Conflict Quarterly

Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Jordan after the

1948 and 1967 Wars: A Comparative Survey
by
Joseph Nevo

INTRODUCTION
Until President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, Jor-
dan was the one and only Arab state that had conducted direct, regular
and serious, albeit confidential, discussions with Israel in order to
reach a peace settlement. This happened following each of the two
wars in which the Jordanian and the Israeli armies were engaged in
direct confrontation. The purpose of this paper is to survey some
aspects of the Jordanian-Israeli talks and to examine the permanent
factors among the variable determinants in the web of Jordanian-
Israeli relations. Two questions are particularly relevant. Of the fac-
tors that affected the negotiations after the 1948 war, which are still
relevant twenty and thirty years later, and, what prospects regarding
future possible negotiations can be deduced from the dead end of
the 1950 talks?
King Abdallah of Jordan had political discussions with the rep-
resentatives of the Jewish agency since the early 1930s. Both parties
had a common foe: al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini, mufti of Jerusalem and
leader of the radical Palestinian nationalism. The contacts with the
Jews became more intensive after World War II. In November 1947
Abdallah obtained the acquiescence of the Jewish agency for his am-
bition of many years, to take over the Arab parts of Palestine which
had been allotted to the Arabs in the United Nations' partition scheme.1
The outbreak of hostilities in Palestine and the views of the other
heads of state in the Arab League, somewhat impeded Abdallah's
plans, but eventually he managed to reach his goal. He controlled
most of the territories that he had previously intended to control, and
the Arab population of Palestine acknowledged him as their king and
urged him to annex their country to his kingdom.-
When the gunsmoke faded away, Abdallah continued his talks
with the Jews (by then, the Israeli government) in order to consolidate
his achievement. The first phase of discussions lasted between De-
cember 1948 and May 1949, with the intention being to achieve an
armistice agreement, though the Jordanian-Israeli armistice talks, si-
multaneously held at Rhodes under U.N. auspices, were a mere fa-
cade. Both parties planned to negotiate this agreement as a stepping
stone towards a peace treaty. The second and more important phase
of discussions took place between November 1949 and March 1950
but still left unresolved difficulties.
Jordanian-Israeli contacts resumed following the Six Day War.
That war created new political and territorial realities, in addition to
the bilateral unsolved problems of 1950. Meetings between the two

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Summer 1984

parties probably commenced in late 1967, and lasted irregularly for

about ten years. In both cases the talks were clandestine, but became
open secrets shortly afterwards.

THE SUBJECTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND THE QUESTION

OF THE PALESTINIANS
There are two basic differences between the situation after the
1948 and the 1967 wars. First, following the first war Jordan con-
trolled the West Bank. T h e Armistice demarcation lines bisected Je-
rusalem and meandered along tens of kilometers within rifle-shot
distance of centres of Israeli civil population. After the Six Day War
the Jordan River — once the eastern border of Mandatory Palestine
— again formed the division line between the two countries.
Second, after 1948 the inhabitants of the West Bank did not
constitute a national determinant that had to be taken into any con-
sideration. The permanent residents, as well as the newly arrived
refugees, under the shock of the debacle, were encouraged by Jor-
danian officials to discard their Palestinian national identity for Jor-
danian citizenship. The "Palestinian problem," therefore, was not a
decisive issue in the peace talks and hardly any reference was made
to this factor. 3
After the Six Day War the Palestinians' national awareness rapidly
increased. Its political expressions were demonstrated on the West as
well as the East Bank and also in other parts of the Arab world. From
the late 1960s onward, it was obvious that any serious discussion be-
tween Jordan and Israel must not overlook this new reality.
Accordingly, the agenda of the 1949-1950 talks were character-
ized mainly by territory-related topics. Abdallah was the one who
stipulated his conditions in return for a peace agreement. His major
demands were: a corridor to the Mediterranean coast near Gaza, the
return of the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road, free port rights in Haifa,
and, the return of some Israeli controlled Arab quarters in (new)
Jerusalem, with repatriation of the refugees from Lydda and Ramie.4
The last demand implied his desire to gain considerable concessions
from Israel in order to display some achievement both to the Pales-
tinians and to the Arabs in general. Simultaneously, these demands
were designed to alleviate the refugee problem that laid a heavy bur-
den on Jordan's meager resources and created severe social problems
as well. T h e gravity of the refugee problem was demonstrated as early
as November and December 1948. Abdallah then offered Israel the
Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and withdrawal from the strategic Latrun
area in return for the Israeli-held Qatamon quarter of Jerusalem and
for the repatriation of Lydda and Ramie refugees. 3
Abdallah's quid pro quo proposals to Israel included free port
rights in Aqaba, the Jewish quarter of old Jerusalem and access to
the potash plant on the Jordanian-controlled north shores of the Dead
Sea.

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 Conflict Quarterly

In January 1950 the talks were deadlocked, mainly because of

the issue of the corridor to Gaza.6 The ice was broken by a Jordanian
proposal of a five-year, non-aggression pact, as an intermediary stage
until a final peace settlement was possible. The armistice lines would
remain intact, the border would be open to trade and travel, and
Jordan was to enjoy a free zone in the port of Haifa. Both governments
were to deposit guarantees in the U.N. for the protection of holy
places and for the granting of free passage to them. The Israeli cabinet
approved these proposals as a proper base for further negotiations.
Intensive discussions continued in February and early March and a
draft was initialed.7
After the Six Day War the situation entirely altered. The years
that had elapsed raised the price that Israel had to pay for a political
settlement. It consisted by then not only of territorial components
(much wider than in 1950) but also the question of the population in
the relevant areas, its affiliation and its national aspirations.
Officially, Jordan adhered to the consensus of the moderate Arab
states, according to which Israel had to evacuate all the territories
occupied in 1967 and to recognize the Palestinians' rights as a pre-
condition to any political settlement. However the information avail-
able regarding the Israeli-Jordanian talks from 1967 implies that Jordan
confined its efforts, in the first years at least, mainly to the territorial
aspect.
These discussions extended over about ten years. The tremen-
dous political and military changes that took place in the Middle East
during this period undoubtedly affected the positions of both parties
as well as their attitudes towards counter-proposals. Israel's concept
of a settlement was inspired by the "Alon Plan," which cited the return
of most of the West Bank to Jordan and its subsequent demilitari-
zation. Israel would have the right to maintain a military presence
along the Jordan River and in some other strategic points and the
boundary line would be modified in the regions of Tul-Karem, Latrun
and the Etzion block. Jordan agreed to discuss some of Israel's con-
ditions, 8 but the "Alon Plan" as a whole was unequivocally rejected as
"totally unacceptable." 9 Jordan especially opposed the reunification
of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, insisting on total Israeli with-
drawal including withdrawal from East Jerusalem. 1 " The focus of the
discussion on territorial topics exclusively, indicated that Jordan was
ready to cope with the challenge of the growing wave of Palestinian
national sentiment in the West Bank and elsewhere. However during
this period the Palestinian problem augmented and ramified. Between
1967 and 1971 the struggle with the Palestinian organizations con-
stituted Jordan's primary domestic problem. At times the regime and
the Hashemite establishment were practically fighting for their own
survival.
After King Hussein managed to liquidate the military and polit-
ical power of the Palestinian organizations in Jordan, in September
1970 and July 1971, he issued his federal scheme that was scheduled

41
Summer 1984
to be executed after Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank. It fos-
tered the unique characteristics of the Palestinians by promoting an
autonomous unit on the West Bank within a federal framework with
the East Bank. Common institutions would administer defence and
foreign affairs only.
Following the disengagement of forces and agreements between
Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in the first half of 1974, Jordan
recognized the advantages of such accords and indicated its wish to
reach a similar agreement regarding the West Bank. American sources
reported on a meeting between King Hussein and the late Mrs. Golda
Meir, then the Prime Minister of Israel, in the second half of 1974.
The meeting discussed the possibility of an agreement, but no con-
clusions were reached."
After the November 1974 Arab summit conference in Rabat,
Jordan formally gave up any claim regarding the West Bank. This act
was the outcome of the resolution that recognized the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Pal-
estinian people, having the right to establish its "national authority"
in any Palestinian territory that "will be liberated." Hussein reluctantly
had to comply with that resolution. Nonetheless, Jordan sought to
prove that such a resolution was impracticable without her consent 12
and even continued contacts with Israel, although she had to modify
her views in accordance with the changing circumstances following
the Rabat resolution.
The question of Jerusalem is another aspect which should be
discussed. Ostensibly it is a territorial issue, albeit consisting of other
attributes as well. As the city of peace, sacred to the three monotheistic
faiths and worshipped by hundreds of millions of believers all over
the world, Jerusalem became a symbol and myth with which a cool,
political realism was not always able to cope.
The talks on Jerusalem, therefore, were affected by sentimental
attributes. Both parties rejected the idea of internationalization (in
spite of some potential mutual advantages) and preferred to deal with
its future through bilateral channels. Both sides also remained more
persistent and less flexible in discussing topics related to Jerusalem
than in dealing with other issues.
Overall, it seems that the 1949/50 negotiations tended to be in-
tensive and concrete. The negotiators went into specifics and discussed
technical and side-issues. By comparison, the talks following the Six
Day War probably did not go further than a general framework and
hardly any experts at executive levels participated.

INITIATIVE, MOTIVATION AND INTERESTS OF BOTH

PARTIES
In 1949 the two countries had (or should have had) a strong
motivation to reach an agreement. King Abdallah emerged from the
1948 war as the Arab ruler who gained the major territorial, political

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 Conflict Quarterly

and prestigious profits. Nevertheless the Arab world refused to accept

these achievements. His colleagues' opposition to the annexation com-
pelled him to postpone the official declaration of the "unification of
the two banks" until 1950. An agreement with Israel, based on Ab-
dallahs conditions would have legalized the annexation, given him
an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and minimized Jordan's depend-
ence on her Arab neighbors. One has to bear in mind that even in
normal time Abdallah was considered the enfant terrible of the inter-
Arab system, and his fellow rulers had severe reservations regarding
his conduct. At this time they became really hostile. Peace and co-
operation with Israel could ameliorate the economic conditions of the
small desert kingdom that had just tripled its population but did not
commensurately increase its material resources. Relations with Israel
could, therefore, provide an economic raison d'être for the existence
of Jordan and decrease its dependence not only on the Arab world
but on Britain as well.
The risks seemed smaller than the prospects. Jordan certainly
hoped that the inter-Arab hostility, the major source of apprehension,
would turn out to be a paper tiger. Following the actual annexation
in December 1948, the Arab world was infuriated. Yet, not a single
state went beyond verbal protests, though some voices called for the
expulsion of Jordan from the Arab League, the severing of diplomatic
relations and imposition of economic and political sanctions. Both in
1948 and in 1950 the inter-Arab system was not capable of reaching
a unanimous decision regarding Abdallah's activities.13 Moreover, the
Jordanian monarch believed that if he could obtain an appropriate
quid pro quo from Israel, it would weaken the criticism against him
and halt the efforts to build up an anti-Abdallah consensus. This is
also an explanation of Abdallah's adherence to the negotiations even
after they were exposed and became public knowledge. 14
Another risk that Abdallah had to consider was the possible de-
terioration of internal stability and public order due to local opposition
to the idea of reconciliation with Israel. The major concern was the
unpredictable reaction of the Palestinians, the new citizens of the
enlarged kingdom. Despite his concerns, Abdallah underestimated
the national awareness of the Palestinians and did not regard them
as a factor that would jeopardize his plans (see below).
The balance of advantages and disadvantages indicated a consid-
erable profit. Jordan therefore had very good reasons to initiate peace
contacts. A peace agreement would also serve some of Israel's best
interests. First of all, it would be a break in the circle of hostility and
provide Arab recognition of Israel's sovereignty and of its right to
exist. Besides the political and psychological significance of such an
agreement it might be the herald of similar treaties with other Arab
states. Even as a bilateral agreement it included some potential eco-
nomic advantages, suggesting, mutual exploitation of the Dead Sea
resources, joint transportation and communication projects in the
Gulf of Eliath and profits from Jordan's use of Israeli Mediterranean
ports. 15

43
Summer 1984

King Abdallah initiated many of the meetings during the first

period under consideration. As mentioned, he had a long tradition
of meetings with the representatives of the Jewish Yishuv prior to
1948, so his initiative should not be merely perceived as an historical
breakthrough but as a continuation of long-established relationships.
Israel, on the other hand, had not yet fully experienced the siege and
the isolation imposed upon it by its neighbors. Arab-Jewish hostility
had commenced a few generations before, but its outcome was not
as decisive and absolute as after the foundation of the State of Israel.
Moreover, not long before 1948 there were still cordial economic and
social relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Jews even trav-
elled to and traded with the neighboring countries.
The government of Israel apparently did not realize how tight
the Arab blockade would be. More than a few people in Israel ex-
pected the Arab world to be realistic and concede Israel's existence
following the failure to defeat it by force. Many Israelis believed that
the Rhodes armistice accords would be a preliminary stage towards
peace treaties as was promised. Prior to the traumatic experience of
a twenty year long siege, the decision makers in Israel could not
appreciate the rareness and uniqueness of the historical opportunity
that the talks with Abdallah might produce. Notwithstanding this, the
readiness to make concessions was limited in both parties, and Israeli
persistence on certain issues stemmed from security calculations and
not from tactics of negotiation.
The talks were suspended by Jordan in the spring of 1950, but
Israel initiated their resumption, probably because the reality of the
situation was becoming more evident. Another round of talks took
place at the end of 1950 and in early 1951 but to no avail.16
When Jordanian-Israeli discussions commenced after the Six Day
War, Israel's feeling of isolation together with the effectiveness of the
Arab siege, influenced the attitude of both parties. At that time, con-
trary to the situation in the early 1950s, direct negotiations between
Israel and an Arab state were nearly an international sensation, due
to the experiences of the previous two decades and especially because
of the unique image enjoyed by Arab-Israeli conflict.
One should bear in mind that the map of the Middle East, as well
as its military and political balance of power, had been entirely changed
in the second half of 1967. As in 1949 many people, and not only
Israelis, believed that the results of the war would persuade the Arabs
to abandon their ambition to destroy the State of Israel. This, in
addition to the territorial bargaining cards that Israel obtained in the
brief war, gave rise to the hope that a political settlement was on its
way. The impact of Israeli society on hundreds of thousands of visitors
from the West Bank and from Arab countries (via the "open bridges")
was intended to aid the process of Arab acceptance of Israel. From
that point of view, Jordanian-Israeli negotiation seemed almost a "nat-
ural" move.
For King Hussein, the outcome of the 1967 war was disastrous

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 Conflict Quarterly

and completely different from the results achieved by his grandfather

in the previous war. He lost all the territories that Abdallah gained
and annexed in 1948, almost half of his population and nearly half
of the combat units of his army. T h e only reasonable way to regain
a foothold in the West Bank was by a direct dialogue with Israel.
Leaders of Western countries whom Hussein visited shortly after the
war, recommended the same course of action. Dialogue would be
slow, however, and the King's major apprehension was that as time
passed his claim on the lost territories might be threatened by an
independent Palestinian entity emerging on the West Bank either with
Israel's support or with at least its acquiesence. That fear was not
unfounded. On the 9th of June 1967, the Israeli prime minister, Levi
Eshkol, sent an emissary to the local leadership in the West Bank to
study their views with that very idea in mind. 18 Hussein realized that
playing the Palestinian card was a viable option for Israel. He was
therefore anxious to find out through a third party what Israel's
condition(s) for the evacuation of the West Bank might be.' 9 These
indirect contacts inaugurated a ten year period of direct discussions.
Israel was interested in communicating with Jordan. Since the
Israeli government perceived the Six Day War as an incentive to bring
the Arab states to the negotiating table, any break in their solidarity
was desirable. Hussein looked the ideal interlocutor, for the above-
mentioned reasons. It was equally obvious, though, that it would be
extremely difficult for him to be the only (or even the first) Arab ruler
to negotiate with Israel. Israel did not make any great effort to per-
suade him, for precisely the same reasons that Hussein was anxious
to commence dialogue. Firstly, Israel believed that time was working
on its behalf and, secondly, few Israeli politicians were seriously con-
sidering the Palestinian option immediately after the war. T h e Pal-
estinian organizations had yet to become considerable and vehement
anti-Israeli factors.

THE ARAB STATES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS

This was undoubtedly the most influential determinant of Jor-
dan's position in both periods though each time it had a different
weight. In early 1950, the Arab states, with the exception of Jordan,
unanimously rejected the idea of direct peace talks with Israel, in spite
of U.N. efforts to encourage them to do so. Simultaneously, the Arab
League endorsed decisions to enforce its boycott more effectively and
took additional anti-Israeli steps.21 However, due to domestic and
inter-Arab considerations, the neighboring governments refrained
from denouncing Jordan for its dialogue with Israel when that dia-
logue was in its early stages.22 Towards the end of February and the
beginning of March 1950, Israel and Jordan were on the verge of
concluding a non-aggression pact, a fact which was extensively re-
ported in the foreign press. At that point the Arab states could remain
imperturbable no longer. The Arab League threatened Jordan with
sanctions as severe as those imposed on Israel. In March 1950 Jordan

45
Summer 1984

suspended the discussions with Israel and on the 31st March its cabinet
ratified the Arab League resolution to expel any member-state that
would conclude a separate peace treaty with Israel. 23
Did the negotiations really fail because of inter-Arab pressure?
The sequence of events leaves little room for doubt. The press dis-
closures regarding the contents of the discussions augmented Arab
resentment, and some states, especially Syria, threatened Jordan mil-
itarily.24 When the matter was discussed by the Arab League, Abdallah
did not have much choice. Abdallah had miscalculated the response
of the Arab world, perhaps by expecting to get more from Israel than
it actually offered which would, in turn, justify the negotiations in the
eyes of his colleagues. Nevertheless, in return for the suspension of
contacts with Israel, Abdallah extracted a high price: a de facto rec-
ognition of the annexation of the West Bank which the Arab states
had thus far refused to give. In the summer of 1950 the Arab League
adopted a resolution allowing the Jordanian Government to declare

... that the annexation of the part of Palestine in question was a

measure necessitated by practical considerations, that Jordan
would hold that part on trust until a final settlement of the
Palestine question was reached and that Jordan would accept in
regard to it whatever might be unanimously decided by the other
member states. 25
Arab and international recognition of the legitimacy of his rule
in the newly occupied territories was Abdallah's ultimate political goal.
He had tried, in vain, to obtain it in the eighteen months previous to
this resolution and was by now ready to sacrifice negotiations with
Israel to achieve it.
It is hardly acceptable to claim that Abdallah spun a Machiavellian
web, initiating the negotiations with Israel only for the sake of their
suspension in return for an Arab recognition of the annexation.
Nevertheless, once it became a possibility he was obviously ready to
make such a deal, especially after his maneuvering space regarding
peace negoatiations was drastically reduced.
When King Hussein commenced his contacts with Israel at the
end of 1967, he had broken a more specific inter-Arab consensus that
possessed a greater moral and institutional authority than the one his
grandfather had violated. The resolutions of the Khartoum summit
conference after the Six Day War stated, in part, that
... the Arab efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression and
to ensure the withdrawal of the ... Israeli forces from Arab lands
which have been occupied since ... 5 June ... will be done within
the framework of the main principles by which the Arab states
abide namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiation with it ... . 26
While in 1950 the Arab League adopted a resolution forbidding
any agreement with Israel after Abdallah's negotiations and practically

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 Conflict Quarterly

as a result of it, in 1967 a similar resolution was approved before

Hussein's meetings with the Israelis. Thus, by contact with the Jewish
state, Hussein deliberately violated an explicit ruling of the supreme
inter-Arab body.
The Jordanian-Israeli negotiations begun in 1967 were less in-
tensive and much more continuous than those of 1949/50. In addition,
the Arab world was more polarized and internally divided than in the
early 1950s. Therefore, the inter-Arab system's reaction to the 1967
negotiations was more variegated and responses of Arab governments
were, by and large, relatively moderate. Since the talks never reached
a conclusive phase, the Arab states were inclined to be satisfied with
Jordan's denials, usually issued whenever foreign sources reported
on meetings between Hussein and Israeli officials.27
In February 1972 the late Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat
informed an Arab Socialist Union audience that contacts between
Israel and Jordan had been in progress for some time past. A month
later the editor of the semi-official Al-Aharam, Muhammad Hasanin
Heikal, disclosed in a leading article that Hussein had met Israel's
deputy prime minister Yigal Alon. In both cases the reports were
informative rather than criticizing.28 Moreover, since the Khartoum
conference, no inter-Arab forum had adopted a resolution denounc-
ing Jordan for negotiating with Israel.
These reactions should not, however, be attributed to a moder-
ation of the Arab world. They stemmed rather from the polarization
of the inter-Arab system and its inability even to reach a consensus
on other crucial issues of the day.29 Jordan was well aware of the
potency of the inter-Arab factor, though its official response ostensibly
did not reflect this. In at least one case King Hussein allegedly ad-
mitted that he had suspended a series of meetings with Mr. Abba
Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister, because of his commitment to Arab
solidarity.30
It was clear to Hussein that no agreement with Israel was prac-
ticable without the concurrence or the acquiescence of at least some
other Arab countries. He therefore tried to persuade his colleagues,
mainly the presidents of Egypt and Syria, to join the path of political
settlement. He sought a comprehensive framework of negotiations,
through the mediation of the U.N., the United States or other powers,
which would include and legitimize his contacts with Israel. These
were probably the considerations that Hussein had in mind when he
explained to his Israeli interlocutors, in late 1970, that the idea of
bilateral public talks was a premature one."

THE POSITION OF THE FOREIGN POWERS

Examination of the international context of the negotiations re-
veals a significant difference regarding the attitude of the powers in
the two cases. In the early 1950s Britain was the most relevant foreign
power to this question. Though in the process of losing its imperial

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Summer 1984
assets, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, as far as Jordan was
concerned, Britain was still a protecting power. The British Govern-
ment balanced the deficit of the Jordanian state budget and financed,
trained, armed and even administered the Arab Legion, Abdallah's
precious source of pride.
The British did not view the course and direction of Abdallah's
negotiation with Israel with favor. Some sources imply that the sus-
pension of the discussions should be credited to Britain's efforts.32
The Israeli-Jordanian agreement that was about to be concluded in
1950, was incompatible with Britain's interests for two main reasons.
First, Britain sought to preserve the Arab League as an unanimous
pro-Western block and felt that any dissonance could weaken that
alignment and undermine Britain's position. Second, Britain was si-
multaneously negotiating the withdrawal of its forces from the Suez
Canal zone. The Israeli Negev was perceived as an ideal substitute
site for the British bases.
Acting on the latter reasoning, British officials encouraged Ab-
dallah, during the 1948 war, to take over the Negev.33 Later, they
tried to persuade him to lay claim to that territory in his diccussions
with Israel. Abdallah demurred, saying that such a claim was not a
vital Jordanian interest. Moreover, a persistent demand for the Negev,
by proxy, was the only raison d'être for Jordanian-Israeli negotiations.
Even if Britain's contribution to the suspension of the negotiations
is exaggerated, it is obvious that Abdallah knew that Britain was dis-
satisfied with them and that he was aware that his maneuvering ability,
with respect to Britain, was rather limited. It seems logical to assume
that Britain's position was not a single decisive factor that put an
end to the talks with Israel, but no doubt it was a supporting one.
In the 1960s and the 1970s it was the U.S. which replaced Britain
as the main source of economic and military aid to Jordan. However,
the involvement of foreign powers in the region had been changed
since 1950. Unlike the days when Britain was the exclusive foreign
power to exercise its influence in the area, no longer was the Middle
East an almost monolithic pro-Western milieu. The U.S. had to share
areas of influence with the USSR and even the American clients in
the region were not unanimous. There were disagreements and con-
flicts of interest between, for example, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, not
to mention differences between both these countries and Israel.
At this time the U.S. and Britain did not oppose direct peace
talks, and to a certain extent even encouraged them. By and large,
the Western bloc states could have benefitted from a political settle-
ment between the Arabs and Israel and traditionally the West sup-
ported Israel's demand for direct negotiations with its neighbors. Thus
the West did not disagree with the bilateral contacts between the two
parties and tried, in fact, to promote such a settlement on various
occasions.
The USSR opposed the negotiations for exactly the same reason
that the West favoured them. The Soviets' ability to maintain their

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 Conflict Quarterly

influence in the Middle East was by means of radical elements and

required constant tension and a hostile atmosphere. No Soviet interest
would be served by an agreement between two pro-Western countries.
Yet, the USSR did not try to interfere with the negotiations as such
an action would require tremendous efforts and resources which were
unjustified by the possible profit. The Soviet influence in Jordan was
limited. Hussein visited Moscow after the Six Day War but, later,
relations somewhat deteriorated. When the conflict between Hussein
and the Palestinian organizations ensued, the unequivocal support of
the Soviets for the Palestinians placed them in midst of an anti-Jor-
danian camp.
Thus, it can be concluded that, unlike the situation in 1950, the
position of the external powers in 1967 and onwards in no way hind-
ered or deterred peace negotiation between the two parties.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN BOTH COUNTRIES

Finally, the internal strength of the regime in each country during
the time of the negotiations should be considered. How far, for ex-
ample, could each resist opposing pressures if such were applied. To
what extent could the heads of both countries impose their will on
their subordinates and, most importantly, did any internal influences
or the fear of such influences affect the positions of the respective
parties or contibute to the suspension of the discussions.
Abdallah's reign over Transjordan in the 1940s was virtually ex-
clusive. The existence of ostensibly democratic institutions such as
parliament and general elections, hardly altered the supreme au-
thority of the king. He appointed the governments and the premiers
were his tools. Political public opinion was almost non-existent and
the press basically reflected the views of the royal court.
After the annexation of the West Bank that state of affairs grad-
ually changed, though more in practice than formally. The amalgam-
ation introduced a Palestinian population into Jordan double that of
the East Bank and with a higher level of political consciousness. Thirty
years of British mandate and the proximity of the Jewish Yishuv had
produced a Palestinian political elite: highly intelligent, nationalistic
in its perception and strongly anti-Zionist and anti-British. This elite,
which enjoyed organizational and intellectual ability, put forward,
after the annexation, such demands as "sovereignty of the people"
and "freedom of expression." In Abdallah's eyes even mentioning
such demands was high treason.
The formal annexation and the granting of political rights to the
Palestinians took place only in April 1950, after the talks with Israel
actually ended. But the Palestinians had begun to accumulate political
power somewhat earlier, having been integrated into the various levels
of the administration, including the Cabinet, since the beginning of
1949. Their authentic political potency, however, was demonstrated
in the extra-parliamentary arena. Because of the harsh line set by

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Summer 1984

Abdallah and his colleagues, clandestine Palestinian resistance fol-

lowed annexation. This was only worsened by Abdallah's intention to
make peace with Israel, the country which the Palestinians considered
the prime source of their troubles. Although this opposition eventually
led to the assassination of Abdallah in July 1951, the initial Palestinian
resentment itself probably did not overly perturb Abdallah. He ob-
viously considered it no more than a nuisance which he could dis-
regard and it hardly influenced his decisions during the negotiations.
There were however other forms of internal dissatisfaction that
affected Abdallah. On 2 March 1950, the Jordanian Prime Minister
Tawfik Abu al-Huda resigned over his opposition to the conclusion
of the non-aggression agreement with Israel. Abu al-Huda, who headed
seven cabinets since 1938, was considered "a strong man" and one of
Abdallah's closest friends. The King nominated in his stead Samir al-
Rafa'i, also a veteran Prime Minister, who was probably in favour of
the agreement. Following the failure of al-Rafa'i in forming a cabinet,
Abu al-Huda was requested to withhold his resignation. A month
later he was replaced by Sa'id al'Mufti.34 In the meantime, however,
the negotiations had been suspended and Jordan had supported the
Arab League resolution that threatened to expel any member state
that would conclude a separate peace with Israel.
Abu al-Huda's resignation, like the inter-Arab pressure and Brit-
ain's position, was a factor that is practically impossible to measure
quantitatively. One cannot say how much Abu al-Huda's views con-
tributed to the suspension of the negotiations. It was a segment in an
elaborate series of determinants and causes. Nonetheless, the fact that
one of Abdallah's loyal mainstays so vehemently opposed the idea of
negotiation indicated strong criticism and serious reservations within
the King's inner circle. The doubts probably influenced Abdallah's
final decision.
The question of the internal constitution of Hussein's regime
after 1967 is rather complicated. Firstly since the duration of the
second period of negotiations was much longer than the first one, one
can more easily observe ups and downs in Hussein's position. Sec-
ondly, Hussein's status was different than that of his grandfather both
theoretically and in practice. The Jordanian constitution of 1952 (with
some later amendments) defined the status of the monarch more
clearly than was done in Abdallah's time. Moreover, Hussein was the
product of another era and of a different culture than his grandfather.
He was not an oriental absolutist who regarded the kingdom and the
citizens as his private domain, but a young man with western upbring-
ing and education, who was more open than his predecessors to the
values of a modern society. Because of these differences, Hussein was
challenged by more numerous and more varied opposition activity
than that with which Abdallah had to cope. However, most of the
opposition groups, though representing different forces and interests,
were usually interwoven.
The Palestinians generally constituted the major reservoir of frus-

50
 Conflict Quarterly

tration and resentment and the main source from which the various
opposition groups received their rank and file members. During 1968-
1970, the Palestinian fidaiyun organizations formed the main threat
to the regime and enjoyed the sympathy of a considerable portion of
the Palestinians in Jordan (refugees and non-refugees alike). They
were also backed by some politicians and by some members of the
establishment. In spite of the strengthening of the various political
forces and regardless of the supposed vulnerability of the regime, the
internal criticism had a very little influence on Hussein's decisions
regarding the discussions with Israel. Parallel to the increase and
variegation of the opposition forces, the supporters of the regime also
gained more power and influence with the emergence of an "Hash-
emite establishment" which included members of the royal family,
politicians, and army officers whose personal and sectarian interests
were interwoven with those of Hussein. They regarded the preser-
vation of the current regime as the best alternative both for themselves
and for Jordan. That establishment was, and apparently still is, strong
enough to secure the survival of the regime even if Hussein ceased
to be the monarch. Further, it created efficient security and intelli-
gence instruments that have, thus far, successfully coped with both
external and internal threats. After the Palestinian organizations were
crushed in summer 1971, the other opposition forces remained as a
sort of semi-official opposition with the tacit consent of the King. This
obviously did not constitute a serious menace to Hussein and therefore
did not affect his contacts with Israel.
In Israel there was not much difference between the governments
after the 1948 and the 1967 wars. In both cases, the state was run by
a coalition of parties most of which had "a left of centre" orientation
corresponding to the social democrats and the socialists in Western
Europe. 35
Israel's search for any opening for contacts with the Arab world
and her idealization of direct negotiations, was popular with Israeli
opposition groups who welcomed discussions with Jordan. After 1967
the contacts with Jordan should be observed a wider context, namely,
that of the public debate in Israel regarding the future of the terri-
tories occupied in the Six Day War. The right-wing Gahal (which
participated in the government between June 1967 and July 1970 and
was thus a part of the national consensus), rejected any possibility of
handing over the West Bank to foreign rule. It justified Israel's control
over this area not only for reasons of national security but because of
religious and historical affiliation. Therefore, Gahal opposed even
specific schemes of the government, such as the Alon Plan that was
introduced to Hussein as a basis for negotiation. Talks with Jordan,
however, took place when Gahal members were cabinet ministers; they
probably did not categorically oppose the talks since the negotiations
never reached a stage at which a government decision was required.
One can say, though, that the right-wing element inside and outside
the cabinet, contributed to the shaping of Israel's ultimate compromise

51
Summer 1984
regarding a political settlement with Jordan. They viewed the Jordan
River as the eastern security border, opposed the establishment of a
third state between Israel and Jordan, and were prepared for terri-
torial compromise in the West Bank. Israeli public opinion favoured
most of these ideas but the Maarach (alignment of labour parties)
emphasized the security aspect, supporting Israel's demand for a mil-
itary position along the Jordan River and on the mountain tops of
the West Bank.
Thus, it can be inferred that the opposition did not directly in-
fluence the talks with Jordan. Indirectly, however, it affected the
crystalization of the government's territorial concept. This perception
is supported by the fact that even after Gahal left the government in
1970 there was no breakthrough in the ongoing negotiations with
Jordan.

CONCLUSIONS
The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan had, from 1948, the best
reasons among the Arab states, for seeking peace with Israel. Its
geographical location, its weak economic base, its dependence on
neighbors for an outlet to the Mediterranean, its vulnerability within
the inter-Arab system and the Palestine problem — all these were
factors whose influence upon Jordan did not weaken and may even
have been aggravated by the passage of time. Peace in the Middle
East and normal relations with Israel might mitigate them. That being
the case, Jordan had not much to lose once peace prevailed in the
area (in comparison for example, with Lebanon, where some circles
expressed their apprehension lest, in case of peace in the Middle East,
Tel Aviv and Haifa collect the lion's share of the financial and eco-
nomic profits that Beirut enjoyed).
As has already been pointed out, some of the basic factors had
altered between 1950 and 1967, albeit their influence upon the pos-
sibility of a peace settlement did not always change accordingly. The
territorial map was, for example, completely different in 1967. Fur-
ther, the 1960s saw the Palestinian question gain more and more
importance whereas in 1950 it had not constituted a considerable
factor in the calculations of either party. Israel's awareness of its en-
forced state of siege and isolation, too, was much stronger in 1967
and had an obvious psychological and practical influence that dimin-
ished, in one way, the value of Israel's territorial bargaining cards as
it raised the price that the Arabs demanded in return for a settlement.
Finally, the inter-Arab system also went through conspicuous changes
in the decades after 1950. Regardless of these changes, Jordan's com-
mitment to (or fear of) the inter-Arab system was probably among
the major attributes of the failure of the negotiations.
What did a peace settlement require of Israel and Jordan in both
periods? In 1950 Israel was required to make certain territorial
amendments and to take some security risks. Jordan was required to
make similar territorial amendments and to recognize Israel. This last

52
 Conflict Quarterly

point, considered a breach of a formal and practical inter-Arab con-

sensus, might have resulted in the deterioration of relations between
Jordan and its neighbors to the point of crisis. After 1967 Israel was
required once again to take security risks and to give u p nearly all
the territories occupied in the Six Day War. These concessions were
far more difficult and painful than those demanded in the first period
for two reasons. First, as the years passed since 1967, the occupied
territories began to be perceived by increasing segments of Israel's
public opinion as more significant than their sheer security value
would indicate. Second, due to the advancement of military technol-
ogy and the sophistication of current weaponry, the risks that Israel
was required to take in the second period were much higher than
before. The deployment of a hostile army less than ten miles from
the Mediterranean, near Nathanya, was in 1950 a grave defence prob-
lem. T h e same situation in the 1970s, many would agree, placed Israel
on the verge of national suicide. For Jordan the difficulties, after 1967,
were just as painful. Besides the recognition of Israel, it had to cope
with the Palestine question in all its human, territorial and inter-Arab
aspects. Since most of the factors since 1967 are still valid,36 it is
worthwhile to observe their relevance to any future Israeli-Jordanian
arrangement. 37
As has already been pointed out, the position of the inter-Arab
system was the major cause that foiled any possible settlement. In
comparison to it, most of the bilateral questions were of minor im-
portance.
Two related recent phenomena associated with the inter-Arab
system should be considered because they will have an important
influence in any future negotiations. First, the Arab world has been
polarized. Countries such as Libya, Algeria and South Yemen have
grown more radical and unequivocally reject any reconciliation with
Israel, even if the latter consents to withdraw from the 1967 occupied
territories and to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Simply, they
demand Israel's liquidation. Such views guarantee that an inter-Arab
consensus for a political settlement with Israel is highly improbable
in the foreseeable future. There may be two or three (possibly more)
Arab countries willing to reach an agreement with Israel, or at least
concur that Jordan may do so. This may make an Israeli-Jordanian
settlement feasible. Nevertheless, if radicalization continues, the weak-
ening Arab backing for Jordan will precipate a higher and higher
price for Israel to pay in return for peace. T h e risks that stem from
the resentment in the Arab world could easily push Jordan into asking
for the maximum amount. Second, there was the late President Sadat's
peace initiative, basically a public repetition of Hussein's clandestine
negotiations. Reactions were not encouraging. Certainly, the peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt has not so far helped persuade Jordan
to enter the peace process and, the hostile Arab reaction to the Egyp-
tian-Israeli negotiations and peace treaty did not encourage Hussein
to follow suit.

53
Summer 1984

Of all the determinants that have been discussed, two affected

(and are still affecting) the possibility of a peace settlement between
the two countries more than the others. First the inter-Arab system in
its various combinations remains the dominant factor, casting its shadow
over the negotiations since 1949. The second factor, that became
decisive only after 1967, is the Palestinian question with all its various
facets. Anyone who strives for a peace treaty between Israel and Jor-
dan must take these factors in account and, there are many indications
that any future settlement will succeed or fail depending on how these
Mid-East realities are handled.

Footnotes
1. Central Zionist Archives (CZA), Jerusalem, S-25 4004.
2. On 1 December 1948, a congress of several hundred of Palestinian notables was
held in Jordanian-occupied Jericho. Their demand from King Abdallah, to annex
Palestine to his realm, provided the grounds for the formal incorporation of the
West Bank into Jordan. See: Joseph Nevo, "Abdallah and the Arabs of Palestine,"
The Wiener Library Bulletin, vol. XXXI, new series nos. 45/46 (1978), pp. 51-62.
3. However, one should bear in mind that the assassination of King Abdallah was an
outcome of a Palestinian plot. The conspirators charged that the King, inter alia,
endeavoured to reach a peace agreement with Israel.
4. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1976), p. 106; James G.
McDonald, My Mission in Israel 1948-1951 (New York, 1951), p. 193; U.S. Charge
d'affaires, Amman to the Secretary of State, 7 February, 1950, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1950, vol. V, p. 727 (FRUS); and, Israel State Archives, Documents
on the Foreign Policy of Israel, vol. 3, pp. 336-339, 350.
5. Dayan, p. 104.
6. Israel had agreed to grant that corridor to Abdallah. However he thought of its
width in terms of kilometers (eight-ten), while Israel was thinking in terms of meters
(two hundred to three hundred, wide enough for a railroad). FRUS, 1950, vol. V,
pp. 665, 671,675, 745.
7. Dayan, pp. 104-115; McDonald, pp. 124-125, 193-194; Walter Eytan, The First Ten
Years: A Diplomatic History of Israel (London, 1958), pp. 38-41; A.H.H. Abidi, Jordan
- A Political Study 1948-1957 (London, 1965), pp. 26-38; Ernest C. Dawn, "Pan
Arabism and the Failure of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Negotiations, 1950," in Gir-
darhi L. Tikku (ed.), Islam and its Cultural Divergence (University of Illinois Press,
1971), pp. 27-51; FRUS, 1950, vol. V, pp. 665 ff.
8. Le Nouvel Observateur, 20-26 March, 1972.
9. Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derech ("Mile Stones") (Tel-Aviv, 1976), p. 542. See also: Arab
Reports and Record (ARR), London, 1974, p. 561.
10. The Middle East Record (MER), vol. 4, 1968 (Tel Aviv, 1973), pp. 221-222; MER,
vol. 5, 1969-70 (Tel Aviv, 1977), p. 92; ARR, 1969, p. 118; ARR, 1972, pp. 589,
610; ARR, 1974, pp. 331, 561; Le Nouvel Observateur, 20-26 March 1972; L'Express,
26 March 1972; and, Time, 23 November 1970.
11. Newsweek, 17 J u n e 1974; NBC report, 2 August 1974; and, quoted by ARR, 1974,
p. 333. See also ARR, 1974, pp. 223, 236.
12. Jordan ostensibly obeyed the Rabat resolutions, trying to create the impression of
dissociating itself of the Palestinian issue, first, by a drastic reduction of Palestinian
representation in governmental and public organizations, then by abolishing the
ministry for the "occupied territories" affairs. There were also reports that the
government initiated a new nationality law, designated to deprive all residents of
Palestinian origin of their Jordanian citizenship.

54
 Conflict Quarterly

13. Hussein H. Hassouna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of
Middle East Conflicts (New York, 1975), pp. 29-40; and, Dawn, pp. 32 ff.
14. Dawn, p. 35; and, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, vol. 3, pp. 329-330, 345.
15. Assessment regarding the ardent willingness of both parties to reach an agreement
see: FRUS, 1950, vol. V, p. 665 ff.
16. ibid., pp. 796, 873-874, 877, 941, 950, 1021-1022; McDonald, pp. 207-208; and,
Marie Syrkin, Way of Valor, A Biography of Golda Myerson (New York, 1955), p. 220.
17. David Kimche and Dan Bawlv, Sofat Ha'esh ("The Fire Storm") (Tel Aviv, 1968),
p. 214; and MER, 1967, pp. 267-268, 404.
18. Kimche and Bawly, p. 182.
19. ibid., p. 214.
20. See sources in note 10.
21. Dawn, p. 28.
22. For the reasons, see Dawn, pp. 33-34.
23. ibid., pp. 50-51.
24. ibid., p. 38; McDonald, p. 194; and, FRUS, 1950, vol. V, p. 787.
25. Hassouna, p. 40.
26. MER, 1968, p. 264.
27. MER, 1968, pp. 221-222; MER, 1969/70, p. 92; ARR, 1970, p. 636; ARR, 1971,
p. 138; and ARR, 1974, p. 321.
28. ARR, 1972, pp. 80, 136. One should not overlook, however, that Hussein's fed-
eration plan, of March 1972, aroused a very hostile response leading even to the
severence of diplomatic relations between Jordan and several Arab states. (ARR,
1972, pp. 157-158). The angry reaction was mainly because the plan indicated the
return of the West Bank to Jordan, if and when Israel withdrew, and not to the
Palestinians, rather than stemming from the possibility of further Jordanian talks
with Israel.
29. Such as: The Jarring mission, the Rogers initiative and the 1970 cease-fire agree-
ment between Israel and Egypt to put an end to the bloodv war of attrition along
the Suez Canal.
30. International Herald Tribune, 26 March 1969.
31. ARR, 1970, p. 653.
32. Jon Kimche, The Second Arab Awakening (London, 1970), pp. 168-169; FRUS, 1950,
vol. V, pp. 665-666. Sir Alec Kirkbride, then the British Minister in Amman, admits
in his memoirs (From the Wings (London, 1976), p. 91) that Abdallahs initiative
towards direct talks with Israel was contradictory to his own advice. See also:
Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, vol. 3, p. 345.
33. Kimche and Bawly, p. 214.
34. Dawn, p. 35; Kirkbride, p. 9 1 ; FRUS, 1950, vol. V, pp. 777-778.
35. Except for the period between June 1967 and July 1970 when Israel was governed
by a national coalition that included the right-wing block in /messet.
36. This paper was written in 1981, before the war in Lebanon.
37. The meaning of the political change in Israel in 1977 and the formation of the
likud government was not discussed since this survey deals mainlv with previous
period. One must, however, take into consideration two possible implications of
that change upon a Jordanian-Israeli agreement:
a) The political and emotional commitment (bevond defence considerations) of
the likud, with regard to Israeli control in Judea and Samaria, is much deeper
than that of the previous governments.
b) As far as the internal political svstem in Israel is concerned, it might be easier
for the likud to make territorial concessions, because the main opposition block,
the Maarach, already advocates a territorial compromise in the West Bank in
order to bring Jordan to the negotiating table.

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