Evidence Digest Wa Pa Nahuman

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS | RULE 129 1
RULE 129 denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
G.R. No. 145169, May 13, 2004 days."
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, as represented by
LYDIA CO HAO and LILIBETH MANLUGON, Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition
petitioner, vs. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, as Presiding for Certiorari is not counted from the date of the receipt of the
Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 44; ANITA CO NG denial of Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the
in trust for ROCKEFELLER NG; and the COURT OF receipt of the questioned order or decision, except that such
APPEALS, SPECIAL 13th DIVISION, respondents. 60-day period is interrupted upon the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly on the 60th day Hence, the petitioners challenged the September 13, 2000
from their receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order of the Manila Resolution of the appellant court as it was made without
Regional Trial Court denying their motion for Reconsideration taking prior judicial notice of Supreme Court A.M. No. 00-2 -
of said court’s Order dismissing, on motion of private 03 SC which resolution took effect on September 1, 2000, and
respondent, their complaint. which amended the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of June 20, 2000,
dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari, however, for ISSUE: Whether or not the courts shall take judicial notice of
being filed out of time, it holding that the instant petition was amendments of the Rules of Court.
filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late. Thus, for being
belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. HELD: Yes. Petitioner’s argument is well-taken.
Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
reconsideration of the above-said June 20, 2000 Order of the SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall
appellate court. take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
(Reglamentary Period to File Petitions for Certiorari and law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
Petition for Review on Certiorari) a Resolution dated August and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
1, 2000 approving the amendment to the following provision Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on
September 1, 2000, reads: Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in
their motion for reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition should have taken mandatory judicial notice of this Court’s
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be respondent’s allegation that the matter was no longer pending
counted from notice of the denial of the said motion. and undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for
certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2000, hence,
to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, covered by the its retroactive application.
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding,
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on. The order of the
Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate trial court granting private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a was subject to appeal, not a petition for certiorari. At the time
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of the
by the Court of Appeals. October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion
for Reconsideration of its dismissal order, the said October 20,
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except 1999 Order had become final and executory after the 15th day
for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) following petitioners’ receipt thereof.
days.
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Motion for G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003
Reconsideration of its Order of June 20, 2000, was denied and DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
held that from the argument espoused by petitioners’ counsel, RESOURCES, represented herein by its Secretary,
it appears that he overlooked the provision of second HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. DENR
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented by BAGUIDALI
Procedure as amended per Supreme Court Circular dated July KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region
21, 1998, which provides as follows: 12 Chapter), Respondents.
"If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or FACTS: On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive
reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was
issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, Title were lost during the Second World War. Respondents
issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles. alleged that the mother of therein defendants pretended to be
Isabel Limbaga and fraudulently succeeded in reconstituting
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are the titles over the subject properties to her name and in selling
members of the employees association, "COURAGE", some of them to the other defendants.
represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for It will be recalled that the subject properties were acquired by
nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) through
expropriation proceedings for the expansion and improvement
In essence, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in of the Lahug Airport. Subsequently, however, Lahug airport
enjoining it from causing the transfer of the DENR XII was ordered closed, and all its functions and operations were
Regional Offices, considering that it was done pursuant to transferred to petitioner MCIAA.
DENR Administrative Order 99-14.
In its Answer, petitioner denied the allegations in the
ISSUE: Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses
reorganize the DENR. moved for the dismissal of the complaint. Likewise,
defendants Ricardo Inocian, Haide Sun and spouses Victor
HELD: Yes. Applying the doctrine of qualified political Arcinas and Marilyn Dueas filed their separate motions to
agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National dismiss.
Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members
exercising control over a particular executive department. On June 14, 2001, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the respondents had no cause of action, and that
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly the action was barred by prescription and laches. Respondents
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied; hence,
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR the Orders of the RTC. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the however, it was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have a cause of action
The trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. against petitioner.
6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the
President’s power to reorganize the executive department, HELD: No. A cause of action is an act or omission of one
specifically those administrative regions which did not vote party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its elements
for their inclusion in the ARMM. It is axiomatic that a court are the following: (1) the legal right of plaintiff; (2) the
has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The
cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations
clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper in the complaint. Thus, in the resolution of a motion to dismiss
appreciation of the questions before it. based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases
In resolving the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on
taken cognizance of the official acts of the legislative, the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the
executive, and judicial departments because they are proper prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss
subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which
of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit: hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made
A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of in a complaint.
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of However, while a trial court focuses on the factual allegations
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime in a complaint, it cannot disregard statutes and decisions
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution material and relevant to the proper appreciation of the
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the court must take judicial notice of decisions this Court has
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the rendered as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
geographical divisions. Court, to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall

G.R. No. 174762, April 16, 2008 take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT VS. the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
HEIRS OF MARCELINA SERO history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
Doctrine: In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
take judicial notice of decisions this Court has rendered as Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the
FACTS: On July 6, 1999, respondents filed a complaint
against several defendants for recovery of ownership and In reversing the Orders of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
declaration of nullity of several Transfer Certificates of Title failed to consider the decision of this Court in Mactan-Cebu
four of which are registered in the names of the petitioner International Airport v. Court of Appeals which settled the
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and issue of whether the properties expropriated under Civil Case
the Republic. No. R-1881 will be reconveyed to the original owners if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned
They alleged that the subject properties were owned by their or if the property was to be used other than the expansion or
predecessor Ysabel Limbaga, but the Original Certificates of improvement of the Lahug airport.
facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the

In said case, the Court held that the terms of the judgment in act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the
Civil Case No. R-1881 were clear and unequivocal. It granted proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2,
title over the expropriated land to the Republic of the 2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of
Philippines in fee simple without any condition that it would the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice
be returned to the owners or that the owners had a right to of such official act without need of evidence.
repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the
be used other than as the Lahug airport. When land has been Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive officials of
acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either informing this Court of the government’s decision not to
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed to have
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be been regularly performed, absent proof to the contrary. The
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any disputable presumption in the present instance.
reversion to the former owner.
Had the appellate court considered the import of the ruling in G.R. No. 107493. February 1, 1996
Mactan-Cebu International Airport v. Court of Appeals, it NATIVIDAD CANDIDO, assisted by her husband
would have found that respondents can invoke no right against ALFREDO CANDIDO, and VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA,
the petitioner since the subject lands were acquired by the assisted by her husband AMOR RUMBAUA, petitioners,
State in fee simple. Thus, the first element of a cause of action, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOFRONIO DABU,
i.e., plaintiff's legal right, is not present in the instant case. respondents
FACTS: Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria

G.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008 Rumbaua are co-owners of a first-class irrigated riceland in
SUPLICO vs NEDA Orion, Bataan. Respondent Sofronio Dabu served as their
agricultural tenant. Petitioners then lodged a complaint with
FACTS: Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against respondent Dabu
mandamus, with application for the issuance of a TRO and/or for termination of tenancy relationship and recovery of unpaid
preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the rentals from crop-year 1983 plus attorney’s fees and litigation
Supreme Court. The prayers of the said petitions, among expenses.
others, sought the annulment of the award of the contract for
the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Petitioners averred in their complaint below that a team from
Corporation and to enjoin any activity in connection with the the Ministry of Agrarian Reform had fixed a provisional rental
said deal. of twenty-six (26) and twenty-nine (29) sacks of palay for the
rainy and dry seasons, respectively, which respondent failed to
On October 2, 2007, during a meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in pay beginning the crop-year 1983 dry season up to the filing
her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao of China that the of the complaint.
Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the
ZTE-NBN project. Later, the Solicitor General made a Private respondent denied the material allegations of the
manifestation and motion stating that in an Indorsement by the complaint and claimed that until 1983 their sharing system
Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been informed that the was on a 50-50 basis; that his share in the crop year 1983 dry
Philippine Government has decided not to continue with the season was still with petitioner Natividad Candido who
ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is no more justiciable likewise retained his water pump. He denied any provisional
controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents rental allegedly fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and
then prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. at the same time maintained that only a proposal for thirteen
(13) cavans for the rainy season crop and twenty-five
The petitioners, in their respective replies, argued that the percent (25%) of the net harvest during the dry season was put
Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient basis that the forward. He claimed that he paid his rentals by depositing
deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that thirteen (13) cavans of palay for the 1984 rainy season crop,
the petition has become moot, the Court may still take thirteen (13) cavans for 1985 and eight (8) cavans representing
cognizance thereof to educate the bench and the bar. Further, twenty-five percent (25%) of the dry season harvest.
because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised,
the Court should take cognizance of this case despite its On motion of respondent upon issues being joined, the case
apparent mootness. was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
a preliminary determination of the existing relationship
The petitioners ultimately contended the declarations made by between the parties and for certification as to its propriety for
officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine trial. Thereafter the DAR certified that the case was proper for
Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN trial but only on the issue of non-payment of rentals and not on
Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible. the ejectment of respondent Dabu. Accordingly trial proceeded
on the issue of non-payment of rentals.
ISSUE: WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of
President GMA? After finding that no evidence was adduced by petitioners to
prove the provisional rental alleged to have been fixed by the
HELD: The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the lower court dismissed the
alternative but to take judicial notice of the official act of the complaint. The Court of Appeals confirmed the findings of the
President. court a quo.
Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the Court ISSUE: WON the verified complaint and the affidavit are
has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts proofs of the provisional rentals? NO. documents were not
of the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive formally offered as evidence.
branch of our government. It is further provided in the said
rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing
HELD: It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence In an attempt to show proof of such authority or
that which has been formally offered. The affidavit of representation, KAL through its general manager, executed
petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning the provisional rate and submitted an Affidavit alleging: that the board of directors
of rentals was never formally offered; neither the alleged conducted a special teleconference; that in that same
certification by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Not having teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution
been formally offered, the affidavit and certification cannot be authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-
considered as evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the forum shopping and to file the complaint; and that the
appellate court correctly disregarded them. If they neglected corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
to offer those documents in evidence, however vital they may However, such attempt casted veritable doubt not only on its
be, petitioners only have themselves to blame, not respondent claim that such a teleconference was held, but also on the
who was not even given a chance to object as the documents approval by the Board of Directors of the said resolution.
were never offered in evidence.
Finally, the petitioner pointed out that teleconferencing is not
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence recognized as a legitimate means of gathering a quorum of
when it is simply marked for identification; it must be board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; hence,
formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an the trial court cannot take judicial notice of the said
opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness teleconference without prior hearing, nor any motion therefor.
called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings The RTC and CA dismiss the petition. In its April 12, 2000
of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence Order, the RTC took judicial notice because of the onset of
offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to modern technology. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the
attach any document to his pleading and then expect the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as
court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty.
consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his Aguinaldos certification.
chance to examine the document and object to its
admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take judicial notice of
reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the the said teleconference without prior hearing.
court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules
of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary HELD: Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
hearing of the case. authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it
Petitioners would insist that the SC take judicial notice of must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
the affidavit of petitioner Natividad C. Candido despite court.
absence of any formal offer during the proceedings in the The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
trial court. This is futile since this is not among the matters to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
which the law mandatorily requires to be taken judicial said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
notice of; neither can the Court consider it of public records and facts of general notoriety. But a court cannot take
knowledge, or capable of unquestionable demonstration, judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
functions. constructive knowledge.
The testimony of petitioner Natividad Candido cannot even be Although the courts may take judicial notice that business
relied upon, to say the least. Quite interestingly, she could not transactions may be made by individuals through
even recall when private respondent first failed to pay his rent, teleconferencing. The Court agrees that persons in the
if indeed there was any failure on his part to comply with his Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons
obligation. She only said that it was sometime in 1982 or in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
1983, and did not even know precisely how many cavans of governance.
palay were being harvested per crop-year.
In this case, however, the Court is not convinced that one
Petitioners definitely failed to establish their cause of action. was conducted. And even if there had been one, the Court
They never proved that respondent Dabu failed to pay his is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly
rentals starting 1982. Neither were they able to competently passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the
confirm the provisional rate of rentals allegedly fixed by the complaint and execute the required certification against
team of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. forum shopping. The respondent’s allegation that its board
of directors conducted a teleconference and approved the
said resolution is not credible, given the additional fact
G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005 that no such allegation was made in the complaint.
EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent. The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged
teleconference never took place, and that the resolution
FACTS: Korean Airlines (KAL), through its appointed allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors
counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint in RTC for the during the said teleconference was a mere concoction for the
collection of the principal amount etc. against Expertravel and purpose of creating an impression on the RTC, the CA and this
Tours, Inc. (ETI). The verification and certification against Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the
forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. petitioner.
The ETI sought for the dismissal of the case; disputing the In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the lower
authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the requisite courts were set aside and the complaint filed by the respondent
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the was dismissed.
resident agent and counsel of the respondent.
G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
TOMAS TUNDAG forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
Facts: Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Tundag, raped her twice. First was on September 5, 1997 and Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
the other on November 18, 1997. judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts
Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
separate complaints for incestuous rape. Mary Ann Tundag SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may
also alleged that she was 13 years old when she was raped by take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
her father. However, the prosecution in the case at bar was not or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be
able to show any documents pertaining to Mary Ann’s age at known to judges because of their judicial functions.
the time of the commission of the rape. The prosecution then With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory
asked the Court to take judicial notice that Mary Ann was or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial
under 18 years of age which was subsequently granted notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule
without conducting a hearing. 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -
She narrated that her father used a knife to threaten her not to SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During
shout while he was raping her on both occasions. While raping the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
her, he was even asking her if it felt good. He was even party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
laughing. After the commission of the second rape, Mary Ann any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
went to her neighbor (by the name of Bebie Cabahug) and told
her what happened to her. They reported this to the police and After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the
was later examined by a doctor who concluded that she was proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,
not a virgin anymore. may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
The Regional Trial Court of Mandaue convicted Tomas material issue in the case.
Tundag on both counts of rape and was sentenced to the
penalty of death. In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is
improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof
On appeal to the CA, Tomas flatly denied that the incidents acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3
complained of ever took place. He contends that on September of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is
5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gals required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact.
Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or
sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7, baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof,
1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by
was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work and
naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to Issue 2: WON Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape
do such wrongdoings.
Held: Yes! Tomas Tundag’s defense of alibi and denial is
Issue 1: WON the penalty of death imposed on him is correct. negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and
WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial notice of weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his
Mary Ann’s age without a hearing. freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private
complainant who testified on affirmative matters, such defense
Held: No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak
was incorrect for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the
Ann’s age without a proper hearing. positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the
violator of her honor. The victim’s account of the rapes
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 penalizes rape of a minor Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained
daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if
The elements are as follows: (1) sexual congress; (2) with found guilty by the court.
woman; (3) by force or without her consent; and in order to Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal
warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of
elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years old at the time sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations
of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim. may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. Bu this does not conclusively and
In this case, Mary Ann’s age was not properly and sufficiently absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact
proven beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she things, nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations
admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped
because her mother did not tell her. by appellant.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape
may properly take and act on without proof because they charges against him because she had quarreled with him after
already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice he had castigated her for misbehavior. But such allegation of a
may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule family feud, however, does not explain the charges away.
129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a
mandatory judicial notice of facts - daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which
take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular
protect her honor. 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice
on this matter which is merely based on his personal
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that
to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This
argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial since he The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
was estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is
only child who lived with him. to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility negative.
of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that
the victim understood the consequences of prosecuting the Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
rape charges against her own father – her father’s death. material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge;
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876. September 19, 1994 (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
State Prosecutors vs. Muro doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
FACTS: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ jurisdiction of the court.
Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave The principal guide in determining what facts may be
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence,
Judicial Conduct. it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety.
The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges
against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will
960. be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter
The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial
basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers (Inquirer notice is not judicial knowledge.
and Daily Globe), which the judge believes to be reputable  The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
reported announcement of the Executive Department in the those matters which are “commonly” known.
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested
the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial
thus motu propio dismissed the case. notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
He further contends that the announcement of the President as they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known,
notice which is discretionary on his part. and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they
Hence, the complainants contend that the respondent judge are of such universal notoriety and so generally
erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be a understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
public knowledge based merely on the account of the the common knowledge of every person.
newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign
exchange restriction. In this case, respondent judge, in the guise of exercising
a) It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which
not to accord due process to the prosecutors who is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
were already at the stage of presenting evidence removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign
(trial)thereby depriving the government the right to exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
be heard. considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety.
b) The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation
taking judicial notice on the published statement of which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was
the President in the newspaper which is a matter that issued.
has not yet been officially in force and effect of the
law. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken
of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge commit grave A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case? YES requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a
fact.
HELD: It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should
be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation Hence, it was impossible for Judge Muro and was improper
before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was for him to have taken cognizance of the CB Circular No. 1353
published in the newspaper, the respondent judge
when it was not yet in force at the time the improvident order G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
of dismissal was issued Grace Garcia-Recio vs Rederick Recio
Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Landbank vs. Wycoco Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18,
1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued
Facts: Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12,
the Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
CARP, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell his land to the DAR lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
for P14.9 million. The evidence presented by Wycoco in marriage.
support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the
Valuation; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992 rejecting the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered price of marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the offer. He claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha
then filed a case before the RTC for the determination of just Samson only in November, 1997. In his Answer, respondent
compensation. averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that there is no need to his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He
present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took petitioner in 1994.
judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the
entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a On July 7, 1998, years after the couple’s wedding and while
total of P13,428,082.00. the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Issue: WON the just compensation determined by the RTC Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably
was valid and within its jurisdiction. broken down. Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. of action. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back
as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
case. that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of
practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market Issue: WON the RTC erred in declaring the marriage
value may be one of the bases of determining just dissolved based on the Australian divorce decree.
compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at
without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at Held: YES. Respondent argues that the Australian divorce
the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of decree is a public document—a written official act of an
acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof
location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent is getting
ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
for determination of just compensation is necessary. The presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly body or tribunal of a foreign country.
resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial
notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the writing or document may be proven as a public or official
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
known, the basis of his action. country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a foreign
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on court is a resident in the court of that foreign court such court
evidence must be demonstrated. could acquire jurisdiction over the person of C.F. but it must
be served in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for Issue: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F.
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact
that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Held: YES. Instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, and exemplary damages.
petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Consequently, the party attacking (C.F.) a foreign judgment
Sydney, Australia. has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. CA the Japanese court must stand.
Facts: Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be
Company (C.F.), through its Japan branch, entered into an similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air transportation Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
tickets. defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made:
March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket 1. on its resident agent designated in accordance with
sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of law for that purpose, or,
the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for 2. if there is no such resident agent, on the government
damages. official designated by law to that effect; or
April 11, 1980: Writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil 3. on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan.
The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
Mr. Dinozo was in Manila and would be back on April 24, summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
1980. summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him.
April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be
the summons but he refused to receive claiming that he no made on the government official designated by law, to wit:
longer an employee. a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign
insurance company
After the 2 attempts of service were unsuccessful, Supreme b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign
Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal banking corporation
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan> c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case
Japanese Embassy in Manila>Ministry (now Department) of of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines>Executive Judge of the business in the Philippines. Whenever service of
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila process is so made, the government office or official
who ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F. Main served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons
Office or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home
or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando necessary part of the service.
Balingit the writ of summons but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. The service on the proper government official under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of
January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment ordering the Corporation Code. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a
the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the purpose to assimilate.
rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed March 24, 1981: C.F. received from
Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. C.F. did not Laureano vs. CA
appeal so it became final and executory .
May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the Facts: In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by
judgment a RTC the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL
July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought to was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees.
be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for
jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano
notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in
mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the Japanese 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case
Court sought in this action is null and void for want of for damages due to illegal termination of contract against
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL
this is an action in personam. The process of the Court in moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
Japan sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged
jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in that the termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to
the case before the Japanese Court of the case at bar. Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the Magno) had no obligation to preserve the properties inherited
case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other heirs (the
of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of siblings)
Appeals reversed the trial court.
*no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB allegedly
Issue: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this averred that under the laws of Texas (although it was arguing
case. that RP laws apply), there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said
conjugal estate
Held: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid >>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the estate of
the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it (which is
trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is initially at least 1/2 of the estate), for admissions by a party
indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be
take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the proven in our courts like any other controverted fact,
burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence create estoppel.
Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be
dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all ISSUES THAT CAN BE DECIDED BY THE COURT:
money claims arising from employer-employee relationships 1. Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr. Hodges
must be filed within three years from the time the cause of did renounce his share, it is clear from the inventory submitted
action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 by Mr. Hodges himself as executor of his wife's estate that
when he was terminated but he only filed the money claim in there are properties which constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges
1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already which should be distributed among her heirs pursuant to her
barred by prescription. will
2. It is now beyond controversy that whatever be the
provisions of Texas Law applicable, the estate of Mrs. Hodges
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE
BANK (PCIB) V. ESCOLIN SPOUSES
Existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
Facts: Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (husband and wife) and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs.
provided mutually in their respective will a provision wherein Hodges, pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3 of
they would give all their estate to the surviving spouse, and the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes and admission
upon the death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of what of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
has been inherited by the surviving spouse from the earlier further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate
deceased spouse would be bequeathed to the brothers and could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later to be
sisters of the later deceased. the actual provisions of Texas law.
3. Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate estate of
Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was appointed special Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should proceed, there having
administrator and later executor of the will. No liquidation was no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the
made. -Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was appointed estate
Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate and was initially also Mr. 4. Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs. Hodges's
Hodges' estate but PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for estate
both estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB and Magno)
differed in the alleged share of Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal WHAT CANNOT BE DECIDED:
partnership property that she could have bequeathed to her 1. WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share
heirs. 2. WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of the
conjugal property
PCIB Magno >>>case is remanded to trial court to allow the parties to
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges Texas law applicable, present evidence in relation to these issues
< 1/2 of her share in the wherein no system of
conjugal estate (Apply legitime provided so estate RULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT BE
Philippine law), of Mrs. Hodges could not LESS THAN 1/4 OF THE CPP VS. FINDING THAT NO
notwithstanding Art16 of our be less than her share or (?) EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS LAWS? Court said that
Civil code which mandates the >1/2 evidence should still be presented re: what Texas law contains
application of Texas law, but PCIB now cannot allege that the estate is less than ¼.
Mr.Hodges being a citizen of *Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
Texas judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in
dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
There was also an allegation on the part of Magno (for the exceptional n instances when the said laws are already within
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges) that Mr. Hodges made a the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well
renunciation of the inheritance in a manifestation to the US and generally known, or they have been actually ruled upon in
inheritance tax authorities (probably to escape inheritance tax other cases before it and none of the parties concerned claim
liabilities), which was allegedly ratified by the heirs in the otherwise.
Philippines.
(court, though, did not rule on alleged renunciation. For
purposes of the discussion, Court assumed that renunciation Judicial notice of municipal ordinances
was not upheld) G.R. No. L-26053
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO
Issue: WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB, should be GARCIA et al.
applied and not Texas law?
Texas law applies, but because of estoppel (?) and it is yet to FACTS: City of Manila (Plaintiff) is the owner of certain
be proven… parcels of land. Defendants entered upon the premises of such
property without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built
*note: in Succession, it was held in this case that there was no houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
fideicommissary substitution so the 1st heir instituted (Mr.
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building The Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case
permits from the city. to the Court of Appeals contending that Lot 5367 was earlier
declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision
On 1947, the defendants were given by Mayor Valeriano E. rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos following an order of
Fugoso written permits, each labeled as "lease contract", to general default. The Solicitor General thus filed a motion with
occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein the appellate court to have the case reopened and remanded to
set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged the court a quo to allow the Republic of the Philippines to
nominal rentals. present the decision of Judge Garlitos. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and ordered the records of the case
The defendants were demanded to pay their rentals and to remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
vacate the premises due to the expansion of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School. However, the defendants refused. During the rehearing, however, the Government failed to
Hence, this suit to recover possession. present the said order of Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the
Court of Appeals held in favour of Gacot. Hence, this case
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, this filed by the Republic.
appeal. The defendants contended that the trial judge ruled in
favor of the plaintiff based on the Exhibit E (certification of ISSUE: WON the Court should take judicial notice of the
the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Order of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos.
Board) which its admissibility was previously ruled out by
him during the hearing. RULING: YES
ISSUE: WON it was proper for the trial court to take judicial Firstly, the rules of procedure and jurisprudence, do not
notice of the Ordinance 4566 in ruling that the city needs the sanction the grant of evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of
premises for school purposes. evidence which is not formally offered, and secondly, that
adjective law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the
RULING: YES. enforcement of substantive law may not remain assured. The
Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed
of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In
Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so
P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962- construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of
1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional substantial justice.
building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court
It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, provides:
ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the
decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall
views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
vacate the premises for school expansion and he cited the very the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
document, Exhibit E. history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature,
to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely
for this purpose. Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras opined:
The elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in
would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the
trial judge could well have taken — because the was duty same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another
bound to take — judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in
reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts the same court, and of public records on file in the same
sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record,
by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the
confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of
P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional the record of another case between different parties in the
building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court
personnel.
Judicial notice of a court’s own acts and records The case was REMANDED to the trial court for further
G.R. No. 119288. August 18, 1997 proceedings
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF As a rule, no judicial notice of records of other cases. The
APPEALS and JOSEFA GACOT, respondents. following are the exceptions: a.) in the absence of objection,
and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court adjudicated Lot No. 5367 properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case
in Cadastral Case No. 13, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 1133, filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
to herein private respondent, now deceased Josefa Gacot, the before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
claimant in the cadastral case. reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number
or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated;
or b.) when the original record of the former case or any part before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even
of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have
admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991 . . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents. all or any part of the original record of a case filed in
its archives as read into the record of a case pending
FACTS: The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
land consisting of about 440 square meters. In 1973, an action party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional name and number or in some other manner by which
Trial Court by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
Tabuena. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in admitted as a part of the record of the case then
arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu pending.
proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which
had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when,
in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the
another case involving the same parties but a different parcel parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part
of land. [Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then
and Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman pending." These conditions have not been established here. On
and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923]. The CA affirmed the ruling the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his
of the RTC that the said exhibits were in fact formally testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the
submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of trial court in the case then pending before it.
stenographic notes.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" were formally
offered as evidence. NO
2. WON the lower court properly took judicial notice of the

evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327. NO
G.R. No. 144570
RULING: VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Petitioner, - versus JOSE J.
CAFE, et al. Respondents.
1. We have examined the record and find that the exhibits
submitted were not the above-described documents but FACTS: Petitioner Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial
Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for
last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not writ of restraining order against public respondents Mayor
include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality
and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution No.
formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." 7).
This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate
court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111,
"C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the
quoted transcript. construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the
Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof
as follows: Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of
Resolution No. 49, series of 1989 (Resolution No. 49),
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider denominated as Ordinance No. 10, appropriating a further
no evidence which has not been formally offered. amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must in the same public market.
be specified.
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who
exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from
part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" their personal funds.
and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this
was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They It appears that both parties agreed to await the decision in CA
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. G.R. SP No. 20424, which involved similar facts, issues and
parties. The RTC, consequently, deferred the resolution of the
2. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized pending petition. The appellate court eventually rendered its
to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending decision in that case finding that the petitioners were not
entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for as they had no legal their office on May 18, 1979; however, it was not included in
interest in the controversy. Upon elevation to the Supreme the May 19 dispatch to Bulacan and was actually dispatched
Court as UDK Case No. 9948, the petition for review on on May 21, 1979. The said motion for reconsideration was
certiorari was denied for being insufficient in form and also denied.
substance
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, their
ISSUE: WON the parties were bound by the outcome in CA appeal was also denied.
G.R. SP. No. 20424
Hence, this petition.
RULING: YES
ISSUE: WON the practice of the post office of stamping
It was the petitioner who wanted the parties to await the immediately on the envelope the date on which a letter was
decision of the Supreme Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since posted is a matter of judicial notice.
the facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner,
having expressly agreed to be bound by our decision in the RULING: NO
aforementioned case, should be reined in by the dismissal
order we issued, now final and executory. In addition to the The post office practice of which the lower court took judicial
fact that nothing prohibits parties from committing to be notice is not covered by any of the instances provided by the
bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial Rules. Neither can it be classified under “matters which are of
notice of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
their consent or do not object. demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.”
As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and For a matter to be taken judicial notice of by the courts of law,
records in the same case, of facts established in prior it must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In
proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of other words, judicial notice of facts is measured by general
its own records of another case between the same knowledge of the same facts.
parties, of the files of related cases in the same court,
and of public records on file in the same court. In Indeed, the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to
pleadings or judgment of a case in another court be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken
between the same parties or involving one of the that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubts
same parties, as well as of the record of another case upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
between different parties in the same court.
G.R. No. 153535. July 28, 2005

Judicial notice of post office practices
G.R. No. L-54886 September 10, 1981 SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION, Spouses
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special JONG-WON HONG and SOO-OK KIM
Second Division), COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF HONG,*TERESITA CU, and RICARDO P. GUEVARA
BULACAN, TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, and Spouse,** respondents.
MARLENE, PACITA, MATTHEW, VICTORIA and
ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, respondents. Facts: Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation (MINFANCO for
brevity) with principal offices in Iligan City. Ricardo P.
FACTS: On May 17, 1979, petitioner asked the CFI Bulacan Guevara was the President and Chairman of the Board of
for a fifth motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal Directors of the Corporation. Jong-Won Hong, the General
from May 18, 1979 to June 17, 1979. Petitioner filed its notice Manager of Ssangyong Corporation, was the Vice-President of
of appeal on June 7, 1979 although the lower court has not yet the Corporation for Finance, Marketing and Administration.
acted on its fifth motion for extension of time. The private So was Teresita R. Cu. On November 26, 1990, the Board of
respondents filed an opposition in the notice of appeal on the Directors of the Corporation approved a ‘Resolution’
ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary authorizing its President and Chairman of the Board of
period because petitioner’s motion dated May 17, 1979 was Directors or Teresita R. Cu, acting together with Jong-Won
filed on May 21, 1979. Hong, to secure an omnibus line in the aggregate amount of
₱30,000,000.00 from the Solidbank. In the meantime, the
Petitioner filed its opposition to the objection of the private Corporation started its operations sometime in April, 1991. Its
respondents, contending that the said May 17, 1979 motion for indebtedness ballooned to ₱200,453,686.69 compared to its
extension of time was actually mailed on May 18, 1979, which assets of only ₱65,476,000.00. On May 21, 1991, the
was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower Corporation secured an ordinary time loan from the Solidbank
court’s order on his fourth motion for extension of time. in the amount of ₱3,200,000.00. Another ordinary time loan
was granted by the Bank to the Corporation on May 28, 1991,
The lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00 or in the total amount of
ground that the fifth motion for extension of time and the ₱5,000,000.00, due on July 15 and 26, 1991, respectively. The
record on appeal were filed out of time; and found the said Corporation failed to pay its loan availments from the Bank
fifth motion was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on inclusive of accrued interest. On February 11, 1992, the Bank
May 18, 1979 as the latter relied on the date stamped on the sent a letter to the Corporation demanding payment of its loan
envelope by Manila Post Office. availments inclusive of interests due. The Corporation failed
to comply with the demand of the Bank.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that The appellate court took judicial notice of the practice of
the said motion was filed on time and attached therein the banks and financing institutions to investigate, examine and
letter of the postmaster stating that the mail was received by assess all properties offered by borrowers as collaterals, in
order to determine the feasibility and advisability of granting OSG said that it was not interposing any objection to the
loans. Before agreeing to the consolidation of Minfaco’s loans, Motion for Intervention filed by the Chamber of Mines of the
it presumed that petitioner had done its homework. Philippines, Inc. (CMP) and was in fact joining and adopting
the latter's Motion for Reconsideration.Memoranda were
accordingly filed by the intervenor as well as by petitioners,
Issue: May bank practices be the proper subject of judicial public respondents, and private respondent, dwelling at length
notice under Sec. 1 [of] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. on the three issues discussed below. Later, WMCP submitted
its Reply Memorandum, while the OSG -- in obedience to an
Ruling: Order of this Court -- filed a Compliance submitting copies of
more FTAAs entered into by the government.
Judicial Notice of Bank Practices
This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court
in taking judicial notice of the practice of banks in conducting Issue: Whether the issue is of judicial notice
background checks on borrowers and sureties. While a court is
not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Ruling: Fifth, it is argued that Section 2 of Article XII
Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless authorizes nothing more than a rendition of specific and
may do so under Section 2 of the same Rule. The latter Rule limited financial service or technical assistance by a foreign
provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice company. This argument begs the question "To whom or for
of "matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be whom would it be rendered"? or Who is being assisted? If the
known to judges because of their judicial functions." answer is "The State," then it necessarily implies that the State
Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of itself is the one directly and solely undertaking the large-scale
banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has noted exploration, development and utilization of a mineral resource,
that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to so it follows that the State must itself bear the liability and cost
investigate, examine and assess would-be borrowers’ credit of repaying the financing sourced from the foreign lender
standing or real estate32 offered as security for the loan applied and/or of paying compensation to the foreign entity rendering
for. technical assistance.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as
al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of well, that the government is and has for many many years
Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, been financially strapped, to the point that even the most
Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); essential services have suffered serious curtailments --
R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC education and health care, for instance, not to mention judicial
(PHILIPPINES) INC. services -- have had to make do with inadequate budgetary
allocations. Thus, government has had to resort to build-
operate-transfer and similar arrangements with the private
Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated sector, in order to get vital infrastructure projects built without
its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the any governmental outlay.
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-
40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the The very recent brouhaha over the gargantuan "fiscal crisis" or
government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs "budget deficit" merely confirms what the ordinary citizen has
are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. suspected all along. After the reality check, one will have to
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar admit the implausibility of a direct undertaking -- by the State
to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 itself -- of large-scale exploration, development and utilization
Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Such an
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural undertaking entails not only humongous capital requirements,
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the but also the attendant risk of never finding and developing
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the economically viable quantities of minerals, petroleum and
Filipino nation. other mineral oils.
It is equally difficult to imagine that such a provision

The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who
restricting foreign companies to the rendition of only financial
had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the
or technical assistance to the government was deliberately
foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the
crafted by the drafters of the Constitution, who were all well
enterprise, including operation of the field in the event
aware of the capital-intensive and technology-oriented nature
petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion
of large-scale mineral or petroleum extraction and the
and development; nearly unfettered control over the
country's deficiency in precisely those areas. 41 To say so would
disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted;
be tantamount to asserting that the provision was purposely
effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of
designed to ladle the large-scale development and utilization
extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic
of mineral, petroleum and related resources with impossible
resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution
conditions; and to remain forever and permanently "reserved"
(Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service
for future generations of Filipinos.
contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed separate Motions
for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the
A More Reasonable Lookat the Charter's Plain Language
Court required petitioners to comment thereon. In the
Sixth, we shall now look closer at the plain language of the
Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the case for Oral Argument
Charter and examining the logical inferences. The drafters
on June 29, 2004.
chose to emphasize and highlight agreements x x x involving
either technical or financial assistance in relation to foreign
After hearing the opposing sides, the Court required the parties corporations' participation in large-scale EDU. The inclusion
to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their of this clause on "technical or financial assistance" recognizes
arguments. In a Resolution issued later the same day, June 29, the fact that foreign business entities and multinational
2004, the Court noted, inter alia, the Manifestation and corporations are the ones with the resources and know-how to
Motion (in lieu of comment) filed by the Office of the provide technical and/or financial assistance of the magnitude
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of public respondents. The
and type required for large-scale exploration, development and interest at P79,732.00 in cash. In determining the valuation of
utilization of these resources. the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established
in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz
The drafters -- whose ranks included many academicians, Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.")
economists, businessmen, lawyers, politicians and government
officials -- were not unfamiliar with the practices of foreign
corporations and multinationals. Issue: Whether the valuation formula of the RTC of the
Neither were they so naïve as to believe that these entities properties based on its pending case (Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR,
would provide "assistance" without conditionalities or et al.) without conducting a hearing is proper.
some quid pro quo. Definitely, as business persons well know
and as a matter of judicial notice, this matter is not just a Ruling: The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of
question of signing a promissory note or executing a respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial
technology transfer agreement. Foreign corporations usually notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case
require that they be given a say in the management, for pending before it and applied the same to this case without
instance, of day-to-day operations of the joint venture. They conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
would demand the appointment of their own men as, for consent of the parties.
example, operations managers, technical experts, quality
control heads, internal auditors or comptrollers. Furthermore,
they would probably require seats on the Board of Directors -- Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
all these to ensure the success of the enterprise and the judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
repayment of the loans and other financial assistance and to even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
make certain that the funding and the technology they supply same court or before the same judge. 24 They may only do so
would not go to waste. Ultimately, they would also want to "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the
protect their business reputation and bottom lines. opposing party,"25 which are not obtaining here.
In short, the drafters will have to be credited with enough

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to
pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign entities will
all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
not enter into such "agreements involving assistance" without
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
requiring arrangements for the protection of their investments,
is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
gains and benefits.
judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
Thus, by specifying such "agreements involving assistance," "SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. –
the drafters necessarily gave implied assent to everything that During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
these agreements necessarily entailed; or that could reasonably request of a party, may announce its intention to take
be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective, judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
including management authority with respect to the day-to-day heard thereon.
operations of the enterprise and measures for the protection of
the interests of the foreign corporation, PROVIDED THAT "After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
Philippine sovereignty over natural resources and full control court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
over the enterprise undertaking the EDU activities remain judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
firmly in the State. heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in
the case."
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS- JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S.
BANAL, respondents. ALFELOR, Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Facts: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are
the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land Facts: Plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children,
situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to Alfelor Spouses. Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily Motion for Intervention. Josefina attached to said motion her
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Answer in Intervention, claiming that she was the surviving
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,1 as amended, spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was void ab initio for having been contracted during the
of 1988. Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, subsistence of a previous marriage.
pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a
summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order 12 denying the motion
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation. able to prove her claim. RTC ruled that while Josefina
submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of
its identification and the accompanying testimony on its
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and
Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a legality.
petition for determination of just compensation. The trial court
computed the just compensation for the coconut land
at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that
of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents' valuation under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an
of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 his name pursuant to their verbal agreement they entered into.
that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to her. When petitioners Arroyo refused, Hence, respondent Taduran
Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the filed a complaint with the trial courtin the Makati RTC,
previous marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage praying that petitioners petitioners be ordered compelled to
was proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, deliver and reconvey the title to the subject property to him
pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the and that petitioners they be condemned adjudged to payliable
second marriage was void from the beginning. for actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱500,000 and to payplus the costs of suit including and
attorney’s fees. Respondent claimed that petitioner Cristino he
Issue: Whether the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by constituted Arroyo, Jr. was his a mere agent tasked to look for
the other party who claims to be the second wife, should be a condominium unit to purchase.
allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the
share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
The Court does not find the evidence presented by plaintiff
sufficient to establish agency. As a contractual relationship
Ruling: The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her agency should be proven by clear, convincing and highly
co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first credible evidence. Petitioners filed an appealed to the Court of
marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to Appeals and decided that in view of the admission by
wit: appellant Cristino Arroyo, Jr. of his obligation to pay the
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the appellee of his time deposit proceeds which was used to pay
previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the off appellant’s loan with the bank, the trial court correctly
herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;20 ruled that while reconveyance of the subject condominium
unit may no longer be ordered, the appellee is entitled to be
indemnified by the appellants to the extent of the amount of
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several
his time deposit applied to the payment of appellants’ loan.
times that she knew that her late husband had been previously
married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission
constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; Issue: Whether the admission of petitioner during the trial is
made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such conclusive
statement qualifies as a judicial admission. 21A party who
judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22production of Ruling:
evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also , petitioners Arroyo’s admission of his their indebtedness to
removes an admitted fact from the field of respondent during the trial and in their petition before us is
controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the conclusive. Such admission is binding on them and no amount
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such of contradictory evidence can offset it. Judicial admissions,
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the
to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case, are
whether objection is interposed by the party or not. 25 The conclusive on them,. No evidence being is required needed to
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading prove the same and it cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with admission was made. However, the records does not show any
what was pleaded. attempt on the part of petitioners to contradict such their
judicial admission, either on the ground of palpable mistake or
by denying that they had ever made such admission. Instead,
G.R. No. 147012 January 29, 2004 petitioners specifically restated in their petition that they were
CRISTINO O. ARROYO, JR. and SANDRA R. indeed indebted to respondent in the amount of ₱500,000.
ARROYO, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO A. Petitioners They categorically declared,:
TADURAN, Respondent.
"(p)ursuant to the dictum that no one should be unjustly
Facts: Respondent Eduardo Taduran and petitioner Cristino benefitted (sic) or enriched at the expense of another, Arroyo,
Arroyo, Jr. were cousins. In 1988, respondent Eduardo Jr. admitted having an obligation to pay respondent. The latter
Taduran and petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr. entered into a can recover whatever Arroyo, Jr. may owe him, pursuant to
verbal agreement to form a corporation and to acquire a Art. 1236 (second par.) of the Civil Code, but the recovery
suitable office for this purpose. Pursuant to the agreement, should certainly be done in the proper manner, in the proper
petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr. was able to purchase from case, and in another forum."
Cityland Development Corporation a condominium unit for
the price of ₱5348,718.30. The amount money used to
purchase the condominium unit was loaned borrowed by Such admission required no further proof and to require
petitioner Cristino Arroyo, Jr. from the Commercial Bank of respondent to file a separate case to recover the ₱500,000 with
Manila (now Bank of Commerce) and was guaranteed by the in a different court and in another proceeding will only result
time deposit of respondent Taduran with in the same bank. in a protracted litigation. This is inconsistent with the orderly
When the loan matured, the proceeds of the time deposit and efficient administration of justice.
proceeds amounting to ₱500,000 was applied by respondent
respondent Taduran in as payment for of the loan. Title to the G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008
condominium unit was in the name of petitioner Cristino FAUSTINA CAMITAN and DAMASO LOPEZ vs.
Arroyo, Jr., married to Sandra Arroyo (his co-petitioner in the FIDELITY INVESTMENT CORPORATION
present case), was subsequently released to Arroyo by
Cityland to said spouses. FACTS: The case arose from the Petition for the issuance of
In the meantime, respondent Taduran discovered that Arroyo another duplicate copy of Certificate of Title No. T-(12110) T-
petitioners had already been enjoying the use of the subject 4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by herein petitioners, before the
property. Respondent demanded from them the delivery of the RTC Laguna. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of
title and other documents, and cause the transfer of title in to the property covered by said title but the owners duplicate
copy was lost and could not be found despite diligent efforts to for petitioners counsel to examine the document, retract his
locate it. After due proceedings, the RTC granted the petition, admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies.But he
directed the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a chose not to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that
second owners duplicate copy of the TCT, and declared void the admission of the petitioners counsel was made through
the first owners duplicate copy thereof. palpable mistake.
Later, herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation filed

a Petition for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title GR No. 154430, June 16, 2006
before the CA. According to Fidelity, it purchased the Sps. JOSE BINARAO & PRECIOSA BINARAO vs. PLUS
property covered by the subject certificate of title from the BUILDERS, INC.
registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
FACTS: Plus Builders, Inc., herein respondent, is in charge of
The CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of the construction and sale of the houses at Bahayang Pag-asa
judgment, and a preliminary conference was set, directing Subdivision. Spouses Binarao, petitioners, purchased a house
Fidelity to bring the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. At the and lot in Bahayang Pag-asa Subdivision for a total price of
preliminary conference, Fidelity’s counsel presented what was P327,491.95. Petitioner Jose Binarao executed an Affidavit of
claimed to be the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Counsel Undertaking on Equity whereby he agreed to pay respondent
for petitoners examined the certificate of title and admitted P96,791.95. Later, he paid the amount of P20,000.00 to
that it is the genuine owners copy thereof. respondent, leaving a balance of P65,571.22 payable in three
installments.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their
counsels admission on the genuineness of the owners duplicate For failure of the petitoners to compy with the undertaking,
copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest mistake respondent filed with the MTC a complaint for a sum of
and negligence owing to his excitement and nervousness in money against petitioners. MTC ruled in favor of Plus
appearing before the CA. They pointed to some allegedly Builders.
irreconcilable discrepancies between the copy annexed to the
petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity during the On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila,
preliminary conference. Fidelity argued that private rendered a Decision3 dated November 23, 2001, affirming in
respondents are bound by the judicial admission made by their toto the MTC Decision, holding that petitioners, in their
counsel during the preliminary conference. answer, did not deny respondent’s allegation in its complaint
that they have still an outstanding balance of P65,571.22.
The CA ruled in favor of Fidelity. Hence this petition. What is denied by petitioners in their answer, if at all, is the
fact that there is no agreed payment plan. But, as to the fact,
ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it considered the judicial that petitioners still owe P65,571.22, as balance after payment
admission of the counsel of the petitioners. of P20,000.00, is admitted by petitioners as this fact is never
denied by them.
HELD: No.
On petion for review to the CA, it affirmed in toto the RTC
In the transcript of the preliminary conference, it indubitably Decision. Hence this petition.
shows that counsel for petitioners made a judicial admission
and failed to refute that admission during the said proceedings ISSUE: WON petitioners admitted absolutely in their answer
despite the opportunity to do so. A judicial admission is an their liability.
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the HELD: Yes.
need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made "Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
Petitioners, in their Memorandum before the CA, attempted to contradicted only by showing that it was made through
retract their counsels judicial admission on the authenticity of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
the owners duplicate copy of TCT in the possession of A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b)
Fidelity. Petitioners explicate that the wrong admission was an during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or
honest mistake and negligence attributable to the counsels stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.5
nervousness and excitement in appearing for the first time Here, petitioners admitted in their answer the allegation in
before the CA. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, paragraph 4 of respondent’s complaint. As correctly ruled by
such an admission may only be refuted upon a proper showing the Court of Appeals, petitioners admitted that: (a) they paid
of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. the amount of P20,000.00; (b) they still have a balance of
Thus, the claim of honest mistake and negligence on the part P65,571.72; and (c) the unpaid balance is to be paid in three
of the counsel due to his excitement and nervousness in installments. It is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot
appearing before the CA did not suffice. be contradicted by the admitter who is the party himself and
binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing
Petitioners now claim that the honest mistake and negligence that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in this case) , no
of their counsel amount to palpable mistake. They also amount of rationalization can offset it.
enumerate observed discrepancies between the original TCT
on file with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and the
owners duplicate copy presented by Fidelity. Upon G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008
examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS
alleged discrepancies are more imagined than real. Had these COMPLEX, INCORPORATED and MATIAS B. AZNAR
purported discrepancies been that evident during the III
preliminary conference, it would have been easy for
petitioners counsel to object to the authenticity of the owners FACTS: Cuenco leased from respondent a property to be
duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity. As shown in operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the contract, Talisay
the transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity Sports Complex conducted a public bidding for the lease of
the property, which Cuenco also participated. The lease was Sps. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI
eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter, Cuenco SANTOS, et al. vs. Sps. JOSE LUMBAO and
demanded through several demand letters for the return of his PROSERFINA LUMBAO
deposit in the sum of P500k. However, all remained unheeded.
FACTS: Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and
Cuenco filed a Complaint for SUm of Money maintaining that Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving
respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita). Herein respondents
the deposut without any justifiable reason. In their Answer, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged
respondents argued that Cuenco caused physical damage to the owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which
leased premises and the cost and repair amounted to more than they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
P500k.
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to
RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property. On the first
that there is no inventory of damages. The respondents later occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in
offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial her mothers estate through a document denominated as Bilihan
court. ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979. Respondents Spouses
Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was
ISSUE: WON a judicial admission is conclusive and binding witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their
upon a party making the admission. signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an
additional seven square meters was added to the land as
HELD: Yes. evidenced by a document also denominated as Bilihan ng
Lupa, dated 9 January 1981.
Petitioner takes exception to the evidence of the alleged
inventory of the property, because of the earlier judicial Petitioners contend that they are not bound by the documents
admission made by respondents counsel that no inventory was denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa because the same were null
conducted and, accordingly, any evidence adduced by the and void for being falsified documents because one of those
respondents contrary to or inconsistent with the judicial documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo
admission should be rejected. This admission was confirmed were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared
in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court on March 8, personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact
1999 after the lease expired on May 8, 1998 they did not.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides: ISSUE: WON petitioners are bound by the Bilihan ng Lupa.
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, HELD: Yes.

made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be Upon examination of the documents, this Court finds that in
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in
petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and
during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses
stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. in the execution of the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August
The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes 1979. And in order to avoid their obligations in the said
judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions Bilihan ng Lupa, petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination,
require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed
clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance
mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the before the notary public due to the length of time that had
admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the passed.
pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him,
counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a
through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to
incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of
pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision- given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial
would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals
Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of mentioned in its Decision, herein petitioners, had not adduced
a general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the any other evidence to override the admission made in their
client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is Answer that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the
meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979, except that they were
the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x. Virgilios
against the person relying thereon. answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule
that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their and conclusive upon him applies in this case.
counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an
error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents
evidence contradictory to the judicial admission. G.R. No. 157847, August 25, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs.
G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007 LEODIGARIO SARABIA, et al.
FACTS: Sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office plaintiff passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board
(ATO) took possession and control of some 4,901 square- resolution authorizing defendant Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to
meter portion of Lot 6068, covered by Original Certificate of T.S. Cruz Subdivision four thousand (4,000) square meters of
Title No. P-15596 of the Register of Deeds of Aklan, in the the land covered by the aforecited Transfer Certificate of Title
names of herein respondents. No. S-1648 (11521-A).
The parties did not agree on the amount of compensation Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction,
therefor. Hence, on June 25, 1998, petitioner Republic of the defendant Rodolfo A. Agana did not return to plaintiff the
Philippines, represented by the Air Transportation Office, filed borrowed aforementioned title and[,] instead, allegedly forged
with the RTC an action for the expropriation of the entire Lot a board resolution of the plaintiff corporation supposedly to
6068. the effect that plaintiff had authorized him to sell the
remaining twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety-eight
RTC fixed the just compensation at P800.00 per square meter, (21,598) square meters of the subject property.
the current market value of the property in 1999. On appeal by
the Republic, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. CA placed A series of transactions thereafter took place between
emphasis on the alleged failure of petitioner prove that the defendant Rodolfo A. Agana and defendant Prima Real
taking of the occupied 4,901 square-meter portion of Lot 6068 Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions culminated to the
occurred in 1956. signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale
transferring the ownership of the subject land from herein
ISSUE: WON the taking of the property in 1956 was plaintiff to herein defendant Prima.
adequately established.
HELD: Yes. On 6 October 1988, defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S.
Cruz Subdivision the aforementioned four thousand (4,000)
As borne by the records, private respondents Answer and Pre- square meters portion of the subject property.
Trial Brief contain irrefutable admissions. In their Answer,
respondents declared, among others, that “they admit that the In its complaint, herein plaintiff alleged that the authorization
portion of the land sought to be expropriated which is was a forgery.
indicated by the white shaded of the sketch plan which is
attached as ANNEX B of the complaint with an area of 4,901 On the other hand, defendant Prima sought and insisted
square meters, more or less, has been in the possession of the constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on
plaintiff since 1956 up to the present.” Besides, respondents the ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A.
no less averred in their Pre-Trial Brief that, “a portion of the Villacorta who filed in behalf of the plaintiff the original
land they owned has been occupied by the plaintiff for many complaint and the amended and the second amended
years now which portion of land is indicated on the sketch complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to sue
plan which is marked Annex B of the complaint, without because they were not authorized therefor by the board of
paying any rental to the defendants”. directors of the plaintiff.
Well-settled is the rule that an admission, verbal or written, Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in good
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same faith when it relied solely on the face of the purported
case, does not require proof. A judicial admission is an authorization. This fact, according to defendant Prima, made it
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in a buyer in good faith and for value.
the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact,
which said party cannot thereafter disprove. Indeed, an
RTC-dismissed the complaint for annulment of sale with
admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
damages filed by the petitioner.4 It found that the respondent
party making such admission and are conclusive as to him,
was a buyer in good faith and for value
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto.
Surely, private respondents admissions in their Answer and Issue: Won Resp Agana was duly authorized by Petitioner to
Pre-Trial Brief are judicial admissions which render the taking enter into the sale of the subject property as evidenced by the
of the lot in 1956 conclusive or even immutable. This Court is Certification issued by said Petitioner?
thus convinced that the taking of the occupied 4,901 square-
meter portion of Lot 6068 occurred in 1956. Ruling: Anent the forged signature of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA
did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of
the Document Examiner of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings were not
G.R. No. 158144 July 31, 2008 really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the
investigation of questionable handwriting was not properly
ST. MARY'S FARM, INC., Petitioner, vs. PRIMA REAL followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively
PROPERTIES, INC., RODOLFO A. AGANA, JR., and show that the alleged standard sample signatures of Atty.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made
MANILA, Respondents. the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the
same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, the examiner testified
that it was possible to have variations in the standard
Facts: Plaintiff was the registered owner of an originally
signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as
25,598 sq m of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas
passage of time, pressure and physical condition of the writer
City under TCT No. S-1648 (11521-A) of the Registry of
which may have decisive influences on his handwriting’s
Deeds of Las Piñas City.
characteristics.8 Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be
concluded that a particular signature appearing in those
In compliance with a final court decision in Civil Case No. 87- documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and
42915 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL of Manila, a more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of
forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well
party making the allegation.9 Unfortunately, in the case at bar, as into the latter’s capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he
the petitioner failed to discharge this burden. relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller’s
duly notarized special power of attorney. He need not prove
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution anything more for it is already the function of the notarial
bearing the Secretary’s Certification, petitioner wants us to acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to
consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. the document, its due execution and authenticity.19
Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization.
We do not agree, because in the past, we have already held Aside from the pertinent documents presented, respondent also
that the non-appearance of the party before the notary public relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register of
who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render Deeds of Las Piñas City and Mr. Timoteo S. Cruz, owner of
the parties’ transaction void ab initio.10 However, the non- the land likewise sold by Rodolfo Agana for the petitioner,
appearance of the party exposes the notary public to with similar authorization by the petitioner and signed by the
administrative liability which warrants sanction by the Court. corporate secretary Atty. Agcaoili. Agana acted as petitioner’s
This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court authorized agent and had full authority to bind the company in
that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the that transaction with Cruz.
truthfulness of the statements contained in the board
resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be Thus, it is too late in the day to have the sale voided,
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all notwithstanding the retraction made by Rodolfo Agana in his
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. 11 In Comment22 on the Petition filed with this Court.
the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld.
Notarization converts a private document into a public A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it.
document, making it admissible in court without further proof He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory to, or
of its authenticity.121avvphi1 inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not
require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that
every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell the no such admission was made.23 In the instant case, there is no
subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an proof of these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the
innocent purchaser for value in good faith. retraction was merely an afterthought on the part of
respondent Agana with the intention to end the rift in the
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need family corporation.
only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property.
He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not G.R. No. 151952 March 25, 2009
obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such
degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the Appellee, vs.
registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession HERACLEO ABELLO Y FORTADA, Accused-Appellant.
thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not
aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the
property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller Facts: On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock (sic) in the
or in his capacity to convey title to the property.14 early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng
Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with her sister-in-
law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
All the conditions enumerated are present in the case at bar, mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m.
enough for us to consider Prima as a buyer in good faith. Abello again mashed the breast of AAA practically under the
Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company engaged in the same previous situation while the latter was sleeping. In these
buying and selling of real properties. As borne out by the two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of
records, respondent exerted efforts to verify the true the light coming from outside which illuminated the house.
background of the subject property. Rodolfo Agana presented Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time
to respondent the (1) notarized board resolution which stated placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got
that at a special meeting held on June 27, 1988, the board of awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand.
directors authorized Mr. Rodolfo A. Agana, Treasurer, to sell AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter
the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on
(TCT) No. S-1648;15 (2) a separate Certification by the the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and
petitioner’s president, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr., authorizing its mother.
Treasurer, Rodolfo Agana, to sell said property; 16 and, (3)
TCT No. T-1648 of the subject property. Convinced that
Rodolfo Agana had the authority to sell on behalf of the Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing
company after being presented all these documents, the sale AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial. In all of the
between the parties was thereby consummated. A deed of sale instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim
was executed on September 5, 198817 and the full at the sala on his way to his room after retiring home.
consideration of ₱2,567,760.00 for the subject property was
paid.18 The RTC found Abello guilty under the three Informations.
It is of no moment that the checks were made payable to The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal.
Rodolfo Agana and not to the company. This was no longer
necessary considering that respondent had every reason to rely Issue: WON the conviction must be sustained? YES.
on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced by the
notarized Certification. Ruling: We carefully reviewed AAA’s testimony in light of
the issues Abello raised in his appeal, and in light of matters
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller he did not raise but which materially affect his innocence or
who has [in his] possession title to the property but whose culpability. After due consideration, we find no reason to
capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith
doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of the mother and sister-in-law who thereafter sought police
events that led to the filing of the present charges. assistance.25
In her testimony, AAA positively and unequivocally narrated The record also shows that AAA lived a sheltered life cared
the details of her rape and sexual abuse she suffered in for by her relatives because of her polio. 26 Unless the contrary
Abello’s hands. is shown, it is highly unusual for her to have the worldly
sophistication to invent or fabricate the charges she made,
We note that both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to particularly one made against her stepfather. A charge against
be positive, direct, and categorical, while the RTC found the one’s stepfather, too, is unusual in our socio-cultural context
defense’s version too strained to be believed for being because of the respect we give our elders, and is only
contrary to human experience; the RTC refused to accept the understandable if there is a deeply felt cause for complaint.
claim that Abello was prosecuted for rape and sexual abuse We particularly note that no imputation has been made at any
simply because he stepped with his knees on her time in the case that AAA is not normal, save for her physical
stepdaughter’s hand.15 A material point we noted is that Abello disability, or has a strained relationship with her stepfather
could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him. 16 The prior to the acts charged.
substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of
motivation are critical points for us since a straightforward, Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear
categorical and candid narration by the victim deserves indications of errors in giving credence to AAA’s testimony,
credence if no ill motive can be shown driving her to falsely we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC
testify against the accused.17 and the CA.
Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other G.R. No. 177361 February 1, 2010
arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons:
ARMANDO VIDAR @ "Ricky", NORBERTO
First, the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice BUTALON,(†) SONNY MARBELLA @ "Spike" and
between the offended party’s positive testimony and the denial JOHN DOES and PETER DOES, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically and OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
unmistakably identified Abello as her rapist and sexual
abuser;18 the identification was positive because the scene was Facts: It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army
illuminated by a light coming from outside the parties’ house officer, Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda (Dioneda), was brutally
at the time of the incidents.19 She also testified that during the murdered and valuables taken from his house located at Sitio
rape, she saw Abello suddenly enter the room of her mother Burabod, Barangay Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City.
after she yelped in pain when he stepped with his knee on her
hand.20 Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide
one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the against herein petitioners Armando Vidar @ Ricky (Vidar),
positive testimony of the offended party.21 Norberto Butalon (Butalon), Sonny Marbella @ Spike
(Marbella), and several Does was filed.
Abello likewise admitted that in the wee hours of the mornings
of June 30, July 2, and July 8, 1998, he passed by the sala of Petitioners, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not
their house where AAA and her companions were guilty to the crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in
sleeping.22 This admission shows that he had the opportunity the Information. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the
and the means to commit these crimes in terms of his location merits followed.
and close proximity to AAA who, together with her
companions, were then sleeping.
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the
prosecution witnesses Florecita Dioneda (Florecita) and Niña
Second, we flatly reject Abello’s argument that his Dioneda Elemanco (Niña) that led to the conviction of the
relationship with AAA insulates him from the crimes charged. petitioners are as follows:
Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of
cases, the relationship between the offender and the offended
party has never been an obstacle to the commission of the At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 30, 2001,
crime against chastity. Although alarming to admit, this kind Florecita, wife of the victim, and her sister-in-law Niña, were
and degree of relationship is now quite common in these types inside the former’s house at Burabod, Poblacion, Bacon
of crimes. Studies show a rising incidence of family and District, Sorsogon City. They were watching television when
domestic violence where 98.8% of the victims are women; an three armed men suddenly barged inside. One of them, later
estimated 26.7% of these cases involve sexual abuse, while identified as Marbella, poked a gun at Florecita while the other
33% involve incest committed against children. 23 In these two ransacked the house taking a wallet, crash helmet and
cases, the male spouse, the father of the victim, or close male a .45 caliber firearm with its magazine. These items belong to
relatives, have been identified as frequent abusers. 24 Dioneda who was then taking a bath outside the house.
Florecita and Niña followed the three men when the latter
went out. At the yard, they saw the three men together with
Third, we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of more or less 10 other persons surrounding Dioneda who was
the incidents complained of, to be preposterous. It is highly lying facing the ground. Despite Florecita’s pleas not to kill
unlikely that a woman in her right mind would expose and her husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots
declare herself a victim of rape and sexual abuse, when she causing Dioneda’s instantaneous death. The three then
would thereby open herself to the humiliating experience of a boarded Dioneda’s motorcylcle and fled the area.1avvphi1
public trial and to the possible social stigma of being a victim
of rape and sexual abuse. In the normal course, a woman will
not expose herself to these risks unless she is certain of what Niña corroborated the material details of the robbery and the
happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the killing and testified further that she could not forget the faces
perpetrator. We note in this regard AAA’s categorical of the three malefactors as she was very sure that they were
testimony that she filed the criminal charges because she did the ones who barged inside the house and later killed her
not know what to do; she thus reported the incidents to her brother.
Petitioners vehemently denied the accusations against them. accused to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence should
Marbella averred that he does not know Dioneda and that he be supported by satisfactory proof.13 Aside from their bare
was in his house in Lungib, Pilar, Sorsogon on April 30, 2001 allegation, petitioners miserably failed in this regard. On the
while Vidar asserted that he has no knowledge of the killing of contrary, we are not prepared to disbelieve the prosecution
Dioneda. Butalon, on the other hand, professed his innocence, witnesses’ testimonies on their vital points substantiating the
claiming that he also does not know Dioneda and that he was circumstances of time and place of the offense charged against
in his house at Omoroy, Legaspi City on April 30, 2001. petitioners.
Collectively, they alleged that the possible motive behind the
charge against them is that they were known members of the Issue 2: Petitioners likewise contend that their identification
New People’s Army (NPA). by the prosecution witnesses was attended with irregularity
considering that they were identified merely from among the
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court- found all of them guilty four photographs presented at Camp Escudero. They posit that
of the crime of robbery with homicide. this manner of identification provides an incredible suggestive
procedure.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals -affirmed
Ruling: NO.
Issue:
In ascertaining whether an out-of-court identification is
Petitioners’ Arguments positive or derivative, the Court has adopted the totality of
circumstances test wherein the following factors are taken into
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in affirming consideration: 1) the witness’s opportunity to view the
the decision of the trial court despite the absence of proof criminal at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’s degree of
adduced before the court below establishing beyond attention at that time; 3) the accuracy of any prior description
reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of robbery given by the witness; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
with homicide. They maintain that the delay of almost a year the witness at the identification; 5) the length of time between
in filing formal charges against them cast serious doubt on the the crime and the identification; and 6) the suggestiveness of
intention and motive of the complainant. They aver that while the identification procedure.14
the incident took place on April 30, 2001, formal charges
against them were filed only in February 2002. We have scrutinized with great caution the witnesses’ manner
of identifying petitioners vis-a-vis the foregoing factors and
Ruling: Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit. The delay we discern nothing irregular that would result in an erroneous
did not greatly weaken the credibility of the testimonies of the identification.
prosecution witnesses. In the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, we believe that the delay in At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses
reporting to the police authorities the attendant facts of the had an unobstructed view of the petitioners’ appearance who
crime for which the petitioners have been charged is consistent were not donning masks to hide their faces when the latter
with normal human behavior considering that after a tragic barged inside the house. There is no indication that darkness
incident, the last thing that the bereaved would want is to prevailed inside the house so as to have an obscure view at the
provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious time. They even testified that one of the petitioners even
act. Although there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of poked a gun at them while the others were ransacking the
justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, house. Thus even for a while, there was a frontal confrontation
personal safety takes priority as dictated by our culture. between petitioners and the witnesses, giving the latter an
Moreover, considering private complainant’s honest belief that opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. Nothing in the
petitioners are known to be members of the NPA, the fear of records allows the presence of any distraction that would have
reprisal from them was ever present which caused her disrupted the witnesses’ attention during the occurrence of the
momentary silence. After all, delay in reporting the occurrence incident. Niña even described to the policemen the physical
of a crime or other unusual event in rural areas is well appearance of petitioners though no cartographic sketch was
known.9 Others reveal the perpetrator of the crime only after presented.15 Experience dictates, precisely because of the
the lapse of one year or so to make sure that the possibility of unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses’
a threat to his life or to his loved ones is already diminished if eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability the
not totally avoided. In People v. Gornes10 we held that: identity of criminals.16 Though a considerable length of time
had elapsed, the witnesses never wavered in their
It is true that the charge against the appellant was initiated identification of petitioners. They cannot forget their faces.
only three and a half years after the commission of the crime.
However, the fact of delay alone does not work against the It is worth mentioning also that the identification of petitioners
witness. was effectively admitted when petitioners failed to dispute the
same before the lower courts. The in-court identification of the
Thus, the fact of delay attributed to the prosecution witnesses petitioners later on dispels any doubt as to the correctness of
cannot be taken against them. 11 What is important is that their their identities.
testimonies regarding the incident bear the earmarks of truth
and dependability. Moreover, the burden is on petitioners to prove that their mug
shot identification was unduly suggestive. There is no
One thing which bolsters the prosecution witnesses’ credibility evidence that the authorities had supplied or even suggested to
is the fact that they had no motive to prevaricate against the the witnesses that petitioners were the suspected gunmen. We,
petitioners. They were not actuated by improper motive to therefore, fail to see any flaw that would invalidate the
fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against eyewitnesses’ identification. As aptly observed by the CA:
them. Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate
that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper Both Florecita Dioneda and Niña Elemanco gave a credible
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and eyewitness’ account of the victim’s x x x death [by gunshots]
that their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 12 For in the hands of accused-appellant. Their testimony [sic] giving
personal motive on the part of a witness to testify against the details of a startling and shocking incident that cannot easily
be fabricated deserves credence and full probative weight for 2002, he was living in the same house as "AAA." 16 However,
it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events. when asked regarding the rape charges filed against him by his
Both of these witnesses had a good look at the victim’s daughter, appellant denied the same.
assailants, who did not at any time during the incident attempt
to conceal their faces. Accused-appellant MARBELLA even The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva (Marcelino)
stood less [than] a meter from Florecita Dioneda as he pointed who testified that he is the father of the appellant. 18He claimed
a gun at her while another accused-appellant even [etched] that "AAA" filed the rape cases against appellant because the
upon her a distinct impression of his baldness as repeatedly latter forbade her to entertain suitors. 19Marcelino also alleged
mentioned by her during her testimony. As there is nothing to that after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA" eloped with her
indicate that these two principal witnesses were moved by 20-year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from her
improper motives, their positive declarations on the witness boyfriend when she was brought under the care of the
stand deserve full faith and credit.18 Department of Social Welfare and Development. 20 When
asked how old "AAA" was when she allegedly eloped with her
The fact that the prosecution witnesses are related to the boyfriend, Marcelino answered that "AAA" was only 13 years
victim will not necessarily taint their testimonies. The weight old.21
of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way
affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
showing of improper motive on their part.19 Relationship per
se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA."
necessarily mean that the witness is biased.20 These However, it noted that although it was agreed upon during the
prosecution witnesses are the most aggrieved parties, being the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the
victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their motive of putting the fact remains that "AAA" was 12 years, six months and 19 days
killers behind bars cannot be considered improper. 21 It would when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9, 2002. 22 The
be unnatural for a relative who is interested in avenging the court below also observed that "AAA has always been a
crime to implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the pathetic child of oppression, abuse and neglect" and that "[h]er
guilty go unpunished.22 innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for survival,
and her virtual orphanhood sufficed to qualify every sexual
Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the molestation perpetrated by her father as rape x x x."23
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left
to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to Ruling of the Court of Appeals
observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts – and when his findings
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant claimed
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.23 that the prosecution failed to present evidence that would
overcome the presumption of his innocence.
G.R. No. 181829 September 1, 2010
Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to
formally offer in evidence the medical certificate and to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant. testify on his findings.28 Likewise, "AAA’s" birth certificate
was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil
Facts: On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed Registrar who allegedly prepared the same take the witness
against appellant for the crime of rape. stand. Thus appellant claimed that assuming he was indeed
guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for
When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not simple rape and not qualified rape because the minority of the
guilty to all charges.7 victim was not duly established.29
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the CA-affirmed the decision of the RTC
father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed that "AAA" was
below 12 years of age when the rape incidents The CA also concluded that even without the medical
happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and medical certificates were certificate, appellant could still be held liable for three counts
likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9 of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible
testimony of "AAA" and the medical certificate would only be
Version of the Prosecution corroborative evidence.40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA
recalled that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and
The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA" her relationship with the appellant had already been stipulated
narrated that when she was about 4 years old, her mother left upon. Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged
her in the care of her father, herein appellant. Since then, she in the Informations and proven during trial.41
had been living with her father.
Issue:
"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on
September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9, 2002. Ruling: At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt
that appellant thrice raped his daughter, "AAA." We examined
After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the prosecution the records and we find "AAA’s" testimony convincing and
rested its case. straightforward. We therefore have no reason to reverse or
modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
Version of the Defense victim’s testimony, more so in this case where the said
findings were affirmed by the CA.
The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his
testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA" is his daughter. 15 He We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that
also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, appellant could be convicted of rape even without the medical
certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely
on the testimony of the victim, provided the testimony is their contents. When "AAA" was placed on the witness stand,
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No reference was
nature and the normal course of things." 44 As stated above, ever made to her birth certificate. The same is true with the
"AAA’s" testimony was credible and convincing. As such, medical certificate. After the marking during the pre-trial, the
appellant’s conviction could rest solely on it. The medical prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the proceedings.
certificate would only serve as corroborative evidence. Neither did it present the doctor who prepared the same.
We, however, agree with the appellant that both the medical Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial that
certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate, although marked as "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age63 would not help
exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court found this
by the trial court and the CA because they were not formally admission inaccurate as in fact, "AAA" was already above 12
offered in evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9,
Court explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no 2002. Second and more important, appellant’s admission
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates Section 2, Rule
which the evidence is offered must be specified." 118 of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the
during pre-trial, the prosecution did not formally offer the said accused and his counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against
medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the the accused.
prosecution rested its case after presenting the testimony of
"AAA" without formally offering any documentary exhibit at In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order was
all. not signed by both appellant and his counsel.
Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha 45 is instructive, In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not
thus: present any satisfactory evidence to prove "AAA’s" minority.
"In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of the crime with which an accused is charged must be
time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying
in this case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and
excluded and rejected. clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no
conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying
xxxx circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the
victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant
must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt."65
The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.’ A formal offer
is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings G.R. No. 156178 January 20, 2006
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and ASSET
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the PRIVATIZATION TRUST, Petitioners, vs.
proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to
its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the Facts: Petitioners are the Philippine National Bank (PNB), a
appellate court will not be required to review documents not private banking corporation, and the Asset Privatization Trust
previously scrutinized by the trial court. (APT), an agency created by Proclamation No. 50 that takes
title to or possession, conserves, provisionally manages, and
xxxx disposes assets, which have been identified for privatization or
disposition, for the benefit of the National Government.
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial
evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered. Respondent Refrigeration Industries Inc. (RII) is a
Documents which may have been identified and marked as manufacturer of refrigerators and compressors.
exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally
offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as Prior to 1984, respondent RII occupied a portion of the
evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned assembly plant of Delta Motor Corporation (DMC). RII
any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there installed in the plant equipment, machinery and other chattels
is a significant distinction between identification of RII used in its business.3
documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done
in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the In February 1984, PNB, then a government-owned and
marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done controlled bank, foreclosed several parcels of real estate and
only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a chattels of DMC located at the DMC Compound. In an auction
particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit of the foreclosed properties, PNB was the highest bidder.
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the Thus, it took possession of all chattels inside the DMC
evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a compound, both as owner of chattels and as mortgagee of the
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must remaining properties.4
formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.46ten.lihpwal On June 18, 1984 when PNB took possession of the DMC
compound, RII demanded the release of its properties still
We find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing inside the compound, now the subject of the case, after RII
the admission of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth made statements claiming ownership over them. PNB allowed
certificate. The records would show that the lone witness for RII to remove some of its personal properties from the DMC
the prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain compound, upon the latter’s showing of proof of ownership.
However, respondent failed to produce any proof of undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question
ownership,5 with respect to the contested properties found in as to the facts.
Annex "C" of the Complaint. PNB’s refusal to release the
subject properties led to the filing of a complaint by RII Summary judgment, as prescribed by the rules must then
for Recovery of Possession with Damages before the RTC of ensue as a matter of law, to weed out sham claims or defenses
Makati on June 10, 1986. at an early stage of the litigation, to avoid the expense and loss
of time involved in a trial, and to separate what is formal or
At all the scheduled pre-trial conferences, PNB consistently pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and
manifested in court its willingness to release the chattels substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the
conditioned upon RII’s showing of evidence of ownership. burden of trial.13
Eventually, some of the properties were released.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim that there was no admission on
By virtue of Proclamation No. 50 as implemented by their part that respondent owned the chattels, our review of the
Administrative Circular No. 14 dated February 27, 1989, records shows that petitioners failed to either specifically deny
certain properties of RII inside DMC’s compound, with some or directly assail and raise as an issue, the validity of the letter
other acquired assets of PNB covered by the Circular, were dated May 11, 1989 and the letter dated May 29, 1989. Their
transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT). Hence in failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the said
1992, APT was impleaded as a party-defendant. Pursuant to documents amounts to a judicial admission pursuant to Section
Republic Act No. 8758,6 the corporate existence of APT 8, 14 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
expired on December 31, 2000. On December 6, 2000, former
President Joseph Estrada signed Executive Order No. 323 Judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be
creating the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the
which succeeded the APT. At the time, RII had not yet shown admissions had been made through palpable mistake. 15 These
additional evidence to support its claim over the remaining letters are deemed admitted as evidence, and they likewise
personal properties in PNB’s possession. supersede the defenses interposed by petitioners in their
respective answers.
Six (6) years later, on February 10, 1995, RII filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment.7 It averred that there was no It may lastly be recalled that from the very start, PNB
genuine issue to any material fact except the issue on consistently manifested its willingness to release the said
damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. RII alleged that during the properties upon respondent’s proof of ownership over them.
pre-trial conference, PNB manifested to APT, in a letter 8 dated The correspondence between the parties shows that PNB
May 11, 1989, that the machineries and equipments of RII actually admitted that the subject chattels belonged to RII but
listed in Annex "C" of the complaint were erroneously were erroneously transferred to petitioner APT. Conformably
transferred to APT, and that in a letter 9dated May 31, 1989, then, the trial court’s summary judgment is proper and correct.
APT acknowledged the mistakes and agreed to release the No reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in
properties to the authorized representative of RII. affirming it.
Both PNB and APT (PMO) opposed the motion on the ground
that there still existed a genuine factual issue, which was the
ownership of the chattels.
On August 7, 1995, a Summary Judgment was rendered by Ramos vs. Spouses Dizon, GR No. 137247, Aug. 7, 2006
the lower court for plaintiff as against defendants who are
hereby ORDERED to effect the return of all the chattels
and/or personal properties of plaintiff that were taken by them Facts: During the trial of the case, petitioner herself took the
as stated in Annex "C" of the Complaint. witness stand and testified. Thereafter, Petitioner presented
Elpidio as her second witness and he essentially reiterated
what petitioner had stated in her testimony. In the same
PNB appealed to the Court of Appeals. hearing, Elpidio was subjected to cross-examination. During
the cross-examination, several documents were marked in
On November 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in evidence.
toto the trial court’s decision. Hence, this petition
Thereafter, respondent counsel manifested before the trial
Issue: Was the summary judgment proper? Did the appellate court in that he was no longer presenting testimonial evidence;
court err in affirming the trial court’s decision? instead, he requested that some documents to be marked in
evidence. Also, respondent counsel was given ten days to
Ruling: We agree that the Court of Appeals correctly held that submit his formal offer of evidence in writing and petitioner
the summary judgment was properly rendered by the trial was given the same period of time to file her comment or
court. opposition thereto after which the case would be submitted for
resolution.
Firstly, it may be noted that PNB admitted in its May 11, 1989
letter to APT that the contested chattels belonged to RII, but The trial court, however, prior to the submission of
were erroneously taken during the foreclosure of DMC’s respondents’ formal offer of evidence, rendered a Decision
properties; that these were eventually transferred to APT. dated 24 January 1995 holding in favor of the respondent. It
Secondly, we also note that APT admitted that PNB wrote the was only on 31 January 1995 when respondent filed his
letter dated May 11, 1989; and that APT wrote a letter dated Formal Offer of Exhibits.
May 29, 1989 to PNB. With these admissions, there is no
genuine issue concerning RII’s ownership of the chattels and Petitioner argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not
their erroneous delivery to APT had remained. A "genuine consider evidence which has not been formally offered. In this
issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of regard, they argue that Exhibits 1 to 7, inclusive of sub-
evidence. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or markings, should not have been considered by the trial court in
its Decision considering that the same were not formally x x x Before we call on our first witness, we propose some
offered in evidence. stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing
Branch of the POEA that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic)
Issue: Whether the court a quo erred in considering an licensed nor authorized by the Department of Labor to recruit
evidence which was not formally offered? -NO workers abroad.
Held: Petitioner cannot complain now that she was deprived Court:
of the opportunity to cross-examine Elpidio. It bears stressing
that respondents Exhibits were presented during Elpidios Would you agree?
cross-examination and in the presence of petitioners counsel.
In fact, Elpidio was even subjected to an immediate re-direct Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor."
examination by petitioners counsel. Although the questions
posed to him at his re-direct examination pertained solely to Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to establish that the
Civil Case No. 90-51838 still, the opportunity was there for offender was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
petitioners counsel to question him as regards the other lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers?
exhibits of respondents. The fact that petitioners lawyer opted –NO
not to conduct a more thorough re-direct examination was his
own choice. Indeed, it may even be a part of his tactic on this
case but it certainly does not amount to a deprivation of due Held: The prosecution and the defense agreed to
process as now claimed by petitioner. stipulate/admit that from the record of the POEA Licensing
and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment,
accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. x x x is neither
But what further defeats petitioners cause on this issue is that licensed nor authorized by that office to recruit workers
respondents exhibits were marked and admitted during the overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative
pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order. On this point, from the POEA Administration is to take the witness stand, he
Section 2, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: will confirm to this fact as borne by the records.
Section 2. Judicial Admissions.-Admission made by the From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the
parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other defense counsel stipulated on two things: that "x x x from the
proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted record of the POEA, x x x accused Cristina Hernandez, Phil.
unless previously shown to have been made through palpable etc. Ass. x x x is neither licensed nor authorized by that office
mistake. to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly
authorized representative from the POEA Administratin (sic)
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that respondents exhibits is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact.
were not formally offered prior to the rendition of the Decision
in Civil Case No. 93-66439 by the court a quo, the trial court The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is
judge committed no error when he admitted and considered bound by the acts of his counsel who represents him. For all
them in the resolution of the case. After all, the pre-trial forms intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a
part of the proceedings and matters dealt with therein may not case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the
be brushed aside in the process of decision making. Otherwise, mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only
the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the
inconsequential and worthless. client. No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this
case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in
the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by
the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but
People vs. Hernandez obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in
conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled
Facts: Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant
with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment
in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 business either in her personal capacity or through Philippine-
(b) and (c) of the New Labor Code. Upon arraignment, Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA
appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed
Evidences were presented by both parties and after careful or authorized to recruit workers.
calibration of the evidence presented, the court a quo rendered
a decision holding that the defense of "denial" interposed by Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence
the accused could not prevail over the positive and clear contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had established the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. would be beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who
should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so
The accused appealed the case and one of her contention was during trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent
that the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her
elements of the crime of illegal recruitment -- that the offender defense.
is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers. In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed
during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is
It is noteworthy that during the presentation of witnesses and tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts
as culled from the transcriptions on record, the following stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of
discourse has occurred: the Rules of Court which provides that:
"Prosecutor: "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of
admission was made." the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in
the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view
of the fact that: [] an attorney who is employed to manage a
partys conduct of a lawsuit [] has prima facie authority to
Silot vs. Dela Rosa, GR 159240 make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written
stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are
conclusive. (Italics supplied.) In fact, judicial admissions are
Facts: On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who
respondent Estrella de la Rosa entered into a contract for the is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When
construction of a dormitory-apartment building on Lot 1-A-9- such admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing
D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed that with proof of some fact, [] they bind the client, whether made
Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of during, or even after, the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
the total value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon
turnover in February 1997 of the completed structure, the total
cost of materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not
of which is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a
total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount prior showing that the admissions had been made through
due. Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot palpable mistake.
about the overpayment but the latter refused to return the
overpayment. After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this
la Rosa filed a suit against Silot. Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and
dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot,
dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should
la Rosa. Atty. San Jose admitted Goingos proposed testimony. be examined any further since his testimony as summarized in
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing
and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount. counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said
witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by
On appeal, petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San opposing counsel.
Jose merely admitted that the subject of Goingos testimony
was that stated in the offer of testimony, but he did not admit
the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty. San
Jose could not and should not have admitted the testimony
because he had no special power of attorney to enter into such
stipulations or to compromise his clients right without the
latters direct intervention.
Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the

admissions as well as the negligence of their counsel.
Issue: whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of

petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondents
evidence? YES
Held: As the records would plainly show, Silot was not

deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court
observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or
otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made
by his counsel. Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was

not deprived of his day in court. He was given every
opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and
manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify.
As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee
de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-
appellant Silots counsel, if he would admit the purpose for
which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with
his testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that We
will admit that. And when asked by the judge if he will admit
it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.
More importantly, Silots counsel clearly made admissions of

the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose
presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we
held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with
proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to
wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and

defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically

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EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS | RULE 129 1

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall

facts without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the

FACTS: Petitioners Natividad Candido and Victoria

G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the

2. WON the lower court properly took judicial notice of the

G.R. No. 153535. July 28, 2005

It is equally difficult to imagine that such a provision

In short, the drafters will have to be credited with enough

Later, herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation filed

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, HELD: Yes.

"Prosecutor: "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the

Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the

Issue: whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of

Held: As the records would plainly show, Silot was not

As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was

More importantly, Silots counsel clearly made admissions of

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and

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