Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

National Capital Judicial Region
Branch 198, Las Pinas City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Complainant,

-versus- Criminal Cases Nos. 20-1313 to 20-1353, inclusive

For: Violation of Section 4(a), R. A. No. 9160

MA. MILAGROS M. RAMIREZ

(Ma. Milagros R. Lisaca), and
ISAGANI Q. LISACA,
Accused.
x-------------------------------------------x

ACCUSED’S COMMENT/OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTION’S

FORMAL OFFER OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Accused Lisaca Spouses, through counsel, respectfully submit their

Comment/Objection to the Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which
was personally served upon the undersigned on 22 August 2022, and argue and state:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Considering the volume of documentary evidence presented by the Prosecution

(Exhibits “A” to ‘LLLL” and their sub-markings) with the Formal Offer itself consisting
of 61 pages, for the ready and easy reference of the Honorable Court in ruling on the
admissibility of said documentary evidence, we have divided this Comment/Objection in
two (2 ) parts: Part I are the documentary evidence to which we have no objection, but
with qualifications, and Part II, documentary evidence with OBJECTIONS, and their
legal, procedural and jurisprudential bases.

Documents of the same nature and kind have also been combined into one group
(e.g.: checks in one group; withdrawal slips into another; computer print outs in another
group, etc.).

All reference to Rules and Sections are to the 2019 Revised Rules on Evidence,
except as indicated otherwise.

PART I. DOCUMENTS WITH NO OBJECTION

BUT WITH QUALIFICATIONS

1. No objection to Exhibits “A” and its sub-markings only in so far as the

adoption of AMLC Resolution No.88, Series of 2006, is concerned but not to the
conclusion of facts reached by the AMLC.

1(a). OBJECTION to the purposes for which said document is being offered in
evidence for being totally baseless, completely misleading and even outright deceptive.

1(b. The AMLC Resolution was unanimously adopted by the members of the
AMLC on 25 October 2006. But the estafa case mentioned in said Resolution was
DISMISSED by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 33, City of

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Manila (Manila RTC), in an Order dated April 3, 2006, as evidenced by the
Prosecution’s own Exhibit “HHHH”. [Both accused had their own certified copy of said
order of dismissal marked in evidence as their Exhibit “5”. The motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal was DENIED by the same Manila RTC on June
22, 2006. Accused had their certified copy of the June 22, 2006 order marked in
evidence as their Exhibit “6”. They will formally offer in evidence their Exhibits “5”
and “6” during the presentation of their evidence].

1©. For the AMLC to cite as basis for filing a complaint for violation of Sec. 4(a)
of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (R. A. No. 9160, approved on Sept. 29, 2001, as
amended by R. A. No. 9194, approved on March 07, 2003, hereafter “AMLA”) a case
that had been DISMISSED is, therefore, completely baseless, utterly misleading and
outright deceptive.

1(d). Violation of the AMLA is a predicate crime and one of those predicate
crimes is estafa or swindling under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. With the
dismissal of the subject estafa case against the accused, their indictment for violation of
Sec. 4(a) of the AMLA had no more “predicate crime” as factual and legal bases.

Money laundering is the cleansing of the proceeds of illegal activities. To convict a

person for the crime of money laundering, it must be proven that he engaged in financial
transactions that involved funds derived from said activity. Thus, money laundering is a
derivative crime, dependent on the commission of a prior act. (Jose Mari Benjamin F.
U. Tirol, “The Anti-Money Laundering Act of the Philippines with Annotations, Notes and
Comments”, Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004, p. 49, emphasis supplied).

2. No Objection to Exhibits “B” and “B-1”

3. No Objection to Exhibit “C”.

4. No Objection to Exhibits “D” and “D-1” because it proves that the Insurance
Commission itself recognized that Atty. HONESTO BONNEVIE was the President
of Wellington Insurance Company Inc. (Wellington Insurance) in 2004, and not
Isagani Q. Lisaca, as claimed by Wellington Insurance’s former Conservator, Atty.
Rommel A. Frias.

5. No Objection to Exhibit “E”, with the qualification that accused Isagani A.

Lisaca was neither an officer or a director of Wellington Insurance as evidenced by the
Prosecution’s own Exhibit “N”, a Secretary’s Certificate listing the stockholders,
directors and executive officers of Wellington Insurance.

In fact, Wellington Insurance’s former Conservator, Atty. Rommel Frias, was not
sure about Isagani Lisaca’s position in Wellington Insurance. Asked who was
Wellington Insurance’s general manager, witness Frias answer was “I could not recall, I
guess it’s Mr. Lesaca (sic.)” (tsn, Frias, April 22, 2022, p. 13). But continuing with his
cross-testimony, he stated that Isagani Lisaca “was the Chief Executive Officer of
Wellington, if I’m not mistaken, if I can recall correctly.” Asked whether he consulted
any document to find out the official position of Lisaca, he said “That is what I know,
he was the Chief Executive Officer of Wellington Insurance Company at that time.”
Pressed what document he consulted, his answer was he could not recall anymore (ibid.,
p. 17).

6, No Objection to Exhibits “F”, “F-1”, “F-2” and “G”, although Exhibit “G”
involves only the AMLC and the Bureau of Treasury (BTr.). No Objection likewise to
Exhibits “IIII”, “JJJJ”, “KKKK” and “KKKK-1” and “LLLL”.

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 6(a). Accused are not objecting to said documents because they prove that the
Fixed Rate Treasury Note (FRTN), with face value of Php11,494,948.98, that
Wellington Insurance purchased from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.
(RCBC) and deposited with the BTr as required under Sections 191 and 192 of the
Insurance Code (P.D. No. 612, as amended) was legitimate money of Wellington
Insurance being part of its paid-up capital and not “proceeds from an unlawful
activity” as claimed by the AMLC.

8. No Objection to Exhibits “JJ” and “JJ-1” as to adoption of said Resolution

but not the conclusion reached by the AMLC in adopting said Resolution.

9. No Objection to Exhibits “N” and “N-1” because said document conclusively

proves that Isagani Q. Lisaca was a mere stockholder of Wellington Insurance and NOT
A MEMBER OF ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS or an EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

9(a). Anent the description of Atty. Ma. Milagros R. Lisaca as “Chief Executive
and Financial Officer” of Wellington Insurance, the Prosecution never produced even one
testimony or a single piece of documentary evidence on her duties and responsibilities as
such “Chief Executive and Financial Officer”. She is not, therefore, the “responsible
officer” of a juridical entity referred to in Section 14 (Penal Provisions) of the AMLA
who has participated in the commission of the crime (in these cases, of estafa which, in
truth and in fact had been dismissed, evidenced by the Prosecution’s own Exhibit
“HHHH”).

9(b). Furthermore, the Prosecution had not presented documentary evidence,

specifically, the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of Wellington Insurance, to prove
that she is one of the officers of Wellington Insurance enumerated in said Articles and
By-Laws.

9©. Who are considered as officers of a corporation was explained and elucidated
by the Supreme Court in Matling Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Corros, G. R.
No. 157802, October 13, 2010. Through then Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin,
the Supreme Court ruled that:

Was respondent’s position of

Vice President for Administration
and Finance a corporate office?

We must first resolve whether or not the respondent’s position as Vice President for
Finance and Administration was a corporate office. If it was, his dismissal by the Board of
Directors rendered the matter an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by the RTC pursuant
to RA No. 8799.

The petitioners contend that the position of Vice President for Finance and
Administration was a corporate office, having been created by Matling’s President pursuant
to By-Law No. V, as amende

Section 25 of the Corporation Code provides:

Section 25. Corporate officers, quorum.--Immediately after their election, the directors
of a corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who shall be a
director, a treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident
and citizen of the Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-
laws. Any two (2) or more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except
that no one shall act as president and secretary or as president and treasurer at the same
time.

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 Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in the By-Laws
in order to be considered as a corporate office. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to
or under a By-Law enabling provision is not enough to make a position a corporate office.
Guerrea v. Lezama (103 Phil. 53 [1958]) the first ruling on the matter, held that the only
officers of a corporation were those given that character either by the Corporation Code or
by the By-Laws; the rest of the corporate officers could be considered only as employees
or subordinate officials. Thus, it was held in Easycall Communications Phils., Inc. v. King
(G.R. No.145901, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 102, 110-111)

An "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the
directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee occupies no office and generally
is employed not by the action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of
the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. (103
Phil. 553 (1958)

10. No Objection to Exhibit “O” in so far as it proves the civil status of both
accused.

PART II. DOCUMENTS WITH OBJECTIONS

AND THE LEGAL PROCEDURAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL BASES
FOR THE OBJECTIONS.

1. OBJECTION to Exhibit “H” for being hearsay as clearly shown by paragraph

3 of said document. Furthermore, the “E.C. Hizon” who allegedly issued said document
was never called to testify to authenticate his signature; neither was the Prosecution able
to present any witness who could have identified and authenticated the signature of said
person.

2. OBJECTION to Exhibits “K” and “K-1” because they are not attested to by
the Clerk of Court of Manila RTC Branch 24 or his/her deputy, who has the legal custody
of said document, with a statement that it is a correct copy of the original of the subject
document; and impressed with the official seal of said court (Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25).

2(a). OBJECTION also to purpose no. 3 for which said Exhibits are being offered
for being completely false, totally baseless and outright deceptive. Purpose no. 3 is being
offered “to prove that the Application for Bank Inquiry was filed after the criminal case
or the unlawful activity of estafa was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.”

That purpose is – to repeat – completely false, totally baseless and outright

deceptive and Prosecution’s own documentary evidence supports this. The Ex Parte
Application for Bank Inquiry was authorized under AMLC Resolution No. 113, series of
2005, dated 30 November 2005. (Exhibits “J” and “J-1”. Manila RTC Branch 24
granted the application in its Order dated January 23, 2006 (Exhibit “K” and “K-1”).

But Prosecution’s own Exhibit “HHHH” conclusively shows that the estafa case
was DISMISSED in an Order dated April 3, 2006.

In the light of the above incontrovertible and irrefutable facts borne out by
the Prosecutions own documentary evidence, will the Prosecution or the AMLC
please explain or clarify how was it possible for the Application for Ex Parte
Application for Bank Inquiry, which was granted on January 23, 2006, to have been
filed after the dismissal of the estafa case on April 3, 2006?

3. OBJECTION to Exhibits “L”, “XXX” and “BBBB” which are all notarized
Secretary’s Certificates on the following grounds:

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 3(a). they are not certified under the hand and seal of the Notary Public before
whom they were subscribed and sworn to, pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.

3(b). neither were they certified under the hand and seal of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of the jurisdiction where the Notaries Public secured their
notarial commissions. The Honorable Court can take judicial notice that copies of all
notarized documents are filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court where the notary
public secured his commission. Since said documents are all dated in 2004, therefore,
their originals are presumed still existing and intact in the records/files of the RTC where
the notaries public secured their commission. This is because under OCA Circular
No. 14-2016, implementing Supreme Court A.M. No. 07-3-09-SC, dated June 30,
2015, copies of all notarial documents on file with the Clerk of Court shall be kept
for 20 years and disposed only thereafter.

3©. neither are those documents certified by an authorized official of the National
Archives, the National Archives being the repository of all notarized documents in the
Philippines (Roabuenafe v. Atty. Aaron Lirazan, A.C. No. 9361, March 20, 2019).

3(d). notarized documents are merely prima facie proof of the fact which gave
rise to their execution (Rule 132, Section 23) and of the date of their execution, but not of
their contents (Rule 132, Sec. 30; also Philippine Trust Co. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.
R. no.150318, Nov. 22, 2010).

3(e). the signatures appearing on those documents were never identified and
proved as provided for in Rule 132, Sec. 22 (How genuineness of handwriting proved.)

4. OBJECTION to the computer print-outs marked in evidence as Exhibits “T”,

“W”, “BB”, “DD”, “JJ”, “JJ-1”, “JJ-2”, “KK” to “KK-3” and “UU” their
authenticity and due execution not having been established in accordance with the Rules
on Electronic Evidence. Said Exhibits are undoubtedly and irrefutably “computer print
outs” and, therefore “electronic documents”. As explained and elaborated by the Supreme
Court in RCBC Bankard Corp. v. Spouses Oracion, G. R. No. 223274, June 19,
2019:

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules."

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of
electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an
electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the
manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized
by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to
the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

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 As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit evidence. - All matters relating to the admissibility and

evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The
affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters
contained therein.

Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence
because it failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required
affidavit of evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception
(when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the
term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes or
attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and
they cannot be given any probative value.

There is absolutely no evidence on record – testimonial or documentary – that the

Prosecution had complied with the above-quoted provisions on the Rules on Electronic
Evidence to render the aforementioned Exhibits admissible in evidence.

5. OBJECTION to the following groups of documents (a) for being mere

photocopies (xerox copies) and not their originals as required under the Best Evidence
Rule; (b) being mere photocopies (xerox copies), they are, therefore, secondary evidence
and the proper foundation for their introduction and admissibility as documentary
evidence was not laid out; (c) they are not public but admittedly private documents but
their authenticity and due execution was never established; (d) the signatures on those
documents were never identified and authenticated under the Rules on authentication of
signatures. More on these below. The documents subject to this OBJECTION are:

Group 1 – Photocopies of checks stamped “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF

SCANNED FILES”, marked in evidence as Exhibits “R”, “R-1”, “S”, “S-1”, “U”, “U-
1”, “V”, “V-1”, “X”, “X-1”, “Y”, “Y-1”, “Z”, “Z-1”, “AA”, “AA-1”, “C”, “C-1”,
“EE”, “EE-1”, “FF”, “FF-1”, “GG”, “GG1”, “HH”, “HH-1”, “TT”, “TT-1”,
“GGG”,”GGG-1”, “HHH”, “HHH-1”, “III”, “III-1”, “JJJ”, “JJJ-1”, “KKK”, “KKK-
1”, “LLL”, “LLL-1”, “MMM”, “MMM-1”, “NNN” and “NNN-1”.

Also photocopies of checks with the typewritten words “Certified true copy of
scanned image”, marked in evidence as Exhibits “GGG”, “HHH”, “HHH-1”, “III”,
“III”, “III-1”, “JJJ”, “JJJ-1”, “KKK”, “KKK-1”, “LLL”, “LLL-1”, “MMM”, “MMM-
1”, “NNN” and “NNN-1”.

Group 2 –Photocopies of Malayan Bank withdrawal slips rubber stamped

“CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF ORIGINAL” marked in evidence as Exhibits “LL”,
“MM”, “NN”, “OO”, “PP”, “QQ”, “RR”, “SS”, “TT”, “UU”, “VV”, “WW”, “XX”,
“YY”, “ZZ”, “AAA”, “BBB”, “CCC”, “DDD”, “EEE”, “FFF”, “OOO”, PPP”,
“QQQ”, and “RRR”.

Also photocopies of Malayan Bank withdrawal slips rubber stamped “VERIFIED

AGAINST ORIGINAL COPY”, marked in evidence as Exhibits “SSS” and “TTT”,

Group 3 – Various Malayan Bank documents rubber stamped either as

“CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF ORIGINAL” or “VERIFIED AGAINST ORIGINAL
COPY, and marked in evidence as Exhibits “M”, “P”, “Q”, “VVV”, “CCCC”,
“DDDD” and “EEEE”

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GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION:

5(a). For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by
the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary
evidence pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3 (Dantis v. Maghinang, 695 SCRA 599). Even a
cursory examination of the Prosecution’s Exhibits “A” to “LLLL” will readily show and
conclusively prove that they are mere photocopies or xerox copies of those documents.
And considering the purposes for which they are being offered, it is obvious that what the
Prosecution wants to prove is the truth of the facts appearing on those photocopies. For
those photocopies to be admissible in evidence, therefore, the Prosecution should have
produced or submitted their originals because under Rule 3, Section 130:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the
original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole;

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office; and

(e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)

The Prosecution failed to give any plausible reason why it could not produce the
originals of its documentary evidence; nor adduce evidence of the presence or existence
of any of the above exceptions to justify the submission of mere photocopies of said
documents. In Republic v. Ma. Imelda “Imee” R. Marcos-Manotoc, et. al. (G. R. No.
1711701, Februay 8, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled:

First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the
documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that
could prove petitioner’s allegations.

Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence
must be the original document itself.

5(b). the photocopies or xerox copies of the documentary evidence offered in

evidence by the Prosecution are deemed secondary or substitutionary evidence. Hence,
to be admissible in evidence, the Prosecution must and should have laid the basis for
their admission as such photocopies or xerox copies, pursuant to Rule 130, Sec. 5:

Section 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated. (5a)

In MCP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp. (G.R. No. 201001,

November 10, 2014), the Supreme Court, citing the earlier case of Country Bankers

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Insurance Corp. v. Lagman (G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011, 653 SCRA 765), set down
the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original document:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.

Unfortunately, the Prosecution woefully failed to comply with, or follow the

above guidelines.

5©. that the photocopies carry the markings “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF
SCANNED FILES”, “Certified true copy of scanned image, “CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF ORIGINAL” or “VERIFIED AGAINST ORIGINAL COPY” did not render them
admissible in evidence because:

A “xerox copy” even if stamped as “certified true copy” is not an authenticated original
of such certified true copy (NYK International Knitwear Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146267,
Feb. 14, 2003 , 397 SCRA 607, cited by retired Chief Justice Diosdado Peralta and Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta in “Insights on Evidence”, 2020, p. 237)

A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that

the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the
unavailability of the original (Lee v. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, 12 February 2008, 544
SCRA 393, 404)

Finally, the names of those who signed the certifications were never
disclosed, nor their identities revealed and, their signatures or initials authenticated
under the procedure laid down in Rule 132, Sections 20 to 22.

5(d). Assuming but without conceding that the photocopies of the Prosecution’s
documentary evidence may be considered as “originals” under Rule 130, Sec. 4. they
are, however, PRIVATE DOCUMENTS whose authenticity and due execution must
still be established. The proper classification of documents as public documents or
private documents, and their distinctions are important because while public documents
are self-authenticating, private documents require authentication and proof of due
execution (Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, G. R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016).

Rule 132, Section 19 enumerates what are public documents:

Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;

(c) Documents that are considered public documents under treaties and conventions which
are in force between the Philippines and the country of source; and

(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein.

All other writings are private. (19a)

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 Since all the documentary evidence presented by the Prosecution do not fall under
any of the foregoing classifications, they are undoubtedly and irrefutably PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS hence, their authenticity and due execution must be – and should have
been - established in accordance with Rule 132, Section 20:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. - Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved by any
of the following means:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity.

Regarding proof of the authenticity of the signatures appearing on those

documents, Rule 132, Section 22 provides:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person

may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he or she has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his or
hers upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (22)

The entire records of these cases that include the testimonies of the Prosecution’s
witnesses, are totally bereft of even the slightest indication that the Prosecution had laid
down the legal bases for the introduction of secondary evidence, in lieu of the original
ones and had established their authenticity and due execution.

As regards the signatures on those Exhibits, not one of the witnesses presented
by the Prosecution, specifically witnesses Romeo Trijo and Elenita Bobis, testified that:
(a) either of them saw the persons whose signatures on those documents signed them; (b)
or has seen any writing purporting to be the genuine signatures of those persons and has
thus acquired knowledge of their handwriting; and (c) neither was a comparison made by
said witnesses or by this Honorable Court with writings admitted or treated as genuine
signature of the signatories.

In the course of his lengthy direct testimony, all that witness Trijo did, after being
shown copy of a certain Exhibit, was to read the words and figures written on a particular
Exhibit, such as the date and the amount written in words and figures, aided by the matrix
that he prepared (Exhibit “GGGG”). He never categorically testified that he saw the
persons whose signatures appear on a certain Exhibit sign it; or he had previously seen a
document admittedly signed by those signatures and has thus acquired knowledge of their
handwriting; nor had compared the signatures appearing on a particular Exhibit with a
document admitted or treated as bearing the genuine signature of the signatory.

This is, of course, expected because all the documents he testified on are dated
2004 and he gathered and saw their photocopies only in 2006 after Manila RTC Branch
24, granted AMLC’s Ex-Parte Application for Bank Inquiry on Wellington Insurance’s
bank accounts.

6. OBJECTION to Exhibits “WWW” (Filwide Multi-Purpose Cooperative

Certificate of Registration with the Cooperatives Development Authority), and “BBBB”
(Filwide Security Certificate of Business Name Registration with the Department of
Trade and Industry)

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 6(a). both are official documents from two government offices – the Cooperatives
Development Authority and the Department of Trade and Industry respectively, and
should have been, therefore, certified to, and authenticated by the proper officials of the
CDA and the DTI pursuant to Rule 132, Sec.14:

Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his or her deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.

7. VEHEMENT OBJECTION to the purposes for which Exhibit “HHHH” for

being BLATANT MISREPRESENTATION and CONVOLUTED INTERPRETATION
of the April 3, 2006 Order of Manila RTC Branch 33.

7(a). Purpose No.1 is “to prove that the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, dismissed the
case for the unlawful activity because of lack of evidence xxx.” Nothing can be further
from the truth. The subject one-page Order is not only short but worded in simple
English understandable by even a senior high school student, to wit:

(Caption & Title omitted)

ORDER

The Court, after personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence, believes there is no probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against the accused.

There is no clear evidence supporting the filing of the information that the accused
withdraw the amount of P11,490,000.00 treasury notes from the Bureau of Treasury.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the case is ordered DISMISSED>

SO ORDERED.

Manila, April 3, 2006

(Sgd.)
REYNALDO G. ROS
Presiding Judge

One does not have to be a Shakespearean scholar or an English grammar guru to

understand and know the difference between “lack of evidence” and “no clear evidence”.

7(b). Purpose No. 2 is “to prove that the dismissal of the unlawful activity was
not by reason of the non-commission of the crime.”

The estafa case filed by Wellington Insurance’s former conservator, Atty. Romeo
Trijo, having been dismissed because there “is no clear evidence supporting the filing of
the information that the accused withdraw the amount of P11,490,000.00 treasury notes
from the Bureau of Treasury”, therefore, all the accused in that case continue to enjoy
their constitutional right to be presumed innocent (Art. III, Sec. 14[2], 1987 Philippine
Constitution), prior to the filing of the case, while it was pending, and specially after the
dismissal of the estafa case. In the eloquent language of the Supreme Court in People v.
Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59):

It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must

be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is

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 not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. xxx.

We respectfully call the attention of the Honorable Court that this is not the first
time that the Prosecution has foisted a MISREPRESENTATION before this Honorable
Court. At the hearing last July 22, 2022, Atty. Grace Javier, in answer to the question
who would be the Prosecution’s next witness, made this manifestation:

“Your Honor, we will just like to manifest that we already sent the Judicial Affidavit and
it is for the execution of the witness from Malayan Bank. It is already for execution”. (tsn,
July 22, 2022, p. 29)

Then, on July 28, 2022, the Prosecution filed a motion to cancel and reset the 29
July 2022 hearing due “to the voluminous documents (i.e. bank records) that said witness
(the witness from Malayan Bank) has to identify and her busy schedule as a branch head,
who attends to both administrative matters and marketing activities of her branch, the
prosecution was not able to finalize the draft Judicial Affidavit that was earlier
provided to he r for review in time for, and three (3)days before the scheduled
hearing on 19 July 2022 (par. 3 of said motion, emphasis supplied).

But Ms. Elizabeth Junio, the witness from Malayan Bank, testified on August 5,
2022 that while she had a meeting with Atty. Grace Javier before her Judicial Affidavit
was taken on August 1, 2022, she never received a draft of an affidavit from Atty. Javier.
It was only during her meeting with Atty. Javier on August 1, 2022 thaher Judicial
Affidavit was taken and finalized (tsn, Junio, August 5, 2022,p. 7-8).

This is, therefore, a good occasion to remind SACP Marlon Almero and Atty.
Grace Javier that “A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT” (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility), nor “allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice” (Rule 10.01, ibid.)

8. Finally, STRONG OBJECTION to Exhibit “HHHH” and all its sub-

markings (Joint Affidavit of Attys. Richard David C.Funk and Rommel D. Trijo) and
MOTION TO STRIKE OUT said Exhibit and the entire testimony of Atty. Trijo for
LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of the facts alleged in the Joint Affidavit and in
the light of his answers to both direct and cross testimonies.

The attention of the Honorable Court is respectfully invited to the copy of said
Exhibit attached to the Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence. The date of execution
by the Joint Affiants is not stated, thus: “IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set our
hands and affixed our signatures this ___th day of May 2007, in the City of Manila.”

It is also not subscribed and sworn before any person authorized to administer
oath. What is printed is: “SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ___th
day of June 2007 in the City of Manila, Phiippines.

STATE PROSECUTOR”

8(a). On witness Trijo’s lack of personal knowledge of the facts he testified to,
Rule 130, Section 22 provides:

Section 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge. - A witness can testify only to
those facts which he or she knows of his or her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his or her own perception. (36a).

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 Witness Trijo never denied and in fact readily admitted that what he knew or
learned about the alleged anti-money laundering activity of the accused Lisaca spouses,
was based mainly on the documents he had gathered in the course of his investigation. It
is, therefore, evidently clear that he had NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of the matters
and transactions reflected in those documents, that is facts which he derived from his own
personal perception. For lack of personal knowledge, his testimony is not admissible in
evidence and should be stricken from the records because:

Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of he witness

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows
of his own personal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception.26 A
witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because
such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned, read or heard.27 Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness
knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony
or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. (Primo C. Miro
v. Marilyn Mendoza vda. de Erederos, G. R. No. 172532 to 45, November 20, 2013.

xxx

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.This is known as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. (D. M. Consunji, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001).

8(b). in the above-cited case of Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,the Supreme Court

made the following observations on how the PCGG gathered the documents that it used
as evidence against the Marcoses:

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified
that these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody
of the PCGG in the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted,
Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents.

The above pronouncement is relevant and applicable to these cases in view of the
admission of witness Trijo that he had no PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of the contents of
the documents that he identified and testified on. All he knew about those documents he
only learned after reading them. Witness Trijo is, therefore, not a credible witness to
testify on those documents.

In the same decision, the Supreme Court found it “xxx deeply disturbing that the
PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) – the very agencies sworn to protect
the interest of the state and its people – could conduct their prosecution in the manner that
they did. To emphasize, the PCGG is a highly-specialized office focused on the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth, while the OSG is the principal defender of the government. The
lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the best in the legal profession.”
The same observation holds true to witness Rommel Trijo – he is a lawyer
(admitted to the Philippine Bar on May 6, 1998, Attorney’s Roll No. 43091) and holds
the position Bank Attorney 1, Legal and Evaluation Staff, AMLC. He is, therefore,

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presumed to know at least the basic rules on testimonial and documentary evidence and
the smallest detail on the investigation of anti-money laundering complaints and cases.
9. OBJECTION to the testimony of witness Elizabeth B. Junio, Branch Manager,
Malayan Savings Bank, Inc. (Malayan Bank), Las Pinas Branch, and MOTION TO
STRIKE OUT her testimony for evident LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE on the
entries and transactions in the documents she testified on which are all dated 2004,
because she herself, admitted that as of August 01, 2022 when her Judicial Affidavit
(hereafter JA, Junio) was taken, she been holding her above-mentioned position for only
one year and 11 months, that is from August 2010 (JA Junio, Q&A No. 3). On cross-
examination, she admitted that from March 1993 to September 2015, she was Branch
Operation Head of Metropolitan Bank, then she transferred to the PNB Savings Bank
where she was Branch Head from September 2015 up to February 2020, and after that,
she transferred to the Philippine National Bank Branch in Cavite where she occupied the
position of Head for only six months, that is from March 2020 to August 2020, when she
joined Malayan Bank (tsn, Junio, August 5, 2022, pp. 4-5). She became aware only of
the existence of the documents she testified on after the Head Office of Malayan Bank
referred to her a letter from the AMLC requesting a representative from Malayan Bank
to testify on the documents listed and attached to said letter which are subject of this
cases (JA, Junio, Q&A No. 7). Since the letter pertains to accounts maintained in
Malayan Bank, Las Pinas Branch, she checked the records of her Branch and found some
of the documents referred to in the AMLC letter (JA Junio, Q&A Nos. 8, 9. 10, 11 and
12). On cross-examination, she admitted that since she started working with Malayan
Bank only in August 2020 and from 2004 to 2006, she was still connected with
Metrobank, she has no personal knowledge of the transactions recorded in the documents
she found in the records of Malayan Bank, Las Pinas Branch (tsn, Junio, Aug. 5, 2002, p.
10). She has likewise no personal knowledge who prepared the 45 documents she
enumerated in answer to Question No. 13 of her Judicial Affidavit (tsn, Junio, Aug 5,
2002, pp. 11-12). She does not also know whose signature or initials are those above the
rubber-stamped words “Certified True Copy of the Original” in the 45 documents she
enumerated (tsn, Junio, Aug 5, 2020, p. 12).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Accused Lisaca
Spouses most respectfully pray that the documentary evidence that the Prosecution has
formally offered in evidence and to which they have STRONGLY OBJECTED, be
DENIED ADMISSION, conformably with the provisions of the 2019 Revised Rules on
Evidence they have relied upon, and the jurisprudence and authorities that they have
cited and invoked in support of their objections.

They pray for such other just and equitable relief and remedies in the premises.

Las Pinas City, September 05, 202

JOSE A. OLIVEROS
Counsel for the Accused Ma. Milagros R. Ramirez
(Ma. Milagros R. Lisaca) and Isagani Q. Lisaca
Attorney’s Roll No. 25263
IBP No. 184894/02-8-2022/Batangas
MCLE VI-0029666 valid until 04-14-2022
52 Kamagong Road, Pilar Village, Las Pinas City
Cell Phone No. 0917-537-7943
E-mail: attyjaoliveros1947@gmail.com
joseoliveros1947@yahoo.com

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copy personally served upon:

Senior Assistant City Prosecutor MARLON Q. ALMERO

City Prosecution Office
Las Pinas City

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