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Arthur Waldron, “How Not to Deal with
China,” Commentary, Vol. 103, No. 3 (March 1997), pp. 44–49.
2. The distinction between coercive diplomacy and compellence is not obvious. Thomas C.
Schelling’s description of compellence is nearly identical to Alexander L. George’s later deªnition
of coercive diplomacy (i.e., action that aims to “persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an ac-
tion”). See Schelling, Arms and Inºuence (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), pp. 69–72; and
George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Deªnition and Characteristics,” in Alexander L. George and Wil-
liam E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 7. Either
term can capture Chinese behavior. This article uses the term coercive diplomacy rather than
compellence to describe Chinese policy, if only because coercive diplomacy has become the more
familiar term.
Moreover, the difference between coercion and deterrence is often not clear. As Schelling ob-
serves, when a state seeks to end the continuance of another state’s policy, there are elements of
both deterrence and compellence (coercion). Schelling, Arms and Inºuence, p. 77. It can be argued
that there are elements of both deterrence and coercion in Chinese behavior. But compellence/co-
ercive diplomacy better captures Chinese behavior, because China took the initiative and main-
tained its policy of threatening the use of force until it received a response from Taiwan and the
United States in terms of concrete policy change. Paul Gordon Lauren calls this pattern “defensive
coercion.” See Lauren, “Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Di-
plomacy,” in Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free
Press, 1979), pp. 192–193. See also Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conºict (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1960), pp. 195–196; and Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Freedman,
ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15–20.
3. The relationship between reputation, credibility, commitment, and deterrence follows Schelling,
Arms and Inºuence, pp. 42–43. For an extensive discussion of the relationship between reputation
and deterrence, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1996), chap. 1.
The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation 89
China’s objective was to coerce the United States into ending its indirect yet
increasingly signiªcant support for Taiwan independence by forcing the
Clinton administration to reassess its relationship with the Taiwan leadership
and to revise its position on Taiwan’s role in international politics. China also
aimed to coerce Taiwan into abandoning its effort to redeªne the “one China”
principle and Taiwan’s status in international politics. The use of force was a
crucial element in Beijing’s coercive diplomacy. China’s large-scale military ex-
ercises and missile tests were intended to signal to the United States and Tai-
wan the tremendous risks inherent in their policies.4 The use of force made the
potential costs of U.S. and Taiwan policy more credible and China’s coercive
diplomacy more effective.5
Initially the Clinton administration did not use force to defend U.S. policy
against Chinese coercion. Instead it relied on diplomacy to bolster the credibil-
ity of the United States’ deterrence posture to discourage future Chinese mili-
tary action and to inºuence the behavior of its allies. The missile tests,
however, challenged the commitment of the United States to impose costs on
any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue with force and to defend its strategic
partners from future military threats. In the end, the United States was pressed
into using force to deter prospective challenges to its interests and to maintain
its reputation for loyalty to its security partners.6
4. Author interview with Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff. Much of the
following analysis of Chinese policy is based on the author’s extensive interviews conducted dur-
ing visits to Beijing between 1996 and 2000 with senior civilian and military specialists on U.S.-
China relations and Taiwan in government think tanks and universities. These policy analysts are
advisers to such government agencies as the state council, the ministry of foreign affairs, the minis-
try of security, and the People’s Liberation Army. They frequently participate in government meet-
ings regarding policy toward the United States and Taiwan. For obvious reasons, I have not
disclosed their identities.
5. On the role of the use of force in coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George and William
Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” in George and Simons, Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 273–
279; and Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” pp. 20–23.
6. This use of deterrence follows the deªnition of deterrence found in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence
and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961),
p. 3. Washington believed that its commitments were “interdependent,” so that its follow-through
in March 1996 on its commitment to Taiwan would affect the credibility of its future commitments
to both Taiwan and other regional actors. On the interdependence of commitments, see Schelling,
Arms and Inºuence, pp. 55–59; and Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, pp. 36–37. On the
difªculty of managing allies’ perceptions to maintain a reputation for loyalty, see Glenn H. Snyder,
Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). On the role of force in signaling repu-
tation to both adversaries and allies, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a more general discussion of the political
use of force, see Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as
a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978). On the role of the U.S. Navy in signaling
intentions, see James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1979 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1981), pp. 81–
83.
Because China and the United States pursued two different types of strategic
objectives, each was able to achieve its purpose. China inºuenced Taiwan’s as-
sessment of the costs of independence and succeeded in curtailing the evolu-
tion of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, thus reestablishing U.S. constraint on
Taiwan’s independence diplomacy. For its part, the United States secured its
reputational objectives. Following U.S. deployment of two carrier battle
groups, China, Taiwan, and U.S. regional allies concluded that the United
States remained committed to the defense of Taiwan and to using its military
power to preserve the East Asian strategic order. The United States thus suc-
ceeded in maintaining its preconfrontation reputation, leaving the credibility
of U.S. deterrence intact.7
The ªrst section of this article addresses the origins of the U.S.-China con-
frontation. It examines, ªrst, why China considered Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to
the United States a major challenge to its interests and, second, Beijing’s initial
efforts to affect U.S. and Taiwan behavior. The second section examines the
March 1996 confrontation and explains why each side used force to achieve its
objectives. The third section assesses the consequences of the confrontation, in-
cluding the costs and beneªts for U.S. and Chinese interests and for U.S.-China
relations. The conclusion argues that because both the United States and China
achieved their objectives and were content with the restoration of the status
quo that existed before Lee's visit to the United States, the confrontation itself
was unnecessary and avoidable. Both countries could have achieved their in-
terests without putting their relationship under such intense pressure. The les-
son of 1996 is not that the United States requires a tougher China policy, but
that its policymakers must avoid the mistakes of 1995 to prevent similar costly
and unnecessary confrontations in the future.
From Ithaca to New York City
Between May 1995, when Lee Teng-hui received his visa to visit the United
States, and October 1995, when President Clinton and President Jiang met in
New York for an unofªcial summit, Washington and Beijing negotiated the res-
toration of their pre-visa agenda. Beijing pressed Washington to afªrm its op-
position to Taiwan independence and to reassure Chinese leaders that there
7. As Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, points out, leaders sometimes believe that com-
mitments are interdependent when, in fact, they are not. This case, however, is one in which U.S.
behavior in March 1996 clearly affected China’s assessment of U.S. future resolve on the Taiwan is-
sue and likely affected the assessment of other countries of their own security, so that U.S. policy
was appropriate and successful.
would be no further erosion of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, as agreed in three

U.S.-China communiqués.8 Washington resisted Chinese pressure. After offer-
ing China informal and ambiguous assurances, American ofªcials insisted that
U.S.-Taiwan relations were no longer at issue as they sought to shift the focus
back to three issues of long-standing interest: Chinese arms proliferation,
trade, and human rights policies. This period ended with China’s failure to
achieve its objectives through diplomatic persuasion.
china’s response to lee teng-hui’s visit to cornell

President Clinton’s decision to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hui did not reºect con-
sidered analysis of U.S. interests, but rather White House acquiescence to con-
gressional pressure. As late as April 1995 U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher had told Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that a visa for Lee
would be “inconsistent with [the United States’] unofªcial relationship” with
Taiwan. Further, National Security Council (NSC) ofªcials had argued against
issuing a visa to Lee. However, when in May the Senate voted 97–1 and the
House of Representatives 360-0 in support of a visa, the president acquiesced.9
Leaders in Beijing considered the U.S. decision to grant a visa to Lee a seri-
ous challenge to China’s opposition to Taiwan’s independence movement. A
Chinese foreign ministry statement charged that this was just the latest step in
Lee’s efforts to create “one China and one Taiwan.”10 When Lee returned from
Cornell, a Xinhua news agency commentary observed that he and his pro-
independence supporters were “now very swollen with arrogance.” A joint
Xinhua–People’s Daily commentary argued that Lee had used his visit to gain
U.S. support for Taiwan’s independence. At the same time, Taiwan seemed to
dare Beijing to stop its drive for independence. Just before his departure for
8. The three are the 1992 Shanghai communiqué, the 1979 normalization of relations communiqué,
and the 1982 communiqué on U.S. arms sales to China. The text of the communiqués can be found
in Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: U.S.-China Relations, 1969–1989 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1995).
9. Although Christopher had pointed out to Qian that support for a visa was growing in
Congress, he did not suggest that policy might be reversed. Warren Christopher, In the Stream of
History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998),
pp. 286–287; author interviews with Robert Suettinger, director of Asian Affairs, National Security
Council, and Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Paciªc affairs. On the
role of Congress and domestic politics in U.S. policy toward Taiwan, see Robert G. Sutter, “Domes-
tic Politics and the U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangle: The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Conºict and Its After-
math,” in Robert S. Ross, ed., After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations (Armonk,
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). Technically, Lee did not receive a visa, but rather permission to enter the
United States.
10. “PRC Foreign Ministry Statement (May 23, 1995),” Xinhua, May 22, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service–China (hereinafter FBIS–China), May 23, 1995, pp. 2–3.
Cornell, Lee had observed military exercises in which Taiwan forces practiced
defense against a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attempt to land on Taiwan.
Then Taiwan announced that it was prepared to spend $1 billion to secure ad-
mission to the United Nations.11
Chinese ofªcials believed that the evolution of U.S. policy had encouraged
Lee Teng-hui to seek sovereignty for Taiwan. The visa decision followed a suc-
cession of similarly important decisions made in Washington since the end of
the Cold War. In 1992 President George Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16
warplanes to Taiwan. The sale not only violated the August 17, 1982, U.S.-
China communiqué on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but also suggested increased
U.S. support for Taiwan in its conºict with China.12 Then in 1994 the Clinton
administration revised its policy on U.S. government contacts with Taiwan,
raising the protocol level for U.S. treatment of Taiwan ofªcials. Thus, as a lead-
ing Chinese authority observed, Washington’s decision to issue the visa was
not an isolated incident. Rather it was the latest step in a dangerous post–Cold
War trend that could lead to a Taiwan declaration of independence.13 The Peo-
ple’s Daily observed that if the trend continued, “Lee Teng-hui will have less to
fear in colluding with ‘Taiwan independence forces.’”14
Lee’s visit also had implications for other countries’ Taiwan policies, includ-
ing those of Japan and countries in Western Europe. Lee had already engaged
in “golf diplomacy” in Southeast Asia and soon might begin traveling further
11. Commentary, “Where Does the United States Really Want to Lead Sino-U.S. Relations?”
Xinhua, June 17, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 19, 1995, pp. 10–12; and Commentary, “A Self-Vindica-
tion of Advocacy for Splitting the Motherland,” Xinhua and People’s Daily, July 23, 1995, in FBIS–
China, July 24, 1995, pp. 91–93. See also, for example, Ren Fan, “The U.S. Government Should
Change Its Course Immediately,” People’s Daily, June 13, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 16, 1995, p. 7.
Taiwan’s military exercises are reported in Lien-Ho Pao (Taipei), May 26, 1995, in FBIS–China, June
5, 1995, pp. 89–90; and Agence France-Presse, May 30, 1995, in FBIS–China, May 30, 1995, p. 85. For
China’s reaction to the exercises, see Xinhua, June 27, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 27, 1995, p. 90. Tai-
wan’s effort to enter the UN is discussed in Di Xiangqian, “Money Diplomacy Goes against the
Popular Will in Taiwan,” People’s Daily, July 12, 1995, in FBIS–China, July 18, 1995, p. 77–78; and in
Central News Agency (Taipei), June 28, 1995.
12. For a discussion of the arms sales communiqué, see John H. Holdridge, Crossing the Divide: An
Insider’s Account of the Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (New York: Rowman and Littleªeld,
1997), chaps. 13, 14; and Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, chap. 6. See also James Mann, About Face: A
History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999).
13. See the remarks by Wang Jisi in Wen Wei Po, August 29, 1995, in FBIS–China, September 13,
1995, pp. 6–7. See also the discussion of U.S. policy in 1994 in Wang Li, Bolan Qifu: Zhong Mei
Guanxi Yanbian de Quzhe Licheng [Roaring waves: the tortuous process of the evolution of U.S.-
China relations] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 297–298. On the new U.S. policy to-
ward Taiwan ofªcials, see also Steven Greenhouse, “U.S., Despite Critics, Is to Expand Taiwan
Ties,” New York Times, September 7, 1994, p. A5.
14. Author interviews with Chinese analysts. Ren, “The U.S. Government Should Change Its
Course Immediately”; and Zhongguo Tongxun She, May 29, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 2, 1995, p. 5.
aªeld to gain greater legitimacy for himself and Taiwan independence. As a

Xinhua commentary explained, Lee was “chief behind-the-scenes backer” of
Taiwan’s independence movement. He aimed to use his visit to the United
States to “boost Taiwan’s status with the help of foreigners and to achieve a
‘domino effect’ leading to the international community’s recognition of Tai-
wan’s ‘political status.’”15
Leaders in Beijing understood that the catalyst for Washington’s changing
policy was domestic political pressure on the White House. Regardless of the
impetus, however, “China [could not] help but show great concern and vigi-
lance” for this trend.16 As a Chinese foreign ministry statement noted, there
were indeed “stubborn anti-China elements in the U.S. Congress.” Neverthe-
less, the U.S. government had to “exercise its power and inºuence to . . . honor
the international commitments it has made.” The statement went on to observe
that if policymakers “only attach importance to pressure from certain pro-
Taiwan forces, Sino-U.S. relations will . . . regress.”17
To complicate matters, a couple of months after Christopher’s April state-
ment to Qian that a visit by Lee would be inconsistent with the United States’
unofªcial relationship with Taiwan, the administration reversed its position.
On June 8 President Clinton told Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu that the issu-
ance of Lee’s visa had not signaled a major change in U.S. policy. The State De-
partment held that the decision was “completely consistent with the . . . three
communiqués that form the basis” of U.S.-China relations. Assistant Secretary
of State Winston Lord seemed to dismiss the signiªcance of the decision when
he characterized it as a mere “tactical change.” And in early July, Christopher
said that the visit was not “violative” of the U.S.-China “basic relationship,”
but rather was “quite compatible” with unofªcial U.S.-Taiwan relations. Al-
though the administration might oppose additional high-proªle visits by Lee,
Lee would continue to visit the United States, and U.S. policy allowed room
for ongoing policy change.18
15. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts; and Commentary, “The Protective Umbrella
and Chief Behind-the-Scenes Backer for ‘Taiwan Independence,’” Xinhua, August 2, 1995, in FBIS–
China, August 3, 1995, pp. 43–44.
16. For a sophisticated analysis of the domestic politics of U.S. China policy, see Niu Jun, “Per-
spective of U.S. Policy toward China,” Guangming Ribao, September 14, 1995, in FBIS–China, Sep-
tember 26, 1995, pp. 4–6.
17. “PRC Foreign Ministry Statement (May 23, 1995),” p. 3. See also Commentary, “Where Does
the United States Really Want to Lead Sino-U.S. Relations?” p. 11.
18. Author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and Assistant Secretary of
State Lord; Department of State daily press brieªng, May 24, 1995; and on-the-record brieªng by
Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, May 30, 1995. Christopher’s remarks were made on the
Beijing, however, sought more than mere U.S. reafªrmation of the three U.S.-
China joint communiqués. The Chinese leadership was determined to compel
the Clinton administration to formally commit the United States to the one-
China policy and to reafªrm the status quo in its relationship with Taiwan. In a
July meeting with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Foreign Minister
Qian insisted that “what is imperative is that the United States make concrete
moves to eliminate the disastrous effects of its permitting Lee’s visit.” Prime
Minster Li Peng demanded that Washington “take practical measures” to cor-
rect its mistaken decision.19
Beijing retaliated to the visa decision by canceling the imminent visits to
Washington by Defense Minister Chi Haotian and State Counselor Li Guixian,
and by cutting short a visit to the United States by the Chinese air force chief of
staff. It also suspended bilateral discussions over arms proliferation and hu-
man rights. Following Lee’s visit, Beijing called its ambassador home for “con-
sultations” and rejected U.S. suggestions that the two sides hold high-level
talks to restore pre-visit cooperation.20
China’s diplomacy also included a show of force. Its leaders were united in
their belief that force was necessary to signal their position that the Taiwan is-
sue was a “question of war and peace” and that the United States “could be
dragged into military conºict” over precisely this issue.21 On July 18, 1995,
China announced that from July 21 to July 28 it would conduct missile tests
and naval and air exercises in the waters near Taiwan. It launched six surface-
News Hour with Jim Lehrer, July 11, 1995. See the Chinese analysis of U.S. “ambiguity” in He Chong,
“Will the Talks between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State Improve Sino-
U.S. Ties?” Zhongguo Tongxun She, August 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 1, 1995, p. 6. Author in-
terviews with Chinese policy analysts.
19. Qian Qichen’s and Li Peng’s remarks are in Xinhua, July 4, 1995, in FBIS–China, July 5, 1995,
pp. 8–9. See also the July 8, 1995, statement by the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson in
Zhongguo Xinwen She, July 13, 1995, in FBIS–China, July 14, 1995, p.1; and Chen Dawei, “To Make
Amends for the Damage Done to U.S. Relations with China, the United States Must Give Up Its
Cold War Mode of Thinking,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, June 23, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 29, 1995,
pp. 3–4.
20. On the cancellations, see Department of State daily press brieªngs, May 24 and 26, 1995, and
the May 30 press brieªng by Assistant Secretary of State Lord; and Xinhua, May 26, 1995, in FBIS–
China, May 26, 1995, p. 3. For subsequent Chinese moves, see Xinhua, June 16, 1995, in FBIS–
China, June 19, 1995, p. 1; and Agence France-Presse, June 22, 1995, in FBIS–China, June 22, 1995,
p. 1.
21. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts. For a discussion of the politics of China’s
hard-line policy preferences, see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making toward Taiwan,
1978–1997,” in David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Re-
form: 1978–2000 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, forthcoming); and You Ji, “Changing
Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of the War Games,” in Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait.
to-surface missiles approximately 100 miles from Taiwan.22 A Chinese foreign

ministry spokesperson explained that “what we are going to do is make the
U.S. realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right
track.”23 The tests and exercises concluded three days before Qian Qichen and
Warren Christopher would meet in Brunei for the ªrst high-level U.S.-China
talks since Lee Teng-hui had received his visa. The meeting would be Washing-
ton’s ªrst opportunity to inform Beijing whether it would take practical mea-
sures to end its support for Taiwan independence.
China’s use of force had a second target: Lee Teng-hui and public support in
Taiwan for his pro-independence activities.24 The Chinese leadership believed
that its earlier, relatively conciliatory overtures—including Jiang Zemin’s Janu-
ary 1995 eight-point proposal for mainland-Taiwan cooperation and Beijing’s
tolerance of Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy—had succeeded only in eroding the
credibility of Chinese deterrence.25 From China’s perspective, the missile tests
and naval exercises were thus necessary to signal Beijing’s determination to
curtail Taiwan’s march toward independence and to make clear that a formal
declaration of independence would result in war.26
u.s. resistance to chinese demands

The agenda for the Christopher-Qian meeting in Brunei on August 1 was clear:
The two sides would attempt to reach sufªcient agreement on U.S. policy to-
ward Taiwan so they could redirect their focus to other issues, including arms
proliferation, trade, and human rights. Prior to the meeting, Qian told the
press that China appreciated U.S. statements that Washington would continue
to abide by the one-China policy, but he recalled the Chinese expression that
“’words must count and deeds must yield results.’”27 Qian wanted Washing-
ton to adopt new commitments that would limit U.S. policy and constrain Tai-
wan.
22. Xinhua, July 18, 1995, in FBIS–China, July 19, 1995, p. 13; and Agence France-Press, August 11,
1995, in FBIS–China, August 11, 1995, p. 13.
23. Quoted in South China Morning Post, August 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 1, 1995, p. 5.
24. For a discussion of the domestic politics of Taiwan’s mainland policy, see Steven M. Goldstein,
“The Cross-Strait Talks of 1993—The Rest of the Story: Domestic Politics and Taiwan’s Mainland
Policy,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996
Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999).
25. See Suisheng Zhao, “Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive Strategy,”
in Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait; and Swaine, “Chinese Decision-Making toward Taiwan, 1978–
1997.”
26. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
27. See the State Department text of the August 1, 1995, press availability of Christopher and Qian,
released in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, on August 1, 1995.
Christopher presented Qian with a conªdential letter from President Clinton

to President Jiang in which Clinton wrote that the United States opposed Tai-
wan independence; did not support a two-China policy, or a policy of one
China and one Taiwan; and did not support Taiwan membership in the UN.
Although Washington expected that such assurances would mollify the Chi-
nese, these were basically the same conªdential commitments that American
presidents had made since President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972.28
Christopher also tried to assure Qian that the U.S. decision to issue a visa to
Lee did not indicate that future visits would be routine. Although he did not
rule them out, Christopher said that Lee’s visit had been a “special” situation
and that future visits would be personal, unofªcial, and rare, and would be
decided on a case-by-case basis.29 While trying to reassure China with well-
established U.S. commitments, Christopher adopted a low-key posture toward
Chinese military activities: He merely reiterated the State Department position
that such activities do not contribute to “peace and stability in the area.”30
Beijing was not satisªed with conªdential and vague U.S. assurances, how-
ever. Following the Brunei meeting, Qian said that although Christopher’s
statements were helpful, the “true value of a promise is shown in real action.”
Prime Minister Li explained that although Christopher and Qian had held a
positive meeting in Brunei, “it is not enough to make oral statements. . . . What
is important is to translate the statements into actions.” The Chinese foreign
ministry insisted that Washington’s main concern should be to translate its as-
surances into “concrete actions.”31
Chinese diplomacy had failed to curtail Lee Teng-hui’s “adventuresome”
foreign policy, including his call for Taiwan admittance to the UN. In late July,
just a few days after China had begun its July military maneuvers, Taiwan con-
ducted its own missile and naval exercises, and announced that it would con-
duct live artillery tests in August. Rather than succumb to Chinese pressure,
Lee was “still stubbornly challenging the ‘one-China’ principle.” Liu Huaqing,
vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, observed that be-
28. Mann, About Face, p. 330. On the commitments of previous administrations, see also Ross, Ne-
gotiating Cooperation. See also the Chinese account of the meeting in Xinhua, August 1, 1995, in
FBIS–China, August 2, 1995, p. 4.
29. Christopher, In the Stream of History, p. 289. See also Christopher’s July 28, 1995, speech to the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C.; and Michael Dobbs, “U.S., China Agree to Talks on Rela-
tions,” Washington Post, August 2, 1995, p. A27.
30. Department of State daily press brieªng, July 14, 1995, and author interview with NSC Direc-
tor of Asian Affairs Suettinger, August 11, 1995.
31. Xinhua, August 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 2, 1995, p. 4; Xinhua, August 17, 1995, in
FBIS–China, August 17, 1995, p. 5; and Xinhua, August 24, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 24, 1995,
pp. 1–2.
cause Taiwan’s leaders had purchased foreign weaponry, they could be

“cocky” and resist reuniªcation.32
China’s next opportunity to press the United States occurred during Under-
secretary of State Peter Tarnoff’s visit to Beijing in late August. On August 15
China began a second round of missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan
that were scheduled to last until August 25, the day of Tarnoff’s arrival in
China. The Chinese media explained that China’s July military operations had
been effective in undermining support for Lee and his efforts to gain UN mem-
bership for Taiwan. Nonetheless Lee had continued to be stubborn, and the
United States had yet to make new commitments in opposition to Taiwan inde-
pendence. Thus, to underscore its position, China carried out live artillery ex-
ercises and missile tests. The Chinese-inºuenced Hong Kong media reported
that the August exercises simulated a naval blockade of Taiwan and China’s
likely response to U.S. military intervention.33
Prior to Tarnoff’s arrival, Chinese leaders had also laid out their demands
for a U.S.-China summit. In particular, they argued for the issuance of a fourth
U.S.-China communiqué that would address the subject of future visits to the
United States by Taiwan’s leaders and would commit the United States to op-
posing Taiwan independence.
Once again, however, the United States adopted a low-key posture. A State
Department spokesperson simply repeated the now common refrain that
China’s missile tests “do not contribute to peace and stability in the region.”
During his visit, Tarnoff privately conveyed previous U.S. assurances regard-
ing Taiwan independence and its membership in the UN, and reiterated that
future visits to the United States by Taiwan’s leaders would be rare. But China
wanted a commitment that there would be no more visits, and it wanted a
fourth communiqué. The Chinese foreign ministry stated that although the
talks were useful, “whether Sino-U.S. relations can be restored to normal de-
pends on whether the U.S. side will take actions to honor its commitments.”34
32. Commentator, “Lee Teng-hui Stubbornly Challenges the ‘One-China’ Principle,” Xinhua, Au-
gust 23, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 23, 1995, p. 50. On Taiwan’s maneuvers, see Agence France-
Presse, July 25, 1995, in FBIS–China, July 25, 1995, p. 41; and Voice of Free China, August 1, 1995, in
FBIS–China, August 2, 1995, p. 78. Liu’s comments are in Ta Kung Pao, September 4, 1995, in FBIS–
China, September 7, 1995, p. 32.
33. Agence France-Press, August 26, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 28, 1995, pp. 81–82; Zhongguo
Tongxun She, August 15, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 17, 1995, p. 57; and Ming Pao, August 16,
1995, in FBIS–China, August 18, 1995, pp. 27–28.
34. Gong Li, Zhong Mei Guanxi Redian Toushi [Perspective on hotspots in China-U.S. relations]
(Harbin: Heilongjiang Chuban She, 1996), p. 159; Department of State daily press brieªngs, August
11 and 28, 1995. Xinhua, August 27, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 28, 1995, p. 3; and Xinhua, Au-
gust 29, 1995, in FBIS–China, August 30, 1995, p. 1.
President Jiang later told former President Bush that “oral undertakings are
not enough; we demand . . . practical and effective measures” to address the
consequences of Lee’s visit and to “avert the recurrence of big ups and downs”
in U.S.-China relations. Prime Minister Li told Bush that China wanted “con-
crete actions.”35
The dispute over Taiwan had thus become enmeshed in negotiations over a
U.S.-China summit. At issue was the summit’s agenda. China wanted to focus
on negotiations over the Taiwan issue. State Department ofªcials believed,
however, that Washington had made sufªcient concessions on this issue and
that a summit with Taiwan as the main focus would be tension-ridden, would
only serve Chinese interests in one-upping Taiwan, and would not address the
issues that most concerned the United States.36
Before Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing ºew to Washington to resume dis-
cussions with Undersecretary of State Tarnoff, the State Department declared
that the United States would not agree to any communiqué that mentioned
visits to the United States by Taiwan leaders or “that deals in any way, shape,
or form with the subject of Taiwan because our position on Taiwan is clear,”
and it “is not going to change.” In effect, the United States would no longer try
to mollify Beijing’s concerns over the Taiwan issue.37 On September 13 Presi-
dent Clinton met with the Dalai Lama at the White House, revealing his con-
tinued willingness to consider domestic politics when making China policy.
Although U.S. ofªcials remained interested in a U.S.-China summit, they in-
sisted that “whether or not it takes place will depend on how much progress
we make in U.S.-China relations.” Progress meant Chinese willingness to reach
agreement on human rights, arms proliferation, and trade.38 After Li’s talks
with Tarnoff and a brief meeting with Christopher on September 22, the State
Department explained that a summit meeting required a “stable” relationship
in which the two sides could “get beyond” the Taiwan issue. Li described his
talks with Tarnoff as “very frank and useful.”39
China faced a de facto U.S. ultimatum: either drop its contentious position
on the Taiwan issue or forgo a summit. On September 27 Christopher and Qian
met in New York to discuss the terms for a summit. Four days earlier, the
35. Xinhua, September 8 and 11, 1995, both in FBIS–China, September 11, 1995, pp. 13–15.
36. Author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger, Undersecretary of State
Tarnoff, and other administration ofªcials.
37. Department of State daily press brieªngs, September 18 and 21, 1995.
38. Department of State daily press brieªng, September 18, 1995.
39. Department of State daily press brieªng, September 22, 1995; and Xinhua, September 23, 1995,
in FBIS–China, September 25, 1995, p. 7.
United States had delivered two E-2T early airborne warning and command
aircraft to Taiwan. The timing of the delivery may have been coincidental, but
it underscored U.S. determination to resist Chinese pressure.40
Without receiving any U.S. concessions on Taiwan, Qian told Christopher
that China would suspend assistance to Iran regarding nuclear energy. He also
explained to the press that China appreciated U.S. commitments regarding Tai-
wan and that it was ready to work for greater cooperation with the United
States. Notably absent from Qian’s remarks were any complaints regarding
U.S. Taiwan policy or demands for “practical measures.” China had appar-
ently decided to follow U.S. advice to get beyond the Taiwan issue. Christo-
pher then instructed Tarnoff to continue discussions with Li regarding a
summit. Finally, after three more rounds of Tarnoff-Li meetings, on October 2
the two sides announced that Presidents Jiang and Clinton would meet on Oc-
tober 24 in New York for an unofªcial summit. Beijing then announced that its
ambassador would soon return to Washington. Following the summit, China
agreed to resume the U.S.-China military dialogue and to hold discussions on
trade and other bilateral issues.41
the october 1995 new york summit

Events leading up to the October 1995 summit suggested that the Clinton ad-
ministration could withstand Chinese pressure to make signiªcant concessions
regarding Taiwan and, at the same time, secure an important Chinese conces-
sion on nuclear energy cooperation with Iran. Regarding visits by Taiwan’s
leaders to the United States, Clinton reafªrmed to Jiang that such visits would
be “unofªcial, private, and rare” and decided on a case-by-case basis. And as
in the past, Clinton offered conªdential assurances that Washington would op-
pose Taiwan independence and membership in the UN. Otherwise the summit
agenda paid scant attention to the Taiwan issue. Instead it focused on issues in-
cluding trade disputes, arms proliferation, human rights, international crime,
and environmental protection.42
40. Central News Agency, September 25, 1995, in FBIS–China, September 25, 1995, p. 73.
41. On the Chinese suspension of the nuclear energy agreement and the decision to move ahead
with summit discussions between Tarnoff and Li, see Department of State daily press brieªng,
September 29, 1995. Qian’s remarks are in Xinhua, September 27, 1995, in FBIS–China, September
28, 1995, pp. 11–12; and Xinhua, October 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 2, 1995, p. 11. The return
of the ambassador is reported in Kyodo, October 17, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 17, 1995, p. 1. On
military exchanges, see Zhongguo Tongxun She, October 31, 1995, in FBIS–China, November 1, 1995,
p. 1.
42. See the October 24, 1995, postsummit brieªng in New York at the Warwick Hotel by State De-
partment and NSC ofªcials; Zhu Chenghu, ed., Zhong Mei Guanxi de Fazhan Bianhua ji qi Qushi [De-
The administration had achieved its goals while retaining its negotiating le-
verage in summit diplomacy. Beijing had wanted a state visit, replete with a
state banquet and military honors. But the White House had agreed only to
hold an unofªcial meeting in Washington. Thus it could use Beijing’s contin-
ued interest in an ofªcial Washington summit to extract additional conces-
sions. The State Department explained that an unofªcial summit “most
appropriately reºects the current standing of U.S.-China relations.“43
Administration ofªcials were pleased with the summit and the direction of
U.S.-China relations. They believed that they had persuaded Chinese leaders
that the decision to allow Lee to visit the United States was a “tactical shift” in
U.S. policy, and that Beijing understood that it could not pressure Washington
to make any additional concessions. The visa issue was a “bump in the road”
and was no longer an obstacle to improved relations on other issues. Assistant
Secretary of State Lord publicly reported that Chinese leaders agreed with the
U.S. position that the two sides can discuss issues sensitive to China (i.e., Tai-
wan), but still “get on with the broad agenda.” Director of Asian Affairs for the
National Security Council Robert Suettinger similarly believed that the sum-
mit enabled the two sides to make “signiªcant progress.”44 After the disrup-
tions caused by Lee’s visit to Cornell, China and the United States had at last
resumed momentum toward resolving other problems.
The summit was followed by a meeting between Secretary of State Christo-
pher and Foreign Minister Qian in mid-November in Osaka. During the meet-
ing, Qian reported that China was prepared for a constructive discussion on
the Taiwan issue. Later, however, Assistant Secretary of State Lord expressed
conªdence that China’s leaders “understand” that administration ofªcials had
“reafªrmed as much as we’re capable of doing” on U.S. Taiwan policy.45 Chi-
nese leaders were not satisªed, however, because the United States still had
not made any commitments on the Taiwan issue since Lee’s visit. China had
agreed to the summit and made the concessions necessary for a successful
meeting. Beijing had not accepted Washington’s Taiwan policy, however, nor
veloping change in China-U.S. relations and its trend] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chuban She,
1998), pp. 190–191; Xinhua, October 25, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 25, 1995, p. 18; and author in-
terviews with administration ofªcials.
43. Department of State daily press brieªng, October 2, 1995; and author interview with an admin-
istration ofªcial. The administration also refused to hold a state visit in Washington due to its con-
cern for the congressional and public reaction to a grand White House welcome for Jiang Zemin.
Interview with Assistant Secretary of State Lord.
44. Author interviews with Undersecretary of State Tarnoff and Assistant Secretary of State Lord;
and October 24, 1995, postsummit brieªng in New York.
45. Press availability of Christopher and Qian at the New Otani Hotel, Tokyo, and brieªng by As-
sistant Secretary of State Winston Lord at the Royal Hotel Osaka, Japan, November 16, 1995.
had it lowered the priority of the Taiwan issue on the U.S.-China agenda.46
Rather China had decided to shelve the issue until its leverage improved. To
underscore China’s position, after announcing Beijing’s willingness to attend
the New York summit, Qian Qichen said that “we do not think that this is
enough because a complete agreement . . . has not been reached.” Immediately
following the summit, Qian said that Clinton and Jiang had held a “positive
and useful meeting,” but “this does not mean that the Taiwan issue will not
again be the main issue affecting U.S.-China relations.” And whereas in Osaka
Christopher had been upbeat about U.S.-China relations, Qian said that the
“differences and contradictions” between Washington and Beijing still “need
to be addressed.”47
China agreed to the New York summit because it had turned its focus to-
ward Taiwan’s upcoming elections to the legislative assembly scheduled for
December 2, 1995, and it needed stable U.S.-China relations if it was to coerce
Lee Teng-hui into stopping his pro-independence activities. Despite China’s
repeated military exercises and missile tests, Lee had continued to defy Chi-
nese warnings. In September Taiwan carried out its own missile tests, and in
early October it held ground, air, and naval exercises simulating a response to
an enemy attempt to land on Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan insisted that Tokyo
invite Lee to attend an upcoming Asia Paciªc Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit in Japan. After visiting the United States, Lee was now aiming for Ja-
pan.48 Moreover, Taiwan leaders had been closely watching U.S.-China diplo-
macy. They stressed U.S. refusal to consider a fourth communiqué,
emphasized U.S. criticism of China’s military activities, and minimized the im-
portance of the U.S.-China summit. China observed this pattern and suggested
that Lee was creating a domestic environment supportive of his independence
efforts.49
46. Gong, Zhong Mei Guanxi Redian Toushi, p. 160; and author interviews with Chinese policy ana-
lysts.
47. Xinhua, October 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 2, 1995, p. 11; Xinhua, October 26, 1995, in
FBIS–China, October 27, 1995, pp. 2–3; and November 16, 1995, press availability of Christopher
and Qian at the New Otani Hotel, Tokyo.
48. Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, September 15, 1995, in FBIS–China, September 18, 1995, p. 53; and Central
News Agency, October 4, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 4, 1995, p. 91. For a Chinese analysis of the
exercises, see Tang Zhengshui, Zhong Mei Qiju zhong de Taiwan Wenti: 1969.1–1999.12 [The Taiwan
issue in U.S.-China chess: 1969.1–1999.12] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chuban She, 2000),
pp. 413–414. On the APEC meeting, see Central News Agency, October 18, 1995, in FBIS–China,
October 18, 1995, p. 89.
49. Central News Agency, August 17, 1885, in FBIS–China, August 17, 1995, p. 58; Chung-Yang Jih-
Pao, December 1, 1995, in FBIS–China, December 6, 1995, p. 101; and Central People’s Radio, No-
vember 4, 1995, in FBIS–China, November 6, 1995, p. 60.
From Summitry to Confrontation
China responded to the failure of its U.S. policy by escalating its use of force. In
October, following the announcement of the New York summit, Jiang Zemin,
accompanied by China’s senior military leadership, observed PLA Air Force
and Navy exercises and boarded a command ship to observe a “high-tech war
game” of submarines and destroyers, and missile launchings. Also on display
were China’s bombers and nuclear and conventional submarines. The focus
was Chinese military modernization, but the foreign ministry stressed that the
maneuvers also demonstrated China’s resolve to safeguard its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.50 Equally important, Jiang had directly associated himself
with China’s determination to militarily resist Taiwan independence, under-
scoring the unity of the Chinese leadership on this issue.
The October maneuvers were a prelude to more serious coercive diplomacy
aimed at Taiwan’s December election. China was concerned that the mere
holding of elections might enhance the international legitimacy of Taiwan’s in-
dependence movement. The elections would also be an opportunity for the
people of Taiwan to pass judgment on Lee’s Teng-hui’s mainland policy. Given
Lee’s recent successes and the impression of U.S. support for Taiwan, China
feared that public optimism might result in a victory for the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP), Taiwan’s pro-independence party. Finally, Lee might use
the elections and the pressures of campaign politics as an excuse to take an-
other step toward establishing formal sovereignty for Taiwan.
On November 15, just as the two-week campaign period before Taiwan’s
legislative elections began and when Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph
Nye was in Beijing to resume the U.S.-China military dialogue, China began a
third round of military maneuvers. This time, however, Beijing explicitly de-
clared that the exercises were aimed at Taiwan and were designed to maintain
the “unity” of China and to resist the “splittist” activities of Taiwan’s pro-
independence forces. It also declared that the Nanjing military theater, rather
than the Nanjing military region, was responsible for the exercises, suggesting
that China had gone on war footing. The exercises, which comprised Chinese
land, naval, and air forces, also included a simulation of an amphibious PLA
landing on a Taiwan-held island and attacks on a mock-up of Taiwan’s largest
airport. China’s actions demonstrated the “military’s resolve and capability to
50. Xinhua, October 18, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 18, 1995, pp. 25–26; and Zhongguo Xinwen
She, October 19, 1995, in FBIS–China, October 20, 1995, p. 2.
defend national sovereignty and . . . safeguard the motherland’s unity.”51 They

were also the “most serious warning” to that point of China’s “determination
to ªrmly oppose and contain Taiwan independence” through “so-called ‘dem-
ocratic procedures’ with the support of foreign sources.”52
Beijing could draw considerable satisfaction from its coercive diplomacy.
Lee Teng-hui’s Nationalist Party, which had been expected to win an easy vic-
tory, held onto its majority by only two seats. The most surprising outcome
was the success of the New Party, composed of candidates highly critical of
Lee’s provocative mainland policy. Although the New Party had been formed
only two years earlier, all of its candidates were elected, and its number of
seats in the legislature increased overall. The outcome had apparently vindi-
cated Chinese forceful opposition to Taiwan independence.53
Although China’s latest round of exercises were by far the largest and most
threatening, the United States responded with conspicuous silence. Neither the
White House, the State Department, nor the Defense Department discussed
the maneuvers with the media or in public speeches. In his mid-November
visit to Beijing, despite strong Chinese warnings to him against U.S. “interfer-
ence” in the Taiwan issue, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye privately reiter-
ated U.S. advice that China’s exercises were counterproductive. The focus of
Nye’s visit was brieªng Chinese leaders on the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan
alliance (which he stressed was not aimed at China) and on expressing Wash-
ington’s interest in renewing the U.S.-China military dialogue. When a Chi-
nese foreign policy analyst asked how the United States would respond to a
mainland attack on Taiwan, Nye replied that it would depend on the immedi-
ate circumstances. He observed that in 1950 the United States had said it
would not become involved in Korea, then quickly reversed itself. Other than
this cautious response to a question from a think-tank analyst, Nye did not
press China on its military activities.54
51. Tang, Zhong Mei Qiju zhong de Taiwan Wenti, p. 414; Xinhua, November 25, 1995, in FBIS–China,
pp. 95–227; Ping Kuo Jih Pao, November 27, 1995, in FBIS–China, November 27, 1995, pp. 24–25;
and author interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger. On the Nye visit, see
Zhongguo Xinwen She, November 15, 1995, in FBIS–China, November 16, 1995, pp. 4–5.
52. See the comments of Xin Qi in Wen Wei Pao, November 27, 1995, in FBIS–China, November 28,
1995, p. 72.
53. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts; and Hong Kong Standard, December 4, 1995, in
FBIS–China, December 4, 1995, p. 15. For a full discussion of the elections, see Shelley Rigger, Poli-
tics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 172–174.
54. Author interview with former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Joseph Nye; Patrick E. Tyler, “China-U.S. Ties Warm a Bit as China-Taiwan Relations Chill,” New
York Times, November 18, 1995, p. A3; and “Perry Voices Concern for Taiwan,” New York Times,
February 7, 1996, p. A3. Cf., Garver, Face Off, pp. 85–86.
On December 19 the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz passed through the Taiwan
Strait, the ªrst such transit by a U.S. aircraft carrier since the normalization of
U.S.-China relations in 1979. The transit was intended neither as a political ges-
ture nor as a quiet warning to Chinese leaders. Rather it was an unpublicized
detour to avoid delays caused by bad weather. U.S. ofªcials believed that Chi-
nese leaders were unaware of the carrier’s presence.55
Thus far, the administration’s response to China’s military exercises had
been intentionally low-key. With the ªrst round of exercises in the summer of
1995, U.S. ofªcials began to understand that the White House had contributed
to U.S.-China conºict by failing to keep its pledges regarding Taiwan, and they
did not want to aggravate the situation further by overreacting to China’s sub-
sequent attempts to ºex its muscles. They also believed that as the “offended
party,” Beijing needed to vent its anger. Moreover, as one NSC ofªcial later ex-
plained, the United States wanted Taiwan to understand that its “actions have
consequences,” that provoking China is not cost free. Thus, so long as China
did not threaten Taiwan with war, the United States would not be anxious to
rise to Taiwan’s defense.56
China was not simply blowing off steam, however. Nor were its exercises
targeted only at Taiwan’s independence diplomacy. They were also intended
to coerce the United States to change its Taiwan policy. In this respect, U.S. si-
lence suggested disinterest in Chinese capabilities and threats as well as Wash-
ington’s intention to continue resisting Chinese demands. To leaders in Beijing,
the White House had yet to get the message that its Taiwan’s policy challenged
a vital Chinese interest. China’s leaders thus concluded that the next round of
PLA activities should be even more provocative, to show the United States its
determination to use force against Taiwan independence.57
coercion versus deterrence in the taiwan strait

Chinese planning took on considerable urgency as Taiwan began preparing for
its ªrst democratic election for president. The election, scheduled for March 23,
55. Central News Agency, January 27, 1996, in FBIS–China, January 29, 1996, p. 83; and Depart-
ment of State daily press brieªng, January 26, 1996. The State Department and the NSC were per-
suaded by the Pentagon that its interest in sending the Nimitz through the strait was to avoid bad
weather, rather than to send China a quiet yet persuasive signal, and thus they did not object. Au-
thor interviews with former Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye, NSC Director of Asian Affairs
Suettinger, and other administration ofªcials. Cf., Garver, Face Off, pp. 87–89; and Li Yihu, ed.,
Zhengzhi Dubo zhong de Taiwan [Taiwan in a political gamble] (Beijing: Youyi Chuban She, 1999),
p. 224.
56. Author interviews with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and former Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense Nye.
concerned China not only because it would add domestic and international le-
gitimacy to Taiwan’s quest for sovereignty, but Taiwan’s campaign politics
might encourage Lee to use the independence issue to raise support for his
candidacy. Also, China had to worry about the possibility of a victory for Peng
Ming-min, the outspoken pro-independence DPP candidate for president.
In the lead-up to the presidential election, the candidates insisted that Tai-
wan could challenge mainland threats. Lee declared that of all the presidential
candidates, only he had the “capability, wisdom, and guts to handle cross-
strait relations.” Two weeks later he said that the effect of the PLA exercises
was “diminishing” and that the mainland was “not pleased with our foreign
trips, but we must also say that we are not pleased with their military exer-
cises. Shall we say that we have broken even?”58 DPP candidate Peng prom-
ised to adopt a more friendly policy toward the mainland, but only if it
“recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign and independent state.” If the PLA carried
out aggression against Taiwan, however, Taiwan’s military would inºict a
“heavy price” on the mainland.59
At the same time, Taiwan seemed intent on using the United States to resist
mainland pressure. In late January it revealed to the media the December
Nimitz transit through the Taiwan Strait, expressed its appreciation to the U.S.
Congress for appealing to the White House to expedite delivery of Patriot mis-
siles to Taiwan, and announced forthcoming antisubmarine exercises. In early
February Taipei revealed that it had accepted delivery of a missile frigate,
which would contribute to Taiwan’s antisubmarine and air defense, and that it
would substantially increase its defense budget to deal with the greater mili-
tary threat from the mainland.60
Washington appeared to support Taiwan’s independence drive. On January
6, despite China’s “solemn representations,” the Clinton administration ap-
proved a visa for Taiwan Vice President Li Yuan-zu to transit through Los An-
geles on his way to Guatemala, insisting that the decision was not inconsistent
58. For Lee’s remarks, see the English translation of his speech distributed by Nationalist Party
campaign headquarters, in FBIS–China, February 12, 1996, pp. 83–84; and live telecast of Lee Teng-
hui news conference, China Broadcasting Corporation (Taipei), February 23, 1996, in FBIS–China,
February 26, 1996, p. 55.
59. “Taiwan Election Candidate Gives China Ultimatum,” Reuters, February 23, 1996.
60. On Taiwan’s publicizing the passage of the Nimitz, see Christopher, In the Stream of History,
p. 426; and Central News Agency, January 27, 1996, in FBIS–China, January 29, 1996, p. 83. On
Taiwan’s defense policies, see Central News Agency, January 27, 1996, in FBIS–China, January 29,
1996; and Central News Agency, February 2, 1996, and Chung-kuo Shih-pao, January 28, 1996, both
in FBIS–China, February 5, 1996, pp. 76–77. See the extensive discussion of this period in Taiwan’s
U.S. policy, in particular, Taiwan’s alleged manipulation of the passage of the Nimitz, in Tang,
Zhong Mei Qiju zhong de Taiwan Wenti, pp. 417–421.
with U.S. unofªcial relations with Taiwan. China expressed its “strong displea-
sure” at the decision.61 Then on January 31, the White House again ignored
Chinese warnings by approving two additional transit visas for Li to travel
round-trip between Taiwan and Haiti. En route to Haiti, Li planned to spend
two nights in the United States, visiting San Francisco and Miami. On his re-
turn to Taiwan, he planned to stay one night in Los Angeles. Although the ad-
ministration needed more than a week to make the decision, it insisted that the
visa was a “routine matter” that should not affect U.S.-China relations.62
Dismayed by Washington’s actions, China warned Taiwan to go no further
toward independence. In late December 1995, the director of the Institute of
Taiwan Studies wrote that the people of Taiwan should “warn [Taiwan’s] sepa-
ratists in all seriousness . . . to rein themselves in at the brink of the preci-
pice.”63 In January 1996 Prime Minister Li stated that China’s commitment to
use force was “directed . . . against the schemes of foreign forces . . . to bring
about ‘Taiwan independence,’” and that since Lee’s visit to Cornell, China had
demonstrated its “determination and ability to safeguard . . . [its] sovereignty
and territorial integrity.” In early March Jiang Zemin told China’s National
People’s Congress (NPC) that if Taiwan did not abandon its independence ac-
tivities, “the struggle between China and Taiwan will not stop.” Qian Qichen
told NPC delegates that the main danger was Taiwan independence with inter-
national support.64
China continued to back up its verbal threats with coercive diplomacy. From
late January through February, the PLA amassed more than 100,000 troops in
Fujian Province.65 The size of China’s deployments got Washington’s attention.
Administration ofªcials stressed that they did not believe that the exercises
were a prelude to an attack, but they warned Beijing not to adopt provocative
actions. When Vice Foreign Minister Li visited Washington in early February,
61. “U.S. Visa to Taiwan Aide,” New York Times, January 7, 1996, p. A9; Department of State daily
press brieªng, January 5, 1996; and Xinhua, January 9, 1996, in FBIS–China, January 11, 1996, p. 2.
62. Department of State daily press brieªngs, January 23 and 31, 1996; and China Radio Interna-
tional, February 2, 1996, in FBIS–China, February 2, 1996, p. 1.
63. Jiang Dianming, “Safeguarding State Sovereignty Is the Greatest Public Opinion,” Wen Wei
Pao, December 24, 1995, in FBIS–China, February 5, 1996, pp. 68–69.
64. Xinhua, January 30, 1996, in FBIS–China, January 31, 1996, pp. 75–77; and Zhongguo Xinwen
She, March 8, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 11, 1996, p. 10. See also Yan Xuetong, “U.S. Policy toward
Taiwan and Tension in the Taiwan Strait,” Liaowang, March 4, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 15, 1996,
pp. 5–6.
65. Associated Press, February 6, 1996; Department of State daily press brieªng, February 14, 1996;
R. Jeffrey Smith, “China Plans Maneuvers off Taiwan,” Washington Post, February 5, 1996, p. A1;
and Steven Mufson, “China Masses Troops on Coast Near Taiwan,” Washington Post, February 14,
1996, p. A16.
U.S. ofªcials told him that China should not try to intimidate Taiwan and
should instead work to reduce tension in the strait. The administration also
used military signals to weigh in against Chinese policy. On February 6 Secre-
tary of Defense William Perry said that he did not yet consider China’s use of
its military a threat to Taiwan, but he did express concern. The same day, the
Pentagon reported that a U.S. naval vessel was passing through the Taiwan
Strait. The next day, Assistant Secretary of State Lord told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the administration had stressed to Beijing its “deep
concern” over the PLA’s activities. He warned that the administration was
closely watching developments and that if hostilities broke out, the “impact . . .
would be extremely serious.” In mid-February the State Department an-
nounced that since January 26, the administration’s senior national security
advisers had been holding a series of meetings to assess Beijing’s activities and
that these meetings would continue.66
Nonetheless, China pushed ahead with its plans for military maneuvers.
Leaders in Beijing believed that China had to raise the stakes to make the
United States understand the risks of its Taiwan policy.67 It also wanted to lay
to rest suspicions that Washington had become so accustomed to Chinese mili-
tary exercises that U.S. silence amounted to acceptance of Chinese actions.68
Moreover, Taiwan seemed unfazed by China’s threats. During the ªrst months
of 1996, Taiwan held its own military maneuvers, reinforcing its resistance to
the mainland’s “anti-splittist, anti-Taiwan struggle.”69
On March 4 China announced that the PLA would conduct surface-to-
surface missile tests from March 8 to March 18. The target areas were waters
just off the coast of Taiwan’s two largest port cities, one of which was barely
twenty miles from the northern port of Keelung. After careful study, Chinese
leaders had concluded that if the target zones were not close to Taiwan, the
tests would be ineffective in opposing Taiwan “splittism” and U.S. policy to-
ward Taiwan.70 When asked whether the likelihood of a mainland attack on
Taiwan had increased, a foreign ministry spokesperson responded that “if Tai-
66. Associated Press, February 6, 1996; testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord be-
fore the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Paciªc, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February
7, 1996; and Department of State daily press brieªngs, February 13 and 14, 1996.
68. Ibid.
69. See the discussion in Tang, Zhong Mei Qiju zhong de Taiwan Wenti, pp. 421–422.
70. Xinhua, March 4, 1995, in FBIS–China, March 5, 1996, p. 68; and Central News Agency, March
7, 1995, in FBIS–China, March 7, 1996, p. 81. Author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
wan declares ‘independence’ or if foreign forces meddle, the Chinese Govern-

ment will not sit by idly.”71
On March 7, despite vigorous and repeated discussions between U.S. and
Chinese diplomats and U.S. advice that China not proceed with its missile
tests, the PLA ªred three M-9 missiles into the waters near Taiwan.72 That day,
Defense Minister Chi Haotian explained to the Fujian delegates to the NPC
that “we have more troops stationed in Fujian because we are facing a grim sit-
uation, in which Lee Teng-hui and his gang are vainly attempting to split
China. . . . We must heighten our vigilance.” A March 8 joint editorial warned
of the danger of allowing Lee to continue advocating Taiwan independence,
stating that China retained the right to use force to oppose “interference by for-
eign forces . . . and their attempt to promote ‘Taiwan independence’. . . . [We
will] exert all our efforts to defend our country’s reuniªcation. We mean what
we say.”73
Clinton administration ofªcials believed that the PLA was not preparing to
attack Taiwan—or preparing to attack smaller offshore islands, carry out a
blockade, and harass Taiwan shipping—but instead was trying to inºuence
Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election and independence movement. As
Secretary of State Perry explained, attacking Taiwan would be “a dumb thing”
for China to do, observing that it was not capable of launching an invasion of
the island. Although Perry believed that China had the ability to harass Tai-
wan, he observed that it would not make any sense to attack. The State Depart-
ment maintained that the missile tests were an exercise in the political use of
force and did not “presage any broader military effort.” Moreover, following
the March 7 missile launches, China, through various diplomatic channels (in-
cluding Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu’s discussions in Washington), had
assured the United States that it did not intend to attack Taiwan.74
71. China Radio International, March 5, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 6, 1996, p. 1.

72. Agence France-Press, March 8, 1996, FBIS–China, March 8, 1996, p. 37; Department of State
daily press brieªngs, March 7 and 8, 1996; and White House press brieªng, March 7, 1996. Note
that throughout the period, Chinese missile tests did not interfere with shipping in or out of Tai-
wan. See Central News Agency, March 8, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-47; and Central News Agency,
March 13, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-50.
73. Wen Wei Po, March 9, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 11, 1996, p. 15; and editorial departments,
“Lee Teng-hui Practicing Taiwan Independence Is the Biggest Danger for Taiwan,” People’s Daily
and Liberation Army Daily, March 8, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 11, 1996, pp. 83–84.
and comments by Secretary of Defense William Perry at the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., February 28, 1996; Department of State daily press brieªng, March 5, 1996; and Department
of Defense news brieªng, March 14, 1996. See also Christopher, In the Stream of History, p. 427; Pat-
rick E. Tyler, “China Signaling U.S. That It Will Not Invade Taiwan,” New York Times, March 13,
1996, p. A3; and author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
Nonetheless, Washington had to react. China had ignored U.S. warnings,

and its missile tests challenged U.S. credibility. Administration ofªcials be-
lieved that if the United States did not respond forcefully, Beijing would doubt
Washington’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan conºict and
would be encouraged to escalate its military activities in a future confronta-
tion—thereby increasing the likelihood of hostilities and a far more serious
U.S.-China crisis. The Defense Department explained that Washington needed
to communicate its determination that China resolve its differences with Tai-
wan peacefully. It could not allow Chinese leaders to conclude that “the U.S.
had lost interest in that area of the world.” As Secretary of Defense Perry later
recalled, the United States had to demonstrate the military resolve behind its
Taiwan policy.75
Equally signiªcant, American leaders believed that failure to respond to
China’s actions would call into doubt the U.S. commitment to remain an active
player in East Asia and to fulªll its bilateral security commitments to its re-
gional allies. Secretary of State Christopher, for example, explained that “be-
cause Asian and Paciªc nations looked to the United States to preserve
stability in the region, we had to take action to calm the situation.”76
Also on March 7 Vice Foreign Minister Liu visited Washington to hold pre-
arranged discussions with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Earlier
that day, China had tested its M-9 missiles. Liu’s visit offered the administra-
tion an opportunity to press China to end its missile tests. To strengthen the
administration’s message, Christopher and Perry joined Lake for his evening
meal with Liu. As secretary of defense, Perry delivered the administration’s
tough message: He publicly reported that he had told Liu that the Chinese mis-
sile tests “bracketing Taiwan” were “reckless” and “aggressive” and could be
seen as a threat to American interests. He warned Liu that the United States
has “more than enough military capability to protect its vital national security
interests in the region and is prepared to demonstrate that.” Perry then said
that China would be making a serious mistake if it continued the missile tests.
Lake then told Liu that the exercises threatened vital U.S. security interests in
the western Paciªc and that China should resume cooperation with Taiwan.77
Department of Defense news brieªng, March 14, 1996; and Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry,
Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 92–
93.
76. Christopher, In the Stream of History, p. 427. See also Department of Defense news brieªng,
March 14, 1996; and author interview with Assistant Secretary of State Lord.
77. See Perry’s comments at the Department of Defense news brieªng, December 8, 1996; and
Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, p. 96.
Ignoring Washington’s warnings, China announced on March 9 that from

March 12 to March 20 it would conduct air and naval exercises with live
ammunition in waters near Taiwan.78 China and the United States had become
engaged in a test of wills, but their respective objectives were very different.
China had three aims: to coerce Taiwan leaders to abandon their independence
activities, to coerce the Taiwan electorate to vote against independence, and to
coerce the United States to adopt a more public and determined stand against
Taiwan independence. Washington, on the other hand, however much it may
have opposed Taiwan’s movement toward independence, aimed to uphold the
credibility of its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan conºict
and to remain a reliable security partner to its regional allies. Despite their dif-
ferent objectives, China and the United States both had important interests at
stake.
Meanwhile, following the dinner with Vice Foreign Minister Liu, Perry de-
cided that China’s missile tests required the United States to conduct a show of
force. He suggested that a carrier battle group sail through the Taiwan Strait.
But after consultations with NSC and State Department ofªcials, who advo-
cated a less provocative course, and with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen.
John Shalikashvili, who preferred to keep the carrier groups farther away from
China’s coastal weaponry, Perry agreed to a more cautious plan. In a March 10
meeting in Perry’s ofªce, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch, Na-
tional Security Adviser Lake, Secretary of State Christopher, General
Shalikashvili, and Perry agreed that the United States should send two carrier
battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan.79 Perry then ordered the Independence
battle group from Okinawa to the waters east of Taiwan and the Nimitz carrier
group from the Persian Gulf to the Philippine Sea, which would allow it to join
the Independence on short notice. Perry stated that China’s insistence that its
missile tests were routine was “baloney” and that they were meant to intimi-
date Taiwan. He said that the deployment of the two carriers would signal to
the Chinese that “the United States has a national interest in the security and
the stability in the western Paciªc region. We have a powerful military force
there to help us carry out our national interests.” The State Department con-
78. Xinhua, March 9, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 9, 1996, p. 54.

79. Author interviews with Undersecretary of State Tarnoff, Assistant Secretary of State Lord, and
NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger. See also Mann, About Face, pp. 336–337. Cf. Carter and
Perry, Preventive Defense, pp. 96–99; and Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New
York: Public Affairs, 1999), p. 33.
curred, explaining that the carriers indicated U.S. interest in a peaceful out-
come to mainland-Taiwan differences.80
The United States was determined to protect its credibility in defending its
interests, but China was determined to protect its territorial integrity. Indeed,
Beijing feared that the U.S. carrier deployments and Washington’s commit-
ment to defend Taiwan might encourage Lee to take another step toward inde-
pendence. The Chinese foreign ministry warned the United States that the
deployment was unwise: “If this . . . is regarded by the Taiwan authorities as
. . . supporting and conniving” with Taiwan’s “splitting the motherland, that
would be very dangerous.” Foreign Minister Qian said that the United States,
not China, was being “reckless.”81
On March 13, China launched a fourth M-9 missile test. Then on March 15, it
announced that from March 18 to March 25 the PLA would conduct joint air,
ground, and naval exercises near Pingtan Island, within ten nautical miles of
Taiwan-controlled islands. On the same day, a joint editorial warned that if Lee
Teng-hui “insists on going his way and clings obstinately to promoting ‘Tai-
wan independence’ . . . or if foreign forces interfere in China’s uniªcation,”
then China would “make every effort to safeguard the motherland’s reuniª-
cation.”82
80. American Forces Press Service, March 11, 1996; Department of Defense news brieªngs, March
12, 14, and 16, 1996; Department of State daily press brieªng, March 11, 1996; and author inter-
views with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and other administration ofªcials. Although
the Nimitz was ordered to proceed to waters near Taiwan, it was also ordered to sail at a deliberate
pace, never reaching the vicinity of Taiwan, but coming close to the Philippines. Author interview
with U.S. ofªcial. Note also that Chinese leaders were aware of the deliberate pace of the Nimitz.
Author interview with Chinese policy analysts.
81. Central People’s Radio, March 12, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-50; and Xinhua, March 8, 1996, in
FBIS–China, 96-47. See also He Chong, “Amassing U.S. Warships Is an Act of Playing with Fire,”
Zhongguo Tongxun She, March 13, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 14, 1996, p. 3.
82. Agence France-Press, March 12, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-50; Central News Agency, March 13,
1996, in FBIS–China, 96-50; China Broadcasting Corporation (Taipei), March 15, 1996, in FBIS–
China, March 15, 1996, p. 92; Central News Agency, March 20, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-55; and edi-
torial departments, People’s Daily and Liberation Army Daily, “Safeguarding the Motherland’s Unity
Is the People’s Army Bound Duty,” March 15, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 18, 1996, pp. 78–79.
China apparently did not carry out two of its planned missile tests. It did not target the closure
zone of the east side of Taiwan. These tests would have been the most provocative, because ªring
missiles into this zone would have required China to send the missiles directly over Taiwan. Au-
thor interview with NSC Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger. See also Tyler, A Great Wall, p. 31,
which notes that China readied “more than a dozen missiles” for ªring. Chinese leaders did not
carry out these tests, probably because they had determined that the prior tests had accomplished
China’s political objectives and/or because the U.S. show of force had made them more cautious.
The ªnal missile test reportedly carried a dummy warhead. China Broadcasting Corporation,
March 13, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 13, 1996, p. 103.
Despite China’s succession of exercises and missile tests, the Clinton admin-
istration remained conªdent that the PLA would not attack Taiwan. Having
deployed the two carrier groups, the administration believed that its credibil-
ity was secure. Thus, with the exception of some verbal boasting about U.S. na-
val prowess, Washington did not engage in further escalation of military
signaling.83 The United States observed the remainder of China’s exercises, Tai-
wan conducted its ªrst presidential election, and neither war nor a Taiwan dec-
laration of independence was forthcoming.
The Aftermath: Assessing Coercive versus Deterrence Diplomacy
The United States and China had two very different objectives in the 1995–96
confrontation over Taiwan: China used force to achieve tangible policy gains;
the United States used force to achieve reputational gains. Because they sought
different goals, both were successful, but each also paid a price for its success.
the costs and benefits of china’s use of force

Following the confrontation, the United States exercised caution in its relations
with Taiwan. Although it did not automatically deny visas to Taiwan ofªcials,
it issued only transit visas and limited the time and activities of Taiwan leaders
in the United States. When Washington issued a transit visa for Taiwan Vice
President Lien Chan in January 1997, it insisted that he agree not to conduct
any public activities. When his spokesperson held a meeting with reporters at
the Los Angeles airport, the White House required him to cut short his visit.
When Lee Teng-hui requested a transit visa in September 1997, he was permit-
ted to transit through Hawaii, but he was told not to schedule appointments
with Hawaiian state ofªcials. China appreciated Washington’s efforts to con-
83. White House press brieªng, March 12, 1996; and author interview with NSC Director of Asian
Affairs Suettinger. Despite the lack of tension, the NSC worked with the Defense Department to
prepare a number of scenarios in which U.S. forces would engage the PLA. Regarding U.S. bra-
vado, Secretary of Defense Perry used China’s ongoing exercises to remind Beijing that the United
States had the “best damn navy in the world.” See Rupert Cornwell, “Taiwan Fans Flames in the
War of Words,” Independent (London), March 20, 1996, p. 9; and Department of State press brieªng,
March 19, 1996. See also Mann, About Face, pp. 337–338. China displayed its own bravado after the
dispatch of the carriers. See the interviews with PLA generals in Ta Kung Pao, March 13, 1996, in
FBIS–China, 96-50. Also, on March 22 the Defense Department and China reported that each had
taken the initiative in delaying a visit to the United States by Minister of Defense Chi Haotian. De-
partment of Defense news release, ref. no. 149–96; and Xinhua, March 22, 1996, in FBIS–China,
March 25, 1996, p. 3. See also Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, p. 99.
trol Taiwan’s independence activities.84 Its silence on subsequent visas for Tai-
wan ofªcials suggested satisfaction with U.S. sensitivity to Chinese interests.
Washington signaled its caution in other ways as well. When Taiwan’s leaders
traveled to Washington in late March 1996 to purchase arms, the Clinton ad-
ministration would not agree to the sales. Later, in mid-1997, during his Senate
conªrmation hearings, Stanley Roth, the Clinton administration’s nominee for
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Paciªc affairs, acknowledged
that the 1995 decision to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa was a “serious mistake.”85
Most important, China made gains in inºuencing U.S. policy toward Tai-
wan’s status in world affairs and in bilateral U.S.-China relations.86 As dis-
cussed, prior to March 1996, the Clinton administration had followed the
practice of U.S. presidents since Richard Nixon by making only conªdential as-
surances regarding U.S. opposition to Taiwan independence. It refused to
change its declaratory policy on Taiwan’s role in international politics, and in-
sisted that negotiations over Taiwan be removed from the agenda of U.S.-
China summits. The administration had also been reluctant to exchange state
visits between U.S. and Chinese leaders.
Following the March 1996 confrontation, there was widespread recognition
in the administration that the U.S.-China relationship had been damaged and
needed to be repaired. Secretary of State Christopher’s May 1996 speech on
China policy reºected the administration’s ªrst effort to place the U.S.-China
relationship and the Taiwan issue within a larger, comprehensive strategic
framework. In addition, State Department ofªcials now believed that a state-
level U.S.-China summit could help to put the relationship on the right track.
In July 1996, during his visit to Beijing, NSC Adviser Lake suggested that the
two countries exchange summits. Then, in a November 1996 meeting in Ma-
nila, Clinton and Jiang agreed to exchange state visits in 1997 and 1998.87
84. Interview with Richard Bush, director, American Institute in Taiwan; Central News Agency,
January 15, 1996, in FBIS–China, 97-011; Central News Agency, January 8, 1996, in FBIS–China, 97-
06; and Keith B. Richburg, “Taiwan Again an Issue in U.S.-China Relations,” Washington Post, July
27, 1997, p. A24. China’s appreciation of U.S. management of Taiwan’s transit visas is reºected in
He Jixiong, “Lee Teng-hui’s ‘Transit Diplomacy’ Can Hardly Succeed,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, Sep-
tember 4, 1997, in FBIS–China, 97-248. China’s protest of the Lien transit visa is reported in Agence
France-Presse, January 7, 1997, in FBIS–China, 97-04.
85. Lien-Ho Pao, March 27, 1996, in FBIS–China, April 11, 1996, pp. 88–89. On Roth’s statement, see
his nomination hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, July 27,
1997.
86. This is the consensus among Chinese policy analysts. See, for example, Zhu, Zhong Mei Guanxi
de Fazhan ji qi Qushi, pp. 195–196; and Tang, Zhong Mei Qiju zhong de Taiwan Wenti, pp. 447–448.
87. Author interviews with Undersecretary of State Tarnoff, Assistant Secretary of State Lord, NSC
Director of Asian Affairs Suettinger and other administration ofªcials. See Warren Christopher,
Although pleased with the U.S. initiatives, China remained concerned about
the Taiwan issue. From November 1996 until the Washington summit in Octo-
ber 1997, China publicly pressed the United States to strengthen its opposition
to Taiwan independence. In a June 1997 meeting with Secretary of State Mad-
eleine Albright to plan for the summit, Foreign Minister Qian insisted that Tai-
wan was the most important and sensitive issue in the U.S.-China relationship.
In August he repeated this position to National Security Adviser Samuel
Berger and warned that the issue had the potential to set back U.S.-China rela-
tions.88
In contrast to the October 1995 negotiations over the Clinton-Jiang meeting
in New York, in 1997 not only did the Clinton administration not insist that
China drop its demands on U.S. Taiwan policy as a precondition of a summit
meeting, but it also made a concession: Clinton assured Jiang that the United
States did not support a two-China policy, Taiwan independence, or Taiwan
membership in the UN or in other international organizations requiring sover-
eignty for membership. White House and State Department ofªcials, including
Secretary of State Albright, then publicly reafªrmed these assurances. Al-
though China was unable to get the United States to agree to include Clinton’s
assurances in an ofªcial summit statement, this was nonetheless the ªrst time
that the U.S. government publicly and explicitly stated that it did not support
Taiwan independence. For its part, the administration made important gains
on arms proliferation, human rights, and other issues, but in a clear break with
the past, it had negotiated and compromised on the Taiwan issue.89
Taiwan remained on the negotiating agenda during the preparations for
President Clinton’s 1998 visit to Beijing. This time China wanted Clinton to
make a public announcement in China of U.S. policy toward Taiwan inde-
pendence. China’s concessions included allowing the president to deliver an
“American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship,” speech presented to the Asia Society, the
Council on Foreign Relations, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, May 17, 1996.
Zhongguo Tongxun She, July 8, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-133; and Central People’s Radio, June 8,
1996, in FBIS–China, July 9, 1996, pp. 6. On the Clinton-Jiang meeting in Manila, see Xinhua, No-
vember 24, 1996, in FBIS–China, 96-228.
88. Xinhua, June 30, 1997, in FBIS–China, 97–181; and Xinhua, August 12, 1997, in FBIS–China, 97-
224.
89. Background press brieªng by senior administration ofªcials, the White House, October 29,
1997; Department of State daily press brieªng, October 31, 1997; and author interview with an ad-
ministration ofªcial. Albright made her statement in her press conference at the Beijing Interna-
tional Club Hotel, April 30, 1998. Note that the president’s August 1995 letter to Jiang Zemin stated
that Washington “opposed” independence for Taiwan. By the time of the 1997 summit, the admin-
istration had shifted to “does not support” independence for Taiwan. See Mann, About Face,
pp. 330, 355–358.
unedited speech on Chinese television and agreeing to a nuclear nontargeting

pact. In return, the president attended an open forum in Shanghai in which he
said that the United States did not support independence for Taiwan.90 The
summit did not produce a written U.S. statement on Taiwan or a fourth com-
muniqué, or require change in U.S. behavior—and the president’s statement of
the “three no’s” contained nothing new regarding actual U.S. policy toward
Taiwan. Yet this was the ªrst time that a U.S. president had publicly stated that
the United States did not support Taiwan independence. In the aftermath of
China’s coercive diplomacy, the Taiwan issue had become an undisputed ele-
ment in U.S.-China summit negotiations.
China was only partly successful regarding Taiwan. On the one hand, the
DPP had fared poorly in the March 1996 presidential election and subse-
quently adopted a cautious mainland policy to increase its appeal to voters.91
In addition, immediately after the elections, Taiwan postponed plans for live-
ªre military exercises based on Mazu, an offshore island close to the mainland,
and Lee Teng-hui indicated that he would limit his travel abroad. Having just
been elected president, Lee explained that a “full agenda” would preclude any
overseas visits for some time and that he had no plans to visit the United
States. His foreign minister explained that Lee would only make trips that did
not create trouble and that he did not want “to bring damage” to Taiwan.92
On the other hand, Lee had won a signiªcant presidential victory, capturing
52 percent of the popular vote.93 Moreover, it was clear that Lee’s postelection
caution was only a tactical response to the U.S.-China confrontation and Chi-
nese pressure. He soon restarted Taiwan’s efforts to gain admittance to the UN,
while his subordinates resumed transit diplomacy. In 1999 Lee sought a transit
90. See the president’s remarks at the Shanghai Library, the White House, Ofªce of the Press Secre-
tary (Shanghai, People’s Republic of China, June 30, 1998); and author interview with NSC Direc-
tor of Asian Affairs Suettinger.
91. For a discussion of the outcome of the 1996 presidential election and shifting party policies on
independence, see Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, pp. 175–177; and Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwanese Elections
and Cross-Strait Relations: Mainland Policy in Flux,” Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July–August
1990), pp. 565–587.
92. “Taiwan Postpones Wargames off China,” New York Times, April 3, 1996, p. A9; Central News
Agency, April 3, 1996, in FBIS–China, April 3, 1996, p. 85; Central News Agency, March 28, 1996, in
FBIS–China, March 28, 1996, pp. 92–93; and Agence France-Presse, March 19, 1996, in FBIS–China,
March 19, 1996, p. 96. See also the text of Lee’s interview with Newsweek magazine, in Central
News Agency, May 13, 1996, in FBIS–China, May 14, 1996, pp. 70–71.
93. Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, pp. 175–177. Note that the outcome of the elections was likely
inºuenced by the deployment of the two carriers, an implicit signal of U.S. support for Lee Teng-
hui. This is a widespread view in China. See Wang Jisi, “Dui Hua Zhengce” [Policy toward China],
in Wang, ed., Gaochu Busheng Han: Lengzhang hou Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue he Shijie Diwei [Lonely at
the top: post–cold war U.S. global strategy and status] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chuban She, 1999),
p. 263.
visa from the United States. Then in July of that year, just before an important
meeting in the cross-strait dialogue, he provocatively described the mainland-
Taiwan relationship as a “special state-to-state relationship.” His aides ex-
plained that: the state-to-state formulation had been under discussion for more
than a year, Taiwan could no longer adhere to the one-China formula, and the
reformulation signaled Taiwan’s new status in its relationship with the main-
land. Outraged by Lee’s actions, Beijing canceled the upcoming meeting be-
tween senior leaders Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu, conducted extensive
military exercises in Fujian, and repeatedly sent its military aircraft over the
midline of the Taiwan Strait.94
China’s new relationship with the United States paid off, however. Con-
cerned that Lee’s statement could lead to renewed tension, Washington pres-
sured him to modify his policy. In addition, the State Department indicated
that it held Lee responsible for the suspended mainland-Taiwan dialogue and
that it expected Taiwan to make the necessary clariªcation to allow the dia-
logue to resume. Immediately following Lee’s announcement, President
Clinton called Jiang Zemin to reassure him that the administration remained
committed to the one-China policy, effectively aligning the United States with
China in opposition to Taiwan’s policy. The president also declared that he had
postponed an arms sales mission to Taiwan by Defense Department ofªcials to
avoid exacerbating the situation. When Clinton met with Jiang in New Zea-
land in September 1999, he cautioned China not to use military force against
Taiwan, but he also used the occasion to reassert U.S. support for its one-China
policy and to say that Lee’s statement “had made things more difªcult for both
China and the United States.”95
China’s successful coercive diplomacy came at a price, however. Its missile
tests increased concern about Chinese power in Southeast Asia. After the
March 1996 confrontation, the region was forced to intensify its focus on “the
rise of China” and its implications for regional stability. Surprisingly, however,
this was a short-lived phenomenon. Some countries in Southeast Asia held
94. “Taiwan Foreign Minister Vows No Halt to UN Push,” Reuters, June 10, 1996; Central News
Agency, July 14, 1999, and Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, July 14, 1999, in FBIS–China, 1999-714; and Lien-Ho
Pao, July 13, 1999, in FBIS–China, 1999-715. On the exercises, see Agence France-Presse, August 5,
1999, in FBIS–China, 1999-805; Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, in FBIS–China, 1999-910; and Wen
Wei Po, September 11, 1999, in FBIS–China, 1999-912. See also Department of State daily press
brieªng, August 3, 1999.
95. Department of State daily press brieªngs, July 13 and 14, 1999; testimony of Deputy Secretary
of State Susan Shirk before the House International Relations Committee, Asia and Paciªc Sub-
committee, September 15, 1999; Philip Shenon, “U.S. Cancels Military Aides’ Visit to Taiwan,” New
York Times, July 22, 1999, p. A8; and David E. Sanger, “Clinton and Jiang Heal Rift and Set New
Trade Course,” New York Times, September 12, 1999, p. A1.
Taiwan’s diplomacy responsible for China’s missile tests and for the ensuing
regional tension. In addition, Beijing’s currency policy following the onset of
the Asian ªnancial crisis in late 1997 earned widespread praise for China’s re-
sponsible use of its ªnancial power. Since then, although the region remains
concerned about Chinese power in the evolving regional order, China’s reputa-
tion is no worse than it was before the March confrontation.96
China incurred a greater cost in its relationship with the United States. The
confrontation exacerbated controversy in the United States over U.S. policy to-
ward China and Taiwan and gave Taiwan’s supporters a greater voice in U.S.
policy debates. Having learned a lesson from China’s reaction to Lee’s visit to
Cornell, members of Congress have become more reluctant to force the presi-
dent’s hand on potentially provocative issues. They have grown increasingly
eager, however, to use the United States’ China policy to score political points
with the American electorate and weaken the White House. This has made it
more difªcult for the president to develop cooperative policies toward China
and to manage the U.S. arms sales relationship with Taiwan.
The 1996 confrontation focused the Pentagon’s attention on the U.S.-China
conºict over Taiwan as the most likely source of U.S. involvement in a major
war. Since then, planning for war with China has become a Pentagon priority,
with implications for budgets and weapons acquisition. Pentagon and con-
gressional interest in theater missile defense, including cooperation with Tai-
wan on this system, has to a signiªcant degree been a reaction to China’s
March 1996 missile tests. In addition, during the confrontation, the Pentagon
became alarmed at how little communication existed between Taiwan and
American defense ofªcials. Since then, it has sought greater coordination be-
tween the two militaries in preparation for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in a war
with China, with implications for U.S.-Taiwan military relations and for
China’s effort to isolate Taiwan.97
96. See Yuen Foong Khong, “Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement,” and
Amitav Acharya, “Containment, Engagement, or Counter-Dominance,” in Alastair Iain Johnston
and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York:
Routledge, 1999), pp. 124–125, 138, 145; and Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Toward
Deeper Engagement,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 124–127.
97. For a discussion of U.S. missile defense cooperation with Taiwan, see Thomas J. Christensen,
“Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 79–90; and
Michael O’Hanlon. “Star Wars Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/ December
1999), p. 77. See also Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense
Architecture Options for the Asia-Paciªc Region,” May 4, 1999. For a discussion of the implications
of the March confrontation for U.S.-Taiwan military relations, see Steven M. Goldstein and Randall
Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,”
China Quarterly (forthcoming).
Chinese leaders acknowledge the costs of their coercive diplomacy. But they
believe that if they had adopted less provocative policies, they would have
failed to get Washington’s attention, independence sentiments in Taiwan
would have remained high, and U.S. policy would have continued to encour-
age Taiwan independence. Shortly after the confrontation, Premier Li Peng
gloated that Americans in and out of government “have come to realize the
importance of China.” He observed that this is “progress because before they
miscalculated the situation. They thought that . . . China was no longer impor-
tant. . . . But facts have negated these ideas.” Chinese leaders accept the costs of
coercive diplomacy as the necessary trade-off for the gains they made in
inºuencing U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the resulting caution among the
Taiwan electorate.98
Chinese threats made the people of Taiwan less likely than ever to consider
uniªcation. The New Party has become irrelevant in Taiwan politics, and the
victory of Chen Shui-bian (the DPP candidate in the 2000 presidential election)
suggests Taiwan’s growing resentment at mainland threats. Greater threat per-
ception has also encouraged Taiwan to develop its political and military rela-
tionship with the United States. Thus China’s ability to expand mainland-
Taiwan economic relations and to develop the cross-strait dialogue on the basis
of the one-China principle has been more difªcult since March 1996. China,
however, never predicated its Taiwan policy on the assumption that diplomacy
could win the affection of the people of Taiwan or persuade Taiwan to reduce
its ties with the United States. Rather, China expects that economic cooperation
will make Taiwan increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy, deterrence
will prevent independence in the short term, and diplomacy will help main-
tain stability over the long term (during which time Taiwan would be absorbed
into the mainland). Hence, from China’s perspective, coercive diplomacy did
not hurt the prospects of uniªcation, but it did reduce the momentum toward
independence.
the costs and benefits of the united states’ use of force

The United States beneªted from its deterrence diplomacy. It maintained its
reputation for resisting Chinese use of force against Taiwan and buttressed the
conªdence of its allies that it was prepared to use force to ensure regional sta-
bility. Many Chinese leaders were surprised by the U.S. deployment of the two
carrier groups, underscoring their miscalculation of U.S. resolve to resist Chi-
98. Author interview with Chinese policy analysts. Li Peng’s comments are in the Financial Times,
June 11, 1996, in FBIS–China, June 11, 1996, pp. 1–2.
nese use of force. This miscalculation affected not only U.S.-China relations,
but also the outcome of the Taiwan presidential election. The U.S. response off-
set any impact China’s use of force might have otherwise had on Beijing’s ef-
fort to curb Taiwan’s independence movement. Following the confrontation,
uncertainty in China over U.S. intentions signiªcantly diminished. Chinese
policymakers must now assume that regardless of the source of a future crisis,
including a formal Taiwan declaration of sovereign independence, the United
States will almost certainly intervene militarily against Chinese use of force.99
Greater Chinese certainty regarding U.S. intervention has injected an ele-
ment of uncertainty into China’s Taiwan policy. Now that the costs for China
of military retaliation against Taiwan independence are better understood—
military conºict with the United States and thus derailment of China’s eco-
nomic modernization program and reduced ability to manage its complex and
troubling societal issues—Beijing has begun to more carefully consider retalia-
tory measures that would reduce the likelihood of U.S. intervention. A few
well-informed Chinese even question China’s commitment to retaliate mili-
tarily against Taiwan independence and suggest less costly options, including
the political use of force.100 Although all Chinese recognize that the alterna-
tives to military retaliation are fraught with danger—including negative conse-
quences for Chinese strategic credibility in Asia and for the government’s
domestic legitimacy—the fact that even a quiet and limited discussion exists
underscores the success of U.S. use of force to support its deterrence posture.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, regional uncertainty over the U.S. role in
Asia and concern over the “rise of China” have increased considerably. To-
gether, they challenged the United States’ commitment to defend its regional
strategic partners. The United States’ show of force in March 1996 bolstered its
99. Shi Yinhong, “Kunnan yu Xuance: Dui Taiwan Wenti de Sikao” [Difªculty and choice:
thoughts on the Taiwan issue], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 5 (1999), pp. 3–
4; Ye Zicheng, “Zhang yu He, Jiaogei Taiwan Dangju Xuan [War and peace, give the choice to the
Taiwan authorities], Huanqui Shibao [Global times] (published weekly by the People’s Daily),
October 22, 1999, p. 14; and author interviews with Chinese policy analysts. Regarding the out-
come of the election, this is the suggestion of Wang, “Dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 263. This analysis is
challenged by reports that China’s deployment of its strategic and attack submarines on March 13
compelled the United States to redeploy the carrier Independence an additional 100 miles from the
Chinese coast. See Su Ge, Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1998), p. 750. Yet this report is at best unreliable, because it based on an uninformed
U.S. Chinese-language newspaper account. See “Zhonggong Shisi suo He Qianting Chu Hai “
[Fourteen Chinese communist nuclear submarines go to sea], Shijie Ribao [World daily] (New
York), March 19, 1996, p. 1; Su, Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti, p. 750, n. 4. U.S. ofªcials
uniformly disagree with this and similar reports.
100. This is the argument of Shi, “Kunnan yu Xuance,” p. 4; Ye, “Zhang yu He, Jiaogei Taiwan
Dangju Xuan”; and author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
strategic position in the region and increased conªdence in Washington’s com-

mitment to its Asian allies. This heightened conªdence of course reºects many
factors, including the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Nonethe-
less, the U.S. response to Chinese use of force made an important contribution
to sustaining regional conªdence in U.S. resolve.101
The costs for the United States of deterrence diplomacy mirrored China’s
costs for its coercive diplomacy. Although Washington achieved its immediate
policy objectives, U.S. policy affected perceptions of the United States among
China’s political leadership. The United States’ ability to threaten China with-
out risk angered, frustrated, and embarrassed many Chinese. U.S. deterrence
diplomacy reminded them of the humiliation they suffered under imperialist
“gunboat diplomacy” during the nineteenth century. Some Chinese policy-
makers were especially angry insofar as the United States had been assured
that China would not attack Taiwan. They therefore believed that the deploy-
ment of the aircraft carriers was not only unnecessary but was aimed at
humiliating China. The net effect of U.S. policy was to establish a consensus
among China’s urban citizens and elites that the United States is China’s
“semi-enemy.”102 Just as the United States’ reaction to China’s “missile diplo-
macy” strengthened opposition in the United States to U.S.-China cooperation,
U.S. “gunboat diplomacy” hardened Chinese attitudes toward the United
States, making it more difªcult for Chinese policymakers to cooperate with
U.S. foreign policy interests, even as they understand the imperative to avoid
U.S.-China conºict.
U.S. deterrence policy also inºuenced the PLA. Chinese leaders believe that
the deployment of the two carrier groups increased the U.S. commitment to
defend Taiwan, tying U.S. credibility to Taiwan’s security. They are now con-
vinced that mainland-Taiwan conºict will compel the United States to inter-
101. Countries throughout the region adopted a cautious attitude toward the U.S. response, lest
they alienate China on a sensitive issue in Chinese foreign policy. Their reaction reºected the com-
mon concern of allies of entrapment versus abandonment, and they chose to split the difference.
They were concerned that although an increased U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan might
enhance their security vis-à-vis China, it might also drag them into a conºict with China over Tai-
wan. See the discussion of entrapment and abandonment in Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Di-
lemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461–495. Beneath the
caution, there was evidence of general support for the U.S. response. Author interview with Secre-
tary of State Lord; transcript of the March 12, 1996, Japanese foreign ministry press conference, in
FBIS–East Asia, March 13, 1996, pp. 7–12; Nigel Holloway, “Strait Talking,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, March 21, 1996, p. 16; “Asians Laud Us Privately,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 4,
1996, p. 17; and Strategic Survey, 1995/96 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1996), pp. 178–179.
vene.103 Thus the PLA is planning for war against the United States, with
implications both for the domestic politics of China’s U.S. policy and for PLA
hardware acquisitions. China’s increased deployment of M-9 missiles in Fujian
Province and its cruise missile program reºect its understanding that missiles
may be the only weapon China can use to deter Taiwan independence, because
it is the only Chinese conventional weapon that the United States cannot de-
feat.104 China began negotiations to purchase Russian Sovremennyi destroyers
in 1996 after the confrontation. One important mission for the destroyers and
their Sunburn missiles is to give pause to the United States before deciding to
intervene in any future confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Although China’s
military modernization program might have led to such deployments anyway,
the pace, quantity, and quality of China’s deployments have been affected by
the assumption that war with Taiwan means war with the United States.105
U.S. policy has thus contributed to the development of a more capable and de-
termined Chinese adversary.
Finally, while U.S. deterrence diplomacy reduced uncertainty in Beijing over
U.S. policy toward Taiwan, it increased conªdence in Taiwan that regardless of
the source of conºict, the United States will intervene to protect it. Since 1979,
U.S. policy toward mainland-Taiwan relations had been characterized by con-
siderable ambiguity. Washington had opposed mainland use of force, but it
had also implicitly opposed provocative Taiwan diplomacy that promoted
sovereign independence. These two policies created ambiguity over how the
United States would respond to mainland use of force against a Taiwan decla-
ration of independence, which in turn promoted caution in both Beijing and
Taipei. Although Washington retains considerable leverage over Taiwan, it is
now more difªcult for the United States to persuade Taiwan to forgo
destabilizing diplomacy.
103. Shi, “Kunnan yu Xuance”; and author interviews with Chinese policy analysts.
104. Ibid. For discussions of post-March 1996 Chinese strategy and military acquisitions relevant
to the Taiwan theater, see You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 99–100;
and Tai Ming Cheung, “Chinese Military Preparations against Taiwan over the Next Ten Years,”
and Bates Gill, “Chinese Military Hardware and Technology Acquisition of Concern to Taiwan,” in
James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: National De-
fense University Press, 1997).
105. On the Sovremennyi destroyer, see Interfax, April 18, 1997, in FBIS–Central Eurasia, 97-108;
and He Chong, “China’s Purchase of Russian-Made Sovremennyi-Class Destroyer Attracts Atten-
tion,” Zhongguo Tongxun She, February 12, 2000, in FBIS–China, 2000-212. For a discussion of
China’s military modernization program and its implications for the Taiwan Strait, See Bates Gill
and Michael O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,” National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999) pp. 55–
62; and Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese Armed Forces in the Twenty-ªrst Century (Carlisle, Pa.: Strate-
gic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999).
The beneªts of Washington’s policy outweighed the costs, however. The

United States increased both Chinese caution and regional conªdence in its
presence in Asia. On the other hand, the costs of inaction could have been very
high, including greater Chinese militancy against Taiwan and less cooperation
from the United States’ Asian security partners. At stake was the post–Cold
War regional security order. Administration ofªcials also believed that the de-
ployment of the two carrier groups was the minimum display of force that
would have succeeded in demonstrating U.S. resolve. Just as China had to use
missile tests to get the attention of U.S. leaders, Washington’s response had to
get the attention of Chinese leaders as well as leaders throughout Asia. In the
context of China’s 1996 coercive diplomacy, U.S. deterrence diplomacy was
necessary and justiªed the costs.
Conclusion: The Lessons of 1995–96
U.S. policy drift in the Clinton administration and the March 1996 U.S.-China
confrontation reºected White House susceptibility to congressional pressure,
which in turn reºected Taiwan lobbying on behalf of its independence diplo-
macy. Administration policymakers understood that U.S. interests lay in the
rejection of a visa for Lee Teng-hui, and they resisted further change in U.S.
policy toward Taiwan, but they were unable to sway the president’s thinking.
Following the confrontation, the White House readily returned U.S. policy to
the status quo of 1994, which suggests that the intervening U.S.-China confron-
tation, including the U.S. show of force, was unnecessary and avoidable. The
missed opportunity and the resultant costs are thus all the more deplorable.
The source of instability in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations was Taiwan’s revi-
sionism and its effect on U.S. policy. After coming to power, Lee Teng-hui
sought a new international role for Taiwan that was destined to provoke the
mainland and cause U.S.-China friction. He was also determined to use
Taiwan’s relationship with the United States to further his goals. In responding
to Lee’s efforts, the Clinton administration not only deviated from its under-
standing with Beijing regarding U.S.-Taiwan relations, but also implicitly
abetted Taiwan’s attempt to move the United States toward abandoning its
one-China policy and establish for itself an independent status in international
politics.
Beijing used coercive diplomacy in an attempt to compel Taiwan to curtail
its independence activities and to accept China’s position that Taiwan is under
Chinese sovereignty. Beijing also adopted coercive diplomacy to end the trend
in President Clinton’s Taiwan policy and compel him to return to the Taiwan
policy of his predecessors. Beijing understood that domestic politics was the
source of U.S. policy change, including the 1992 F-16 sale, the 1994 Taiwan pol-
icy review, and the 1995 decision to issue a visa to Lee Teng-hui. But it was the
policy, rather than its sources, that mattered to China. The Chinese used force
to persuade the Clinton administration that appeasement of the “Taiwan
lobby” was not risk free and to compel it to incur the domestic costs of return-
ing to the status quo ante in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The 1997 and 1998
U.S.-China summits and the administration's statements on Taiwan—the
“three no’s”—reºected the changes in U.S. policy.
The 1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation further reveals how easy it can be for
the United States and China to stumble into a collision. The United States is
committed to the defense of Taiwan, but it found itself in a confrontation with
China that originated over a conºict of interest peripheral to U.S. security—the
international legal status of Taiwan. The United States and China will deal
with the Taiwan issue well into this century. If they are to avoid similar con-
frontations, Washington cannot permit American ideological support for Tai-
wan's democracy or Taiwan's democratic politics to undermine the politics of
war and peace between the United States and China.106 Nor can the United
States allow its China policy to be determined by Taiwan’s diplomacy. To
avoid policy drift, future administrations will have to make policy that is in the
interest of the United States, not Taiwan.
106. Proving a negative is difªcult, yet it is clear that the origins of the 1996 confrontation lay in
Taiwan lobbying of Congress and congressional pressure on the president. It is also important to
stress that Taiwan’s lobby did not reºect the pressure of Taiwan’s democracy, which is a constant
in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Taiwan’s electorate has been cautious regarding independence diplomacy
and the risk of war with the mainland. Lee Teng-hui was not responding to public opinion, but
rather leading it, and Chen Shui-bian had to abandon his support for independence to win the
presidency in 2000, suggesting that a confrontation over Taiwan was not inevitable. This further
suggests that Taiwan public opinion can be inºuenced by cautious U.S. policy toward Taiwan. On
DPP policy and the politics of the 2000 campaign, including public attitudes toward Taiwan inde-
pendence, see Wu, “Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations”; and Shelly Rigger, “Taiwan
Rides the Democratic Dragon,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 107–118.

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The 1995–96 Taiwan Robert S.

International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87–123

in the development of the new regional order. The confrontation continues to

From Ithaca to New York City

would be no further erosion of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, as agreed in three

china’s response to lee teng-hui’s visit to cornell

aªeld to gain greater legitimacy for himself and Taiwan independence. As a

to-surface missiles approximately 100 miles from Taiwan.22 A Chinese foreign

u.s. resistance to chinese demands

Christopher presented Qian with a conªdential letter from President Clinton

cause Taiwan’s leaders had purchased foreign weaponry, they could be

the october 1995 new york summit

From Summitry to Confrontation

defend national sovereignty and . . . safeguard the motherland’s unity.”51 They

coercion versus deterrence in the taiwan strait

wan declares ‘independence’ or if foreign forces meddle, the Chinese Govern-

71. China Radio International, March 5, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 6, 1996, p. 1.

Nonetheless, Washington had to react. China had ignored U.S. warnings,

Ignoring Washington’s warnings, China announced on March 9 that from

78. Xinhua, March 9, 1996, in FBIS–China, March 9, 1996, p. 54.

The Aftermath: Assessing Coercive versus Deterrence Diplomacy

the costs and benefits of china’s use of force

unedited speech on Chinese television and agreeing to a nuclear nontargeting

the costs and benefits of the united states’ use of force

strategic position in the region and increased conªdence in Washington’s com-

The beneªts of Washington’s policy outweighed the costs, however. The

Conclusion: The Lessons of 1995–96

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