Manila

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207433. December 05, 2018 ]

DR. FE LASAM, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

J. REYES, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul the March
18, 2013 and May 28, 2013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union,
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Branch 66 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 6778, a petition for relief from a final order. The present petition for
certiorari also seeks to set aside the February 23, 2010 Order of the same court in Civil Case No.
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6778 for annulment of mortgage.

On January 22, 2013, petitioner Dr. Fe Lasam (Lasam) filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
Order, or Other Proceedings before the RTC. In her petition, Lasam alleged, among others, the
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following: that on January 14, 2003, she filed a Complaint for Annulment of Mortgage against 5

Philippine National Bank (PNB), docketed as Civil Case No. 6778, before the same court; that on the
February 23, 2010 hearing of the case for initial reception of evidence where she was present, her
former counsel failed to appear; that as a consequence, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the civil
case for failure to prosecute and for failure of her counsel to appear; that her former counsel filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion where she explained her failure to attend the hearing on February
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23, 2010, but the RTC denied the same in its April 29, 2010 Order as the motion was not seasonably
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filed; and that on May 24, 2010, her former counsel sought the reconsideration of the order, but the8

RTC denied the same in its July 7, 2010 Order for being in the nature of a second motion for
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reconsideration.

Lasam further alleged that her former counsel filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
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Appeals (CA), which was docketed as CA- G.R. SP No. 116446, but the same was dismissed. On 11

September 27, 2012, an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction was also filed. However, in its November 21, 2012 Resolution, the CA stated
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that it could no longer act on the urgent motion in view of this Court's issuance of a Resolution dated
May 28, 2012, and an Entry of Judgment. The Entry of Judgment stated that the Court's February 22,
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2012 Resolution in G.R. No. 199846, denying the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 116446, had become final and executory and had been recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 3, 2012.

Lasam claimed that she only learned of the finality of the February 23, 2010 Order after she
consulted a different lawyer. She also averred that she was seriously deprived of her right to present
her case due to the gross negligence and ignorance of her former counsel who caused the dismissal
of her complaint for annulment of mortgage due to her failure to appear on the February 23, 2010
hearing of the case; who failed to file the motion for reconsideration on time; and who availed of the
wrong remedy by filing a second motion for reconsideration which eventually led to the finality of the
February 23, 2010 Order. Thus, she was prompted to file the petition for relief from the February 23,
2010 Order of the RTC within 60 days from her knowledge of its finality.

Ruling of the RTC

In its assailed March 18, 2013 Order, the RTC dismissed outright Lasam's petition for relief. The
trial court explained that under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a petition for relief from a final
judgment or order must be filed within: (a) 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) six months from entry of such judgment, order, or
other proceeding. It emphasized that these two periods must concur and must be strictly observed
since compliance with the reglementary periods is jurisdictional. 15

The trial court ruled that contrary to Lasam's belief, the 60-day period had commenced when she,
through her former counsel, received a copy of the April 29, 2010 Order denying the reconsideration
of the dismissal of the case on February 23, 2010, and not from the time of her belated knowledge of
the finality after consulting with a different lawyer. Thus, the trial court opined that the petition for relief
was filed way beyond the two periods set by the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Order provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 16

Lasam moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in its May 28, 2013
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Order. 18

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

WHETHER THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

Lasam argues that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright her petition
for relief considering that she has been seriously deprived of her right to present her case due to the
gross negligence and ignorance of her former counsel. Although she recognizes the general rule that
the negligence of the counsel binds the client, Lasam nevertheless claims that the gross negligence
of her fmmer counsel justifies the application of the exception to her case.

In its Comment, private respondent PNB counters that Lasam has not been unduly deprived of
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her right to present her case. It contends that Lasam has had sufficient legal representation contrary
to her claim that her former counsel was guilty of gross negligence and ignorance. PNB points out that
the records of the case, as well as Lasam's admissions, would reveal that her former counsel moved
for the reconsideration of the RTC's February 23, 2010 Order. Her former counsel also filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA; and, when the same was dismissed, moved for the reconsideration of the
same, which was also denied. PNB further states that the CA's denial of the motion for reconsideration
apparently became the subject of Lasam's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
199846, before this Court. PNB maintains that the legal services and representations by Lasam's
former counsel in the proceedings before the RTC, the CA, and this Court clearly manifest that no
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists which could have justified a petition for relief.

PNB further disputes Lasam's claim that the petition for relief from the order of the RTC has been
timely filed. It underscores that Lasam's petition in G.R. No. 199846, assailing the decision and
resolution in CA- G.R. SP No. 116446, was denied in this Court's February 22, 2012 Resolution, which
became final and executory as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment on May 3, 2012. Thus, the petition
for relief filed on January 22, 2013, or more than six months after the entry of the final order on May
3, 2012, was clearly filed out of time. Therefore, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
when it denied Lasam's petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition must be dismissed for utter lack of merit.1âшphi1

Direct recourse to this Court was improperly resorted.

As already stated, Lasam filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court directly
to this Court, assailing the orders of the RTC. On this consideration alone, the instant petition must be
dismissed for failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.

The rationale for the principle of hierarchy of courts was discussed in Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. In the said case, the Court, citing the
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Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, explained that:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following
pronouncements:

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court
with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts. (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
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There is nothing in the instant petition which would justify direct recourse to this Court. Thus,
dismissal of the same is in order.
 Furthermore, even if the Court gives due course to this petition, it would certainly still meet the
same fate. The Court is convinced that the RTC, in issuing the assailed orders, did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion.

Petition for relief from the order of the RTC was filed out of time.

A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings is an equitable remedy which is
allowed only in exceptional circumstances. The petition is the proper remedy of a party seeking to set
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aside a judgment rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing,
was prevented from taking an appeal, or a judgment or final order entered because of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. 25

However, as an equitable remedy, strict compliance with the applicable reglementary periods for
its filing must be satisfactorily shown because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality
on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle
that a judgment, order, or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end
to litigation. As such, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the petition was filed within its
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reglementary periods, otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright. 27

In this regard, Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for relief from
judgment must be filed within: (1) 60 days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding
to be set aside; and (2) six months from the entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These
two periods must concur. Further, these periods could not be extended and could never be
interrupted.28

Unfortunately for Lasam, she failed to comply with these two periods when she filed her petition
for relief from a final order before the RTC. It must be emphasized that the subject of Lasam's petition
for relief is the RTC's February 23, 2010 Order. Accordingly, the reglementary periods provided in
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court must be reckoned from Lasam's knowledge of the said order,
as well as on the date it was entered.

In her petition for relief, Lasam alleged that the petition was filed within 60 days from the time she
learned of the finality of the RTC's February 23, 2010 Order. The insufficiency of this allegation is
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very glaring.

Again, and as expressly provided under the Rules of Court, the 60-day period under Section 3,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court should be reckoned from the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of
the judgment or order sought to be set aside. In other words, for purposes of the 60-day period under
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Rule 38, knowledge of the finality of the judgment or order is irrelevant.

The records reveal that Lasam's knowledge of the February 23, 2010 Order could be traced to at
least two periods: on February 23, 2010, when the Court issued the subject Order and on which Lasam
was admittedly in attendance; and on July 23, 2010, the date Lasam signed the Verification and
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Certification for the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA. It must be underlined that the very subject
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of the aforementioned petition for certiorari was the February 23, 2010 Order itself.

On the other hand, while there was an attempt to argue the compliance with the 60-day period in
the petition for relief, there was no effort to show that the six-month period - which is equally relevant
for a petition for relief-was complied with. It may be that this was consciously adopted to conceal the
fact that the petition for relief - was also filed beyond the six- month reglementary period. As pointed
out by the PNB, the RTC's February 23, 2010 Order was, in effect, entered on May 3, 2012, when this
Court's February 22, 2012 Resolution in G.R. No. 199846 was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. Thus, the January 22, 2013 petition for relief was filed two months late.
 From the foregoing, it is clear that Lasam failed to comply with the 60-day period provided under
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court when she filed her petition for relief on January 22, 2013, or
almost three years from the time she acquired knowledge of the order sought to be set aside. Likewise,
she failed to comply with the six-month period provided in the same Rule when she filed her petition
for relief more than eight months from the date of entry of the order sought to be set aside.

Since strict compliance with the relevant periods was not observed, the RTC correctly dismissed
Lasam's petition. At the time the petition was filed, the reglementary periods under Rule 38 had already
expired. Consequently, the RTC lost all jurisdiction to entertain the same. Thus, no grave abuse of
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discretion could be attributed to the trial court when it dismissed the petition outright.

Considering that Lasam's petition for relief was certainly filed out of time, it becomes unnecessary
for this Court to determine whether the alleged negligence of her former counsel constitutes sufficient
ground for a petition for relief.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.