Creating alternative visions of Arab society: emerging youth publics in Cairo

Shannon Arvizu
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, USA

How can we account for the development and maintenance of civic publics created for alternative realms of discourse within a censored media field? How do we explain the form, function and strategies of publics that are neither subaltern nor elite? What characteristics facilitate the use and consumption of new media (in this case, desktop publishing) to express views counter to state-run media? Youth publics provide a rich case for understanding how social class and linguistic capital are effectively utilized to create civic networks of publicity within such contexts. While it could be argued that the relatively small sphere of influence of youth publics in Cairo, especially those linked by publications intended for an English-language audience, is sufficient to explain why authorities would allow such publics to exist, this position ignores the potential of youth-initiated and youth-run media in the region to stimulate critical discussions about their society and their role as citizens. In order to understand how youth publics emerge, and how the development of new communication channels among young people can be viewed as a form of activism, the experiences of editors and writers of youth magazines in Cairo are presented and analysed. First, to understand youth publics more broadly, this case is situated within the theoretical framework provided by Emirbayer and Sheller (1998). I argue that the intermediary opening position discussed by Emirbayer and Sheller helps to explain the emergence of youth civic publics in Cairo. Second, I posit that education and class facilitate the development and maintenance of youth civic publics. Third, I present data from interviews with youth writers and editors to understand the structural opportunities available to create publics. Fourth, I conduct a frame analysis of these publications to illustrate how consensual notions of identity, the youth civic role, and views towards the state are constructed within these publics. Lastly, I speculate on the durable influence of such publics on young peoples present and future civic development.
Media, Culture & Society 2009 SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore), Vol. 31(3): 385407 [ISSN: 0163-4437 DOI: 10.1177/0163443709102712]

386

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

This work is important for placing in perspective research that focuses on other aspects of contemporary youth politics in the Middle East, such as militant Islam or the new piety conservative religious movement (Bayat, 1997, 2003; Martinez, 2000; Miliani, 2003; Willis, 2000). Rather than focus on subversive political movements or religious-cultural movements, we bring attention to civic discussions found in youth culture magazines. The editors and writers of youth magazines seek to create alternative public communication networks for critical discussions about state and society. They are a form of democratic media activism (DMA) in that they exist to establish flows of communication among young people that engender specific collective orientations about themselves, their civic roles, and views about the government. In developing a space for young people to consider alternative visions of Arab and Egyptian society based on their own unique perspectives, editors and writers of youth publics intend to contribute to the civic socialization of their readers and influence their present/future perspectives and actions.

Publics research Since Jrgen Habermas introduced the notion of the public sphere into academic dialogue (1989), scholars have offered several criticisms and suggestions to improve the analytical worth of this concept (Calhoun, 1992; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Emirbayer and Sheller, 1998; Fraser, 1992). For Habermas, the public sphere is defined as a communicative space for rational-critical discourse about public issues by private persons. His argument is based on the belief that a public sphere of sufficient quantity and quality is a precondition for the existence of a democratic polity. Habermas lists a set of criteria for assessing the quality of an ideal public sphere, which for him, is exemplified by 17th-century British and French bourgeois men who gathered in coffeehouses to critique the state and demand political inclusion. This notion is limiting, however, because it assumes that there is a specific model of government that derives from a specific public sphere formation that should be generalizable to other cases. Furthermore, Habermas ignores the possibility of multiple publics, the presence of both strong and weak publics, and the relationship between the two (Fraser, 1992: 137). In order to remedy these shortcomings, Emirbayer and Sheller (1998) provide a terminology and a rigorous framework that incorporates many of the criticisms levied against Habermas and adopts a relational approach to more accurately reflect the existence of a multiplicity of publics. They believe, like Calhoun (1992), that civil society is a master concept used to refer to social life that is distinct from the government or the economy. The public sphere refers to a narrower mode of association than civil society. Following Cohen and Arato, public sphere associations arise through open communication and popular participation through which alternative directions for social life are collectively

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

387

reflected upon and adjudicated (Emirbayer and Sheller, 1998: 737). In this reformulation, sufficient attention is given to the diversity of actors and practices among multiple publics. Nancy Fraser also notes that: actors communicate in different ways depending upon their gender, race, class, ethnicity, and cultural backgrounds (1992: 132). She brings attention to the importance of linguistic capital for creating and participating in a public. This is a particularly salient concept when examining the specific case in this article. Lastly, Emirbayer and Sheller draw upon Harrison Whites contribution on the interstitial nature of publics, recognizing that they vary widely in scope, size, and timing and are dynamic and interactional, rather than single, reified entities (1998: 738). Emirbayer and Sheller offer the following definition of publics:
Open-ended flows of communication that enable socially distant interlocutors to bridge social-network positions, formulate collective orientations, and generate psychical working alliances, in pursuit of influence over issues of common concern. Publics are not simply spaces or worlds where politics is discussed, as the popular public sphere idea suggests, but rather, interstitial networks of individuals and groups acting as citizens. (1998: 741)

Thus, the term publics, or networks of publicity, as utilized in the present article reflects this reformulation. This conceptual framework takes into consideration power differentials among publics, varying modes of communication, and the political, economic and civic fields from which publics emerge and which they hope to influence. Power asymmetries among publics are classified as: subaltern, intermediary openings and elite. Modes of communication are denoted by: face-to-face, locally mediated and time-space distanced. Political publics include political clubs or associations; economic publics refer to those groups that are concerned with the relationship between the economy and civil society; and civic publics include those voluntary associations that are engaged in reflexive communication about themselves and their role towards societal institutions. The important point to note is that while publics have organized in response to certain developments in the political, economic or civic realms, they often direct their efforts towards multiple institutional domains. Thus, although we may treat each type of public as analytically distinct from one another, in actuality there is often an overlap of strategies and goals. In order to understand the intermediary opening public, it is necessary to examine the ways in which such publics differ from subaltern or elite publics. A subaltern public, be it a political, economic or civic public, is characterized by a subversive approach. Such publics might rightly be called counterpublics. They engage in resistance tactics and communicate with one another via underground communication networks. An elite public is associated with the higher echelons of the established power structure of a given society. These publics communicate through official and mainstream publications, are composed of high-status members and engage in symbolic civil rituals. The

388

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

intermediary opening public represents the middle position on the axis of power. In this research, I examine civic publics that fall into the intermediary opening position. For clarity, I will present the operational definition that Emirbayer and Sheller use to characterize the specific modes of communication for a civic intermediary opening public:
A civic intermediary opening public has the following communication forms: (1) face-to-face: Publicity through reflexive self-presentation, alternative lifestyles, bodily self-fashioning. (2) locally mediated: Submerged networks and multi-organizational fields of new social movements. (3) time-space distanced: Publicity through alternative press, independent publishers, publicly-owned media. (Emirbayer and Sheller, 1998: 743)

I focus on civic publics that are time-space distanced, that is, publics which take the form of publicity through alternative press and independent publishers. Historically, print has been used as a vehicle for communicating alternative discourse by several constituencies interested in stimulating social, political or cultural change. In a review of alternative press in Europe and in the US since the 1500s, Downing et al. conclude that: We see some of the most significant historical illustrations of the power that radical media may exert despite their small size and sometimes their very gradual transformation of the status quo (2001: 143). By focusing on emerging independent print media used for civic discourse, we gain a unique perspective on how intermediary opening publics develop and strive to stimulate change. The potential of alternative media as a form of activism has been discussed by several researchers (Carroll and Hackett, 2006; Couldry and Curran, 2003; Downing et al., 2001; Melucci, 1996). Alternative media is media production that challenges, at least implicitly, actual concentrations of media power, whatever form those concentrations may take in different locations (Couldry and Curran, 2003: 7). Carroll and Hacket (2006) call these types of communication networks democratic media activism (DMA). They describe such activism as emergent movement praxis, characterized by democratization through the media (the use of media to promote democratic goals and processes elsewhere in society), and democratization of the media themselves (2006: 84). The political significance and potential of DMA lies in its distinctive action repertoire. Carroll and Hacket identify predominant forms of action to democratize communication, including building independent, democratic and participatory media to give voice to politically excluded actors through communication channels independent of state and corporate control (2006: 89). They view DMA as a new type of social movement. It is a reflexive form of

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

389

activism that treats communication as simultaneously means and end of struggle (2006: 96). These actors build independent forms of media as a way to stimulate thought and discussion that could lead to larger change, but their efforts are focused on creating communication forms, rather than organizing for other ends. It is especially interesting to analyse the ways that citizens pursue DMA in media-censored regions. New media composes, in many countries, the only media available for the distribution of information that is not produced by the state. Simply creating alternative communication networks is a primary goal for emerging publics in these contexts. However, access to new media is far from universal. Class and education account for both the economic and cultural capital (in terms of language skills and market/technical savvy) needed to create a viable public through the use of new media. Emerging intermediary opening publics in the Arab-Muslim region present an intriguing case for examining how economic and linguistic capital are used to create reflective and critical realms of discourse within a constricted media sphere. In a recent compilation entitled, New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, Eickelman and Anderson write: New media refigure audiences as communities, because senders and receivers have far more in common, not just in interests but also in cultural style and social position. Their natural home is the emerging middle, bourgeois classes of the Muslim world (2003: 9). Eickelmans depiction of what he calls small media in the region points to their potential for carving out a space for discussion that erodes the legitimacy of the state and creates alternative visions of society. He writes: Through fragmenting authority and discourse, the new technologies of communication, combined with the multiplication of agency facilitated by rising education levels, contribute significantly to reimaging Middle Eastern politics and religion (Eickelman and Anderson, 2003: 42). Young people, especially those of the middle, bourgeois classes, have been instrumental in the development of alternative media in the region. Youth publics are particularly well situated to enable an understanding of the motives and strategies involved in creating new forms of DMA. Youth publics are defined by flows of public communication relating to civic issues among young people between the ages of 1830. Youth publics are a part of youth culture, an inclusive term that relates to various aspects of cultural production by and for young people (Amit-Talai and Wulff, 1995: 6). Youth culture is an evolving landscape that marks out different relationships to the dominant ideologies and values of society (Wyn and White, 1997: 73). Within youth culture, youth publics assess and challenge established civic identities and roles. Such is the case, for example, in Homegirls in the Public Sphere (Miranda, 2003). This book looks at the use of film by young Mexican-American gang women to convey a more accurate portrayal of their life (versus that portrayed in mainstream culture). It is meant for both civic reflection on their role in society as well as a means for communicating the

390

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

multi-faceted gang culture to which they belong. By focusing on youth culture publications, we analyse how young people use this form of communication to assess the power structure within their larger society and create consensual notions of identity and civic roles. Youth publics are also ideally suited for this type of analysis because, developmentally, young adulthood is a crucial period for identity formation and civic socialization (Rebenstorf, 2004). Studying the ways young people interpret the social world through the medium of youth publics provides a speculative glimpse into their future perspectives and strategies of civic engagement. What remains to be seen is how we can account for the development and maintenance of an intermediary opening civic public, exemplified here by emerging youth publics in Cairo, and how these publics attempt to bridge audiences while simultaneously navigating the censored media field. Through a closer examination of the specific case below, the classification schema that Emirbayer and Sheller provide proves to be analytically advantageous for explaining the form, function and strategies of contemporary youth civic publics in Cairo. However, it is important also to take into consideration specific characteristics of publics that facilitate the use of intermediary opening communication forms in this case, social class and education.

The role of education and class in the emergence of intermediary opening publics in Egypt Emerging intermediary opening youth publics in Cairo are composed mostly of upper middle-class young people who have graduated from or currently attend private educational institutions that adopt an American or European curriculum and English as the medium of instruction (Arvizu, 2004). The growth of this demographic English-speaking Arab youths is a result of historical trends in the Arab region (Waterbury, 2003: 45). Most students enrolled in these institutions are the children of the nouveau riche. Migration and employment in the Gulf region during the oil boom era of the 1970s and the Open Door economic policies of Anwar Sadat contributed to the emergence of a nouveau riche segment of the population (Mitchell, 1999: 32). As such, one young person in this study termed his cohort, the Oil Boomers, to describe the influence of this economic upsurge on their upbringing. These parents send their children to private schools with an American- or Europeanbased curriculum and language of instruction because it is believed these institutions provide a form of education that is of a higher quality than that provided by the state (Cochran, 1992). Private education in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab region, from kindergarten to university level, has become popular among the nouveau riche segment of the population because it is believed that only with a quality, Western-style education can a young person expect to find a well-paying job.

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

391

The rise in demand for this type of education is reflected in the steady annual increase in student enrollment at the American University in Cairo (and in the construction of a larger campus to accommodate more students in 2008), as well as in the proliferation of several other Western-style university and secondary institutions in recent years. In 1990, only three private foreignlanguage universities in existed in Egypt. There are now 15 such institutions. These universities are known for cultivating a certain habitus and linguistic capital that professional employers look for (Barsoum, 2004). Barsoum argues that English-language universities contribute to the reproduction of class status in the Bourdieusian notion of the term (Bourdieu, 1984). In this analysis, we look at how linguistic and economic capital can be used to bridge class boundaries, rather than reify them. In the evidence provided below, we see a development over time of publics originally linked by publications intended for an upper middle-class and Western-educated audience to later include non-English-speaking young people who do not share the same socioeconomic background.

Studying youth publics in Cairo Data-gathering for this work took place in two phases. The first phase of data collection (20024) was for an ethnographic study of upper middle-class youths in Cairo, which included a description of lifestyles/subcultures, media representations, organizations, publications, and a survey analysis of youth views towards the family, marriage/dating, generational consciousness, politics, and gender (Arvizu, 2004). The second phase, which forms the basis for the present study, took place in the summer of 2006, when I focused exclusively on youth culture publications. The findings presented in this work are based on interviews with youth magazine editors and writers, and a frame analysis of articles within these publications.1 I have taken care to pay attention to the form, as well as the content, of youth publics, as prescribed by Emirbayer and Sheller:
An important challenge for empirical research is thus to show how practical maneuvering within and across publics, in addition to rational critical deliberation and discourse, takes advantage of structural opportunities for breaking old ties or for fashioning new social-network ties, symbolic alignments, and psychical resonances among previously unallied actors. (1998: 763)

I conducted interviews with writers and editors from five youth publications to gauge the motivations, structural opportunities and strategies necessary to create and maintain youth publics. These publications (Campus, Gmag, Ihna, Ego and Al-Waqe) represent the current development of youth publics in Cairo because each was created at different times and for varying reasons. Campus began publication in 1999 and is a forerunner in the development of English-language youth culture magazines. Although teen and comic magazines were in existence before

392

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

this time (almost all in Arabic), publications geared specifically to a college and young adult audience were not on the market. The same group of young people (known as Core Publications) also started Gmag in 2003 (a pocket-sized events calendar, intended to promote youth social events) and Ihna in 2005 (Us, an Arabic-language magazine intended to reach non-English-speaking youth audiences). Together, Core Publications prints 29,000 copies a month (Campus 10,000; Gmag 12,000; and Ihna 7000; actual readership numbers are estimated to be higher because youth magazines are usually shared among friends or put on magazine racks for public reading in cafes). Ego began publication in 2006. This publication represents the new generation of youth magazines that aspires to a larger age-group audience. At the time of research, they had printed their fourth issue (with a monthly distribution of 5000 copies). Al-Waqe (The Reality) began publishing in 2004 and represents a bi-lingual magazine (English and Arabic) created by a youth organization, the Cairo International Model Arab League, based at the American University in Cairo (AUC). This publication is distributed primarily to members, who attend both public and private universities and secondary schools throughout Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab region (in 2006, Al-Waqe was distributed on a bi-annual basis to 700 delegates from four Egyptian private universities, four Egyptian public universities, eight institutions outside of Egypt, and several secondary institutions). Although I do not include an analysis of all youth publications on the market, I posit that the growth in the total number of youth culture magazines between 1999 (n = 2), 2004 (n = 6) and 2006 (n = 10) is an indication that the conversations found in these publications are salient for an increasing number of young people. Other publications include TeenStuff (a magazine tailored towards a younger audience, with an emphasis on teen pop culture and teen psychological development), Kallimitna (the Arabic version of TeenStuff), the New Youth Paper (a monthly social awareness newspaper), TeenCleo (a sister publication of Cleo, a womens fashion magazine, geared to teen girls), Maskoff (a youth lifestyle magazine), and Cilantro Central magazine (a magazine created and distributed by a cafe chain that caters to a youth clientele). Desktop publishing and the formation of youth alternative press, along with mass distribution (for free, in most cases) in youth locales (cafes, clothing stores, bars/lounges/clubs), enable these publics to cross the time-space distanced networks that Emirbayer and Sheller refer to. This loose network consists of young people who read English (and the youth-dialect of Egyptian Arabic), who frequent cafes advertised in these magazines, who participate in conferences and organizations featured as news stories in magazines, who buy the clothing advertised in magazines and/or who attend the parties captured in pictures in magazines. These networks are locally mediated through youth locales or through youth organizations/conferences where magazines are distributed/sold. Face-to-face mediation, described by Emirbayer and Sheller as publicity through reflexive self-presentation, alternative lifestyles, and bodily self-fashioning, occurs through the adoption of clothing styles, lifestyle

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

393

behaviors and language use (as promoted through youth publications) that are signifiers of belonging to this network. Although a systematic analysis of consumption practices and reader interpretations of youth magazines is not presented in this work, informal visits to youth cafes and other youth locales throughout the city tentatively confirm that these sites operate as centers where young people read and discuss matters found in such magazines. Civic discussions are more commonly found in Campus, Ego and AlWaqe. I chose these three magazines, Campus (as an established youth magazine), Ego (as a relatively new youth magazine) and Al-Waqe (as a student organization youth magazine) for a frame analysis to examine how youth culture magazines operate as youth publics. This data is based on four different issues of each publication. (As Al-Waqe is a bi-annual publication started in 2004, and Ego is publication which started in April 2006, four copies of each publication were available for analysis at the time of data collection. I analysed four copies of Campus printed in 2006 for comparison.) In order to understand how these magazines create consensual notions about identity, the youth role in society and views towards the state, I isolated those statements found within each article that relate to each of these frames. Such discussions are found within articles that relate to a wide variety of topics of interest to youth, including gender/sexuality, literature, lifestyles, politics and local culture/history. A discussion of how each statement was coded is explained in the presentation of the frame analysis in a later section. Structural opportunities for creating youth publics Emirbayer and Sheller call upon researchers to show how practical maneuvering within and across publics takes advantage of structural opportunities for fashioning new social-network ties among previously unallied actors (1998: 763). When speaking to editors and writers about their motivations to create youth publics, the consensus that emerges is (1) they are creating a civic public for upper middle-class and Western-style educated youth where none existed before, (2) that the goal of these publics is to create an awareness of issues that relate to their role as part of Egyptian and Arab society and (3) these venues can and should be expanded to reach other audiences. The editor of Campus says:
Our magazine came out of wanting to create something for which nothing existed before.What we wanted to do was to get this specific group of people thinking and looking outside of themselves and thinking about the problems of what we call the real Egyptians. That was my main goal, to instigate change through the people who have the education, who have the money and who have the resources.

The founder of Ego believes that other magazines in Egypt do not accurately reflect the nature of the society they live in. She says: I felt they [in the magazine

394

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

industry] werent being real enough, or at least from my standards of reality, so I decided I shouldnt sit here and whine, I should start my own publication. Ego intends for its readers to rediscover their city and its culture. It also aspires to appeal to a wider age group. The motivations behind Ihna were to create an Arabic-language magazine that young people would want to read, given the fact that youths had lost faith in other Arabic publications. It is also intended to appeal to non-English readers and as a way for English-speaking youths to reconnect with the Arabic language, because they were starting to not only read in English, but to think in English. Al-Waqe began as a way for student members of the Cairo International Model Arab League (CIMAL) to become informed and comment on political, cultural and historical events in the region. The mission of Al-Waqe is to express a shared struggle with the gloomy reality of this part of the world, either by trying to improve it, trying to overcome it, or even simply trying to survive it. An important question that arises from this discussion is how young people are able to take advantage of structural opportunities to create publics. Obviously, the young people that decide to create such publics exercise a high degree of agency. Not all youths choose to devote their time and energy to these kinds of enterprises, nor do all youths have the resources necessary to undertake these projects. Emirbayer and Sheller write: Empirical social action is a synthetic product of the channeling influences of the structuring contexts of action, on the one hand, and of human agency, on the other (1998: 761). In this case, young people rely upon their social ties and economic capital to utilize structural opportunities. To establish themselves, these youths draw upon their social networks for members, writers, readers and ties to financial support. Those involved in the magazine start-ups state that they developed coalitions with their friends for securing investors in their projects. The founders of Ego, for example, spent two years in this stage before they found someone as a principal investor who didnt think the idea was way too silly (from this perspective, persistence and determination are factors in the success of the creation of a public). They hire friends as marketing directors to convince local and multinational businesses to invest advertising dollars. They connect with youth promoters to sponsor music events as a way to generate publicity for their magazines. They also use the existing structure of youth locales that they frequent themselves to distribute their materials. Campus, as the most established magazine in this study, has been particularly adept at securing advertising dollars for their endeavors. Of the issues selected for the frame analysis of this research, 42 percent of Campus page space is devoted to advertisements, as compared to 15 percent of page space in Ego and 4.3 percent of page space in Al-Waqe. The Ego advertising director reports that, despite their recent appearance on the magazine scene, she expects advertising revenue to climb significantly as they continue to permeate the market. Al-Waqe, as a student organization publication, uses American University in Cairo student funding to cover publication expenses. Financial backing allows

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

395

youth magazines to purchase computer equipment, print professional quality copies, cover distribution expenses and pay staff salaries. In each case, access to economic capital is key to creating youth publics. Language is a conscious choice for these youths and constitutes the fashioning of new symbolic alignments within youth publics. Campus and Gmag choose to publish in English, yet they are forerunners in the use of Arabized English and the use of Arabic words in English type supplemented by numbers. This is also in common use in SMS text messaging and instant messaging (IM)/email. For example, Ihna could be written I7na. The hah is written with a 7. Other Arabic letters that have no English equivalent are also written using numbers. Sometimes, English words are adapted to have a new meaning in Arabic. Campus has a humorous section in their magazine called, Campus Dictionary of Arabic Slang. One submission is the word barashot, defined as (1) Arabization of the word parachute, (2) one who constantly mooches off of friends or strangers and is infamous for it, and (3) one who overstays his/her welcome, and uses up other peoples resources merely be existing (May 2006: 6). The editor of Gmag says:
I think we have developed something because there are other publications that have followed us, using Arabic English, using letters and numbers to write Arabic words in English. This is part of the official Gmag language. For example, we print Egyptian jokes [in Arabic English] that only an Egyptian would understand. We sort of, yes, we do speak English, but we are Egyptian. I personally went to an American university, but it doesnt mean I have to choose this or that. A lot of people are unaware that there are young Egyptians that can speak two different languages and still keep their language and identity intact. (interview, 13 July 2006)

The creative blending of Arabic English in print is a specific symbolic strategy made popular through these publics that reflects the disposition of these writers. The same group of young people that started Campus and Gmag also started Ihna, a magazine printed in Arabic font and using Amaya, the Egyptian Arabic dialect. As to the origins of the magazine, the editor of Ihna says: Ihna was launched [because] we thought that there could be an original Egyptian publication that could speak their [young peoples] language and their thoughts. He believes youths are used to other Arabic publications that express ideas as if they were in denial and not facing problems as they really are. For Ihna:
Were going to write about it just how it is. Were just going to talk about problems just the way you talk about them in your everyday life. We just wanted to tell youths that, yes, you can talk about problems in this country.

When asked about the decision to print the magazine using the Egyptian dialect rather than the modern standard Arabic common in the mass media, the editor said: It made it easier to read, more real and alive, more present. It must also be noted that the Egyptian dialect printed is a particular youth style of Arabic. This type of linguistic practice, as Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman discuss:

396

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

[is] not just random improvisations on shared themes, codes, tools, or languages, but are themselves patterned and structured ways of inflecting the very meanings of linguistic formations, and potentially every bit as crucial in determining inclusion (as well as exclusion) as those linguistic formations themselves. (quoted in Emirbayer and Sheller, 1998: 755)

The introduction of this magazine to the market extends the range of readers to include those youths who are not fluent in English, yet are familiar with the youthful ways in which Egyptian Arabic is spoken. We later examine how linguistic capital is used to maintain a civic public under government censorship. In the above discussion, we looked at how agency, social ties, economic capital and linguistic capital are instrumental for young people to create publics. But how do these flows of communication engender collective orientations within youth publics? I focus on three types of collective orientation to explore this process further those relating to identity, the youth role and views towards the state. By exploring the frames around which these concepts are discussed, we understand how youth culture magazines act as publics for civic discussions.

Frames in the cultural context of action The previous analysis provides the foundation for comprehending how alternative press magazines in Egypt originate and develop. As a form of DMA, writers and editors contend that they provide a public space, outside of mainstream or state-run media, for young people to read and write about issues of concern to them not available elsewhere. But do these publics espouse a particular ideology? Melucci (1996: 349) states that an ideology of a movement defines the identity of the actors involved, an adversary and a specified means of attaining a particular goal. Because DMA is not a movement per se, but a form of activism that establishes alternative media as both means and end of struggle, we will not attempt to show how youth magazines meet these specific criteria. However, we can approximate what could be understood as an ideology within youth publics by conducting a frame analysis with regard to identity, views towards the state and the youth role in society. To code identity frames, I looked for how identity is couched in terms of Who am I?, Who are we? and Who are they? This is following Charles Tillys framework for assessing that potent set of social arrangements in which people construct shared stories about who they are, how they are connected, and what has happened to them (2003: 608). For the time period and selected number of publications chosen, such discussions occurred in 45 instances (identity frames, n = 45, see Figure 1). I classified these discussions in terms of I vs. Them and We vs. Them in order to deduce whether there existed any consensus of who I, We or Them are. I found that I, We or They are not referenced in a consistent manner in these publics. The most frequent way in which I or We are discussed is as part of a young generation,

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

397

composing 25 percent of identity frames. The They is used in reference to older generations within Egyptian society. The second most frequently mentioned identity frame for I or We is a composite of cultures (or some version thereof), making up 22 percent of identity frames. An example of a composite of cultures identity is the following excerpt:
Im talking about identity; a concept that I feel is becoming more elusive in our contemporary understanding of ourselves. We all have a composite identity pieced together from whom we think we are, what jobs we do, who are parents are, what nation we swear allegiance to, and a million and one other little factors. (Campus, July 2006: 72)

When talking in these terms, there is often an appreciation for the diversity that comes from acquiring various cultural schemas through having a foreign education or living/traveling abroad, as well as a recognition of the difficulty of having such an identity. Consider the following statements:
On a personal level, I have tried four types of education Egyptian, French, British, and American and based on that experience, the most effective system is that which encourages growth, understanding, and the joy of learning only through these experiences can a person become fully-rounded and balanced. (Al Waqe, April 2006: 5) You could say we are abcultured, like some people are abnormal, but that would just be mean. Far nicer would be to call us subcultured, and far more accurate because a subculture is that thing which weaves itself into and out of lives, into places and out of places, into circumstances and out of circumstances, and these things can be determined. (Ego, July 2006: 6) Dina is an Egyptian Sudanese young artist, who was born in Kuwait, where she spent her childhood before moving to Egypt. At the core of her work lies the difficulty of the definition of ourselves nowadays, especially with the rapidly increasing rate of technology, globalization, and the rising waves of different types of nationalism. (Campus, July 2006: 58)

Identifying as young people whose identities have been influenced by several factors is a strategy that works to create bonds with others who have had similar experiences. Other identities mentioned include Egyptian (16 percent) and Arab (16 percent). When these identities are salient, apart from being an Egyptian youth or Arab youth, they are in relation to either other Arabs or non-Arabs, respectively. One article discusses Egyptians as second-class citizens in the Arab Gulf countries. Perhaps we [young Egyptians] are better off here, serving our home God knows Egypt still continues to suffer from a massive brain drain as the most qualified of its youth and adults seek employment abroad (Campus, May 2006: 24). When young people identify as Arabs vs non-Arabs, it is usually in terms of presenting a better image of themselves to the non-Arab world. A famous Egyptian footballer who plays for a UK team is quoted in an article saying:

398

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

Alienated 4% Privileged 4% Muslim 9%

Fantasy identity 4%

Composite of cultures 22%

Arab 16%

Young 25% Egyptian 16% Note: n = 48, compiled from four issues each of Campus, Ego and Al-Waqe

In the West, some people think that Arabs just create problems, or that theyre terrorists. Im trying to let them see that if were given a fair chance in anything we will succeed. Thats all Im trying to do. (Ego, April 2006: 86)

When a Muslim identity is activated (9 percent), it is in regards to bridging differences with either a Christian, feminist or nationalist identity. One young man writes:
Say, for example, I am a pious Muslim man who, in accordance with his faith believes that his wife has the complete right to work. This belief clearly emanates from the fact that I believe in a certain interpretation of Islam and thus believe in the right of women to work. But at the same time, this ideal is propagated in feminist thought. Does that mean that I am a feminist? Not necessarily. However, it does show that the boundaries between different ideas, like feminism and Islam, intersect with each other in many ways. (Al-Waqe, April 2006: 11)

Another author comments on the state of religious discrimination in Egyptian society. He writes:
The time has come for Muslims and Christians to stand together and say Enough. We all share the same country, eat the same food, and breathe the same polluted air

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

399

on a daily basis. We share the general lack of rights that is the plight of all Egyptians. So lets stop thinking in terms of us and them. Lets work together for the sake of our country. (Al-Waqe, April 2006: 9)

Or consider the statement of one writer who is concerned whether there is a conflict between being a Muslim and being an Egyptian.
It becomes clear that my Islamic identity need not negate my patriotic one. For patriotism neatly fits in an Islamic framework when one defines patriotism as love for his country and the zeal to defend it, freeing it from hegemonic powers. (AlWaqe, April 2005: 2021)

Although a religious identity is not as frequently mentioned as other identities, it is noteworthy that in the few instances it is mentioned there is an explicit attempt to transcend the conventional ways in which a religious identity is discussed. There is also an alienated identity that accompanies coming from a certain class stratum and having a multicultural disposition (4 percent). Although less frequently mentioned, this identity is usually attributed to the disjointed feelings one has in relation to common Egyptian society. One writer uses the term connoisseur kids to describe those who have bought into the whole consumer lifestyle with its gadgetry and logo recognition. He continues:
[Connoisseur kids] have forgotten where theyve come from and should be ashamed of themselves too. There are actually many such alternative threads of existence in this country, completely removed from the mainstream and happy to remain so. We are many; we who live in this country without actually living in it. (Ego, June 2006: 37)

Another author speaks of being proud to be alienated, but also mentions the need to overcome it to feel more integrated. He writes:
Being alienated means living in the city, means living next to poor people, means living next to rich people, means living next to people. Being alienated means living in Cairo. But the point, of course, is not to be alienated. We do want to make this our city. So we cant afford to pretend we are alienated. (Ego, April 2006: 11)

In order to see beyond the alienation, young people are encouraged think of their culture as fluid and changing.
Egyptians as Egyptians need to realize that their culture is not static, but rather liquid and permutable; no to blind imitation, but a definite yes to integration. We need to know ourselves, accept ourselves, and grow more tolerant of others, and perhaps then well all feel at home here, and stop wishing for a plane ticket out. (Campus, July 2006: 72)

Speaking of the responsibilities of a privileged identity (4 percent) is another way in which greater societal integration is discussed. One woman in Al-Waqe writes:
Especially as an A.U.C. conference, CIMAL tries to convey the message that belonging to a privileged section of Egyptian and Arab society at large does not mean we

400

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

are indifferent to the problems that afflict them having access to valuable resources most of the population does not have access to only increases our moral responsibility towards our countries and our people. (Al-Waqe, April 2006: 1)

Also mentioned is the idea of a virtual life with a fantasy identity (4 percent). In this sense, alienation from the real world, described as less exciting and satisfying, so mundane and predictable, is the reason why some youths choose to become engrossed with video role-playing games (Ego, June 2006: 28). The frames related to the role of youth in society are coded in terms of agency vs apathy. If a statement implied that young people should take an active role in changing society, it was coded as agency. If a statement implied that young people should take a passive role in society, it was coded as apathy. Of the 15 instances in which the youth role was mentioned within the time period under study (Youth role frame, n = 15), all of those discussions were oriented towards activating an agency perspective versus an apathy perspective (100 percent agency frames). These discussions arise within a context of dissatisfaction with the status quo. For example, one author writes:
If the Arab youth take it upon themselves to make a difference and bring us out of the miserable situation we face today, they will provide the innovation, the planning, and the work ethic we need. It is time we decide to make a difference. (Al-Waqe, April 2006: 10)

Another young person frames this in terms of a call for greater democratization. He writes:
Lawrence Whitehead once wrote that democratization is like a theatrical drama. If his analogy is precise, then our curtains have been down, and our lights have dimmed for decades. However, it is time, as the youth of the Middle East, to brush off the dust, remove our cobwebs, and start determining our own destinies. This is not a call for a revolution against governments or violent mobilization. We need less 20-year-old guys in BMWs and girls with silicon bodies. And we need more scholars, activists, politicians, and community leaders. (Ego, May 2006: 16)

There is a general sense of urgency for young people to apply the skills their education instills in them towards societal improvement. Views towards the state were categorized in terms of approval or critique. Of the 25 discussions of views towards the state in this analysis, all expressed a critique rather than an approval of current national and regional governance (Views towards the state, n = 25; 100 percent critique frame). These discussions include a critique of national economic policy, the state of authoritarianism, Arab regional and international governance, and farcical interpretations of overall national governance. In relation to a critique of national economic policy, one contributor asks:
Does a genuine interest in improving conditions for investment actually exist, or is all this a cover up for soldering a new ruling coalition of elites? And how is the

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

401

government, knowing that the country is already running a massive deficit, going to compensate for lost revenue from taxes and tariffs without compromising on public subsidies? (Al-Waqe, November 2004: 2)

Another sees the military budget as impinging upon the governments role to provide social benefits. He says: The significant amount of money deducted from the countrys budget and spent on the military could be drastically cut and diverted into economic interests so as to fulfill more vital economic and social demands (Al-Waqe, November 2004: 16). There is a general sense that state patronage of business and military elites is not healthy for the socioeconomic condition of the country. Another set of discussions centers around the authoritarian rule of the state in prohibiting expressions of dissent and the consequences of emergency law. In response to the ways in which undercover police treated protestors calling for political reform in May 2005, one young woman writes:
Women were trampled upon and sexually abused in a supposedly conservative society right in the middle of a crammed street. This incident can be considered as representative of the population of violations that took place this year. It is thus very accurate to use George Orwells 1984 to describe 2005 and equally accurate to describe the Ruling Party as the PARTY ruled by Big Brother. (Al-Waqe, November 2005: 10)

Another author makes a comparison between the protest potential in Egypt and abroad. He writes:
Abroad, it is surprising how people demand their rights so strongly, as if they were their um rights. Our rulers have managed to make us believe that these inalienable rights are not really for us, and that if we get a little, we should be grateful. Yet all this grandiose talk abroad eventually leads nowhere. Opposition is absorbed and ignored. Dissent actually means something here, but not over there. Millions in the West took to the streets against the war, and yet they couldnt affect the change they wanted. Here, a few hundred protestors are met by the full regalia of the official welcoming committee, because it is known that if it is allowed to snowball unchecked, then things might really happen. (Ego, July 2006: 55)

Authoritarianism is linked with regional Arab governance as well, as one author asserts:
I am an Arab citizen among many others who have found themselves in a world that knows no justice. Millions of Arabs would stand strongly against violence and bloodshed, yet they are persecuted on a daily basis within their own countries and abroad. (Ego, July 2006: 16)

Given this anti-authoritarian stance, one might expect these publics to espouse a pro-democratic position. However, the discussions problematize notions of a democracy. One young man asks:
Is democracy a means or an end? Do we really need to fight to attain it? Why do scholars never mention political reform without mentioning democracy? Why do we

402

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

always consider democracy as the way? Would China have sustained her economic growth under a democratic regime? These are not rhetorical questions; these questions are still persistent to the author and have not yet gained a clear answer. (Al-Waqe, April 2006: 12)

Ego prints writings by two authors with pseudonyms who discuss the hypocrisies of democracies in practice. In a democracy, power rests entirely with the people, but they are, in fact, entirely powerless, say Alec Smart and Noah Tall (Ego, April 2006: 345). They are also quick to critique Western countries intentions to promote democracy in the region. A concerned youth comments:
After 9/11, discourse on democracy and human rights reached a peak, yet in practice none of these principles were adopted. People turn a blind eye to the many violations perpetrated by Arab regimes against their own people, despite Western promises to promote democracy and human rights. At the same time, those Western powers have overseen some of the worst of recent violations. (Ego, July 2006: 16)

Another writer hints at the possibility of Western intervention in the region as way to promote further authoritarianism. He writes:
The U.S.-led war on terror and its new habit of pointing fingers at its former Arab allies, asking them for stronger confrontation of terrorism, has given more energy to Arab governments in their internal war. It is necessary to clarify that, notwithstanding any large conspiracy theories, it is quite inconceivable that the Western world, especially the United States, have particular interests in keeping the Arab world in an arms race. (Al-Waqe, November 2004: 16)

These discussions use a critical lens to understand geo-political arrangements that have local/national effects. The last set of articles depicting criticism towards state governance are those written in a humorous or farcical fashion. Ego has a regular feature in every issue called Il Dictatore. The idea behind the feature is to solicit responses from readers on what they would do if they were dictator of Egypt for a day. Some of the ideas whimsically discussed include breeding laws, legalized prostitution and a progressive income tax (Ego, April 2006: 467). When irony is used in this fashion, one reads between the lines of what is written. A writer for Campus discusses emergency law in the following way:
The emergency law is enforced for a reason. Certainly the police do not just pick up people at random and beat them to dehumanization, or more mercifully to death for no reason. Its all in the service of the country. (Campus, July 2006: 30)

This is often the tone used when print censorship is discussed in these publics. In a review for a play performed by bloggers at AUC, the writer says:
The night (which was advertised as a bloggers concert) had begun with a video presentation about pro-democracy activists. It was basically anti- well, you can imagine what or who the activists were upset with. (Ego, July 2006: 21)

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo Instead of printing a specific article, Ego ran the following statement:

403

Unfortunately, we have had to take the very tough decision to completely censor his [the writers] article, as we deemed it to be contrary to dearly-held values in our country and potentially offensive to the authorities who are very good friends of ours. (Ego, May 2006: 17)

The issue of censorship and the relation of these publics to the state are discussed more fully in the next section. This analysis demonstrates that discussions are highly structured towards activating the agency potential of youth and adopting a critical stance towards the government. Discussions are less structured around identity, but there is a tendency to favor a youth identity and an identity based on a composite of cultures. By focusing on the ways these publics engender specific collective orientations, we can posit that they espouse a particular ideology that could be viewed as potentially threatening to the state. What type of challenge do youth publics pose to governmental elites? Perhaps these publics pose more of a symbolic, rather than actual, threat to the power structure and, for this reason, are allowed to continue to print and distribute copies. We look to the experiences of editors and writers with government censors to answer these questions.

Bridging publics in a media-censored field As mentioned earlier, youth publics have reason to be cautious in their vocal opposition to the state. Egypt is a country where martial law has been in effect since 1981 and numerous intellectual detractors have been detained for years under this legislation. There exists a cadre of government officials whose job it is to preview publicly printed material for subversive content before they are released to the masses. To further substantiate the claim that freedom of expression is restricted in Egypt, the country is ranked 143rd of 167 countries in the 2005 World Press Freedom Index. In recent years, the government has allowed independent publishing houses to print newspapers and news magazines, but they must still be previewed by government censors. How, then, are youth publics that espouse an anti-authoritarian ideology able to thrive within this context? I propose that linguistic capital works to the advantage of these publics. The editor of Campus concurs. She says: We never used to have problems with censors because English magazine readers are such a small percentage of the population (interview). The organizing committee chair of the CIMAL remarks that they experience no censorship of their printed materials, especially because they publish at AUC. He says: We have freedom, but we have to be responsible. It could be that these publics, like similar publics in Iran, do not pose enough of a threat to warrant the conventional modes of state intervention. Eickelman writes:

404

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

Small intellectual magazines in Tehran publish on a latitude of subjects, as the authorities who retain tight control on radio, t.v., and the content of Friday sermons know that their political impact is minimal and that the costs of repression outweigh those of turning a blind eye. (Eickelman and Anderson, 2003: 39)

While their perceived minimal impact and use of English language may account for why censors ignored youth publications in the past, the recent experiences of Campus and Ihna portray a different picture. The Campus editor continues:
Once, we wrote an article about the Presidents son [Gamal Mubarak], but in a positive light. It got the attention of the authorities. They started asking, Who are you? What are you doing? [Another time] we had a huge run-in with censorship. Not because of what weve done, because weve gotten away with so much. Somebody, somewhere, had issues with us, so they sicked the censorship on us. We sort of got in trouble for printing something about the army. So now, it is an adventure because censorship for us is real. Before we never thought about it, but we still do what we do. (Interview)

The editor of Gmag adds: Sometimes they [censors] pick on really ridiculous articles and leave really serious hardcore political articles alone, because they are not smart. It helps that government censors are known to have a poor command of the English language. Here, we see the strategic use of linguistic capital to explain the maintenance of these publics despite governmental scrutiny. Writers find creative ways, such as leaving out certain words as we saw in some of the examples above, to communicate their message while evading the attention of censors. Ihna, as an Arabic-language publication, faces greater scrutiny from censors. It could be that Ihna is monitored more closely by authorities because, as an Arabic-language youth magazine, it is perceived to have a potentially larger influence than English-language youth magazines. Before they print each month, the editor of Ihna spends two days in the government censorship office to review the content of their articles. He says that he tries to negotiate with them, explaining to censors, No, we didnt mean this, we meant that. Often, the writers of Ihna have their own ways of creatively defying censorship guidelines by using youth slang instead of terms that censors are familiar with. Carroll and Hackett maintain that media activism is not simply a symbolic challenge to elites, but a challenge to the system of symbolic production a critique of the political economy of mass communication and an effort to build democratic alternatives (2006: 99). The above experiences of youth writers and editors confirm this notion. By continuously adapting new ways to communicate to avoid the suspicions of elites, while simultaneously creating more venues, such as the introduction of Arabic-language magazines, to increase their influence and include other perspectives, youth publics seek to democratize the current media structure by creating their own forums for expression.

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo The durable influence of youth publics

405

An important question for further research is how can we measure and understand the influence of the messages contained in youth publics. By focusing on the origins, development and maintenance strategies of an intermediary opening public, we have assumed that magazine readers actively engage in the discussions and reflect on the messages contained in these publics. This is a reasonable assumption, given that Al-Waqe is a publication produced and written for young people who participate in conferences designed for similar kinds of discussions. Campus, Ego, Gmag and Ihna are distributed in youth locales, such as cafes, where young people gather to read and socialize. We could also infer, as mentioned earlier, that, since youth magazines in Egypt have continued to increase in number over the past eight years, that the messages contained therein must be salient for a growing number of young people. Because youth identities and civic/political orientations are conceptually shaped by the experiences they have at this time in their lives (Erlich, 2000; Rebenstorf, 2004), I suggest that these publics generate psychical alliances among members that may persist after they have moved beyond the youth stage. By creating publications that espouse consensual notions around youth agency potential, constructive critiques of the state and heterogeneous notions of identity, youth publics contribute to a generational consciousness that could have a lasting influence in whatever capacities these young people work in the future. As a way to demonstrate this lasting influence, the CIMAL includes an alumni guide in their publications that lists those who now work as an assistant program officer in the International Relations Department of the National Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, an economic researcher in the Regional Arab Financial Institutions Department in the National Ministry of International Cooperation, an intern and speech writer in the Office of the Secretary General of the Arab League, as well as several others who work for the United Nations, multinational firms, media companies or diplomatic positions. While these alumni are no longer members of this youth public, it is implied that their experiences as part of CIMAL and as readers of Al-Waqe influenced their decisions to pursue occupations that further their desire to play an active role within Egyptian and Arab society. Nonetheless, only a future systematic assessment of reader consumption practices and interpretations can yield reliable data to assess the above propositions. For our present discussion, it is hoped that the empirical evidence provided here illustrates the multi-dimensional aspects and analytical worth of publics that Emirbayer and Sheller intended, as well as making a compelling case for taking notice of DMA in contexts such as Cairo. The success of DMA forms, as demonstrated by youth publics in Cairo, is measured not by having its interests absorbed by elites, but by creating a vibrant public sphere for previously excluded voices (in this case, young people). Carroll and Hackett write:

406

Media, Culture & Society 31(3)

Its [DMA] success will not likely bring it a collective identity or a well-defined niche within the polity or social movement sector [but] will consist in making democratic communication a nexus, and a conscious priority, for various critical social movements (2006: 100)

By establishing new communication channels among young people in Egypt, youth publics demonstrate their potential to become a venue for future critical social movements within the region.

Note
1. The youth publications cited in this article are: Al-Waqe, November 2004April 2006; Ego, AprilJuly 2006; Ihna, FebruaryJuly 2006; Campus, FebruaryJuly 2006.

References
Amit-Talai, V. and H. Wulff, (eds) (1995) Youth Cultures: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. London: Routledge. Arvizu, S. (2004) El-Shabab El-Masry: Coming of Age in Contemporary Cairo, MA thesis, American University of Cairo, Sociology-Anthropology Department. Barsoum, G. (2004) The Employment Crisis of Female Graduates in Egypt: An Ethnographic Approach, Cairo Papers in Social Science 25(3). Bayat, A. (1997) Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt Compared, Comparative Studies in Society and History 40(1): pp. 13669. Bayat, A. (2003) From Amr Diab to Amr Khaled, Al-Ahram Weekly Online 639: 228 May. Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Calhoun, C. (ed.) (1992) Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Carroll, W.K. and R. Hackett (2006) Democratic Media Activism through the Lens of Social Movement Theory, Media, Culture & Society 28(1): 83104. Cochran, J. (1992) Western Higher Education and Identity Conflict: The Egyptian Female Professional, Convergence 25(3): 6678. Cohen, J. and A. Arato (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Couldry, N. and J. Curran (eds) (2003) Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Downing, J.D.H., with T.V. Ford, G. Gil and L. Stein (2001) Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Eickelman, D. and J. Anderson (2003) New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere, 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Emirbayer, M. and M. Sheller (1998) Publics in History, Theory and Society 27: 72779. Erlich, H. (2000) Youth and Arab Politics: The Political Generation of 193536, in R. Meijer (ed.) Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State, and Street. Richmond: Curzon Press.

Arvizu, Emerging youth publics in Cairo

407

Fraser, N. (1992) Rethinking the Public Sphere, in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, pp. 10992. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Martinez, L. (2000) Youth, the Street and Violence in Algeria, in R. Meijer (ed.) Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State, and Street, pp. 83106. Richmond: Curzon Press. Melucci, A. (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miliani, H. (2003) Legitimate Subversion and the Symbolism of Integration in Rai Music in Algeria, in R. Meijer (ed.) Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth, pp. 13542. Richmond: Curzon. Miranda, M. (2003) Homegirls in the Public Sphere. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Mitchell, T. (1999) Society, Economy and the State Effect, in A. Sharma and A. Gupta (eds) The Anthropology of the State, pp. 16986. Oxford: Blackwell. Munoz, G.M. (2000) Arab Youth Today: The Generation Gap, Identity Crisis, and Democratic Deficit, in R. Meijer (ed.) Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State, and Street, pp. 1726. Richmond: Curzon Press. Rebenstorf, H. (ed.) (2004) Democratic Development? East German, Israeli, and Palestinian Adolescents. Germany: VS Verlag Fur Sozialwissenschaeften. Tilly, C. (2003) Political Identities in Changing Polities, Social Research 70(2): 60520. Waterbury, J. (2003) Hate Your Policies, Love Your Institutions, Foreign Affairs Jan./Feb, pp. 5868. Willis, M.J. (2000) Youth and Politics in the Maghreb: Islamism and After, paper presented at the First Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, 226 March. Wyn, J. and R. White (1997) Rethinking Youth. London: SAGE.

Shannon Arvizu is a PhD candidate at Columbia University in the Department of Sociology. Her current work examines the role of alternative media (and other movement organizations) in the promotion of clean technology in the automotive sector in the US. Address: Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027-6902, USA. [email: sla2113@columbia.edu]