OXFORD WORLD’S CLASSICS

ARISTOTLE

The Nicomachean Ethics

Translated by
DAVID ROSS

Revised with an Introduction and Notes by

LESLEY BROWN

1
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 BOOK I · THE HUMAN GOOD

subject of our inquiry

All human activities aim at some good: some goods subordinate to
others
1. Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 1094a
choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.* But a
certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where 5
there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the prod-
ucts to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions,
arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical
art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single 10
capacity — as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the
equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every
military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under
yet others — in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be pre-
ferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former 15
that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activ-
ities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart
from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

The science of the human good is politics

2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire
for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), 20
and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else
(for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our
desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and
the chief good.* Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great
influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at,
be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline 25
at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capaci-
ties it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authorita-
tive art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics
 4 the nicomachean ethics i.3
appears to be of this nature;* for it is this that ordains which of the
1094b sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citi-
zens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and
we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this,
e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of
5 the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and
what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include
those of the others, so that this end must be the human good. For
even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the
state seems at all events something greater and more complete
whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the
10 end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for
a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our
inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

nature of the science

We must not expect more precision than the subject-matter admits
of. The student should have reached years of discretion
3. Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.
15 Now noble and just actions, which political science investigates,
exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought
to exist only by convention, and not by nature.* But goods exhibit
a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for
before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and
others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in
20 speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the
truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which
are only for the most part true, and with premisses of the same kind,
to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore,
should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far
25 as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he
is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject
 the nicomachean ethics i.4 5
is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an 1095a
all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man
is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science;* for he is
inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions
start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to
follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because 5
the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no
difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the
defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing
each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as
to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who 10
desire and act in accordance with reason, knowledge about such
matters will be of great benefit.
These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be
expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

what is the human good?

It is generally agreed to be happiness, but there are various views as to
what happiness is. What is required at the start is an unreasoned
conviction about the facts, such as is produced by a good upbringing
4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we 15
say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for
both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say
that it is happiness,* and identify living well and faring well with
being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and 20
the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
honour; they differ, however, from one another — and often even
the same man identifies it with different things, with health when
he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignor- 25
ance, they admire those who proclaim some great thing that is
above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from
these many goods there is another which is good in itself * and
causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions
that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to
examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
 6 the nicomachean ethics i.5
30 Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was
right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘Are we
on the way from or to the first principles?’ There is a difference,
1095b as there is in a racecourse between the course from the judges to
the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with
what is evident, things are evident in two ways — some to us, some
without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things
evident to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures
about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of
5 political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the
fact is a starting-point,* and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will
not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought
up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither
has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:
10 Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

Discussion of the popular views that the good is pleasure, honour,

wealth; a fourth kind of life, that of contemplation, deferred
for future discussion
5. Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which
15 we digressed.1 To judge from the lives that men lead, most men,
and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground)
to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the rea-
son why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say,
three prominent types of life — that just mentioned, the political,
and thirdly the contemplative life.* Now the mass of mankind are
20 evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to
beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that
many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.*
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of
superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness
with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political
life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since
1 a30.
 the nicomachean ethics i.6 7
it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on 25
him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something of
one’s own and not easily taken from one. Further, men seem to
pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their merit; at
least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured,
and among those who know them, and on the ground of their vir-
tue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.
And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than hon- 30
our, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat
incomplete;* for possession of virtue seems actually compatible
with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the
greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so 1096a
no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all
costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently
treated even in the popular discussions. Third comes the contem-
plative life, which we shall consider later.1
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, 5
and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely
useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather
take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for them-
selves. But it is evident that not even these are the end; yet many
arguments have been wasted on the support of them. Let us leave 10
this subject, then.
Discussion of the philosophical view that there is a Form of good
6. We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss
thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made
an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
friends of our own.* Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better,
indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to 15
destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers
or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to
honour truth above our friends.
The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of
classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which
is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea
embracing all numbers); but the term ‘good’ is used both in the 20
category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation,
1 1177a12–1178a8, 1178a22–1179a32.
 8 the nicomachean ethics i.6
and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the
relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being); so
that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods.
Further, since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’* (for it is predi-
25 cated both in the category of substance, as of god and of reason, and
in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is
moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the
right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the
like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases
and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the
categories, but in one only. Further, since of the things answering
30 to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science
of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the
things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for oppor-
tunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine,
and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by
the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what
in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself ’, if (as is the case) in ‘man
35 himself ’ and in a particular man the account of man is one and the
1096b same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ;
and if this is so, neither will ‘good itself ’ and particular goods, in so
far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for
being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which
5 perishes in a day.* The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible
account of the good, when they place the One in the column of
goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.*
But let us discuss these matters elsewhere;1 an objection to
what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the
Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the
goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good
10 by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce
or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are
called good by reason of these, and in a different way. Clearly, then,
goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in
themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then,
15 things good in themselves from useful things, and consider
whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea.
What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those
1 Cf. Met. 986a22–6, 1028b21–4, 1072b30–1073a3, 1091a29–b3, b13–1092a17.
 the nicomachean ethics i.6 9
that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelli-
gence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we
pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would
place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other
than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be 20
empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in
themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as some-
thing identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow
and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in
respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse.*
The good, therefore, is not something common answering to one 25
Idea.
But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
things that only chance to have the same name.* Are goods one,
then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one
good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly, as sight is in the
body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps 30
these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect
precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch
of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there
is some one good which is universally predicable of goods, or is
capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not
be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something
attainable.* Perhaps, however, someone might think it worth while 35
to have knowledge of it with a view to the goods that are attainable
and achievable; or, having this as a sort of pattern, we shall know 1097a
better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall
attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash
with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim
at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one 5
side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the
arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid
is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter
will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good
itself ’, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better 10
doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study
health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the
health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But
enough of these topics.
 10 the nicomachean ethics i.7

The good must be something final and self-sufficient. Definition of

happiness reached by considering the characteristic function of man
15 7. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it
can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different
in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then
is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is
done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture
20 a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and
pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever
else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will
be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one,
these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same
25 point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there
are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g.
wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something
else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evi-
dently something final.* Therefore, if there is only one final end,
this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the
30 most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that
which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is
never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the
things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that
other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that
which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of some-
thing else.
1097b Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this
we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else,
but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for
themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose
each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,
5 judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the
other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for
anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems
to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by
self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by
 the nicomachean ethics i.7 11
himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, 10
wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is
born for citizenship.* But some limit must be set to this; for if we
extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends’
friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question,
however, on another occasion;1 the self-sufficient we now define as 15
that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in noth-
ing; and such we think happiness to be;* and further we think it
most desirable of all things, not a thing counted as one good thing
among others* — if it were so counted it would clearly be made more
desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which
is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is
always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self- 20
sufficient, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good
seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired.
This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function
of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, 25
in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good
and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem
to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and
the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he
born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each 30
of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man
similarly has a function apart from all these?* What then can this
be? Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is
peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems 1098a
to be shared even by the horse, the ox, and every animal. There
remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason; of this,
one part has it in the sense of being obedient to reason, the other in
the sense of possessing reason and exercising thought.* And, as ‘life
of the rational element’ also has two meanings,* we must state that 5
life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the
more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an
activity of soul which follows or implies reason, and if we say ‘a so-
and-so’ and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in
kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without
1
i. 10, 11, ix. 10.
 12 the nicomachean ethics i.7
10 qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being
added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player
is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if
this is the case [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind
of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a
rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good
and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed
15 when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if
this is the case], human good turns out to be activity of soul exhib-
iting virtue,* and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and most complete.*
But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not
make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short
time, does not make a man blessed and happy.
20 Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would
seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what
has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or
partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are
25 due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also remem-
ber what has been said before,1 and not look for precision in all
things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords
with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the
inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle
30 in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is
useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort
of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the
same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may
not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the
1098b cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be
well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is a
primary thing and first principle. Now of first principles we see some
by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation,
and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try
5 to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to deter-
mine them correctly, since they have a great influence on what
follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the
whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.
1 1094b11–27.
 the nicomachean ethics i.8 13

Our definition is confirmed by current beliefs about happiness

8. But we must consider happiness in the light not only of our
conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said 10
about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false
one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three
classes,* and some are described as external, others as relating to
soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and
truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating 15
to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to
this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is
correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and
activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among
external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is 20
that the happy man lives well and fares well; for we have practically
defined happiness as a sort of living and faring well. The character-
istics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to
belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some iden-
tify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with
a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these,
accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others 25
include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have
been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent
persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one
respect, or even in most respects.
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one 30
virtue our account is in harmony;* for to virtue belongs virtuous
activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place
the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity.
For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, 1099a
as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but
the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be
acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the
most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who
compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who 5
act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul,
and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant;
 14 the nicomachean ethics i.8
e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spec-
10 tacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are
pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the
lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict
with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but
the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are
15 pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said,
the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good;
since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
20 nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly
in all other cases.* If this is so, virtuous actions must be in them-
selves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of
these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges
well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have
described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant
25 thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the
inscription at Delos —
Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But most
pleasant it is to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or
30 one — the best — of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said,1 it needs the external goods as well; for
it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper
1099b equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political
power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which
takes the lustre from happiness — good birth, goodly children,
beauty;* for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or
solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a
5 man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or
friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said,2
then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition;
for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune,
though others identify it with virtue.

1 1098b26–9. 2 ibid.
 the nicomachean ethics i.9 15
Is happiness acquired by learning or habituation, or sent by god or
by chance?
9. For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is
to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of
training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by 10
chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable
that happiness should be god-given* and most surely god-given of
all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would
perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems,
however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and 15
some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike
things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the
best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.
It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are
not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a
certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus 20
than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since
everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good
as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any
rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes.
To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a
very defective arrangement.
The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the 25
definition of happiness;* for it has been said to be a virtuous activity
of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must neces-
sarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally
co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to
agree with what we said at the outset;1 for we stated the end of
political science to be the best end, and political science spends 30
most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character,
namely, good and capable of noble acts.
It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other
of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such
activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet 1100a
capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called
happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for
them. For there is required, as we said,2 not only complete virtue
1 1094a27. 2 1098a18–20.
 16 the nicomachean ethics i.10
but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all
manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great
misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle;* and
one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly
no one calls happy.

Should no man be called happy while he lives?

10 10. Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must
we, as Solon* says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this
doctrine, is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or
is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is
an activity? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon
15 does not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man blessed,
as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter
for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead
man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them;* e.g.
20 honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children,
and in general of descendants. And this also presents a problem; for
though a man has lived blessedly until old age and has had a death
worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants — some
of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with
25 others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of
relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefin-
itely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these
changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while
it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for
30 some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.
But we must return to our first difficulty;* for perhaps by a con-
sideration of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we
must see the end and only then call a man blessed, not as being
blessed but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that
when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly
35 predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy,
1100b on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we
have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no
means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of
fortune’s wheel. For clearly if we were to follow his fortunes, we
5 should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making
the happy man out to be ‘a chameleon, and insecurely based’. Or is
 the nicomachean ethics i.10 17
this following his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life
does not depend on these, but human life, as we said,1 needs these
as well, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what deter- 10
mine happiness or the reverse.
The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For
no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities
(these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the
sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more dur- 15
able because those who are blessed spend their life most readily and
most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we
do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to
the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always,
or by preference to everything else, he will do and contemplate what
is excellent, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and 20
altogether decorously, if he is ‘truly good’ and ‘foursquare beyond
reproach’.
Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in
importance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly
do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a 25
multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life more
blessed (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to
life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good),
while if they turn out ill they crush and maim blessedness; for they
both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in 30
these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation
many great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but
through nobility and greatness of soul.
If activities are, as we said, what determines the character of life,
no blessed man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts
that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, 35
we think, bears all the chances of life becomingly and always makes 1101a
the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military
use of the army at his command, and a good shoemaker makes the
best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other
craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become 5
miserable — though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with
fortunes like those of Priam.*

1 1099a31–b7.
 18 the nicomachean ethics i.11
Nor, again, is he many-coloured and changeable; for neither will
he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misad-
10 ventures, but only by many great ones, nor, if he has had many great
misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if
at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained
many splendid successes.
Why then should we not say that he is happy who is active in
accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
15 external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete
life? Or must we add ‘and who is destined to live thus and die as befits
his life’?* Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we
claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call
20 blessed those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are
to be, fulfilled—but blessed men. So much for these questions.

Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead?

11. That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man’s friends
should not affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doc-
trine, and one opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the
events that happen are numerous and admit of all sorts of differ-
25 ence, and some come more near to us and others less so, it seems a
long — nay, an infinite — task to discuss each in detail; a general
outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man’s own mis-
adventures have a certain weight and influence on life while others
are, as it were, lighter, so too there are differences among the mis-
30 adventures of our friends taken as a whole, and it makes a difference
whether the various sufferings befall the living or the dead (much
more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed
in a tragedy or done on the stage*), this difference also must be
taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt
1101b whether the dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these
considerations, that even if anything whether good or evil pene-
trates to them, it must be something weak and negligible,* either in
itself or for them, or if not, at least it must be such in degree and
kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to take away
5 their blessedness from those who are. The good or bad fortunes of
friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of
such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy not happy nor
to produce any other change of the kind.
 the nicomachean ethics i.12 19
Virtue is praiseworthy, but happiness is above praise
12. These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider 10
whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather
among the things that are prized;* for clearly it is not to be placed
among potentialities. Everything that is praised seems to be praised
because it is of a certain kind and is related somehow to something
else; for we praise the just or brave man, and in general both the good
man and virtue itself, because of the actions and functions involved, 15
and we praise the strong man, the good runner, and so on, because he
is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good
and important. This is clear also from the praise given to the gods; it
seems absurd that the gods should be measured by our standard,* but
we do so measure them, since praise involves a reference, as we said, 20
to something else. But if praise is for things such as we have described,
clearly what applies to the best things is not praise, but something
greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do to the gods and
the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so too 25
with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but
rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.
Eudoxus* also seems to have been right in his method of advocat-
ing the supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though
a good, it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that
are praised, and that this is what god and the good are; for by refer- 30
ence to these all other things are judged. Praise is appropriate to
virtue, for as a result of virtue men tend to do noble deeds; but enco-
mia are bestowed on acts, whether of the body or of the soul. But
perhaps nicety in these matters is more proper to those who have
made a study of encomia; to us it is clear from what has been said
that happiness is among the things that are prized and perfect. It 35
seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for 1102a
the sake of this that we all do everything else,* and the first principle
and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and divine.

kinds of virtue
Division of the soul, and resultant division of virtue into intellectual
and moral
13. Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect 5
virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue;* for perhaps we shall
 20 the nicomachean ethics i.13
thus see better the nature of happiness. The true student of politics,
too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes
to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an
10 example of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the
Spartans,* and any others of the kind that there may have been.
And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit
of it will be in accordance with our original plan.* But clearly the
virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking
15 was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human
virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and
happiness also we call an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly the
student of politics must know somehow the facts about the soul, as
the man who is to heal the eyes must know about the whole body
20 also; and all the more since political science is more prized and better
than medical; but even among doctors the best educated spend much
labour on acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of politics,
then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in
view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the ques-
25 tions we are discussing; for further precision would perhaps involve
more labour than our purposes require.
Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the
discussions outside our school, and we must use these; e.g. that one
element in the soul is irrational and one has reason.* Whether these
30 are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are,
or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex
and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the
present question.
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distrib-
uted, and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutri-
tion and growth;* for it is this kind of power of the soul that one
1102b must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to
full-grown creatures; this is more reasonable than to assign some
different power to them. Now the excellence of this seems to be
common to all species and not specifically human; for this part or
faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness
5 are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy
are no better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this
happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in
that respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a
 the nicomachean ethics i.13 21
small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the soul,
and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those of 10
ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the
nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human
excellence.
There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul —
one which in a sense, however, shares in reason.* For we praise the
reason of the continent man and of the incontinent, and the part of 15
their soul that has reason, since it urges them aright and towards the
best objects; but there is found in them also another natural element
beside reason, which fights against and resists it. For exactly as
paralysed limbs, when we intend to move them to the right, turn on
the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incon-
tinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we 20
see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, how-
ever, we must none the less suppose that in the soul too there is
something beside reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it
is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even 25
this seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the
continent man it obeys reason* — and presumably in the temperate
and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all
matters, with the same voice as reason.
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be twofold. For
the vegetative element in no way shares in reason, but the appeti- 30
tive and in general the desiring element* in a sense shares in it, in
so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak
of ‘taking account’ of one’s father or one’s friends, not that in which
we speak of ‘accounting’ for a mathematical property.* That the
irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle
is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and
exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a rational 1103a
principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which
has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict sense
and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does
one’s father.
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this
difference;* for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and 5
others moral, philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical
wisdom being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For in
 22 the nicomachean ethics i.13
speaking about a man’s character* we do not say that he is wise or
has understanding, but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet
we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and
10 of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.