Faculty Internship Report DR Ajith S
Faculty Internship Report DR Ajith S
Faculty Internship Report DR Ajith S
Submitted by
Dr. S. Ajith
Assistant Professor
Fire & Environment, Health, Safety Engineering
I hereby declare that the Industrial Internship Report entitled “An Investigation on
work as requirements of Industrial Internship during the period from 19-12-2022 to 31-
12-2022 under the guidance of Shri. Priyank Soni, Manager EHS, Chemcon Speciality
Chemicals Ltd.
Dr. S. Ajith
Assistant Professor
Fire & Environment, Health, Safety Engineering
Date: 15.02.2023
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I take this moment to thank the Lord Almighty who gave me strength and
Panchal, and Director (Campus) Shri. Mahesh Barot for providing me a good
opportunity to carry out the research work through faculty internship. I wish to express
my thanks to Dr. Saurabh Shah, Dean, School of Technology for the continuous
Adjunct Professor, Department of Fire & EHS for his support in arranging industrial
Speciality Chemicals Ltd. for granting permission for faculty internship and to carry
out minor projects. I deeply thank my industrial mentors Shri. Priyank Soni, Manager
EHS and Safety officer Shri. Nilesh Modi for their continuous guidance and
Dr. S. AJITH
III
TABLE OF CONTENT
1 Declaration II
2 Acknowledgment III
3 Table of Content IV
4 List of Tables V
5 List of Figures VI
7 Chapter 1: Introduction 1
14 References 44
IV
LIST OF TABLES
No. No.
3.3 Products 13
4.1 Likelihood 17
4.2 Severity 17
V
LIST OF FIGURES
No. No.
1.1 Methodology 5
VI
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
IC - Incident Controller
RA - Risk Assessment
VII
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Chemcon are the only manufacturer of HMDS in India and were the third largest
manufacturer of HMDS worldwide in terms of production in the calendar year 2019.
They are the largest manufacturer of CMIC in India and the second largest manufacturer
of CMIC worldwide, in terms of production and capacity in calendar year 2019.
Further, they are the only manufacturer of Zinc Bromide and the largest manufacturer
of Calcium Bromide in India, in terms of production in calendar year 2019 (source:
Frost & Sullivan Report).
1.2 BACKGROUND
The Indian chemical industry mainly produces basic types of chemicals as well
as knowledge type chemicals and specialty type chemicals as of 2018. In India, Gujarat
was the largest state contributor to the chemical industry of India in 2018. India also
produces products related to petrochemicals, fertilizers, paints, varnishes, glass,
1
perfumes, toiletries, pharmaceuticals, etc. The India chemical industry is divided into
six sub-segments. These sub-segments are Basic Organic Chemicals, Specialty
Chemicals, Chlor-alkali, Pesticides, Dyestuff, and alcohol-based chemicals. India is a
major producer of basic organic chemicals [1].
Environmental risks may be difficult to evaluate and may take years to become
apparent. The risk to the Earth's ozone layer from the release of CFCs required the
investigative powers of scientists throughout the world to understand fully. Science is
still working out the seriousness of the effects of persistent halogenated organics on the
marine food chain with some of these chemicals becoming concentrated in the fatty
deposits of top predators in concentrations that appear to effect their reproductive
success [3].
The organic chemicals industry is one of the most significant sectors of the
chemical industry in the world. It plays a vital role in providing inputs for other
industries of paints, adhesives, pharmaceuticals, dyestuffs and intermediates, leather
2
chemicals, pesticides, etc. Methanol, acetic acid, formaldehyde, pyridine, phenol,
alkylamines, ethyl acetate, and acetic anhydride are major basic organic chemicals that
are produced in India. Six major chemicals are produced in India: methanol, aniline,
alkylamines, and its derivatives formaldehyde, acetic acid, and phenol contributing to
nearly 2/3 of Indian basic organic chemical industry. The country has several basic
organic chemical companies that are among the largest companies globally in their
chemical productions.
3
communication, motivation and their consultation & participation where they
exist
❖ Determining the risk and opportunities through periodically reviewing systems
and updating objectives, targets & their action plans
❖ Adopting and promoting process approach and risk base thinking concept
among the organization
❖ Adopting and synchronizing integrated management system through
establishing process performance indicators in line with organization business
plan
❖ Provide quality assured product and services at competitive cost through
continual improvement in process, production, environment, health & safety
❖ Reaffirming commitment to sustainable developments through effective
implementation and monitoring of Integrated Management System (IMS)
In India, process industries have grown significantly over the last ten years.
Better process safety and risk management in the workplace are essential with the
development of technology and improvements in infrastructure. Chemicals play a vital
part in process industries and require special handling and storage considerations. The
divergence from ideal safe circumstances is caused by a variety of factors, including
process characteristics, operator/human parameters, management parameters, and
social elements. The first phase in the safety management process is the hazard
analysis and risk assessment in the chemical storage area. There are many risk
assessment techniques available to examine important factors in specific parts. The
consequences of chemical spills and leaks around the world have been severe, and they
are still being felt today. Rugged chemical leakage instances include the BP Texas City
refinery explosion, the Flixborough accident, the Piper Alpha disaster, and the tragic
Bhopal gas tragedy [5].
The relative severity of the parameters in the site safety, if ascertained, will
help the site engineers/supervisors to take appropriate decisions to ensure better safety.
A workplace cannot be certified as safe until the workplace holds competent workers,
engineers, supervisors and the availability of PPE’s. Unlike many other manufacturing
sectors, in the chemical industries, the tasks cannot be fully automated and mandate the
4
involvement of human resources (workers) [7]. The severity of these hazards can be
mitigated if the worker uses proper PPE during the time of work. Attitudes and
behaviours are the key elements that lead to unsafe acts and can be reduced through
behavior-based safety [8]. Do the workers have a proper attitude towards adopting PPE
for site safety? If no, the reason for the same need to be identified and remedial action
is to be taken, which may vary from site to site.
1.5 OBJECTIVES
1. To identify the hazards in the chemical industry and to quantify the risk
involved in each plant using HIRA technique
5
CHAPTER 2
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the theoretical background of the reported research works
on safety management, risk assessment and tools to assess safety performance in
chemical industries. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the issues in the previous
literature and to emphasize the relevance of the present study.
For the Bhopal gas tragedy, research has been done on key advancements in
process safety, the Logical Framework Approach, and safety protocols for handling
abnormal and emergency situations in process plants [10-12]. The Fire Dynamics
Simulator, a Computational Fluid Dynamics model of fire-driven fluid flow created by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, has been used to investigate the
Flixborough catastrophe and determine the cause and a potential alternate explanation
[13, 14]. The analysis of multiple idea maps by combining the cause and consequences
from the case study of the Piper Alpha catastrophe to learn about safety [15]. BP Texas
City refinery explosion was evaluated using dynamic risk assessment, dynamic process
simulator, and quantitative dynamic HAZOP analysis [16-18]. Inadequate maintenance,
equipment failure, operational errors, human error, pipeline and capacity tank bursts,
storage tank breaks, fugitive emissions, and apocalyptic disasters have all been
identified as the main causes of all these mishaps [19].
Incidents in the chemical industrial region release deadly gases, harmful air, and
a lot of heat into the surrounding environment [20]. The release of dangerous chemicals
also creates hazards for toxic gas emissions, fires, and explosions that spread quickly to
the surroundings, as well as a devastation in the building's construction [21]. The
majority of the 650 accidents in ports around the European Union had chemicals as their
primary contributing factor [22]. Most mishaps that have happened over the previous
40 years were caused by the release of dangerous chemicals [23]. Incidents involving
chemical storage tanks have the potential to have a domino effect both on and off-site
6
[24]. The causes of mishaps in ammonia storage tanks include overpressure, under
pressure, stuffing, and pipeline breakage. Hazardous chemical gas leaks have negative
effects on both the surrounding environment and human life. These substances can cause
minor irritation all the way up to death, depending on their dosage and intensity [25].
Using risk assessment approaches, all workplace hazards are prioritised, which
also enhances the industry's performance in terms of safety. Complex tasks and a lack
of worker awareness are the main causes of numerous near-misses and accidents. Every
organisation is accountable for identifying the underlying causes of each risk. Therefore,
doing risk assessments, implementing mitigation strategies, and regularly assessing
those strategies are important.
7
CHAPTER 3
There are four different hazardous process that is carried out in the industry as
mentioned in Table 2.1. These processes may take place parallelly or one after another
depending upon the requirement. There are specific process for different products, the
process flow of hexa methyl di silazane is shown in Figure 2.1
8
Figure 3.2 Process Flow of Hexa Methyl Di Silazane
9
Figure 3.4 Process Flow of Calcium Bromide
10
Figure 3.5 Process Flow of Sodium Bromide
11
Figure 3.6 Process Flow of Zinc Bromide
Chemicals are the organic or inorganic molecular building blocks used in processing
materials and adhesives. Raw materials include fillers, minerals, gases, and specialized
chemical additives. The raw materials used in the production is listed in Table 2.2.
S. No Raw Materials
1. Hexamethyl disiloxane (HMDO)
2. HCL liquid – 30%
3. Ammonia
12
4. n-butanol
5. Methyl chloridocarbonate/ Methyl dichloride
6. Chlorine
7. Isopropyl alcohol
8. Pyridine sulphate
9. NaoH (caustic)
10. Bromine
11. Hydrogen bromide (HBr)
12. Sulpher
13. Calcium hydroxide
14. Zinc oxide
15. Sodium hydroxide Lye. (50%)
16. Trimethyl chlorosilane
17. AIBN
18. Sulphur
S. No Products
1. Hexa methyl di silazane (HMDS)
2. Chloro methyl isopropyl carbonate (CMIC)
3. Pyridine hydro bromide or hydro bromic acid
4. Sodium sulphate
5. Calcium bromide
6. Oxalyl chloride
7. Zinc bromide
8. Sodium bromide
9. Calcium sulphate (by product from Mfg of calcium bromide solution)
10. Hexamethyl disiloxane (HMDO)
13
3.4 LIST OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
A total of 13 types of hazardous chemicals are used in the industry and those are
classified as toxic, flammable, corrosive, fire and reactive as mentioned in Table 2.4.
3. Chlorine Toxic
4. Bromine Toxic
5. Ammonia Toxic
8. Sulphur Fire
14
CHAPTER 4
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the risk is quantified for two plants such as Hexa methyl di
silazane (HMDS) and bromine using Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(HIRA) technique. As HIRA is a generic method for quantifying risk in all types of
workplaces, this method is adopted to classify and prioritize the risk zone. The purpose
of risk assessment is to identify all the factors that may cause harm to employees and
others (the hazards) and consider what are the chances that harm and the possible
severity that could come from it (the risks). The person who is performing risk
assessment should be familiar with all the tasks in the construction site, must have in-
depth knowledge of the likelihood and severity of the hazards.
15
4.3 Hazard Identification
The likelihood and severity ratings are obtained by consulting with the team
of experts which includes an HSE officer and safety officer. As the evaluation of hazards
requires knowledge about existing safety measures, the respondents for this study are
chosen from the top-level management. The ratings given by both the respondents have
matched almost equally. The overall responses are checked with the project manager in
the site and a higher weightage is given to the HSE officer considering the industrial
experience and educational qualification. Hence the HSE officer score is adopted for the
final rating. In case if the ratings given by the team don’t match or the difference in the
rating is two or greater, then the senior safety engineer should discuss with the other
members and the reason behind the variance must be identified. Then the ratings must
be reconsidered after a better understanding of the ratings.
16
Table 4.1 Likelihood
The risk value as determined in Table 3.5 & 3.6 is calculated by multiplying
the likelihood and severity ratings. The classification of risk is done through the risk
matrix as shown in Table 3.3 as low, medium, high and extreme. A risk matrix is used
in risk assessment to describe the degree of risk by comparing the likelihood to the
severity ratings. The risk matrix assists the management in decision-making. For
instance, if the likelihood rating is 1 and the severity rating is 5 then the risk value is 5
which falls under the low-risk category as mentioned in Table 3.4. After categorizing
the risk zone, it is suggested to follow the risk response and make necessary
modifications in the task to reduce the high risk to as low as possible. The maximum
17
risk score will be 25 and the minimum risk score maybe 1 as these scores have arrived
through the 5x5 risk matrix.
Risk Risk
S. No Risk Response
Score Category
1. 20-25 E Activity should be modified
Work not to proceed until further mitigation measures
2. 11-19 H
were implemented
3. 6-10 M Requires review and approval to perform this activity
Can be performed using existing standard controls and
4. 1-5 L
plans
18
Table 4.5 Classification of risk zone – HMDS Plant
19
4.6 RELATIVE PERCENTAGE OF RISK IN EACH ZONE
The risk in the workplace is assessed through HIRA and the risk zones are
classified accordingly. The relative percentage of risk involved in the workplace with
respect to the risk zone is calculated using Equation (4.1).
60
50
40
Risk level
30
20
10
0
Low Medium High Extreme
Relative % of risk in each zone
20
90
80
70
60
Risl level
50
40
30
20
10
0
Low Medium High Extreme
Relative % of risk in each zone
21
Table 4.7 Hazard Category
Hazard
Description of Effects / Hazard Category
Rating
No known adverse health effects.
1 ACGIH A5 carcinogens
Not classified as toxic or harmful
Reversible effects to the skin eyes or mucous membranes, not severe
enough to cause serious health impairment.
2
ACCGIH A4 carcinogens
Skin sensitizers and skin irritants
Possible human or animal carcinogens or mutagens, but for which data
is in adequate.
3 ACGIH A3 carcinogens.
Corrosive (ph 3 to 5 or 9 to 11), respiratory sensitizers, harmful
chemicals.
Probable human carcinogens, mutagens or teratogens based on animal
studies.
ACGIH A2 carcinogens.
4 NTP Group B
IARC Group 2A
Very corrosive (ph 0 to 2 or 11.5 to 14)
Toxic chemicals
Known human carcinogens, mutagens or teratogens.
ACGIH A1 carcinogens
5 NTP group A
IARC group 1
Very toxic chemicals
22
Table 4.8 Health Hazards of Chemicals
Hazardous Hazard
S. No Hazard Category Risk First Aid
Material Rating
Wash hands, forearms and face thoroughly for 20
Serious eye
1. Ammonia Flammable 3 minutes if contacted, Safety eyewear, Chemical-
damage & burns
resistant, impervious gloves
Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water,
Oxidizer, contains
Severe skin burns occasionally lifting the upper and lower eyelids, Check
gas under pressure,
2. Chlorine 4 and eye damage. and remove any contact lenses, continue to rinse for at
may explode if
Fatality if inhaled least 10 minutes. Chemical burns must be treated
heated
promptly by a physician
Harmful if If breathed in, move person into fresh air, take off
swallowed, Severe contaminated clothing and shoes immediately. Wash
3. Bromine Corrosive 3
skin burns and eye off with soap and plenty of water. Take victim
damage immediately to hospital
Harmful if
Highly flammable swallowed, Severe Rinse immediately with plenty of water also under the
4. HMDO 2
liquid and vapour skin burns and eye eyelids for at least 15 min.
damage
23
Methyl Wash face, hands any exposed skin thoroughly after
Highly flammable Severe skin burns
5. Chloroform 2 handling, remove victim to fresh air
liquid and vapour & eye damage
ate
Serious eye
Unconscious: Maintain adequate airway and
Isopropyl Highly flammable irritation,
6. 3 respiration
Alcohol liquid & vapour Respiratory
Respiratory arrest: Artificial respiration or oxygen
irritation
Burns to
respiratory tract,
Immediately flush contaminated areas with water,
7. Caustic Corrosive 3 skin, eyes and
Remove contaminated clothing
gastrointestinal
tract, Eye damage
In case of contact with eye, immediately flush with
clean low-pressure water for at least 15 min, remove
Serious burns and
8. Sulphur Irritant 4 contaminated clothing, Wash contaminated areas
blindness, Irritation
thoroughly with soap and water or waterless hand
cleanse
24
4.8 MEASURES TAKEN BY THE OCCUPIER TO ENSURE SAFETY AND
CONTROL OF PHYSICAL AND HEALTH HAZARDS
25
❖ Check earthing, bonding and jumper, if not okay inform to higher authority
❖ Always follow superior advice
❖ After completion of shift, handover the charge properly
❖ During loading, handle the material according to capacity or take help of other
❖ While using chain saw, EOT crane and hydra, use 80% of it safe working load
❖ Crane, forklift should be handled by license person
❖ While using EOT crane check brake and control
❖ Do not walk beneath while lifting load
Safety Helmets (IS:2925) – Safety helmet should be worn inside the plant to prevent
head injuries
Welding Helmet/Goggle – It is used for protection of eyes from ultraviolet & infra-red
radiation
Safety Shoes (IS15298) – Safety shoes with steel toe cap & acid alkali & electrical
resistance sole. Used for protecting the foot
Safety Goggles: It should be used to prevent eye injuries which may occur due to
chemical splash & flying objects
Face Shied: It is used while working with grinding machine to prevent injury from
flying objects
Earmuff/Ear Plug: It is used for protection against high noise levels. At workplace
90db noise level is recommended to work for 8 hours without any adverse effects
Full body harness with double lanyard & scaffold hook safety belt: It is used to
work at height job (above 3 meters) wearer should confirm the fixing of scaffold hook
on work at height
Hand gloves: It includes PVC gloves, nitrile rubber gloves, electric shock proof gloves,
leather patched gloves, PU coated hand gloves, polka dotted cotton gloves, asbestos
26
gloves which are used for hand protection against chemical, mechanical abrasion,
electric conductivity upto 33KV, thermal protection gloves for lab chemicals etc.
Canister Full/Half face mask: These are special type of portable respiratory
equipment used for respiratory protection against organic vapours, acidic fumes,
ammonia, toxic gases etc. Time limit is 12 to 15 min based on concentration of vapours
in the atmosphere
27
CHAPTER 5
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Toxic wastes are poisonous even in minute or trace amounts. They may have
acute effects, resulting in death or severe illness, or they may have chronic effects,
causing irreparable harm over time. Some are carcinogenic, as they can cause cancer
after many years of exposure. Others are mutagenic, causing significant biological
changes in humans and wildlife.
Reactive wastes are chemically unstable and react violently with air or water.
They cause explosions or form toxic vapors. Ignitable wastes burn at relatively low
temperatures and may cause an immediate fire hazard. Corrosive wastes include strong
acidic or alkaline substances. They destroy solid material and living tissue upon contact,
by chemical reaction.
28
5.3 HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
29
Table 5.1 Hazardous waste at Generation Stage
At Generation Stage/Area
Storage
Hazardous Transporting & Feeding
Handling & Storage Capacity
Waste Mechanism
MOC:HDPE
HCL 30% ❖ There is no manual handling of hydrochloric acid. HCL is unloaded from ST 6016 20 KL ❖ There is no manual
Category B- the closed tanker to storage tanks through pipeline using dedicated transfer handling of HCL
ST 6015 20 KL
15 of SCH- pumps when virgin HCL is using. ❖ Feeding of HCL from
II ❖ Separate storage tanks/area at designated place with proper cover & acid ST6017 07 KL storage tank to evaporator
brick lining floor for storage of HCL. is done through closed
❖ HCL stored in dedicated HDPE tanks & kept in acid proof brick lined dyke ST 6018 18 KL pipeline using dedicated
wall along with slope and collection pit provided in storage area. transfer pump
ST 6019 10 KL
❖ Appropriate PPE’s to be used while handling
❖ Two stage water scrubber followed by alkali scrubber is provided to treat ST 6020 20 KL
the emission liberated from reactor and also the vent of HCL storage tanks
ST 6021 10 KL
is connected to scrubbers
30
Table 5.2 Hazardous waste at Utilization Stage
At Utilization Stage/Area
31
5.6 FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS REPORT
A sample fingerprint analysis report of solid ash powder is shown in Table 5.3.
From the analysis, it is known that the solid ash powder should be disposed in secured
landfill cell. Whereas, BDS indicates below detectable limit, Other heavy metal
analysis can be carried out as required and clear leachate generated & solubility
18.857% so improve less than 10%
32
o
18. Flash point C \ \
o
19. Fire point C \ \
20. PH (4 to 12) 10%w/v 12.21 7.49
21. Moisture content <20% 19.081 50.97
22. Gross calorific value Cal/gms 160.95 9670
23. Net calorific value Cal/gms \ \
24. L O I (organi cont.) % \ 82.08
25. Ash content % \ 17.92
26. TOC ppm \ \
27. Led mg/l \ \
28. Cadmium mg/l \ \
29. Chromium mg/l \ \
30. Copper mg/l \ \
31. Nickel mg/l \ \
32. Mercury mg/l \ \
33. Zinc mg/l \ \
34. Cobalt mg/l \ \
35. Manganese mg/l \ \
36. Sulphate ppm \ \
37. Chloride ppm 34989.15 \
38. COD ppm \ \
33
CHAPTER 6
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Emergencies can happen at any time in any types of industry, due to fire
in a process area, tank form area, toxic gas/liquid release into the area from storage
vessels or piping network, or a bomb threat. The approach of the plan is to eliminate
or reduce the risk of injury or harm that may occur during an evacuation by
undertaking following steps,
34
❖ Emergency response procedures and measures
❖ Emergency organization and responsibilities
❖ Infrastructure requirements
❖ Procedures for declaration of on-site and off-site emergency
❖ Resources for controlling emergency
❖ Demographic information
❖ Medical facilities
❖ Evacuation
❖ Public relations and information to public
❖ Reporting of the incident
❖ Emergency recovery procedures
❖ Emergency plans for tank trucks and pipelines carrying hazardous products
To manage any type of emergency that arises in the site, there is a separate team
to handle and overcome it. The emergency management team in the site is shown in
Figure 6.1. The site main controller initiates the emergency management system
followed by the incident controller.
35
❖ Protect load bearing structure, critical valves though it is having fireproofing.
Fireproofing provides limited fire resistant and hence to be considered as second
phase firefighting process.
❖ For leak/spill over body, it shall be decontaminated for 15 minute by using eye
wash and safety shower. Casualty should be shifted to occupational center for
further treatment. Contaminated clothing & shoes to be disposed off.
❖ Always use breathing apparatus for respiratory protection. Any leakage shall be
consider as heavy leakage. Canister mask shall not be used. It is limited
protection and possibly may trap in toxic gas.
❖ Minimum required person shall be allowed at emergency site and other
employees shall report to safe assembly point. They may be called if needed.
Overcrowding may worsen the emergency.
36
6.5 PROBABLE EMERGENCY AT SITE
37
❖ If total evacuation is necessary, then the safe assembly area opposite to the
admin building shall be used.
❖ After emergency is over, supervisor at designated safe assembly area shall take
head count and report to the manager.
❖ In case of emergency including fire, gas leakage, electric short circuit and other
immediately inform to superior and emergency control room
❖ Inform to safety in charge and if possible, inform to HR
❖ Fireman with emergency response team will reach the spot and start fire fighting
❖ Do not spread false information
❖ The area which is to be evacuated, turn off the machine safely and assemble to
nearest assembly point
❖ Without information do not leave the company
❖ The person who had taken first aid training may attend the person who is injured
and shift to occupational health centre or nearest hospital depending on severity.
38
❖ Intimate to the police, factory inspector, collector, other government
authorities
❖ Inform private and government hospitals for making necessary
arrangements
❖ Inform to the relatives injured or death persons, if so
❖ Report to the IC time to time and comply any pending or as directed by IC
❖ Maintain the records for all communications
❖ On withdrawal of emergency, it shall be communicated to all respective
department/section, key persons, essential workers, assembly point,
government authority etc.
There are two modes of sounding the siren in the site viz., one in case of
emergency and another for testing. The range and operation of the siren type is
mentioned in Table 6.2.
39
Table 6.2 Range & Operation of Sirens
40
6. Hydrocholoric Acid – Wear respiratory mask and with help of lime confined the
leakage
41
CHAPTER 7
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
❖ The hazards involved in two plants of the site are identified through walk
around audit. Risk is quantified through the likelihood and severity values
as pointed out by the safety expert. Risk classification is done according
to the risk range and the relative percentage of risk involved in each zone
is determined. Hazard rating is done for all the hazardous chemicals and
first aid measures are suggested.
ii. HAZOP can be performed to identify the process hazards and enhance the
process safety
42
iv. The workers performance & site performance can be determined using
various techniques
43
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44
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