TAC Attack February 1980 ADTAC Participates in giant voice ..

page 18
TAC ATTACK (USPS 423- 530) FEBRUARY 1980

READINESS IS OUR PROFESSION

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

GENERAL W. l. CREECH
COMMANDER

LT GENERAL ROBERT C. MATHIS

CONTENTS VICE COMMANDER

Angle of Attack 3
Needle, Ball and ... 4
Aircrew of Distinction 7
TAC Tips 8
On Flying Airplanes After Things Go Wrong 12
Safety Awards 14
COL RICHARD K. ELY
Tragedies Can Be Prevented 15
CHIEF OF SAFETY
ADTAC Participates in Giant Voice 18
Rules for Survival MAJ PETE ABLER
22
ED I TOR
Weapons Words 24
Down to Earth 26 STAN HARDISON
Chock Talk 28 AR T EDITOR
Letters 30
TAC Tally 31 BEATRICE WAGGENER
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

SGT DAVID GARCIA

STAFF ARTIST
TACRP 127-1
Material in this magazine is nondirective in nature . All suggestions and recommendations are intended to rema in within
the scope of existing directives. Articles published in this magazine represent the opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the position of Tactical Air Command or the USAF. Information used to brief accidents and incidents does
not identify the persons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the Un i-
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Contributions of articles and photos from personnel in the field are encouraged. as are comments and criticism . We
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ATIACK, HQ TAC/ SEPP, Langley AFB , VA 23665; AUTOVON 432 -2937 .
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Authority to publish this periodical automatically expires on 26 Jan 1981 unless its continuance is authorized by the ap-
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VOLUME 20 NUMBER 2
 Angle
of angle of attack

Att

done anyway." Are you sure? By ignoring the

situation , your inaction can be responsible for an

WHO IS accident.
It is natural to feel what people do with their
lives is their business -- it's a free country. We
RESPONSIBLE ? don't want to interfere--it's not our job--we're not
qualified . It is just this tendency that has cost us
many good people -- and will continue to cost us
How many times have you heard someone say good people .
after an aircraft mishap, " I knew that was going If you know someone who regularly "presses"
to happen someday," or after an automobile on ordnance delivery or who flies below
accident, ''I'm not the least bit surprised the way minimums during low levels, talk to him as a
he/ she drove " ? Often our reaction to these concerned individual. If that doesn 't work, get
remarks is only slightly negative, if not silent someone else to talk to him--tell your supervisor--
agreement. Our reaction ought to tell us before he takes a ricochet on the range or drags
something . a wing tip through the trees. If you have a friend
No one can accurately forsee the future , but if who drives recklessly, get him / her to slow down,
you knew someone was going to fly an aircraft before they hurt themselves and others. Peer
into the ground on his next sortie or was going to pressure works.
be electrocuted doing a wiring job in base hous- Show you care for your friends and com -
ing --you would do something about it. You would panions by helping them see the real hazards in
prevent them from flying that next sortie or keep some of their habits or work practices. If you ig -
them off the job, just the same as you keep nore someone who needs your help and they
matches and poisons away from ch ildren . have an accident you knew was only a matter of
Let's back up a step. None of us know an indi- time, _y.Q.!! should accept a share of the responsi-
vidual is going to cause an accident--but many bility. ~
times we at least suspect it or recognize the

~K?A_
potential. If you recognized the potential , what
did you do about it? Nothing? Talk to the indi-
vidual? Tell the supervisor?
It is easy to walk away and say, " That's not my RICHARD K. ELY, Col~,, USAF
responsibility," or "There 's nothing I could have Chief of Safety

3
 NEEDLE,
BALL,
AND ....

"Lancer 32's missed approach."

"Roger, standby this freq for departure. "
"Lancer 32." Nose up 3 degrees, airspeed
through 760, gear up, flaps up, nose to 4
By Capt David Burnett degrees to catch the sink from the flaps retract-
355 TTW/ SEF ing. Way ahead of it, looking good. Engine
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ checks good, VVI positive, 7300 feet to go to
pattern altitude. Airspeed through 235, power
back to 90 percent for a 2 50-knot climb. Off
flag on the AD/ Ma ster Caution flashing . Rats!

4 FEBRUARY 1980
 Generator fatlure. No sweat: Bold Face accom- Getting more sporty all the time! Now that he's
plished. Crosscheck the standby AD/. Will the locked on to terra firma he should be able to
generator reset? Nope. hack it. Hope he gets on the turn needle if he
goes popeye again though --it's all he has left!
Doing all right so far . Bold Face out of the
way Airplane in the soup but still under contro l. Vts is crappy and there are low clouds up
Now. what's his plan? ahead No way out. Rats. back tn the soup.
Enough of thts already. Burner. back on the
Where should I land? No check in the wallet. pole. Got to climb out of these clouds. The tops
and $2 plus coins won't get a ·a room. "Lancer should be around eight thou. Come on altimeter.
32 request immediate RTB to Homeplate. De - keep wtndtng up Airspeed's bleeding off a bit.
claring emergency for generator fat!ure. One Decrease back pressure. Altimeter's slowing
soul on board. 2 +00 fuel rematntng. negative down. Level at five thou' More back stick--got to
ordnance. will require departure -end cable." keep cltmbmg. Hell. now it's unwinding again!
"Roger Lancer 32. turn right to 060. climb What giVes? Atrspeed climbmg. altimeter still un -
and maintain niner thousand. .. wmdtng -- through 1500-EJECTI
"Rtght to 060. out of 2 point 4 for nine thou -
sand. Lancer 32 ... Maybe it'll reset now--nope. Good idea. but too late. If he'd been back in
Holy--off flags on everythtng! 'Approach. 32 re- the GCA pattern at Homeplate. he'd have known
quest emergency vector and immediate descent about the low hills he's going to hit just before
for full stop at Boondock Field .. man/seat separation.
'Roger. Lancer 32. turn right to 180. descend. A high timer with good hands and above
and maintatn 2400. .. average emergency procedure knowledge. 32
"Unable 180 vector. approach. request gyro was doing a fair-to-middling job of handling his
out vector. emergency. Then he forgot rule number one--
"Roger. Lancer 32. turn right now." maintain aircraft control. Or maybe he didn't
exactly know how. It wasn't an easy situation--in
Change one. Still doing okay though. Wonder the soup. needle. ball. and airspeed His standby
if he'll figure out that he knocked the inverter off ADI was good until he inadvertently knocked the
the line when he tried to reset the generator? inverter switch to off while trying to reset the
adjacent generator switch. It just doesn't seem

Ok. roll right. Looking good. Airspeed climb-

mg. throttle back. What the hell happened to the
inverter? This rain must've shorted something
out Alttmeter unwtnding through 18001 Roll out
and recover' There's the ground. How'd I get in-
verted? Ok. got it recovered now with a couple
of hundred feet to spare.

TAC ATIACK 5
NEEDLE, BALL, AND.... excessive loss of altitude and possible loss
fair for the weather, unfamiliar terrain, generator
of aircraft control. Therefore, if a minimum
failure, and inadvertent inverter problem to gang safe altitude for unusual attitude recovery
up on anyone at the same time; but there he is not contained in the flight manual,
was, and when he needed it most he didn't have
decide upon an altitude at which recovery at-
it.
tempts will be discontinued and the aircraft
A quick scan of the computer memory banks
abandoned. On aircraft equipped with an
at AFISC shows that others have faced similar
operative autopilot, it may be used to assist
situations. and some have even brought their
in a last chance recovery from unusual at-
crippled birds home safely, Could you? Those
who have been able to hack it knew that once
titude b AMIO& _ms
the main and standby ADI were gone, they had After you think you've got it straight in your
to get on the turn needle, airspeed. and mind, you might like to put it to use. Try it dur-
altimeter. That also may have been obvious to ing your next sim: or if your unit doesn't have a
lots of you reading this article, but I'm not too sim, give it a go on your next flight. (VFR and
sure many of us would have been able to work frequent peeks at the ground and other instru-
our way out of this situation. ments are authorized and highly recommended
Do you think you could recover should Lancer the first time you try it, and until you're sure it
32's situation greet you one day? If you think works for you!)
you could, but want to be sure, or are just Have you practiced partial panel approaches?
interested in an enlighting review of partial How about needle, ball, and airspeed- -could you
panel flying, motor over to the Ops Desk and control It in a climb to get out of the clouds?
pull AFM 51 -37 out of the FCIF. Here's a recap How about a final approach? Check the Dash
of what it says. One--will the needle still work with DC power
Determine whether the aircraft is in a only? Give it some thought and get your plan
climb or a dive by referring to the airspeed, together You'll probably never need to use it,
altimeter. and vertical velocity indicators. but if you ever do you'll have a great "war story"
to tell at the bar.
b. If diving. roll to center the turn needle
and recover from the dive Adjust power or
drag devices as appropriate (Disregarding
vertical attitudes. rolling away" from the
turn needle and centering it will result in an
upright attitude.)
C. If climbing, use power as required If
the airspeed is low or decreasing rapedly,
pitch control may be aided by maintaining
a turn or approximately standard rate on
the turn needle until reaching level flight If
the turn needle in a flight director system is
used center the turn needle. This is be-
cause it is very difficult to determine
between a standard rate turn and full
needle deflection
d. Upon reaching level flight, Center the
turn needle. The aircraft is level when the
altimeter stops The vertical velocity indica-
tor lag error may cause it not to indicate
level until the aircraft passes level flight.
tiote: Spatial disorientation may become
severe during the recovery from unusual at-
titudes with an inoperative attitude indica-
tor. Extreme attitudes may result in an
6 FEBRUARY 1980
 AIRCREW of DISTINCTION

186 TRG
Key Field
Meridian, MS

On 12 October 1979, Colonel Riffle 0. Pittman

and Major Maxey J. Phillips were flying a low
level reconnaissance training sortie enroute from
England AFB, Louisiana, to Key Field, Mississippi.
Approximately three minutes into the low level at
500 feet AGL and 480 kts ground speed, the air-
craft collided with a large vulture. The bird im-
pacted the right quarter panel and penetrated the
right side of the front cockpit. Colonel Pittman
was stuck in the face and right shoulder area by
bird and canopy fragments. This impact shattered Col Biffle 0. Pittman
his clear visor, bent and distorted his glasses,
and left his right shoulder and arm numb and im-
mobile.
The aircraft began a series of pitch oscillations
from -6.0 to -2 Gs. Extreme wind blast and flying
debris made orientation difficult, Major Phillips
assumed control of the aircraft during the first
pitch oscillation, slowing to 250 KIAS and climb-
ing to 2,000 feet AGL to maintain aircraft control
and attempt to establish intercockpit communica-
tion. Damage inspection immediately revealed
that Colonel Pittman's personal parachute
container was broken and portions of the para-
chute were hanging loose from the container.
Major Phillips returned to England AFB to land.
Colonel Pittman was able to lower the landing
gear and flaps with his left hand and deploy the
drag chUte during landing rollout.
The professional airmanship and crew coordi-
nation of both crew members prevented the loss
of a valuable combat aircraft and further injury to
themselves_ Their actions qualify them as the
Tactical Air Command Aircrew of Distinction.

Maj Maxey J. Phillips

TAC ATTACK
7
 tac tips

... interest items,

mishaps with
morals, for the
TAC a1rcrewman
Man does not live bJ ••tds aloa•, despite the
fact tll•t tollffl'fMfl be ltf* to ftt tl~ta~ .
A'Dt.AI STEVENSON

HOT BRAKES
The F-1 06 was preparing for a DACT mission .
Start. taxi . and run-up were normal. Shortly after
brake release . the pilot noted eye-burning fumes
in the cockpit and aborted the takeoff . After
THIS WAY . NO, THAT WAY . clearing the runway. the pilot elected to ta xi
back to the chocks since no evidence of fire or
The A-7 was waiting for takeoff clearance overheat or other source of the fumes could be
when the nose wheel suddenly turned hard left. identified .
The pilot also noted IMS and AFCS failures with After arriving back at the chocks. the fuze
numerous off flags on various instruments. The plugs in the wheels melted and the tires de-
flight was aborted. and the pilot found the nose flated . During the taxi out. runway abort . and the
wheel could be made to go either left or right. following taxi back. the aircraft had covered over
but control was extremely sensitive and four miles and had built up an excessive amount
maintaining directional control at more than a of heat in the wheels . If you end up in a situa-
crawl was doubtful. The nose wheel steering tion such as this. it would be prudent to have
was disengaged . and the aircraft was ta xied to your wheels and tires checked before entering
the parking ramp using differential braking . the parking ramp. Exploding brakes and tires
The problem was traced to a bent pin which can cause extensive damage and fatal injuries .
created some shorts in the electrical system
including loss of power to the 26V Primary
Instrument Bus which powers the nose wheel
steering feedback transducer . Operation of the
nose wheel steering system without the feed-
back transducer results in full left or full right
commands whenever the rudder is other than
neutral--not what you could call your ideal situa-
tion .
That's why the problem happened. but what if
something had happened while the pilot was
taxiing the aircraft back to the chocks . using
only brakes for directional control when
"maintaining directional control at more than a
crawl was doubtful"? About the only thing you
should do with an aircraft that has directional
control problems is to shut it down and let the
maintenance folks tow it wherever they want to.
That is infinitely better than running it off the
runway. taxiway. or into another aircraft!

8 FEBRUARY 1980
F-15 EMERGENCY BRAKES OUCH!
An Eagle driver in another command was A pilot undergoing F-1 06 training was flying
parking his aircraft on a sloping portion of the his first front cockpit night mission in the F-
ramp . The pilot stopped the aircraft and shut 1 068. During the first night touch-and-go land-
down the engines. Unfortunately. the chocks ing . the IP and student reported touchdown ap-
had not been put lace . As the en ine proximately 2.000 feet down the runway at 1 55
kts. The speed brake was retracted. power ad-
vanced. and the nose lowered to accelerate for
takeoff . The aircraft accelerated normally at first.
but then the crew noted a sharp decrease in
thrust and several engine surges. The crew
elected to abort with 3.500 feet of runway remain-
ing . The departure-end BAK-12 was engaged
with the nose gear on. or just above the runway .
The nose gear strut sheared about halfway
between the wheel and upper portion of the
strut. The aircraft came to rest on the sheared
strut and the aircrew shut the engine down and
egressed. Other than the sheared strut. there
was only minor damage to the aircraft.
What happened? Well. during the initial inter-
cept portion of the mission. the altitude warning
horn activated several times with the system set
at 10.000 ft. The system was reset to 1.000 ft
to keep the horn from interrupting the intercept
activity On RTB. during the base turn. the
altitude warning horn sounded again . The pilot
reached for the audio warning cutoff button and
.• . ' apparently turned the idle thrust switch on. (The
~--=:.- idle thrust switch had been checked off during
descent.) With the idle thrust switch on and
weight on the left main landing gear. the engine
exhaust nozzles are opened and the effective
spooled down and the hydraulic pressure drop- thrust of the engine is reduced about 40
ped. the aircraft started to roll. The pilot pulled percent in idle and 35 percent at military power.
the emergency brake /steering handle but got no During the takeoff roll . the upgrading pilot
braking . He quickly started the Jet Fuel Starter was "h unting " for the proper pitch attitude. As
(JFS). engaged an engine. and stopped the air- he changed the pitch during ground roll. the
craft. microswitch in the left main landing gear
Why didn't the JFS accumulator provide opened and closed . causing the nozzles to cycle.
pressure to stop the aircraft? The pilot held the giving the crew the impression of engine surges
brake pedals depressed the whole time and dur- and thrust problems .
ing the sequence. as the engine spooled down. As the 106 engaged the BAK-12. the aircraft's
residual utility hydraulic pressure was no longer nose was still on a downward vector. This factor
sufficient to hold the brakes . but was sufficient combined with the additional force of the cable
to prevent the brake pressure shuttle valve from engagement caused the strut to shear.
moving and allowing the emergency brake In a dark or dimly lit cockpit. it's very easy to
pressure from the JFS accumulator to activate inadvertently hit a wrong switch. If the time is
the brakes . Releasing the brakes momentarily available. it might pay to double check. This
would have allowed the shuttle valve to move should also serve as a reminder to our 106
and the pilot would have had brake pressure . drivers of the indications you might have if the
Another fact to store in the pilot's computer . . switch is left on at the wrong time .

TAC ATIACK 9
TAC TIPS • • •
A flight of four F-4s was on an RTU training
mission. The number 3 aircraft experienced
cabin pressurization problems. so the IP elected
ALL I NEED IS to continue the mission below 25.000 ft MSL.
While practicing 4-ship tactical formation at
THE AIR THAT I BREATHE ... 23 .000 ft. the IP noticed icing in the left rear
Or so go the lyrics to a popular song. While portion of the canopy He informed the student
that may be overstating things. if you don't have pilot who checked the thermostat and also
air to breathe you won't be needing much of stated that he felt fine. The student pilot also felt
anything else. There have been a number of slightly dizzy and nauseous--but didn 't tell the IP
physiological incidents lately where it was ap- because he figured this was normal for flying
parent that folks didn 't give their 02 equipment without cabin pressurization .
a good preflight--here are some of the in c idents To alleviate the icing problem. the flight lead
directed number 3 to descend to 1 5 .000 ft. The
student started a shallow descent not matching
lead's pushover and set the throttles at idle si-
multaneously extending the speed brake . The IP
in the rear cockpit of number 3 felt "content"
with the situation.
The flight lead began to suspect physiological
problems and directed number 3 to activate the
emergency oxygen (green apple). Number 3
replied that everything was fine in a slurred
voice. After several more attempts to get the
crew to activate their emergency oxygen. the
flight lead finally got through and the crew
pulled their green apples Both immediately felt
better.
The oxygen converter proved to be faulty on
this one. It would not supply more than 45 psi
to both regulators at once. (Normal pressure is
50 to 125 psi .) Both crew members became
hypoxic due to the combination of ca bin
pressurization and oxygen systems failure .
The flight lead's quick thinking and aggressive
action prevented a far more serious mishap .
A pilot was flying his l\Bird at 28.000 ft over
the southern U .S. Cabitl altitude indicated • • •
24.000 ft. After being at this altitude for about
10 minutes. he experienced dizziness and light- In still another incident. a crew member
headed ness lasting 1 5 seconds. He selected suffered hypoxia and symptoms of the " bends "
100% and then the "safety" position on the while cruising at FL 310 with a cabin altitude of
regulator--without any improvement . The pilot 23.000 ft . Postflight investigation revealed
increased cabin heat which reduced cabin another loose connection· which would have
altitude to 20 .000 ft. and he began to feel bet- been noted during a full oxygen system
ter . Further descent cleared up all symptoms. pref light .
Postflight investigation revealed that the con-
nector between the regulator and the pilot's • • •
hose was faulty so that more than 50% of the
regulator output was leaking into the ca bin . The Whatever the procedu res are for checking out
pilot was getting less than 50% of the oxygen he your aircraft's oxygen system--follow them. They
should have received tru ly are a matter of life and breath . -~

10 FEBRUARY 1980
 PIF 4-1-1
The effects of hypoxia haven' t changed much since... May 1, 1943

EFFECT OF OXYGE N-WANT ON

HANDWRITING DUR ING ASCENT

ASCENT TO 25,000 FEET WITHOUT OXYGEN EXPLANATORY REMARKS

a 7Q Control specimen of normal handwriting.

46--t1-0 telst
No apparent effect.
/0-0-0-ty /if

7"T Beginning muscular incoordination.

iMeMIIIIm'
Definite physical and mental inefficiency.

Last zero off both 18,000 and 20,000-marked

incoordination,
4,/vi plittd-7-11
,2_,14-4-11-7/p.04-/07-1- Feeling better? Evidence of false feeling of
well-being,

10 pk4 z het,
Feel good. Insight, judgment and coordination

ii
very faulty.

Mental and physical helpiessners.

Improvement with few breaths of oxygen.

aliOsew.W

3 Last zero left off-general improvement, but

not completely normal.

Goa Ai, )40.e,

 ON FLYING
! AIRPLANES
. AFTER THINGS Us folks 1n the a1rplane dnvmg business have
a tendency to see ourselves as a little bit faster .
meaner. smarter. or whatever than our earth-

GO WRONG
By Maj Pete Abler
bound acquaintances. Sometimes. during our at-
tempts to prove JUSt how smart we are. we end
up proving JUSt the oppos ite. Here are a few
examples of what I'm talk ing about.
)

TD stumble tlltlinst the st11ne stDne

twice is t1 prDveriJitll disgrt1ce.
CICERO

An F-1 1 1 was en route to 1ts home stat1on

followmg depot mamtenance. During the f light.
one of the oil pressure gauges began fluctuat-
Ing. The crew fol lowed the checklist steps and
after the throttle was placed in idle. the fluctua-
tions stopped . The crew watched the engine fo r
other signs of 011 pressure problems. Since the
F-111 oil pressure gauges have a freq uent
fa ilure history. the crew decided to swap the two
gauges instead of mon1toring the engme as
called for by the checkl1st. During the crew's on-
site maintenance attempts. the engine se1zed
due to inadequate 011 pressure ...
Another F-1 11 was fly1ng a night low level on
Terrain Fo llowing Radar. The system was set to
maintam 400 ft AGL; and as the plane f lew

12 FEBR UARY 1980

along at that altitude. the c rew noticed a fly wind events ensued . On ce again the flaps were
down which the automatic protective circu1ts did raised and the paddle switch held until th ings
not override. The c rew recovered the aircraft. settled down. The crew had adequate room to
c l1mbed to their minimum en route altitude. and recover the aircraft and complete an otherwise
turned the terrain following system to standby. uneventful landing ...
After a bit of system "troubleshooting. " the crew The list could go on and on. By now I'm sure
turned the system "on" again and descended to you ca n iden tify the co mmon thread in these mis-
1 ,000 ft AGL. A few minutes later. the aircraft haps . In eac h case. the aircrew in it ia lly
d1d a -2G flyove r from wh1ch the crew barely identified a problem and analyzed it correctly.
recove red ... They began to follow the proper proced ures f or
An F-4 c rew was return ing from a norma l co rrective action and in some cases completed
traming mission . The pilot flew an overhead pat- them--and t he n reactivated the bad system. The
t ern and conf ig ured the aircraft on downwind . results are predictable to us now that we 're sit-
The gear extended normally, but as the flaps ting here rea ding the incidents. but weren't
were lowered. th e rudder pedals pul sed about predictable by the aircrews. Otherwise. they
six mc hes and a mild rolling moment was wouldn 't have rea ctivated a malfunctioning
expe ri enced. The pilot r aised the flaps. system.
depressed the paddle switch . and set up for a Think about 1t for awhile. Have you ever had a
stra1ght-in approach . While setting up for the malfunctioning engine--compressor stalls. ha r d
straight-in, the pilot pulled th e ro ll stab aug c ir- A / B lights. engine surges. etc? Did you play
cui t breaker. (He should have pu lled the yaw aug around with it. trying to see how hard it would
breaker.) Once establish ed on th e straight-in . stall or how high th e EGT would go? I'd bet th at
we've all done something similar in our flying
caree rs. We probably didn't spend too much
time wondering if we were damaging the engine
or not. But. that is pre c isel y what we all shou ld
co nsider.
Airc rew members are trained to fly an aircraft
and t o opera te th e systems and components
within establ ished limits-- limits set by design
engi nee rs aft er appropriate testin g. Their test s
also help define norma l and emergency
procedures . You and I as crew members don 't
have th e benefit of kn ')wing all the whys and
wh erefores fo r each procedure. so we can 't
po ssibly predict th e outcome of act ions not
li sted in operator's manuals.
Once an airc raft begins to show you it's not
hitting on all eight. foll ow the established
procedu res. If they take care o f th e problem--
you 're in good shape . Don't put yourself back
behind th e eig ht ball by giving in to the t empt a-
tion t o see if th e problem has "fi xe d" itself. Very
few do. One more point. If you're tempted t o "in -
vent" some troubl eshooting procedures--don't.
Leave that to th e maintenance folks wh o are
trained for th e job . Your attempts at trou-
bleshooting co uld eve n mask th e real prob lem
and lead to an " unable to duplica te."
Let's make ce rtain that in o ur attempt s to
about four miles o ut. the pi lot decided t o lower prove how sma rt we are that we don't end up
th e flaps again . A repeat of th e previou s down- outsmartmg ourse lves . _.::::-

TAC ATIACK 13
 TAC
SAFETY AWARDS
Crew Chief Safety Award
Airman Brian Spessard, 49th Aircraft Genera-
tion Squadron, 49th Tactical Fighter Wing,
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the
recipient of the Tactical Air Command Crew Chief
Safety Award for February 1980. Airman
Spessard has demonstrated an uncommon level
of dedication and attention to detail in his duties
as an F-15 crew chief. He consistently excels in
all assigned tasks and has promoted a high level
of safety consciousness within his unit.

Arnn Brian Spessard

Individual Safety Award
Technical Sergeant Hugh A. Delconte, 49th
Aircraft Generation Squadron, 49th Tactical
Fighter Wing, Holloman Air Force Base, New (1411111N1
Mexico, is the recipient of the Tactical Air Com-
mand Individual Safety Award for February 1980.
Sergeant Delconte is currently assigned as an In-
tegrated Avionics Specialist Supervisor in the 8th
Aircraft Maintenance Unit. Recently, an aircraft
assigned to his unit experienced a Jet Fuel
Starter explosion and fire during engine start.
The aircraft was loaded with live ordnance.
Sergeant Delconte directed efforts to extinguish
the fire, aid the aircrew, and move aircraft which
were too close to the fire area. His quick thinking
and prompt response prevented injury, possible
loss of life, and further damage to a valuable air- TSgt Hugh A. Delconte
craft.

14 FEBRUARY 1980
 TRAGEDIES CAN BE
PREVENTED
By Col Stanley P. Schneider
Vice Commander
23 TFW, England AFB, LA

I have had an extremely difficult time prepar-

ing this editorial. I feel compelled to address a
problem for which there is no solution im -
mediately available to a wing commander--or
any commander for that matter . So. rather than
turn you off immediately by telling you what that
problem is. let me relate some experiences I
have had recently in hopes of generating your
interest and concern. Then maybe you will
understand our dilemma and can help solve it. and destructive thing like losing a member of
On two occasions in my short term as vice your family as a result of an unnecessary ac-
commander. I have been required to knock on cident/ How do you co nvey to them the frustra-
the doors of two of our dependent wives and tion the commande r and families feel when
advise them of the deaths of their husbands . that message must be delivered/ Most im-
One recent weekend. the base civil engineer had portantly. how do you make the point strongly
to perform the same totally distasteful duty. No enough that it is within your power to prevent
one can convey to you the emotion or the heart- these tragedies from happening/
rending sympathy and frustration experienced Commanders and supervisors talk so mu ch of
when you carry such a shattering message to a safety that it risks losing its importance or
totally unsuspecting and unprepared dependent meaning . The assumption often is made that ac-
or parent. cidents happen to others. Well. I want to tell you
Personally. and I admit quite candidly and that a wing commander does not and cannot di-
openly. I am not able to perform this duty in the vorce himself from this problem He is not ask-
strictest military traditions of self-discipline. I ing you to share that concern because it is a dif-
too. become emotional--especially when young ficult task for him to bear the tragic news. He is
children are involved--when I suddenly realize asking you to share his concern not only for
how my message to them has so completely your sake. but most importantly. for those
changed their lives . members of your family and friends who must
I freely admit to a weakness. if indeed it is suffer the deeply emot1onal experience of losing
one. of being unable to divorce myself from the a loved one and being forced to face the future
tragedy that is taking place at that moment. I alone. I think it is life 's greatest tragedy to un-
defy anyone who has a concern for the dignity necessarily lose someone you love . Events of the
of the human spirit and love for the sacred insti- recent past point out very clearly that it can hap-

I
tution of the family unit not to become emo- pen to you--and your families.
tionally and personally involved . I hope you never have to share a commander's
When a soldier dies in combat. the circum- responsibility to inform a family of the death of a
stances of the loss are much easier to explain relative. Conversely. no one can issue an order
and easier for the family to understand and ac- that these tragedies will stop. It boils down to a
cept. But when the tragedy occurs through clear understanding of the influence you have in
neglect. disregard for the law. self-abuse or by preventing the tragedy from happening .
sheer "accident." then it becomes difficult or That's what I am ask1ng you to do. Accept the
impossible for relatives to understand or accept. responsibility for your actions and understand
Many cannot accept it . I certainly can't. that you. and only you. can keep these things
The problem is. how do you make people from happening.
aware of the tragic results of such a traumatic Think about it. Is it worth it/

TAC ATIACK 15
T AC AND T AC-GAINED (ANG & AFI

LOSSES JAN-DEC 1979

~
--
(1:1
ADTAC
ADTAC Participates in Giant Voice

PARTICIPATES
IN

By Capt Owen Jensen Flag where accurate F-1 06 radarscope film

NORAD/0000 debnefing and real t1me scoring of tall gun
shots never occurs. th1s exerc1se was des1gned
.. A huge bomber was sk1mming the plams of to fully account for bomber defens1ve measures
eastern Colorado. Knowmg I was behmd h1m . he and requ1red all simulated Interceptor launches
was desperately weaving back and forth. jam- to be validated on film . It posed a d1ff1cult prob-
ming my radar and trymg to suck me mto tail lem for interceptor pilots flying F-1 06s and
gun range . As I worked for a valid shot. my t1me F- 4s and many valuable lessons were learned.
was rap1dly running out. I never thought shoot - For air defenders. Giant Vo1ce started over six
mg a 8-52 could be so tough ." months before the actual flying . Suitable
For the first t1me. Strateg1c Air Command a1rspace had to be found and approved. rules
(SAC) inv1ted a1r defense un1ts to part1c1pate as and refuel1ng schedules agreed upon w1th SAC.
adversaries for bombers flying 1n the1r annual E-3A support coordinated. communication links
bombing and navigation competitiOn. G1ant set up. interceptor un1ts scheduled . and support
Voice. that was held last November. Unl1ke Red prov1ded at a stagmg base. The primary goals

18 FEBRUARY 1980
were to run a well-coordmated. professional over eastern Co lorado and western Kansas at an
exercise with safety fully considered and realism approximate rate of one every twelve minutes for
injected 1nto every intercept. over five hours on three successive days. Each
In the midst of these preparations came the unit flew a different crew each day . SAC score-
reorganization of ADCOM. All fighter squadrons keepers then tallied the points and selected one
were integrated into TAC for daily training. with best c rew from each unit. and on the final fourth
NORAD regaining the1r services in time of war. day all 21 flew a mission on a completely new
G1ant Vo1ce was specifically aimed at a CONUS route to determine individual winners. Fighter
strategic defense scenario. so it was judged to adversaries were not included on this scenario
be a good veh1cle to test NORAD and ADTAC in- due to a lack of a suitable intercept airspace .
terface and capabilities both now and in the fu- The NORAD contingent consisted of 28 air-
ture years . Therefore. it became a NORAD craft and aircrews from the fol lowing active and
exercise with operational control of fighters Air National Guard interceptor units:
passmg from ADTAC to NORAD just prior to
5 FIS, Minot AFB , ND (F-1 06)
deployment. NORAD representatives were
84 FIS, Castle AFB , CA (F-1 06)
aboard the E-3A and the activi ty became a fu lly
87 FIS, K I Sawyer AFB , Ml (F-1 06)
integrated test of NORAD's fighting forces.
318 FIS, McChord AFB, WA (F- 106)
Let 1t not be forgotten that Giant Voice IS
119 FIG , Fargo, ND (F-40)
SAC's major competition of the year Although
120 FIG , Great Falls , MT (F- 106)
allowing f1ghters to participate promised to
144 FIW, Fresno, CA (F- 106)
enhance realism . they were unsure of its impact
on scoring and safety. So. for this first trial. they Peterson AFB. Colorado. was the staging base
decided to keep objectives limi ted and to award and supported the aircraft. crews. and
only a minor portion of possible points to maintenance teams . Refueling was provided for
bomber crews for evading and employ1ng the fighters directly over the intercept area and
countermeasures against the fighters . Simply the 552 AWACW flew an E-3A in a nearby orbit
stated. the problem for bomber crews could be for intercept control. refueling rendezvous. and
wntten: "G iven that you have been found at low FAA coordination. Responsibility for air defense
alt1tude by two fighters. can you successfully was div1ded into separate blocks with each unit
employ countermeasures to escape them?" This responsible for a specific number of bombers on
was never meant to be a test of E-3A/ intercep- a given day. Most units flew only one competi-
tor detection capability. Bomber routes and tion m1ssion; but they were long. tiring and very
entry times were known and published wel l m busy
advance. ADTAC's commitment was to put two During the planning phase. specific rules of
f1ghters on every bomber and evaluate the engagement were developed after careful
results . It was a good test. consideration. These rules proved to be safe and
Twenty-one bombe rs consisting of various yet still allow excellent training. They serve as a
models of the B-52. FB-111 s. a TAC F-111 . and model for similar exercises in the future or for
two RAF Vulcans. competed in the exercise. The dally training . given suitable airspace. Therefore.
bomber stream penetrated the exercise area they are listed here for reference:

TAC ATIACK 19
ADTAC PARTICIPATES
IN GIANT VOICE
I. All provisions of JM 55-200 apply.
II. Bomber Restrictions
A. VFR
1. Bombers may operate between 400
and 2000 ft AGL.
2. ECM/chaff allowed .
3. Up to Level I evasion allowed.
4. No comm jamming (only for
scoring purposes on tail gun shots).
B. IFR
1. Must maintain hard altitude of
2000 ft AGL.
2. No ECM/chaff (only for radarscope
film evaluation purposes) . See 1 5 Sep
79 JM 55-200 for allowable counter-
measures.
3. No evasion.
4. No comm jamming
lll.lnte rceptor Restrictions
A. VFR
1. Never descend below bomber altitude.
2. Autonomous (no GCI) operations
allowed.
3. VFR defined as 3500/5. other fighter The remainmg (cold)
4. Maintain 1000 ft clear of
fighter is responsible for pos1tive sep-
target block and 500 ft clear of other
aration until the "hot" crew fmishes
fighters prior to JUDY (Tally-Ho). the attack. Roles will then reverse .
5. Never fly closer than 2000 ft to 2 If a spare from another forma-
any bomber regardless of Heading tion joins a single fighter. he will
Crossing Angle (HCA) or altitude after always be number two .
Tally-Ho Some two months pnor to Giant Voice . the
B. IFR USAF Interceptor Weapons School at Tyndall
1. Never descend lower than AFB. FL. conducted full scale tests to verify fire
bomber. control system techniques. safety rules. and
2. GCI must be operating If no GCI. sconng procedures . Representatives from SAC
mission must be aborted. monitored these missions and concurred in their
3. Maintain 2000 ft clear of validity .
target block and 1000 ft clear of other Since all interceptor shots had to be fully
fighters prior to JUDY. verified on film. simply obtaining a tone. visually
4. Never fly closer than 3000 ft ranging. and squeezing the trigger was not good
to any bomber regardless of HCA enough. In the face of full bomber counter-
or altitude after JUDY. measures and tight parameters for armament
C. · Co llision Avoidance launches. a highly challenging problem for
1. Flight lead must ensure interceptor crews was developed . Crews quickly
separation between himself and his found that sorting out ground clutter . Jamming .
wingman during attacks. Flight lead and chaff while ensuring specific launch indica-
will call either himself or his wingman tions were recorded on film- -all done while fly-
"in hot." The "hot" fighter is not re- mg at relatively h1gh and low altitude- -was a de-
sponsible for separation from the mandmg task.

20 FE BRUARY 1980
 planning and precise object ives pa id off by
pointing out specific improvements and valuable
lessons learned. Both SAC and NORA D were
pleased with the performance of t hei r c rews and
goals began to be formulated for the next com-
petition . When an exercise such as this is care-
fu ll y planned and precise goa ls are establis hed.
it becomes almost an R&D effort. and as quickly
as answers are found further questions arise
that need to be answered in fol lowing years.
The success of Giant Voice 80 and the
testimony by ai rcrews affirmmg the critical
necessity for this type of realistic exercise was
met by a firm determination not to let this
experience fade or be repeated o nl y once a yea r.
It is imperative that trainers at all levels car ry on
from here. Good training airspace must be
further deve loped. Coordination with loca l SAC
units must be expanded . All airc rews with an air
defense mission must reap the benefits fr om
training that was shown to be both feasible and
effective during Giant Voice 80.

At home. the ADTAC squadrons had studied

the rules and area maps. prepared f light p lans.
planned how to rotate to the tanker without let-
ting a bomber slip through. and practiced low
level Intercepts . Generally it was agreed that
even if the competition never came off the
preparation was a va luable effort in itself. At the
appointed times. however. fighter units fina lly
began to assemble at Peterson A FB. Communi-
cation links were set up to allow full NORAD
command and control from a temporary com-
mand post . Then the first launches began. For
three days. fighters. tankers. bombers. and A bout th e author ..
Capt Owen " Juice" Jensen was th e NORAD and
AWACS converged on the small intercept area
ADTAC proj ect officer for Giant Voice 80. He graduated
and held the closest thing to strategic war that from the University of Illinois with a BFA degree; and
many had ever experienced. It quickly became after rece iving his ROTC comm ission, he entered pilot
evident that bomber crews took these missions train ing at Ree se AFB in February 1969. After pilot tra in-
very seriously. They were not about to let ing , Capt J ensen checked out in th e F-1 06 wh ich he flew
at th e 95 FIS, Dover AFB , DE , and Southern Air Defense,
themselves be "shot" without attempting
Tyndal l AFB , FL, until November 1974. After spending a
everything allowed to them. Likewise. a competi- yea r at Osa n Korea as a defen si ve duty officer in t he
tive spirit developed among the interceptor 314th Air Divi sion, he w as reassigned to F-106s at K I
aircrews ; and at the end. the "best interceptor Sawyer AFB , Ml, in November 1975 . Capt Jensen was
crew" trophy went to Maj Dick Lambert of the assig ned to HO NORAD/ A DC OM in December 1978 and
has an MA degree in Public Administrat ion from the
318 FIS .
Un iversity of Oklahoma .
In the end. evaluators found an amazing va-
riety of tact1cs and techniques. but the careful

TAC ATIACK 21
RULES FOR SURVIVAL
"NEVER HIT ON TWElVE. II
''AlWAYS HIT ON SIXTEEN. II
"DON7 SWEAT THE SMAll STUFF. II
''ADD lfJ KNOTS FOR MAMMA AND THE KIDS."
"NEVER WAlK UNDER A UDDER!"
''AlWAYS WEAR A SEATBElT!"
''AlWAY$ CHECK SIX."
By Maj Wayne Skora
HQ TAC/SEF

Everyone has their own set of rules or per- Some are just for surv1val : "Never P.O. the guy
sonal guidelines that they live by. Most of them who writes your OER (APR)I "
aren 't wr1tten anywhere . A lot of them have JUSt There are two more rules I would like to pass
been put mto use over the years because of per- on that were g1ven to me by an old. bold fighter
sonal expenence . People use these little per - pilot who had flown many combat miss1ons and
sonal rules to help them soc1ally: "If you lose. many type a1rcraft . "Son ." he sa1d (he called
double your bet.'·' We also use them every young fighter p1lot son). "the most
professionally: "Attack from out of the sun ." Important rule in l1fe IS never draw to an 1ns1de
stra1ght." (I have since found out he was right.
so naturally I believed everything else he told
me.) "And second. when you're in an airplane.
never trust anybody! You have to assume the
back seater. front seater. left seater. right seater.
navigator. IP. GCA controller. weatherman. SOF.
a1r traffic controller. crew chief. maintenance. diverted an F-4 with a low fuel ~te without
quick check. flight lead. or w1ngman. IS checking the status of the divert base. It was
professional and capable--but still subject to also below minimums. The weatherman had a
makmg mistakes. m1stakes that can be fatal. lot to do with that one too . You can no doubt
Never completely trust the a1rplane. e1ther. You come up w1th a lot more examples.
can't afford to have blind faith in anyone or Take a hard look at some of our accident
anything wh1ch can get you into trouble in the reports. Ask yourself why an airplane with two
a1r. people in it hits the ground on a low level--the
You may feel uncomfortable with that word- ultimate 1n bad crew coordination . Why does a
mg. but 1t's plain and simple--if you want to be wingman let lead drive h1m into the ground try-
an old. bold pilot or nav. just assume the other Ing to stay VFR? And it's not just the military pi-
guy can make a mistake . That philosophy is not lots . Recently an airline airplane mistakenly
impossible to live with. It's not that you should landed at the wrong airport. 30 miles short of its
assume everyone else is incompetent or un- destination. Talk about embarrassing! What do
professional or out to kill you. You can't go to they all have in common? They assumed! They
the extreme where you refuse to look into the assumed the other guy would keep them out of
radarscope because you might have to take your trouble. and they assumed wrong
eyes off the other guy. Nothmg wrong with The amateur trusts luck. the professional
assuming everyone IS capable and professional. doesn't. The professional trusts himself and
but also assume he could make a mistake and doesn 't assume anything . Want to be an old.
that mistake could end up in you being dead. bold pilot? Don't assume the TACAN IS locked
So. you want to catch that mistake before it on to the right station. Don't assume the pilot
catches you . knows his alt1tude is 1.000 feet low. Don't
Think about all the times you've come close assume lead sees the bogey. Don't assume the
and have JUSt been lucky. Remember the crew WSO's head is out of the cockpit when yours is
chief who told you the drip was within limits. ln.
and you came back later with hydraulic fa1lure? And above all. don't assume that you yourself
How about the radar controller who forgot about won't make a mistake . Bnef every GIB and/or
you. and if it hadn't been VFR. you 'd have flown wingman you fly with: "Let's make a deal! Don't
mto a mountain? Most GIBs can remember the assume anything. I won 't trust you with my life
front seater who thought he was level after pull- and don 't you trust me with yours!" There never
ing off a night bomb pass--but was still has been a st1gma attached to self- preservation.
descendmg. Because of bad weather. a SOF .....;:-
TAC ATIACK 23
 yond the other rounds in the belt. 1t's consi dered
a " long round ." The opposite is true of a "short
round." Makes sense to me.
A round in either of these conditions could fail
to be fired and extracted. allowing another
round to be jammed in behind the previous
round (double-feed) . This double-feed could
cause a round to fire out of chamber and result
in a damaged gun . A note of caution straight out
of the Technical Order: "A mislinked round.
once loaded into the pod. will remain out of

HOW LONG IS control in the feed system and will cause

damage to the feed system and gun ." I can't

A SHORT ROUND ?• improve on that.

Some double-feed preventions include avoid-
ing "short or long rounds" in the system by
ca refully checking the linked ammo during load
By SMSgt John Mann
operations. Don't use undue force to load the
HQ TAC/ SEW
ammo since this may be an indication of
A "short round" of ammo does not refer to the misal ignment or worn parts.
length of the cartridge. The term "short round" Since most ammo loading takes place at
or "long round" is used to describe the position o'dark-thirty. 1t's necessary to have a lite-all on
of the cartridge in the conveyor elements. Figure the site to increase correct task performance
1 depicts both correctly and incorrectly loaded percentages .
projectiles . If a cartridge projectile extends be- The bottom line is-- Inspect! Inspect! Inspect!

SI X ROUND BELT WITH TWO ROUNDS MISliNK ED

LON G ROUND
(liN K TABS BELOW
EXT RACTOR GROOVE)

liN K TABS ABOVE

EXTRACTOR G ROO V E

24 FEBRUARY 1980

weapons words
 Since we here at TAC ATTACK t ry to have
something for everyone. we offer you this
crossword puzzle . Although it has a definite
munitions flavor. anyone who works around air-
planes ought to have a good cha nce of finishing
it.
To add an incentive. fill in t he puzz le--original
or copy--and mail to HO TAC/SEPP. Langley
AFB VA 23665. Include your name and address
All correct entries received by 10 April will be
eligible for a drawing fo r a Fleagle T-shirt. Only
one entry per person please.

ACROSS

· 1. W1th 4A. where explos1ve mis-

haps are reported (two words).
4. See 1A.
8. Where there's-------
there 's f1re .
10 . Tools are kept here .
11 . Name of crew to arm a1rcraft.
12 . Weapons safety school is taught 68 . M61A1 IS one . 24 . Inspection method.
by th1s command . (Abbreviation) 69. Long term wa1ver that requ1res 25. Disposal IS one type .
13 . MERs and TERs are some- the Office of Secretary of the Air 28 . See 70.
times------ed . Force approval. 29 . See 220.
15. Part of primer 72 . An explos1ves locat1on bar- 30 . Protects agamst low flymg frag-
17. Clearing CAM holdback 1s one . ricaded on at least three s1des . ments .
18 . Suff1c1ent. 73 . You never know until you--- 31. Poisonous.
19 . Add1t1onal part. 34 . Open avenue for fire f1ghter's
20 . Fus1ble metal or alloy used 1n 74. Hand protection requ1red when access .
jOining electrical wires. work1ng w1th solvents. 3 5. Med1eval catapult.
21 . N o t - - - - - - - -. . 76 . Storage bays . 36 . Explosives storage structure .
23 Wntten authomation to deviate . 7 7. Organ of s1ght. 37 . Aff1rmat1ve.
26 . Denved from oil . 79. Net explosives we1ght . (Abbre- 38 . See 50.
27 . A gun is not a - - - - - - - -. viation) 39 . With 61 D. peaceful and military ·
28 . . A type of d1splay. 80. & 81 . MJ-1 IS one (two words) . force .
32. Noteven. 82. Live and l e t - - - - -. 41. Dangerous around explos1ves .
33 . Mortally wounded . 43. Munit1ons are compatible if they
35 . Coated with oil. DOWN are the same-------- .
39, 40. & 42 TAC Ch1ef of Safety 45 . Chemical suff1x .
article . 1. W1th 230. this sect1ons t1tle . 46 . Perce1ved by touch .
44. Speeds a chem1cal reaction . 2. Sign des1gnat1ng explosives 48 . Explos1ve----. or to teach.
4 7. Type of energy. area. 52 . See 70 .
49 . S1gn. 3. Special weapon (another name) . 56 . 2000#
50 . Cat's--------. 5. With 21 D & 380. type of explo- 58 . Used to tow.
51. Agreeable excitement and keen Sive storage structure . 60 . Pickle/discard .
enjoyment of the mind . 6. Damages aircraft engines . (Ab- 61 . See39D.
53. Accidents. mc1dents. and defi- brev1at1on) 62 . Observes
ciencies. (Abbreviat1on) 7. With 280 & 520. AFR 127-100 63 . Shows explosives locat1ons .
54 . Address to male. t1tle. 64. - - - - - - - - m a n concept.
55 . To provide with mun1tions . 8. Halt. 66 . Harshness .
57 . The shop that normally works on 9. Procedures to be followed when 67 Obtained .
bomb racks and guns. things don't go right. 70 . Tox1c. flammable. oily l1qu1d .
59 . Behold! 11 . Deadly. 71 AF weapons rev1ew body.
61 . Requ1red when non-government 15 . 20mm for instance . 75. Posit1on .
land is exposed to explos1ve 16 . Not out. 76 . Cluster bomb un1ts .
clear zone . 21 . See 50 . 7 7. Jett1son cart IS one .
66 . To ass1gn someone. 22 . W1th 290. TAC safety magazme . 78 . AFR 66-1 armament squadron .

TAC ATTACK 25
 shower. or sink. Water is an excellent conductor
of electricity. Countless electrocutions have
resulted from radios. heaters. sun lamps. and
other electrical devices.
Both the very young and elderly should be at-
tended in the tub. Drownings can be prevented
if people will only use a moderate amount of
common sense and remain aware of the hazards
involved in the bathroom.

I
• I
WATCH OUT
FOR YOUR TUB I•
MOTORCYCLE SAFETY
We've all probably heard that one of the most
dangerous places for us to be is in the home. HELMETS, BAH !!
This is a fact that cannot be over-emphasized .
By TSgt Ike Rose, NCOIC
Surely. one of the most hazardous places in the
18 TFW/ Ground Safety Office
home is the bathroom. Bathtubs and shower
stalls are involved in 187.000 inJuries every year Many of you have already read a recent issue
that are serious enough to be treated in a hos- of the Air Force Times and have seen the article
pital. on current motorcycle helmet laws. You
Falls. burns. electrocutions. ar,d drownings probab ly noticed that many states require
are the end results of many mishaps . Nonskid helmets only if you're under 18 years of age--
coatings are available for tubs and showers and and with good reason. When you're under 18.
the addition of one or two grab bars can save a your head is softer and can crack easier. And
serious fracture. everyone knows that once you're past 18 years
In the past year several infants and small of age. you just don't have accidents; so helmets
children have received serious and even fatal in- are really unnecessary. State legis lators are glad
juries from hot tap water . Never leave a small that adults don't have motorcycle accidents. be-
child alone in the bathroom. You might also cause their "hard heads" do a lot of damage to
lower the temperature on your hot water heater the environment. such as knocking holes in
to the minimum necessary for your needs. You'll brick wa lls. knocking down poles. and inflicting
be saving energy and preventing a possible substantial damage to four-wheel vehicles.
scalding burn at the same time. What? You say fatali t ies to motorcyclists have
Keep electrical appliances away from the tub. increased twenty-four percent since the safety

26 FEBRUARY 1980

Down to earth
 helmet law repeal in one state alone? How can
that be? Surely, all bikers know that helmets are P00000OFF !I
heavy, cumbersome, obstruct vision, and com- Recently, a group of individuals from another
pound injuries if you take a spill while wearing command were undergoing riot control squad
one, don't they? And they all know that it's better training. Their training included use of the M-
to slam your unprotected head onto the roadway 25-A2 Riot Control Hand Grenade.
without a helmet. right? mean, we like to feel
I

the rushing air massaging our hair as we ap-

proach an intersection and watch a car pull sud-
denly into our path of travel, and a helmet cer-
tainly couldn't help us here, could it?
I know we read about a lot of biker fatalities
attributed to head injuries, but those guys were
different; they had softer heads and couldn't ride
as well as can, right? Isn't it wonderful, know-
I

ing that as your loved one climbs on the back of

the bike, their head is also extra hard, and with
your riding skills, you surely won't be involved in
an accident and anyway, you're older than 18.
right? Many states have given you the option of
wearing or not wearing a helmet. It's up to you
A guy named Professor Harry Hurt says if you
have a ten dollar head, wear a ten dollar helmet!
I think I disagree with all the negative statements
about safety helmets; and since I'm over 18 and
do have a hard head, think I'll make my head a
I

little harder with a well constructed helmet. How

about you?

While the training was in progress, one indi-

vidual's grenade detonated as he was throwing
it, causing contusions and chemical burns to his
right hand.
The design of the hand grenade [Figure 1] is
such that the actuating plunger must be held
down while the safety pin is pulled and must be
held down until the grenade is released during
the throw. If the plunger is allowed to come up --
even momentarily- -the first timer is started and
the grenade will explode in 1.4-3.0 seconds. In-
terytevvs of other team members indicated that
some people lacked a thorough understanding
of how the grenade worked. This was largely
due to trying to cover too much material in too
little time. At the time of the mishap, it was clear
that people were hurrying to complete the train-
ing. Generalized instruction was not followed up
with individual supervision on the range.
If you're involved in training--on either end- -
don't hurry. Instructors should try their best to
get the key points across. If you're on the learn-
ing end, ask questions. They can usually save a
lot of trouble--and pain too.

TAC ATTACK 27
 The left tire had a flat spot with eight layers of
cord showing. Du r ing subsequent towing from
the runway. the left main ti re blew--a surprise to
all concerned. A serious hazard exists with tires
involved in skids. Tires that have been involved
in skids or maximum braking incidents may ap-
pear safe. but t hey should be treated with
extreme caution. If you're involved in a situation
such as this. make sure the tire and wheel are
cool enough to work on . If you think they're too
hot. then they are too hot. Use caution. That fat.
black hunk of rubber can kill and maim if it
blows.

WHERE'D IT GO?
chock talk An F-4 on a local training mission experienced
utility hydraulic failure . The aircrew followed all

... iluidu£u aJ£d iluiduuaU the proper procedures and terminated the
missio n with an approach-end cable engage-
ment.
will£ a ~ duu. After the aircraft had been towed to the ramp.
the investigation began. It didn 't take the
maintenance folks long to determine the cause
of the hydraulic failure as a failed spoiler actua-
WATCH OUT!! tor. A new actuator was procured and mstalled
in the aircraft.
A low speed antiskid check was being Maintenance and safety personnel determined
conducted on an A-1 0. The antiskid was the failed actuator should be the subject of a
checked on and the Antiskid Caution Light out Materiel Deficiency Report (MDR). As the MDR
prior to brake release. The aircraft was ac- was being prepared for submission . it was dis-
celerated to 50 knots. followed by maximum covered the failed spoiler actuator had been
braking with throttles idle. The antiskid appeared turned in to supply and could not be ide ntif1ed .
to tug and release followed by smooth release. Without the actuator for an exhibit. the MDR
What apparently happened is the antiskid failed was useless .
and the wheels locked . Eventually. the right Although th e preced ing incident is fictitious.
main tire failed; the pilot released the brakes many such incidents occur every year. In our
and coasted to a stop_:__ vast system of parts and hardware. defects are

28 FEBRUARY 1980
bound to occur . The MDR program is set up to
identify parts which are defective in design or
manufacture . If these defective parts slip
through our system and aren't identified and
fixed. recurring incidents or accidents can
result .
Imagine taking your car to a service station
and asking a mechanic to tell you why it won't
start--but tell him he can 't examine the engine
That's what we ask engineers to do without MDR
exhibits .
The next time your aircraft has an emergency
or minor mishap. keep track of the parts which
caused the problems--if they can be identified--
until you're sure there's no need to retain them .
Maybe we can close the holes in this system .
Postflight investigation revealed the rear
CRUSHED CLAMP cockpit flexible oxygen hose which connects to
the CRU-60/P had been pulled free from the
Recently. a T-33 pilot in the rear cockpit was point where it is attached to the metal oxygen
flying a practice instrument mission. He pulled tube assembly located behind the pilot's right
the instrument hood forward JUSt prior to begin- shoulder on the side of the seat. The clamp used
ning his instrument recovery . Shortly thereafter to hold the flexible hose in place had been
he began to feel weak and dizzy. Cabin pressure damaged . apparently during mstallation. and
was ind1cating 24.000 feet. The pilot then was had worked free .
sure his symptoms were hypoxia and checked Security of the oxygen hose had not been
the oxygen regulator. The blinker was not work- verified during postflight inspection. Security of
ing. indicating oxygen wasn't flowing through this hose is a BPO work card item and should
the regulator. although all connections appeared have been noted on postflight from the previous
OK. After a descent. the symptoms disappeared. sortie .

craft stopped JUSt before takeoff . The flashlight

was removed from the left intake. just forward of
In the safety business. we can probably be ac - the compressor . No damage had occurred. The
cused of dwelling on the negative aspects of our honesty of this individual in admitting his mis-
operat1ons. at the expense of the many indi- take is commendable . His prompt. correct ac-
viduals who do their jobs conscientiously every tions prevented a far more serious incident.
day. In an attempt to tip the scales the other
way. here are a few instances of folks who did
the JOb right...
At another base. another crew chief was
• • • * • • • • • • performmg the thruflight on his F-4. As he was
v1sually mspecting the aircraft for dents. loose
Dunng a recent squadron/AMU surge opera- panels. and missing fasteners. he noted the left
tion. a crew chief completed an intake FOD In- s1de of the leadmg edge of the vertical stabilizer
spection and proceeded to launch his aircraft. might be cracked . The crew chief obtained a
After the aircraft taxied. the crew chief returned ma1ntenance stand and confirmed his suspicion
his tools to h1s tool box and did a quick inven- that the f1berglass vertical fin was indeed
tory. H1s flashlight was missing! Mentally retrac- severely cracked and was only attached by the
mg h1s actions. he concluded the flashlight must fiberglass on the right s1de . Another flight would
be 1n the intake of the aircraft that had just have increased the s1ze of the crack and it was
tax1ed. h1ghly probable the fin tip would have separated
W1thout hesitation. he notified the flight chief from the a1rcraft. Another "save" by a sharp-
who notified the command post and got the air- eyed crew chief .

TAC ATIACK 29
 A
~..

letters to the editor

tl Stan Ha rdison, 1977

Dear Readers, to a statement in y our (Nov 79) article, "TA C's

You may or may not have noticed the lack of let- Newest Members," crediting the 178 FJS, North
ters in the magazine lately. It's not that we are overly Dakota A NG, with being "the first ANG unit to
selective in the ones we print, it's because we haven't assume a dedicated air defense mission with F-4s."
received any! ow I know that not all of you are The /99th Tactical Fighter Squadron/ !54th Com-
atisfied with the articles and other features in the posite Group, Hawaii Air National Guard, assumed
magazine. If there's something else you'd rather see active air defense alert with F-4Cs on 1 October
in the magazine, why not let us know? 1976; a mission that has continued uninterrupted
By the way, if you don't feel your airplane, since 1956 in the F-86D, through unit conversions to
weapons system, or area of operation is getting the F-86L. F-102, and most recently, the F-4.
enough "exposure" in our magazine, it might be your Keep up the fine work with your magazine, but
fault. It's very difficult for me to tell your story. please set the record straight.
Most of the staff here come from F-1 00, F-1 05 , A-7, Lawrence C. Cabrinha, Lt Colonel, HANG
or F-4 backgrounds. The F-15 and A-10 are relative Commander
newcomers, and the people who started those aircraft 199 TFS
systems are still there. We also lack a lot of expertise
in air defense operations. Lt Col Cabrinha
I've said this before--it's your magazine. If you
You could have knocked me over with a pineap-
want something in ir, let me know; or better yet,
ple. I guess the 178 FIS is going to have to se!lle for
write it. You'll do yourself and the others who want
being the first CON US A NG unit to assume a dedi-
to read your story a big favor.
cated air defense role in the F-4.
Consider the record straightened.
Ed Now, a Fleagle's Fanny Feather of Fate A ward to
the first individual who can fell me--in wri!ing, no
• • • phone calls please -- what !he original unit designa-
tion of the /99th TaCfic·a/ Fighter Squadron was and
Dear Editor, where they were stationed from 20 Oct 1944 to 14
Though not associated with T A C. our gammg Dec 1944.
command being PACAF, we wish to take exception Ed

30 FEBRUARY 1980
 tac tally

TAC ANG AFR

THRU DEC THRU DEC THRU DEC
DEC 1979 1978
DEC 1979 1978
DEC 1979 1978
CLASS A MISHAPS I• 0 35 35 0 8 13 0 3 4
AIRCREW FATALITIES I• 0 26 19 0 6 9 0 2 2
TOTAL EJECTIONS I• 0 36 38 0 4 9 0 3 2
SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS I• 0 23 31 0 2 8 0 1 2

TAC'S TOP 5 thru DECEMBER '79

TAC AIR DEFENSE
class A mishap free months
91 84 FIS
83 57 FIS
33 TFW 36 5 FIS
56 TFW 33 48 FIS
1 TFW 19 318 FIS

TAC GAINED AIR DEFENSE lAC/GAINED Other Units

duss A mishap free months class A mishap free months
89 191 FIG (ANG) 118 193 TEWG (ANG)
123 TRW 70 102 FIW (ANG) 105 USAFTAWC (TAC)
121 TFW 66 177 FIG (ANG) 101 919 SOG (AFR)
108 TFW •s 158 DSEG (ANG) 93 105 TASG (ANG)
162 TFTG 125 FIG (ANG) 74 1 SOW (TAC)

CLASS A MISHAP COMPARISON RATE 78/79

(BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FlYING TIME)
1978 16.0 12.4 8.3 7.5 5.8 6.3 6.1 6.7 6.5 6.3 5.9 6.8
TA
c i·,.vit9: fk1i:t~" ti~~~1e>
' ,,- I· ~·:;· 6.6 7.4 6.2 7.2 7.1 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.2
19781
0 3.4 4.0 5.9 8.1 7.4 7.9 6.9 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.2
AN
G 1 ~.rt79" b<. 0"'' llo4 9:0 9.7 7.6 6.2 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.8
5.7
AF 1978 0 0 10.9 7.8 6.0 4.8 8.1 7.1 6.3 7.8 9.7

R ~"~:; : ~:.~.~{~ ,~· ;-,,7:t ·.

1 f , ••, 23.1 17.0 13.4 11.6 9.9 8.7 7.8 7.1 6.5

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
* US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980-635-083/9