General Aviation Report Nov 2023

OCCURRENCE LISTING
Aircraft Below 5700kg
OCCURRENCES RECORDED BETWEEN 01 NOV 2023 and 30 NOV 2023
Content: This list contains occurrences and accidents to aircraft of 5700kg and below
recorded on the MOR database during the period shown above. The list includes
information reported to the CAA, information from CAA investigations and
deductions by CAA staff. The authenticity of the contents or absence of errors
and omissions cannot be guaranteed. The list contains preliminary information.
Purpose: The information is supplied for flight safety purposes only.
Queries & Contact Safety Data Department, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House,
Reporting: Gatwick Airport, W Sussex, RH6 0YR. sdd@caa.co.uk
YOUR REPORT COULD PREVENT SOMEONE ELSE'S ACCIDENT
FIXED WING AIRCRAFT
AEROPRO EUROFOX BOMBARDIER ROTAX En-route Denbighshire 30/10/2023 202339371

914
Carbon monoxide alarm triggered during use of the cabin heater. Aircraft returned.
During warm up I had the heating on and all the time during the aerotow (probably 10 mins total). At around 400ft the CO detector alarmed. I immediately turned off the heater and
opened up the air vents. I then turned back to the airfield to wave the glider off in a safe spot. I explained the situation to him while we turned back. Once he released I opened up the door
of the Eurofox for more fresh air. I then landed safely (as well as the glider).Once the CO alarm went off, I immediately felt unwell, dizzy + light headed, however it may be more
psychological, rather than physiological…! Short term fix we have covered up the heater vent, to prevent any CO leaking into the cockpit. We monitor the CO using a special CO meter
now. We are in the process of dealing with Rotax for support for a long term solution.We think that the exhaust is leaking from all 4 ball joints, which we are either going to fix, or
replace. The heater vent is located by one of these leaking joints The cabin hot air intake is behind an exhaust joint, this arrangement is likely to leak and bring exhaust gases into the
cabin.
AEROPRO EUROFOX BOMBARDIER ROTAX Standing EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 15/11/2023 202340314

912
Standing aircraft overturned due to jet blast from departing helicopter.

*-**** has been left post flight on the apron outside hangar 6 at EGCJ. The next student was in the process of pre-flighting it when it was blown over by the downdraught from a
helicopter departing from one of the helipads adjacent to the Jet A1 tank. CTV shows the event.Helicopters involved - *-**** + *-*******.
Complementary 12/12/23:
On 5 Dec 2023 I was notified of an insurance claim regarding damage to a Eurofox 3K, *** which had been blown by downwash when parked between 2 hangars, 50m downwind of a
Bell 429 departing the helicopter refuel area at Sherburn-in- Elmet. Follow-up to be provided pending investigation.
AQUILA AT01 BOMBARDIER ROTAX Cruise En route 09/01/2023 202311295

912
Alternator failure. Aircraft returned.

At approximately 1300Z Leuchars LARS rang to advise that an aircraft () a local flight from Dundee which was in the vicinity of Crail, Fife wished to return to Dundee due to an
indication of a red warning light in the cockpit. When queried hat the actual issue was the pilot stated that it was a failure of the alternator. The aircraft was co-ordinated to route to
Broughty Castle VRP for a straight in approach Runway 27. Due to the time the aircraft would take to get to Dundee, and 10-15 minutes I elected to alert the Dundee AFS via the direct
line phone rather than the Crash Alarm. A Local Standby was initiated at 1301Z and the Fire Chief contacted ATC via radio for details at 1306Z. The subject aircraft came onto the
Dundee frequency at approximately 1310Z and as instructed to report established on final approach to Runway 27. The pilot was advised that the visual circuit was active with two
aircraft but was informed that he would have priority. At 1316Z landed safely and taxiied to *** without incident, and the AFS stood down at 1317Z.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Initial climb LEAL (ALC) : Alicante 25/10/2023 202334992
(CANADA)
PT6A
Cabin pressurisation failure during departure. Aircraft immediately descended and diverted.
Take-off and climb out from LEAL was normal and we continued with the SID northbound. As wepassed FL130 we heard a loud whistling sound from the cabin and it appeared to be
comingfrom the rear ceiling area, (however the passengers have since reported that the sound wascoming from the either the rear door or baggage area). We continued the climb towards
ourassigned altitude of FL240, expecting the sound to decrease as the cabin climbed and asexpected the sound began to decrease. It then became apparent that the cabin was not
climbingin accordance with our expectations, climbing at a far higher rate than normal, so we asked tolevel at FL220. Once in the cruise we took stock of our situation as we had noted
that the cabinhad levelled at 9000ft, well above where it should have been. Shortly after, we noticed that thecabin was starting to climb again and the Altitude Warning illuminated. We
asked ATC forimmediate descent and diversion to Barcelona, as this airport was close to our track and wouldbe able to accommodate our patient. We were given descent to FL180
initially and as wedescended the oxygen masked in the cabin dropped, but we were now able to reduce the cabinaltitude below 9000ft very quickly because we were already descending.
However as wedescend further it was clear that the pressurisation system was becoming weaker. ATC wereable to give us continuous descent to join the STAR and ILS for 24R at
Barcelona and theapproach and landing was continued without further incident.
Supplementary 29/11/23:
Part-145 attended and carried out troubleshooting, the results of which were inconclusive. Doorseal was deferred and the aircraft positioned back to maintenance base. Findings and
observations Door seal was replaced, and the aircraft has not suffered the issue since.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Take-off EGNJ (HUY) : Humberside 02/11/2023 202336418
(CANADA)
PT6A
PAN call due to gear in transit light remained illuminated with aural gear warning. Aircraft return.
Although this was a single pilot flight for currency 2 senior type rated pilots were on board and due to the numerous failures both crew members became involved in to get the aircraft on
the ground safely. After take off gear was selected up and the gear transit light remained on with the aural warning sounding. (All 3 green light went out) The autopilot also failed so the
captain hand flew the aircraft whilst other crew member spoke to ATC. We extended the gear and it showed correct configuration with no warnings. After a short time we tried raising the
gear and still the transit light remained on with audible warning. The decision was made to return to Humberside. The second crew member completed checks informed ATC and we got
vectors to the ILS (weather not great but above limits due to the incoming winter storm.) The very dim aircraft lighting added further to our difficulties and the aircraft torches were not in
their usual place. Crew used own torches to help. We declared a PAN call as we were unsure why the gear in transit light and audible warning wasn't cancelling. On lowering the gear it
showed correct indication for landing with no warnings. We landed without incidence and the fire department followed the us to stand.
At time 1727 ***** BE20 departed EGNJ RW20 . ADI instructed the a/c to contact APS on 119.130 when the pilot reported a problem & to standby. He then requested to be transferred
to APS for radar vectored ILS to RW20 as had unsafe gear warning. A/C was transferred to APS and on contact the pilot declared PAN PAN. A Full Emergency was declared by ADI &
Local Emergency Orders followed. PC East were contacted to cancel the airways joining clearance. D&D were contacted by APS & operational control was obtained. The a/c was
vectored for ILS RW20 , the pilot reported 3 greens gear down indicaton showing and landed safely at 1740. It was then followed back to stand by EGNJ Fire section , no other faults
were reported by the pilot who shut down on stand . A stop call was put in to the Local emergency services. The Incident was closed at 1749 & a diversion arrival message sent & runway
inspection carried out.
BEECH 200 UNKNOWN Cruise En-route 05/11/2023 202336837

UNKNOWN
Infringement of Daventry CTR (Class D) by a BE20 at FL82 operating with incorrect pressure setting on altimeter.
On 5th November I was controlling as GW INT. I had a free call from *** requesting a traffic service as they made their way up the West side of my
airspace. After Identifying and validating the level I provided a traffic service to the aircraft. Shortly after this the pilot made a request to see if it would be
possible to climb to 12,000ft to carry out an altitude test. I said this would not be possible and to remain outside controlled airspace.
After speaking to a few other planes on frequency my scan returned to ****. At this point they were a few miles West of Cranfield and were showing
FL82 (CAS base FL75) on the radar. There was no CAIT activation. I checked the QNH with the pilot who was still operating on 979hP. They were told
that they need to be on the standard pressure setting as they had passed the transition altitude and that if they continued on the present track they would
infringe controlled airspace again in 5 miles. Once the pilot had changed to standard pressure setting their level dropped outside of controlled airspace
and they turned left to avoid further infringement.
The CAA infringement notice refers to my VFR flight on Nov 5 at 9h18 GMT from Booker (EGTB) to Little Staughton. In 30 years of flying I have never made a mistake of this nature
but there were extenuating circumstances.
The VFR flight was conducted in VMC, the QNH on the day was extremely low at 979Mb
I was positioning the aircraft, single pilot, to Little Staughton for its annual maintenance. It is typically a short flight executed at low altitude. A couple of days before the flight, I was
contacted by ##### who asked me to perform an ‘Altitude Warning’ light check which required an unpressurised climb to approx 10000'.
My plan, prior to departure, was to remain outside controlled airspace until north of Luton and Cranfield airspace where I hoped to get permission from Luton Radar to perform the
altitude check.
After take off, reaching 1000', I engaged the autopilot and proceeded north at initially 2200' and then, based on airspace boundaries, progressively climbed to higher altitude but always
remaining below controlled airspace. Immediately after leaving EGTB (Wycombe Air Park) ATZ I contacted Luton Radar on 129.550. After a couple of ‘stand by’ requests I was given a
squawk and a reduced traffic service with instructions to remain outside controlled airspace. My requests to climb into controlled airspace well north of Luton airspace were denied twice.
In light of Luton Radars instructions, I decided to proceed towards airspace east of Wittering where I thought I could perform the altitude check in uncontrolled airspace. To get there I
planned to continue north from EGTC towards Wittering via airspace Daventry (D) CTA13, Daventry (D) CTA12 and Daventry (D) CTA21.
North of EGTC, when entering D-CTA13, I started to climb to 7300' (leaving 5300') but failed to set 1013 when crossing transition altitude of 6500'. Minutes later, entering or already in
D-CTA12 and heading towards D-CTA21, Luton Radar advised me that if I continued with present heading I would enter controlled airspace ahead. There was no mention that I was
already inside controlled airspace. It is then I realised that I was flying on the incorrect pressure setting, which given that the actual QNH that day was 979 hPa was significant ( some
1000’ difference). As you can see from FlightRadar pic I took immediate action and turned north remaining in D-CTA12 and adjusted my altitude. However, at that time I had not entered
the CTA21 and believed I was below the controlled airspace in CTA12. A few minutes later I switched to East Midlands radar who kindly allowed me to climb to above FL100 and then
back down again. With the check done, I proceeded to Little Staughton remaining outside controlled airspace.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Standing : Engine(s) EGPC (WIC) : Wick 15/06/2023 202319171
(CANADA) Shut Down
PT6A
Small amount of smoke in cabin on engine shut down from flap motor.
Following landing (survey aircraft) we taxied back to the apron. Upon arriving at the apron there was a smell, a bit like Marzipan. The aircraft was shut down without incident on the
apron. The camera operator examined the camera and identified a small amount of smoke coming from the front right side of the camera. I instructed the camera operator to unlatch the
fire extinguisher to be on the safe side, which he did. It was not discharged. The smoke dissipated immediately. Ops/Camo were informed immediately via phone. Details of the
investigations completed Rectification action and investigation captured on Work Order **** - Smoke found to be coming from Flap motor, Flap motor and gearbox replaced and aircraft
released to service. Findings and observation See Investigation Conducted - No further action considered necessary. **** is not the CAMO or the Primary Maintenance provider for the
aircraft. Copy of Safety Report to be passed to the CAMO/Operator **** for their information and review.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Standing : Engine(s) EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 12/04/2023 202324842
(CANADA) Start-up civil
PT6A
Aircraft started engines without ATC permission.

xxx, a BE20 parked on North Apron xx with a 0745Z FPL to EGNL, started their engines without approval from me, the Tower ATCO. xxx had received their clearance, however they
didn't request start approval. The Tower ATCO was only aware of xxx starting their engines on hearing said engines. The Tower ATCO queried via RT to xxx if they had started their
engines, however no reply was heard.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Initial Approach EGTE (EXT) : Exeter 20/09/2023 202334930
(CANADA)
PT6A
Level bust - aircraft descended below cleared 2600ft to 2000ft before correcting.
*** was being vectored for the ILS to Runway 26 when it descended below its cleared level, which the controller witnessed and subsequently re-climbed the aircraft. Findings The
weather was no factor (The aircraft was inbound IFR) and no ATC equipment
failures to cause or contribute to the incident. The controller on duty was within his hours. *** was being vectored for the ILS RW26, they were instructed “when ready descend to
altitude 2600ft QNH 997hpa”, which is both sector safe and standard practice.
The radar controller then observed the aircraft on a base leg for the ILS, indicating 2200ft descending and informed the pilot to “check assigned level, altitude should be 2600ft QNH 997
hpa”. The pilot read this back correctly and initiated a prompt climb back up to 2600ft. The Pilot could be heard (whilst still broadcasting on frequency) relaying to CLIMB, CLIMB,
CLIMB to his co- pilot. The lowest observed altitude was 2000ft during the level bust which it climbed from quickly back to its assigned level. *** then continued the ILS approach
normally and landed safely.
The Radar controller on duty used good skill and knowledge to carry out his duties correctly. When interviewing the ATCO and witnessing the replay of the event, it was apparent to see
the controller witnessed the whole event and watched to see if the aircraft descended through the 200ft leeway on the Mode C readout. Once this happened, he subsequently straight away
called the aircraft correctly to check his correct assigned level. There was no ATC fault or blame with this incident.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Climb to cruising EGSS (STN) : 28/10/2023 202337114
(CANADA) level or altitude London/Stansted
PT6A
Aircraft climbing to a FL that the aircraft was never cleared to.

I was on NW Deps band boxed with BNN, the sector was busy due to pockets of weather around the BKY area and also BNN hold.
I was dealing with a NUGBO Dep on an unusual weather heading when the **** checked in, informing me that he was on HDG270 and climbing to
FL80. I acknowledged this and then went onto climb and turn other aircraft in order to keep the sector moving. When I scanned back to the vicinity of Luton I noticed that the *** was at
FL84, I was about to go in and check the pressure setting he was on when the NODE then displayed FL87. There were no immediate aircraft in his vicinity so I asked the pilot what FL
they were climbing to, his response was "flight planned level, FL280". I was a little shocked so asked him who had cleared him to climb to FL280, to which his response was that there
had been some confusion in the cockpit and that they would return to FL80. I informed them over the RT that I would be filing. Separation was maintained at all times.
Complimentary 30/10/2023:
I was the Captain of a medical flight departing Stansted on the Utava 1R. After the initial restriction of Altitude 4000ft, I was cleared to Altitude 6000ft. The departure was very
challenging into difficult weather with multiple frequency, heading and altitude changes. As a single pilot, the cockpit workload was extremely high resulting in my delay in setting the
Standard Pressure setting when cleared to Flight Level 80. soon after departure, I encountered severe Icing conditions and was actively involved in preparing the aircraft which delayed
me setting the Standard Pressure setting. I was setting the Standard Pressure setting just before the aircraft was about to level off resulting in a difference of approximately 400Ft. At this
point the controller challenged me as to my Cleared Level whilst I was recovering back to Level 80 and stated Level 80. As I had not maintained my assigned level, the
controller stated that they would be filing a report accordingly.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Final approach EGHI (SOU) : Southampton 19/10/2023 202338338
(CANADA)
PT6A
Level bust BE20 descended below cleared flight level of 4000ft to 3500ft.
Vectoring left hand circuit for RW20 I descended the XXXXX from FL70 to 4000ft. QNH (982HpA) readback correctly and Mode S indicated selected level of 4000ft. The southeast
wind meant I issued a corrective heading for downwind when the XXXXX was 8nm SE of EGHI. At this point I noticed the Mode reading A036 and the next sweep A035. I instructed
the GMA to climb to 4000ft. Although there was no traffic to effect their descent they were close to the side of the CTA where the CTA base descends to 3000ft so I elected to climb
them to their initial cleared altitude. After landing the crew phoned to apologise and indicated that they had failed to set the QNH and were using the standard 1013HpA. As the QNH was
982HpA there was potentially almost 1000ft difference.
During the descent into SOU, I was cleared to descend to an altitude of 4000 ft from my current flight level of FL 70. However, I didn't change to QNH staright away. I admit that I might
have been slightly distracted by the weather conditions (heavy Turbulace), which contributed to missing the “set QNH call” at it was a turbulent light. As a result, ATC asked me to
climb back up, which made us realize the mistake that had been made. I quickly adjusted the QNH to 981 and returned to the correct altitude of 4000 feet. Once I landed, I immediately
called the tower to explain what had happened and to offer my sincere apologies for the error. No other aircraft where affected by the altitude bust. In furture SOP's must be followed
even when having to deal with weather condiations.
This investigation was conducted with reference to the original report text, conversations with both crew members, an email exchange with @@ ATC and with referecne to xxx
Operations manuals and SOPs. During descent into EGHI a **** descended below its cleared altitude. @@ ATC requested a climb back to A040 and the flight continued as normal.
Conclusions: The PF set the correct altitude for descent but did not change their pressure setting from "Standard" (1013 hPa) to the airfield QNH (981 hPa). The error was approximately
minus 960'. The PM had changed their pressure setting but did not cross check that the PF had done so as well. The PF did not make the "altimeter" call which normally trigers the PM to
cross check altimeter settings.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY En-route En-route 05/09/2022 202235290
(CANADA)
PT6A
Crew missed radio call.

* WHAT HAPPENED? Missed communication with ATC.* WHY DID IT HAPPEN? Inadvertently switched frequencies.* HOW WAS IT FIXED? Re established communication with
ATC.* SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS Crew to Confirm correct frequency after each change to Nav & Comms.
Correct procedures were followed and following a call to Scottish Control to check their frequency, *** was returned to the Glasgow frequency and continued in sequence to land.
Glasgow ATC did not require to amend their planning of traffic.
Suggest close as low risk event.
BEECH 200 PRATT & WHITNEY Approach EGBJ (GLO) : 19/02/2023 202335710
(CANADA) Gloucestershire
PT6A
Beech 200 received a TCAS RA.

Callsign ##### "####", a Beech 200 Super King Air was inbound to EGBJ and carrying out the RNP 27 instrument approach under a Procedural Service. The aircraft was in the vicinity
of the IAF REKLO when the pilot reported that he had received an 'RA'. This was acknowledged by Approach. No aircraft under a service with EGBJ were believed to be in that area.
APP rang Brize Norton to see if they were working any aircraft in that area. They advised that there were several '7000' squawks around but that they were not working any thing in that
area. The pilot reported that he was continuing the RNP approach and subsequently landed on RWY27.
BEECH 55 CONTINENTAL Normal descent EGAA (BFS) : 21/10/2023 202336983

(TELEDYNE) USA Belfast/Aldergrove
470 FAMILY
Turn without instruction and level bust.

I was working as the INT controller when an inbound a/c, ***, asked if he could do 3 ILS approaches to RWY25. After checking with the WM and
ADM, I said yes and told him to continue on his present heading and gave him initial descent to FL80. When he was at 35nm from touch down I gave
him descent to 4A on the QNH of 989Hpa. At approx. time 1650 I noticed DIAFS had turned off the heading I had assigned him and when I asked him
why, he said his heading was 283 degrees and I think he said something about following the flight planned route. I could not understand exactly what he meant but I told him to turn right
onto 350 degrees if he wanted to continue the approach. I questioned myself then, wondering if he'd asked for a procedural app and I had missed it, so when he was established on the ILS
I asked if he had turned for BELZU but again I could not make sense of what he was telling me, although he did say something about a gyro. His ILS approach was erratic and several
times he was off both the GP and the Loc. When he was on his second ILS, I turned him for the LOC and cleared him for the approach in what I thought was good time, but he went
through the LOC slightly. I asked if he needed a turn and he said yes, but then he may have said he was establishing. I then noticed that his mode C was indicating 2200Ft. I asked him to
check his altitude as he was supposed to be at 2.5A and I think I gave him the QHN again. He said he was correcting. I called the WM this time and she advised me to get the aircraft to
land off that approach.
BEECH 58 CONTINENTAL En-route MAY 03/11/2023 202336827

(TELEDYNE) USA
520 FAMILY
Infringement of the Gatwick CTA (Class D) by a BE58 at 2700ft. Gatwick inbounds were turned away as a precaution.
Aircraft squawking 3763 approximately 2nm west of MAY climbed to 2.7A inside CAS without clearance and not on frequency with Gatwick approach.
Inbound aircraft to Gatwick were turned away as a precaution. The 3763 immediately dropped out of controlled airspace. Radar indicated the callsign to be ****.
On 3 November 2023 - I arranged 2 flights with a highly experienced pilot following a period of 4 months of not flying.
The flights were from Elstree to Shoreham and Shoreham back to Elstree following the same route and at the same altitude (2200’). The weather on the day was fine but with strong
winds and very low pressure (982 hPa) in the aftermath of Storm Ciaran.
The flights were planned for, and flown at, 2200’ QNH (ie. 800’ below the level at standard day pressure). The flight to Shoreham took place as planned. On the return flight, as we were
approaching MAY VOR, we experienced significant turbulence which knocked out the autopilot which was engaged. This caused the aircraft to pitch and roll and to climb. I quickly
regained control (flying the aircraft manually) and returned the aircraft to the planned altitude of 2200’. The recovery (and return to planned altitude) took no more than a couple of
seconds. Neither I nor the co-pilot observed the aircraft climbing above 2500’ during the incident.
We returned to Elstree at the planned altitude without further incident.
BEECH 90 PRATT & WHITNEY Approach EGBE (CVT) : Coventry 11/02/2022 202235692
(CANADA) (PT6A-28
MCCAULEY
PROPELLER SYSTEMS
4HFR34C762/94LMA-4 )
PRATT & WHITNEY
(CANADA) (PT6A-28
MCCAULEY
PROPELLER SYSTEMS
4HFR34C762/94LMA-4 )
Pilot mis-identified Coventry for Birmingham and then broke off approach.
Coventry ATS observed a BE9L *** callsign ***, was observed braking off an approach to Coventry runway 05 to the North climbing through 200ft when Coventry ATS was called by
Birmingham Radar on the tie-line to say about the traffic - which had mis-identified Coventry for Birmingham runway 33. Coventry was using runway 23 at the time, and at the time of
the incident had no traffic in the ATZ. the weather at the time was CAVOK.
BRITTEN NORMAN BN2B LYCOMING Cruise En route 14/01/2023 202312300
540 FAMILY
Stall warner inoperative.

The aircraft landed at Colonsay with a southerly wind at 28knots. One may expect the stall warner to flicker in the final stages of landing and on the ground due to the gust factor but
nothing was heard, and hadn't been for quite a period of time. Tested stall warner on the ground and it worked fine so carried on. Departed empty back to Oban, the aircraft was slowed to
the approaching stall, all other signs where present other than the stall horn and visual warning. On the ground at Oban the stall warner was checked and again appeared to function
correctly. However if the vane was only lightly raised replicating airflow then it did not sound, if wiggled laterally then it engaged, however at the standard point that one would expect it
to work with the simulated force of airflow it did not sound. Other report inform. The incident is under investigation by engineering.
Engineering action to correct the stall warner has been carried out, and the aircraft returned to service following a satisfactory Maintenance Check Flight. No further instances have been
recorded. Investigation continues in order to identify the root cause.
02-Feb-2023, work packs **, MF **, reviewed. Lift detector had been replaced on the previous noted work pack just 3 months prior to failure; a used part had been installed as no new
part was available. The lift detector was reported not working again on 22-Mar-2023, this was rectified by replacing the lift detector again, this time with another new part. This failure
was detected during the pilots pre-flight checks, not in flight. Risk mitig. action Conclusions Stall warner performance will be monitored.
BRITTEN NORMAN BN2T ALLISON USA En-route EGLC (LCY) : London City 22/11/2023 202340201
250 FAMILY
Possible infringement of the London City CTA (Class D) by a BN2T at 2400ft. Avoiding action initiated.
I was the Thames controller on duty. The sector was split from SVFR. At approximately 1140, *** departed from London City runway 27 on a SOQQA departure, positioning to Biggin
Hill. As the aircraft was north of the field, level at 3000ft, I gave it a heading of 085. At this point, I noticed an opposite direction aircraft squawking 4362 (subsequently identified as ***,
a BN2T, inbound to Northolt) indicating 2400ft. This aircraft was outside CAS, where the base is 2500ft, although it was pointing very close to the north-eastern corner of the London
City CTA, where the base is 1500ft. I passed the traffic to the pilot of *** when they were about 4nm apart, due to the potential of only having 600ft separation. I climbed *** to 4000ft
slightly earlier than I should have to at least try to minimise the confliction. As the 4362 squawk approached the edge of the CTA, I assumed an imminent intrusion and began to issue
avoiding action to the pilot of ***. As soon as the word 'avoiding' came out, the 4362 squawk appeared to turn right onto a track that would have kept it outside CAS, so I stopped myself
and told the pilot to disregard. Then the 4362 squawk appeared to turn left again and at this point, I decided to issue avoiding action in full. Wary of traffic on the London City R27 ILS, I
advised the pilot to turn left onto a heading of 360. I then passed traffic information to BN2T. Once clear, I resumed vectoring *** for Biggin Hill. 4362 had been under the control of
Northolt Radar.
BRITTEN NORMAN BN2T ALLISON USA En-route En route 06/11/2023 202337775

250 FAMILY
Fuel leak into aircraft during flight. Aircraft returned to base.

During a flight at FL90, approximately 1 hour 30mins minutes into the flight a leak of fuel developed from the overhead panels onto the rear occupants. The fuel was caught with a rag
and a plastic pouch and the flight terminated with a return back to base. Initial risk classification pending discussion with pilot tomorrow.
The SM interviewed the ***, GOM and **** Engineers on 7 Nov 23.
The pilot reported that while at 9,000ft approx 20NM SE from the field the rear observer reported a fuel leak from the roof of the cabin. Initially the pilot thought this was outside then
quickly determined it to be from the interior. NB the pilot also noted that there had been a smell of fuel within the cabin for 2-3 weeks which had been put down to refuelling.
The observer reported catching the fuel in a bag. It was a slow drip. The pilot immediately cancelled the trg sortie and returned to the field. He did not deem it necessary to request a
PAN.The major concern was the smell potentially leading to a nauseous feeling.
On return to EGAA, the Engineers attended and removed two panels from the ceiling. They were damp on the underside. Further investigation from *** Engineers suggests that the most
likely cause was degradation(wear and tear) of the O ring for the crossfeed valve on the inner side of the fuel tank. RtL was deemed to be low due to the slow nature of the drip. The
investigation determined that the most likely cause of the fuel leak was degradation (wearand tear) of the O ring for the cross feed valve on the inner side of the fuel tank.
CESSNA 150 CONTINENTAL Initial climb EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 11/11/2023 202337906

(TELEDYNE) USA
200 FAMILY
Rough running engine on climb out and engine lost full power. Emergency declared and aircraft returned.
Pilot Statement. On a climb out at around 600-700ft engine lost full power and at full throttle started vibrating. while we still had some power I decided to declare emergency and turn
back to the runway. We took off of 28L and landed on to 10. Before take off, all power checks were completed satisfactory
CESSNA 150 CONTINENTAL En-route EGCB : Manchester/Barton 25/11/2023 202340506

(TELEDYNE) USA
200 FAMILY
Infringement of the Manchester CTA (Class D) by a C152 at 2700ft.

APC S. Controlling as mentor to phase 10 learner. *** infringed the CTA North of EGCB. The a/c was indicating 2.7A and squawking 7365. I telephoned EGCB who instructed the a/c
to descend.
It was my first flight after passing my SEP skills test. I was flying back towards Barton after a local flight and knew I had to descend down from 3000ft to 1700ft ready to rejoin. I briefly
lost my situation awareness and started my descent late by which point I had passed into the Manchester CTA where the base is at 2500. I quickly realised and Barton ATSU had also
contacted to inform me of my position. By this point, I had already increased my descent to get down to 1700ft. I do use a moving map but at this time it wasn't in use as I was trying to
go off my heading and timings that I had planned whilst using my chart.
CESSNA 152 LYCOMING Take-off run EGKR (KRH) : Redhill 17/01/2023 202312960
O235
Rejected take-off due to no airspeed indicator. Blocked pitot tube.

At 1015 **** commenced a take-off however shortly afterwards at a low speed rejected the take-off due to no airspeed indicator increase. The pilot asked to taxi back to the threshold
and attempt to clear the pitot tube which was the suspected problem. Another take-off was attempted at 1025, which again resulted in another rejection due to no airspeed indicator
indication. The aircraft then taxied back to parking to make further attempts to rectify the issue. At 1038 the aircraft successfully took-off and proceeded en-route to lydd.
CESSNA 152 LYCOMING Initial climb EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 06/11/2023 202337427
O235
Full emergency declared due to rough running engine on take-off. Aircraft returned and emergency services deployed.
Whilst working as ADI trainee under OJTI instruction *****, a C152, had been cleared for take-off for a VFR departure to Meppershall. At 12:05Z on climb out the aircraft was observed
to make a sharp left turn instead of the planned right and joined the low level circuit, at this point the pilot reported a rough running engine and that they intended to land back at
Cambridge, a Full Emergency was called. At 12:06 the local emergency services were informed and the Aerodrome RFFS also reported on frequency in 'Crash Combine', details were
confirmed with the aerodrome emergency services. *-** was cleared to and had already landed at this time and was initially instructed to hold position to allow the Aerodrome
emergency services to access the runway. The pilot was asked whether he could taxi under his own power to which he replied in the affirmative, the RFFS vehicles advised they would
require to enter the runway to turn around so that they could meet the aircraft at the Compass base, they were cleared to enter the runway and hold short of taxiway Charlie in order to
follow the aircraft off of the runway. Another C152 (*****) had been sent around to keep the runway clear and was instructed to orbit mid point downwind to make room for the
emergency aircraft. *-** vacated the runway at 12:08 and shut-down in the compass base for the RFFS vehicles to respond. D and D were informed at 12:12, at this time we asked
whether the RFFS required the local emergency services, they replied that they did not so the local services were stood down. The RFFS took their tow vehicle out to retrieve the aircraft
and take it back to Hangar 1. At 12:18 the SAFO (Fire 1) confirmed that the emergency could be stood down and after a runway inspection normal operations resumed.
Corrective Action - No corrective action required Containment - Emergency plan activated using FACT 24 system. - Emergency services responded to incident and stood down once
aircraft deemed safe. Root Cause - No root cause attributable to EGSC. Processes worked effectively
CESSNA 152 LYCOMING En-route EGSS (STN) : 25/11/2023 202340461

O235 London/Stansted
Infringement of the Stansted CTA (Class D) by a C152 at 2000ft.

Whilst controlling a bandboxed configuration with SS INT and FIN. A radar return got airborne within the EGSX (North Weald) area (15nm~ south of
EGSS). It started tracking towards the west whilst climbing. Upon leaving the EGSX area the return continued to climb passed 1500ft infringing the SS
CTA activating CAIT. As SS were operating on Runway 04, the potential risk of losing separation with SS inbounds was increased. However, during this
time there was a natural gap between inbounds so no action was required. Using MODE S the return was identified as ***, squawking 7000. Just
before a blind call was transmitted the return started to squawk 5021 (EGLF Squawk). After a phone call to EGLF LARS North, they were able to give the
full details of the AC (Cessna 152), the routing and the type. A suggestion was given to remind the pilot of the airspace surrounding North Weald to
hopefully avoid any potential problems on the return flight.
N&E, Medium to High traffic. *** called on frequency after departing EGSX inside CAS climbing to 2A above TMZ2. They were leaving CAS as they
called so no action needed.
I took off from north Weald made a left turn east and then west . I am aware I started my climb to early and entered Stan-stead CTA 1500ft which was a silly mistake my by me and
infringed that airspace and will not happen again on my behalf. The reason for that was just a pure accident by me which caused this .
I took off from north Weald and followed a departure out the to west and after take off i climbed to 1200ft. Approximately 5 minutes later once I was away from circuit height I began my
climb to 2000ft realising that I entered Stanstead CTA by mistake immediately after initiated a descent to 1500ft ( Stanstead CTA limit ) and when I switched to Farnborough radar I was
informed of that infringement and I had already left the CTA two minutes later. This lead to pure pilot error by myself and was an accident and lead to confusion by myself . Apologies
for this won’t happen again.
CESSNA 152 LYCOMING En-route BNN 25/11/2023 202340462

O235
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C152 at 2600ft.

*** was seen to infringe CAS @2600' in the vicinity of BNN, no action was taken.
N&E, Medium to High traffic. I was carrying out a handover and had just gone through the traffic on North and was going through all the AC on East. As I was doing this CAIT went off
and it was *** for his 2nd infringement of his short flight. I told the AC to descend to leave CAS.
I climbed to 2600ft and wasn’t unaware of London TMA at 2500ft . This lead to Infringement in the TMA . I was confused with this because I mis identified that TMA to be 3000ft not
2500ft which was an error and confusion by myself .
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route Grafham Waters 29/09/2023 202335481
360 FAMILY
UK AIRPROX 2023235 - DA40 and an unknown aircraft IVO Grafham Waters.
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route EGNM (LBA) : Leeds 18/10/2023 202335493

320 FAMILY Bradford
Infringement of Leeds CTR (Class D) by a C172 at 2300ft squawking 7000.

7000 squawk observed 7nm south east of LBA heading towards Leeds controlled airspace. Blind calls made. *** calls as he enters Leeds airspace at 2300ft squawking 7000.
Direct route from Sherburn to Eccup reservoir VRP. As an instructor I was giving as much flexibility as possible to the student with regard to navigation. As he was used to departing
Leeds East, and not Sherburn, he took up a track which was too southerly. As an instructor, I misjudged the point at which I needed to intervene, and we entered the Zone before
receiving the clearance. Our initial call to the Radar frequency coincided with our crossing of the boundary. Whilst I appreciated that any infringement is unacceptable, having
interrogated the ADS B Exchange website and downloaded the track, I estimate that the infringement was well within a mile.
Please be aware that I have been instructing at EGNM for over a year with numerous sorties conducted without incident.
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 01/11/2023 202337504

360 FAMILY
UK reported NEAR MISS - C172 and DA40 overhead Cambridge.

I was flying a circuit lesson with a student in a C172 for ***. Cambridge Airport has recently allowed **** from Cranfield to operate DA40 and DA42s from Cambridge on certain days.
This day was one of them. My understanding is that the DA42s fly a larger and higher circuit and the DA40 would be expected to fly standard circuits. The general view from xxxxxx
Club instructors is that the DA40s of **** fly excessively large circuits at Cambridge which disrupt our lessons Just before turning downwind for runway 23, I was asked to take up right
hand orbits at the start of the downwind leg and that there would be a DA40 orbiting at the end of the downwind leg. I instructed my student accordingly. On turning downwind my
student started a right turn. After 2 or 3 seconds I instructed him to apply more bank and explained we will need to fly an oval into wind in order to maintain position. (The wind was
down the runway). From commencing the right hand orbit I maintained visual with the DA40 and at no time did I think it was too close. In my opinion the DA40 pilot sounded ‘panicky’
over the radio. Orbiting one or more aircraft in the circuit is common practice at Cambridge and is likely to happen at least once during every circuit lesson. I suspect the DA40 pilot was
not used to such procedures. I think also with the DA40 flying each leg of the Cambridge circuit twice the length of the one agreed by the based operators, he was expecting to see me at
the start of his downwind leg and not at the start of mine, approximately one and a half miles difference. In my opinion there was no airprox.
DUE TO INS TRAFFIC, WE (***) WERE ASKED TO ORBIT AT THE END OF THE DOWNWIND AND THE C172 WAS ASKED TO ORBIT AT THE START OF THE
DOWNWIND. WE HAD APPROX. 25 KNOTS OF TAILWIND ON THE DOWNWIND LEG AND IT SEEMED THAT THE C172 WAS DRIFTING CLOSER TO US AT WE
WERE HALF WAY INTO THE ORBIT. WE GOT A TAS ALERT AND ALSO BECAME VISUAL WITH THE C172 WHICH SEEMED TO BE GETTING CLOSER. WITH
SAFETY IN MIND, WE BROKE AWAY FROM THE ORBIT AND EXTENDED DOWNWIND, ADVISING ATC.
I was on duty as ADI during a busy circuit training session. There were two aircraft cct training with another on the instrument approach and a category A helimed to depart. *** DA40
was instructed to orbit at the end of the downwind leg to allow for the priority traffic to depart, he was passed traffic on a C172 *** orbiting at the beginning of the downwind leg behind
him. *** was instructed to orbit at the beginning of the downwind leg and was passed traffic information on the DA40 orbiting at the end of the downwind leg. The *** departed and the
circuit traffic continued and after a few minutes *** advised me that he would be filing an airporx against the C172 in the circuit who "was not orbiting early downwind"
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route CAWZE 10/11/2023 202337521

320 FAMILY
Infringement of Cotswold CTA (Class D) by a C172.

At approximately 0920Z, an aircraft squawking A5050 was observed to enter the Cotswold CTA with Mode C readout of cFL106, above the base of
controlled airspace. I contacted EGGD radar to check if they had communication with the aircraft and to verify the aircraft's intentions.
I was informed by the EGGD controller that the aircraft was ***, believed to have previously been on their listening frequency, but with whom they
now had two way R/T contact. The EGGD controller reported the pilot believed he was at FL102. It was later discussed between myself and the EGGD
controller that the pilot may have been using their QNH of 992hPa instead of the standard pressure setting of 1013hPa but I do not know if the pilot
confirmed this over the R/T. The aircraft was later descended by EGGD and left CAS.
The reason I entered the Class A Cotswold Controlled Area (CTA-13) as I was on route to Lincoln area from Exeter, I was aware with the forecast that there was going to be some cloud
around, worse in the south and getting better further north. As I was around Taunton I noticed a large amount of cloud that was around Bristol area so I decided to climb above this to stay
VMC (there were also fairly high winds so preferred being above the cloud for a smoother ride) And with the cloud i had already been over I didn't think it would be that long until I
could drop down again . I knew there was CTA at FL105 But I didn't change my Altimeter to 1013 and had it at the QNH setting of 996 so I thought I was clear of the CTA, as my
altimeter was reading less than 10,500ft. I was on listening frequency for Bristol 125.650 Sq 5077. They got in touch when they saw that I had entered the airspace. As soon as they said I
realised my mistake and could safely do so I found a gap in the cloud to drop below it, I continued the flight with out incident.
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING Climb into traffic EGMC (SEN) : Southend 11/11/2023 202337758
360 FAMILY pattern
Reduced engine power on departure. Full emergency declared. Aircraft returned.

**** departed runway 23 at 1410. Shortly after the aircraft reported engine problems with reduced power and a popping sound. The pilot requested an immediate return to Southend
airport, the aircraft was given a right hand circuit and declared number one in traffic. Full emergency - small aircraft called. The aircraft landed safely at 1416 and taxiied back to ****
without further incident. Incident stand-down 1419.
CESSNA 172 UNKNOWN Normal descent EGNT (NCL) : Newcastle 23/10/2023 202337970
UNKNOWN
VFR aircraft unable to get visual with surface. It was ascertained the pilot did not have suitable qualifications to fly an ILS or IFR approach. Headings given to re-gain visual. At about
1nm final the pilot reported that he could see the surface.
***, Cessna 172, called on Newcastle approach frequency approximately 8 miles north of Morpeth VRP stating that he was a VFR aircraft that could not get sight of the surface and
therefore could not landed at his intended destination of Eshott Airfield, he requested to come into land at Newcastle.The pilot was given clearance to enter the CTR (in the vicinity of
Morpeth) maintaining his current altitude of 2800ft Special VFR.Once inside the CTR the aircraft was given vectors to ensure separation form an inbound IFR aircraft on the ILS for Rwy
07.Radar 2 was opened at this point to take Inbound IFR traffic to hold at ETSES.Tower were informed of the aircraft and requested to take a local standby. Whilst I considered this to be
an ermergency situation the pilot was NOT instructed to squawk 7700, in order to avoid further stress in an already difficult situation.The pilot was instructed to fly headings and was
given clearance to slow descend maintaining VMC until he reached the cloud tops.It was ascertained the the pilot did not have suitable qualifications to fly an ILS or IFR approach.The
aircraft was given headings to position at about 3nm final RW07 and pointing towards the overhead, the pilot was instructed to continue on heading 070 degrees to wards the overhead
and report if he could see any visual identification with the surface.At about 1nm final the pilot reported that he could see the surface. I instructed the aircraft report if he felt he could
maintain visual reference to the surface, which he affirmed, he was then cleared to descend at his own discretion maintaining visual with the surface.The pilot was offered to maintain
station on the Approach frequency which he accepted.When at approximately 1000ft the pilot report he was over the runway and would perform a low level circuit ti land.He was
informed he could position 'as required' in either circuit direction and to report on final for RW07.Via the intercom, clearance to land was obtained from the Tower Controller.The pilot
was instructed that after landing he should come to a stop on the runway and await a follow me vehicle to parking. The aircraft was cleared to land on RW07 on the approach frequency
and landed safely at 1422, after which he was instructed to hold position on the runway and contact the tower frequency.
CESSNA 172 CONTINENTAL En-route Epsom/Kenley 15/11/2023 202339101

(TELEDYNE) USA
300 FAMILY
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C172 at 3000ft.

Operating SVFR, in a Westerly configuration. The sector was being operated by a Student controller with myself as OJTI. At approximately 1440z, an EXCDS strip was received from
KK of a potential transit - *** a C172 EGKA to EGSC that was transiting through KK controlled airspace south to north. An onwards squawk of 7030 was entered onto the strip for KK.
*** was observed to leave the northern boundary of KK airspace tracking northeast, roughly in the vicinity of Epsom / Kenley and apply the 7030 squawk. A short period of time had
elapsed with no contact, and I noticed the Mode C displaying altitude 3000ft, infringing controlled airspace where the base is 2,500ft. An attempt was made to raise *** on the frequency
to no response. A phonecall was made to KK to see if they still had the aircraft, but that they had already transferred it. A priority phone call was then made to TC SE to alert them to the
infringement - as no CAIT alert was present due to the aircraft being on a discrete SVFR squawk. There were no aircraft in the vicinity at the time and no loss of separation observed. ***
did then check in on frequency. They were instructed to descend immediately and informed they were infringing controlled airspace. The QNH was passed. Once the aircraft had vacated
controlled airspace in descent, they were provided with a basic service and the onwards zone transit of London City with no further incident.
After transiting and exiting the Gatwick CTA at 1,400 feet ASML, I started my climb back up to the expected and planned cruise level of 2,200 feet ASML. Radio contacts were frequent
and a lack of concentration on my part caused me to bust the bottom of the London TMA.
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route BNN 17/11/2023 202339102

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C172 at 2300ft. An early turn off the SID for a departing aircraft was given to avoid the infringer.
Infringing traffic spotted tracking NE at BNN at A23 initially and subsequently climbed to A27. The infringing return was found to be *** squawking A7000. The GW INT controller
later informed me that he freecalled C172 and was able to tell the aircraft to leave CAS via descent which the aircraft did. An early turn off the SID to avoid the infringing traffic was
given on a WU CPT departure *** but no avoiding action given as there was enough time for the turn to take effect without separation being lost. There was also traffic *** requesting to
join the sector from EGTR about 1nm in trail. This traffic had not been given clearance to enter CAS and was outside CAS under a basic service at the time so no action was taken against
the infringer for this aircraft. Only once the infringing traffic was seen to have left CAS was a joining clearance given to *** .
CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route Sevenoaks 25/11/2023 202340446

320 FAMILY
UK AIRPROX 2023257 - C172 and an unknown aircraft which caused an infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C172 at 2600ft.
LARS N&E, Medium to High traffic. *** reported on frequency at 2.6A East of Sevenoaks. I told it to descend and then issued a squawk and service when OCAS.
Please note i reported the below as an airprox AIRPROX BOARD ####
On my way to Bembridge from north weald, i carried out my usual freda checks, looking for traffic. i was heading south, and I was on a basic service. I did ask for traffic service because
the airspace was very busy and the low sun made it harder to spot aircraft. i exersised due diligence to keep away from airspace above. however, all of a sudden, a piper as i was heading
south, the other aircraft went from my left to right, i spotted him to my left and i could see he did not see me to take avoiding actions, usually both aircraft turn to the right. i had nothing
else to do other than climb because i was at 2300 feet approx, had to climb immediately to get above him because decreasing height will have caused a collision.
at that same moment in time, i also had my eye on another aircraft to my right that was close to me that i was watching, so at that moment, everything happened at once, low sun hazards,
two aircraft at once, didnt get a traffic service, and the fast speed aircraft to my left was on my collision path i had to take emergency actions to climb to avoid a collision.
i also was refused a traffic service and this would have been better as i then could have had more heads up with this other aircraft with it so busy and a low sun hazard.
CESSNA 182 CONTINENTAL En-route EGKK (LGW) : 09/11/2023 202337518
(TELEDYNE) USA London/Gatwick
O470
Infringement of Gatwick CTR (Class D) by a C182 at 2000ft.

I was plugged in as KK approach with all positions band-boxed. At approximately 1417 I noticed an infringer in the NW of the Gatwick CTR, wearing 3767
squawk for Redhill conspicuity, that sCAIT had turned pink to indicate unknown traffic in the zone. Mode S told me that the callsign was ****.
My first reaction was to get on the FIN priority line to the tower to let them know this was unknown traffic and to pass information to the departure I'd just
seen get airborne. After letting them know of the presence of the infringer they informed me that they had already transferred the departure, ***, to
London Control (SE), so I said I'd call across to let them know and agreed with the tower on their suggestion that all further departures should be
suspended until further notice. I verbally shouted across the room to the controllers sitting on SE to let them know the infringer was unknown traffic and
that the *** would need action against it. I found later that they had issued avoiding action to the *** and vectored it clear of the infringing traffic
until it had left the zone, and were confident they had not lost separation against it at any point.
My next action was to call Redhill on the phone and they knew straightaway that I was looking for the infringer, ****, and asked if I would like it on my
frequency, to which I affirmed and told them to tell it to contact 126.825. Redhill had informed me that the pilot had reported that he was avoiding
turbulence which may be the reason for the infringement. I carried on with my normal IFR traffic and when *** called on I gave it a Gatwick squawk
(3750) and validated and verified the aircraft so that we no longer had to take evasive action against it. I asked the pilot if he was intending on leaving the
zone to the north to which he confirmed he was, and looking back I realise I never gave an official clearance to leave controlled airspace but I was
confident at this point that at least he was no longer a hazard to our IFR traffic. I then informed him that due to the fact he had infringed Gatwick
controlled airspace without our knowledge and we had to take evasive action against him that paperwork would have to be filed just to make him aware.
*** then left the zone, and after dealing with my other traffic transferred him back to Redhill so that he could continue as intended outside of CAS.
Tower called soon after that to ask if we could resume departures as normal, to which I agreed free flow of departures again and then carried on with the
rest of my traffic.
Unsettled by helicopter calling same location and passing beneath meant I was not ready for the adverse weather.
(See Pilot notes submitted with this questionnaire)
CESSNA 210 UNKNOWN En-route Selby 12/10/2023 202336477

UNKNOWN
Overflight of active winch glider site.

*** *** *** is located to the southwest of both Sherburn (EGCJ) and Leeds East (EGCM) airfields. Launch methods by winch and aerotows. **** is identified on 500mil aviation chart
showing winch launching to 3000ft and air/ground radio of 129.980. It is also labelled as an area of Intense Gliding Activity. When ** ****** is operating both Sherburn and Leeds East
are notified by e-mail so that any GNSS approaches can be made aware.<br>On Thursday 12th October 2023 **** were launching gliders on runway 25 to heights of 1500ft.<br> At
14:01 (local) a light aircraft was heard and then seen approaching the airfield on a heading of approximately 330 degrees. It was identified as Cessna T210M from Flightradar24 at a
height of 1800Ft and again at 1768Ft (barometric).<br>The Cessna overflew the winch situated at the western end of runway 25 potentially within 300ft of a winch launched glider. At
the time no gliders were being launched.<br>Later at 14:52 (Local) a light aircraft was heard and seen approaching the airfield on a heading of approx 150 degrees, It was not visible on
Flight radar 24 but was observed from above by a *** **** which had winch launched at 14:50. The **** glider was equipped with an ADS-B conspicuity device (SkyEcho2).The
Cessna again was judged to have flown over the winch located on the western end of runway 25. Sherburn Aeroclub were contacted in an attempt to identify the aircraft, they suggested
the aircraft was out of Leeds East airport. Leeds East airport were contacted and confirmed that the Cessna registration **** had departed and heading to Sturgate airfield (Lincolnshire.
) The Pilot was made aware that *** *** *** were active before leaving Leeds East.I am concerned that the Cessna pilot overflew an active gliding site well below the height shown on
the air navigation charts as a glider site winching to 3000ft, twice in an hour and when on the return trip they had been made aware of the active gliding site.This would suggest poor
airmanship, route planning and lack of understanding of the risk in his actions.
CESSNA 340 CONTINENTAL Landing EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 17/01/2023 202312313
(TELEDYNE) USA
TSIO520
New encoding altimeter giving false mode C.

On second flight after annual maintenancewhere the encoding altimeter was replaced we notice a discrepancy between the two altimeters. With the help of the RAD ALT we established
the new altimeter was over reading so adjusted our altitude to maintain flight below controlled airspace using the correct data from the right altimeter.Whilst carrying out circuit training
at North Weald the radio operator informed us Stansted had called and asked us to remain outside their CTA as it appeared we were at 1700 ft when we were in fact at 1300 ( base of
controlled airspace 1500 ) We established contact with stansted confirmed we were below the CTA and offered to switch off the mode C as it was obvious the encoder was giving
incorrect information. They preferred us to keep the mode C on and so we agreed to maintain a listening watch with Stansted radar Box 2 until the detail was completed. On arrival
Biggin Hill engineers informed and awaiting maintenanceinput and report.
CESSNA 402 UNKNOWN Cruise En route 01/06/2023 202319101

UNKNOWN
Smoke in cabin due to hydraulic fluid leak.

On 1st of June 2023 as the pilot operating the aircraft xxxxxx, I departed AAA with three passengers, one male and two females. The male passenger sat in the co- pilot seat and two
females in the immediate seat behind. The aircraft departed AAA at 2:49pm local time and climbed up to cruising altitude of 6500. Levelled at my cruising altitude of 6500, I began to
take this unusual smell in the aircraft. I turned to look at the back of the aircraft to determine the source of the smell. With the aircraft at cruise altitude I observed what appeared to be
smoke coming from the below the instrument panel. I immediately opened the small DV window next to me to let out the smoke. At that time, I was able to assess that it was not smoke
related to any electrical fire based on the smell emanating. It seemed to smell more like oil on a warm or hot surface. I closed the window and after closing the window, I could tell the
situation was still present because of some smoke still in the cabin. I then turned off the air-condition unit which I knew was on and would be the likely source of the warm surface. The
smoke then subsided almost immediately. All this was done while maintaining altitude and directional control of the aircraft. There were no abnormalities with the systems or operating
parameters of the aircraft to get my concern. With the smoke isolated, I kept the small DV window next to me partially open to control the smell until I was ready to land in BBB. As I
was descending abeam xxxxx the passenger behind me tapped my shoulder trying to communicate something to me. I indicated to her that I could not understand what she was saying
and gave her a thumb’s up as to indicate everything is under control. After landing in BBB I welcomed the passengers and briefed them on the situation and explained that the situation
was never in any way life threating to passenger or structural damage to the aircraft. The Defect was recorded in the Tech Log and maintenance was alerted and briefed to ascertain and
determine what the likely cause of the smell and smoke may have been. On report from the captain to maintenance upon arrival and the subsequent defect raised, the aircraft was taken to
the hanger and the source of the smell was investigated. It was found that the bottom of the hydraulic reservoir sight inspection tube/hose was chafed and leaked hydraulic fluid down the
fittings onto the Air-Condition Evaporator Motor housing. *The hydraulic Reservoir Inspection hose was replaced with a serviceable item and secured with clamps rather than fast ties.
*The area around the attachment clamps was checked for any further possible chafing to take place to the hose in the future that may be caused any movement or squeezing/pressure
overtime applied to the inspection panel…rectification and panel installation was found to be very sturdy and well secured...determined to be satisfactory with positioning of the
attachment clamps to mitigate against any chafing of the inspection hose…See pic.. “inspection window with clamps installed” in attachment. Continued monitoring between inspections
will be embraced.
CESSNA 406 PRATT & WHITNEY Taxi to runway EGNX (EMA) : Nottingham 29/03/2023 202323759
(CANADA) East Midlands
PT6A
Aircraft taxied past cleared stop bar, causing near conflict with another aircraft.
F406 XXXXXX asked for taxi from XXX apron for departure. He was told to taxi to A6 and the stopbar was put on. ###### was subsequently given taxi clearance out of the Central
Apron via Q to A1. XXXXXX didn't appear to be slowing down as he approached the A6 stopbar so I asked him to confirm that he was stopping at A6. He said that he was stopping
there but came to a stop after A6. Had he continued he would have been in direct conflict with the taxying #######. I then instructed him to follow the ######.
Timeline Short Description
0540 XXXXX called to taxi to MA
0543/50 XXXXX called for further taxi, given taxi clearance to A6
0545/40 XXXXX appears to taxi over A6, tower at this moment, questioned XXXXX to confirm holding A6, to
which XXXXX apologised and confirmed holding A6.
0545/50 XXXXX told to give way to traffic taxiing from Q and then taxi to hold W1.
XXXXXX called to taxi to MA, shortly thereafter, XXXXX requested further taxi for departure, tower controller, gave an initial clearance to XXXXX to taxi from MA and to hold at A6.
This was then read back to the tower controller by XXXXX. As XXXXX approached A6 holding point, it was clear to the controller that XXXXX wasn't going to stop at A6. XXXXX
was then questioned as to whether he was going to stop at A6, to which XXXXX apologised and advised holding at. The operator contacted the ANS Safety manager a few days after the
event and explained that the pilot was distracted during the taxi out. The controller gave a positive clearance to XXXX to hold at A6, which was read back correctly. XXXX then taxied
and on the SMR appeared to cross the A6 stop bar, but was quickly challenged by the controller, to which XXXX confirmed he was holding at A6. Correct procedures carried out by the
tower controller, clearance was read back by XXXX spot by the tower controller that the likelihood was that XXXX was not stopping at A6 and reminded him of the clearance limit.
CESSNA 441 GARRET AIRESEARCH Cruise Westcott corridor 14/11/2023 202337990

TPE 331 FAMILY
PAN declared due to rapid decompression. Crew donned oxygen masks.

***** was transferred to me maintaining FL280 routing to PEPIS. I noted this would just clip BCN airspace, so coordinated this with them. Shortly afterward, at approximately 1750z
***** declared a PAN, a decompression, and that they needed descent down to FL150. I immediately cleared the aircraft down to FL220, and then phoned TC CAP to coordinate further
through their airspace, then further cleared the aircraft down to FL160. I noted the aircraft turning right as it descended at roughly 5000 feet per minute, and so once again coordinated
with BCN. I instructed the aircraft to squawk 7700. The pilot reported that they had full control of the aircraft but wanted further descent down to FL120. There is no direct phone line to
TC deps/SW from the sector, so I coordinated this via TC CAP, and then subsequently cleared the aircraft down to FL120. When asked, the pilot stated their intentions were to continue
to destination. I noted again the aircraft turning while it descended, and so instructed the aircraft to fly a heading of 175 to ensure it stayed inside controlled airspace. I then transferred the
aircraft to TC SW, as previously coordinated via TC CAP.
We had departed EGNE at 1723Z and had climbed without incident to FL280 in a stepped climb due to ATC restriction.We had been established in the cruise for approximately 10
minutes, cabin pressure seemed normal and the cabin altitude was reading approximately 8000ft. Suddenly, there was a banging sound came from within the cabin followed by a rapid
increase in cabin altitude. The rapid change in pressure could be felt by the ears and the cabin altitude rate of climb showed in excess of the upper limit on the scale. The third crew
member who was sat in the cabin later reported that a fogging had occurred in the cabin so he knew that a rapid decompression had occurred and the oxygen masks dropped
automatically, one of which he donned. The flight crew immediately donned oxygen masks and I made a PAN PAN call to London to alert them that we had had a rapid decompression
and required an immediate descent. We were immediately cleared to FL220 and the emergency descent procedure was initiated. During the descent I monitored the cabin altitude which
contained to show a rising cabin at a high rate. At the request of ATC we changed the squark to 7700. Further descent was requested, and we were given FL160 and asked where we
would like to descend to and I requested FL120. After some arranging ATC allowed the descent to continue constantly down to FL120 where we levelled off.
At this point the situation seemed under control. The aircraft was behaving normally. ATC asked for our intentions, and since we were only 30 minutes away from EGJB ( the CAMO
maintenance base) we decided to continue low level to destination. The flight continued without further incident. In the decent from FL120 into EGJB it was noted that the cabin rate of
descent indicator was reading 1500ft per minute down almost continuously until we reached the ILS platform altitude of 2000ft. The pressure increase within the cabin was also
continuously noticeable by the ears. After landing there was no pressure dump or change in pressure noticeable, but it was decided that it would be good practice to select the cabin
depressurise switch to ensure that the cabin was completely depressurised. There was no change when the switch was selected. After shutdown, operations and maintenance were
informed.
CESSNA 525 WILLIAMS Cruise EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 27/03/2023 202336458
FJ44
TCAS RA.
Thames rang to inform us that ##### had reported a TCAS RA and had climbed to 3400'. No other details were passed by APP to TWR. ##### made no report of TCAS warnings on
134.805 before switching to Thames, and had been passed traffic information on light aircraft traffic working approach.
1. 1311 - #### Clearance - BPK 2, climbing 2400ft altitude. off runway 03.
2. 1314 - Right turn at 1nm, runway 03 Clear for takeoff.
3. 1314 - @@@@@ free called Approach inbound 5nm NE of the field and given traffic information
on the Citation just about to depart runway 03 turning east after departure, which was
acknowledged by the pilot.
4. 1314.30 traffic information passed on an inbound aircraft working Biggin Approach, 4.5nm NE
field a Cherokee @@@@@, which was acknowledged by the pilot.
5. 1315 #### given climb to 3000ft.
Findings and
observations
1@@@@@ first call was at 5nm inbound, so limited time available to pass traffic information, but
this was achieved,.whilst both aircraft were in Class G airspace.
2. Normal procedures conducted with traffic information being passed as early as possible to
both aircraft.
3. Biggin ATC were not informed of the TCAS RA. by the pilot of #####
No action required.
CESSNA 525 WILLIAMS Standing : Engine(s) EGBB (BHX) : Birmingham 11/03/2023 202321367
FJ44 Not Operating
Aircraft not positioned correctly on stand.

xxx xxx wing positioned over T-Boards on stand xxx. Cone placed under wing by handling agent.
CESSNA 525 WILLIAMS Taxi to runway EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 09/11/2023 202338235
FJ44
Aircraft taxied through cleared holding point.

XXXX a C25B from EGKB to ESSA was instructed to taxi from our main apron to holding pointD1 for a 21 departure. The aircraft was observed taxiing through the holding point and
commencing the right turn on to the perpendicular portion of taxiway that leads on to the runway. ATC asked the aircraft if they had passed the holding point and to hold position. The
aircarft departed without any issues a few miuntes later. A lighting inspection was requested and the Checker reported no lighting faults at the D1 holding point.
CESSNA 560 UNKNOWN Scheduled EGTK (OXF) : 28/09/2022 202234722

UNKNOWN maintenance Oxford/Kidlington
Issue with grease type used.

AMM task 12-20-32-6400 Para C Table 301. (See attachment). on ** Top Nosewheel Steering Bearing - Lube type is listed as Aeroshell 7 Type 1 (PN U197003) Bottom Nosewheel
Steering Bearing - Lube type is listed as Aeroshell 7 Type 1 (PN U197003) Top and Bottom TQ Link - Lube Type GHL. AMM 12-20-00 List of lubricants copied below includes ref to
GHL as Aeroshell Grease 7.Ref AMM task 12-20-32-6400 Para F Note states that NW steering bearings are shipped with Aeroshell Grease 7. AMM 1220-32-6400 Para D indicates
grease to be used on upper and lower tq links is type 1 grease. Aeroshell Handbook edition 2021 details that Aeroshell 7 is Type II (not Type 1). Both the AMM and Aeroshell book
caution that Type II should not be mixed with Type I. (See attachment). Due the inconsistency of the AMM If engineers utilise a type 1 grease such as Grease 33 , with type 2 grease such
as Grease Aeroshell 7 already in it, this will result in mixing of incompatible greases. ** have been contacted to clarify which grease Type 1 or Type 2 Grease is recommended for this
task. In the event of mixing of incompatible grease, the caution is for breaking down of the thickener structure of the grease. This would likely result in failure of the lubricant to prevent
wear and corrosion that would highly likely be detected before any failure that would result in an accident outcome. Safety Manager's Comments Actions to address the AMM have been
left with Textron, the TCH. ** have no further control over the actions on the AMM. The problem of identification of what grease has been used on the landing gear remains. Other TCH
(SAAB) have issued an SB to colour code the grease nipple area. As ** only support customer aircraft , there is no provision for ** to develop a local modification. Awareness of the
issue will be highlighted by circulation of this Occurrence. Information supplied to team XL and response received on the same day 28/09/22 confirming change to AMM would be made.
Email from ** QM, sent on 29/09/22 highlighting significance of the change in the AMM on other Ac. Email attached. Consideration of impact on previously maintained AC by ** for
XLS . C525 series AMM does not seem to ref Aeroshell 7. Grease type changeover procedure now required on XLS**as recently issued NLG was provided with Aeroshell Grease 7 and
serviced with Grease 33. Findings and observations 2nd response from ** received (attached) - ** advised the change to spec was recent and only applicable to post SB560XL-32-44 but
the manual would be amended to reflect type II grease. No response was received on the possibility of use of 2 types of grease being on the 560XLS NLG and the human factors/ability to
mix greases from one maint organisation carrying out the task to another. It is recommended that the NLG grease points are identified with the grease being used. See act phase. The
actions on the aircraft that may have been affected have already been raised below.
CESSNA 750 HONEYWELL En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 30/10/2023 202337188

AS907 civil
CAS excursion.
I was approach, zone and west band boxed in very light traffic conditions. I knew I had **** inbound due in about 10 minutes so went looking for it to
the south as it had EVATA on the strip. I could not see it so though that maybe the estimate was wrong or it was too far away to see.
A few minutes later on I noticed the same aircraft 7 miles bearing 280 from EGLF. It was descending and had 40 as its selected level. I called the south
west radar line (normal, not priority) and when they answered I told them to stop it's descent. They responded with that it had been already transferred to me.
It called on my frequency passing 4.5A and therefore leaving CAS. I changed the service to a DS with no other traffic seen to affect. It re-entered CAS
after about a mile.
I called London after and they mentioned that because of its routing on the strip it was descended to 4A as that would be the level if it was on one of the
southerly STARs.
I was working as SW DEPS/OCK controller during a busy session with bad weather. The WILLO controller had taken a phonecall from AC checking that I
had strips on **** which I did. I transferred the aircraft to LF descending outside of CAS due to the exit level on the strip being incorrectly populated
to show 4A (possibly due to an incorrect reroute) but I didn't pick up on it due to a complex workload at the time.
Around 10 minutes after this incident I had another aircraft inbound to my sector (*** inbound to OCK which also had incorrect levels auto populated on it).
CESSNA F406 PRATT & WHITNEY Climb to cruising EGBB (BHX) : Birmingham 27/10/2023 202337971
(CANADA) level or altitude
PT6A
Level Bust F406 and potential loss of separation with A380.

*** was climbed to FL80 hdg 085deg from EGBB with *** inbound to EGBB descended to and maintaining FL90 working EGBB APC. At 11:37 I observed the **** at FL086 and
immediately instructed him to descend immediately to FL80 as that was his cleared level. he responded with "ah yes, I just realised that" and descended quickly. I am unsure if separation
was lost between the *** and ***. After I gave the instruction to the *** to descend, I telephoned EGBB to inform them that the TWG100 had level busted and was descending again.
CESSNA T206 UNKNOWN En-route Cardington 02/11/2023 202338892
UNKNOWN
T204 outside CAS.

Working as sector controller TMA North. *** on frequency, coordinated join with EGGW Approach at 6a. Climbed straight to FL90 on 1st contact.
Aircraft left controlled airspace for a few seconds just south of Cardington due poor climb performance. Service changed to basic service and as soon as done aircraft re-entered CAS so
service changed back immediately to RCS.
CIRRUS SR20 LYCOMING En-route Portmoak Airfield 23/09/2023 202336768

IO390
Overflight of active winch site by fixed wing aircraft below height listed on chart.
This aircraft flew over our site at about 1300 ft AGL. On that day our winch launches were frequently between 1200-1400 ft AGL. The pilot did not call before departure, nor did they
call en route. I was on the ground returning to the launch point with a student when I heard the aircraft, which flew directly over the site and then departed to the west. Weather was
overcast, cloud base around 3000 ft AGL.I later traced the pilot who called me back after their arrival at Biggin Hill. He was an instructor for the day trip to Glenrothes. He said that he
knew our site was there and decided to route overhead for weather (I could not see any weather to the south which required this, perhaps they were not ready to enter the Edinburgh
CTA). He told me that because he remained south of the winch line (barely, and still within the boundary of the airfield) this was perfectly acceptable, despite not making contact or
knowing whether we were about to launch. I told him that this represented incredibly poor airmanship. He told me that he was aware of gliding operations but didn't seem to accept that a
winch cable would create a hazard to his flight.
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL Take-off EGSH (NWI) : Norwich 03/11/2023 202337185

(TELEDYNE) USA
550 FAMILY
Birdstrike without damage or system problems. PAN Call.

I was acting as the EGSH Radar controller when at 1628, I received a Pan Pan call from *****. The Captain stated that the ac had suffered multiple birdstrikes on climbout from West
Raynham and requested an immediate diversion to Norwich. The ac was given the brief weather & clearance to enter CAS for a RH Downwind join for RW27. I liaised with the Tower
Controller who called a Full Emergency at 1632. The ATSA followed the Emergency guide and informed the ***** Service Control Room who then proceeded to ask the ATSA for
directions to the Airport. This was extremely unhelpful at a time when the ATSA was trying to complete all other actions and cope with the UHF radio traffic. The ac reported airfield in
sight, was passed to the Tower Controller and landed safely at 1638. A RW inspection was completed and the Fire Crews closed the incident at 1650. Subsequently, the ac booked out for
a flight to EGNV.
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route EGLK (BBS) : Blackbushe 13/11/2023 202338998

(TELEDYNE) USA
550 FAMILY
Infringement of the Farnborough CTR-1 (Class D) by an SR22 in the Blackbushe circuit.

I was working as an OJTI monitoring a low hours Radar trainee on Radar 1 operating Approach, LARS West and Zone bandboxed at the time of the event.
**** had previously crossed Farnborough's CTR under a correct VFR clearance operating from Fairoaks to Blackbushe VFR. The aircraft had left
CAS and been passed to Blackbushe.
A short while later, I was alerted to an infringement of the Farnborough CTR1 by means of the AIW alert function alerting against a 7010 squawk in the
Blackbushe circuit. Whilst this can occasionally generate alerts prior to an aircraft leaving the Blackbushe LFA, zooming in the Radar showed that the
aircraft had left the Blackbushe LFA and was therefore an infringement. There was a VFR transit within the CTR, but this was not proximate to the
infringer, so no ATC action was taken.
The Mode S data block indicated the callsign as ****, which I recalled had previously transited our airspace. Details were therefore obtained from the
retained strip.
I was conducting a series of training flights for a new PPL seeking to purchase a Cirrus, we had flown to Fairoaks to see an aircraft he was interested in purchasing. This was his first day
flying an SR22 which is faster than the DA40 he has learnt on. Our last sector was very short Fairoaks to Blackbushe. I obtained a clearance on the ground at Fairoaks to cross
Farnborough CTR. As soon as we were airborne from Fairoaks I contacted Farnborough and was cleared through their zone VFR not above 2000’.
We called visual with Blackbushe and were cleared to contact Blackbushe but retain the sqwark until in the circuit. Blackbushe cleared us straight in RW 25 but I didn’t want to rush my
client on his first day in a Cirrus so elected to enter the ATZ from the north while pattering him through through the circuit. We joined crosswind 25L at 100KTS IAS and our GS was
118KTS. As we turned downwind the wind speed was 260/46 at circuit altitude and our GS exceeded 150KTS downwind, by the time the student had completed the base we had briefly
exited the Blackbushe ATZ to the south east. At the time I did not notice because I was north of the M3 which is generally considered inside the Blackbushe ATZ while downwind, at
low altitude and in such strong wind conditions I was focusing on the flying of my student and not staring at Skydemon.
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route EGNR (CEG) : Hawarden 18/10/2023 202336675

(TELEDYNE) USA
TSIO550
Infringement of the Hawarden RMZ (Class G) by an SR22.

****, SR22, infringed the Hawarden RMZ transiting NW bound squawking 1177.
I had a knowledge gap for the requirements of an RMZ, this is my first airspace infringement having got my original licence nearly 20 years ago.
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route EGNM (LBA) : Leeds 29/10/2023 202336710
(TELEDYNE) USA Bradford
TSIO550
Infringement of airway L975 (Class C) by an SR22 at FL50 due to controller error.

**** called radar for a pre booked training sorting at LBA . The aircraft was inbound from EGNE (although the booking had them inbound from EGCM) After identifying and validating
the aircraft I cleared them to the LBA at 5.0 IFR . However I had failed to initially notice that due to the low pressure at Leeds (985hpa) this would take them into airway L975 where the
base is FL55. On reaching 5.0A (aprox Fl58) i realized my error and rang PC , apologized and asked for an IFR crossing clearance. The PC controller said it wasn't a problem and there
was no aircraft in that portion of the airway at that time. The aircraft then entered LBA airspace and completed their training detail as normal.
*** was the only aircraft on frequency
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL Cruise WARE 06/11/2023 202336845

(TELEDYNE) USA
TSIO550
Infringement of the Stansted CTA (Class D) by an SR22 at 2000ft.

**** was observed entering CAS in the vicinity of WARE, tracking NE at 2000'. The aircraft was not on either Stansted frequency and the GS called
Farnborough, who were also not working the aircraft. I put a Check All on monitored the aircraft until it left CAS to the North.
No other aircraft were involved.
I am filing this report as the instructor. I was sitting in the right-hand seat, teaching the aircraft owner, who is a PPL IR(R) holder who is training with me for his UK CB-IR. We had been
doing a day of Instrument training, with this to be the last flight of the day, being VOR tracking around the London area. Just prior to departure from EGTR, it became apparent that due
to sunset timing and the lack of daylight hours remaining, we changed from our initial plan of routing from BPK to LAM to DET, to the route BPK to BKY. This change shortly before
departure, and the added pressure factor of needing to return to Leicester prior to sunset, led us to change the route and inadvertently enter the Class D of Stansted, as the student was
taking time to change the VOR from BPK to BKY, and then take the northerly required route in challenging windy conditions, which affected the track of the aircraft to be further east
than anticipated.
CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route En-route 27/10/2023 202337515

(TELEDYNE) USA
550 FAMILY
Infringement of Airway (Class A) by a S22 at FL109. Level bust.

I was seated at OP...39I
I was training on TAY.
At 1420Z **** left CAS at PTH maintaining FL100, under a TS. The traffic was expected to rejoin CAS P600 on track to ADN still maintaining FL100.
At 1426Z *** called climbing to FL120 and was observed on radar inside CAS at FL109 (base of P600 FL105). I immediately instructed the traffic to
maintain FL110, due to traffic above cleared to and descending to FL120.
I advised **** that the flight had entered CAS above the planned level.
I revised the acceptance FL for *** with Aberdeen radar and then transferred to 119.055 at 1428Z.
COMCO IKARUS IKARUS C42 BOMBARDIER ROTAX Landing EGFH (SWS) : Swansea 15/10/2023 202336317
912 (ULS)
Conflict with helicopter on runway due to air ground operator error.

I’m an instructor and examiner, and was working at ****), Swansea EGFH(SWS). I was in the circuit (runway 22, RH) in ***, an Ikarus C42 A FB100 belonging to ***. I was PIC, my
student was flying, I was teaching exercise 12 in the NPPL syllabus, take-off and landing. We had flown maybe 7 landings and had been flying most of an hour. A Robinson R66
helicopter, ***, had landed before the start of the lesson, re-fuelled, and was preparing for take-off as we completed our eighth circuit. The A/G service knew we were in the circuit and
had received our regular ‘downwind’ and ‘final’ calls. Response to these calls was patchy and unpredictable, with the operator often acknowledging our calls quite late (frequently up to
20 second delay in response) and sometimes mistaking us for other aircraft when he replied. This low standard of A/G service was not unusual for that particular operator***but it was
noticeable and undermined safety as other traffic would either have to wait before transmitting, or butt in and disrupt the normal flow of call and response, to the confusion of everyone
on frequency. My student was handling the radio calls, with me jumping in as necessary to correct inappropriate responses from the A/G operator. That undermined the effectiveness of
the lesson, with the resulting radio confusion adding to the load on my student, and the distraction to me reducing the attention I could give to him. On our eighth landing, at around 15:15
UTC on Sunday 15/10/23, we were in the hold-off phase over the runway and about to touch down. We had made the appropriate ‘final’ radio call at the appropriate time, around 30 - 45
seconds ago. I heard the A/G operator tell the R66, who had lifted and was hover-taxying on taxiway Alpha ahead and to our left, that the runway in use was 22, right-hand. He then said
‘nothing known to affect…’ at which point the R66 pitched forward to enter runway 22, directly in our path. By that point we had just touched down, so I applied the brakes and brought
the C42 to a rapid halt, just as the R66 pilot saw us, and also stopped as sharply as a helicopter can. I taxied beyond him and applied full power to take off (22 is huge for a C42, so we
had plenty of runway remaining), and transmitted that we were resuming our take-off run, so that everyone involved knew our intentions. The A/G operator made some remark to the
R66 pilot that we were the aircraft he had previously said was on final, presumably when the R66 started to taxi since I didn’t hear that as part of the transmission when the helicopter was
on Alpha and waiting to depart. In my opinion, this kind of incident was inevitable sooner or later with this particular A/G operator. I teach and examine at Swansea regularly and also
have my own aircraft there, so have received service from this person many times over an extended period. My direct experience is that you won’t get any response at all from him
maybe 20% of the time, when you do get a response it’s very likely to be after a delay (often up to 10 seconds, sometimes 20), and if he does reply, it will frequently be to an incorrect
call sign, causing you to get back on the radio and correct his misunderstanding. He’s an accident waiting to happen. On the specifics of this particular incident, runway 22 is clearly
visible out of the large windows of the tower, the conditions were 1 okta cloud at 3,000’, 40km visibility beneath, less than 5 kn wind, all round excellent flying conditions, and it should
have been impossible for the A/G operator to be unaware of the position of the aircraft I was in charge of - HAD HE ACTUALLY BEEN LOOKING. My strong belief, given the
available evidence over an extended period, is this particular A/G operator is simply not paying attention to his job, not looking out of the window, and must be doing something else
rather than actually monitoring the local situation as he should. He frequently displays a faulty understanding of the operational situation he’s there to supply information on, and safety
is undermined as a result. This is a real shame, as he’s acceptable at his job when he actually pays attention, but this matter has, I understand, been mentioned to him many times over an
extended period, with no positive result. I therefore believe it’s time for this official report. I have spoken to the CFI at *** about this incident, who tells me that he had occasion the
previous day to go and see the safety manager in the tower, after an aircraft operated by another school at Swansea had an engine failure at take-off on runway 28. The lack of response
triggered by that event was so far from proper procedure that he went up to discuss it, since everyone’s safety was undermined by the poor response (there wasn’t even a runway
inspection afterwards, even though an engine failure could well indicate debris had been dumped onto the runway by the event - and I know that is true, as I was parked on the hold
warming up my own aircraft at the time, with a view of the runway in use, so I witnessed the whole thing and the lack of any proper response by the airport staff). The same A/G
operator was on duty, and my CFI observed that the normal ‘board’ system, by which an A/G operator would usually keep score of who’s where locally and what they were doing, was
present and available for use, but not being used. He challenged that, and was given an implausible excuse as to why it wasn’t in use. I can’t say any more about that, as I wasn’t present,
but I mention it as it seems relevant to what happened to me next day.
COMCO IKARUS IKARUS C42 BOMBARDIER ROTAX En-route EGHI (SOU) : Southampton 03/11/2023 202336824
(-UL WARP DRIVE
ground adjustable pitch )
BOMBARDIER ROTAX
(-UL WARP DRIVE
ground adjustable pitch )
Infringement of the Solent CTA-5 (Class D) by a C42 at 3000ft. No LOS.

*** infringed CTA5 in the vicinity of Winchester. Aircraft made an orbit before leaving to the north. Blind calls were made before and during the infringement with no response. There
was traffic right base for runway 20 at the time of the infringement but no loss of separation.
Rain shower at home airfield meant I had to spend some time nearby waiting for shower to leave the field before landing.
I chose to track down A34.
Previously I have always turned before South Wonston to keep out of Southampton airspace. Unfortunately this time, unusually, I was flying at 3000 feet not at 2000 ft as I normally
would.
The additional height kept me clear of nearby small cumulus clouds.
Had intended to fly North of Popham but due to arrival of rain cloud over Popham and another arriving to the West, I decided to wait for Popham to clear and return to land. I therefore
tracked down and then up the A34 - between the two clouds while I waited. There were also small cumulous at about 1800' - so I was flying at 3000'. Unfortunately I normally make sure
I fly at 2000' when South of Popham and so I incorrectly identified South Wonston as the Southampton airspace boundary. With the concern about the rain clouds and then seeing a
beautiful rainbow over Popham I had not though about the impact of my extra height.
COMCO IKARUS IKARUS C42 UNKNOWN En-route EGCC (MAN) : 05/11/2023 202336842
UNKNOWN Manchester/Intl
Infringement of the Manchester LLR by a C42 at 1600ft.

A 7365 squawk was observed in the LLR accompanied by the AIW alert. The traffic was identified using mode S as ****. I tried to contact the traffic
but they were not on frequency. I then phoned EGCB to see if they were in contact with them, they were not. I noticed that **** had then started to
climb and reached 1.6 in the LLR. I phoned EGGP to alert them to the issue. I then phoned EGCB to tell them that the traffic had climbed to 1.6 and also
to remind them to get them to squawk 7366 as EGCB were now in contact with the traffic.
Before take off the weather was checked, a weather front was expected but not before midday. Flight was proceeding without any concerns until the final leg when i became aware the
front had moved earlier than anticipated. At that time i was passing the M56 vfr and decided to switch back to Barton information to listen to any reports of the weather conditions, this is
when muscle memory took over and i also switched squawk code by mistake. Proceeding down the low level route the cloud thickened and rain began, further in to the leg of the trip i
was confronted by a large cloud formation that extended to below 1000 ft i could not see through but for a small area slightly above and to my left. Being VFR only i chose to take this
route and believe i ascended to 1400 ft to clear the formation. Shortly after that time Barto advised me of my transgression.
The weather conditions dictated the safest route for aircraft and pilot. Wind in excess of predictions delayed my flight times by approximately 15 minutes, the weather south of the low
level route being bright and sunny led me to believe i had time to continue my flight without the need to shorten any leg of the planned flight.
DE HAVILLAND DH82 DE HAVILLAND ( DE Landing EGKA (ESH) : Shoreham 25/11/2023 202340184

HAVILLAND GIPSY
MAJOR I ( HOFFMANN
HO21 198B 140LK )
DE HAVILLAND ( DE
HAVILLAND GIPSY
MAJOR I ( HOFFMANN
HO21 198B 140LK )
UK Reportable Accident: Aircraft drifted off runway on landing and struck a fence. Significant damage to right wing. One POB, no injuries. AAIB Record Only.
DE HAVILLAND DHC1 DE HAVILLAND En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 15/11/2023 202339096

GIPSY MAJOR civil
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a DHC1 at 4000ft.

*** a Chipmunk routing EGLF to EGLF VFR was general handling W of EGLK. At about 1055 the infringement alarm went off, showing *** at 4A 3nm west of LK where the base if
3.5A. I told them to descend or turn west, and then the Mode C readout showed 3.6A, then 3.1A, and went back to 4A. I asked *** their altitude and they said. I then asked them to turn
off their Mode C. When they left their Moe C was not on. I cant remember if I verified it when I saw an active Mode C readout. The initial infringement may not have been immediately
spotted as we have had spurious infringement alarms all day.
Fixed position North of Basingstoke and SSW Reading in the vicinity of Bramley at 3,000 ft on the QNH supplied by Farnborough under a Basic Service. Few clouds became scattered
as I carried-out general handling and these partially obscured my view of these towns, or at least prevented their continuous clear identification. I noted a very strong westerly wind aloft.
At the railway line at Bramley and from 3,100ft, I proceeded to fly a sequence of manoeuvres with vertical and lateral extent mainly in to the wind but was blown downwind more than I
had anticipated. Final loop appears to have momentarily penetrated the base of the London TMA, although I didn't realise that at the time.
DE HAVILLAND DHC6 PRATT & WHITNEY Initial climb EGEC (CAL) : Campbeltown 25/10/2023 202335253
(CANADA)
PT6A
Momentarily loss of rudder control during climb.

Aircraft had experienced some rudder issues the past few days but engineers were unable to find a fault. On return from CAL issue became worse with both rudder and rudder trim being
extremely sensitive. Smallest input would cause large yaw. On passing MSA of 4000’ and in the climb, aircraft was handed over to FO in trimmed condition. As soon as I took my feet of
the rudder pedals and just before FO had his feet in position, aircraft violently yawed to the right, banked and nose dropped as well. Aircraft recovered with 40-50 degrees change of
heading to the right and and loss of 200ft altitude. Continued to Glasgow where winds were light and straight down the runway so not much rudder required for landing. Spoke to
engineers on ground and tech log entry made.
Immediate Risk Mitigation: Event reported to engineers and inspection carried out. CREW DEBRIEF-FO interviewed 13/11/2023: *-**** felt funny a few days before and was reported
and Tech'd in the days preceding. It felt much more sensitive in yaw today than previously. Captain and the tiniest of pressure on rudder pedals during handover. FO had feed covering
pedals but was not expecting the rudder force on handover then felt full left deflection. Captain on leave and unavailable for interview. SUMMARY - This was a technical fault with the
Rudder Geared Tab Gear Box. The fault had been raised by others crews on days leading to event with ongoing fault diagnosis and interventions carried out to isolate the fault. The Gear
box was replaced, and no further faults have been reported since event. Crew actions were correct to report event to engineering and raise ASR. Root Cause Analysis (Factual record /
reference / investigation details): Functional Areas Involvement: Flight operations. Engineering. Possible Root Causes (include reference to Functional Area SME by title): Technical -
Rudder assembly fault (Engineering). Environmental - Icing build up in rudder controls/assembly (Flight Operations): Selected Root Cause (include reference to Functional Area SME by
title): Technical - Rudder assembly fault (Engineering). Report Closed.
DE HAVILLAND DHC6 PRATT & WHITNEY Normal descent EGPF (GLA) : Glasgow 03/11/2023 202336656
(CANADA)
PT6A
Green laser illumination x 4.

**** reported a green laser from the Alexandria area, the ATSA on duty was asked to pass the details to the police on 999, incident number ****.
Approaching Glasgow, flying level at 3500ft on a heading of approx 045, the aircraft was struck by a green laser being shone from the Alexandria/Dumbarton area. The cockpit was
struck four times in approximately a minute with both crew being briefly hit in the eyes. One passenger also reported seeing the green flashes. ATC were informed and the flight
continued safely.
DE HAVILLAND DHC6 PRATT & WHITNEY Cruise EGPF (GLA) : Glasgow 02/11/2023 202336779
(CANADA)
PT6A
Infringement of the Glasgow CTR (class D) by a DHC6.

*** was departing the zone VFR, routing NNB. On leaving the zone at Ardmore Point, I transferred the aircraft to FIR in anticipation of losing two
way with him when he went round the coast.
Shortly afterwards I noticed the aircraft, now on a SFIS squawk, approaching very close to the boundary of the zone in the vicinity of Inverkip. I rang FIR
immediately to issue a clearance, but the AIW warning triggered as the phone was still ringing. FIR relayed the clearance, and immediately transferred
the aircraft back to me as they were no longer able to provide a service inside CAS. I saw the aircraft taking a sharp turn to the west, and by the time they
called me they had already left the zone again. I offered a basic service and transferred back to FIR. The pilot apologised and said they had "wandered back in".
I was seated at OP37j
I received a prenote from EGPF about a **** going VFR to EGEC. The aircraft called on the frequency at 0813 and I put them under a BASIC
service and put them on a squawk of 7401. At 0814 EGPF APP phoned to give me a clearance as the aircraft was moving towards their CTR I passed
the clearance, but according to EGPF the aircraft had already infringed, I then transferred the aircraft back to EGPF APP as it was inside controlled
airspace. The pilot initially said he had been transferred from EGPF, but I explained that I could not offer a service inside controlled airspace and he went
back to EGPF APP.
Left the Glasgow Zone via Ardmore point VFR, handed over to Scottish information and routed direct for
Campbeltown, at which point Scottish information advised to re contact Glasgow Radar as we appeared to have re entered the control zone. Spoke with Glasgow radar, made a right turn
and no further incident
As we were operating VFR and the Garmin screen is tiny we did not notice the zone infringement although controlled airspace was displayed.
I am awaiting further information to complete the investigation for this event. Once this has been agreed I will provide a full Event Progress Report.
If you require further information or an interim report, please do not hesitate to get in touch.
DIAMOND DA40 LYCOMING Normal descent EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 15/10/2023 202336178
360 FAMILY civil
DA40 no EFPS strip activated.

I was working Approach only, the traffic was steady but needed some deconfliction. My colleague who was working West and Zone noticed ***
approaching EVATA from the south with an EGLK intention code. I had no strip or details of the inbound as the EFPS strip did not automatically activate due to no NAS data. I found
the strip in the activate bay but when I attempted to request NAS data, it came up with an error "invalid fix". TC SW RAD called me shortly before the aircraft asking if I had the details
as they didn't have them initially. I told them that we had found the details for the aircraft.
DIAMOND DA40 TECHNIFY MOTORS En-route EGSS (STN) : 07/11/2023 202337516
TAE 125 London/Stansted
Infringement of Stansted CTR (Class D) by a DA40 at 1900ft.

At approx. 14:15z, I was alerted to the infringement of *** by a CAIT activation. *** was at 1900ft in the portion of CAS where the base is 1500ft.
I put out a blind call as there wasn't a callsign immediately visible, and phoned the tower to delay the departure of a NUGBO that I had previously
released. Whilst on the phone the infringing aircraft descended out of CAS and the NUGBO ended up not being delayed.
*** was observed landing at EGSX.
I was the ferry pilot of *** on 7th November as *** from EGBE to EGSX When transiting under the Luton CTA at 2300’ with Essex radar conspicuity squawk, I called 129.55 to
confirm and this was acknowledged, but no basic service was requested nor given. When abeam the Luton NDB (LUT 345khz) and east of Stevenage, VFR squawk was set and decent
from 2,200’ to 1,300’ activated in the autopilot. North Weald were called on 120.625 but there was some confusion with radio messages and avoidance of other traffic with student pilots
in the circuit. These unexpected events resulted in omission to check the autopilot progress in the decent and the error realised upon entering the 1,500’ section of the Stansted CTA at
approximately 14:14 The autopilot was disengaged and a swift decent to below 1,500 followed. The resulting infringement of a few hundred feet was for a distance of approximately
.65nm NE of the Ware VRP (West of Sawbridgeworth).
DIAMOND DA40 TECHNIFY MOTORS En-route EGTF : Fairoaks 25/11/2023 202340515

TAE 125
Infringement of the Farnborough CTA (Class D) by a DA40 at 2100ft.

I was working as West only with a low hours learner. I noticed a 7000 depart TF and level at 2000FT. I took the frequency and tried to free call them using the mode S callsign ***. They
did not answer but the AIW alerted as the aircraft indicated 2100FT. Shortly afterwards they left CAS laterally towards OCK no IFR traffic was affected. The aircraft called LARS
EAST.
On Saturday 25.11.23 I flew solo from Stapleford to Fairoaks in a Diamond DA40. Later that day I returned to Stapleford from Fairoaks.
For the second flight, after paying my landing fee at Fairoaks, I wanted to check the details of how to depart correctly from Fairoaks in relation to both Heathrow and Farnborough
airspace, so I had a detailed briefing on this from staff at Fairoaks Tower. They told me that if I departed to the south and then to the south east I would not need to speak with Heathrow
Radar and I could change frequency from Fairoaks Radio to Farnborough Radar, which I did soon after take off.
I set the QNH according to the pressure setting given to me by Farnborough. I remained on the Farnborough Radar frequency, squawking with mode C as they advised, until approaching
Stapleford toward the end of the flight. At no time did Farnborough pass any message to me about my altitude. I was aware that in the initial part of the flight I should not be higher than
2000’ QNH, because the base of the Farnborough CTA is 2000’.
I used SkyDemon as a navigation aid, and the log of this flight shows that when I was in the vicinity of Farnborough controlled airspace, my maximum altitude was 1828’, which was just
to the south east of OCK, i.e. not above 2000’. I then proceeded easterly, remaining clear of controlled airspace.
In addition the aircraft has two Garmin GTN 650s. The aircraft operator (########) has provided the Garmin download data to me. The time column reports BST so you will need to
subtract one hour for UTC. The Garmin GTN 650 second-by-second log shows that for 15:07 UTC (show in the log as 16:07) for the whole of that minute the maximum altitude is 1884
feet as shown in column G. The dataset from the other certified device in ***(Garmin 650) gives similar readings. Should you have any questions about the Garmin data log(s) the
company is happy to be contacted at #########################.
I am very much aware of the seriousness of airspace infringements and I have reviewed the latest version of CAP1404 (Edition 6 on 20 June 2023). However because of the data from
these flight logs, I believe that I did not exceed 1900 feet on the correct pressure setting for the sector of the flight under Farnborough CTA. I wonder if there can be another explanation
for this apparent misunderstanding?
I do not see a way to attach the SkyDemon and Garmin flight logs and send them to you in this NATS webpage. Both are available for me to send to you, for example, by email, at your
request.
DIAMOND DA40 TECHNIFY MOTORS Cruise BPK 25/11/2023 202340517

TAE 125
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a DA40 at 2700ft.

I was just taking over the GS Airports position when Farnborough called to advise of a CAS infringer. Farnborough reported that at 1347 *** infringed the LTMA 4nm SE of BPK at
altitude 2700ft.
I was working a busy North and East, ***, called on frequency requesting a BS. I took their details, gave them a squawk, QNH and basic service. As they selected their squawk the AIW
alerted me to them inside the LTMA indicating 2.7A. As they were not yet validated and verified I asked them to
report their altitude on the QNH and reminded them the base of controlled airspace above them 2.5A. They apologised and said they would descend. I
asked them to report their passing level in the descent and was told 2.5A which was within tolerance. Essex radar called and I informed them it was an
infringement and I would be filing an MOR.
Re: (from NATS) At 1347 hours UTC, the aircraft was observed on radar inside LTMA-1 approximately 4NM southeast of Brookmans Park VOR/DME (BPK), squawking 5025,
indicating 2,700 feet where the base of controlled airspace is 2,500 feet AMSL.
This is a correct summary of that part of my first flight on 25th November. Shortly after take-off I was levelling off, making contact with Farnborough Radar, entering the correct QNH
pressure setting, squawking their requested code on mode C, establishing myself on track for BPK, and setting the autopilot as I approached 2500’.
I was aware that I needed to remain below 2500’ to avoid entering into controlled airspace. I made an error when I set the autopilot. I pressed the heading (HDG) knob, and I then pressed
the altitude (ALT) knob. I expected that the autopilot would maintain level flight below 2500’ and therefore clear of controlled airspace.
I was therefore surprised when Farnborough radar told me that I was at 2700' and I saw that this was correct according to my instruments. I replied to Farnborough that I would
immediately descend to below 2500’. I communicated with Farnborough again as I descended through 2500’.
I realised that the autopilot was not operating as I had intended, namely to maintain altitude below 2500’. I therefore disabled the autopilot and reset it and it then worked correctly.
I proceeded with the flight, staying with Farnborough Radar until near Wycombe Air Park, when I changed to Heathrow Radar. I requested and received clearance to enter their airspace
near Bracknell, to proceed direct to Fairoaks.
DIAMOND DA40 AUSTRO ENGINE Standing : Engine(s) EGTC : Cranfield 23/10/2023 202339138
GMBH Operating
E4 (A MT-PROPELLER
MTV-6-R/190-69 )
Flying instructor disembarked aircraft while engine still running.

I was sending a Trainee on their first solo and was disembarking the aircraft (DA40) while theengine was running. Since it is a widespread practice among single-engine
instructors,especially at my previous place of work, I deemed it a low risk practice. However, it was verysoon brought to my attention that this is not allowed at ******** and is stated in
the Ops Manual.In that moment I didn't recall seeing any reference in the Ops Manual apart from under reference'A.9.4 Trainee Passenger Flights' where it states "If a TRAINEE is
required to change seatswithin the aircraft, this must be carried out whilst the aircraft is parked on the ground withengine(s) off." This reference in no way hinders me as an instructor to
disembark the aircraft withengine running.I have also looked into ******* safety notices and ****** with no success of finding anyreference to engine running disembarking. I have
since heard it is on the Ops Site website towhich I have no access so cannot confirm it.Since I am not sure whether or not I have done something wrong I felt the obligation to file
thissafety report to prevent future events like this to take place. Human contact with a spinning propellor is likely to cause serious injuries or death. Once the decision was made to exit
the aircraft the only barrier remaining was the pilot's care in avoiding the propellor, which can not be deemed to be effective and reliable.
DIAMOND DA40 AUSTRO ENGINE Cruise Wisbech 06/11/2023 202339850

GMBH
E4
PAN declared due to double ECU failure en route. Aircraft diverted and emergency services met aircraft on arrival.
On a solo cross-country navigation flight, maintaining 2800 feet above mean sea level ('AMSL) in the cruise, in radio contact with Marham Air Traffic Control (ATC), an ECU-A FAIL
and ECU-BFail caption annunciated. The Trainee immediately advised Marham of the situation, declared a"Pan-Pan" and requested diversion to the nearest suitable airport. The ECU-A
FAIL and ECU-BFAIL caption self-cleared after about 20 seconds, but the Trainee elected to continue on the diversion. Marham ATC vectored the Trainee to land on runway 23 at
Marham. The Trainee declined ATC request to descend to 1600'AMSL, preferring to maintain altitude until the runway was in sight. Due to the short time available to landing, the
Trainee elected not to refer to the paper QRH checklist, but rather to carry out the actions from memory. A normal approach and landing was executed on runway 23. After landing, the
Trainee was escorted by emergency services during taxi to the parking apron. Redundancy in the form of two ECUs on the engine is an effective barrier to an engine failure and ensuing
accident or forced landing without power. However, in this case both ECUs may have failed, meaning that this barrier cannot be relied on in every case. The incident was well managed
by the trainee. The Trainee made good decisions in primarily maintaining aircraft control, maintaining altitude until runway in sight, and not delaying the diversion for want of
completing the paper QRH checklist. Although the the "ECU-A FAIL" and "ECU-B FAIL" caption extinguished shortly afterdeclaring an emergency and commencing the diversion, the
Trainee again demonstrated good decision making to continue to land at the nearest suitable airport, as he was no longer confident that the engine would continue running normally.
Awaiting engineering report.
Engineering found light corrosion on the MOK sensor mounting screw holes and suspected that this may have interfered with electrical grounding of the sensor. The MOK sensor is an
oil sensor and may send erroneous signals to the ECUs if not properly grounded.5. See attachment "Defect Record.pdf". The MOK sensor was replaced, the engine successfully ground
run and the aircraft released for service
DIAMOND DA42 UNKNOWN En-route Sutton Bank Gliding Site 07/10/2023 202335325
UNKNOWN
UK AIRPROX 2023236 - Ask21 and a DA42 0.5 nm NW Sutton Bank. DA42 Overflight of Sutton bank Gliding site (class G) by a DA42.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Scheduled EGPT (PSL) : Perth/Scone 25/10/2023 202335642
TAE 125 maintenance
Port engine exhaust manifold cracks.

Nil narrative.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS En-route Yorkshire CTA 01/11/2023 202336846

TAE 125
Infringement of the Yorkshire CTA (Class A) by a DA42 at 8000ft.

On an IFR transit from Gamston to Wick, I was given a squawk and frequency to contact for Scottish while taxiing at Gamston. After departure and outside the Gamston ATZ, I
contacted East Midlands to request a traffic service outside of controlled airspace while climbing enroute to join the class A airspace to the north. Approaching the CTA boundary, I
contacted Scottish control. While I thought I had contacted Scottish in time to receive a clearance, I had inadvertently entered class A airspace at 1620z without such clearance.
On an IFR transit from Gamston to Wick, I was given a squawk and frequency to contact for Scottish while taxiing at Gamston. After departure and outside the Gamston ATZ, I
contacted East Midlands to request a traffic service outside of controlled airspace while climbing enroute to join the class A airspace to the north. Approaching the CTA boundary, I
contacted Scottish control. While I thought I had contacted Scottish in time to receive a clearance, I had inadvertently entered class A airspace at 1620z without such clearance.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Standing : Engine(s) EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 17/10/2023 202337108
TAE 125 Start-up
Smoke from right engine on start-up. Engine starter switch was found to be sticking and was replaced.
After a normal left and then right engine start, we got the indication warning of L/R ALTN AMPS.The gauges for the amps / volts were fluctuating from normal to abnormal range. Soon
after we could smell electrical smoke coming into the cabin. I shut the engine down as a precaution and vacated the aircraft. Looking outside we could see smoke coming out of the RH
engine cowling. I contacted ATC who promptly sent the fire crew out for assistance. No further action was taken bythe fire crew after assessing. Comments on the assessment of this risk:
Event Risk Classification has been updated. Any source of smoke carries the associated threat of fire which, if unextinguished, can cause major damage to the aircraft, serious injuries or
fatalities. Crew recognition and appropriate handling of the event coupled with available Rescue& Fire Fighting support act as effective barriers to escalation into an accident. Safety
Manager's Comments: The incident risk category is "fire on the ground" as there is no category referring to smoke only. Although there were no visible flames, smoke was smelled and
seen,indicating an overheat of some sort. Details of the investigations completed: 1. Interview aircraft commander. 2. Review engineering fault finding and rectification report. Findings
and observations: 1. The pilots followed the checklist and took the correct actions in shutting both engines down,declaring an emergency and evacuating the aircraft. 2. See attachment
"Tech Log.pdf" showing Defect Record pages 10 and 11. The source of smoke was initially traced to the right engine starter motor which did not disengage after engine start. The starter
motor was replaced on 23 October 2023 but still did not disengage after engine start. Further troubleshooting revealed that the engine starter switch was sticking in the start position after
starting the right engine. The engine starter switch was replaced on 27 October2023 and the aircraft was found serviceable.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Maintenance phases RAF Membury 13/10/2023 202337774
TAE 125
Exhaust fitted in wrong position.

Whilst looking at what caused the hole in the first place, we noticed that the exhaust is in the wrong place.This is unable to sit in the normal position because of the way that the coolant
hoses have been installed.The first photo below is your engine, the second one, my own DA 42.On the photo of your engine, we have moved the exhaust as far as it can go and is broadly
nowin the correct position, but now fouls on the coolant hose/clamp.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS En-route: Other EGBJ (GLO) : 01/11/2023 202338058
TAE 125 Gloucestershire
Drone sighting reported 8NM south of Gloucestershire Aerodrome.

Suspected Drone Sighting. I was on an instructional detail 8nm SW of EGBJ . A solid object which appeared to be a drone passed close to our RH wing tip at the same altitude 3000ft I
circled the aircraft at a safe distance from the object to attempt to better identify it but I could not confirm without doubt that it was a drone. I reported the incident with approximate
position to Gloucestershire ATC. I filed a flight safety report through the ***** UK SMS.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Taxi EGTK (OXF) : 10/11/2023 202338248

TAE 125 Oxford/Kidlington
Aircraft taxied past cleared holding point, causing near conflict with another aircraft.
XXXXX (DA42 XXXXXX) was told to hold at A3 as there was a ground taxiing A109 ##### thatwas going the opposite direction into Juliet for MA1. XXXXXX taxied through A3,
exceeding theirTaxi Clearance and came into confliction with the A109. Both aircraft stopped and TWR asked if ##### was happy to continue and they confirmed there was enough
room. Both aircraftcontinued as normal.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Landing EGBW : Wellesbourne 15/11/2023 202339143

TAE 125 mountford
Smoke from burst tyre on landing. Runway closed and remained closed for 2h20m.
From the tower, I observed a DA42 landing on runway 18 with smoke coming from the wheels. The aircraft came to a stop near to the runway 36 threshold and the pilot reported that he
had a burst tyre. I could see from the tower that the starboard main tyre was flat. I dispatched the local RFFS to the scene. The runway was closed by NOTAM and remained closed for
2h20m, until the aircraft was towed clear.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS En-route EGMC (SEN) : Southend 17/11/2023 202339989
TAE 125
Infringement of the Southend CTA-1 (Class D) by a DA42 at 2000ft.

I was the Radar controller at Southend Airport.At 1049.00 *** called and was initially told to standby. At 1049.25 the aircraft was observed to be indicating 2000' in the vicinity of
Basildon.The aircraft was asked to report its level which he reported as being 2000' and orbiting and was then advised they had entered Southend CAS. The aircraft was then asked its
flight rules and given a CAS entry clearance.
I normally and exclusively utilise SkyDemon on my iPad (visible in-flight by Line-of-sight via a suction RAM mount) however I had recently felt that I have become used to (reliant on,
even?) the moving-map safety net that the CAA have encouraged of recent years, and so on this trip I had (ironically) been navigating by standard navigation methods and Paper Chart, as
I was concerned that this (moving map) had eroded my ‘traditional’ navigation skills… The iPad was on and running SkyDemon in the background, but in my flight bag (for flight
tracking / subsequent review).
In this instance, I was at the planned altitude of 2000’ and attempting to contact Southend Approach on 130.780 but due to busy radio traffic was unable to make contact until overhead
Wickford (rather than before Billericay VRP as planned - review of the Paper Chart shows Frequency Change point just east of Stapleford, following Transit of their overhead), which put
me just over the transition from the 2500-3500 CTA to the lower 1500-3500 - I immediately carried out a descending orbit while in contact with Southend, but in hindsight once
established that I could not communicate due to the heavy radio traffic I should have turned away before entering the lower level.
On first contact with Southend Approach (at Wickford) they confirmed I had entered Controlled Airspace, and provided clearance to continue - on landing I called ATC to apologise and
(briefly) give an explanation.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Cruise EGGD (BRS) : Bristol 21/11/2023 202340728
TAE 125
Infringement of the Bristol CTA-7 (class D) by an unknown aircraft at 4700ft.

A 6227 squawk was observed 12 miles north of the airfield at A47/F50 manoeuvring and identified using Mode S as ***. At approx. 0950 the aircraft
entered CTA7 (base 4000ft) in the turn, surface wind 35010kt. No effect on any traffic.
I was on an IFR flight from EGBJ to EGFF to fly HOLDs and instrument approaches at EGFF and then to return IFR back to EGBJ at 5000 ft. On the go around from EGFF, I simulated
an engine failure after take off (EFATO) and the student did not carry out the correct actions and so I suggested we practice some EFATOs at altitude on the return leg. Once clear of
Cardiff's CA, the student entered a climb and I simulated an EFATO - she mis-identified the engine and applied rudder force to the dead engine and so we yawed considerably to the dead
engine, she continued to apply rudder force to the incorrect engine and so we continued to yaw and our heading changed through around 90 degrees. I then took control and recovered the
aircraft using the alternative method of control (closing both throttles). I discussed what had happened and suggested another EFATO. I gave control back to the student who climbed
away and I simulated an EFATO. Again she identified the incorrect engine and again she maintained rudder force to the dead engine and so again we turned - this time through over 180
degrees (as I left the student in control longer to see if she would identify her mistake) - I took control and recovered the aircraft using the alternative method of control. I then paused the
exercises to review my position and I noticed that we had travelled significantly further south than I anticipated and we had entered Bristol's CTA. We were heading south and so I
initiated an immediate turn to the left to a heading of north and commenced an immediate descent.
The contributing factors to this infringement were:
1) We were in IMC so I had no reference outside the cockpit of my position
2) Cardiff ATC usually give a Traffic Service once we depart their CA but on this occasion a Basic Service was given
3) There was a strong northerly wind at 40 knots
4) The student's performance was poor and so 100% of my focus during the EFATOs was maintaining control of the aircraft and my concentration on navigation momentarily lapsed.
I did phone Bristol Radar immediately after landing and the radar controller said that this infringement hadn't been spotted on radar and no issues had been caused and so no further action
was required on my behalf.
DIAMOND DA42 OTHER (Austro E4-B) Unknown aircraft EGNV (MME) : Teesside 01/11/2023 202336440
OTHER (Austro E4-B) category
Birdstrike with damage or system problems.

Complementary 01/11/2023.
***** ON DEPARTURE FROM RUNWAY 23 REPORTED HITTING A BIRD. REMAINS FOUND BETWEEN FIRE ACCESS TRACK AND TAXIWAY 'B'. NO OTHER ISSUES
TO REPORT, PILOT ADVISED NO ASSISTANCE NEEDED AND RETURNED TO THE AIRFIELD AND ONCE BIRD REMIANS REMOVED BY FIRE 5 AND AIRCRAFT
LANDED SAFELY AT 0955.
Complementary 02/11/2023.
After a normal take-off roll, and immediately after rotate, a large white bird was seen to move left to right in front of the aircraft. An impact was felt by both crewers in the vicinity of the
right wing mid-section. Both engines continued to run ally and there were no adverse handling characteristics. There were also no visible signs of damage. The aircraft was climbed on
runway heading and the birdstrike declared to ATC. The aircraft was then turned downwind and held briefly in the at 1200ft while the bird remains were removed from the runway.
Given that the act had been adjacent to the right hand engine, the crew elected to land rather than burn to MLW. Once cleared to land the aircraft was fully configured at the end of the
downwind leg and slowed to Vref for a controllability check which was normal. The aircraft landed without further incident. After vacating the aircraft it me apparent that the bird had hit
the right hand engine and had cracked the prop pinner (photos attached).
Supplementary 09/11/2023.
Root Cause: Bird strike during take off. Corrective Action: Aircraft landed safely. During inspection propeller and spinner found with bird debris / damage. Prop and spinner replaced and
aircraft declared serviceable. Preventative Action: Due to the nature of flying, bird strikes are a known and accepted risk. No further action required.
DIAMOND DA42 TECHNIFY MOTORS Initial climb EGBJ (GLO) : 03/11/2023 202336464
TAE 125 Gloucestershire
PAN declared due to left engine fire warning in flight. Aircraft returned and emergency services met aircraft on arrival.
Pre-flight was conducted as normal, the Aircraft Technical Log indicated no abnormalities or deferred defects.Following a Normal Take-Off at 0855Z a practice Simulated Failure of the
right engine was initiated as a normal training item by drawing the right engine power-lever to idle. During the subsequent climb an intermittent L ENG FIRE warning was observed
accompanied by audio alert, this recurred several times before becoming persistent and uninterrupted. The aircraft was returned to a normal two-engine climb as the warning persisted.
URGENCY state was declared to Gloucestershire ATSU, and a re-join made to land on RWY 27. The effected engine, the left engine, was shut down, and the L ENG FIRE warning
ceased shortly afterward. An OEI landing was made at 0900Z without further incident. With no further indications of fire, the runway was vacated to enable other aircraft to land with the
remaining engine shut-down and evacuation performed immediately beyond holding-point C1. The disabled aircraft was recovered under tow to dispersal.Observations:This situation
warranted declaration of DISTRESS (MAYDAY) rather than URGENCY (PAN PAN) as the aircrew were concerned for the safety of the aircraft and required immediate assistance.The
Landing was performed with one engine shut-down the performance of the aircraft conformed with that of simulated asymmetric operations.Taxying with OEI complicated directional
control, particularly at high-power uphill.
****** Callsign ********* ***, a DA42 Diamond Twin Star had departed RWY22 into the righthand circuit at 09:00.At 09:02 the pilot declared a Pan due to a problem with the left
engine. A full emergency was put in place and the pilot was advised that RWY22 and RWY27 were available. The pilot then advised that he had shut down his left engine as a precaution
and the aircraft landed safely on RWY27 at 09:06 with RFFS in attendance. The pilot elected to vacate RWY27 at holding point C1 and shut down. He advised that they had several fire
warning lights.RFFS stood down at 09:52.
Complementary28/11/2023:
No additional information.
DIAMOND DA42 AUSTRO ENGINE Standing EGNE : Repton/Gamston 02/03/2023 202323115
GMBH
E4
Incorrect fuel added to left tank. 1 litre of AVGAS contaminated the fuel tank.
Approximately 1 Litre of AVGAS was added to an almost full main left tank . Preliminary discussion held between ** Airport Manager, *** CMM and **. Email sent to reporting pilot
requesting a meeting to discuss. Pilot interviewed about circumstances surrounding the event. He stated he requested a top up on the aircraft fuel and was conducting the pre flight
inspection whilst the fueller arrived and commenced fuelling. When he looked up he noticed the AVGAS markings and called to stop the process. His call to stop was simultaneous with
the fueller observing the error himself and stopping. Findings and observations Initial feedback from ** suggest inadvertent fuel operator error which was quickly spotted by himself. ***
*** requires company fuel requests and uplifts to be supervised which was lacking in this case. As the pilot was under training, this has been fed to the crew training department.
**(DA-42) was filled with one litre of AVGAS into the left main tank. The fuel operator realised their mistake and shut down the fuel bowser. ** were informed as well as the
accountable manager for **who was operating the fuel bowser. The aircraft drained it's left main tank. The refueller has been sent for further training.
DIAMOND DA42 AUSTRO ENGINE Rejected take-off EGNE : Repton/Gamston 20/11/2023 202339594
GMBH
E4 (B)
Rejected take-off due to left Engine ECU A and B failure caption.

Following a normal ECU test at C1, I taxied onto RWY32 and lined up to take off. During the runup check the left engine seemed to be slow to pick up and took 2 power checks to get to
fullpower. After starting the take off run at approx 1/3 along the runway the 'L ENG ECU A FAIL' and'L ENG ECU B FAIL' captions appeared but didn't latch on. I rejected the take off,
told Gamstonradio i was stopping and taxied back to the northern apron. Gamston radio helped me get amessage to ops and I was met at the aircraft by Engineering.
DIAMOND DA42 AUSTRO ENGINE Scheduled EGTK (OXF) : 17/10/2023 202336810

GMBH maintenance Oxford/Kidlington
E4 (B MT-PROPELLER
MTV-6-R-C-F/CF 187-
129)
Multiple maintenance items overdue and tracked incorrectly by the previous CAMO.
Reg: *-**** Serial Number: ******* Current Hours: 1357.9 ARC Expiry Date: 15/06/2024 Aircraft was released from 100 hour check on 19/05/2023 @ 1264.5 hours, next check due on
CRS 100 hour @ 1364.5 hours or on 06/05/2024. Engine Replacements were in the out of phase section as due replacement 05/06/2023, (this was given an additional 12-month extension
by the OEM) The following maintenance items are overdue - Items showing overdue on previous CAMO’s status report, report was run at 1264.5 AF hours.
 Air filter replacement (LH & RH) - Status reports show these were 87.7 hours overdue, they are now 181.1 hours overdue.
 Fuel Filter Replacement (LH & RH) - Status report show these were 84.1 hours overdue, they are now 187.5 hours overdue.
 High Pressure Fuel Pump Replacement (LH & RH) - Status report show these are 107.5 hours overdue, they are now 200.9 hours overdue.
 LH Accumulator - Showing on status report to have been due overhaul on 14/08/2023.
 ECU backup battery replacement - Due 06/05/2023
 Alternator Excitation Battery Replacement - Due 06/05/2023.
 Pitot Static Leak Check - Due 28/07/2023
 Transponder System Check - Due 28/07/2023.
 Emergency battery package - On the CAMO status report but no compliance time noted, after checking through records it was found this was due 28/10/2022.
The following maintenance items are overdue - these items were being tracked incorrectly by the previous CAMO.
 LH Propeller - Status reports show being due overhaul 31/07/2024, after checking logbooks / Form 1 and inspecting OH sticker on prop, this was due for overhaul 17/07/2023.
 Battery Cap Check - 1000 year / annual item, being tracked bi-annually, this was due 06/05/2023.
 First Aid Kit Inspection & Fire Extinguisher Inspections - Annual items being tracked bi-annually, these were due 06/05/2023.
 Altimeter Indication Check - Bi-Annual item being tracked every 4 years, was due 28/07/2023.
 Compass Swing - Annual item being tracked bi-annually, this was due 05/05/2023.
The following maintenance items were not being tracked by the previous CAMO (or at least were not included on the status report)
 Timing Chain Inspection (1000-hour engine inspection) - 357.9 hours overdue.
 Wastegate controller circlip replacement (600-hour engine) - 200.9 hours overdue
 ELT System self-test (bi-annual item) - not being tracked, no records found.
 Boroscopic inspections of the short push rod to flaps / aileron (5-year item) - not being tracked, no records found.
The following items are not overdue but were either being tracked incorrectly / or due before the next check and were not on the CRS.
 RH Propeller - Showing overhaul date 19/05/2023 and TBO as 19/05/2029, after physically checking the prop And Form 1, prop was only repaired on 19/05/2023, it was overhauled
on 20/08/2018, TBO on 20/08/2024
 6000 Hour / 12 Year MSI - Only being tracked on hours, is due on calendar is due on 02/11/2023.
 Brake fluid replacement - Due 06/11/2023.
 Safety Harness replacement - Due 25/10/2023.
DIAMOND DA62 AUSTRO ENGINE Take-off EGFF (CWL) : Cardiff 04/11/2023 202336547
GMBH
E4
Precautionary landing at Cardiff following ECU failure and two rejected take-offs.
Following two aborted take-offs due to Right engine ECU cautions which were successfullycleared on the ground a third takeoff was successfully achieved. However on the initial climb
outanother right engine ECU caution was experienced with both ECU cautions intermittentlyshowing.
ECLIPSE AVIATION 500 UNKNOWN Climb to cruising EGHI (SOU) : Southampton 18/10/2023 202336416
UNKNOWN level or altitude
Aircraft turned in the wrong direction after departure.

*** departed runway 02 at 0833, appeared to not follow the NPR by tracking west of the climb out and then turned right to THRED rather than left as
per the standard procedure as detailed in the AIP.
I had nothing to effect so this did not cause any issue.
ECLIPSE AVIATION 500 PRATT & WHITNEY Push-back/tow EGGW (LTN) : 21/10/2023 202336486
(CANADA) London/Luton
PW600 Series
Aircraft commenced pushback without clearance.

#####, an E550 on stand 54 requested engine start, approved by GMC ATCO. ATCO observed another E550 on the same stand facing nose-out. Ops mobile called requesting to cross
taxiway Bravo from stand 3 to stand 54 on foot, approved by GMC ATCO. While scanning the taxiway to observe Ops mobile, GMC spotted CLF505 beginning a pushback from stand
which the pilot reported just after. GMC ATCO instructed ###### to hold position until all conflicting traffic had passed.
EUROPA EUROPA BOMBARDIER ROTAX Landing EGKR (KRH) : Redhill 22/10/2023 202337867
BOMBARDIER ROTAX
Aircraft landed outside marked runway.

I was the duty ADC when the EUPA, a based aircraft, reported inbound from EGHN. When the pilot reported final I checked and the aircraft appeared to be correctly aligned with the
runway although lower than normal. After issuing landing clearance I turned my attention to other activities. When I looked up the EUPA was in the flare however it was positioned to
the west of the runway. There was no confliction with any other traffic. Pilot apologised.
EVEKTOR AEROTECHNIK EV97 BOMBARDIER ROTAX Maintaining EGNH (BLK) : Blackpool 31/10/2023 202338690
912 position
Runway incursion by an EV97 with B505 on approach.

I was the ADI/APP controller at Blackpool airport, at time 13:50 *** an EV97 reported ready holding at A3, I gave him his clearance: hold at A3, squawk 0450 and after departure left
turn to the left. **** a B505 helicopter reported on left base runway 10 and then *** read back: hold position at A3, squawk 0450 after departure left turn. I told *** correct, break, ***
runway 10 clear to land after landing Echo to JMAX. The helicopter read it back, I looked down to move the strips and as I looked up I noticed *** moving, just passed holding point A3,
immediately I told *** to go around I say again go around acknowledge. ** read it back and started going around as he was approaching the sand dunes to the west of Blackpool airport.
After *** acknowledged his go around instruction, I told *** to hold position, I say again, hold position acknowledge, *** read it back and operations resumed normal.
EXTRA EA230 LYCOMING Cruise ZAGZO 27/10/2023 202336686

360 FAMILY
Infringement of Luton CTA (Class D) by an unknown aircraft at FL83 twice.

Operating GW INT and GW FIN Bandboxed, GW operating runway 25
At approximately 1320z, sCAIT activated alerting me to an infringement in Clacton CTA 10, approximately 3nm East-South-East of ZAGZO. The contact
was squawking 7000, converting to "V" on the radar display. No Mode S callsign was present, but the transponder unique aircraft ID was displayed as
401104.
The aircrafts Mode C was observed to climb to FL83 - where the base of controlled airspace is FL75. The aircraft continued to manoeuvre within this
volume of airspace. No aircraft within controlled airspace were in the vicinity with no loss of separation. TC LOREL were alerted to the infringement to
ensure any releases would be separated from it.
The contact was shortly after observed to leave controlled airspace via descent, before climbing to re-infringe within the vicinity. The aircraft once again
left via descent and was not seen to re-enter.
The aircraft was tracked and was seen to continue manoeuvre outside of controlled airspace - and at the time of this report had not been traced to a
destination airfield.
There were scattered showers with variable cloud on the day. I could see sunshine on the ground in the vicinity of Sutton Meadows but there was a cloud mass with drizzle and haze
between the airfield and the intended practice area. Initially it looked as though it would be possible to traverse across the cloud mass. I started SkyDemon to help navigate the upper
airspace given the anticipated altitude required to cross the cloud mass. As we climbed it became clear that we couldn't cross without entering the airspace so we turned East to an
alternative location. I thought I had remained below the base of controlled airspace but on reviewing the trace after receipt of the MOR it is clear that the aircraft climbed inadvertently
while I was briefing the student on the new heading and plan.
EXTRA EA300 LYCOMING Unknown aircraft EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 16/11/2023 202340379
360 FAMILY category
Multiple losses of radar contacts.

12:03.50 primary only contact observed departing Fowlmere (EGMA).Contact remains strong and continues North East bound routing approx. 5 NM south East of Cambridge. At
12:11.49, The traffic is then observe to make a sharp right turn and completely disappears from Radar in a single sweep.12:12.22 Primary contact resumed with he aircraft conducting
tight manoeuvres (Aerobatics)12:19.28 Contact made a tight right turn to head towards the Radar and disappeared in 1 sweep. Approximately 10 NM East of the airfield. 12:20.33 The
contact appeared on Radar for 2 sweeps before contact was lost. 12:20.50 Contact returned routing Northbound. 12.22.29 The aircraft appears to be conducting high energy manoeuvres.
The contact drops the trail history and appears as a new contact.12:24.10 Contact lost approximately 10 NM East of the airfield.12:24.22 Contact returned routing north. 12:26.56 Contact
lost approximately 10 NM East of the airfield.12:27.17 contact returned. 12:28.29 Contact lost12:32.42 Contact returned approximately 5 NM East of the airfield. 12:33.41 contact breaks
from the trail history and projects that the aircraft is continuing forward in a South Westerly direction. 12:34.13 Contact returns approximately 2NM north of where is was projected to be,
routing North towards traffic under a service from Cambridge Radar 12:35.14 Contact degrades and is lost.12:36.16 Contact returns 4NM East of the airfield.12:38.48 Contact
lost12:39.41 Contact returns12.40.13 Contact lost12:40.30 Contact returned. The contact is then observed to route South West, through the Duxford overhead before contact is lost
directly in the Fowlmere overhead at 12:43.13, believed to have landed. On calling Duxford ATC, the aircraft was traced to be ****, an Extra 200 aerobatic aircraft based at Fowlmere.
GROB (Glider) GROB (Glider) UNKNOWN Landing EGBS : Shobdon 10/11/2023 202337751
UNKNOWN
Glider landed with central wheel retracted. Emergency services deployed.

At 1454 ****** ** called final for Runway 26 (main) and landed. On its landing roll, sparks were observed from the underside of the aircraft, it having landed with the central wheel
retracted. RFFS were alerted and attended: the aircraft suffered minor damage and the pilot was unhurt.
GROB G115 LYCOMING Cruise En route 31/10/2023 202336068

360 FAMILY
Electrical failure enroute. Aircraft diverted.

Aircraft suffered a total electrical failure and diverted to nearest airfield.Safety report submitted to Part 145/CAO by pilot.Narrative from Pilots safety report:After 1hr:10 mins of a
planned 2hr:30 min engine bedding in flight Lo Volt caption illuminated followed within 1 minute by Generator caption, immediately followed by Generator circuit breaker tripping. No
electrical services had been selected immediately prior to this.FRC ( reference cards/checklist) actions carried out while turning towards Yeovilton as nearest suitable diversion airfield.
Generator circuit breaker reset following complete load shed. Ammeter indicated greater than 20 amps, volt meter decayed rapidly and all electrical services tripped off. Emergency back
up attitude indicator worked as advertised. Diversion to Yeovilton conducted maintaining VMC for no radio transmission re-join. No sign of fire or smoke apparent in the cockpit
throughout. Initial investigations by Part 145 have found heat damage to the main aircraft battery solenoid and initial thoughts are this has contributed to electrical failure although this
has not yet been proven. At this moment the Part CAO does not believe there to be a fleet wide issue but investigations are fluid and on-going to ascertain root cause of electrical failure
and damage to battery solenoid. Part 145/CAO have instigated a fleet check to inspect for fit, form and function of battery solenoid. Aircraft OEM informed.
Update from initial report : Heat damage also found in surrounding structure and mounting tray. Investigations on-going with Aircraft OEM and 145 Engineers. Fleet check results found
no other aircraft issues.
GROB G115 LYCOMING Cruise EGGW (LTN) : 24/11/2023 202340439

360 FAMILY London/Luton
Infringement of the Luton CTA (Class D) by a G119 at 5900ft.

At time 1205 an unknown aircraft infringed the northern part of the luton CTA. It climbed to 5,900 ft where the base was 5,500ft. Mode S identified it as ***. It didn't effect any other
traffic.
On the time and date stated I was teaching an FI student. Specifically I briefed the base of controlled airspace and the location of the difference base height changes. At each stage I
ensured we remained clear by at least 500 ft and normally 1,000 ft.
I received the MOR report and initially thought it was generated as a result of a student going solo. I then realised I was in the aircraft. We have a Skydemon trace for part of the sortie
showing we remained clear by over 1,000 feet.
We have had the transponder checked and it is all working perfectly.
GRUMMAN AA5 LYCOMING En-route GOW 25/11/2023 202340520

O320
Infringement of the Glasgow CTA (class D) by an AA5 at 3500ft.

I was seated at OP37J *** called on freq at 1322 at 2.5A. At approx 1324 I happened to notice on the FID that an 'SFIS' was showing as CAIT (MODE S had callsign as ***) and I
believe the FID showed them at 3.5A NNE of PG and they hadn't quite reached the 4000-6000 Fillet north of Stirling. I asked aircraft to confirm ROCAS to which they said they were
outside CAS. I advised the pilot that the base of the CTA to be 3.0A on the PF QNH for the position I believed the aircraft to be. PF phoned at this point to advise they could see an
infringer that I was working. I asked if they wanted to work it or otherwise to which they advised they did not. I suggested that we both file on the infringement as it was in their airspace
whilst on my frequency. Initially PF seemed to indicate that they preferred that I alone file on it. PF did ask that I try to get the pilots name/tel number/email address. I felt I was too busy
at that moment to try and get all of that info. I thought it more appropriate to speak to Perth AG on the tels and ask them to advise the pilot to contact PF ATC when on the ground. I
advised the OS of the infringement at this point after the initial call with PF. PF did call later before my 1430 break to ask for more info on pilot (I did offer more via GINFO) but they
took Callsign and Dep/Dest and type only. Also the pilot called on again as he had only done a touch and go at Perth and later asked to Freecall PF for a transit. I am not clear on if PF
will file or not, but the follow up call suggests they will.
Operating as INT when an FIR code was observed infringing the Glasgow CTA. I phoned FIR and they confirmed the aircraft was *** an AA5 PG-PT
although they also informed me that the aircraft was reporting at 2.5A.
I was planning to go from Cumbernauld to Perth via Stirling - for a touch and go at Perth twice and back to Cumbernauld via Loch Lomond and Glasgow airspace. This flight was to get
my 3 takeoff and landings in the aircraft after 91 days to allow passengers to fly with me. It was my first flight back in the AA5 after being returned from an engine rebuild and i had been
flying Piper Archers for about 3 months prior to that and as getting refamiliarised with the. At EGFG while requesting airfield info i incorrectly wrote down the wrong QNH as 1002
rather than 1022. In addition i was using a new pair of headsets that were connected to my phone and skydemon - which while connected - the volume for Skydemon was quite low. As i
took off and headed towards Perth, continuing the climb to just under 3000 ft (according to my settings) i was conscious that i was to remain below Glasgow CTA at 3000 feet. asi left the
circuit and headed towards Stirling, i contacted Scottish information who gave me the squawk code of 7401 and advised the correct QNH - at which point i recognised my altitude was
higher by 300ft into the CTA and started to reduce the altitude to below 3000ft - however the 3000ft base had been lifted to 4000ft. I believe the error was 2 folds - first i incorrectly
noted the QNH and didn’t make note of the ground elevation being different than the 350ft altitude it should be at the correct QNH setting. Secondly as i was using the new headsets, the
volume setting had not been adjusted to allow Skydemon warnings to be properly heard as Scottish information was very busy that day also. When advised of the correct QNH i
recognised the issue immediately but of course the infringement had already happened. I perhaps should not have chosen so close to the base of the CTA and left a bigger distance for my
pressure variations.
JODEL D140 LYCOMING En-route EGHL (QLA) : Lasham 25/11/2023 202340512
360 FAMILY
Infringement of the Gatwick CTA (Class D) by a D104E at 1700ft. Pilot reported they were at 1500ft.
An aircraft transponding 7012 (KK APC listening watch) was observed via CAIT to infringe the KK CTA. The contact was exceptionally close to the
southern boundary of the CTA and indicated 1700ft. The infringement lasted only a few seconds and had no impact on operations. I blind called the pilot who immediately responded and
stated he was flying at 1500ft on QNH1021. I advised the Mode C readout indicated 1700ft and the pilot reiterated that he was flying level at 1500ft.
a listening sqwak of 7012 was selected, and 126.825 tunned, the controller contacted me to say I had infringed, both my altimeter and transponder showed below the CTA, however his
read-out said 1700ft showing. Subsequent test showed the transponder had an error and was showing 250ft above actual height, sky demon log also showed this to be max 1377ft .
MAULE M6 LYCOMING Landing EGMD (LYX) : Lydd 10/11/2023 202337754

540 FAMILY
UK Reportable Accident: Runway excursion due to a loss of directional control on landing. Damage to propeller and engine.Two POB, no reported injuries. AAIB Record Only.
****** performed a routine left-hand visual circuit to land on runway 21. Loss of directional control on landing resulted in runway excursion. The aircraft sustained damage to
propeller/engine from pitching action which caused the propeller to strike the surface. The aircraft came to rest on an unpaved area east of runway 21/03 adjacent to 21 ROP (airfield
map grid reference D2) and constituted a blocked runway. Aircraft engine shut down and occupants disembarked. Aircraft Ground Incident procedures initiated. RFFS attend scene of
incident and declare CAT 0 (depletion in RFFS Fire category).Ground operations staff assist with recovery of aircraft using tow and parked on Apron C. Pilot and passenger unharmed
and transported to the terminal in RFFS vehicle. Runway inspection completed with no evidence of damage to runway surface or aerodrome ground lighting.Runway reopened and
normal ops resumed. RFFS Fire CAT II restored.No impact on other flights.
MOONEY M20 LYCOMING Cruise En route 13/10/2023 202337992

360 FAMILY
Level bust M20P climbed above cleared FL90 to FL94 before correcting.
*** checked in at FL90 and was sent DCT to CPT. A few minutes later at approximately 1607 I observed the mode C as FL92 and then queried as it changed to FL93, the pilot stated that
they had an auto pilot error and were trying to correct the problem. The maximum level observed was FL94 before the a/c descended back to FL90. There was no loss of separation and
no avoiding action was required.
MOONEY M20 LYCOMING Normal descent EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 15/11/2023 202339098
360 FAMILY civil
Infringement of the Southend CTA (Class D) by an M20P at 2300ft.

I was working Farnborough LARS North and East at the time of the infringement in medium traffic levels. *** was receiving a Basic Service on a flight Elstree to Elstree, mode A and C
validated and verified. At time 1257 Southend Radar called to requesting the intentions of the 5022 squawk to the west of their overhead, I located the aircraft on radar and saw that it was
inside the Southend CTR and I recollect the altitude may have been 2,300ft. We have been receiving nuisance AIW alerts for the last 2 days and as it was constantly alerting, this time
with a *** departing Heathrow. I was not drawn to the Southend infringement due to AIW being active for quite some time. I turned the aircraft to vacate controlled airspace and they
stated they did not believe they had infringed using their GPS but I believe the aircraft may have been inside controlled airspace for a period of time before Southend called. Southend did
not have any traffic that was affected by the infringement.
On the day in question I was advised by Farnborough Radar that they believed I infringed the Southend Zone, I was aware of the zone location and was doing a 180 at the time heading to
avoid the zone and head back to the west, the wind did blow me closer than I would have liked as there was strong gusts on the day in question.
Although whilst close to the zone I don't believe I infringed and upon landing I contacted Southend tower directly and spoke to them to confirm Farnborough's claim of infringement and
they confirmed that there was no infringement into their zone.
MOONEY M20T CONTINENTAL Standing EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 21/04/2023 202325628

(TELEDYNE) USA
TSIO550
Pedestrian taxiway incursion.

The pilot of *** a M20T who had parked spot 12 on Apron 2- vacated the aircraft and walked along Taxiway Alpha to the Aeroclub.
NORTH AMERICAN NORTH UNKNOWN En-route EGHP : Popham 25/11/2023 202340450

AMERICAN UNKNOWN
Infringement of the Solent CTA-2 (Class D) by an NA-145 at 2100ft. No other aircraft involved.
At 1131, ***, squawking 7011, climbed to A021 to infringe CTA 2. The a/c was called and on responding, asked to report their altitude, to which they reported 2100ft, apologised, and
descended to remain outside CAS. No other aircraft were affected.
After take off from EGHP I switched to Solent Radar 120.230, sqawking 7011. I descended abeam Romsey VRP to 1400ft to transit below Solent CTA. during the leg from Ower to the
southern edge of the 200ft CTA I allowed myself to be distracted by my passenger. At 1130 received a call from ATC to check my altitude. at that point my GPS reports I was at 2046ft. I
immediately descended and was below 2000ft within 6 seconds. My GPS reports I was over 2000ft for a total of 30 seconds and at a max alt of 2046ft. The cause of the incident was a
lack of situational awareness caused by my allowing myself to be distracted by my passenger - I should have asked them to be quiet.
OTHER (CZAW SPORTCRUISER) UNKNOWN En-route EGCB : Manchester/Barton 25/10/2023 202335518
OTHER (CZAW SPORTCRUISER) UNKNOWN
Infringement of the Manchester LLR (Class D) by a Czech Sportcruiser at 1000ft squawking 7000.
AIW alerts me to a 7000 squawk in LLR to the west of Barton. Using Mode S it is identified as *** and a blind call is made with no response. I sorted out an inbound IFR sequence, and
spoke with Air 2 who said they had no departures (DRM deselected anyway). Another blind call made with no
response. Eventually *** selects 7366 and I manage to raise them. They confirmed that they had erroneously been squawking 7000. Flight continued
with no issues. No separation issues as no traffic in the vicinity at that time.
I had originally planned to track NW from EGCB heading towards Lake District but on reaching Hulton VRP I considered weather worsening to the north and better to the south . I then
changed course to track down Lolevel corridor and after 3min of that airspace changed to 7366 from 7000. And then I was informed by Manchester so you realise you have been
squwaking 7000 for past 3min of the low level corridor journey. I am familiar to entering low level corridor at thelwall viaduct and typically change from 7365 to 7366 before then.
However I am unfamiliar with entering the low level corridor south west of Hulton industrial estate.
OTHER (WAG A CUBY) OTHER CONTINENTAL Initial climb EGBJ (GLO) : 11/11/2023 202337767
(WAG A CUBY) (TELEDYNE) USA Gloucestershire
200 FAMILY
PAN declared due to aircraft with a rough running engine on climb out. Aircraft returned and emergency services deployed.
***** (J3) was airborne at 1447 for a local flight SE off RWY27. On climb out the aircraftrequested a return to the field due a rough running engine then declared PAN PAN. FE
initiatedand the aircraft landed safely on RWY22 at 1450 with RFFS in attendance. ****** on final for RWY27 was instructed to go around (see next report re *****)
No additional information.
Details of the investigation complete: Recordings audited. Runway 27 in use, split frequencies. **** was cleared for the take-off to the southeast. 14:48:10 - '*-** turning righthand
downwind, partial power issue' *-** was asked if they were declaring an emergency and reported 'PAN PAN at this stage'. Other traffic was rearranged and the aircraft was offered
runway 22 with the wind given, which *-** elected to take. 14:48:48 - *-** reported 'Engine is running OK now, just a little roughness on the climb out so cancel PAN, request runway
22 righthand'. 14:49:08 - Details were passed to RFFS on CH2 with correct category of emergency, however confusion as to the nature of the problem due to another concurrent
emergency with *****. *-** landed safely on Runway 22. Findings and observations: ***** reported a power issue on climb out. Correct emergency category declared. Traffic
rearranged to give *-** priority and alternative runway offered. Aircraft landed safely. Status: Open - Investigation ongoing and expected to require follow up.
PARTENAVIA P68 LYCOMING En-route EGNM (LBA) : Leeds 12/10/2023 202336080

360 FAMILY Bradford
Loss of separation and ATCO incapacitation.

*** P68 ON A SURVEY. EAST WEST LINES AT 5.0 - CO-ORDINATED INTO THE MANCHESTER TMA AT 5.0 SOUTH OF POL THEN BACK INTO THE SOUTHERN PART
OF THE LEEDS CTA REMAINING ON THE LEEDS RADAR FREQUENCY. WHEN SOUTH OF POL THE *** REPORTED SURVEY COMPLETE, REQUESTED A FIGURE
OF 8 MANOUEVRE TO CALIBRATE THE A/C AND THEN TO RETURNTO LIVERPOOL. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO CO-ORDINATE THIS REQUEST MANCHESTER
APPROACH DESCENDED A MANCHESTER INBOUND IN THE VICNITY OF THE RVR LEADING TO A POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEPARATION.
This report is being submitted on behalf of an ATCO, who became incapacitated and is unable to file. I was in the CTB for other operational reasons when I was called into the radar
room following an ATCO incapacitation. I took over the final director to relieve the ATCO who had witnessed the incident. He eluded to the fact their had possible been a LOS of
separation in the moments surrounding the incapacitation. After unplugging I went to watch the time period and a LOS occurred between *** and ***. *** was at 5000ft 5nms south of
POL on a EGNM squawk 2676 tracking westbound alerting on the AIW. *** had been given a heading of 090 and descent to 5000ft 5nms south east of ROSUN. EGNM called to
coordinate the *** doing a figure of 8. During the call with EGNM several calls by a/c disrupted the coordination. *** had been transferred to final director and APS S controller pointed
this out to FIN DIR when the intentions of *** were realised but the *** never responded and remained on APS frequency. *** called the frequency on more than one occasion to
determine if the call for transfer was for him, whilst the coordination was still taking place with EGNM. ATCO then used ERBM to check the range of *** and *** initially indicating
5.6nms. Another a/c was transmitting on the RT as this took place. As soon as RT was free, ATCO called the ***, *** replied again to ask if that call was for them. ATCO advises ***
negative stay with me at this point range is 4.5NM and 150ft. *** then transmits his callsign. ATCO issues avoiding action turn right immediately heading 110 degrees. *** replies.
Range is 3.77nm 75ft and it's closest range.
I was in the CTB on a non-operational office day. Whilst in the vicinity of the radar room with a colleague we were made aware that the radar ATCO
needed urgent help due to having become incapacitated. We entered the radar room to find the ATCO being assisted away from the radar screen by ATC Ops and a non-operational
ATCO. I took my headset and unplugged him from the console. My colleague did the same for the DIR ATCO who had temporarily selected the APS frequency and shouted for help as
soon as he realised what was happening. The outgoing DIR ATCO communicated that he believed there to have been a loss of separation and that he had telephoned PC to stop all further
inbound traffic. Having no handover I quickly attempted to scan the whole screen and strips to ascertain the traffic picture. The strips suggested it was not too busy
however there were a lot of radar contacts on the screen. I could see that all EGCC inbounds were vertically separated although not all in the expected positions in the radar circuit. I also
had a *** transit strip at 5000', I could not see this aircraft therefore focused on this first as the altitude 5000' was of concern. I observed a 7000 squawk and using mode S identified the
RVR which was now below CAS. I then returned my focus to the CC inbounds and coordinated with DIR to resume vectoring towards final approach. Normal ops resumed, no aircraft
left CAS, the period between the APS ATCO becoming incapacitated and being relieved was about 2 minutes
PARTENAVIA P68 LYCOMING Standing EGGP (LPL) : Liverpool 10/10/2023 202337997

360 FAMILY
Prop wash by P68 during engineer's ground run.

Detailed Events: After refuelling ****, *** did power checks approximately 20 metres away from me. This resulted in ****'s flight control surfaces to violently flutter and the aircraft to
shake around. **** was positioned at the refuelling bowser with its tail pointing directly into the prop wash of ****. At the time there was also wind at 190/10. *** was undergoing
maintenance by engineers at the time and there was little space on the apron. Actions Taken: After realizing the severity of the prop wash, I began moving *** to the left of our apron
through the yellow square. This placed the aircraft even more into ****'s wake, now at a 90* angle. After realising this, I subsequently tied the aircrafts controls and pushed the aircraft
backwards to the right side of the bowser next to ****. After securing ****, I called ops to check if *** was on frequency and if they could tell them to move somewhere else. ****
continued its power checks for another 5 minutes after the incident with ***.
Suggested Preventative Action: Review where P68's can do power checks on KFSO ***** *** ****. This incident is still under investigation with our engineering department and EGGP
Airport Operations Centre.
PIAGGIO P180 PRATT & WHITNEY Take-off EGLK (BBS) : Blackbushe 31/10/2023 202338900
(CANADA)
PT6A
Departure of aircraft in official night without aerodrome lighting.

The aerodrome ground lighting at Blackbushe failed in May 2023 due to a catastrophic lightning strike. The airport is currently in the design phase of a replacement system. A NOTAM
applies (L6159/23) with respect to the amended airport opening hours which mirror the sunset time at Blackbushe + 30 Minutes.A/C was filed to depart LFMV at 14:30z with an ETA
into EGLK at 16:22z. The A/C was delayed leaving LFMV and arrived at EGLK at 16:50z. At 16:54:56 the A/C asked what was the latest take off time and was told that the latest take
off time was 17:09z and had 14 minutes until that time. At 17:06:19 A/C requested start and it was approved. At 17:07:23 FISO told A/C “When ready taxi A1” with aerodrome
information. A/C readback correct information. At 17:08:07 A/C was passed the Runway condition report of RWY 25. At 17:08:25 the A/c requested that he needed 1 minute at the hold
point. FISO passed that the A/C had 30 seconds until their take of time. The A/C responded that “that will work”. At 17:08:37 the A/C requested to line up on RWY 25. The FISO asked
the A/C to “report lined up Rwy 25”. At 17:09:00 the FISO stated that the A/C was unable to depart EGLK due to no AGL. A/C responded with “Ah”. At 17:09:31 FISO advises that the
A/C taxis back to the stand, A/C responded with “understood”. At 17:09:50 A/C states that “he is still displaying 17:08 on his screen and taking off RWY25” FISO states that they have
17:10 on their screen. ADSB shows A/C Airbourne at 17:10:32. A/C changes to EGLF at 17:11:10.
PILATUS (PC24) PILATUS (PC24) PRATT & WHITNEY Climb to cruising SOQQA 07/10/2023 202335307
(CANADA) level or altitude
PT6A
Aircraft turned unexpectedly after completing a SOQQA SID.

I was working Thames Director when a *** turned unexpectedly towards the south after completing the SOQQA SID from EGLC. I had two inbounds from the south inbound to EGLC
and one inbound to EGKB. These aircraft were unusually high because of a survey flight working EGMC. I had to turn the departure towards the east on a heading to maintain separation.
Thames procedures are such that SOQQA departures must go to SODVU after SOQQA as this is the point that they should be level at min-stack to enable separation from traffic inbound
to RAVSA and silent hand overs etc. When SODVU was removed from the SID I thought it would be only a matter of time before this event would happen. We have an essential
operating procedure for maintaining separation and someone thought it wise to remove SODVU from the SID.
PILATUS (PC24) PILATUS (PC24) PRATT & WHITNEY Normal descent EGGW (LTN) : 19/10/2023 202336563
(CANADA) London/Luton
PT6A
PC24 leaving CAS due weather.

*** inbound to ZAGZO reported weather and requested to turn right to avoid. Pilot was warned that it would take him outside CAS and it would be a basic service outside. Before
leaving the pilot reported clear of weather and was turned heading 245. While making the turn the aircraft momentarily left CAS at FL110 I was unable to inform the pilot and change the
service due to other aircraft checking in and by the time I was able to he was back in CAS.
PILATUS PC12 PRATT & WHITNEY Final approach EGCC (MAN) : 27/10/2023 202335975
(CANADA) (PT6E) Manchester/Intl
PRATT & WHITNEY
(CANADA) (PT6E)
Green laser illumination.

XXXXXX checked in on frequency and reported he had a green laser shone at him from his 4 o'clock direction. There were no further reports from other
aircraft.
PILATUS PC12 PRATT & WHITNEY En-route SAM 27/10/2023 202337100

(CANADA)
PT6A
Excursion from CAS.

**** coordinated in from TC South to myself at FL170. Aircraft called me West of SAM (approximately 15nm from entering my sector) on a weather
avoidance heading of 030. Climb instruction given to FL210 and then the aircraft was observed to have left CAS. I informed the pilot and changed the
service to a DCS. This was for approximately 15-20 seconds. The aircraft re-joined CAS and service changed to RCS.
PILATUS PC12 UNKNOWN En-route EGTF : Fairoaks 10/11/2023 202339617

UNKNOWN
Aircraft airborne without release.

I was coordinating on TC SOUTH. Around about 1014z I received a phone call from LF APC explaining that **** had got airborne from EGTF
'without their permission', no further details were given but LF apologised and asked if we would accept the aircraft. I said that we would and coordinated
the aircraft's passage into our airspace. I let the GS know what had happened.
Normally EGTF would request the aircraft from EGLF APC and EGLF APC would then ring South for a release and we would release it, then they'd ring
back later and arrange a course of action.
PILATUS PC12 UNKNOWN En-route EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 19/11/2023 202340593
UNKNOWN
Level bust by a PC12 that climbed above its cleared level of 2400ft.
*** was cleared to 2400' as standard and released by Thames Radar 3000' when east. *** was seen climbing above the assigned level of 2400' and instructed to descend immediately to
their cleared level. *** descended to 2400' and climb was given as normal once east of the field.
PILATUS PC12 PRATT & WHITNEY Taxi EGPF (GLA) : Glasgow 19/10/2023 202336588
(CANADA) ( PT6E-67XP
( HARTZELL HC-E5A-
31A/NC10245B ))
PRATT & WHITNEY
(CANADA) ( PT6E-67XP
( HARTZELL HC-E5A-
31A/NC10245B ))
Taxiway incursion by ATC car.

Aircraft met by Follow-me vehicle at Delta taxiway. On passing ATC control tower there was a gap of approximately 100yds between vehicle/aircraft. ATC car drove across taxiway
between Follow-me and aircraft We were taxiing very slowly and there was no risk of contact, however, the controller in question rang the tower to report and apologise. They had just
finished a long duty so suspect they were focused on the homeward journey.
No loss of separation. Phones ATC and agreed to both report. Vehicle not checking taxiway after Ops vehicle passed. Possibly fatigue of ATC controller after duty.
PILATUS PC12 PRATT & WHITNEY Final approach EGJJ (JER) : Jersey, 03/11/2023 202338379
(CANADA) Channel Is.
PT6A
On approach, PC12 was less than minimum distance behind preceding AT72 for wake turbulence requirements.
I was asked to act as the safety controller for a level 3 approach check. XXX, a PC12 was cleared for a visual approach behind an ATR. The trainee controller gave traffic information
and XX reported the ATR in sight, but did not give the wake turbulence caution. As the safety controller, and on subsequent debrief with the Assessor and reflection, I should have
stepped in and ensured the caution was given by the trainee, as a safety critical issue. The spacing as the ATR touched down was approximately 3.5nm, when 4nm were required.
PILATUS PC21 (PC24) PRATT & WHITNEY Take-off: Other EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 16/10/2023 202338004
(CANADA)
PT6A
Level bust PC24 climbed above cleared 2400ft to 2600ft before correcting.
While working as xxxxxxx bandboxed and crosscoupled in moderate traffic, *** was released from runway 21 at Biggin Hill to 2400ft only. I observed the aircraft climb to indicate A26,
and checked there were no potential losses of separation on the radar, as this was within tolerance of it's clearance. It then climbed to indicated A27, however before I was able to ring
Biggin it had descended again to A26 and eventually went back to A24, it's cleared altitude. It then continued as per normal, with no further incident of which I'm aware.
PIPER PA18 CONTINENTAL Landing roll EGKA (ESH) : Shoreham 15/11/2023 202338419
(TELEDYNE) USA
CONTINENTAL
(TELEDYNE) USA
Brief runway excursion on landing roll due to weather encounters.

During the landing roll, the aircraft appeared to get caught by a gust of wind causing it toweathercock and briefly exit the runway on to the grass at low speed. The aircraft taxied back
onto the runway after a few seconds. No apparent damage to aircraft or aerodrome property. Surface wind at the time was 290/11KT.
PIPER PA24 UNKNOWN En-route EGHI (SOU) : Southampton 07/11/2023 202336853

UNKNOWN
Infringement of the Solent CTA/CTR (Class D) by a PA24 at 2100ft. An aircraft on approach was turned away to keep it clear.
**** was tracking down the western side of the zone on 2650 squawk at approximately 2.1A. Blind calls had been made previously with no response.
The aircraft then called on frequency squawking 7011 whilst in the turn towards controlled airspace. I instructed the aircraft to remain outside controlled
airspace. The aircraft entered for a short period just east of Romsey VRP before turning to the west to leave.
During the infringement I had a training aircraft on approach for the ILS 20. At the point of infringement the aircraft was just intercepting the localiser. I
cancelled the approach and turned it left to keep it clear as we were SSR only so 5nm was required. There was no loss of separation.
I filed a flight plan as crossing a fir boundary. I do this trip regularly and normally avoid solent radar as they are busy. `On a blustery November day with difficult conditions I choose to
route through solent airspace. When airborne I was asked to contact Boscombe as Middlle Wallop was active. Normally heading North out of area unnecessary. This took time to squawk
and talk to them. I then contacted London control and activated my flight plan. As weather was impending at Cherbourg I put forward the flight plan. I asked London to deal with Solent
Radar. They came back a few minutes later and told me to squawk 7011 and contact Solent radar. /I did so . I was intending to climb to 3000 ft as per my flight plan. Solent radar came
back to me and said stay clear. I immediately stopped my climb began a descent and turned sharp right. I then said to Solent I would be happy to route to the west avoiding their airspace
completely. They came back a few minutes later and said I was clear through their area. I proceeded as the per the flight plan. I do this route a lot and I normally avoid Solent Radar as
they tend to be busy and it is easier to fly West avoiding their airspace. This time I was aware of weather from the West and also thought wrongly they would not be busy on a marginal
November day. I believe I acted correctly . As a commander of aircraft without autopilot I flew the plane. As soon as I was told to stay clear I reacted . The problem was as I see it
London did not deal with my flight plan expeditiously. I suspect my putting the time forward affected the readiness of the authorities. The time to react was short. I was under the
impression London would deal with Solent.
I hold a uk atpl. ##### FAA ATpl. Trained at *** and been a Captain on B767,B737 and BAE146. As such fully aware of responsibilities of abiding by the rules.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Normal descent EGNT (NCL) : Newcastle 07/10/2023 202335513
320 FAMILY
VFR clearance provided in SVFR criteria.

I was the tower controller at the time. I cleared *** into a visual right hand circuit with a cloud ceiling of 1200ft (***) with a visibility in excess of 10KM. There was a Logan aircraft on
final approach. Radar requested the intentions of *** as the conditions were SVFR. I informed the Logan of the aircraft turning down wind and gave a SVFR clearance to *** to leave
CAS via Morpeth after coordination with radar. I was visual with both aircraft at all times. *** given a SVFR clearance and told to leave CAS by Morpeth. Tower ATCO removed from
seat at 0930utc Investigation commenced
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGSX : North Weald 26/10/2023 202335577

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the Stansted CTA (Class D) by a PA28 at 2100ft.

I had just taken a handover and then subsequent band-boxed the sector. It was a low traffic session. I noticed *** climb into the SS CTA above EGSX. They reached A2100ft
QNH990hpa. Blind calls were made out to that callsign with no response. I called someone over to call EGSX for me, they then got the aircraft to descend out of controlled airspace.
There were no losses of separation. No traffic information needed.
I joined Circuits in the wrong direction and targeted Runway 02 join Crosswind. This is contrary to other aircraft movements in circuits and may cause serious accidents.
I noticed this during the flight and realised that I must have made a mistake. So, in order to avoid other aircraft, I raised the altitude to 2000 (a safe altitude in my opinion) without
informing North Weld Radio and Stansted Radar, and flew overhead the runway in the hope of observing the current situation before choosing to leave the airspace or land. At this point,
I heard a warning from North Weld Radio that I had infringed Stansted airspace. After observation and ensured that there is no risks of collision with other traffic, I left this area and
returned to Stapleford.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route KMLB (MLB) [MLB] 08/10/2023 202335617

360 FAMILY Melbourne, Fl/Melbourne
Intl
Foreign Airprox - PA28 and a B787 On Approach To MLB.

On a 7nm final approach to RW 27L at MLB we were made aware by MLB twr of traffic potentially conflicting with us on the approach. At the same time we saw TCAS tfc approaching
and potentially crossing our approach path at a similar level. We were at about 2000ft and busy configuring for landing when this was happening. The controller said he was not in
contact with the traffic who seemed oblivious to our presence. The FO was Pf and we were both busy looking for the traffic about to possibly go-around when he spotted it first. I then
saw it too and it became clear it would be above us as we
passed abeam. I’m fairly sure there may have been a serious conflict had we gone around. It flew straight across the approach from right to left at about 3-4nm final. After landing I spoke
to the controller who gave me the reg of the aircraft.. *** - a Piper Pa-28 Cherokee (which I suspected -we were that close). It’s hard to gauge these things but there was a maybe 30 sec
period when the traffic disappeared from our TCAS display that I thought we were at a serious risk of collision just because we couldn’t see it. I don’t think the other aircraft was aware
of us at any time.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Landing EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 21/10/2023 202335838

320 FAMILY
Birdstrike without damage or system problems.

Pilot Report - ***** Birdstrike on RWY28 during a touch and go. We were unaware of any strike, but the remains of what appeared to be a seagull were observed on the runway near to
L1 during a further touch and go. This was reported to Sherburn Radio. On parking at the end of the sortie, damage to the starboard leading edge was observed with fresh blood! So the
only conclusion was that we were the guilty part.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Push-back/tow EGBG : Leicester 29/10/2023 202336109

320 FAMILY
Pushback collision between 2 aircrafts.

Following a successful flight down to Leicester (EGBG), **** **** and I were walking back to the aircraft for a return flight to Sherburn when we were approached by **** ********
(pilot in command of **** *-**** and informed that his aircraft had collided with *-**** while pushing back into the parking bay. Upon inspection it became apparent that the port
wing aileron of * **** had made contact with the leading edge of the starboard wing of *-**** causing paintwork damage and a minor indentation on the leading edge (see attached
photo). having assessed the damage, **** **** and I were both satisfied that the damage would not impact on the safety of the flight, however, following protocol I contacted the flight
desk at Sherburn informing them of the incident The attached photo of the damage was sent to be assessed by ***** ******* and a Sherburn engineer (**** ****). A short time later we
were given confirmation the damage would not affect the safety of the flight. Contact details of the pilot involved were taken and passed onto the flight desk staff at Sherburn As
anticipated, the flight back was uneventful and there was no impact on the ability to control the aircraft.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGMC (SEN) : Southend 16/10/2023 202336340

360 FAMILY
Infringement of the Southend CTR (Class D) by a PA28, after clearance entry expired.
*** ISSUED A CLEARANCE TO LEAVE CAS (ST LAWRENCE TO EGMT) WITH CLEARANCE EXPIRY TIME OF 1040. AIRCRAFT APPEARS AIRBORNE AT 1046.
Following pre flight clearance from Southend ATC for flight to Thurrock obtained on the ground by telephone (as always unable to contact ATC by radio on ground) with correct read-
back took off and followed clearance exactly - squawk - height restriction - heading as cleared by ATC so I am baffled by the MOR. Any clarification would be welcome. I always work
closely with Southend ATC (27 years) who are always helpful and have an LOA for #### which I normally fly from St Lawrence. Please Note: After take-off I was unable to initially
contact ATC as my headset seemed very quiet and I could not tell if my transmissions were received. My Co-pilot's PTT button was faulty so I changed to my spare headset and
explained to ATC that I had had a headset problem and apologised. From memory I then asked for a Basic Service and proceeded to Thurrock Airfield. Please Note I had received ATC
clearance to depart within the CTR and I followed the instructions I had been given. I can't add much more.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGTR : Elstree 06/11/2023 202336641

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the Halton ATZ (Class G) by a PA28 at 2100ft.

As soon as the aircraft was identified, the SFSO called Elstree. The captain called soon after landing and was very apologetic. Screenshots show the aircraft at 2100' just before the
avoiding turn, making the aircraft approx 1750' AGL. The flight was IMC training, with the student under a hood. The captain was receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough. They
were flying in a slightly different area than usual. The captain said he usually got a warning from Farnborough when he was in the vicinity of other airfields but received no warning
about Halton. As soon as the captain saw Halton airfield he turned the aircraft and climbed. They were not using Sky Demon and admitted that this may have helped him avoid the ATZ.
While on the phone he checked his planning (electronic but not Sky Demon) and admitted his route took him right through our ATZ. I then did the usual education: we are open 7 days a
week, opening hours, training flights and gliding with cables etc. Calling us is preferable to talking to Farnborough.
I would like to start by stating that I take full responsibility for any errors that led to the MOR on 6 Nov 2023. Normally we conduct our general handling training in the Royston area in
Cambridgeshire. However, for the first time we decided to practice NDB holds for IMC training at an off-airfield location. For this purpose, we opted to use a new training area around
Wescott using the WCO NDB for holding purposes, as well as for additional IMC general handling manoeuvres. The route to the WCO NDB was entered directly into a Garmin GTN
650, which does not provide airspace warnings (unlike a Sky demon enabled tablet). Shortly after departing from Elstree, we contacted Farnborough radar for a Basic service. I had
noticed that the student was tracking slightly right of track towards Luton’s Class D airspace and so asked him to turn left. Due to the combination of having to oversee a student under
IMC training Foggles, and the limited scree size of the GTN 650, I did not notice that the new track would take us over the Halton ATZ. As soon as I realised that we had entered the
Halton ATZ I took immediate action and we initiated a sharp steep turn and climbed away. Unfortunately, this still meant that we had entered their ATZ.
Just after a Halton-based aircraft landed, another aircraft was heard overhead the airfield. On checking FR24 it was found that **** appeared to have infringed the ATZ. Just before
reaching overhead the runways the aircraft turned sharply and climbed. There was no traffic airborne at the time of the incursion.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGSS (STN) : 28/10/2023 202336701

320 FAMILY London/Stansted
Infringement of the Stansted CTR (class D) by a PA28 at 1800ft. Suspected loss of separation with a B738 on approach. A second B738's approach was delayed due to the infringement.
I was acting as OJTI for a low hours trainee in the FIN position. My focus was on the left base area as my trainee worked on achieving gaps with a
continuous stream of traffic. I suddenly became aware of traffic squawking 7010 3 nm east of final approach RW22 at 1800ft. I was immediately confused
as I really wasn't expecting to see anything this location. We had already handed off **** to the tower. At this point I suspect there was a loss of
separation with this aircraft. It therefore did not receive any traffic information or avoiding action. However, as it was moving away from the infringer, there
was no course of action that would increase separation anymore than continuing with the approach. I moved onto ensuring separation between the next
aircraft in the sequence that had been given instructions to establish. I told *** not to establish, and to turn right 270 to go through the localiser due
to unknown aircraft within the zone. I also advised the following aircraft (***) to go through the localiser also. Both aircraft received an extra 5-7nm each.
I used Mode S to interrogate the unknown contact - this came up as ***. I made a blind call to no avail. I then called Andrewsfield. They advised he
had departed them and was enroute to Stapleford. The aircraft was still infringing at this point, and was indicating 1600ft within CTA1. I asked the person
at Andrewsfield to relay an instruction, which I immediately realised they were not allowed to do. So I asked them to transfer this aircraft to my frequency,
136.2, so that I could identify, valid the Mode C and ensure it would remain outside of CAS for the duration of it's flight. I subsequently identified ***
and provided a Basic Service. The remainder of their flight remained outside of CAS and was uneventful up until it leaving my frequency for Stapleford.
Right hand circuit departure from Andrewsfield runway 27 is within the Stanstead CTA, while also within the Andrewsfield ATZ. There are also a number of noise abatement areas to
avoid. I very conscious of the noise abatement areas on climb out and the need to manage my turn within aircraft limits while also staying within the ATZ. Turning after the farms and
before the village of Stebbing, my attitude indicator malfunctioned, rolling constantly. This impacted my ability to measure angle of bank but moreover was very distracting, therefore I
was unable to maintain the turn or change squawk and frequency. Levelling at 1,800 feet I increased the rate of turn, however I was already outside the Andrewsfield ATZ and the
controller asked me to contact Stanstead directly.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGPH (EDI) : Edinburgh 05/11/2023 202336839

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the Edinburgh CTA (Class D) by a PA28 at 3600ft.

I was seated at OP...37J
GBODD (PA28) called on frequency at 1047 at what sounded like 2300ft on a QNH of 977HPa with a location and destination that were not discernible
on first report. These were then confirmed as "abeam West Linton" and "Kirkbride" respectively. The pilot was instructed to squawk 7401 and given a
basic service. At this point a return was noticed on the FID to squawk SFIS in that location at 3400ft. The pilot was ROCAS'd, given the EGPH QNH,
informed of the base of CAS and asked to confirm his level, which he confirmed as 3400ft. The pilot confirmed that he would remain below 3500ft. CAIT
was then triggered as the return showed A36, the pilot again ROCAS'd, given the EGPH QNH and advised the base of CAS as 3500ft. At this point
EGPH called to confirm the QNH being used by the pilot as he had shown on their system as 3600ft, 100ft inside CAS. The QNH was confirmed as 977
HPa which was correct for that area and the Controller confirmed that he had shown as 3600ft. At this point the aircraft appeared to descend to 3400ft as
confirmed by the EGPH controller and he was happy the A/C was now outside CAS. The OS was informed of the situation.
I was acting as approach controller at EGPH and had 4 aircraft being vectored for the ILS 24 and 2 VFR
aircraft that were transitting the Control zone.
*** was a P28A cleared VFR not above three thousand feet leaving the zone in the vicinity of West Linton.
At around 1045 I advised him that he had left controlled airspace, now had a Basic service and requested that
he advise when he wished to change frequency.
He immediately requested change to ScFIR and as I had no further pertinent information to pass I told him to
squawk 7000 and said goodbye.
I returned to my primary task of vectoring to final approach.
I observed *** change to the ScFIR squawk and climb slightly to 3300ft but this in not unusual and the
base of CAS in that area is 3500ft.
At 1050 the mode C on ***'s transponder showed 3600ft and the AIW was triggered. I monitored the
return to see if would continue to climb and immediately called ScFIR for coordination. The aircraft quickly
left CAS by descent.
I informed ScFIR that I would be filing an airspace infringement as the AIW had been triggered.
*** was South of the aircrafts position, when the AIW was triggered it was still approx FL120
decending to FL80 and no further descent was given until after the intentions of *** had been clarified.
At no time was any other Flight within 5Nm or 5000ft of *** when the AIW was activated.
Closure Statement
**** leaves EDI CTZ to the South. Service changed to BAS and requested to advise leaving the
frequency. **** replies they'll go to SFIS.
**** starts a slow climb from A030 to A035, before setting off the AIW indicating A036 for a few returns
before descending back down to A034 and remaining outside CAS.
INT ATCO calls SFIS promptly to inform them of the infringement and to clarify ****'s intentions, and
that they'll file on them.
Closest aircraft when *** was infringing was *** which was at FL110 descending FL80 and
greater than 5nm away.
Initial Investigator is a UCA, no action required except a reminder to the ATCO to use "squawk conspicuity"
rather than "7000".
I was with atc all the time during the zone transit everything went fine just cleared to maintain 3500 there was flown 3600 for few seconds 100 feet different cause of weather I tried
maintained alt requested by controller
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Taxiing to/from EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 06/11/2023 202337904

320 FAMILY runway
UK Reportable Accident: Ground collision with parked aircraft spinner and wingtip damaged. 1 POB, No injuries. Subject to AAIB AARF Investigation.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Landing EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 10/11/2023 202337910

320 FAMILY
Runway excursion on landing.

Pilot Statement. 1.1 hours completed with instructor, 8 circuits completed as pu/t but almost unaided. Felt confident for first solo. Aircraft climbed steady and stable in the circuit. Final
approach was steady, correct altitude and on centre line. Touchdown was smooth and central and power was off. Initial roll was good but then for an unknown reason aircraft veered to
the right. I compensated by pressing down on the left rudder pedal which the aircraft then circled onto the grass. As the grass was wet I was unable to obtain enough power myself to taxi
back. I therefore called on the radio for assistance to tow me back onto the tarmac as the aircraft became stuck in the grass.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Taxi EGGP (LPL) : Liverpool 18/11/2023 202339990

360 FAMILY
Carbon monoxide detected on ground run-up.

Detailed Events: Carbon monoxide. Co detectors reaching 70 and the manual detector went very dark brown upon taxi to do the run-up checks. Turned back to park on the line and exited
the aircraft. The heater or defroster was not on at the time of the incidentActions Taken: Parked on the line opened the dv window and made sure vents were off. Suggested Preventative
Action: N/a FSO ******** . In addition to the fitted aircraft CO detector we have invested in digital CO detectors so that we can monitor exact levels of CO.Our engineers are looking
into the cause of the CO that we detected and will make repairs.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route DET 25/11/2023 202340526

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a PA28 at 2600ft.

I was acting as OJTI for an experienced colleague who was retraining. LARS North and East, high workload. AIW alerted us to *** indicating 2600ft west of DET where the LTMA base
is 2500ft. My trainee spotted the infringement straight away and instructed the pilot to descend, reminding them of the base of controlled airspace. The pilot acknowledged the instruction
and descended immediately to leave controlled airspace.
The QNH at EGKR was 1021. After clearing Gatwick CTA I climbed to 2300ft on QNH 1021, and then changed to Farnborough East QNH 1022. I remember hearing of another aircraft
infringing airspace, I checking my altimeter which showed 2300 ft, several minutes later I received a call from Farnborough saying I was at 2600ft I descended straight away from 2300ft
QNH 1022, and levelled out at 1900ft. Throughout the flight I heard numerous aircraft checking altitude with Farnborough. At the end of the flight i checked my Skydemon log and noted
that the maximum altitude recorded was 2298ft and thought nothing else of the incident until I received via ###### the notice of the alleged infringement.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 22/11/2023 202340735

360 FAMILY civil
Infringement of the Farnborough CTA-6 (Class D) by a PA32 at 2600ft.

I was operating as OJTI with a phase 9 learner.
West+Zone medium traffic. I was alerted to a possible infringement when the AIW activated at 2600FT in CTA6. The aircraft was squawking 4572
(Farnborough West listening squawk). There was no traffic in the vicinity so I allowed the learner to continue with a pre note. After this was complete I
called the 4572 taking the callsign from mode S. They reported that they had mistakenly left the local QFE set after departing a site at Frensham ponds.
The flight in question was a positioning flight to Thruxton for the aircraft’s annual check.
The previous flight was 2 weeks earlier where it was found that the battery was flat and ground start had to be used. On this flight the same thing happened and positioning cars for a
ground start proved difficult as there were only 2 of us. Also, the Taxiway at the Frensham airstrip was very muddy, carrying lots of mud into the cockpit.
These issues predisposed the flight to a bit of stress, but at the pre-take of checks I elected to set the main altimeter to the local QFE in case a return was required.
Post take-off I failed to change the altimeter to QNH and due to altimeter tolerances, my particular altimeter was set to 1020, 10mb away from the regional pressure (1030).
Until Farnborough called me I was pleased with myself that I had stayed at least 200ft below the start of controlled airspace, so was rather devastated by my mistake when I realised what
had happened.
At the time of the incident, I got a traffic warning of gliders at Lasham so overshot my climb height by some 80ft to 2280ft indicated whilst looking for the traffic.
Lesson Learned: always use QNH on take off and just remember the airstrip offset should a return to the strip be required. Be thorough with the post take off checks.
PIPER PA28 TECHNIFY MOTORS Rejected take-off EGLS : Old Sarum 30/10/2023 202335747
TAE 125
Take off aborted and runway overrun.

PoB was 2, for the necessary 1 hour of dual time for SEP revalidation by experience. Runway 24 at Old Sarum. Windsock was slack. All checks proceeded normally. It was the first flight
from the airfield that day. On take-off acceleration was normal to begin with, on passing the Eastern windsock, the ground became muddier and acceleration ceased at about 49kias. For
the next third or so, the drag persisted and speed remained stagnant, I asked if the student was on the brakes at all, but I do not recall his reply. I took control to abort the take-off.
However, most of the remaining runway was downhill, and the grass was wet, so braking action was poor. The aircraft crossed the end threshold at what I would estimate as around 15-
20mph. The aircraft stopped in the field beyond after about another 20feet. We shut down and notified the dropzone of our situation by radio. We then disembarked and were driven back
to the office. We noted tip damage to all three propellor blades, but no further apparent damage to the aircraft.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route LOREL 30/10/2023 202336740

O320
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) and Luton CTA (Class D) by a PA28. Loss of separation.
I was OJTI with my student and the position had just been taken over when a phone-call was received by GW Radar to ask whether FIR was working
**** and if so it was higher than it should be.
My student replied they were working the a/c. GW radar requested us to tell the aircraft to descend to be not above 5.0A. My student responded that they
could not do that and the GW radar controller asked to work the a/c and the FIS student replied yes and GW radar gave frequency 129.550.
A/c transferred immediately to 129.550 at time 1448/1449Z.
A/c was believed to have infringed CAS yet the strip from last known altitude stated a/c to be at 1.8A Q995Hp written by previous FISO, last known
position was Epping at 1426Z routing Cheshunt.
**** was tracking north underneath the 2500' base abeam LOREL. When I looked back **** was in the climb and infringed CAS for 3 or 4
sweeps between 2600' and 2700' before leaving again underneath the 4500' base.
At approximately 1446Z, I was working GW INT/GW FIN bandboxed when I observed an aircraft enter controlled airspace without a clearance. The
aircraft activated sCAIT and was approximately 4nm west of EGSC at FL77, where the base of controlled airspace is FL75. The aircraft had the FIS
squawk selected and I rang the London FIR line to ask if the aircraft could be transferred to me.
As the aircraft called me, it had descended and left controlled airspace. I identified the aircraft and gave the pilot a service, and then took the details of
the flight.
There were no other aircraft in the vicinity of the infringing aircraft.
The latch of the door on the passenger side of the door wasn’t securely fastened and it came loose shortly after takeoff. As I tried to fix it I wasn’t aware that I had climbed. As soon as I
realised I dived down to a safe altitude but it took some time to get the latch locked and secure again.
Summary:
Having previously already infringed the Luton CTA by climbing to 2600 feet where the base was 2500 feet, and then descended clear, the pilot of *** (on the London FIR frequency)
infringed again, eroding separation with **** inbound to Luton, descending to 5000 feet. The pilot of *** then passed into an area of airspace where the base of controlled airspace was
4500 feet, thereby restoring separation. The pilot of *** infringed controlled airspace a third time, ten minutes after the loss of separation with no traffic in confliction on that occasion.
Description and Investigation
Sector: The loss of separation occurred whilst the pilot of *** was in receipt of a Basic Service from the London FISO, and the pilot of *** was under the control of the Luton
Intermediate Director (GW INT).
Airspace infringed and base of CAS: The airspace infringed when separation between *** and *** was eroded was the Luton CTA, Class D which had a prescribed base of 2500 feet.
Infringing aircraft: ****, a Piper PA28 operating from and to North Weald (EGSX) on a local flight, VFR.
Time aircraft entered controlled airspace: This was the second of three infringements by the pilot of *** during the same flight, but the only one which resulted in a loss of separation.
The first infringement of the Luton CTA was at 14:34:10, when the pilot climbed to 2600 feet 11.7nm East of Luton Airport, where the base was 2500 feet, tracking North. *** then left
the confines of controlled airspace by descent at 14:34:22.
On the occasion where the infringement resulted in separation with **** being eroded, **** entered the confines of the Luton CTA at 14:36:23 by climbing to 2600 feet, and then 2800
feet, still tracking North, where the base was 2500 feet.
Result of Infringement: An immediate loss of separation with ****, an Airbus A320 inbound to Luton, descending through 5200 feet for 5000 feet. *** was 0.3nm bearing 248 degrees
from reporting point LOREL at this time, at 2800 feet.
Which Safety Net Tools activated: CAIT activated at 14:36:31.
Actions of the controller: The GW INT Controller did not have any opportunity to take action with *** due to the short length of the infringement.
*** left the confines of the Luton CTA laterally and vertically, and thereby restored separation against ***, at 14:36:35.
There was a third infringement of controlled airspace by the pilot of **** at 14:47:27 when they climbed to FL78, where the base of the Clacton CTA (Class C) was FL75, 3.1nm
Northwest of Cambridge (EGSC). No other traffic was affected during this third infringement.
Response from pilot/aircraft operator: In their responses to the Airspace Infringement Questionnaire they received relating to this incident, the pilot of *** detailed, ‘The latch of the door
on the passenger side of the door wasn’t securely fastened and it came loose shortly after takeoff. As I tried to fix it I wasn’t aware that I had climbed. As soon as I realised I dived down
to a safe altitude but it took some time to get the latch locked and secure again. The incident happened as I wasn’t focused on my flying I was focused on trying to resolve the issue with
the door’.
Conclusions and RAT Assessment
Separation minima were eroded at 14:36:27
Minimum separation occurred at 14:36:31 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 2.4nm and 2400 feet.
The loss of separation was caused by the pilot of **** climbing into the confines of the Luton CTA without a clearance to do so and despite being told to remain clear of controlled
airspace by the London FISO. The pilot stated they did so because they were distracted by an unlatched passenger door.
The incident was resolved when the pilot of *** left the confines of the Luton CTA both laterally and vertically, at 14:36:35.
The loss of separation is RAT assessed as None ATM Ground: N / Overall: E (0 ATM ground points).
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route CPT 09/11/2023 202337520

O320
Infringement of LTMA by a PA28.

LF Approach rang me on the GSA desk to advise that they believed an aircraft in receipt of a service from them had infringed controlled airspace. They
further advised that the pilot reported their level as altitude 6300ft where the base of CAS is FL65. London QNH at the time was 0997HPa. I did not
witness the event.
I am a Flight Instructor at ***, based at ***. I was conducting a climbing and descending lesson. Wind at altitude was 250/25kts. QNH was 992 HPA I misjudged where the aircraft was
over the ground. I thought I was further to the west. I thought I was under a FL105 shelf of class A airspace. I was actually under a FL65 shelf of class A. I instructed the student to
enter a climb to 7000ft. in the climb Farnborough LARS West (125.250) requested our altitude, to which I replied 6400ft. Anticipating an airspace issue I entered a descent. Farnborough
then advised that we had infringed airspace and the controller suggested that the difference in QNH and Standard played a role in the infringement. on reflection I should have been using
my VFR moving map better, and had audio alerts set to play in my headset, which is a capability I had but did not use. More checks of position and airspace could have prevented this
infringement.
I was working LARS west band boxed with zone and approach. *** called from EGLK-EGLK on a training detail. They were instructed to squawk 0430 and given a Basic Service. The
QNH was 997 Hpa which was passed to them and, I believe read back correctly. The AIW alerted after *** had been manoeuvring for some time, it showed their Mode C indicating a FL
inside Q41 (FL67) where the base is FL65. *** had reported operating up to the base of CAS. I asked their altitude which they reported as A064. Unfortunately due to the pressure this
put them above the FL base. I instructed them to descend, which they did. Their flight continued without further incident.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGGW (LTN) : 06/11/2023 202339205

360 FAMILY London/Luton
Aircraft continued past VFR transit clearance.

Whilst I was taking over the approach position the incumbent controller explained that **** was transiting EGGW CTR, that several attempts had to
be made for the pilot to understand the clearance limit - but that the pilot had understood eventually. The tower knew of the transit.
The clearance that had been given was a standard VFR not above alt 2000ft, to hold 2Nm north of the Rnwy 25 threshold.
The outgoing controller mentioned that the pilot had initially asked for a transit via Junction 4 ( this being on the A1M and slightly further East of the
threshold by approx. 4Nm and south of the final approach ie the other side to that of the clearance limit).
Based upon the handover I chose to reaffirm the clearance limit with the pilot and he replied about 'Holding 2Nm North of the 2500ft bit'. This didn't make
sense and I believe I queried this but with the knowledge some VFR pilots refer to the ATZ during clearance readbacks. As I was trying to coordinate
with the tower and other aircraft were calling on frequency I was quite busy for a short period. *** said something about telling him when to hold but I
didn't fully catch what was said.
However based on all of the above I had already decided to control defensively - *** definitely appeared to be tracking towards Junc 4 A1M and didn't
look like holding. I had already cancelled the tower working this ac and I elected to keep the pilot on my frequency.
During the above I vectored **** (I believe) onto the 25 Localiser but told the pilot to only establish on the Loc - so as to maintain 3000ft and thus be
separated from *** if that pilot continued thru the final app. **** pilot queried the instruction but then understood as I repeated that the pilot wasn't
to descend. *** had by this point continued in such a way that I allowed the pilot to continue as holding would be of no use - and broke *** off
the approach, repositioning for an attempt when safe to do so.
*** continued apparently oblivious and left the CTR to the South East. I mentioned the fact that he had gone thru his clearance limit only after the
frequency was quiet and *** was clear of EGGW CTR. I politely mentioned what had happened and the pilot replied 'Thank you that's a good learning
point', and 'Thought the limit was the 2500ft TMA bit'.
I'm filing not only as a clearance limit was exceeded but also in case this situation happens to another controller in a more hazardous manner.
Unfortunately I couldn't hold *** north of the final approach due frequency loading at that particular time and also as I wasn't convinced *** would
hold in such a manner that the approach of *** would be safe.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Approach EGTR : Elstree 12/11/2023 202339596

O320
PA28 turns final for wrong runway with traffic on climbout.

*** JOINED FOR THE WRONG RUNWAY. *** WAS ON THE CLIMB OUT FOR RWY 08, THE CORRECT RUNWAY, AS **** WAS TURNING FINAL FOR RWY 26.
INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO BOTH AIRCRAFT INVOLVED. RESCUE 1 ON LOCAL STANDBY AS THE PILOT OF *** SEEMED CONFUSED. BOTH AIRCRAFT
LANDED SAFELY.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route En route 11/11/2023 202337911

LYCOMING-O360
Serious Incident: Spinner detached in flight. 1 POB, 0 injuries. AAIB Record Only.
CAA Closure:
AAIB reclassified as 'Record Only’ from AARF investigation. No further investigation to be progressed by the AAIB.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Cruise En route 15/10/2023 202338199
360 FAMILY
Level bust PA28 climbed above cleared 4000ft to 4200ft.

*** was cleared through the Solent CTA (north to south) at 4000ft VFR and told to maintain 4000ft and to report if unable to maintain VMC. The Mode C readout was questionable from
before the transit as the pilot was indicating 4100ft. When an indication of 4200 showed I questioned the level and the pilot reported at 4000ft. The Mode C then almost immediately
changed to 4100. There were various fluctuations in the level readout between 3900 and 4100 over the next few miles but when I again observed 4200ft I queried the pilot just as an
indication of 4300ft was observed. The pilot reported at 4200ft. There was no traffic to directly affect the fluctuating level although the choice of 4000ft was tactical against an @@@
that was departing RW02 at Southampton.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Scheduled EGHH (BOH) : 25/10/2023 202335634

LYCOMING-O360 maintenance Bournemouth/Hurn
Corroded engine cylinders discovered during scheduled maintenance.

Corroded Cylinders, 2 year life.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING ( O-360- En-route EGSS (STN) : 09/11/2023 202337517

A4M SENSENICH London/Stansted
76EM8S5-0-62)
LYCOMING ( O-360-
A4M SENSENICH
76EM8S5-0-62)
Infringement of Stansted TMZ-2 by a PA28 at 1700ft.

I was working North and East bandboxed, the traffic level was low with nothing on frequency. I observed a 7000 squawk get airborne from EGSX and
climb. As the aircraft continued to climb it passed 1500ft and was therefore indicating within the TMZ. The AIW alerted as the aircraft indicated 1700ft. I
then tried to blind call the aircraft, using Mode S to get the callsign. The aircraft climbed to 1800ft and then left the TMZ to the west. The aircraft then
called me later for a BS.
Whilst in position as GS Airports at time 0850z, I became aware of a Stansted CTA infringement in the vicinity of EGSX, by the activation of CAIT. The
infringing aircraft details were shown as ****, and was showing at an altitude of 1900, where the Class D CAS base is 1500ft
At time 0919z, I became aware of a further infringement to the West of the London Heathrow Control Zone. CAIT activated, showing ****, squawking
0430 at 2800ft where the Class A CAS base is 2500ft.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING ( O-360- En-route WOD 09/11/2023 202337519

A4M SENSENICH
76EM8S5-0-62)
LYCOMING ( O-360-
A4M SENSENICH
76EM8S5-0-62)
Infringement of LTMA by a PA28 at 2800ft.

I received a phone call from EGLF radar to report that *** had infringed TC airspace in the vicinity of WOD at 0920. The controller stated that the
aircraft was wearing a 0430 squawk and had been at 2800ft altitude where the CAS base is 2500ft. No loss of separation had been observed.
The controller then informed me that the same aircraft, *** had also infringed the EGSS TMZ-2 on departure from North Weald at 0850 when it
climbed to 1700ft altitude.
*** came to LARS west and was instructed to squawk 0430, he was outside CAS routing westbound under a BS. The frequency was band boxed with Zone and App. The AIW alerted
indicating GNIKE inside the TMA in the vicinity of WOD. I instructed them to descend and leave CAS immediately, this took several attempts, but they did comply with the instruction
and left CAS by descent. They informed me that they had a technical issue to do with a fuse, which they had resolved and did not need further assistance. The events described have not
been checked for accuracy against the appropriate RTF recording.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING Approach EGBJ (GLO) : 11/11/2023 202337769

360 FAMILY Gloucestershire
Local standby initiated due to ASI and alternator problem during go-around. Emergency services met aircraft on arrival.
***** (P28A) on final to land RWY27 was instructed to Go around due to the FE emergency associated with *****. As the aircraft went around they reported a problem with there Airs
peed Indicator and Alternator. A local standby was initiated and the AC landed safely on RW27 AT1453 with RFFS at A1.
Supplementry 05/12/2023:
No additional information. Report status Open.
PIPER PA28 LYCOMING En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 23/10/2023 202337788

LYCOMING-O360 civil
Infringement of Farnborough CTR (Class D) by a PA28 with radio issues.

*** - RETURN FLIGHT TURWESTION TO FAIROAKS
MONDAY 23 OCTOBER 2023 1340 -1425
THE PLAN
Route Turweston - Waddesdon - WOD - Junction 4 M3 - south of Woking - Fairoaks
THE FREQUENCIES
Turweston Radio - 122.180 [on leaving the ATZ]
Brize Radar - 124.275 [on leaving Turweston]
Farnborough North - 132.800 [at or after WOD]
Farnborough West - 125.250 [as instructed but probably at Stokenchurch]
Farnborough VFR Traffic - 133.440 [as instructed]
Fairoaks information/Radio - 123.430 [on leaving Farnborough Class D]
SEQUENCE
Brize asked me to call at Westcot.
At WCO Brize called: ‘call Farnborough on 125.250.’ I assumed that West was handling North and called for Basic service and in due course Zone transit.
Was told to call F/N. I said Brize advised 125.250, but will call and received ‘speak to you later’
Normally I expect at Stokenchurch to be asked to change to 125.250 but received no instruction to call West so remained on 132.800. Remaining on one or other of Farnborough’s
frequencies is not unusual.
I received and read back the clearance but to hold at the M3.
Was requested to confirm/read back ‘VFR’
This is normal as is hold cancellation closer. I was anticipating but waiting for this.
Concurrently for 4 maybe 5 minutes I had 5 or 6 loud broken, different tenor, broken calls - broken conversation/instruction - interference which I judged to be CB or other rogue
transmissions.
My passenger in P2, a qualified and experienced pilot was able to ‘process’ the interruptions more said it sounded like cockpit/cabin conversation with intermittent touching of the PTT
button.
Approaching the M3 and aware of Blackbushe to the right but with no cancellation of the hold planned to left orbit.
In the event of not making/receiving contact due to the interference I considered options a) change frequency apologise and explain or b) route remaining ‘outside controlled airspace’
avoiding Blackbushe round the west.
I established brief contact with Farnborough who said they had been calling for some time.
I then received relayed from another aircraft a message to call 133.440 which I did and thereafter radio was normal.
On leaving the CTR change of frequency to Fairoaks and squawk 7010 was approved.
PIPER PA34 CONTINENTAL En-route EGSS (STN) : 28/10/2023 202338044

(TELEDYNE) USA London/Stansted
346 FAMILY
Transponder incorrect labelling of aircraft data.

FIR made us aware of an error with ****. A PA34 , transiting EGNV to EGMD. The actual aircraft registration and R/T callsign is ****.
HOWEVER, the Mode S data block taking data from the aircraft shows it as ****. On querying with the pilot, it was revealed there may have been an
incorrect labelling and registration when Mode S was installed on the aircraft. My point was, in the event of an infringement when we rely on interrogating
the data from Mode S to identify the infringing aircraft, this could present an issue in tracking. I am observing this in the hope that the very process of
reporting the issue may force the error to be rectified by the owner/operator.
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING Cruise Midpoint of Irish Sea 23/10/2023 202334854

O235 between Ronaldsway and
Liverpool
PAN declared due to carbon monoxide warning in the cockpit. Emergency services met aircraft on arrival.
EGNS call to say ***** PA38 EGNS-EGGP POB 2 has declared a PAN due to carbon monoxide warning in the cockpit and aircraft continues towards Liverpool. Pilot feeling nil effects
and happy to continue but reports a slight headache when on base leg. RFFS given a heads up with details via direct line at 1645z. Local standby initiated via crash alarm at 1703z and
aircraft lands safely at 1714z. Fire Chief follows aircraft to K and local standby stood down at 1718z.
Detailed Events: *-**** had been previously defected for a carbon monoxide detection as per entry *** in tech log. On Monday 23rd October 2023, engineers have assessed *-****.
They have tested the aircraft on the ground for possible carbon monoxide using what appeared to be an electronic device, they have conducted that none was detected in their tests and
have issued a new CO detection card as the previous one had expired. A flight from Liverpool to Isle of Man has been conducted on this date. The initial leg of the flight did not highlight
any problems, although on return, after reaching top of decent from Ronaldsway Airport, just prior to the midpoint of the Irish Sea, ***** has noticed the carbon monoxide detector had
turned a dark colour. I agreed that the detector seemed to display a dark/black dot. Checklist items were carried out for suspected carbon monoxide detection as detailed below. The
colour of the detector has later restored. Actions Taken: Checklist items for carbon monoxide detection have been carried out, namely closing heating/demisters, opening air vents, and
opening the small window on the left door. After several minutes this appeared to have remedied the problem.A pan call has been declared to Ronaldsway Radar. Throughout the
situation, I have used the National Decision Model (NDM) to inform my decision making. I am aware ********* advocate TDODAR although I was more familiar with the NDM. My
initial priority was to fly the aircraft and look to fix the problem, I have then endeavoured to continue navigating the aircraft, especially as I was aware that another aircraft had recently
taken off and would be in the vicinity before finally communicating the problem to air traffic control. Using the NDM, on finding the problem, I have looked at the information I have
received: suspected carbon monoxide in the cockpit. I have assessed the threat, which is ultimately pilot incapacitation, sickness, headaches and so on. I have considered what options I
have had available to me which has ultimately led me to carry out the checklist items to remedy the problem. I had to consider diversions should the problem persist: I was now some
distance from Ronaldsway, although it was still close to me. I was aware that I was flying into a strong headwind and it would take more time to get to the west coast of mainland Britain
for alternate airports, such as Blackpool. I have also factored in that Ronaldsway also had poor weather conditions on departure which were deteriorating which low clouds spotted over
the hills on the Isle of Man. The problem appeared to remedy itself, and the colour had returned to normal after completing the items on the checklist. I have decided the best course of
action would be to continue navigating to Liverpool continually assessing the threat and looking at the carbon monoxide detector. I looked to continually see how far we were from
Blackpool and Liverpool. I decided a pan call was appropriate. The nature of the problem did not indicate we needed an immediate landing, although I was in a vulnerable position being
over water with an earlier carbon monoxide detection. I have also requested a traffic service to alleviate some of my workload looking for planes that had departed. I was satisfied with
the course of action. I tried to act on a safe and efficient manner. The situation was made worse by being over water. FSO ********* Flying School. This incident is still under
investigation by our engineers.
In your opinion did Fatigue contribute to this event? No. In your opinion did Stress or Distraction contribute to this event? No. SCOD Comments: All ATC actions correct. Nothing to
add. Investigation Findings:EGNS inform EGGP that ***** inbound from themselves has a Carbon monoxide warning onboard the aircraft. On receiving this information, APS ATCO
confirms with ***** that they have had no effect from the potential of carbon monoxide poising, and ***** states that they have gone through the check list. ADC instigates a Local
Standby. Aircraft lands safely. No other traffic effected. Root Cause of the Event: Technical issue onboard the aircraft. Investigators Recommendations (If non-compliant with procedure,
state published procedure here) All ATC actions were correct. No remedial action required. SMT Accept / Reject for Investigator Recommendations: Not Applicable. Conclusions:
Occurrence discussed at SMT meeting on 6 Dec 2023. Closed. L1. Aircraft Technical Issue (LOC - I).
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING Cruise Colwyn Bay 22/10/2023 202335601
O235
Carbon monoxide detector activated en route. Aircraft returned.

Detailed Events: When in the cruise above Colwyn Bay I performed a check before commencing a climb and noticed that the carbon monoxide detector had turned dark brown. I had
checked this prior during my preflight checks but everything seemed fine at the time.
The colour of which it had turned was much darker than any detector i had ever seen before but I was doubting myself for a few seconds as to whether I was correct because the sticker on
the device says that it was only 5
days old and I didn't know if it was a new design / batch. I immediately turned back to Liverpool and landed. I had the carbon dioxide indicator checked upon landing by ****who agreed
it didn't look correct and that he wouldn't have been happy if he saw that too.Actions Taken: I promptly turned back to Liverpool instead of continuing the journey. I descended to 1300 to
be below local airspace on my return and opened all the air vents and windows in the cock pit while making sure that cabin and carb heat was still turned off.Suggested Preventative
Action: More attention given to the indicator during the pre-flight by myself. FSO ****SchoolThis incident is still under investigation with our engineering department.
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING Landing EGGP (LPL) : Liverpool 24/10/2023 202335604

O235
Carbon monoxide detector indicating carbon monoxide during landing phase.

Detailed Events: Carbon monoxide detector indicating carbon monoxide. Had previously been teched twice for this and released to service by engineers. Half of the circle black other half
normal Actions Taken: Opened the vents straight away. Was due to land and in the landing phase so didn't report to ATC as in a critical phase of flight Suggested Preventative Action:
Na. FSO ******** ******* *******.This is the 3rd occasion this week that this aircraft has had a CO event.I therefore submit this MOR whilst we continue to fully investigating the
incident.
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING Take-off EGGP (LPL) : Liverpool 29/10/2023 202336356

O235
Birdstrike without damage or system problems. Rejected take-off.

Pilot aborted take off due to confirmed bird strike (buzzard) falcon 7 entered runway 09 located and removed remains. ATC informed and liaised with pilot on kilo. No damage to the
aircraft.
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING En-route En route 09/11/2023 202337760

O235
Low level of CO detected en route.

Detailed Events: Had just completed a stalling exercise and upon carrying out checks prior to descent noticed the red warning light on the digital CO detector was reading 9ppm.Actions
Taken: The fresh air vents and the DV window were immediately opened, this soon brought the reading back to zero. On approaching Tarporley the window was closed again and after
several minutes the CO indicator showed a reading of 15ppm. Again this reduced to zero on opening the window.Suggested Preventative Action: Guidance shows this is well below
dangerous levels, but should be monitored. FSO **** Flying School. This is the first carbon monoxide ASR with one of our new digital CO detectors. Our current checklist does not
contain enough guidance for low amounts of CO.Checklist to be revised.
PIPER PA38 LYCOMING Take-off EGBP : Kemble 05/10/2023 202337764

O235
CO detector showed 18ppm on departure.

Detailed Events: On departure going into the evening, the temperature had dropped and the student put the heating on. I noted as part of a scan there had been a slightly darker patch of
brown on the analog CO detector. I advised the student to open the vents to see if that improves the colour. I wasn't able to ID if the CO detector was working or had some discolouration
as the CO panel seemed to have a few colours.Actions Taken: Fortunately, the student had a digital CO meter, so we had it on, and it went up to 18PPM max, with the vents closed, and
with the vents open, it ranged between 10-13.Suggested Preventative Action: Digital CO detectors *** ******** ****** ******. After the aircraft CO detector showed a slightly darker
patch of brown, the student produced his own CO detector which confirmed a low level of 18ppm. We are looking into this and other similar events across our fleet with a view to
investing in digital CO detectors.
PITTS S2 LYCOMING Landing roll - off EGLM : White waltham 20/11/2023 202340007
AEIO360 runway
Overrun of runway due to misjudgement.

I positioned the aircraft overhead the active runway at 1200 QFE pointing towards but at 90 degrees to the downwind leg. I positioned thus in order for my student to fly his first PFL
down to a full stop landing onto the active runway via a 270 degrees gliding turn to the left. From the overhead position I heard and observed a club aircraft lining up on the runway to
depart. Expecting it to depart imminently I closed the throttle and instructed my student to begin the exercise. By the downwind part of the turn, I observed the departing aircraft had only
just been rolling so I told my student to continue but we would monitor the situation. By the time our turn was completed the other aircraft was airborne and climbing away so I told my
student to continue to the landing which he did. The landing was a bit unsettled, so the student decided to go around and applied full power. Although there was no risk of collision with
the departing aircraft the large disparity in performance would have necessitated us climbing past and along side it which I considered would be a possibly alarming distraction to its
crew. I took control of our aircraft, closed the throttle, and landed. At this point it became apparent that the go around initiation had reduced our landing distance margin although I
assumed, erroneously, there was enough room. In the three point attitude there is no visibility directly ahead but I was aware we were running out of room and braked as hard as I felt able
on the soggy grass runway. By the time the end of the runway came up we were still moving at about 15-20mdh and overshot into the adjoining field where we came to a standstill with
no damage fortunately.
ROBIN (DR400/120) ROBIN LYCOMING Landing Spilsted Farm 26/02/2023 202337557
(DR400/120) O235
Hard and bounced landing during unauthorised flight and ground collision with fence due to unrecorded rudder damage from previous hard landing.
This is the second time of writing, the first disappeared, ok this aircraft was observed by two witnesses to of made a very hard landing onto the nose landing gear, causing it to bounce
back into the air, On seeing the incident I ****** **** contacted the person responsible for the operation of the aircraft, Mr * ****, he responded with Mrs *** ******** should not be
flying it as she should of had have a check flight first, he also said that he would have the aircraft inspected by ******* ***, I asked to see the aircraft while on inspection, this I was not
allowed to do. My son ***** wish to fly the aircraft and was told it was good to go, a few further flights where made, although I had looked at the aircraft in particular the nose gear from
underneath the cowling where could see a the landing gear plates were bent, later told that they had always been bent, on the day of the next incident my son removed the aircraft from the
hangar as normal, started it ready to taxi, power was applied and the aircraft moved forward almost immediately it turned to the right, left rudder was applied with no effect, the aircraft
had to pass through a pinch point between a hangar and a fence ( now removed ) the clearance being only about 3ft off each wing tip the aircraft had to travel about 45 to 50 ft before
reaching the pinch point, so with no change in direction full left rudder and brake applied, with left hand wheel now locked up the aircraft responded and started to turn to the right
however too late to prevent it from contacting the fence with the right hand wing tip, causing damage to the right hand wing tip and crank rib (crush damage), on inspecting the aircraft on
the next day I found that not only was the nose landing gear bent as seen before but there was next no steering to the left while little to the right, the brakes only worked once the rudder
pedals reached the bulkhead, next to no tension on the rudder cables, steering springs coil bound with no tension, rudder contacting with lower stern post and making rubbing noises
when operated, at no time has any paperwork been raised or certification of work or inspection been carried been made or recorded , prior to ******* **** inspecting the aircraft it was
found that an alteration of the rudder cables had been made.
ROBIN DR400 LYCOMING En-route En-route 17/10/2023 202336270

O235
UK AIRPROX 2023238 - DR400 and an EV97 overhead Gloucestershire.
ROBIN DR400 LYCOMING Climb to cruising EGBB (BHX) : Birmingham 16/10/2023 202336338
360 FAMILY level or altitude
Woods Farm departure procedure.

I was busy vectoring several inbounds to runway 15, when I received an RT call from a *** on the ground at Woods Farm requesting to depart to a site in Essex. As I didn't have a
prenote of this departure I created a strip, issued the pilot 0401 squawk, and queried the aircraft type as I'd not heard it. I struggled to hear the replies, but a colleague was able to ascertain
the aircraft type for me. I cleared the aircraft to leave controlled airspace to the west VFR, but again the readbacks were hard to hear, so I repeated myself. As soon as I saw the 0401
airborne I tried to reiterate for them to leave to the west initially (as I did not want them tracking through the 15 climb-out) and again this was unanswered, and so I telephoned the Tower
ATCO to let them know that the 0401 wasn't listening to me and was tracking towards the climb out (fortunately there were no imminent departures). Shortly afterwards I was able to
instruct *** to leave controlled airspace southbound and away from the climb out, and received a readback. The pilot did later apologise for the confusion. My observation is that this
departure from Woods Farm had not followed the LOA procedures (i.e. had not telephoned the WM prior to departure for a strip to be created with all the relevant details, and for the
WM to agree an initial route /level etc if different from the standing agreement.). This along with issues communicating with the pilot when they were low level, led to a much higher
work load and the risk that they were going to fly straight through the climb out for runway 15.
ROBIN DR400 LYCOMING Cruise EGMC (SEN) : Southend 06/11/2023 202336849

360 FAMILY
Infringement of the Southend CTA-7 (Class D) by a DR400 at 2600ft.

**** OBSERVED INDICATING 2.6A APPROX 0.5NM INSIDE CAS (CTA-7). A/C CALLED AND RESPONDS REQUESTING A CAS CROSSING CLEARANCE. PILOT
ADVISED.
When approaching Southend controlled airspace, south of Sittingbourne, I made my initial call to Southend Approach 130.780, to request zone transit. I received no reply for roughly two
minutes, at which point, Southend Approach responded to me to inform me I had 'just clipped' controlled airspace, roughly 100 feet too high, at 2600 feet, and to process my request. As
soon as I was informed of infringing controlled airspace, I immediately descended to exit controlled airspace, and remained well clear until authorised to enter.
At the time of receiving my first reply from Southend Approach, I was beginning an orbiting turn to hold station.
On that day, the air was moist, and I experienced an abnormally high frequency of carburettor icing for the duration of the flight.
This was the first flight I had experienced such a high frequency of carburettor icing, and I was adjusting my habits to it, which I believe led to greater distraction than I would normally
experience, especially as this incident occurred less than fifteen minutes after takeoff, and so it was very early in the flight. On the day, the wind was westerly, so the runway in use at
Headcorn was 28, leading to my track north being to the west of my intended track, and a combination of distraction and misinterpretation of controlled airspace boundaries led to me not
properly correcting my track.
I had also misread the chart for Southend's controlled airspace, due I believe partly to my distraction at the new carburettor icing conditions, and to not properly scanning the information
presented on the chart. Which led to the assumption that the controlled airspace over Sheerness, between 2500 feet and 3500 feet, was actually the same as the more eastern airspace over
Eastchurch, between 3500 feet and 5500 feet. Which led to a lack of urgency to properly rectify my position.
ROBIN DR400 LYCOMING En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 30/10/2023 202336728

LYCOMING-O360 civil
Infringement of the Farnborough CTA-3 (Class D) by a DR400 at 2100ft.

This was a glider-towing flight. The target tow height for the flight was to be 3,100 feet QNH (2,500 AGL). After departing runway 23 at EGHL, I turned left and began to climb up
under CTA 6 in a NNE direction. I had intended to track towards the village of Weston Patrick and then assume a westerly heading to the North of Lasham airfield. I was aware of the
CTA3 boundary and knew that I was flying close to it. There was a lot of cloud in the area at the time and I ended up having to track in a more northerly diection to avoid penetrating
cloud. In doing this, it appears that I have strayed slightly into CTA3 before I could turn left to avoid penetrating this airspace. Although I knew I was very close to the boudary, I wasn't
aware that I had actually penetrated the CTA3 until I received notice from the CAA. I got no alarm or warning from the Oudie GPS to indicate that I was inside the airspace.
ROBIN R2120 LYCOMING En-route Blackpool beach 16/11/2023 202339008
O235
Rough running engine en route. Full emergency declared and aircraft landed on the beach with emergency services in attendance.
***** was on a local flight to the north and asked for recovery at 17:41 with a rough running engine. A local standby was called initially, when the pilot asked if the tidewas in or out a
full emergency was called. The pilot elected to land on the beach between between central pier and south pier. The aircraft landed safely on the beach at17:45 with no known damage or
injuries. The outside services were called, informed and directed to the landing site. **** were called and informed. The **** called andwere informed.
**** informed *** of a possible aircraft landing on Blackpool beach with no other details known. Blackpool airport were contacted who confirmed that *-**** had been inbound to them
when the pilot reported a rough running engine and their intention to make a precautionary landing on the beach. Blackpool phoned 999 and the emergency services attended the scene.
The aircraft landed safely and no damage to the aircraft or injuries to the occupants were reported. The **** were back briefed, and the AC Sup was informed for reporting purposes.
Whilst flying *-**** (Robin2120u) during a routine night training sortie at around 3500 feet over Fleetwood, I noticed a decrease in engine power and rpm and immediately turned back
down the coast trucking towards the airfield. I pulled the carb heat and there was a small drop in rpm which did not indicate a carb icing issue after 15 to 20 seconds elected to put the
carb heat away in order to gain the extra hundred or so rpm. I called Blackpool ATC and stated that I was returning to the airfield with a rough running engine. By this point, the engine
rpm was around 1500 rpm and rough running. The engine stayed in this state for the remainder of the flight. Temps and pressures were normal and fuel pressure was indicating normal.
Aware that the aircraft has only one tank with a single vent I used a pen to pierce the fuel filler rubber hose from inside the cockpit having ripped off the cover. This had no effect. I tried
the carb heat again but to no avail. As part of our booking up process, we check the tide times tide states before the flights. In the pressure of the moment I confused myself into being
unsure as to whether it was high tide or low tide around 1830. I asked Blackpool and Atc to confirm if the tide was in or out questions which they did not know, As I passed Blackpool
tall tower I caught a glimpse of a puddle on the beach which confirmed the tide was out. I elected to carry out a precautionary landing on the beach as this option was available to me. I
had calculated that I would arrive at the airfield with 100ft to spare if I continued. At night I thought this was too tight with no room for variables.
Aircraft appeared to have fuel issue resulting in loss of power and inability to sustain flight. Aircraft emergency landed off the aerodrome with no injury to persons onboard, third party
persons, damage to structures or environment. The aircraft on landing was undamaged. The aircraft had quater full tanks and no leaks or blockages were apparent. The engine and
ancillaries are to be removed and sent for inspection before any further information can be submitted as to the cause of the incident. The aircraft was carrying out flight training with two
occupants onboard when the engine started to lose power approximately 10 miles enroute from the airport.The pilot instructor tried to reinstate engine power with carb heat, mixture and
throttle settings but the engine remained unrtesponsive.The pilot decided that it was too dangerous to attempt flight and landing at the airport due to the proximity of housing at the
runway start. He contacted Blackpool ATC and alerted them of the situation and his decision to land the aircraft on the beach area to the west of the airport.The pilot landed the aircraft
without incident on the beach and both occupants were uninjured. The aircraft was undamaged at this point, though had to be craned off the beach.It is unknown at this time what caused
the aircraft to lose power though a fuel issue is suspected. The engine and ancillaries are being removed and sent for inspection to determine the failure cause.
ROCKWELL 112 LYCOMING Cruise BNN 31/10/2023 202336765

360 FAMILY
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by an unknown aircraft. BE40 given avoiding action to maintain separation. Loss of separation did eventually occur.
I was the NE controller. *** was airborne from EGWU at 3000ft. I instructed the pilot to climb to 5000ft and route to BPK. During the call, I noticed
a possible VFR infringer to the left of ****, indicating 1200ft. I issued avoiding action to the pilot, instructing them to turn right heading 060 degrees
and passed traffic information. The possible infringer vacated controlled airspace as I transmitted. I informed the pilot that the infringer was now outside
controlled airspace. The pilot stated that they had the traffic in sight.
This was my first visit to Denham airfield. I took off on Runway 24 and climbed out. I then became aware of some bright lights off to my right which I took to be oncoming traffic.
Rather than turn crosswind and risk a possible conflict I thought the safest course of action would be to extend my take off path. This I did but was then very concerned about the
proximity of the London CTR. As soon as I realised the lights were reflections from the low sun and not conflicting traffic I immediately turned crosswind but not enough unfortunately
to prevent me clipping the edge and entering the zone. I have flown for thirty one years and have never had this happen to me before. I am completely mortified that it has happened (and
still am) but it is entirely my fault and responsibility. I am willing to discuss it hence leaving my phone number if you feel this is necessary. It is a lesson learned.
SCHEMPP HIRTH ARCUS M SOLO En-route Lleweni Parc 18/10/2023 202336272

KLEINMOTOREN
GMBH
2625
UK AIRPROX 2023239 - Glider and a SR22 3.5km SE of Lleweni Parc at 3500ft.
SLINGSBY (Swallow) SLINGSBY UNKNOWN En-route Bishop Hill 07/11/2023 202337274

(Swallow) UNKNOWN
UK Reportable Accident: Glider landed on the side of a hill, reason unknown. Damage to be confirmed. 1 POB, seriously injured. Subject to AAIB AARF investigation.
SLINGSBY T67 LYCOMING En-route Langar Airfield 22/10/2023 202336657

540 FAMILY
Fournier RF6 flew through parachuting dropzone whilst student parachutists in the air.
Infringement of parachuting dropzone by *** Fournier RF6 motorglider whilst student parachutists in the air.
SOCATA TB20 LYCOMING En-route Corbiere 17/03/2023 202320078
IO540
TB20 clearance deviation.

TB20 departed on BENIX5A SID. To facilitate a faster proceeding departure the Tower coordinated a heading of 180 degrees
for the TB20 with Jersey Control.Tower controller transferred the TB20 to Jersey Control once the conflict between the two
aircraft was resolved. TB20's first call to Jersey Control stated 'heading 100 degrees'. Jersey Control asked the ADI ATCO if
they had given the TB20 pilot an amended heading; the answer was no. Jersey Control asked the TB20 pilot to confirm that
the tower had them a heading of 180 degrees. The pilot apologised for the error, saying they were intercepting the BENIX5A
SID. The pilot was informed that this was a clearance deviation and would be filed upon. This was acknowledged by the pilot.
SOCATA TB20 LYCOMING Scheduled EGLD : Denham 15/11/2023 202338138

540 FAMILY maintenance
Horizontal stabiliser spar intergranular corrosion found during scheduled maintenance.

Whilst carrying out scheduled maintenance on the above aircraft (Annual Inspection), there was a recurring EASA Airworthiness Directive: 2015-0130 to comply with. EASA AD: 2015-
0130 is a 6 year recurring borescope inspection of the Horizontal Stabiliser Spar. The Inspection is to be performed in accordance with ******** Service Bulletin: **-*** . The aircraft
log books state this Inspection was last performed on the 1st of May 2018 by ** *******: *** *******. When we inserted our borescope into the inspection holes located on the lower
skin of the horizontal stabiliser, we found alarming amounts of intergranular corrosion on the fwd spar. We have since removed the horizontal stabiliser and de-skinned it to assess and
measure the depth of the corrosion. As you will see from the attached pictures, the corrosion has gone all the way through the spar flange. This was immediately reported to “** ***
****” who are currently reviewing all of the data we have submitted. If this inspection was carried out properly on the 01st of May 2018, then the recurring inspection interval of 6 years
is far too long. The structural integrity of the horizontal stabiliser has seriously diminished and would undoubtedly result in loss of life if it were to fail. In my opinion, a borescope
inspection should be performed on an annual basis.
SOCATA TBM700 PRATT & WHITNEY En-route EGKB (BQH) : Biggin Hill 19/11/2023 202340598
(CANADA)
PT6A
Level bust by a TBM 850 when it climbed above cleared level of 2400ft.
*** was given the standard clearance to 2400' and had been released by Thames radar with3000' when east. While on the climb out, Thames informed APP that he had 3000' selected on
Mode S.Before an instruction to descend could be past, the pilot noticed his error and continued climbing while requesting instructions on whether to continue climb or descend to
2400'.Aircraft was instructed to descend to 2400' and to expedite the descent. Once the aircraft was east of the field, climb was given as normal.
SOKO J20 (P-2 KRAGUJ) LYCOMING Landing roll EGBW : Wellesbourne 05/11/2023 202336473
GSO480 mountford
Ground loop on landing on runway.

I was the AFISO on duty at EGBW. *-**** made a normal join and circuit to final for runway 18. Shortly after touch down on runway18 the aircraft ground looped clockwise one
complete rotation and came to a stop. The aircraft then taxied along runway 18 and vacated right onto runway 23 as directed by me. At the end of runway 23 the aircraft stopped. The
pilot reported that steering control was lost. The aerodrome RFFS were despatched to assist. After 30 minutes the aircraft taxied to parking under it's own power but with some obvious
steering difficulties. The pilot later reported to me that the aircraft had suffered damage to the tail wheel steering. It was not clear if the damage was pre existing and caused the ground
loop or the ground loop caused the damage.
TECNAM P2002 BOMBARDIER ROTAX En-route EGMC (SEN) : Southend 09/11/2023 202337522
912
Infringement of Southend CTA-4 (Class D) by a P2002 at 2800ft.

***SQUAWKING 5050 OBSERVED INSIDE CTA 4 INDICATING A28. COMMUNICATION WITH AIRCRAFT ESTABLISHED, CLEARANCE ISSUED.
As the flight instructor and PIC, I acknowledge negligence on this occasion. I conducted the flight without utilizing an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) like Sky Demon or Foreflight, relying
on the GPS already present in the aircraft I typically instruct in. However, in this specific aircraft, a separate tablet with a moving map is required as a backup, which I failed to bring due
to the brevity of the lesson and its last-minute addition to my schedule. The flight was intended as a short session for stall practice in preparation for the student's revalidation with the
examiner. Due to its brief nature, I overlooked grabbing the tablet containing Sky Demon. Additionally, unexpected stronger winds at altitude caused us to briefly enter Southend CTA 4
airspace after the last stall recovery. Although we swiftly descended out of it upon realizing, Southend had already notified us of our unintentional entry by that time. We were on
listening squawk 5050 and will in future make sure to have a service even for short flights.
VANS RV6 LYCOMING En-route EGAD : Newtownards 11/11/2023 202338211

320 FAMILY
Infringement of the Belfast City CTA-3 (Class D) by an RV6 at 2500ft.

On first contact, *** departure from EGAD, observed to have entered CTA3 at 2.5A. No other aircraft impacted.
VANS RV6 LYCOMING En-route EGNT (NCL) : Newcastle 20/04/2023 202337743
320 FAMILY
Local standby as a precaution due to pilot reporting 'huge negative trim which I'm unable to remove and would like vectors'.
Investigation
**** called upon Radar Frequency at 0950:40 and was instructed to standby. RAD1 ATCO asked *** to pass his message at 0953:31, the pilot reported 'huge negative trim which I'm
unable to remove and would like vectors for 07.
Following a further request for information the pilot reported that he could maintain level flight and that he was VFR only. The pilot did not declare an emergency. Priority was given to
***, *** was broken off the approach and placed in the NT HOLD. **** Instrument training was also placed into the NT HOLD The RAD1 ATCO passed a series of QDM to assist the
pilot with finding the aerodrome, which was effective and the pilot became visual with the control tower 6nm NW of the aerodrome. .
At no point did the RAD1 ATCO ask the pilot whether he wished to declare an emergency, although ultimately it is the pilots responsibility, confirmation would have aided the decision
making process within ATC, rather than having to second guess.
Good communication/TRM between ADC and RAD1, as they attempted to assess the nature of the issue and the required response. RAD1 confirmed that the pilot had not declared an
emergency. ADC instigated a local standby based upon the information to hand, the pilot had reported that he could maintain level flight and the fact that the pilot had not formally
declared an emergency. The aircraft landed safely at 1004.
. Report or sighting of a UAS flying inside the FRZ (Zone C)
- Contact Northumbria police (make a note of the reference number);
- Contact NPAS;
- Contact the airport police;
- An operational alert should not be sent via email unless the UAS has a significant impact on aircraft safety or airport operations.
All traffic due to operate within 5nm of the reported position of the UAS are to be informed in order to support the “detect and avoid” principle. The pilot may choose to continue their
flight but following an altered flight path - ATCOs shall permit such track or level alterations consistent with flight safety. ATCOs should also be prepared for evasive actions taken by
the crew.
All procedures were followed as per MATS part 2 scenario C along with the filing of an MOR.
No further action required.
Actions
No further actions required from ATC.
VANS RV8 LYCOMING (YIO-360- Normal descent EGCK : Caernarfon 08/10/2023 202336158
M1B)
LYCOMING (YIO-360-
M1B)
Helicopter vortex wake encounter on short final.

Following a high bounce and go-around from R25 at EGCK, I positioned the aircraft to final approach once again. Aircraft was in landing config and stable by 500ft and an approach
flown at 65-70 kts. I called 'final' and was given a surface wind of 170 deg 12 knots. This was the same surface wind as per previous approach.At some point during the approach, the
resident '***' aircraft called for departure. (The helipad is located 64 metres to the left of R25 centreline and 270 metres along the runway from the 25 numbers.)The A/G Radio Operator
advised the Helimed pilot that there was an aircraft on final approach to R25.I would estimate my aircraft was at about 300ft agl when the *** pilot advised that he would '"in that case,
lift vertically and depart to the South, over the car park."I became aware, more through peripheral vision of the helicopter rising vertically - above the height of my aircraft. I think I was
focussed on the landing, given the 12 knot crosswind.The aircraft touched down normally, but almost immediately began to veer left, possibly involving a 'skip to the right'. The aircraft
continued to veer left, despite me being aware that I was applying full right rudder. The aircraft remained on the runway surface but was close to the left-hand edge, before control was
regained.The A/G Radio Operator, almost immediately said words to the effect: "Are you OK? I think you were caught in the Helicopter downwash there..."I replied, "I almost certainly
was.."I submit this report since there were 2 pilots in my aircraft, a Radio Operator and a Helimed pilot - 4 people who did not immediately appreciate the effect on the column of
downwash of the surface wind - which would have moved the vortex swiftly across the runway.It is a peculiarity of EGCK, that the use of the more in to wind Runway 20 was not in use,
probably due to the presence of 2 x 161ft amsl wind turbines. Their wake would have lay across this runway, precluding its use on the day.The potential exists, therefore, for helicopter
wake encounters to occur again on R25, anytime there is a southerly wind.
VULCANAIR P68 LYCOMING Manoeuvring Merseyside 02/11/2023 202337926

LYCOMING-O360
(A1B6)
Audio panel intermittent failure in flight leading to diversion.

Tasking received at base for coastal search NW of Liverpool. IFR departure, transit into the task area, and descent to cloudbreak above MSA without incident. During the course of the
task weather deteriorated further resulting in a cloudbase of approximately 900' AMSL and visibility of 9000m. Towards the end of tasking the GMA 1347 audio panel began
intermittently illuminating all switch captions, and fluctuating backlight brightness (video attached). When the captions were illuminated interference was detected for TX and RX on
both COM radios. It also became apparent that the functions behind each switch was being activated as the caption was illuminated as intermittent DME ident audio was heard during the
illuminations. during these cycles it was also impossible to command TX on either COM radio. Button functionality was also suppressed. FRC's consulted, Audio Panel CB remained in
throughout. Given prevailing IFR conditions en-route and at EGNM, the likely inability to IDENT the DME for the required ILS recovery, as well as the potential for further system
deterioration, it was decided to divert SVFR to Hawarden before dark. Diversion & approach uneventful. GMA unit replaced and ground tested satis. Aircraft released to service evening
of 03 Nov 23.
OCCURRENCE LISTING
Aircraft Below 5700kg
OCCURRENCES RECORDED BETWEEN 01 NOV 2023 and 30 NOV 2023
ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT
AEROSPATIALE AS355 ALLISON USA En-route EGPF (GLA) : Glasgow 29/10/2023 202336708
250 FAMILY
Infringement of the Glasgow CTR (Class D) by an AS55.

Whilst operating in INT *** had just left my zone at Greenock SVFR not above 2Aft. I had passed the details to FIR and informed *** *** from
me and Flight Information available on 119.875. When I observed *** turning slightly left and getting very close to the edge of my zone. I telephoned
FIR to inform them of this and to advise them that when *** called he was cleared to re-enter the zone VFR not above 2Aft if required. *** had
not called FIR by this point, and subsequently the AIW alarmed briefly as **** entered the zone without a clearance.
Cleared direct from north bank clyde to landing site islay. Transfered to scottish at zone boundary due to level/lack of atc coverage
AEROSPATIALE SA341 TURBOMECA, Take-off Holbeach 05/11/2023 202336447

FRANCE
ASTAZOU
TURBOSHAFT
UK Reportable Accident: Helicopter struck a post at 6 ft agl after lift off. Extensive damage. Two POB, no injuries. AAIB Record Only.
CAA Closure:
AGUSTA A109 PRATT & WHITNEY Cruise En route 14/10/2023 202333649

(CANADA)
PW200 FAMILY

XXXXXX was routing from a private site Clitheroe to a private site Oxford and reported a green laser from Rochdale Direction as he passed abeam the town to the East
at 3000ft.
AGUSTA A109 PRATT & WHITNEY En-route - holding En route 05/10/2023 202333659
(CANADA)
PW200 FAMILY

XXXXXX reported a laser attack while holding in the vicinity of the QEUH awaiting clearance to land at the helipad. Laser was green and from the
Barrhead area. Police advised incident number 0351.
AGUSTA A109 PRATT & WHITNEY Landing Cornwall 05/11/2023 202336623

(CANADA)
PW200 FAMILY
UK Reportable Accident: During landing a tent was caught in the downdraft and struck the tail rotor. Damage to be assessed. POB TBA. Subject to AAIB AARF
investigation.
CAA Closure:
AAIB downgrade to 'Non-Reportable' from AARF investigation. No further investigation to be progressed by the AAIB.
AGUSTA A109 PRATT & WHITNEY Landing EGTF : Fairoaks 05/11/2023 202339173
(CANADA)
PW200 FAMILY
FOD believed to pass through tail rotor on landing.

During approach to land at a remote private site a tent was identified near to the landing spot. A high approach was flown to overshoot the potential hazard but a small
nylon sheet was seen to lift from the ground. Given the proximity of the FOD to the aircraft the crew elected to land immediately and as the wheels touched the ground
the sheet was seen blowing towards the tail rotor and a subsequent slight vibration was felt through the airframe. The aircraft was shut down and, on inspection of the
tail rotor, the crew believed that the sheet was likely to have passed through it.
EUROCOPTER EC135 PRATT & WHITNEY En-route En route 16/01/2023 202312311

(USA)
PRATT & WHITNEY
(USA)
Passenger seat insecure.

Pax seat insecure. Rear crew member realised the **** seat fitted in the rear of the aircraft was insecure. Rear lugs not engaged in seat rails.
GUIMBAL CABRI LYCOMING Cruise Helicentre Aviation 06/01/2023 202311057

LYCOMING-O360
Overflown maintenance by 1hr.

Aircraft was overflown +1fh during training flight making it run over the scheduled maintenance time.
GUIMBAL CABRI LYCOMING (O-360- Cruise BNN 11/11/2023 202338196

J2A)
LYCOMING (O-360-
J2A)
Infringement of the LTMA (class A) by a G2 helicopter at 2700ft which continued to climb to 3100ft before descending out of CAS.
CAIT alerted me to an infringer, squawking conspicuity, southeast of BNN, that had climbed to 2,700ft inside controlled airspace. It continued to track
WNW and climbed to 3,100ft. It subsequently descended back outside controlled airspace. Interrogation of the radar showed the callsign to be ***, and tracing action
discovered it was inbound to EGTR.
I was instructing a student conducting an SPIC flight from Leicester to Elstree via Silverstone and Aylesbury. We approached the LTMA from the west at 3000ft and
descended to below 2500ft as we approached 2500+ boundary. We then changed from Farnborough LARS to Elstree for joining information. We were given airfield
information and student dialled in QFE. I did not notice that student had changed pressure settings as I was looking at Elstree plate to see if downwind approach would
be possible as winds were very light. I then looked up and noticed the changed setting by which point student had climbed to 2500ft on Elstree QFE. I immediately told
them to descend. During the descent Elstree contacted us to inform that Farnborough had called and asked us to descend out of LTMA. Once on the ground I called
Farnborough tower to apologise.
MBB BK117 TURBOMECA, Push-back/tow EGTK (OXF) : 24/10/2023 202338018

FRANCE Oxford/Kidlington
ARRIEL 1
Heli lift aircraft damage.

During location of the tiger tug under the aircraft, the Heli saddle made contact with the rear cross tube and has damaged it. The rear cross tube and the heady saddles
were recently replaced because of previous damage. The only operator of the tiger tug at Oxford is the airport operations ground team.
Analysis / follow up Awaiting feedback from Oxford Ground Operations regarding this event. Once
received this will be reviewed prior to closure of this report.
Therefore, this report will remain open for the time being.
ROBINSON R44 LYCOMING Standing : EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 17/03/2023 202321626

540 FAMILY Engine(s) Not
Operating
Aircraft refuelled with incorrect fuel type.

xxx ground crew refuelled xxx Helicopter (xxx) with Jet1 instead of Avgas.
ROBINSON R44 LYCOMING Cruise EGPH (EDI) : Edinburgh 07/11/2023 202336862
540 FAMILY
Infringement of the Edinburgh CTR (Class D) by an R44.

I noticed an SFIS callsign around Kelty area routing southbound. I checked Mode-S information tab and saw callsign '***'. I rang Scottish Information and advised to get
*** to change to Edinburgh Radar as it was about to infringe controlled airspace. In the time between that conversation and the pilot contacting Edinburgh Radar, the
aircraft had infringed controlled airspace below altitude 2000ft whilst turning to go northbound. The aircraft infringed for only a couple of sweeps before going outside
controlled airspace. On first contact, I advised he had infringed and what his intended routing was. He said he was doing general handling around that area. I put him on
squawk 0430 and asked if he was going ro remain north of Kelty to which he said he would. Consequently, I advised to change back to Scottish information or Fife and
he subsequently went back to Scottish Information. I told the FISO working the Scottish Information that he had infringed and would be filing a report.
Initial Investigation
The Controller was working in the Edinburgh Radar Controller position.
The Controller identified an Aircraft on a SFIS squawk that was routing towards and on the verge of infringing
Edinburgh controlled Airspace at the northern boundary.
The Controller made a phone call on to Scottish Information and informed the FISO that **** was about to
infringe Controlled Airspace and requested that the Aircraft call Edinburgh Radar on 121.205.
*** entered controlled Airspace at the northern boundary and was at 1900ft. The Aircraft descended to
1800ft before leaving controlled Airspace to the north. From the timestamp on the Radar replay, *** was
within the Edinburgh zone for 31 seconds.
After exiting the zone to the north, **** made contact with Edinburgh Radar on 121.205 to request a basic service.
The Controller informed **** that they had infringed controlled Airspace and requested their intentions.
**** indicated that they would be remaining north of controlled Airspace and conducting general handling
around Kelty.
The Controller issued **** with a squawk of 0430 and a basic service.
After further confirmation that **** would be remaining outside controlled Airspace, the Controller
provided **** with the option to contact either Scottish Information or Fife radio.
**** said that they would contact Scottish Information.
The Controller instructed **** to squawk 7000.
There were no other Aircraft to affect at this time.
A very similar sortie was flown an hour earlier without incident with one student and the plan was to replicate the route with a second student when this infringement
occurred. I was unfamiliar with the area as I was conducting training to a syndicate of aircraft owners. I completed a RA of flying in a new area before arriving in Fife and
had mitigations of flying with PPL pilots who were familiar with the area and getting a Basic Service from Edinburgh Approach.
When climbing out from Fife Airport we got a Basic Service from Scottish Info, I then gave the student a heading to fly. I got the student to put the foggles on as we were
going to conduct some instrument flying. There was less cloud cover than the previous flight and the sun was lower, I asked the student to turn onto a heading slightly to
the left in order to put the sun behind the only cloud in our part of the sky to make it easier to see. Without having the chart in front of me or a mounted GPS I’d forgotten
about the edge of the CTR touching the CTA which South of Fife was at 2500’. We received a call from Scottish Info to change to Edinburgh and we turned away. I
cannot recall the transmissions as the headset I was using had occasional interference on receiving (although within the cockpit it was fine). My active headset was not
compatible with the student’s so I had changed to a passive headset that was in the aircraft before we took off and I had difficulty to clearly hearing what was being said
by the controllers when the interference occurred. The student heard better than I and liaised with ATC. I wouldn’t have put the student in this position to deal with the
situation if I heard clearly, this may well have made us react slower than we could have done. I thought we were just over the woods on the Northern edge of
Cowdenbeath which was far too close but just out of the zone. I later telephoned Edinburgh tower with the details of the aircraft and timings and they called me back to
confirm that there was an infringement. With almost 5000hrs of commercial flying experience I have never infringed airspace before. Flying low level pipeline around the
UK in and out of Class D airspace and being based at a Class D airspace airport I’ve always followed the correct procedures. I believe a number of factors lead to this
infringement but ultimately in this case I didn’t follow what I said I would do as listed below.
ROBINSON R44 LYCOMING Emergency EGGP (LPL) : Liverpool 10/11/2023 202337573

540 FAMILY descent en-route
PAN declared. Precautionary landing in nearby field.

****, R44 Helicopter, inbound to EGGP from a private site called Waltonwood. As the helicopter passed the western edge of the Low Level Corridor near to Burtonwood,
the pilot reported a PAN. The pilot did not like the readings on the gauges and elected to make a precautionary landing in a field close to the site of the old Burtonwood
airfield, along the M62. The pilot said he would carry out an inspection of the helicopter once on the ground. Helicopter disappeared off the radar screen at 16:36 passing
200ft. D+D informed.
***** Police informed, Log number ****. Manchester Radar informed as they had previously worked the helicopter. **** called me at 16:49, lifting out of the field and
requesting to continue inbound to EGGP. All systems were normal and I confirmed with the pilot that the PAN was no longer in operation. **** was given a clearance to
continue to the airfield, transferred to the TWR freq at 16:52 and landed safely at 16:56. D+D updated.
In your opinion did Fatigue contribute to this event? No. In your opinion did Stress or Distraction contribute to this event?No. SCOD Comments: As was the Watch
supervisor on duty and dealt with this incident. Investigation Findings: In quite a busy session in Liverpool radar. ***** inbound to the field, declared a PAN whilst in the
Low Level Route whilst on route to the field. They stated they had an issue with the readings on their gauges, of high pressure and low fuel, and that there were going to
land in a field. The ATCO acknowledged the PAN, passed the wind at the field, as well as the traffic situation around the aircraft. D&D were called and informed of the
situation. Aircraft later lifted and was able to come into EGGP with no further issue. Root Cause of the Event: ATCSL INVESTIGATION REPORT: Page 4/4 Technical
issue onboard the aircraft. Investigators Recommendations (If non-compliant with procedure, state published procedure here) All ATC actions correct, no remedial action
required. SMT Accept / Reject for Investigator Recommendations Not Applicable Conclusions: Occurrence discussed at *** meeting on 6 Dec 2023. Closed. L2. LOC-I
(Aircraft Mechanical Issue).
ROTORSPORT MTOSPORT BOMBARDIER ROTAX Take-off EGPE (INV) : Inverness 05/11/2023 202336448
912 (ULS)
UK Reportable Accident: Rotor struck propeller during take-off. Damage to propeller, rotor and rudder. POB TBA. AAIB Record Only.
CAA Closure:
ABBREVIATIONS
AAIB Air Accidents Investigation Branch

AAL Above aerodrome level
AARF Aircraft Accident Report Form
A/c Aircraft (or a/c)
AD Airworthiness Directive
ADELT Automatically Deployed Emergency Locator Transmitter
AFS Airport Fire Service
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
A/P Autopilot
ASI Airspeed indicator
BS Basic Service
CAIT Controlled Airspace Intrusion Tool
CAS Controlled Airspace
DS Deconfliction Service
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
FIS Flight Information Service
FRC Flight Reference Card
GASIL General Aviation Safety Information Leaflet
IHUMS Integrated Health and Usage Monitoring System
Kts Knots
LACC London Area Control Centre
LTCC London Terminal Control Centre
LH Left-hand
MACC Manchester Area Control Centre
MGB Main gearbox
MLG Main Landing Gear
MPD Maintenance planning document or Mandatory Permit Directive
MOR Mandatory Occurrence Report
NLG Nose landing gear
Nr1 Number 1
NM Nautical Miles
PC Prestwick Centre
PCB Printed Circuit Board
POB Persons on board
RH Right-hand
RT Radio Telephony
R/W Runway
ScACC Scottish Area Control Centre
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
TDA Temporary Danger Area
VATDA Volcanic Ash Temporary Danger Area
VCR Visual Control Room (Tower)
If another abbreviation that you do not understand appears in the listing please email sdd@caa.co.uk for a definition, or try an internet
search engine such as Google.

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OCCURRENCE LISTING

Aircraft Below 5700kg

OCCURRENCES RECORDED BETWEEN 01 NOV 2023 and 30 NOV 2023

AEROPRO EUROFOX BOMBARDIER ROTAX En-route Denbighshire 30/10/2023 202339371

AEROPRO EUROFOX BOMBARDIER ROTAX Standing EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 15/11/2023 202340314

Standing aircraft overturned due to jet blast from departing helicopter.

AQUILA AT01 BOMBARDIER ROTAX Cruise En route 09/01/2023 202311295

Alternator failure. Aircraft returned.

BEECH 200 UNKNOWN Cruise En-route 05/11/2023 202336837

Aircraft started engines without ATC permission.

Aircraft climbing to a FL that the aircraft was never cleared to.

Crew missed radio call.

Beech 200 received a TCAS RA.

BEECH 55 CONTINENTAL Normal descent EGAA (BFS) : 21/10/2023 202336983

Turn without instruction and level bust.

BEECH 58 CONTINENTAL En-route MAY 03/11/2023 202336827

Stall warner inoperative.

BRITTEN NORMAN BN2T ALLISON USA En-route En route 06/11/2023 202337775

Fuel leak into aircraft during flight. Aircraft returned to base.

CESSNA 150 CONTINENTAL Initial climb EGCJ : Sherburn-In-Elmet 11/11/2023 202337906

CESSNA 150 CONTINENTAL En-route EGCB : Manchester/Barton 25/11/2023 202340506

Infringement of the Manchester CTA (Class D) by a C152 at 2700ft.

Rejected take-off due to no airspeed indicator. Blocked pitot tube.

CESSNA 152 LYCOMING En-route EGSS (STN) : 25/11/2023 202340461

Infringement of the Stansted CTA (Class D) by a C152 at 2000ft.

CESSNA 152 LYCOMING En-route BNN 25/11/2023 202340462

Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C152 at 2600ft.

UK AIRPROX 2023235 - DA40 and an unknown aircraft IVO Grafham Waters.

CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route EGNM (LBA) : Leeds 18/10/2023 202335493

Infringement of Leeds CTR (Class D) by a C172 at 2300ft squawking 7000.

CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route EGSC (CBG) : Cambridge 01/11/2023 202337504

UK reported NEAR MISS - C172 and DA40 overhead Cambridge.

CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route CAWZE 10/11/2023 202337521

Infringement of Cotswold CTA (Class D) by a C172.

Reduced engine power on departure. Full emergency declared. Aircraft returned.

CESSNA 172 CONTINENTAL En-route Epsom/Kenley 15/11/2023 202339101

Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by a C172 at 3000ft.

CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route BNN 17/11/2023 202339102

CESSNA 172 LYCOMING En-route Sevenoaks 25/11/2023 202340446

Infringement of Gatwick CTR (Class D) by a C182 at 2000ft.

CESSNA 210 UNKNOWN En-route Selby 12/10/2023 202336477

Overflight of active winch glider site.

New encoding altimeter giving false mode C.

CESSNA 402 UNKNOWN Cruise En route 01/06/2023 202319101

Smoke in cabin due to hydraulic fluid leak.

CESSNA 441 GARRET AIRESEARCH Cruise Westcott corridor 14/11/2023 202337990

PAN declared due to rapid decompression. Crew donned oxygen masks.

Aircraft not positioned correctly on stand.

Aircraft taxied through cleared holding point.

CESSNA 560 UNKNOWN Scheduled EGTK (OXF) : 28/09/2022 202234722

Issue with grease type used.

CESSNA 750 HONEYWELL En-route EGLF (FAB) : Farnborough 30/10/2023 202337188

Level Bust F406 and potential loss of separation with A380.

T204 outside CAS.

CIRRUS SR20 LYCOMING En-route Portmoak Airfield 23/09/2023 202336768

CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL Take-off EGSH (NWI) : Norwich 03/11/2023 202337185

Birdstrike without damage or system problems. PAN Call.

CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route EGLK (BBS) : Blackbushe 13/11/2023 202338998

Infringement of the Farnborough CTR-1 (Class D) by an SR22 in the Blackbushe circuit.

CIRRUS SR22 CONTINENTAL En-route EGNR (CEG) : Hawarden 18/10/2023 202336675