Series Editor H.G.

Widdowson

Published in this series:

Pragmatics
H. G. Widdowson: Linguistics
George Yule: Pragmatics George Yule

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press
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 Contents

Preface XI

SECTION I:
Survey I

1 Definitions and background 3

Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 4
Regularity 4
The pragmatics wastebasket 6
2 Deixis and distance 9
Person deixis IO
Spatial deixis 12
Temporal deixis 14
Deixis and grammar 15
3 Reference and inference 17
Referential and attributive uses 18
Names and referents 19
The role of co-text 21
Anaphoric reference 22
4 Presupposition and entailment 25
Presupposition 26
Types of presupposition 27
The projection problem 30
Ordered entailments 33
5 Cooperation and implicature 35
The cooperative principle 36
Hedges 38
 Conversational implicature 40 SECTION 2
Generalized conversational implicatures 40 Readings 91
Scalar implicatures 41 SECTION 3
Particularized conversational implicatures 42 \ II7
References
Properties of conversational implicatures 44
Conventional implicatures 45 SECTION 4
Glossary 127
6 Speech acts and events 47
Speech acts 48
IFIDs 49
Felicity conditions 50
The performative hypothesis 51
Speech act classification 53
Direct and indirect speech acts 54
Speech events 56
7 Politeness and interaction 59
Politeness 60
Face wants 61
Negative and positive face 61
Self and other: say nothing 62
Say something: off and on record 63
Positive and negative politeness 64
Strategies 65
Pre-sequences 67
8 Conversation and preference structure 71
Conversation analysis 71
Pauses, overlaps, and backchannels 72
Conversational style 76
Adjacency pairs 76
Preference structure 78
9 Discourse and culture 83
Discourse analysis 83
Coherence 84 '*
Background knowledge 85
Cultural schemata 87
Cross-cultural pragmatics 87
 Preface

Purpose
What justification might there be for a series of introductions to
language study? After all, linguistics is already well served with
introductory texts: expositions and explanations which are com-
prehensive and authoritative and excellent in their way. Generally
speaking, however, their way is the essentially academic one of
providing a detailed initiation into the discipline of linguistics,
and they tend to be lengthy and technical: appropriately so, given
their purpose. But they can be quite daunting to the novice. There
is also a need for a more general and gradual introduction to
language: transitional texts which will ease people into an under-
standing of complex ideas. This series of introductions is designed
to serve this need.
Their purpose, therefore, is not to supplant but to support the
more academically oriented introductions to linguistics: to
prepare the conceptual ground. They are based on the belief that
it is an advantage to have a broad map of the terrain sketched out
before one considers its more specific features on a smaller scale, a
general context in reference to which the detail makes sense. It is
sometimes the case that students are introduced to detail without
it being made clear what it is a detail of. Clearly, a general under-
standing of ideas is not sufficient: there needs to be closer scrutiny.
But equally, close scrutiny can be myopic and meaningless unless
it is related to the larger view. Indeed, it can be said that the
precondition of more particular enquiry is an awareness of what,
in general, the particulars are about. This series is designed to
provide this large-scale view of different areas of language study.
As such it can serve as a preliminary to (and precondition for) the

PREFACE XI
 more specific and specialized enquiry which students of linguist- that there must be an alternative to a technical account on the one
ics are required to undertake. hand and an idiot's guide on the other if linguistics is to be made
But the series is not only intended to be helpful to such stu- relevant to people in the wider world.
dents. There are many people who take an interest in language
without being academically engaged in linguistics per se. Such Readings
people may recognize the importance of understanding language Some people will be content to re1,d, and perhaps re-read, the
for their own lines of enquiry, or for their own practical purposes, , summary Survey. Others will want to pursue the subject and so
or quite simply for making them aware of something which will use the Survey as the preliminary for more detailed study. The
figures so centrally in their everyday lives. If linguistics has reveal- Readings provide the necessary transition. For here the reader is
ing and relevant things to say about language, then this should presented with texts extracted from the specialist literature. The
presumably not be a privileged revelation, but one accessible to purpose of these readings is quite different from the Survey. It is to
people other than linguists. These books have been so designed as get readers to focus on the specifics of what is said and how it is
to accommodate these broader interests too: they are meant to be said in these source texts. Questions are provided to further this
introductions to language more generally as well as to linguistics purpose: they are designed to direct attention to points in each
as a discipline. text, how they compare across texts, and how they deal with the
issues discussed in the survey. The idea is to give readers an initial
Design familiarity with the more specialist idiom of the linguistics liter-
ature, where the issues might not be so readily accessible, and to
The books in the series are all cut to the same basic pattern. There encourage them into close critical reading.
are four parts: Survey, Readings, References, and Glossary.
References
Survey One way of moving into more detailed study is through the
This is a summary overview of the main features of the area of Readings. Another is through the annotated References in the
language study concerned: its scope and principles of enquiry, its third section of each book. Here there is a selection of works
basic concerns and key concepts. These are expressed and (books and articles) for further reading. Accompanying com-
explained in ways which are intended to make them as accessible ments indicate how these deal in more detail with the issues dis-
as possible to people who have no prior knowledge or expertise in cussed in the different chapters of the survey.
the subject. The Survey is written to be readable and is uncluttered
by the customary scholarly references. In this sense, it is simple. Glossary
But it is not simplistic. Lack of specialist expertise does not imply Certain terms in the Survey appear in bold. These are terms used
an inability to understand or evaluate ideas. Ignorance means in a special or technical sense in the discipline. Their meanings are
lack of knowledge, not lack of intelligence. The Survey, therefore, made clear in the discussion, but they are also explained in the
is meant to be challenging. It draws a map of the subject area in .Glossary at the end of each book. The Glossary is cross-
such a way as to stimulate thought, and to invite a critical parti- referenced to the Survey, and therefore serves at the same time as
cipation in the exploration of ideas. This kind of conceptual an index. This enables readers to locate the term and what it
cartography has its dangers of course: the selection of what is signifies in the more general discussion, thereby, in effect, using
significant, and the manner of its representation will not be to the the Survey as a summary work of reference.
liking of everybody, particularly not, perhaps, to some of those
inside the discipline. But these surveys are written in the belief

XII PREFACE PREFACE XIII

 Use
The series has been designed so as to be flexible in use. Each title is
SECTION I
separate and self-contained, with only the basic format in
common. The four sections of the format, as described here, can Survey
be drawn upon and combined in different ways, as required by
the needs, or interests, of different readers. Some may be content
with the Survey and the Glossary and may not want to follow up
the suggested references. Some may not wish to venture into the
Readings. Again, the Survey might be considered as appropriare
preliminary reading for a course in applied linguistics or teacher
education, and the Readings more appropriate for seminar dis-
cussion during the course. In short, the notion of an introduction
will mean different things to different people, but in all cases the
concern is to provide access to specialist knowledge and stimulate
an awareness of its significance. This series as a whole has been
designed to provide this access and proi:note this awareness in
respect to different areas of language study.

H.G. WIDDOWSON

f\

XIV PREFACE
 1
Definitions and background

J
.ii
i
I1 Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as commun-
icated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or
reade!,hh has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what 11\I
.J people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases V
I in those utterances might mean by themselves. Pragmatics is the
I study of speaker meaning.

I
.
This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of
what people mean in a particular context and how the context .
R
~
'l
influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers
organize what they want to say in accordance with who they're
talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances.
0 .,{_

~ Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.

t This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make
inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpreta- (;\ .
j tion of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study \::)3
I ,:xplores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part
I of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation
I of invisible meaning. Pragmatics is the study of how more gets
I communicated than is said.
j This perspective then raises the question of what determines the
choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tied to the (~
.notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or con- \2.)
ceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of hgw close
pr distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be
~Pragmatics is the study of the expression ofrelative distance.
These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with. To
understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its
relationship with ~ther areas of linguistic analysis.

DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND 3

 syntax, semantics, ana pragmaucs pat~erns ot behav10r exJected w1thm the group. W1thm a tam1har
One traditional distinction in language analysis contrasts prag- so~1al gr~up, we norma iy find it easy to be polite and say appro-
matics with syntax and semantics. Syntax is the study of the priate thmgs. In a new, unfamiliar social setting, we are often
u~sure about what to say and worry that we might say the wrong
relationships between linguistic forms, how they are arranged in
thmg.
seguence, and which seguences are well-formed. This type of
When I first lived in Saudi Arabia, I tended to answer questions
study generally takes place without considering any world of ref-
in Arabic about my health (the equivalent of 'How are you?') with
erence or any user of the forms. Semantics is the study of the
the equivalent of my familiar routine responses of 'Okay' or
relationships between linguistic forms and entities in the world·
'Fine'. However, I ~ventually noticed that when I asked a similar
that is, how words literally connect to things. Semantic analysi~
question, people generally answered with a phrase that had the
also attempts to establish the relationships between verbai
literal meaning of 'Praise to God'. I soon learned to use the new
descriptions and states of affairs in the world as accurate (true) or
expression, wanting to be pragmatically appropriate in that con-
not, regardless of who produces that description.
text. My first type of answer wasn't 'wrong' (my vocabulary and
Pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic
pronunciation weren't inaccurate), but it did convey the meaning
..fuoru_and th~ users of those forms. In this three-part distinction,
only pragmatics allows humans into-the analysis. The advantage that I was a social outsider who answered in an unexpected way.
o stu ymg anguage via pragmatics is that one can talk about In other »:ords, wore was be.iog communicated than was being
~ Initially I did not know that: I had learned some linguistic
OR EVgrJ people's intended meanings, the~r assumptigps, their purposes or
forms in the language without learning the pragmatics of how
VIHiN llt~ goals, and Fbs kinds Bg255iens
(for example, re uests) that the
those forms are used in a re ular attern b social insiders.
t,1 iJs•:r are erformm when t e s eak. The big isa vantage is that.rul.
Anot er source of regularity in language use derives from the
these very human concepts are extremely difficult tp analyze in a_
Jf~M'. fact that most people within a linguistic community have similar
consistent and objective way. Two friends having a conversation
basic experiences of the world and share a lot of non-linguistic
may imply some things and infer some others without providing
knowled e. Let's say that, in the middle of a conversation, I men-
any clear linguistic evidence that we can point to as the explicit
tion the information in [2].
~o~rce of 'the meaning' of what was communicated. Example [1]
1s Just such a problematic case. I heard the speakers, I knew what [2] I found an old bicycle lying on the ground. The chain was
they said, but I had no idea what was communicated. rusted and the tires were flat.
[1] Her: So-did you? You are unlikely to ask why a chain and some tires were suddenly
Him: Hey-who wouldn't? being mentioned. I can normally assume that you will make
the inference that if X is a bicycle, then X has a chain and tires
Thus, pragmatics is appealing because it's about how peopk
(and many other regular parts). Because of this type of assump-
make sense of each other linguistically, but it can be a frustrating
tion, it would be pragmatically odd for me to have expressed [2]
area of study because it requires u~. to make sense ~f p_eople and
what they have in mind. as [3 ].
[3] I found an old bicycle. A bicycle has a chain. The chain was
rusted. A bicycle also has tires. The tires were flat.
Regularity
You would perhaps think that more was being communicated
Luckily, people tend to behave in fairly regular ways when it than was being said and that you were being treated as someone
comes to using language. Some of that regularity derives from the with no basic knowledge (i.e. as stupid). Once again, nothin9 in
fact that people are members of social groups and follow general
~~ (J) " ~-~~ ~"a ~ t,""'l ... ~ ~ ( ~ iM-,. ,. ~ .tU ,...,,, Jw.,-. i«p--1-'-'\ t..
4 SURVEY DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND 5
f.l&!ll(",\1TlQ)J I> -
' . " ~ - ~ .,,...!, G)(!\ i":;;i )W.."'
~t- :1.l
l)t,'Jf"'<I ~ ~.N'.,.._ J-• ..
UM ...,,.
J
fJ'-'";. ~
('.;\ .,
.....
...
!--"\ '~
·I·
'W•pd;1 '
,...,•.n.;,c, .,,
r_;:"\' L '\ 'lfr),,,r,,v>tl "" ~'l"f' {;ilf>.oJo, • ~~,J;r'<\ O,J;, ®13t: 1'""" lJ;.,-.-1,-ilU,v../-J_,,.
f µn,,,-6'>~. ,-. ~ t. ~~i. V • f . '
 the use of the linguistic forms is inaccurate, but getting the pra,g- ! the rules that allow that empty slot, or accept the pronoun 'it' in
matics wrong misht be offensive. ~ that position. However, those working on syntax would have
I
The types of regularities just described are extremely simple thotght it totally irrelevant if you tried to say that ducks don't do
I
examples of language in use which are largely ignored by most that and maybe the speaker had meant to say 'dog'. Indeed, from
linguistic analyses. To understand why it has become the province I a purely syntactic perspective, a sentence like 'The bottle of
j
of pragmatics to investigate these, and many other, aspects of ketchup ran up to Mary' is just as well-formed as [4].
ordinary language in use, we need to take a brief historical look at l Over on the semantics side of the table, however, there would
how things got to be the way they are. j have been concern. An entity labelled 'duck' has a meaning

The pragmatics wastebasket I

i
feature (animate) whereas a 'bottle of ketchup' would be (non-
animate). Since a verb like 'ran up to' requires something animate
as its subject, the word 'duck' is okay, but not a 'bottle of
For a long period in the study of language, there has been a very ketchup'.
strong interest in formal systems of analysis, often derived from i Semantics is also concerned with the truth-conditions of
mathematics and logic. The emphasis has been on discovering Ii propositions exressed in sentences. These propositions generally
some of the abstract principles that lie at the very core of lan- correspond tot e basic literal meaning of a simple clause and are
guage. By placing the investigation of the abstract, potentially ! conventionally represented by the letters p, q, and r. Let's say that
universal, features of language in the center of their work tables, !: the underlying meaning relationship being expressed in 'The duck
linguists and philosophers of language tended to push any notes ! ran up to Mary' is the proposition p, and in 'the duck licked
they had on everyday language use to the edges. As the tables got I Mary', it is the proposition q. These two propositions are joined
crowded, many of those notes on ordinary language in use began'I" by the logical connector symbol for conjunction, & (called
to be knocked off and ended up in the wastebasket. That 'ampersand'). Thus, the propositional representation of the sen-
overflowing wastebasket has become the source of much of what · tence in [4] is as in [5].
will be discussed in the following pages. It is worth r~~embering I
[5] p & q
that the contents of that wastebasket were not ongmally or- I
ganized under a single category. They were defined negatively, as ; If p is true and q is true, then p & q is true. If either p or q is not
the stuff that wasn't easily handled within the formal systems of i true (i.e. false), then the conjunction of p & q is necessarily false.
analysis. Consequently, in order to understand some of the mater-1.·.. This type of analysis is used extensively in formal semantics.
ial that we're going to pull out of the wastebasket, we really have Unfortunately, in this type of analysis, whenever p & q is true,
to look at how it got there. · it logically follows that q & p is true. Notice that q & p, in this
The tables upon which many linguists and philosophers of Ian- i particular case, would have to be expressed as in [6].
guage worked were devoted to the analysis of language structure. [ [6] The duck licked Mary and ran up to her.
Consider the sentence in [4].
In the everyday world of language use, this state of affairs is not
[4] The duck ran up to Mary and licked her. identical to the original situation described in [4]. There is a
A syntactic approach to this sentence would be concerned with sequence of two events being described and we expect that
the rules that determine the correct structure and exclude any sequence, in terms of occurrence, to be reflected in the order of
incorrect orderings such as *'Up duck Mary to the ran'. Syntactic mention.
analysis would also be required to show that there is a missing ele- If p involves some action and q involves another action, we
ment ('and_ licked her') before the verb 'licked' and to explicate have an overwhelming tendency to interpret the conjunction
~ /;>J.\.. ,'r,,w. & ' .....w. ~ 'IIMI.'. t }JJC~ : -{,,_ - ,---,.J e0:_ ~ - ~!& wL,_ µ
'"""" -

"f/'V'• ).'a J,,i,~ ~ ~-..\ ,

6 SURVEY . DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND 7
11H ..i1 ;,., ,_d,,.,,~. 4- ,w.t ;~"'#<,~ n 4 \..J.,.J.,-1.,
A. © rn ,~v. w.,.. , .J,,.i\:
.,,J,,,,,. '✓'\1 i 1k,,..,.v~
 'and', not as logical &, b_ut as the seguential expression 'and
then'. This is another example of more being communicated than
is said. We might propose that there is a regular principle of lan-
guage use which can be stated as in [7].
2
[7] Interpret order of mention as a reflection of order of occur-
Deixis and distance
rence.
What is expressed in [7] is not a rule of syntax or semantics. It
isn't a rule at all. It is a pragmatic principle which we frequently
use to make sense of what we hear and read, but which we can
ignore if it doesn't apply in some situations.
There are many other principles of this type which will be Deixis is a technical term (from Greek) for one of the most basic
explored in the following chapters. In Chapter 2, we will start
things we do with utterances. It means 'pointing' via language.
with a really simple principle: the more two speakers have in com- Any linguistic form used to accomplish this 'pointing' is called a
mon, the less language they'll need to use to identifr, familiar deictic expression. When you notice a strange object and ask,
things. This principle accounts for the frequent use of words like 'What's that?', you are using a deictic expression ('that') to indic-
'this' and 'that' to refer to things in a shared physical context (for ate something in the immediate context. Deictic expressions are
example, 'Would you like this or that?'). Exploring this basic also sometimes called indexicals. They are among the first forms
aspect of language in use is the study of deixis.
to be spoken by very young children and can be used to indicate
people via person deixis ('me', 'you'), or location via spatial deixis
('here', 'there'), or time via temporal deixis ('now', 'then'). All these
expressions depend, for their interpretation, on the speaker and
hearer sharing the same context. Indeed, deictic expressions have
their most basic uses in face-to-face spoken interaction where
utterances such as [1] are easily understood by the people present,
but may need a translation for someone not right there.
[1] I'll put this here.
(Of course, you understood that Jim was telling Anne that he was
about to put an extra house key in one of the kitchen drawers.)
Deixis is clearly a form of referring that is tied to the speaker's
context with the most basic distinction between deictic expres-
sions b:ing 'near speaker' versus 'away from speaker'. In English,
the 'near speak er', or proximal terms, are ' t h.1s ' , 'here ' , ' now ' . The
'away from spea k er,' or distal terms, are ' t h at,' ' t h ere,' 'th en.'
Proximal terms are typically interpreted in terms of the speaker's
1
location or the deictic center, so that 'now' is generally under-
stood as ~eferring to some point or period in time that has the time
of the speaker's utterance at its center. Distal terms can simply

8 SURVEY DEIXIS AND DISTANCE 9

 I
I
indicate 'away from speaker', but, in some languages, can be used to use the 'tu' version to a lower, younger, and less powerful
to distinguish between 'near addressee' and 'away from both I addressee, and be addressed by the 'vous' form in return. When
speaker and addressee'. Thus, in Japanese, the translation of the social change is taking place, as for example in modern Spain,
pronoun 'that' will distinguish between 'that near addressee' where a young businesswoman (higher economic status) is talk-
'sore' and 'that distant from both speaker and addressee' 'are' ing to her older cleaning lady (lower economic status), how do
with a third term being used for the proximal 'this near speaker' I they address each other? I am told that the age distinction remains
'kore'. l more powerful than the economic distinction and the older
I woman uses 'tu' and the younger uses 'Usted'.
Person deixis i The Spanish non-familiar version (' Usted') is historically
related to a form which was used to refer to neither first person
I
The distinction just described involves person deixis, with the (speaker) nor second person (addressee), but to third person
speaker ('I') and the addressee ('you') mentioned. The simplicity ; (some other). In deictic terms, third person is not a direct parti-
of these forms disguises the complexity of their use. To learn these ; cipant in basic (I-you) interaction and, being an outsider, is neces-
I
deictic expressions, we have to discover that each person in a con- sarily more distant. Third person pronouns are consequently
versation shifts from being 'I' to being 'you' constantly. All young I distal forms in terms of person deixis. Using a third person form,
children go through a stage in their learning where this distinction I where a second person form would be possible, is one way of
seems problematic and they say things like 'Read you a story' I communicating distance (and non-familiarity). This can be done
(instead of 'me') when handing over a favorite book. \ in English for an ironic or humorous purpose as when one person,
Person deixis clearly operates on a basic three-part division, J who's very busy in the kitchen, addresses another, who's being
exemplified by the pronouns for first person ('I'), second person very lazy, as in [2].
('you'), and third person ('he', 'she', or 'it'). In many languages [2] Would his highness like some coffee?
these deictic categories of speaker, addressee, and other(s) are l The distance associated with third person forms is also used to
eldadborated V:hithh_mharkers of relativedsdocial stat~hs (for example, I make potential accusations (for example, 'you didn't clean up')
a ressee wit 1g er status versus a ressee wit 1ower status). I
less direct, as in [3a.], or to make a potentially personal issue seem
Expressions which indicate higher status are described as hon- I like an impersonal one, based on a general rule, as in [3 b.].
orifics. The discussion of the circumstances which lead to the i,-:

choice of one of these forms rather than another is sometimes I [3] a. Somebody didn't clean up after himself.
described as social deixis. ' b. Each person has to clean up after him or herself.
A fairly well-known example of a social contrast encoded lj Of course, the speaker can state such general 'rules' as applying to
within person deixis is the distinction between forms used for a the speaker plus other(s), by using the first person plural ('we'), as
familiar versus a non-familiar addressee in some languages. this in [4].
is known as the TN distinction, from the French forms 'tu' (famil- ii
[4] We clean up after ourselves around here.
iar) and 'vous' (non-familiar), and is found in many languages i
1 There is, in English, a potential ambiguity in such uses which
including German ('du!Sie') and Spanish ('tu/Usted'). The choice 1
of one form will certainly communicate something (not directly allows two different interpretations. There is an exclusive 'we'
said) about the speaker's view of his or her relationship with the (speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee) and an inclusive_ '"!e'
addressee. In those social contexts where individuals typically (speaker and addressee included). Some languages grammanc~ze
mark distinctions between the social status of the speaker and I
1 this distinction (for example, Fijian has 'keimami' for exclusive
addressee, the higher, older, and more powerful speaker will tend * first person plural and 'keda' for inclusive first person plural).

I DEIXIS AND DISTANCE II

IO SURVEY
 u1 Lu 0 w,u, tuc a1uu15uny p1csc1u u1 L4J pruv1ues a suone opportu- 1 nis1s sometimes aescnbea as deictic projection ana we make
nity for a hearer to decide what was communicated. Either the more use of its possibilities as more technology allows us to
hearer decides that he or she is a member of the group to whom manipulate location. If 'here' means the place of the speaker's
the rule applies (i.e. an addressee) or an outsider to whom the rule utterance (and 'now' means the time of the speaker's utterance),
does not apply (i.e. not an addressee). In this case the hearer gets then an utterance such as [5] should be nonsense.
to decide the kind of 'more' that is being communicated. [ 5] I am not here now.
The inclusive-exclusive distinction may also be noted in the
However, I can say [5] into the recorder of a telephone answering
difference between saying 'Let's go' (to some friends) and 'Let us
machine, projecting that the 'now' will apply to any time some-
go' (to someone who has captured the speaker and friends). The
one tries to call me, and not to when I actually record
action of going is inclusive in the first, but exclusive in the secoJ\d.
the words. Indeed, recording [5] is a kind of dramatic per-
formance for a future audience in which I project my presence to
Spatial deixis be in the required location. A similar deictic projection is accom-
plished via dramatic performance when I use direct speech to
The concept of distance already mentioned is clearly relevant to
represent the person, location, and feelings of someone or some-
spatial deixis, where the relative location of people and things is
thing else. For example, I could be telling you about a visit to a pet
being indicated. Contemporary English makes use of only two
adverbs, 'here' and 'there', for the basic distinction, but in older store, as in [6].
texts and in some dialects, a much larger set of deictic expressions [6] I was looking at this little puppy in a cage with such a sad
can be found. Although 'yonder' (more distant from speaker) is look on its face. It was like, 'Oh, I'm so unhappy here, will
still used, words like 'hither' (to this place) and 'thence' (from that you set me free?'
place) now sound archaic. These last two adverbs include the The 'here' of the cage is not the actual physical location of the
meaning of motion toward or away from the speaker. Some verbs person uttering the words (the speaker), but is instead the loca-
of motion, such as 'come' and 'go', retain a deictic sense when tion of that person performing in the role of the puppy.
they are used to mark movement toward the speaker ('Come to It may be that the truly pragmatic basis of spatial deixis is actu-
bed!') or away from the speaker ('Go to bed!'). ally psychological distance. Physically close objects will tend to_ be
One version of the concept of motion toward speaker (i.e. treated by the speaker as psychologically close. Also, somethmg
becoming visible), seems to be the first deictic meaning learned by that is physically distant will generally be treated as psycho-
children and characterizes their use of words like 'this' and 'here' logically distant (for example, 'that man over there'). However, a
(= can be seen). They are distinct from 'that' and 'there' which are speaker may also wish to mark something that is physically close
associated with things that move out of the child's visual space (for example, a perfume being sniffed by the speaker) as psycho-
(= can no longer be seen). logically distant 'I don't like that'. In this analysis, a word like
In considering sQ_atial deixis, however, it is important to 'that' does not have a fixed (i.e. semantic) meaning; instead, it is
remember that location from the speaker's perspective can be 'invested' with meaning in a context by a speaker.
fixed mentally as well as physically. Speakers temporarily away Similar psychological processes seem to be at work in our dis-
from their home location will often continue to use 'here' to mean tinctions between proximal and distal expressions used to mark
the (physically distant) home location, as if they were still in that temporal deixis.
location. Speakers also seem to be able to project themselves into
other locations prior to actually being in those locations, as when
they say 'I'll come later' (= movement to addressee's location).

I2 SURVEY DEIXIS AND DISTANCE 13

 Temporal deixis has only two basic forms, the present as in [10a.], and the past as
We have already noted the use of the proximal form 'now' as indic- in [rnb.].
ating both the time coinciding with the speaker's utterance and [10] a. I live here now.
the time of the speaker's voice being heard (the hearer's 'now'). In b. I lived there then.
contrast to 'now', the distal expression 'then' applies to both past The present tense is the proximal form a~d the past te~se is the
[7a.] and future [7 b.] time relative to the speaker's present time. distal form. Something having taken place m the past, as m [11a.],
[7] a. November 22nd, 1963?IwasinScotlandthen. is typically treated as distant from the speaker's current situation.
b. Dinner at 8:30 on Saturday? Okay, I'll see you then. Perhaps less obviously, something that is treated as _extr~me~y
It is worth noting that we also use elaborate systems of non- unlikely (or impossible) from the speaker's current s1tuat1on 1s
deictic temporal reference such as calendar time (dates, as in also marked via the distal (past tense) form, as in [11 b.].
[7a.]) and clock time (hours, as in [7b.]). However, these forms of [11] a. I could swim (when I was a child).
temporal reference are learned a lot later than the deictic expres- b. I could be in Hawaii (if I had a lot of money).
sions like 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'today', 'tonight', 'next week', The past tense is always used in English in those if-clauses that
'last week', 'this week'. All these expressions depend for their mark events presented by the speaker as not being close to present
interpretation on knowing the relevant utterance time. If we don't reality as in [12].
know the utterance (i.e. scribbling) time of a note, as in [8], on an
office door, we won't know if we have a short or a long wait [12] a. If I had a yacht, ...
ahead. b. If I was rich, ...
[8] Back in an hour. Neither of the ideas expressed in [12] are to be treated as having
happened in past time. They are presented as d:ictically distant
Similarly, if we return the next day to a bar that displays the notice from the speaker's current situation. So distant, mdeed, that they
in [9], then we will still be (deictically) one day early for the free actually communicate the negative (we infer that the speaker has
drink.
no yacht and is not rich). .. .
[9] Free Beer Tomorrow. In order to understand many English cond1t1onal constructions
The psychological basis of temporal deixis seems to be similar (including those of the form 'Had I known sooner .. _.'), we have to
to that of spatial deixis. We can treat temporal events as objects recognize that, in temporal deixis, the remote or distal f?rm can
that move toward us (into view) or away from tis (out of view). be used to communicate not only distance from current time, but
One metaphor used in English is of events coming toward the also distance from current reality or facts.
speaker from the future (for example, 'the coming week', 'the
approaching year') and going away from the speaker to the past Deixis and grammar
(for example, 'in days gone by', 'the past week'). We also seem to
treat the near or immediate future as being close to utterance time The basic distinctions presented so far for person, spatial, and
by using the proximal deictic 'this', as in 'this (coming) weekend' temporal deixis can all be seen at work in o~e of the most com-
or 'this (coming) Thursday'. mon structural distinctions made in English grammar-that
One basic (but often unrecognized) type of temporal deixis in between direct and indirect (or reported) speech. As already
English is in the choice of verb tense. Whereas other languages described the deictic expressions for person ('you'), place
have many different forms of the verb as different tenses, English ('here'), a~d time ('this evening') can all be interpreted within the
~ c.. ""'1, lJ'P~ l ~~'1'11) \!) :t;., t ;..1,. . t wvl. ~~ " µ,,-W4,; t, ~ . G:l ;o-1-,_ j., J,\o,.u same context as the speaker who utters [1 3a.].
~"31'r., """"' ""d"F ~ - ~u:hi'. i:,.""""" (!) ,,_,j;¾ <\ J~ t.;>-\:~,J:;, i ~ , ~l~"-'(lt,1
vNlJ.:h" 14 SURVEY .41-l• .-, ~ - ~ ~-~ ~l.l',•J _ ~ "'-"lW\n; ~ - , flM>}•~, ~~- 0isc, DEIXIS AND DISTANCE 15
7 1 "I"
i\41lh l..oM.,v,. -
•I • \I .
/lK./'J.tV\}JJ,.;'.J - ,
...j
1
nrn; \
•\~h, - ,,..., ....... .f,j,_
• 1 , ,i
;\;i ·'..Y-A"-.JJt
iJ
 L.LJJ JV"U. ,PJ.CI.J..L.LJ..U.J.E, LV LI\,,, J.J.\,,,.l.\,,, L.LJ..L,3 \.,V\.,111115;

3
.L.L.l.lo.,

b. I asked her if she was planning to be there that

evenmg.
When the context shifts, as for example in (136.], to one in which Reference and inference
I report the previous utterance, then the previous utterance is
marked deictically as relative to the circumstances of asking.
Note that the proximal forms presented in [13a.] have shifted to
the corresponding distal forms in [1 3 b.]. This very regular differ-
ence in English reported discourse marks a distinction between
the 'near speaker' meaning of direct speech and the 'away from.
speaker' meaning of indirect speech. The proximal deictic forms
of a direct speech reporting communicate, often dramatically, a · Throughout the preceding discussion of deixis, there was an
sense of being in the same context as the utterance. The distal assumption that the use of words to refer to people and things
deictic forms of indirect speech reporting make the original was a relatively straightforward matter. It is indeed fairly easy for
speech event seem more remote. · people to do, but it is rather difficult to explain how they do it. We
It should not be a surprise to learn that deictic expressions were do know that words themselves don't refer to anything. People
all to be found in the pragmatics wastebasket. Their interpreta- refer. We might best think of reference as an act in which a
tion depends on the context, the speaker's intention, and they speaker, or writer, uses linguistic forms to enable a listener, or
express relative distance. Given their small size and extremely reader, to identify something.
wide range of possible uses, deictic expressions always communic- Those linguistic forms are referring expressions, which can be
ate much more than is said. proper nouns (for example, 'Shakespeare', 'Cathy Revuelto',
'Hawaii'), noun phrases which are definite (for example, 'the
author', 'the singer', 'the island'), or indefinite (for example, 'a
man', 'a woman', 'a beautiful place'), and pronouns (for example,
'he', 'her', 'it', 'them'). The choice of one type of referring expres-
sion rather than another seems to be based, to a large extent, on
what the speaker assumes the listener already knows. In shared
visual contexts, those pronouns that function as deictic expres-
sions (for example, 'Take this'; 'Look at him!') may be sufficient
for successful reference, but where identification seems more
difficult, more elaborate noun phrases may be used (for example,
'Remember the old foreign guy with the funny hat?').
Reference, then, is clearly tied to the speaker's goals (for ex-
ample, to identify something) and the speaker's beliefs (i.e. can
the listener be expected to know that particular something?) in
the use of language. For successful reference to occur, we must
also recognize the role of inference. Because there is no direct rela-
tionship between entities and words, the listener's task is to infer
correctly which entity the speaker intends to identify by using a

16 SURVEY REFERENCE AND INFERENCE 17

 particular referring expression. It is not unusual for people to A similar distinction can be found with definite noun phrases.
want to refer to some entity or person without knowing Pv,,rt-1'11 During a news report on a mysterious death, the reporter may say
which 'name' would be the best word to use. We can even use [3] without knowing for sure if there is a person who could be the
vague expressions (for example, 'the blue thing', 'that icky stuff', referent of the definite expression 'the killer'. This would be an
'ol' what's his name', 'the thingamajig'), relying on the listener's attributive use (i.e. 'whoever did the killing'), based on the
ability to infer what referent we have in mind. Speakers even speaker's assumption that a referent must exist.
invent names. There was one man who delivered packages to our [3] There was no sign of the killer.
office whose 'real' name I didn't know, but whose identity I could
infer when the secretary referred to him as in [1]. However, if a particular individual had been identified as having
done the killing and had been chased into a building, but escaped,
[1] Mister Aftershave is late today.
then uttering the sentence in [3) about that individual would be a
The example in [1] may serve to illustrate that reference is not referential use, based on the speaker's knowledge that a referent
based on an objectively correct (versus incorrect) naming, but on does exist.
some locally successful (versus unsuccessful) choice of expression. The point of this distinction is that expressions themselves can-
We might also note from example [1] that successful reference not be treated as having reference (as is often assumed in semantic
is necessarily collaborative, with both the speaker and the listener treatments), but are, or are not, 'invested' with referential func-
having a role in thinking about what the other has in mind. tion in a context by a speaker or writer. Speakers often invite us to
assume, via attributive uses, that we can identify what they're
talking about, even when the entity or individual described may
Referential and attributive uses
not exist, as in [2c.]. Some other famous members of that group
It is important to recognize that not all referring expressions have are the tooth fairy and Santa Claus.
identifiable physical referents. Indefinite noun phrases can be
used to identify a physically present entity as in [2a.], but they can
also be used to describe entities that are assumed to exist, but are
Names and referents
unknown, as in [26.], or entities that, as far as we know, don't The version of reference being presented here is one in which there
exist [2c.]. • is a basic 'intention-to-identify' and a 'recognition-of-intention'
[2] a. There's a man waiting for you. collaboration at work. This process need not only work between
b. He wants to marry a woman with lots of money. one speaker and one listener; it appears to work, in terms of con-
c. We'd love to find a nine-foot-tall basketball player. vention, between all members of a community who share a com-
mon language and culture. That is, there is a convention that
The expression in [26.], 'a W?man with lots of money', can desig- certain referring expressions will be used to identify certain entities
nate an entity that is known to the speaker only in terms of its on a regular basis. It is our daily experience of the successful op-
descriptive properties. The word 'a' could be replaced by 'any' in eration of this convention that may cause us to assume that refer-
this case. This is sometimes called an attributive use, meaning 'who- ~ing expressions can only designate very specific entities. This
ever/whatever fits the description'. It would be distinct from a refer- assumption may lead us to think that a name or proper noun like
ential use whereby I actually have a person in mind and, instead of
'Shakespeare' can only be used to identify one specific person, and
using her name or some other description, I choose the expression an expression containing a common noun, such as 'the cheese
in [26.], perhaps because I think you'd be more interested in hear- sandwich', can only be used to identify a specific thing. This belief
ing that this woman has lots of money than that she has a name. is mistaken. A truly pragmatic view of reference allows us to see

18 SURVEY REFERENCE AND INFERENCE 19

 how a person can be identified via the expression, 'the cheese sand- to be a member of the same community as the speaker. In such
wich', and a thing can be identified via the name, 'Shakespeare'. cases, it is rather obvious that more is being communicated than
For example, it would not be strange for one student to ask is said.
another the question in [4a.] and receive the reply in [4b.]. The nature of reference interpretation just described is also
[4] a. Can I borrow your Shakespeare? what allows readers to make sense of newspaper headlines using
b. Yeah, it's over there on the table. names of countries, as exemplified in [8a.] where the referent is to
be understood as a soccer team, not as a government, and in [Sb.]
Given the context just created, the intended referent and the
where it is to be understood as a government, not as a soccer
inferred referent would not be a person, but probably a book
team.
(notice the pronoun 'it').
In a restaurant, one waiter brings out an order of food for [8] a. Brazil wins World Cup.
another waiter and asks him [5a.] and hears [5b.] in reply. b. Japan wins first round of trade talks.
[5] a. Where's the cheese sandwich sitting?
b. He's over there by the window. The role of co-text
Given the context, the referent being identified is not a thing, but In many of the preceding examples, our ability to identify
a person (notice the pronoun 'he'). intended referents has actually depended on more than our
The examples in [4] and [5] may allow us to see more clearly understanding of the referring expression. It has been aided by the
how reference actually works. The Shakespeare example in [4] linguistic material, or co-text, accompanying the referring expres-
suggests that there is a conventional (and potentially culture- sion. When [8a.] appeared as a headline, 'Brazil' was a referring
specific) set of entities that can be identifed by the use of a writer's expression and 'wins World Cup' was part of the co-text (the rest
name. Let us call them 'things the writer produced'. This would of the newspaper was more co-text). The co-text clearly limits the
allow us to make sense of the sentences in [6]. range of possible interpretations we might have for a word like
[6] a. Shakespeare takes up the whole bottom shelf. 'Brazil'. It is consequently misleading to think of reference being
b. We're going to see Shakespeare in London. understood solely in terms of our ability to identify referents via
c. I hated Shakespeare at school. the referring expression. The referring expression actually pro-
vides a range of reference, that is, a number of possible referents.
Obviously, this convention does not only apply to writers, but
Returning to a previous example, we can show that, while the
also to artists [7a.], composers [7b.], musicians [7c.], and many
phrase 'the cheese sandwich' stays the same, the different co-texts
other producers of objects.
in [9a.] and [9b.] lead to a different type of interpretation in each
[7] a. Picasso's on the far wall. case (i.e. 'food' in [9a.] and 'person' in [9b.]).
b. The new Mozart is better value than the Bach.
[9] a. The cheese sandwich is made with white bread.
c. My Rolling Stones is missing.
b. The cheese sandwich left without paying.
There appears to be a pragmatic connection between proper names
Of course, co-text is just a linguistic part of the environment in
and objects that will be conventionally associated, within a socio-
which a referring expression is used. The physical environment, or
culturally defined community, with those names. Using a proper
context, is perhaps more easily recognized as having a powerful
name referentially to identify any such object invites the listener
impact on how referring expressions are to be interpreted. The phys-
to make the expected inference (for example, from name of it
ical context of a restaurant, and perhaps even the speech conven-
writer to book by writer) and thereby show himself or herself l! tions of those who work there, may be crucial to the interpretation

20 SURVEY l REFERENCE AND INFERENCE 21

I
 of [96.]. Similarly, it is useful to know that a hospital is the context anaphora. In technical terms, the second or subsequent expres-
for [1oa.], a dentist's office for [106.], and a hotel reception for sion is the anaphor and the initial expression is the antecedent.
[10c.]. It is tempting to think of anaphoric reference as a process of
[10] a. The heart-attack mustn't be moved. continuing to identify exactly the same entity as denoted by the
b. Your ten-thirty just cancelled. antecedent. In many cases, that assumption makes little difference
c. A couple of rooms have complained about the heat. to the interpretation, but in those cases where some change or
effect is described, the anaphoric reference must be interpreted
The examples in [10] provide some support for an analysis of
differently. In example [12], from a recipe, the initial referring i
reference t_h~t depends on local context and the local knowledge
expression 'six potatoes' identifies something different from the '.!
of the pa~t1c1pants. It may crucially depend on familiarity with the
anaphoric pronoun 'them' which must be interpreted as 'the six
local soc10-cultural conventions as the basis for inference (for
peeled and sliced potatoes'.
example, if a person is in a hospital with an illness, then he or she i
can be identified by nurses via the name of the illness). These con- [12] Peel and slice six potatoes. Put them in cold salted water.
ventions may differ substantially from one social group to There is also a reversal of the antecedent-anaphor pattern some-
another and may be marked differently from one language to times found at the beginning of stories, as in example [1 3].
anot~er. Reference, then, is not simply a relationship between the
[1 3] I turned the corner and almost stepped on it. There was a
meamng of a word or phrase and an object or person in the world.
large snake in the middle of the path.
It is a social act, in which the speaker assumes that the word or
phrase chosen to identify an object or person will be interpreted Note that the pronoun 'it' is used first and is difficult to interpret
as the speaker intended. until the full noun phrase is presented in the next line. This pat-
tern is technically known as cataphora, and is much less common
than anaphora.
Anaphoric reference There is a range of expressions which are used for anaphoric
The preceding discussion has been concerned with single acts of reference in English. The most typical forms are pronouns, such
reference. In most of our talk and writing, however, we have to as 'it' in [14a.], but definite noun phrases are also used, for ex-
keep track of who or what we are talking about for more than one ample, 'the slices' in [14b.].
sentence at_ a time. After the initial introduction of some entity, [14] a. Peel an onion and slice it.
speakers will use various expressions to maintain reference, as in b. Drop the slices into hot oil.
[11]. c. Cook for three minutes.
[11] In the film, a man and a woman were trying to wash a cat. When the interpretation requires us to identify an entity, as in
The man was holding the cat while the woman poured 'Cook (?) for three minutes', in [14c.], and no linguistic expres-
water on it. He said something to her and they started sion is present, it is called zero anaphora, or ellipsis. The use of zero
laughing. anaphora as a means of maintaining reference clearly creates an
!n Eng!ish, initial reference, or introductory mention, is often expectation that the listener will be able to infer who or what the
mdefimte ('a man', 'a woman', 'a cat'). In [11] the definite noun speaker intends to identify. It is also another obvious case of more
phrases ('the man', 'the cat', 'the woman') and the pronouns ('it' being communicated than is said.
'h
. e ' , 'her ' , ' t h ey ') are examp les of subsequent reference to already' The listener is also expected to make more specific types of
mtroduced referents, generally known as anaphoric reference, or inference when the anaphoric expressions don't seem to be lin-
guistically connected to their antecedents. This point was noted in
22 SURVEY
REFERENCE AND INFERENCE 23
 \...,napcer r With the "bicycle' example, and is further illustrated
in [r 5].
[ r 5] a. I just rented a house. The kitchen is really big.
b. We had Chardonnay with dinner. The wine was the
4Presupposition and entailment
best part.
c. The bus came on time, but he didn't stop.
Making sense of [rp.] requires an inference (i.e. if xis a house,
then x has a kitchen) to make the anaphoric connection. Such
inferences depend on assumed knowledge which, as in [ r 5 b.],.
may be much more specific (i.e. Chardonnay is a kind of wine). In
addition, the inference can be considered so automatic for some In the preceding discussion of reference, there wa~ an_ appeal to
speakers (for example, a bus has a driver), that they can go the idea that speakers assume certain information is already
straight to a pronoun for anaphoric reference, as in [ r 5c. ]. In this known by their listeners. Because it is treated as known, su~h
example, note that the antecedent ('the bus') and the anaphor information will generally not be stated and consequently ~ill
('he') are not in grammatical agreement (i.e. normally a bus count as part of what is communicated but not said. T~e techmc_al
would be 'it'). As pointed out already, successful reference does terms presupposition and entailment ~re used to describe two dif-
not depend on some strictly literal, or grammatically 'correct', ferent aspects of this kind of information. .. .
relationship between the properties of the referent and the refer- It is worth noting at the outset that presupposit10n and e?ta~l-
ring expression chosen. The word 'sandwich' can identify a per- ment were considered to be much more central to pragmatics m
son and the pronoun 'he' can be an anaphor for a thing. The key the past than they are now. In more recent a~proa~hes, ther~ has
to making sense of reference is that pragmatic process whereby been less interest in the type of technical discuss10? associated
speakers select linguistic expressions with the intention of identi- with the logical analysis of these phenomena. Without som_e
fying certain entities and with the assumption that listeners will introduction to that type of analytic discussion, how~ver, _it
collaborate and interpret those expressions as the speaker becomes very difficult to understand how the current relationship
intended. between semantics and pragmatics developed. Much of what_fol-
The social dimension of reference may also be tied to the effect lows in this chapter is designed to illustrate the_process of thmk-
of collaboration. The immediate recognition of an intended refer- ing through a number of prob~ems in the_ analysis of some aspects
ent, even when a minimal referring expression (for example, a of invisible meaning. Let's begm by definmg our terms.
pronoun) is used, represents something shared, something in A presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case
common, and hence social closeness. Successful reference means prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not senten~es, have pre-
that an intention was recognized, via inference, indicating a kind suppositions. An entailment is something that logically follows
of shared knowledge and hence social connection. The assump- from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences, not speakers,
tion of shared knowledge is also crucially involved in the study of have entailments. . .
presupposition. We can identify some of the potentially assumed mformation
that would be associated with the utterance of [r].
[ r] Mary's brother bought three horses.
In producing the utterance in [r], the speaker will normally be

PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT 25

24 SURVEY
 expected to have the presuppositions that a person called Mary which you disagree (via a negative, as in [4b.]) with someone who
exists and that she has a brother. The speaker may also hold the has already made the statement in [4a.].
more specific presuppositions that Mary has only one brother and
[4] a. Everybody knows that John is gay. (= p)
that he has a lot of money. All of these presuppositions are the
b. Everybody doesn't know that John is gay. (=NOTp)
s~eaker's and all of the~ can be wrong, in fact. The sentence in [1 ]
c. John is gay. (= q)
will be treated _as havmg the entailments that Mary's brother
d. p »q&NOTp >>q
bought something, bought three animals, bought two horses,
bought one horse, and many other similar logical consequences. Notice that, although both speakers disagree about the validity of
These entailments follow from the sentence, regardless of p (i.e. the statement in [4a.]), they both assume the truth of q (i.e.
whether ~he spea~er's beliefs are right or wrong, in fact. They are [4c.]) in making their statements. The proposition q, as shown in
commumcated without being said. Because of its logical nature [4d.], is presupposed by both p and NOT p, remaining constant j
however, entailment is not generally discussed as much in con~ under negation.
temporary pragmatics as the more speaker-dependent notion of 1
presupposition.
Types of presupposition I'
In the analysis of how speakers' assumptions are typically expressed,
Presupposition
presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of
In many discussions of the concept, presupposition is treated as a words, phrases, and structures. We shall consider these linguistic
relationship between two propositions. If we say that the sentence forms here as indicators of potential presuppositions, which can only
in_[2a.] contains_t?e proposition p and the sentence in [2b.] con- become actual presuppositions in contexts with speakers.
tams the proposition q, then, using the symbol>> to mean 'pre- As already illustrated in examples [1] to [3], the possessive con-
supposes', we can represent the relationship as in [2c.]. struction in English is associated with a presupposition of ex-
[2] a. Mary's dog is cute. (= p) istence. The existential presupposition is not only assumed to be
b. Mary has a dog. (= q) present in possessive constructions (for example, 'your car' >>
c. p >> q 'you have a car'), but more generally in any definite noun phrase.
By using any of the expressions in [5 ], the speaker is assumed to
Interestingly, when we produce the opposite of the sentence in be committed to the existence of the entities named.
[2a.] by negating it(= NOT p), as in [3a.], we find that the rela-
[5] the King of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door,
tionship
. . of presupposition doesn't change. That is , the same the Counting Crows
proposition q, repeated as [3b.], continues to be presupposed by
NOT p, as shown in [3c.]. We shall reconsider the basis of existential presuppositions
[3] a. Mary's dog isn't cute. later, but first we should note that there was a different type of
(=NOTp)
b. Mary has a dog. .presupposition present in [4]. In [4], the verb 'know' occurs in a
(= q)
c. NOTp >>q structure, 'Everybody knows that q', with q as the presupposi-
tion. The presupposed information following a verb like 'know'
This property of presupposition is generally described as con- can be treated as a fact, and is described as a factive presupposition.
stancy under negation. Basically, it means that the presupposition· A number of other verbs, such as 'realize' in [6a.] and 'regret' in
of a statement will remain constant (i.e. still true) even when that [6b.], as well as phrases involving 'be' with 'aware' [6c.], 'odd'
statement is negated. As a further example, consider a situation in [6d.], and 'glad' [6e.] have factive presuppositions.

26 SURVEY
PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT 27
 [6] a. She didn't realize he was ill. (» He was ill) with the presupposition that the information after the wh-form
b. We regret telling him. (>> We told him) (i.e. 'When' and 'Where') is already known to be the case.
C. I wasn't aware that she was
[8] a. When did he leave? (» He left)
married. (>> She was married) b. Where did you buy the bike? (>> You bought the bike)
d. It isn't odd that he left early. (>> He left early)
e. I'm glad that it's over. (>> It's over) The type of presupposition illustrated in [8] can lead listeners to
believe that the information presented is necessarily true, rather
There are also a number of other forms which may best be than just the presupposition of the person asking the question.
treated as the source of lexical presuppositions. Generally speak- For example, let's say that you were standing at an intersection
ing, in lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted one evening. You didn't notice whether the traffic signal had
meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition turned to red before a car went through the intersection. The car
that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood. Each time was immediately involved in a crash. You were witness to the
you say that someone 'managed' to do something, the asserted crash and later you are asked the question in [9].
meaning is that the person succeeded in some way. When you say
that someone 'didn't manage', the asserted meaning is that the [9] How fast was the car going when it ran the red light?
person did not succeed. In both cases, however, there is a presup- If you answer the question as asked (Just answer the question!)
position (non-asserted) that the person 'tried' to do that some- and estimate the speed of the car, then you would appear to be
thing. So, 'managed' is conventionally interpreted as asserting accepting the truth of the presupposition (i.e. >> the car ran the
'succeeded' and presupposing 'tried'. Other examples, involving red light). Such structurally-based presuppositions may represent
the lexical items, 'stop', 'start', and 'again', are presented, with subtle ways of making information that the speaker believes
their presuppositions, in [7]. appear to be what the listener should believe.
[7] a. He stopped smoking. (>> He used to smoke) So far, we have only considered contexts in which presupposi-
b. They started complaining. (>> They weren't tions are assumed to be true. There are, however, examples of non-
complaining before) factive presuppositions associated with a number of verbs in
c. You're late again. (>> You were late before) English. A non-factive presupposition is one that is assumed not to be
true. Verbs like 'dream', 'imagine', and 'pretend', as shown in [10],
In the case of lexical presupposition, the speaker's use of a particu- are used with the presupposition that what follows is not true.
lar expression is taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept,
whereas in the case of a factive presupposition, the use of a par- [10] a. I dreamed that I was rich. (>> I was not rich)
ticular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the in- b. We imagined we were in Hawaii. (>> We were not
formation that is stated after it. in Hawaii)
In addition to presuppositions which are associated with the c. He pretends to be ill. (>> He is not ill)
use of certain words and phrases, there are also structural presup- We have already noted, at the end of the discussion of deixis, a
positions. In this case, certain sentence structures have been ana- structure that is interpreted with a non-factive presupposition ('If
lyzed as conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of I had a yacht, .. .'). Indeed, this type of structure creates a counter-
the structure is already assumed to be true. We might say that factual presupposition, meaning that what is presupposed is not
speakers can use such structures to treat information as presup- only not true, but is the opposite of what is true, or 'contrary to
posed (i.e. assumed to be true) and hence to be accepted as true by facts'. A conditional structure of the type shown in [11 ], generally
the listener. For example, the wh-question construction in called a counterfactual conditional, presupposes that the informa-
English, as shown in [8a.] and [86.], is conventionally interpreted tion in the if-clause is not true at the time of utterance.

28 SURVEY PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT 29

 [II] If you were my friend, you would have helped me. (At this point, the speaker uttering [12a.]
(» You are not my friend) presupposes [ub.].)
The existence of non-factive presuppositions is part of an inter- d. I imagined that Kelly was ill. (= r)
esting problem for the analysis of utterances with complex struc- e. Kelly was not ill. (=NOTq)
tures, generally known as 'the projection problem', to be f. r>>NOT q
explored in the next section. (At this point, the speaker uttering [ud.]
Indicators of potential presuppositions discussed so far are presupposes [ue.], the opposite of [ub.].)
summarized in Table 4.1. g. I imagined that Kelly was ill and nobody
realized that she was ill. (=r&p)
Type Example Presupposition h. r&p>>NOT q
existential theX
(At this point, after combining r & p, the presupposi-
>> X exists
factive I regret leaving » I left
tion q can no longer be assumed to be true.)
non-factive He pretended to be happy >> He wasn't happy In an example like [u], the technical analysis may be straight-
lexical He managed to escape >> He tried to escape forward, but it may be difficult to think of a context in which
structural When did she die? » She died someone would talk like that. Perhaps example [13] will contex-
counterfactual If I weren't ill, » I am ill tualize better. In an episode of a TV soap opera, two characters
have the dialog in [13].
TAB LE 4. I Potential presuppositions [ 1 3] Shirley: It's so sad. George regrets getting Mary pregnant.
Jean: But he didn't get her pregnant. We know that
The projection problem now.

There is a basic expectation that the presupposition of a simple If we combine two of the utterances from [13], we have the
sentence will continue to be true when that simple sentence sequence, 'George regrets getting Mary pregnant; but he didn't
becomes part of a more complex sentence. This is one version of get her pregnant'. Identifying the different propositions involved,
the general idea that the meaning of the whole sentence is a com- as in [14], we can see that the presupposition q in [14b.] does not
bination of the meaning of its parts. However, the meaning of survive as a presupposition of the combined utterances in [14e.].
some presuppositions (as 'parts') doesn't survive to become the [14] a. George regrets getting Mary pregnant. (= p)
meaning of some complex sentences (as 'wholes'). This is known b. George got Mary pregnant. (= q)
as the projection problem. In example [12], we are going to see c. p >>q
what happens to the presupposition q ('Kelly was ill') which is d. He didn't get her pregnant. (= r)
assumed to be true in the simple structure of [12c.], but which e. George regrets getting Mary pregnant,
does not 'project' into the complex structure [12h.]. In order to but he didn't get her pregnant. (= p & r)
follow this type of analysis, we have to think of a situation in f. p&r>>NOTq
which a person might say: 'I imagined that Kelly was ill and One way to think about the whole sentence presented in [14e.] is
nobody realized that she was ill.' as an utterance by a person reporting what happened in the
[12] a. Nobody realized that Kelly was ill. (= p) soap opera that day. That person will not assume the presupposi-
b. Kelly was ill. (=q) tion q (i.e. that George got Mary pregnant) is true when uttering
C. p >> q [14e.].

30 SURVEY PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT 31

 In LI60.J, rne speaKer 1:s uuL 1.uuu111u<eu Lv . . ..., P'"'" ... l:'l:'~u ..,~ •• , .. -
• • u1ar presuppos1t1ons don't
--------·· -~· .u.., ,a'-L
has a car) as an assumed fact. It is worth remembering that it is
'project' is that they are destroyed by entailments. Remember that
never the word or phrase that has a presupposition. Qnly speak-
an entailment is something that necessarily follows from what is..
asserted. In example [13], Jean's utterance of 'he didn't get her ers can have presuppositions.
pregnant' actually entails 'George didn't get Mary pregnant' as a
logical consequence. Thus, when the person who watched the Ordered entailments
soap op~ra ~ells you that 'George regrets getting Mary pregnant,
Generally speaking, entailment is not a pragmatic concept (i.e.
but he ~1dn t get her pregnant', you have a presupposition q and
having to do with speaker meaning), but instead is considered a
an enta1~me~t ~O~ q. The entailment (a necessary consequence
purely logical concept, symbolized by II-. Some examples of
of what 1s said) 1s simply more powerful than the presupposition ..
entailment for the sentence in [17] are presented in [18].
(an earlier assumption).
The power of entailment can also be used to cancel existential [ I7] Rover chased three squirrels. (= P)
presuppositions. Normally we assume that when a person uses a (18] a. Somethingchasedthreesquirrels. (=q)
definite description of the type 'the X' (for example, 'the King of b. Rover did something to three squirrels. (= r)
Engl~nd'), h~ or she presupposes the existence of the entity c. Rover chased three of something. (= s)
described, as m the utterance of [r5a.]. Also, in any utterance of d. Something happened. (= t)
the form 'X doesn't exist', as in [r5b.], there is an entailment that
In representing the relationship of entailment between [17] and
there is noX. But does the speaker of (r5b.] also still have the pre-
[18a.] asp II- q, we have simply symbolized a logical· con-
supposition of the existence of the entity described?
sequence. Let us say that in uttering the sentence in [ I7 ], the
[ r 5] a. The King of England visited us. speaker is necessarily committed to the truth of a very large num-
b. The King of England doesn't exist! ber of background entailments ( only some of which are presented in
Instead of thinking that a speaker who utters [r5b.] simultan- [18 a.-d.]). On any occasion of utterance [17], however, the
eously believes that there is a King of England (= presupposition) speaker will indicate how these entailments are to be ordered.
a?d that there is not a King of England(= entailment), we recog- That is, the speaker will communicate, typically by stress, which
~1ze that the entailment is more powerful than the presupposi- entailment is assumed to be in the foreground, or more important
t10n. We abandon the existential presupposition. for interpreting intended meaning, than any others. For example,
As alread~ ~mp~asized, it ?1ay be best to think of all the types in uttering [19a.], the speaker indicates that the foreground entail-
~f pr~sup~os1t1ons illustrated m Table 4.r as 'potential presupposi- ment, and hence her main assumption, is that Rover chased a
t10ns which only become actual presuppositions when intended certain number of squirrels.
by s_peaker~ to _be recognized as such within utterances. Speakers [19] a. Rover chased THREE squirrels.
can mdeed md1cate that the potential presupposition is not being b. ROVER chased three squirrels.
presented as a strong assumption. Possessive constructions such
In (19b.], the focus shifts to Rover, and the main assumption is
as ~his car' have a potential presupposition (i.e. he has a car)
that something chased three squirrels. One function of stress in
which can be presented tentatively via expressions such as 'or
English is, in this approach, clearly tied to marking the main
something', as in [r6].
assumption of the speaker in producing an utterance. As such, it
[r 6] a. What's that guy doing in the parking lot? allows the speaker to mark for the listener what the focus of the
b. He's looking for his car or something. message is, and what is being assumed.

PRESUPPOSITION AND ENTAILMENT 33

32 SURVEY
 A very similar function is exhibited by a structure called an 'it-
cleft' construction in English, as shown in [20].
[20] a. It was ROVER that chased the squirrels.
b. It wasn't ME who took your money.
5
Cooperation and implicature
In both examples in [20], the speaker can communicate what
he or she believes the listener may already be thinking (i.e. the
foreground entailment). In [2ob.] that foreground entailment
(someone took your money) is being made the shared knowledge
in order for the denial of personal responsibility to be made. The
utterance in [20b.] can be used to attribute the foreground entail-
ment to the listener(s) without actually stating it (for example, as
In much of the preceding discussion, we have assumed that
a possible accusation). It is one more example of more being com-
municated than is said. speakers and listeners involved in conversation are generally
cooperating with each other. For example, for reference to be suc-
cessful, it was proposed that collaboration was a necessary factor.
In accepting speakers' presuppositions, listeners normally have to
assume that a speaker who says 'my car' really does have the car
that is mentioned and isn't trying to mislead the listener. This
sense of cooperation is simply one in which people having a con-
versation are not normally assumed to be trying to confuse, trick,
or withhold relevant information from each other. In most cir-
cumstances, this kind of cooperation is only the starting point for
making sense of what is said.
In the middle of their lunch hour, one woman asks another how
she likes the hamburger she is eating, and receives the answer
in [r].
[ r] A hamburger is a hamburger.
From a purely logical perspective, the reply in [r] seems to have
no communicative value since it expresses something completely
obvious. The example in [r] and other apparently pointless
expressions like 'business is business' or 'boys will be boys', are
• called tautologies. If they are used in a conversation, clearly the
speaker intends to communicate more than is said.
When the listener hears the expression in [ r ], she first has to
assume that the speaker is being cooperative and intends to com-
municate something. That something must be more than just
what the words mean. It is an additional conveyed meaning,
called an implicature. By stating [r], the speaker expects that the

34 SURVEY COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 35

 .. ~ ... .,..,. vv 111 uc: au1e ro work out, on the basis of what is already
known, the implicature intended in this context. idea that people involved in a con~ersation will c~~p~r~:d::i
each other (Of course, the woman m [2] may actua Y_ e.
Given the opportunity to evaluate the hamburger, the speaker
·n that sh~ does not want to take part in any cooperative m~era\
of [r] has responded without an evaluation, thus one implicature
i _g 'th the stranger.) In most circumstances, the assumption_o
is that she has no opinion, either good or bad, to express. t10n w1 . 1s . so pervasive that it can be stated as ab cooperative
Depending on other aspects of the context, additional implic- cooperation f · · 1s
· an d elaborated in our su -pnncip e ,
principle of conversation
atures (for example, the speaker thinks all hamburgers are the
same) might be inferred. called maxims, as shown in Table 5.r.
Implicatures are primary examples of more being communicated . . ·pie· Make your conversational contribu-
than is said, but in order for them to be interpreted, some basic The coohpera~zve prtn1· cetd a.t the stage at which it occurs, by the
tion sue as is requ r ' . h. h
cooperative principle must first be assumed to be in operation. accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange m w ic you
are engaged.
The cooperative principle The maxims
Consider the following scenario. There is a woman sitting on a
park bench and a large dog lying on the ground in front of the r. ~:~=~~ur contribution as informative as is required (for the
bench. A man comes along and sits down on the bench. current purposes of the exchange). . . h .
2. Do not make your contribution more mformat1ve t an is
[2] Man: Does your dog bite?
Woman: No. required. .
(The man reaches down to pet the dog. The dog Quality Try to make your contribution one that is true.
bites the man's hand.) r Do not say what you believe to be false. .
Man: Ouch! Hey! You said your dog doesn't bite. 2: Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Woman: He doesn't. But that's not my dog. Relation Be relevant.
One of the problems in this scenario has to do with communica- Manner Be perspicuous.
tion. Specifically, it seems to be a problem caused by the man's r. Avoid obscurity of expression.
assumption that more was communicated than was said. It isn't a 2 • Avoid ambiguity. . .
problem with presupposition because the assumption in 'your 3 _ Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
dog' (i.e. the woman has a dog) is true for both speakers. The 4 . Be orderly.
problem is the man's assumption that his question 'Does your dog
bite?' and the woman's answer 'No' both apply to the dog in front TABLE 5.r Th e cooperative principle (following
.. Grice r975)
of them. From the man's perspective, the woman's answer pro-
1 . .mportant to recognize these maxims · as·· uns t a ted assump-
vides less information than expected. In other words, she might
t 1s 1 Wi
tions we have in conversations. e assu11i1e a t people
th f . fare norm-
.
be expected to provide the information stated in the last line. Of

~~t
course, if she had mentioned this information earlier, the story in to rovide an appropriate ~mount o in or~atton
wouldn't be as funny. For the event to be funny, the woman has to a1~1J~ t;e wiman in [2]); we assume they are telling the
give less information than is expected. ;ruth, being relevant, and trying to be as cbr as they can. Be~~~::
The concept of there being an expected amount of information these rinciples are assumed in normal mte_rac~10n, spe
provided in conversation is just one aspect of the more general 1 p t. them However there are certain kmds of expres-
rare y men ion . h ' h ma be in danger of not fully
sions speakers use to mark t at t .ey_ Y w,,~.ul °'...d. ~ ....,.~ _ ~.,""'4 ??
36 SURVEY em~,cue()S t>. 11-,4,»<\ ~ ~ ~ '"-"Wt,,J. ~ /Jl.f 1 1

~- • ml\L\ili ....J.. "-"W\. • COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 37

r··r---/J
f'-"!11A<J~ r:\ r '.\ . 4~ . ~ N J -t'I.Ovl\.lO..;wJ r.
'"+'•, . ~ \ ~ (., • J'"''"' r r { ·
ThN'r<p
 adhering to the principles./hese kinds of expressions are called [5] a. I don't know if this is important, but some of the files
hedges. ·····~·· / are m1ssmg.
b. This may sound like a dumb question, but whose hand
Hedges writing is this?
c. Not to change the subject, but is this related to the
The importance of the maxim of quality for cooperative interac- budget?
tion in English may be best measured by the number of expres-
The awareness of the expectations of manner may also le~d
sions we use to indicate that what we're saying may not be totally
speakers to produce hedges of the type shown in the initial
accurate. The initial phrases in [3a.-c.] and the final phrase in
phrases in [6a.-c.], heard during an account of a crash.
[3 cl.] are notes to the listener regarding the accuracy of the main
statement. [6] a. This may be a bit confused, but .I remember being in a
car.
[3] a. As far as I know, they're married.
b. I'm not sure if this makes sense, but the car had no
b. I may be mistaken, but I thought I saw a wedding ring
lights.
on her finger.
c. I don't know if this is clear at all, but I think the other
c. I'm not sure if this is right, but I heard it was a secret
car was reversing.
ceremony in Hawaii.
cl. He couldn't live without her, I guess. All of these examples of hedges are good indications that the
speakers are not only aware of the maxims, but that they want to
The conversational context for the examples in [3] might be a
show that they are trying to observe them. Perhaps such forms
recent rumor involving a couple known to the speakers. Cautious
also communicate the speakers' concern that their listeners judge
notes, or hedges, of this type can also be used to show that the
them to be cooperative conversational partners.
~peaker is conscious of the quantity maxim, as in the initial phrases
There are, however, some circumstances where speakers may
m [4a.-c.], produced in the course of a speaker's account of her
recent vacation. not follow the expectations of the cooperative principle. In court-
rooms and classrooms, witnesses and students are often called
[4] a. As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs. upon to tell people things which are already well-known to those
b. So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and people (thereby violating the quantity maxim). Such specialized
ran. institutional talk is clearly different from conversation.
c. I won't bore you with all the details, but it was an excit- However, even in conversation, a speaker may 'opt out' of the
ing trip. maxim expectations by using expressions like 'No comment' or
Markers tied to the expectation of relevance (from the maxim of 'My lips are sealed' in response to a question. An interesting aspect
relation) can be found in the middle of speakers' talk when they of such expressions is that, although they are typically not 'as
s~y things like 'Oh, by the way' and go on to mention some poten- informative as is required' in the context, they are naturally inter-
tially unconnected information during a conversation. Speakers • preted as communicating more than is said (i.e. the speaker knows
~ls~ seem to use expressions like 'anyway', or 'well, anyway', to the answer). This typical reaction (i.e. there must be something
1~d1cate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some pos- 'special' here) of listeners to any apparent violation of the maxims
sibly non-relevant material and want to stop. Some expressions is actually the key to the notion of conversational implicature.
which may act as hedges on the expectation of relevance are
shown as the initial phrases in [5a.-c.], from an office meeting.

38 SURVEY
COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 39
 When no special knowlectge 1s reqmreo m rne 1..:umcxL Lu <-a1<-u-
- - - - - - - - ................ II IIJlll\,i:U.ure
late the additional conveyed meaning, as in [7] to [9 ], it is called a
!h~ basic assump~i?n in conversation is that, unless otherwise generalized conversational implicature. One common example in
1~d1cated, the p~rt1c1pants are adhering to the cooperative princi- English involves any phrase with an indefinite article of the type
f e_ and:he ma~nms. In example [7], Dexter may appear to be vio- 'a/an X', such as 'a garden' and 'a child' as in [ro]. These phrases
are typically interpreted according to the generalized conversa-
atmg t e reqmrements of the quantity maxim.
(7] Charlene: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese. tional implicature that: an X +> not speaker's X.
Dexter: Ah, I brought the bread. [10] I was sitting in a garden one day. A child looked over the
After
th Dhearing • Dexter's response in [7] , Cha r 1ene h as to assume fence .
. at e~er is coope~ati?g and not totally unaware of the quan- The implicatures in [ ro], that the garden and the child mentioned
tity maxim. But he d1dn t mention the cheese. If he had brought are not the speaker's, are calculated on the principle that if the
the ch~ese, he_would say so, because he would be adhering to the speaker was capable of being more specific (i.e. more informative,
quan~1ty maxim. He must intend that she infer that what is not following the quantity maxim), then he or she would have said
ment10ned was not brought. In this case, Dexter has conveyed 'my garden' and 'my child'.
more than he said via a conversational implicature. . A number of other generalized conversational implicatures are
We can represent the structure of what was said with b commonly communicated on the basis of a scale of values and are
(= bread) and c (= cheese) as in [8]. Using the symbol+> for ~n impli- consequently known as scalar implicatures.
cature, we can also represent the additional conveyed meaning.
[8] Charlene; b & c? Scalar implicatures
Dexter: b (+>NOT c)
Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word
!tis ii:n~orta?t to note that it is speakers who communicate mean- which expresses one value from a scale of values. This is particu-
mg ~1a implicatu~es and it is listeners who recognize those com- larly obvious in terms for expressing quantity, as shown in the
~umcat~d me_anmgs via inference. The inferences selected are scales in [11], where terms are listed from the highest to the low-
t ose which will preserve the assumption of cooperation.
est value.
[ 11] < all, most, many, some, few>
Generalized conversational implicatures < always, often, sometimes>
In th_e case of example [7], particularly as represented in [8] no When producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word from
spec~al :~ckground knowledge of the context of utteran~e is the scale which is the most informative and truthful (quantity and
reqmre m order ~o make the necessary inferences. The same quality) in the circumstances, as in [ 12].
process of calcul~t1~~ the implicature will take place if Doobie [12] I'm studying linguistics and I've completed some of the
asks Mary ~bout mv1tmg her friends Bella(= b) and Cathy(= c) to
required courses.
: party, as m [9a.], and gets the reply in [96.]. The context is dif-
By choosing 'some' in [ 12], the speaker creates an implicature
ere~t from [7], but the general process of identifying the implica-
ture Is the same as in [8]. (+> not all). This is one scalar implicature of uttering [12]. The
basis of scalar implicature is that, when any form in a scale is
(9 ] a. Doobie: ~id ~ou invite Bella and Cathy? (b & c?) asserted, the negative of all forms higher on the scale is implic-
b. Mary: I mv1ted Bella. (b +> NOT c) ated. The first scale in [ 11] had 'all', 'most', and 'many', higher

COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 41

40 SURVEY
 than 'some'. Given the definition of scalar implicature, it should appear on the surface to adhere to relevance. (A simply relevant
follow that, in saying 'some of the required courses', the speaker answer would be 'Yes' or 'No'.)
also creates other implicatures (for example, +> not most, +> not
many). [16] Rick: Hey, coming to the wild party tonight?
Tom: My parents are visiting.
If the speaker goes on to describe those linguistics courses as in
[13 ], then we can identify some more scalar implicatures. In order to make Tom's response relevant, Rick has to dra.w on
some assumed knowledge that one college student in this setting
[ 1 3] They' re sometimes really interesting.
expects another to have. Tom will be spending that evening with
By using 'sometimes' in [13], the speaker communicates, via his parents, and time ~pent with parents is quiet (consequently+>
implicature, the negative of forms higher on the scale of frequency Tom not at party).
(+> not always,+> not often). Because they are by far the most common, particularized con-
There are many scalar implicatures produced by the use of versational implicatures are typically just called implicatures. A
expressions that we may not immediately consider to be part of further example, in which the speaker appears not to adhere to
any scale. For example, the utterance of [14a.] will be interpreted (i.e. to 'flout') the maxim of manner, is presented in [17 ].
as implicating '+> not certain' as a higher value on the scale of
[17] Ann: Where are you going with the dog?
'likelihood' and [146.] '+> not must' on a scale of 'obligation' and
Sam: To the V-E-T.
'+> not frozen' on a scale of 'coldness'.
In the local context of these speakers, the dog is known to re-
[14] a. It's possible that they were delayed.
cognize the word 'vet', and to hate being taken there, so Sam pro-
b. This should be stored in a cool place.
duces a more elaborate, spelled out (i.e. less brief) version of his
One noticeable feature of scalar implicatures is that when message, implicating that he doesn't want the dog to know the
speakers correct themselves on some detail, as in [1 5], they typ- answer to the question just asked.
ically cancel one of the scalar implicatures. In [18], Leila has just walked into Mary's office and noticed all
[1 5] I got some of this jewelry in Hong Kong-um actually the work on her desk. Mary's response seems to flout the maxim
I think I got most of it there. of relevance.
In [1 5], the speaker initially implicates '+> not most' by saying [18] Leila: Whoa! Has your boss gone crazy?
'some', but then corrects herself by actually asserting 'most'. That Mary: Let's go get some coffee.
final assertion is still likely to be interpreted, however, with a In order to preserve the assumption of cooperation, Leila will
scalar implicature (+>not all). have to infer some local reason (for example, the boss may be
nearby) why Mary makes an apparently non-relevant remark.
Particularized conversational implicatures The implicature here is essentially that Mary cannot answer the
question in that context.
In the preceding examples, the implicatures have been calculated In addition to these fairly prosaic examples of implicatures,
without special knowledge of any particular context. However, there are other more entertaining examples, as in [19] and [20],
most of the time, our conversations take place in very specific con- where the responses initially appear to flout relevance.
texts in which locally recognized inferences are assumed. Such
[19] Bert: Do you like ice-cream?
inferences are required to work out the conveyed meanings which
Ernie: Is the Pope Catholic?
result from particularized conversational implicatures. As an illustra-
tion, consider example [16], where Tom's response does not .il2JLt.-"" r,.,J, (-f4,J,). 1 fW-1 )01. ~ (-.,,.J.,\ r ~ ' / ~) M ;-J. ~t'J(~.:.~ · il ).©
( r,•.,,\~ f,~, Ve ) ;,,,j,,, . t., a°" i '). ---1< • fJ..,,.,,J.;.;m
.k-1,. ©I~ t.; ~ , 1,., i~ :ik fM,.
42 SURVEY COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 43
 crn1e: uo chickens have lips?
t~:Ced. None of these properties apply to conventional implicat-
ures.
In [19], Ernie's response does not provide a 'yes' or 'no' answer.
Bert must assume that Ernie is being cooperative, so he considers
Ernie's '_Pope' question and clearly the answer is 'Yes'. So, the Conventional implicatures
answer 1s known, but the nature of Ernie's response also impli- In contrast to all the conversational implicatures discussed so far,
cate_s _that the answer to the question was 'Obviously, yes!'. An conventional implicatures are not based on the cooperative prin-
add1t10nal conveyed meaning in such a case is that, because the ciple or the maxims. They don't have to occur in conversation,
answer was so obvious, the question did not need to be asked. and they don't depend on special contexts for their interpretation.
Example [20] provides the same type of inferencing with an Not unlike lexical presuppositions, conventional implicatures are
answer 'Of course not!' as part of the implicature. • associated with specific words and result in additional conveyed
meanings when those words are used. The English conjunction
Properties of conversational implicatures 'but' is one of these words. The interpretation of any utterance
of the type p but q will be based on the conjunction P & q plus
S~ fa_r, all the implicatures we have considered have been situated an implicature of 'contrast' between the information in P and
w1thm conversation, with the inferences being made by people the information in q. In [23], the fact that 'Mary suggested black'
who hear th~ u~erance~ and attempt to maintain the assumption (= p) is contrasted, via the conventional implicature of' but', with
of coope:at1ve mter~ct1on. Because these implicatures are part
my choosing white(= q).
of what 1s comm~mcated and not said, speakers can always
deny tha~ the~ m~ended to communicate such meanings. [23] a. Mary suggested black, but I chose white.
Co~versat1onal 1m~hcatur~s are deniable. They can be explicitly b. p & q (+>pis in contrast to q)
d_emed (or alternatively, remforced) in different ways. To take a Other English words such as 'even' and 'yet' also have conven-
s1m~le example, there is a standard implicature associated with tional implicatures. When 'even' is included in any sentence
statmg a number, that the speaker means only that number: as describing an event, there is an implicature of 'contrary to ex-
shown in [21]. ' pectation'. Thus, in [24) there are two events reported (i.e. John's
coming and John's helping) with the conventional implicature of
[21] You have won five dollars! (+> ONLY five)
'even' adding a 'contrary to expectation' interpretation of those
As shown. in [ ~2 J, however, it is quite easy for a speaker to sus-
pend the 1mphcature (+> only) using the expression 'at least' events.
[~2a.J, or to cancel the implicature by adding further informa- [24] a. Even John came to the party.
t10~, oft~n following the expression 'in fact' [22b. J, or to reinforce b. He even helped tidy up afterwards.
the 1mphcature with additional information, as in [22c. J. The conventional implicature of 'yet' is that the present situa-
[22] a. You'vewonatleastfivedoHars! tion is expected to be different, or perhaps the opposite, at a later
b. You've won five dollars, in fact, you've won ten! time. In uttering the statement in [25a.J, the speaker produces an
c. You've won five dollars, that's four more than one! implicature that she expects the statement 'Dennis is here'(= P) to
be true later, as indicated in [25b.J.
W~ ha:e already noted with many of the previous examples
that 1mphcatures can be calculated by the listeners via inference. [25] a. Dennis isn't here yet. (= NOT p)
b. NOT pis true (+> p expected to be true later)
In terms of their defining properties, then, conversational

COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE 45

44 SURVEY
, It ~ay be ~ossib!e to trea_t the so-called different 'meanings' of
and m English (discussed m Chapter 1) as instances of conven-
tional implicature in different structures. When two statements
~ont~ining s~ati_c information are joined by 'and', as in [26a.], the
6
1mphcature 1s simply 'in addition' or 'plus'. When the two state- Speech acts and events
me~ts c~ntain dynamic, action-related information, as in [26b.],
the 1mphcature of 'and' is 'and then' indicating sequence.
[26] a. Yesterday, Mary was happy
and ready to work. (p & q, +> p plus q)
b. She put on her clothes and left
the house. (p & q, +> q after p)
In attempting to express themselves, people do not only produce
Because of the different implicatures, the two parts of [26a.] can
utterances containing grammatical structures and words, they
be reversed with little difference in meaning, but there is a big
perform actions via those utterances. If you work in a situation
change in meaning if the two parts of [26b.] are reversed.
where a boss has a great deal of power, then the boss's utterance
For many lingu_ists, the notion_oL'iP1J?licature' is one,of the.--
of the expression in [1] is more than just a statement.
ce?tral concepts m pragmatics. An implicature is certainly a
pnme example of more being communicated than is said. For [1] You're fired.
those sa~e linguists, another central concept in pragmatics is the The utterance in [1] can be used to perform the act of ending your
~bservat1on that utterances perform actions, generally known as employment. However, the actions performed by utterances do
speech acts'. not have to be as dramatic or as unpleasant as in [1]. The action
can be quite pleasant, as in the compliment performed by [2a.],
the acknowledgement of thanks in [2b.], or the expression of sur-
prise in [2c.].
[2] a. You're so delicious.
b. You're welcome.
c. You're crazy!
Actions performed via utterances are generally called speech
acts and, in English, are commonly given more specific labels,
such as apology, complaint, compliment, invitation, promise, or
request.
These descriptive terms for different kinds of speech acts apply
• to the speaker's communicative intention in producing an utter-
ance. The speaker normally expects that his or her communica-
tive intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and
hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances
surrounding the utterance. These circumstances, including other
utterances, are called the speech event. In many ways, it is the

SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 47

 nature of the speech event that determines the interpretation of an will utter [4) on the assumption that the hearer will recognize the
utterance as performing a particular speech act. On a wintry day, effect you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful
the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been smell, or to get the hearer to drink some coffee). This is also gener-
freshly made, takes a sip, and produces the utterance in [3]. It is ally known as the perlocutionary effect.
likely to be interpreted as a complaint. Of these three dimensions, the most discussed is illocutionary
force. Indeed, the term 'speech act' is generally interpreted quite
[3] This tea is really cold! narrowly to mean only the illocutionary force of an utterance.
Changing the circumstances to a really hot summer's day with the The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it 'counts as~. ~he
speaker being given a glass of iced tea by the hearer, taking a sip same locutionary act, as shown in [p.], can count as a pred1ct1on
and producing the utterance in [3], it is likely to be interpreted as [5b.], a promise [5c.], or a warning [5d.]. These different analyses
praise. If the same utterance can be interpreted as two different [5b.-d.] of the utterance in [5a.] represent different illocutionary
kinds of speech act, then obviously no simple one utterance to one forces.
action correspondence will be possible. It also means that there is
[5] a. I'll see you later.(= A)
more to the interpretation of a speech act than can be found in the
b. [I predict that] A.
utterance alone.
c. [I promise you that) A.
d. [I warn you that] A.
Speech acts One problem with the examples in [5] is that the same utterance
On any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance can potentially have quite different illocutionary forces (for ex-
will consist of three related acts. There is first a locutionary act, ample, promise versus warning). J;lQw can speakers
assume that
which is the basic act of utterance, or producing a meaningful lin- th eintepciedilloFMSiPPiEY for~e :wm be
;scogpize9 by
the he~rer?
guistic expression. If you have difficulty with actually forming the That question has been addressed by cons1dermg two thmgs:
sounds and words to create a meaningful utterance in a language Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and felicity conditions.
(for example, because it's foreign or you're tongue-tied), then you
might fail to produce a locutionary act. Producing 'Aha mokofa' IFIDs
in English will not normally count as a locutionary act, whereas
The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force
[4] will.
(the lllocutionary Force Indicating Device, or IFID) is an expression of
[4] I've just made some coffee. the type shown in [6) where there is a slot for a verb that explicitly
Mostly we don't just produce well-formed utterances with no names the illocutionary act being performed. Such a verb can be
:'1~
p~rpose. form an utterance with some kind of function iu called a performativeverb (Vp).
mmd. This 1s the second dimension, or the illocutlonary act. The
[6] I (Vp) you that ...
illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of
an utterance. We might utter [4] to make a statement, an offer, an In the preceding examples, [5c~,d.], 'promise' and 'warn' would
explanation, or for some other communicative purpose. This is be the performative verbs and, if stated, would be very clear
also generally known as the illocutionaryforce of the utterance. IFIDs. Speakers do not always 'perform' their speech acts so
We do not, of course, simply create an utterance with a func- explicitly, but they sometimes describe the speech act being per-
tion without intending it to have an effect. This is the third dimen- formed. Imagine the telephone conversation in [7], between a
sion, the perlocutionary act. Depending on the circumstances you man trying to contact Mary, and Mary's friend.
J!!J!T'-'f I'\ \ll~H«.y i,. '-tj, ( ~ 1 1/\M,~),0~ \ ~ , ,i,_: Wi_. 6\ , k ~ \ ~-Qi
~ • # , J.1 "' ~ , ©A'11,., - s~ (M,l~ SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 49
, 48 SURVEY
 [7] Him: Can I talk to Mary? there are two preparatory conditions: first, the event will not hap-
Her: No, she's not here. pen by itself, and second, the event will have a beneficial effect.
Him: I'm asking you-can I talk to her? When I utter a warning, there are the foJlowing preparatory condi-
Her: And I'm telling you-SHE'S NOT HERE! tions: it isn't clear that the hearer knows the event will occur, the
speaker does think the event will occur, and the event will not have
In this scenario, each speaker has described, and drawn attention
a beneficial effect. Related to these conditions is the sincerity condi-
to, the illocutionary force ('ask' and 'tell') of their utterances.
tion that, for a promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out
Most of the time, however, there is no performative verb men-
the future action, and, for a warning, the speaker genuinely
tioned. Other IFIDs which can be identified are word order,
believes that the future event will not have a beneficial effect.
stress, and intonation, as shown in the different versions of the
Finally, there is the essential condition, which covers the fact
same basic elements (Y-G) in [8].
that by the act of uttering a promise, I thereby intend to create an
[8] a. You're going! [I tell you Y-G] obligation to carry out the action as promised. In other words, the
b. You're going? [I request confirmation about Y-G] utterance changes my state from non-obligation to obligation.
c. Are you going? [I ask you if Y-G] Similarly, with a warning, under the essential condition, the utter-
While other devices, such as a lowered voice quality for a warn- ance changes my state from non-informing of a bad future event
ing or a threat, might be used to indicate illocutionary force, the to informing. This essential condition thus combines with a
utterance also has to be produced under certain conventional s,12ecification of what must be in the utterance content, the con-
conditions to count as having the intended illocutionary force. text, and the speaker's intentions, in order for a S,l?ecific s12eec;b act
to be appropriately (felicitously) performed.

Felicity conditions
The performative hypothesis
There are certain expected or appropriate circumstances, tech-
nically known as felicity conditions, for the performance of a One way to think about the speech acts being performed via utter-
speech act to be recognized as intended. For some clear cases, ances is to assume that underlying every utterance (U) there is a
such as [9 ], the performance will be infelicitous (inappropriate) if clause, similar to [6] presented earlier, containing a performative
the speaker is not a specific person in a special context (in this verb (Vp) which makes the illocutionary force explicit. This is
case, a judge in a courtroom). known as the performative hypothesis and the basic format of the
underlying clause is shown in [ro].
[9] I sentence you to six months in prison.
[ro] I (hereby) Vp you (that) U
In everyday contexts among ordinary people, there are also pre-
conditions on speech acts. There are general conditions on the par- In this clause, the subject must be first person singular ('I'),
ticipants, for example, that they can understand the language followed by the adverb 'hereby', indicating that the utterance
being used and that they are not play-acting or being nonsensical. • 'counts as' an action by being uttered. There is also a perform-
Then there are content conditions. For example, for both a promise ative verb (Vp) in the present tense and an indirect object in sec-
and a warning, the content of the utterance must be about a ond person singular ('you'). This underlying clause will always
future event. A further content condition for a promise requires make explicit, as in [ub.] and [12b.], what, in utterances such as
that the future event will be a future act of the speaker. [ua.] and [12a.], is implicit.
The preparatory conditions for a promise are significantly differ- [n] a. Clean up this mess!
ent from those for a warning. When I promise to do something, b. I hereby order you that you clean up this mess.

50 SURVEY
SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 5I
 [ r 2] a. The work was done by Elaine and myself.
fying explicit performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not
b. I hereby tell you that the work was done by Elaine and
myself. know how many performative verbs there are in any language.
Instead of trying to list all the possible explicit performatives, and
Examples like [rrb.] and [ub.] (normally without 'hereby'), are then distinguish among all of them, some more general
used by speakers as explicit performatives. Examples like [rra.] classifications of types of speech acts are usually used.
and [ua.] are implicit performatives, sometimes called primary
performatives.
The advantage o~ this typ~ of analysis is that it makes clear just Speech act classification
what elements are mvolved m the production and interpretation One general classification system lists five types of general func-
of ut~erances. In syntax, a reflexive pronoun (like 'myself' in [u]) tions performed by speech acts: declarations, representatives,
reqmres the occurrence of an antecedent (in this case 'I') within expressives, directives, and commissives.
the s~me sentence structure. The explicit performative in [ub.] Declarations are those kinds of speech acts that change the
~rovides the 'I' element. Similarly, when you say to someone, 'Do world via their utterance. As the examples in [ r 5] illustrate, the
1t yourself!', the reflexive in 'yourself' is made possible by the speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific con-
antecedent 'you' in the explicit version ('I order you that you do it text, in order to perform a declaration appropriately.
yourself'). Another advantage is to show that some adverbs such
[ r 5] a. Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.
as 'honest!!', or adverbial clauses such as 'because I may be late',
b. Referee: You're out!
as shown m [r3], naturally attach to the explicit performative
clause rather than the implicit version. c. Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.

[ r 3] a. Honestly, he's a scoundrel. a declaration ·

b. What time is it, because I may be late?
the speaker believes to be the case or not. Statements of fact,
t?e
In [ r 3/· ], it is tell~ng part (t~~ performative verb) that is being assertions, conclusions, and descriptions, as illustrated in [r 6],
d~ne ho~estly a~d, I~ [r~b.], It IS the act of asking (the perform- are all examples of the speaker representing the world as he or she
ative agam) that 1s bemg Justified by the 'because I may be late' believes it is.
clause.
[ r 6] a. The earth is flat.
There ~re some technical disadvantages to the performative
b. Chomsky didn't write about peanuts.
~ypothes1s. For example, uttering the explicit performative ver-
c. It was a warm sunny day.
sion ?f a command [ r r b.] has a much more serious impact than
uttermg the implicit version [rra.]. The two versions are con- In using a reJ;?resentativei the_sJ;?eaker makes words fit the world
sequently not ~quivalent. It is also difficult to know exactly what (of belief).
the performat1ve verb (or verbs) might be for some utterances. Expressives are those kinds of SJ;?eech acts that state what the
Although the speaker and hearer might recognize the utterance in speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be state-
[qa_.J_as an_insult, it would be very strange to nave [146.] as an ments of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow. As illus-
explicit version. trated in [r7], they can be caused by something the speaker does
[r4] a. You'redumberthanarock. or the hearer does, but they are about the speaker's experience.
b. ? I hereby insult you that you're dumber than a rock. [r7] a. I'm really sorry!
b. Congratulations!
~ The really practical problem with any analysis based on identi-
~ ll> 1c r 111'~ ©,~ i"' i · Qi II# q,a,Ji '\ ~ . . c. Oh, yes, great, mmmm, ssahh!
52 SURVEY ltfEllilP,rJt ... ~ - , ~ o/• . "'
1"
~M.. . I. .... I . . ,..ji_
,,.J.,.,,.,_ ~ t•~v' ,,,.,.~"''""''• .,..,.~•~· .
I
.J.U
J..t,., '"'
\ILNl'1lff ~I\,(
•

SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 53

~ C.. l-,,\¼> 1k,,,_ • /~•1•~•,·• v.,\, }'•i.cJ/ < tM-< ~ M,}J,.\ f'W'-";,,. I <""1} ,\ i.,.s·,. JbJ,... ~!tif'l\lN
~illt'-J"""' \JwM.~-~- ~~.,;,"a, {r,,,)\, ~-[AA"-"¼- ~LA\f;i
 Di_rection of fit S =speaker;
Speech act type X =situation

words change the world Scauses X

Declarations S believes X
Representatives make words fit the world
make words fit the world S feels X
Expressives SwantsX
Directives make the world fit words
make the world fit words S intends X
Commissives

TAB LE 6. 1 The fi,ve general functions of speech acts (following

Searle 1979)
function, we have a direct speech act. Whenever there is an in-
direct relationship between'. a structure and a function, we have an
indirect speech act. Thus, a declarative used to make a statement is
a direct speech act, but a declarative used to make a request is an
indirect speech act. As illustrated in [21], the utterance in [21a.] is
a declarative. When it is used to make a statement, as paraphrased
in [21 b. ], it is functioning as a direct speech act. When it is used to
make a command/request, as paraphrased in [21c.], it is function-
ing as an indirect speech act.
[21] a. It's cold outside.
b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.
Different structures can be used to accomplish the same basic
function, as in [22], where the speaker wants the addressee not to
stand in front of the TV. The basic function of all the utterances in
Direct and indirect speech acts
[22] is a command/request, but only the imperative structure in
A different a pp~oach to distinguishing types of speech acts can be [22a.] represents a direct speech act. The interrogative structure
::eon t~e basis of structure. A fairly simple structural distinction in [22b.] is not being used only as a question, hence it is an in-
e een t ree ~eneral types of speech acts is provided, in En lish direct speech act. The declarative structures in [22c.] and [22d.]
by the three basic sentence types. As shown in [2 ] th . g ·1 '
reco · d 1 • h" o, ere1saneas1 y are also indirect requests.
(d 1 gmze· re· at10ns tp between the three str uc t ura l forms
[22] a. Move out of the way!
ec ara~1ve~ mterr~gative, imperative) and the three eneral
b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?
commumcat1ve functions (statement, question, command/r!quest).
c. You're standing in front of the TV.
f20] a. You wear a seat belt. (declarative) d. You'd make a better door than a window.
b. Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative) One of the most common types of indirect speech act in
c. Wear a seat belt! (imperative) English, as shown in [23], has the form of an interrogative, but is
Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a
SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 55
54 SURVEY
 uur ryp1cauy usea to ask a question (i.e. we don't e
answer, we expect action). The exam I . xpect only an [24c.]. Asking about precondltlons tecnml:auy uv~"u. ~~~--- __
P es m [2 3] are normally
understood as requests. making a regµ~..h ..Ql!!.,QQes allow the hearer to react 'as if' the
request had been mad~...Because a request is an imposition by the
r,
[2 3] a. Could you pass the salt?
speaker on the hearer,* is bett"' in most social circumstances, for
p
b. Would you open this?
the speaker to avoid a irect imposition via a direct request. When 0
Indeed, there is a typical pattern in En 1· h h . the speaker asks about preconditions, no direct reguest is made. J
que~~)ion af bout t?e ~earer's assumed abiITt; (';a:ry~;/s,~nglda The preceding discussion is essentially about one person trying
you. or uture hkehho d · h
you?', 'Would you:i') o ~:r d . · ' ou
regar to domg something ('Will
that something. . norma y counts as a request to actually do
to get another person to do something without risking refusal or
causing offense. However, this type of situation does not consist
'
T
I
It
of a single utterance. is a§8Siel sjtuatjpp jnyo)ying participants b
Indirect speech acts are generall . . ~ho necessarily h~ve a.§..Qs:;ial relationship of some kind, and who, N
_politeness in English than dir t \associated WI!_h greater on a specific occasion, may have particular goals.
stand why, we have to look a;~ sfeec ~cts. In ord~r to under-
We can look at the set of utterances produced in this kind of situ-
utterance performing a s1·ngl b hgger picture than 1ust a single
e speec act. ation as a speech event. A speech event is an activity in which par-
tici12ants inte,mg_via language in some conventional way to arrive
Speech events at some outcome. It may include an obvious central speech act,
such as 'I don't really like this', as in a speech event of 'complain-
We can treat an indirect req t (f l ing', but it will also include other utterances leading up to and sub-
[23)) as being a matter of aski~; wh:;hexa:p e, the utterances in sequently reacting to that central action. In most cases, a 'request'
for a request are in plac F er t e necessary conditions
is not made by means of a single speech act suddenly uttered.
that the speaker assume:·th ohr exampleb, al preparatory condition is
. A content c d. . e earer 1s a e to, or CAN , perrorm Requesting is typically a speech event, as illustrated in [25 ].
action. r.
t he
WILL perform the :;ti~t1o~~?ncerns fu_tu_re action, that the hearer [25] Him: Oh, Mary, I'm glad you're here.
n. Is pattern 1s illustrated in [24 ] Her: What's up?
[24] Indirect requests · Him: I can't get my computer to work.
a. Content Future act of Her: Is it broken?
condition 'WILL you do X?' Him: I don't think so.
hearer
(= hearer WILL
Her: What's it doing?
doX) Him: I don't know. I'm useless with computers.
Her: What kind is it?
b. Preparatory Hearer is able to 'CAN you do X?' Him: It's a Mac. Do you use them?
condition perform act Her: Yeah.
(= hearer CAN Him: Do you have a minute?
doX) Her: Sure.
c. Questioning a ~earer-based condition for making Him: Oh, great.
. request results man indirect request. a The extended interaction in [25] may be called a 'requesting'
There is a definite difference between a k'
asking someone if the preconditions fo; ~:!
sgo;aeon~ toldo X a~d
re m p ace, as m
speech event without a central speech act of request. Notice that
there is no actual request from 'him' to 'her' to do anything.
We might characterize the question 'Do you have a minute?' as a
~6 SURVEY
SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 57
 'pre-request', allowing the receiver to ,
she has to be somewhere else I . say that she s busy or that
is taken to be an acknowl d . n this context, the response 'Sure'
able, but a willingness to ep:C~ment ~ot only of having time avail-
I sis of s eech events is clearl orm ht e unstated action. The ana-
7
gets communicated than is s -d
anot erwa of st d · h
u m ow more Politeness and interaction
Th a1 .
e usefulness of speech . . . .
1 is ~n illustrating the kinds
of things we can do w1"th acdt anady~d1s
. wor s an 1 entify· f h
vent10nal utterance for mg some o t e con-
ms we use to perfo •fi .
However, we do need to I k rm spec1 c actions.
understand how those t?o at more extended interaction to
. ac ions are carr· d d .
within speech events. ie out an mterpreted
In much of the preceding discussion, the small-scale scenarios
presented to illustrate language in use have been populated by
people with virtually no social lives. Yet, much of what we say,
and a great deal of what we communicate, is determined by our
social relationships. A linguistic interaction is necessarilt a social
interaction.
=In order to make sense of what is said in an interaction, we have
to look at various factsars which relate to social distanc1 and
closeness. Some of these factors are established prior to an igter-
action and hence are largely external factors. Ihey typicall~
involve the relative status of the participants, based on social values
tied to such things as age and power. For example, speakers who
see themselves as lower status in English-speaking contexts tend
to mark social distance between themselves and higher status
speakers by using address forms that include a title and
a last name, but not the first name (for example, Mrs Clinton,
Mr Adams, Dr Dang). We take part in a wide range of interac-
1,ions (mostly with strangers} where the social distance deter-

l
l
mined by external factors is dominant.
However, there are other factors, such as amount of imposition
or de ree of friendliness which are often ne otiated durin an
interaction. t r i t r ction an can resu t in

f ffie initial social distance changing and being marked as less, or

more, during its course. This may result, for example, in partici-
pants moving from a title-plus-last name to a first-name basis

58 SURVEY
I
t
within the talk. These internal factors are typically more relevant
to participants whose social relationships are actually in the
process of being worked out within the interaction.

POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 59

 kinds of politeness associated (and marked linguistically) with the
Both types of factors, external and internal, have an influence
assumption of relative social distance or closeness. In m_ost
not only on wha: we say, b~t also on how we are interpreted. In
English-speaking contexts, the participants ~n an i~ter_act10n
?1any cases, the mterpretat1on goes beyond what we might have
often have to determine, as they speak, the relative social distance
mtended to convey and includes evaluations such as 'rude' and
'inc?nsiderate', or 'considerate' and 'thoughtful'. Recognizing between them, and hence their 'face wants'.
the impact of such evaluations makes it very clear that more is
being communicated than is said. The investigation of that Face wants
impact is normally carried out in terms of politeness.
In this discussion let's assume that the participants involved in
interactions are n~t living in a context which has created rigidly
Politeness fixed social relationships. Within their everyday social inter~c-
tions, people generally behave as if their expe~tations concernmg
~tis possib~e to treat_po,litenes~ as a fixed_co?cept, as in the idea of
their public self-image, or their face wants, will be respected: If _a
pohte social behav10r, or etiquette, w1thm a culture. It is also
speaker says something that_represents a threat to another md1-
po_ssible to specify a number of different general principles for
vidual's expectations regarding self-image, it is described as a face
bemg polite in social interaction within a particular culture. Some
threatening act. Alternatively, given the possibility that some
of thes~ might include being tactful, generous, modest, and sym-
action mightB~)!1.!~rt:!rete4 as a threat to a_nother's face, _t~e
patheti~ toward others. Let us assume that participants in an
seeaker C~Afi~a.x~2w.e~hing,tQ.~ssen the possible threat. lJrn )S
m~er~ct1on are_ generally aware that such norms and principles
~x1st m the society at large. Within an interaction, however, there called a face saving act,_ . . .
lmagme a late night scene, where a young ~e1ghbor 1s playmg
1s a more narrowly specified type of politeness at work. In order
his music very loud and an older couple are trymg to sleep. One of
to describe it, we need the concept of face.
them, in [2], proposes a face threatening act and the other sug-
As a technical term, face means the public self-image of a per-
son. It refers to that emotional and social sense of self that every- gests a face saving act.
?ne has. and expects everyone else to recognize. Politeness. in an [ ] Him: I'm going to tell him to stop that awful noise right
2
mteract1on, can then be defined as the means employed to show now!
awareness of another person's face. In this sense, politeness can be Her: Perhaps you could just ask him if he is going to stop
accomplished in situations of social distance or closeness. soon because it's getting a bit late and people need to
Showing awareness for another person's face when that other get to sleep.
seems socially d~stapt js.oft_en described in .t~rms of respect or. Because · ted that each erson will attem t to
deference. Showmg the eqmvalent awareness when the other is respect the rs there are many different ways of
socially close is often described in terms of friendliness, cama- _performing face saving acts.
raderie, or solidarity. The first type might be found in a student's
q~esti?n to h~s teacher, shown as [ra.], and a s~cond type in the
fnend s question to the same individual, as in [rb.]. Negative and positive face
[ r] a. E~cuse me, Mr Buckingham, but can I talk to you for a When we attempt to save another's face, we can pay attention to
mmute? their negative face wants or their positive face wants. A person's
b. Hey, Bucky, got a minute? negative face is the need to be independent, to have fr~edo~ o~
action, and not to be imposed on by others. The word negative
It follows from this type of approach that there will be different
POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 6r
. 60 SURVEY
/
 here doesn't mean 'bad', it's just the opposite pole from 'positive'.
Say something: off and on record
A person's positive face is the need to be accepted, even liked, by Even if you decide t~ say something, you don't actual~ ~ave t~
others, to be treated as a member of the same group, and to know ask for anything. You can (perhaps after your ~earc t roug
that his or her wants are shared by others. In simple terms, neg: your bag) simply produce a statement of the type m [4a.] or [4b.].
ative face is the need to be indeeend,ent. _;ind positive face is the
[4] a. Uh, I forgot my pen.
need to be connected. b Hmm I wonder where I put my pen.
O, a ace savmg act W lC lS Ortente to t e person'sn.egative
~nd ot~er similar types of statement, are not directly
face will tend to show deference, emphasize the importance of the
other's time or concerns, and even include an apology for the ~!l:::sed to the other. The other can act as if the_statement~ have
They are technically described as bemg off
imposition or interruption. This is also called negative politeness. not even been heard · f d 'h. t '
record. In casual descriptions, they might be re erre to as dm( s .
A face saving act which is concerned with the person's positive
in an off record statement may or may not succee as a
face will tend to show solidarity, emphasize that both speakers
want the same thing, and that they have a common goat This is
~::~:~~ g~tting a pen), but if it ~oes, it will be because more has
also called positive politeness. been communicated than was said. d" 1
ff record statements, you can irect y
In contrast to sue h O . d Th
address the other as a means of express_mg your ~ee s. e~e
Self and other: say nothing .rect address forms are technically described as bemghon rechor .
dl · · t" forms sue as t ose
One way to see the relevance of the relationship between these The most direct approach, usmg impera ive . d" tl
. [ ] 1· s known as bald on record. The other person is irec y
politeness concepts and language use is to take a single speech m 5,
event and map out the different interpretations associated with asked for something.
different possible expressions used within that event. For exam- [5] a. Givemeapen.
ple, you arrive at an important lecture, pull out your notebook to b. Lend me your pen. .
take notes, but discover that you don't have anything to write These bald on record forms may be followed by ehxp~ession~ hk~
with. You think that the person sitting next to you may provide 'please' and 'would you?' which serve to soften t e eman an
the solution. In this scenario, you are going to be 'Self', and the
are called mitigating devices. d h ·th all
person next to you is going to be 'Other'. It is tern ting to equate the bald on rec~r approac _w1 .
Your first choice is whether to say something or not. You can, a· p and forms (i.e. imperatives). This would be m1sl~admg
of course, rummage in your bag, search rather obviously through 0
b::;:~::;erative forms are odfte~ used ~y c:~:{~~~i:r;r:~~ 0~~
your pockets, go back into your bag, without uttering a word, but b ·n interpreted as comman s. xamp es . b]
with the vague intention that your problem will be recognized. f::in~ something to eat, as in [6a.], or trying to help you, as m [6 ..
This 'say nothing' approach may or may not work, but if it does,
it's because the other offers and not because the self asks, as in [3]. [6] a. Have some more cake.
b. Gimme that wet umbrella.
[3] Self: (looks in bag) c situations also occasion the use of direct commands,
Other: (offers pen) Here, use this.
;;:~~~:Ssyof who is being addressed, as when danger prompts use
Many people seem to prefer to have their needs recognized by
of the expressions in [7].
others without having to express those needs in language. When
those needs are recognized, as in [3], then clearly more has been [?] a. Don't touch that!
communicated than was said. b. Get out of here!
POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 63
62 SURVEY
 direct co~manl a;-~-,b, -1-d...~ ~v..,a, o,..u1...uu1~iances wnere using a IlappCll LV lld.V\... a,11. '-'.AL.1.u. .t'"'.u. ......... __ - - - _____ 7 ,1

- a on record ex · ·
appropriate among social equals. press1on Is considered maybe borrow?
Ho_wever, generally speakin bald . Using this strategy also results in forms which contain expres-
associated with speech events !'here hon record expressions are sions of apology for the imposition, of the type shown in [1ob.].
or she has power over th h c t e speaker assumes that he
e ot er (ior exam I · ·1· More elaborate negative politeness work can sometimes be heard
)
texts and can control the oth ' b h . ~ e, m m1 Itary con- in extended talk, often with hesitations, similar to that shown in
day interaction between e_r ~ e av1or with words. In every-
[rnc.).
behavior would potenti 11 soc1a equals, such bald on record
It is worth noting that negative politeness is typically expressed
~nd would generally be :v:i~:i'dre;nt_a_threat to the other's face
via questions, even questions that seem to ask for permission to
is accomplished by fac . . · voi~mg a face threatening act
. e savmg acts which ·• ask a question (for example, 'Might I ask ... ?') as in [1oc.]. On the
polIteness strategies. use positive or negative
surface, such questions present an opportunity for the other to
answer in the negative to the question without the same refusal
Positive and negative politeness effect of responding with a negative to a direct, bald on record
imperative. (This distinction is an important motivation for the
A positive politeness strategy leads th distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, discussed
~ommon goal, and even friend h. . e reques~er to appeal to a already.)
m [8]. s tp, via express10ns such as those
Even more relevant for our concern with the pragmatics of lan-
[8] a. guage in use, the availability of the bald on record form, as well as
b. ~;w ~bout le~ting me use your pen? off record forms, means that the use of a face-saving on record
Y, uddy, Id appreciate it if you'd let
pen. me use your form represents a significant choice. The choice of a type of
These on record expressions do expression that is less direct, potentially less clear, generally
speaker of suffering a refusal and r:a_resent a greater risk for the longer, and with a more complex structure means that the speaker
tmg to know you' talk f h k" d y be preceded by some 'get- is making a greater effort, in terms of concern for face (i.e. po-
establish the necessary ~im~ e m prdesented in [9 J, designed to liteness), than is needed simply to get the basic message across
. , . on groun for this strategy. efficiently.
[9] Hi. Hows It going? Ok "f I . h
ested in the same crazy
huh? Say, do me a bi f
:~;f;it eri? We must be inter-
. ou ta ea lot of notes too,
These observations are summarized in Figure 7. 1 overleaf.

pens. g avor and let me use one of your Strategies

However, in most English s k. The tendency to use positive politeness forms, emphasizing close-
more commonly performe·dp~a mg contexts, a face saving act is ness between speaker and hearer, can be seen as a solidarity strategy.
. via a negative polit
most typical form used is a . . _ eness strategy. The This may be the principal operating strategy among a whole group
as [rna.J. quest10 n contammg a modal verb such or it may be an option used by an individual speaker on a particu-
lar occasion. Linguistically, such a strategy will include personal
[10] a. ~ouldyoulendmeapen?
information, use of nicknames, sometimes even abusive terms
b. I m sorry to bother ou b
something? y ' ut can I ask you for a pen or (particularly among males), and shared dialect or slang expres-
sions. Frequently, a solidarity strategy will be marked via inclusive
c. I know you're busy, but might I ask you if-e 'f terms such as 'we' and 'let's', as in the party invitation in [n].
m-1 you
'
64 SURVEY

POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 65

 How to get a pen from someone else Pre-sequenc;.es
I
As already suggested, the concept of face saving may be helpful in
say something say nothing understanding how participants in an interaction inevitably
(but search in bag)
understand more than is said. The basic assumption, from the per-
spective of politeness, is that face is typically at risk when the self
on record off record needs to accomplish something involving other. The greatest risk
('I forgot my pen') appears to be when the other is put in a difficult position. One way
of avoiding risk is to provide an opportunity for the other to halt
face saving act bald on record the potentially ris'ky act. For example, rather than simply make a
('Give me a pen') request, speakers will often first produce what can be described as
I a pre-request. We already noted one example in discussing speech
positive politeness negative politenesss events earlier, at the end of Chapter 6. Another is presented as [13],
('How about letting me use your pen?') ('Could you lend me a pen?')
along with one analysis of the structure of this interaction.
[13] Her: Are you busy? (= pre-request)
FIGURE 7. 1 How to get a pen from someone else (following Him: Not really. (= go ahead)
Brown and Levinson I987) Her: Check over this memo. (= request)
Him: Okay. (= accept)
[n] Come on, let's go to the party. Everyone will be there. The advantage of the pre-request element is that it can be
We'll have fun. answered either with a 'go-ahead' response, as in [13], or with a
The tendency to use negative politeness forms, emphasizing the 'stop' response, as in [14].
hearer's right to freedom, can be seen as a deference strategy. It [14] Him: Are you busy? (= pre-request)
can be the typical strategy of a whole group or just an option used Her: Oh, sorry. (= stop)
on a particular occasion. A deference strategy is involved in what The response in [14] allows the speaker to avoid making a request
is called 'formal politeness'. It is impersonal, as if nothing is that cannot be granted at the time. Understanding that it is a
shared, and can include expressions that refer to neither the response to a pre-request also allows us to interpret the expres-
speaker nor the hearer (for example, 'Customers may not smoke sion 'sorry', not only as an apology about being busy, but also as
here, sir'). The language associated with a deference strategy an apology about being unable to respond to the anticipated
emphasizes the speaker's and the hearer's independence, marked request.
via an absence of personal claims, as in [12], an alternative ver- There is, however, a general pattern of pre-requests actually
sion of the party invitation in [I 1 ]. being treated as requests and being responded to, as in [15 ], with
[ 12] There's going to be a party, if you can make it. It will be the (unstated, hoped for) action being performed.
fun.
[15] Her: Do you have a spare pen?
These general types of strategies are illustrated here via utter- Him: Here. (hands over a pen)
ances which are actually central to the speech event (for example, This 'short-cut' process of going from pre-request to granting of
invitation). Face saving behavior, however, is often at work well request helps explain the literal oddness of the common pattern in
before such utterances are produced, in the form of pre-sequences. [16].

66 SURVEY POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 67

 l 16 J Her: Vo you mind if I use your phone? structure for the mteraction. 1 nae scruLtu1~ _m':'"• "":vv '.""'
use it is our comfortable famihanty with its
Him: Yeah, sure. ana lyze d beca · d h ·
regularity that allows a great deal to be commumcate t at is
As a literal response, 'Yeah' or 'Yeah, sure' would be the equi-
never said.
valent of 'I do mind' and wouldn't count as allowing use of the
phone. However, these forms are normally interpreted as a posi-
tive response, not to the pre-request, but to the unstated request.
Pre-sequences are also commonly used in making invitations.
As illustrated in [17], with a 'go ahead', and [18], with a 'stop',
inviters tend to ask a pre-invitation question and receivers tend to
recognize their function.
[17] Him: What are you doing this (= pre-invitation)
Friday?
Her: Hmm, nothing so far. (= go ahead)
Him: Come over for dinner. (=invitation)
Her: Oh, I'd like that. (= accept)
[18] Him: Are you doing anything
later? (= pre-invitation)
Her: Oh, yeah. Busy, busy, busy. (= stop)
Him: Oh, okay. (= stop)
Children often use pre-announcements to check if their parents are
willing to pay attention, as in example [19 ].
[19] Child: Mom, guess what
happened? (= pre-announcement)
Mother: (Silence)
Child: Mom, you know (= pre-announcement)
what?
Mother: Not right now, Jacy,
I'm busy. (= stop)
In example [19], there are two pre-announcements, neither of
which receives a 'go-ahead'. The initial pre-announcement is met
with silence, which is generally interpreted as a 'stop'. The child's
second attempt must be based on an interpretatidn that the parent
did not hear the first attempt. The final response has to be inter-
preted as a 'stop', but noticeably it is expressed, in face-saving
terms, as a postponement.
Throughout this discussion of politeness in interaction, we
have been assuming a well-known and easily recognizable
POLITENESS AND INTERACTION 69
68 SURVEY
 8Conversation and preference
structure

The previous chapter focused on aspects of social awareness which

can have an impact on what gets communicated by what is said
during an interaction. The term 'interaction' could actually apply
to a very large number of quite different social encounters. For
example, a teacher talking to students in a classroom is one kind of
interaction; others include a doctor talking to a patient in a clinic,
or individuals taking part in courtroom proceedings, attending a
committee meeting, buying stamps at the post office, and dozens of
other different experiences people have in which there is interper-
sonal exchange of talk. The kind of talk is likely to differ according
to the different contexts of interaction. However, the structure of
the talk, the basic pattern of 'I speak-you speak-I speak-you
speak', will derive from that fundamental kind of interaction we
acquire first and use most often. This is the structure of conversa-
tion. Conversation structure is what we have been assuming as
familiar throughout much of the preceding discussion. It is time to
look more closely at that structure as a crucial aspect of pragmatics.

Conversation analysis
There are many metaphors used to describe conversation struc-
ture. For some, conversation is like a dance, with the conversa-
tional partners coordinating their movements smoothly. For
others it's like traffic crossing an intersection, involving lots of
alternating movement without any crashes. However, the most
widely used analytic approach is based, not on dancing (there's no
music) nor on traffic flow (there are no traffic signals), but on an
analogy with the workings of a market economy.

CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 71

 rhythm to their transitions, mucn.more is oemg cummu1~1~aL~u
u1 urn, marKer, rnere 1s a scarce commodity called the floor than is said. There is a sense of distance, an absence of fam1hanty
which can be defined as the right to speak. Having control of this or ease, as in the interaction shown in [_1] between a student and
scarce commodity at any time is called a turn. In any situation
his friend's father during their first meetmg.
where control is not fixed in advance, anyone can attempt to get
control. This is called turn-taking. Because it is a form of social [l] Mr. Strait: What's your major Dave? .
Dave: English-well I haven't really decided yet.
action, turn-taking operates in accordance with a local manage-
ment system that is conventionally known by members of a social (3 seconds)
group. The local management system is essentially a set of con- Mr. Strait: So-you want to be a teacher? .
No-not really-well not if I can help it.
ventions for getting turns, keeping them, or giving them away. Dave:
This system is needed most at those points where there is a poss- (2.5 seconds)
go ahead
ible change in who has the turn. Any possible change-of-turn Mr. Strait: Wha-// Wh ere d O you-
Dave: I mean it's a-oh sorry II I em-
point is called a Transition Relevance Place, or TRP. Within any
social group, there will be features of talk (or absence of talk) typ- As shown in [1], very short pauses (marked with_ a dash) are
ically associated with a TRP. simply hesitations, but longer paus_es become silences. The
This type of analytic metaphor provides us with a basic per- silences in [1] are not attributable to either speaker because ~ach
spective in which speakers having a conversation are viewed as has completed a turn. If one speaker actually turn~ over ~he ~~r
taking turns at holding the floor. They accomplish change of turn to another and the other does not speak, t~en_the s1len~e is attn_ .
smoothly because they are aware of the local management system uted to the second speaker and becomes s1gmficant. It s an attr•~-
for taking those turns at an appropriate TRP. The metaphor can utable silence. As shown in [2], the non-r~sp~nse of Da:e is
be applied to those conversations where speakers cooperate and treated, by his girlfriend, as possibly commumcatmg somethmg.
share the floor equally. It can also be used to describe those con-
[
2
] Jan:
Dave I'm going to the store.
versations where speakers seem to be in competition, fighting to
(2 seconds)
keep the floor and preventing others from getting it. These pat-
Jan: Dave?
terns of conversational interaction differ substantially from one
(2 seconds)
social group to another. In order to illustrate the system at work,
Jan: Dave-is something wrong?
we will focus on the conventions of one social group-middle
Dave: What? What's wrong?
class English speakers in public-while remaining aware that
Jan: Never mind.
other social groups will have substantially different assumptions
Silence at a TRP is not as problematic for the local management
about the meaning of various features.
system as overlap. If the expectation is that only one p~rson speaks ~t
a time, then overlap can be a serious problem. R~turmng to examp e
Pauses, overlaps, and backchannels [ ] the final two lines illustrate overlaps, convenu~nally marke~ by a
do~ble slash(//) at the beginning of the overlappmg ~a~~- Typically,
1
Most of the time, conversation consists of two, or more, particip-
the first overlap occurs as both speakers attempt to m1t1ate t~lk. In
ants taking turns, and only one participant speaking at any time.
Smooth transitions from one speaker to the next seem to be val- accordance with the local management system, one speaker will stop
ued. Transitions with a long silence between turns or with sub- to allow the other to have the floor. However, for ~o speakers who
are having difficulty getting into a shared conversational rhythm, the
stantial overlap (i.e. both speakers trying to speak at the same
time) are felt to be awkward. When two people attempt to have a stop-start-overlap-stop pattern may be repeated.
conversation and discover that there is no 'flow', or smooth
CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 73
72 SURVEY
 The type of overlap shown in [1] is simply part of a difficult first they must avoid an open pause at the end of a syntactic unit. As
conversation with an unfamiliar person. There are other kinds of illustrated in [5 ], the speaker fills each of his pauses ('um' or 'uh'),
overlap and they are interpreted differently. For many (often which are placed inside, not at the end of, syntactic units. (Just
younger) speakers, overlapped talk appears to function like an prior to this turn, another speaker had attempted ~o take the floor,
expression of solidarity or closeness in expressing similar opin- so the speaker in [5] seems concerned to protect his turn.)
ions or values. As shown in [3], the effect of the overlapping talk [5] I wasn't talking about-um his first book that was-uh
creates a feeling of two voices collaborating as one, in harmony. really just like a start and so-uh isn't-doesn't count
[3] Min: Did you see him in the video? really.
Wendy: Yeah-the part on the beach Another type of floor-holding device is to indicate tha_t there is a
Min: Oh my god II he was so sexy larger structure to your turn by beginning with expressions of the
Wendy: he was just being so cool type shown in [6].
Min: And all the waves II crashing around him! [6] a. There are three points I'd like to make-first ...
Wendy: yeah that was really wild! b. There's more than one way to do this-one example
In example [3], overlap communicates closeness. In example [4], would be ...
overlap communicates competition. c. Didn't you know about Melvin?-oh it was last
[4] Joe: when they were in October ...
II power las- wait CAN I FINISH? d. Did you hear about Cindy's new car?-she got it in ...
Jerry: that's my point I said- The expressions in [6a.] and [6b.] are associated with discus-
In example [4], the speakers may appear to be having a discus- sions of facts or opinions whereas those in [6c.] and [6d.] are pre-
sion, but they are, in fact, competing for the floor. The point at ludes to storytelling. In all cases, they are used to get the regular
which overlap occurs is treated as an interruption and the first exchange of turn process suspended and allow one speaker to
speaker actually has to make a comment about procedure (with a have an extended turn. Within an extended turn, however, speakers
louder voice, shown by the capital letters in 'CAN I FINISH?') still expect their conversational partners to ind~cate t_ha~ they ~re
rather than about the topic of conversation. listening. There are many different ways of domg this, mcludmg
By drawing attention to an expectation that he should be head nods, smiles, and other facial expressions and gestures, but
allowed to finish, the first speaker in [4] is appealing to some of the most common vocal indications are called backchannel signals,
the unstated 'rules' of conversation structure. Each potential or simply backchannels. Some of these are present in Mary's con-
speaker is expected to wait until the current speaker reaches a tributions to [7].
TRP. The most obvious markers of a TRP are the end of a struc- [ ] Caller: if you use your long distance service a lot then you'll
7
tural unit (a phrase or clause) and a pause. Notice that, in [4], the Mary: uh-uh
first speaker has uttered 'when they were in-' at the point where Caller: be interested in the discount I'm talking about because
the second speaker begins to talk. There is no pause and it is not Mary: yeah
the end of a phrase or clause. This is a clear interruption and Caller: it can only save you money to switch to a cheaper service
breaks the 'rules'. Mary: mmm
. Normally, those who wish to get the floor will wait for a poss- These types of signals ('uh-uh', 'yeah', 'mmm') provide feedback to
ible TRP before jumping in. Of course, those holding the floor in a the current speaker that the message is being received. !he_y nor-
competitive environment will avoid providing TRPs. To do so, mally indicate that the listener is following, and not obiectmg to,

CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 75

74 SURVEY
 . - - --, ........... •-'-........ , .--•r--: ---
• · th structure of conversation. Some
or oac1<channe!s is typically interpreted as significant.
,w:,c::m.:e almost automatic patterns m. e d dbyes shown in [8) to
During telephone conversations, the absence of backchannels may clear examples are the greetmgs an goo

I prompt the speaker to ask if the listener is still there. During face-to-
face interaction, the absence of backchannels may be interpreted as
[ro].
[8] Anna: Hello.
Bill: Hi.

I
a way of withholding agreement, leading to an inference of dis- [9] Anna: How are you? Bill: Fine.
agreement. In conversation, silence is significant and will be inter;.
a' Bill: Bye.
preted as meaningful. [10] Anna: See Y ·
11 d adjacency pairs. They
These automatic sequences are ca e rt oduced by differ-
. f first part and a second pa , pr
Conversational style always consist o a f fi t part immediately creates an
ent speakers. The utterance o ~ rs d part of the same pair.
Many of the features which characterize the turn-taking system of expectation of the utteranc~ o at ~:cr:~ponse will be treated as a
conversation are invested with meaning by their users. Even within Failure to produce the sechon par . ful There is substantial
a broadly defined community of speakers, there is often sufficient . 'fi b and ence meanmg · .
s1gm cant a sence h' h ed to fill the slots in adiacency
variation to cause potential misunderstanding. For example, some variation in the forms w ic are us b arts
individuals expect that participation in a conversation will be very . h · [ i] but there must always e two P ·
pairs, as s own m 1 ,
active, that speaking rate wiU be relatively fast, with almost no . Second Part
[n] F1rstPart h' , h
pausing between turns, and with some overlap or even completion A· What's up? B: Not m ~u,c_ . h
of the other's turn. This is one conversational style. It has been . , . . •~ B· Jus' hangm mt ere.
A: Hows1tgom • ·
caUed a high involvement style. It differs substantially from another A· How are things? B: The usual. .
style in which speakers use a slower rate, expect longer pauses · d • •~ B· Can't complam.
A: Howya om• ·
between turns, do not overlap, and avoid interruption or comple- . ll f din the opening sequences
tion of the other's turn. This non-interrupting, non-imposing style The examples _in [II] are typ1ca iaJ~:ency pairs are illustrated in
has been called a high considerateness style. of a conversation. O th er types O J [ ] a thanking-
[ 12) including a question-answer sequence 12a. '
When a speaker who typically uses the first style gets into a con-
response' [12b]• , and a request-accept [12c.].
versation with a speaker who normally uses the second style, the
talk tends to become one-sided. The active participation style will Second Part
[ 12 ] First Part B: About eight-thirty.
tend to overwhelm the other style. Neither speaker will necessarily a. A: What time is it?
recognize that it is the conversational styles that are slightly differ- b. A: Thanks. B: You're welcome.
ent. Instead, the more rapid-fire speaker may think the slower- c. A: Could you help
paced speaker just doesn't have much to say, is shy, and perhaps me with this? B: Sure.
boring or even stupid. In return, he or she is likely to be viewed as · h · econd parts how-
Not all first parts immediately re~e1ve t eir s ce ~ill be
noisy, pushy, domineering, selfish, and even tiresome. Featyres of ever. It often happens that~ question-answer se!~;;venes. The
conversational style will often be interpretep as pe,:sonality traits. delayed while another quest1on-ans~eQrseqQuen~2-A1 with the
ill then take the form O I- 2- ' lh h
se~dudelnce ~(Q2-A2) being called an insertion sequence. At o~g
Adjacency pairs m1 e pair . Q ) ·n response to a question
there appears to b~ a ~uehstion ( 2 h1 second part (A2) of the
Despite differences in style, most speakers seem to find a way tg_ (Qi), the assumption is t at once t e
cope with the everyday business of social interaction. They are
CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 77
7;6 SURVEY
 insertion sequence is provided, the second part (Ai) of the initial ance is structurally more likely than a refusal. This structural like-
question (Qi) will follow. This pattern is illustrated in [13). lihood is called preference. The term is used to indicate a socially_
[13) Agent: Doyouwanttheearlyflight? (=Q1) determined structural pattern and does not refer to any individ-
Client: What time does it arrive? (= Q2) ual's mental or emotional desires. In this technical use ·
Agent: Nine forty-five. (= A2) of the word, preference is an observed pattern in talk and not a
Client: Yeah-that's great. (= A1) personal wish.
Preference structure divides second parts into preferred and dis-
An insertion sequence is one adjacency pair within another.
preferred social acts. The preferred is the structurally expected .
Although the expressions used may be question-answer
sequences, other forms of social action are also accomplished next act and the dispreferred is the structurally unexpected next
act. (The generafpatterns are presented in Table 8.1.)
within this pattern. As shown in [14), there is a pair which con-
sists of making a request-accepting the request (Q1-A1), with First part Second part
an insertion sequence of a question-answer pair (Q2-A2) which
Preferred Dispreferred
seems to function as a condition on the acceptance (A1) being
provided. Assessment agree disagree
Invitation accept refuse
[14] Jean: Could you mail this letter (Q1 = Request)
for me? Offer accept decline
Fred: Does it have a stamp on it? Proposal agree disagree
(Q2)
Jean: Yeah. Request accept refuse
(A2)
Fred: Okay. (Ai= Acceptance)
TABLE 8. 1 The general patterns of preferred and dispreferred
The delay in acceptance in example [14), created by the insertion structures (following Levinson 1983)
sequence, is one type of indication that not all first parts ne-
cessarily receive the kind of second parts the speaker might In considering requests or offers as first parts, acceptance is the
anticipate. Delay in response symbolically marks potential preferred and refusal is the dispreferred second part. In examples
unavailability of the immediate (i.e. normally automatic} [15a.-d.], the responses in each second part all represent pre-
expected answer. Delay represents distance between what is ferreds. Thus, acceptance or agreement is the preferred second
expected and what is provided. Delay is always interpreted as part response to a request [15a.], an offer [15b.], an assessment
meaningful. In order to see how delay is locally interpreted, we [15c.], or a proposal [15d.].
need some analytic terms for what is expected within certain [1 5] First Part Second Part
types of adjacency pairs. a. Can you help me? Sure.
b. Want some coffee? Yes, please.
Preference structure c. Isn't that really great? Yes, it is.
d. Maybe we could go for a walk. That'd be great.
Adjacency pairs are not simply contentless noises in sequence. To get a sense of how expected these preferred second pa_rts
They represent social actions, and not all social actions are equal are in the examples in [15 ], imagine each of the first parts bemg
when they occur as second parts of some pairs. Basically, a first met with silence. We might say that in any adjacency pair, silence
part that contains a request or an offer is typically made in the in the second part is always an indication of a dispreferred
expectation that the second part will be an acceptance. An accept- response.

78 SURVEY
CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 79
 maeea, suence otten leads the hrst speaker to revise the first Hesitations and prefaces are also tound m ct1spreterrect secona
.1.?.~ft in order to ge! a second part that is not silence from the other parts to invitations, as shown in [18] .
speaker. This may be clearer via an example, such as [16], where [18] Becky: Come over for some coffee later.
Jack's silence in response to Sandy's comment prompts Sandy to Wally: Oh-eh-I'd love to-but you see-I-I'm
restate her assessment. Jack then agrees (a preferred) with Sandy's supposed to get this finished-you know.
assessment. As is often the case, the expression of a refusal (a dis~ref~rre?
[16] Sandy: But I'm sure they'll have good food there. second) can be accomplished without actually_ saym~ no ·
(1.6 seconds) Something that isn't said nevertheless gets commumcated m [18].
Sandy: Hmm-I guess the food isn't great. After a preface ('Oh') and a hesitation ('eh'): ~he secon? speaker
Jack: Nah-people mostly go for the music. in [1 8] produces a kind of token acceptance ( Id love to) to ~ho~
Notice that Jack's silence occurs where he would have had to pro- appreciation of the invitation. Then, the other's understandmg 1s
duce a disagreement (i.e. a dispreferred response) regarding invoked ('you see') and an account is presented ('I'm supposed to
Sandy's assessment. Non-response communicates that the get this finished') to explain ~hat prevents ~he speaker from
speaker is not in a position to provide the preferred response. accepting the invitation. There 1s also a meam_ng conveyed here
However, silence as a response is an extreme case, almost risk- that the speaker's circumstances are beyond his c?ntrol ?ec_aus,e
ing the impression of non-participation in the conversational of an obligation ('I'm supposed to') and, once agam, the mv1ter s
structure. Generally speaking, when participants have to produce understanding ('you know') is invoked. _ _
second part responses that are dispreferred, they indicate that The patterns associated with a dispreferre~ second m English
they are doing something very marked. are presented as a series of optional elements m [19 ].
In example [17], the first speaker has made a statement that the [ 1 9] How to do a dispreferred Examples
second speaker appears to disagree with. Agreement would be the
a. delay/hesitate pause; er; em; ah
preferred second part, eliciting a response such as 'Yeah' or even 'I
b. preface well; oh
think so'. The second speaker (Julie) finds herself in the position
I'm not sure; I don't
of producing a dispreferred. c. express doubt
know
[17] Cindy: So chiropodists do hands I guess. that's great; I'd love to
d. token Yes
Julie: Em-well-out there-they they mostly work on I'm sorry; what a pity
e. apology
people's feet. I must do X; I'm
f. mention obligation
Julie's dispreferred second part is marked with initial hesitations, expected in Y
as if it is difficult to perform this action (essentially correcting the you see; you know
g. appeal for understanding
other). There is a delay ('em', plus pause) in getting started and everybody else; out
h. make it non-personal
the actual statement which indicates disagreement only comes there
after a preface ('well'), an appeal to the views of others ('out too much work; no
1. give an account
there'), and a stumbling repetition ('they they'):~Even the state- time left
ment contains an expression ('mostly') which makes the informa- really; mostly; sort of;
J· use mitigators kinda
tion less challenging to the claim in the first part. The overall
effect is that this speaker is presenting herself as having difficulty k. hedge the negative I guess not; not possible
and is unwilling to have to say what is being stated.

CONVERSATION AND PREFERENCE STRUCTURE 81

8b SURVEY
 The overwhelming effect of a dis preferred is that more time and
more language are used than in a preferred. More language essen-
tially represents more distance between the end of the first part
and the end of the second part. From a pragmatic perspective, the
9
expression of a preferred (in response to an offer or invitation, Discourse and culture
for example) clearly represents closeness and quick connection.
The expression of a dispreferred, as mapped out in [19], would
represent distance and lack of connection. From a social perspect-
ive, it is easy to see why participants in a conversation might try to
avoid creating contexts for dispreferreds. One obvious device for
accomplishing this is to use those pre-sequences described at the
end of Chapter 7. The best way to avoid a dispreferred second is The emphasis in the preceding chapter was on the sequential
not to get to the point where a first part of the pair is uttered. Jt. structure of conversation, particularly on aspects of the turn-
must follow? then.J that conversations between those who are taking procedures for control of the floor, with less attention paid
close familiars will tend to have fewer elaborate dispreferreds to what speakers had to say once they got the floor. Having gained
than conversations between those who are still working out thei!._ the floor, speakers have to organize the structure and content of
social relationship. The amount of talk employed to accomplish a what they want to say. They have to package their messages in
particular social action in conversation is a pragmatic indicator of accordance with what thex; think their listeners do and do not
the relative distance between the participants. know as well as se uence ever thin in a coherent wa . If those
speakers ecide to write out their messages, creating written text,
they no longer have listeners providing immediate interactive
feedback. Consequently, they have to rely on more explicit struc-
tural mechanisms for the organization of their texts. In this
expanded perspective, speakers and writers are viewed as using
language not only in its interpersonal function (i.e. taking part in
social interaction), but also in its textual function (i.e. creating
well-formed and appropriate text), and also in its ideatlonal func-
tion (i.e. representing thought and experience in a coherent way).
Investigating this much broader area of the form and function of
what is said and written is called discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis
Discourse analysis covers an extremely wide range of activities,
from the narrowly focused investigation of how words such as 'oh'
or 'well' are used in casual talk, to the study of the dominant ideo-
f logy in a culture as represented, for example, in its educational or
political practices. When it is restricted to linguistic issues, dis-
course analysis focuses on the record (spoken or written) of the

82 SURVEY DISCOURSE AND CULTURE 83

 process by which language is used in some context to express instant interpretations of familiar material and tend not to see
intention. possible alternatives. For example, the question presented in [2] is
Naturally, there is a great deal of interest in the structure of dis- easily answered by many people.
course, with particular attention being paid to what makes a well-
[2] How many animals of each type did Moses take on the
formed text. Within this structural perspective, the focus is on
Ark?
topics such as the explicit connections between sentences in a text
that create cohesion, or on elements of textual organization that If you immediately thought of 'two', then you accessed some
are characteristic of storytelling, for example, as distinct from common cultural knowledge, perhaps even without noticing that
opinion expressing and other text types. the name used {'Moses') was inappropriate. We actually create a
However, within the study of discourse, the pragmatic • coherent interpretation for a text that potentially does not have it.
perspective is more specialized. It tends to focus specific~lly 011. We are also unlikely to stop and puzzle over 'a male and a
aspects of what is unsaid or unwritten (yet communicated} within... female {what?)' as we read about the accident reported in [3].
the discourse being analyzed. In order to do the pragmatics of dis- [3] A motor vehicle accident was reported in front of Kennedy
course, we have to go beyond the primarily social concerns of Theatre involving a male and a female.
interaction and conversation analysis, look behind the forms and
We automatically 'fill in' details {for example, a male person
structures present in the text, and pay much more attention to_
driving one of the motor vehicles) to create coherence. We also
psychological concepts such as background knowledge, beliefs_,_
construct familiar scenarios in order to make sense of what might
and expectations. In the pragmatics of discourse, we inevitably
first appear to be odd events, as in the newspaper headline in [4].
explore what the speaker or writer has in mind.
[4] Man Robs Hotel with Sandwich

Coherence If you created an interpretation for [4] that had the sandwich
{perhaps in a bag) being used as if it was a gun, then you activated
Generally, what language users have most in mind is an assump- the kind of background knowledge expected by the writer {as
tion of coherence, that what is said or written will make sense in confirmed by the rest of the newspaper article). You may, of
terms of their normal experience of things. That 'normal' experi- course, have created a quite different kind of interpretation {for
ence will be locally interpreted by each individual and hence will example, the man was eating the sandwich while robbing the
be tied to the familiar and the expected. In the neighborhood hotel). Whatever it was, it was inevitably based on what you had
where I live, the notice in [ia.] means that someone is selling in mind and not only on what was in the 'text' in [4].
plants, but the notice in [1b.] does not mean that someone is sell-
mg garages.
Background knowledge
[I] a. Plant Sale
b. Garage Sale Our ability to arrive automatically at interpretations of the
unwritten and the unsaid must be based on pre-existing know-
Although these notices have an identical structure, they are inter-
ledge structures. These structures function like familiar patterns
preted differently. Indeed, the interpretation of [1b.], that some-
from previous experience that we use to interpret new experi-
one is selling household items from their garage, is one that
ences. The most general term for a pattern of this type is a schema
requires some familiarity with suburban life.
{plural, schemata). A schema is a pre-existing knowledge struc-
This emphasis on familiarity and knowledge as the basis of
ture in memory.
coherence is necessary because of evidence that we tend to make
If there is a fixed, static pattern to the schema, it is sometimes

84 SURVEY DISCOURSE AND CULTURE 85

 called a frame. A frame shared by everyone within a social group details of a script ¥e assumed to be known, they are unlikely to be
would be something like a prototypical version. For example, stated. For members of the same culture, the assumption of
within a frame for an apartment, there will be assumed compon- shared scripts allows much to be communicated that is not said.
ents such as kitchen, bathroom, and bedroom. The assumed ele- However, for members of different cultures, such an assumption·
ments of a frame are generally not stated, as in the advertisement can lead to a great deal of miscommunication.
in [5 ].
[5] Apartment for rent. $500. 763-6683. Cultural schemata
A normal (local) interpretation of the small fragment of discourse Everyone has had the experience of surprise when some assumed
in [ 5] will be based on not only an 'apartment' frame as the basis component of an event is unexpectedly missing. I remember my
of inference (if Xis an apartment, then X has a kitchen, a bath- first visit to a Moroccan restaurant and the absence of one of my
room, and a bedroom), but also an 'apartment for rent' advertise- 'restaurant script' requirements-there were no chairs! (The large
ment frame. Only on the basis of such a frame can the advertiser comfortable cushions were an excellent replacement.) It is almost
expect the reader to fill in 'per month' and not 'per year' aft~r inevitable that our background knowledge structures, our
'$ 500' here. If a reader of the discourse in [5] expects that 1t schemata for making sense of the world, will be culturally deter-
would be 'per week', for example, then that reader clearly has a mined. We develop our cultural schemata in the contexts of our
different frame (i.e. based on a different experience of the cost of basic experiences.
apartment rental!). The pragmatic point will nevertheless be the For some obvious differences (for example, cushions instead of
same: the reader uses a pre-existing knowledge structure to create chairs), we can readily modify the details of a cultural schema.
an interpretation of what is not stated in the text. For many other subtle differences, however, we often don't recog-
When more dynamic types of schemata are considered, they are nize that there may be a misinterpretation based on different
more often described as scripts. A script is a pre-existing know- schemata. In one reported example, an Australian factory super-
ledge structure involving event sequences. We use scripts to build visor clearly assumed that other factory workers would know
interpretations of accounts of what happened. For example, we that Easter was close and hence they would all have a holiday. He
have scripts for what normally happens in all kinds of events, asked another worker, originally from Vietnam, about her plans,
such as going to a doctor's office, a movie theater, a restaurant, or as in [7].
a grocery store as in [6].
[7] You have five days off. What are you going to do?
[6] I stopped to get some groceries but there weren't any bas-
The Vietnamese worker immediately interpreted the utterance in
kets left so by the time I arrived at the check-out counter I
terms of being laid off (rather than having a holiday). Something
must have looked like a juggler having a bad day.
good in one person's schema can sound like something bad in
Part of this speaker's normal script for 'getting groceries' ob- another's.·
viously involves having a basket and going to the check-o~t
counter. Everything else that happened in this event sequence 1s
assumed to be shared background knowledge (for example, she Cross-cultural pragmatics
went through a door to get inside the store and she walked The study of differences in expectations based on cultural
around picking up items from shelves). . . schemata is part of a broad area of investigation generally known
The concept of a script is simply a way of recogmzmg some as cross-cultural pragmatics. To look at the ways in which meaning
expected sequence of actions in an event. Because most of the is constructed by speakers from different cultures will actually

86 SURVEY DISCOURSE AND CULTURE 87

 require a complete reassessment of virtually everything we have attention to an uq.,g,erstandi,ng of what characterizes pragmatic
considered so far in this survey. The concepts and terminology accent, not only in others, but in ourselves. I hope that this brief
may provide a basic analytic framework, but the realization of survey has provided a beginning, and an incentive to explore
those concepts may differ substantially from the English language further.
examples presented here.
When we reviewed the cooperative principle and the maxims,
we assumed some kind of general middle-class Anglo-American
cultural background. What if we assumed a cultural preference
for not saying what you know to be the case in many situations?
Such a preference is reported in many cultures and would clearly
require a different approach to the relationship between the
maxims of quality and quantity in a more comprehensive
pragmatics.
When we considered turn-taking mechanisms, we did not
explore the powerful role of silence within the normal conversa:_,:_
tional practices of many cultures. Nor did we include a discussion
of a socially prescribed 'right to talk' which, in many cultures, is
recognized as the structural basis of how interaction proceeds.
When we explored types of speech acts, we did not include
any observations on the substantial differences that can exist
cross-culturally in interpreting concepts like 'complimenting',
'thanking', or 'apologizing'. The typical American English style
of complimenting creates great embarrassment for some Native
American Indian receivers (it's perceived as excessive), and can
elicit a reaction similar to apologizing from some Japanese
receivers (it's perceived as impossible to accept). Indeed, it is
unlikely that the division one cultural group makes between any
two social actions such as 'thanking' or 'apologizing' will be
matched precisely within another culture.
The study of these different cultural ways of speaking is some-
times called contrastive pragmatics. When the investigation focuses
more specifically on the c0mmunicative behavior of non-native
speakers, attempting to communicate in their second language, it
is described as interlanguage pragmatics. Such sti.7dies increasingly
reveal that we all speak with what might be called a pragmatic
accent, that is, aspects of our talk that indicate what we assume is
communicated without being said.
If we have any hope at all of develq,ping the capacity for cross-
cultural communication, we will have to devote a lot more

88 SURVEY DISCOURSE AND CULTURE 89

 SECiION 2
Readings

Chapter 1
Definitions and background

Textl
GEORGIA GREEN: Pragmatics and Natural Language
Understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum 1989, page 3
The broadest interpretation of pragmatics is that it is the study of
understanding intentional human action. Thus, it involves the
interpretation of acts assumed to be undertaken in order to
accomplish some purpose. The central notions in pragmatics
must then include belief, intention (or goal), plan, and act.
Assuming that the means and/or the ends involve communica-
tion, pragmatics still encompasses all sorts of means of communi-
cation, including nonconventional, nonverbal, nonsymbolic ones
as, for example, when a lifeguard throws a volleyball in the direc-
tion of a swimmer struggling in the ocean. The lifeguard believes
that the swimmer wants assistance, and that the swimmer will
understand that the volleyball thrown in his direction is intended
(by the lifeguard) to be assistance, and that the swimmer will
know how to take advantage of the volleyball's property of being
lighter than water. That makes at least three beliefs and one inten-
tion on the part of the lifeguard, including two beliefs about the
swimmer's beliefs, and one about the swimmer's desires.
[> From this description, it seems as if every act in life is part of
pragmatics. Do you think that pragmatics is the study of all
actions, or should it be limited to only certain actions? What
kind of limitations would you propose?

READINGS 91
 [> The final sentence in this brief extract mentions 'beliefs about [> In what ways is the view of pragmatics tn thts text szmttar ro or
... beliefs'. How can we know about a person's beliefs when different from the way pragmatics is defined in Text I?
we are analyzing their actions and utterances?
[> If the swimmer doesn't want assistance (in the example), how Chapter 2
does that affect the analysis? Deixis and distance

Text2 Text3
'Pragmatics: meaning and context.' File 70 in Language Files: CHARLES FILLMORE: Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis.
Materials for an Introduction to Linguistics. (6th edn.) Indiana University Linguistics Club 1975, pages 40-2
Ohio State University Press 1991, page 223
The most obvious place deictic terms in English are the adverbs
To fully understand the meaning of a sentence, we must also 'here' and 'there' and the demonstratives 'this' and 'that', along
understand the context in which it was uttered. Consider the with their plural forms; the most obvious time deictic words are
word ball. In a sentence such as, He kicked the ball into the net, adverbs like 'now' or 'today'. There are important distinctions in
we may visualize a round, black and white soccer ball about nine the uses of these and other deictic words which I would like us to
inches in diameter. In a sentence such as She dribbled the ball be clear about right away. I will frequently need to point out
down the court and shot a basket, we would visualize a basket whether a word or expression that I am referring to can be used in
ball. Given yet another sentence, She putted the ball in from two one or more of three different ways, and these I will call gestural,
feet away, we would visualize another ball, a golf ball. In these symbolic, and anaphoric. By the gestural use of a deictic expres-
examples, the word ball is understood in different ways depend- sion I mean that use by which it can be properly interpreted only
ing on what type of action is associated with it. Whatever under- by somebody who is monitoring some physical aspect of the com-
stood meaning is common to ball in all of these contexts will be munication situation; by the symbolic use of a deictic expression I
part of the word's core meaning. If we think of enough types of mean that use whose interpretation involves merely knowing cer-
balls, we can come up with an invariant core meaning of ball that tain aspects of the speech communication situation, whether this
will allow speakers to refer to any ball in any context. knowledge comes by current perception or not; and by the
Nevertheless, even though we can discover a word's 'invariant anaphoric use of an expression I mean that use which can be cor-
core', we normally understand more than this. It is the CONTEXT rectly interpreted by knowing what other portion of the same dis-
that fills in the details and allows full understanding-such as the course the expression is core(erential with.
usual color of a soccer ball, the size of a basketball, or the weight I can illustrate the distinction I'm talking about by taking the
of a golf ball. The study of the contribution of context to meaning word 'there'. It has all three uses. Its gestural use can be seen in a
is often called pragmatics. sentence like, 'I want you to put it there'. You have to know where
[> What do you think is the 'invariant core' meaning of the word the speaker is pointing in order to know what place he is indicat-
'ball', as proposed here? Can you think of any use of the word ing. The symbolic use is exemplified in the telephoner's utterance,
'ball' that would not have that 'core' meaning? Can 'the con- 'Is Johnny there?'. This time we understand the word 'there' as
text' cause a word not to have its 'core' meaning? meaning 'in the place where you are'. An example of the
anaphoric use of 'there' is a sentence like 'I drove the car to the
[> What does the term 'context' seem to refer to in this text? If
parking lot and left it there'. In that case the word refers to a
you have a different concept of 'context', how would you
place which had been identified earlier in the discourse, namely
revise this paragraph to illustrate it more clearly?
the parking lot. Take another example, this time one showing just
,.
/ 92 READINGS READINGS 93
 the distinction between the gestural and the symbolic use. If dur- Text4
ing my lecture you hear me use a phrase like 'this finger', the QUENTIN SMITH: 'The multiple uses of indexicals' in
chances are fairly good that you will look up to see what it is that Synthese 78, 1989, pages 182-3
I want you to see; you will expect the word to be accompanied by 'I am in last place' is often used to indicate that the speaker is in
a gesture or demonstration of some sort. On the other hand, if last place. But this sentence is also used on a number of occasions
you hear me use the phrase 'this campus', you do not need to look to indicate that somebody else is in last place. I am watching a
up, because you know my meaning to be 'the campus in which I race and the person upon whom I have bet, No. 10, drops to the
am now located', and you happen to know where I am. The for- last place. 'I am in last place!' I exclaim in anguish to my compan-
mer is the gestural use, the latter the symbolic use. ion. My companion knows perfectly well what I mean-that the
[> Can you transfer this discussion to temporal deixis (as person upon whom I have bet is in last place. Indeed, she replies in
described in Chapter 2), considering 'then' (instead of'there') kind, disagreeing with my statement. 'No you aren't! Look!' she
in gestural, symbolic, and anaphoric uses? exclaims, pointing at No. 10, 'You are passing No. 3 !'
[> Given the three categories described here, which category [> Can you think of any other contexts where 'I' is not to be liter-
seems to fit the typical uses of deictic expressions such as 'yes- ally interpreted as 'the person who is speaking'?
terday' and 'tomorrow'? [> Do examples such as these mean that we need a new definition
Place indications take part in the deictic system of a language by
of the meaning of the word 'I' in English? If yes, what would
virtue of the fact that for many locating expressions, the location of
have to be in that definition? If no, how would you explain
one, or another, or both, of the speech act participants can serve as a this type of 'extra' usage?
spatial reference point. Sometimes all that means is that for an
Texts
expression which in a nondeictic use requires mention of
GEOFFREY NUN BERG: 'Indexicality and deixis' in
a reference object, in its deictic use the reference object, taken to be
Linguistics and Philosophy 16, 1993, page 41
the speaker's body at the time of the speech act, simply goes unmen-
tioned. Take, for example, the expression 'upstairs'. If I say, ... you might point at a picture of John Ashberry to identify his
'Johnny lives upstairs', you will understand me as meaning upstairs most recent book, using the demonstrative that, with no restric-
of the place where I am at the time I say the sentence, unless the tion on the things you could say about it:
immediately preceding discourse has provided some other refer- (94) That is in all the bookstores (on the top shelf, temporarily
ence point. If I say 'Harry lives nearby', the same can be said. You out of stock).
will understand that Harry lives near to the place where I am when
But while John Ashberry might easily say of himself 'I am in all the
I say the sentence, again, except for the case where a reference point bookstores,' it would be odd for him to say 'I am on the top shelf' or
has been identified in the immediately preceding discourse. 'I am temporarily out of stock,' unless it could be supposed that the
[> Is the speaker's body always the unmentioned reference point, fact that an author's book was on the top shelf or was temporarily
as Fillmore suggests here? Consider the uses of words like out of stock carried some noteworthy implications for him.
'front', 'back', 'down (the street)', 'above', 'outside', and any [> Following on from these examples, could you point to an
others that seem to be similar to 'upstairs' and 'nearby' in the
empty space on the bookshelf and and ask the owner of the
examples. bookstore, 'Is that out of stock?'? If yes, do we have to re-
formulate the definition of deixis (i.e. 'pointing via language')
when there's nothing being pointed to?
READINGS 95
94 READINGS
 t> Why do you think the idea of 'some noteworthy implications' is not in the end essential to the case). This, I shall say, is an
is mentioned in this text? Does identifying the reference of attributive use of the definite description.
deictic expressions depend on information about a person's The contrast with such a use of the sentence is one of those situ-
thoughts and feelings? If yes, can you think of other examples ations in which we expect and intend our audience to realize
(involving other deictic forms)? whom we have in mind when we speak of Smith's murderer and,
t> How does the example with 'I' in this text fi.t in with your most importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we
analysis of 'I' in Text 4? are going to say something.
[> Before Donnellan's proposal, many philosophers argued that
Chapter3 if a description does not fit anything, then it fails to refer.
What is Donne/Ian's perspective on this?
Reference and inference
[> Using Donne/Ian's disti"nction (plus any additional distinctions you
Text6 think are needed), how would you account for the use of a definite
KEITH DONNELLAN: 'Reference and definite descriptions' in description that does not accurately fit the person or thing?
Philosophical Review 75, 1966, pages 285-6 [> Can the attributive versus referential distinction be related to
I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the Fillmore's distinction (Text 3) between gestural, symbolic,
attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who uses a and anaphoric uses of deictic expressions?
definite description attributively in an assertion states something
about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses Text7
a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other M.A. K. HALLIDAY and RUQAIYA HASAN: Cohesion in
hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out English. Longman 1976, page 31
whom or what he is talking about and states something about There are certain items in every language which have the property
that person or thing. In the first case the definite description might of reference, in the specific sense in which we are using the term
be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert some- here; that is to say, instead of being interpreted semantically in
thing about whatever or whoever fits that description; but in the their own right, they make reference to something else for their
referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing interpretation. In English these items are personals, demonstra-
a certain job-calling attention to a person or thing-and in gen- tives and comparatives.
eral any other device for doing the same job, another description We start with an example of each:
or a name, would do as well. In the attributive use, the attribute of
a. Three blind mice, three blind mice.
being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referen-
tial use. See how they run! See how they run!
To illustrate this distinction, in the case of a single sentence, b. Doctor Foster went to Gloucester in a shower of rain.
consider the sentence, 'Smith's murderer is insane.' Suppose first He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle and never went
that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal there again.
manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable c. There were two wrens upon a tree.
person in the world, we might exclaim, 'Smith's murderer is Another came, and there were three.
insane.' I will assume, to make it a simpler case, that in a quite
In (a), they refers to three blind mice; in (b) there refers to
ordinary sense we do not know who murdered Smith (though this
Gloucester; in (c) another refers to wrens.

96 READINGS
READINGS 97
 These items are directives indicating that information is to be I say 'My neighbor is a bachelor,' which, let us suppose, entails
retrieved from elsewhere. So much they have in common with all that he is adult anamale. I might just as well have said 'my neigh-
cohesive elements. What characterizes this particular type of bor is unmarried.' The same information would have been con-
cohesion, that which we are calling REFERENCE, is the specific veyed (although the nuances might not have been exactly the
nature of the information that is signalled for retrieval. In the case same). That is, the increment of information, or of content, con-
of reference the information to be retrieved is the referential veyed by the first statement is the same as that conveyed by the
meaning, the identity of the particular thing or class of things that second. If the asserted proposition were accepted, and added
is being referred to; and the cohesion lies in the continuity of ref- to the common background, the resulting situation would be
erence, whereby the same thing enters into the discourse a second the same as if the second assertion were accepted and added to the
time. background. ~
[> In this analysis, the assumption is that certain words refer to
This notion of common background belief is the first approx-
other words. Do you think that this is a helpful or misleading imation to the notion of pragmatic presupposition that I want to
use. A proposition Pis a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in
assumption?
a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P,
[> Do you agree with the fi.nal statement that 'the same thing assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P,
enters into the discourse a second time'? How about example and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is
(c), where the analysis proposes that the word 'another' refers making these assumptions, or has these beliefs.
to 'wrens'?
[> Do you agree that the two utterances quoted in the fi.rst para-
[> If the word 'there' in (b) is an example of cohesion by refer- graph would add exactly the same information to the com-
ence, is the word 'there' in the second line of (c) the same? mon background?
How do you decide?
[> According to the defi.nition presented in the second para-
[> Is Donnellan's distinction in Text 6 relevant to what these graph, would it be correct, or not, to say that a pragmatic pre-
authors are saying? supposition is any belief of the speaker? (It may be helpful to
look again at Chapter 4, pages 2 5-3 o.)
Chapter4 [> Can you think of circumstances where it is not inappropriate
Presupposition and entailment for someone 'to assert something that each of us assumes the
other already believes'?
Texts
ROBERT C. STALNAKER: 'Pragmatic presupposition' in Text9
Milton Munitz and Peter Unger (eds.): Semantics and GERALD GAZDAR: Pragmatics. Implicature, Presupposition,
Philosophy. New York University Press 197 4, and Logical Form. Academic Press 1979, page 106
pages 199- 200 (6 5) John got to safety before the boiler blew up.
Although it is normally inappropriate because unnecessary for (66) John got to the safety handle before the boiler blew up.
me to assert something that each of us assumes the other already
If we assume in (66) that John's getting to the safety handle pre/
believes, my assertions will of course always have consequences
vented the boiler blowing up, then (66) does not, but (6 5) does,
which are part of the common background. For example, in a
presuppose that the boiler blew up. If we treat before as bein!?
context where we both know that my neighbor is an adult male,
'ambiguous', then we are again left with no principle for decidin!?

98 READINGS READING~ 99
 -- --- - ---- r----rr-- .... &-&_ .... _._ ...... _...... _., ,.,_......,"' ya.Lt,..L'-'uJ.aL .:,1..,11- UIU.C:pc:11u.c:11L d.IIU. C:VC:U 111 li...UllUI\..L-Cc::l\..U Uic:ty Wc:tllL LU l5C:l LJlC:

tence. Note also that, if all presupposing constructions are car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded.
ambiguous, then the notion of 'infelicity' or 'unacceptability' is In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even
inapplicable, since we will always have an alternative reading if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second order one,
with respect to which the sentence will be acceptable. namely that each party should, for the time being, identify
[> How do you account for the fact that 'before' creates a pre- himself with the transitory conversational interests of the
supposition in example {65), but not in {66)? Can you think of other.
2. The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed,
other examples where the use of 'before' does, or does not,
lead to a presupposition? mutually dependent.
3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit
[> Does 'after' work the same way? Should we define 'before' but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the
and 'after', not only as opposites, but also as creating different transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both
presuppositions? parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not
just shove off or start doing something else.
Chapter 5 But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
Cooperation and implicature some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling
and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.
Text 10
[> Can you spell out why 'quarreling and letter writing' do not fit
PAUL GRICE: 'Logic and conversation' in P. Cole and J. L.
comfortably with the conditions presented here?
Morgan (eds.): Syntax and Semantics Volume 3: Speech Acts.
Academic Press r 9 7 5, page 4 8 [> What would you call the three 'features' listed here if you were
to make them into maxims for cooperative transactions?
I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversa-
tional practice not merely as something that all or most do IN [> Grice emphasizes the word 'reasonable' as he describes his
FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to consideration of the cooperative principle and his maxims as a
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was kind of contract. Would the cooperative principle, the
attracted by the idea that observance of the CP [co-operative maxims, and the three features listed here be treated as
principle] and the maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought 'reasonable' in all societies and cultures?
of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm
of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my Text11
stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you J .L.MORGAN: 'Two types of convention in indirect speech
will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, acts' in P. Cole (ed.): Syntax and Semantics Volume 9:
my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms Pragmatics. Academic Press 1978, pages 277-8
(in the absence of indications that you are merelr an incompetent Just above I presented cases involving particular expressions and
meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, character- the conventionalization of their use for certain implicatures, as in
istically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative the case of If you've seen one, you've seen them all, or the original
transactions: example, Can you pass the salt? I said in the latter case that it had
r. The participants have some common immediate aim, like become a convention of usage to use this expression, with its lit-
getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be eral meaning, to convey an implicature of request. The question

roo READINGS READINGS IOI

 now arises, can there be this kind of conventionalization of rules I> What do yotj. think about the idea that an implicature may
of conversation? I think there can. For example, it is more or less begin by being based on inference, but can become so conven-
conventional to challenge the wisdom of a suggested course of tionalized that no one has to make the inference any more? Is
action by questioning the mental health of the suggestor, by ANY that the same process as we use in interpreting idioms?
appropriate linguistic means, as in:
( 37) Are you crazy? Chapter6
( 3 8) Have you lost your mind? Speech acts and events
( 39) Are you out of your gourd?
and so on. Most Americans have two or three stock expressions Text 12
usable as answers to obvious questions, as in: JOHN SEARLE: Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press
1969, pages 58-9
(40) Is the Pope Catholic?
(41) Do bagels wear bikinis? One crucial distinction between promises on the one hand and
threats on the other is that a promise is a pledge to do something
But for some speakers the convention does not specify a particu-
for you, not to you; but a threat is a pledge to do something to
lar expression, and new ones are manufactured as they are
you, not for you. A promise is defective if the thing promised is
needed. It seems that here a schema for implicature has been con-
something the promisee does not want done; and it is further
ventionalized: Answer an obvious yes/no question by replying
defective if the promisor does not believe the promisee wants it
with another question whose answer is very obvious and the same
done, since a non-defective promise must be intended as a
as the answer you intend to convey. promise and not as a threat or warning. Furthermore, a promise,
In a similar way, most speakers have a small number of expres-
unlike an invitation, normally requires some sort of occasion or
sions usable as replies to assertions, with the implicature that the
situation that calls for the promise. A crucial feature of such occa-
assertion is transparently false-(42), for example:
sions or situations seems to be that the promisee wishes (needs,
(42) Yes, and I'm Marie the Queen of Romania. desires, etc.) that something be done, and the promisor is aware of
But again, for some speakers the convention specifies only a this wish (need, desire, etc.). I think both halves of this double
general strategy, rather than a particular expression: To convey condition are necessary in order to avoid fairly obvious counter-
that an assertion is transparently false, reply with another asser- examples.
tion even more transparently false. I> This paragraph lists several required features for a speech act
I> Do you know any other 'stock expressions' for these types of to count as a promise. Do you agree that all these features are
occasions (request, challenge, answer to obvious questions, necessary? Are other crucial features not included here?
reply to a false assertion)? How would you explain (to some- One can, however, think of apparent counter-examples to this
one learning English as a foreign language, for example) how condition as stated. Suppose I say to a lazy student, 'If you don't
to work out the communicated meaning from the literal hand in your paper on time I promise you I will give you a failing
meaning? grade in the course'. Is this utterance a promise? I am inclined to
I> The author uses the term 'convention' in talking about the think not; we would more naturally describe it as a warning or
kinds of implicatures involved here. Do you think that the possibly even a threat. But why, then, is it possible to use the
examples presented here can be analyzed in terms of conven- locution 'I promise' in such a case? I think we use it here because
tional implicatures (as discussed in Chapter 5, pages 45-6)? 'I promise' and 'I hereby promise' are among the strongest

102 READINGS READINGS 103

 illocutionary force indicating devices for commitment provided requests than that there are m geograpnica1 rea1uy UlMlll'-L '-•1L-
by the English language. For that reason we often use these egories such as puddles, ponds and lakes. Somehow, this assump-
expressions in the performance of speech acts which are not tion slips unnoticed into Searle's introduction to his taxonomy:
strictly speaking promises, but in which we wish to emphasize the What are the criteria by which we can tell that of three actual
degree of our commitment. To illustrate this, consider another utterances one is a report, one a prediction and one a promise?
apparent counter-example to the analysis along different lines. In order to develop higher order genera, we must first know
Sometimes one hears people say 'I promise' when making an how the species promise, prediction, report, etc. differ from
emphatic assertion. Suppose, for example, I accuse you of having one another.
stolen the money. I say, 'You stole that money, didn't you?'. You (Searle, J. 1979.: Expression and Meaning. Cambridge:
reply, 'No, I didn't, I promise you I didn't'. Did you make a Cambridge University Press, page 2.)
promise in this case? I find it very unnatural to describe your
But it would be strikingly inappropriate if one were to begin a
utterance as a promise. This utterance would be more aptly
treatise on expanses of water on the world's surface in this way:
described as an emphatic denial, and we can explain the occur-
rence of the illocutionary force indicating device 'I promise' as What are the criteria by which we can tell that of three actual
derivative from genuine promises and serving here as an expres- expanses of water, one is a puddle, one a pond, and one a
sion adding emphasis to your denial. lake? In order to develop higher order genera, we must first
know how the species puddle, pond, and lake differ from one
I> Do you agree that having used the words 'I promise', you
another.
could later claim that 'strictly speaking' you did not make a
promise because you meant something else? In defence of Searle it could be argued, first, that the comparison is
unfair: if one had chosen monkeys and giraffes (say) instead of
I> What seem to be the conditions for an utterance containing
ponds and puddles, the example would have been less ridiculous.
the IFID 'I promise' to serve as an emphatic denial?
But my reply is (a) that one has no right in advance to assume that
I> Is the recognition of speech act conditions related at all to the such categories exist in reality (although one might discover them
cooperative principle as discussed in Text Io? (It may be help- by observation); and (b) that in actuality, when one does observe
ful to refer to the discussion of felicity conditions in Chapter 6, them, illocutions are in many respects more like puddles and
pages 50-1.) ponds than like monkeys and giraffes: they are, that is to say, dis-
tinguished by continuous rather than by discrete characteristics.
Text 13
GEOFFREY LEECH: Principles of Pragmatics. I> What exactly is the argument being presented here against the
Longman 19 8 3, pages 177-8 idea that we can identify a speech act as a prediction or not?
In referring to human conversational behavior, as to other areas I> What would distinguish the definition of a puddle, in Leech's
of experience, our language provides us with categorical distinc- view, from the kind of definition of a promise presented in
tions. But it is to commit a fundamental and obvious error to Text 12?
assume that the distinctions made by our vocabulary necessarily I> Do you think that Leech's argument is based on an important
exist in reality. Language provides us with verbs like order, issue, or just a minor point? How do you think Searle would
request, beg, plead, just as it provides us with nouns like puddle, respond to this criticism from Leech?
pond, lake, sea, ocean. But we should no more assume that there
are in pragmatic reality distinct categories such as orders and

104 READINGS READINGS 105

 Chapter 7 fessions. Diplomats speak of an incident when they mean that
Politeness and interaction their countries art in a virtual state of war; bureaucrats talk of
revenue enhancement when they renege on a promise of no new
Text 14 taxes; doctors discourse on iatrogenesis when they mean they did
RoBiN LAKOFF: Talking Power. The Politics of Language. something that made the patient sick. These words provide a
Basic Books 1990, pages 34, 36, 38 buffer between pure denotative meaning and its emotional wal-
Indirectness can function as a form of politeness. Politeness is a lop: the hearer, in all probability, knows perfectly well what the
system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction speaker intends; but the latter has chosen deliberately Latinate
by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inher- words from a sector of the vocabulary not rich in emotional con-
ent in all human interchange. We like to think of conversation as notations, so as~ to lessen the danger of collision.
conflict-free, with speakers normally being able to satisfy one [> Can you think of other examples of distance politeness in lan-
another's needs and interests. But, in fact, we enter every conver- guage use?
sation-indeed, every kind of discourse-with some personal [> Can you think of situations or special circumstances where
desideratum in mind: perhaps as obvious as a favor or as subtle as the type of distance politeness, as defined here, is ignored?
the desire to be likeable. For some of these needs, participants can
accede to each other, and both gain their desires; but with others, It is essential to realize that camaraderie can be conventional . . . .
one must lose, however minimally, for the other to win. One per- But ... someone unaccustomed to conventional camaraderie will
son must tell another something that the other doesn't want to take it as genuine, arising out of long acquaintance and the develop-
hear; one person must refuse another's request; one person must ment of mutual liking and trust. Modern camaraderie probably
end a conversation before the other is quite willing to go. In such began in California as an outgrowth of the human potential move-
cases, there is the danger of insult and, consequently, the break- ment of the 1960s and 1970s. For a while it was a bane to visiting
down of communication. If societies did not devise ways to Easterners, who were confounded by the Californian's appearance
smooth over moments of conflict and confrontation, social rela- of good fellowship and deep caring; the immediate first-naming,
tionships would be difficult to establish and continue, and essen- touching, looking deep into the eyes, and asking truly caring ques-
tial cohesion would erode. Politeness strategies are the means to tions: 'Are you really happy with your life?' To the properly
preserve at least the semblance of harmony and cohesion .... brought-up Easterner, such behavior was permissible only after
years of earning it, and maybe not then. Easterners fell into one of
[> In what ways is this definition of politeness more or less
several schools of thought about the character of Californians:
specific than the general social meaning of politeness you are
either that they had the simplicity of children and should be patron-
familiar with?
ized; or that they were rough frontier sorts, probably raised by
Distancing cultures weave remoteness into their language. The wolves (and you know how wolves are); or that they were truly
attribution of responsibility represents an intrusion of the per- wonderful people who could get to know you as well after two
sona 1: it suggests that individuals with different interests are seconds as would take most of us a lifetime. All of these attitudes
involved in the discussion. So grammatical devices that minimize assumed, of course, that the camaraderie was real rather than
a speaker's personal involvement are favored-for instance, pass- conventional.
ive verb forms and impersonal forms like one. Words that [> What examples of language use would you predict (or have
threaten to convey or evoke dangerous emotion are replaced with you experienced) as representative of 'conventional cama-
safer ones, which suggest that no emotion is involved. This formal raderie' in contrast to 'distance politeness'?
language is the language of diplomacy, bureaucracy, and the pro-

106 READINGS
I READINGS 107
 Text 15 Text 16
GABRIELE KASPER: 'Politeness' in R. E. Asher (ed.): PENELOPE BROWN and STEPHEN LEVINSON: Politeness.
The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Volume 6. Cambridge University Press 1987, page 281
Pergamon 1994, page 3209 In language the constraints are more on form than on content (or
Some types of linguistic action are carried out more frequently in at least form provides a more feasible area of study). The ways in
some cultures than in others. Hearer-beneficial acts such as com- which messages are hedged, hinted, made deferential, and embed-
plimenting and thanking occur more regularly in some Western ded in discourse structures then become crucial areas of study. But
contexts (e.g., the USA) than in some Asian cultures (e.g., main- such areas are also the concern of pragmatics, the study of the
land China), reflecting both the strong positive politeness orienta- systematic relation of a language to context. The special interest
tion and reluctance to impose on others in mainstream American • of sociolinguistics in our view is in the differential use of such
culture, on the one hand, and the assumption, in China, that par- pragmatic resources by different categories of speakers in differ-
ticipants act according to their social positions and associated ent situations. It is in this way that we derive our slogan
roles and obligations, on the other. Also, hearer-costly acts such as 'Sociolinguistics should be applied pragmatics.'
refusals are perceived as being more socially offensive by Japanese t> Do you agree with the assumption that pragmatics comes first
and Chinese interlocutors and thus tend to be avoided, whereas it and then is 'applied' to the social use of language, or should it
seems more consistent with American interlocutors' right to self- be the other way round?
determination not to comply with another person's wishes.
t> Notice that the concepts of 'hedge' and 'hint' are used here.
t> Can you think of other 'hearer-beneficial acts' and other Recall the use of 'hedges' on implicatures in Chapter 5, pages
'hearer-costly acts'? For example, what is an invitation or a 3 8-9 (which themselves may be termed 'hints'); would such
complaint? Is it possible that the concepts of 'cost' and phenomena in the use of language be better analyzed as
'benefit' may be culturally determined? aspects of politeness? Is pragmatics really just the study of lin-
t> There is a suggestion in this text that people in the USA are guistic politeness?
more concerned with their rights as individuals than with t> Does the 'slogan' at the end of this text provide a better (or
their social roles and obligations. What kind of evidence from worse) perspective on pragmatics than those offered in Texts
language behavior would you look for in order to decide I and 2 earlier?
whether this suggestion is true or not?
t> Can you characterize the normal behavior of your own social
group as having more 'hearer-beneficial' acts? What about
Chapters
'hearer-costly' acts? Are there other social groups with whom Conversation and preference structure
you share the same language, but whose politeness strategies
Text17
appear to be different?
HARVEY SACKS: Lectures on Conversation. Volume r.
t> Where does Lakoff's 'conventional camaraderie' (Text r4) fit Blackwell 1992, pages 3-4
into the distinction that Kasper is making here?
I'll start off by giving some quotations.
(1) A: Hello.
B: Hello.
(2) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you.
B: Yes, this is Mr Brown.

108 READINGS READINGS 109

 (3) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you. structure (as outlined in Chapter 8, pages 78-82) by including
B: I can't hear you. example (3) in-your analysis?
A: This is Mr Smith. [> What advantages and disadvantages do you think there are in
B: Smith. using telephone data as the basis for analyzing how conversa-
These are some first exchanges in telephone conversations col- tion works?
lected at an emergency psychiatric hospital. They are occurring
between persons who haven't talked to each other before. One of Text18
them, A, is a staff member of this psychiatric hospital. B can be H. SACKS, E. SCHEGLOFF, and G.JEFFERSON: 'A simplest

either somebody calling about themselves, that is to say in trouble systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversa-
in one way or another, or somebody calling about somebody else. tion' in Language 50, 1974, pages 700-1
I have a large collection of these conversations, and I got started To merit serious consideration, it seems to us, a model should be
looking at these first exchanges as follows. A series of persons capable of accommodating (i.e., either be compatible with, or
who called this place would not give their names. The hospital's allow the derivation of) the following grossly apparent facts. In
concern was, can anything be done about it? One question I any conversation, we observe the following:
wanted to address was, where in the course of the conversation ( 1) Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs.
could you tell that somebody would not give their name? So I (2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
began to look at the materials. It was in fact on the basis of that (3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are com-
question that I began to try to deal in detail with conversations. mon, but brief.
I found something that struck me as fairly interesting quite (4) Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no
early. And that was that if the staff member used 'This is Mr Smith overlap are common. Together with transitions charac-
may I help you' as their opening line, then overwhelmingly, any terized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the
answer other than 'Yes, this is Mr Brown' (for example, 'I can't vast majority of transitions.
hear you,' 'I don't know,' 'How do you spell your name?') meant ( 5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies.
that you would have serious trouble getting the caller's name, if (6) Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
you got the name at all .... (7) Length of conversation is not specified in advance.
Looking at the first exchange compared to the second, we can (8) What parties say is not specified in advance.
be struck by two things. First of all, there seems to be a fit between (9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance.
what the first person who speaks uses as their greeting, and what ( 10) Number of parties can vary.
the person who is given that greeting returns. So that if A says, (11) Talk can be continuous or discontinous.
'Hello,' then B tends to say 'Hello.' If A says 'This is Mr Smith ( 12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current
may I help you,' B tends to say 'Yes, this is Mr Brown.' We can say speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a
there's a procedural rule there, that a person who speaks first in a question to another party); or parties may self-select in
telephone conversation can choose their form of address, and in starting to talk.
choosing their form of address they can thereby choose the form (13) Various 'turn-constructional units' are employed; e.g.,
of address the other uses. turns can be projectedly 'one word long', or they can be
[> Do you think that the 'procedural rule' presented here applies sentential in length.
to all 'first exchanges' in telephone conversations? ( 14) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking
[> Can you describe this 'procedural rule' in terms of preference errors and violations; e.g., if two parties find themselves

II0 READINGS READINGS III

 t:atKmg ar me same nme, one or rnem wrn stop prema- \.,IIQ.,1,,i;;:1 .;,

turely, thus repairing the trouble. Discourse and culture

[> Can you divide these fourteen statements into two groups-
one that applies to all conversations and one that applies to Text20
JOHN GUM PERZ and JENNY COOK-GUMPERZ:
only some conversations in some contexts? What kinds of
situations or people appear to create exceptions? 'Introduction: language and the communication of social
identity' in J. Gumperz (ed.): Language and Social Identity.
[> Should these statements be restricted to any conversation that Cambridge University Press 1982, page 12
is middle-class American and basically friendly? Can you
think of different factors such as social class, culture, ethnic- Although the pragmatic conditions of communicative tasks are
ity, relationship, age-or any others that will have an effect on theoretically taken to be universal, the realizations of these tasks
how turn-taking proceeds? as social practices are culturally variable. This variation can be
analyzed from several different perspectives, all of which of
Text 19 course co-occur in the actual practices.
JACK BILMES: Discourse and Behavior. Plenum Press 1986, ( 1) Different cultural assumptions about the situation and
page 166 about appropriate behavior and intentions within it.
Consider the following exchange: (2) Different ways of structuring information or an argument
in a conversation.
A [addressing B]: Where are you going?
( 3) Different ways of speaking: the use of a different set of
B [no response]
unconscious linguistic conventions (such as tone of voice)
A The hell with you.
to emphasize, to signal local connections and to indicate
This exchange makes sense. It is orderly, not random. We may the significance of what is being said in terms of overall
characterize B's (non)response with an infinite variety of neg- meaning and attitudes.
atives. It is not a question, not a promise, not a lecture, and so
By 'different cultural assumptions' we refer to the fact that, even
forth. However, given that questions call for answers, it is relev-
though people in situations such as we study agree on the overall
antly not an answer.
purpose of the interaction, there are often radical differences as to
[> Why do you think the word 'relevantly' is emphasized in this what expectations and rights are involved at any one time.
text? Does this mean that every '(non)response' counts as
[> There is a suggestion here that 'pragmatic conditions' can be
relevantly not something in conversation?
treated as 'universal' (i.e. applicable everywhere). Can you
[> Consider what speaker A says in reaction to the suggest some examples of pragmatic universals? How about
'(non)response'. What kind of speech act is this? Does this 'Be polite'? Any others?
utterance tell us anything about the relationship between the
[> Can you think of any examples that would support the idea
two speakers (i.e. strangers, acquaintances, or in_timates)?
that 'appropriate behavior' differs in different cultures {prag-
matically speaking)?
[> Do you agree with these authors that there are different ways
of 'structuring an argument'? How is an argument structured
in English? How could it be structured any other way?

112 READINGS READINGS 113

 Text21 Text22
JENNY THOMAS: 'Cross-cultural pragmatic failure' in DEBORAH TANNEN: You Just Don't Understand.
Applied Linguistics 4h, 1983, page 105 Wm. Morrow 1990, page 40
'Free goods' are those which, in a given situation, anyone can use A woman was telling me why a long-term relationship had ended.
without seeking permission, for example, salt in a restaurant She recounted a recurrent and pivotal conversation. She and the
(providing, of course, that you are having a meal in that restaur- man she lived with had agreed that they would both be free, but
ant and have not simply wandered in from the street with a bag of they would not do anything to hurt each other. When the man
fish and chips). Generally speaking, what an individual regards as ?egan to sleep with other women, she protested, and he was
'free goods' varies according to relationships and situation. In mcensed at her protest. Their conversation went like this:
one's own family or home, most things (food, drink, books,
SHE: How can you do this when you know it's hurting me?
baths) are free goods. In a stranger's house they are not. Cross-
HE: How can you try to limit my freedom?
culturally, too, perceptions of what constitutes 'free' or 'nearly
SHE: But it makes me feel awful.
free' goods differ. In Britain, matches are 'nearly free', so one
HE: You are trying to manipulate me.
would not use a particularly elaborate politeness strategy to
request one, even of a total stranger. In the Soviet Union cigarettes On one level, this is simply an example of a clash of wills: What he
are also virtually 'free' and a request for them demands an equally wanted conflicted with what she wanted. But in a fundamental
minimal degree of politeness, such as Daite sigaretu [give (me) a way,_ it reflect~ the_ differe~ce in focus I have been describing. In
cigarette]. A Russian requesting a cigarette in this country and argumg for his pomt of view, the key issue for this man was his
using a similar strategy would either have wrongly encoded the independence, his freedom of action. The key issue for the woman
amount of politeness s/he intended (covert grammatical or pragma- ~as their interdependence-how what he did made her feel. He
linguistic failure) or seriously misjudged the size of imposition i~te~preted her i~sistence o~ their interdependence as 'manipula-
(sociopragmatic failure). t10n : She was usmg her feelmgs to control his behavior.
t> The author is writing ('in this country') about Britain. Do you t> Do you agree with the analysis presented here? Are there
think her observation on salt in a restaurant is based on a uni- other implicatures possible from what is said in the dialog?
versal component of a 'restaurant script'? In a family context, t> We are used to thinking that the term 'cross-cultural' will
do you agree that 'most things ... are treated as free goods'? apply to peo~le from different countries. Is it appropriate to
What about other cultures you are familiar with? think of the interactions between males and females within
t> The examples in this text are physical objects. There are also one country (sharing a lot of one culture) as a site for the study
cultural differences in what kind of information is considered of cross-cultural pragmatics? What kinds of differences might
'free goods'. What constraints are there, in cultures you are be worthy of investigation?
familiar with, on asking people about certain topics (for
example, their political views, religion, marital status,
income, cost of their possessions, bathroom behavior, sexual
practices)?
t> What do you think the distinction is between the two kinds of
'failure' {pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic) described
here?

II4 READINGS
READINGS II5
 SECTION 3
References

The references which follow can be classified into introductory

level (marked ■□□), more advanced and consequently more tech-
nical (marked ■■□ ), and specialized, very demanding (marked
■■■).

Chapter 1
Definitions and background

■■■
STEVEN DAVIS (ed.): Pragmatics. A Reader.
Oxford University Press 1991
This is a collection of thirty-five papers, originally published in
journals dealing mainly with philosophical issues in the recent
history of pragmatics.
■□□
GEORGIA GREEN: Pragmatics and Natural Language
Understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum 1989
This is an introduction which focuses on linguistic pragmatics as
'the study of understanding intentional human action', with a
strong emphasis on grammatical issues.
■□□
GEOFFREY LEECH: Principles of Pragmatics.
Longman 1983
This introductory text presents a rhetorical model of pragmatics,
attempting to describe 'principles and maxims of good com-

REFERENCES I 17
 municative behaviour'. Pragmatics is defined as 'the study of how ■■□
utterances have meanings in situations', with an emphasis on the ROBERT JAitVELLA and WOLFGANG KLEIN (eds.): Speech,
analysis of politeness. Place and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics.
John Wiley & Sons 1982
■■□
STEPHEN c. LEVINSON: Pragmatics. This is a collection of fifteen papers on different aspects of deixis
Cambridge University Press 1983 by both linguists and psychologists, incorporating studies on
This widely used introductory text offers several different deixis and the blind and in the sign language of the deaf.
definitions of pragmatics and presents 'an overview of some of the ■■□
central tasks that pragmaticists wrestle with'. The emphasis is on JOHN LYONS: Natural Language and Universal Grammar.
linguistic and philosophical issues. Cambridge University Press 1991
■ OD Chapters 8 and 9 in this collection of essays provide a lot of
JACOB MEY: Pragmatics: An Introduction. insights into the nature of deixis.
Blackwell 1993
■ OD
This is a comprehensive introduction to pragmatics as 'the study ROGER WALES: 'Deixis' in P. Fletcher and M. Garman (eds.):
of the conditions of human language use as these are determined Language Acquisition (2nd edn.) Cambridge University Press
by the context of society'. There is a strong emphasis on the ways 1986
in which society's institutions govern the use of language.
This is a review paper covering studies of the first appearance
■ DO and development of deictic forms in the early language of young
JAN NUYTS andJEF VERSCHUEREN (eds.): children.
A Comprehensive Bibliography of Pragmatics. Volumes 1-4.
■■□
John Benjamins 1987
JURGEN WEISSENBORN and WOLFGANG KLEIN (eds.):
This remarkable resource provides a wide range of references. Here and There: Cross-linguistic Studies on Deixis and
The very useful diagrams in the Subject Index (pages 51-69) act Demonstration. John Benjamins 1982
as a guide to the wide areas of study covered by pragmatics.
This is a collection of fourteen papers on different types of deixis
in a wide range of languages.
Chapter 2
Deixis and distance Chapter3
Reference and inference
■■□ :
STEPHEN ANDERSON and EDWARD KEENAN: 'Deixis' in • f
Timothy Shopen (ed.): Language Typology and Syntactic i •••
HERBERT CLARK and DEANNA WILKES-GIBBS: 'Referring
Description. Volume 3: Grammatical Categories and the I as a collaborative process' in Cognition 22, 1986
Lexicon. Cambridge University Press 198 5
This important paper presents evidence for the ways in which
This paper presents a review of the range of deictic expressions
speakers in conversation collaborate to create referring expressions.
used in a wide variety of languages.

118 REFERENCES REFERENCES II9

 ■■□
GILES FAUCONNIER: Mental Spaces.
•••
CHOON-KYU OH and DAVID DINEEN (eds.): Syntax and
Cambridge University Press 1994 Semantics Volume n: Presupposition. Academic Press 1979
This is a very original approach to the ways in which we connect This collection of sixteen papers, plus an extensive bibliography,
words to referents, emphasizing the assumption of shared know- illustrates the types of controversies surrounding the nature of
ledge and the role of pragmatic connections. presupposition. Many are presented in very technical language.
■■□ ■■□
TALMY GIVON: Mind, Code and Context: Essays in NEIL SMITH and DEIRDRE WILSON: Modern Linguistics.
Pragmatics. Lawrence Erlbaum 1989 Penguin 1979
This collection of essays covers many topics in pragmatics, Chapters 7 and 8 of this text provide a detailed review of presup-
including reference (Chapters 5 and 6), from a perspective that position, entailment, and the role of ordered entailments.
emphasizes function (what language is used for).

■□□
•••
ROB VAN DER SANDT: ContextandPresupposition.
JOHN LYONS: Semantics. Volume r. Croom Helm 19 8 8
Cambridge University Press 1977 This book reconsiders the connection between presupposition,
Chapter 7, on reference, sense, and denotation, presents a com- context, and the projection problem.
prehensive background to the basic issues in the traditional
semantic treatment of how words are used to refer.
Chapters
•••
GEOFFREY NUNBERG: The Pragmatics of Reference.
Cooperation and implicature

Indiana University Linguistics Club 1977 ■□□

This dissertation uses the idea that words can be shown to have DIANE BLAKEMORE: Understanding Utterances. An
endless possible referents to argue for a pragmatic analysis in Introduction to Pragmatics. Blackwell 1992
which word-meanings cannot be separated from 'knowledge of This is an introduction to pragmatics in which Relevance is taken
other kinds of conventions and social practices'. to be the central concept .

Chapter4
•••
LAURENCE HORN: 'Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic
Presupposition and entailment inference: Q-based and R-based implicature' in Deborah
Schiffrin (ed.): Meaning, Form and Use in Context: Linguistic
•••
NOEL BURTON-ROBERTS: The Limits to Debate. A Revised
Applications. Georgetown University Press 1984
This paper proposes an alternative approach to analyzing how
Theory of Semantic Presupposition. Cambridge University
implicatures arise, using two instead of four maxims.
Press 1989
This book represents one of the few recent attempts to reconsider
the basic concepts involved in presupposition.

REFERENCES REFERENCES 121

 ••□ ■■□
PAUL GRICE: Studies in the Way of Words. JOHN SEARLE: Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of
Harvard University Press 1989 Language. Cambridge University Press 1969
This volume includes the collected papers of the philosopher The best known work on the topic, with detailed discussion of
whose ideas are considered by many to be the foundation of con- both conditions and applications of the concept of a speech act.
temporary pragmatics.
•••
•••
Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistic Society 16, 1990
JOHN SEARLE: Expression and Meaning. Studies in the
Theory of ~peech Acts. Cambridge University Press 1979
There is a collection of sixteen papers, presented as a parasession A collection of seven papers, including one on indirect speech acts
within these published proceedings, on the legacy of Grice, cover- and another on a taxonomy of illocutionary acts. These fre-
ing a wide range of issues in the analysis of meaning. quently cited papers represent a development of the ideas pre-
sented earlier in Searle (1969).
■■□
DAN SPERBER and DEIRDRE WILSON: Relevance. ••□
Blackwell 1986 JEF VERSCHUEREN: What People Say They Do With Words.
Presented as a study of human communication, this book takes Ablex 1985
the single maxim of Relevance as the key. Arguments and illustra- This book presents a critical review of problems in speech act
tions are presented to support the contention that 'communicated theory and a proposal for a different approach based on the study
information comes with a guarantee of relevance'. of linguistic action.

Chapter& Chapter 7
Speech acts and events Politeness and interaction

■■□ ••□
J .AUSTIN:How to Do Things with Words. (2nd edn.) SHOSHANA BLUM-KULKA and GABRIELE KASPER:
Clarendon Press 1975 Journal of Pragmatics 14h (Special Issue on politeness),
The original work which introduced the concept of language use 1990
as a form of action. This collection of six papers includes a review paper by Kasper on
■□□
current res~arch issues as well as three reports on the develop-
KENT BACH and ROBERT HARNISH: Linguistic ment of politeness behavior in children.
Communication and Speech Acts. MIT Press 1979 .l ••□
Two linguists present a detailed framework for the analysis of PENELOPE BROWN and STEPHEN LEVINSON: Politeness.
speech acts. Some Universals of Language Usage. Cambridge University
Press 1987
This is the most comprehensive book on linguistic politeness,

122 REFERENCES
REFERENCES 123
 offering lots of detailed discussion and illustrations from different This paper presents a review of the uses of the term 'preference'
and argues for a more precise application of the analytic concept.
languages.
■■□
■■□
PAUL DREW and JOHN HERITAGE (eds.): Talk at Work: ROBERT CRAIG and KAREN TRACY (eds.): Conversational
Interaction in Institutional Settings. Cambridge University Coherence: Form, Structure and Strategy. Sage 198 3
Press 1992 This is a collection of fourteen papers on conversation as interper-
This is a collection of fifteen papers on the general topic of inter- sonal communication, viewed from a range of perspectives.
action in work contexts (for example, news interviews, court pro- ■■□
ceedings, doctor's office). HARVEY SACKS: Lectures on Conversation. Volumes 1-2.
Blackwell 1992
■□□
M.DUFON, G.KASPER, S.TAKAHASHI, andN.YOSHINAGA: These two volumes present the original lecture material in which
'Bibliography on Linguistic Politeness' in journal of the foundations of conversation analysis were established. \
Pragmatics 21, 1994, pages 527-78
■■□
This is an extremely useful listing of published work concerned DEBORAH TANNEN: Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk
with language and politeness. Among Friends. Ablex 1984
■■□
This book presents extensive illustration of different aspects of con-
ERVING GOFFMAN: Forms of Talk. University of versational style as 'the basic tools with which people communicate'.
Pennsylvania Press 1981
■■□
This is a collection of five important papers by one of the most TEUN VAN DIJK: Handbook of Discourse Analysis.
influential writers on language and social interaction. Volume 3: Discourse and Dialogue. Academic Press 19 8 5
This volume contains sixteen papers illustrating a range of differ-
Chapters ent perspectives on aspects of interactive talk.
Conversation and preference structure
Chapter9
■■□
MAXWELL ATKINSON and JOHN HERITAGE (eds.): Discourse and culture
Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis.
■■□
Cambridge University Press 1984
S.BLUM-KULKA, J.HOUSE, and G.KASPER (eds.): Cross-
This is a collection of sixteen papers by some of the best known cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies. Ablex 1989
writers on conversation analysis.
This is a collection of ten papers describing studies undertaken
■■□ within the framework of the Cross-cultural Speech Act
JACK BILMES: 'The concept of preference in conversation Realization Project.
analysis' in Language in Society 17, 1988

REFERENCES 125
iJ:24 REFERENCES
 ••□ .
GILLIAN BROWN and GEORGE YULE: Discourse Analysis.
Cambridge University Press 1983 SECTION 4
This is a standard textbook with a linguistic focus on the study of Glossary
discourse.
■■□
JOHN GUMPERZ: Discourse Strategies.
Cambridge University Press 1982
This is a collection of ten papers by one the most influential
writers on social interaction and cross-cultural communication.
Page references to Section 1, Survey, are given at the end of each entry.
••□ adjacency pair A sequence of two utterances by different speakers
GABRIELE KASPER and SHOSHANA BLUM-KULKA (eds.):
Interlanguage Pragmatics. Oxford University Press 1993 in conversation. The second is a response to the first, e.g. ques-
tion-answer. (771
This is a collection of eleven papers on various pragmatic aspects anaphor The word, typically a pronoun, used to maintain refer-
of second language learning. ence to someone or something already mentioned, e.g. 'An old
man was limping towards us. He slowly came into view.' (23]
■■□
DEBORAH SCHIFFRIN: Approaches to Discourse. antecedent The initial expression used to identify someone or
something for which an anaphor is used later, e.g. 'An old man
Blackwell 1994
was limping towards us. He slowly came into view.' (231
This is a guide to several different frameworks for doing discourse
attributable silence The absence of talk when a speaker is given
analysis. the right to speak in conversation. (73]
attributive use Using an expression to identify someone or some-
■■□
ANNA WIERZBICKA: Cross-cultural Pragmatics. The thing without being committed to the existence of an actual per-
Semantics of Human Interaction. Mouton de Gruyter 1991 son or thing, e.g. 'the first person to walk on Mars'. (18]
This is a book about how cultural values and norms shape differ-
backchannels/backchannel signals Vocal indications of atten-
ent modes of interaction.
tion, e.g. 'uh-huh', 'hmm', when someone else is talking. (751
background entailment Any logical consequence of an utter-
ance. (33]
bald on record Utterances, e.g. orders, directly addressed to
another where the illocutionary force is made explicit. [631

cataphora The use of a word (typically a pronoun) to introduce

someone or something that is more fully identified later, e.g. 'He
slowly came into view. An old man was limping towards us.' [23]
coherence The familiar and expected relationships in experience

GLOSSARY 127
126 REFERENCES
 wn1cn we use IO connect rne meanings or unerances, eveu wm::n ....... ..., ..... ■■-- - • • - • - ~ ,._ __ .__ ... _ _ .......... _______ • - ----- ----c--~---

those connections are not explicitly made. [84] tive politeness, the non-personal, and freedom from impositi~n. [66]
commissive A speech ·act in which the speaker commits him or deictic center The speaker's location/time. [9]
herself to some future action, e.g. a promise. See Table 6.1. [54] deictic expression See deixis. [9]
constancy under negation Quality of the presupposition of a deictic projection Speakers acting as if they are somewhere
statement remaining true when the statement is negated. [26] else. [13]
content conditions In order to count as a particular type of deixis 'Pointing' via language, using a deictic expression, e.g.
speech act, an utterance must contain certain features, e.g. a 'this', 'here'. [9]
promise must be about a future event. [50] directive A speech act used to get someone else to do something,
context The physical environment in which a word is used: cf. e.g. an order. See Table 6. r. [54]
co-text. [211 direct speech act Speech act where a direct relationship exists
contrastive pragmatics The study of culturally different ways of between the structure and communicative function of an utter-
using language. [88] ance, e.g. using an interrogative form ('Can you ... ?') to ask a
conventional implicature An additional unstated meaning asso- question ('Can you swim?'): cf. indirect speech act. [55]
ciated with the use of a specific word, e.g. 'A but B' implies a discourse analysis The study of language use with reference to
contrast between A and B, so 'contrast' is a conventional the social and psychological factors that influence communica-
implicature of 'but'. [45] tion. [83]
conversational implicature An additional unstated meaning that dispreferred The structurally unexpected next utterance as a
has to be assumed in order to maintain the cooperative principle, response, e.g. an invitation is normally followed by an accept-
e.g. if someone says 'The President is a mouse', something that ance, so a refusal is dispreferred. [79]
is literally false, the hearer must assume the speaker means to distal Away from the speaker, e.g. 'that', 'there': cf. proximal. [9]
convey more than is being said. [40]
conversational style Particular way of participating in conversa- ellipsis The absence of a word or words from a structural slot.
tion. [76] [23]
cooperative principle A basic assumption in conversation that entailment Something that logically follows from what is
each participant will attempt to contribute appropriately, at the asserted. [25]
required time, to the current exchange of talk. [37] essential condition In performing a speech act, a requirement
co-text The linguistic environment in which a word is used: cf. that the utterance commits the speaker to the act performed. [511
context. [211 exclusive 'we' Addressee excluded: cf. inclusive 'we'. [111
counterfactual presupposition The assumption that certain existential presupposition An assumption that someone or
information is the opposite of true. [29] something, identified by use of a noun phrase, does exist. [27]
cross-cultural pragmatics The study of different expectations explicit performative A speech act containing a performative verb:
among different communities regarding how meaning is con- cf. implicit performative. [52]
structed. [87] expressive A speech act in which the speaker expresses feelings
cultural schemata Pre-existing knowledge structures based on or attitudes, e.g. an apology. See Table 6.1. [53]
experience in a particular culture. [87]
face A person's public self-image. [60]
declaration A speech act that brings about a change by being face saving act Utterance or action which avoids a potential
uttered, e.g. a judge pronouncing a sentence. See Table 6.1. [53] threat to a person's public self-image. [61]

;128 GLOSSARY GLOSSARY 129

l
 •

face threatening act Utterance or action which threatens a implicature A short version of conversational impllcature. [35]
person's public self-image. [61] implicit performative A speech act without a performative verb: cf.
face wants A person's expectations that their public self-image explicit performative. [52]
will be respected. [61] inclusive 'we' Speaker and addressee included: cf. exclusive 'we'.
factive presupposition The assumption that information stated [11]
after certain words, e.g. 'know', 'regret', is true: cf. non-factive indexicals Like deictic expressions, forms used for 'pointing' via
presupposition. [27] language. See deixis. [91
felicity conditions The appropriate conditions for a speech act to indirect speech act Speech act where an indirect relationship
be recognized as intended. [50] exists between the structure and communicative function of an
first part The first utterance in an adjacency pair, e.g 'How are utterance, e.g. the use of an interrogative ('Can you ... ?') not to
you?' See also second part. [77] ask a question, but to make a request ('Can you help me with
floor The current right to speak in a conversation. [72] this?'): cf. direct speech act. [55]
foreground entailment The main logical consequence of an inference The listener's use of additional knowledge to make
utterance. [33] sense of whjlt i~ not ~Xl),li<;it in an utterance. [17L
frame A pre-existing knowledge structure with a fixed static, insertion sequence A two part sequence that comes between
pattern. [86] the first and second parts of another sequence in conversation.
[77]
general conditions Preconditions on performing a speech act. [50] interlanguage pragmatics The study of how non-native speakers
generalized conversational impllcature An additional unstated communicate in a second language. [88]
meaning that does not depend on special or local knowledge: interpersonal function The use of language for maintaining
cf. conversational implicature. [41] social roles and taking part in social interaction. [831

hedges Cautious notes expressed about how an utterance is to lexical presupposition The assumption that, in using one word,
be taken, e.g. 'as far as I know' used when giving some informa- the speaker can act as if another meaning (word) will be under-

I
tion. [38] stood. [281
high considerateness style A non-interrupting, non-imposing local management system A metaphor for describing the con-
way of taking part in conversation. [76] ventions for organizing the right to speak in conversation. [72]
high involvement style An active, fast-paced, overlapping way of 1 locutionary act The basic act of uttering a meaningful linguistic
taking part in conversation. [76] form. [481
honorific Expression which marks that the addressee is of higher
status. [10] manner One of the maxims, in which the speaker is to be clear,
brief, and orderly. See Table 5. r. [39]
ideational function The use of language as a means of giving maxim One of the four sub-principles of the cooperative principle.
structure to thought and experience. [83] See manner, quantity, quality, and relation. See also Table 5. 1. [37]
lllocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID) Indication in the mitigating device Expression used to soften an imposition, e.g.
speaker's utterance of the communicative force of that utterance. 'please'. [63]
[49]
illocutionary act or force The communicative force of an utterance. negative face The need to be independent, not imposed on by
[48] others: cf. positive face. [61]

130 GLOSSARY GLOSSARY l3l

 negative politeness Awareness of another's right not to be pragmatic connection A convent1ona1 assoc1auuu uc:twcc;u "
imposed on: cf. positive politeness. [62] person's name and a kind of object, e.g. 'Shakespeare' used to
negative politeness strategy An attempt to demonstrate aware- identify a book. [20]
ness of another's right not to be imposed on: cf. positive po- pragmatics The study of speaker meaning as distinct from word
liteness strategy. [641 or sentence meaning. [4]
non-factive presupposition The assumption that certain in- pre-announcement Utterance before an announcement to check
formation, as presented, is not true: cf. factlve presupposition. [29] if an announcement can be made. [68)
preference/preference structure A pattern in which one type of
off record Utterances not directly addressed to another. [631 utterance will be more typically found in response to another in
on record Utterances directly addressed to another. [63] a conversational sequence, e.g. an acceptance will more typi-
overlap More than one speaker talking at the same time in cally follow an invitation than a refusal. [79]
conversation. [72] preferred The structurally expected next utterance used in a
response. [79]
particularized conversational implicature An additional un- pre-invitation Utterance before an invitation to check if an
stated meaning that depends on special or local knowledge: cf. invitation can be made. [68]
conversational implicature. [42] preparatory conditions Specific requirements prior to an
performative hypothesis A proposal that, underlying every utter- utterance in order for it to count as a particular speech act.
ance, there is a clause with a verb that identifies the speech act. [50]
[51) pre-request Utterance before a request to check if a request can
performative verb A verb that explicitly names the speech act, be made. [67]
e.g. the verb 'promise' in the utterance 'I promise to be there'. presupposition Something the speaker assumes to be the case.
[49] [25)
perlocutionary act/effect The effect of an utterance used to per- primary performative An utterance which performs a speech act
form a speech act. [48, 49) but which does not contain a performative verb. [52]
person delxis Forms used to point to people, e.g. 'me', 'you'. [91 projection problem The problem of the presupposition of a simple
politeness Showing awareness of another person's public self- structure not surviving when part of a more complex structure.
image face wants. (60] [30]
positive face The need to be connected, to belong to a group: cf. proximal Near speaker, e.g. 'this', 'here': cf. distal. [91
negative face. [62] ps~cru!_logical distance Speaker's marking of how close or dis-
positive politeness Showing solidarity with another: cf. negative tant something is perceived to be. [13]
politeness. [62)
positive politeness strategy An appeal to solidarity with quality One of the maxims, in which the speaker has to be truth-
another: cf. negative politeness strategy. [64) ful. See Table 5.r. [38]
potential presupposition An assumption typically associated quantity One of the maxims, in which the speaker has to
with use of a linguistic form, e.g. the use of the verb 'regret' in be neither more or less informative than is necessary. See Table
'He regrets doing that' carries an assumption that he actually 5.r. [38]
'did that'. [271
pragmatic accent Aspects of talk that indicate what is assumed range of reference All the possible referents identifiable by use
to be communicated without being said. (881 of a word. [21]
;
132 GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY r33
 reference An act by which a speaker uses a word, or words, to speech event A set of circumstances in which people interact in
enable a listener to identify someone or something. [171 some conventional way to arrive at some outcome. [47, 571
referential use Using an expression to identify someone or structural presupposition The assumption that part of a struc-
something when the person or thing is assumed to be known: ture contains information being treated as already known. [281
cf. attributive use. [181 syntax The study of the structures connecting linguistic forms.
referring expression A linguistic form which enables a listener, [41
or reader, to identify something. [171
relation One of the maxims, in which the speaker has to be rel- tautology An apparently meaningless expression in which one
evant. See Table 5.r. word is d~fined as itself, e.g. 'business is business'. [351
representative A speech act in which the•speaker states what is temporal deixis Forms used to point to location in time, e.g.
believed or known, e.g. an assertion. See Table 6.r. [531 'now', 'then': cf. spatial deixis. [91
textual function The use of language in the creation of well-
scalar implicature An additional meaning of the negative of any formed text. [831
value higher on a scale than the one uttered, e.g. in saying 'some Transition Relevance Place (TRP) A possible change of speaker
children', I create an implicature that what I say does not apply point in an interaction. [721
to 'all children'. [411 tum The opportunity to speak at some point during a conversation.
schema (plural schemata) A pre-existing knowledge structure [721
in memory typically involving the normal expected patterns turn-taking The change of speaker during conversation. [721
of things, e.g. an apartment schema has a kitchen, a bedroom, TN distinction A distinction between forms used for a familiar
etc. [851 ('tu') and a non-familiar ('vous') addressee, in French and other
script A pre-existing knowledge structure for interpreting event languages. [101
sequences, e.g. a visit to the dentist has a script of specific events
in sequence (which might start with giving one's name to the zero anaphora The absence of an expression in a structural slot
receptionist and finish with making a further appointment). [861 where one is assumed, as a way of maintaining reference, e.g.
second part The second or response utterance in an adjacency 'Mary mowed the lawn and then_ watered it.' [231
pair, e.g. 'Fine, thanks'. See first part. [771
semantics The study of how words literally connect to things, or
more generally, the investigation of meaning as encoded in lan-
guage. [41
sincerity conditions Requirements on the genuine intentions of a
speaker in order for an utterance to count as a particular speech
act. [511 ·
social deixis Forms used to indicate relative social status. [10]
solidarity strategy An emphasis on the closeness of speaker and
addressee. [651
spatial deixis Forms used to point to location, e.g. 'here', 'there':
cf. temporal deixis. [91
speech act An action performed by the use of an utterance to
communicate. [471

IJ4 GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY IJ5
 Acknowledgements

The author and publisher are grateful to the following for permis-
sion to reproduce extracts from copyright material:
Academic Press, Inc. and the authors for extracts from Gerald
Gazdar: Pragmatics. Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical
Form (1979 ); J. L. Morgan: 'Two types of convention in indirect
speech acts' in Peter Cole (ed.}: Syntax and Semantics Volume 9:
Pragmatics (1978).
Basic Books, a division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. for an
extract from Robin Tolmach Lakoff: Talking Power: The Politics
of Language, copyright® 1990 by Robin Tolmach Lakoff.
Blackwell Publishers for an extract from Harvey Sacks: Lectures
on Conversation (1992).
Cambridge University Press and the authors for extracts from
Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson: Politeness (1987}; John
Gumperz and Jenny Cook-Gumperz: 'Introduction: language and
the communication of social identity' in J. Gumperz (ed.):
Language and Social Identity (1982); John Searle: Speech Acts
(1969).
Elsevier Science Ltd., The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington
ox5 1GB, UK for an extract from Gabriele Kasper: 'Politeness' in
Ron Asher (ed.}: The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics
Volume 6 (1994), copyright® 1994.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. and the author for an extract
from Georgia Green: Pragmatics and Natural Language
Understanding (1989).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 137
 Charles Fillmore for an extract from Charles Fillmore: Santa
Cruz Lectures on Deixis (Indiana University Linguistics Club
1975).
Kathleen Grice for an extract from Paul Grice: 'Logic and conver-
sation' in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.): Syntax and Semantics
Volume 3: Speech Acts (1975).
Kluwer Academic Publishers for extracts from Geoffrey
Nunberg: 'Indexicality and deixis' in Linguistics and Philosophy
16 (1993); Quentin Smith 'The multiple uses of indexicals' in
Synthese78 (1989).
The Linguistics Society of America for extracts from Harvey
Sacks et al.: 'A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-
taking in conversation' in Language 50 (1974).
Longman Group Ltd. for extracts from M.A.K. Halliday and
Ruqaiya Hasan: Cohesion in English (1976); Geoffrey Leech:
Principles of Pragmatics (1983).
Wm. Morrow for an extract from Deborah Tannen: You Just
Don't Understand (1990).
New York University Press for an extract from Robert C.
Stalnaker: 'Pragmatic presupposition' in Milton Munitz and
Peter Unger (eds.): Semantics and Philosophy (1974).
The Ohio State University Press for an extract from: 'Pragmatics:
meaning and context' File 70 in Language Files: Materials for an
Introduction to Linguistics (6th edn.), the Ohio State University
Department of Linguistics, edited by Stefanie Jannedy, Robert
Poletto, and Tracey L. Weldon, copyright® 1994 by the Ohio
State University Press. All rights reserved.
Oxford University Press for an extract from Jenny Thomas: 'Cross
cultural pragmatic failure' in Applied Linguistics 4h (1983 ).
Plenum Publishing Corporation and the author for an extract
from Jack Bilmes: Discourse and Behaviour (1986).
Despite every effort to trace and contact copyright holders before
publication, this has not always been possible. If notified, the
publisher will be pleased to rectify any errors or omissions at the
earliest opportunity.

138 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS