FPRC 6

FPRC Journal
No.6
Focus : India-Iran relations

Responses
1. Prakash Shah Former Ambassador of India 2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi Former Iranian Ambassador to India 3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh Editor,Iranreview.org 4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer Chairman, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism,Mumbai 5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi Rutgers University, USA
Articles
1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari 2. Dr. David J. Karl 3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori 4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant 5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad A. Khan 6 Dr.Vijay Prashad 7. Dr.Anjali Sahay 8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee 9. Dr.Farah Naaz 10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad 11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui 12. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan 13. Gauri Jain
Consul General of Islamic Rep.of Iran, Hyderabad President, Asia Strategy Initiative, Los Angeles Former Pakistan Ambassador Reader,King's College, London
Pakistan,memberWSN Foundation Int. Advisory Board
Prof.of Int.Studies,Trinity College , Hartford (CT) Gannon University,Erie, Pennsylvania BPPIMT (Kolkata, India) JMI, New Delhi
A leading researcher on Iran
Res. Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi Manipal University,Manipal ,(Karnataka) India beinformedjournal.org
(Ed.) Prof. Mahendra Gaur
Foreign Policy Research Centre

NEW DELHI (India)
FPRC Journal No. 6
India-Iran relations
CONTENTS
PREFACE Responses
(pp. 5-22)
1. Prakash Shah 2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi 3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh 4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer 5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi
Articles
1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of Sciences during the Qutb Shahi Period in Dakan (Southern India) (pp.24-50) 2. Dr. David J. Karl The Fading Iran Factor (pp.51-58) 3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori India-Iran Relations: Not Quite Ideal, Yet (pp. 59-70) 4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant The Israel Factor in India-Iran Relations (pp.71-72) 5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad Aslam Khan Triangulating India-Iran-Pakistans Balance of Equation (pp.73-85) 6. Dr.Vijay Prashad Quid Pro Quo: Indias Quest for the American Narrative (pp. 86-93) 7. Dr.Anjali Sahay At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations (pp. 94-103) 8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee India and Iran: Can SCO serve as the common platform? (pp.104-117) 9. Dr.Farah Naaz India-Iran Relations : Testing Time? (pp.118-125) 10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslims Clerics (pp.126-130) 11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui India- Iran Relations:Need for formulation of a Foreign Policy (pp.131-140) 12. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives (pp.141-145) 13. Gauri Jain India's Shifting Loyalties: Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran? (pp.146-149)
FPRC Journal No. 6
PREFACE
Is it testing time for the age old relationship between two great nations- India and Islamic Republic of Iran ? Are they at the Crossroads? Do they present varying Challenges and Perspective? These questions have engaged the attention of all of us. The public leaders, diplomats, strategic affairs experts, journalists and academics from both countries, have ,time and again,emphasized that on many issues they need each other. Both have a responsibility to make greater diplomatic efforts to reduce misunderstanding between the two countries and to get them to come closer. There should be greater efforts to meet each others concerns. The 6th issue of the FPRC JOURNAL focuses on - India-Iran relationspolitical,economic,strategic,cultural,educational , and seeks to analyse the subject from international perspective also (The US factor, The Israel Factor, The Arab Factor and The Pakistan Factor) We are thankful to our contributors who have enriched the contents of the Journal,even at the cost of personal inconvenience. They are our source of strength.
Mahendra Gaur Director
Indira Gaur Mg. Editor
Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi
FPRC Journal No. 6
RESPONSES
1. Prakash Shah 2. Siavash Z. Yaghoubi 3. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh 4. Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer 5. Prof. Hooshang Amirahmadi
FPRC Journal No. 6
(1) Ambassador Prakash Shah
Prakash Shah is an independent consultant on both domestic and international policies and is Chairman of PRS Consultants, headquartered in India. He is currently Senior Advisor to Dodsal Group, Dubai. He is a Member of the Board of Falcon Corporate Advisory Services and the Hinduja Group India. Ambassador Shah is Emeritus Board Member of Pathfinder International, Boston, an NGO with an annual budget of $100 million with projects on family planning, antHIV Aids and adolescent health care in 23 developing countries, and Indo-American Arts Society, New York. He is currently a Member of the Board, on Policy and Development, of the Symbiosis International University, Pune, and a Member of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi. Ambassador Shah has served as Indias Permanent Representative to the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva, Indias Ambassador to Japan and Venezuela and Indias High Commissioner to Malaysia. During 1998-2000, Ambassador Shah was the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for Iraq in his capacity as Under-Secretary General, U.N. He has also served as Indias Petroleum Advisor for Gulf countries with headquarters in Tehran, Iran and has worked as Director in the Ministries of Petroleum, and of Economic Affairs in New Delhi. Ambassador Shah has led a number of Indian delegations to UNCTAD, ECAFE, OPEC, UN Disarmament Conference, Non-Aligned and Commonwealth Summits, among other international conferences. Ambassador Shah has contributed articles frequently to newspapers and magazines on foreign political and economic policies and on multi-lateral issues. He has been a member of the visiting faculty in a number of academic institutions such as Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis and United Services Institute, as well as lectured at foreign institutes such as the Foreign Services Institutes of Mexico and Peru, University of Santa Maria at Caracas and National Defence College, Canberra.
FPRC Journal No. 6
Response to Questionnaire
1. Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years? 1) Over the decades, India-Iran relations have not been uniformly smooth even though both countries have always recognized the benefits of cordial and active relations. During the early years of the rule of the Shah of Iran, and particularly during 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan, Iran was transparently pro-Pakistan in its attitude. The collapse of the much publicized Pakistani military might and the surrender of the Pakistan Armed Forces in Bangladesh within 16 days of the 1971 war dramatically changed both the approach and the policy of the Shahs regime towards India. Some deft diplomacy by India in the post-Bangladesh era resulted in India-Iran relationship reaching a high point, with political, economic and energy co-operation blossoming to a higher stage. Since the departure of the Shah and the emergence of an Islamic Republic in Iran, the religious ideology of Irans ruling elite became a factor in Irans foreign policy and it inevitably impinged on relations with India. Indian policy was mature enough not to let relations with Iran deteriorate either by Irans support for Pakistans Kashmir policy or Irans support of South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. If there has been another hiccup in India-Iran relations as a result of Indias vote in the IAEA on Irans nuclear programme, then the blame needs to be share by both countries. 2. Is IPI gas pipeline a dead issue so far as India is concerned? 2) The IPI gas pipeline was a sensible proposition which would have benefited both Iran and India. India needs to ensure its energy security for future growth and Iran needs an assured stable market for its surplus natural gas. In pure economic terms, sale of Irans natural gas via the IPI pipeline through Pakistan would make a lot of sense. But the proposal was doomed from its inception due to the nature of Pakistans hostile relations with India, a lack of credibility in its desire or ability to provide security along the route of the pipeline in Pakistan and the progressive deterioration in Pakistans internal security. Indian policy makers wisely decided not to make its industrial and power sector growth, based on Iranian natural gas, hostage to Pakistans uncertain policies. However, a bilateral arrangement for India to buy Iranian gas on a long-term basis through the LNG route remains a mutually beneficial idea to pursue. 3. Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? 3) India-US relations have improved exponentially over the last decade for bilateral, regional, global and strategic reasons. India does not need to play the Iran card to enhance India-US relations. 4. Is Indias enhanced engagement with Israel one of the constraints on Indias flourishing relations with Iran? 4) It is well-known in diplomacy that a countrys relations with another country are never at the expense of its other bilateral relations. Iran-India relations would flourish if both countries recognize that they have several long-term common interests in a region that has increasingly shown signs of volatility. Independent foreign policy pursued by each country should not blind either India or Iran to the benefits of closer bilateral relations.
FPRC Journal No. 6
5. Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? 5) There is a persisting perception, since Indias positive vote in IAEA on the Western Resolution on Irans nuclear programme, that Indias Iran policy is dependent on the US factor. The government of India has not been able to dispel this perception, as US sanctions against Iran have progressively become more stringent. While US sanctions are not mandatory on India, unlike the UN sanctions, their impact on Indias international, economic and trade interests have undoubtedly become a factor in Indias Iran policy.
6. Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapproachement?
7.
Is Indias inability to deal with the US and Iran simultaneously,without upsetting one or the other , a failure of Indian diplomacy?
6) & 7) Hostility in Iran-US relations poses a special challenge to India. It is in Indias interest, as it is in the interest of the West Asian region, that this hostility is reduced and understanding prevails. To the extent that miscommunication between US and Iran is responsible for this hostility, India has an important role to play. As an emerging power and a good friend of both Iran and USA, I believe India has a responsibility to make greater diplomatic efforts to reduce misunderstanding between the two countries and to get them to come closer. 8. Do you believe that a shift in Indias Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obamas Af-Pak policy? 9. Can India-Iran work together to stablise disorder in Afganistan? Could India be a part of a regional initiative on Afghanistan with Iran? 8) & 9) Both India and Iran have a major stake in Afghanistans future, considering that they are neighbours of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Any take-over of Kabul by Pakistan supported Taliban will impose great burden on both countries, who have reason to be apprehensive of a Taliban dominated Afghan policy. With President Obama announcing the beginning of withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, India will need to consult with Iran more closely on developments in AF-PAK region. For India to play a role along with Iran in a regional initiative on Afghanistan is a difficult proposition for two main reasons. In the first place, Pakistan remains unalterably opposed to any such role. The second reason is the present state of non-relations between USA and Iran with little prospect of change in the immediate future. 10. Is Indias Iran policy designed for domestic consumption, mostly to please the domestic Muslim audience' ? 10) Indias policy towards Iran cannot be sensitive to US concerns and at the same time, meet the demands of Indian Muslims. Despite the powerful Shia affinity towards Iran, the coalition government of India believes that for the Indian Muslim diaspora, Pakistan is far more important than Iran. If anything, the mistaken belief in the coalition government that a strong Indian policy against Paksitan will alienate Indian Muslims votes, continues to prevail.
FPRC Journal No. 6
(2) Siavash Z. Yaghoubi Former Iranian Ambassador to India

Email : S.Z.Yaghoubi@gmail.com
Education: B.S. in Civil Engineering at Evansville University ,Indiana, USA , High school Diploma from Rahnama High School , Tehran .Iran
Current Position :Planning and Development Director as well as member of the Board of Directors at
IFIC( Iran Foreign Investment Co.) Member of the Board of Directors in Iran/Oman Joint Investment Company
Work Experience: Secretary to Presidents Special Committee for IPI(Iran Pakistan India) Pipeline
Iranian Ambassador to India Iranian Ambassador to Oman Iranian Ambassador to Algeria General Director for West Asia, Ministry of External Affairs General Director for East Asia, Ministry of External Affairs General Director for Cultural Affairs Ministry of External Affairs General Director for Foreign Aids, Ministry of External Affairs Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Iran Representative for Colombo Economic plan Charge D,Affair of Iranian Embassy in Srilanks Charge D,Affairs of Iranian Embassy in Pakistan Member of the Economic and Development Committee of Reconstruction Ministry , In charge of Fars ,Khusestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr, Buyer Ahmad and Kohkilouyeh
Other Achievements : Chosen as the best National Management Director

: Received the highest honorary award from the Sultanate of Oman Presently doing studies and research in the issues related to Regional issues in the Gulf Region as well as neighboring countries. The idea of putting up a center as a think tank is on the agenda.
FPRC Journal No. 6
Response to Questionnaire 1.Why India-Iran relations have soured in recent years? - Several reasons could be addressed such as change of priorities, International environment and regional crisis, development in Afghanistan, US- Pakistan relation..etc 2.India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the specific areas of cooperation? That could be a logical approach from both sides. However it is a general statement, and should be supported by deed and action to be delivered. To start with both sides should take necessary step to uplift the current declining qualities of their relations. Of course, historically relations have been cordial and friendly, but not with much ingredients. However, both countries are main players of the region and there are many common and sheared interests .There are many area of immediate corporations which are vital to the sustainable development of the two nations and do not have any substitute, such as energy.Our region is rather backwards and poor.This situation will help to create social unrest and extremists . Peace and stability of our region would be in the interest of whole world, as well. However, Strategically we are lacking behind. 3.Is Indias slight disagreement with Irans nuclear programme one of the stumbling blocs in India-Iran ties? - Even though several differences are there, this issue is not the main concern of both sides. 4.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? - India is following her own interest, regionally and internationally. Sometimes it is not in conformity with traditional and classical policy of independent of India. One can say in today,s vibrant world these changes are inevitable. It is true ,but perhaps following a strong and proactive rule in the region will not be only in the interest of security and prosperity of our nations but also could be much more helpful and beneficial to the outsiders as well. Like what we did together in Afghanistan when Taliban and Alqaede were in power. They were recognised by Arab Countries which are still in the Western Countries camp. Not only that,some of the Western Countries even recognised them indirectly. Likewise now! they are rushing to recognise Taliban again, who will suffer the most again? Isn't it time to ring the bell again? They will leave the region but the mess is there for us to clear.
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5.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? -I think I have already answered this question. 6.Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties? It is not only about Iran-India it the same where ever they wish. It is about misinformation and lack of communication.
7.Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapproachement? - US- Iran relation has suffered a lot for decades. It is not an essay task. After all ,every body feels the pain of the problem which we are facing in our Region. They might be also responsible for it, but there are many other common platforms which could be used to have a secure and stable region which is in the interest of everybody. 8.Do you believe that the shift in Indias Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obamas Af-Pak policy? - We have gone through similar question already.
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(3) Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh

Executive Editor of Iran Review
Mahmoudreza Golshanpazhooh (Ph.D)

Executive Editor, Iranreview.org Director of Democracy and Human Rights Research Group, Center for Strategic Research (CSR) Vice Chairman, Tehran International Studies and Research Institute (TISRI)
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1.Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years? Let me first say that there are many reasons for the positive attitude of Iranians toward India, including background of historical relations, positive mutual sentiment between the two nations, presence of Zoroastrian minority (Parsi) in India and Indian minorities (such as Sikhs) in Iran, absence of any colonialistic precedence between the two countries, Irans positive attitude toward Indias struggles to get rid of the British colonialism. Developments in recent years (regardless of how correct subsequent judgments have been) have caused some Iranians to think that India is not as independent as they thought. Iranians assumed that India is too powerful to be brought to its knees by the United States through pressure or other means. The progress on Iran-India gas pipeline had strengthened those assumptions. Of course, Iran and Pakistan have had different views on some issues, but we, Iranians, love to see that countries are able to withstand global pressures. 2.India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the specific areas of cooperation? I think that countries which are not suspicious of one another can expand relations in many areas from such soft areas as culture, exchange of students, tourism, arts and handicrafts, as well as civilizational and religious dialogue to harder areas like economic exchanges and even security matters. Iran and India do not see each other as threats and, therefore, they are not involved in a zero-sum game. 3.Is Indias slight disagreement with Irans nuclear programme one of the stumbling blocs in India-Iran ties? To a great extent, the answer is yes. The Iranian public opinion was shocked by Indias positive vote for the anti-Iranian resolution at the Security Council. Although Indias stances in the past few years may be justified on the basis of the Indian governments policies, they are not understandable to Iranians which still see India as a powerful member of the Non-Aligned Movement. As a result of those stances, we expect nothing from India, neither with regard to the nuclear energy, nor in such areas as human rights and security. This is because we presume that India is not with us anymore. However, no presumptions are permanent. 4.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? I know that every country makes decisions according to its own national
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interests to promote or demote relations with others. However, when I see that there is no special problem between Iran and India, yet relations are not as cordial as they should be, the only reason which occurs to me is the effect and influence of foreign factors. We believe that presence of the United States in the Middle East and South Asia has been followed by more negative than positive developments and we are, therefore, surprised why India is repeating that experience. In reality, Irans relations are much friendlier with China and Pakistan which are Indias rivals, but Iran has never tried to pressure India. Iran prefers to have three friends on its side. It is very pleasant to imagine friendly India, China and Pakistan around Iran. This does not necessarily mean that we are going to form an anti-American block, but we seek peaceful conditions which will make way for stability as well as economic prosperity and security. 5.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? As I said before, this is a general feeling in Iran and it is not limited to India, but we feel the same toward Russia, China and many other countries. Let me tell you something. When the Peace Pipeline project failed after many years of negotiations and although Iranians experienced frustration due to Indias position, there was also a good feeling among the Iranian experts. They noted that we were giving our most precious commodity at a low price to another country just because we needed friends in the region to dispel this sense of isolation. I dont mean that this was the dominant view or the official viewpoint of the government, but some Iranian experts really thought along those lines. They sometimes feel the same toward China and Russia. Although the result of that process was not economically or politically in our favor, we have come to the conclusion in the past few years that we should stand on our own feet and do not reckon on other countries. In general, it has had good results for us. 6.Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties? The United States (I mean the American government, not the American nation) fears anything that many make Iran more powerful and they think that it would not be to their benefit if powerful countries took sides with Iran. This is a wrong presumption in the minds of the American statesmen that isolating Iran and putting pressure on it will finally make Iranians give up their policies and back down. Thirty years of post-revolution experience has proven otherwise. I personally support a solution for problems between Iran and the United States, but I also think that this could only happen if the Americans cared for Irans mentality and concerns and gave up their condescending attitude. 7.Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapproachement?
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Not necessarily, but India will be among the best choices. Finding a solution to Iran-US problem is difficult and time-consuming due to accumulation of negative attitudes on both sides. During the past few months, the US government has attributed all negative developments, such as developments in Syria or behavior of Hamas, to Iran and I think that this is at odds with good politics. We are almost sure that the United States is trying to use all means, even irrational ones, to increase pressures on Iran in order to make Iran genuflect. The United States is mistaken in that under false analyses, Washington thinks that there is a wide divide between the Iranian nation and government and is trying to deepen that gap by asserting that it supports the Iranian nation. In reality, however, the US behavior, examples of which we recently witnessed in the Middle Easts developments, have been so closely associated with profiteering and hypocrisy in Iran that most Iranians cannot be optimistic toward the United States. If a country intends to mediate between Tehran and Washington, even if it is a reputable country like India, it should first analyze the reasons behind the existing distrust between Iran and the United States. It should also firmly believe that improved relations between Iran and the United States will be ultimately to the benefit of other regional countries, including India. 8.Do you believe that the shift in Indias Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obamas Af-Pak policy? I am not sure, but I know something. Regardless of how different Iran, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan may approach various issues, they are situated in the same region and any kind of insecurity will hit them all. Years of conflict between India and Pakistan as well as chronic border clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have made transregional powers think that regional states really need them for a balance. Many countries in South Asia and the Persian Gulf have apparently reached the conclusion that there would be no security for them in the absence of transregional powers. I think that the first step should be for us to get rid of such ideas. The United States policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has led to no positive development in the region to make us believe that India has decided to revise its ties to Iran in the light of such development. If India is distancing from Iran because the United States is getting close to Pakistan and New Delhi does not want to make Washington upset, then India cannot be rightfully called an emerging superpower. This would mean that India is so scared of Pakistan or the United States that it cannot manage this situation. I know that problems between India and Pakistan or between India and Afghanistan are deep-rooted, but building positive relationship with Iran will not worsen the existing problems in Indias foreign relations. On the opposite, Irans influence on Pakistan can work to establish a general atmosphere of friendship, peace, and tranquility in the whole region.
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(4) Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

Chairman
Centre for Study of Society and Secularism Mumbai E-mail: csss@mtnl.net.in Website: www.csss-isla.com
He has been named as one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the World (2009). This study has been done by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre (Jordan) and the Prince AlWaleedbin-Talal Centre for Muslim Christian Understanding of Georgetown University, Washington. Special Awards:
Honorarydegree of D.Litt. by Jamia Millia Islamia University,New Delhi,2008. Prof. Shah Sahib Award (2006) by Institute of Mappila Studies, Thrissur, Kerala. Muhammed Abdul Rahiman Sahib Foundation, Kodungallur, Thrissur, KeralaNational Award ? 2006. Honorary degree of D. Litt. (Causa) by Jamia Hamdard, Islamic University, New Delhi, 2005. Right Livelihood Honorary Award (aka: Alternate Nobel Award) for Vision andWork, Stockholm, Sweden, December 2004. C.N.Ahamed Moulavi M.S.S. Award 2004 (Muslim Service Society, Kozhikode,Kerala). Association for Communal Harmony in Asia (ACHA), USA Award 2003 Inter-faith Award, 1999 ((Khwaja Gharib-Un-Nawaz Welfare Centre, Bangalore) Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Award, 1998 (Haryana Urdu Academy) New Leader Award , New Leaders Award Committee, Madras ,1998 National Communal Harmony Award, 1997, Government of India
Fourth South - Asian Youth Summit ?94 Award at Punjab University, Patiala, 1994
Honorary degree of D. Litt. by the University of Calcutta, 1993 Hakim Khan Sur Award by Maharana Mewar Foundation, Udaipur for national integration. Dalmia Award on Communal Harmony, 1990 Distinguished Service Award by USA International Student Assembly and USAIndian Student Association, 1987. Publications: Dr Engineer has published 63 books on Islam, Problems of Muslims, Muslim Women?s Rights, Communal and Ethnic Problem in India, South Asia and Islamic State. He also publishes Secular
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Perspective (fortnightly) and Islam and Modern Age (monthly) Offices held in Organisations/Institutions:
(a) Nominated by ICSSR as a representative on the Governing Board of A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna for 3-years (2009-12) (b) Nominated as member of National Integration Council in the year 2005 by Prime Minister of India/Re-nominated in the year 2009 for the further period of 3-yars. (c) Nominated by the Central Government as a member of Society of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study (IIAS), Shimla for the term of 3-years (2009-2011) (d) Chairman, Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, Mumbai (e) Director, Institute of Islamic Studies. Mumbai (f) Chairman, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN), Mumbai (g) Member, National Foundation for Communal Harmony (h) Former Vice-President, Peoples Union for Civil Libertise (PUCL), Mumbai (i) Ex-Member, Executive Council, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi (j) Ex-Member, University Court, Aligharh Muslim University, U.P. (k) General Secretary, Central Board of Dawoodi Bohara Community, Mumbai (l) Chairman,Vikas Adhyan Kendra, Malad (W), Mumbai (m) Member, Presidium Indian National Social Action Forum (INSAF), Mumbai (n) Chairman, Ekta Samiti, Mumbai
1.Why Iran needs India and vice versa? 1)Both India and Iran are Asian and developing countries. On many issues they need each other. Iran has oipl and gas and India needs both. Iran needs India's help on several issues in international fora. Also Iran is a gateway to Asia. 2.Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years? 2) the main cause of India-Iran relations souring is India not supporting Iran on the issue of nuclear issue. Even Turkey was ready to mediate but India supported anti-Iranian line on this voital issue. 3.Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? 3) Yes, Ibdia depends a lot on US for its policy towards Iran. It is under pressure from America not to support Iran. America has no principled foreign policy except its own selfish interests as against India which, under Nehru, had principled stand on foreign policy issues. However, after Nehru except Indira Gandhi no one followed policy of non-alignment. 4.Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? 4) Yes, I fully agree that India has not hesitated to play Iran Card to draw concessions from USA. It is very unfortunate. 5.Do you believe that the shift in Indias Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obamas Af-Pak policy?
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5) No0, it is not so. India's Iran policy had undergone change during Bush's time. Obama became President later. It is so unfortunate that Iran had supported India on Kashmir issue and yet we supported Americaan stand on nuclear issue and alienated Iran. Since then our relations cooled off. 6.Is Indias enhanced engagement with Israel one of the constraints on Indias flourishing relations with Iran? 6) There is no doubt India is far too c;loser to Israel these days which makes Iranian authorities uncomfortable but it is not fundamental cause. Fundamental cause is India's unhesitant pro-US stance. 7.Is Indias Iran policy designed for domestic consumption, mostly to please the domestic Muslim audience?
7) No I do not agree. India's Iran policy is not designed for domestic consumption. Indian Muslims would welcome warm relations between two countries. But of course Hindutva lobby would like warm relations between India and Iasrael. And a section of bureaucracy works for bringing India and Israel closer. 8.How should India meet Irans concerns? 8) India and Iran should come together on mutual interests. Iran is very sensitive on the issue of nuclear power. India, along with few other neutral countries should help Iran dispell doubts about not enriching euranium for weaponisation but for power..
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(5)Interview with
Professor Hooshang Amirahmadi

Rutgers University, USA
HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI holds a Ph.D. in planning and international development from Cornell University and is a professor at Rutgers University. He is also a Senior Associate Member at Oxford University in the U.K. and was director of Rutgerss Center for Middle Eastern Studies for many years. He is the founder and president of the American Iranian Council and was a candidate for President in the ninth presidential elections in Iran in June 2005. Dr. Amirahmadis most recent book on The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars is forthcoming (fall 2011) from I.B. Taurus in London. He is the author of Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience and three other books in Persian on civil society, industrial policy, and geopolitics of energy. Dr. Amirahmadi is also editor of 10 books on Iran and the Middle East, and 16 conference proceedings on US-Iran relations. He has authored numerous scholarly journal articles and book chapters. A frequent contributor to lots of conferences in Europe, North America, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, Dr. Amirahmadis writings have been translated and published in Europe, Iran and the Arab world. Dr. Amirahmadi is also often interviewed on national and international TV and radio, and is quoted in newspapers throughout the world. Email: hooshang@amirahmadi.comWebsite: www.amirahmadi.com
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FPRC Journal No. 6 1. Why India-Iran relations had soured in recent years?
Indias policy toward Iran is influenced by a multitude of motivations and forces, some principled and others opportunistic. India wishes to become a global power and to achieve that status, it must first enhance its regional pre-imminence. This requires a careful identification of strategic allies and rivals. In the Persian Gulf region, where India wants to be reckonedas a great power, it has chosen Arab states of the Persian Gulf over Iran. The reasons for this choice arestraight forward: Arab states are weaker than Iran, they are less ambitious, and they are friends of the west. The Arab states also need India as a source of cheap labor supply and of huge demand for oil and commerce. For India, too, these are the key reasons to favor Arab states over Iran. Besides, India-Iran history is marked with certain past conflicts while Arabs have had little problem with Indians. Currently, Iran claims leadership of Islam, making India nervous as it has the largest Muslim population of any non-Muslim states. US-Iran tension is another source of Indias unwillingness to get closer to Iran. Sanctions increase the cost of Iranian business for India, and the constant pressure from the US and Europe to help isolate Iran cannot be always and easily resisted. However, the western pressure does not just constrain India but provides it with opportunity as well. By cooperating with the US over Irans nuclear enrichment dispute, e.g., India has learned that it can extract real and valuable concessions. Thus, when India learned that it can get what it needed for its nuclear programs from the US, it did not hesitate to vote against Iran in the IAEA and in the UN Security Concil. From Indias perspective, loosing Iran and gaining the US did not involve an equal trade off; that the gain was much larger than the loss given also that doing business with the Islamic Iran is not easy to begin with. Irans close cooperation with China and Pakistan, Indias rivals, and Indias close relations with Israel,Irans arch enemy, are other sources of tightnessin IranIndia relations. Kashmir is another but lesser obstacle. Has India made its strategic calculations right? Are Arab states more reliable strategic partners than Iran? Will the US honor its strategic openings to India after it normalizes relations with Iran? Can India afford to close its pathways to the Central Asia by making Iran into an adversary? Can India afford to lose Afghanistan to Iran and or Pakistan when the US leaves that country? Only the time can tell. Indian strategists must have pondered responses to these questions but their choices show that they have not looked far into the future. Just consider one possible scenario: normal US-Iran relations in a few years a real possibility! Under such a condition, India can end up being a big looser because resumption of relations between Iran and the US will radically change the regional political environment in favor of Iran, leading to shifting alliances and counter-alliances among the Middle Eastern states. Regardless of how powerful India become by then, it will find it hard to compete with a resurgent Iran that will have not just the west on its side but also China, Russia and many other regional states. 2. India says it is keen to expand relations with Iran. What could be the specific areas of cooperation? Iran and India are doomed by geography and resource complementarity to coexist and cooperate. Broadly speaking, they may cooperate in two areas: strategic and economic. Of course, they can and should also cooperate in cultural, scientific and educational areas as well. Strategic cooperation can include coordinated efforts to create a more stable Afghanistan free from terrorism and Pakistans influence. They can also work together in creating corridors of 19
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transport, trade and development to the nations in the Central Asia. Pipelines are a sure source of binding cooperation between the two states for decades to come, and one example that comes to mind is the famous Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Unfortunately, India, under pressure from the US and also because of shortsighted strategic calculations, has only given lip service to this potentially historic project. This brings me to the economic area for cooperation. India has already been involved in a few major infrastructural and energy-related projects in Iran, including those in Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf coast and in the South Pars gas field in the heart of Persian Gulf. Energy is certainly a top commercial item in Iran-India relations and was at one point in not so distance past the defining economic tie between the two nations. India gets 16 per cent of its oil supply from Iran as against 45 per cent coming from the Persian Gulf countries that include Saudi Arabia. This clearly indicates that oil import alone is not the compelling reason for India to warm its ties with Iran and antagonize its other trading partners. Yet, when oil, gas and geopolitics are put together, India will have better reason to expand economic ties with Iran than with any other regional states. Unfortunately these and other projects and economic relations, which were originally well planned and operated, have run into deep difficulties following Indias votes against Iran. Tehran is particularly dismayed at New Delhi because India is not even a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty and has built its bombs by defying the international community. Incidentally, Iran is not on record to have made many noises against India when it was developing its military nuclear programs. Besides, Iran sees Indias objection to its civilian nuclear project as self-defeating because it could free Iranian oil and gas for trade with India, a nation with a 8 percent growth in its energy consumption. This opportunity is being increasingly lost to both sides as India develops more dependency on Arab oil and uncertain US promises. 3. Is Indias slight disagreement with Irans nuclear programme one of the stumbling blocks in India-Iran ties? It sure is! The disagreement is not slight. India has consistently voted against Iran and is now working with the US to isolate Iran. India has also accepted the western premise that Irans nuclear programs are not peaceful. This is not even consistent with the views of IAEA or the UN Security Council. Indias turn against Iran was a shocking incidence for Iran, which had counted on a non-aligned leader for support. Iran was caught off guardedalso because it counted India among its friends and had even supported it in the Kashmir case outside the Organization of Islamic Countries.The India turn has been devastating for Iran as it became the source of Irans troubles with Europe and the US, and then with IAEA and the UNSC. Indias votes legitimized the anti-Iran moves that followed. Compared to China and Russia, who also voted against Iran, India has been more vocal and consistent in its opposition to Irans nuclear programs, largely because of deals it made with the US. 4. Do you agree with the view that India seems to be a lot dependent on US so far as policy towards Iran is concerned? Yes, I sure do. Unfortunately, India let itself to be played by the US over the Iranian nuclear programs. India was a leader of non-aligned nations, a hope for the developing world, and one of the most independent-minded Asian states. It betrayed that position. India accepted US 20
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support for its nuclear adventure as a prize to cooperate with it against Iran.Of course India is not doing these entirely to please the US. Wishing to become a global power, India feels that it must work closely with the US and Europe. India also needs American support for its rivalry with China and Pakistan. For example, from Indias perspective, cooperation with the US will lessen Pakistans influence over Afghanistan a rather false assumption! 5. Do you agree that India has not been hesitant to play the Iran card to draw concessions from US on matters of bilateral concern? Yes, I agree! The irony is that India did not need to sell Iran out for such concessions. The United States had no choice but to work closely with the emerging India at a time of American military and economic troubles.India also did not need the US support for its nuclear programs and the slight gains it made for its national interest in this respect was not worth the principles it undermined. By turning against Iran, in favor of the US, India turned its back against developing nations and lost their trust and leadership. I may be exaggerating the negative impact on Indias image among the oppressed nations, but given Indias past stands, the proposition does not seem too farfetched. 6. Why many Americans have serious misgivings about Iran-India ties? India in the past used to be very vocal about its independence and defense of the oppressed nations. It was an initiator and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and for decades did not have a good relationship with the US. Iran is currently in that mode as India moves closer to the west. Americans who have misgivings about India-Iran tie know this past history and mindset. They are concerned that the India-Iran unity is a possibility and that their partnership can create a powerful and rival bloc, economically and strategically. After all, India and Iran are the two most important countries in Southwest Asia large in population, geography, economic means, and human resources. American Southwest Asia strategy also makes them to divide the two nations and rule. Americans particularly want India on their side as China becomes economically more powerful and Russia becomes more nationalistic. The American need for Indian friendship is also borne by the fact that the Arab-Israeli lobby in the US has successfully blocked the US-Iran rapprochement. 7. Does US road to better relations with Iran pass through India? Can India facilitate US-Iran rapprochement? India is an important nation, an emerging economy, a strategic country at a very important region for the US. If India was to seriously mediate and put asset behind such mediation and act as a really honest broker and sustain that brokerage for a while, it can help change the direction of the relations. After all, India is a nuclear power as well as a neighbor of Iran. Now that India has taken side with the US in this conflict, it has more credibility from the US side to mediate. However, for India to be successful it must also earn Irans trust and that can be achieved by India seeing Iran in more realistic and pragmatic terms than in the last few years. India can also use better information and analysis about Irans nuclear project. One place India may get some help is in using a joint opinion piece that the former ambassadors of UK, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Sweden to Iran have written regarding Irans nuclear dispute. In a nutshell, their article exposes the hollowness and hypocrisy of the western policy 21
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toward the Iranian nuclear program. Theybelieve that Iran as a sovereign nation has the right to pursue its nuclear enrichment program, and that the western states must accept it in principle and encourage Iran to work with the IAEAas it develops credible means of inspection. Indeed, they argue that the UNSC resolutions are indefensible under international law; the IAEAor western intelligence estimates have never determined that Irans program is for weapon, andIran has painstakingly abided by IAEA safeguards. 8. Do you believe that the shift in Indias Iran policy has been brought about in response to President Obamas Afghanistan-Pakistan policy? Only partly! The Indian strategists believe that sanctions could lead to pre-emptive military action against Iran. This they see as a threat to Indian interest particularly because the Strait of Hormuz could be negatively affected. It was this war fear that made India to originally vote against Iran and then support the Brazil-Turkey-Iranenriched-uranium swap deal. India is also driven by the obsession to be seen as the regional superpower.India has other national interests and concerns,including the Afghan-Pakistan problem. Any relieve in that front helps India. Thus, the main reason for the Indian policy change regarding Iran is not the shift in Obama policy. India changed its Iran direction under Georg W. Bush when he gave India the promise of access to US nuclear technology! While India was ready to expand on its nuclear technology and military arsenal, it voted against Irans peaceful nuclear enrichment just because it thought its interest is better served by working with the US! Obama has called for "a close strategic partnership" with India, but that call has not been put in practice. Obamas Afghan policy of early withdrawal and negotiation with Taliban may indeed create trouble for India. The US is also increasingly more willing to accommodate Pakistan in regards to Afghan future. I can see that without cooperation with Iran, India will not have success in relation to its Afghan-Pakistan dilemma. For example, Indias involvement in Chabahars project was a major aspect of its Afghan and the Central Asia access policy. Indias vote against Iran has put that cooperation in jeopardy.
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1.H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari 2. Dr. David J. Karl 3. Amb. Karamatullah Ghori 4. Dr. Harsh V. Pant 5. Brig (Retd) Dr.Muhammad A. Khan 6. Dr.Vijay Prashad 7. Dr.Anjali Sahay 8. Dr.Uddipan Mukherjee 9. Dr.Farah Naaz 10. Dr. Mahnaz Zahirinejad 11. Dr. Rushda Siddiqui 13. Dr.Venkateshwaran Lokanathan 13. Gauri Jain
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"The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of Sciences during the Qutb Shahi Period in Dakan (Southern India)
H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari Farkhud

Consul General of Islamic Republic of Iran Hyderabad
Literary work:
Wrote a Number of articles on Foreign Policy of India in Journals of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles on Relations of India with Central Asian countries etc.
Occupation :
1993 1996 Political Expert. 1996 -1999 : Expert on foreign Relations, Liaison officer for the Asian - Africa Legal Consultative Organization. (AALCO) in India . 1999-2001: Deputy Director in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Islamic Republic of Iran . 2001 2004: Deputy Ambassador of Islamic Republic of Iran at Tbilisi - Georgia 2004- 20th August 2009: Director General Department of Economic Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21st August 2009: Consul General of Islamic Republic of Iran Hyderabad .
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India Iran Relations
A lot has been said and done pertaining to the age old relationship between two great nations India and Islamic Republic of Iran. Relations between India and Iran date back to the Neolithic period. The existence of several empires spanning both Persia and northern India ensured the constant migration of people between the two regions and the spread and evolution of the Indo-Iranian language groups. As a consequence, the people of India and Iran share significant cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics. During much of the early Cold War period, relations between contemporary Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Iran were frosty. However, following the 1979 revolution, relations between Iran and India strengthened after Iran withdrew from CENTO and dissociated itself from strategic cooperation with Pakistan (an arch-rival of India). The two nations further cemented bilateral strategic cooperation when India collaborated with Iran to support the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban in late 1990s. Even though the two countries share some common strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues. India has expressed strong opposition against Iran's nuclear program and while both the nations continue to oppose the Taliban, India supports the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan unlike Iran. Despite the decline in strategic and military links, the two nations continue to maintain strong cultural and economic ties. Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh India, continues to be a major center of Shiite culture and Persian study in South Asia. Iran is the second largest supplier of crude oil to India, supplying more than 425,000 barrels of oil per day and India is one of the largest foreign investors in Iran's oil and gas industry. December 2010, the $14 billion worth annual oil trade between India and Iran and inspite of the Reserve Bank of Indias refusal to process transactions with Iran using the Asian Clearing Union the trade and Commerce between Iran and India are continuing with out any hurdle. The first Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and said about India and Iran Relationship: Few People have been more closely related in origin and throughout history than the people of India and the people of Iran Among the many peoples and races who have come in contact with and influenced Indias life and culture the oldest and most persistent have been the Iranians Taking into account the above fact as being stationed in Hyderabad the cradle of Culture and Civilization I would like to high light the Role of Migrant Scholars in Deccan. Unlike many other countries who invaded India with their army and swords to loot its riches. Iranians were the people who came to India especially to Deccan were the Poets, epistolarians, Historiographers, Ulema, Muftis, physicians and enriched this region with Knowledge and Culture.
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"The Contribution of Iranian Scholars in the Advancement of Sciences during the Qutb Shahi Period in Dakan (Southern India) The founder of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk (ruled from 918 A.H./1512 A.D.-950 A.H./1543 A.D.) belonged to the cultured and noble family of Qara Quyunulu, in Iran as such he brought with him a good literary savior.(1)The Qutb Shahi rulers invited great scholars, poets , historians ,religious Divines and the Sufis from Iran to settle down in the kingdom. The learned Iranian migrants to the Qutb Shahi dominions made the kingdom seat of learning and extensive literary activities. The Qutb Shahi rulers and the nobility, who were mostly Iranians, were genuine patron of arts and sciences. The kingdom made an invaluable contribution to the cause of letters and bequeathed to posterity a vast treasure of knowledge which can never sink into oblivion. All the Qutb Shahi rulers were highly educated and were great patrons of art and learning .Much as they exulted in a selfless discharge of their duties as rulers, they inculcated in them deep love of arts and sciences. Poets and litterateurs were equally at home with them. They even composed poetry and penned volumes in prose, with the result that literary pursuits had a fresh of life during their regime. Most of the elite and nobility of Golkonda was drawn from it developed a great degree of cultured exchange from the two countries. Most of the Iranian poets, epistolarians, historiographers, Ulema, Muftis, physicians and other visited Golkonda and some of them settled there. The Persian epistolography developed by Iranian migrants is the best artistic prose in Golkonda .Migration of great Ulama from Golkonda created a great volume of religious literature which surpassed the size of any other branch of Persian literature in Golkunda. This Shiite Ulama religious literature relates to the interpretation of the Holy Quran, theology, eschatology, jurisprudence and prayers. Iranian scholars in Golkonda showed profound interest in philosophy, ethics and mysticism. They introduced almost all important Greek, Arab and Iranian thinkers in Golkonda society through Persian literature. Iranian scientists and physicians in Golkonda contributed vastly to the study of medicine, physics, meteorology and mathematics. The Iranian scholars produced considerable amount of historiography work in Golkonda. They highlighted the political and cultural aspects in their works and also paid attention to the civil and military administration and economic life of the people .The Iranian scholars created specialized work in various disciplines. The encyclopedias written during the Qutb Shahi period by them is no way inferior to modern encyclopedias. They also compiled dictionaries of specialized nature. They also prepared comprehensive gazetteers of in Golkonda. Official documents, bonds and deeds and a huge number of Persian epigraphs are also the ever-lasting contribution of Iranian scholars in Golkonda. The seals and coins produced in Golkonda is also the valuable contribution of the Iranian scholars and technicians settled in the kingdom. Extensive Persian literature written by Iranian scholars in Golkonda is the part of golden cultural heritage of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Sultan-Quli (ruled from 918 A.H./1512 A.D.-950 A.H./1543 A.D.) The Golkonda during the reign of Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk boomed with scholars and literary magnates. He formed a literary club known as (Aash Khana) where all men of letters used to assemble.
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Jamsheed Quli (950 A.H./1543 A.D.- 957 A.H./ 1550A.D.)
Sultan Qulis successor, Jamsheed Quli (950 A.H./1543 A.D.- 957 A.H./ 1550A.D.) showed a keen aptitude for poetic compositions. He was poet of merits wrote verses under the pseudonym of Jamsheed. At times, he delved into extempore recitation of poetry. We have quite a few poetic compositions from the facile pen of Jamshid in the Tarikh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shah, full of romantic ideas. Mulla Waqui Nishapuri Jamshid-Quli, second ruler of the dynasty appointed Mulla Muhammad Sharif Waqui Nishapuri, from Nishapur (eastern Iran, in the Khurasan province) as poet-laureate at his court. Mulla Nishapuri played an important part in the evolution of Persian poetry in the Qutb Shahi Kingdom. He wrote the famous book on history by name Majma-ul-Akhbar or Najm-ul-Akhbar. Professor Devare writes about Majma-ul-Akhbar that it is a comprehensive general history of the Muslim world written at the behest of Ibrahim Quli Qutub Shah. Mulla Qasim Tabassi A great poet from Tabas (north-eastern who came to Golkonda during Jamsheed-Qulis reign was rewarded with gifts and property by sultan. The famous book written by him is Insha-i Qasim Tabassi.(9) This book was completed during Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shahs period. It comprises official letters from Ibrahim-Quli to the rulers of Bijapur and the Safawid monarch. He held the same position in the court of Ibrahim Quli which the Munshi-ul-Mamalik or Dabirul-Mulk held during the times of his successors. His language is supported by fundamental tenets of Islamic faith. The Waqf Nama drafted by him is an instance, how even in official writings he cites all necessary verses of the Holy Quran which enlightened the legal, religious and the moral justification of an act of endowment. He makes use of rhyme words but at pleasant distances. Most of the devices adopted by him are connotative. His style manifests an intellectual and spiritual emancipation which is not tamed and intimidated by the formalities of court. Freedom of his mind has made his writings lucid, crisp and lively. Mulla Qasim Tabassi is the first prose artist of Golkonda, who was capable of being natural in his writing of all occasions.The period subsequent to Mulla Qasim Tabassi, seems to have been encouraging rhetorical artifice. Mulla Husain Tabassi Mulla Husain Tabassi, an Iranian migrant from Tabas(north-eastern),was patronized by Sultan-Quli Qutbul Mulk. He wrote the book Marqub-ul-Qulub.(10)The author of Tarikh-iMuhammad Qutb Shah had quoted extensively in his book from Marqub-ul-Qulub. Fursi, the great Iranian poet, lauded Mulla Husain Tabassi in his Nasb Nameh. Mulla Husain Tabassi was also Chief Justice of Sultan Qulis reign. His book, the Marghul-ul-Qulub, has already been referred to in connection with the reign of Ibrahim-Qulis father,Sultan-Quli. He lived on and wrote another book, the Saidiyahthe Book of the Game at the instance of Ibrahim Qutb in 983A.H/1575-76A.D.The book consists of an introduction ,ten chapters and an Epilogue, and deals with all aspects of the game and its limits set for it by Islamic jurisprudence. Its manuscript copies are preserved in Mulla Firaz Library, and the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Munshi Khushdil
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There is another and a shorter work called Tawarikh Qutb Shahi reputed to be the work Munshi Khushdil, private secretary of Prince Haidar-Quli. This is a much small composition and only an abridgement of Fursis work. This book is also divided into four parts: part-1 deals with the birth of the founder of the dynasty up to his accession to power, part-2 with his rule, part-3 with the reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah and part-4 with the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah .This history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty was written on the model of the Bahman Nama of Azari .A unique manuscript of this history is preserved in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta. Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah(957 A.H./1550 A.D.-988 A.H./1580 A.D.) The reign of Ibrahim Quli, when the foundation of the kingdom had been firmly laid, ushered in an era of patronage of arts and sciences .Ibrahim was a man of polite learning and liberal education and also bore a love of knowledge. He made scores of school where the children were imparted basic primary education. He rallied round him a galaxy of learned and scholars and made the best of time in their company .The learned conferred with the king even when the latter was on his tour of the dominions and enlivened his company by their palatable discussions. These scholars were the receipt of royal honors and some of those who illumined the court of Ibrahim Quli were prominent Iranian scholars like: Amir Shah ,Muhammad Anju, Amir Imaduddin, Mahmood Shirazi, Qasim Beg Shirazi and Husain Quli Mirza. They were all profound scholars and masters in logic. (13) He was one who is known for his lavish patronization of Telugu poets. He was so popular among them that he was compared with the Hindu gods by some of the Telugu poets. In spite of this his period saw the compilation of three Persian books, two on the subject of history by Khurshah and Sharif and one over the games and sports by an Iranian scholar Husain Tabassi.(14) In, 1512A.D. Sultan Quli Qutubul Mulk declared Shiite faith as the state religion which resulted in the opening of a new chapter in the Iran-Haidarabad relations. The Qutb Shahi sultans encouraged scholarly, educated and qualified Iranian to migrate to Qutb Shahi Kingdom in waves. Thus large number of Iranian religious scholars, poets, calligraphers, architects, artisans, scholars, builders, engineers came down to Golkonda in large numbers. This migration of Iranian to Golkonda continued right up to the end of the Qutb Shahi rule. The Qutb Shahi sultans not only patronized these immigrants but appointed them to higher posts of administration. There was tremendous migration of learned Iranians to Qutb Shahi kingdom during the reign of Ibrahim Quli. With their migration, Dakkan became the cradle of Iranian poets, writers, religious scholars, calligraphers, painters and artisans, who richly contributed to the progress of culture, literature, architecture, poetry, medicine, theology and jurisprudence in Dakkan. Little research had been carried out on the most valuable manuscripts covering the fields of religious literature like tafseer, hadith, jurisprudence, theology, ethics, philosophy etc. present in various libraries of India especially in Haidarabad. Khurshah Husaini One of the famous books dedicated to Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah was Khurshah bin Qubad alHusainis voluminous History of the World stressing the history of pre-Islamic and post-Islamic Iran, the dynasties which ruled the lands of the Muslims, the Sultans who held sway in north India, Bengal, Malwa, Gujrat, and finally the history of the Bahmanis of the Dakkan down to the death of Mahmud Shah Bahmani in 1518A.D. This book was written in the reign of Ibrahim-Quli and was completed in 972A.H/1564-65A.D. It preceded by twenty five years, Mulla Waqui Nishapuris Majma-al-Akhbar another chronicle produced at Golkonda during the same period.
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The author, Khurshah Husaini, does not specifically mention the name of his work anywhere in the text, but it is commonly known as Tarikh-i Elchi Nizam Shah. Haji Abarkhuhi Haji Abarkhuhi was born at Abarkhuh near yazd City (Central Iran). His father died when Haji was only a small child. He took to trade and traveled for this purpose to ShirazCity and Kirman. After sometime he migrated to India and secured a position in the court of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah at Golkonda .He was later patronized by Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah in whose praise he wrote a number of poems . The poet compiled his poetic works at the instance of a prominent noble of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Mustafa Khan Ardestani. An incomplete manuscript of the poets Diwan preserved in the Majlis Library at Tehran comprising 2400 lines contains the following: (1) Qasidas , including religious poems (2) A small romantic Mathnawi called Nazir-wa-Manzur, (3) Ghazals arranged alphabetically covering more than half of the Diwan, (4) Rubaiayat. The manuscript abruptly finished at page 217.The most attractive feature of his ghazals is that they seem to have been composed on the model of Sadi and Hafiz and he fairly succeeded in imitating his masters. Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah (988 A.H./1580 A.D.-1020 A.H./1612 A.D.) Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah was a devoted Shiite and practiced his faith openly. He greatly strengthened the relations with Safawid Iran. He himself was an artist by nature. The advent of Allama Mir Mumin Astarabadi as the Peshwa-e Sultanat of the Qutb Shahi kingdom during his reign spurred the vast influx of Iranian poets, physicians and scholars into the kingdom. He composed a Diwan in Persian, which is written in nastaliq style. It is reserved in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. It contains more than three thousand couplets. Meer Shah Meer Isfahani Meer Taqiuddin Meer Shah Isfahani came to Haidarabad during Ibrahim Qulis reign and attained the position of Peshwa-e-Saltanat. He was also a famous poet, scholar and warrior of his period. Kami Shirazi Kami Shirazi was a famous poet during the Qutb Shahi period. He lived during the period of MuhammadQuli Qutb Shah and was the associate of Muhammad Amin Shahristani famous as Ruh-al-Ameen. Mirza Kashani Mirza Muhammad Shareef Kashani, the famous Persian poet of the Qutb Shahi period was the pupil of famous Iranian poet Muhtasham Kashani. He was affiliated to the court of MuhammadQuli Qutb Shah. The copies of his Diwan is preserved in India Office Library, London City.
Hakeem Arif-i-Egi Hakeem Arif-i Egi arrived Haidarabad in 1014 A.H/1605-6 A.D. and entered the Qutb Shahi service in Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shahs reign. He wrote laudatory verses and was magnificently rewarded for it. Arif was a distinguished poet. He was the author of Andarz Nameh or the Book
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of Admonitions, which is modeled on the Shahnamah and comprises 2300 couplets. He also composed Saqi Namah which deserves a very high place in the Persian literature. Adai Yazdi Mir Muhammad Mumin Adai Yazdi belonged to the Sadaat family of YazdCity (Iran).He was a famous poet, physician and philosopher who came to Haidarabad in 1030 A.H. He was more inclined towards Rubai form. Mir Mumin Astarabadi Mir Mumin Astarabadi was a statesman, a litterateur, a divine and a polished courtier, and he exercised a great influence on the person of the Sultan. He was without doubt one of the chief advisors of the Sultan in planning the new city of Haidarabad. He caused the rapid introduction and universalization of Shiaism in the kingdom. Shiaism had a hold on the court of Haidarabad to such an extent that the court circles of the capital appeared like a replica of Safawid Iran. Mir Mumin attempted to make Haidarabad a new City eIsfahan City and thus he planned the city on the architectural style and pattern of Isfahan City, the capital of Safawid Iran. Thus, he called Haidarabad as Isfahan-e-Nau(New Isfahan).His political ,cultural, social and literary achievements have to be discussed in a separate section. His poetical works were collected and compiled in the form of a diwan a copy of which covering 175 folios, is preserved in the India Office Library, LondonCity. This diwan comprises Ghazals in an alphabetical order in honor of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. Mir Mumin excelled both in the panegyric and lyric forms. In his gazals, the poet depicts the true sentiments of lovers and as such he succeeds in widening the scope of popular appeal to his lyrics. It was the patronage of learning on the part of the court at Haidarabad which made poets of Iran throng into the city, and Haidarabad became a place of refuge for reputed Iranian poets because of royal patronage offered to them by the Qutb Shahi sultans. There were a number of minor poets of Iran who came and settled down in Haidarabad and ended their life there. Apart from this a kind of fashion had set in for travelers of note coming from Iran to an addressIndian Court addressStreet to come and pass a few years at Haidarabad as well, for they were sure of being accorded a warm welcome with the prospect of leaving Haidarabad much richer than when they arrived there. Mirza Muhammad Amin Shahristani Ruh al-Amin One of the leading Iranian poets who also became an outstanding personality of QutbShahi Kingdom was Mirza Muhammad Amin Shahristani Ruh al-Amin. He came to Haidarabad and was forthwith appointed Mir Jumla by the Sultan on Mir Mumins recommendation in 1011A.H/1602-3A.D.He proved to be the strong man of QutbShahi Kingdom and MuhammadQuli Qutb Shah relegated practically all governmental powers to him both on the civil side and in the military field. He remained at the helm of affairs till the death of Sultan ten years later. In spite of his obvious preoccupations as a statesman and a soldier, Mirza Muhammad Amin Shahristani Ruh al-Amin found time to compose some fine poetry. He belonged to renowned noble family of Musavi Sayyid in Shahristan near Isfahan City. Members of his family commanded great respect at the Safawid court. Mirza Amin Shahristani had a fine literary taste and was poet of great order. He was so confident of his own capacity that he in a way challenged such a masterly work as the Khamsa Nizamiya of the great poet Nizami Ganjawi, and while at Haidarabad began to compose his own khamsa, or five-Mathnawis, four books of which he was able to complete.
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(1) Shirin wa Khusro was the first mathnawi in the Khamsa-i-Ruhul Amin was composed in 1018A.H, in imitation of Nizamis poem of the same name. One of its manuscript is preserved in the Majlis Library, Tehran and the other in the India Office Library, London.) (2) Matmahul Anzar being an imitation of Nizamis Makhzanul Asrar was Amins second Mathnawi. It comprises an epilogue in mixed prose and verse, praise of Allah, supplications, praise of the Holy Prophet of Islam (S.A.W.) and the Ahlul-Bayt (A.S.) and eulogy of Sultan. (3) Laila Majnunbeing the third Mathnawi of Amins Khamsa. Its two manuscripts are preserved one in the British Museum Londonty and the other in the India Office Library, London. (4)Asman-i-Hashtum being the forth Mathnawi of Amins Khamsa was written in imitation of Nizams Haft- Paikar. It was started in the time of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah but could be finished only after his death. It was therefore dedicated to the Sultans successor Muhammad Qutb Shah. One of its manuscripts is preserved in the BritishMuseumLondon (5)We have no exact information about his fifth Mathnawi. Besides these Mathnawis, Mirza Amin composed a large number of lyrical poems and those written in the early period of his poetic career were compiled into a diwan which exists in three manuscripts. One in the British Museum, London City, the other in the India Office Library, London:City and the third in the Majlis Library, Tehran. His diwan is named Gulistan-i-Naz.. Mulla Muin Mirak Sabazwari Another great Iranian poet who was honored at Haidarabad was Mulla Muin Mirak Sabzwari, who began acting as envoy of Ahmadnagar sent to Haidarabad to felicitate Muhammad-Qulis accession to the throne and then represented the Nizam Shahi Kingdom on being sent on the occasion of the marriage of the Kings daughter, Hayat Baksh Begum in 1016A.H/1607A.D. It was probably after he had settled down at Haidarabad that the Sultan constructed his famous palace Khudadad Mahal. Muin Sabzwari belonged to a distinguished family of Sabzwar in the Khurasan province, Iran country-region. He entered the services of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah and attained honorable positions in the royal court. He was a poet of great repute during Muhammad-Qulis reign. Sabzwari was a humorist and proved great fun and laughter in the jovial assemblies. Husain bin Ali Fursi Shaidani The tradition of compiling a metrical chronicle of the Qutb Shahi dynasty which had begun in the reign of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah was continued during the reign of his successor. .Husain bin Ali Fursi compiled Nasab Namah Qutb Shahi or Nisbat Namah Shahryari during the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah in 1019 A.H. It is the metrical history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty from the beginning of the dynasty to the early period of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. This history is expressed in poetical form and comprises 18600 couplets. The work is divided into four parts: the first part is a kind of introduction and takes the reader up to the end of the Bahmani dynasty: the second takes him right up to the accession of Ibrahim: the third deals with the reign of Ibrahim, while the forth brings the history up to the compilation of the work. He based his Nasab Namah on the Shahnamah-i-Firdausi and it is heroic _expression of poet. .
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Sultan Muhammad Qutb (1020 A.H./1612 A.D.-1034 A.H./1626 A.D.) Muhammad Qulis successor Sultan Muhammad Qutb was taught and brought up by Allama Mir Mumin Astarabadi, Peshwa-e-Sultanat. He therefore is known as Mujtahid and Faqih Sultan of the Qutb Shahi dynasty. Besides being a peace loving Sultan, he was a great lover of the books. He employed a large number of calligraphers to make copies of the books. His court companions were religious divines. It was he who stopped all the practices and customs contrary to religion. Allama Mir Muhammad Mumin Astarabadi, Vakil and Peshwa-e- Sultanat during Muhammad Quli and Muhammad Qutbs reigns played very crucial role in the development and furtherance of Persian literature in the Qutb Shahi kingdom. He was also an outstanding Persian poet. His ghazal is full of allusions to the land of his birth, Iran, and is reminiscent of some of the famous cities of that country like Isfahan and Shiraz. The ode he composed after the accession of Sultan Muhammad was presented to him immediately after his enthronement. There is again the ode composed on the festival of Idd-al- Azha, 1020A.H/1613A.D., another on the birth of the Prince Muhammad Ali Mirza and few lines in praise of the Sultan in the preface to the Risala-i- Miqdariyah. It deals with all the weights, distances and measures prevalent in the kingdom. Mir Mumin was also the author of Kitab-i-Rajat and wrote the preface to the Persian translation of the Arabic work Kathirul-Miamin,which was ascribed to the eighth Shiite Imam, Ali ibn Musa ar- Reza(A.S.). Tarikh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shah The famous book of the Qutb Shahi history was written by an anonymous writer. This book contains the history of the Qutb Shahi dynasty up to 1026A.H./ 1617A.D. six years after Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shahs death. This book was compiled at the behest of Muhammad Qutb in 1025A.H.or 1026. The special literary significance of this work consists in this, that it has preserved a selection of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shahs poetry in its concluding portion. (46)As a complement to Tarikh Muhammad Qutb Shah the history of the dynasty is brought right up to the end of the reign in Maathir-i Qutb Shahi compiled by Muhammad bin Abdullah Nishapuri. Hakeem Rukna Kashi Hakeem Ruknuddin Masud Kashi alias Hakeem Rukna-i-Masih was a famous physician and poet during Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shahs period. The author of Khazana-i-Amera writes that Hakeem Rukna Kashi was the author of one hundred couplets. Professor Devare writes that Hakeem Rukna Kashi is the author of Mathnawi, Majmua-e-Khayal comprising two thousand couplets. Rukhna Kashi in youth was personal friend and favorite of Shah Abbas Safawi-I. He was an outstanding physician and calligrapher. He is the author of ten diwans. His mathnawi Majmua-iKhayal is available in the British Museum London
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. The mathnawi was written by Rukna Kashi based on the model of Nizamis Khusro-waShireen. He is also the author of Saqi Namah. Rukna Kashi closely imitated the odes of Baba Fighani . He died in Mashhad in 1066A.H 1655-56A.D Mulla Fazlullah Semnani Mulla Fazlullah Husaini Semnani rendered Rauzat-ur-Riyaheen into Persian and named it Nuzhat-ul-Uyun. It is a book on the lives of Sufi saints and divines. Rauzat-ur-Riyaheen was translated into Persian by Mulla Semnani in 1026A.H./ 1626-27A.D. at the request of Sultan Muhammad Qutb (490 Mulla Husain Amuli Mulla Husain Amuli was a great scholar who migrated to Haidarabad from the Mazandaran province (Iran) during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He penned the Sharh-e-Nahjul Balagha in Haidarabad. Zainuddin Ali Badakshi Zainddin Ali Badakshi translated into Persian Shaikh Nasiruddin Tusis Arabic treatise Tajrid. It was completed in the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. The translator also wrote a commentary on Tajrid and gave it the title of Tuhfa-i-Shahi. Shah Qazi Astarabadi Shah Qazi, a famous Iranian poet from Astarabad near Isfahan:City, wrote Qasidah in praise of Sultan Muhammad Qutb in the book known as Kaseer-ul-Mayameen. Wisali Ardistani Wisali Ardistani migrated from Ardistan near Isfahan City to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. He was an author of Diwan in Persian. Ali Gul Astarabadi Ali Gul Astarabadi, a distinguished Persian poet from Astarabad near Isfahan City came to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb and was partonised by Sultan and Allamma Mir Mumin, Peshwa-e-sultanat who also hailed from Astarabad. Mulla Abdul Baqi Damavandi Mulla Abdul Baqi hailed from Damavand (Iran). He came to Haidarabad during the last days of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. As a Persian poet, he earned a great reputation in Haidarabad.
Amir Taqi Isfahani Amir Taqi Isfahani also famous as Durkani visited Golkonda during the reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah. He was an outstanding Persian poet. Tajalli Kashani
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Muhammad Husain Kashanis poetic name was Tajalli. He had been to Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. Askari Kashani Mir Hasan Askari hailed from Kashan. He visited Haidarabad during the reign of MuhammadQuli Qutb Shah. His Saqi Namah best represent his poetry and it consists of 223 couplets in the praise of Imam Ali (A.S.). Qasim Arsalan Mashhadi His name was Qasim and poetic name Arsalan. He hailed from Mashhad He joined the court of Adbullah Qutb Shah and enjoyed royal favors. Jalaluddin Nishapuri He hailed from Nishapur and had been to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. Sali Ardestani Mirza Sali Ardestani came to Haiderabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb .He was one of the famous Persian poet of Haidarabad during that reign. Ishrati Yazdi Ishrati of Yazd died in Haidarabad in 1037A.H/1627A.D. He was an outstanding poet and contributed richly to Persian literature. Shams Dah Dah Isfahani He was a poet and came to Golkonda during the second half of the sixteenth century and stayed there for considerable time. Syed Murad Isfahani Syed Murad Isfahani had written short mathnawi on the city of Haidarabad. There are many other works compiled in Persian during Muhammad Qutbs reign on tasawwuf, ethics, and literature interspersed in the libraries of London, Calcutta, Bankipur and Haidarabad, which throw light on the avidity of the Court for gems of literature. Abdullah Qutb Shah (1034 A.H./1626A.D-1083 A.H./1672A.D.) Muhammad Qutb and his renowned wife Hayat Baksh Begum appointed some of the best teachers available to train prince Abdullah. His teachers were Iranians and Persian was the official language of the state as well as the language of communication among the learned. Thus, Abdullahs court became rendezvous of scholars and writers from Iran. Great scholars from Iran hovered round him. A few of them are as follows: Allama Mir Majduddin, Allama Rounaqi, Qazi Ahsan, Mir Miran ,Hakim Abdul Jabbar Gilani ,Shaikh Abdul Lateef Nurullah, Mirza Muhammad Jowhar Tabrizi, Mirza Hamza Astarabadi, Mir Fazlullah Shirazi, Shaikh Harun, Mulla Taphtai Shirazi and Mulla Arab.
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Abdullah Qutb Shah(1626A.D-1672A.D) kept the traditions of his father alive and lavishly patronized the men of letters ,who came down to Haidarabad from Iran. Beside Allama Muhammad Ibn-e-Khatun Ameli, who was the Vakil and Peshwa-e-Sultanat and Riaz Astarabadi, who held a prominent post in administration ,there were other Iranians too whose list is very long. But the other most important Iranian scholars of his period are: Mulla Jamaluddin, Mulla Hussain Amuli, Nizamuddin Ahmed Shirazi, Syed Ali Masoom Shirazi, Muhammad Hussain Burhan Tabrizi, Muhammad Quli Jami, Razi Danish, Reza Quli Beg Neknam Khan, Hakeem Abdul Jabbar Gilani, Hakeem Nizamuddin Ahmed, Zulfiqar Sasani, Khalqi Shustari etc .Beside the literary work, Abdullahs reign is marked for a large number of books in religious literature. The Iranian scholars and divines like Shah Qazi Yazi, Nizamuddin Gilani, Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami, etc. wrote a number of books covering all aspects of religion.. Allama Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli One of the foremost among such scholars was Allama Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli, who became the Peshwa-e-Sultanat. He rose to such an eminence in the realm of knowledge that he came to be known as Hadrat Allama Fahami or the most learned and full of wisdom. He wrote four books Sharh-e-Irshad-ul-Azhan, Sharh-e-Arbaeen. Jameh Abbasi, Kitab-al-Imamat. He held regular classes twice a day and delivered lectures on the commentaries of the Holy Quran, logic, philosophy and mathematics. Mulla Muhammad Husain Burhan Tabrizi He is the author of the well known Persian dictionary Burhan-i-Qatey and was an erudite and learned Persian scholar. He migrated from Tabriz Iran and settled in Haidarabad during the Abdullah Qutb Shahs reign. He complied this famous Persian dictionary Burhan-i-Qatey at the behest of Abdullah Qutb Shah. Allamah Ibn Khatun Amuli, had great respect for Mulla Muhammad Husain Burhan Tabrizi. This monumental dictionary was completed in 1656A.D.in Haidarabad. This is one of the most standard works on Persian in lexicography compiled under the patronage of Abdullah Qutb Shah. This book has enjoyed wide reputation both in India and Iran. This dictionary had been printed in Calcutta, Bombay and Lucknow and the copy of it is at hand in every distinguished and reputed library in the world. In the body of the books, words have been enumerated under each orthographical heading, the total number of words dealt with being 19,177. Burhan-i-Qatey is still one of the basic dictionaries of the Persian language. Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmed Saidi Another Persian work of a permanent value complied during Abdullah Qutb Shahs reign is Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmad Saidis, Hadiqat-us-Salatin. It is a detailed history of the first nineteen years of the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and was written at the instance of the Peshwa-e-Saltanat, Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli. It purports to be a day to day chronicle of the kingdom from Abdullahs birth on 21-10-1023A.H/21-11-1614A.D to 26-12-1053A.H/25-2-1644A.D. It gives a correct picture of social life of the people and the administrative and the international set-up. Mirza Nizamuddin Ahmed al-Saidi Shirazi was leading religious scholar and poet during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was also a leading professor at the Hawzah-i-Ilmia(Islamic Seminary) of Allama Shaikh Muhammad ibn Khatun in Haidarabad. He also occupied a respectable post in the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah.
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He was also well versed in applied sciences like mathematics and astronomy. He wrote a book Shajr-e-Danish which includes 108 articles in various branches of sciences like mathematics and astronomy. Kaukab Qazwini Qubbad Beg Kaukab Qazwini came to Haidarabad during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb and died in 1033A.H/1623A.D. and is buried in Dairah Mir Mumin cemetery in Haidarabad. He was a famous poet of his period and composed a diwan which is at present extinct. His poetry has a deep under-current of pessimism and a fatalistic pathos. Abdul Ali Taliqani Haji Abdul Ali Talighani, a famous Iranian scholar hailed from the city of Talighan (Iran). He migrated to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and attained the distinguished position of Nazir-ul-Mamalik which contains royal letters written by him during the service of Abdullah Qutb Shah. This book is great work in the art of letter-writing and correspondence in Persian. This book also gives an insight into the political, social and international conditions of the kingdom. The copies of the book are present in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad and British Museum Library, London. He drafted letters of political and administrative nature on behalf of Abdullah Qutb Shah and Hayat Baksh Begum addressed to the Emperor Shah Jahan, Shah Abbas Safawi-II of Iran, Adil Shahs of Bijapur and the Mughul princes, Dara Shikoh, Aurangzeb, Muhammad Sultan as well as the grand-daughter of Shah Jahan and wife of Muhammad Adil Shah. Among the types of documents drafted by him, there are Farman, Kabin Nama,Wakalat Nama,Waqf Nama,diplomatic correspondence and belles letters. Above all the historical Inqiyad Nama or the Deed of Submission executed by Abdullah Qutb Shah to the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan was drafted by him. In his writings, though he has dealt with a variety of subjects relating to politics, diplomacy, administration and culture, his individual style prevails in all these directions. His style manifests his two fold capacity of writing the most artificial prose on one hand and the practical on the other hand. Abdul Azeem Taliqani Abdul Azeem Taliqani succeeded his father Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani and was appointed as Dabirul-Mulk during the reign of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. He too drafted all important foreign and international correspondence. His drafts include letters addressed to the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, Shah Sulaiman Safavi of Iran, Sikander Adil Shah of Bijapur and the Prince Muhammad Moazzam and others. His style was plain and ornate. He made a better room for Persian glosses than his father. He maintained a uniform style throughout by thinning the ceremonial baroque in the beginning or end. The contention expressed in his Insha prevails over the heaviness of diction and makes his writings more palatable than his fathers. His style keeps up freshness in every letter and does not become thick with any traditional or individual stereotype. Thus Abdul Azeem Taliqanis style is more effective and artistic. Ali bin Taifoor Bustami He was a famous historian of the Qutb Shahi period. He was patronized by Neknam Khan and wrote many books on history, biographies, ethics and mysticism. His famous works are:
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1) Tuhfe-e-Mulki, Persian rendering of Ibn-i-Babwaih Qummis Uyun-ul-Akhbar ar-Reza(A.S.). 2) Anwar-ul-Tahqiq, which contains extracts from the writing of the Sufi saint Khwaja Abdullah Ansari. 3) The translation of Makarem-ul-Akhlaq. 4) Risalah-i-Masoomah. 5) Tuhfa-tul-Gharaib, containing the traditions of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.), verdicts of the saints, acrimonious sermons of certain preachers and the advice of the learned. 6) Ganj Nameh, the monumental work which explains the difficult words in the Shahnamah-iFirdausi. It was compiled at the behest of Neknam Khan in 1079 Hijrah. It contains 174 folios. 7) Sharah-i-Awamil. 8) Tuhfa-i-Qutb Shahi, written on the style of Gulistan which includes eight chapters and conclusion. 9) Hadaiq-us-Salatin: It is a very important treatise on the historical events during the reigns of Abdullah Qutb Shah and Abul Hasan Qutb Shah. It can be considered as magnum opus of Ali bin Taifoor Bustami. The copy of it in fine nastaliq script is preserved in Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. Its literary value is unique since it preserves poetical extracts of the Bahmanis and the Qutb Shahi sultans as well of other eminent poets of Iran and India. The notices of Mir Mumin Astarabadi and Mir Muhammad Amin Shahristani in this work are of great value. Mir Majduddin Astarabadi Mir Muhammad Majduddin was the son of Allama Mir Muhammad Mumin Astarabadi. He was renowned scholar and poet during the Qutb Shahi period. According to the author of Hadaiq-usSalatin, he was the author of Diwan, copy of it is at present extinct. Ulfati Yazdi Maulana Ulfati Yazdi wrote about the events of Abdullah Qutb Shah in the form of a book known as Rawaeh-i-Gulshan Qutb Shahi, which contains seven chapters. The copy of it is present in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. Ulfati Yazdi is one of the distinguished writers during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He wrote a Risalah on Ilm-ul-Arus in1048A.H, known as Riyaz-ul-Zaeh Qutb Shahi. The copies of the book are present in Bankipur Library, Patna; Asafia Library, Haidarabad, and Cambridge University Library, U.K. Meer Razi Meer Razi bin Meer Turab Razavi belonged to the Razavi Sadaat family of Mashhad Iran. He came to Haidarabad during Abdullah Qutb Shahs period and settled in the city. He was a Persian poet of great standard and merit. His father Meer Turab died in Haidarabad in 1060A.H. and was buried in the Dairah Mir Mumin Astarabadi cemetery, the exclusive graveyard for the Iranian during the Qutb Shahi period.
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In 1073A.H.,Abdullah Qutb Shah deputed Meer Razi as Nayeb-us-Ziarah, for the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Imam Reza (A.S.), the eighth Shiite Imam. Meer Razi composed a Diwan which the author of Aatish Kade states that Diwan of Meer Razi consisted of one thousand couplets. But unfortunately the copy of it is extinct now. Shah Jami Muhammad Shah Jami was born in Haidarabad in an Iranian family. He was a great scholar of Persian and Sanskrit during Abdullah Qutb Shahs reign. He had translated Koka Shastra attributed to Pundit Koka of Kashmir form Sanskrit to Persian in1036A.H., during Abdullahs reign..
Kismet Mashhadi Muhammad Qasim Kismet Mashhadi migrated form Iran to Haidarabad during Abdullah Qutb Shahs period. He was a great artisan as well as distinguished Persian poet . Salik Yazdi Salik Yazdi was a famous Persian poet who migrated to Haidarabad from Yazd (Iran) during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He composed a Diwan, a copy of which is preserved in Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. A selection of his lyrical poetry is housed in the Bombay University Library. Azad Bilgrami and the author of Makhzan-ul-Gharaib had praised the poetical genius of Salik Yazdi. He composed about six thousand couplets. Farajullah Shushtari Farajullah Shushtari belonged to a distinguished Sadaat family of Shushtar (Iran) and was author of a Diwan. Authors of Maasir al Kalaam, Riyaz-al-Shuara and Natayej-al-Afkar had applauded the outstanding lyrical merit of Farajullah Shushtaril He came to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and attained a respectable position in his court. His Diwan contains about three to four thousand couplets. Gulam Ali Masoom, author of the famous Salafat-ul-Asr writes that Farajullah Shushtari was also an Arabic poet of great repute. The copies of his Diwan are present in the Bankipur Library, Patna and Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta Hamza Astarabadi Hamza Astarabadi came to Haidarabad from Iran during Muhammad Qutbs reign. He attained the dignified position of Sarkhail during Abdullah Qutab Shahs reign. He was a writer and poet of good repute but unfortunately his works are at present extinct. Khalqi Shushtari Shaikh Abdul Lateef Khalqi Shushtari was a distinguished religious scholar from Iran who reached Haidarabad in 997A.H. and attained high positions in the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was an outstanding Persian poet and also lectured at the Darul Shifa Medical College in Haidarabad. Husaini Kareem
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Meer Muhammad Kazem Husaini Kareem, was a distinguished and famous Persian poet who migrated to Haidarabad form <st1:Iran during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He had written a lengthy Qasidah, ode, in praise of Abdullah Qutb Shah which is famous as Ganj Namah. A copy of the Kulliyat of Hussaini Kareem is present in the British Museum Library. Bayan Isfahani Mahdi Bayan Isfahani came to Haidarabad from Isfahan during the reign of Abdullah Qutb shah and was distinguished Persian poet. Neknam Khan Mirza Reza Quli Beg Neknam Khan, an Iranian who held a honorable position in the administration of Shah Abbas Safavis court, migrated to Haidarabad and occupied distinguished administrative and military posts in the Qutb Shahi Kingdom Neknam Khan was a strange combination of a man of sword and a man of pen. He patronized the men of letters, religious scholars and poets lavishly. Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami, one of the leading scholar of Abdullah Qutb Shahs reign came to Haidarabad on the invitation of Neknam Khan and flourished under his patronization. Akhtari Yazdi Akhtari Yazdi was a great Persian poet who was also well versed in astronomy. He came to Haidarabad during Muhammad Quli Qutb Shahs period and was associated with services of Mir Muhammad Amin Shahristani, Mir Jumla. He died in 1026A.H. and is buried in Langar Houz, Haidarabad. Abdullah Amani Abdullah Amani came from Mazandaran province Iran to Haidarabad during reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and wrote a Diwan in Persian and also a book on medicine. The copy of his Diwan is still present in Indian Office Library, London.(98) Muhammad Ali Jabalarudi Muhammad Ali Jabalarudi was born in a village Jabalarud near Isfahan. He migrated to Haidarabad in 1054A.H. during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and entered the services of Allama Ibn Khatun Ameli. At behest of Allamah Ibn Khatun, he collected the amsal in Persian in 128 chapters famous as Majma-al-Amsal or Jameh-ul- Tamseel. It was compiled in 1054A.H. While explaining amsal, the author had described the historical events and anecdotes pertaining to the amsal. Professor Ethe calls this book as Jameh-ul-Tamseel. The original manuscripts of the book are present in Rampur Library, Berlin Library and Asafia Library, Haidarabad. It was printed in Tehran 1278A.H. and inBombay in 1291A.H. It is a voluminous work containing 205 folios. Abdullah Nishapuri Muhammad bin Abdullah Nishapuri came to Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. He was a distinguished historian of the Qutb Shahi period and wrote a famous book on the events during the Qutb Shahi period known as Maathir Qutb Shahi.Professor Devare
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writes This work is supplement to Tarikh-e-Muhammad Qutb Shah recording in details the history of Muhammad Qutb Shahs reign till his death in 1035 Hijrah. . Shaikh Ahmed Jabel Ameli Shaikh Ahmed Jabel Ameli came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He translated the monumental work of Bahauddin Amelis Kashkul into Persian in seven volumes in Haidarabad in 1101A.H. According to Professor Ethe, the copy of this book is present in the Indian Office Library, London. Rounaqi Hamadani Rounaqi Hamadani came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was also an author of Diwan running into 3,500 couplets. Munsif Isfahani Ghiyasuddin Ali Munsif Isfahani was a didactic poet, writing plain and chaste poetry. He joined the Qutb Shahi services. His diwan was compiled posthumously by a friend of his. His Saqi Namah is highly ethical and reflective in tone and comprises five thousand verses. Reza Danish Mashhadi Reza Danish was Razavi Sayyid of the holy city of Mashhad and son of a great poet Abu Turab Fitrat. He composed a mathnavi in praise of the holy cities and the mausoleum of Imam Reza (A.S) in Mashhad.(104) He arrived in Haidarabad in 1068A.H./1657-58A.D. As a Mashhadi Sayyid, he naturally commands the reverence of the Qutb Shahi ruler and he was exalted to high rank. Jung-i-Qutb Shahi It is a treatise on ethics and theology by an anonymous author who flourished in the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. The manuscript of this book is preserved in the Andhra Pradesh Oriental Manuscript Library, Haidarabad. The work comprises 178 folios. Lamaate-Qutb Shahi It is work on meteorology compiled by an Iranian named Ibn Husain bin Jamaluddin in the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. The manuscript contains 61 folios.. Muizuddin Wafa Khan Muizuddin Wafa Khan was an eminent Persian poet who migrated to Golkonda during IbrahimQulis reign. He is the author of Parwane-i-Shikar. Haji Hamadani Haji Hamadani, a distinguished poet in Persian migrated from Hamadan (Iran) to Haidarabad during Sultan Muhammad Qutbs reign and contributed to the advancement of Persian literature in the kingdom.
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Fikri Isfahani
Muhamman Reza Fikri Isfahani was a great scholar and poet in Persian. He was a minister under Muhammad Amin Shahristani and died in Haidarabad in 1002A.H/1593-94A.D.. Zulfiqar Sasani Zulfiqar Azar Sasani famous as Mobed is author of Dabistan a book written on various religions, creeds and sects. He arrived in Haidarabad from Iran Abdullah Qutb Shahs reign and was patronized by Allama Ibn Khatun Ameli, Peshwa-e-Sultanat. Ulfati Savehji Ulfati bin Husain Savehji wrote a book on prosody called Riyaz-us-SanaI Qutb Shahi at the instance of Abdullah Qutb Shah in 1046A.H/1636A.D. this work covers 32 folios.. Mir Fazlullah Shirazi He was great religious scholar and traditionalist Muhaddith. He was well versed in all the branches of knowledge and collected one thousand Apostolic Traditions in support of the Shiite faith. He translated Al-Misbah into Persian.(113) Safi Shirazi Shaikh Muhammad Safi Shirazi came from Shiraz to Haidarabad during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah where he was appointed as Mir Munshi. He was a famous Persian poet. He died in Haidarabad in 974A.H/1566-67A.D, and was buried in the Dairah-i-Mir Mumin cemetery.(114) Fitrat Mashhadi Mirza Abu Turb Fitrat Mashhadi came to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah and was favoured with a mansab. He was a Persian poet of great repute.He died in 1060A.H./ 1650A.D. and was buried in the Dairah-i-Mir Mumin cemetery.(115) Wahshi Jaushqani He was born in Kashan and was student of Maulana Muhtashim Kashi. He died in Haidarabad in 1013A.H/1604-5A.D. He wrote more than two thousand couplets of ghazal. Hukmi Shirazi Mulla Hukmi Shirazi was the nephew of Urfi Shirazi. He had been to Haidarabad during Sultan Muhammad Qutbs reign. He died in Haidarabad. (117) Famous Iranian scholars in the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah who contributed beautiful chronogramatic verses on different occasions were Shaik Ahmed Jabal,(118) Mulla Arab Shirazi, Mulla Burhan Tabrizi,(119) Mulla Qutb-e-Adai,(120) Mir Khalilullah Husaini,(121) Mulla Mina-eGilani,(122) Mirza Ghiyas Khwish,(123) Qaiser Maddah(124) and Mulla Majlisi.(125) Shaikh Harun Jazairi He was a famous mujtahid (jurisprudent) and theologian during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He taught fiqh for thirty years and died in 1047A.H/1638A.D. (126)
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Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (1083 A.H./1672A.D-1098 A.H./1687A.D.)
The last ruler of the Qutb Shahi dynasty Abul Hasan Qutb Shah (1672A.D-1687A.D) was interested in many branches of knowledge and encouraged poets and writers but unfortunately he fell before the expanding might of the Mughal empire.The extinction of the Dakkani kingdoms at the hands of Aurangzeb closed the chapter of Persian art and learning in the Dakkan as a separate entity. Ali bin Taifoor Bustami completed the compilation of Hadaiq-us-Salatin or the Gardens of Kings in 1092 A.H/ 1681A.D , i.e. nine years after Abul Hasan Qutb Shahs accession.He also wrote Tuhfa-e-Qutb Shahi) (127) relating to ethics during his reign. Abul Hasan never lagged behind in the field of art and letters.His reign had reached the golden prime in the advancement of learning, especially Islamic theology. Risalah Dar Akhlaq, a treatise on ethics was written at the instance of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah.(128) Ibne Imad Ibne Imad the great scholar from Iran and wrote Kirkha-tul-Ulema which is considered as master-piece in the Persian literature.This book embodies various arts and sciences.The book makes a comprehensive survey of all sciences and is a perpetual glory of the Qutb Shahi age. This work consists of six volumes: the first is on Tafsir, the second on Hadith, the third on Fiqh, and was entitle Majma-ud-Daqaiq, the fourth was on Causes of things and was entitled Kashf alAsrar, the fifth was on Hikmat and the sixth on Miscellaneous Arts and Sciences. A copy of this work is available in the Salar Jung Museum Library, Haidarabad. He completed this work in Haidarabad in 1046A.H/1635A.D and consists of 263 folios. (129) Mulla Muhazabbuddin Ahmed During the reign of Abul Qutb Shah, the famous Iranian scholar in Haidarabad, Mulla Muhazabbuddin Ahmed wrote a commentary on the Quran entitled Tafsir-ul-Quran in 1089A.H.He also wrote sixteen more treatises on various topics such as Islamic law, jurisprudence, traditions. (130) Ali Husain Alkoh Khailavi At the instance of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, Ali Husain Alkoh Khailavi wrote Hilyat-ul-Qari, a book on the science of Quran elocution.Abul Hasan Qutb Shah himself was well versed in Quranic elocution and recited the Quran in the seven manners of pronunciation. Tafsir-ul-Quran and Hilayat-ul-Qari (131) are regarded as magnum opus with regard to both their academic and bulk which redound to the memory of the scholar-king Abul Hasan Qutb Shah as also to the religious zeal of the age. Insha (Epistolography) Insha or epistolography is the foundation of all literary prose in Persian language.The art of prose writing termed as Insha pardazi was supposed to be a natural gift and an admirable faculty possessed by a writer.The art of prose writing was intrinsic as well as extrinsic.Every syllable of a writing was tied up with some principle and well-knitted with a larger fugal scheme. Every word had a careful usage. The meanings were extended, decorated and made full of imagery with the
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help of several figures. If the imagery involved in Qutb Shahi prose is distilled, it shall afford a more picturesque glimpse of the contemporary cultural traits than a painting or an architectural baroque. The asset of literary prose of Golkonda which is now extant is also coloured with individual stylistics. The art of prose writing was called Insha and every stylistic pattern of Insha went after the name of its writer as Insha-e-Tabasi and Insha-e-Taliqani etc. Some of the prominent stylists are Mulla Qasim Tabasi, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani, Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun, Nizamuddin Ahmed Shirazi, Muhammad Kazim Karim, Ali bin Taifoor-al-Bustami and Abdul Azeem Taliqani. In Qutb Shahi administration, there had been eminent epistolarians known as Dabir-ul-Mulk or Mushi-ul-Mamalik. Several authors who held prominent position in the Qutb Shahi court are Mulla Qasim Tabassi, Abdul Jabbar, Muzaffar Ali, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani, Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Khatun Ameli, Muhammad Reza Astarabadi and Abdul Azeem Taliqani. The rare collections of Insha of three prose writers, namely Mulla Qasim Tabassi, Haji Abdul Ali Taliqani and Abdul Azeem Taliqani are preserved. Some of the letters of Mir Muhammad Kazim Karim are also preserved. Insha has been one of the strongest channels of Arabicising the Persian language during the 14th and 15th centuries A.D. It is with this retrospects, Persian Insha developed in the Qutb Shahi kingdom during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, all the epistolographers during that reign were the Iranians who contributed immensely in this literary field. Qissa Khawn (Fictionists) The Iranian fictionists of the Qutb Shahi kingdom produced only romances and no novels. Eminent and skilled Qissa Khawn or story tellars are seen in the kingdoms who were Iranian migrants. (132) Mulla Khalil Qissa Khwan(133) came from Iran to Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah in 1047A.H. Mullah Hamza Isfahani, (134) was another famous Iranian Qissa Khawn in Haidarabad during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was employed in the royal library. His picturesque narration of lighting has been categorized as Dastan or Romance by Nizammudin Shirazi. The famous Iranian Qissa Khawn during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Qutb was Haji Qissa Khawn Hamadani. He brought with him several versions of the famous romance entitled Dastane-Amir Hamza. This romance has been lithographed in seven volumes in Tehran in 1274A.H Tafsir (Exegesis) There are instances of Tafsir in fragmentary forms written during the Qutb Shahi period. The Tafsir-e-Surah-e-Hal Ata by Muizuddin Ardistani who wrote in the year 1044A.H/ 1634A.D, at the suggestion of Ibne Khatun Ameli and dedicated to Abdullah Qutb Shah. The tafsir of selective verses, is found in different forms.It is in the form of an independent work compiled in an anthology as Sawame-ul-Malakut of Shah Qazi Yazdi compiled in 1017A.H/ 1608A.D,during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah,or Ayat-ul-Ahkam (136) a Persian rendition of Shah Qazi Yazdis work which he prepared in 1021A.H/ 1612A.D. for Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah. Ibn Imad Rozbihan has classified Tafsir as one of the branches of
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Maarifat and has dealt with it in his scholarly work Khirqa-e-Ulama. Shah Qazi Yazdis translation of Ayat-ul-Ahkam in eight volumes each having several chapters in which there is Tafsir of each Ayat referred to therein. Fiqh (Jurisprudence) Shah Qazi Yazdis another important work is Fiqh-ul-Razavi. This work is an explanation of an original Arabic work on Fiqh ascribed to the eighth Shiite Imam Ali bin Musa Reza (A.S.).This translation with notes and explanation, has been prepared by Shah Qazi Yazdi at the instance of Sultan Muhammad Qutb and was completed in 1029A.H/1620A.D.This was done under the supervision of Allama Mir Mumin Astarabadi, the Peshwa-e-Sultanat. Aqaid (Ideology) The earliest work on Islamic doctrine Aqaid during the Qutb Shahi period is Sirat-al-Mustaqeem wa Deen-e-Qawim, written during the reign of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah.The other work on this subject is Usul-e-Khamsa-e-Imamiya. The reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah is the richest period regarding the production of Aqaid literature.During his reign not only several important works of Aqaid were translated but many original works were also recorded in Persian.There are at least seven works of this period which have survived through the ravages of time and which exclusively deal with the subjects of Aqaid (ideology). Muizuddin Muhammad, an eminent Iranian scholar in Haidarabad wrote Fauz-ul-Najat. This voluminous work runs over 402 folios and has been divided into one Muqaddama, one main part and an epilogue.It mainly attempts at justifying Imam Alis (A.S.) claim to the Imamat and elaborately describes the significance of the eleven Shiite Imams succeeding Imam Ali(A.S). Nikat-e-Duwan-o-Dudman-e-Qutb Shahi written by Husain-al-Yazdi, who wrote it in the year 1054A.H/ 1634A.D with this chronographic title.This small treatise of 24 folios contains information on various aspects of the religious mind and practice of the Qutb Shahi rulers.It commences with the prophecies of Shah Nimatullah Kirmani and comes down to the period of Abdullah Qutb Shah.The author has described the interest of the Qutb Shahi rulers in the development of both Shiite and Sunni religious institutions. Adiya (Prayer Manuals) Iranian scholars of Golkonda prepared many manuals of prayers. Prayers are normally in Arabic language.But the compilers of the prayer manuals of the Qutb Shahi kingdom have compiled Arabic prayers with Presian translation and commentary on the significance of these prayers has been offered.There are four manuscript manuals on Adiya or prayers compiled during the Qutb Shahi reign. The first manual entitled Sawame-ul-Malakut was compiled by Shah Qazi Yazdi in 1017A.H/ 1607A.D.The second important work in the translation of the famous Arabic manual of prayers is entitled Misbah-e-Kafami.The work with translation runs over 826 folios.This translation was prepared by Qazi Jamaluddin Fathullah bin Sadruddin Shirazi at the instance of Sultan Muhammad Qutb. The third work is Riyaz-ul-Salikin Fi Sharh Sayyid al Abideen, a commentary on Imam Zainulabedins famous work on prayers called as Sahifah-e-Kamilah.
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The fourth work is a translation of Bahauddin Amelis Miftah-ul-Falah made by Ali bin Taifoor al Bustami with the title Minhaj-ul-Najah.The codex runs over 127 folios and has been divided into one introduction and six chapters.Ali bin Taifoor al Bustami has added his own notes and comments to this translation. Hikmah (Philosophy) The intellectual elite in the Qutb Shahi kingdom who were mostly Iranian were conscious and responsive to the ideological developments in the contemporary Muslim world.The philosophic, the ethical and the mystic literature of Golkonda bears a testimony of this effect.These disciplines in Golkonda were mainly of oriental Islamic character. Danish Name-e-Shahi, which is the exclusive book on philosophy produced in the Qutb Shahi kingdom was written by Muhammad Amin bin Muhammad Sherif Astarabadi (d.1036A.H.)at the instance of Sultan Muhammad Qutb.The philosophy dealt with in this codex is theological.The author has derived information from authorities like Naseeruddin Tusi(d.1067A.H.),Jalaluddin Dawwani (d.908A.H./1502-3A.D), Razi(d.311A.H.) Syed Sharif Jurjani, Fareeduddin Taftazani (d.1510 A.D.)and several Muslim thinkers attached to scholastic group. He claims to have styled his work after the Arbain of Fakhr-al-Razi and has divided the book in forty sections entiltled Faida or the benefit. Another important work which exclusively relates to philosophy is the Tadhkirat-ul-Hukama. This is a small Whos Who of philosophers with a brief and useful introduction, written during the reign of Abdul Hasan Qutb Shah. The work introduces about forty-seven thinkers of Greece Rome Iran and Arabia. This biographical dictionary of the philosophers was written by Ismail bin Ibrahim Tabrizi. Encyclopaedia In 1035(A.H/ 1625A.D., a magnificent Persian encyclopaedia entitled Nafais-ul-Funun Fi Araisul-Uyun(144) of Muhammad bin Mahmud al Amuli was copied and placed in the royal library. This work comprises a very scholary muqaddama and two parts. These parts have been divided in eighty-five chapters, each grouped under several maqalas. Every chapter deals with a special branch of knowledge. Anthology One of the great personal anthologies of the Qutb Shahi era is the Shajar-e-Danish written by Hakim Nizammuddin Ahmed Gilani, who was the court physician of Abdullah Qutb Shah and was famous as Hakeem-ul-Mulk. The codex runs over 439 folios and comprises one hundred and eight items, which are of varied nature and cover a good variety of disciplines. The famous personal anthology written by Shaik Bahauddin Ameli known as Kashkul was translated by Ahmed al Shahidi al Amuli at the instance of Abdulah Qutb Shah. The royal codex runs over 173 folios. Physics During the Qutb Shahi period, the science of physics attained great progress.The properties, the causes and effects of material and metaphysical were dealt with by the author of Nafais-ulFunun. Hakim Nizamuddin Gilanis treatise No.14 and 22 also relate to physics.
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Mathematics
In view of grand architectural constructions and Nizamuddin Shirazis report of Massaahan (the Surveyors), Zamin Paimayan (the land measurers), mathematics was fairly in advanced stages in the Qutb Shahi period. The only available work on mathematics is the translation of Bahauddin Amelis(d., 1621-22A.D.) Khulasat-ul-Hisab. Indexes The tradition of indexing and referencing was in vogue in the Qutb Shahi kingdom. Hadiya-eQutb Shahi is one of the best examples of indexes. This is an index of the selective words of the Holy Quran alphabetically arranged together with reference to the Quranic chapter in which such words have occurred. Other famous literary works accomplished by Iranian scholars are Tarikh-e-Ganjina. It is a comprehensive world history written in Haidarabad by an anonymous author. It was completed somewhere during the fourth decade of the eleventh century, during the reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. Tarikh-e-Ganjina is divided into an introduction and twelve books termed Khizanahs, the sub-division of which are called Ganjinas.Jame-e-Mufidi is an important work written by Mulla Muhammad Mufid Yazdi al-Mustaufi. He was in Haidarabad during the reign of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah but left for Delhi in 1088A.H/1677A.D.). He is the author of Majalis-ul-Muluk, Mukhtisar Mufid and Jame-e-Mufidi, in three monumental volumes. He started the compilation of Jame-e-Mufidi in Haidarabad. The first volume deals with the history of Yazd. The second volume deals with the history of Safawid dynasty in Iran. The third volume is of an encyclopedic character which has been nicely edited by Iraj Afshar and published from Tehran in 1340A.H. He also wrote the famous gazetteer Ausaf-ul-Amsar in Haidarabad in the year 1091A.H/1680A.D. Primary Education Ibrahim-Quli Qutb Shah started a kingdom wide campaign to rout out and eradicate illiteracy and universalize primary education.He established a network of schools in the kingdom where the students irrespective of caste, creed and religion were imparted basic and primary education. Haidarabads Hawzah-Ilmea (Islamic Seminary) By the sixteenth century, education system in Iran had developed at a large scale. The Safawids set it in a new direction of training Shiite divines and jurisprudents or Mujtahids. The Islamic Seminaries or Hawzah-i-Ilmea were instituted in Haidarabad and Qutb Shahi kingdom which served as an important agency for the diffusion of ideas and knowledge which had developed in Iranian environment. There had been some notable Islamic seminaries or Hawzah-i-Ilmea in Haidarabad as Madrasah-i-Ibn Khatun and Madrasah-i-Hayat Baksh Begum. The curriculum taught at these Islamic seminaries included detailed courses of reflective maqulat and narrative manqulat branches of knowledge. The curriculum comprised Tafasir, the commentaries of Holy Quran, Ahadith the traditions of the Holy Prophet of Islam (S.A.W.). Fiqh, Islamic Jurisprudence, Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, Arabic and Persian Literature. In 1595A.D, Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah established Madrasah-Darul Shifa or the Medical College in Haidarabad.
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The colleges in Haidarabad produced great scholars like Mir-i-Miran son of Qazi Zahiruddin Muhammad, who rose to the position of royal epistolarian (Dabir-i-Huzur). He was first appointed as qazi of cantonment and later as Dabir and the member of the Majlis in 1047A.H/1637A.D. The curricula for the education of princes was somewhat different and comprised the following subjects obviously in addition to curricula meant for common people. 1. Qawaid-i-Jahandari the art of governance. 2. Administration of justice. 3. Adab-i-Giti Comity of nations. 4. Qanun-i-Majlis the laws of Majlis. 5. Diwan Dar court procedure. 6. Marasim-i-PadshahiRoyal customs. 7. Ihtimam-i-Asakir military organization. 8. Tarbiyat-i-Nizami military training. The language of education was Persian and the books of the syllabi were those written in Iran and most of the teachers in the schools and colleges of the Qutb Shahi kingdom were Iranians. Among the tutors of Abdullah Qutb Shah there were men like Mir Qutbuddin Nimatullah Shirazi, Syed Sharif Shahristani, Khwajah Muzaffer Ali and Maulana Syed Husain Shirazi. A close observation of the situation reveals that <st1:country-region Iran was the source of intellectual light. It was a model and an ideal in education and administration or fairly well in all walks of life of the nobility and aristocracy. The educational set up organized for the nobility in the Qutb Shahi kingdom smoothened ways for the new generation competently to receive the changing ideas imported from Iran and in turn to make their own contribution. Akhlaq (Ethics) The best of the works relating to ethics produced in Qutb Shahi kingdom is perhaps Tuhfa-iQutb Shahi written by Ali Bin Taifoor Bustami. Among the other ethical works produced in the Qutb Shahi kingdom reference may be made to Dastur-ul-Amal-i-Salatin(154), Risalah Dar Akhlaq and Resalah Shajar. During the Safawid era all the Islamic sciences were revised from Shiite point of view. Haidarabad followed Iran as a sincere disciple in all disciplines. Eschatology The Iranian scholars of Qutb Shahi kingdom like Muhammad Muqim bin Kamaluddin Husayn wrote a treatise Dar Tahqiq-i-Maad Wa Hashr-i-Ajsad, Ali bin Taifoor Bustami wrote Risalah-iMsdumiysh and the author of Usul-i-Kamsah paid special attention to the propagation of Islamic eschatology and contributed considerable literature projecting it as a very important issue.
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There had been hardly any Iranian scholar of Qutb Shahi kingdom who contributed to the religious and ethical literature and should have over looked a discussion on justice(Adl). There is a sizeable volume of literature relating to the interpretation of the Holy Quran, the traditions (Hadith) and jurisprudence (Fiqh) produced in Haidarabad or imported from Safawid Iran which reveals many more specialized aspects of Islamic thoughts and values diffused in Haidarabad. That had been done both by the Sufis through their mystic mission as well as by the Iranian elites through their control of administrative, judicial and educational institutions in their own ways. Education in the Qutb Shahi kingdom was common for everybody. The Hindus in the kingdom learned craft pertaining to their hereditary caste. The practice of Sati was prohibited and women were prevented from burning themselves on the funeral pyres of their husband. Tibb (Medicine) The Qutb Shahi rulers patronized Unani (Greek) medicine by inviting eminent physicians from Iran, encouraging medicinal researches by establishing medical institutions. The Unani medicine found its way in the kingdom through the efforts of Iranian physicians Hakims who were all the experts of Greco-Arab medicines. Almost all the Unani medicinal system had come from Iran. Many of them were officially invited by the Qutb Shahi sultans. The Unani system made great stride in Haidarabad. There had been constant inflow of eminent physicians from Iran and so Iranian medicine became an important import commodity of the foreign trade of Haidarabad. The Qutb Shahi kingdom had been one of the Greco-Persian Unani medicine during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hakim Ismail He was attached to the court of Abdullah Qutb Shah and attended the aristocracy. Other famous Iranian physicians in the Qutb Shahi kingdom were Hakim Shamsuddin Ali al-Husaini, Hakim Saifuddin Muhammad, Hakim Jabbar, Mirza Abdul Qasim, Kareem Yazdi, and Khulqi Shushtari. Hakim Nizamuddin Gilani He was perhaps the greatest of the medical scholars of Haidarabad. He hailed form Gilan and was student of Bahauddin Ameli (d1031A.H/1621A.D) and Shamsuddin Muhammad Baquer Damad (d. 1040A.H/1630A.D). In the year 1044A.H/1634A.D), he was invited by Abdullah Qutb Shah and appointed as the Royal Physician. He was considered as Hakim-ul-Mulk of the kingdom. Hakim-ul-Mulk contributed to the promotion of Unani medicine in Haidarabad in many ways. He was a versatile person. He served Haidarabad as a physician, a scholar, and as an ambassador. He died in Haidarabad. Makhzan-e-Tibb-e-Qutb Shahi discovered by Dr. Syed Muhammad Quadri Zore, who contended that it belonged to the Qutb Shahi period. It is an excellent work of pathology and therapeutics. Its author was a student of Maulana Ataullah Kurdistani. The work has been divided into chapters relating to various categories of diseases. Ikhtiyarat-e-Qutb Shahi of Mir Muhammd Mumin Astarabadi and Mizan-ul-Tabai Qutb Shahi of Taqiuddin Muhammad bin Sadruddin Ali were written at the instance of Sultan Muhammad Qutb are two books on medical sciences complied during the Qutb Shahi period.
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Tadhkirah-al-Kahhalin ( a note for occultists) was translated in Hiadarabad at the instance of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah. The translator of this book is Shamsuddin Ali al-Husaini al-Jurjani. Hygiene A unique manual of hygiene was compiled by Hakim Shamsuddin bin Nuruddin during the reign of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. This manual is entitled Zubdat-al-Hukam(164) Another hygienic manual is entitled Farid. It was written by Hakim Abdullah at the instance of Muhammad-Quli Qutb Shah. Medicinal Research Studies in different branches of medicinal science were encouraged in Haidarabad. Such studies were carried out either by directly indulging into a research project or by translating authoritative Arabic works into Persian. It imported the traditional system of Iran and introduced it at a large scale in the Sultanate. The scientific interest shown by the physicians of Haidarabad appears to have been centered round pharmacology. In this discipline of pharmacology attention has been paid to introduce the Greco-Arab methods of assaying both simple and compound drugs. In that effort many such drug ingredients were introduced which were found in Iran The standard forms of Unani compound drugs introduced in Haidarabad were: a) Electuaries Maajin, b) Liquids Araq, c) Powder Sufuf, d) Tablets Qurs e) pills Hubub f) Ointments Marham An enormous fund of recipes suggesting all sorts of compound medicine to cure various diseases was imported from Iran and assayed in Haidarabad The Iranian physicians in Haidarabad laid much emphasis on observing the principles of sound habits and hygiene. Hygienic slogans for the upkeep of health were formulated and manuals for maintaining health were written. Major medical institution founded during the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah was the Darul Shifa which was run by the government. Darul Shifa had been a hospital with medical college and several other ancillary institutions like hostels ,mosques ,caravanserai and hamman(bath).It was constructed in 1004A.H/1595A.D. Even administrators and monarch like Abdullah Qutb Shah had their own laboratories. Various Hakims maintained private medical institutions. In Darul Shifa general hospital which was established in 1595A.D in Haidarabad, nearly three hundred and fifty patients were lodged and fed at the expense of the government. Apart from the great state hospitals like Darul Shifa,at Haidarabad ,the state kept salaried Hakims and vaids Ayurvedic physicians in different towns at its expense, and they were commanded not to charge the patients for treatment. Thus the Iranian physician in the Qutb Shahi kingdom dominated the medical research and treatment in the kingdom. They were greatly respected in the kingdom by the rulers, nobility and the people. They even occupied key administrative positions. Thus the Iranian physicians and pharmacologists outstanding contribution to the system of health and hygiene in the kingdom is
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immense. The efforts of the Iranian physicians in Haidarabad paved the way for the further advancement of Unani medicine in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Conclusion Thus due to the Qutb Shahi Sultans patronage, the Iranian scholars in the kingdom compiled vast volumes of books on every aspect and fields of science and knowledge. Due to there incessant endeavors Haidarabad became one of the greatest seats of learning during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries A.D. The Iranian scholars in Golkonda strengthened their cultural, ideological, commercial, political and religious ties with Safawid Iran, which also helped in the rapid progress and evolution of Persian literature and Islamic-Iranian culture in Haidarabad and Dakkan. Today we come across thousands of manuscripts at Andhra Pradesh oriental Manuscrip Library and Research Centre in Persian, Urdu and Arabic Languages and Noor Micro Film Centre one of the Organizations in India under the Auspicius of Iran Culture House New Delhi have taken up the work of Repair, Binding, digitalization and Cataloguing of them. The Department of Persian at Osmania University is in existence ever since its inception and Thus the Indo-Iran relationship even today is very strong and will continue to be so.
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The Fading Iran Factor

Dr.David J. Karl
President Asia Strategy Initiative, Los Angeles
David J. Karl is president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, a consultancy based in Los Angeles that provides policy-relevant analysis of geopolitical, diplomatic and macroeconomic developments in Asia, with particular focus on South Asia. He also is an adjunct professor of diplomacy & world affairs at Occidental College, where he teaches on South Asia and globalization. Dr. Karl previously served as director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, in charge of the Councils think tank focused on foreign policy issues of particular resonance to the U.S West Coast, and was project director of the Joint Task Force on Enhancing India-U.S. Cooperation in the Global Innovation Economy that was jointly organized by the Pacific Council and the Federation of Indian Chambers & Industry. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry. He currently serves on the executive committee of TiEs Southern California chapter, and is an active contributor to the India blogs run by the Foreign Policy Association (http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/) and the U.S-India Political Action Committee. (http://www.usinpac.com/component/lyftenbloggie/authors/272.html).
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The Fading Iran Factor

With Iran moving closer to producing weapons-grade uranium1&2 Tehrans atomic ambitions will be an item of discussion at the upcoming U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. The issue has been a prominent bilateral irritant in the past and some fear3 that continued friction might well endanger New Delhis candidacy for a permanent seat the United Nations Security Council. In truth, though, the issue is losing its potency to bedevil U.S.-India ties. This is not because Washington will cease regarding the Iranian nuclear program as a matter of concern. Nor will South Block finally figure out how to painlessly balance its simultaneous quest for constructive relations with Iran and its American nemesis. Rather, now that Tehran has largely accumulated the requisite materials and technology for a nuclear weapon4 U.S. policymakers are increasingly coming to the grudging realization that there are real limits as to what can be done to elicit Iranian compliance with the global nonproliferation regime. One of the ironies of the diplomatic process that eventuated in the U.S.-India civil nuclear accord is that as concerns about Indian proliferation activities ceased being a hindrance to closer bilateral ties, the Iranian nuclear issue surfaced as a new point of discord. Indeed, in some quarters in both Washington and New Delhi, the two developments were inextricably linked. In the months following the path-breaking July 2005 summit between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford continuously sounded the alarm that a failure to back a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) motions censuring Iran risked jeopardizing Congressional support of the agreement. In September 2005, in the run-up to the first IAEA motion, Mulford delivered a tough message to Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, warning that it is time for India to make some hard decisions. We are approaching the moment when fence sitting will not be an option. And as the IAEA wrestled with a second motion in early 2006, Mulford took to the media 5&6 to warn that the lack of Indian support would have a devastating effect on Congressional opinion, causing the nuclear accord to die on Capitol Hill. Influential Congressional voices underscored the admonishments. The late Tom Lantos, a leading player in the House International Relations Committee, was especially vocal. He publicly stated7 in September 2005 that There is quid pro quo in international relations. And if our Indian friends are interested in receiving all of the benefits of U.S. support, we have every right to expect that India will reciprocate in taking into account our concerns. He subsequently
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warned that New Delhi will pay a heavy price for a disregard of U.S. concerns vis--vis Iran. The U.S. Congress gave preliminary assent to the nuclear initiative when it passed the so-called Hyde Act in late 2006 in a strong show of bipartisan support. But it also attached provisions to encourage Indian backing of the U.S. approach on Iran, thus ensuring that the issue would continue hanging in the air throughout the negotiations over the enabling 123 Agreement. With Lantos once more leading the charge, Congressional leaders sent a toughly-worded letter 8 to Prime Minister Singh in May 2007 warning of grave concern that Indias ties with Iran have the potential to significantly harm prospects for the accords final passage. Although President Bush took the position that the Hyde Acts provisions on Iran were advisory in nature, an odd alliance of the Indian Left and Right regarded them as an affront to the countrys sovereignty. Pointing to New Delhis support of the IAEA censures, they accused Mr. Singh of purchasing Washingtons concessions on the civil nuclear initiative by mortgaging Indias hard-won strategic autonomy. These passions came to a head in the parliamentary vote of confidence that occurred in July 2008, an unprecedented act for a foreign policy matter. Although Mr. Singh emerged victorious from the fray, the prolonged melodrama led some in Washington to question New Delhis reliability as a strategic partner. As the Washington Post commented 9, if New Delhis politicians cannot find a way to say yes to such a clearly advantageous agreement with a natural ally, the next U.S. administration no doubt will think twice before trying anything like it. Given what was at stake in the U.S.-India nuclear negotiations not only critically-need access to reactor technology and fuel but also the prospect of converting a strategic rapprochement with the worlds premier power into a fullfledged partnership it is not surprising that New Delhi sought to mollify Washingtons concerns on Iran. Still, the charges leveled against the Singh government were off the mark. The IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006 represented a tactical adjustment rather than a wholesale shift occasioned by excessive deference to U.S. policy preferences. This is not to say that India would otherwise have been supportive of Irans nuclear weapons program. New Delhi has been consistent that Tehran must live up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a position that was reaffirmed in November 2009 when it backed another IAEA rebuke of Iran.
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Yet the Indian government also has done little to surrender the pursuit of what it considers important national interests vis--vis Tehran. This is vividly demonstrated by the recent acrobatics in finding a stable mechanism to pay for crucial energy imports from Iran. Acceding to U.S. pressure, New Delhi barred Indian oil and gas companies last December from settling payments through the Tehran-based Asian Clearing Union. Iran had advertised the ACU as a means of sidestepping U.S. economic sanctions and Indian enterprises made extensive use of the facility. Though American officials hailed the move as asignificant step10, New Delhi quickly arranged an alternative conduit, using an Iranian-owned bank in Germany to funnel euro-denominated payments. When this connection was shut down in April, again due to Washingtons insistence, India and Iran soon enough settled on a new arrangement, this time to pay for oil imports in rupees. And even as New Delhi was going through these maneuvers, a consortium of firms, led by the overseas arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, was moving forward with plans to invest $5 billion in developing the Farsi gas field in Iran. 11 Energy security is a substantial reason for New Delhis desire to continue its engagement with Tehran. Possessing the worlds second largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran ranks just behind Saudi Arabia as Indias most important crude oil supplier. And with the countrys power requirements burgeoning 12, India will be increasingly dependent upon foreign energy sources, including Iran, which currently provides over ten percent of the countrys oil imports. Besides the petroleum connection, geopolitics will also drive New Delhi into a closer relationship with Tehran. India has traditionally relied upon Iran to help blunt Pakistans influence in Central Asia and to serve as a bridge to trade and energy opportunities there. And with the political endgame of the Afghan conflict beginning to unfold, this reliance will only deepen. Indeed, this process has already started. A year ago, just after the Obama administration unilaterally enacted fresh sanctions against Tehran, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao (now slated as Indias new ambassador in Washington) highlighted13 the unique civilizational ties and the instinctive feeling of goodwill between India and Iran. She spoke of how links with Tehran are a fundamental component of New Delhis foreign policy and how there has been a recent convergence of views on important policy issues. Regarding bilateral cooperation in Afghanistan, she argued that the two countries are of the region and will belong here forever, even as outsiders [read the Americans] come and go. A senior Indian official 14 described the outreach to Iran as a policy
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recalibration necessitated by the scenario unfolding in Afghanistan and Indias determination to secure its national interests. Earlier this year, Indias national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, visited Tehran seeking to shore up strategic ties 15. In early June, the deputy secretary of Irans National Security Council was in New Delhi to continue the talks. New Delhi now has even less incentive to go along with any new exertions of U.S. sanctions, and both countries may go so far as to revive their cooperation during the 1990s that provided critical support to the non-Pashtun militias battling the Taliban regime. The Americans will surely grumble about the cozying up with Iran, but the strategic logic of the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves New Delhi little choice. But as New Delhi adjusts policy, an even more significant change is underway in Washington. It is true that the U.S. government has prepared a new National IntelligenceEstimate16 concluding that Iran has resumed work on key nuclear weapon components. It is also the case that President Obama signed into law last summer a new round of anti-Iran penalties and that his administration has been fairly energetic in enforcing them. This implementation has affected some Indian companies and prompted complaints from New Delhi about the extra-territorial reach of U.S. laws. But over the last year, U.S. options in dealing with Iran have narrowed in important ways. Critics urge the Obama administration to be more forthcoming in diplomatic talks17, though with the current disarray in the Iranian government it is difficult to see how even the most sincere of efforts could gain meaningful traction. The administration has also pointedly stressed that all options are on the table, implying that it is willing to pick up the cudgel of military action in the event Tehran fails to engage diplomatically. Yet this threat always had an air of unreality, given how armed hostilities in the Persian Gulf region the epicenter of the worlds petroleum lifeline would have such calamitous economic consequences. And now the saber-rattling option is ringing more and more hollow by the month, in view of the bipartisan political consensus that is quickly growing in Washington in favor of reducing the countrys strategic commitments. President Obamas announcement of a fairly large and rapid drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is illustrative of this consensus, as is the likelihood that the Pentagon will face sharp budget cuts for years into the future. Confessing that the U.S. military establishment is exhausted, outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.
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With Mr. Obama declaring that America, its time to focus on nation building here at home18, a new geopolitical era is dawning. Hawks in the United States hold out hope that even if the Obama administration lacks the stomach to deal sternly with the Iranian nuclear program, the assignment can always be outsourced to Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have staked out hard-line positions on the issue. But even in Tel Aviv, salient changes in elite opinion may be afoot. Meir Dagan, the newly retired chief of the Mossad intelligence agency, for instance, has been outspoken in warning 19 that an attack on Iran would be a stupid idea and a dangerous adventure. In the final analysis, the Iranian issue will likely be to Mr. Obama and his successor what the North Korean nuclear program was to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Despite tough rhetoric directed at Pyongyang, the horrendous consequences of any major resort to arms on the Korean peninsula ultimately forced Washington to come to terms with the strategic reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea. And notwithstanding ample evidence that Chinese assistance was underpinning Kim Jung-ils regime, the U.S. government reluctantly came to the conclusion that it had bigger fish to fry in its bilateral relations with Beijing. To be sure, the parallels with the Iranian case are not fully complete. Few countries would welcome a nuclear-armed Tehran, but it does remain far from Pyongyangs international pariahtude. Nor is Indias rather limited engagement with Iran the equivalent of Chinas sustenance of North Korea. Still, at the end of the day, the lack of viable alternative options will compel Washingtons acquiescence were Iran to develop a strategic arsenal, affecting in turn the demands that it places on allies and partners. A harbinger of what is likely to take place over the next few years occurred during the recent visit to Washington by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose country to Americas chagrin continues to maintain a huge trading relationship with Iran. At a joint press conference, Mr. Obama once more issued a warning about Tehrans nuclear program, threatening additional steps, including potentially additional sanctions. Yet his words were half-hearted and Mrs. Merkels presence at his side only underscored U.S. difficulties in securing the enthusiastic support of its even long-time allies. Of course, American focus on a nuclear Iran will not flag entirely. New unilaterally formulated and enforced sanctions are certainly possible and these could come to ensnare Indian firms. But the real challenge for Indian
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policymakers these days seems to lie more in Riyadh than in Washington. The simmering rivalry between the Shiite theocracy in Iran and the Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia is once again coming to a boil. Last week, a senior member of the Saudi royal family reportedly warned 20 that Riyadh is preparing to employ all of its economic, diplomatic and security assets to blunt Tehrans regional ambitions. India may well get caught in the crossfire. If it does, satisfying the demands of its principal suppliers of crude oil will be South Blocks next balancing act.
URL LINKS 1: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/science/31nuke.html?ref=nuclearprogram 2:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?hp=&pagewanted= print 3:http://www.rediff.com/news/report/iran-issue-may-turn-out-to-be-a-train-wreck-forindo-us-ties/20110623.htm 4:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1087.html 5:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f98f4ca-8e10-11da-8fda0000779e2340.html#axzz1PqGS54AD 6:http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-01-25/india/27815005_1_nuclearissue-eu-3-international-atomic-energy-agency 7:http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/01/stories/2005100104491100.htm 8:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/02/AR2007050202484.html 9:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/24/AR2008062401503.html 10:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203513204576046893652486616.ht ml 11:http://www.livemint.com/2011/05/0823...ties-with.html 12:http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2010/WEO2010_ES_English.pdf 13:http://www.idsa.in/KeynoteAddressIndiaandIrananenduringrelationship_nirupamaroy 14:http://www.livemint.com/2010/07/11205722/India-moves-closer-to-Iran-ove.html 15:http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Globespotting/entry/india-s-reset-with-iran 16:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp57
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dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807152.html 17:http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-ambassadors-iran-20110609 18:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-wayforward-afghanistan 19:http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/former-mossad-chief-israel-airstrike-on-iran-stupidest-thing-i-have-ever-heard-1.360367 20:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304887904576400083811644642.ht ml?mod=googlenews_wsj
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India-Iran Relations: Not Quite Ideal, Yet

Karamatullah K. Ghori
Former Pakistani ambassador
His area of specialization includes the Arab world and ME, in particular. Hes currently working on a book Partition Revisited on his recollections, as a child, of the great divide and the two-way migration it spawned, and how the two main communities of India and Pakistan Hindus and Muslimshave since fared as independent peoples. The books publication is intended to coincide with the 65th anniversary of the Partition, next year.
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India-Iran relations have a history, a long one, going back to millennia. The two countries had been neighbours to each other and shared a land border until the birth of Pakistan, in 1947, created a physical wedge between them. In the course of their millennial interaction the two enriched each other at the level of civilizations. India of antiquity was the font of Buddhism and Buddhist ideology that seeped across the historic Khyber Pass into Afghanistanthen ruled by Persia. Buddhism flourished in Afghanistan but couldnt penetrate across the formidable barrier of Hindukush Mountains into the heartland of Persia. However, in the modern context, the genesis of relations between India and Iran should, in all fairness, be traced to Indias birth as a sovereign state as a result of the historic partition of the South Asian sub-continent into India and Pakistan in August 1947. Independent India was launched on an idealistic, socialistic, course under Pundit Nehru. He had expounded his creed of socialism long before he became Indias first Prime Minister. Iran, on the other hand was a monarchy, and an exploitative elitist order prevailed there because of the over-bearing influence of the west that was in full control of Irans rich mineral resources, particularly oil and gas. India and Iran, in that early phase, found themselves orbiting in diametrically opposite orbits as the Cold War enveloped the world and sought to divide it into conflicting spheres. India, because of its socialistic moorings, got rooted in the so-called Eastern bloc, led by the then Soviet Union. Iran, in contrast, was saddled with a key role in the Western camp in the context of the geo-strategically important Gulf region; the Shah of Iran took on the mantle of the head policeman of western imperialistic interests in the Gulf and ME region. The early phase of India-Iran relations, which stretched right up to the end of monarchy in Iranunder its 1979 Islamic Revolution could well be described as cordial and correct but lacking in warmth that many may have considered not only desirable but ineluctable given the centuries-old bonds of history between them. Pakistans extraordinarily close entente with Iran, and the two neighbours camaraderie induced by their common membership of the Anglo-American-led CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) was also a major factor in keeping India and Iran mired into a relationship that was correct but cool. Pakistan, a neighbour to both India and Iran has persistently played a rolewittingly or unwittinglyin influencing the course of India-Iran relations. No discussion of the whole gamut of Indo-Iranian can be complete, or even fully understood, without Pakistan butting into it. In this narrative, therefore, Pakistan would be appearing intermittently into the discourse. It has always had an obvious or unobtrusive place in the India-Iranian equation and cannot be left out of any analysis or prognosis of this equation. So the first quarter century of India-Iran relations visibly lacked any dynamics that could inspire confidence about the two getting out of the rut, while Pakistan and Iran went on adding all the substance of close co-operation in their bilateral sphere. The Shah of Iran was so committed to
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Pakistan that he didnt even mind breaching U.S. law by transferring American weapons to Pakistan during its war with India in 1971.*1+ That calculated defiance of U.S. laws governing the weapons supplied to close allies by the Shah underlined the regard he had for Pakistan. He took the risk of annoying the power that had restored him, in 1953, to his Peacock Throne (carted away from India, no doubt, in the 18 th century by the Persian invader, Nadir Shah after he had sacked Delhi in 1739) when the then socialist Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadaq, had forced him to flee to Rome for his life. That the Shah had elected to take sides with Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, anchored in the conflict in East Pakistan that eventually spawned the independent state of Bangladesh, was also indicative of his low esteem for relations with India. Even in an earlier conflict between India and Pakistanthe so-called 1965 Warthe Shah had provided parking space to the civilian aircraft of Pakistan, transported there for safe-keeping. The Islamic revolution of Iran, in early 1979, impacted a sea-change in the global perception of Iran and the worlds of Iran, too. The revolutionary regime, determined to put the monarchic era of the loathed Shah firmly behind it, disentangled Iran from all those alliances that the Shah had saddled it with. Even the next door Pakistan that had been a bosom ally in the days of the Shah couldnt escape the revolutionary backlash as the new regime cut off all strategic ties with Pakistan. But Irans distancing itself from Pakistanat least in the sense that had defined Pakistan-Iran relations during the Shahs ruledidnt, necessarily, lead to India taking advantage of it, or Iran taking a big step to cultivate India. There was hardly any change perceptible in the status quo of Indo-Iran bilateral relations, in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution. India, in that period, was still preoccupied with its experimentation with socialism; Indo-Soviet alliance was still intact; it had, in fact, gathered more mass and substance with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the helm in India. Iran, too, was soon consumed with the war that had been inflicted on it from Iraq. That cold phase in India-Iran relationswith business as usual but lacking in any sense a new direction or dynamicprevailed well up to the end of the 80s. Another contributing factor in keeping India-Iran relations on a slow burner was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which happened within a year of Irans Islamic revolution. There was ample evidence to suggest that the Iranian revolution had impacted the Soviets nervously and given them a creeping fear of the Islamic revolutionary ardour seeping into Afghanistan, a land the Soviets had always regarded with suspicion but also coveted it as a vital piece of the jigsaw puzzle they had been working so hard to fashion as their answer to the western bloc.
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The new Iranian leadership, deeply embroiled in fighting off the Iraqi invaders, had ample reason to distrust India, which was allied to the Soviet Union and didnt condemn its invasion of Afghanistan. By the same token, India elected to sit on the fence in the wasteful war of attrition between Iran and Iraq. But India was not alone in that fence sitting; Pakistan, too, for a variety of reasonsthe most powerful being its relations with the Arabsalso kept itself firmly insulated from any partisan role in the Iran-Iraq war. The end of the 1980s and the dawn of 1990s heralded the commencement of the current phase of India-Iran relations. By then, Iran had seen the end of the nightmare that its 8-year-long war with Iraq1980 to 1988had kept it onerously wrapped in. The 10-year-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had also come to an end with the ignominious withdrawal of the invader from there in 1989. It soon triggered the collapse of the ersatz union that the Russians had clobbered together under the weight of their military might. That, in a sense, freed India from its entanglement with an imperialist power, which in any case was an oxymoron for a country like India that had been founded under an anti-imperialistic creed and had expounded a middle-coursenonalignmentbetween the two rival ideological super-power camps in international relations. Two other more tangible developments in India and Iran further helped pave the way for the two countries to discover a more pro-active phase in their bilateral relations, which, more or less, had stayed fairly moribund for decades. One of these was India at last casting off its strait-jacket of a rigidly-controlledSoviet-style economic orientation and opting for an open-door, market-driven, economy. That inaugurated the ongoing leap into an unshackled economic enterprise ruling the roost in the post-Nehru and post-Indira Gandhi India. It also meant, in another sense, that an India eager to take-off, in real economic sense, needed a vast amount of energy-input. With India itself short of fossil fuels, that meant tapping outside sources of available energy: oil and gas. Iran, just across the Pakistani land-mass, possessed both in abundance. It was also anxious to tap new markets for its burgeoning gas deposits, in particular. Indias drive to an economic miracle required both oil and gas to fuel its new industries and motors of economic boom. These were ideal ingredients and incentives for India and Iran to embark on active economic and commercial co-operation. The other development that factored itself like a bolt from the blue into the budding equation between India and Iran was the emergence of the Taliban as a new political force in Afghanistan. To the Shiite-ruled Iran, the Wahabi-brainwashed Taliban, with their dogmatic interpretation of Islam, were anathema. The Iranians were already fighting a proxy-war-of-ideas and-creeds against Saudi Arabia in the ideologically-fertile Pakistan, next door. Now with a Talibancontrolled Afghanistan, also next door, the Iranian leadership found itself being forced to contend with the Saudi-inspired Wahabi antagonism on two fronts. 62
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For India, on the other hand, the fact that the Taliban were a product of the religious seminariesmadrassasof Pakistan was reason enough to be wary of their intent and agenda. The traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan came into a sharp focus on the issue. India didnt, however, allow itself to be bothered by another fact that these religious seminaries had often been funded by the Americans who saw the zealous religious brigade among the Afghans exiled in Pakistan as a potent force against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. It was the same U.S. that India was making visible efforts to curry favour with, especially in regard to the ban that Washington had slapped against both India and Pakistan for the transfer of nuclear knowhow and technology. What clinched the issue against the Taliban, as far as India was concerned, was evidence, in spades, that they had the moral and material support of Pakistans much-maligned intelligence serviceswhich were backing the Taliban to gain power in Afghanistan for their own reasons. One of these, no doubt, was to ensure that Pakistans strategic back was secure and tactical depth in military terms was on side in its confrontation with India. There couldnt be a more welcoming backdrop to usher in a phase of close tactical and pragmatic co-operation for India and Iran. The two found a proxy in the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan, a largely non-Pushtoon ethnic group from northern Afghanistan, which was ideologically opposed to the Taliban. The stage was set for the Taliban-opposed Northern Alliance (NA) to become a recipient of assistance from both Iran and Indiain more ways than oneto maintain a credible resistance against the Talibans goal to over-run the NA-held northern strip of Afghanistan the way they had over-powered the rest of the country. The Taliban proved the worst-case fears of the Iranians when soon after wresting control of the city of Mazar-e-Sharifwith a heavy presence of the Afghan Shiitethey carried out a brutal massacre of the local Shiites and didnt even spare the Iranian consular personnel stationed there. Pragmatism was, obviously, the name of the new game kicked off between India and Iran, distant, otherwise, in ideology or creed. For instance, India helped Iran gain the status of an observer at the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Iran returned the compliment when, in 1994, it stopped a Pakistani effort at the UN Human Rights Council to bring in a collective resolution, in the name of OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) on Kashmir condemning Indian human rights violations [2]. That Iran, a formidable ally to Pakistan on Kashmir during the monarchical era, had chosen to subvert an ostensibly altruistic Pakistani initiative on behalf of the Kashmiris, under Indian control of the Kashmir Valley, was a shock to Pakistan. But it was no less befuddling to Pakistans friends and brothers in the Arab world. This scribe, then Ambassador of Pakistan in Kuwait, was briefed by the Kuwaitis of their concern over the Iranian brazen volte face. The Kuwaitis, no doubt, had their own axe to grind with Iran, whose influence in the oil-rich Sheikhdom within hailing distance of Iran, has been on an upswing since Kuwaits liberation 63
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from the brief Iraqi occupation of 1990-91. The Kuwaiti Shiites are not only close to being equalin numberswith the Wahabi segment of the Kuwaiti population but are also rich and powerful. That may sit well with the Kuwaitiswhose innate business instinct tells them that being on good relations with Iran is in their best interest, but it nags the Saudis, next door, whose influence over the Kuwaitis is far more powerful than whatever clout Iran wields over them. Common interest and mutual benefit is, obviously, the key element in Indian-Iranian commercial exchanges. The two sides seem to have settled on fostering a purely business-like ambience between them. That Iran has become the second largest supplier of crude oil to India, over the years, with close to half-a-million barrels per day of it being poured into the Indian market, is ample proof of hard-nosed business deals dominating the India-Iran agenda of co-operation. On its part, India has steadily become one of the largest foreign investors in Irans oil & gas industry, giving it a huge stake in the stability of Iran as a major exporter of oil, both regionally and internationally. Direct bilateral trade between India and Iran notched up an impressive figure of $ 14 billion in 2009the last year for which full figures were available. However, there is much more to IndiaIran trade quantum taking place indirectly through third parties, overwhelmingly located in the thriving regional hub of Dubai. With that indirect trade thrown into direct trade, the total volume, in dollar terms, is estimated to be close to a hefty almost $ 30 billion, annually [3] India tapping into the Iranian market in an era when Iran was, and still is, being corralled with myriad economic sanctions and boycotts by the western economies, spear-headed by U.S., should be seen as nothing less than a big and welcome helping hand extended to Iran in its trying days. India has also been helpful to Iran and quite munificent in lending its technical expertise and financial assistance to the building of vital infrastructure projects in Iran, such as Zaranj-Delaram highway and the Chahbahar Port, jointly financed by India and Iran. And yet India has balked at becoming part of an ambitious gas pipeline project, which would have includedhad India not wriggled out after showing early enthusiasm for itIndia, Iran and Pakistan in a trilateral co-operation to bring Irans natural gas to both India and Pakistan. The trilateral gas pipeline project has been on the anvil for nearly two decades. It started, primarily, as a brain-wave of some Pakistani oil & gas engineers and experts who came to the conclusion that Pakistans rapidly depleting gas deposits were quite insufficient for its growing needs and the best alternative to relying only on whatever it had was to import gas from the next-door neighbour and old friend Iran.
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India was invited to get on board the Iranian-Pakistani initiative because it made all the economic sense for Iran, sitting over some of the largest natural gas deposits in the world, to tap not just the Pakistani market for its gas but also rope in the much larger consumer market of India. Pakistan, after some initial reluctance, which was entirely an off-shoot of its congenital suspicion of India, also signed on the Iranian thrust. The Pakistanis agreed to extend the pipeline to India for two reasons: the lure of several hundred million dollars in transit fees to fill their empty coffers and, two, getting a sort of political and economic noose in their hands to clamp on India for leverage whenever needed. There is, of course, no riddle in why India back-tracked on its commitment to both Iran and Pakistan in the pipeline deal. It did so under American pressure. It was common knowledge among international observers of India, Pakistan and Iran that the Americans were not happy at all with India and Pakistan throwing what American pundits of the region regarded as a lifeline to Iran in circumstances where U.S. has been, constantly, on a campaign to tighten the ring around Irans neck and isolate itin both economic and political sensesin the region. Washington used its nuclear deal with India as a lever to put pressure on Delhi to forget about buying gas from Iran. It was, again, widely known that Washington made it a condition of its lucrative nuclear co-operation with Delhi (lucrative to both sides) that any deal with Iran must be off the table. While Washington deployed soft and nuanced persuasion vis--vis Delhi to force a rethinking on its part on the gas pipeline deal, it was blatant arm-twisting that went on with Islamabad because of its client status in American eyes. Its, however, interesting, if not intriguing, that despite its obvious handicaps and constraints with Washington, Pakistan has not only signed a bilateral deal with Iran to bring the Iranian gas to its starved consumers and industries but seems intent on building the pipeline as quickly as possible. U.S. initially tried to convince both India and Pakistan of a deal with Qatara redoubtable American ally and geo-political launching pad in the regionfor a gas pipeline under the sea. But that involved exorbitant capital that Pakistan, in particular, couldnt afford. For a second-best option, Washington has blessed a gas pipeline to bring gas from Turkmenistan to India and Pakistan, via Afghanistan. These four countries have been prevailed upon, if not bamboozled, by Washington to sign the deal for whats known in the oil and gas circles as TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) project. Heads of state from the first three, and a cabinet minister from India, met in Ashkabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, in December, 2010, and actually signed the deal to the delight of the projects god-father. But the project is, at this stage, is no more than a pie- in- the- sky, given the war in Afghanistan which to say the very leastgives no hope of the project getting off the ground any time soon. The proposed pipeline involves hundreds of kilometers of transit through the war-torn Afghanistan, a daunting factor. 65
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However, in the India-Iranian context, the biggest blow to any hope of an abiding friendship between the two was dealt by Indias susceptibility to arm-twisting from Washington on Irans nuclear status. The Nuclear Factor: Washingtons Iran-phobia on the nuclear issue is no secret. That its nuclear co-operation with Indiaand the transfer of technology it promises to India from U.Sgives it a stout stick to discipline India with and keep it in line behind it is no brain-teaser. Delhis vulnerability to persuasion or arm-twistingor a combination of both, depending on the exigencies of a situationhas triggered an obvious down-ward slide in India-Iran relations over the years since Delhi and Washington kicked off their nuclear co-operation. For instance, India, which had been supportive to Irans nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, without attaching any caveats to it, apparently succumbed to U.S. pressure when the then India Foreign Minister, Parnab Mukerjee intoned that the Iranian enrichment programme should proceed in accordance with its own international commitments and obligations [and must] satisfy the international community that its programme is indeed peaceful.*4+ However, despite being egged on by Washington to lean more in favour of its campaign to openly blackmail Iran over its suspected intentions to make nuclear weapons, Delhi still maintained a nuanced position, vis--vis Irans nuclear intent. It didnt lend any support to the jingoistic drums beaten in Washington and Tel Aviv on the issue and insisted on a peaceful approach to resolving the crisis. Indian categorically refused to be a party to twist Tehrans arm on the issue [5] as quoted by Ariel Farrar- Wellman in his Iran Tracker of June 25, 2010 But apparently Indias nuanced and calibrated stance of playing safe on both sides of the IranU.S. divide was not to the liking of Tehran. They regarded Indias equivocation as being a ploy to curry favour with the Americans and resented it. This contributed to Irans sense of isolation and reflected negatively on its relations with India. The downward slide in relations appeared to have reached its nadir toward the close of 2010. But the low point had been years in the making, with Iran becoming increasingly chary and suspicious of Indias budding co-operation with U.S., in the nuclear field, among others. Washingtons rambunctious diplomacywhich for years has been geared to block any effort on Irans part to acquire nuclear know-how or weapon capabilityseemed all the more focused on creating a gulf between India and Iran. Iran had a bone to pick with India on the nuclear issue since the time, in 2005, when Indiaa member of the 35-nation board of governors of IAEAhad voted against Iran. To Tehran that was only symptomatic of India signing on the U.S. agenda to deny Iran whatever it was legitimately entitled to doby way of peaceful use of nuclear energy and know-howas a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tehran regarded it as nothing short of
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being ironic that U.S. was using a non-NPT-signatory state, such as India, to block the legitimate rights of an NPT-signatory like Iran. To the Iranian leadership, increasingly under scrutiny in an orchestrated campaign led by U.S. and its western allies, what India was doing was akin to betrayal of the principles it had espoused with such exuberance and lan when it was a leading light of the non-aligned movement. A frustrated Iranian leadership, cornered from the west, seemed to have decided to let loose its pent-up frustration on India for what they regarded as unbecoming behaviour of a neighbour that Iran had been trying hard to cultivate. The charge was led, from the Iranian side by no lesser a person than Syed Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader and guide. Availing himself of the address marking the solemn occasion of the day of Hajj, 2010, Khamenei took a swipe at India, without naming it as such, for its suppression of the rights of the people of Kashmir under its control. Painting the country he led as an ideological and principled defender of the oppressed everywhere, Khamenei exhorted the collective Muslim Ummah to rescue oppressed nations from the demonic clutches of hegemonic powers. The oppressed nations on his list included, among others, Kshmir and he prodded the world Islamic leaders to make their contribution to the emancipation of their oppressed brethren. He said: The major duty of the elite of the Islamic Ummah is to provide help to the Palestinian nation and the besieged people of Gaza, to sympathize and provide assistance to the nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Kashmir. [6] The Indian response and retribution to what was clearly seen in Delhi as a calculated snub was swift and telling. On the heels of Khameneis salvo, India abstained on a UN resolution critical of Irans human rights. It was a calibrated climb-down from the position India had hitherto taken on the issue by consistently voting against such resolutions and, in a way, shielding Iran. It was a loud and categorical tit-for-tat to remind Iran of its vulnerability. Understandably, Khameneis gambit didnt pay any dividends to Iran, as far as its bilateral relations with India were concerned. But in Irans western-enforced isolation, it was a desperate bid by its supreme leader to seek friends among the community of Muslim states to off-set some of the enormous damage done to Iran under the American-led propaganda and economic blockade of Iran. But Indias backlash obviously amounted to calling Irans bluff. 2011 thus seems to have commenced with India-Iran relations declined perceptibly in trust and mutual respect from preceding years. With nearly half the year gone, there is no evidence of either country making a deliberate and calculated effort to repair the damage done to the bilateral equation. India, apparently, doesnt feel any urgency or obligation to revert the relationship to where it was before Iran dealt it a blow. India has the upper hand in an equation where the other entity is an international pariah. India, on the other hand, is now a major player in a big league; its 67
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membership of the elite G-20, has lent it an international stature that seems far removed from Iran. Why should Delhi compromise its position by being seen as making an extra effort to repair the damage done to its relationship with a regional and international out-cast? The Arab Factor: The Indian pragmatism on the issue is also heavily influenced by the Arab factor, i.e. consideration that there are millions of Indian expatriate workers gainfully engaged in earning their living in the oil rich Arab countries of the Gulf. These expatriatesskilled, semi-skilled and un-skilledare also a lucrative source of foreign exchange remittances to India, making up 40 % of the total remittances from the Indian diaspora from across the globe. [7] The number of Indian workers in the Arab world is expected to increase 5 to 10 % in the coming decade [8]. Its a question of simple arithmetic. There are 22 member-states of the Arab League. Of course, these Arab states dont always unite on the same platform on an issue much of the time; the Arab proclivity to nit-pick and unravel on even the most trifle of issues, much of the time, is legendary. However, on the issue of Iranian nuclear ambitions, there is an over-whelming concert of Arab voices that sings in chorus against Iran. India, sheer pragmatism dictates, cannot afford to ignore these Arab concerns or consensus. Sudha Ramachandran, writing in the Asia Times on the nadir reached between India and Iran, quoted an academic teaching West Asian Studies at Delhis Jawaharlal University as saying with unusual candour that India can override US-Israeli concerns vis-a-vis Iran, but it cannot ignore Arab pressure. He was hitting the nail on the head. Equally weighted is, again, the matter of arithmetic on the quantum of trade between India and Iran, on the one hand, and between India and the Arab states, on the other. With Iran, as already cited above, the two-way direct trade figure is $ 14 billion, whereas with the Arab world its $ 114 billion, which is expected to double by 2014 *9+. For its oil imports, too, India is more dependent on the Arab countries than on Iran, from which it fulfills only 14 % of its requirements. Compared to this, oil from Saudi Arabia makes up 18 % of Indian imports, from Kuwait 10 %, from Iraq 9 % and from U.A.E. 8 % [10]. So the total Arab share of 45 % of Indian imports outweighs the one from Iran more than 3 to 1; the balance is overwhelmingly in favour of the Arabs. It was quite understandable, for instance, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, visiting Saudi Arabia in March 2010, agreed fully with King Abdullah that Iran must co-operate with the world to help remove the doubts about its nuclear programme *11+ The Wiki Leaks, through recent revelations, have left no iota of doubt about the unvarnished sentiments of the Arab leaders on the issue of Irans nuclear ambition. Some Arab leaders, including King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, have been quoted of telling their American interlocutors to chop off the head of the serpent. India, if it had any doubts before, should know well 68
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enough, now, how the Arabs feel about Iran. Circumspection is the bottom line for the Indians in their dealings with Iran. Conclusion: Indias circumspection or expediency doesnt help Iran in coping with the dragnet U.S. has been conducting against it. Iran is being surrounded from all sides; the noose is being tightened with relentless efficiency. India, even if it doesnt relish the idea much, is becoming part of the U.S. inspired and led forced isolation in the region. Its a grand design to tighten the screws on Iran to the point where a regime changeone of the principal aims of the new Great Gamein Iran becomes achievable. Vast resources of oil and gas are Irans strength. But the U.S. strategy is to use this strength as a weapon in the task of weakening the clerical regime of Iran. The way Indias arm has been twisted by Washington to forget about joining hands with Pakistan to bring Iranian gas to India is one example of it; Pakistanwith a weak and wretchedly corrupt ruling eliteis being worked upon to go slowdead-slowon its touted intent to implement its deal for a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan. But in the latest instance, Iran is also being hobbled with problems regarding its oil sales to India. Up until now the two countries had been using an Asian clearing house to facilitate payments to Iran against its oil exports to India. That facility is being closed because of Indias obligations under the sanctions on Iran. The visit to Delhias these lines are being writtenof Irans National Security Chief, Saeed Jalili is believed to be related to this problem. Iran has ample reason to feel deeply worried over this latest U.S. thrust into its export earning from oil. On top of it, American sources are talking of a Saudi offerwithout explaining as to whom this offer has been made, India or U.S.to make up for the loss of Iranian oil supplies to India because of payment wrangles. [12] The Saudis have long been part of the Iranian problem. Their aversion to the Iranian regime, based largely on the sectarian differences between the two countries, has been exploited by Washington as the cutting edge of the wedge in the region. The trust deficit between Riyadh and Tehran needs hardly any elaboration, notwithstanding occasional attemptsno more than window-dressingby them to work out some modus Vivendi. Saudi Arabia, in the prevailing scheme of things, is to Washington what Iran was under the Shah. Its the new policeman in the region to stand in the vanguard of protecting American interests, which match so much with Saudi Arabias own. The Saudis are, obviously, putting this status to full use in Bahrain and Yemen. India is already on excellent terms with Saudi Arabia. However, if it becomes a party to depriving Iran of its Indian marketand if that market is picked up by Saudi Arabiait would add a huge element of complication in the tangled relationship between India and Iran.
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India and Iran could ideally exploit the rich potential for co-operation between them if Pakistan could also be party to it. That would revive the bonds that had existed between the two historically. However, for this ideal to materialize the kinks and strains in relations between India and Pakistan will first have to be ironed out, the prospects of which are not much exciting to talk about. In fact, there are indications to the contrary, given the likelihood of U.S. pulling out of its messy entanglement in Afghanistan. U.S. would withdraw from Afghanistan only after some face-saving deal with its adversary, the Taliban. Such a deal will not happen without Pakistan being in the thick of it. That, implicitly, would spell complications for both India and Iran. The bottom line is that the odds dont seem to augur well for a full flowering of India-Iran relations in the near future. The road to mend these odds will be long and tortuous.
Footnotes:
1. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America; Kenneth M. Pollack, Random House, NY. P. 105 2. Authors own archives. 3. Fars news agency, June 24, 2010 4. IRNA ( Iranian news agency), May 13, 2008 5. India Seeks Velvet Divorce from Iran, Asia Sentinel, November 5, 2008 6. India Iran relations at nadir, Sudha Ramachandran, Asia Times Online, December 4, 2010 7. S. Ramachandran, op. cit 8. ibid 9. ibid 10. ibid 11. PTI News, March 2, 2010 12. STRATFOR, Global Intelligence Dispatch: Increasing Complications in India-Iran Relations, June 14, 2011
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The Israel Factor in India-Iran Relations

A Short Intervention
Dr. Harsh V. Pant

Reader in International Relations, Department of Defence Studies, King's College London, United Kingdom
HARSH V. PANT is a Reader in International Relations at Kings College London in the Department of Defense Studies. He is also an Associate with the Kings Centre for Science and Security Studies and an Affiliate with the Kings India Institute. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. His recent books includeContemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy (Palgrave Macmillan), Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World (Routledge), The China Syndrome(HarperCollins), and The US-India Nuclear Deal: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Despite the hype surrounding Indias ties with Iran, Indias relations with the Arab Gulf states and Israel have been on an upswing, something that will continue to circumscribe India-Iran relations in the coming years. Since establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, India has moved considerably closer to Israel, so much so that India and Israel now share a growing defense partnership. It will be difficult for India to maintain strategic partnerships with both Israel and Iran for a long time, given the peculiar nature of relations among the West Asian countries. Irans policy toward the Palestine issue can become a major stumbling block in Indo-Iranian relations, because Iran supports not only the Palestine cause and the right of its people to reclaim occupied lands as their homeland but also non-recognition of Israel. As has been pointed out by many, this basically means the elimination of the Israeli state. And this hostility toward Israel shows no signs of abating, with the present Iranian president Ahmadinejad adopting a particularly hard-line approach vis--vis Israel by openly questioning the Holocaust and calling for Israels removal from the face of the earth.
Israel has a deeply antagonistic relationship with Iran. Israel sees Iran as the main supporter of the anti-Israeli Hezbollah in Lebanon. It also blames Iran for actively supporting extremist Palestinian groups that use terrorism against the Israeli civilians. Israel, along with the United States, has also been putting pressure on Iran to stop its suspected nuclear weapons program, with some reports even suggesting that Israel could consider taking military action against the Iranian nuclear facilities. With Iran openly calling for its elimination, Israel clearly sees a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. While the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein may have removed one of Israels enemies, it also seems to have created new opportunities for Iran to increase its influence in Israels immediate neighborhood. In this respect, Israel is concerned about Indias growing ties with Iran. It is especially worried about India sharing with Iran some of the military technology it is receiving from Israel. Israel has officially raised its concerns in its interactions with Indian officials, because Israel would like India to acknowledge the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran and would like India to make efforts to help in the stabilization of the volatile security situation in West Asia. While India and Israel need not make their bilateral relationship a function of each others relationship with any third country, both will have to manage it carefully in light of Indias relations with other countries in Middle East, and with Iran in particular. Israel will remain concerned about the direction of Indian foreign policy in the Middle East even though India might try its best to keep its relationship with Israel insulated from its bilateral dealings with other countries of the Middle East. Indian interests in the Arab Gulf and Israel are significant and evolving, and India is carefully nurturing these ties. This will clearly have an impact on India-Iran relations.
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Triangulating India-Iran-Pakistans Balance of Equation

- Brig (Retd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan
(Pakistan)
Brig (Retd) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan

Dr. Makni (his acronym) has military experience of about 32 years and is from the Regiment of Artillery. Recipient of "sitara-e-imtiaz", he served on various command, staff, instructional, administration, operational, research and evaluation appointments during his career. As a young officer, he saw actions in 1971 Indo-Pak War on the Eastern border. Holds first class Masters degree in International Relations and acquired doctorate in 2002-2007, from University of Peshawar, Pakistan. He has attended national and international seminars/conferences and appeared selectively as an analyst on Pakistani as well as foreign media channels. Also a member of WSN Foundation International Advisory Board, his book, "The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia" was published by Raider Publishing International, simultaneously from New York, London and Swansea in February 2008. (makni49@hotmail.com)
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While you and your kind were wrong to be right. ---Pierre Courtade1 Hypothesis of narrative of power of the three countries is manifestly simple in the regional setting but more one ponders about the complexities, more frustration grips once any side endeavors to relegate its conflict vulnerabilities to workable equation with the neighbors. Like Pierre Courtades dialogue, Pakistani right sounds Indian wrong, Iranian wrong may be Indian right and Indian wrong may be Pakistani right as one moves along and around the pivots of the triangle. Discussing Iran-India in isolation would be a parochial approach. Their foreign policy undercurrents and strategic objectives invariably crisscross, of necessity, to India, Pakistan, Iran, China and beyond. India is relatively huge land mass. Its geo-strategic significance is established not only as a South Asian country but also as a power with massive expanding ability to influence sea-lanes in Indian Ocean and thus South East Asia and Middle Eastern countries by implications. Approaches to the Pacific, land operations in Himalayan Range, southern plains and the desert with China and Pakistan are also located within its prowess. India has a firm foot in Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, notably Kazakhstan for energy proxy, Tajikistan and Mongolia where it now maintains military facilities that afford her better strategic orientation against the adjoining countries, Pakistan and China from the North West. Its economy leapt forward in mid 90s era and speculations abound that the center of gravity of the riches would shift to BRICS2 from the West, some placing it exclusively between China and India. However, geo-political environments which, would remain a major threat to its expansive ambitions and adoption of the global role that some world powers would like it to embrace, not necessarily to Indias advantage, acutely eclipse Indias future prosperity. The simmering Kashmir dispute with Pakistan and its corollaries like Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and now Rivers Water Distribution can catapult the prevailing no war no peace scenario, should any side lose patience. Impending war among the two would perhaps be unprecedented by the (de)merit of its horrific mutual destruction because both sides have counted each others teeth very accurately. Indian military might is impressive while Pakistan, a much smaller country, maintains an efficient system of forces with credible nuclear deterrence. Despite being riveted by internal turmoil, it has shown remarkable astuteness to keep ready its steeds of war to deter any of the perceived threats. It has remained laced with crises since inception but at the same time, it has fine-finished its ability to survive the crises as well. Whenever Pakistan was found ignorant of internal and external build up of storms, and its leadership failed to rise to the occasion, it paid an exorbitant price. India imposed such price on it, at least once before during
1
. Tony Judt, Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945, (Vintage Books London, 2010) p. 197 . BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
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the final phases of cutting Pakistan to size. Obviously, the reference is to the debacle of erstwhile East Pakistan. Indias territorial dispute with China could develop into a formal conflict if it fits the design of capturing geo-political space by either power. Sujit Dutta comments euphemistically but with visible concern, downplaying the stand off as competition only, China and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the Himalayas and South and Southeast Asia. This makes for strategic and geopolitical competition.3 The remarks, from the point of view of International Relations are simply in the domain of liberalism, but the followers of Realist approaches would side line such comments in the light of ground realities. The ensuing dilemma from these realities has forced a compulsion on the Indian hierarchy to maintain a potent military system to react to or eliminate these threats, which the war evaluations prove, it cannot. It sounds like war mongering. However, it is very heartening that powers to the disputes have come to recognize the base line wisdom and that is, wars alone cannot resolve the conflicts4 though the guns have been branded as the final argument of the kings historically. David Scott concludes in his essay, Finally some competition between India and China is likely to continue within regional organizations, in the diplomatic arena, within their military and economic strategies; and with it their elements of mutual balancing, and above all hedging. However, neither state will want to antagonize the other too much, both will want to maintain their own long term grand strategies of peaceful rise and economic modernization....5 Nevertheless, Indian forces have to maintain a superb state of readiness to cater for the worst contingencies but that unfortunately means sinking billions of taxpayers dollars every year that could be well spent productively elsewhere instead of rattling the sabers. Any attempt to lower the guards by sliding back from the build up of war arsenals may be even more risky within the riddle of maintaining a balance of power, and the resultant encroachment upon Indias luster as a huge customer of the modern weaponry with its ability to pay in dollars instantly.
. Sujit Dutta, Chinas Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia, in Jonathan Pollack and Richard Yang, eds., In Chinas Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), p. 92.
4
. Indian Minister of Home Affairs, Shri P. Chidambaram appears inclined however, to support war option to resolve issues with Pakistan as he hurled an open threat on June 8, 2011. Being an optimist, I still see lesser graveside of his thunder that aimed possibly at an opposition BJP leader who had expressed shock a day earlier over the scale of Indian forces atrocities committed in Kashmir.
. David Scott 'Sino-Indian Security Predicaments for the Twenty-First Century', Asian Security (Journal),
2008, 4:3, p.265
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The sound and burgeoning economy tends to intensify the territorial lust of any state, if also cajoled by its civil society, to adopt a role that transcends the geographical borders. In other words, the virus of lebensraum, catching up with the appetite for seeking expansion or recognition of their influence among the comity of nations can afflict any prosperous nation. India, in a bid to survive the crunch of fading oil and gas reserves is likely to be vulnerable to committing military adventurism by mid 21st Century, what Japan did against Pearl Harbor, to sustain its military as well as economic might. This is particularly worrisome and the possibilities, if not probabilities, heighten when some leading powers are already showing the symptom of morality collapse under such desire and have come to deal with certain theaters in Eurasia in a manner that is not finding due legitimacy despite their ardent desire to paint them as such. India now is a regional power but its markers on the world map reach far and wide. The role it yearns as a world power, particularly on the high seas and in the space does not find adequate means but even the pipe dreams can materialize if the leadership perseveres in attaining the objectives. Knowing the ambitious sides of Indian build up, other than its traditional rivals, China and Pakistan, two powers, Australia and Indonesia can throw their tentacles up as a preemption strategy. Gary Smith visibly circumvents Australias Indian fears through the entire length of his essay but he puts across indirectly, which some times sounds more valid than direct. He comments, The uranium trade plays directly into two of the major regional and global problems: the traditional concern of military security/insecurity...6. About Australia, it is not only the war of caricatures now. Australia has Herculean tasks ahead to keep engaged not only China and India simultaneously but also China and America as well when the national interests pull is divergent between them. Some of their taught syllabi advocate, Australias strategic relationship with America has always been fundamentally different from the old strategic relationship with Britain, in that the British relationship was a matter of identity, and the US relationship was based on interests.7 More the Australian relationship would deepen with US and India, more ominous strain it would cast on China and other subsystems that are well poised to meet the challenge, thus making it a complex tangle. From the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), however, India has managed an effective image profile, obfuscating that she focuses on the development of trade relations and fostering peace though it also implicates power game as well as its power projection. Staging a counter deception perhaps, Australia and Indonesia particularly, have pretended to look the other way but not remaining lax about her naval and nuclear expansion. Should India be stuck across the waterways by drawing their disapproval if not full-blown rivalry, it would make Indian tasks insurmountable. In other words, India would be a victim of backlash of its own build up. Seeing Europe somewhat critical of US go alone ventures and cis-trans-Atlantic alliances ride
. Gary Smith 'Australia and the rise of India', Australian Journal of International Affairs,2010, 64: 5, p.570
. Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence (a Course Guide-2011), School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, ANU College, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre of Asia & the Pacific, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/gssd, (accessed on 10 May 2011).
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becoming bumpy, certain quarters are already advocating a new axis between India, America, Israel and Australia (IAIA).8 Japan and New Zealand could be fifth and sixth candidates but it would be hard to keep Japan in Americas fold if at any stage its relations smoothen out with China or Russia over the disputed ocean spaces. New Zealand would be better advised by its friends to stay away from the conundrum. Briefly said, India has the wherewithal to emerge as a power with global role but not without heavy baggage of severe frustrations. Conversely, Indian diplomacy, an important instrument of foreign policy, in regional setting, more so about Pakistan and Iran, is vibrant from Indian perspective but within the globalize environments, it has some severe critics, even at home who rate it a victim of sheer ambivalence. Harsh V. Pant (not as harsh as Sikri is towards Pakistan) and Rajiv Sikri belong to realists and traditionalists school of thought respectively. The former laments Indias ambivalence towards US, advocating to take bold leaps in foreign policy conduct, the latter bitterly criticizes such mode of falling in the lap of US, perhaps at the expense of not clearing mine fields for its diplomacy in near abroad. Ian Hall comments about Sikri, The region, he thinks, displays remarkable commonality of cultural practices; its divisions, in other words, stem not so much from cultural distinction but political decision.9 Here the hint appears to division of the Subcontinent in August 1947 that became the bedrock of disputes and hostilities. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had observed over six decades ago (1946), The factors that laid the foundation of Islam in Indian society and created a powerful following have become victim of politics of partition.10 Thus, according to such generalizations, territorial disputes between India and Pakistan and to a certain extent include China as well; are of lesser consequences than the psychological barriers of hearts and minds among them, gaining height with the lapse of each year. Muslims have endured a level of genocide at the time of partition and its horror still lurks on the horizon. Concluding a chapter on Black Death that devastated Europe in mid fourteenth century, Cathie Carmichael comments, Every Jew, Muslim, atheist or Christian who died at this time as a result of being targeted for his or her faith or ethnicity was an individual with his or her own unique martyrdom11. One would expect from the leaders who steer the destinies of the masses to obviate such tragedies, occurring to the minorities in the Subcontinent, though history is witness
. The alphabets (IAIA), if pronounced one by one, sound Urdu, meaning incidentally as, welcome, welcome.
9
. Ian Hall, The other exception? India as a rising power, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2010, 64: 5, p. 606
10
. Shorish Kashmiri, Richness and Depth of Vision, an interview with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in Chattan, (Matbooaat-e Chattan Lahore n.d. April 1946).
11
. Cathie Carmichael, Genocide before the Holocaust, (New Haven & London: Yale University
Press, 2009) p.160
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that states seldom learn from past determinants of genocide. In fact, the most enduring bond, a sage said, among the brothers has been the sword. Iran with its potent hydrocarbon reserves has significant weight in the domain of geopolitics. It maintains a long coastal line on Arabian Sea as well as Persian Gulf that act as trade lanes for huge stocks of oil and gas and thus gain geo-strategic significance. It is essentially a Middle Eastern country, but at the same time, a Caspian littoral and also contiguous to Central as well as South Asia. Before Soviets phantasmagoria, it shared borders with the Soviet Union.12 India and Iran have had the history of looking in opposite directions. During the royal era when Iran was embedded deep in the Western, read American, alliance, it leaned more towards Pakistan because of similarities in their geo-strategic priorities. India, on the other hand, inclined towards Soviet Union and pursuing course of non-aligned bloc at the same time, was not Irans choice obviously, when Indias energy thirst had also not exacerbated yet. On the fall of Shah of Iran, the succeeding theocracy attempted to grasp the leadership role among Muslim Ummah and hence India-Iran relations remained cool. Iranian support for Kashmir cause was an impediment. The growth of US-Iran polarization and ensuing sanctions through Iran, Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA 1996) forced Iran to break American cordon by looking towards China, India and Russia for its strategic assets safeguards and to parry off Israeli and Western wrath that she feared by implications. Neutral observers blame Iran for some selfinflicted wounds in the international arena. While right to tap nuclear energy as a source and shrewd option to explore alternatives for her enormous but fast dwindling oil and gas reserves can not be denied, it is also encumbered as a responsible member to allay international fears and move along the wind rather than flexing muscles in confrontational manner.13 For Iran, India was yet another lucrative window for breaking the US noose, which now imports 14% of its energy needs from Iran. In return, India-Iran sounded comfortable with each other when Iran ebbed down its Kashmir rhetoric. Their relations could plummet on conclusion of US-India and Indo-Israel dialogues of strategic collusion but the mutual fears were downplayed by Iran as a geopolitical expediency. However, Indian reluctance to render her support on nuclear issue at IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to Iran and by abstaining from the November 2010 UN vote that condemned Iran on question of Human Rights, have made the job of diplomats of both the countries too perplexing to mend the fences. As if, it was not enough. Indian ambivalence to join in contemplated Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project has also exposed vulnerabilities of their souring relations. The Iranian leadership has come to see India clearly fixated by US and Israel, an assumption perhaps not very valid to
12
. If one sees Iranian northern boundaries and its claim over the Caspian Sea status as unresolved, Iran is well within its right to claim sharing Caspian borders with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, as well as Azerbaijan.
13
. Brig (Retired) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi (Makni), The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia, (Raider Publishing International, New York. London and Swansea, 2008), p.192.
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stand the test of expert scrutiny. Indian rejection of US tenders worth $11 Billions equipment deal14 last April proves that India generally could not be spoon fed by her allies and would jealously guard its ability to steer foreign policy course without strings, compatible to its national interests. Here, the likes of Rajiv Sikri have won. The decision must have taken wind out of US incentives of the times while granting India concessions on acquiring advanced nuclear technology and fuel from the nuclear club. US might have been relishing ever since the scenario of launching India as a counterweight to China in the Indian Ocean as well as Pacific and the potentials of India being a huge modern weaponry market that US would love to secure. The shocks apparent casualty was the US ambassador to New Delhi; Mr. Timothy Roemer who resigned for personal as well as professional reasons. Yet another surprise is that India is turning to Europe and not even to its traditional supplier, Russia though Russia protested discreetly, as some reports suggest, by withdrawing its bid for supply of weapons to India. The shift aspect, relevant to the topic, would have far-reaching consequences by lending India an added maneuver space to keep Iran engaged successfully and perhaps Pakistan also, including on Kashmir issue. Iran and Pakistan are glued together by the sort that dries up in a day and revitalizes the next day when Indo-centric concerns are always dominant factors to count. The two countries interact frankly and informally. Iran has some grievances against Pakistan; the main perhaps its tilt to Middle Eastern actors and US with whom Iran has direct or indirect territorial or ideological stand off but finds hard to ditch Pakistan at the same time. Iranian President, Mr. Ahmadinejads recent claim (08 June 2011) to have known a US plot that aims at denuclearization of Pakistan is a sincere revelation that validates such a predominant conviction, already prevailing among the entire Muslim Ummah. In the regional context, US mean now a full team, comprising US, India, Israel, Russia and NATO collaborators versus Pakistan as their thrust lines converge in strategic dimension, a paradigm hard to admit by them but a reality nevertheless. India has the ability to nourish its Middle Eastern diplomacy by driving a wedge among Iran and others further deep to conduct chicanery of its exterior maneuvers. There may be another twist in the Indian perception that Iran is failing to register and that is its impending demographic explosion and corresponding aggravating energy thirst. Robert Kaplan comments, India -- soon to become the world's fourth-largest energy consumer, after the United States, China, and Japan -- is dependent on oil for roughly 33 percent of its energy needs, 65 percent of which it imports. And 90 percent of its oil imports could soon come from the Persian Gulf. India must satisfy a population that will, by 2030, be the largest of any country in the world.15 Indian energy imports from other Middle East countries, measure up to about 45% of its total needs as compared to 14% from Iran (some sources figures vary). When Irans nuclear venture is suspected among the Middle East countries and its role seen clearly as a force trying to unhinge the ruling hierarchies of its neighbors in the wake of recent uprising in North Africa and Middle East, India has the option to weigh gains and losses. By playing cool, India
14 15
. India rejects U.S. tender, The News International, Pakistan, 28 April 2011. . Robert Kaplan, Center Stage for the 21st Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Foreign Affairs, April 2009(accessed at RealClearPolitics website on 22 April 2011.
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reaps the advantage of ensuring that its energy lifeline remains green and large numbers of its expatriates remittances from the Middle East fill her coffers. For Sudha Ramachandran, however, India needs to focus still at Iran when she writes, With Pakistan refusing India overland access to Afghanistan, Iran is key to Indias land access to there and beyond to Central Asia. Besides, at times Delhi is concerned over the resurgence of Taliban; can India afford to lose an important ally in Iran on Afghan issue?16 The statement clearly affords an insight to possible magnitude of cooperation between India and some Taliban faction(s) through Iranian influence in Afghanistan. It also reveals the level of advocacy to accord, alternative access route through Iran to Afghanistan and Central Asia, a high priority tag as compared to remaining warmed up with Middle East for the sake of energy and expatriates remittances even though they are sizeable. However, Sudha Ramachandran prescription has limited scope as he envisions the immediate crucial spaces and ignores the global obligations India has to meet. Indians Iran embrace could resist US as well as Israel with whom it collaborates strategically, but for the Middle Eastern countries and Europe combined, she would find dent to her image unmanageable because of Iran once its own nuclear posturing and refusal to sign Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is yet not out of the woods. His arguments would have been even weightier, had he not, wittingly or unwittingly, downplayed Indo-Iranian forces operational collusion. Some experts see this as part of broad strategic cooperation between two powers in the Persian Gulf and Arabian SeaIndia had reportedly hoped the Declaration (Indo-Iran of January 2003) would pave the way for Indian sales to Iran of upgrades of Irans Russian-made conventional weapons systems. The same report further dilates at another place, It is perhaps because of Indo-Iranian cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan that Tajikistana Persian speaking Central Asian state bordering Afghanistan allows Indian combat aircrafts to use its Farkhor air base. There are reports that India will soon also be allowed to use Tajikistans Aini air base as well.17 Iranian influence made the difference for India. Pakistan and perhaps China as well as Central Asians view Indo-Iranian collaboration in Afghanistan as unnatural or rather too lavish in full view of their antagonists, if not hostile neighbors. Iran has to understand that India needs Iran and it would gravitate on its energy bait relentlessly, giving Iran an impression at the same time that she stands by it despite US disapproval. IAIA axis, when allies would maintain forces preponderance for the Gulf energy
16
. Sudha Ramachandran, India-Iran relations at nadir, Asia Times ( www.atimes.com) , December 4, 2010.
17
. K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzma, India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS 22486, August 2, 2006, (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf, accessed on 18 May 2011) p. 6
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security against Iranian wish in the Gulf by force if necessary, shall rupture Indo-Iranian close relationship mirage in a nasty way. But for a non-Jew to challenge that American and Israeli interests are identical is to invite the charge of anti-Semitism, which has been the kiss of death politically since the holocaust.18 India is safely in the same bracket now. Iran would not gulp down Israeli threat behind Indian smoke screen on its borders with Afghanistan. Under these circumstances when US-Israel-India draw more closer because of their wider convergence of global priorities, Iran would have no option but to restrict Indian access to its seaport of Chah Bahar that India is helping it to develop, cutting at the same time Indian roots in Tajikistan as well as Afghanistan. Pakistan would remain comfortable anyway, because of its loyal Pathan belt on its western borders with Afghanistan that could not be subverted ever since partition. However, some powers with heavy stakes are keen to ignite this strategic asset called ethnic pukhtoons against Pakistan by bribing and equipping an odd tribal segment in adjoining Afghan border areas through moles that portray perfect turban and beard combination. Such a degree of loyalty consolation for Pakistan through historic incidence however, has to be nurtured and sustained laboriously for which Pakistan is putting little effort and eroding its own reservoir of strength under aliens pressure. It is an interesting paradox, when India did incessant finger pointing to Pakistan for indulging in illegal nuclear proliferation (Dr. A Q Khan episode), Indian scientists were helping Iran on possible enrichment techniques. According to Wall Street Journal, in September 2004 determination, two Indian nuclear scientists were sanctioned against under the INA (Iran Nonproliferation Act), Dr.Chaudhary Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad. The two formerly headed the Nuclear Power Corp of India and allegedly passed to Iran heavy-water nuclear technology.19 At least four or five other Indian chemical and engineering companies faced sanctions or threat of sanctions in 2005 by US on similar transfer violations to Iran in nuclear and missile technology field under INA. Grant Pakistan that when it faced an avalanche of Indian propaganda, hardly any one in Pakistan blew trumpet of Indian complicity with Iran, out of sheer laziness of its diplomatic corps or its urge to build bridges of understanding with India! It remains clear that Pakistani leadership, embroiled in survival war with opposing political parties has not been able to cash on such/similar profitable themes to gain a diplomacy edge internationally as does India, whenever situation presents her an opportunity. Killing of Osama bin Laden was still wrapped in a mystery but India clinched Pakistan by throat to label it as the harbinger of global terrorism on the same day, 02 May 2011. The allegation came like a bolt from India and even US who are very weak in simple arithmetic and are not impressed by five times more Pakistani forces personnel and civilians falling martyrs than theirs all combined, spilling blood for US war on terror. Such an ill timed and possibly, a deliberate barrage, if spared
18
. Theodore P. Wright, Indo-Israel Relations and the Concept of National Interest in Multi Ethnic/Religious States in FPRC Journal-5, (accessed at Foreign Policy Research Centre, New Delhi website on 20 April, 2011)
19
. John Larkin and Jay Solomon, Indias Ties With Iran Pose Challenge for U.S., Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2005
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for a while, could permit the two countries moving closer for chalking out an agenda of reconciliation. The cool of cricket diplomacy, which Indian Prime Minister achieved so assiduously, vanished overnight. Demolishing the bridges among the states has been the easiest narrative historically than building ones. Ephemeral gestures of reconciliation India makes occasionally have fast become the fuel for added fury, which, India and Pakistan can ill afford to suffer for a long time. Recent inconclusive talks on Sir Creek and Siachen issues in May 2011 were least followed by the Pakistani public, with foregone assumption that it was a mere gimmickry, aimed at securing credibility reservoir from peace-seeking-Western world and a ploy to further isolate Pakistan. On Pakistan domestic front, mega corruption scandal breaks cover almost every fortnight, forcing its top leadership to go out of breath to defend it. Within weeks when judiciary comes in to play its role, instead of recovering from the shame, they embark on the monstrous campaign to defy the highest courts because the corruption tales in Pakistan explored by the media are more or less always true. It is not the bad governance only but some opposition parties are also corrupt to the roots and cooperate with the Government after securing big share in the deals. In all probability, while Pakistan Army, Judiciary and Media are reassuring icons, the country has the potentials to wriggle out of the crises. Indo-Iranian collaboration on trade and military cooperation in the presence of serious Indo-Pak territorial irritants and perceptional gulf would remain a concern, not only for Pakistan but for China as well. Coupled with it, Indian image as a factor for inducing instability in Pakistan from its Eastern as well as Western borders, perhaps as counter stroke to Jihadis operations in Kashmir is extremely disturbing, when the pointers also prove US nod to India if not active support from Afghan territory. Tiff between US-Pakistan on the magnitude of war on terror and do more syndrome haunts every Pakistani because it is unrealistic as well as impracticable. Intelligentsia in Pakistan clearly perceives that prolongation of the war on terror in Afghanistan is a mere farce to defile it or at least force Pakistan to give up its nuclear arsenals that it possesses as a solitary Muslim power. The scenario is horrible to conceive but there is graceful diplomatic maneuver space available if both the countries heed to the reason rather than making recourse to the ruses contrived by some war mongering think-tank, known for their prejudice and bias. For India, to assume the status of 21st Century economic giant, its energy thirst would not satiate unless it resolves its dispute with Pakistan. Its strategic significance far exceeds than that of Iran when it would need every drop of oil and gas, possibly from Iran as well as Central Asia. Until Pakistan acts as an energy bridge and Damocles sword of internal and external threats are not taken off Pakistan, Indian economic boom would face severe eclipse. India may well argue that Pakistans internal problems are of its own making or their resolution at least its own prerogative but the fact remains that there is so much of arms twisting and intrusion in its internal affairs that even US officials had the tongue in cheeks to openly admit, yes, our operators are there in Pakistan. Raymond Davis saga renders all speculations on the contrary to rest. Within the wider game, India needs to reassess its ambitions by recalling that as a poor but 82
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relatively ethics based country, it enjoyed far more respect even in bipolar world of Cold War era. With economic boom and lager stocks of guns, missiles and munitions, logically, its reach and recognition would have taken longer strides but it has not. All its direct neighbors except Bhutan, a protectorate, maintain uneasy relationship with India, is a coincidence worth reckoning. Is it the lack of will to mend fences with the neighbors or too much of a flare for courting distant actors who would see India supplementing their own designs at the cost of wreaking miseries to Indian masses? The technology that is pushing globalization to the zenith, is also making the inter states relations transparent. Cloak and dagger policies, no matter who the executioners are, would seldom remain covert in the coming years; wikileaks may be a small demonstration only. The dichotomy in acts and facts, when the big powers in 21st Century were to be more benign towards the planet if not the humanity, is exaggerating. The irony is that the most powerful states that have grown beyond measures in annihilating capabilities are showing strong tendencies of eliminating the reconciliatory approaches, whatever the pretexts, in reverse ratio that bodes catastrophic for breathing space of the developing countries. China, Iran, India and Pakistan are high on the graph periphery that could be sucked in by the centripetal character of the tornado of violence in pursuit of narrow or aliens objectives. While India and China have history of recovering from the brink, Pakistan and Iran are more vulnerable and would need to stand guard to preempt such follies. Some conclusions are pertinent to draw: India as a power in military spectrum has immense emerging influence not only in the Subcontinent but also as far as China and Australia to the East and to Gulf of Aden to the West. While India would welcome seamless cooperation from the countries within this space, they would need equal, if not more, Indian cooperation as well in the process of its improved power potentials from regional to extra regional capability. Iran, Indonesia, Australia, China and Pakistan, if not on board with India, can inflict severe dent to the perceived Indian hegemony.
India-Iran relations figure out prominently in the sphere of trade and at forces operational levels. Conceiving any military alliance with Iran as of today, does not fit in the Indian wider considerations. However, its cordial relations with Iran might prevent Iran to be studded on, as some Pentagon officials call it, the string of pearls or pearls necklace but noose for India, engineered by China. In other words, the Iranian seaports in Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, being vital for energy security, shall emerge as a subject from covert to overt diplomacy when China and India would bid for their naval use or lien in the event of any collapse of energy security environments. Iran in this context would not oblige India but China instead, not because India does not mean any importance to her but in energy security setting, Iran would see India more as a US ally and China, its all weathers choice. To woo Iranian favor for energy supplies, India has to walk on the tight rope and maintain balance with US, Israel and other Middle Eastern countries that would turn it as suspect if diplomacy cards were not played judiciously. 83
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Kashmir is the mother of all disputes and mistrust between India and Pakistan. After having fought three short wars and Kargil misadventure, Pakistan has to remain committed to its viable resolution, according to the wishes of People of Kashmir. Lingering Kashmir dispute is dangerous more for India than for Pakistan, particularly when the Subcontinent, Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Russia and at some stage China as well, can integrate on European Union (EU) pattern that would herald tremendous peace, tranquility and hence prosperity. After India-Pakistan possible patch up, no reason remains in the fold why Pakistan should not become Energy Bridge for India as well as South East Asia. Iran, Caspian littorals and other Central Asians would be in the line by choice.
Indian Government needs to ensure effective public awareness so that the ruling as well as opposition parties support India-Pakistan reconciliatory overtures and ditching the dialogue does not become electioneering agenda. It fuels anti Pakistan sentiments and India has it in abundance. Too much of vitriol is pumped into masses to demonize Pakistan that is usually resorted to hype the war phobia before launching full-fledged offensives. India has the prerogative to do so if she foresees hostilities in short term. If not, she should commit herself to douse the flames.
Tension with Iran developed because of extra regional considerations and Indian obligation to support its allies. The alliances surfaced because India was not comfortable with neighbors including China. Chinese conduct in the international arena has remained pragmatic, fostering peace. Indo-China disputes are there but not so complicated that these cannot be resolved. After all they have been, Hindi-Cheanee bhai bhai that translates people of India and China are brothers to each other. It only needs a stock of pragmatism from Indian side and well-intentioned diplomacy away from the distant alliances specter while on Chinese side India would find it in plenty. Friendly dance together is possible. Any side that makes the first move would enjoy moral ascendancy. It thus becomes imperative that India takes wind out of international meddling in this part of the world that is thriving on Indo-China competition. Inward coalescing of Russia, China, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, further on to Australia makes a fantastic dream for free trading space. History has it that some grand accomplishments were perceived as dreams to start with. All actors need to take cue from EU, which has amongst them, not only brute memories but some lingered on as well.
Iran has to adopt a flexible approach toward the regional as well as world issues. Its anti US and anti Israel jargons hit no one else but Iran. Obliteration of Israel is her fantasy, far removed from reality. She must reconcile with impracticable ideal by sponsoring peace and harmony. Reconciled Iran would not only be more prosperous and ardently sought for power but also the one that makes its friends task much easier in give and take deals. Discreet pragmatism would enable her to prove an assumption wrong, what Fred Halliday said about Iran, condemned to react, unable to influence.20 Conversely,
20
. Dr. Makni, op cit, p. 193
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Israel has emerged as a trusted ally of the US and now of India as well. Instead of setting up snares for the surrounding as well as distant countries including Iran and Pakistan, Israel is best advised to knock out two issues. It must grant Palestine a statehood that is ultimately to the benefit of Israel and return the 1967-captured territories to its neighbors. Instead of taking pleasure in demeaning US President, Barak Obama on Palestinians issue, it must regret its obstinacy for not picking up the advice of its most trusted benefactor, America. On the other hand, one sees a remarkable change that Muslims are prepared to work with Israel if these two obstacles were removed. India, as an allied country should exert its influence on Israel for helping Palestinians whose supporter, India remained for long time during Cold War era. Any success in this direction would render its standing tall with Arabs.
Pakistan has tremendous heap of homework to accomplish and there is light/hope on the long end side. It needs to reassess the circumstances that have pushed it to the precipice of internal turmoil and portrayed it as the subject of international conspiracies despite its rich dossier of decades long loyalties against the utopian ideology. It must pursue a policy within the ambit of recognized international relations, free of the gridlocks clamped by the powers that embrace it today and kick it out the next day. Resolution of imminent conflict scenarios by applying soft power while maintaining impeccable military deterrence would be the best option. Spare no effort that fosters honorable peace with the immediate neighbors, cordial relations with Muslim countries and equitable ties with all major powers.
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Quid Pro Quo: Indias Quest for the American Narrative

Dr.Vijay Prashad
Trinity College (Hartford,CT)
Vijay Prashad is the George and Martha Kellner Chair of South Asian History and Professor in and Director of the International Studies Program at Trinity College (Hartford, CT). He is the author of eleven books, most recently The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World: New Press and LeftWord, 2008) which was chosen as the best nonfiction book of 2008 by the Asian American Writers' Workshop and which won the 2009 Muzaffar Ahmad Book Prize. He will soon release The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (Verso and LeftWord) and Uncle Swami (The New Press). He is a columnist for Frontline (Chennai) and Counterpunch (Petrolia, CA).
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Traditional ties with West Asia will be given a fresh thrust.

National Common Minimum Programme of the Government of India, May 2004.
Pragmatism trumps moral clarity in Delhis Middle East policy.

U. S. Ambassador to India, David Mulford, March 31, 2006.
On April 21, 2011, journalist Sadanand Dhume published a commentary essay in the Wall Street Journal entitled Its Time to Re-Align India. The context for Dhumes essay was the consolidation of a view of the world among the BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Meeting in Hainan, China, the BRICS countries called for a multipolar world (i. e. no longer dominated by the Atlantic powers, led by the U. S.) and for a less militaristic approach to common problems (i. e. with special reference to the imbroglio in Libya, fast becoming the 21st centurys Yugoslavia). For Dhume, like a monster in a B-grade horror film, Indias love affair with non-alignment refuses to die. The end of the Cold War should have ended this approach to foreign policy. Unfortunately, it hasnt. What Dhume does not realize is that the BRICS dynamic is precisely a post-Cold War phenomenon. The major powers within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) recognized in the 1990s that the U. S. had come to dominate world affairs, and that their main instrument, the UN General Assembly, had been set aside. NAM had few institutional forums through which to try and exert the power of the planets majority. The demographic minority through the UN Security Council, the Group of Seven (G7), NATO and the GATT exerted their domination: this is what George H. W. Bush called the new world order, one that emerged out of the detritus of the Iraq war of 1990-91. It was in the 1990s that the large states of the South began to consider a new approach to protect ideas of multipolarity and development against NATOs Kosovo model of political relations and the G7s neoliberal economic policies. Various platforms were tried out, such as the NAMs G-15, the IBSA (India-BrazilSouth Africa) group and eventually with the addition of Russia and China, the BRICS. These are robust forums to provide an alternative to what many see as the failed polices of the G7 both in political and economic terms. India was not only central to the Third World Project (from Bandung to the formation of the NAM in 1961), but it was also crucial to the rethinking of the post-Cold War landscape being a member of the G-15, the IBSA and the BRICS. In the early years after the Cold War ended, India positioned itself in a way to exert its power on the world stage and yet, contradictorily, not to do so in an antagonistic manner to the Atlantic powers, whose own appetite for sharing the stage remains modest. The Liberalization policy inaugurated in 1991 came with much fanfare, and with considerable nudging from the IMF and IMF-oriented economists within India (such as the current Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh). With Liberalization came a reorientation of the foreign policy: there was an assessment in the early 1990s that the shift from a dirigiste economy must be 87
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met with a friendlier attitude toward the West. It was hoped by the emergent consensus among the New Delhi elite that normal relations with Israel would send a signal to Washington of Delhis seriousness toward the established power equation. NAM was to be squandered on behalf of a new alliance policy with the U. S., a kind of alliance that might mimic the special relationship between Israel and the United States. It was toward this alliance that the Congress (led by Narasimha Rao, 1991-1996) and the BJP (led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 1996, 1998-2004) pushed, with a brief interregnum that tried to return the country to both the planned economy and the non-aligned foreign policy (led by Dewe Gowda and Inder Gujral, 1996-1998). These governments ran roughshod over a recalcitrant Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), where the habits of Nehruvian statecraft remained (when Natwar Singh returned to the office in 2004-2005, an MEA bureaucrat told me that they hoped for a revitalization of the NAM dynamic; it was not to be). The principle mode of the Congress and BJP governments has been to engineer a strategic partnership with the United States. Other currents remained, however, such as the recognition amongst sections of the elite and in the MEA that the United States was a fickle friend, in need of its alliance with Pakistan (particularly after 2001) and unwilling to fully commit to making India a partner in the first circle of world affairs (the U. S. promised Japan and Germany that it would campaign for them to become permanent members of the Security Council on June 10, 1993 and it has still not done more than offer anemic public statements of support). This latter recognition reinforced the long-standing ideological commitment to non-alignment amongst sections of the Congress, whereas the former problem (fealty to Pakistan) reproduced distrust amongst sections of the hardened BJP. It was never going to be an easy sell, to disrupt Indias own various international entanglements and the various theories of its national interest in order to become the subordinate partner in an alliance with the U. S. (all those who partner with it are subordinate; there are no equals, at this time). On the plane of Indian politics, it was only the Communist Left that was ideologically opposed to an alliance with what they saw as the central political spear of imperialism. Others had various pragmatic disagreements with the alliance, or else had ideological misgivings that could otherwisebe set aside once in a while (such as the socialists). That is precisely why it was the Communist Left that provided the parliamentary backbone to resist sending Indian troops to join the U. S. adventure in Iraq (one forgets that even Natwar Singh, the standard bearer for the NAM in the lonely halls of the MEA, had indicated in a July 11, 2004 press conference with U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that India was delighted with the UN Resolution on Iraq [1546] and it might reconsider the issue of troops to Iraq). It was the Communist Left that persisted with its warnings on various aspects of Indian foreign policy, in particular the assertions by the U. S. Embassy that India adopts three pillars, essential to Washington:
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Intensified Military and Commercial ties with the U. S. armed forces and firms. Isolation of Iran.
The Indian government recognized the state of Israel in January 1992, and over the course of the decade developed close ties for the import of military hardware and intelligence software. As well, India tempered its previously resolute backing for the Palestinian struggle. This was an important signal to Washington. It meant that India was willing to sacrifice its own ideological and institutional commitments for a narrative of the world favorable to Washington. If India could become close to Israel, the door to the special relationship that really mattered (with Washington) opened wider. By the late 1990s, the Indian government turned toward increased arms purchases from the U. S. and welcomed U. S. military personnel to train with the Indian arms forces. This close relationship (inter-operatability) sent the next hint. Since much of the military relationship is also commercial, it is fitting that these two elements (the military and the commercial) remain side-by-side. In the Clinton years, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen repeatedly said of India that its middle class is the size of France, and so is capable of buying much that U. S. firms produce (even as the production sites might be in China!). It was to this end that the special relationship had a very prominent commercial angle, with agricultural businesses interested in drastically changing Indian agriculture (to a more agro-business model) and energy firms invested in the privatization of the energy boom that was forecast. Cargill and Enron, General Electric and ADM they lined up with as much enthusiasm as the major banks, who wanted to open up the money markets to predatory hot money. The Left was unable to prevent the rapid, and much of it secret, alliance with Israel (Efraim Inbar, director of Israels Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, who is actively involved in the Indo-Israeli contacts, recognizes the political problem, this kind of cooperation needs to be secret if it can be, he told Newsweek). The commercial and military ties also came upon the country like a Tsunami, but here the Left in alliance with sections of the Congress and the BJP was able to stave off the elimination of protections against finance capital, having been unable to hold back the energy and the agricultural transformations. The protection against financial openness saved India during the credit crunch of 2007 onwards, and the recession that followed. The battlefield that turned out to be the most contentious was over the question of Iran. It was the test case of Indias subordination to the U. S. narrative of world affairs. The Bush administration was adamant that Iran be isolated, despite Washingtons appalling adventure in Iraq and its own isolation from the world community of the UN General Assembly. The problem of Iran is not so much about the Iranian government and the Iranian people. U. S. foreign policy is rarely grounded in the aspirations of the peoples of far-off lands: if it were so, then it might not have removed popularly elected leaders via coups and military conquests, from the removal of Arbenz from Guatemala (1954) to Aristide from Haiti (1991, 2004). Iran poses a threat to the establishments order of things in the Middle 89
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East and North Africa (MENA). By the establishment, I mean the United States, Saudi Arabia (and its satellite emirates), Israel and the European players. For the establishment, Iran has been a threat since 1979, and this is precisely the reason why they encouraged the Carter Doctrine -- that the defense of the Persian Gulf region was a vital national interest for the U. S. (1980); they pushed Iraq to go to war with Iran (1980-1988); and they formed the Gulf Coordination Council, the Arab NATO (1981). Iran poses a political threat to the establishments order of things, and it has long been its policy to defang Iran by military and political means. Corralling India into this policy was a policy since the early 1990s, and it has come close to fruition over the past decade. In January 2004, the Bush administration sent a man of the banks (head of Credit Suisse and previously senior advisor to the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency), David Mulford, to be the Ambassador to India. Mulford remained at this post till 2009. It was a crucial period. When Mulford came to India, relations between Teheran and New Delhi were on a reasonably good footing: congruence on Afghanistan was the most recent foreign policy linkage, but so too was the question of energy (India had long been in talks with Teheran and Islamabad to allow a natural gas pipeline to run from Iran to India). Mulfords brash style mimicked that of his president (Bush), demonstrated in his unwillingness to bend to the niceties of diplomatic aide-mmoires. The deal from Washington was simple. India would soft-pedal the natural gas pipeline, and it would be given more than assurances to build up its nuclear sector (to be built, largely, by U. S. firms). Any disentanglement from Iran would allow India freedom of maneuver toward the U. S. narrative of world affairs. When next the U. S. needed a vote to sanction Iran (in the International Atomic Energy Agency or in the U. N.) it might have to call upon India, and thereby confuse the NAM bloc, which was often led by India on some of these matters. To make the case, Bush sent his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to India in 2005: she got what the U. S. wanted from India, but gave very little. India did not get a commitment to a permanent seat at the U. N. Security Council, and the U. S. would not go back on its commitment to sell Pakistan a new batch of F-16s. Rice lobbied hard for India to abjure the peace pipeline and to adopt the nuclear road. It was clear by 2005 that the nuclear deal was a quid pro quo for scuttling the peace pipeline and for giving the U. S. political cover in the NAM-type forums in its policy to isolate Iran. When External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh said at a press conference that India has good relations with Iran, Rice grimaced. The best case scenario for nuclear power, according to energy analyst Prabir Purkayastha, was that it would provide no more than 5% of Indias primary energy needs by 2015 this is hardly a solution to Indias energy problem. It is, rather, a political matter: India is now anointed as a nuclear power, and feels emboldened to seek its proper place in the Security Council, and to earn that role it must act maturely, namely work with the international community (viz. the Atlantic powers) to isolate revisionist powers, such as Iran. That was the bottom line. The aggravations of David Mulford come out clearly in the cables he sent off to the U. S. State Department (and revealed by Wikileaks). In early September 2005, prior to Indias vote against Iran in the IAEA on September 24, Mulford met Foreign Secretary 90
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Shyam Saran. In Mulfords rendering, he delivered the mail (wrapped in a brick) (September 6, 2005, 05NEWDELHI6840, Wikileaks). This is the kind of aggressive language that he often used. Mulford took Saran to task for Natwar Singhs statements during a visit to Teheran and told Saran that the time was drawing near for fence-sitters to make hard decisions. Then comes the clear quid pro quo: Many in Congress and throughout Washington, [Mulford] reminded Saran, were watching Indias treatment of Iran prior to Congressional debate on the U. S.-India civilian nuclear initiative. One could only come if the other was demonstrated. Why was Indias vote so important? India had a key voice in the NAM and could swing opinion in the [IAEA Board of Governors]; it was time, [Mulford] said, for us to know where India stood. From the U. S. side, the nuclear deal was about nuclear energy (and $60 billion promised in purchases for nuclear hardware), but more so it was about cementing Indias shift from its non-aligned foreign policy to being a subordinate ally of the U. S. narrative. The irritant to Mulford was not the BJP, nor the Congress. On December 28, 2005, BJP National Executive Member Seshadiri Chari told the U. S. embassy that they should not read too much into the foreign policy resolution [of the BJP national council meeting], especially the part relating to the U. S. (December 28, 2005, 05NEWDELHI9761, Wikileaks). This was just standard practice, the BJP leader told the Embassy, rhetoric for the elections. On October 21, 2005, BJP leader Jaswant Singh met with Nicholas Burns, no. 3 at the U. S. State Department, and the point person for the nuclear deal. Singh complained about U. S. support of Pakistan and other such points. But the main message that Singh delivered was that the Congress does not have the intellectual commitment to improve U. S./India relations (October 24, 2005, 05NEWDELHI8231, Wikileaks). The Congress is hampered by the Communists, who are bent on hollowing out the Congress Party by disapproving anything and everything. The BJP would govern without any Communist influence, and was therefore a better partner. The U. S. was not convinced that the Congress was the problem. It was the Communist bloc that was obdurate. Jaswant Singh told Burns, The Communists will obstruct the policy and the PM should deal with this problem. Singh emphasized that the U. S. should not have frontloaded the relationship with nuclear issues but should have waited to construct a large political base first. The Communist bloc in the parliament had to be cut down to size. This meant that the bastions in West Bengal and Kerala needed to be pruned. It helped that at this opportune moment, the Left Front government in Bengal ran into trouble with its attempt to create the Tata factory in Singur. The slide downhill for the Left Fronts popularity could be gauged to the events in Singur of 2006, just when the nuclear deal/Iran began to heat up. The Left Front suffered in the panchayat elections (2008), the Lok Sabha elections (2009), the municipal elections (2010) and the Assembly elections (2011). The four parties that comprise the Left bloc in the parliament (the two Communist Parties, the Forward Bloc and the Revolutionary Socialist Party) saw their membership in the Lok Sabha drop from 58 (in the 14th Lok Sabha, 2004-2009) to 24 (in the 15th Lok Sabha, 2009-) out of a total of 543. A weaker Left presence in the parliament has strengthened the ability of the Congress to more fully adopt the U. S. narrative of world events. 91
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The other decisive problem for those who wished to consolidate the U. S.-India relationship was the inherited people and ideas inside the bureaucracy, both in the MEA and in the ambassadorial personnel. Prior to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads visit to India in late September 2008, the MEA went into turmoil. It released an official statement that the U. S. embassy in Delhi characterized as an anodyne draft statement that reiterated standard Indian talking points on Iran. MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar had showed the draft to the Political Counselor at the Embassy, and told him, Indias growing relationship with the U. S. had split MEA into two camps (April 24, 2008, 08NEWDELHI1134, Wikileaks). A member of the MEA who was against the strong relationship wrote the draft, which enraged Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, who was in Beijing on a visit. The Embassy registered its protest against the MEAs offensive statement on Iran, and pushed on with its attempt to strengthen its allies in the MEA and weaken its adversaries. One example of how the U. S. government influenced the Indian MEA bureaucracy is in its attempt to undermine the Indian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Nirupam Sen. Sen had come to the UN from his post as Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka. An intellectual with a seasoned understanding of world affairs, Sen threw in his energy to push for more democracy in the UN and less fealty by the NAM bloc and India to the tantrums from Washington (the Bush administration sent as its Representative John Bolton, whose views on the UN can be captured in his view that, the Secretariat building in New York has 38 stories. If it lost ten stories, it wouldnt make a bit of difference). Sen was well-liked among the representatives from the South, and earned the respect of the UN establishment (upon his departure from the ambassadorship, Sen was the Special Senior Advisor to the President of the UN General Assembly). But he was despised by Washington. A cable from Bolton offered the full view of why they disliked Sen: Sens arguments consistently attack the Charter-based rights of the Security Council and the P-5 [the five permanent members] in particular. He routinely characterizes the P-5 as an exclusive club attempting to perpetuate an historical dominance within the international community that no longer reflects reality and does not acknowledge rising powers. (His statements along these lines, particularly as they coincide with the [U. S.] Administrations efforts to achieve an historic nuclear deal with India, strike us as terribly anachronistic.). (June 21, 2006, 06USUNNEWYORK1254, Wikileaks). Bolton suggested that Sen was an unreformed Communist. Remarkably, at a lunch meeting between Sens Deputy, Ajai Malhotra and Boltons Deputy, Alejandro Wolff, the Indian said that he had been sent to New York with instructions from Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran to cooperate with the USG on the broad range of issues, and, as Wolff put it, to check his bosss antiquated instincts. Malhotra criticized Sens confrontational attitude to the USG, which led Wolff to his own assessment (May 19, 2006, 06USUNNEWYORK1033, Wikileaks). In May 2009, the Indian government ended Sens tenure, and sent as his replacement Hardeep Singh Puri, whose appointment pleased the U. S. Government. In a meeting on May 1 with Political Counselor Ted Osius in New Delhi, Malhotra indicated that he wanted to increase U. S. India engagement to a higher 92
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degree of convergence (May 1, 2009, 09NEWDELHI877, Wikileaks). Head of the India-U. S. Forum of Parliamentarians, Ramesh Chandran put it plainly, Noting Puris Moscoweducated, UN predecessor Nirupam Sens proclivity to cling to a leftist non-aligned mentality, Chandran favorably compared Puri whom he contended has a much more modern and 21st century way of thinking, in other words, much more prone to the U. S. narrative of world affairs. Pressure from Washington and from sections of the Indian political and commercial elite upon the MEA and the Left had the desired result: the Left is weakened inside the parliament, and the MEA has largely been sequestered to the U. S. narrative. In Dhumes essay, he asks two questions that have been largely answered by the events detailed above: Will New Delhi back tougher sanctions, and possibly military action, against Iran should the Islamic Republic refuse to abandon its rogue nuclear program? Will it publicly stand by Israel, a stalwart friend and close defense partner? The answer to both questions should be yes, but events are not so easy to define. Despite the house-cleaning in the MEA, there are few who would allow the U. S. interests to trump common sense, international law and morality. Iran, unlike India, is a member of the NPT; it is not clear at all that its nuclear program should be categorized as rogue (India and Israel both have nuclear programs and both are outside the treaty obligations of the NPT). Israels asymmetric warfare against the Palestinians, and its own increasing isolation among the nations of the world for its wars and occupation make it hard for India to publicly stand with Israel in the same way as the U. S. does so (it is worth pointing out that Israels politicians are not above humiliating U. S. politicians, with no retribution Netanyahu did this to Joe Biden during his March 2011 trip to Israel, and to Obama during Netanyahus May visit to the United States). Despite the craven wish to adopt the U. S. narrative, the behavior of the U. S. and Israel make it very hard for India to go along their grain. It is much easier to align Indias own foreign policy ambitions to those of the BRICS project, which has the ear of the majority of countries in the UN General Assembly and has the respect of many. Unwilling to be antagonistic to states like Iran, or to the revisionist current in MENA that emerge out of the Arab Spring, the BRICS favor a less militaristic view of the world than the U. S. and Israel, and NATO. There will always be quid pro quo deals in the world of international relations, but these will not necessary be premised upon subordination or of the creation of cliques to bully those who refuse to be cowered. The Indian political class, and scribes like Dhume (who is at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute) might wish that India become the new Israel; but the interests of the planet (and of India) lean in a different direction, toward the strengthening of a multipolar world that is defined less by conflict and more by cooperation. That is a more modern and 21 st century way of thinking.
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At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations

Dr. Anjali Sahay Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA
Currently working in a tenured position as Assistant Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA since 2008 and has been appointed as Program Director of the International Studies Program (undergraduate) as well as Director of the Model UN Program. Prior to her current work she was appointed as Visiting Assistant Professor of International Relations at East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA from 2006 - 2008. She received her doctoral degree in International Studies from Old Dominion University, Virginia, USA. Additionally, she received her bachelors and Masters degree in History from Delhi University, New Delhi, India. Her recent publications include her book titled: Indian Diaspora in the United States: Brain Drain or Gain? in 2009. She also published an article titled: The Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications and Challenges for Regional Security in Strategic Analysis, 2010 published by Routledge.
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At the Crossroads: The Future of India-Iran Relations

Introduction:
Much has been written about the strategic relations between India and Iran in the twenty first century. Yet this relationship is not as predictable today as it has been in the past. The nuclear, economic, diplomatic, trade and other ties that these two countries share can in no way be an indication to its future. This article explores the current problems and hurdles in the Indo-Iranian relations to predict the future course of the relations between them. First and most important, the role of the United States as a factor in this relationship will be explored. Both India and Iran have an important place in US foreign policy-making, although dissimilar in US foreign policy towards each of these countries. Second, Irans nuclear ambitions and Indias continued support for this will be critical in any future relations shared by these two countries. Third, Indias growing population and its ever growing energy requirements as the demand country and Iran as the energy (natural gas and oil) supplier country will be critical in any discussion on the future of this relationship. And last, the diplomatic chord between the two countries needs to resonate together to continue the goodwill that the two countries have shared over the decades. At the crossroads, in which direction are the two countries headed?
The United States in the Middle The I factor in US foreign policy looms pretty large. Not only is this a reference to US national interests in its foreign policy but also countries such as Iraq, Iran, and now India. United States is a very big factor in the relationship between India and Iran. This is triangular relationship where one is affected when the other two interact. The three dyadic relationships being, (a) India United States; (b) United States Iran, and (c) Iran India. Of these three, its the last one that concerns the US the most. On the Indian side, New Delhis relationship and ties to the United States restrains it from embracing Iran in all of its range of connections. Yet India and Iran are important trading partners and in the last few years, Indias policy toward the Middle East has often been viewed through the prism of IndianIranian relations.1
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Two other key factors behind Indias interest in maintaining a positive relationship with Iran, are its energy needs and its desire to play well with others in the region, especially at times when Indias relationship with Pakistan (which Iran also shares a border with) is increasingly contentious.2 As the Ministry of External Affairs in India notes: Political engagement with Iran, while of great importance, may not be sufficient to ensure that our interests are protected. Economic engagement with Iran is also necessary and would help us in promoting our energy security, connectivity and opening of new markets, and to underpin our political objectives. Several commentators have written recently about the strengthening of relations between India and Iran. Despite negative overtures over the Iranian national interests, India and Iran relationship harps on shared geopolitical interests and the security issues that are centered on the conflict in Afghanistan. Since the American announcement of rounding up the Afghan mission by 2014, India is working overtime with Iran to ensure that its interests post US withdrawal from Afghanistan remain secured therein with the crucial help of Iran. Iran has a justifiable interest in Afghanistan being its neighbor. It has been a great supporter of Northern Alliance. India also supports the Northern Alliance heavily and relies on it as panache for implementing its agenda in Afghanistan.3 The intersection of Irans controversial nuclear program, the Wests persistent efforts to slow it and Indias interests in maintaining economic ties with Iran have made for complicated relationships between the three.4 Politically India supports the sanctions on Iran, but remains a firm supporter or states rights and Irans right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. While India continues its balancing act with both United States and Iran, it remains to be seen how long India will support Iran against United States wishes. Developments in relations between New Delhi and Tehran, however, may expose limits in the U.S.-India partnership as the standoff between the U.S. and Iran continues. 5 In the long run, if India had to choose one strategic relationship, would it be the United States as the world leader and global player or Iran, which is increasingly seen as the key to Indias future in energy security. Much will depend on how India perceives its own role as a global player in twenty first century.
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Nuclear Ambitions: India and Iran as part of the have-nots club are two of the most nuclear ambitious countries today. Not only do they pose proliferation problems in their
respective regions but also huge security threats for the world with non-state actors such as terrorist organizations looming large in these regions. The United States however views these two countries as completely different insofar as the treatment each of these countries gets from the world and the United States. While there is continued tensions between Iran and the US over Irans nuclear program, United States recognizes and even rewards India for its nuclear ambitions. As US officials have put it, India today falls into the trusted category of countries which can be allowed to handle nuclear weapons on a strategic scale, which means that the transfer of nuclear-weapons facilitating technology can be allowed with some degree of confidence and comfort. Among others, the US National Security Adviser, Mr. Stephen Hadley, has been quoted as saying that India has a good record, as a practical matter, in terms of proliferation to third countries. They have been a very responsible party.6 The US India Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2006, although taking three years to come to fruition, confirms United States commitment to help India in its nuclear program. While it is clear that the United States and the West oppose Irans insistence on continuing to enrich uranium to low levels despite three UN Security Council resolutions ordering it to desist, India has publicly supported Irans right to peaceful nuclear technology. Many Indian diplomats have openly expressed their opinion supporting Irans right to pursue a nuclear enrichment program. However recently, Iranian leadership has expressed disappointment over Indias decision to vote in favor of a recent resolution by the IAEA regarding Tehrans nuclear program. India now maintains (since 2010) that the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs are dissimilar and that Indias nonproliferation record is free from blemishes. IranIndia relations remain hostage to Indian diplomatic chivalry as the former seeks not to lose Iranian friendship while supporting the Western acts of cornering Iran. India voted in 2005 for taking the issue of Irans enrichment program to the UN Security Council and in 2010, India voted against Iran yet again and supported the IAEA resolutions cornering Iran on nuclear issue.
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Although India is trying to resolve the controversy over Irans nuclear program through dialogue with other partners such as South Arabia, India continues to vacillate over its governments opposition to any sanctions that would negatively affect the Iranian people and its desire to not support Irans violations of IAEA rules.
Trade and Energy Security:
India, as one of the largest growing economies in the world has diversified its trade with many countries. Its exports to the United States remain at second position after China at 12.59% of all exports and 7.16% of all imports.7 However, its trade with Iran is seen as crucial to Indias energy security. India, while playing the double game, has benefited across the board tremendously on the trade with Iran. In 2011 trade with Iran has soared up to plus US $14 billion. A huge part of this trade is spread over Iranian hydrocarbon exports to India. The year 2010 notes an increase in India-Iran economic and commercial ties which has been buoyed by Indian import of Iranian crude oil. India imported about 22 million tons of crude oil valued at about $ 10 billion in 2009-10, which makes it the third largest market for Iranian crude. India-Iran trade in 2009-10 was US$ 13.4 billion (Indian exports US$ 1.9 billion and imports US$ 11.5 billion). Indias exports to Iran include petroleum products, rice, machinery & instruments, manufactures of metals, primary and semi finished iron & steel, drugs, pharmaceuticals & fine chemicals, processed minerals, manmade yarn & fabrics, tea, organic/inorganic/agro chemicals, rubber manufactured products, etc. Figure 1 below depicts current trends in India-Iran bilateral trade from 2005 2010.8
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As noted by the Department of Energy in the United States, India is still dependent on coal, oil, and gas to meet its energy needs. Nuclear energy constitutes less than 5% of its energy requirements.
Indias large and growing energy demand and Irans pool of energy resources make the two nations natural economic partners. Indias search for energy security in a rather volatile energy market makes Iran, with the worlds fourth-largest reserve of oil and second-largest reserves of natural gas, highly attractive. It is the energy relationship between India and Iran that remains at the heart of a long-term partnership between the two countries, even as Indo-Iranian relations have significantly diversified across various sectors in recent years. It is in this context that the building of a natural gas pipeline between India and Iran through Pakistan had assumed great importance. Popularly known as the IPI Peace pipeline, various options, such as offshore and overland routes, have been under consideration for quite some time now. However, the proposal has been stuck because of differences between India and Iran on pricing and on methods to supply the gas and in February 2010 news report it has been proposed that, China replace India in the proposed IPI gas pipeline project as New Delhi has been dithering over the deal. 9 In addition to the viability of India remaining in this project, the United States has been vehemently opposed to the IPI gas pipeline project.
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Although energy security is vital to Indias long term growth, Iran is not vital to India in supplying oil. For all the hype, Iran is responsible merely for about 8% of Indian oil imports. Amid the growing global isolation of Iran, sectors of the Indian government have suggested that Indias participation in the gas pipeline deal might not give any strategic advantage to India. Again it remains to be seen whether India will pursue strategic trade relations with Iran, or diversify its oil and gas imports from other countries such as Russia if it sees Iran as an unreliable trading partner.
Leadership and Domestic Politics:
India-Iran relations have gone from strength to strength ever since the then Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao took fresh initiatives on Iran and further underscored the significance of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Sharing
cultural and historical ties, these two mammoth civilizations span centuries in their meaningful interactions. The table below gives us a quick chronology of the deepening ties that the two countries have shared since Indias independence in 1947. What is notable is the frequency and depth of the relations since the turn of the century. Most recent diplomatic exchanges have enhanced their cooperation in economic, energy, political and security arenas. The most recent and important one being the high-level visit by President Ahmadinjad to New Delhi in April 2008 and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjees visit to Tehran in November 2008. During these visit, several documents were signed to strengthen and cement existing ties. 10 India Iran Key Developments11
Until 1947 The two countries shared a border till 1947 and share several common features in their language, culture and traditions Independent India and Iran established diplomatic links The Shah visited India Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru visited Iran P M Smt. Indira Gandhi visited Iran followed by Morarji Desai in 1977 Shah visited India
15 March 1950 February/March 1956 September 1959 April 1974 February 1978
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1979
Iranian Revolution introducing a new phase of engagement between India and Iran marked by exchange of high level visits Indian Prime Minister Shri Narasimha Rao visits Iran Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visits India Indian Vice President Shri K. R. Narayanan visits Iran Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee visits Iran return visit by President Mohammad Khatami of Iran and also the Chief Guest at the Republic Day function The Iranian President Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited India Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki led a high-level delegation to India The Foreign Secretary of India, Smt. Nirupama Rao visited Tehran External Affairs Minister Shri S.M. Krishna visited Tehran to attend the 14th G-15 Summit. Minister of State for Human Resource Development Dr. D. Purandeswari visited Tehran to attend the 9th Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) Ministerial meeting Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser visited Tehran for discussion with his counterpart Dr. Saeed Jalili, Secretary, Supreme National Security Council Shri Jayant Prasad, Special Secretary (PD) visited Tehran. He met Deputy Foreign Minister for Education and Director General, Institute for Political & International Studies (IPIS), Dr. Mostafa Dolatyar. Shri Gulam Nabi Azad, Honble Union Minister of Health & Family Welfare visited Iran to represent India at the Second World Nowruz Festival held in Tehran
September 1993 April 1995 October 1996 2001 2003
29 April 2008 16-17 November 2009
2-3 February 2010 15-18 May 2010
8-9 November 2010
7-8 March 2011
13-14 March 2011
26-27 March 2011
The visit by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the present Indian Prime Minister in April 2001 as also President Khatamis visit to India in January 2003 signal the good health of bilateral relations and underline the promise to work consistently towards consolidation of friendship between the two countries. In January 2003, then Iranian president Mohammed Khatami visited New Delhi as a chief guest at Indias Republic Day parade. During his visit, important energy deals were signed and a strategic partnership was established between both countries. However, just over three years later, India has twice voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The second of
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these votes, which had the support of nearly all the IAEA board, recommended that Irans nuclear program be referred to the UN Security Council for violating international obligations.12 This shift in the Indian policy not only deepened the cracks in the IndoIranian relationship but also drew a sharp criticism amongst Indias Communists and other Leftist parties who accused India of dancing to US tunes. David Mulford, the U.S. ambassador to India at the time, also publicly noted that if India voted against referring Iran to the UN, the nuclear deal with the United States would not materialize. Since the election of Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran, India has avoided any sharp critique of his government and has urged the international community to handle Iran nuclear program with diplomacy rather than confrontation.
At the Crossroads:
The future of India-Iran relations is critically dependent on the changing dynamics of Indian relations with the US and is own positioning in the international community. Over the years India-Iran relations were perceived as something inspired by mutual interests such as energy, economy and trade, strategic interests vis--vis Afghanistan and Pakistan, and historical ties. The future holds two obvious directions in this relationship. Either India will give in to the U.S. obsession with Iran during the last few years, where it has been asked to prove its loyalty to the United States by lining up behind Washington at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the question of Irans nuclear program. Or it will maintain its own independent foreign policy and pursue its strategic trade and energy relations with Iran. Of the two, the latter seems to be more probable direction based on the following observations. There is growing evidence of a deepening of Iran-China relations and Indias own marginalization in Iranian politics. Where Beijings economic engagement with Iran is growing, Indias presence is shrinking, as firms such as Reliance Industries have, partially under Western pressure, withdrawn from Iran, and others have shelved their plans to make investments. The IPI gas pipeline project has for the most part been shelved or China might be replacing India in the project. Even if it does not the
unreliability of Iran as a trading partner leaves it as a pipedream. With respect to imports
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in oil, Iran accounts for only 8% of all oil imports. India seeks better relations with the United States than it does with Iran and wants a US endorsement on a permanent member seat at the UN Security Council. Although India respects Irans sovereign right to a peaceful nuclear program and maintains that sanctions will hurt Iranian civilians, it has voted twice against Iran at the IAEA. All these do indicate a growing drift in the IndoIranian relations. In a changing world with ever-changing alliances and interests, it remains to be seen whether India and Iran will resume their strategic relations in the future. At the crossroads, maybe India can pick a third direction and balance its relations with both United States and Iran in a sophisticated manner.
-----------------------------------------------1http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter_Pant.pdf 2 3
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1539453.ece http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=24905&Cat=2&dt=1/10/2011 http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations data compiled from http://www.iptu.co.uk/content/india_economy.asp#6 of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
4http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations 5
6http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2006/03/13/stories/2006031300260800.htm 7All
8Ministry 9
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_china-may-replace-india-in-ipi-gas-pipeline-
project-report_1344669
10http://www.idsa.in/event/india-iranrelations_meenasinghroy_051208 11
Information compiled from http://meaindia.nic.in/meaxpsite/foreignrelation/iran.pdf
12http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam92.pdf
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India and Iran: Can SCO serve as the common platform?

Dr Uddipan Mukherjee
BPPIMT (Kolkata, India).
Dr Uddipan Mukherjee is a strategic analyst for ITS (Landshut, Germany and Gais, Italy). He is an Assistant Professor at BPPIMT (Kolkata, India).
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SCO seems a potent multilateral framework which could be put to effective implementation by both India and Iran so as to settle their bilateral hick-ups. However, the geopolitical calculus is not easily integrable. This paper explores the potholes in the path to camaraderie, if any, between India and Iran. ____________________
Introduction When Shinichi Nishimiya said: "I do not think so"[1], he was sternly expressing the common agenda propped up by White House so as to vilify the Axis of Evil. And Tehran was included as a coordinate in that axis in 2002 by none other than George Bush. Foreign policy is shaped mostly by national interest. But not always is national interest the only defining parameter. Supporting a cause or buttressing an agenda may have a different raison detre: for instance, value and ethics. For Japan and countries strategically inclined to the US, the former rationale mostly holds true. These nations simply do not want to lose out in the race of acquiring a top spot in the global strategic architecture; whether that has a direct bearing on their national interest or not. Inasmuch as Japan is concerned, a passively obdurate stance as expressed through Nishimiya, its deputy foreign minister, bespeaks the desire of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). And in the process, Japan does not feel necessary to align with rising stars like India. This was clearly indicative when Tokyo disallowed India to use Japanese banks in providing a clearing house mechanism to pay for Iranian oil imports. When asked whether Japan would allow its banks to process the payments, Nishimaya said his country would follow global sanctions against Iran, which stands accused by western powers of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme [2]. The message from the Japanese was loud and clear. They are going to follow a discernible foreign policy regime insofar as Iran or for that matter; any other pariah state is concerned. For Japan, the foreign policy priorities are aptly set. Germany, another contender for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has also exhibited a lucid and pro-active foreign policy stance vis--vis Iran. Berlin is in fact, a part of the 5+1 group (5 permanent UNSC members and Germany) in deliberations with Iran with regard to the latters allegedly clandestine nuclear programme. An economically resilient Germany (amidst the Euro Crisis) has catapulted itself to the league of global crises solvers: and thats no mean achievement.
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India, on the other hand, has time and again, projected itself as a peace-loving, lawabiding, ethically correct player in the world rostrum. However, as two noted analysts of Indian foreign policy have opined in a recent paper that a subversive pragmatic vision is increasingly challenging some of the key foundations of Indias traditional nationalist and left-of-center foreign policy, diluting the consensus that shaped the policy, and raising new possibilities especially for Indias relations with the United States and global nuclear arms control. [3] A most recent instance which further declaims Indias sixty-year old Nehruvian legacy in foreign policy was its abstention from voting in the contentious UNSC resolution against Libya. [4] In simultaneity, if Indias actions of referring Iran to the UNSC in February 2006 is placed [5], then it might engender slight confusion. However, as corroborated according to the taxonomy put forward by Ollapally & Rajagopalan, it needs to be understood that the dominant centrist foreign policy perspective prevalent in India is the nationalist school. And they, that is the nationalists, according to the authors, prefer foreign policy cooperation on a case-by-case basis [6] Thus, India may go ahead with a civilian nuclear deal with Washington and in spite of such a move (which may force analysts to ponder about New Delhis new found strategic proximity with the US and accordingly let them surmise about a fresh alignment in Asia); India has the capabilities to bludgeon the argumentative theoreticians and empiricists by refraining to meddle in Libya (by vociferously talking about sovereignty) and keeping mum about positioning its troops in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Iraq or Afghanistan. Furthermore, Indias overtures toward Myanmar and at times its soft approach toward Iran bothers the Americans but as of yet have not botched up the Indo-US strategic partnership; which, does not merely hinge on Indias diplomatic position with respect to the pariah states, viz. Iran, North Korea, Myanmar or for that matter Libya. Indias Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has asserted, though somewhat imperfectly, diplomacy has changed and today it is about economics, trade and petroleum. [7] America keeps the trade factor in mind in any sensitive dealing with India. In fact, postPokhran-II sanctions got diluted to some extent because of this. Naturally, India too keeps in mind the trade and petroleum aspects when nurturing an already fragile relationship with Iran. New Delhis major challenge in a post-1991 American world is to balance an apparently antediluvian foreign policy framework with the increasingly pragmatic demand for a paradigm shift in policy, both from within as well as without.
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FPRC Journal No. 6 The SCO-Iran dynamics
At the just concluded 11th Summit meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) at Astana, Kazakhstan, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, predictably, roared thus: Which one of our countries (has played a role) in the black era of slavery, or in the destruction of hundreds of millions of human beings? [8] In the same venue, he called for a post-Soviet security alliance against America-backed West. He has made it a habit, in tune with Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, to lambast the US (specific leaders in particular) at important platforms. His personal traits notwithstanding, domestic pressures and internal discontent could be assumed to provide the necessary fillip for such explosive demagogy. In 2009 at Yekaterinberg, Russia, the Iranian President had echoed similar sentiments, with special emphasis on a single currency for intra-SCO trade and an exclusive energy club. [9] If STRATFORs analysis is to be relied upon, Iran spent the better part of the past decade using its nuclear program (or the threat of one) to try to get a primo spot at the world's geopolitical table. In case of Iran, STRATFOR further contends: Highly publicize your progress on a nuclear program, stir in a reputation for irrational behavior you've got a brilliant strategy for getting concessions from major powers.[10] Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran strongly aspires to be SCOs 7 th full member: a desire the cocooned SCO doesnt really seem to relish. Iran currently holds an observer status in the group and had applied for full membership in a request filed on March 24, 2008. From a geopolitical perspective though, a bonding between Iran and the SCO could only benefit the regional cartel. Iran is worlds 2nd largest natural gas producer and if clubbed with SCO, would enhance the energy capabilities of the group and hence uplift its negotiating powers with the rest of the world. Moreover, an expansion of SCO is overdue and with Iran expressing an earnest desire, it seems logical that the glue must be searched. More so, since the primary (unstated) objective of SCO was to erect a security alliance vis--vis NATO, which was apparently stated through the aim of addressing religious extremism and border security in Central Asia. In the post-1979 era, after the Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution in Iran, and furthermore with the ascension of Ahmadi-Nejad, it seems somewhat certain that it would be difficult for Iran to forge a workable relationship with USA, at least in the foreseeable future. And in the unholy backdrop created by Washingtons maneuvers to the extent of browbeating a defiant Iran, the bilateral equation of the two countries does not appear to be analytically solvable. In such a scenario, Iran as a full member could only provide
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fillip to SCO since the latters primary motive was to construct a multipolar world, challenging US dominance. Additionally, since Russia may act as a viable mediator in the 5+1 party talks with Iran with regard to its allegedly clandestine nuclear programme [11], inclusion of Iran in SCO can only provide negotiating leverage to Russia and by group extension, to China. Such a measure, due to its natural fallout, would also strengthen the strategic objectives of these two countries in the UNSC. Hence, it was no wonder that the Deputy Head of Tajikistan's Center for Strategic Research, Seifollah Safarov underlined the positive outcomes of Iran's membership in the SCO. To quote him: "Changing Iran's membership status in the Shanghai Organization will provide further grounds for cooperation among the organization's members in confronting security threats that have targeted the region.[12] According to Wan Chengcai, a Chinese expert on Russian foreign policy, SCO is constantly growing in stature which is understood from its appeal to countries like Mongolia, Iran, India, Pakistan and of late, Afghanistan. [13] Despite the apparently favourable bonding parameters, all is not well between Iran and SCO. Russia and China do not want a rhetorically violent Iran with its pariah tag. That is why Russia has urged Ahmadi-Nejad to conform to the IAEA guidelines and get on with the 5+1 party talks. It is veritably clear that the SCO doesnt prefer to openly antagonize the US, at least at the present juncture. The elasticity of the SCO is being challenged. Indias equation with the SCO The new-brand of pragmatists, as defined by Ollapally and Rajagopalan, emphasize exclusively on national interest rather than global justice and ethics. However, they are still on the fringe, at least as far as devising foreign policy is concerned. The so-called nationalists, who are at the helm of foreign policy making, prefer moderating events on a case-by-case basis [14] without basically compromising the overarching tenet of the Nehruvian dogma. While putting into effect Indian foreign policy, there has been an incessant conflict between idealism and realism, with the former winning on the majority of occasions. An obvious criticism has been that India led too much focus on idealism at the cost of national interest. It is also a fact that power projection has never been the adopted methodology for New Delhi. Dasgupta and Cohen are correct to assert that strategic restraint has been Indias doctrine [15] and they conclude with the expected: Linear projections of current trends do not predict India abandoning its strategic restraint; for that, it will require a major and unforeseeable disruption at home or abroad.[16]
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On bilateral terms, Indias relations with Russia have been more than cordial. Even after the fall of communism, and post 9/11 dominance of America in the world order, IndoRussia ties, especially in defence has leapfrogged. With Central Asia, (after 1991) India has remained tentative; mainly because of the territorial disconnect due to the presence of Pakistan and also because the former being a land-locked region. Nevertheless, as and when opportunities existed, like during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89) and after 9/11, India has skillfully projected its soft power in Afghanistan and tried to use the land of Abdali as the launching pad for Central Asia. However, New Delhi has been diffident to even accept the making of an Air Base at Ayni near Dushanbe, Tajikistan [17]. However, as far as joining SCO is concerned, India never expressed its desire earnestly. Like Iran, India is an SCO-observer, but has never been overly ambitious to claim a permanent membership, unlike Iran. In the Summit-meetings of SCO, Indias Prime Minister had been hardly visible, except that in Yekaterinberg in 2009. Finally, after sufficient dilly-dallying, India at last expressed its intent of being a permanent member in 2010. [18] India-Iran Ties: A Critical Look There is no gainsaying that Indo-US bonhomie has been on the rise since the era of Bushjunior. Whatever speculations existed in the scholarly discourses regarding the Obama administration, have probably been assuaged to a significant degree by the recent overtures of the American President. In this context, it is pertinent to explore Indias relationships with the so-called pariah states like Iran since Indias foreign policy regime vis-a-vis these countries may define the future trajectory of its bilateral relationship with USA. It is not at all unlikely for one to discover on a frequent basis anything similar to the following: While India and the United States have embarked on a campaign to strengthen their bilateral relations, as symbolized by the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal, it appears as though New Delhi has similarly begun to pursue a more robust relationship with another major power: Iran. The two states have recently expanded cooperation in a number of key areas, including counterterrorism, regional stability, and energy security. What are the implications of this New Delhi-Tehran Axis for the United States, and how should Washington respond to growing ties between India and Iran?[19] Now, it is quite natural for foreign analysts, especially Americans, to believe in the above manner as far as India-Iran relations are concerned. For instance, in a CRS report prepared for the Congress in August 2006, Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman echo
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somewhat similar concerns.[20] Nevertheless, they sound positive as far as future IndoUS bilateral ties matter. However, the doubts regarding the New Delhi-Tehran Axis may be somewhat unfounded as Indo-Iran ties can hardly be interpreted as strategic. In fact, that is what Indian analyst Harsh V Pant argues in his recent paper [21]. He says that ever since India and the United States began to transform their ties by changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India with the 2005 framework for the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, Iran has become a litmus test that India has occasionally been asked to pass to satisfy U.S. policymakers. He further states: Nascent Indian-Iranian ties have been categorized by some analysts as an axis, a strategic partnership, or even an alliance, which some in the U.S. strategic community have suggested could have a potentially damaging impact on U.S. interests in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Such dialectics notwithstanding, it remains a reality that the US views Indias moves vis-vis Iran quite cautiously and on the other hand, India keeps the Iran card up its sleeve in a post-US Afghanistan scenario where its childhood enemy Pakistan may become a potent player. A Sunni-radicalized Afghanistan may not be a lively picture for either a secular India or a Shi-ite Iran. India has some valid interests in Iran and chief among those is energy. Moreover, Pakistan has signed a pipeline deal with Tehran. Also Indias Asian competitor China is venturing into Iran to grab the energy field left open after the Western companies vacated the area. Already in 2005, India had signed a long term (25 year), $22 billion agreement with Iran for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Furthermore, India also initiated another energy project; and that too with much fanfare. It was the construction of a 1,700 mile, $7 billion pipeline to carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan. However both these projects have been stalled.[22] The Indian government says it would pay for the gas only after it will be received at the Pakistan-India border. Also, New Delhi does not agree to Tehrans demand to revise the gas prices every three years. On the other hand, the LNG project is yet to proceed as the proposed plant would need American components, which might violate the US-Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). Plainly speaking, behind the garb of commercial losses that India is citing, it is the American-factor which is telling its tale. And this is no mere presumption, which may be corroborated from the following facts.
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Of late, India has voted in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) resolutions against Iran on grounds that a nuclear Iran needs to comply with such directives as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, New Delhi also stresses that it favors dialogue and diplomacy as means of resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis; in tune with its Nehruvian legacy. On the issue of energy relations, India proclaims that Iran is an important partner as well as a significant source for hydrocarbon resources. Iran is also one of Indias largest suppliers of crude oil, and India in turn is a major supplier of refined petroleum products for Iran. While the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution does not directly affect Indias oil trade with Iran, the US monitoring surely must have had an impact. Moreover, the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, along with its caveat The Hyde Act, categorically mentions that India ought to toe the US line with regard to pariah states like Iran. However, such a weird Indian behavior with respect to Iran may not be blamed fully on US hegemony in a post Cold War era. It probably has some specific diplomatic basis pertaining to Indo-Iran ties. It will be worthwhile to reminisce that Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Moreover, it also backed the UNSC Resolution asking India and Pakistan to cap their nuclear capabilities by signing the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Iran has repeatedly urged India for accepting the NPT regime. Furthermore, with the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Iran warned that the pact had endangered the NPT and would trigger new crises for the international community. Although Iran has claimed that such an assertion was basically directed at Israel (which is also not an NPT signatory), the implications of that move could be seen in the recent diplomatic counter-attacks launched by India as far as Irans nuclear programme is concerned. Furthermore, Tehran has been critical of the Indian government's way of handling protests in Kashmir. This made India to issue a demarche, expressing reservations against Iranian interference in Indias domestic issues. In these circumstances, it may appear prudent for India to follow the recommendation of the Harvard-Kennedy School. They postulate that India should distinguish sharply between Irans nuclear position and other areas of cooperation. That is, while India needs to continue cooperation with Iran in pursuit of its own national interests, New Delhi should make it clear that it will continue to strongly support American efforts to bring Iran into legal compliance over its nuclear program.
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Nonetheless, though such a recommendation appears to be fine on paper, it might be diplomatically unfeasible for India to pursue a dualistic foreign policy vis--vis the pariah states. For instance, standing by the US in order to sternly monitor Irans nuclear programme would make it quite difficult to go ahead with the gas deals; since such a move would evoke apprehensions in both the US as well as in the Iranian camps. Actually, Indias position regarding the contentious issue of the Iranian nuclear programme is logical. India believes that since Iran is an NPT signatory, it needs to conform to NPT guidelines and clarify the doubts, if any, of the IAEA. India never denies the fact that Iran has the right to pursue nuclear energy program for civilian purposes. However, the existence of a stubborn political dispensation in Tehran will not make matters smooth in this regard and Indo-Iran mutual camaraderie would be on tenterhooks. In addition to that, American and Israeli misgivings regarding Irans motive will not create any salubrious diplomatic ambience for India either. In sum, India needs to perform the balancing act to a level of precision. For that, it shall be natural for New Delhi to maintain the status quo regarding the gas deals with Tehran, at least in the foreseeable future. That is, New Delhi is most likely to procrastinate the gas deals by citing commercial problems and likely terrorist infringements. However, it is unexpected that it would outrightly scrap the deals altogether. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that USA or no USA, Pakistan and its homegrown terrorist network shall remain a perennial problem in the path of fructification of the gas deals. Anyhow, future sanctions against Iran would entangle India, at least tangentially because India is at present a non-permanent member of the UNSC. And if it seeks for a permanent position in the influential body, it needs to quickly solve the foreign policy conundrum toward the pariah states. The Oil Angle A fresh spin was provided to the already turbulent India-Iran bilateral relations when Indias Central Bank issued a directive on 27 December 2010, regarding the payment mechanism concerning trade with Iran. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced that: In view of the difficulties being experienced by importers and exporters in payments to and receipts from Iran, the extant provisions have been reviewed and it has been decided that all eligible current account transactions including trade transactions with Iran should be settled in any permitted currency outside the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism until further notice.[23] ACU is the simplest form of payment arrangements whereby the participants settle payments for intra-regional transactions with the central banks as their representatives.
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As an initial reaction, Iran refused to sell crude oil to the Indian companies if the payment was done outside the ACU route. Nevertheless, Iran later agreed to ensure shipments at least for January 2011. In fact, to make matters worse, on 07 January 2011, the State Bank of India (SBI) refused to issue fresh Letters of Credit (LCs) to public and private sector refiners. This particular stance by major public sector Indian banks forced the private sector firm Reliance to abandon its plans of investing in an oil refinery in Iran. Though there is no direct evidence that American pressure is operating on Indian companies, however, there are indications that it is quite likely that firms like Reliance were coerced to withdraw from Iran if they wanted to keep their prospects alive in the Shale Gas sector in USA. To partially corroborate such a hypothesis; according to WikiLeaks, the officials of the US government had warned executives of France's Total and Italy's Eni SPA that investments in Iran could possibly impact their Shale gas investments in the US. Moreover, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that US officials had made a similar warning to the Indian companies. Presently, India will try to ensure that political underpinnings do not jeopardize its own economic interests. Hence, the RBI directive may be interpreted as a temporary muscleflexing so as to serve two purposes simultaneously: one, an indication of allegiance to US interests and two, censuring Iran for Ayatollah's Kashmir comments made in November, 2010. To resolve the ongoing impasse, India and Iran are looking at various options and payment through other currencies like the euro, yen and dirham since settlement through US dollars has become difficult due to sanctions imposed against Iran. Unfortunately, as discussed above, Japan has turned down Indias proposal of routing the payments through Japanese banks. SCO as the common platform: An examination Richard Weitz posits a viable reason why the SCO has not designated new members since its founding, or new formal observers since Irans accession in 2005, is that, despite numerous attempts, the SCO governments have been unable to define the legal basis for such expansion. [24] Moreover, SCO for obvious reasons is keen to pull in the energyrich Turkmenistan into its fold, whereas the latter has always exhibited diplomatic coyness. Ashgabat is part of the Central Asian geopolitical framework, both in terms of topography as well as history. So, if the SCO has to expand, its first preference must be Turkmenistan and not Iran. India, on the other hand, might not be a distant proposition,
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till Russian persuasion exists. But the obvious impediment to include India would come from three quarters. First, India itself, as New Delhis strategic restraint doctrine would hardly enable it to free the holy gyves of Nehruvian dogma and openly adhere to Realpolitik. Furthermore, it might not be prudent for India to displease the US by joining a security framework which is basically antithetical to US interests. Second is the China-Pakistan factor. SCO has made it almost clear that if India has to be co-opted, then Pakistan would come as part of the package. China insists on such a configuration as it would not allow the rising Asian power to challenge its authority in the SCO; in conjunction with Russia. Moscow, on the other hand, would like a scenario in which India joins the SCO without Pakistan. But, it has to be kept in consideration that any extension of SCO to integrate South Asia naturally must go through Afghanistan and Pakistan. India may not appreciate such a formation, but it is to a large extent, inevitable. And third, the SCO members must be wary of the inherent discord between India and Pakistan. Interestingly, at the 11th Summit of SCO in the second week of June 2011, Indias External Affairs Minister had to face verbal bombardments from the Kazakh president regarding the Kashmir dispute. [25] These are ominous signs for India. India has nonetheless fought bilateral issues with its childhood enemy Pakistan in multilateral forums; viz. in South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), but that is a platform where India reigns supreme, both politically as well as economically. However, in an expanded SCO, India might not get such an advantage and to what extent the present Indian political dispensation is ready to take up challenges of such genre is perhaps not difficult to fathom. On the other hand, a RAND study [26] alleges that Iran continues to provide measured support to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and also maintains close relations with the same Afghan central government that is battling Taliban forces. The research rules out any abatement in confrontation between Iran and the US. In such an atmosphere, it seems highly unlikely that the US would welcome any moves by the SCO to accommodate Iran. Interestingly, Iran and India have shown similar modus operandi in Afghanistan. Both the countries provided support, (military aid by Iran and logistical help by India), to the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, as a counterweight to the Taliban. Moreover, both the countries have pumped in major investment projects in infrastructure and education for Kabul. It wont be preposterous to assume that these two states would harbour
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roughly similar mode of operation in Central Asia through the SCO. In that sense, SCO provides a decent platform for interaction to both these nations. However, there are other impediments. Inclusion of Iran, India and Pakistan into SCO can further complicate matters for the regional block. Iran suspects that Pakistan abets the Sunni-insurgent group Jundallah, which wreaks havoc at times within Iran. And the plethora of bilateral matters plaguing India-Pakistan ties may come to the fore in an extended SCO. Such factors can easily dissuade the region-specific issues of Central Asia and make SCO an unnecessary bickering ground for outsiders, as far as the original members are concerned. At the same time, however, an enlargement of SCO can broaden its scope and widen its reach in the global geopolitical chessboard; with a resurgent Russia and intimidating China gaining most of the fruits. Conclusion Since independence, India has hardly deviated from its non-committal position in aligning with power blocks. Perhaps that is the perpetual backdrop which adumbrates Indias incumbent Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs articulation: India is too large a country to be boxed into any alliance. [27] Iran, on the other hand, presently is a Mullah-dominated theocracy, the rudders of which are with a vociferous President. Till Iran is under the umbrella of Shi-ite Mulla-ism and India holds the banner of its ageold foreign policy paradigm, a strategic bonhomie between the two nations is an unlikely outcome; prevalent may be in the writings of academicians and in the domain of wishful thinking. Even if India and Iran share the same dais through the SCO, it is a definite possibility that India would keep a safe distance from Tehran and not antagonize White house to any significant degree. Both nations want to be a part of the SCO for reasons specific to each. But a bilateral strategic partnership is not seen to be evolving out of the SCO. Before that occurs however, Irans asymmetric military doctrine (allegations of aiding Hezbollah and other Shi-ite insurgent groups in Middle East) and India-Pakistan outstanding bilateral problems would continue to ensnare the SCO-veterans to allow a smooth direct entry for these two nations. References and Notes
1: Japan banks unlikely to settle India-Iran oil payments, Reuters Jun 7, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-06-07/news/29629839_1_iranian-oilimports-india-iran-japan-banks 2: ibid 3: Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy, The Washington Quarterly, 34:2, pp. 145 - 162
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4: Uddipan Mukherjee, India ducks UNSC bouncer, Uday India, 09 April 2011, http://www.udayindia.org/content_09april2011/spotlight.html 5: John Cherian, Indian Betrayal, Frontline, Volume 23 - Issue 03, Feb. 11 - 24, 2006, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2303/stories/20060224005912800.htm 6: see 3 7: VP Dutt, "India's Foreign Policy", National Book Trust, India, p 238, ISBN 978-81-237-4955-6, p 238 8: Irans president calls for post-Soviet security alliance to unite in alliance against West, Associated Press, Wednesday, June 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asiapacific/irans-president-calls-for-post-soviet-security-alliance-to-unite-in-alliance-againstwest/2011/06/15/AGr0wnVH_story.html 9: Richard Weitz, The SCOs Iran Problem, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 11, No. 15, 19 Aug 2009 10: Iran's World: Breaking Out of the Mountain Fortress, STRATFOR 11: Russia urges Iran to cooperate with UN on nuclear program, Reuters, June 15, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/russia-urges-iran-to-cooperate-with-un-onnuclear-program-1.367908 12: Tajik Analyst Stresses Importance of Iran's Membership in SCO, FARS News Agency, June 14, 2011, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9003240965 13: SCO demonstrates growing vitality, appeal, says Chinese expert , Xinhua, June 15, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-6/16/c_13933870.htm 14: see 3 (p 3) 15: Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine? The Washington Quarterly , 34:2, pp. 163 177 (p 3) 16: p 13, ibid 17: Uddipan Mukherjee, Presidential Visit to Tajikistan: India among the Pamirs?, Artice No. 2972, 22 September 2009, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2972 18: India's agenda at the SCO, The Hindu, Opinion-Editorials, June 17, 2011, http://www.hindu.com/2011/06/17/stories/2011061755141000.htm 19: India-Iranian Relations: Key Security Implications, Harvard-Kennedy School, March 26, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/India%20Iran%20Brief-%20Final%204.pdf 20: India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests, CRS report for the Congress, August 02, 2006, K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70294.pdf 21: Harsh V Pant, Indias Relations with Iran: Much Ado about Nothing, The Washington Quarterly, 34:1, pp. 61-74 22: India and Iran are in discussions for the setting up of a number of projects such as the IPI gas pipeline project, a long term annual supply of 5 million tons of LNG, development of the Farsi oil and gas blocks, South Pars gas field and LNG project, Chabahar container terminal project and Chabahar-Faraj-Bam railway project, etc. Both countries have set up joint ventures such as the Irano-Hind Shipping Company, the Madras Fertilizer Company and the Chennai Refinery. Indian companies such as TATA, ESSAR, OVL, etc have a presence in Iran. The State Bank of India (SBI) has a representative office in Tehran. India is also a member of the International North-South Corridor project. The two countries are in the process of finalizing a Bilateral Investment Promotion & Protection Agreement (BIPPA) and a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479 23: RBI Notification, ACU Mechanism Indo-Iran Trade, http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6172&Mode=0 24: see 9 25: Iftikhar Gilani, At SCO summit Krishna faces Kashmir jigsaw, June 17, 2011, The Kashmir Monitor, http://kashmirmonitor.org/06172011-ND-at-sco-summit-krishna-faces-kashmirjigsaw-7190.aspx
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26: Alireza Nader and Joya Laha, Irans Balancing Act in Afghanistan, RAND, May 31, 2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/may/31/rand-irans-balancing-act-afghanistan 27: see 3
Note : India-Iran economic and commercial ties have traditionally been buoyed by Indian import of Iranian crude oil. India imported about 22 million tons of crude oil valued at about $ 10 billion in 2009-10, which makes it the third largest market for Iranian crude. India-Iran trade in 2009-10 was US$ 13.4 billion (Indian exports US$ 1.9 billion and imports US$ 11.5 billion). Indias exports to Iran include petroleum products, rice, machinery & instruments, manufactures of metals, primary and semi finished iron & steel, drugs/pharmaceuticals & fine chemicals, processed minerals, manmade yarn & fabrics, tea, organic/inorganic/agro chemicals, rubber manufactured products, etc. http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044479
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India-Iran Relations : Testing Time?

Dr. Farah Naaz
Jamia Millia Islamia
New Delhi
Farah Naaz is an Assitant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. She did her MA from Aligarh Muslim University,Aligarh and Ph.D from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She worked with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi from 1998 to 2002, as an Associate Fellow. She has written extensively on West Asia, particularly Indias relations with the countries of the region. She has published one book (West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives), two monographs (Israel Palestinian Relations and India- Israel Cooperation) and twelve articles.
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The interaction between India and Iran were present since time immemorial. Both the countries were well disposed towards each other even before Indias independence. In the post World War II period, the changed international system compelled them to formulate their foreign policies according to their national interests. During the cold war years, Iran aligned with the west while India did not join any power bloc. Indias policy of non alignment and Irans policy of alignment with the west determined their relations to a great extent. As there was very little in common between them at that time their relations during the 1950s were confined to nonpolitical spheres like trade and commerce. Over the decades these relations improved but in 1980s during Khomeinis time, there was a downward trend in India- Iran relations due to Irans inclination towards Islamic causes and its preoccupation in the Iran Iraq war. 1 The end of the cold war heralded a new era characterised by the unipolar world. Iran was facing an adversarial situation in the region as the Arab Gulf states consolidated their ties with the US. Iran also lost its strategic leverage. India too was troubled by the regional rivalries and international pressures and was set to expand its economic and political relations with the countries of the world including the Islamic world. During the 1990s, security threat perceptions and common interests of India and Iran brought them closer. The decade saw an upswing in their relations and their cooperation expanded in all possible areas. The main areas where the relations were expanded were energy partnership, bringing stability in Afghanistan and building linkages to Central Asia for economic interaction. 2 The last decade, however, put their relations to different tests. Indias close relations with the US, Irans nuclear program and its confrontational stance with the US presented different problems for the Indian policy makers. Indias stand on Iranian nuclear issue had the potential to strain their relations with Iran and also slowed down negotiations on the pipeline project. The pressures on India posed considerable problems where it was left with very less option but to balance its relations between US and Iran. Nuclear issue Iran has been under serious observation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as UN Security Council over its nuclear energy program during most of the last decade. Although Irans nuclear program began in 1960s under the Shah, it could not make much progress and was abandoned. In the mid 1990s, it made new efforts but raised suspicion among the world community about its clandestine nuclear program. To avoid possible international sanctions, in 2003, it agreed to suspend work on uranium enrichment and allow a stepped-up level of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Association.3 In August 2005, Ahmadinejad, a hardline conservative became the President of Iran. In the same month, Iran decided to restart uranium conversion against the commitment to suspend all enrichment related activities under the Paris Agreement of 14 November2004 with the EU-3 (France Germany and Britain). In January 2006, Iran made it clear to the IAEA that it would resume nuclear research which led to the current confrontation between Iran and the US. 4
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India had always regarded Iran as an important regional player and had never supported the US policy of isolating Iran. At the same time it did not want another nuclear weapons power in the region. Consequently, it aligned itself with international efforts to bring Irans controversial nuclear program into conformity with Non Proliferation Treaty and IAEA provisions. However, India consistently supported Irans right to peaceful nuclear technology but it also insisted that it must satisfy the international community of its peaceful program. Because of its association with the Non Aligned Movement, close relations with the US under worlds changing power equation and Indo-US nuclear deal, the Indian policy makers faced difficulties and were also criticised by the leftist and opposition parties in the country who have been critical of Indo US civil nuclear cooperation. They argued that Indias closer relations with the United states should not come at the expense of positive ties with Iran. 5 Given the US hostility with Iran, India had been asked to prove its loyalty to the US. In this case, Iran became a litmus test that India had been asked to pass to satisfy US policy makers. Consequently, India was expected to support the US at the IAEA on the question of Irans nuclear program.6 In September 2005, the IAEA board approved a resolution that found Iran in non compliance with its international obligations. It set up Iran for future referral to the UN Security Council. The resolution seeks to refer Iran to the Security Council at an unspecified date 7 India voted in favour of the resolution. Only 22 of the 35 board nations voted for the US backed European Union motion. Indias External Affairs Ministry spokeman defended the vote by saying, Nevertheless, the resolution does not refer the matter to the Security Council and has agreed that outstanding issues be dealt with under the aegis of the IAEA itself. This is in line with our position and therefore, we have extended our support to it.8 It justified it being in its national interests saying that its vote in favour of the EU resolution on Irans nuclear program in the IAEA addressed some of the major concerns and did not reflect any change in its stand on Iran. 9 Tehran however did not show any signs of downgrading its relations with India and interpreted Indias vote as an example of realpolitik and national interests transcending long-standing traditions and principles. 10 In Jan 2006, the US ambassador to India linked progress on proposed US India civil nuclear cooperation with Indias upcoming vote indicating, that India must side with the US otherwise US-India initiative would fail in the congress. On February 4, 2006, India again voted with the majority in referring Iran to the Security Council, but emphasised that it was not detracting from its close ties with Iran.11 Some independent observers felt that Indias IAEA votes demonstrated its strategic choice to strengthen partnership with US even at the cost of friendship with Iran.12 In March 2006, the United Nations (UN) Security Council discussed Irans nuclear issue and called for a report by the IAEA to check if Iran complied with the NPT. In its view, IAEA was unable to provide assurances. It gave a strong message to Iran to suspend enrichment and reprocessing and find a diplomatic solution. Finally, in July 2006 it adopted resolution 1696 demanding, Iran suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, failing which it would face economic and diplomatic sanctions. 13
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Following this Iran has been subjected to four rounds of UN Security Council sanctions in relations to the nuclear programme. The first round was in December 2006 when Security Council adopted resolution 1737. This called on states to block Irans import and export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and to freeze the financial assets of those involved in Irans nuclear activities. In the second round, in March 2007, Security Council passed resolution 1747 to toughen sanctions and banned all of Irans arms exports, froze the assets and restricted the travel of people it deemed involved in the nuclear program. In the third round, by resolution 1803 in March 2008, more restrictions were imposed. In the fourth round of sanctions, Resolution 1929 was passed in June 2010. The Council approved fresh sanctions against Iran. The measures prohibit Iran from buying heavy weapons such as attack helicopters and missiles. They also toughen rules on financial transaction with Iranian banks and increased the number of Iranian individuals and companies that are targeted with asset freezes and travel bans.14 In compliance with the UN Security council Resolutions, India imposed a ban on the direct or indirect export of all items that could contribute to Irans nuclear fuel enrichment related, reprocessing or heavy water related activities as well as development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. India made changes in countrys foreign trade policy (2004-2009) to conform to the UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. 15 In November 2009, India again voted against Iran (the third time in four years) in a resolution passed by IAEA censuring Iran over its nuclear program and demanding that it stop uranium enrichment. The resolution demanded that Iran immediately suspend construction of its newly revealed uranium enrichment plant at Qom a site kept secret until recently.16 India however, was strongly against the additional fourth round of sanctions on Iran and considered them as counterproductive.17 Opposing the sanctions India regarded them as extra territorial and which would lead to restrictions on the third countries to investing in Irans energy sector. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said India has always supported dialogue and avoidance of confrontation and that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to provide the best framework for addressing technical issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Indicating that it would have an adverse impact on Indias energy security she said, We are justifiably concerned that the extra-territorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries in Irans energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies and more importantly, on our energy security and our attempts to meet the development needs of our people.18 By this India not only made it clear to the US that sanctions would directly affect Indian companies and Indias energy security but also showed its intentions to retune its relations with Iran.19 To further underline its inclination to strengthen its relations with Iran, India hosted the Iranian Minister of economic affairs and finance just prior to the arrival of James Jones, US National Security Adviser in July 2010. The Iranian official came with 30 member business delegation and signed agreements on energy, transportation and counter terrorism cooperation. Both sides also discussed building of an undersea natural gas pipeline. 20
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Few months later again, India repeated its support for Iran. Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at a conference at Indian Council of World Affairs said that India supports Irans right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.Indias stand on the Iran nuclear issue has been consistent. We support the right of all states, including Iran, to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with their international obligations. She also added that India desired to have an enhanced partnership with Iran. 21 India has constantly maintained peaceful resolution to the conflict. Its refusal to support any threats of violence against Iran could be seen in its opposition to impose additional sanctions on Iran. Even though Indias stand at the IAEA is seen to have been influenced by the US, it maintained its stand on nuclear issue keeping in view its cordial relations with Iran as well as its national interests. Energy: The pressures generated by the US and Indias stand against Iran on IAEA votes affected the India Iran energy cooperation particularly the pipeline project. It should not be ignored that Indias energy requirement is growing with years and consequently its imports are expected to grow as consumption rises. With plenty of coal reserves and modest oil and gas reserves, Indias policy makers are trying to meet their ever growing energy demands. Indias energy consumption will rise to 27.1 quadrillion BTUs by 2025, up from 12.7 in 2000.22 Indias demand for natural gas would also increase despite the increase in the share of nuclear power. As cited, nuclear power at this point accounts for some 2.6 percent of Indias electricity; the most ambitious plan now under discussion would increase this share to some 12 percent by 2020. Much of the estimated 8 percent annual increase in demand will therefore have to come from oil and gas, with gas demand growing more rapidly than any other part of Indias energy market. 23 Iran which holds the largest gas reserves after Russia and is a large reservoir of oil, is one of Indias leading supplier. While it is keen to find export markets, India has also emerged as one of the worlds biggest consumers and importers of petroleum products. Energy cooperation has thus inevitably emerged as the top agenda between India and Iran. In May 2003, both the countries agreed that Tehran will supply India with 5 million tonnes of liquefied gas annually for twenty five years. They also agreed to provide for exchange of experience in the field of compressed natural gas production and reconstruction of refineries. There were also new opportunities for Indian companies to invest in Iranian energy. 24 In June 2005, the two countries signed a 25 year deal, under which India would import five million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran every year. In connection with this deal, Iran granted development rights to India in two Iranian oil fields that are potentially capable of generating 60,000 barrels per day in production.25 In another deal Iran gave development rights to a block in the North Pars gas field to India. Both the countries have also pledged to explore joint investment projects in petrochemicals.26
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Currently, both India and Iran are engaged in negotiating an Iranian project for an IPI (IranPakistan-India) gas pipeline to India. Initially, Pakistan was opposed to the idea of allowing the gas pipeline to India using Pakistani territory. Later, however, it agreed and even assured the Iranians of its full support to the pipeline going across its territory to India. 27 But there are many obstacles. For India, running a pipeline through Pakistan has its own security considerations. The Indian policy makers fear that Pakistan might cut off the supplies during any military or diplomatic tension. There is also the risk of threat of terrorists damaging the pipeline. Another issue that needs to be resolved is agreeing on a gas price acceptable to all the three countries. Indian observers also wonder if Indias IAEA votes and its new partnership with the US will undermine its energy relations with Iran including the prospects of the pipeline.28 India has been staying away from the talks since 2008 and withdrew from the project in September 2009. Many reasons have been attributed to this stalled talks like, Indias concerns over safe delivery of gas from Iran to India through Pakistan was not addressed by the Pakistan government. The post 26/11 diplomatic chill too cast a shadow over the talks. Also, New Delhi wanted Iran to be responsible for safe passage of natural gas through Pakistan. 29 Other factors that disrupted the talks included anti- Iranian pressure from the US, price dispute with Pakistan and the possibility of less expensive domestic alternatives.30 As a result, Iran and Pakistan proceeded and signed a deal to begin construction without Indias participation. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki also informed of Chinas keenness to join the Pakistan Iran project.31 They however remained open for the future participation of India. Iranian Foreign Minister was quoted as saying, we have a bilateral arrangement with Pakistan and the door is open for our Indian friends. That (IPI) will be a reality 32 India finally gave indications of reviving the talks on pipeline. The Additional Secretary of India Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Sudhir Bhatnagar told his Iranian counterparts that India was willing to rejoin the IPI pipeline project. Bhatnagar discussed mutual oil and natural gas concerns and also showed Indias interest in boosting oil and gas ties with Iran.33 Another positive development in this direction was, in a commerce secretary level dialogue, both the sides agreed to increase trade relations. Among important decisions were examining the feasibility of cross border trade in petroleum products.34 The pipeline project may have stalled for some time but both India and Iran seem to be keen on completion of the project. Conclusions India -Iran relations were built up over the years. Indias vote against Iran at the IAEA has to an extent negatively affected these relations. US Iran conflict has posed considerable problems for the Indian policy makers. It is not in the interest of either US or Iran to confront each other. The US must be conscious of the fact that most of the world energy passes through the straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that both the US and Iran would like to escalate military tension in the region. Also, Iran should not loose the sympathies of China and Russia
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who have often resisted the attempts of US, Britain and France to adopt tougher measures against Iran. 35 To the Indian policy makers, Irans nuclear program would not be favourable to peace in the region. It is because of this that India did not support Irans pursuits of nuclear weapons but supported peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, India is fully conscious of its relations with Iran and keeps consolidated them. The negotiations on pipeline are also showing signs of picking up again. India should not let it get affected by its relations with US and must strengthen its energy partnership with Iran. Iran too does not want to downgrade its relations with India. If India cannot disregard the US, it must also protect its close ties with Iran which are based on common interests in energy, Afghanistan and Central Asia and balance the two. For that it is important to diffuse the confrontational stance between US and Iran. Imposing sanctions is not the solution to the problem. Peaceful dialogue is the need of the hour and is in everybodys interest for which India should also persist.
_________________________ End Notes
1
Farah Naaz, West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives,(New Delhi, Shipra Publications, 2005),pp. 36Ibid., pp. 52-63. Irans Nuclear Program, New York Times, June 17, 2011. Available at,
43.
2. 3.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html.
4.
Rajesh Kumar Mishra, Irans Nuclear Defiance, in S. D. Muni, ed., IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2007, (New Delhi, Academic Foundation, 2008), p. 255; See also, ibid. 5. K. Alan Kronstadt, and Kenneth Katzman, India Iran Relations and US Interests, CRS(Congressional Research Service), Report for Congress, Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS22486, August 2, 2006, p. 3, (available at, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/70294.pdf); Biswaranjan Mohanty, International Relations: New Horizons and Changing Equations, (New Delhi, Atlantic publishers, 2010), pp. 293-294. 6 Harsh V. Pant, Indias Relations with Iran : Much Ado about Nothing, The Washington Quarterly, vol.34, no. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 61-62. 7. John Cherian, India and Iran: The Indian Volte-face, Frontline, vol. 22, no. 21, October 8-21, 2005. Available at, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2221/stories/20051021007113000.htm. 8. Statement by External Affairs Ministry spokesman, in, Amit Baruah, Indias IAEA Vote was decided in Advance, The Hindu, online edition of Indias National Newspaper, Sept 26, 2005. 9. India votes to refer Iran to UN Security Council, September 25, 2005, http://specials.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/25iran.htm. 10. John Cherian, op. cit. 11. K. Alan Kronstadt, and Kenneth Katzman, op. cit. 12. Ibid., pp 3-4. 13. UN Sanctions against Iran, BBC News Middle East, 26 July 2010, (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10768146, See also, Mishra, op. cit. , pp. 255-256. 14. BBC News Middle East, 26 July 2010, ibid. 15. India Imposes ban on nuclear trade with Iran, The Hindu, February 22, 2007, accessed at www.hindu.com/2007/02/22/stories/2007022206300100htm, See also, India bans Iran nuclear related trade, Al Arabia news, 17 May 2011, english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/02/143895.html?PHPSESSID=
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16. 17.
India votes against Iran in IAEA resolution, The Hindu, November, 27, 2009. Sanctions on Iran Counterproductive, says India, The Hindu, March 9, 2010. Accessed at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article223516.ece. 18. Iran sanctions may hit our energy security: India, The Hindu, July 5, 2010 , http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article501500.ece, See also, Indrani Bagchi, India to US: Iran curbs will hurt us, Times of India, July 6, 2010. 19. As reported in The Hindu, (July 5, 2010) earlier in April, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) urged the countries to sever business ties with Iran in view of its nuclear dispute with the nation. For that it identified several Indian oil and gas companies that were doing business with Iran, including Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Oil India Limited (OIL), Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), ONGC Videsh and Petronet LNG. 20. David J. Karl, James Jones Comes A-Calling but Storm Clouds Gather, http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/07/22/james-jones-comes-a-calling-but-storm-clouds-gather/, p.3. 21. India supports Irans peaceful use of n-power: Nirupama Rao, Times of India, November 21, 2010. 22. Pramit Mitra and Vibhuti Hate, India Iran relations : Changing the Tone, South Asia Monitor (Washington D.C.), no. 92, March 8, 2006, p. 2. (http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sam92.pdf. 23. Ibid. 24. Donald L. Berlin, India Iran Relations : A Deepening Entente, Special Assessment, October 2004, pp 45. http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/India-IranRelationsBerlin.pdf 25. H. P. Chattopadhyay and Surya Narain Yadav, India and the Contemporary World, (New Delhi, Global Vision publishing house, 2010), p. 575 26. Ibid. 27. Farah Naaz, op. cit., pp 55-56. 28. Pramit Mitra and Vibhuti Hate, op. cit., pp 2-3. 29. It wants to pay for the gas only when it reaches Pak- India border. But Iran and Pakistan are in favour of a trilateral mechanism that provides for all the three countries being involved in ensuring safe transportation of gas. India will have to pay for the gas even if supply is disrupted in Pakistan, if the mechanism is accepted. 30. India Worried over Iran Pipeline, Deccan Herald, march 18, 2010, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/58830/india-worried-over-iran-pipeline.html ; Iran Tracker, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/india-iran-foreign-relations. The US pressure affected the cooperation between India and Iran. Like Indias Reliance Industries Ltd. halted gasoline exports to Iran to avoid possible restriction on sales in the United States,( which has increased pressure on companies selling gasoline to Iran). On its part Iran reduced its share of a project that was signed with India in December 2009 due to concerns over slow progress and US pressure on India. 31. Iran Tracker, ibid. 32. Door open for India to join IPI gas pipeline: Mottaki, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Door+open+for+india+to+join+IPI+gas+pipeline+Mottaki/1/71286.h tml, (IPI Iran-Pakistan-India) ; See also Iran Pakistan India Gas Pipeline Deal Still Open, http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2009/11/19/iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-deal-still-open-3071.html 33. India and Iran Boost Energy Ties, Jan 3, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/ResourceWars/2011/01/03/India-and-Iran-boost-energy-ties/UPI-41221294076253/. 34. India Pak to explore preferential trade deal, Times of India, April 29, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-29/india/29487104_1_trade-talks-bilateral-tradecommerce-secretary-level . 35. Mishra, op. Cit., p 260.
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The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslim Clerics

Dr.Mahnaz Zahirinejad
I am an Iranian national and was recently awarded Ph.D from Centre for West Asian Studies (Middle East Studies), International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. I have conducted many research works on the Middle Eastern and Asian foreign and energy policies for more than 6 years . The area of my research concentrates on critical study of the Middle Eastern Countries particularly Iran and Iraq foreign and energy policies in relations with the East and South Asian Countries. Publications : 1. Foreign Policy of Iraq: The Role of Iraqs Geopolitics in Relations with Neighbors, Tehran (2005). book 2. Ayatollah Khomeinis Relation with the Islamic Movements in the World, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (2003) book 3. The Role of Political Structure in Irans Energy Decision Making Policy, Journal of Third World Studies (JTWS), spring 2012. 4"Irans Energy Policy and Indias International Orientation, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Volume XXXIV. No 1, 2010. 5. "Energy Factor in China-Iran Relations", Journal of Peace Studies, Volum17, Issue 2- 3, April-September.2010. 6. Culture and Identity of Iranian Kurds, International Journal of National Studies, Tehran, (2000). th th 7.Irans Energy Policy towards China and India, International Conference: IAEE Istanbul conference 18 to 20 June, Turkey (2008). 8. Iran and India Foreign Policies under Complex Interdependence, International Seminar Centre for West Asian th th Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, 4 to 5 December, India (2009). th th 9.Irans Foreign Policy towards New Afghanistan, Indian Social Science Congress, New Delhi, 27 to 30 December (2007). th th 10.Foreign Policies of Iran and India in the New World, International Seminar at Gauhati University, 4 to 6 February, India (2010). 11.Change in Irans Foreign Policy Impacts on Energy, Indian Social Science Congress, New Delhi, 17th to 22 th December(2008).
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The Impact of Islamic Revolution on the Indian Muslim Clerics

Following the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, did his best to renovate Irans diplomacy in accordance with Islamic principles and values. He announced, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic will give priority to freedom, independence, as well as interests of Islam and Muslims and this principle will not be sacrificed for anything else. 1 Based on this opinion he emphasized the Islamic Republic of Iran will do what it can to restore the Islamic identity of Muslims all through the world. We declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran will remain a haven for Muslims of the world for good and ever, and Iran, as an invincible fortress, will supply the needs of soldiers of Islam and make them familiar with ideological and educational bases of Islam as well as principles and values of fighting infidels and unreligious governments. 2 Therefore, the Islamic government of Iran, based on the Ayatollah Khomeinis opinion in supporting Muslims in the world, paid special attention to Shiite groups and took steps to help co-religious groups in other countries such as India. The Islamic revolution had a strong emotion on the Indian Muslims due to the fact that India's Muslim population is the world's third largest and also the world's largest Muslim-minority population. The influence came directly by the Iranian missions to India and also through Pakistan. The reason is that the revolution gave Pakistani Shiite a new visibility and a renewed impetus for identity assertion. The Iranian regime helped Pakistan's Shiite to organize Shiite groups.3 The new situation of the Pakistani Shiites affected Indian Shiites. Although, the impact of Islamic revolution was on the Shiite groups more than Sunni in Pakistan, it covered both Sunni and Shiite in India. As a matter of fact Iran and India have a historical relation which is a result of Moguls Empire in India. This is an important factor in contemporary relation between Indian Muslims and the Iranian and can be seen as a reason behind the relation between Iranian Shiites and Indian Sunnis. For instance the Islamic revolution, as a theocratic regime, ruled by the religious leaders, called Mullahs, started to give the new role to clerics. As a result the Shiite and Sunni clergies re-emerged as an assertive group in India.4 As the result, the Sunni clerics in India became active in politics, social life and also became leaders of Muslims groups. It might not be the only reason for increasing the role of clerics leaders in India but it helped the clerics and gave them more legitimacy to be on power. It can be seen that, Muslim clerics
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negotiate on behalf of the Muslim community with some senior leaders of political parties.5 In addition, almost all organizations that claim to represent the Indian Muslims are mullah-led.6 Meanwhile, even a majority of non-religious issues of the Muslim community are being addressed mostly by clerics. 7 Therefore, leading Muslim groups and organizations by clerics has become common on Sunni and Shiaa groups. For instance, Syed Jalaluddin Umri, president of Jammat-e-Islami Hind, Sayyid Hyderali Shihab Thangal , the Kerala State president of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and current supreme leader of the E. K. Sunni of Kerala, Maulana Syed Mahmood Madni General Secretary Jamiat Ulama-I Hind and, ... This is important to know that Khana-e-Farhang (Iranian cultural centres) offered scholarships to Indian Muslims who are interested in pursuing religious studies in Qom and other religious centres in Iran. Moreover, Iranian government has supported Indian clerics financially. 8 Moreover, the result of relation between Iranian government and Indian Muslims clerics in the first decade after Islamic revolution, Indian Muslims followed the Iranian policies regarding many national and International issues. As an example, religious symbolism was increasingly used to legitimize political action, and Iranian slogans against the United States and Israel were adopted verbatim and chanted after Friday prayers in many. In addition, due to the influence of Iran on the Indian Muslims clerics, it can be seen that the government of India which was ruled by the Congress party, made India the first country to ban the book The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. This was following the call of some clerics particularly Ayatollah Khomeini who felt that the book offended Islam. In addition, when the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini died, India declared a three-day official period of mourning. However, the pragmatic policy that was followed by the Iranian government changed its situation among Indian Muslims. In fact promoting relations with the Indian state, instead of Muslim groups of the country that had been following since 1990 by the Iranian government, reduced Iranian influence among the Indian Muslims. For instance, Iran adopted a very moderate position after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Also in 1991, during discussions between the leaders of the two countries, Iran agreed that Kashmir was an integral part of India. These policies changed the Indian Muslims first view towards the Iranian government. However, three decades after the Islamic revolution, Iran still has the belief that it can play with the Muslims card in its relation with India. This issue
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could be observed at the time when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appealed to the Muslim elite worldwide to support the "struggle" in Jammu and Kashmir, equating the northern Indian state with the "nations" of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Ayatollah Khameneis speech was a week after Barak Obama visit to India. But, it seems that, Indian Muslims have been steadily falling behind other countrymen. The one reason is the leading Indian Muslims by the clerics. The Indian Muslims clerics are in relations with many non- Muslims political parties and they follow them in the politics. However, relations between political parties and Muslim clerics in India are more sentimental than rational. Instead of a healthy relation, one sees a relationship based on mutual exploitation, mistrust and blackmail. On one hand, political parties just want to use the Muslims for their immediate interests and on the other hand Muslims are content to be playing the role of pawns in political games. 9 Therefore , the relation has not changed the Indian Muslims situation .This is because , at the first, most clerics do not have adequate background in subjects like economics, law, sociology and technology that is needed to understand and debate today academics complex issues .In addition because of their background, most clerics typically look at even non-religious issues from a religious perspective. 10 Moreover, they mainly focus on problems affecting the socio-cultural freedom of Muslims and strongly safeguard encroachment by communal elements in the government on the personal laws and the freedom of Muslims as envisaged by the time-honoured and time-tested laws of the Islamic Shariah. 11 It appears that, the Indian Muslims after trying all such versions, they are now getting disillusioned with the political process itself. 12 This can be seen in the Indian Muslims leaders policies. For instance, Ejaz Ahmed Aslam, national secretary of the Jammat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) who is responsible for Public Relations, fort forming a separate political organization, emphasizes that: ...the JIH considered all the relevant dimensions related to the creation of a separate political party but it reached the conclusion that it is not willing to relinquish the core work that it has carried out every day without fail here in India for the past 70 years.13 Thus, thought, Iran is trying to recover its position among Indian Muslim, it seems that they are influenced by some internal centres and are connected to Indian political parties. This can be the main obstacle to keeping Indian Muslim clerics far from Iranian influence.
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---------------------1
Shahroud, Amir Entekhabi, Role of Religious Texts in Shaping the Foregin Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran, June 20, 2010, Centre for Scientific Research and Middle East strategic Studies. 2 Ibid. 3 Hassan , Abbas, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Titfor-Tat Violence, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 22, 2010 . p28.
4
Ibid.P8
Kaleem,Kawaja , Who Shrunk The Muslim Intelligentsia?, August 17, 2008 , http://indianmuslims.in/who-shrunk-the-muslim-intelligentsia/
6
Yoginder, Sikand, Indian Muslim Middle-Class Must Play A More Active Leadership Role: Asghar Ali Engineer, 18 March, 2011, Newageislam.com, http://www.countercurrents.org/sikand180311.htm
7
The role of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Muslim world , Hawzah net , http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/Magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=6696&id=79427
8
The role of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the Muslim world , Hawzah net , http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/Magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=6696&id=79427
9
Kaleem, Kawaja, Is India Really A Secular State?, Indian Muslims, February 1, 2009. http://indianmuslims.in/is-india-really-a-secular-state
10
Religion and Politics , September 21, 2010. http://niro-nirosha.blogspot.com/2010_09_01_archive.html The Situation of Muslims in India, http://www2.irib.ir/worldservice/englishradio/ISLAM/muslindia.htm.
11
12
http://www.samarthbharat.com/muslim.htm
13
Shahroud, Amir Entekhabi, Role of Religious Texts in Shaping the Foregin Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran, June 20, 2010, Centre for Scientific Research and Middle East strategic Studies.
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India- Iran Relations:

Need for formulation of a Foreign Policy
Dr. Rushda Siddiqui
Research Fellow Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Rushda Siddiqui is a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs. Her area of expertise is in the field of religion-based movements in West Asia and North Africa. She has worked exclusively on the religion based states of Israel and Iran, and has been writing extensively on the dynamics of change in the Gulf. A Ph.D from the Centre for West Asian and African Studies, JNU on State and Political Islam in North Africa: Comparative Perspectives from Algeria and Egypt (1988-1995), Rushda has also worked as an Associate Fellow on the West Asia Desk at the National Maritime Foundation and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
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(As the world awaits for the outcome of the Jasmine Revolution that is sweeping West Asia and North Africa, policy makers are busy with scenario building exercises about the possible state and social formations that will emerge. Most consider the beginning of the change taking place today, as a continuation of the revolution that toppled the stable and established government of the Shah. This paper seeks to argue that since the time of independence, the biggest challenge that was faced by foreign policy makers in India, apart domestic political changes has been the dynamics of West Asia, and most importantly the dynamic of Iran. This was a challenge that began with the creation of Israel, but peaked with the revolution of Iran. Indias inability to grasp the magnitude of the revolution and the dynamics of change that it unleashed is responsible for Indias apparently contradictory stands in international forums with regard to Iran India needs to consciously identify its national interests and project its aims and objectives. Once it is able to project a definite image about its identity, would it be able to have a foreign policy that is proactively effective. At the outset, it will need to understand the dynamics of change within Iran, its foreign policy objectives and the process it uses to achieve its goals.) It is said that one of the disadvantages of a democracy is inconsistency in policy. For a country like India, the challenge of formulating a stable foreign policy is more daunting than can be imagined. To begin with, like any Western country, India does not have a commitment to a specific ideological cause, like capitalism or communism. As a result, the guiding ideology for defining foreign policy has been extremely varied for India. From being the founding member of the non-aligned movement to adapting to the Realist School in international relations in the post-cold war era, Indias foreign policy has shifted priorities with time. If we look at the period prior to WWII, Western interest in the region was limited to seeing it as a trade route between Europe and Asia. Theorists dealing with the concept of Clash of Civilizations would rather see the developing dynamics as a continuity of conflict from the time Christianity shifted out of Asia to Greece and Rome. Till the time India gained independence and was able to find her identity, relations between the region and India had been independent of developments in the region. One of the residual impacts of European colonialism has been the change in bi-lateral relations between countries, not just colonizer and colony but between colony and any other country. Analysts and policy makers largely tend to overlook the impact that European colonialism has had on the policy making process in the former colonies. If we take the case of India alone, as the experience of independence and partition was not pleasant for her, the ideological and psychological impacts of the independence movement left a deep mark on the way the initial foreign policy was shaped. From 1947 until the late 1980s, or foreign policy goals enabled us to achieve some successes in carving out an independent international role. Regionally, India was the predominant power because of its size, its population (the world's second-largest after China), and its growing military strength. Our first Prime Minister, Pt. Nehru, who gave the world the first vision of future Indias foreign policy, was heavily influenced by the Gandhian thought of occupying a moral high ground to put the adversary at a disadvantage, he wanted to follow a similar policy in external affairs. Since the model brought us independence, Nehru visualized that this concept could be applied to
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foreign policy as well. As a result, Indias foreign policy has largely been reactive rather than proactive. As Prime Minister, Pt. Nehru achieved a domestic consensus on the definition of Indian national interests and foreign policy goals--building a unified and integrated nation-state based on secular, democratic principles; defending Indian territory; declaring India's nonpartisan approach internationally through nonalignment. Non alignment meant not depending on a single or a group of countries for economic, military and political leadership. However, India's nonaligned stance was not a viable substitute for the political and economic role it wished to play. The biggest disadvantage with the Nehruvian model of non-intervention and non-alignment was that it was centered around the personality of the Prime Minister. After his death, there was no anticipation of challenges and a need design a mechanism to respond to the challenges. Though the principal of non-alignment remains a utopian concept, its inability to resolve international disputes did not allow it grow as a foreign policy directive. The end of the Cold War gutted the core meaning of nonalignment, and India's economic problems in the changed global economic, military and political scenario forced her to reassess foreign policy objectives and goals. It led India to re-assess its relation with West Asia and redefine its antiIsraeli policy. I have used the background of the evolution of Indias foreign policy to point out that by not actively studying the dynamics of global change, India found it difficult and will continue to find it difficult to respond to the change that WANA is continually going to throw up. We will need to learn from the changing scenarios in the same manner as our founding fathers. Mahatma Gandhi, took up the concept of non-violence and satyagrah and re-defined it in the context of combating colonialism. Pandit Nehru too, took the concepts of independence, non-violence and decolonization to formulate a policy of panchsheel that continues to be the guiding principle of the Chinese foreign policy makers. His concept of non-aligment, though difficult to follow in the changing economic and political scenario, has given India a foundation on which its bi-lateral relations with various countries find stability. Iran, by far, has posed the biggest foreign policy challenge that the world has ever faced. By having a revolution, establishing an Islamic state Iran has emerged as a sole state that like nonstate actors defy conventionalism. Iran went from being an ideal oil-rent economy that could easily gel with the global economy to becoming a stand-alone economy. The country has huge 1 reserves of oil and gas, is the country with the world's fifth largest Islamic population and is the only predominantly Shiite movement that has formed a state. It is a country that chose to be a religion-based state, and established a political and administrative system that can find parallels in the rest of the world yet can remain distinct. When it came to dealing with Iran, the United States and Europe followed a blanket policy, keeping their interests and needs in mind. Their interventions as a result have been systematic, calculated and decisive. From the beginning of the 1900s itself, both Britain and Russia wanted to divide Iran within their spheres of influence, and the British succeeded in influencing the polity in Iran to the extent that it could potentially become a protectorate. This was largely due
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to the potential oil resources of Iran that could be exploited. As early as the 1870s, there was a fierce battle among the Europeans over the rights of to the Iranian oil. It was the Iranian oil that fueled the British ships. The French, the British, the Dutch, the Russian and even the Australian businessmen were interested in financing the oil exploration and processing of Iranian oil, as it would result in large profits. Britain took the lead in politically and militarily dominating Iranian polity, as Iran lay en-route to India. The American interests in the region increased with the First World War. Once the American realized that they were not getting enough in the spoils of the war, and the Sykes-Picot agreement, they actively started taking an interest in the developments in Iran. Post WWII the importance of Iran as being an oil-producing country and being strategically located south of the Soviet Union, were two factors that saw an increased US interest in the country. The US was guided by three factors: money, Israel and the needs to have a military foothold in the region. Iran remained a playground for power play, till the 1978, when the revolution turned the tide for everyone. The Shah was ousted, and the government that came into existence was made of people who were not very known in the world. Ayatollah Khomeini was one of the many ayatollahs who were part of the clerical order. The revolution destroyed everything that the rest of the world was familiar with. It redefined democracy and government. Most importantly, the national interests and priorities of the new Iran got defined. It was no longer successfully enmeshing with the global economic order. The revolution had separated Iran from the rest of the world. The elite that emerged was new, the leadership was different, and the systems that were being setup were unconventional Suddenly, the world had to deal with the second largest oil producer attempting to establish a new socio-political-economic order. Iran was no longer content with being a nation-state, rather it consciously chose to redefine its identity in terms of Islamic and Shiite. It was fearless and ready to take on the world on its own terms. The brashness with which the revolutionaries took US nationals as hostages and for 444 days did not bow down to international pressure to release them, were the first indications that the new Iran was going to be looking at every country, every person and every detail from a new perspective. It was no longer going to be an issue of historical, emotional, civilizational ties. In brief, Iran started re-structuring its foreign policy framework, and aligning it with its own national demands and needs. The clearest example of this was the relations it developed with neighbouring Iraq and the other states in the Gulf. Soon after the revolution, the Iranian leadership realized that it has unwittingly taken over the leadership of the section of the world that was unhappy with the power play between the two superpowers. Most importantly, with the success of the revolution, Iran was able to tell Muslims across the world that an alternative model of governance and state formation was possible. Shias across the world were a section of a larger population in various parts of the world. The revolution gave them a newer and stronger identity, and a hope that the revolution would expand and create a new Shiite world. If we look at statistics: Irans population is more than that of Iraq and all six GCC countries put together.
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---- Though the Shias constitute less than 15% of the global Muslim population, the Shia population of the Gulf region, which includes the 6 GCC countries, Iraq and Iran, is 63.35 % of the regions total population. For the first time, an Arab country, Iraq, has emerged as a Shia ruled state. Bahrain has a Shia majority. Almost one third of Kuwaits population is Shia. Saudi Arabias Shia population is concentrated in its eastern oil producing region. The Shia populations in other GCC countries, although small, have a disproportionately large role in the economies of these countries. In February 2008 the Iranian Ambassador to the UAE disclosed that 4,00, 000 Iranians live in the UAE and that almost 15% of Dubais indigenous population is of Iranian origin. 2 ---- According to a Feb 27, 2008, article entitled US efforts to scuttle Iran-UAE ties fail by Kimia Sanati in Asia Times,3 UAE is Iran's top non-oil trade partner with bilateral trade reaching US$14 billion in 2008 and Iranian investment in Dubai is around $300 billion. This is despite the territorial dispute about the Tumbs islands, between the two countries. There is no unified GCC political stance towards Iran, with Oman having had a close relationship for decades and Qatar playing a particularly proactive role in seeking to bring Iran and the GCC closer in more recent years. ----Irans military is numerically larger than that of Iraq (still being reconstituted) and the GCC countries put together. Arguably, its indigenous military capabilities are very likely much more potent than of the GCC countries whose armed forces have never fought a real war. Yet the same Iran worked overtime to curb its revolution within its own borders. Though it could have exported the revolution and redefined the demographic geography of the Persian Gulf region, Iran chose to limit the image it projected. The eight years of war had given it a legitimacy and identity that were unique. Like Israel and Pakistan, post-revolutionary Iran, became part of the group of states that are culminations of a socio-political movements, and are not based on identities of simple geography or cultural or ethnic affinities. The basis for Irans strength comes from its ownership of resources and its ability re-define its working styles for its national priorities. It is on the basis of the identification of its national priorities that Iran has defined its foreign policy within the realms projecting power and influence, containing rivals, and deterring attack by enemies. What we see in Iran is the constant conflict between the social and the state powers. As the functions of the state include representing the society, the state authorities have to work overtime to balance the image and practice of the state within the state and outside the state. The state has be Islamic, revolutionary, modern and ideal at the same time. It has to represent itself as the alternative to both the capitalist and communist state systems, yet at the same time it has to distinguish itself from the other concepts of the Islamic state. It has to demonstrate its compatibility with the rest of the world, yet it has to distinguish itself from the rest of the world. And it is in this paradox that the role of the power struggle between the governing political forces and the clerical orders come to the fore.
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Once Iran gave up its rhetoric about exporting the Islamic revolution, its foreign and regional policies, have been driven primarily by pragmatic national interests rather than by ideology, rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding. The Islamic Republic has not initiated any conflict or aggression in the region. It was neutral in the first Gulf War, it was helpful in the US action against Afghanistan, in the initial period after US attacks on Saddams Iraq it cooperated with the US in Iraq also. In the ultimate analysis, more than anything else, Iran ardently desires international acceptance of the legitimacy of its regime, full integration into the international economic and political order and recognition of the reality that it is the regions preeminent power. The record of Iranian foreign policy since the eruption of the revolution in 1979 reveals that policymakers have seldom disregarded the pragmatic interest of the Iranian state. Perhaps the most striking example of dominance of pragmatic factors over ideological influences in Irans foreign policy during Khomeinis lifetime was the secret purchase of arms from the Great 4 Satan US and Israel, the lesser Satan. The process of reintegration of Iran into the international community intensified after Khomeini. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in his eight years in office in effect turned on its head the doctrine of Neither East, nor West by expanding Irans relations with both and by reaching out to the pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies to an unprecedented extent. With respect to the United States, he observed a strict policy of neutrality in the first Persian Gulf War and upheld UN resolutions. He also helped in the 5 release of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon. Efforts to reintegrate Iran into the international system have reached an unprecedented height since the presidency of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. It came as a surprise to most observers that his first major foreign policy statement addressed the American people. In keeping with the essentially conciliatory thrust of his foreign policy, Khatami took the initiative of pressing for dialogue among civilizations in the United Nations. The General Assembly took up his initiative in a resolution calling for the designation of 2001 as the year of dialogue among civilizations. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for international conferences, seminars, and other forums and the dissemination of scholarly studies worldwide for enhancing dialogue among 6 civilizations. Of the factors impacting change in Iranian polity, there is a need to focus on three. The first is the changing stands of Imam Khomaini, which resulted in giving the state of Iran a very flexible kind of character. From being theocratic state, his vacillations did not allow for the creation of a singular body that would allow for the theocratic state to come in into existence. The second factor, is the fluctuation of the foreign policy of the US in WANA as a region. The US foreign policy towards Iran, and its opposition towards the revolution and the ideology of the revolution has been responsible for the changes in the stands of the various governments of the country. They have either adopted a hostile stand, like Khomaini and Ahmednijad, or they have sought to accommodate changes and thaw relations with the US, like Khatami and Rafsanjani. Their standoffs between the two countries has been responsible for the siege mentality of the
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Iranians, the regional instability of West Asia, the growth and sustenance of the non-state actors like the Hizballah, and the fluctuating oil politics on the region. The third variable for change is the role of the coercive apparatus, particularly of the revolutionary guards. Their significance in the Iranian polity cannot be ignored, as they represent the core of the value systems that the Iranian revolution stood for. Also, they represent the strength of the revolution, and its ability to organize and defend itself. It is on the basis of the revolutionary guards that the Iranian clerical order is able to assert its strength and challenge or support the political system. Iran has also managed to make itself an indispensable factor in the processes of arriving at any solution of the Israeli Palestinian imbroglio. It has a place on the high table on all Israeli Palestinian issues for all practical purposes through Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. Distance would enable it to play spoiler with relative impunity should it choose to do so. Features of the regions demography and the manner in which it has spread its influence help fortify Irans perception of itself as the preeminent power of the region. The initial confusion of defining the character of the Islamic revolution, combined with the problems of the Iran-Iraq war, all led to the changes in the nature of the factors governing the foreign policy in Iran. According to Ramazani, during Khomeinis era, Irans foreign policy was guided more by ideology as embodied in his interpretation of Islamic governance (vilayat-i faqih), than Irans interest in the nation-state.7 The issue of survival and security is a question that besieges Iran. The need to protect their identity in a hostile world, safeguard their uniqueness and to ensure that they are not swallowed up in the new secular world, has shaped the focus of the primary role of the government in Iran. The support that Iraq received during the Iran-Iraq war was an indicator of the isolation that Iran would face in the international arena in times to come. The hostility and organized campaign that Israel mounted on Iran back in 1979 and the continued rhetorical warfare between the two, the labeling of being part of axis of evil despite being one of the first countries to condemn 9/11, have all played a part in the insecurity and hostility with which Iran treats the rest of the world. Relations between the United States and Iran have remained difficult even as Khatami improved Iran's international profile and significantly improved relations with many U.S. allies, particularly European nations. The aggressive push towards developing indigenous war heads and pursuing a possible nuclear weapons program comes partly from the hostility it faces from Israel and partly from the constant confrontation that successive US governments force on it. The Israelis recognise the difference between Irans rhetoric and its policy, and initially treated the post-revolutionary Iran as a potential regional ally regardless of the nature of its regime and its rhetoric. Shimon Peres, successively Israels prime minister and foreign minister (1984-88) was at the forefront lobbying with the US to boost Irans defenses and bring Tehran back into the western fold. In October 1992, Israeli went cold on Iran. This was partially motivated by the fear that its strategic importance would diminish significantly in the post-cold war middle east if the then president (1989-97) Hashemi Rafsanjanis outreach to the Bush Sr. administration was successful. Also, the
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geopolitical map of the Middle East had changed. Israel no longer needed Iran to balance Iraq and the Arabs rather, Iran was now a potentially powerful regional player who could become a threat. And according to Israels military doctrine, potential threats are to be treated as existing 8 threats. During President Ahmadinejads first term, Iranian foreign policy had two main challenges. First was the new security dilemma brought about by the U.S. presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003. Iran responded with an accommodating policy, which consisted of expanding cooperation after Saddams fall with the main Arab world actors, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the United States. This included Irans engagement in direct talks with Coalition Forces regarding the prevailing security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The second challenge was to seek an alliance policy while regionalizing the nuclear issue, in which Iran sought to tie and interweave the nuclear issue with broader regional dynamics such as Israels undeclared nuclear arsenal and the Arab-Israeli conflict. By building relationships with friendly states (e.g., Syria) and political movements (e.g., Hezbollah or Shiite factions in Iraq), Iran tried to deter the U.S. or Israeli military threat in the short term and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. role in its backyard in the long term. Given the North Korean precedent and Indias example (the Indo-US civil nuclear deal), Iran may at some point of time it may be possible to resolve the nuclear standoff. However, for this to happen, Iran will have to compromise on certain aspects of its nuclear programme in a manner acceptable to the international community as well as give up its precondition that US forces must be withdrawn from the region. Iran has been buying time to allow the regional geopolitical situation continuing to change to its advantage and to increase its strategic bargaining leverage. In all its confusion and stabilizing post-revolution, Iran has not been able to determine a foreign policy vis a vis India. It is aware of the deep civilizational ties and the fact that numerically India has the one of the worlds most sizeable population of Shiias, the fact that India and Iran have many common shared strategic and regional interests. India is strategically located, as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had pointed out, at the pivot of change in Asia. If we take West Asia as a geopolitical unit, India is the largest country near its Eastern borders that has the capability to impact and influence socio-economic and political change in the region. India is a big enough neighboring power for the Iran not to completely eschew engaging it over the long run. The nervousness of Iran due to the nuclear threat from Sunni Pakistan, the fear of being rivaled by a Hindu India, and the need to remove opposition to the establishment of a state for the Jews has been a very strong influence in shaping the strategic alliances in the region. India, as one of the largest country, located at the center of West, East, South and South East Asia, has been repeatedly drawn into the shifting strategic partnerships in the region. Also the two most important developments that shape every countrys policy towards Iran are: the Iranian nuclear ambition and the politics of sanctions. Prior to 9/11, Iran and India shared strong strategic commonalities in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan and later in providing a corridor for economic and
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transport linkages between India and Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iran. Plans for substantive and innovative defence cooperation and a very strong energy and transport infrastructure development relationship were agreed to. Post 9/11 too, President Khatami of Iran was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day in 2003. This was the high water mark of the bilateral relationship when the two countries signed a strategic partnership. However, both sides moved very tardily in implementing the various bilateral agreements that had been signed, and thus missed the opportunity to securely lock in this extremely promising turnaround in the bilateral relationship. The fact is that India does not rank high in Iranian priorities and Iran has not made up its mind as to the kind of relationship it wants with India. Moreover, the vacillating attitude of the US and Europe towards the nuclear policy of North Korea and India and Pakistan, has proven to be a stumbling block for Iran for negotiating with India. Critics say that Indias vote at the IAEA against Iran was the price that India has to pay for the development of a strategic partnership with United States, thereby jeopardising an ostensibly burgeoning relationship with Iran. The reality remains, that as India tries to grow as an economic and military power, it is difficult for India not to continue its nuclear program. The Indo-US nuclear deal is not a step towards a nuclear weaponization programme of India, rather it is a civil nuclear deal. However, the point remains, that like Israel, that has had a consistent policy of aligning with the stronger forces, or the US that seeks to ally with forces that it would benefit most from, or Europe that prioritizes its own economic and ideological interests over those of other countries, or even China that seeks to first engage and later increase its sphere of influence, India has no defined foreign policy. It has been engaging or disengaging with Iran on an issue based approach. As a result, it would oppose Iran on the issue of nuclear ambitions, while at the same time, it would support Iran on the subject of economic sanctions as punitive punishment. It would be offended by Iran equating Kashmir with Palestine, but it would appreciate the Iranian opposition to the violation of human right in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India is not an ally to any superpower not does it have a dogmatic power driven hegemonistic world view of power. It has advocated non-alignment, peace and de-colonization in its earlier approaches. After the cold war, it switched to economic growth and the pragmatic realist approach to foreign policy. Though the approaches have not led to many problems, India will need to define a foreign policy. Iran is one of the first countries to have destabilized the stable nation-state, secular world, cart. It re-defined the identity of the state. Admittedly the Iranian revolution and the dynamics that the new state presented was difficult to assess and respond to. However, India will need to consciously spell out its responses to hypothetical situations of change. The need to understand the dynamics of Iran and frame a foreign policy is most urgent now than ever before. This is not due to the new set of sanctions that targeted Indian imports from Iran or due to the possible anticipated domestic changes within Iran. Rather, it an understanding of how the revolution worked and settled down, would go a long way to help India cope with the new challenges that West Asia and North Africa as a region are bound to throw up in a few years time. As the US presence in the domestic politics of Iraq, Libya and
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Afghanistan fades, the new governments are likely to demand more than banal responses to their foreign policies. The impact of the Jasmine Revolution and the changes that it has set in motion are likely to become clearer by the beginning of next year. The possibilities of the new governments being as religion driven as Iran are very strong. Also, once the revolution settles down, Iran may emerge as one of the bigger political, strategic economic players in the region. It has led a revolution earlier, and may be able to understand the new elite in the region better. India does not need to go out of its way to woo the Iranian leadership, but it will definitely need to understand the psyche of the leadership. It will have formulate a foreign policy, beginning with Iran, where it does not see the country in question through the prisms of analysis that the other countries view it with. An understanding of the change that is responsible for todays Iran would go a long way for India in formulating a successful foreign policy. Though the new polities that will come into existence now in WANA will not repeat the pattern that Iran set, they will definitely be as unconventional if not more. Most importantly for India, it is time to realize that despite its handicaps and limitations, Iran is actively preparing a regional engagement policy and has already started working on how to tackle its neighbours as the US and allied presence in the region decreases. India does not need to compete with Iran, but it would help to understand the variables and factors that Iran is taking into consideration while formulating their regional policies. _____________________
1
After Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh However, official statistics do not confirm these figures as there has always been a deliberate official ambiguity about statistics relating to Iranian involvement with and in Dubai.
2
3 4
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB27Ak02.html accessed on 15 May 2011 See Ramazani, R. K.: Ideology and pragmatism in Iran's foreign policy. Middle East Journal Vol. 58, No.4; Autumn 2004: p 555-6 5 See See Ramazani, R.K., Irans Hostage Crisis: International Legitimacy Matters, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, A Duke University Press Vol. 25, No. 2, 2005 6 bid 7 See Esposito, John L. (ed.) & Ramazani, R. K. (ed.): Iran at the crossroads. New York. Palgrave, 2001, Chapter 10. 8 Parsi, Trita, The Iran-Israel cold war, 28 October 2005, www.openDemocracy.net, cited: 4/18/06.
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India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives
Dr. Venkat Lokanathan

Manipal University, Manipal, India
The writer is currently Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India. He has also worked as a Research Officer at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. His areas of interest include the broader contours of International Security Affairs with specific focus on US foreign policy towards China and South Asia.
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India-Iran Relations: Varying Challenges and Perspectives
A policy of non-alignment and the presence of a significant domestic Muslim population ensured that Indias foreign policy towards Iran, in its formative years, was largely ideological rather than one based on national interests. On March 15, 1950, New Delhi and Tehran signed a friendship treaty. In principle, this document committed them to amicable relations; yet, in practice, both countries were miredalbeit to differing extents at different timesin opposing Cold War alliances that precluded the development of robust bilateral ties. However, post-Cold War, keeping substantial regional interests in mind, India sought to forge a robust and comprehensive relationship inclusive of energy, commercial cooperation, infrastructure development, military and intelligence ties. Narasimha Raos 1993 state visit was significant in improving relations as it was the first by an Indian Prime Minister. Iranian President Rafsanjani made a reciprocal visit in 1995. While high-level visits continued after 1995 solidifying mutual economic interests in key technological sectors, the next state visit did not occur until 2001, when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tehran. This visit culminated in the Tehran Declaration which laid the foundation for cooperation on a wide array of strategic issues including defense. In January 2003, during President Khatamis visit as the Chief Guest at Indias 2003 Republic Day celebrations, the New Delhi Agreement was signed further committing both countries to deeper levels of engagement including military cooperation. The US factor Significantly, despite extensive regional press coverage, the Indian-Iranian rapprochement drew the attention of the United States only episodically and never as intensely as in 2006. Arguably, increased scrutiny arose due to the convergence of two unrelated developments. The first was the nuclear crisis which directly put Iran in confrontation with the United States. The second was the 2005 framework for a civilian nuclear agreement that began transforming ties between India and the United States. Critics of the nuclear deal argued that it would weaken the non-proliferation regime at a time when it had to be adequately robust to counter Iranian intransigence towards its nuclear program. Both opponents and proponents of some variant questioned the relationship between New Delhi and Tehran. Hence, India was put under immense pressure to back the United States at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the question of Irans nuclear program. India voted for the resolutions finding Iran to be in non-compliance in September 2005. It, then again, voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council as the Bush administration voiced its concerns that if India voted
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against the February 2006 U.S. motion on Iran at the IAEA, Congress would likely not approve the nuclear agreement. Nevertheless, many Congressional members, citing the second Indian-Iranian naval exercise in March 2006, continued to demand that the United States make the nuclear deal conditional on Indias ending all military relations with Iran. When New Delhi raised its concerns, the Bush administration assured that it would oppose any amendment to the nuclear pact which would condition U.S. cooperation with India on its policies toward Iran. Interestingly, throughout Congress deliberation on the civilian nuclear deal, the Bush administration consistently downplayed New Delhis ties with Tehran by reducing them to Indias growing energy needs. Officials argued that the civilian nuclear engagement would diminish Indias reliance upon Iran, or at least provide the opportunity for the United States to shape Indias relationship with Iran. Given the various apprehensions about the Indo-Iranian relationship in the context of the nuclear deal, the Congressional Research Service authored a report in August 2006 examining the extent of the relationship, ostensibly to put to rest some of these concerns. While acknowledging that some differences in preferred policy towards Iran could emerge, that report too concluded that Indias motivations to pursue relations with Iran were primarily rooted in its growing energy needs and therefore were relatively benign to U.S. interests. Yet, the U.S.India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (also known as the Hyde Act), signed by President Bush in December 2006, contained a Statement of Policy including riders designed to ensure Indias support for U.S. policies regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. In particular, India was to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Although this generated considerable domestic opposition in India, President Bush, while signing the Act, emphasized that his administration would interpret this provision as merely advisory. The nuclear issue is complex as India and Iran have long held significantly different perceptions of the global nuclear order. Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and backed the UN Security Council Resolution asking India and Pakistan to cap their nuclear capabilities by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Additionally, Tehran has repeatedly called for universal acceptance of the NPT, much to New Delhis chagrin. Although Iran has claimed that this was directed at Israel, the implications of such a move are far reaching for India. With the conclusion of the U.S.India nuclear deal, Iran has warned that the pact had endangered the NPT and would trigger new crises for the international community. Meanwhile, Indias position on the Iranian nuclear question is relatively straightforward. Although India believes that Iran has the right to pursue
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civilian nuclear energy, it has insisted that Tehran should clarify the doubts raised by the IAEA regarding its compliance with the NPT. India has continued to affirm its commitment to enforce all sanctions against Iran as mandated since 2006 by the UN Security Council. However, much like China and Russia, it has argued that such this should not hurt the Iranian population, and has expressed its disapproval of sanctions by individual countries that restrict investments by third countries in Irans energy sector. Indias presence in Iran has shrunk, as firms such as Reliance Industries have, partially under American pressure, withdrawn from Iran, and others have shelved their plans to make investments. To date, Iran accounts for only about 8 percent of Indian oil imports. Moreover, both of the major energy deals recently signed with great fanfare, and raising American concerns, are now in limbo. The 25-year, $22 billion agreement with Iran for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has not produced anything since it was signed in 2005, as it requires India to build an LNG plant in Iran. The plant would need American components, which might violate the U.S. IranLibya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The other project involving the construction of a 1,700-mile, $7 billion pipeline (IPI) to carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is also stuck. Pakistan has already signed the pipeline deal with Tehran, while China, now Irans largest trading partner, has undertaken massive investments in an effort to rapidly occupy the space vacated by Western firms. Irans position on several other crucial issues has also run counter to Indian interests. Tehran was critical of the way India handled protests in Kashmir in early 2011. The Indian government was forced to issue a demarche, protesting against Iranian interference in Indian domestic issues. The need for momentum India has ambitions to be recognized as the preeminent power within the Indian Ocean basin and also be a global player in due course. For this, it will have to be proactive to prevent developments that are fundamentally negative to its interests by relying upon two instruments of soft power: its economic and political sources of influence. Central Asia, which includes Afghanistan along with Iran, comprises an important theatre for this power projection as India sees enormous energy potential in the region. With 2.7 percent of the worlds confirmed oil deposits and seven percent of the worlds natural gas deposits, Central Asia has long figured imminently in Indias efforts to diversify its energy sources. However, the crucial regional issue where India and Iran need each other is the evolving security situation in Afghanistan. There is a fundamental disconnect that has emerged between U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States has actively discouraged New Delhi from assuming a higher profile in Afghanistan, for fear of
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offending Islamabad. However it has failed to persuade Pakistan into taking Indian concerns regarding cross border terrorism more seriously. So long as Afghan territory is not being used to launch attacks onto American soil, the United States may have no vital interest in determining who actually governs in Afghanistan, however, it is important to India. If the United States were to abandon the goals of establishing a functioning Afghan state and seeing a moderate Pakistan emerge, that would put greater pressure on Indian security. To preserve its interests in case such a strategic milieu evolves, India has reason to coordinate more closely with states such as Russia and Iran as a contingency. In recent months, India has infact reached out to Iran about Afghanistan, and the two sides are now involved in structured and regular consultations on the issue. Both New Delhi and Tehran are unlikely to accept a political regime in Kabul which serves as a springboard to project Pakistans military interests. Militarily and strategically, Central Asia is an important area for Indian presence, at least in part to deny Pakistan the strategic depth it craves. Although Iran has joined the Indian navys annual initiative, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which provides a forum for the navies of the Indian Ocean littoral states to engage each other, the defense relationship, however, remains not only sporadic and tentative, but also circumscribed by Indias growing defense linkages with Israel.
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India's Shifting Loyalties: Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran? Gauri Jain
(beinformedjournal.org)
Born and brought up in Mumbai, India I have immigrated to the US. I have lived here in the US since 1996. I am a Psychiatrist by training. I work as the Medical Director of a local Mental Health Center in the US. I am an avid reader and a long time political observer. I write and publish the 'beinformedjournal' (beinformedjouran:org). In the short time that the journal has been online (since December 2009) it has become quite popular. People from all over the world read the journal daily. My articles have been used as a reference by a number of other writers, bloggers, online publications including Wikipedia and Forbes.
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India's Shifting Loyalties: Does India Need US More Than It Needs Iran?
India has tried to skirt around the issue of its historically warm relations with Iran for the longest time now, despite growing US pressure to cut ties with Iran. With the announcement from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), in December 2010 which indicated tightening of financial transactions for trade with Iran, it appeared that New Delhi has finally decided to jump off the fence and had landed on Washington's side. The RBI had announced that it would no longer allow financial transactions to Iranian crude imports through the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism. The RBI's statement did not specifically single out Iran as the target of this regulation, but it was obviously so. India is Iran's biggest trade partner within the ACU. The ACU - headquartered in Tehran - is a financial clearing house system set up by the UN in 1974 to facilitate trade and economic growth among Asian countries. Its members are the central banks of nine Asian countries: India, Iran, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar (Burma). The ACU allows companies which trade with each other within these nine countries, to transact via their respective central banks rather than deal directly with each other. The benefit of this is that the central banks can process these financial transactions in such a manner that it can be very difficult for third parties to track the payments. Thus the details about the transaction remain obscure, which benefits both the payee and the payer. Full disclosure of the details can create problems for some Indian companies because the current sanctions against Iran mandate that companies that engage in trade with Iran in excess of $20 million, be not allowed to do business with American companies. These companies would then essentially set themselves up for getting sanctioned by the US. For huge multinationals with lucrative business interests all around the world, getting officially sanctioned by the US can spell a kiss of death. The sanctions imposed by the UN on Iran do not forbid countries from buying oil from Iran. But transacting with Iran becomes complicated due to severe restrictions and sanctions placed on Iranian banks by the US and the EU. As the sanctions against Iran have become more severe, Iran has increasingly relied upon the ACU over the last few years to do business with its regional trade partners. The fact that Iran can do business with others via the ACU makes the sanctions imposed by the international community toothless and ineffective. Washington has therefore long pressured New Delhi to shut down this loophole of the ACU and to take a firmer stand against the Tehran's nuclear program. Following the decision by the RBI, by the end of December 2010, Tehran retaliated by saying that it will not accept any transactions by Indian companies for Iranian crude, outside of the ACU. This essentially put India into a bind. Iran is the second biggest exporter of oil to India, after Saudi Arabia. India cannot afford to entirely displease Iran. India's increasing energy demand to fuel its growth is a major factor in this dynamic. In January 2011, Iran suggested that the Indian companies use the Hamburg based bank - EIH Bank (aka European-Iranian Trade Bank or Europisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG) - to process payments for Iranian crude. This proposal required Indian companies to open accounts with the SBI (State Bank of India), which in turn would open an account on behalf of its Indian clients with the EIH and thus process their payments to Tehran.
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However back in September 2010, the EHI was already blacklisted by the US Treasury for allowing Iran to trade with other states, despite the sanctions. This means that any bank that works with the EHI is subject to an US investigation. In May 2011, the EHI was blacklisted by the EU as well. Tehran had also suggested using two banks in the UAE, both of which turned down the request to process the payments. India reportedly used the EHI to process some overdue payments to Tehran in early 2011. However that option quickly fizzled out, as Germany put an end to these transactions. Fierce negotiations have continued on both sides for months, as New Delhi currently owes close to $2 billion to Tehran for imported crude. In early May 2011, it was reported by Indian media that the Indian government is considering paying for the Iranian crude in Indian Rupees, by allowing the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to open rupee accounts with Indian banks. However by the end of May 2011 when the Indian delegation from the finance ministry led by R. Gopalan met with Iranian delegation led by deputy governor of Iranian central bank, Hamid Bohrani, this issue was (and it still is) - unsettled. Thus for India it has not been easy to take sides and appease the US. India has vested interests in Iran, most important being - crude. India is estimated to import $13 billion of crude annually from Iran annually. India also has a long history of cultural ties with Iran. Indians relationship with Tehran runs deeper than its new found friendship with Washington. India is in Iran's neighborhood, so to speak, more so than the US. This means India also has geopolitical interests at stake in this partnership. In a program (1) aired in July 2010, by the highly respectable American public radio station National Public Radio (NPR) - journalist Corey Flintoff explained this nuanced issue rather well. Here is an excerpt: "India and Iran have had a relationship that dates back not just for years but millennia. Iran also figures into India's geopolitical interests in the region, including its relations with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. Rajiv Sikri (a retired Indian diplomatic and foreign policy strategist) says that India wants to stay engaged with Afghanistan partly to counter terrorism and partly to balance the influence of its main rival, Pakistan. Pakistan has been blocking India's land access to Afghanistan, so the Indians built a road through Iran. India supported the U.S. drive for sanctions against Iran in 2005 and 2006, when it was negotiating for a nuclear technology deal with the Bush administration. Sikri says many Indian leaders feel the U.S. never appreciated what a difficult decision that was for India and never properly reciprocated. U.S. officials have said that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is as important for India's security as it is for the United States. But Sikri says Indians are less anxious about the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran because they already live with a rival who has the bomb - Pakistan." At least for now it appears that New Delhi has finally ceded to Washington's pressure. There are multiple factors that may have driven Indias decision to side with Washington. First and foremost there is the overshadowing presence of the proverbial elephant in the region China! China is the key reason why Washington is warming up to India. For instance, President Obamas vocal support to India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, during his recent trip to India, had less to do with India itself and more to do with China. First of all, the logistics of adding a new permanent member to the UN Security Council are so complicated that it is not even a theoretical option in the foreseeable future. Since it is not ever likely to happen during Obamas term as the President he has nothing to lose and much to gain by doing lip service. The message he was trying to send by this announcement was twofold: primarily
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to Beijing that Washington is willing to put its full diplomatic weight behind Beijings rival, to prop India up against China and second he wanted to dangle a carrot in front of New Delhi of what could possibly be achieved (albeit in some distant future, if ever), if it chooses its friends wisely. Ever since former President Bush signed the civilian nuclear energy deal with India in 2008, China has been fuming. In an effort to get back at the US, China has been increasingly getting more involved with Pakistan. Chinas recently announced nuclear deals with Pakistan are a cause for concern for both the US and India. Last summer China announced that it wants to sell two more civilian nuclear reactors to Pakistan. China, which officially became a member of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 46-country group of nuclear supplier countries), in 2004 has said that this sale is grandfathered, as Beijing had supposedly made commitment to Islamabad to build nuclear reactors at Chasma in Punjab (in Pakistan) prior to becoming a NSG member, and as such it had to fulfill its obligation. Washington refuses to accept that argument and is vehemently opposed to the idea. An article published in Londons Economist last June (2) explains this further: AT FIRST sight, Chinas proposed sale of two civilian nuclear-power reactors to Pakistan hardly seems a danger sign. Yet the sale (really a gift, as Pakistan is broke) has caused shudders at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal cartel of countries who want to stop their advanced nuclear technology getting into the wrong hands. By any measure, Pakistan is a shocker. Its proliferation record would make the serial nuclear mischief-makers of North Korea blush. If the Chinese reactor deal goes ahead, the damage will be huge: beyond just stoking the already alarming nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India. That does not deter China, which still seethes about the way in which the Bush administration in 2008 browbeat other NSG members into exempting Americas friend India from the groups rules. China is trying a legalistic defense (the 'grandfather clause') of the sale of the third and fourth reactors at Chasma. But its real point is this: if America can bend the rules for India, then China can break them for Pakistan. Indeed reports circulated last October, that when an American official questioned China about its ongoing support to Pakistan, the Chinese official sarcastically retorted, Pakistan is our Israel. In March 2010, Pakistan and Iran finalized the long pending natural gas pipeline (also called the 'peace pipeline') deal, worth $7.6 billion. The deal first conceptualized in 1989, had been in the making for several years and was initially supposed to include India as well. New Delhi withdrew from the talks in 2009 due to its chronic distrust of Pakistan and also because it was able to reach a deal for civilian nuclear energy development with Washington in 2008. The new deal between Iran-Pakistan, allows Islamabad to charge New Delhi a 'transit fee', if in future India changed its mind and the pipeline is ever actually extended into India (via Pakistan). The reason why all of this matters with regards to Indias relations with Iran is because there is now a new three-way alliance being formed in the region between China, Pakistan and Iran, which not only creates an increasing isolation but also poses new threats for India in the region. New Delhi seems to have reached the conclusion that it needs Washington now more than ever and definitely more than it needs Tehran and that explains the ACU decision. References : 1.http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128685206
2.http://www.economist.com/node/16426072?story_id=16426072
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FPRC Journal

Focus : India-Iran relations

(Ed.) Prof. Mahendra Gaur

Foreign Policy Research Centre

FPRC Journal No. 6

FPRC Journal No. 6

Mahendra Gaur Director

Indira Gaur Mg. Editor

Foreign Policy Research Centre New Delhi

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(1) Ambassador Prakash Shah

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(2) Siavash Z. Yaghoubi Former Iranian Ambassador to India

Other Achievements : Chosen as the best National Management Director

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(3) Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh

Mahmoudreza Golshanpazhooh (Ph.D)

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(4) Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

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Professor Hooshang Amirahmadi

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H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Safari Farkhud

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India Iran Relations

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