02a Assignment 2 - Rules 1-5 - Commentary
02a Assignment 2 - Rules 1-5 - Commentary
02a Assignment 2 - Rules 1-5 - Commentary
PART II
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1
Title of the Rules. – These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court.
Section 2
In what courts applicable. – These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by
the Supreme Court.
• The 1987 Constitution provides that the Rules of Court “shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.”
Section 3
Cases governed. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal,
and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable
by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
II. Real Action and Personal Action
• Real actions are those affecting title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein, or
forcible entry and detainer actions.
• Personal actions are those founded on privity of contract or for the enforcement or resolution of a
contract, or for recovery of personal property.
Here, the property involved may be real or personal. An action to resolve a contract of sale of land
is in personam and not quasi in rem.
Examples:
1. Action for collection of sum of money and damages;
2. Action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry;
3. Acton for specific performance; and
4. Action to enforce a foreign judgment in a complaint for a breach of contract.
• In Rem – actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole
world. The phrase “against the thing,” to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the “thing”
that is a party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem
actions.
Examples:
1. Petitions directed against the “thing” itself or the res which concerns the status of a person, like
a petition for adoption;
2. Correction of entries in the birth certificate;
3. Annulment of marriage;
4. Declaration of nullity of marriage;
5. Petition to estanblish illegitimate filiation;
6. Registration of land under the Torrens system; and
7. Forfeiture proceedings.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• Quasi In Rem – a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests in
the property to the obligation or loan burdening the property. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendants. But, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive
only between the parties.
Examples:
1. Suits to quiet title;
2. Actions to foreclosure; and
3. Attachment proceedings.
IV. Distinction
• In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the
parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or
liability upon a person.
• In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
• Stated simply, actions in personam are those actions brought against a person on the basis of his
personal liability; actions in rem are actions against the thing itself instead of against the person.
Action quasi in rem are those where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his or her interest in the property to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.
Section 4
In what cases not applicable. – These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
• The 1987 Constitution provides that “rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.”
Section 5
Commencement of action. – A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in a court.
If an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him
on the date of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if
necessary, is denied by the court.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Commencement of Civil Action
• The commencement of the action interrupts the period of prescription as to all the other parties to
the action.
• The former rule did not provide for the commencement of the action with respect to an additional
defendant who is joined after the filing of the original complaint.
• The present rule provides that it is the date of the filing of the amended complaint joining the
additional defendant which is the date of the commencement of the action with regard to such
additional defendant.
• It is only in cases where the amended complaint is filed after the answer to the original complaint
has been served on the plaintiff that a motion for the admission of such complaint is necessary. In
cases where the amended complaint is attached to the motion for its admission, the date of filing
thereof is the date of the commencement of the action with regard to the additional defendant,
irrespective of the action of the court on the motion.
• This provision is modified by decisions of the SC on the necessity of payment of the docket fees
upon the filing of the original complaint.
• Manchester Corporation v Court of Appeals laid down the stringent rule that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. Payment of docket
fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amendment pleading.
• Subsequently, Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v Asuncion modified the Manchester ruling such that the
guidelines on payment of docket fees are as follows:
1. The amount of damages prayed for should be specified not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment and payment of
the docket fee.
2. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or the appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action.
3. Without the payment of the correct docket fee, no original complaint or similar pleading is
considered filed. Hence, there can be no amendment of such complaint or similar pleading, nor
can there be payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the pleading that
would vest jurisdiction in the court.
4. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescription or reglementary period.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
This gives rise to the conclusion that if the complete amount of the docket fee is not paid, the
prescriptive period continues to run as the complaint is deemed not filed.
5. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims, and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
6. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, such damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading, or if specified, the same has been left to the determination of the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
• To reconcile the seemingly contradictory rulings of Manchester and Sun Insurance, the SC
explained that the strict set of guidelines in Manchester was prompted by the fraudulent intent of
the counsel in the said case to avoid payment of the required docket fee. The rule on payment of
docket fees was relaxed in the Sun Insurance case because private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Subsequent
decisions uniformly hold that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule will not apply.
Section 6
Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
• The 1987 Constitution provides that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
I. Fundamental Principles
1. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys another. It is, rather, a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing
aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for
defect or form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
2. The new rules are really simple and liberal and the purpose which they seek to accomplish is to
eliminate technical matters by removing the basis for technical objections, to make it as difficult as
impossible, for cases to go off on procedural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive, as
practicable and as convenient, as can be done.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
3. Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when they do not involve
public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have
not prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the courts of its authority. Conceived in
the best traditions of practical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of Court frown
upon hair-splitting technicalities that do not square with their liberal tendency and with the ends of
justice unless something in the nature of the factors just stated intervenes. This should be the
case especially where, as here, the omission or fault complained of could have been prevented by
the petitioners if they had adopted the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions.
4. Liberality of the construction of the Rules should not however be subordinate to gross mistake and
negligence and equity should not be allowed to interfere where there has been laches in the
prosecution of rights.
5. Those indispensable ingredients of due process or fundamental fairness were not expendable and
could not be sacrificed on the altar of expediency on the pretext that a pragmatic approach and a
speedy administration of justice demand that technicalities should be jettisoned and that
procedural shortcuts be tolerated.
• Procedural requirements, which have often been disparagingly labelled as mere technicalities,
have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them
aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
• Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rues, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.
• Nor should the rules of procedure be held to be for the benefit of only one side of the litigation, for
they have been instituted for the sake of all.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
CIVIL ACTIONS
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS
RULE 2
CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 1
Ordinary civil actions, basis of. – Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2
Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.
I. Cause of Action
• Section 2 defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. In order that one may claim to have a cause of action, the following elements must
concur:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
• In other words, a cause of action arises when that should have been done is not done, or that
which should not have been done is done.
• The term cause of action has been held to be synonymous with right of action but in the law of
pleading one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a remedial right belonging to
a person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such
remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is
a matter of statement and is governed by the laws of procedure.
Section 3
One suit for a single cause of action. – A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action.
Section 4
Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Concept and Purpose of the Rule
• For a single cause of action or violation of right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is
the filing of the separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting of the cause
of action prohibited by the rule. Thus, a party seeking to enforce a claim must present to the court,
by the pleadings or proofs or both, all the grounds upon which he expects a judgment in his favor.
He is not at liberty to split up his demands and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion
of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second
suit if the first fails. The whole cause must be presented in one action.
• The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation
between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. It comes
from that old maxim nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed
for one and the same cause).
• The rule applies not only to complaints but also to counterclaims and cross-claims. If two or more
complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be
pleaded in abatement of the other or others. This may be set up either by means of:
1. A motion to dismiss; or
2. An affirmative defense on the ground of pendency of another action between the same parties
for the same cause or bar by prior judgment.
• As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or
nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the
two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action: otherwise, it is not.
• The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action for all
that is due him and which must be sued in one action, or has a severable demand for which he
maintains separate suits, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or
contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts.
• Entirely distinct and separate contracts give rise to separate causes of action for which separate
actions may be instituted and presented. On the other hand, where several claims payable at
different times arise out of the same transactions, separate actions may be brought as each
liability accounts. But where no action is brought until more than one is due, all that are due must
be included in one action; and that if an action is brought to recover upon one or more that are
due but not upon all that are due, a recovery in such action will be a bar to severai or other actions
brought to recover one or more claims of the other claims that were due at the time the first action
was brought.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• In the absence of special and controlling circumstances, an open or continuous running account
between the same parties constitute a single and indivisible demand, the aggregate of all the
items of the account constituting the amount due. The rule is otherwise if it affirmatively appears
that the parties regarded the different items of the account as separate transactions and not parts
of an ordinary running account.
• As a general rule, a contract to do several things at several times is divisible, and a judgment for a
single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach. But where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action in which plaintiff must recover
all damages.
• A claim for damages for a breach of a continuing contract, as when a defendant terminates a
continuing contract by absolute refusal to perform in bad faith, is an indivisible demand and where
a final judgment was rendered in a former case, it is a bar to any damages which the plaintiff may
thereafter sustain. In an indivisible contract, plaintiff should prove in the first action not only such
damages as he has then actually sustained, but also such prospective damages as he may be
legally entitled to recover by reason of the breach.
Section 5
Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of actions are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
• Joinder of causes of action is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could
be the basis of a separate suit. in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under
certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one
declaration, complaint or petition. Joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or
different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, there must be a common question of fact
or law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of
actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs. The dominant idea is
to permit the joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, when there is some substantial unity
between them. While the rule allows plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have,
there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law
and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties.
II. Limitations
• This rule liberalizes the 1964 rule on the requisites of permissive joinder of causes of action by
limiting the conditions, as follows:
a. In cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
However, where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant
join in a single complaint, or where a plaintiff having separate causes of action against two or
more defendants joins them in a single complaint, the causes of action in favor of the two or
more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact.
If there are multiple parties, the joinder is made subject to the rules on joinder of parties under
Section 6, Rule 3. Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be joined in a complaint
involving multiple parties:
(1) the right to relief must arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions; and
(2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all the parties. In other words, in cases
of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the total of all the claims shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
But if the requisites of permissive joinder of parties are not present, separate actions will
have to be filed by or against the parties, and the amount demanded in each complaint
shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
2. Special civil actions or actions governed by special rules are not covered.
• The reason for the second condition is that the special civil action may be governed by a different
rule, or the action may be governed by special rules, such as summary procedure in ejectment
cases.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
3. In case of different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be made in the Regional Trial
Court, provided it has jurisdiction over one of the causes of action and the venue lies
therein.
• Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial
Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court, the action should be filed in
the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in any
of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in
the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties reside.
4. When all the causes of action are for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction.
• Under the fourth condition, the totality of the principal claims for money determines which court
has jurisdiction.
Section 6
Misjoinder of causes of action. – Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately.
• This new rule is similar to the rule on misjoinder and non-joinder of parties, except that the court
may not order the joinder of causes of action. If neither the court nor the adverse party objects to
the misjoinder of a cause of action, it will be adjudicated together with the other causes of action.
• Misioinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to
hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.
Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involves an
implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon
the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined
cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or
the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
• It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined
cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any
adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
RULE 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Section 1
Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action. The term “plaintiff” may refer to the claiming party, the counter-
claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) – party plaintiff. The term “defendant” may refer to
the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth,
etc.)-party defendant.
• When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a
transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known.
• A sole proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a juridical person as defined under the Civil
Code. The law does not vest it with a separate legal personality to file or defend an action in court.
The action should be filed in the name of the owner of the sole proprietorship.
II. If an association has no juridical personality, all members thereof must be made parties.
Exceptions.
• In the case of an association of natural persons not legally organized as a juridical entity, each
and every one of the members thereof must be made parties. The only exceptions are when –
1. The persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties, in which case, a
number of them may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
2. Two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction,
they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known.
• It follows that an association or organization without juridical personality has no capacity to sue.
• A suit is against the State in the following instances; hence, suability depends on whether the
State has consented to be sued.
1. When the suit is against the Republic of the Philippines eo nominee (by that name).
2. When the suit is against a government office or agency without juridical personality.
• A suit against a government office or agency that is created by an executive order and operates
directly under the control and supervision of a department of government, if it were to produce any
effect, would in practice be an action or proceeding against the government itself. In reality, it is
the government which renders and performs the activities in question, through the said office or
agency. Not being incorporated and not having a juridical personality of its own, any award, order
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
or decision against said government office or agency, if attempted to be executed, would
necessarily operate against the government.
3. A suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency's
performance of governmental function.
4. When the suit against the officers and agents of government will involve financial liability of the
government.
• Where a judgment in a suit by a private citizen against the officers and agents of the government
claiming title over and right of possession of a certain property, would result not only in the
recovery of possession of the property in favor of the said citizen but also in a charge against or
financial liability to the government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the
government itself.
• The lack of jurisdiction of the courts becomes more obvious if the suit of the citizen is against a
foreign government that has not given its consent.
• When a government entity is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive
prerogative of the State, may be undertaken by private concerns.
2. When the State enters into a business operation, unless it does so only as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function.
• The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from
suit extended to such government entity.
3. When the State sues a private party, unless the suit is entered into only to resist a claim.
• Where the government ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, its failure to institute the
necessary condemnation proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the collection
of the just compensation due. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Thus, when the government takes any
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
• Similarly, the failure of the government to abide by the conditions under which a donation was
granted to it, should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action. The consent of the
government is likewise presumed on grounds of equity.
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private
or non-government capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for
public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state.
The latter is true, although the state may own the stock or property of such corporation, for by
engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its
sovereign character, and by implication, consents to suits against the corporation.
Section 2
Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defendant in the name of the real party in interest.
• This provision has two requirements: (1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party-
in-interest; and (2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. Interest
within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as the plaintiff in an action.
• The interest of the party must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest means present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
• The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at
law are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in
the case; (b) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain
bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Who are Real Parties in Interest
• When a chose, capable of legal assignment, is assigned absolutely to one, but the assignment is
made for the purpose of collection, the legal title thereto vests in the assignee, and it is no concern
of the debtor that the equitable title is in another, and payment to the assignee discharges the
debtor.
B. A Corporation Sole
• The corporation sole, the Roman Catholic Bishop of a diocese, in which temporalities of the
Roman Catholic Church are situated, is the administrator of such temporalities and the parish
priests, as such, have no control thereover.
A. An Attorney-in-Fact
• An action upon a cause of action pertaining to his principal cannot be brought by an attorney-in-
fact in his name. A judgment for or against the attorney-in-fact, personally or as the attorney-in-
fact, in no way binds or affects the principal. It does nothing. It touches no interest, settles no
question, binds no party, quiets no litigation.
• Also, a complaint for partition filed by an attorney-in-fact of the true interested party is defective.
No adjudication can, therefore, be made in such partition case without including the real party in
interest, the one claiming to be entitled to the partition of the property.
• Similarly, the making of an attorney-in-fact of a company a party defendant, does not make the
company a party defendant. The judgment obtained in such case does not bind the company.
• A resident agent of a foreign insurance company doing business in the Philippines is not liable, as
principal or agent, on insurance contracts issued in the name of the company. There was no
contract, oral or written, between the agent and the insured. It was the insurance company, acting
through the agent, that entered into a contract with the insured.
• A person who has transacted business with an agent acting in the name of and for the account of
his principal, has a right of action against such principal, notwithstanding the latter's denial of the
agent's commission or authority, and should be permitted to prove that commission or authority of
the agent to transact the business in question.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
C. The General Manager of a Bank
• No cause of action for damages exists against the manager of a bank for forcing an employee to
resign where the former, in doing so, acted as manager or head of the establishment and there is
no allegation that he exceeds his powers as manager or that his actuation is repudiated by his
principal, the employer. Such claim should be directed against his principal, the employer - not
against the manager personally.
• Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In
private suits, Section 2. Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." who is "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit." Succinctly put, a party’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
• Locus stand or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
• Notwithstanding, the Court has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a government act, when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest. The rule on locus stand is, after all, a procedural technicality which
the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional
plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act.
Section 3
Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
• A public interest suit may be brought provided the class benefited by it is included in the title of the
case. A party for whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another
may sue or be sued, provided the person benefited by the contract is joined.
• There is nothing in Section 3, Rule 3 that expressly allows, much less implies that, an action may
be filed in the city or municipality where either a representative or an attorney-in-fact of a real party
in interest resides. It merely provides that the name or names of the person or persons being
represented must be included in the title of the case and such person or persons shall be
considered the real party in interest. In other words, the principal remains the true party to the
case and not the representative.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
Section 4
Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
I. General Rule
• The general rule is that husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly inasmuch as both are co-
administrators of the community property under the system of absolute community of property, as
well as the conjugal partnership property.
II. Exception
1. A spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the
family with respect to marital, parental or property relations.
2. A spouse of age mortgages, encumbers, alienates or otherwise disposes of his or her exclusive
property.
3. The regime of separation of property governs the property relations between spouses.
Section 5
Minor or incompetent persons. – A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued,
with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
• Under the present rule, a person need not be judicially declared to be incompetent in order that
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem. It is enough that he be alleged to be incompetent.
Section 6
Permissive joinder of parties. – All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent
any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings
in which he may have no interest.
1. Right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions; and
2. Common question of law or fact in the action.
• In permissive joinder of parties, the aggregate sum of all the claims, determines the jurisdiction of
the court.
Section 7
Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Who is an Indispensable Party
• An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence without injuring or affecting that interest; a
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest
of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in
whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court
which is effective, complete, or equitable. An indispensable party is one who must be included in
an action before it may properly go forward.
• A person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or
injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not
an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those
already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not
sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid
multiple litigation.
• The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy is
to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court
on motion of the party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times
as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order
or the court that the latter may dismiss the complaint.
Section 8
Necessary party. – A necessary party is one not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.
• Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case
may go on without them because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on their rights
and interests.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Versus Necessary Party
• An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
• A necessary party is one whose interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment
which does complete justice to the parties in court.
• An indispensable party should be joined under any and all conditions, his presence being a sine
qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
• A necessary party should be joined whenever possible. His presence would merely permit
complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple
litigation.
Section 9
Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. – Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted
a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is
omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the
omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver
of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
• Under the new provisions, the failure of the pleader asserting a claim to explain to the satisfaction
of the court the non-joinder of a necessary party or to comply with the order of the court for his
inclusion, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such necessary party if jurisdiction over
his person may be obtained.
• The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action,
and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
• If a joint obligor is not impleaded because jurisdiction over his person could not be obtained, the
judgment rendered against the impleaded joint obligor will not prejudice the rights of the joint
obligor not impleaded.
Section 10
Unwilling co-plaintiff. – If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained,
he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but
who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other
court processes. Plaintiffs should not take it upon themselves to simply implead any party who
does not consent to be a plaintiff. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied
due process.
• This section does not apply to an action for partition among co-owners or co-heirs.' Section 1 of
Rule 69 provides that a complaint in an action for partition of real estate must join as defendants
all other persons interested in the property, hence, there is no need to state the reason why a co-
owner is made a defendant.
Section 11
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
• The non-joinder of an indispensable or a necessary party is not by itself ipso facto a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The court should order the joinder of such party and non-compliance with
the said order would be a ground for the dismissal of the action.
• The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The
rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the
ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any
stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.
• If the court does not order the joinder of an indispensable party, the validity of the judgment may
be questioned on appeal or certiorari.
Section 12
Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds
to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue
or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
1. The subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2. The interested persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties (instead
of "impracticable to bring them all before the court", as provided in the former rules, which could
be construed as physical impracticability); and
3. The parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can
fully protect the interests of all concerned.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• In determining the question of adequacy of representation of members of a class, the court must
consider: (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total
membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to
speak for the rest of the class. If the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class
they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.
• The suit may be brought by the class as plaintiffs or against the class as defendants.
Section 13
Alternative defendants. – Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to
relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against
one may be inconsistent with a right to relief against the other.
• An action may be brought against an agent and a principal as alternative defendants. If the
agency is proved, the principal would be liable on a contract entered into by the agent in his name
and for his account; otherwise, the agent would be liable.
Section 14
Unknown identity or name of defendant. – Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he
may be sued as the unknown owner, heir, devisee, or by such other designation as the case may
require; when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accordingly.
• Service of summons upon a defendant whose identity is unknown may be made by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation.
Section 15
Entity without juridical personality as defendant. – When two or more persons not organized as an entity
with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known.
In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said entity must
all be revealed.
• This section is not limited to a business entity as it was under the old rule.
• Two or more persons transacting as an entity without juridical personality may be sued under the
name by which they are generally or commonly known, but they cannot sue under such name.
• The service of summons may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of
them, or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained under such
name.
• The answer of such entity must reveal the names and addresses of the persons composing it, so
that the judgment rendered against them shall set out their individual or proper names.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
Section 16
Death of a party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after
such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground of disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time,
to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter
shall immediately appear for an on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
• The provision on death of a party is separated from that on incompetency or incapacity of a party
(Section 18 of this Rule) because the action may not survive in case of death, although in both
instances, it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court of such fact.
• Attorneys are agents of their clients and upon the death of the latter, the relation of attorney and
client is terminated. In the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his
deceased client, the attorney would thereafter have no further power or authority to appear or take
any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary
steps to safeguard the deceased's rights in the case.
• If the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party, it is the duty of the counsel, within thirty
(30) days after such death, to inform the court thereof and to give the name and address of the
legal representative of the deceased. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative to
appear and be substituted for the deceased within thirty (30) days from notice.
• Upon the failure of the said legal representative to appear within the specified period, the court
may order the opposing party, within a given period, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator who hail immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.
• Under the old Rules of Court, priority was given to the legal representative of the deceased, that
is, the executor or administrator of his estate, as the substitute. It is only in cases of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, that the court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• Under the present Rules, the heirs are allowed to be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. The heirs step into the shoes of the
deceased and acquire the rights of the deceased at the moment of death. Thus, the prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of the deceased's estate is not necessary for his heirs
to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.
• The death of the incompetent ward, the real party in interest, terminates the guardianship. The
guardian, if appointed as the administrator of the estate, shall be the legal representative of the
deceased and shall appear for and in behalf of the interest of the deceased in his capacity as. the
administrator, and no longer as the judicial guardian of the incompetent ward.
• The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental. In
the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental.
• Where the action is purely personal, such as that brought for support or for legal separation or
annulment of marriage, the action is abated by the death of a party Even if the action involves
changes in the property relations between spouses under Article 106 of the Civil Code, it cannot
survive the death of a spouse if it occurs prior to the decree of legal separation or marriage, the
changes being mere effects of the decree.
• The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.
The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed
to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through
his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the Rules
results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
VII. However, if there is no notice of death of party and the court has no knowledge thereof, the
proceedings are not set aside.
• The mere failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his
client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's jurisdiction over
the case subsists despite the death of the party. If the deceased litigant is protected as he
continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of
their estate, the proceedings before the trial court is not invalidated.
Section 17
Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. – When a public officer is a party in an action in his
official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may
be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor
takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any
party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made,
the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice
of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
• Under this modified provision, it is no longer necessary to aver that the law enforced by the
predecessor in office is in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines. It suffices that it is
satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need to continue or
maintain the suit against the successor and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to
adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.
• It is also emphasized that the public officer is a party in an action in his official, and not private,
capacity.
Section 18
Incompetency or incapacity. – If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion
with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person
assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem.
• In case a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the action survives and may be continued
by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian
ad item who is his legal representative.
Section 19
Transfer of interest. – In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
• The joinder of or substitution by the transferee is not mandatory under this section.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• A transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be
bound by the judgment. While it is proper to have the transferee substituted for the original party, if
such substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the right of action should not be
brought to the attention of the court, the original plaintiff, if successful in the litigation, would hold
the fruits of the action as a sort of trustee for the use and benefit of his transferee. In the same
manner, the transferee of the original defendant is bound by the judgment against the latter. In
short, a transferee pendente lite is a proper party in the case but not an indispensable party.
• The transferees pendent lite are successors-in-interest of the parties by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action and are bound by the judgment or final order.
• Unless the court upon motion directs the transferee pendente lite to be substituted, the action is
simply continued in the name of the original party. For all intents and purposes, the Rules already
consider the transferee joined or substituted in the legal proceeding, commencing at the exact
moment when the transfer of interest was perfected between original party-transferor and the
transferee pendente lite.
Section 20
Action on contractual money claims. – When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in
the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
• Under the former rule, if the defendant dies before the Court of First Instance or the Regional Trial
Court has rendered a judgment, the action is dismissed and the plaintiff is required to file a money
claim against the estate of the deceased. But if the defendant dies after the said court has
rendered a judgment and pending appeal, the action is not dismissed and the deceased
defendant is substituted by his executor or administrator or legal heirs. However, if a final
judgment is entered against the estate of the deceased, the same will have to be enforced as a
money claim without need of proving the same.
• Under this modified provision, the death of the defendant does not affect a pending action for
money, whether the death occurs while the case is pending in a Municipal Trial Court, a Regional
Trial Court or an Appellate Court. The defendant is substituted by his executor or administrator or
legal heirs and the action continues until a final judgment is entered. Once a final judgment is
entered against the estate of the deceased, it shall be enforced as a money claim without need of
proving the same.
• Under the former rule, if a writ of attachment has been issued and levied on the property of the
defendant and the defendant dies before the rendition of a judgment by the Regional Trial Court,
the action is dismissed, the writ of attachment is dissolved, and a money claim has to be filed.
Allowing the plaintiff to attach the defendant's property would give the former an undue advantage
over the other creditors against the estate.
• Under the new rule, if a writ of attachment has been issued and levied, the death of the defendant
at whatever stage of the action would not be a ground for the dismissal of the action and the
dissolution of the writ of attachment. If judgment is entered against the estate of the deceased
defendant, the same shall be enforced as a money claim, and the writ of attachment obtained by
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
the plaintiff which has not been dissolved will entitle him to preference over the other creditors
against the estate.
• If the debtor dies before an action could be filed against him, the creditor will have to file a money
claim with the probate court. But if the claim does not arise from a contract, express or implied,
such as a claim for damages for an injury to person or property arising from tort or delict, an
ordinary action may be filed against the executor or administrator.
• The probate court may hold in abeyance the closing of the proceedings on the settlement of the
estate pending determination of an ordinary action against the executor or administrator on a
matter involving the estate of the deceased.
Section 21
Indigent party. – A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the
court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his property.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by
the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
I. Indigency Tests
• In a case, the SC reconciled the apparent conflict between Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 16,
Rule 141, both provisions dealing with indigent litigants. Section 19, Rule 141 considers as an
indigent litigant one (a) whose gross income and that of his immediate family does not exceed the
amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee, and (b) does not own real property
with a fair market value of more than P300,000.00. If the applicant meets both income and
property requirements, the authority to litigate as an indigent litigant is automatically granted; the
grant is a matter of right.
• If one or both requirements are not met, the trial court, following Section 21, Rule 3, shall set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that he has "no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant. The trial court
shall then rule on the application based on the evidence adduced. The grant of authority to litigate
as an indigent litigant, however, is not a matter of right and is revocable by the trial court. At any
time before judgment, the adverse party may contest the grant of authority. If the court determines
after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property. the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of
court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the
payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court
may impose.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
Section 22
Notice to the Solicitor General. – In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the
appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through a representative duly
designated by him.
• This provision is now applicable to any court, not just to a superior court.
RULE 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1
Venue of real actions. – Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall
be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
• Real actions are those affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or
expropriation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. All other actions are personal.
• The venue of real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts-the court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved or a portion
thereof is situated.
• The real actions within the jurisdiction of municipal trial courts (or metropolitan and municipal
circuit trial courts) are forcible entry and detainer and those involving title to or possession of real
property with assessed value of not more than P 200,000.00 in Metro Manila.
• Venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions Is the court which
has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
• An action to annul a deed of sale of real property and to obtain a judicial declaration that the
plaintiff is the owner thereof is a real action.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
• An action for the annulment or rescission of the sale of land or building does not operate to efface
the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the action which is to recover said real
property, even if the plaintiff does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question. The same ruling was made in an action for rescission of a subdivision
contract.
• Although the complaint is entitled to be one for specific performance, the fact that he asked that a
deed of sale of a parcel of land be issued to him shows that the primary objective and nature of
the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to execute the conveyance requested,
there is need to make a finding on the issue of ownership. Hence, this is a real action.
• An action which prays that a certificate of title to land be declared null and void, or alternatively.
that damages from the assurance fund be awarded, must be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies. The venue is not affected by the alternative relief for
damages inasmuch as there could possibly be no recovery of damages unless the title is declared
void.
• A suit that principally seeks the recovery of a sum of money, but in the event of failure of the
defendant to voluntarily pay the amount, the foreclosure on the real estate mortgage shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
• It is a settled doctrine that when a contract of mortgage covers various parcels of land situated in
different provinces, the Regional Trial Court of any of said provinces has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for foreclosure of said mortgage, and the judgment therein rendered can
be executed in the other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
• Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the
property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action, which
should be commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
• An action to redeem by the mortgage debtor affects his title to the foreclosed property. If the action
is seasonably made, it seeks to erase from the title of the mortgage debtor the lien created by the
registration of the mortgage and the sale. If not made seasonably, it may seek to recover
ownership to the property since the purchaser's inchoate title to the property becomes
consolidated after the expiration of the redemption period. Either way. the redemption involves the
title to the foreclosed property. It is a real action.
• An action for cancellation of real mortgage is considered a real action where the defendant-
mortgagee already acquired ownership or possession of the subject property, and the
complainant-mortgagor filed the action precisely to recover it. The action affects title to or interest
in the subject property.
• The action for revival of judgment seeking to enforce the complainant's adjudged rights over a
piece of realty is a real action, as it affects complainant's interest over real property.
Section 2
Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Venue of Personal Actions
• Because of the uniform procedure rule, the venue of personal actions is also the same for regional
trial courts and municipal trial courts--the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found.
The word "principal" has been added in order to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence
of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue.
• Where the trustees sue to recover the object of the trust agreement, the principal party is the
beneficiary because the latter is the real party in interest who ultimately stands to be benefitted or
injured by the judgment in the suit. Hence, the venue of the action should be the place of
residence of the beneficiary, not the trustees.
• As clarified in an earlier ruling, the venue can be laid in the place where the defendant is found
only when the defendant has no residence in the Philippines. A defendant cannot have a
residence in one place and be "found" in another.
• In a case, the Court said that the residence was held to be not necessarily permanent in nature
• This was, however, modified in a later case. The fact that defendant was sojourning in Pasay for
the purpose of attending to his interests in Manila at the time he was served with summons, does
not make him a resident of that place for purposes of venue. The term residence was interpreted
to mean "the permanent home, the place of which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return". In short, residence was held to be synonymous with domicile.
• Subsequently, the term resides was clarified and was held to be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. The residence of corporations for purposes of venue
is the location of its principal office as stated in the articles of incorporation.
• An action to annul cancellation of award of a house and lot is a personal action, not a real action.
The action is actually one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and house in his favor
which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks to compel the
recognition that the award is valid and subsisting.
• An action for the cancellation of real estate mortgage is considered a personal action, if the
mortgagor retains ownership or possession of the mortgaged property.
• An action for the recovery of damages is purely personal, despite the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the spouse from selling certain parcels of land belonging to
the conjugal partnership.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
Section 3
Venue of actions against nonresidents. – If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or the property of said defendant
located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the
plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
• Examples of actions affecting the personal status of the plaintiff are actions for annulment of
marriage or for the recognition of a natural child. The venue in these actions is the place where the
plaintiff resides.
• If the action affects the property of the nonresident defendant located in the Philippines, the venue
is the place where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
• In proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within
the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. Therefore, in an action to foreclose a mortgage
against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication. no
personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered.
• In these cases, jurisdiction is limited to the res, namely, the personal status of the plaintiff or the
property of the defendant located in the Philippines. The judgment must be confined to the res,
and no personal judgment can be rendered against the defendant, unless he submits to the
jurisdiction of the court
• RES = personal status of plaintiff or property of defendant
• In these actions, summons may be served by extraterritorial service.
Section 4
When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
• The former rule (Sections 3 and 5, Rule 4) which provided that "when improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss it is deemed waived." has been deleted. Hence, improper venue
may be raised in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed. The court may not motu
proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
I. Jurisdiction versus Venue
• The parties are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue before the filing of
the action, as qualified by Section 4, Rule 4. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in
the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the
parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As
in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter.
• As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that
such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only preceding the designation of
venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.
• In cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written
instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be
binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of
improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written
instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and
should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue, otherwise, compliance therewith
would mean an implicit recognition of the validity of the contract.
• Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties where only one of the
causes of action arises from a contract with exclusive venue stipulation, the complaint may be
brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of
the court and the venue lies therein. The complaint, therefore, may not be dismissed for improper
venue even if the exclusive venue stipulation is not observed.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.
IV. Such stipulations are valid in contracts of adhesion.
• The condition printed in fine letters at the back of the passage tickets that all actions shall be filed
in the courts of Cebu City was held to be against public policy since it prejudiced the rights of
innumerable passengers from different parts of the country who could file suit against the shipping
company only in Cebu City.
RULE 5
UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
Section 1
Uniform procedure. – The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional
Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said
courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
• Pursuant to Rule 5, when Rule 38 of the Rules of Court declares that a party may file a petition for
relief from a judgment or final order issued by "any court" through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, the term "any court" refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial
courts. The procedure before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court. The remedy of petition for relief does not exist for
judgments of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
I. Examples of Exceptions
• If the municipal trial court dismisses a case without a trial on the merits, the regional trial court, on
appeal, may affirm or reverse the order of dismissal. In case of affirmance on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the regional trial court shall try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it, if it has jurisdiction thereover. In case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings. If the municipal trial court tries the case on the merits without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the regional trial court, on appeal, shall decide the case
accordingly, if it has original jurisdiction thereover.
• An action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is now governed entirely by the rule on summary
procedure.
Section 2
Meaning of terms. – The term “Municipal Trial Courts” as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
• The word "inferior" that formerly applied to municipal and city courts has been eliminated.
[Drafted by J. Rementilla] – While all attempts to ensure the accuracy of the reviewer are made, errors (typographical
or not) may have been possibly made. As such, discretion in the use of the reviewer is advised.