Jan Apr2010

PB 7-10-1
MG MICHAEL FERRITER
Commanding General,
Maneuver Center of Excellence
Infantry
JANUARY-APRIL 2010 Volume 99, Number 1
RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor FEATURES
26 COIN AND COMPANY FUSION CELL OPERATIONS
MICHELLE J. ROWAN 1LT David Liebmann, 1LT Christopher Ploss, 1LT Stefan Hasselblad,
Deputy Editor 1LT Karl Gunther, CPT Brendan Collins, MAJ Augustine Gonzalez
31 NON-LETHAL TARGETING IN COIN
MEREDITH DALZELL CPT Thomas J. Woodard
Editorial Assistant 34 REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY INFANTRYMAN IN IRAQ
CPT Matt Russell, 1LT Bill Helmsing, 1LT David Kimsey, 1LT Charlie Timm
DEPARTMENTS
FRONT COVER: 1 COMMANDING GENERAL’S NOTE
Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 2 INFANTRY NEWS
4th Infantry Regiment take a 5 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
knee while descending a
mountain ridge in Zabul 5 FM 3-24.2: THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM IN A COIN LEADER’S KIT BAG
province, Afghanistan 8 March COL Mark W. Suich and Dr. Douglas N. Campbell
2009. (Photo by SSG Adam
Mancini) 8 A NEW BATTALION COMMANDER’S COMMAND FOCUS THROUGH
THE APPLICATION OF LLOS
LTC Bryan P. Hernandez
10 UAV SINGLE VEHICLE EMPLOYMENT PLATFORM
CPT Gordon R. Kinneer
BACK COVER:
14 JFOS ARE A NICE START
Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry
Regiment scan for enemy activity during MAJ Scott P. Knight
operations in Zabul province, Afghanistan, 8 March 15 THE AIRBORNE HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY IN THE COE
2009. (Photo by SSG Adam Mancini)
CPT Keith W. Benedict
21 PERSIAN-MESOPOTAMIAN RELATIONS: RELIGIOUS AND TERRITORIAL
FAULT LINES FROM THE 16TH CENTURY TO 1975
CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy
37 TRAINING NOTES
This medium is approved for official 37 THE CULT OF ARMS: SOW ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING ABILITY TO
dissemination of material designed to keep WAGE SUCCESSFUL WARS
individuals within the Army knowledgeable of 1LT Joseph Morsello
current and emerging developments within
44 WALKS-A-HEAP: LESSONS STILL APPLY FROM MORE THAN 140-YEAR-
their areas of expertise for the purpose of
enhancing their professional development.
OLD FIGHT
LTC (Retired) Michael E. Reichard
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 49 OODA LOOP: SETTING A PATTERN MAY NOT ALWAYS BE A BAD IDEA
CPT Michael Mostaghni
GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. 51 BOOK REVIEWS
General, United States Army 53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
Chief of Staff
Official:
x INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.
Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. x Although it contains professional information for the
infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information
JOYCE E. MORROW presented in other official Army publications. x Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors
Administrative Assistant to the and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. x Official distribution is to infantry and
infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. x Direct communication concerning
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1005002
31995-2005. x Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail
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Commanding General’s Note
MG MICHAEL FERRITER
COUNTERINSURGENCY:
THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH
T
oday we are engaged in a counterinsurgency against an in the area of operations.
innovative and determined enemy whose tenacity and We have gained a broader
adaptive skills challenge those of any adversary grasp of the connection
opposing us since Vietnam. Today’s enemy is media-savvy, between security and
adapts and employs advanced technology whenever possible, infrastructure, and can
and readily modifies his tactics in an attempt to offset our better support the
firepower and mobility advantages. He also screens our government officials and
unclassified print and broadcast media to glean information on citizens as we train the host
our capabilities and intentions. Today’s COIN fight demands nation’s own forces to
that we recognize the comprehensive nature of the enemy and secure the communications assets, water and sewage facilities,
requires vigilance, flexibility, and resourcefulness on the part schools, power plants, and the bazaars that will sustain a return
of Soldiers and all of us. As we address the realities of the current to normal patterns of life.
operational environment we cannot lose sight of the traditional Our current doctrinal literature reinforces this approach to
approaches to COIN which have already yielded success, and COIN. The 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
in this Commander’s Note I want to discuss how we have built two decades after the COIN field manual that preceded it,
upon earlier success in counterinsurgency operations, the impact bridged the gap between our existing doctrine and the COIN
of cultural awareness in the COIN fight, and how we can assist lessons captured from the outset of the global war on terrorism
Soldiers and leaders in their noble cause. (GWOT). FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, published
Our government’s aim is to establish and sustain stable three years later, has not discarded our traditional approaches
governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, free of domination by to COIN, but instead has addressed them in light of our extensive
terrorism and whose stability and security are guaranteed by knowledge gained from the current operational environment. Not
their own nations’ military and civilian security forces. In his limited to small-unit counter-guerilla actions, FM 3-24.2
August 2009 Commander’s Initial Assessment of International improves upon earlier COIN doctrinal guidance by focusing on
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan, a broader range of activities that accounts for both changes in
GEN Stanley McChrystal recognized the “uniquely complex” Army doctrine and changes in the world and the nature of the
COIN environment in that country. He stressed a primary focus enemy and the environment in which he lives. FM 3-24.2
on understanding, working with, and protecting the Afghans. expands the coverage of cultural awareness beyond that
This requires that our Soldiers spend more time out among the addressed in FM 3-24. Cultural competence and situational
population, dismounted, active, and visible. GEN McChrystal awareness appropriately appear in the first chapter, and these
has based this strategy on four concepts that will enable us to: are threads that run throughout the manual, recognizing the role,
improve effectiveness through greater partnering with Afghan potential, and vulnerabilities of the host nation populace. The
National Security Forces (ANSF), prioritize responsive and new field manual is a non-prescriptive source document that
accountable governance at all levels, gain the initiative and can connect and guide commanders of tactical units from platoon
reverse the insurgency’s momentum, and prioritize resources and to brigade level, and it was written by credible, experienced
focus them on the areas whose populations are in the greatest tacticians who have served in these very types of units in the
danger. GWOT.
This offers a paradigm for our units who train and partner The way we prosecute COIN will remain the paradigm for
with Afghan and Iraqi military and police units and who routinely conflicts of the immediate future, because of the lessons it offers
interact with the population. Dealing with counterparts whose on the threat and how we are learning to defeat that threat. FM
culture and belief systems differ from our own can be challenging 3-24.2 will be supplemented by the experience we are steadily
indeed. We have taken cultural awareness beyond the traditional gaining and the enemy’s own adaptations, because we must
customs and manners approaches of the past and are now evolve to maintain the initiative, and we certainly will.
teaching leaders how to gain a clearer picture of the population One force, one fight!
January-April 2010 INFANTRY 1

Combatives School Revamps Curriculum
New Plan Builds
More Effective
Close-Quarters
Fighters
VINCE LITTLE
T
he U.S. Army Combatives School
at Fort Benning, Ga., has adopted
a new teaching plan.
The Army is revamping the curriculum to
take lessons learned from Iraq and
Afghanistan and build more effective close-
quarters fighters, said Matt Larsen, the
school’s director. The goal is to push
advanced techniques down to the small-unit
level, including basic training.
“We want Soldiers to be agile, adaptive
and competent (so) they can adjust to the
realities of the battlefield,” Larsen said.
The modifications are based on feedback ryl i
from across the Army and other factors, he CPT Keenan Ellison places a rear-naked chokehold on CPT Chris Zagursky before beating him
in one of the early bouts of a combatives tournament held on Fort Benning, Ga.
said. More than 900 interviews were
conducted with Soldiers who saw hand-to- techniques Soldiers will now be exposed to within both instructor phases.
hand combat in the villages, houses and at lower unit levels, Larsen said. “Combatives is an integral part of what
streets of Iraq or Afghanistan. Larsen said the school will stick with the we do as Soldiers,” Larsen said. “You can’t
Soldiers most often enter small houses four pillars — instruction based on effectively train in close-quarters combat
and rooms during combat operations, so universal, foundational, motivational and without combatives. You’re going to need
the Army wants to take the ground- tactical attributes — that allowed the it any place you can be hands-on with
grappling principles taught in combatives program to thrive. But Soldiers often potential enemies.”
and emphasize them from a standing struggled to retain knowledge gained in unit He said more than 57,000 troops have
position, Larsen said. combatives training, so adjustments were graduated from the Army Combatives
“In the field, the fight is always over needed. School since its inception in 2002 —
weapons and how to maintain control of Levels 1 and 2 are being changed to the including 50,374 (Level 1), 5,255 (Level 2),
them,” he said. “That will be taught all the basic and tactical combatives courses, 1,408 (Level 3) and 564 (Level 4).
way down to basic training.” while the basic and tactical combatives For more information, go to the school’s
Knee strikes, clinch drills, fighting with instructor courses replace Levels 3 and 4. Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil/
weapons and combat equipment, and Under the new construct, the number of combatives or call (706) 545-2811.
pushing terror suspects against the wall are training hours at each tier remains the same (Vince Little writes for Fort Benning’s
among the upper-echelon combatives — 40 in basic, 80 for tactical, and 160 each The Bayonet newspaper.)
To view current and past issues of the magazine, check out Infantry Magazine’s Web site at
https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine (will require AKO login).
2 INFANTRY January-April 2010

HRC INFANTRY BRANCH TALKS
TRANSFERS, EMERGING TRENDS
CPT JIMMY ROSS
T his article includes updates on current topics at the

U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Infantry
Branch. Managing officers continues to be our first priority. In
enter the Infantry portion. At branch, we are aware of how important
the Web site is for communicating to the field. Maintaining accurate
information on the site has become a priority for us. Each
addition to managing officers, informing the field on emerging trends assignment desk still has its own link to address hot topics,
and policies is part of our mission as well. In recent months, there assignments, references, and frequently asked questions.
have been numerous inquiries concerning force numbers and
trends. We are also in the beginning phases of our move from Infantry Stats
Alexandria, Va., to Fort Knox, Ky. Changes in our Web site have We conducted queries to see exactly how Infantry officers by
been implemented to reduce less useful information. Each of these rank and year group are assigned across the Army. There are more
subjects will be further discussed in detail. If there are any than 6,500 active duty Infantry officers currently serving in the
questions concerning the information in this article, we will be glad Army. We examine our strength, distribution, promotions
to assist. percentages, and schools. The total authorized 11A numbers were
compared to total number assigned. Total numbers assigned included
Branch Transfers 11A coded authorizations and immaterials 01A, 02A, and 03A
As of 2 November 2009, branch transfers — now known as the requirements. These numbers were provided by TOPMIS (Total
Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) — are now boarded Officer Personnel Management Information System). Immaterial
by the retention office instead of processed by branch. Officers jobs 02A and 03A are Infantry and Armor jobs, such as an Infantry
must be a promotable first lieutenant or major with no more than 14 officer serving in a Cavalry Squadron, and vice versus for Armor.
years of active federal service to be eligible in accordance with the Those serving in 01A jobs are positions filled by any officer. At
latest Military Personnel (MILPER) message (10-082). If an officer first glance, it appeared that Infantry Branch was overstrength on
is approved for branch transfer, he has a 14-day window to accept authorization; that we were over 100% strength for Infantrymen
or decline. Once an officer accepts the transfer, he will incur an jobs. When these distributions are taken into account, our
additional three-year active duty service obligation (ADSO). That percentages are significantly lower for those working in 11A coded
ADSO begins at the first day of training or upon PCS. A common positions. Additional impacts on this lower percentage reflects
question asked is: “Does the ADSO augment my existing ADSO?” officers that are branched detailed, or in schools ( Army or civilian).
The answer to that question is “no.” An officer’s new obligation is From observing the data we are able to clearly see how Infantry
concurrent with the existing ADSO. Those who are or have officers are distributed across the Army to ensure accurate
participated in Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS), Expanded Graduate assignment placing. Promotions percentages were based on the
School Program (EGSP), or the menu of incentives programs are total number of eligible officers for each available promotion zone
not eligible until their obligation is fully up. A MILPER message (primary zone [PZ],below the zone [BZ], and above the zone [AZ])
will be published each quarter before the board convenes. A table from the latest results. There were a total of 121 LTCs eligible for
with each branch by year group will illustrate who is eligible to promotion to COL for FY 09. A total of 41 were promoted, of those
transfer into a certain branch, and another table will illustrate who’s 9 BZ (7.7%), 31 PZ (26.8%), and 1 AZ (0%). There were 144 total
eligible to transfer out. Officers participating in the branch detail eligible for promotion LTC for FY 09, with 131 promoted. Of those
program must go before the board to remain in their detail branch. promoted 12 were BZ (9%), 115 PZ (86.7%), and 4 AZ (3.3%). Lastly,
Packages are to be submitted to OPMD Retention at total number of MAJs eligible were 154 for FY 10. A total of 134
opmdretention@conus.army.mil. Refer to the MILPER message promoted, 47 BZ (25.9%), 82 PZ (70.9%), and 5 AZ (3%). Based off
Web site at https://perscomnd04@army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf for the these promotion statistics, promotion up to LTC looks promising if
latest updates. Information can also be found on the HRC Infantry officers successfully follow the career path outlined in accordance
Web site. Branch will continue to assist by answering questions, with AR 600-3, The Army Personnel Development System.
as well as provide options for career enhancement opportunities. In October 2009, the CFD board for year group 2002 convened.
Here are some numbers for individuals selected. Up to this point I
HRC Web site have been under the impression that whoever was selected for a
You may have noticed the recent changes to the HRC Web site. CFD was forced out. Though there are a few that are, those that
Last fall, efforts began to alter HRC’s site to make it more user- appeal after the results are published fall into the low teens. A total
friendly. The intent is to limit the number of pages before you get of 201 officers in year group 2002 went before the board. A total of
to the Infantry Branch portion of the site. It now takes two clicks to 69 officers were selected for a functional area, of the ones that got

INFANTRY NEWS
selected, 24 got their first choice, 27 got their

second choice, and six got their third choice.
There were 12 of 23 that got selected that didn’t
put a preference, the rest stayed Infantry. Those
numbers selected for CFD represents only CFD
choices, not Infantry. To clarify, if an officer got
CFDed and received his 2nd choice or 3rd choice,
he didn’t have Infantry in his previous choices.
In summary, 132 officers remained in the Infantry,
69 were CFDed, and of the ones selected, one
could assume that around 12 officers didn’t get
what they wanted. Officers that want to appeal
now must submit their request to retention IAW
MILPER Message 10-082.
Movement to Fort Knox

HRC has started the process of transitioning
from Alexandria, which had been its home for 37
years, to Fort Knox. HRC at Fort Knox will
consist of Alexandria, St. Louis, and Indianapolis
personnel offices combined. Those officers who
have been active duty Infantry during the past
ur yp
15 years may know or have heard of Juanita
The Dignity Memorial Vietnam Wall, a three-quarter-scale replica of the Vietnam Veterans
Walker, the 2LT assignment specialist. She has Memorial Wall, will be at the National Infantry Museum from 28 May until 13 June.
worked at HRC for 37 years, spending a
majority of her time in Air Defense Artillery
and Infantry. She has been a part of Infantry
VIETNAM VETERANS MEMORIAL
Branch since 1994 and unfortunately has
decided not to move to Fort Knox. Others who VISITS NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM
have greatly served our branch and will be
missed are Phyllis Harley, who contributed 20
years of service to HRC, and Lee Gray, who
O f the more than 58,000 Soldiers who died in the Vietnam War, more than
20,000 were Infantrymen. It is fitting that a replica of the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Wall should be at the National Infantry Museum in Columbus, Ga., for
has eight years of service. These ladies will
Memorial Day.
be truly missed not only for their knowledge
The original memorial, located in Constitution Gardens adjacent to the National
but their dedication and commitment to our
Mall in Washington D.C., was inspired by a member of the 199th Light Infantry
branch. Walter Ezar will assume responsibility
Brigade. Jan Scruggs started the project, which was completed in 1982. It was
for 2LTs. Marlena Williams will assume
designed by U.S. landscape architect Maya Lin and receives around three million
responsibility as LTC HR specialist. MAJ Jake
visitors each year.
Jacobs and CPT Mike Eliassen are the current
Since a pilgrimage to the original isn’t always possible, replicas have been
assignment officers moving to Fort Knox. They
crafted to tour the country. One, the Dignity Memorial Vietnam Wall, is a three-
will be augmented with the rest of the assignment
quarter-scale replica. Eight-feet high and 240-feet long, its black, faux granite
officers and civilians in Kentucky. Transition
reflective surface is inscribed with the names of more than 58,000 servicemen and
will be between the months of April to August
women who died or are missing in Vietnam.
2010, with the main body moving between June
The traveling monument was created by Dignity Memorial as a service to those
and July 2010. Efforts at HRC and Infantry who might never have the chance to travel to the nation’s capital. Since the monument
Branch have been implemented to continue began its travels in 1990, it has been displayed in more than 200 cities across the
continuity to sustain momentum for taking care country, allowing millions of visitors to experience the healing power of the memorial.
of Soldiers and families. “We are so proud to be able to present this sacred display,” National Infantry
For more information or to contact a member Foundation MG (Ret) Jerry White said. “I know seeing it, touching it, will be a
of the HRC Infantry Branch staff, go to https:// moving experience for me, and thousands of other Vietnam veterans and their
www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/branches/officer/ families, too.”
mfe/infantry/index.htm. Following its arrival at the National Infantry Museum on 28 May, the wall will
(CPT Jimmy Ross currently serves as the remain through 13 June. The replica will be located just east of the museum, along
Infantry Branch Future Readiness Officer.) Heritage Walk.

THE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM IN
FM 3-24.2: A COIN LEADER’S KIT BAG
COL MARK W. SUICH AND DR. DOUGLAS N. CAMPBELL
Why is there an article telling you about effort and nullify lessons learned in years Tactics is no mere primer on small-unit counter-
a counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics field of unconventional fighting. If you are guerilla combat. It connects the operations of
manual? After all, you may have already leading troops in the Afghanistan surge — tactical units from platoon to brigade, and
studied it in one of your training courses. Or or if you are still leading them in Iraq — use explains how to synthesize and apply
perhaps you saw real COIN operations in a this new manual to make your outfit part of procedures that have yielded successful COIN
past combat deployment, and you don’t need the solution and not part of the problem. results. That brings up another way in
some manual telling you what you already which Tactics is well worth attention.
know. Overview of FM 3-24.2’s Practical In his August 2009 Commander’s Initial
Worth Assessment of the challenges facing the
F
ield Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in When FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was International Security Assistance Force
Counterinsurgency, is not simply published in 2006, it received praise for (ISAF), Afghanistan, GEN Stanley
a training document; it is not only reshaping the Army’s COIN doctrine — so McChrystal acknowledged Afghanistan’s
a recipe for ambush tactics; and it is not what makes FM 3-24.2 so compelling?
U.S. Soldiers with the 8th Squadron, 1st
some highbrow tome about insurgency Tactics in Counterinsurgency “merges
Cavalry Regiment and Afghan National
theories. For any Army leader, it offers traditional approaches to COIN with the
Police officers meet with a village elder in
practical guidelines to adjust COIN tactics realities of the current operational Nimakay, Afghanistan on 13 January.
from nation to nation, rotation to rotation, environment,” as it incorporates the latest Photo by TSgt Francisco V. Govea, USAF
province to province, and village to village. tactics and procedures gleaned from combat
Written by talented, experienced tacticians operations through 2008. It understands
from platoon to brigade level, and then vetted the integrated ‘process’ aspect of COIN as
by Army tactical units as well as by other well as the fact that integration applies not
services and institutions, it understands that only to functions but also to command levels.
misapplied COIN tactics will scuttle much

R FESSI NA F R
people, events) — apply to counterinsurgency operations.

For example, in applying ASCOPE to COIN civil operations,
Tactics marries a systematic approach with concrete civil
concerns to make its civil ops discussion much more than
a general admonition to know the locals. To enable the
commander to “visualize, describe and direct operations
EST CIVIL
when positional references to an adversary have little
EST CIVIL SUPPORT HN SUPPORT TO
SECURITY CONTROL SEC FORCES GOVERNANCE reference, such as [during] an insurgency,” the third
chapter introduces seven lines of effort:
(1) Establish civil security;
SUPPORT TO INFORMATION (2) Support host-nation security forces;
RESTORE
ESSENTIAL SERVICES ECON DEVELOP ENGAGEMENT (3) Support governance;
(4) Establish civil control;
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
(5) Restore essential services;
• EACH KNOB REPRESENTS A SINGLE LINE OF EFFORT (6) Support economic and infrastructure
• ADJUSTMENT OF A SINGLE KNOB REPRESENTS A PRIORITIZED development; and
APPLICATION OF RESOURCES (7) Conduct information engagement.
• SYNCHRONIZATION OF ADJUSTMENTS RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER IS One might say these acronyms only create an
THE FOUNDATION OF UNIT’S LONG RANGE PLAN alphabet soup of competing doctrinal laundry lists. But
• TARGET ALONG ALL LINES OF EFFORT TO ENHANCE POTENTIAL Tactics provides graphs and models to explain how
FAVORABLE OUTCOMES commanders apply these guides interactively to
ascertain their units’ progress and then execute a
Chapter 3, FM 3-24.2 comprehensive plan for their areas. The lessons apply
Figure 1 — Rheostat Approach to the Lines of Effort up and down the chain; and many of Tactics’ illustrative
“uniquely complex” counterinsurgency environment, but examples describe higher command and staff situations as much as
concludes that so far “ISAF is not adequately executing the basics they do small-unit actions in the field.
of counterinsurgency warfare.” He charges ISAF to change its The lines of effort appear as a recurring theme in later chapters
operating practices to protect and work with the Afghans directly, on other counterinsurgency activities. At one point Tactics uses a
even if it entails greater discomfort and risk. All parts of the Afghan rheostat chart to emphasize how the various lines rise and fall in
counterinsurgency effort require sharper focus upon how things priority as the commander’s COIN situation develops (see Figure
are done. Such comments are remarkable given that we’ve done 1). When applying U.S. Army decision-making procedures to a
COIN for several years and even published a new field manual for it counterinsurgency and when expanding upon FM 3-24’s COIN
in 2006. FM 3-24.2 more directly provides ISAF commanders with targeting and planning methods, Tactics emphasizes the process
guidelines that support GEN McChrystal’s vision. aspect of counterinsurgency by offering time-assessment tools.
One noteworthy Tactics expansion on FM 3-24 involves cultural
Where Tactics Expands Upon Previous COIN Guidance awareness. Tactics’ first chapter provides questions for developing
FM 3-24.2 breaks from previous COIN tactics guides by focusing a clear picture of the operating area’s people. Questions such as
upon a broad range of activities instead of only describing military- “What is the daily wage of an average worker/laborer? What jobs
specific tasks like counter-guerilla sweeps. As such it accounts for are considered honorable?” can be telling when one considers a
changes in the world and changes in U.S. Army doctrine as it focuses recent Washington Post article on the Afghan Army. In the 9
upon COIN’s more comprehensive nature. Tactics has no single December 2009 article “General Offers Assurances on Afghan War:
planning scheme for the successful COIN campaign; instead it gives McChrystal, Envoy Testify on Hill about New Obama Strategy,”
you matrices to sort out the myriad considerations, currents, and authors Greg Jaffe and Glenn Kessler wrote “that as few as 52,000
other factors involved in planning your COIN operations. Further, soldiers regularly show up for work, because of poor pay and other
its planning considerations understand the importance of time reasons. In recent weeks, the military has boosted the troops’ pay
phasing in this process. And when Tactics discusses how to design so that they make as much as or more than Taliban fighters do.”
measures of effectiveness/performance for your COIN effort, its When addressing insurgency itself, Tactics’ second chapter
examples include questions like “How many people registered to converts FM 3-24’s comments about the variable nature of insurgency
vote at the school this week” instead of only combat-related queries into categories that help the commander “track, categorize, and develop
like “How many rounds were expended on patrol?” the insurgency’s pattern.” These in turn facilitate use of the lines of
Tactics adapts many of the precepts of FM 3-24 and other doctrine effort in applying the appropriate counterinsurgency methods. Of
manuals, and introduces a few new ones. Its first chapter explains how note is Tactics’ differentiation between insurgency components, with
various acronym reference guides seen elsewhere — PMESII-PT emphasis on familiar things like leadership, ideology and types of
(political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, info, physical insurgencies — and insurgency manifestations, which focus upon
environment, time); METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, tactical realities like insurgent vulnerabilities/strengths and the level
civil ops); ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, of insurgent violence.

Security TTPs (We Are Still Fighting a War) in most other activities it describes, from tactical planning to building
Tactics does not abandon security and combat concerns. It bases. In its chapters on COIN planning and on host-nation forces,
understands that power plants, telecommunications, roads, schools, Tactics describes the situational roles of other groups; and
bazaars, and government officials will not interact synergistically if throughout its pages are steps to support the coordination process.
guerillas disrupt their proper function. As such, Tactics well These will help higher-level commanders maximize efforts by not
addresses familiar counter-guerilla combat operations like ambush/ only their own commands, but also by associated groups.
counter-ambush and base defense. It then spends time on recent Regarding ISAF’s overall aim of a self-secured Afghanistan,
counter-guerilla tactical developments like sniper-defeat, counter- Tactics has chapters on stability operations and on support to
improvised explosive device, and counter drive-by shooting host-nation security forces. Again revealing Special Forces’
operations. It devotes an annex to intelligence preparation of the influence, Tactics includes the MORTEAM (measure, organize,
battlefield which distills FM 3-24’s counterinsurgency intelligence rebuild, train, equip, advise, mentor) guideline in its “support to
discussion to those items most pertinent to the tactical leader. host-nation” chapter. Its annex includes straight talk about
Drawing from Special Forces’ experience in difficult counterinsurgency and/or advisory efforts from two influential
counterinsurgency situations, Tactics incorporates some of their experts, David Kilcullen and Lawrence of Arabia.
practices. For example, the CARVER (criticality, accessibility,
recoverability, vulnerability effects, reconcilability, and “That’s All Very Nice, But I’ve Seen This Stuff Before”
psychological impact) model helps the commander prioritize combat For lieutenants and captains who have finished their basic and
options when employing limited forces in a big area with multiple career courses, note that your study of tactics in a
threats and tasks. counterinsurgency was an introduction. FM 3-24.2 tackles a way
of war, COIN, that demands constant updating — and provides the
ISAF, Afghanistan, And Tactics means to do so. As a COIN task organizer, it especially helps when
To support its aim of a stable Afghanistan free of terrorist responsibilities and tactical demands shift during COIN: the captain
influence, the Obama Administration’s surge plan gives GEN may have to plan for a brigade; or a colonel may have to work more
McChrystal 30,000 more troops, but resources are not his major with ‘operational NCOs’ and ‘strategic lieutenants.’ Indeed for
concern. His initial assessment observed that “focusing on force veteran leaders and the higher ranks, Tactics provides an
or resources requirements misses the point entirely. The key take opportunity to avoid misapplying the tactics of a previous rotation
away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant to the newest one.
change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.” For
counterinsurgency, the assessment wants primary focus upon It’s All Yours!
protecting, understanding, and working with the Afghans — to FM 3-24.2 is not prescriptive. It offers no set-piece strategy, no
“spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time silver-bullet solution, and no checklist that must be applied to all
as possible in armored vehicles and behind the walls of forward situations. Instead it provides tools to help you better analyze,
operating bases” so that Afghanistan can ultimately handle itself. plan, execute, and revise tactics with other leaders to develop a
GEN McChrystal wants efficient, better coordinated operations that unique strategy for your area. It retains and promotes a key
well use the resources granted. operational philosophy: on-scene commanders make the
To support this strategy, GEN McChrystal introduces four assessments and direct the actions. It therefore wants you, the
underlying pillars: individual leader, to develop and then refine constantly a unique
(1) Gain the initiative against the insurgents; formula which produces mission success.
(2) Improve and work with Afghan security forces; Tactics gives sergeants, captains, and colonels alike a means to
(3) Assist improvement of governance; and retain situational awareness and tactical agility in the tricky shadow
(4) Prioritize resources to critical areas. world of counterinsurgency. It also well supports GEN McChrystal’s
He will apply these to a complex Afghan society with “multiple assessment of how to achieve his daunting mission in Afghanistan. It
actors and a vast set of interconnecting relationships among those is a most important document for the COIN warrior.
actors,” and thus emphasizes that “no element can be viewed in
isolation.” Nor can one concentrate upon one timeframe; instead COL Mark W. Suich is the Director of Training, Maneuver Center of
ISAF commanders must be able to coordinate short- and long-term Excellence, at Fort Benning, Ga., and oversaw publication of FM 3-24.2.
tasks in an on-going process. He received a bachelor’s degree from Edinboro University and a master’s
degree in Military Studies (Unconventional Warfare) from American Military
With its comprehensive, interactive guidelines, Tactics tackles
University. He served in Operation Desert Storm and in deployments to
interconnectivity in COIN. Its time-task assessment tools use multiple Somalia and Haiti. His most recent combat assignment was as commander
inputs to create chronological snapshots which give commanders of the 1st Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division in
at all levels the situational awareness to adjust time-related goals southwest Baghdad from 2006 to 2007.
Dr. Douglas N. Campbell is a military history instructor at Fort
properly. GEN McChrystal’s four strategic pillars fall clearly within
Benning. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air War College, and
the lines of effort that run through Tactics’ pages. Another recurring received a B.A. from North Georgia College, an M.A. from UNLV, and a
topic in Tactics involves “Clear-Hold-Build” operations, which Ph.D. in History from Texas Tech University. He is author of The Warthog
likewise well support the ISAF’s population-oriented approach. and the Close Air Support Debate, and his military career included A-7,
A-10, and F-117 flying assignments in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force.
Beyond “Clear-Hold-Build,” Tactics addresses population issues

R FESSI NA F R
A New Battalion Commander’s Command

Focus Through the Application of LLOs
LTC BRYAN P. HERNANDEZ
S
hortly after assuming command and after completing my soldier level such as marksmanship, warrior tasks & battle drills
initial assessments of the unit, my command sergeant major (WTBDs), and combat lifesaver (CLS) skills. These areas, along
and I began formulating a plan to refocus and introduce with physical fitness, represent intermediate objectives which
concepts to improve the battalion — from systems and processes require greater focus and resources to ensure they are trained to
to the quality of training and care for our cadre. The method we greatest extent possible. This focus allows commanders to
chose coincided with the mental process I found myself using to understand training priorities in a resource-constrained environment
address the challenges, applying logical lines of operation (LLOs). with a multitude of obligatory training requirements. Along this
The application of this process has enabled our team to articulate LLO, the concept of outcomes-based training and education
our command focus in time, space, and purpose with the company (OBT&E) is imperative. OBT&E provides an emerging model and
commanders, first sergeants, and cadre. Further, it has helped define methodology to train Soldiers. Not only does it depict the desired
the endstates sought to successfully achieve our unit’s mission as outcomes of Soldiers, but it describes the ways in which to achieve
a Basic Combat Training (BCT) battalion. and train Soldiers through active learning, problem solving, and
Logical lines of operation form a cognitive operational framework the understanding of purpose. In order to leverage training focused
to define and arrange actions and intermediate objectives towards on outcomes, we have applied the standard of scenario-based
a desired endstate, unified by purpose. Although LLOs are generally situational training exercises or STXs. These STXs incorporate
associated with campaign planning, it serves as a viable vehicle to various tasks linked together within a realistic scenario Soldiers
mentally model the linkage of ends, ways, and means. As the method will encounter in combat to train and test both proficiency of key
to depict our command focus, it has enumerable benefits in framing tasks and also critical thinking.
where we, as a battalion, need to go and how we will get there. Today’s Soldiers now operate in environments where the lowest-
The four lines of operation we determined as necessary to meet ranking member may be responsible to make decisions that may
our endstates are training, leader development, cadre wellness, and have strategic impacts. They must be trained and placed in
the safety and security of our IET Soldiers and cadre. These key demanding scenarios to test their wit and ability to comprehend the
areas were established based on an assessment of the desired cause and effect of their actions and our expectations of them in the
endstates necessary to
Figure 1 — Command Focus LLOs
complete our battalion’s mission
to transform civilians into
Soldiers that are prepared for
combat. Along each line of
operation are the intermediate
objectives, i.e. focal areas,
programs, initiatives, to achieve
success and attain the endstate
along the LLO.
The most important aspect
of our mission is training. In
order to develop Soldiers
prepared for combat and their
first unit of assignment, they
must be competent, physically
fit, and proficient in select tasks.
The cadre responsible to train
our Soldiers must also be master
trainers who can instill
confidence, competency, and
values. To achieve this
endstate, we focus on several
key areas of required
proficiency at the individual

contemporary operating environment. deployments. Several cadre members, as train, regardless of gender. Providing this
Finally, the quality of training given to our well as their families, assumed that an environment, coupled by professionalism
Soldiers is only as good as those providing assignment in the U.S. Training and Doctrine and high standards, is critical and ensures
the instruction. Our cadre and their Command (TRADOC) would provide a that they can learn the necessary skills to
proficiency in training the numerous tasks needed break from the operational force. be successful in the Army and, more
within BCT are paramount to the mission’s Unfortunately, shortly after arrival, it importantly, combat. Key objectives to
success. As a unit, we understand the becomes apparent that the environment support this endstate are providing proper
strengths and weaknesses within this within a BCT is just as demanding as any supervision and senior leader involvement,
system and have developed a detailed deployable unit. Hours are long, and weeks which we have established within our
program to ensure all of our cadre, regardless consist of working six-to-seven days standard duty policy and senior leader
of Military Occupational Specialty, are straight without a break. For many drill checks. Our focus also recognizes that in
master trainers and capable to provide the sergeants this places an enormous burden order to train Soldiers well, they require the
best instruction to our new Soldiers. on their personal life, especially if they have best facilities and resources available. We
Perhaps one of the most under- families. By analyzing the requirements to continue to strive for the best facilities and
appreciated components within a unit is take care of our cadre and the demands of training resources for our cadre and Soldiers
leader development. In the Initial Entry basic training, we determined that any and employ them throughout the training
Training environment a great deal of necessary movement along any line of cycle. Although it is a constant battle due
emphasis is placed on the Soldiers in training operation to achieve the desired endstates to limited resources, we must ensure that
but not on the cadre. Junior commanders would require addressing this area first. Our training is first class and the equipment,
and NCOs require continuous training primary purpose along this line of operation support, and services on the installation are
focused on their development for both their is to build a cohesive, disciplined, and maximized to support our units’ mission.
current and future assignments. Due to the motivated organization focused on the In developing our command focus to
current operational tempo and more rapid mission, the cadre, and family well-being. achieve mission success, we found our LLOs
promotions, many junior officers and NCOs Achieving success here equates to stable, as the best method to provide the needed
are propelled into positions of greater professionally focused NCOs and officers. contextual framework to focus our efforts.
responsibility with insufficient experience Implementing policies that ensure our The actions and objectives within our lines
or training. Shortfalls exist in critical areas subordinates conduct high quality training of operation depict causal relationships that
such as training management, leadership, along with providing appropriate are both linear and nonlinear, and are
tactics and doctrine, and administration. supervision while balancing cadre personal represented, in some cases, on more than one
These shortfalls are correctable with a time is essential. As a unit, we have invested line of operation because they occur
deliberate and sustained leader development in certain initiatives that target simultaneously and are supporting. We
program focused on training key strengthening the individual and family reviewed our immediate objectives many times
competencies expected of Army leaders wellness. These include ensuring NCOs get to ensure their suitability and feasibility to the
throughout their service. Many cadre to the required schools for professional defined endstates and desired outcomes of
members will return to deployable units in development and advancement, IET. We also cross referenced them with our
positions of greater responsibility, and the reestablishing a battalion-level Family installations’ campaign objectives and found
senior leadership must make a concerted effort Readiness Group focused on cadre wellness them similar and mutually supporting. As we
to ensure they are prepared. Our focus is to and communication, offering single soldier and continue down the road as a new command
develop our junior officers and NCOs through married couple retreats, and other activities team with a demanding mission, the logical
professional development programs (OPD/ such as military formals, leader calls, and sports lines of operation will serve as the road map
NCOPD), reading and writing programs, competitions to build camaraderie and espirit for our unit to collectively understand where
counseling, and developing maneuver live-fire de corps. By simultaneously working on we are going and how we will get there. This
ranges such as the Combined Maneuver Live- these objectives, we set the necessary most important impact will be the new Soldiers’
Fire Exercise Program, which enforces conditions to work on the other lines of ability to rapidly integrate into their next unit
understanding both the art and science of operation and endstates. as a professional and competent member of
training. A well-resourced leader development The final line of operation is much the U.S. Army.
program, sustained over time, builds not only broader and addresses the necessary
the competency level of leaders within their endstate of a safe and secure environment LTC Bryan P. Hernandez i an in an ry
i r an ra ua l A an
current position, but postures them for greater for Soldiers and their cadre to train within. ili ary u i A a pr i u ly
success in their military career. This includes the command and cadre a i n a r ary J in a an i
The most noticeable challenge the CSM climate that new Soldiers are expected to be lan a u rn an
and I have faced since taking command is part of for their first 10 weeks in the Army. pl y ra a a a ali n - an a r
ui i r il a i n 1
the welfare of our cadre. Many of the NCOs Basic training has changed over the years a ali n 0 ara u n an ry i n
and junior officers within the battalion are and so has the manner in which newly 2n Air rn i i i n urr n ly an
recent veterans of combat in Afghanistan enlisted Soldiers are treated. Soldiers require r a ali n n an ry i n a r
and Iraq, the majority with multiple good leadership and a safe atmosphere to Ja n

R FESSI NA F R
UAV Single Vehicle Employment Platform

CPT GORDON R. KINNEER
A
s a commander of a headquarters and headquarters mobile and capable of being attached out to supplement any
company (HHC) in an Infantry battalion, your job is operation. We were able to set this up as a “turnkey package” to
inherently complex. In dealing with a myriad of sections any platoon or company that requested it. With this package, the
and platoons all performing various functions, it can become gaining unit had little or no requirements for sustaining our small
overwhelming at times. This is especially so in an environment that element. We request the ROZ from battalion, call in the ROZ from
is present in Iraq post-January 2009 and post-June 30 after the our Stryker, operate the UAV, broadcast the feed from the UAV
security agreement was implemented. As the HHC commander, I platform to the ground commander’s Stryker, as well as to the
had numerous assets at my disposal, the largest property book in battalion tactical operations center (TOC).
the battalion, including equipment and technologies that could We also report anything suspect to the ground commander from
provide combat multipliers to each of the rifle companies. I made it the UAV feed. The end result was that the Stryker was turned into
my responsibility to figure out how to effectively employ these a single vehicle UAV employment platform, seamlessly attached to
systems to accomplish the mission. any unit operation.
In conducting combat operations in our battalion operating The ground unit now has an immediately responsive ISR asset
environment (OE) of Abu Ghraib and Nasir Wa Salam, just west of above them, observing their disposition and detecting potential
Baghdad, it quickly became apparent how useful Intelligence, targets in a complex urban environment. This asset was the result
Security and Reconnaissance (ISR) of weeks of work put in on behalf of my
platforms could be employed to enhance the NCOIC of the project, SSG Todd
ground commander’s mission set. Drawing Patterson. We worked at coordinating
from the Soldiers assigned to my tactical with the field representatives at
command post (TAC), which consisted of Tacticomp, Honeywell, and other
one Stryker vehicle, the battalion snipers, technical experts to assist us in our set
and various company HQ personnel, I had up of the UAV employment platform. The
determined how to more effectively employ following is a menu of the various
ISR assets organic to the company such as modifications and add-on’s we installed
the Gas Micro Air Vehicle (GMAV) and both inside and outside of our Stryker. It
Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). not only transformed the vehicle into a
My plan was simple. I wanted to mobile control platform for the Raven and
streamline the process whereby a company GMAV but also acted as a broadcast
designates a restricted operating zone (ROZ), platform. We simultaneously were able
activates it, and maintains it throughout an to transmit the feed from the Raven and
operation. I also wanted to consolidate the ur y au r GMAV, via the various towers set up in
pilots of the GMAV and Raven into one SSG Todd Patterson prepares the GMAV for an and around Abu Ghraib province, to the
vehicle, thereby making the team highly operation in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. ground commander and the battalion TOC.

The T-1.5 is a handheld system that can be used
The workstation created for one Stryker is seen in its early stages. Various brackets and shelving had to view video and maps, send text messages and
to be removed to free the system’s eventual footprint. conduct voice communications.
A workstation was created in the left- antenna is permanently mounted on the headsets. Free text is an option, maps, and
hand side of the passenger compartment of vehicle. Although larger antennas (10-13db) video feeds from multiple sources, such as
the Stryker, opposite the radios, in much the are available, they require additional a remote weapons station (RWS), J-lens and
same way a TACP (tactical air control party) planning factors and were not required for other surveillance platforms can be selected
Stryker is set up. This was designated as our application. for viewing from a drop down-menu.
the UAV ground station from which the UAV VAP (Versatile Access Point): This 8-inch Battery Charger Unit: This unit charges
could be flown, and the ground controller by 8-inch box is powered by the vehicle, four batteries that power the T-1.5, and
could observe the flight path and video feed, backed up by a battery, and acts as the provides backup power to operate all
maintaining communication with all units wireless router, and video injection point for Tacticomp portable devices.
during an operation. The setup would have Tacticomp operations. This is where the Tactisite: Similar to the Land Warrior
been better accommodated with a command video-producing platform (GMAV or system, this system is provided to ground
or TACP variant of the Stryker, where there RAVEN) is connected. Additional video feed commanders so that they can instantly view
are seats facing outward toward small work is imputable from many other sources. the UAV feed. This helps establish better
stations with ruggedized laptops and T-1.5: (x3) These are handheld systems situational awareness, as well as identifies
monitors. In either platform, the ground — essentially ruggedized PDA units — that
controller and UAV pilot sit next to each can be used to view video, view maps, send
other and work closely together. This allows text messages, and conduct voice
them to adapt to mission changes or receive communications with the addition of a head
requests from the ground commander, with set and ground controller. These are helpful
whom the ground controller is speaking with when the unit you are providing support to
via SINCGARS. does not have Tacticomp installed in their
The Tacticomp system provides an vehicles. The ground commander can
information transmitting platform that offers remain mounted, or dismounted, and view
many applications to enhance our UAV all feeds transmitted from the UAV. The
Single Vehicle Employment Platform ground commander can also communicate
concept. Real-time video can be transmitted to the ground controller, who is sitting next
from our platform to other vehicles, ground to the pilot, and direct the UAV where to go,
commanders and the battalion TOC using what to look at, and what to focus on.
Tacticomp towers. We have incorporated T-6 Ruggedized Tablet Computer: This
the following features from Tacticomp in the unit allows viewing and recording of the
platform. The basic vehicle install includes UAV surveillance video feed. A headset is
the following: available and allows communication to all The T-6 ruggedized tablet computer allows the
8db Omni Directional Antenna: This similarly equipped Tacticomp holders with viewing and recording of the UAV video feed.

R FESSI NA F R
Figure 1
together for a well-trained pilot and observer, Stryker vehicles and the attached UAV
bring UAV assets to the lowest echelon employment platform The ROZ was
possible, that of the ground commander. coordinated, called in, and controlled by
GMAV or Raven video is transmitted to the Soldiers assigned to my TAC. Red
The Ghostbusters pack was developed to make the the UAV employment vehicle and other Platoon of B/2-112 IN conducted a security
pilot’s combat load more manageable. locations following the paths shown in halt, around the UAV employment vehicle,
any potential threat detected by the aerial Figure 1. and my Soldiers set up the GMAV. We
system. The parameters for operating UAVs are launched, and immediately flew the route of
Tacticomp Controller: This controller evolving slowly. On numerous occasions, the counter-IED patrol. The GMAV flew the
allows remote control of the T-1.5, and the ROZ and flight plans have been cancelled entire four- mile route, moved south to cover
use of the headset for voice communication due to misunderstandings of the GMAV’s a canal noted for cache emplacement, and
to the pilot and ground controller, as well as capability. What brigade aviation landed successfully. By conducting this
any other Tacticomp user with a headset. elements (BAEs) may not yet understand type of operation using the GMAV, we were
Ground Control Station Pack: Before we is that the capabilities of the GMAV allow able to keep Soldiers out of harm’s way by
developed the Ghostbusters pack, we had it to work in conjunction with air weapons getting a better view with the infrared camera
to wrestle with four different pieces of teams (AWTs), Shadows, Predators, and to detect potential sub-surface IEDs or
separate equipment. This made dismounted most other air traffic in the airspace. cache emplacements that the human eye
operations awkward. The new pack allows Additionally it is capable of flying in would not have been able to detect.
the ground data terminal, the T-1.5, and the adverse conditions, and when air is “red.” Additionally, we were able to produce
unit that the pilot uses to control the aircraft Even with low visibility, the GMAV is able excellent imagery of each site and the route
to be truly portable. In addition we attached to fly low enough to provide cover for a for future operations.
a video converter module (VCM). The VCM dismounted element, or to use its camera The second operation in which the UAV
relays the video feed from the Raven or to over watch specific targets. If nothing employment vehicle was assigned was a
GMAV to the UAV employment vehicle. We else, an object as peculiar looking as the similar counter IED/ IDF patrol. Once B/ 2-
mounted these four systems on an old GMAV in flight deters the enemy and 112 IN exited, the platoon leader received
ALICE rucksack frame. All four of these makes them think twice about conducting an order to assist a nearby EOD team in the
systems are attachable to your MOLLE gear; an attack. detection and disposal of a suspected IED.
however, combat Soldiers must carry much Two combat operations demonstrate The platoon arrived, set up an outer cordon,
more than just the GCS. He must also the success of this concept. B Company, and the UAV team quickly set up the GMAV
contend with his personal equipment and 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment and began to conduct their operation. The
basic load as well. The Ghostbusters pack was tasked with a counter-IED GMAV pilot, SSG Patterson, was able to
was developed out of necessity and made (improvised explosive device), counter- assist the outer cordon in detection of
the pilot’s combat load manageable. IDF operation during limited visibility. possible triggermen, as well as assist EOD
The aforementioned systems, working They were task organized into three in a better top-side view of the potential IED.

During one mission, the GMAV flew the entire four- mile route,
moved south to cover a canal noted for cache emplacement, and
then landed.
Within the change of mission, we were able to quickly set

up and launch the GMAV with little difficulty. Working
in conjunction with the EOD team’s robot, SSG
During one mission, the GMAV maneuvers into position using its downward camera Patterson was able to quickly determine that the
to view a suspected IED inside a tire in the battalion’s area of operations. suspected IED was nothing more than a tire with some
trash in it.
These are just two of many successful operations
supported by the UAV Single Vehicle Employment
Platform. With more attention given to the notion, and
perhaps an MTOE change, the concept will further evolve.
A command or TACP variant Stryker should be dedicated;
the manning requirement would be a driver (11B), vehicle
commander (11B), a ground controller, two pilots trained
on both the GMAV and Raven UAV systems (11B), and a
communications specialist (25B). A Soldier designated and
trained on all the peripheral Tacticomp systems and
equipment (25B) is also needed. Lastly, two Soldiers would
be assigned as the dismounted security element (11B).
It remains to be seen how far the Army’s use of UAVs
will unfold. My assumption is that we are seeing just the
tip of the iceberg. New prototypes of the Raven and GMAV
will roll off the production line frequently as the Army’s
use of UAVs matures. A newer version of the GMAV is
already out and has an upgraded camera, which locks onto
a specific target.
My hope is that this article assists other units in
establishing their own UAV employment platform and gives
them a recipe of how to do it. As technologies emerge
making UAVs lighter, faster, smaller and stronger, the sky
really is the limit.
n i ar i l a ri n CPT Gordon R. Kinneer a

a i n a an r 2n a ali n 112 n an ry
ry r ri a a a i a pl y in upp r
p ra i n ra i r i a ra ua all y r
ili ary A a y an ll an nn a ni r i y
SSG Todd Patterson A pil an in l
The author observes while SSG Todd Patterson pilots the GMAV in support of a i l A pl y n pla r pr al n ri u i
ar i l
joint clearance operation in Iraq.

R FESSI NA F R
JFOS ARE A
NICE START
ART
MAJ SCOTT P. KNIGHT
T
he Army and Air Force quickly determined that the concept
of the tactical air control party (TAC-P) with its minimal
number of joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) personnel
was inadequate to support major combat operations in both the
Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. Simply put, there are not enough
JTACs to cover the battlefield. Over the past several years, the
Field Artillery communities of the Marines and the Army have made
efforts to push the capabilities of close air support (CAS) down to
lowest level utilizing the joint fires observer (JFO) concept. The
JFO is not meant to bypass the requirements of a qualified JTAC, i a
but augment the ability of maneuver units below the battalion level Soldiers with the 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment determine a grid
to provide timely target information when the JTAC is not present coordinate during a live-fire exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C., on 11 June.
in the target area.
This methodology to support the JTAC in the current operating CAS as described in the JFO methodology.
environment yields successes, but as we reduce the number of The JFO Course (JFOC) is currently offered at Nellis Air Force
forces and transition to an advisory role, we must look beyond the Base, Nev.; Fort Sill, Okla.; and Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany;
artillery community in order to ensure CAS capability continues to and should be expanded to support small unit leaders within
be a combat multiplier on the battlefield. Given the fire support maneuver companies. Currently, course requirements limit the
structural design shortages currently inherent in ground combat training to field artillery personnel or members of reconnaissance
maneuver battalions, the expanding area ground units must operate units. Use of virtual training devices such as the JTAC Training
in, and the lack of training outside of the fire support community, and Rehearsal System (TRS) dome should be expanded or integrated
ground commanders must shift their reliance for CAS from the JFO into ground tactical trainers such as the engagement skills trainer
and empower small unit leaders to assume the role. (EST) or close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) to support training of
The fire support element (FSE) of maneuver battalions currently maneuver leaders. Furthermore, efforts must be made to adjust
is not up to the JFO task for providing terminal guidance support equipment allocations in unit MTOEs to reflect changes in
below the company level. The current modern table of organization communications and terminal guidance technologies in order to
and equipment (MTOE) for the Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) promote air-ground integration congruent with the JFO “Eyes and
provides at best one forward observer (who may or may not be JFO Ears” concept.
qualified) to each platoon, and the heavy BCT cannot even do that. Whether or not small unit leaders become JFO certified is
The equipping of the FSE further supports the assertion that the irrelevant. Familiarity breeds confidence remains the basis of my
company level is the lowest by providing only one laser designator argument. Although JFOs are an asset to the integration of air and
per company. When combined with the ever increasing land firepower, everyone acknowledges that the commander on the
requirements of company and battalion command post operations, ground makes the final call when the circumstances warrant.
it is likely that the employment of CAS at the company level must Employing CAS will continue to be a critical requirement given the
be a predetermined decision by the commander in order to ensure dispersion of ground forces and the need to provide indigenous
the JFO is specifically placed with the unit conducting the operation. forces with enablers to reinforce their efforts. Commanders and
This company commander CAS decision is in direct contradiction maneuver leaders at all levels would be served well to empower
to how forces both currently conduct operations in the current OE their subordinates with preparation and training to employ CAS
and are likely to conduct operations as a member of an advisory before it becomes on-the-job training.
and assistance brigade. The majority of combat force activities
take place at the platoon level conducting patrolling or specific
MAJ Scott P. Knight i urr n ly a u n a an an
operations within a company area of operation. Often platoon, n ral a ll i pr i u a i n n in lu r in a a
section, and squad leaders are the executors with eyes on the a i in ru r a ili ary A a y an a a pany
ground, and the likely requestors of enablers such as fire support. an r i r n an ry i i i n i pl y n ra
Because these small unit leaders are the likely consumers of a i i n in 1 r A an a a a r u li
A ini ra i n r r iy ni r i y r
CAS, efforts should be made to facilitate their ability to employ

THE AIRBORNE HEAVY WEAPONS
COMPANY IN THE COE
CPT KEITH W. BENEDICT
“The only way the mortar team was able In light of the recent publication of FM 3- based upon my own experiences as the
to evade your pursuit was by digging in, a 21.12, The Infantry Weapons Company, and company commander for Delta Company,
tactic that does not play well to their the development of the find, fix, finish, 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry
strengths, and making it only a matter of exploit, and analyze (F3EA) methodology, Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division for more
time before you found them.” maneuver leaders at all levels must take the than 16 months. In light of my own
— Joint Multinational Readiness opportunity to reflect upon lessons learned experiences in training and after observing
Center Observer/Controller from recent deployments to challenge and other weapons companies during their own
push the evolving limits of what assault mission rehearsal exercises, I found that
T
he contemporary Infantry heavy platoons can provide to full spectrum weapons companies are often
weapons company and its assault operations. misunderstood and unnecessarily
platoons bear little resemblance to This article is an attempt to promote doctrinally constrained by their legacy
its anti-tank counterparts of just 10 years discourse and facilitate leader “anti-tank” role with the seemingly
ago. The integration of new technologies understanding of the capabilities and defensive tasks of blocking and screening.
such as the Improved Target Acquisition limitations of an Infantry weapons company, However, a better understanding of this
System (ITAS) and the RQ-11 Raven in general, and an airborne Infantry weapons company’s capabilities and its organic
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has company, in particular. The findings and assets can enable maneuver commanders at
transformed weapons companies into a recommendations outlined in this article are all levels to further exploit the contemporary
much more capable and dynamic assault assault platoon or weapons company in the
force within brigade combat teams (BCTs). conduct of full-spectrum operations.
SPC John Co le of Com any, nd

attalion, 3 th Air orne nfantry Regiment,
mans the AS during a com any attack.
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Composition shortages, particularly leaders. In a four-vehicle

Similar to the Infantry weapons company Within an airborne infantry convoy, this would facilitate an absolute
outlined in FM 3-21.12, an Airborne weapons battalion, a weapons maximum of nine dismounts, leaving only
company should be the first
company is composed of four assault gunners scanning sectors, drivers monitoring
company filled with all key
platoons, each with two squads of vehicles the radio, and one TC to command and control
leader positions, ideally
comprised of two gun trucks each. However, the vehicles, with no backup personnel to react
leaders with previous
unlike the platoons depicted in FM 3-21.12, in the event of a downed gunner. This limits the
experience at their current
an assault platoon in the 82nd Airborne pay grade. assault platoon’s capacity to engage with the
Division does not have organic Javelins. population to the same extent as a dismounted
Alternatively, platoons have the capability rifle platoon, particularly in an urban setting.
to mount on their gun trucks up to two each M240B 7.62mm machine During an extended deployment, once environmental morale leave
guns, M2 .50 caliber machine guns, MK-19 automatic grenade is incorporated into the troop-to-task, this number quickly
launchers, or TOW ITAS. They also have one cargo HMMWV deteriorates to five to seven dismounts. Within an airborne
and HMMWV trailer. That assault platoon is comprised of the operation, assault platoons face several major challenges and
platoon leader (0-2), platoon sergeant (E-7), section sergeant (E-6), variables. Depending upon the assembly procedures, it may take
and two squads consisting of the squad leader (E-5), two gunners up to an hour to have one section fully-mission capable, and up to
(E-4), two to three riflemen/drivers (E-4), and two assistant gunners/ two hours to place an entire platoon’s vehicles into operation.
drivers (E-3), for a total of 18 personnel. Second, assault platoons can quickly dissolve and have difficulty
Within an airborne brigade combat team (ABCT), assault covering initial objectives in the event of a damaged vehicle. This
platoons provide invaluable capabilities as far as maneuver, can force truck crews to operate dismounted, which may necessitate
firepower, and overwatch. With the potential need to transport or a task organization change on the ground depending upon the
secure casualties, detainees, or noncombatants seeking protection mission for that platoon or company, a contingency that should
— and with the ever-present need to reinforce or react to contact always be included in planning and rehearsals.
throughout the perimeter — every single gun truck serves as a
battalion-level asset. In theater, gun trucks afford the battalion Manning and Training Priorities
with a means of transporting and immediately placing into operation Within an airborne infantry battalion, a weapons company should
a variety of key assets, including the Raven. With organic weapons be the first company filled with all key leader positions, ideally
systems, the airborne assault platoons greatly enhance an ABCT’s leaders with previous experience at their current pay grade. Though
ability to find, fix, and finish the enemy. As far as finding the enemy, a rifle platoon has more than twice as many personnel and four
the ITAS itself provides an assault platoon with an unprecedented squads to command and control, the complexity of the many different
ability to scan an engagement area, engage a variety of threats up assets available and potential mission sets for an assault platoon
to and including an armored enemy, provide overwatch, facilitate demands experienced and mature leadership. In order to place leaders
named area of interest (NAI) reconnaissance, and call for fire. where they can have the most impact on the battalion-level fight as
Assault platoons provide more direct firepower than rifle far as where they may end up on the battlefield and the volume of
companies. The M2 has a significant psychological and area effect, effects that they directly control, platoon leaders and platoon
and can effectively fix, if not finish, a motorized enemy. Additionally, sergeants should already have served in that capacity in rifle
the MK-19 also provides increased dead space coverage well platoons. Section sergeants should also already have served as
beyond the M203 within rifle platoons. All three of these systems weapons squad leaders in rifle platoons. Weapons companies are
enhance an assault platoon’s ability to close with a suppressed often task organized such that individual platoons or even sections
enemy, and under more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), the operate decentralized in order to support other company or specialty
M240B can supplement the ability for that platoon to finish the platoons. This requires a mature leader who can inherently operate
enemy. One section, mutually supported or overwatched by another away from organic leadership and provide sustainment training and
element, can scan more open terrain than multiple dismounted weapons support to other leaders potentially less familiar with that
platoons. Granted, the absence of the Javelin system does decrease platoon’s or section’s capabilities.
the specific anti-tank capabilities of the airborne weapons company Additionally, the second- and third-order effects of leader
compared to that depicted in FM 3-21.12. However, the introduction vacancies have more serious consequences in a weapons company.
of the M240B into the weapons configuration does provide assault For instance, in the absence of one E-6 section sergeant, one of the
platoon leaders with a wider menu of munitions to conduct two E-5 squad leaders must serve as the section sergeant, leaving
escalation of force and consequence management within the unique an E-4 as a squad leader and vehicle TC. That E-4 is now responsible
ROE following an airborne assault. for one of the four types of mounted weapons systems, three
Despite the capabilities of the airborne heavy weapons company, different dismounted weapons systems, two radios, a blue force
there are several key limitations. The greatest constraint for an tracking (BFT) system, three other personnel, and would potentially
organic weapons company is manpower. Although having four be the senior individual present in a decentralized escalation of
platoons provides an added capability as far as the number of force incident. Alternatively, an E-4 in a rifle platoon that serves as
maneuver elements, each of those elements is considerably smaller a team leader to fill an E-5 vacancy is responsible for three different
than a rifle platoon and thus more affected by taskings or personnel weapons systems and three other personnel. Battalion commanders

need to look closely at the officers and current munitions in theater. Each BCT ensure that operators understand how they
NCOs who serve in their heavy weapons should schedule this course semiannually can best support those leaders.
companies in order to fully leverage the for all ITAS gunners, as it is designed to
available assets and mitigate the inherent train approximately 25 personnel and would Employment of Assault Platoons
limitations of the smaller platoons. ensure that new gunners have baseline Cordon and Search Operations — The
Though assault platoons are often task proficiency with the system. Raytheon also primary advantage that a weapons company
organized such that they fall under rifle provides a four-hour leader’s course has in conducting a cordon and search
companies while conducting sustained oriented towards maneuver commanders derives from the integration of the ITAS and
combat operations, I recommend against the and S-3s who may command and control the Raven to provide effective overwatch
practice of decentralizing the assault assault platoons. After firing more than 100 and early warning of enemy activity. In an
platoons to fall under rifle company TOW missiles during its last 14-month urban environment, leaders must do a cost-
headquarters prior to the execution of a full rotation to Afghanistan, the 173rd ABCT benefit analysis of whether or not to mount
training cycle with the weapons company recommended that every gunner fire a live the ITAS if they lack the ability to mount
consolidated. With the complexity of the TOW missile prior to deployment. BCTs both the ITAS and an automatic weapon
equipment in an assault platoon, and given must make every effort to afford maximum system. With the limited field of view that
the constraints on training sites that can opportunities to fire TOW missiles. Only by the gunner has in the ITAS optic, he
afford an opportunity to train with those placing an annual training event on the sacrifices breadth of coverage for specificity.
systems, assault platoons’ manning, calendar to ensure that all ITAS gunners With regards to force protection, especially
training, and equipment is best supervised fire live munitions can a unit ensure that for improvised attacks like the RKG-3,
by a single company headquarters. I had proper emphasis is being place on retaining gunners would be unlikely or even
the opportunity to go through an entire this vital skill set, particularly in the event discouraged from opening up with the
training cycle with all four platoons, of a conventional conflict. heavy weapon system first, and would most
allowing us to follow the progression from All Infantry commanders, and likely end up engaging with the M4 in the
the Raytheon ITAS Operator’s Course, to particularly weapons company turret. Thus, even in an urban environment
the ITAS Basic Skills Trainer (BST), to firing commanders, must also stress UAV training. there may still be merit to mounting an ITAS
live TOW missiles at Camp LeJeune, N.C. The quality of the imagery has improved with an M4 also in the turret, even if it means
Only after completing this cycle had all four dramatically just since the original fielding having one less M240B, MK-19, or M2 in
platoons had enough supervised training of the RQ-11 in 2005. I made the Raven a that environment.
on each of the weapons systems to afford priority for training and have almost reached Whenever possible, one ITAS vehicle
them the capacity to effectively decentralize the standard of having two qualified should be centrally-located within the
throughout the battalion task force to operators per platoon. After experimentation cordoned area to scan the surrounding area
provide weapons and anti-tank overwatch with battery life and sustainable flight for activity, particularly at night. The optical
and reconnaissance support. frequency, I find that with eight operators zoom would make it possible, even during
Airborne heavy weapons companies (who can rotate according to their assigned the day, for the gunner to identify anyone
must prioritize the training on the ITAS, the duties and responsibilities) and two attempting to take pictures or video the
one remaining organic anti-tank weapon complete Raven aircraft systems, barring operation, or possibly personnel serving as
system. I cannot overemphasize the major maintenance issues it is possible to early warning. For daytime operations,
importance of maintaining proficiency for sustain 8-12 hours of flights per day with leaders need to assign very clear NAIs or
gunners on the ITAS. Without this minimal impact on the platoon manning. points of interest to the gunners due to the
proficiency, the company lacks the ability Those 8-12 hours, accompanied by an ISR limits of their field of view. At night, however,
to finish an armored threat, severely (Intelligence, Surveillance and gunners would have more freedom to move
inhibiting its capacity to impact the F3EA at Reconnaissance) matrix, can provide quickly through their designated sectors of
the battalion level. Because I was very innumerable benefits as far as area or fire, given the clearly visible thermal image
unfamiliar with the system when I assumed objective reconnaissance, pattern of life that personnel would give if they were
command, I sought out the assistance of behavioral monitoring, and route observing or attempting to initiate contact
the Raytheon contact team at Fort Bragg to reconnaissance for patrols. Even more through windows or doorways. Even
provide higher-level training. My company important than the maintenance of their personnel well back from the window itself
had not used the ITAS on the previous flying proficiency is the routine can be observed, and a very quick
deployment to any large extent, and the last communication between squad- and determination could be made as far as gender,
training support package on the system had platoon-level leaders and Raven operators, body positioning, the presence of
been conducted in the fall of 2006. I which also serves as a means of developing threatening materials or hostile intent. In
contacted the Raytheon team concerning its junior leaders who constantly train in a addition to scanning from the inside of the
54-hour ITAS Operator’s Course. This combined-arms atmosphere. Only through cordon to observe activity, the ITAS can
course proved to be extremely valuable in routine interaction during all collective also be used to monitor and scan the
the level of understanding my gunners training events can leaders understand the exfiltration route.
acquired as far as the system itself and the capabilities and limitations of the Raven and For operations like the cordon and search

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
route, or simply observe the objective. Though the RQ-11 does

emit an audible noise, a technique called the “silent approach” can
be used to drift from a high to a low altitude using the motor
minimally. This ability to identify personnel moving inside or outside
of the intended perimeter can have a significant impact on
intelligence development. After the operation, the UAV can also be
integrated to overwatch the objective area to gather atmospherics
for any potential enemy personnel that seek to intimidate members
of the local population.
Deliberate Raids
An assault platoon’s organic assets also facilitate the execution
of deliberate raids. During the platoon situational training exercise
(STX) during our mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), platoons were
tasked to conduct a deliberate raid on a known enemy compound
after confirming the presence of weapons smugglers. After
conducting a terrain analysis using the BFT circular line of sight
(LOS) tool, platoons identified an ideal overwatch position that
was out of earshot for the enemy, approximately 600 meters away to
overwatch the objective. Using the ITAS, platoons could easily
confirm or deny the presence and activity of the weapons smugglers
and have a variety of means to find, fix and finish the enemy. With
a confirmed LOS, the long range optics make it possible to determine
the exact composition, disposition, and strength of the personnel
on the compound, well beyond heavy PAS-13s or “three bys”
organic to rifle platoons. The ITAS can also greatly enhance the
effectiveness of indirect fires, either by confirming pre-planned
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs
targets or using the laser range finder (Far Target Locator [FTL]
SPC en amin est of Co., 3 th A R, mans the and
1 on a dual mount configured . available in theater) to receive an immediate and accurate distance
and direction. In conjunction with a 10-digit grid from the BFT,
where dismounts are a planned portion of the operation, the best forward observers can call in an accurate and expedited call-for-fire
tactic we found for command and control was for the platoon leader mission through the instantaneous polar information. Units with
and FO to be part of the dismount element, with the platoon sergeant the 173rd Airborne Brigade found this tactic to be highly effective,
remaining with the vehicles. This allowed the platoon sergeant to usually placing indirect fire rounds on target with just one
supervise the overwatch element and the sectors of fire for the adjustment.
weapons, and it also affords him the most flexibility as far as either Beyond reconnaissance and overwatch, the platoon can use
maintaining the platoon casualty collection point (CCP) at the pre- the ITAS to engage a hardstand building with minimal collateral
designated vehicle or to move the CCP to the point of injury for damage. The 173rd again pioneered the usage of the ITAS against
medical evacuation, while providing him the more robust buildings. The bunker buster munitions now available in theater,
communications platform possible between the ASIP on a poweramp combined with the accuracy of the ITAS, significantly mitigates
or through an expedited BFT message to the higher headquarters. historic collateral damage concerns. With a positive identification
One major disadvantage with weapons’ direct involvement in and an ROE that would afford this type of engagement, a target can
cordon and search operations pertains again to the number of be conclusively identified and engaged by the same sensor-shooter.
dismounts, particularly if there are other enablers (military working The patrol leader can also use the connected video screen to observe
dogs, Civil Affairs team, etc.) that require additional security. Under what the gunner is seeing in their optics and provide firing
absolutely ideal circumstances, a mounted assault platoon may commands to the gunner. Finally, if the intelligence that may be
have six to nine dismounts available, though during sustained obtained on the objective warrants a tactical call prior to finishing
combat operations this more realistically becomes four to six the enemy on the objective, then the assault platoon leader has an
personnel, barely enough for a local national engagement. When optimal array of capabilities, particularly if the UAV is airborne, to
operating entirely dismounted, an assault platoon can effectively find, fix, and, if the tactical callout is unsuccessful, finish the enemy
engage the population and operate independently with an adequate on the objective.
battalion quick reaction force (QRF) readiness status. However, if The combination of speed and overwhelming firepower can also
trucks must be manned, then individual assault platoons face provide a mobile support by fire that can immediately establish
significant task organization and security challenges. superiority of fire and effectively fix the enemy. Thermals can then
The UAV should also be incorporated into the cordon and search. be used to continue to assess any movement on the objective
It can provide overwatch or route reconnaissance for the infiltration before ever dismounting and using the vehicles for cover to the

objective area. Though an assault platoon
may be a likely candidate for the routine or
permanent PSD for battalion or higher-level
leaders given its size on paper, this role may
not make full use of its capabilities unless it
is part of a deliberate tactical command post.
Even up to three or four kilometers away
from an objective, if a line of sight with the
objective area is possible, senior leaders
riding as part of a convoy with an assault
platoon could have direct control over the
UAV ISR before, during, and after the
operation through the on-board Raven
operator, and would have a robust capability
to identify targets for indirect fire and
provide intelligence updates on the
objective area.
Search and Attack Missions

Airborne heavy weapons companies and
assault platoons are best suited for search
and attack or deterrence missions, Photo courtesy of the author
particularly in non-urban environments. SS Paul illiams and S reddy Salmeron rovide feed ack to SPC Christo her Richardson
During my own MRE, we integrated the during a . cali er range.
Raven UAV and our ITAS to conduct a directional antennae continued to overwatch ITAS element, all platoons
search and attack mission on a mortar team communicate with the aircraft. This afforded involved in the operation would receive
operating in wooded terrain. Though we us an opportunity to use the full battery updates on the location of personnel or
were unsuccessful in destroying or detaining power, usually 45 minutes to one hour vehicles in the battlespace and could
the individuals involved in this instance, our depending upon wind, to attempt to pursue provide near real-time 10-digit grids for
pursuit was highly effective in denying the possible enemy with an internal aerial possible enemy locations. In the absence
enemy’s ability to use the terrain outside of platform under our direct control. We would of previously developed NAIs, these
the towns to conduct indirect fire attacks, then set up a hasty security perimeter when patrols converted a traditional movement to
decreasing the number of attacks from 10 in we needed to land the aircraft, change out contact into a deliberate search and attack,
the previous 48 hours to zero in the the battery, and then resume the operation. with the Raven providing information on
subsequent 48 hours that we conducted the In concert with the ITAS, the UAV provided possible enemy activity which could be
search and attack missions. The integration the company with multiple means of confirmed by the overwatch ITAS element
of the UAV and the usage of the ITAS in a identifying the enemy or, at a minimum, or the maneuver element.
rural environment demonstrated the severely restricting his movement. After the operation, we learned from the
potential for conducting combined The actual maneuver of forces looked observer/controllers that the only means the
operations at the company level to dominate very much like a company-level bounding mortar team had of evading our pursuit was
the three-dimensional battlespace. These overwatch. In one particular operation within by digging into the terrain. Given their
operations also emphasized the potential for two hours we effectively dominated propensity to remain mobile and blend into
the airborne heavy weapons company in approximately 15 square kilometers with just the population in this Afghanistan-based
purely offensive operations in order to three platoons, destroying the one enemy scenario, this severely limited their freedom
dominate the surrounding battlespace. element present within that battlespace. We of movement and their ability to disrupt
The current tracking mechanisms for the routinely used the LOS tool on the BFT to friendly operations via indirect fire attacks.
Raven afford more opportunities to use the identify higher, open terrain where we could
Raven during mounted operations, even if emplace a stationary force with a retrans Defensive Operations
the takeoff and landing areas are different. COM 201 and an ITAS scanning designated The assault platoons have even more
When conducting these search and attack terrain, while the bounding element would potential in enhancing a company or
missions, on multiple occasions, I seek to cover dead space or canalize possible battalion-level defensive position. Whether
designated primary and alternate takeoff and enemy mortar teams into the line of sight of as part of a FOB defense or the establishment
landing sites. We would launch from one the stationary element. Communication and and expansion of a lodgement during an
position, and then have the antennae a common operating picture were critical airborne operation, assault platoons have
projecting through the turret of a HMMWV, during these operations. With a stationary the ability to enhance a unit’s ability to
with the assistant operator ensuring that the Raven team back at the COP or with the conduct engagement area development.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
With the use of the BFT, an assault platoon can do a detailed map more appropriately engaged by close air support or attack aviation.
and imagery reconnaissance of the potential defensive position or Or if he simply wants to draw the attention of other gunners or
likely avenues of approach. This contributes directly to the dismounts in the area towards a potential target, then a large IR
identification of the primary and contingency engagement areas. (hellfire equivalent or larger) would allow a gunner to do just that.
The assault platoon also has more options as far as weapons The 173rd ABCT has found a way to mount a PEQ-2 to the ITAS
systems to ensure that dead space is covered through the use of system as a means of designating sectors of fire or to provide an IR
the M203 or MK-19, and that multiple kill zones are established signature, but a much larger designator would greatly enhance the
with a defense in depth. The mobility and storage capabilities of systems potential as a reconnaissance or ISR asset for the battalion.
the gun trucks provides the airborne assault platoon with the ability As far as the Raven, battalions should look closely at the task
to quickly emplace and retrieve obstacles, and also to conduct organization of their companies with respect to Raven operators
physical reconnaissance of the engagement area and any dead and the push for company intelligence support teams (COIST).
space to plan and integrate indirect fires. BFT then affords a quick Two qualified operators per platoon could also serve as COIST
opportunity to graphically depict the entire patrol base and the personnel. That way the personnel responsible for developing NAIs
indirect fires plan for the higher headquarters. and analyzing patterns of life within the company are also the same
In the event of a unit conducting an extended ground assault individuals operating the Raven and executing the ISR synch matrix.
convoy over the course of multiple days, the Raven can work in Another course of action that should be explored at the battalion
conjunction with the ITAS to provide overwatch of the surrounding level in airborne units includes pushing additional UAVs to the
area and provide a means of early warning to maintain the initiative assault platoons as the primary means of transporting the asset
even when conducting a mounted patrol base or even a short halt. and as the elements most likely to be operating remotely. Any push
In these instances, ensure that an unobstructed runway of for COIST or battalion-level UAV elements within weapons
approximately 75-meters long by 25-meters wide is available, and companies, however, would require additional manpower given the
take into consideration the approximate 10 minutes it takes to primary constraint for those elements.
conduct preflight testing. The Raven and ITAS in concert can Given the uniqueness of a weapons company and the sheer
facilitate the establishment of a vehicular patrol base, which we did breadth of missions it can execute, leaders at all levels should ensure
at the company level during our MRE. By burying our 3K generator that they understand the specific capabilities and limitations of the
and conducting a cold-start every two hours and running the systems that make it a highly lethal and dynamic force. Whether the
vehicles for 20 minutes to maintain the vehicle battery life, and by commander’s intent is to defend friendly structures through a more
camouflaging our vehicles and choosing a position off of the main comprehensive defense and ISR plan, to more closely monitor activity
lines of drift but with overwatch of those lines of drift, we were able in adjacent buildings in an urban environment, or to pursue the enemy
to minimize our physical and audible signature and establish a robust when he chooses to separate himself from the population, an assault
and effective defensive position. platoon has all the tools to facilitate or even individually execute almost
If another nation was to request the assistance of a coalition any mission in the contemporary operating environment.
force where we would be establishing a base of operations within
friendly borders and projecting forces in a stability and support References
capacity, conducting counterinsurgency operations, or in training * “The Antitank Section: In Support Of A Light Infantry Rifle
role supporting and assisting host-nation forces with full-spectrum Platoon,” CPT Charles L. Hiter, Training Techniques, 1st Quarter, FY02
operations, higher-level planners should take into consideration these * “Battles from Cortina: D Company — A Combat Multiplier
capabilities, particularly in site selection for forward operating bases During Movement to Contact,” SFC Charles Schwab, JRTC News
or combat outposts. On open terrain — either in the mounted or, ideally, from the Front, Jan-Feb 2001
in an elevated dismounted position — the ITAS could provide a * FM 3-21.91, Tactical Employment of Antiarmor Platoons and
constant means of reconnaissance and observation for key avenues Companies
of approach. Perhaps the best position for such an operating base * FM 3-21.12, The Infantry Weapons Company
would be in an open rural environment or on relatively high ground * FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company
where the ITAS could see 3-5 kilometers in each direction, severely * FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad
limiting a potential adversary’s ability to conduct harassment operations * ITAS AAR, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd ABCT, April 2008
on the outpost itself or emplace IEDs along key routes. This would * “TOW ITAS Requires New TTP,” CPT Thomas N. McFadyen,
also severely impact the enemy’s ability to influence the local News from the Front, Mar-Apr 2000
population by mitigating the danger they face purely due to their
CPT Keith W. Benedict is the commander of D Company, 2nd Battalion,
proximity to coalition forces compounds. 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. He received his
commission from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in May 2003. As
The Way Ahead a Rhodes Scholarship recipient, he later received a Masters of Philosophy
As far as potential improvements or enhancements of current in Development Studies from Oxford University in July of 2005. He has
previously served as a rifle platoon leader and rifle company executive
capabilities, BCTs should receive the ITAS with FTL capabilities officer for B Company, 2-325th AIR. CPT Benedict then served as the
starting in the fall of 2010. Raytheon should also consider adding a battalion assistant operations officer and battalion logistics officer during
target designation capability to the system. In the event that a the White Falcons’ most recent deployment in support of Operation Iraqi
gunner or leader on the ground identifies a target that would be Freedom.

PERSIAN-MESOPOTAMIAN RELATIONS:
Religious and Territorial Fault Lines from the 16th Century to 1975
COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, U.S. NAVY
T
he United States’
involvement in Iraq and
challenges from Iran compel
a greater understanding of the
complexities of Iraqi as well as Iranian
military and political history. We can
no longer ignore the patterns of Iranian
and Iraqi history which stretch for
centuries. It is vital that America’s
war colleges delve into obscure
disputes such as those between the
Ottomans and Safavid Persians. Iraq,
known before the 20th century as
Mesopotamia, has always been the
scene of superpower struggles for
centuries: the Greeks versus the
Lakhmids, the Romans versus the
Parthians (able horsemen, the
Parthian could fire a bow while
mounted, giving the term Parthian and
now parting shot). The Sassanid
Persians fought in Iraq first against
Figure 1 — Map created between 1934 and 1939
Christian Byzantium and then the
Arabs unified by Islam. Then Iraq would be the stage for rivalries Works by Arab intellectuals and graduate theses of military
between the Ottomans and the Safavid Persians. The Cold War significance that are printed into books are important to analyze.
(1945-1991) engulfed three monarchs of Hashemite Iraq (Kings Faisal They offer American military planners a method to better understand
I, Ghazi I, and Faisal II) and the Shah of Iran. Fears of Iranian the region from the vantage and culture of those living, writing and
expansion pitted the Republic of Iraq against the Shah, and those reflecting on conflicts within the Middle East. It is not important to
fears were amplified with the successful coup that brought the agree or disagree with a point of view, but to learn, study and
Islamic Republic of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini. Fears now become acclimated to the perceptions, as well as the overt and
include not only the expansion of Iran, but the export of covert hostilities between Iran and Iraq over the centuries. This
revolutionary and radical Shiite political doctrines. review of Khalifa’s work will not highlight his views on all 10 treaties,
Despite Iraq being the scene of so much historical violence from but introduce readers to the main points of his book with a focus on
1554 to 1975, there would be 10 major agreements signed between the sources of conflict between Iran and Iraq from the 16th century
Iraq (or Mesopotamia) and Iran (or Persia). Nabil Khalifah, a then- to 1975. Once identified, these tensions can be monitored and
recently graduated Arab student of Islamic civilization, wrote two managed, as we balance the complexities of political-military affairs
books, one on Lebanese historical culture and the second on Saudi in the Persian Gulf.
petroleum politics. His third book — the subject of this review
essay — was published in 1983 and was part of his undergraduate Religious Issues
thesis. It is a historical analysis of these 10 agreements between A key guarantee for any Persian ruler, since Shiite Islam became
Iraq and Iran. Khalifah attempted to address the central issues that the state religion in Persia (now Iran) under Shah Abbas I in 1508,
have resulted in conflict between these two regional powers from was to secure unmolested access to Shiite holy sites under Sunni
1554 to 1975. He published his work under the title Ruyah Jadeedah control such as Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and Mecca and Medina
lil Harb al-Iraqiyah al-Farisiyah (A New Assessment of the Iraq- in Arabia. This would be the central focus of the Amasia Treaty
Iran War). It is important to pause and note that this Arabic book of 1554. The treaty was negotiated to stop the harassment of
was published three years into the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989). The Shiite pilgrims by Ottoman government functionaries, villagers
book was self-published in Beirut and can be found through inter- and Sunni tribes. Shiite pilgrims were robbed of their valuables
library loan by citing Library of Congress call number 84962304. on their way to Karbala from Persia or in northern Arabia as they

R FESSI NA F R
made their way to Mecca. well as Mosul were designed to force a for the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf,
The Nadir Shah Treaty of 1746 focused reaction — recognition and respect for and what would evolve into the Trucial
on getting Ottomans to acknowledge their Shiism. In reality, both the Ottomans and Coast. In World War I, the British would
responsibility for the concept of aman (safe- Persians fanned the flames of sectarianism. use their relationship with the Sheikh of
passage or safety and security) of guests Complicating Shiite rights in Sunni Ottoman Muhammara to flow British Expeditionary
visiting Ottoman domains as pilgrims. The dominions were the Kaab tribe who left the Forces into the Port of Muhammara to
focus of the treaties of 1554 and 1746 were central Arabian region of the Najd and protect Persian oil fields and the refinery in
geographically centered on access to settled in what would be eventually named Abadan, and open a military campaign
Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. The Arabistan (land of the Arabs). These Sunni against Germany’s ally Ottoman Turkey.
Ottomans captured Mesopotamia gradually minorities were discriminated against in
from 1534 and wrested the entire region from Shiite-dominated Persia. Ottoman and Persian Regional
Persia by 1555. The Ottomans (a Sunni Jealousies
power) now controlled the holy sites of both The Strategic Port of Muhammara The book details the subconscious and
Shiites and Sunni Muslims to include Mecca The Port of Muhammara (now conscious jealousies between Persia and
and Medina in Arabia as well as Karbala and Khorramshahr) located on the lip of the Shatt the Ottomans that would carry over well into
Najaf in Mesopotamia. The Ottoman al-Arab waterway fell in the region of present day. We have already highlighted
capture of Shiite holy shrines in Iraq from Arabistan. Tribal histories in this region that Iraq was a nation that possessed Shiite
Persia necessitated a renegotiation of the matter, and this port was established by holy places that Persia did not have. In
treaty of 1554 and renewed hostilities Ghaith ibn Kaab, of the Kaab tribe, likely in addition, Iraq boasted larger cities than
between Persia and the Ottomans. Sunni the 10th century. This port would evolve Persia and had more cultivatable marsh and
dominance of Shiite holy sanctuaries in Iraq and expand to the modern ports of Umm Qasr flatlands versus the mountains of Persia.
would continue from 1555 until the fall of and Abadan combined. The strategic From the Persian perspective, all trade,
Saddam Hussein in 2003. importance of the Port of Muhammara would development, agriculture and holy sites
The capture of Karbala in 1556 so be magnified when the Mamelukes of Egypt seemed to be going towards Mesopotamia.
outraged the Shiite community that fought a titanic struggle against the Muslim Trade was of great interest throughout the
skirmishes broke out between Persian and Mongols over control of the Levant in the region’s history, and the book highlights the
Ottoman forces. By the 19th century the 13th century. This diverted trade to the Mesopotamian saying, “The Persian makes
Ottomans and Persians massed large Persian Gulf, making the Port of Muhammara pilgrimage to trade and trades to make
formations, a stand-off that required the a valuable asset. The port would be an pilgrimage.” This adage captures in a few
intervention of Britain and Russia, who autonomous region ruled by the Kaab Tribe, words the importance of unimpeded access
organized the Eruzurum Talks. These talks and there were no organized or enforced of Shiite Persians into Iraq and then onto
resulted in two treaties in 1823 and 1847. tariffs. The Port of Muhammara quickly Arabia. The author highlights the following
The second Eruzurum Talks began in 1843, evolved into an open port for Arabs, Turks, issues from studying the multiple
but it took four years for an agreement to be Persians and Europeans, with the Kaab tribe agreements reached and broken from 1554
reached between Persia and the Ottomans sandwiched between the great powers of to 1975:
on the status of the holy sites and the status Persia and the Ottomans. * The 1746 Nadir Shah Agreement has as
of the Shiite Hawza (clerical cluster) in In Ottoman times, higher tariffs were part of its components Ottoman taxation,
present-day Iraq. Persian demands during levied on British goods, and the an issue resolved when an agreement was
the second Erzurum Talks included: autonomous tribal confederacy of struck in which Persians would not be taxed
Protection of Shia tradesmen and Muhammara exploited this by ignoring the unless they earn a profit or engage in trade
pilgrims within Ottoman domains; Ottoman decree. In the expansion of the within Mesopotamia.
Abolishment of discriminatory port during the late 19th century, the name * In 1823, it was agreed that a one-time
practices against Shiites in Ottoman law Khuramshahr/Muhammara was applied to tax of four percent be levied per visit on
courts; this trade zone. It became a vital strategic Shiites from Persia visiting Mesopotamia.
asset bringing in goods from the Persian * There were a bevy of tariffs on Persian
The right to establish Shiite mosques Gulf and into Persia, Mesopotamia and the goods, and then in 1843 there was a
in Ottoman domains; southern Levant. The Kaab tribe now led cancellation of all tariffs and taxes except
Security to worship in Medina and the tribal confederation of Muhammara, and the four-percent tax. Trade equality between
Mecca in Arabia and Najaf and Karbala in its control of the port was encouraged by Ottoman Sunni and Persian Shiites was a
Iraq; and Britain to declare independence from matter of discussion.
Ease restrictions on rights to bury Ottoman suzerainty. The Sunni Kaab Tribe The underlying Persian tension was that
Shia in or near holy shrines, an imposition saw in this the ability to maintain autonomy, the Ottomans controlled the vital
placed in the 19th century under the pretext by eliciting a new power (Great Britain) in transportation links for pilgrimage and trade.
of lack of space. its survival against the Ottomans and Iraq also enjoyed waterways, rivers, and
Persia’s military incursions and Persians. This was perhaps the earliest flatlands that made transportation much
harassment of Ottoman-controlled Basra as instance of the British providing protection easier for those pilgrims and tradesman.

Figure 3 — Close up of port areas
giving Iraq land in Qasr Shireen that the

Iraqis felt they were entitled to and
negotiated for (although this is debatable)
both in the Shah’s time and in the time of
Figure 2 — Present Day Map of Area
Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1975, this line was
Persia by 1843, sought to assert control of (1980-1989). In Operation Iraqi Freedom, again discussed and the Algiers Agreement
those routes through negotiation, a one key objective was the quick control of redrew the line in favor of Iran. This
condition that would not last, as the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr, which allowed a explosive combination of centuries of
negotiations were only viewed as a logistical beachhead to be established. jealousy and obsession of gaining minor
temporary truce with the Ottomans. Many advantage between Sunni and Shiite on the
in the west failed to realize that the Border Tensions in the 19th and fault-line between Iraq and Iran was
agreements and negotiations in the region 20th Centuries exacerbated when Shah Reza Pahlavi and
were merely another form of warfare. The 1847 Second Treaty of Erzurum drew Iran was transformed as one of two pillars
the borders between Persia and Ottoman of American security interests in the region,
Geographic Border Flashpoints Iraq under the auspices of Britain and the second pillar being Saudi Arabia.
American military planners should also Russia. In addition, the borders agreed to Provided with American arms and
study the three strategic geographic regions in this treaty have remained relatively intact equipment, Iran evolved into the fifth largest
that have been contested between Iraq and to this day. The reason every agreement army in the world, and Iraq would be
Iran. These geographic regions were among between Persia and Mesopotamia never marginalized making the Baathists look
the agenda items between Sunni and Shiite endured was because although these towards the Warsaw Pact and Arab
regional powers from Ottoman times to agreements were on paper, the intention for nationalism to counter America’s favor of
Saddam Hussein. The book defines these peace and settlement was never present and the Iranian regime.
geographic flashpoints as: could only be described as a cold peace. It is important to pause and understand
(I) Suleimaniyah in the north: The Persian This cold peace between the Ottomans and the lack of options thrust upon the United
side is mountainous, and Persia has guarded Persians involved inciting Kurdish and States, with the announcement of the
Iraqi access into Iran itself and Turkey. This Sunni insurgencies in Persia and Shiite withdrawal of British forces east of the Suez
is why the Kurds would be pawns in the agitation in Ottoman Mesopotamian by 1971 (an announcement made in 1967).
power struggle over dominance of mountain provinces. To demonstrate the sensitivity The Twin Pillar Policy, developed by the
passes between Persian Shiite and Arab of even a few kilometers between Persia and Nixon administration, was designed to have
Sunni powers. Iraq, the book highlights this case. In 1911, a Sunni and Shiite regional power police the
(II) The Zehab region in the center: This the Shatt al-Arab Waterway line of region, but this disrupted the balance of
offered a direct route into Iran from central demarcation moved 7 3/4 kilometers from the power in the region, placing significant
Iraq and vice versa. center through negotiations, and in 1937 it players like Egypt and Iraq at a
(III) Muhammara and Ahwaz region of moved 7 3/4 kilometers of the Thalwig disadvantage. Flush with modern weapons,
the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the South: (Water Demarcation) Line into the Iranian Iran began to flex its military muscle in the
This provided access to the Persian Gulf, side of the coast towards Abadan. The Persian Gulf, taking physical control of the
and various rivers and tributaries. It was a reason for the breakdown and tactical duels islands of Abu Musa, as well as the Greater
flashpoint of warfare for centuries, to include over the Shatt al-Arab was that the Persians and Lesser Tunbs from the United Arab
the last major conflict, the Iran-Iraq War used the Shatt al-Arab waterway without Emirates. Iran made blustery statements

R FESSI NA F R
claiming Emirate of Bahrain and the Shatt al-Arab waterway as its

Iraq Iran
territory. Saddam Hussein cancelled the 1975 Algiers Agreement in
1980, the Iraqi Baathists used the pretext of Iran not returning 150 Population Ratio 1 to 3
square kilometers of Qasr Shireen, a negotiation point the Iraqis
Troops 242,000 514,000
believed they had gained. This combined with the fear of the spread
of Khomeinism and the Ayatollah’s labeling of the Baathists as Reserves 250,000 400,000
apostates as well as Iranian support of world Islamist Liberation
Strategic Depth 400 km 1,300 km
movements led to a strategic decision by Iraq to pursue a more
hostile policy against Teheran. But the new Islamist radical regime Coastline 100 km 1,500 km
in Iran altered the dynamics of the region, with Iran marginalized by
Oil Potential 9.6 billion barrels* 23 billion barrels*
the United States and scaring the Arab world, Iraq found an
opportunity to assert its dominance in the Persian Gulf region. In Oil Reserves 31 billion barrels 58 billion barrels
many ways Saddam had misread internal events within Iran and
Gas Reserves 2.75 million cubic ft 490 million cubic ft
chose not to take a more covert option for dealing with fights between
Ansar Khomeini, radicalist hardliners, and the Revolutionary * per year
Government of Iran. A covert approach of supporting factions
Figure 4
within the Iranian Revolution would have been a better option for
Iraq, than direct action, the choice Saddam made when he invaded east of the Shatt al-Arab banks. Saddam hoped to:
Iran in 1980. * Topple the Khomeini regime;
Saddam viewed Iranian command and control in the early months * Receive territorial recognition of Iraq’s primacy over Qasr
of the Iranian Revolution to be completely eroded and looked on as Shireen in the north and the Shatt al-Arab in the south; and
Iran purged its top generals for even a perceived loyalty to the * Demonstrate Iraq’s supremacy over the Persian Gulf.
Shah. Economically Iran’s oil industry was in tatters, and the The war instead drew down into a stalemate and a static trench
demonization of both the United States and USSR left Iran isolated. defense using 20th century weapons of war. Iran’s immediate
Saddam also saw the balkanization of Iran’s minorities as the Kurds objectives were:
in the north and Arabs of Arabistan in the south began challenging * Quickly reconstitute its forces;
the authority of the central government in Tehran. This was brought * Break its political and military isolation to access weapons and
on by internal skirmishes as the Iranian revolution took on the parts from any source even if it was Israel; and
trappings of an Islamist version of the Reign of Terror, except the * Galvanize and mobilize the massive Iranian population, an
terror was perpetrated by hardliners wanting to impose a advantage Iran always enjoyed over Iraq.
fundamentalist Shiite regime upon all Iranians. No war simply involves two sides. The case of the Iran-Iraq War
Under this instability within Iran, Saddam could have stimulated from 1980 to 1989 is no exception. Arab Sunni Muslim states saw it
revolts among the Kurds and disgruntled minorities of Arabistan to as a means of containing Persian Shiite ambitions. Israel saw it as
the Southwest and Sunni Baluchistan in the southeast. Both are a covert means of containing Iraq’s Saddam Hussein who craved
not without risks; tension between the Iranian-Pakistan borders nuclear weapons, and saw Iraqi armor in support of Jordan in any
would have diverted attention from the Soviet adventure in future Arab-Israeli War as a threat. Israel also contended with
Afghanistan. Empowering the Kurds on either the Iranian, Iraqi, Iraq’s support of Palestinian rejectionist groups as an internal threat
Turkish or Syrian borders was always a delicate gamble, as to Israel. Egypt saw the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to bolster
empowered autonomous Iranian Kurds could hypothetically foment its credentials as a moderate Arab power, and begin the rehabilitation
insurgency in Iraqi Kurdistan. Instead Saddam chose to invade of relations with the Arab League, damaged by Egypt’s peace
Iran, deluding himself that it would be a quick victory in which he accords with Israel. Syria saw an opportunity to undermine a rival
would have the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway and Arabistan. Baathist regime in Iraq. Iran’s hard-line policies and irrational public
statements were betrayed by desperation for American military spare
The Iran-Iraq War parts, it used American hostages to negotiate a much needed
The opening gambit of the Iran-Iraq War were Iraqi forces infusion of arms.
engaging in a dual thrust through Qasr Shireen and Sumar in the Iran’s mullahs turned the essence of the conflict into one of
North and Arabistan in the South. Thirteen Iraqi divisions were Persian nationalism and playing on the victimization imagery that is
allocated for the initial attack, with five crack divisions as the lead inherent within Shiite Islam. Its mandate became to rid the globe of
attack force to control the Arabistan/Ahwaz region of Southern oppressors of the earth starting with Saddam. Iraq could never win
Iran. The central focus of the opening shots of the Iraqi ground a drawn-out conflict with Iran, due to demographic factors and lack
war against Iran in 1980 was the control of the flatlands. With control of strategic depth of major Iraqi cities to include Baghdad and
of these, armored and mechanized columns could flow with ease, Basra. The book breaks down the numbers why Iraq could not
leaving the Iranians the northern mountainous regions and marshes afford a drawn-out war with Iran (see Figure 4).
in the south past Basra. Another tactical objective for Saddam’s Syria, a Baathist competitor, all but sided with Iran when it closed
General Staff was to push Iranian positions away from artillery down Iraq’s oil pipeline that took Iraqi oil to Banyas, Syria and
range of Iraqi cities. Iraq’s initial assault pushed 10-30 kilometers Beirut, Lebanon for shipment around the globe. This was a blow to

Iraq’s ability to sustain a war of attrition with Iranian military planners abandoned the that the United States be cognizant of these
Iran. Desperate, Iraq explored pipelines futile attempt to attack through the marshes groups which add instability to an already
through Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea or in favor of human wave assaults on key tense region. This instability is not helped
through Turkey. strategic objectives. by a reactionary Shiite fundamentalist
Iran began amassing massive human government in Iran.
wave assaults and withdrew formations Conclusion By liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein,
along its border with the USSR, directing The balance of power between Iraq and the coalition has broken centuries of Iraq’s
them against Iraq. By the summer of 1982, Iran in the past and now rests upon Iraq history in which cruel leaders have governed
Saddam realized he could not have the ultimate joining a union of Arab Gulf States as a the region. In addition, its geographic
victory he and his advisers deluded counter to Iran. For only through a common location combined with its resources has
themselves could be achieved. In late June collective such as being part of the Ottoman made it the stage for numerous wars of great
1982, Saddam ordered the withdrawal of Iraqi Empire or support from Arab Gulf States powers. The United States has for a single
forces from Iranian territory gained in 1980. during the Iran-Iraq War, can Iraq match and moment in Iraq’s long history given the
This did nothing to change Khomeini’s deter Tehran economically, demographically, Iraqis the opportunity to break this cycle.
personal agenda and determination to militarily, and strategically. When Iraq In the end, it is up to the Iraqi people to
continue the war. The Ayatollah’s demands became a quasi independent monarchy in seize the moment and defy centuries of
made it clear he did not want to seize any 1921 and then a nepotistic dictatorship under history by evolving into the Arab world’s
serious opportunity for peace in 1982 and the Baathists, it could never successfully first multicultural true democracy or regress
would continue the war for another six and counter Iran alone and particularly in any back into the pattern of Iraqi history of being
a half years. Among Khomeini’s demands: war of attrition. dominated by dictatorships and
* $150 billion in compensation; Books by Arab authors on Iraq’s political manipulated by regional powers. The men
* The removal of Saddam Hussein and military history along with those written and women of the United States armed forces
(regime change —the Iranian terms for by Persian authors in Farsi (the Persian have done something truly extraordinary,
regime change were more stringent than language) need to be translated, assessed and provided the Iraqis a small window to break
what the United States demanded on the understood by future American military their historical cycle of violence and
eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Khomeini planners. This allows American policymakers oppression. The success of Operation Iraqi
wanted the removal of Saddam and his entire and military leaders the ability to enter the Freedom is still debatable, but America has in
cabinet of ministers); and nuances, language and perceptions (right or the end succeeded in turning the tide of history
* Permission to allow Iranian forces to wrong) that individuals both allies and long enough for the Iraqi people to make a
traverse Iraq to engage in war against the adversaries from the region hold. Obscure choice. In the end, success or failure will be
Israelis in support of any wider Arab-Israeli titles in Arabic such as the one featured in this the result of the choice of Iraqi leaders and
War. essay written 25 years ago by a recently the Iraqi people.
The terms dictated by Khomeini led graduated Lebanese university student are
Saddam to ask for United Nations vital as the United States undertakes a long- CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Navy
peacekeepers in July 1982 along the Iran- term commitment to the challenges of the Medical Service Corps officer who currently
serves as a Defense Department Middle East
Iraq border and to confirm that all Iraqi units Middle East. Khalifa’s book highlights the Counter-Terrorism Analyst and Advisor. From 2002
have left Iran. Saddam wanted United tribal, historical and sectarian issues that Iran to 2006, he served as Middle East Country Director
Nations forces to enforce a cease-fire. Both faces, which include Kurds in the North, at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Iran and the United Nations refused these tribes of Arab origin in the south, and Sunnis International Security Affairs. For the past several
years, CDR Aboul-Enein has been highlighting
proposals. That same month (July 1982), Baluchis along the border with Pakistan. Arabic works of military significance for Infantry
Iranian forces carried out Operation Web sites offer a revealing look into Magazine. This work would not have been
Ramadan, a massive assault on Basra. emerging and established separatist possible without the help of the staff of the Library
Although a military failure, the Iranian movements among these groups that of Congress Middle East Reading Room and the
John T. Hughes Library in Washington, D.C.
assault should have worried Saddam, for threaten Iran’s territorial integrity, it is vital
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COIN AND
COMPANY
FUSION CELL
OPERATIONS
1LT DAVID LIEBMANN, 1LT CHRISTOPHER PLOSS,
1ST STEFAN HASSELBLAD, 1LT KARL GUNTHER,
CPT BRENDAN COLLINS AND
MAJ AUGUSTINE GONZALEZ
A Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade

Combat Team, 1st Armored Division was deployed in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom in the spring of 2008 to the Salman Pak
area of Baghdad. The company was comprised of an infantry
headquarters section, two mechanized infantry rifle platoons and
the battalion scout platoon.
I
n the contemporary operating environment, it has been
demonstrated that company-level fusion cells are an
increasingly effective tool that enables company
commanders to respond to and neutralize threats within their area
of operations while also creating a more detailed and comprehensive
picture of their key terrain — the local population. Commanders
who do not emphasize the implementation of this concept face
challenges that would be less daunting and much easier to handle
if the time were taken to train personnel to utilize the fusion cell
concept at the company level. These challenges include
understanding complex tribal associations and regional dynamics,
maintaining a relevant and comprehensive picture of lethal targeting
uring a atrol, Soldiers with A Com any, nd attalion, th nfantry Regiment,
in zone, and executing effective relief-in-place operations within
the company itself and when the unit is replaced at the end of its understanding of who’s who in an area. Knowing who leaders are,
deployment. whom they trust, who they are related to, and if they are an asset as
Given that the population is the key terrain in counterinsurgency opposed to a liability are just a few questions that must be answered
(COIN) operations, understanding tribal affiliations and family trees and then presented in a way that can be used and submitted to
is essential. The fact that areas of operation (AOs) for land-owning higher in order for COIN operations to be successful. Also, seeing
companies are getting bigger enforces the point that a dedicated how tribal affiliations fit into the greater picture of regional dynamics
intelligence cell in the company will be needed just to get a functional is a key task. Small unit leaders gather this information through

Courtesy photos
sto to check the identification adge of a Sons of raq leader.
company priority intelligence requirements The fusion cell eases the tracking and stable society. The information gathered
(PIR) and local leader engagements, but distribution of lethal targeting information. by small unit leaders and synthesized in
obtaining a working picture of the entire Though lethal operations are often the fusion cell makes it much easier for the
company AO is too large of a job to be done considered a shaping operation as opposed company commander to react to new
well by the company commander alone. A to a decisive operation in the COIN fight, threats and anticipate future problems in
dedicated intelligence section eases this they are still a vital step in the path between his AO. Company fusion cells reporting to
burden. a fully mature insurgency and a safe and task force S2s facilitate higher quality

targeting information at the task force and brigade combat team Our team began transitioning from being a product-making
levels, which pays dividends for the maneuver units on the ground support shop to an offensive tool. Making products became a
as well. framework operation that wasn’t needed as much, while targeting
Most company teams experience a transition in leadership at and link analysis became the main effort. This was the main cycle
some point in the deployment. Company commanders and platoon of our lethal targeting:
leaders are often switched out and move on to other duties while 1. Reading the intelligence summary (INTSUM) and looking for
the company is deployed. Even after a well-executed transition names particularly in the collected data and tactical reports
new leaders will still have questions that need to be answered (TACREPS) that applied to our company operating environment
about the people and the enemy in zone. Even more vital then intra- (OE);
unit moves is the transfer of authority between outgoing and 2. Going through our NOI list and other link diagram charts we
incoming units. had made to see if there was a match;
Illustrating the usefulness of this tool, this article will give an 3. Compiling the information and presenting it to the commander;
example of its implementation by A Company, 2-6 IN, 2nd BCT, 1st 4. Developing the PIR for the platoons to go out and obtain; and
AD. The fire support officer (FSO), platoon leaders, and company 5. After we had a good base of information on the target, we
commander will each share their experiences working with the fusion would send it up to the TF.
cell and identify some specific instances of when the fusion cell On today’s battlefield, I have found that the overall data
aided in the accomplishment of the company’s mission and how it management is really what makes or breaks a good fusion cell.
operated day to day. Being able to reference a name or key locations in a timely manner
will greatly augment the fight at the company level.
FSO (Fusion Cell OIC) In addition to this, our duties included making a daily read book
Fusion Cell Structure and Development from all the patrols and intelligence summaries for the day, managing
Company fusion cell teams are most often led by the company our interpreters (phone calls to local leaders and giving them their
FSO who is supported by his fire support team (FIST) section. My SP time for the next day’s mission), managing the task force census
team included myself, my fire support NCO (FSNCO) and one 13F operations, developing our company PIR to distribute to the
Soldier; the rest of my 13Fs were pushed to the maneuver platoons. platoons, managing all of our Sons of Iraq (SOI), and having myself
At one point I had a night crew that was another NCO and Soldier. or my FSNCO accompany the commander on every mission he
However, even though the extra personnel was nice, it’s important went on. Reading patrol debriefs and going out of the wire gives an
to remember that it’s all about working with what you have. entire different view of the OE. In addition to all of the previously
Depending on what we were doing, the commander would either mentioned duties, we also conducted a monthly artillery and mortar
task me or my FSNCO to find an answer to whatever problem we registration every month (we would switch mortar and artillery
wanted to solve. between C Company).
Coming fresh from the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and Since I was considered the “effects guy,” I was also in charge of
being tasked to manage a fusion cell team, there were many being the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) pay
questions I didn’t have answers to; the first and most obvious was agent for the company. This meant I was paying money out to local
“what is a fusion cell?” We were basically a company-level S2 leaders for jobs they did for us. One example was a public works
shop and started off producing graphics by utilizing the tactical contract for 30 workers who picked up the trash on the street to
ground reporting (TiGR) system for the corresponding maneuver mitigate IEDs. Later in the deployment we started a micro-grant
platoon that requested it. From there stemmed more products which program where small business’ that needed some extra materials
eventually made it seem as though we were acting more like a service could submit applications to get extra funding.
shop than an intelligence shop; it was frustrating. This lasted for Doing intelligence is definitely an acquired taste and more like a
about the first three months, and even though we were helping the strange form of art. Every piece of information a patrol receives and
company, my team didn’t really feel that we were contributing to brings back to be processed may not seem like it means anything,
the fight as much as we could. This all changed in August. We just like a spot on the wall. However, the more time spent in the area
moved from a product development phase and into more of an means more information, which means more spots. Eventually these
offensive phase. spots will start to form a picture of what is going on. Having a clear
My FSNCO began to formulate a names of interest (NOI) list by picture equals being able to know what the next step is.
logging every local national (LN) we encountered into an Excel This was the basic groundwork on what our fusion cell did to be
spreadsheet. This was an extremely slow process at first, but if it is effective and help out the maneuver platoons. Although there are
done from the beginning it can pay vast dividends to the company many different ways to accomplish the mission, the following
and higher after several months of data entry. There were many examples given by each platoon leader were some of the tactics
columns under our list that we could search by, but there were four that worked with our company.
main entries we searched under (first name, middle name, last name,
abu name). The purpose of dividing the names into separate Scout Platoon Leader
categories is that it makes the searching much more efficient. For Knowing the Population
example, if there is a report stating that the first name is Hussayn, In the first few months of the deployment, one the company’s
the middle and last name are unknown and the abu name is Jasim, it biggest non-lethal targeting operations was reigning in and
will only take seconds to search by the sections of names rather imposing a set of rules upon the Sons of Iraq. This was part of a
than if they were grouped together. battalion-wide effort to organize and control the SOI. In my platoon’s

AO, there were six SOI contracts that
employed more than 600 local nationals. Just
a few months earlier, these men were critical
in driving out al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) from a
hotly contested region. By midsummer
though, the area was secure, and it was time
to move on. Despite knowing this was not
a permanent solution or lasting institution,
many local nationals were reluctant to return
to their farms. They remembered the bad
times and did not want to give up their easy,
profitable job of standing by a roadside
checkpoint with an AK-47. Alpha Company
and the Gator Battalion worked with local
sheikhs to reduce the number of SOI. This
forced local nationals to return to their farms
and other pervious jobs, getting the local
economy back on track. Once the number
of SOI was reduced, it was time to implement
new, tighter control measures. The old ID
cards were collected, preventing
unemployed SOI from walking around the
streets with their AK-47s claiming to be
working. We established permanent, static Soldiers with 3rd Platoon, A Com any, nd attalion, th nfantry Regiment conduct census
checkpoints. Mobile patrols were o erations south of Salman Pak, raq.
eliminated. Finally, new ID cards and
uniforms were issued, turning the SOI into individual local nationals saw CF’s friendly Company’s fusion cell could coordinate
a quasi-private security company. faces in a personal environment, CF gathered with its Charlie Company counterpart and
At the company level, the SOI was the PIR and collected data on the population. access data on the target house. So, even
fusion cell’s baby. In one lone, sweltering Each adult male was entered into the though no Alpha Company units had been
week, hundreds of SOI were processed. This Handheld Interagency Identity Detection to that house, they knew the layout of the
entailed photographing, recording names, Equipment (HIIDE) system. The head of village’s block and the house’s courtyard.
and collecting biometric data. Then the real each household also answered a Another example occurred just before a
work began. The line platoons dropped off questionnaire. Upon returning to the COP, SIGINT raid where the planned infiltration
the data at the company command post questionnaires and HIIDEs were turned into route came from the south. One of the
(CP), leaving the fusion cell to correlate and the fusion cell. Using a unique data platoon leaders remembered the entrance to
create a useful product. The fusion cell organization system, the fusion cell tracked the courtyard was on the north side of the
managed dozens of different contracts that which houses were missing data and which house. If the current plan was used, the
employed hundreds of LNs. They stored houses were complete. Doing the census assault element would have had to run
biometric information, checkpoint data, and provided an easy cover for an informal around the block. With this information, a
contract status for each sheikh, SOI cordon and search of a suspected anti-Iraqi new route was used, and the assault
supervisor, and worker. The fusion cell forces (AIF) house. Once that house was element moved onto the objective quickly
created, printed, and laminated hundreds of visited, would-be insurgents realized their and effectively.
ID cards. The platoons rapidly distributed fingerprints and residences were logged,
them, giving the new SOI legitimacy. deterring them from future activity. 1st Platoon Leader
Eventually, the SOI was handed over to the When a few houses had to be revisited Lethal Targeting
Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Iraqi Army, for a cordon and search or for a raid, the In COIN, lethal targeting is a shaping
but the SOI the GOI managed was a vastly data collected during the census was operation rather than a decisive operation,
different organization than the SOI originally invaluable in helping plan for the raid. A CF but it is still a critical part of overall success.
in the company’s AO. platoon from within the battalion had already The A Company fusion cell made significant
Another large task for the fusion cell was been on the ground, collected data regarding contributions to lethal targeting by
to store census data. One of the battalion’s who lived in the house, and taken pictures developing target packets and combing
framework operations was a census of the of the males and building’s entrance and intelligence from census operations with
area. In addition to being a powerful tool layout. This was a great tool for mission lethal missions. The cell was adept at
for mapping the human terrain, the census preparation. On one occasion, our company identifying both friends and enemies and
delivered the intangible benefits of letting was tasked with conducting a raid in Charlie providing line platoons the necessary
LNs interact with coalition forces and see Company’s AO. Charlie had been doing an information to neutralize targets.
the men behind the body armor. So, while all-day cordon and search. Alpha The fusion cell’s census data was an

invaluable resource for forming the comprehensive intelligence from terms of IEDs used in our AO.
often fragmentary battalion reporting. A battalion-level report might The IED clearance mission went off well, and by having the
indicate that, in a conversation between Abu Ahmed and Abu fusion cell leader out on the patrol as well, he was able to document
Mohamed, Abu Mohamed said that he was angry because Abu and note all of the IEDs and their detonators as they were found.
Abdullah, an SOI member from village A with many brothers in the The success from the initial route clearance mission led to a second
SOI, was preventing him from planting IEDs. Fusion cell could joint patrol with the IA and this mission too proved to be a success.
then examine the census data from village A and find out who had The difference between the first and the second mission, however,
children named Ahmed, Mohamed, and Abdullah, and then began was the fact that the fusion cell produced and distributed a slide
to narrow down their identities. In a case very similar to that show which covered all of the IEDs and the detonators that were
described above, fusion cell was able to identify one of the potential found during the first mission. Thus, my men were better prepared
IED emplacers and the SOI who was preventing IED emplacement. and enabled to look for and find the IEDs on the second mission.
This was doubly valuable because A Company then not only knew Upon completion of the second IED mission, the fusion cell once
the enemy in village A, but also knew an SOI member who was again made and distributed an IED slide show for everyone in the
committed to security and could possibly be used as a future source. company to learn from. This dissemination of enemy TTPs,
With the census data, the fusion cell was able to piece together subsequently helped ensure everyone’s safety when moving
such intelligence on a daily basis. around the company’s AO.
Combining census operations with company intelligence also
fostered better mission execution. For example, battalion intelligence Company Commander
identified a house in our AO as the home of a possible AQI As this was my second command in Iraq, I had some previous
intelligence cell member. The A Company census tracker identified experiences with trying to identify, understand, and fight the enemy.
the house and showed that only partial information had been In my previous deployment, I had command in two different zones
gathered on the occupants as some of the males had not been of operation. The first was the most peaceful of the task force’s
home during the initial visit. During the next census operation in zones and the next was arguably the most active. In my first zone I
that village, 1st Platoon returned to the house to gather additional had a FO who helped to collect and analyze the intelligence we
data, but this time conducted an informal cordon and search in gathered in zone. In my second, I did not have someone to do that
which we observed the exits in order to see if anyone attempted to piece for the first few weeks as the FSO was wounded in action and
leave the house upon our arrival and conducted a search of the not replaced until later. I had to learn to become my own company
house rather than the standard walk-through. Nothing was found, intelligence section. It was tough. Most of my mental energy was
but 1st Platoon gathered more complete information on the spent trying to develop my understanding of the enemy: what he
occupants and it was believed that such unexpected appearances was trying to accomplish, how we stop that, how we target him and
by CF act as a deterrent to insurgents. how we ultimately succeed. I learned a thing or two and decided to
A Company’s fusion cell combined battalion intelligence with implement those lessons in my second command. Fortunately, my
company intelligence, generated from knowledge of the population, company had a fusion cell that was open to my guidance and worked
to facilitate better planning and execution of lethal targeting. This to make it happen. They made my job easier and allowed me to
allowed our company to correctly discriminate threats from the focus on the problems in our zone. By doing the things previously
general population and execute raids to neutralize these threats. discussed in the article, we succeeded as a company team. We
helped to continue the work of our predecessors and set our
3rd Platoon Leader replacements up for greater success.
Leadership Transition
As a new platoon leader, I met my platoon down range halfway CPT David Liebmann graduated from Liberty University and was
through their 15-month tour in Iraq, I had not yet heard of the commissioned in May 2006. He served as platoon leader of 2nd Platoon,
company fusion cell concept. I knew little about what resources B Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry and executive officer for A Company,
2-6IN during the deployment. He is currently the S-4 for the 3rd Battalion,
and capabilities the fusion cell could offer a new platoon leader to
4th Infantry.
facilitate better mission planning. The support and input that they 1LT Christopher Ploss graduated from Texas A&M University and
offered greatly enhanced my mission planning and executing ability. commissioned in May 2007. He served as the company fire support
Shortly after being given my platoon, I was tasked to conduct a officer for B/2-6IN for the entire deployment. He is currently a fire direction
officer in the 1st Battalion, 84th Field Artillery.
joint patrol with our local Iraqi Army (IA) unit in order to clear a 1LT Stefan Hasselblad graduated from Columbia University and was
known road that contained several suspected IEDs on it. Prior to commissioned in July 2007. He served as platoon leader for 1st Platoon, B/
executing the mission, the fusion cell contacted the IA commander 2-6IN during the deployment. He is currently an XO in C Company, 3-4 IN.
in order to coordinate for the patrol. The fusion cell also provided 1LT Karl Gunther graduated from the University of Oregon and was
commissioned in June 2007. He served as the platoon leader for 3rd
me with detailed maps of the targeted area, since I was still fairly Platoon, B/2-6 IN during the deployment. He is currently the platoon leader
unfamiliar with the area of operations. Lastly, the fusion cell was for Scout Platoon, 3-4 IN.
able to provide me with the latest intelligence on the known and CPT Brendan Collins graduated from Boston College in May 2006.
suspected enemy presence within the area. Three weeks before He served as the 2nd and Scout Platoon Leader during the deployment.
He is currently attending the Military Intelligence Captains’ Career Course.
conducting this mission, a HMMWV from our company had hit an MAJ Augustine Gonzales graduated from the United States Military
IED in the same area. Thus, the fusion cell was able to provide me Academy in May 1999 and served as the commander of A Company, 1st
with a copy of the debrief from that mission, which allowed me to Battalion, 36th Infantry during OIF 05-07 and the commander of A/2-6IN
during this deployment. He is currently the commander for A/3-4 IN.
better understand what to look for on this and future missions, in

NON-LETHAL TARGETING IN COIN
ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL, AND
CIVIL ACTIONS KEY
TO SUCCESS
CPT THOMAS J. WOODARD
B
y nature, counterinsurgency
(COIN) is a complex, always
changing, and multi-faceted
process. Joint Publication 1-02, The
Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, defines
COIN as any military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions
taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
In this article, I will focus on the economic, Tech Sgt. Cohen A. Young, USAF
political, and civil actions — and to a certain A Soldier prepares a micro-grant application for an Iraqi store owner in Baghdad.
extent on the psychological actions. As with
any complex problem, all of these elements destroyed during the ensuing conflict. civil development framework. A strong
are linked so I will discuss other actions as The first step in starting any non-lethal solution set will involve all lines of effort,
well. Long-term success in targeting cycle is to identify problem sets. even if minimally. An example of a strong
counterinsurgency operations depends on In our company, this was done through solution set was seen when dealing with an
the people taking charge of their own affairs thoughtful discussion by leaders in a weekly insurgent cell in the Mada’an province. This
and consenting to the government’s rule meeting. Problem sets revolve around cell cell was targeted with non-lethal means
(FM 3-24). structure, tribal/religious rift lines, significant before sufficient intelligence for lethal
Economic/civil development falls into acts, census data, and the current operations had emerged. Targeted micro-
several broad lines of effort: infrastructure status. The identification of grants were distributed to local shop owners
Infrastructure development, problem sets is a careful deliberate process, who had a high level of interaction with the
and the application of non-lethal effects and local population (barber shops, restaurants).
Economic supplementation, lethal effects should be coordinated and The local governance paved roads that went
Employment initiatives, and selected appropriately to threaten and into the village off of the main road. Through
Reconstruction/refurbishment. eventually defeat an insurgent cell. A simple the local sheik, a water pump was built to
Infrastructure development involves but effective indicator of a possible problem provide irrigation water to 30 families near
building the system for basic services that area is the atmospherics displayed by the the site of several hostile acts. After one to
will facilitate economic growth and ensure population as they react to the national two weeks, the attacks stopped and the
basic health. Examples include water security forces. It is important to note that National Police obtained sufficient
purification plants, electrical grid coordinated lethal and non-lethal targeting information to arrest three suspects in the
improvement, sewage system construction/ may not occur in the same neighborhood; attacks.
repair, and hospital construction/ lethal effects may be targeted at a cell while Non-lethal targeting does not necessarily
refurbishment. Economic supplementation non-lethal effects may be targeted against involve fiscal investment by coalition forces.
includes micro-grants and micro-loans — recruitment for that cell in a different It is commonly said that anything done to a
anything that will get capital into the hands neighborhood. Generally speaking, non- 50-percent standard by host nation forces
of the business owner or operator for use in lethal targeting is utilized prior to lethal is better than 100-percent by a foreign force.
store or factory improvement. Employment targeting because it is also used to identify The same applies to non-lethal sets;
initiatives are programs focused on either targets for lethal operations. anything that is done by the local
the direct creation of jobs or training in Once a problem set has been identified, government is better than something done
different vocational areas. Finally, a specific non-lethal solution set must be solely through our fiscal involvement.
reconstruction/refurbishment is the repair chosen. These will inevitably fall into the Pressure applied to the local councils and
of key infrastructure that was damaged/ four lines of effort in the broader economic/ provincial councils can affect decision

making to push government investment into Vocational training is also instantaneous; the
The most resource intensive
the lethal problem set regions. This approach non-lethal solution is the
students are paid and in school almost
has the added benefit of allowing the local improvement of immediately after initiation of the program. The
government to determine the most useful infrastructure, but it also downside to vocational training is that it is
improvements to make to the region given their has the greatest impact on expensive (training aids, teacher pay), and
knowledge of the population needs. An the areas with little or no employment after the program is complete is not
example of this is quid-pro-quo tactics at the services provided by the guaranteed. Big business investment is
local governance level. After assessing the top government. sustainable, and all costs are sunk costs. The
five to 10 needs of the area, set milestones downside is that the effects are not
where certain coalition forces projects and certain local governance instantaneous; after an investment is made, it may be several months
projects are completed before work can continue towards the next before sufficient capital can be raised to hire more workers. A good
milestone in a specified neighborhood. example of this is the opening of heavy oil pipelines to a local brick
Employment initiatives have the most universal application and factory. The output of the factory was eventually increased by this
possible effects of any of the non-lethal solutions. Creating or single investment because once sufficient capital was established
promoting jobs can preempt the formation of the insurgent cell or to open a new set of furnaces, more workers were hired.
prevent it from becoming lethal; it can also cause members lower in The most resource intensive non-lethal solution is the
the cell structure to leave the cell, and it can possibly provide improvement of infrastructure, but it also has the greatest impact
intelligence on what they have seen. There are several forms of on the areas with little or no services provided by the government.
employment initiatives: public works programs, vocational training, This is usually conducted in areas that are targeted by insurgent
and big business investment. All three programs provide jobs, and cells for recruiting. Infrastructure improvement must be completed
all three have positive and negative attributes. Public works in a manner which allows the most efficient use of resources. For
programs provide jobs instantaneously. The workers can be hired the investment to be fully realized, the government must take full
quickly and require no real training before beginning. They are responsibility for it when completed. The project must be visible to
simply given manual labor tools and a responsible leader, and they the populous when completed, and projects should be identified
begin cleaning and clearing streets and canals. The downside to for tactical value. A good example of an infrastructure project is the
public works programs is that they are not sustainable. They require installation of solar lights, which contribute substantially to an
reoccurring costs to maintain the employment, and the moment area by increasing market activity and reducing the likelihood of
those funding sources stop, the employment discontinues. The IED emplacement. Another example is supplying generators to
other issue with public works is that they are not glamorous or provide electricity. If the generators are placed carefully, key
viewed as being of sufficient status, so some of the population may engagement areas can be taken away from the enemy.
still be drawn to insurgent cells as opposed to public works Economic supplementation is an effective tool if used correctly,
programs. Vocational training has the benefit of being sustainable. and generally speaking it is not used correctly. The gains made by
After a three-or-four month period of training, trainees can be picked micro-grants and local government micro-loans can only be realized
up by government or private employers for permanent positions. if certain things occur. First, they must be given to the right
Figure 1 — The Non-lethal Solution Set neighborhood. Second, a quality
control program must be
established; and third, the grants
are given to the right businesses
in the right quantity. For example,
often times an excessively large
grant will have negative impact; the
recipient may close his shop to
spend his money somewhere else.
These grants will come in three
varieties:
A coalition forces micro-
grant (will be discussed in detail
later);
A coalition forces-backed
loan (effective in developing
confidence in the economic and
financial infrastructure); and
A host nation micro-loan.
When host nation micro-loans
are utilized, the only issue
remaining is to get those loans into
the right area. An effective example
of coalition micro-grants is the use

Lethal Metrics Non-lethal Metrics
Name Area Customers Customers Source Demographic Business Business Econ Positive IO Intel
(Daily) Known Assessment Plan Type Gained
Oday XX 10 %50 No interest All Good Food O X O
Firas YY 50 %50 Very interested Families Average Food(meat) X X XX
Figure 2 — Micro-grant Assessment Worksheet
of a micro-grant fair. Such a fair was candidate also was assessed by a Human regulated and regular. Resources must shift
successfully conducted in the spring of Intelligence Collection Team for viability as to the more violent areas and local
2009. The project began with small vouchers a source. If the individual was not going to governance must be in place to take over as
advertising the fair and limiting the number talk to the CF about information that they an area improves. A good non-lethal
of attendees. On the event day, a detailed overheard, then they would not be a great targeting program will be linked at every
interview/application process was candidate from an intelligence-gained level with lethal targeting, and just as
undertaken with each applicant to determine standpoint. The workshop tool allowed the intelligence drives operations and
if the business had a strong business plan company to screen more candidates and operations drive intelligence, non-lethal
and a high potential intelligence gain; Figure bring more enablers (PSYOP, HUMINT, targeting must drive intelligence and
2 shows an example of the evaluation background checks) to bear on each intelligence must drive non-lethal.
process. The business plan review involved possible micro-grant. Effective
assessing the amount of preparation that implementation of micro-grants through a CPT Thomas J. Woodard currently serves
micro-grant fair can provide improvement as the commander of the Alpha Company, 2nd
was taken prior to the workshop and Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 170th Infantry
assessing the value of the use of the grant to the economy, provide positive IO for CF/ Brigade. He deployed in 2008 in support of
for actual business improvement. For ISF, and provide intelligence gained to Operation Iraqi Freedom first as a platoon leader
example, we would not provide a grant to facilitate lethal operations. and later as executive officer of Bravo Company,
The use of non-lethal targeting is a 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry. He received a
stock someone’s shelves. The potential commission from the University of Missouri at
intelligence gain was assessed by looking powerful tool, but it must be done as Rolla in 2006 and received a bachelor’s degree
at the average number of customers that carefully and deliberately as lethal targeting in Electrical Engineering. He graduated with
attended the business each day, and which is done. Non-lethal targeting requires that honors from the Special Warfare Language
monetary flow to the company level be School where he studied Arabic.
area the people are coming from. Each
Tech Sgt. Cohen A. Young, USAF

Iraqi workers work on the roof of a shop in Sadr City’s Jameela Market. Many shop owners were able to rebuild their stores through micro-grants.

REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE
U.S. ARMY INFANTRYMAN IN IRAQ
CPT MATT RUSSELL, 1LT BILL HELMSING, 1LT DAVID KIMSEY, 1LT CHARLIE TIMM
I
t’s a date that will be remembered as a true turning point in
Iraq — 30 June 2009. It marked the first step towards a
complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al Maliki declared a national holiday as U.S. forces
(USF) withdrew from more than 120 bases located throughout cities
of Iraq. Combat operations resumed shortly after 30 June in rural
areas, with the caveat that all missions require approval from Iraqi
security forces (ISF). ISF now has sole responsibility for protecting
Iraqi cities while USF have taken on a smaller role serving as both
military advisors and providing support as enablers for current ISF
operations. This is a historic victory for both U.S. and Iraqi forces
that presents a new and complex operating environment for Infantry
leaders and Soldiers.
With ISF taking the lead on conducting combat operations in
Iraq and the mission becoming less kinetic, the American Infantry
Soldier had to ask himself, “What do I do now?” With the realization
that ISF is now in charge, the leadership of the 1st Battalion, 24th
Infantry took on the difficult task of redefining the role of the
American Infantryman in Iraq. In addressing this new problem set,
Company C, 1-24 IN explored and identified different avenues to
engage the local population and ISF leaders within our area of
operations (AO) — AO Centurion.
Prior to 30 June, the Infantry led the way in all full spectrum
operations in Iraq. However, a rifle platoon’s actions were now
dictated by the needs and desires of ISF and the local populace.
ISF consists of the Iraqi Police (IP), which assumed control of high
population areas, and the Iraqi Army (IA), which took responsibility
for the more rural regions. USF, as outlined in the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), were required to stay out of densely populated Photos courtesy of authors
areas to reduce coalition signature and respect the IP’s authority. em ers of C Com any, 1st attalion, th nfantry Regiment, conduct
In some unfortunate cases, the IP denied or blocked USF access to an o eration in A Centurion.
Iraqi cities due to a variety of reasons. Several ISF elements saw Soldiers understood this shift of USF to the role of enabler to aid in
this time as a way to exert their newfound authority and to boost the success of ISF operations. It was finally time for the ISF to take
their confidence in the eyes of the populace, which was arguably a responsibility for security operations in their own battlespace.
good thing, despite the frustration it created within some USF ranks. While Iraqi autonomy had to be respected, C/1-24 units continued
Due to the decreased role of USF in Iraqi cities, more interaction to engage local leadership and consulted with them to identify
and a closer working relationship needed to be established between where our Infantrymen could best be employed. We dramatically
USF and the IA, while still maintaining a working relationship with increased our situational awareness and the ability to affect the
IP forces as well. operational environment by establishing a close relationship and
To ensure coordination between U.S. and Iraqi forces, coalition communication with ISF and local leadership. The following example
patrols were approved by ISF leaders one day prior to execution of a Centurion platoon demonstrates how this relationship and
and required an ISF escort when in villages or cities. ISF also communication can influence a situation. While speaking with
reserved the right to refuse USF entry until they received approval Iraqis in the streets of a small village, it immediately became apparent
from their chain of command. On multiple occasions C/1-24 IN that there was a great dislike and distrust of USF due to a series of
patrols were held for up to an hour at checkpoints or outside IP misunderstandings with the previous unit. To rectify the situation,
stations while waiting on permission from ISF to proceed. Due to the platoon leader coordinated a town meeting at the local IP station
prior negative experiences with American forces within AO to discuss the issues that were negatively affecting the relationship
Centurion, some Iraqi villages preferred limited interaction and between USF and the populace. This IP station was chosen because
assistance from USF. Infantry leaders had to ensure that their it provided a secure meeting site for the ISF to contribute and voice

their concerns. This open forum revolved security was often the chief task of Soldiers to bolster relations and become familiar with
around the muhktars and sheiks of the village while on patrol. As monotonous routines the local geography (both human and
expressing various issues the villagers had tend to do, complaints sometimes came from geographical terrain). After the PL
with USF. The Centurion platoon leader (PL) Soldiers that the coalition was just “going completed his KLE, the platoon linked up at
and a senior squad leader (SL) listened to through the motions” and was “not really a predetermined location and the entire
the local leadership and cleared up all accomplishing anything.” Countering these element remounted the vehicles. The goal
misconceptions to the best of their ability. frustrations required continuous leader of this system was twofold; it broke up the
This meeting was undoubtedly beneficial, as involvement to keep Soldiers motivated as monotonous routine of the Soldier in an
one muhktar in attendance stated, “This is a well as constant communication reminding attempt to stem the tide of boredom and
new page in our relationship with coalition Soldiers of the relevance they continued to complacency and it maximized the platoons’
forces.” Mediating and negotiating is yet maintain to the mission in Iraq. patrol efficiency and information-gathering
another facet of the role of the American To combat complacency and boredom, capability, falling in line with the saying
Infantryman in present-day Iraq. senior leadership expanded the everyday “every Soldier is a sensor.”
As the American Infantryman’s role in tasks and purposes to incorporate a greater Another issue that rifle platoons faced
Iraq became increasingly non-kinetic, one number of Soldiers. C/1-24 IN found that was the bruising of egos, pride, and esprit
of the biggest post-SOFA obstacles for dividing dismounts into two sections with de corps when ISF asserted their dominance.
Infantrymen was fighting the perception that different tasks and purposes allowed In the words of one team leader, “Why does
Infantrymen were no longer doing the job Soldiers to become more involved in the the most powerful army in the world have to
for which they joined the Army. Soldiers in mission. These sections were usually ask permission to go on patrol?”
the Infantry signed up to close with and comprised of at least one squad and an Infantrymen, especially those with previous
destroy the enemy, and virtually every interpreter. Changing the usual tasking/ OIF deployments, were accustomed to
training event prior to deployment focused organization of routine missions such as going wherever they wanted to accomplish
on forging a lethal unit. The majority of C/ KLEs keeps the Soldiers engaged and active. the mission and many times in the past
1-24 IN patrols were key leader engagements Instead of simply pulling security outside considered the IA to be a nuisance if not
(KLEs) with ISF, and generally consisted of the building where the KLE is taking place, the outright enemy. The IA demanding to
all riflemen and machine gunners pulling the second section could accomplish a know where a platoon is going can appear
security outside the building where the second task and purpose that mutually to be demeaning to the American
meetings took place while the platoon and supports the PL’s decisive operation. There Infantryman, and though Soldiers
squad leaders discussed current operations are several options as to how the second understood the SOFA, they often struggled
in the area with local leadership. Though section can support the overall mission. with its limitations. The solution to this
USF could technically patrol through the They could act as a roving patrol which problem starts with the understanding that
streets unilaterally, it was done very provides increased security and an the modern Infantryman has to be a thinking
sparingly. The IA could not patrol the cities, additional maneuver element, or they could warrior and realize that while USF might no
and the IP were unable to conduct joint assess key infrastructure close to the longer conduct unilateral operations, the
patrols with USF. As a result, pulling meeting area and talk with the local populace enemy can still be destroyed by advising,
influencing, and training ISF. ISF primacy
is a crucial and historic step for Iraq, and
rifle platoons must grasp the importance of
ISF taking responsibility for their country
and understand that with ISF success future
Iraq deployments will no longer be
necessary. As the 1-24 IN commander often
said, “You don’t want to be coming back
here in 10 years.” Clarifying the USF role in
current operations in Iraq helps Soldiers
understand their jobs and the mission
overall. While the American Infantryman
should embrace that he is a part of the most
elite fighting force in the world, he must also
understand his role in accomplishing the
mission, which, in this case, was a
supporting role to the ISF.
Keeping Infantrymen informed on the
specifics of every mission is also essential.
Each pre-patrol ramp brief included the
agenda of the meeting to keep the Soldiers
abreast of current issues in the AO. Armed
hen avid imsey and another Soldier ass out candy to raqi children. with this knowledge, team leaders and

Soldiers can engage their ISF counterparts at the IP station or IA
The American Infantryman must embrace his new
combat outpost while the PL engages the ISF commander. Often a
role as a partner with the ISF in order to dominate
rifleman or SAW gunner pulling security next to an IA soldier at the
the battlespace and ultimately succeed.
gate can gain valuable information about the IA, enemy, or area
that might not be shared in the KLE. These observations will be
shared more readily if the Soldier can relate them to the mission and avenues of approach, and other aspects of the mission. The IA had
the KLE agenda. Soldiers may have a different perspective of the a much better understanding of the area as they patrolled it
ISF unit based on the behavior of the IA Soldiers, the conditions of constantly, and as a result much better local intelligence was
their weapons and equipment, and how they interact with their gathered which enabled the creation of an accurate situational
superiors. During a KLE, the commander of the ISF unit often template. Also, as the PL engaged the IA commander, the USF
presents a facade to gain a favorable reflection of himself and his battalion commander and company commander concurrently
unit; a more realistic and complete picture can be obtained by using coordinated with the IA battalion commander to ensure the mission
the observations of the lower enlisted. had the cooperation of the IA. This allowed for a smooth execution
The individual relationship between a rifle platoon leader and of the mission, as the platoon had the full support of the IA chain of
his IA counterpart has a significant impact on operations and must command.
be constantly developed. One of the ways to build this relationship The development and professionalization of ISF is closely linked
is to respect the IA’s authority over its AO. As mentioned previously, with the joint operations discussed above and also joint training.
to ensure ISF were aware of USF presence in IA/IP battlespace, all ISF conduct training at the battalion level regularly and have made
patrols were approved by ISF and the landowner was notified of great progress. However, a greater emphasis must be placed
the coalition presence. If communication could not be established between joint training between ISF and USF to both increase the
with the ISF unit who controlled the battlespace, C/1-24 units proficiency of ISF and bolster relations. C/1-24 supported IA training
stopped at the first IA checkpoint and notified the leadership of the by going to IA COPs and conducting blocks of instruction on
mission’s intent and destination. Another method used to develop battle drills, marksmanship, combatives, combat lifesaver, and mortar
relations between USF and ISF was to involve the Iraqis in planning firing. The IA were usually very receptive to the idea of conducting
and developing operations. By including ISF leadership in the joint training, but often logistical and manpower issues cut the
planning process and incorporating their suggestions, ISF was classes short or limited the number of participants. Another factor
more likely to approve the operation and take ownership of it. negatively impacting joint training was the extreme shortage of IA
Building a solid relationship is crucial for the fact that more ammunition and training aids; many IA soldiers had not fired their
intelligence can be obtained regarding significant activity and weapons since basic training. While the acquisition of ammunition
receiving battalion priority information requirements. was difficult, marksmanship fundamentals were still taught without
Communication and bolstering of USF/ISF relations was essential firing any rounds through the use of dime and washer drills. Joint
along the entire chain of command in order to be effective, and both training is crucial to increase the capabilities of ISF, and
sides stand to greatly benefit from this interaction. improvisation will often be required on the part of USF due to the
Expanding on the above, ISF and USF both have strengths that lack of IA/IP supplies or training aids.
when combined can greatly increase the success of current Gone are the days when USF ruled the cities, towns, and villages
operations. The IA naturally has more information and intelligence of Iraq. The American Infantryman must embrace his new role as a
sources and can understand many local situations in a cultural partner with the ISF in order to dominate the battlespace and
context. USF has more manpower, better maintained equipment, a ultimately succeed. While this can be frustrating and challenging
vastly superior supply system, and leadership that is capable of for the Soldier who has joined the Army to close with and destroy
planning more complex operations. USF can provide a myriad of the enemy, it is undoubtedly a sign of impending victory in Iraq.
assets to support operations, which include attack and lift aviation, With full withdrawal of USF from Iraq on the horizon, understanding
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets , signal this new role will allow the American Infantryman to continue to
intelligence (SIGINT) assets, military working dogs, and close air impact and shape the battlefield and ultimately accomplish the
support. Many ISF units began to realize this and started to request mission.
USF support for IA driven/led operations. Unilateral USF operations
at this point are almost nonexistent, and the shift to bilateral
CPT Matt Russell served as the platoon leader for 3rd Platoon, C
operations was not only a requirement but a necessity. Instead of Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment during the unit’s most
simply giving the IA a time and place to link-up for a joint operation, recent deployment as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is currently
C/1-24 integrated them into the planning process and listened to attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He
was commissioned through Clemson University in 2006.
their suggestions and contributions. While this brings up obvious 1LT Bill Helmsing served as a platoon leader in C/1-24 IN from May
operational security concerns, it is a risk that must be accepted in 2008 until January 2010. He is currently serving as the executive officer
order to strengthen the partnership and professionalize ISF. in C/1-24 IN in Fort Wainwright. He graduated in May of 2007 from U.S.
This method of planning operations was used to great benefit in Military Academy.
1LT David Kimsey is currently serving as platoon leader for 2nd
the following example experienced by C/1-24. In an effort to confirm Platoon, C/1-24 IN. He graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 2007
or deny enemy activity in the area, the rifle platoon leader wanted with a bachelor’s degree in Psychology.
to emplace observation posts in a mountain range along suspected 1LT Charlie Timm served as a platoon leader in C/1-24 IN and
enemy avenues of approach. A meeting was held in which USF/IA deployed to Diyala Province in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from
May-Sept 2009. He graduated in May 2008 from the U.S. Military Academy.
discussed in detail the location of the observation posts, possible

THE CULT OF ARMS
SoW Essential to Maintaining Ability to Wage Successful Wars
1LT JOSEPH MORSELLO
Metaphor for Discussion The Software of War challenge is to develop a new piece of
T
oday’s armed forces have become includes the methods, equipment. Traditionally unable to sustain
fixated on technical or equipment- processes, techniques, substantial battlefield casualties, Western
based solutions to tactical problems. and procedures that are political leaders shy away from risky situations
The Cult of Arms is excellence in the research, performed in order for the or methods and gravitate toward more predictable
development and application of paramilitary hardware of war — solutions. For example, using remote-controlled
and military science through soft technology. weapon systems — to or autonomous vehicles of every kind in attrition-
It is the Software of War (SoW) that is essential function and be employed based tactical and operational techniques. In
for maintaining the ability to wage successful on the battlefield. conventional battles, this methodology has
wars of all types. The SoW is not software in proven successful; however, in
the traditional application. It’s not the counterinsurgencies and low intensity conflicts,
computer code required to run many advanced weapon systems it has opened another politically charged issue of collateral damage.
but ideas on the application of weapons against an enemy. The Critical to an equipment-focused methodology is making weapons
SoW includes the methods, processes, techniques, and that are foremost effective but are also easy to use and maintain,
procedures that are performed in order for the hardware of war reliable under field conditions, and producible in a sufficient
— weapon systems — to function and be employed on the quantity to make an impact on the battlefield.
battlefield. Without software, computers and weapons would be The second is the methodology of tactical and operational
useless — objects with no utility. prowess such as that employed by the German Army in WWI and
The kernel or core of the SoW is a culture promoting WWII. The small Reichswehr was starved of every possible piece
professionalism, cohesion, mission-oriented command and control of equipment in the interwar period but evolved tremendously in
and hard realistic training. Tactics, techniques and procedures the software of war. Working off the principle that sweat saves
(TTPs) — the primary algorithms in the SoW — are methodologies, blood, the Germans developed modern combined arms organization
processes, and ways of thinking that the armed forces use to apply with superior training, command and control and leadership,
weapons on the battlefield. Through the minds of warriors, the overcoming initial equipment inferiority. This is not to say that any
code for the software of war is written and tested during training army that is tactically proficient can overcome an enemy with
and proven in combat. superior weapons alone; it must also be comparably equipped.
However, the equipment need not be the very best or latest that
Evolution of Ground Warfare money can buy it; simply has to be good enough. Functional,
The automatic machine gun and artillery fire were the primary rugged and reliable equipment in the hands of well-trained and
dangers to infantry units during the early 20th century, and during motivated soldiers is the holy grail of success in battle. Weapons
WWI these weapons were difficult to move and were primarily development and procurement in a software-focused military is
stationary weapons. Such massive immobile firepower ensured that led by tactical innovation where new weapons are designed
positional defensive warfare would dominate confined geographic supporting new techniques and solving specific problems with
areas such as the Western Front of WWI. The massive casualties no methodological solution. Technological innovation follows
and stalemate at the front forced military thinkers to find ways to as a matter of course through the primacy of the SoW; the
effectively transition back to mobile offensive action. New tactics Wehrmacht introduced the armored personnel carrier, assault gun,
and weapons began to appear identifying two clear evolutionary assault rifle and deployed the most feared crew-served machine
paths in modern ground warfare. guns and tanks.
The first is the equipment focus of the western methodology, Weapon systems have gotten more advanced, complicated and
clearly evident since WWI. Working off the premise that equipment expensive to design, manufacture, and train with. The disposable
saves men, western powers have historically put hardware ahead M72 Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW), rocket-propelled grenade
of software. The West’s first response to any military problem or (RPG) 26/27 and AT-4 are cheaper and easier to manufacture then

TRAININ N TES
for those that “punch their ticket;” it is

retirement as long as no embarrassing service for the good of society, a noble life
Functional, rugged and relia le equi ment mishaps take place on their watch. Any style where the weak and selfish need not
in the hands of well-trained and motivated
mistakes can be either covered up or the apply.
Soldiers is the holy grail of success in attle.
service member hung out to dry depending Core skills define a professional and his
a ll r
on the repercussions felt by the individual’s profession. The warrior’s professional body
guided missiles and are sufficient for chain of command. This has also negatively of knowledge begins with infantry skills,
destroying many battlefield targets. A affected training to the point that simple tactics, weapons, and the ability to
perfect example of this is Soviet weaponry training injuries are no longer tolerable. This improvise, innovate, and exercise good
produced during and after World War II ridiculous situation is further compounded judgment during the chaos of operations.
such as the T-34 tank, the PPSh-41 by the lack of credibility and respect the How to conduct a military and paramilitary
submachine gun, AK-47 assault rifle, and military profession has from society at large. operation from inception through execution
the RPG-7. Contrarily, the Wehrmacht Professionalism — A profession is in all environments is critical. The military
introduced many new and very effective judged by the quality of those who choose education emphasizes field operations
weapons whose efficacy could not be fully to pursue it and the standards and advancing toward the command of larger
realized suffering from mechanical reliability requirements to enter, maintain membership units while including a mix of international
issues under field conditions and complex and to excel within that profession. In spite assignments and academic study in branch
engineering and manufacturing of need, standards must never be specific knowledge. A warrior’s civilian
requirements; most notably the Mark-VI compromised. The best of those in the armed education must be technically focused on
Tiger tank and the StG-44 assault rifle. forces, officers and NCO, must view their hard sciences and engineering. Modern
Advances in less sophisticated weapons responsibilities as a sacred duty demanding weapons are increasingly complex offering
that are tough, reliable, cheap to manufacture tireless improvement, innovation, creativity many capabilities that must be understood
and train with, and capable of sufficient and professionalism — total commitment. completely if they are to be employed with
battlefield performance will unlock the cult The military officer and NCO are the maximum utility. From here, it is an open
of arms. pinnacles of professionalism. They are avenue for academic exploration focusing
entrusted with a sacred duty to build men on strategy development through
The Cult of Arms out of the youngsters coming to them for understanding politics and international
An organization’s culture or work military service. Entrusted with the ability affairs, national security issues, and the use
environment is critical for establishing the to lead the nation’s youth in life-threatening of armed forces in world affairs.
necessary norms and atmosphere for men situations is the greatest responsibility The professional warrior must
to become warriors. Professionalism, unit anyone can be given. It is their duty to constantly seek self improvement involving
cohesion, and command and control are the mentor and develop Soldiers into warriors physical, mental, and spiritual growth.
essential cultural aspects for creating as well as fine men. The selection, Everything that can be of benefit to a military
warriors who can succeed in combat. The educational standards, training and member and the growth of excellence under
zero tolerance mantra of today is causing promotion criteria of this cadre must be arms cannot be addressed through military
inexplicable damage to America’s ability to vigorous and based on ability, achievement training alone. This is where individual
wage war. Military bureaucrats will succeed and character. The military is not a welfare pursuit of art, literature, music, science,
in punching their ticket all the way to system providing a comfortable retirement traveling and varied experiences provide the

necessary interdisciplinary knowledge required for solving complex in the interwar period called mission tactics. Commanders assign
problems and growth as individuals. The human weapon is a warrior missions and objectives based on their desired battlefield result;
dedicated to the profession of arms; the art and science of armed they provide additional support as required but leave the details
conflict. It is being mentally and physically fit, an expert on the and tactics of accomplishing that desired end state to subordinate
martial body of knowledge and possessing sufficient leaders. The basics of radio communication, hand and arm signals,
interdisciplinary knowledge broadening problem-solving abilities. flares, messengers and predetermined action queues all must be
Unit cohesion and comradeship is created during training and mastered in order for the on-scene commander to move his troops
solidified at the front forming lifelong bonds between warriors. It is at the speed of thought when favorable or dangerous developments
the glue that holds an army together during the trials of war forging emerge during an engagement. Assigned objectives and axis of
it into a mighty machine. The shared experiences of hard training, attack are sufficient controls during operations; the use of phase
life at the front and soldierly honor (being able to rely on each other and boundary lines stifle momentum and limit tactical flexibility.
no matter what) forge the military primary group. In the Summer Mission-oriented order systems create the norm of risk taking and
1948 issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly, Edward A. Shils and responsibility for actions taken as well as the understanding of
Morris Janowitz state in their article “Cohesion and Disintegration mistakes as learning points during training. Decision making is
in the Wehrmacht in WWII” that soldiers in the same squad, platoon decentralized to company grade officers and senior NCOs with
and company form the military primary group, bound by the eyes on unfolding events, dangers, and opportunities. At critical
expectations and demands of that group. Warriors of the same unit points of main effort, more senior level commanders may be on
that endured hard training felt great pride in their accomplishment scene pushing critical tasks with more resources and urgency,
which, is only surpassed when recognizing they’re combat boosting moral.
proficiency after successfully applying their skills at the front. This Reconnaissance-pull (recon-pull) involves maximizing battlefield
created a sense of membership to a proud organization that not just intelligence driving the orientation of the battle. In the field this
anyone could join. These proud warriors crave challenge and relish concept uses recon units to probe for gaps in enemy lines or routes
being the focal point of battle. Their strong sense of belonging and of approach and then “pull” friendly forces through these paths
solidarity is intensified by sharing life at the front. The every day toward their objectives. Reconnaissance determines the axis of
frontline experience is characterized by the misery of constant advance and can cause shifts in the main effort when dangers and
exposure to the elements, being unable to wash or get clean cloths, opportunities are discovered. It is more than this field concept,
living with no personal privacy, filthy conditions without shelter, however, revolving around the critical role of intelligence driving
lack of adequate rest or food and the constant fear of being killed, fighting forces. Recon-pull depends on a complete field intelligence
having to kill, or failing ones comrades. Warriors can only endure system: identifying what is required, the means to collect it, analyzing
this environment with the support of their comrades and faith in it, the commander’s ability to plan based on it and junior officers
their leaders. As the executers of orders, company grade officers acting on it as well as a commitment to operational security. The
and NCOs are the link between a nation’s battlefield intent and the more questions answered the better; however, this should not
action necessary to accomplish it. The leader’s ability, military prevent operations from taking place. Combat will always be
competence, and a sincere concern for his men’s well-being creates conducted with numerous unknowns and that is where innovative
trust. Units bound by comradeship — which Stephen G. Fritz combat leaders with decentralized authority can capitalize on the
describes in his book Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in WWII opportunities presented. The system must be fast, accurate, and
as “loyalty, mutual obligation, willingness to sacrifice, pride, a sense continuously working allowing constant battlefield updates.
of duty, even love…” felt between soldiers — would fight with Mission-oriented order and recon-pull systems allow battlefield
great determination. Every effort should be made to keep men forces to strike at the enemy’s weaknesses seizing the initiative,
together in the same unit from recruit training through post- maintaining momentum, and providing adaptability. Decision making
deployment retraining and redeployment. The same officers and is made at the speed of thought where the action is taking place and
NCOs that train a unit must lead it in combat and conduct retraining the battle decided.
incorporating lessons learned at the front before the next frontline The Combined Arms Task Force (CATF) is the basic
rotation. organizational structure for ground operations. Modern combat
Command and Control (C2) — An army’s C2 apparatus is another requires a mix of arms and weapons that through maneuver exploits
vital aspect of military culture forming warriors into fast, flexible, the capabilities of each while protecting their weaknesses. Combined
and lethal teams. C2 is the overall command climate pervading an arm operations at battalion/company level and above employ
armed force for the direction of operations. It is a decentralized infantry, tanks, artillery and aircraft in combination, using each arm’s
system allowing warriors to wage war with the outcome dependent strength to engage the enemy while protecting each others’
on skill, leadership, and daring. C2 is the glue binding weaknesses from enemy action. Similarly, at company/platoon level
professionalism, unit cohesion, training, and TTPs together and below, combined weapon methodology — a varied weapons
providing the environment where it all is allowed to work. Pivotal to mix of automatic weapons, rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, hand
this concept are mission-oriented orders and reconnaissance-pull. grenades, shoulder-fired rockets and missiles, demolition charges
A mission-oriented order system assigns goal- or intent-based and man- and vehicle-portable crew-served weapon systems —
orders rather than directive-based orders defining tasks and how- allows the infantry platoon, squad, or team the ability to engage
to instructions. Operations embody what the Germans developed and defeat a wider variety of targets and accomplish more missions

TRAININ N TES
then if they were armed with standard small of similarly built assault groups (AG). The Soldiers’ lives and any loss of life under
arms alone. infantry fire team and vehicle or gun platoon/ their command must be minimal and justified.
The battle group should be about the section will supply the basic building block Although rank gives them the authority to
size of a regiment/brigade. The modern of this organizational structure enabling give orders, it does not make them a leader.
division of close to 20,000 men is way too maximum flexibility across conflict types. People do not follow rank; they follow
large and clumsy. Ideally 5,000-9,000 men Leadership and the authority to knowledge and good judgment. Building an
should be built from various companies and command come from exemplary ability. They effective team through leadership qualities
batteries. Armor, infantry, artillery, assault don’t come from the uniform or from a rank such as values, character, fairness, trust,
guns, anti-aircraft weapons and helicopters or position but being an example in the field. respect, and mentorship make elite units
are combined with sufficient logistical and Leadership is the process or art of with the ability to accomplish any goal.
engineer support for sustained operations. influencing people to accomplish the True leadership makes followers want to
The companies would be formed into mission because they want to not because succeed and achieve great things while
multiple reinforced battalion-sized elements, they have to. It is also the ability to make offering mentorship and the fruits of the
the CATF according to terrain and mission. on-the-spot decisions exercising leader’s experience. True leaders take pride
The layers of inter arm support have been professional knowledge and experience in when their subordinates excel, inspiring
proven successful in combat throughout the fluid situations. This is accomplished trust. We must train our young officers and
20th century. The mission-specific CATF has through trust, mutual respect, innovation, NCOs to be warfighters and leaders not
been the most successful combat formation and cohesiveness. Leaders must look after bureaucrats. Bureaucrats excel at making
because of its combined arms structure, the physical and emotional needs of their checklists, Power Point slides and adding
adaptability to terrain and enemy situation, Soldiers by creating a sense of belonging endless rules and procedures to control their
logistical independence and ability to to a tight-knit family and judging them not subordinates. Severely lacking are the
integrate the varied formations necessary by their rank, name, or honors but by their critical skills required to conduct high tempo
for mission accomplishment. Reinforced or character and performance. They must be operations under constantly changing
regular company-sized elements building fair and treat everyone equally. Officers and circumstances. Initiative, trust, team
into the CATF will themselves be composed NCOs must be duly considerate of their building, taking responsibility and
innovation become lost in the avalanche of
paperwork, doing it by the book, self interest
and pointing fingers when things go wrong.
The zero-defect mentality creates leaders
that are more afraid of making mistakes than
they are of exercising initiative. How can
leaders with this mentality win on the
battlefield?
Making on-the-spot decisions during an
engagement and thinking on your feet are
the providence of leadership possessed by
men of vigor, courage and strong character.
Maintaining the initiative and uniting all
available forces at the point of decision
demands cool, competent, bold, imaginative
and opportunistic leadership. Every officer,
NCO and Soldier must be trained and
competent exercising leadership at one or
two grades above his peacetime rank.
Officer and NCO selection must be based
on field abilities from the ranks of the
enlisted or through an intensive officer
preparation course for those entering
through Reserve Officer Training Corps,
Officer Candidate School or from a Service
Academy. The gentlemen’s officer corps is
a thing of the past where a university
J r y Al an r
education is required. A man’s ability to
eadershi is the rocess or art of influencing eo le to accom lish the mission ecause they command troops on the battlefield is
want to not ecause they have to. t is also the a ility to ma e on-the-s ot decisions exercising determined by character and leadership.
rofessional nowledge and ex erience in fluid situations. While being university educated is certainly

taking place later. The training follows in
sequence building upon previous
knowledge and skills. For example, some
tasks learned individually are then integrated
within teams and squads. Movement under
direct/indirect fire, each Soldier’s place and
responsibility in formations, using cover and
concealment to move securely and stealthily
are essential individual skills which must be
integrated within team/squad capabilities.
First aid also an individual task requiring
team/squad integration when forming aid
and liter teams during operations. Reacting
to ambushes, indirect fire and contact,
crossing danger areas and encountering
IEDs are all team/squad tasks that build
upon the warrior mastering his specific piece
of the pie and being able to cover other
r n an p n
pieces as casualties are incurred.
odified attle drill training see s flexi le res onses to the most encountered attlefield situations. Modified Battle Drill. Standard battle
desirable and may be required for some can contribute combat power or raise the drills are used as lecture tools and a
technical branches, it certainly is not for tooth-to-tail ratio when necessary. After foundation for experimentation. Modified
measuring a person’s leadership ability in attending basic combat training, I think there battle drill training is a force-on-force
combat. Officer and NCO candidates should needs to be a light infantry course (LIC) all exercise using a noticeable means of
be selected from the ranks of the enlisted warriors attend before beginning branch- assessing casualties allowing trainees to
that show potential or enter through a specific training. track how well they are performing and
special training program assessing their Light Infantry Course where they need improvement. Speed,
performance at various enlisted ranks before Light infantry is the foundation of all stealth and deception are used to measure a
commissioning. armed forces. They can operate in all types TTP’s level of surprise while allowing
of terrain and conflict types. Insurgencies constant improvement, optimizing a TTP’s
Training and counterinsurgencies are essentially efficacy. TTPs experimentation must seek
The main objective of military training is battles between light infantry. Police forces to limit friendly casualties providing a means
developing proficiency in the tactics of are paramilitary light infantry units and the for rapid battlefield action. American
conducting military operations enabled by primary counterterrorism asset. They are trainees are force fed doctrine and offered
suitable warrior culture. These methods are also the cheapest units in terms of equipment little or no latitude in experimentation for
designed to enable outnumbered, requirements to form because men can only improving technique and the overall quality
outgunned, and technologically outclassed carry so much and still be effective in of tactical maneuvers. This is why Soldiers
armies to prevail on the battlefield with combat. This corresponding lack of heavy must be taught how to think and not what
minimal friendly casualties. An integrated equipment forces the light infantry to be to think. Emphasis must be placed on a
training program must be tough and realistic highly skilled. And that highly skilled leaders’ ability to make sound decisions
stressing tactical flexibility and creativity infantry warrior is what is needed. appropriate for the tactical problem he faces.
through the use of mission-oriented orders, Operating Principles: Cascading The mission must be accomplished as fast
reconnaissance pull, modified battle drills, Operability, Modified Battle Drills, Mobile as possible and with as few casualties as
and mobile assault training. A complete Assault and Goal-Oriented Physical possible preserving combat power for
training program understands that armies Fitness further operations; how that is
exist to wage war, and the product of any Cascading Operability. First Soldiers accomplished is open to the leader’s
military training program must be competent must master individual military skills then discretion. Modified battle drill training
warriors who are taught how to think not integrate those skills into the two- and four- seeks flexible responses to the most widely
what to think. During times of war, constant man team, the two fire-team squad, and encountered battlefield situations such as
reports from the front should help form the finally into the assault group. These skills breaking contact, reacting to an ambush,
basis of future exercises and lessons learned need to be trained and mastered over desert, crossing danger areas, hasty attack, meeting
should be incorporated as quickly as forest, mountain, and urban terrain in all engagements and movement to contact.
possible to warriors heading to the front. weather conditions. In the construct of the Mobile Assault. Characterized by
The program must focus on producing LIC, this training will take place in the terrain surprise, flexibility and rapid mission
Infantrymen. The greatest military utility is found at the location of the training facility accomplishment mobile assault tactics
achieved when all elements of a formation with more specific environmental training revolved around the reconnaissance and

TRAININ N TES
combat patrol. Raids, ambushes, security and reconnaissance for advanced patrolling operations and exposure to the use of
patrols must be practiced day and night focusing on achieving combined arms. Including armor sections, assault guns and calling
positional superiority over the enemy employing friendly weapon for and adjusting indirect fire and combat air support during
systems with maximum effect. The fundamentals of troop formations offensive and defensive operations. Using direct-fire weapons in
and movement utilizing cover and concealment, the effects of force-on-force exercises that produce a visible effect (such as paint
weather and terrain, communications, noise and light discipline, balls) reinforces tactical necessities such as the need to find
observation, detailed attack and withdrawal planning including main appropriate cover while moving. The AG conducts force-on-force
and alternate routes and redeployment in the event of unplanned engagements guided by the modified battle drill and mobile assault
contact; all geared toward flexible and decisive mission techniques where the standard TTPs will be tested and refined
accomplishment. Critical to the successful mobile assault is the based on the operational results. Absolute freedom is allowed during
formation’s ability to maneuver gaining positional superiority over these exercises combined with detailed after action reviews to
the enemy accomplishing its mission with minimal friendly determine what TTPs actually work in this simulated combat based
casualties. on the combined arms standard and most current contemporary
Goal-Oriented Physical Fitness. Combat physical fitness goes operating environment. Particular attention must be paid to
beyond the standard calisthenics, running, and hiking by maintaining the AG’s cohesion during operations, while occupying
incorporating assault and obstacle courses. Effectiveness in combat an assembly area, and then quickly reorganizing for follow-on
is the goal of physical training with all activities designed to achieve missions and preparing against counterattacks. The troops will
this end. Pursuing a rigorous physical fitness program of calisthenics learn and understand that in combat certain things are relative. For
and running is the basis of any military fitness program; however, example, they will be aware of various troop formations such as the
when preparing for combat, training in events that mimic the tasks wedge and column and their place within those formations; however,
to be performed under fire is a goal-oriented physical fitness they will learn that their position is more directed by terrain and
program. These incorporate assault courses involving orienteering available cover and concealment.
while negotiating obstacles and shooting exercises for time.
Course Phases Tactics
Individual Phase: This training phase focuses on the necessary TTPs are the soft technology created as ways of acting in and
individual warrior skills essential to successfully engaging enemy employing weapons in combat. Successful TTPs are often recorded
units. Warriors must become proficient in cross-country in military doctrine, standardizing training and ensuring that war-
orienteering, weapons care, function and employment, camouflaging winning methodologies are disseminated to the armed forces as a
equipment and personnel, movement techniques utilizing cover whole. Training and fighting from a standard doctrine was an
and concealment under direct and indirect fire, tracking and stalking, outstanding concept in theory and very successful in practice for
communications (both visual signaling and radio operation), first the Wehrmacht in between World Wars I and II. The doctrine
aid, hand-to-hand self defense, advanced marksmanship, and should not stifle flexibility by being presented as the only right way
demolitions. After establishing a solid shooting foundation, warriors of doing something. It should focus on concepts to guide
move into walking combat shooting, first dry firing and ending with warfighting TTPs, not dictate how things should be done. Concepts
fast live-fire drills. This phase culminates with planning mobile such as combined arms and mixed weapons, mission tactics, task
assault operations in the classroom. force or battle group organization embodying decentralization, unit
Team Phase: Tactical exercises begin with the issuance of the integrity, maneuver, intelligence and leadership stand as the pillars
operations order or fragmentary order and are conducted at the of warfighting. Using terrain board and field problems, combat
terrain board. After the proper troop leading procedures are followed, leaders should be evaluated on tactical dilemmas not based on the
the mission is executed at the terrain board as if the unit was in the textbook answer but on the soundness of the leader’s assessment,
field. Proper radio procedures are observed with the instructors judgment, and overall thought process.
acting as higher headquarters and introducing enemy contact, etc. Doctrine should be a bottom-up development process where
From this point the combat shooting exercises are done in two-man officers are free to copy and experiment with TTPs from all over the
teams, then four-man fire teams, and finally with a mixed weapon world in force-on-force or terrain board simulations. They can then
squad. Movement, communication, tracking and stalking techniques disseminate their findings to other officers and NCO discussing
are refined and built upon as team and squad patrolling missions the merits of each maneuver. If the TTP can withstand further
begin. Operational security becomes a religion as formations experimentation and peer review, the officer is obligated to publish
conduct reconnaissance and screening missions as well as it or otherwise pass it up the chain of command. This process is
ambushes and raids. Teams/squads are taught how to break contact, faster during war as effective TTPs are adopted regardless of what’s
conduct hasty attacks, cross danger areas, plan assaults and other written in doctrine. This doctrine development system also prevents
necessary TTPs. All unit positions are rotated allowing every warrior units in the field from being predictable and allows situational
to learn the requirements of each position within the formation, uniqueness depending on the threat. Expanding on some of these
which will develop leaderships skill and ensure the team will continue concepts, it is evident how TTPs emerge from doctrine as guidance
to function as casualties are taken. not law. Leadership is most effective when the leader is at the point of
Assault Group Phase: During this phase, warriors gather into main effort employing creativity, improvisation, flexibility and initiative
mission-specific task forces up to reinforced platoon-size elements to operations; otherwise it’s simply management. Maneuver relies on

the travelability of terrain, mobility allowed moving them out for other duties is a fall back protecting their career in a zero
by a network of roads and highways and counterproductive and part of the “ticket defect system. Maneuver warfare is riskier
leadership yielding speed and surprise. punching” mentality. Officers should requiring leadership not management! The
Various techniques and procedures have perform three years as combat platoon software of war must be up to the challenge
proven themselves throughout history and leaders, not including training before if a comprehensive military system of
are worthy of becoming doctrine, but they becoming eligible for promotion. Captains operational and tactical excellence is desired.
need to be broad enough to guide should serve four years as line company Armies focusing on software will only
operations not dictate them. For example commanders not including staff rotations. require weapons that are good enough to
reconnaissance pull, deep penetration, A series of tactical and operational defeat a technologically advanced but
timely counter attacks, suppression and competency examinations will also be given tactically uninitiated enemy. This poses a
volume of fire, coordinating fire and establishing eligibility for promotion once serious threat for the United States as
maneuver, reinforcing success, bold thrusts, the prescribed time in grade is reached. tactical proficiency continues to take a back
and economy of force have been identified Additionally, the total percentage of officers seat to fancy new gizmos while our enemies
as pivotal aspects of many operations and in the armed forces should not exceed six to focus on the SoW and have access to
provide the backdrop for the development seven percent. weapons that are good enough. Through
of modern TTPs that are flexible and the discussion of the critical elements in
situational. Conclusion employing efficient and effective armed
Focusing junior officers and NCOs on Historically since the First World War the forces I hope to refocus priority where it
their primary responsibility of TTP United States has maintained an attrition- should be, on the Software of War and
development is necessary for them to learn based warfighting methodology. Attrition dedication to the Cult of Arms.
their current positions while maintaining allows a nation capable of producing
them in grade, which allows for mastery of massive amounts of arms and equipment A i i ar i l a u i 1LT
the position. Company grade officers and with sufficient population although Joseph P. Morsello a r n ly pl a
NCOs seeking to become masters of their operationally and tactically inferior to prevail 1 - n a i n n a an r r n r ll r
rain r i 1 n an ry ri a 1 Ar y
trade must first serve as apprentice and in combat. The Soldiers of an attrition-based a a r ra al pr i u ly r
journeyman as part of a comprehensive system need master few unsophisticated a an n in r uip n pla n l a r upp r in
combat leadership training and mentorship military skills. This methodology is based 1-1 n an ry i n 1 ri a 101
development program. Giving warriors just on bureaucratic control and predictability Air rn i i i n an r Ar r a alry
i n in n r rn ra
enough time to learn the basics of a job then presenting little risk for commanders seeking
Soldiers ex lain
small-team
movement tactics
to their raqi
order security
artners rior to
conducting a
artnered foot
atrol along the
raqi-Syrian
order at night,
ecem er .
i a

TRAININ N TES
WALKS- A- HEAP
LESSONS STILL APPLY FROM MORE THAN 140-YEAR-OLD FIGHT
LTC (RETIRED) MICHAEL E. REICHARD
F
or over seven months he had been patiently waiting for perimeter on key terrain that permitted observation of the work
the right moment. His reconnaissance patrols had sites, most of the road, excellent fields of fire, and was centrally
determined the number of Americans, their daily routine, located to the three dispersed work sites. Observation/listening
and they could often smell what was being served in the mess hall posts (OPs/LPs) were well placed and alert. As long as the
on any given day at the forward operating base (FOB). His combat infantrymen stayed alert, they had a fighting chance to get to the
patrols harassed and inflicted casualties on incoming and outgoing combat outpost and assume their assigned positions.
convoys that used the main supply route, one which served a It is several hours before beginning morning nautical twilight on
string of FOBs. In July a group of less than 100 lightly armed 2 August 1867. “He” is Red Cloud, an Oglala Chief and for now task
Soldiers and civilian contractors operated and bivouacked outside force commander of the Tetons (Lower Bands) of the Dakotas
the fire support range of the FOB. Yet they were still close enough (Sioux). The Tetons are comprised of the bands of Oglalas
for a quick reaction force (QRF) to sally out to their relief. His (Wanderers), Brules’ (Burnt-Thighs), San Arcs (No Bows),
objective was the complete destruction of the QRF in a “baited trap Hunkpapas (They who camp by Themselves), and Minneconjous
ambush,” and if the situation developed the destruction of the (Those who Plant by the Water), according to Richard I. Dodge in
FOB. His strategy was to induce the QRF to sacrifice security for his 1877 book The Plains of the Great West and Their Inhabitants.
speed in order to rescue the combat outpost before it was wiped Cheyenne (Cut-wrist) and Northern Cheyenne tribes have also allied
out. The QRF in their haste would get strung out the length of the with Red Cloud. His operation is in the movement phase. Each
relief route. Along this route were several large naturally band is being guided to their selected positions. A leader’s recon
camouflaged kill zones. They were large enough to conceal over several days determined the best sites to conceal the war
hundreds of his men. Strung out in these kill zones, the Soldiers parties along the route the QRF is most likely to take in the relief
would be fighting in small unsupporting teams. They would face effort. Although the combat outpost is always alert, Red Cloud’s
attacks from multiple directions. Panic would take hold and unable large force could easily have taken it in the night. The astute Red
to function as a cohesive force, they would cease to exist in less Cloud wants a fight in the daylight so the lookouts in a watchtower
than 15 minutes. He figured the combat outpost might last half as on a hill and those in the FOB blockhouse five miles away can see
long. Once the fighting ended, he could Figure 1
begin his psychological warfare campaign.
Any wounded would be tortured to death
and all the dead Americans would be
displayed. A similar operation seven months
before was a total success, and he was sure
tomorrow would be no different.
It was the start of a new month — August
— so it was the 49 enlisted men and three
officers of Charlie Company’s turn to rotate
outside the FOB. CPT James Powell,
commander of C Company, 1st Battalion,
27th Infantry made an estimate of the
situation. He did not like what he saw.
Mission requirements had the civilians
scattered into three work parties over a mile
requiring squad-size elements to be posted
with two of them. So that left him in the fourth
position — the combat outpost with a
reserve force of just 24 infantrymen led by
1LT John Jenness. The good news was A
Company, whom they were relieving, and
the civilians had not neglected their tactical
duties during the previous weeks. They had
selected and prepared a fine defensive Atlas of the Sioux Wars a u i n iu Ar y an an n ral a ll

and hear the attack on the combat outpost. the wood train as it headed back to the FOB.
The lookouts then can sound the alarm and PVT Deming returned and reported that the
dispatch the QRF from the FOB — Fort Phil lumberjacks and the other Soldiers in their
Kearny (15 miles south of present-day detail were making for the wood train. PVT
Sheridan, Wy.). Gibson was reluctant to abandon his post.
The outpost’s mission was to cut down Yet he and his buddies were on foot about a
trees to provide lumber and fuel especially mile from the defensive perimeter of the
for the upcoming winter. The 40-plus civilian wagon boxes. The enemy was mounted.
contractors were lumberjacks, teamsters, They had completed their mission of early
and mule skinners. Each morning after warning. They had to leave now. A stray
stand-to and breakfast, one group of mule skinner leading his pony on foot joined
teamsters in a wood train hauling logs and them as they started at a brisk walk toward
cordwood loaded the previous day heads the wagon boxes. Two would cover fire as
back to the FOB with 2LT Francis two moved. They were being over taken so
McCarthy’s escort detail of 12 Soldiers. A they started running, but still in bounds.
second group of lumberjacks and 13 Soldiers While they could keep the pursers directly
in an empty wagon train departs for the behind them at bay, it became obvious that
woods to cut down trees (this is called a the mounted braves would get ahead of them
pinery). This pinery was by a creek about a and cut them off. The reality was they were
mile from CPT Powell’s combat outpost. going to lose the race and their scalps. The
Several hundred yards from the pinery 300- mule skinner had the only horse and could
plus mules were being rotated off the wagon mount and make a run for it. He chose to
i rary n r rin an rap i i i n
teams. They were kept in a grazing, watering, stay on foot with the Soldiers, continue to
Red Cloud
and resting herd by the third party of mule fight, and share a common fate.
skinners with no Soldiers. The fourth and Fighters. They don’t realize they have With the first shots CPT Powell and 1LT
final group was in a defensive perimeter (the discovered the assault element for the fort’s Jenness readied the defensive perimeter by
combat outpost) made up of 14 wagon QRF. having the Soldiers put extra rifles, tools,
boxes removed from their carriage and Eighteen-year-old PVT Samuel S. Gibson ammo, sacks of flour, and corn, cracker
wheels and placed on their bed in an oval is part of the 13-Soldier escort for the boxes, bundles of clothes, tent and wagon
perimeter end-to-end with seven on each lumberjacks at the pinery. Once there he is canvas inside the wagon boxes. Seeing the
side. (A wagon box is similar to the bed of a put in charge of a three-man OP/LP. As he group of mule skinners hotly pursued as
large pickup truck just slightly longer. Its completes a sunshade for what he knows they made a break for the wood train, CPT
side walls are about four feet high, and the will be a hot August day, PVT Garrett yells, Powell led part of the reserve force on foot
lumber used to construct the box is generally “Indians!” to fire on the braves from behind. His attack
two inches thick). A small gap between It is about 0700 hours on 2 August. Seven is successful because the mounted braves
wagon boxes was left to permit a man to slip mounted braves are in single file trotting turned to attack his force.
through but block horses, mules, or cattle. toward them at an oblique angle. Still no Watching from a nearby hill, Red Cloud
At each end of the oval was a wagon box shot has been fired. Estimating their range has his “commo chief” signal (with a small
left on its wheels with bows and canvas (a at 700 yards Gibson sites his target, pocket mirror) the QRF ambush sites NOT
covered wagon). Here, a month’s worth of squeezes the trigger and manages to drop a to attack the 60-plus mule skinners,
food, supplies, spare clothing, extra horse which throws its rider (E.A. teamsters, lumberjacks, and escorting
weapons, and ammo were stored. Some of Brininstool, Fighting Indian Warriors). soldiers of the wood train. They were still
the extra barrels and sacks were placed in Gibson orders Garrett to watch for signals pursued by other bands of braves that
the gaps between the wagon boxes. Outside from the outpost and he sends PVT Deming managed to kill four Soldiers and four
this perimeter were tents which quartered over to the pinery to alert the lumberjacks civilians. These braves also served as
the soldiers, civilians, and served as a mess. and Soldiers. He can see hundreds of decoys to lead the QRF into the ambush.
At the same time Red Cloud’s braves are Indians and more seem to be materializing The remaining 50-plus Soldiers and civilians
moving into position, a civilian teamster R.J. every second. Scattered shots were now from the wood train, mule herd, and pinery
Smyth and his buddy ride out the gate of ringing out. Simultaneously several hundred reached the covering cannons and guns of
Fort Phil Kearny to hunt deer. Shortly after dismounted adolescent teen braves were Fort Phil Kearny after a five-mile running
sunrise they spot smoke signals in some given the task of running off the mule herd. fight. Red Cloud is confident his main
distance hills and immediately decide to start The mule skinners stood fast and kept the ambush force has not been compromised.
back to the fort. They hadn’t gone far before herd in control until 60-plus experienced Seeing the passage of so many back to the
they discover the Tetons are between them mounted braves stampeded the herd and the fort, Red Cloud thought the QRF would
and the fort, according to Cyrus Townsend mule skinners. With the way to the wagon surely think the route was clear and they
Brady in his book Indian Fights and boxes blocked, the mule skinners made for will race out into the jaws of his ambush.

TRAININ N TES
PVTs Gibson, Deming, Garrett, and the mule skinner are still the center forcing Rain-in-the-Face and the Hunkpapas to slow
making an unobserved and unsupported withdrawal. They are down, pushing them deeper into the formation. The line formation
moments away from being ridden down when a 21-year-old SGT was being compressed into a column. As this occurred the number
Max Littman spots the attackers. He was putting a sack of flour in a of Soldiers facing braves started to equal out.
wagon box when their movement caught his eye. He drops the The attackers thought that as soon as the Infantrymen fired
sack, grabs his rifle and leaps out of the wagon box. He sprints their first volley they would then have to stand up to reload. Only
toward the group for about a hundred yards, drops to one knee and chiefs (officers) and a few sub-chiefs (sergeants) would have
begins to deliver a covering fire that drops several braves and revolvers and not have to stand up. The others, they thought,
horses. His fire rolls back the envelopment. The exhausted OP/LP would have to expose themselves to reload. At that time, the braves
team and the mule skinner still leading his pony reach the perimeter would then return fire, and with their greater numbers they would
shortly after CPT Powell and his team returned. Somehow under a surely drop most of the Soldiers. The Soldiers fired when the
hail of bullets and arrows none of CPT Powell’s force or the OP/LP attackers were at 300 yards, but it wasn’t much of a volley (just over
team sustained a single casualty. Within minutes the deer hunting 17 shots). Then a steady stream of fire came from the wagon boxes,
party of R.J. Smyth and his buddy enter the perimeter. CPT Powell’s but the braves pressed forward with the assault. They smelled the
force of 29 infantrymen and three civilians are now totally black powder, the dust, and the blood of men and horses. Those
surrounded by thousands! braves and horses hit in the front slowed the momentum of the
A perimeter designed to be held by 100 must be held by 32. The assault. (It was just like being in a battalion run. When the front
original plan was for 1LT Jenness’ platoon of 24 to serve as the slows, the trail companies often compress and come to a complete
reserve and on order move to achieve fire superiority in a critical stop.) From the level of fire being unleashed, it appeared that there
sector or to counterattack a breech. CPT Powell quickly readjusts must have been hundreds of Soldiers in those wagon boxes. Once
the available manpower. He assigns 15 men to defend each side of the braves were close enough to see through the smoke and dust
the oval wagon box perimeter and gives them primary, alternate, into the beds of the wagon boxes, they were surprised that they
and supplementary positions. He posts himself at one end of the could see almost no Soldiers. The Walks-a-Heap draped canvas
perimeter in a covered wagon and directs 1LT Jenness to the other from side board to side board for concealment. The braves urged
end. With his field glasses 1LT Jenness surveys the field and spots their war ponies forward to jump the wagon boxes, but the horses
what he is sure to be Chief Red Cloud and his “staff” on a distant balked at jumping the four-feet high double wall of the wagon boxes.
hill to the east. With colored cloth and mirrors, they are issuing They slowed right in the middle of the kill zone. At 50 yards, the
what is in effect a “frago.” The LT shouted this information to CPT accuracy and the volume of fire coming from the infantrymen broke
Powell at the other end of the perimeter. The CPT knew the assault the charge. Rain-in-the-Face and the other bands withdrew and
would soon begin. A low rumble was heard coming from the pinery, tried to recover as many of the fallen as they could.
and then hundreds of mounted braves emerged from the trees. CPT For all the thoroughness and daring Red Cloud scouts had
Powell gave the order, “Men here they come! Take your places and displayed in the previous months, they had missed one small but
shoot to kill!” important piece of intelligence. On 10 July 1867, a large resupply
Rain-in-the-Face was a young “company grade” chief of the convoy brought in food, blankets, clothing, tools, and 700 Allin
Hunkpapa band. He and his braves were riding in the tribe’s assigned conversion breech-loading, single shot Springfield rifles and a
position in the attack. He would have preferred to be at one of the hundred thousand metallic cartridges. With these rifles, instead of
big ambush sites waiting for the QRF. But he did as directed thinking having to stand and reload, a Soldier could remain in a covered and
the attack wouldn’t take long. They were going up against the slow concealed prone or kneeling position, fire, and reload in two-to-
moving and slow firing “Walks-a-Heap” (what the tribes called the three seconds. Plus, the metallic cartridges could be handled rougher
Infantry). He wore his war bonnet and just a loin cloth on this hot and offered a more reliable and consistent performance over the old
day. His face, chest, arms, thighs, and pony were painted for war. paper cartridges of the muzzle loaders. The paper cartridges had a
He knew the Soldiers thought the colors and designs were whimsical tendency to degrade over time, exposure to the elements, and sweaty
decorations, but in fact they follow a definite pattern. Each design hands.
and color has a meaning. Along with the headdress, it denotes An undeniable and overlooked component of C Company’s
“rank” or status, combat experience, and especially band or tribe survival up to this point was the seamless handover and preparation
(since each band uses different battle drills). Any brave can identify from A Company, 1-27th Infantry two days before. During their
a different band on the battlefield and the combat experience the stay, the men of A Company bored firing holes in the outward
group has by the war paint. This is similar to the way we mark units facing side of the wagon boxes to cover their assigned sectors of
and skills on our uniforms, vehicles, and aircraft. fire. A Soldier could lie on the wagon bed site and shoot without
He and his braves were in the middle ranks of the assault exposing himself. Their commander’s obstacle plan called for placing
formation, which was picking up speed. The front of the charge the wagon boxes on their beds instead of their side. This covered
was the honor position. (In this position, you don’t have to eat and concealed the Soldiers’ backs from attacks from the opposite
dust, you can see the enemy, and no one is in front of you blocking side of the perimeter and would block braves on horses from riding
your shot.) He started to see the wagon boxes but still didn’t see into the combat outpost. He also had placed the combat outpost on
any Soldiers. Because the oval shape objective presents only a the northern edge of the plain so he could see the work sites and
small area to the Tetons, the assault line started to channel in toward most of the road. On the northern edge, less than 100 yards away,

Ar y n r ili ary i ry
The Wagon Box Fight became part of the U.S. Army in Action Series, which depict American Soldiers from the Revolutionary War through the
Korean War. This picture, titled “Good Marksmanship and Guts!,” may still hang in some units’ orderly rooms.
was a shallow erosion ditch, then a gentle acclivity with broken no more than 400 “for duty” Soldiers available, detaching a force
ground. To the east, west, and south was flat, open grassland that big enough to do the job would expose the fort to attack. CPT
extended a half mile or more in these directions (Roy E. Appleman, Powell and C Company would get no immediate help.
Chapter 12: The Wagon Box Fight, Great Western Indian Wars). Red Cloud saw the attack being repelled and reassessed his
Over the previous weeks, the mule herd had grazed or stomped tactics. This resulted in a lull that curious Soldiers used to start
away the prairie grass on this plain removing any possible poking their heads above cover. 1LT Jenness left his position to
concealment for crawling and had eliminated the fire hazard. The check his men. In quick succession four Soldiers were hit from fire
combat outpost had near perfect observation and fields of fire. coming from the rise to the north. The braves were skilled marksmen
CPT Powell further improved the outpost by having his men line and could hit a Soldier who exposed himself. 1LT Jenness and two
the wagon boxes with sacks of flour and corn, and bundles of others were killed, a fourth was hit in the shoulder. The Soldiers
canvas and clothing, which helped stop bullets and flying wood quickly learned to move only when necessary, then crawl and be
splinters. Some canvas was draped over the wagon boxes for fast. They did just that as they readjusted the perimeter to cover
concealment and shade. Seven ammo boxes, each holding a thousand the sectors of the fallen four and to get ammo.
rounds, were opened and evenly placed around the perimeter so CPT Powell wondered if 28 men were enough to defend his
everyone was close to a resupply point. Each Soldier filled his pockets perimeter as the braves would surely come again and seek the weak
and hat with as much ammo as he could hold. This was in addition to spot to penetrate. Once inside the perimeter, the sheer number would
the 40-round basic load of the cartridge box and belt. win the hand-to-hand fight. Somehow he must outgun the braves
There was one other bit of intel that every Soldier knew and Red at the point of attack without creating an exploitable gap. He lost
Cloud didn’t. There would be no “quick” reaction force. The total his second in command and wondered if he had overlooked
annihilation of CPT Fetterman’s 80-man QRF in December 1866 had something. He had, but so had Red Cloud. In his preparation, he
resulted in a change of tactics. Against standing orders NOT to left the tents (each about the size of a GP small) standing on the
pursue across a phase line, CPT Fetterman crossed the line in pursuit south, creating a dead space almost up to the wagon boxes. In the
of the decoys. The 20 mounted Cav troopers pulled away from the first attack the braves chose not to use the tents to mask the attack
60 dismounted Infantrymen armed with muzzle-loading rifles. Strung because they could not see the objective. Simultaneously, almost
out nearly a half mile in small groups when the ambush was sprung, everyone on the battlefield thought or said, “The tents!”
the Soldiers were overrun in minutes. The QRF would only come Within seconds four Soldiers (one being PVT Gibson) sprinted
after careful assessment of the situation. The realization was the out of the perimeter and started slipping the ropes off the stakes
QRF, or more importantly the fort, could be the main objective. With collapsing all but a distant one. Somehow none of the four were hit,

TRAININ N TES
and they assumed their positions as nearly 700 braves on foot continued to mark their targets, but it seemed as though it was
raced toward them. having no effect. The braves pressed on. Ammo was critical and
Red Cloud saw how the line had collapsed into a column and the braves were almost to the point where they could have leapt
that the horses would not jump the wagon boxes. The field was into the wagon boxes and then met their foes face-to-face, hand-to-
littered with dead and wounded men and horses becoming an hand. Rifle bullets passed thru several braves at this close quarter.
obstacle to a horse charge. Hence this attack would be on foot, The wedge of braves finally broke at five feet. Red Cloud then gave
plus braves did not take up as much space as a horse so he could the order to recover the wounded and dead and to depart.
get more in the same space. Sheer weight of numbers would sweep From Fort Phil Kearny, the gates then opened and a compact
the infantry away. Again the braves pressed the assault, rushing formation moved out. A howitzer did a recon by fire. The red legs
past fallen comrades and horses. They will not balk when the critical knew a bursting shell would stampede Indian ponies. If they were
time came to leap into the wagon boxes. concealed along the route, the shell would flush them. They fired a
R.J. Smyth and his partner were skilled scouts and frontiersmen few shells, waited, and then bounded forward a quarter mile at a time.
and were teamed up with the famous explorer and mountain man CPT Powell observed the Tetons massing off in the distance. He heard
Jim Bridger (who is watching from the fort). They were the final the booming of the howitzer. Finally C Co. spotted the cavalry screen
protective line. Smyth was armed with two lever action, seven shot followed closely by the Infantry, the howitzer, and several wagons. C
Spencer Carbines and two Colt revolvers. His partner was allotted Co. started cheering. Some started to leave the perimeter, but CPT
eight Springfield rifles, and one soldier had the sole purpose of Powell ordered them all back to the security of the perimeter. Finally,
making sure the rifles remained loaded. Just as it looked as though MAJ Benjamin F. Smith and a 100-man QRF arrived at the wagon
the human wave would reach the wagon boxes and the fire can’t boxes. It was around 1300 hrs. MAJ Smith hadn’t expected to find
get hotter, Smyth quickly and accurately fired each Spencer then anyone alive. MAJ Smith and CPT Powell were awed at the numbers of
the Colts, and the wave of braves melted away. braves off in the distance. They quickly decided to load the two
As the attack receded, fire from the north once again limited wounded and three dead into the wagons and make for the FOB. After
movement in the perimeter. Flaming arrows were used, but there getting a drink and an ammo resupply, C Co. and the QRF walked
was no grass to burn, and the Soldiers put out any that hit the the five miles to Fort Phil Kearny uncontested.
wagons. Some hit and burned manure left by the mules and horses. Measure, countermeasure, change comes quick. In the few weeks
This smoke burned the throat and increased the thirst already acute prior to the wagon box fight, the leadership, technology and tactics
from dust and a hot August sun. Many Soldiers had neglected their of his adversary had changed. Red Cloud drew off to ponder the
canteens and did not carry them. PVT Gibson had a full one as he changes, fight off challenges to his leadership, and to adapt. The
left the OP/LP in the morning and had carried it all the way back to death of his nephew left an opening for another young combat
the wagon boxes. He shared it with two other Soldiers in his leader — Crazy Horse.
position. But now as the rifles began to overheat and foul from the Politics and money had kept the Infantry inadequately armed
black powder cartridges, the water was used to cool and clean the with muzzle loaders even though large quantities of “repeating
rifles. Those who did not have water blew and fanned the breeches rifles,” breech loading rifles, and metallic cartridges were in storage
to cool them. Then using shirt tails, they wiped off the carbon. from the War Between the States. The loss of CPT Fetterman’s team
After the lull, another foot charge came from a different point of the seven months before forced the rearming of the Bozeman Trail
compass. Red Cloud looked for any weak spots, but there were none. forts. This drove a change in the tactics from standing in open
The pattern was repeated the rest of the morning. Red Cloud forgot firing lines to fighting prone or kneeling from a covered and
about ambushing the relief force. He wanted to break the “Walks-a- concealed position. Due to the discipline and the marksmanship
Heap medicine.” His Oglala and several other bands had been at the skills of the Infantrymen in Charlie Company, the full potential of
ambush sites all morning unengaged. He recalled them all. His nephew breech loading rifles was realized. Credit also must go to the capable
and most likely his future successor led the sixth and final attack that and cool leadership of CPT Powell, who recognized how technology
they believed would sweep away the Infantry in the wagon boxes. had changed tactics. He was able to lead his men to quickly and
Some of the sides of the wagons were nearly shot to splinters. successfully employ both in combat. Victory was also the result of
The 7,000 rounds were nearly gone after five full assaults. Some of a young PVT Gibson, who did not wait to be ordered to do
the rifles were so hot the rounds cooked off in the chamber. The something. He was well trained on the battle drills, the standard
barrels were blistering the Soldiers’ finger tips, and with the barrels operating procedures, and how to size up the situation and execute
so hot they couldn’t be wielded as clubs. They had no bayonets. a solution without waiting for an order. It was also SGT Littman
For CPT Powell and C Co., this was it. The Infantrymen took hunting who saw something his superiors didn’t and immediately took
knives, axes, and hatchets and stuck them into the side boards or corrective action. It was a mule skinner who knew what every
the bed of the wagon to keep them close. When the ammo was Soldier knew, to have any chance they would have to fight as a
gone, it would be hand-to-hand combat. team.
Red Cloud’s tall nephew was at the apex of the massive wedge
LTC (Retired) Michael E. Reichard pl 2 y ar ular
formation of braves approaching from the west on foot. The Oglalas
Ar y an r r i a an n an ry i r A a i ilian p n 1
were right behind him followed by other bands of Tetons and y ar in ari u a i n n i in pa u l aun an an in
Cheyennes. His large size and full war bonnet made him a target. He p ra i n a nn y pa n r la A par ir r
was cut down, but the wedge pressed on. The infantrymen of C Co. upp r ni r i y l ri a pr ra

OODA Loop
SETTING A PATTERN MAY NOT ALWAYS A BAD IDEA
CPT MICHAEL MOSTAGHNI
“D O NOT SET A PATTERN!”

Soldiers deployed to combat
usually have that maxim drilled
fight on the enemy’s terms. So why not act?
How can we regain the precious
initiative? How can we force the enemy to
into their minds from day one. It is very fight us on our terms when it seems like
relevant and makes sense. The enemy despite our technology, discipline, money
notices everything a unit does in the streets and superior training, the enemy keeps us
of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan. reacting? A solution is to win the OODA
Someone is always watching, and loop race from the start. When we
furthermore, someone is always reporting. deliberately ignore our own doctrine or
When establishing a pattern of regular patrol principles, we exercise tactical judgment.
schedules, traveling favorite routes or even Sometimes that requires establishing a
a using favorite patrol technique, the enemy pattern carefully and exploiting it.
gains knowledge on our vulnerabilities, and This process can be very simple or
then we are forced to fight the enemy on his extremely complex. It begins with identifying
terms, in a reactionary way. These reactions what patterns we have already established.
Figure 1 — OODA Loop
only further reinforce our patterns. React to Write them down. “First Platoon went on
ambush, react to contact (direct, indirect, and therefore hard to observe. If we cannot patrol at this time to this place along this
and IED) are battle drills, actions executed observe our combatant, we lose the OODA route.” Continue this process to establish a
with little thought or guidance. While battle loop race from the start. COL Boyd observed discernable pattern. Use 2nd Platoon to
drills are extremely important, they generally that American pilots were “very successful identify the locations from where 1st
look the same. Key to success in combat is during the Korean War. They achieved a kill Platoon’s patterns can be observed and pick
to seize the initiative; make the enemy fight ratio of 10:1 over their Chinese and North the best three. Next, identify positions where
on our terms. This is basic Army doctrine Korean opponents … In traditional 2nd Platoon can be observed. That is the
and conceptually nothing new to measures of aircraft performance, the location of possible observation points
commanders. However, deliberately setting principal communist fighter plane, the MiG- (OPs), a camera, or an ambush. Continue
a pattern can help us regain the initiative. 15, was superior to the American F-86 … business as usual with respect to the
The Boyd Cycle is a conceptual but in two less obvious measures the F-86 established pattern. It is now possible to
breakdown of American fighter pilot combat was superior to the MiG. The F-86’s bubbled more effectively observe the enemy. The
tactics, and it argues that every time a pilot canopy gave its pilot very good outward decision point now is whether an observer
reacts to a given situation he becomes more vision, and the F-86 could transition from is a threat or not. Is he a triggerman for a
vulnerable to his opponent. Also known as one action to another much more quickly command-detonated IED, or is he strictly a
the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) than the MiG,” according to Lind. Despite feeler? The answer determines the action
loop, Air Force COL (Retired) John Boyd the superior abilities of the MiG, success forthcoming.
theorized that “conflict is a series of time- centered on observation and transition. The model of observing the observer is
competitive observation, orientation, From an enemy’s perspective, we are very overly simplified, but the concept is sound.
decision, action cycles … If one side in a easy to observe. We wear uniforms, we have While my company was responsible for the
conflict can consistently go through the heavy, noisy vehicles, and we are slow from city of Old Baquba in the Diyala Province of
Boyd Cycle faster than the other, it gains a wearing 70 pounds of gear. Despite our Iraq, we deliberately established a pattern
tremendous advantage,” according to superior abilities, we cannot observe or that offered our opponents a sense of
William S. Lind in his book The Maneuver transition fast enough to win. Our enemy, comfort among us. This pattern began with
Warfare Handbook. The enemy combatant however, can easily orient on us. They know identifying our habits.
falls into a reactive mode versus a proactive the terrain much better than we do, and they Since these terrorist cell leaders doubled
mode, losing the initiative. Essentially, rapid know where they can hide or where to run, as Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), they
execution of the OODA loop is a way to exploiting unit boundaries with restrictive routinely invited us over for lunch to
establish and retain the initiative. fire lines. The enemy decision portion is discuss legitimizing their program in the
Currently, we are fighting an insurgency, easy: yes or no. The action part is easy as hopes of getting paid. In turn, we would
a combatant group that is hard to identify well since, so far, we have been forced to have them over for lunch as well. As they

RAININ NO ES
came to the joint combat outpost (JCOP), they were thoroughly safely while winning the OODA cycle race. Establish the pattern;
searched and disarmed before being invited in. This pattern of observe the reaction; orient the mission toward exploiting that
disarming “our guests” prior to entry into the JCOP became routine, pattern and that reaction; decide how to act and when; and, finally,
as did their reaction. take action in a manner appropriate to the situation: in essence,
We oriented our culminating operation toward exploiting their exploit the pattern. This is one possible way to regain the initiative.
reaction. Once we had enough sworn statements, discovered caches The critical points of the OODA loop are the first two and the
and evidentiary pictures to incarcerate, we invited the terrorist cell ones we, as Soldiers, struggle with: observing and orienting. Soldiers
leaders over for lunch to sign their contracts to legitimize their are very good being decisive and taking action, which is specifically
organization. why we are so good at fighting. To observe, we must first identify.
To best exploit the leaders’ reaction, we arrayed our forces to Identifying the threat has proved to be one of the hardest things to
achieve a quick and safe detention of both the leaders in the JCOP train. Seizing and retaining the initiative are paramount in winning
and the subordinate soldiers in the CLC houses who were still battles. Success at Battle Drill Six is a matter of repetition and
armed. Furthermore, we needed to decide on how to fill the void left resources. Knowing the point of origin of enemy sniper fire is a
by our detained guests. The action portion of the cycle is simply function of experience. Orienting does not always mean pointing a
the warfare and tactical academics involved with such a mission. weapon. Although it can include physically orienting your vision
In the case of Operation Goodfellas, we employed simultaneous toward the enemy, it also means orienting combat power toward
raids once the leaders were detained. The remaining houses were overwhelming the threat; how to exploit the pattern or the reaction.
broken into sub objectives and assigned to each of the platoons Superior observation and orientation skills are paramount in winning
based on platoon boundaries. Once the company commander gave the OODA race.
the “go-code” over the radio, signaling that the leaders had been
detained, the platoons began sequentially raiding houses. We
disarmed each house and left behind a small security detachment At the time this article was written, CPT Michael Mostaghni was
attending the Manuever Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. His
to secure the detained occupants until the mission was complete. previous assignments include serving as a Stryker platoon leader,
Once all the CLC houses were secured, we re-seeded the void with company executive officer, and company commander with the 1st Battalion,
trustworthy CLCs, spent several hours sorting through sworn 38th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis,
statements, and processed the detainees. Wash., which deployed to Baghdad and Baqubah, Iraq, from April 2007
to June 2008.
The art is balancing the patience required to establish a pattern

A Gallant Little Army, The Mexico City Mexico City is a useful reference. The 17 Eight Lives Down. Others may be
Campaign. By Timothy D. Johnson. pages given to a roster of officers at just disappointed.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, one point in time would seem to have limited Considering this is a memoir, one expects
2007, $39.95, 365 pages. Reviewed by BG appeal. The list of those who served in the the writer to be the center of events, but
(Retired) Curtis H. O’Sullivan. Mexican War and made general in the Civil Hunter takes this to dizzying heights. One
The author states that the purpose of this War (on both sides) could have been more can almost see the perpetual spotlight
book is to fill an alleged long-existing void interesting by taking the short time and shining upon his every movement. He is
by covering the perspective of the lower space to show the grades achieved. center stage at all times. Others, when
ranks. He does a good job reflecting the Over the years, I’ve read a fair number of mentioned at all, are supporting cast
views of all levels — as found in outgoing accounts on this conflict but still learned members, frequently nameless or at best with
letters (before the days of censorship) and some new details and perspectives from this. only a first name, whose actions and
personal diaries (before these were It is a readable, understandable coverage contributions amount to nothing except
prohibited, as in recent conflicts). Extracts for someone starting out — keeping in mind when he steps to the fore to coalesce their
from these are intertwined with the factual the parameters. efforts to a successful conclusion. Despite
narrative to give color to the tale. There was his relatively short deployment — four
dissension at various levels throughout the months — in a comparatively quiet area, he
war and the opinions on these are presents a picture of skewed intensity in
enlightening. The author has written an Eight Lives Down: The Story of the which he alone makes the streets of Basra
earlier book about Winfield Scott and is an World’s Most Dangerous Job in the safe for humanity.
admirer, but not everyone loved “Old Fuss World’s Most Dangerous Place. By Chris Despite handling a relatively low number
& Feathers” and this is well covered. Hunter. New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 351 of missions, or taskings as he calls them in
Johnson stresses that he doesn’t try to pages, $26. Review by CSM (Retired) James British parlance, he complains about an
cover the Mexican side. It’s too common to Clifford. overwhelming operational tempo. Even his
make this choice because of intended The threat of explosive ambush in the family serves his self-aggrandizing purpose.
emphasis, space requirements, or the form of landmines, booby-traps, and He serves up a continuous menu of
inconvenience of obtaining foreign sources. improvised explosive devices (IED) has been complaints from his self-absorbed wife more
However, to the extent possible, the history inherent in every war in American history. concerned with her own burdens than with
could have been rounded out by the However, IEDs dominate the war in Iraq to his safety, as he tells it. This is particularly
Mexican order of battle, battlefield an unprecedented extent. Chris Hunter, a nauseating considering that in my experience
dispositions, brief bios of key figures, the retired British Explosive Ordnance Disposal most Soldiers’ wives are the real strength in
attitude of different segments of the (EOD) soldier who operated in southern Iraq an Army family. Even if true, his wife
population to another foreign invasion, and in 2004, writes Eight Lives Down. EOD deserved better treatment.
the feeling about the loss of a third of the Soldiers in both the British and U. S. armies The most disappointing aspect of Eight
country with nominal compensation. have the unique mission of rendering safe Lives Down is that it paints a stereotypical
He also chose not to cover, in detail, the IEDs. This is the first memoir written from portrait of the EOD Soldier as an adrenaline
period after the capture of Mexico City. This an EOD Soldier’s point of view. junky, a cross between self-appointed hero
is understandable though since the peace This is a suspense-filled, fast-paced and God, rather than the highly dedicated,
negotiations and the ultimate Treaty of memoir that competes with the best-written well-trained professionals that I knew during
Guadalupe Hidalgo are what the six-month war or crime novels. It is a cat and mouse my 28-year career as a U.S. Army EOD
campaign was designed to achieve. The story that blurs the lines to such an extent Soldier.
point is well made that Scott, throughout, that one is not sure whether Hunter is the
used the sword-and-olive-branch approach. cat or the mouse. He risks life and limb to
He did not attempt to overthrow the Mexican defeat IEDs while the bomb-making
government but rather wanted a responsible networks personally stalk him, targeting him War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon
one with which to negotiate and to help for death. The author does an excellent job at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. By
maintain order. of bringing readers into the deadly, pressure Douglas J. Feith. New York: HarperCollins,
The maps are of varying quality, and packed world of the EOD Soldier in Iraq. 2008, $27.95, 653 pages. Reviewed by CDR
some are hard to read. The pictures help tell Those unfamiliar with this world, especially Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN.
the story. In the absence of a better map, those susceptible to an old-fashioned war America’s War Colleges have started to
the table of distances from Vera Cruz to story from a slightly different angle, will love incorporate lessons on Operation Iraqi

OO RE IE S
Freedom. At the national security policy America’s weakest pillars of security in the they formed part of a strategic reserve and
level, those lessons include the decision to war on terrorism, the perception and were available for emergencies such as the
go to war with Iraq in 2003. There will no ideological war. Before reaching a judgment Bulge. The 1st Special Service Force was
doubt be many debates, discussions and about OSI, think about Ayman al-Zawahiri’s different in several ways. It was formed for
writings from America’s future military letter to the late al-Qaida in Iraq leader one specific operation — an invasion of
leaders, particularly those who must study Zarqawi admonishing that half this battle is Norway — and was trained and equipped to
national security decision-making. To get a media as well as the exponential increase in fight in snowy weather and terrain. When that
full breadth of understanding how the audio tapes from al-Qaida senior leaders in operation was cancelled, there was a scramble
United States came to commit troops to Iraq, 2007 and 2008. to find some good use for it. Kiska seemed the
it is important to read divergent sources. This Feith ends the book with his personal next best option, but the unopposed landing
includes the memoirs of GEN Tommy Franks, recommendations; he not only criticizes there didn’t really test it. Other than Pacific
Ambassador Paul Bremmer, George Tenet, and past acts but also pursues the war by looking jungles, Italy was the only other show in town
Iraq’s postwar Finance Minister Ali Allawi to forward. He also argues that the cost of and had a fair amount of snow, and troops
name but a few. Another necessary volume is failure in Iraq would be great for not only were getting short with the departure of seven
the subject of this review, the memoirs of the United States but the region, and that a divisions for Operation Overlord. The unit’s
former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy future American President may have no name was misleading. I was on an adjacent
Douglas Feith. option but to send American forces again peak when their arrival was released and
Feith offers a very well-written and should al-Qaida affiliates acquire a thought the bottom of the barrel was
comprehensive account of his time in the comfortable base of operation within Iraq. reached if the USO was being thrown into
Pentagon’s number three position from 2001 Before making judgments and reaching combat. They were given tough
to 2005. He opens his book with 9-11. He conclusions, it is recommended Feith’s book assignments and had a rough time (as did
was abroad on official business, and as be among those future American military all of us in the Appenines then) and had
events unfolded he desperately attempted planners read as they understand how high casualties in 40 days on line. They were
to return to the United States. Aboard the America’s national policy is made and what next on Anzio from 2 February to the break-
long flight, he, Assistant Secretary of lessons can be learned from Feith’s out on 23 May 1944 protecting the right
Defense for International Security Affairs experiences. flank of the beachhead along the Mussolini
Peter Rodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Canal. This was a period of outposts and
Defense William Luti and General John patrols. The breakout was no pushover. The
Abizaid penned an outline of proposals that Germans resisted with their usual tenacity,
would be refined into initial ideas placed A Perfect Hell, The True Story of the which the force had to overcome in the
before the Defense Secretary Donald Black Devils, The Forefathers of the standard Infantry mission given to them.
Rumsfeld and the President. The book Special Forces. By John Nadler. New York: Their final campaign was Anvil/Dragoon in
contains intimate details as to how the Presidio Press, 2006, $15.95, 398 pages. southern France. They were able to use
interagency and National Security Council Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. some of their special talents during the
would debate evolving war plans which O’Sullivan. landing on 15 August 1944 but were
would be refined into Operation Enduring Throughout our history, we’ve had units employed thereafter to screen the right flank
Freedom in Afghanistan. raised for specific purposes with different of 7th Army until disbanded on 5 December
The section on Iraq contains the weapons or a varied method of 1944. The unique characteristics of the 1st
infamous declassified memo entitled the transportation. Washington led a select SSF made this particularly poignant. The
“Parade of Horribles,” a memo dated October expeditionary force to Fort Duquesne while unit was bi-national with both U.S. and
2002 that summarizes all that could go wrong short-term, stay-at-home minutemen turned Canadian soldiers so these bonded brothers
in an American military intervention in Iraq. out at Lexington and Concord. During the went different ways.
He offers a rational explanation of the Office Revolution, Daniel Morgan raised a The book finished with a chapter on its
of Special Plans (OSP): as the momentum of regiment of riflemen, 500 sharpshooters also homecoming and then an epilogue, and the
war with Iraq increased, the need for stand- known as the Corps of Rangers. latter tells of selected former members of the
alone office within the Defense Department In WWII, the variety proliferated. The force. Much of the work is devoted to
was needed, as there was no final decision Marines had Raiders who were intended for individual stories and anecdotes which add
on war with Iraq, the office was given the brief forays and when such missions were color and some historic perspective. A good
name “Special Plans.” It was an office that exhausted, had to be melded into standard part is given to the initial training at Fort William
coordinated the complexity of problems forces. The Army had Ranger battalions Henry Harrison near Helena, Mt. There is some
involved in the potential Iraq invasion and copied from the British Commandos with useful biographical data on a few key players.
securing the peace. similar missions, but they were sometimes The maps are adequate and some of the
Another office that Feith admits freely misused — as on Anzio. The Marines had a pictures are entertaining. Nadler made good
he established was the Office of Strategic parachute battalion while the Army had five use of his sources. I’m not sure if he has added
Influence (OSI), which was quickly airborne divisions and some separate outfits anything significant to them. However,
criticized. According to the book, it was the — all designed to reach the battlefield by anyone with a particular interest in the Black
earliest attempt at addressing one of ‘chute and glider. In between such missions Devils may find new minutiae here.

SGT Travis Zielinksi
Two Soldiers with the 1st Cavalry Division provide security at a traffic control point in Taji, Iraq, on 12 December 2009.
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PB 7-10-1

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 1

2 INFANTRY January-April 2010

T his article includes updates on current topics at the

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 3

selected, 24 got their first choice, 27 got their

Movement to Fort Knox

4 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 5

people, events) — apply to counterinsurgency operations.

6 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 7

A New Battalion Commander’s Command

8 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 9

UAV Single Vehicle Employment Platform

10 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 11

12 INFANTRY January-April 2010

Within the change of mission, we were able to quickly set

n i ar i l a ri n CPT Gordon R. Kinneer a

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 13

14 INFANTRY January-April 2010

SPC John Co le of Com any, nd

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 15

Composition shortages, particularly leaders. In a four-vehicle

16 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 17

route, or simply observe the objective. Though the RQ-11 does

18 INFANTRY January-April 2010

Search and Attack Missions

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 19

20 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 21

22 INFANTRY January-April 2010

giving Iraq land in Qasr Shireen that the

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 23

claiming Emirate of Bahrain and the Shatt al-Arab waterway as its

24 INFANTRY January-April 2010

SUBMIT ARTICLES TO INFANTRY MAGAZINE

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 25

A Company, 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade

26 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 27

28 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 29

30 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 31

32 INFANTRY January-April 2010

Oday XX 10 %50 No interest All Good Food O X O

Firas YY 50 %50 Very interested Families Average Food(meat) X X XX

Figure 2 — Micro-grant Assessment Worksheet

Tech Sgt. Cohen A. Young, USAF

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 33

34 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 35

36 INFANTRY January-April 2010

January-April 2010 INFANTRY 37

for those that “punch their ticket;” it is