MODULE 7 Same; Same; Judicial Independence; Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances,

independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise
CASES – SAME SAME their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a
whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of
1. ARTICLE 8: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed
A. JUDICIAL POWER by the Constitution itself.—Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances,
independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018 their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a
Masyado pong mahaba and wala pa pong copy sa escra whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of
restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down into
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.”
Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012 Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers is a from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through applicable law.” On the other hand, institutional independence “describes the
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and government.” Simply put, institutional independence refers to the “collective
is supreme within its own sphere.—In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. independence of the judiciary as a body.”
139 (1936), we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows: The
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It Same; Same; Same; Fiscal Autonomy; One of the most important aspects of
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for
its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and funds for purposes germane to judicial functions.—One of the most important
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy.
the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all
void if violative of the Constitution. jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to
use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While,
Same; Same; The powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the
of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the
single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.— Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary
other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative
it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary
wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. Judiciary; Judges; By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the
intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of
specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.—By way of a long standing conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the advisory opinion.”
sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used
during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. Same; Same; Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws.
This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that
has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the Congress may or may not pass.—Similar to Montesclaros v. COMELEC, 384
privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its SCRA 269 (2002), petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing
officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained
supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is “not
administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to subject to judicial restraint[.]” A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is
handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret
personnel as provided by law and by its own grants. laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill
that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or
Constitutional Law; Judicial Independence; Fiscal Autonomy; The Chief Justice issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does
and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court’s
how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials determination.
and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power.—
Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as “a right of
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Even assuming that there
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no
judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal
granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160
grant as grantor. (2006): Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real parties-in-
In the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence against interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
the Abolition of JDF and Reduction of Autonomy, UDK 15143, January 21, Procedure, as amended. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
2015 defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.” Accordingly, the “real party-
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; The power of judicial review, like all in-interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.—The in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the
power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial
review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial when the issues involved are of “transcendental importance” to the public.—
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a issues involved are of “transcendental importance” to the public. Specifically,
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will this court has stated that: the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest. Transcendental importance is not defined in our
Same; Same; Actual Controversy; One (1) of the requirements for this court to jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy.— mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44 (2003): There being no
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be “an determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific discretions; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
interest in raising the questions being raised. A mere invocation of without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this court to set or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
aside procedural rules: Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations, is
transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations. inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence. The doctrine of
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; The writ of mandamus will which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not of ‘political cases.’ ”
issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial. An act is ministerial
when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
compliance with a legal mandate.—The writ of mandamus will issue when the narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
act sought to be performed is ministerial. An act is ministerial when it does not power of judicial review of the Supreme Court not only to settle actual
require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
legal mandate. In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
to show that one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie instrumentality of government.—In the Philippine setting, this Court has been
“to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner
duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by and outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case is Tañ ada v.
law.” Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitutional Law; Judiciary; The judiciary is the weakest branch of Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
government.—The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
courts have power to declare what law is given a set of facts, but it does not or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of the purse. upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” To a great degree, the
“Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
judiciary should not go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget is. actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 453 (2001) of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
Political Question Doctrine; Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the on the “thou shalt not’s” of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
constitutional law.—To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket.
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. In the Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this
United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a Court in limpid language to “x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
Baker v. Carr, viz.: “x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment thereof x x x.”
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of speech and of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; People Power; Revolutionary Governments; It assembly provides a framework in which the “conflict necessary to the progress
is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful of a society can take place without destroying the society.”—The
revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government indispensability of the people’s freedom of speech and of assembly to
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop.—Respondents rely on the democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first,
case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfilment;
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to support their thesis that second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all
Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable
cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance
the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.” In this sense, freedom of
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the “conflict necessary
Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society.” In
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people “in defiance of the Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, this function of free speech and
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended.” It is familiar learning that the assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights
legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that “the basis of
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all.” In the relatively
Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, this Court similarly stressed that “. . . it
Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a
that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances
1987 Constitution. are ciphers.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; EDSA I Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is emphatically the province and duty of the
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the judicial department to say what the law is.—Needless to state, the cases at bar
whole government while EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
grievances which only affected the office of the President—EDSA I is extra section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of
constitutional but EDSA II is intra constitutional, the former presenting a governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for
political question and the latter involving legal questions.—In fine, the legal a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of what the law is . . .” Thus, respondent’s invocation of the doctrine of political
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra question is but a foray in the dark.
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and Public Officers; Presidency; Resignation; Resignation is not a high level legal
the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the abstraction—it is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on relinquishment.—The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President
freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took
for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level
not inappropriate. legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It
was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he
Same; Same; Same; Totality Test; Whether erstwhile President Estrada resigned was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance,
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.—In it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act.
resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or legal significance. Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the resignation
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioner’s letter and this shall be
material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
resigned as President.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); A
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court holds that, the resignation of former public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign, but
President Estrada cannot be doubted—it was confirmed by his leaving if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or
Malacañ ang.—In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañ ang. In the press release cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him.—
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure,
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or
which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the retirement to avoid prosecution.
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 12 of R.A. No. 3019 contemplates of cases
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.—There is another
reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada’s resignation from the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed
presidency cannot be the subject of changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755,
especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.—To 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then,
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.
Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”
any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and
Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; The exact nature of an impeachment addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
proceeding is debatable, but even assuming arguendo that it is an cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time when separation of powers.
then President Estrada resigned because the process already broke down when
a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings temporarily since such claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
were postponed indefinitely.—Petitioner contends that the impeachment that President Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.—In fine, even if the
bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were Same; Presidential Immunity; Impeachment; Since the Impeachment Court is
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending now functus officio, it is untenable for former President Estrada to demand that
against petitioner when he resigned. he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.—
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We
Presidency; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Political Question Doctrine; reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must
Implicitly clear in the recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo as first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
President is the premise that the inability of former President Estrada is no petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the
longer temporary.—What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and
of inability. then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting
to review the claim of temporary inability of former President Estrada and President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
President is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings
constitutional fiat—it is a political issue which cannot be decided by the have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal
Supreme Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.— and civil cases may already be filed against him.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of
temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of Same; Same; Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.—
Philippines. Following Tañ ada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent
its judicial power for this is an issue “in regard to which full discretionary Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government.” period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the
Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a “textually demonstrable peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is
demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance
on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan and related cases are inapropos for Same; Same; Public Officers; The constitutional polices on accountability of
they have a different factual milieu. public officers—of public office being of public trust—will be devalued if the
Court sustains the claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit
Same; Same; By no stretch of the imagination can the crimes of plunder, bribery for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.—There are more reasons
and graft and corruption, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.—We now our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a
come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that “(t)he State shall
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the effective measures against graft and corruption.” It ordained that “(p)ublic
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” It set the rule that “(t)he right of
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.” It maintained the Sandiganbayan as
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with
such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. enormous powers, among which is to “(investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
Same; Same; A critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when it inefficient.” The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.—Indeed, a constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner’s claim that a
critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed
disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when it impedes the search for during his incumbency.
truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US
President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain Due Process; Prejudicial Publicity; Words and Phrases; Two (2) Principal Legal
recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. and Philosophical Schools of Thought on Dealing with Unrestrained Publicity of
Seven advisers of President Nixon’s associates were facing charges of High Profile Cases; The British school of thought approaches the problem with
conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury, while the American school
burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington’s Watergate of thought assumes a sceptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive
Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial.—There are two (2) principal
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.
judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will
before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when
rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that “when the ground for the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial different. US courts assume a sceptical approach about the potential effect of
is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial
criminal justice.” In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only
“official acts.” Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this Same; Same; There is not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the
doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President’s preliminary investigation of former President Estrada by the Ombudsman—the
former President needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his —the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for
burden of proof, more weighty social evidence to successfully prove the instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.—Applying the above minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent
ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of as the “most fundamental of all freedoms.” To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor
proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that
prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free
note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls “the
investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent impatient vehemence of the majority.” Rights in a democracy are not decided by
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism
because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If
panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has
whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong.
Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Theory of Derivative Prejudice; The Court to man’s progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key
cannot adopt former President Estrada’s theory of derivative prejudice, i.e., that just to pander to some people’s prejudice.
the prejudice of the Ombudsman flows to his subordinates—the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure gives investigating prosecutors the independence to Kilsobayan v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110 (1994)
make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by Remedial Law; Actions; Parties; A party’s standing before the court is a
their superiors.—Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in
insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner view of the importance of the issues raised.—The preliminary issue on the locus
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party’s
denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his technicality because “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and must, technicalities of procedure.
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be
reversed but they cannot be compelled to change their recommendations nor Same; Same; Same; Objections to taxpayers’ suits for lack of sufficient
can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. personality standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters.
In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking —“Objections to taxpayers’ suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or
slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s
cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
before the proper court. branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
Constitutional Law; Republicanism; Rule of Law; Rights in a democracy are not them, this Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason, nor cognizance of these petitions.”
are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the
dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule Constitutional Law; Franchise; It is a settled rule that in all grants by the
of law.—A word of caution to the “hooting throng.” The cases against the government to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises,
petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee.—No interpretation
of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since venture exists between the contracting parties.—A careful analysis and
the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the
similar activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the
settled rule that “in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an
of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily
against the grantee . . . . [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation proscribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the
of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which most, exists between the contracting parties. Collaboration is defined as the acts
is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or of working together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of
doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally persons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint venture
granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.” is defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some
commercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks. It
Same; Same; Same; The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of requires a community of interest in the performance of the subject matter, a
collaboration, association or joint venture.—In short then, by the exception right to direct and govern the policy in connection therewith, and duty, which
explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses.
its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture.
Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. It has been said that “the Same; Same; Same; Same; Court declares the contract of lease invalid for being
rights and privileges conferred under a franchise may, without doubt, be contrary to law.—We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates
assigned or transferred when the grant is to the grantee and assigns, or is the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
authorized by statute. On the other hand, the right of transfer or assignment amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This
may be restricted by statute or the constitution, or be made subject to the conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by
approval of the grantor or a governmental agency, such as a public utilities the petitioners.
commission, except that an existing right of assignment cannot be impaired by
subsequent legislation.” Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is of
Same; Same; Same; The challenged Contract of Lease violates or contravenes the common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.—We agree Philippines; All the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12
with the petitioners that it does, notwithstanding its denomination or Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.—Petitioners instituted Civil
designation as a Contract of Lease. We are neither convinced nor moved or Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
fazed by the insistence and forceful arguments of the PGMC that it does not respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule
because in reality it is only an independent contractor for a piece of work, i.e., that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
the building and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by the PCSO in the is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
operation of its lottery franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
instrument. In order to give life or effect to an instrument, it is essential to look Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
to the intention of the individual who executed it. And, pursuant to Article 1371 petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
of the Civil Code, “to determine the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.” To put Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the
it more bluntly, no one should be deceived by the title or designation of a succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
contract. responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.—This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
Same; Same; Same; Same; The contract is not in reality a contract of lease but minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association or joint unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause; A timber license is not a contract,
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced Constitution.—Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by
considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” the due process clause of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does not create irrevocable
environment constitutes at the same time the performance of their obligation to rights, neither is it property or property rights.—A license is merely a permit or
ensure the protection of that right for the generation to come.—Needless to say, privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
protection of that right for the generations to come. rights.

Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
right; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology.—The complaint focuses on impairment clause cannot be invoked.—Since timber licenses are not contracts,
one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.—In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the the police power of the state
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.—The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol, 415 SCRA 44
from impairing the environment. (2003)
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances;
Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is The Supreme Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.—Thus, the branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution; In cases
right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.—This Court’s
Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said right. power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government
in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The
Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is no longer the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
review.—The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied) Such
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission after
that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par.
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: x x x In times
of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In technical terms are employed.—To determine the merits of the issues raised in
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. First,
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The executive and legislative branches of the Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court,
government effectively acknowledged the power of judicial review in Article 7 speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared: We look to the
of the Civil Code.—In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. And as pointed in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
V. Mendoza, the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being
Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary Same; Same; Same; The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of accordance with the intent of the framers—ratio legis est anima—the object is
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact
the people for which it serves.—As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of calculated to effect that purpose.—Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it the Intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise: A foolproof yardstick in
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive calculated to effect that purpose.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole—ut magis
valeat quam pereat.—Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever possible, the words interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon, this Court, through Chief
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where Justice Manuel Moran declared: x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional
Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of
the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. Garcia vs. COMELEC, “[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should
When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs.”
itself alone, but in con junction with all other provisions of that great document. Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
(Emphasis and italics supplied) United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, “we have cut the umbilical cord.”
Same; Same; Same; If the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available; The proper interpretation of a constitutional Same; Same; Same; The major difference between the judicial power of the
provision depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
than the framers’ understanding thereof.—If, however, the plain meaning of the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and
word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded: While lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as instrumentality; There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.—The major
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
than in the framers’ understanding thereof. (Emphasis and italics supplied) discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are
also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Same; Same; Impeachment; American jurisprudence and authorities on Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
persuasive merit as Philippine constitutional law is concerned; Although the Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the
paths of development have long since diverged—in the colorful words of Father exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord.”—Respondents’ and intervenors’ thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
reliance upon American jurisprudence, the Americana Constitution and impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment cases,” as provided for Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress—it provided for certain well-
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the defined limits, or “judicially discoverable standards” for determining the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably —Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
impeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much on the principle that “whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive judicial wilfulness and pride.” But did not the people also express their will
when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined of difficult constitutional issues.”—There is, however, a difference between the
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for rule on real party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. In
judicial review. view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is meant by
Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There exists no constitutional basis for locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest. The difference
the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.—There exists no authorities thus: “It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one section is not to capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring
be allowed to defeat another.” Both are integral components of the calibrated that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern
in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who
Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Review.—As clearly stated in Angara v. have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
Electoral Commission, the courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of questions.” x x x On the other hand, the question as to “real party in interest” is
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’ ” (Citations omitted)

Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; The gist to the question of Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; When suing as a citizen, the interest of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the personal.—When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
constitutional questions.—Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real-Party-in-Interest; The rule on real-party- interest.
in-interest is a concept of civil procedure while the rule on standing has
constitutional underpinnings—the question as to “real party in interest” is Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; In the case of a taxpayer, he is
whether he is “the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit’ ” while the question of standing is that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
whether such party have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law; Courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.—In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed raised, a class suit ought to fail.—In the same vein, when dealing with class suits
to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court. Where it
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No.
It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing
of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
not a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Transcendental Importance,”
the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Explained; There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. the following instructive determinants are instructive—(1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislator’s Suits; For a legislator, he is allowed to sue disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his agency or instrumentality of the government, and, (3) the lack of any other
prerogatives as a legislator.—As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a raised; In not a few cases, the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a liberal
legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to attitude on locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are
Constitution in his office. of paramount importance to the public.—There being no doctrinal definition of
transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated
Same; Same; Same; Same; Association’s Suits; While an association has legal by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the
personality to represent its members, especially when it is composed of character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and, (3) the lack of
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.—While an being raised. Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues
association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance. In not a few cases, this
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos’ case, he failed to allege any
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; An intervenor must possess a legal
Same; Same; Same; Same; Class Suits; When dealing with class suits filed in interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently nu merous to fully interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
all interests involved in the suit, and where it clearly appears that not all officer thereof.—With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2
of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest picture.”—In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts before a court may come into the picture.” Only then may the courts pass on the
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
authorizing intervention. legal proceeding.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Senator possesses a legal interest in the Same; Same; Same; Justiciability; Political Questions; Separation of Powers;
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the petitions Words and Phrases; The term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance,
are directed.—Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy—it refers to
intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
view that differs with Senate President Drilon’s. He alleges that submitting to in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
this Court’s jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”—In
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the the leading case of Tañ ada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined
Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of the term “political question,” viz.: [T]he term “political question” connotes, in
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to “those
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue. delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A motion to intervene as a taxpayer measure. (Italics in the original)
will be denied where such party fails to allege that there will result an illegal Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, the Supreme Court
improper purpose; A lawyer’s mere interest as a member of the Bar does not vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political
suffice to clothe him with standing.—As to Jaime N. Soriano’s motion to questions; The frequency with which the Court invoked the political question
intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer’s regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, to wit: x x x While, concededly, the Commissioner, to clarify the Court’s power of judicial review and its application
elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their on issues involving political questions.—Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is “being extracted and consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
legislative power,” or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. In other cases, however,
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on
omitted) In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988
allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised the issue of whether the
funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
standing. Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity. The frequency with which this Court invoked the
Same; Same; Same; Ripeness and Prematurity; For a case to be considered ripe political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases
for adjudication, “it is a prerequisite that something had by then been during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became
a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court’s power of judicial review kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and
and its application on issues involving political questions. distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the record of the proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem in applying the
power—it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter standards provided in Baker v. Carr, 227 U.S. 100 (1993), is that the American
of this creature called the political question doctrine.—From the foregoing concept of judicial review is radically different from the current Philippine
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that concept, for the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue; In our
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
Article VIII was not intended to do away with “truly political questions.” From are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: political bodies.—The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
(1) “truly political questions” and (2) those which “are not truly political American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current
questions.” concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with
far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Truly political questions are beyond constitutional issue. In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
judicial review while courts can review questions which are not truly political in question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
nature.—Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
review questions which are not truly political in nature. properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards for Determining Political
Questions; Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define what are Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; Words and Phrases; A
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, and determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely political
identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic.— question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not define what are justiciable legislature—it is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial power;
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. impeachment, two of these—other high crimes and betrayal of public trust—
There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carrattempts elude a precise definition.—It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an
to provide some: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, this
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially Court held: x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
or an unusual, need for questioning adherence to a political decision already left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements will be unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied] Succinctly put, courts will
by various departments on one question. (Italics supplied) Of these standards, not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2)
the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an
and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible.—The first issue goes into the merits of the second the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s
impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More self.
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; Judicial Restraint; The
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before the
the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the Supreme Court, otherwise the Court would be shirking from its duty vested
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution—The exercise of judicial restraint
of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate referred.” Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority
to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the
cut definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it
to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is guided by the related canon of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even in cases where it is an interested party,
adjudication that it “should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule
required by the precise facts to which it is applied.”—Noted earlier, the instant upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.—Even in
consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office
which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In has the authority to do so. On the occasion that this Court had been an
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter “not
be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related canon of adjudication that with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
“the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required with detachment and fairness.” After all, “by [his] appointment to the office, the
by the precise facts to which it is applied.” public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For
Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries; Standard of Conduct for the Conduct of this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to
Legislative Inquiries.—En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with
conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office.”
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, viz.: The 1987 Constitution
expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Seven Pillars of Limitations of the Power of
in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or Judicial Review.—In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through Justice Marcelo
the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct Fernan cited the “seven pillars” of limitations of the power of judicial review,
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA as
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall follows: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions
of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is ‘is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of
circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the
provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.’
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then 2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the necessity of deciding it.’ . . . ‘It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case.’ 3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader Impeachment; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “Initiate” of course is
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’ 4. The Court understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence,
will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the or set going.—The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be the term “initiate.” Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order. That
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court,
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide agreed on the meaning of “initiate” as “to file,” as proffered and explained by
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed
the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 5. The Court during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at
will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to which he added that the act of “initiating” included the act of taking initial action
show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word “initiate” as it twice
rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official and take initial action on it. “Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” which jibes with Justice
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Regalado’s position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003.
behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the framers intended “initiation” to start with
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious the filing of the complaint.—It is thus clear that the framers intended “initiation”
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which Maambong explained that “the obvious reason in deleting the phrase “to initiate
the question may be avoided (citations omitted). impeachment proceedings” as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3
(3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of the occurrence of a impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
constitutional crisis is not a reason for the Supreme Court to refrain from one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.—Respondents Speaker de impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified
Venecia, et al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.” Amicus
“judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary.” They stress the need to avoid the Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the word “initiate” as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of moving.
Congress to remove an impeachable official. Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Same; Same; Same; Reddendo Singula Singulis; The term “cases” must be
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode distinguished from the term “proceedings”—an impeachment case is the legal
public confidence and faith in the judiciary. Such an argument, however, is controversy that must be decided by the Senate but before a decision is made to
specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the initiate a case in the Senate, a “proceeding” must be followed to arrive at a
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this conclusion, and such proceeding must be “initiated” in the House of
Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Representatives.—Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action common verb is “to initiate.” The object in the first sentence is “impeachment
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. case.” The object in the second sentence is “impeachment proceeding.”
Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term “cases” must be
distinguished from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a “impeachment proceeding.” From the records of the Constitutional Commission,
case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive power” to to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a “proceeding” must be followed impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be “initiated.” To initiate, which complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the
takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper same official within a one year period.
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution Same; Separation of Powers; The power of Congress to promulgate its rules on
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either this section.”—the rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary Constitution; If Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it would by
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and Constitution without need of referendum.—Respondent House of
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House “initiates an Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
impeachment case.” It is at this point that an impeachable public official is unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
successfully impeached. governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however,
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment “case” before the is misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
Senate impeachment court. promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution understood initiation the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
in its ordinary meaning.—The framers of the Constitution also understood rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
proposing that “A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz.: It is basic
be necessary . . . to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this was met by a that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it would by
initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. Thus necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution. Constitution without need of referendum.

Same; Same; Same; Same; From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to Same; Same; Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.—In
without a doubt that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the Osmeñ a v. Pendatun, this Court held that it is within the province of either
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what
complaint; Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another constituted “disorderly behavior” of its members. However, in Paceta v.
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, Justice (later Chief Justice)
year period.—To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says “The House of United States v. Smith, declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph to benefit or suffer therefrom, unafraid by whatever imputations or
& Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved
and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to validity of a government branch’s official act as tested by the limits set by the
be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the
open to the determination of the Legislature. judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
Same; Same; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give which is simply a non sequitur.
the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”—The provisions of Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that Same; Same; The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the member of the Court, but just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is he gets to have less in law than anybody else.—No one is above the law or the
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or equality of all men before the law as essential to the law’s moral authority and
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps,
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified there is no other government branchor instrumentality that is most zealous in
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
“initiate” a meaning different from “filing.” numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; The raison d’etre of the judiciary is to member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered individual’s rights irrespective of his station in life.,
our society upon the rule of law.—This Court in the present petitions subjected
to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether Brillantes v. Commission on Elections, 432 SCRA 269 (2004)
the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed Remedial Law; Actions; Parties-in-Interest; Taxpayers are allowed to sue where
the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn being deflected to any improper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great an invalid or unconstitutional law.—Since the implementation of the assailed
branches of the government. Rather, the raison d’etre of the judiciary is to resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to
to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
our society upon the rule of law. expenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to
sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public
Same; Same; To disqualify the entire institution that is the Supreme Court from money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where the petitioners
the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality seek to restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the
when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.— enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long
held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal Same; Same; Political questions are concerned with “issues dependent upon the
rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions, This Court wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”—The Court does not agree with
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood the posture of the respondent COMELEC that the issue involved in the present
petition is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not
the leading case of Tañ ada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are concerned make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final Deliberation
with “issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” Panel, more so by the former President. It should be recalled too that
respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Same; Same; The assailed resolution usurps x x x the sole and exclusive Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Mañ osa and
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice- Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno
President.—The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” was not included in the second shortlist.
tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole
and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when
President and Vice-President. they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and
Same; Same; Contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is Mañ osa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to
“unofficial,” is puerile and totally unacceptable.—The contention of the respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañ osa and Moreno fails to pass
COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and
Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is puerile and totally petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an
of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose
more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes. of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules
Brillantes, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 432 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 163193 June and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot
15, 2004 claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an
equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a
National Artist for Literature Virgilio Alamario, et al. v. The Executive violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that is
Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013 (2013) substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; The parties who assail the
constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a direct and Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; A taxpayer’s suit is proper only
personal interest.—The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress.—As
statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they claim of deep concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result artistic heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of
of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a
way. They must show that they have been or are about to be denied some right substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. Nor can they take
or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve any illegal
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an
complained of. exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress.

Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; No real and substantial Same; Prohibition; Injunction; It has been held that the remedies of prohibition
distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that and injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an
would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, act that is already fait accompli.—The present action is a petition for
and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all other legal, just and
was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and equitable reliefs. It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and
well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act
effect.—Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid that is already fait accompli. Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined
personal and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañ osa and has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction
Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. becomes moot. Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this
Court may still resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter
Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her
repetition, yet evading review.” by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have
considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not
Presidency; Order of National Artists; The President’s discretion in the considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the
conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the
with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.—In the matter of the NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on the conferment of the Order of
conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or may not adopt National Artists.” Applying this to the instant case, the former President could
the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañ osa
the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion. and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous
nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. Discretion is not a screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and
free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of
keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, “discretion is not unconfined Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its
and vagrant” but “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.” The deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake any
President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the
President: Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; There was a violation of the equal
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully protection clause of the Constitution when the former President gave
executed. (Emphasis supplied.) The President’s discretion in the conferment of preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañ osa and
the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to Moreno; The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents
faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.—
construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when
power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and Alvarez, Caparas, Mañ osa and Moreno. The former President’s constitutional
execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that “[a]dministrative or duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.” the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited
hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules,
Administrative Regulations; Statutes; An administrative regulation adopted guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that
pursuant to law has the force and effect of law.—We have held that an unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañ osa and Moreno.
administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was
law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to
their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. 162272, April
aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213, 251
the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws. Administrative Law; National Telecommunications Commission; Broadcast
stations are still required to obtain a legislative franchise.—Associated
Presidency; Order of National Artists; In view of the various stages of Communications makes clear that presently broadcast stations are still required
deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her duty to to obtain a legislative franchise, as they have been so since the passage of the
faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the matter Radio Control Act in 1931. By virtue of this requirement, the broadcast industry
of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her falls within the ambit of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the one
by the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCCA) and the Cultural constitutional provision concerned with the grant of franchises in the
Center of the Philippines (CCP) Boards.—In view of the various stages of Philippines. The requirement of a legislative franchise likewise differentiates
deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her duty to
the Philippine broadcast industry from that in America, where there is no need powers from Congress. If the restriction or sanction imposed by the
to secure a franchise from the U.S. Congress. administrative agency cannot trace its origin from legislative delegation,
whether it is by virtue of a specific grant or from valid delegation of rule-making
Same; Same; After securing their legislative franchises, stations are required to power to the administrative agency, then the action of such administrative
obtain Certificates of Public Convenience (CPCs) from the National agency cannot be sustained. The life and authority of an administrative agency
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) before they can operate their radio or emanates solely from an Act of Congress, and its faculties confined within the
television broadcasting systems.—Broadcast and television stations are parameters set by the legislative branch of government.
required to obtain a legislative franchise, a requirement imposed by the Radio
Control Act and affirmed by our ruling in Associated Broadcasting. After Same; Same; Even as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is
securing their legislative franchises, stations are required to obtain CPCs from vested with the power to issue Certificates of Public Convenience (CPCs) to
the NTC before they can operate their radio or television broadcasting systems. broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power to cancel such
Such requirement while traceable also to the Radio Control Act, currently finds CPCs.—We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as established by
its basis in E.O. No. 546, the law establishing the NTC. E.O. No. 546. One can readily notice that even as the NTC is vested with the
power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the
Same; Same; The legal obligation of the National Telecommunications power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast
Commission (NTC) once Congress has established a legislative franchise for a stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs from operating radio or television
broadcast media station is to facilitate the operation by the franchisee of its stations.
broadcast stations.—The complexities of our dual franchise/license regime for
broadcast media should be understood within the context of separation of Same; Same; Allowing the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to
powers. The right of a particular entity to broadcast over the airwaves is countermand State policy by revoking respondent’s vested legal right to operate
established by law—i.e., the legislative franchise—and determined by Congress, broadcast stations unduly gives to a mere administrative agency veto power
the branch of government tasked with the creation of rights and obligations. As over the implementation of the law and the enforcement of especially vested
with all other laws passed by Congress, the function of the executive branch of legal rights.—Allowing the NTC to countermand State policy by revoking
government, to which the NTC belongs, is the implementation of the law. In respondent’s vested legal right to operate broadcast stations unduly gives to a
broad theory, the legal obligation of the NTC once Congress has established a mere administrative agency veto power over the implementation of the law and
legislative franchise for a broadcast media station is to facilitate the operation the enforcement of especially vested legal rights. That concern would not arise if
by the franchisee of its broadcast stations. However, since the public Congress had similarly empowered the NTC with the power to revoke a
administration of the airwaves is a requisite for the operation of a franchise and franchisee’s right to operate broadcast stations. But as earlier stated, there is no
is moreover a highly technical function, Congress has delegated to the NTC the such expression in the law, and by presuming such right the Court will be acting
task of administration over the broadcast spectrum, including the contrary to the stated State interest as expressed in respondents’ legislative
determination of available bandwidths and the allocation of such available franchises.
bandwidths among the various legislative franchisees. The licensing power of
the NTC thus arises from the necessary delegation by Congress of legislative Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Quo Warranto; The special civil action of quo
power geared towards the orderly exercise by franchisees of the rights granted warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
them by Congress. person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise.—The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
Same; Same; The restrictions imposed by an administrative agency such as the which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) on broadcast media holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that “[t]he
franchisees will have to pass not only the test of constitutionality, but also the determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to
test of authority and legitimacy.—The restrictions enacted by Congress on enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
broadcast media franchisees have to pass the mettle of constitutionality. On the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a
other hand, the restrictions imposed by an administrative agency such as the rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that
NTC on broadcast media franchisees will have to pass not only the test of the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury.” A forfeiture
constitutionality, but also the test of authority and legitimacy, i.e., whether such of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose
restrictions have been imposed in the exercise of duly delegated legislative brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful
exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo warranto is specifically and set aside the issuance subject of this case is a special civil action for
available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action,
offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer
Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc. v. Overseas Workers Welfare acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
Administration, G.R. No. 166923, November 26, 2014 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal in
all cases involving only questions of law shall be by petition for review on Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; It is settled in
certiorari to the Supreme Court (SC) in accordance with Rule 45.—Section 2(c), law and jurisprudence that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of appeal in all cases resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree (PD), executive
involving only questions of law shall be by petition for review on certiorari to order (EO), or administrative regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article
the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45. Time and again, this Court has VIII of the 1987 Constitution.—As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of pure subject matter involved in this case, it is settled in law and jurisprudence that
questions of fact in the following manner: A question of fact exists when a doubt the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires decree, executive order, or administrative regulation, as recognized in Section
a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SECTION 5. The
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x (2) Review, revise,
query is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does Court may provide final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in
not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
authority to hear and determine a case; Jurisdiction is neither a question of fact January 21, 2015
or of fact and law but a matter of law.—Jurisdiction is the right to act or the Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Rule 64 is not the exclusive
power and authority to hear and determine a case. It is conferred only by the remedy for all acts of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Rule 65 is
Constitution or by statute. The question as to whether or not the dismissal by applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion
the lower court for lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the determination of resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.—Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for
whether, admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial court all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections
has jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws governing jurisdiction. As relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a
such, jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of fact and law but a matter of special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy,
law. For this reason, We have consistently held that a court’s jurisdiction over and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
the subject matter of a case is a question of law, and have, in fact, affirmed
dismissals by the CA of appeals brought to them involving pure questions of law. Election Contests; Appeals; Conditions in Order for the Supreme Court (SC) to
Considering that only questions of law was raised in this petition, direct resort Review Orders and Decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
to this Court is proper. Electoral Contests Despite Not Being Reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc.—
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Certiorari, as a special civil action, is Based on ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811
available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising (2000), this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if: 1) It will
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting prevent the miscarriage of justice; 2) The issue involves a principle of social
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, justice; 3) The issue involves the protection of labor; 4) The decision or
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—We cannot, therefore, give resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or 5) The need for relief is
credence to the lower court’s contention that the appropriate remedy to annul
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
available. Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
Supreme Court; Jurisdictions; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) over the subject matter is important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their
defined as the authority “to hear and determine cases of the general class to territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of
authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.”—The jurisdiction course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions
petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority “to hear and could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court Same; Court of Appeals; The Court of Appeals (CA) is primarily designed as an
and defines its powers.” Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the
from the cases cited by respondents. Nothing less than the electorate’s political trial courts. It is collegiate in nature.—The Court of Appeals is primarily
speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law
speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of
power whether through the election of representatives in a republican Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the
government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine
which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom
of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-
the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in clad rule.—The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This
our democratic society. court has “full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction
[over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally
Same; Same; During elections, the Supreme Court (SC) has the power and the compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with specifically raised in the petition.”
unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.—
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In a democracy, the citizen’s right
discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. making is recognized.—In a democracy, the citizen’s right to freely participate
Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is
against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public
constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC. participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution.
As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas must be given
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy immediate protection by this court.
of courts was created by the Supreme Court (SC) to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Same; Same; The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s
—The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in
this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated general, in the hope of influencing their votes.—In the case before this court,
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of
speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to suffrage power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of
not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right discretion.
to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their
votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Political Speeches; Sovereignty resides
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The
fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this
this court. fundamental right.—Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
Same; Same; This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
to post the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise of their right of petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
free expression.—The present petition does not involve a dispute between the threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the
rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for media context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In
in their private property, as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), Justice Carpio in a separate opinion
the invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not emphasized: “[i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case. expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of
political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top.”
Same; Political Questions; What is generally meant, when it is said that a Sovereignty resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the
question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been order to protect this fundamental right.
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act.—In Tañ ada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Suspension of the Rules; Time and again, we have
1051 (1957), this court previously elaborated on the concept of what held that the Supreme Court (SC) “has the power to relax or suspend the rules
constitutes a political question: What is generally meant, when it is said that a or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or
question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the the court.”—Time and again, we have held that this court “has the power to
government, with discretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not for relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when
this court to rehearse and reenact political debates on what the text of the law compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and
should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit
text of the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.” Certainly, this case of
construed in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. first impression where COMELEC has threatened to prosecute private parties
Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that who seek to participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want
affect the rights of certain individuals, per se. debated by the public in the manner they feel would be effective is one of those
cases.
Same; Same; A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the
powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the executive Election Law; Fair Elections Act (R.A. No. 9006); Section 17 of Commission on
or those of the legislature.—A political question arises in constitutional issues Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations
relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of implementing the Fair Elections Act, regulating the posting of campaign
the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are
as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are neither of the two.—Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign
exclusively within the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of
the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and
act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that petitioners are neither of the two. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on “Lawful
Election Propaganda” also states that these are “allowed for all registered feature of a good polity.” This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely
political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations “includes [a] collective decision-making with the participation of all who will be
participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide candidates affected by the decision.” It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of
seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. To ensure order in
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . .” Section 6 of running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions would be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the
show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the
coordination with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination right of the people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes
with the candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental
released would ensure that these candidates and political parties maintain functions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out
within the authorized expenses limitation. grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.

Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In this case, the tarpaulin contains Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held free speech and other intellectual
speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation freedoms as “highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights
or criticism on votes made in the passing of the Reproductive Health Law (RH enjoy precedence and primacy.—Petitioners invoke their “constitutional right
Law). Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.—True, to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates.”
there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation
and political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their
be “designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or criticism toward those who voted in its favor. It was “part of their advocacy
candidates to a public office.” In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a campaign against the RH Law,” which was not paid for by any candidate or
matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism political party. Thus, “the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed]
on votes made in the passing of the RH Law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
to freedom of expression. unconstitutional and void.” This court has held free speech and other
intellectual freedoms as “highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.”
Same; Same; The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum These rights enjoy precedence and primacy. In Philippine Blooming Mills
of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189
as a symbolic manner of communication.—Communication exists when “(1) a (1973), this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of
speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he or she expression: Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions.” “[I]n passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs —
for justification.” Speech is not limited to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’” such free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
that “‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’” The right to freedom of permitting dubious intrusions.”
expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances
made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of Same; Same; “Political Speech” and “Commercial Speech,” Distinguished.—We
communication. distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to
speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation
Same; Same; Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out about some issue,” “foster[ing] informed and civic-minded deliberation.” On the
grievances and political discontent, should be protected and encouraged.— other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
Proponents of the political theory on “deliberative democracy” submit that than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the
“substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
 their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
Same; Same; Election Propaganda; While the tarpaulin may influence the constitutional rights.
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda.—While the tarpaulin may influence Same; Same; “Content-Based Restraint” and “Content-Neutral Regulation,”
the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not Distinguished.—Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such
list group. as time, place, or manner of the speech.

Same; Same; Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of Same; Right of Peaceful Assembly; In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing,
expression and must be protected by the Supreme Court (SC).—Speech with 125 SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps that permit applicants
political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be must follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as
protected by this court. Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression “is regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly.—In the landmark case
not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government protection of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), this court summarized the steps
of state interest must bow.” The right to freedom of expression is indeed not that permit applicants must follow which include informing the licensing
absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subject to some authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the
restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is assembly. This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if there
content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can either be would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the
based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression. standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the opportunity to
be heard. This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa Blg. 880,
Same; Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; Content-based regulation bears a otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Subsequent jurisprudence
heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present have upheld Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In
danger rule as measure.—Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226 (2006), this court discussed
expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of how Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates
its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, their time, place, and manner. In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar of the
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Thus, in Philippines v. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518 (2010), that respondent Mayor Atienza
Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008): A content-based regulation, however, committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first
present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.
by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor
vague. (Citations omitted) Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be Same; Freedom of Expression; Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and freedom of expression.—In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression. The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the
Same; Same; Same; Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences.
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the equally important right to suffrage.
the right of freedom of expression.—Even with the clear and present danger
test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and Same; Same; The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected.—The guarantee of freedom
state to minimize the right of noncandidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate
should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be
elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the
to hide the candidate’s real levels of expenditures. However, labelling all public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is
expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of
elections as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental Same; Same; Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally
freedom. valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
Same; Same; Satire; Words and Phrases; Satire is a “literary form that employs regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object
such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,” the endorsement of a candidate only; The regulation must only be with respect
and this may target any individual or group in society, private and government to the
alike.—The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.—Regulation of election
“literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
prevailing vices or follies,” and this may target any individual or group in persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political
society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech
greater purpose, often used for “political and social criticism” “because it tears that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
spoofed.” Northrop Frye, well-known in this literary field, claimed that satire candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
had two defining features: “one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of attack.” Thus, satire object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner
frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices. of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or
censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether
Same; Same; In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged speech the speech is made with or on private property.
prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails
over speech.”—In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged Same; Same; Right to Property; Other than the right to freedom of expression
speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also
prevails over speech.” This view allows the government leeway to redistribute involves one’s right to property.—Other than the right to freedom of expression
or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage, the present case also
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s involves one’s right to property.
ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that there are dominant political
actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the
capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in right to property.—Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the
a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the
ours. expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property
rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their
Same; Same; Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by fundamental right to speech.
candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties
may be regulated as to time, place, and manner.—Clearly, regulation of speech Same; Same; This caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected
in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of speech.—The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of
their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, those who are running for public office. Their message may be construed
and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeñ a v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA generalizations of very complex individuals and party list organizations. They
447 (1998) and National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992). are classified into black and white: as belonging to “Team Patay” or “Team
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons Buhay.” But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected
who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party speech.
 that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the
Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing
to file this petition.

Same; Same; Same; Unwilling Co-petitioners; Impleading the former President

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et.al. v. as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the
Reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015 functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Citizen Suits; Rules of President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
Procedure for Environmental Cases; The Court passed the landmark Rules of free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our holders time, also demands undivided attention.”—Section 10, Rule 3 of the
environmental laws.—It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and Rules of Court provides: Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.—If the consent of any
environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a
legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. Under the
by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This
have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can
directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party’s name
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and
liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and consent, as such would be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason cited by
jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas’s paradigm of legal the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in
standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. Recently, the Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she
Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public
allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before policy against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of
our courts for violations of our environmental laws. Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; Even before the Rules of from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.”
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Supreme Court (SC) Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of
had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
environmental cases.—Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on Service Contracts; In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA
the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 1 (2004), the Supreme Court (SC) held that the deletion of the words “service
SCRA 792 (1993), we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.—
yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc.
said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held that the deletion of the words “service
need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In
of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the
environment. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean regime.
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition
Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; Oil Exploration and Development Act of organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
1972; The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
(PD) No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.—The law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people
and the revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to the petitioners’ Same; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; National Integrated Protected Areas
argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the System Act of 1992; Natural Resources; True to the constitutional policy that the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
repealed. healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress
enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS
Statutory Construction; In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with Act) to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through
the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.—
also possible, that construction should be preferred.—In cases where the True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the
statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the
preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment
283 (1999), expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess
statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of
intent. x x x. (Citation omitted) Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’ rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for administers all the designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological
service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction. processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure
sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Oil Explorations; Natural Resources; Paragraph conditions to the greatest extent possible. The following categories of protected
4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President areas were established under the NIPAS Act: a. Strict nature reserve; b. Natural
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum.— park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife sanctuary; e. Protected landscapes and
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the seascapes; f. Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other categories
President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of established by law, conventions or international agreements which the
petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the Philippine Government is a signatory.
DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said
constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 of the National Integrated Protected
nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), a protected area refers to portions of
contract. Public respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological
principle,” their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against
apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the human exploitation.—Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers
concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and
and its limit in this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative against human exploitation. The Tañ on Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No.
1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the category of as follows: h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves
Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative
national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation
land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and and abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating
tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the
management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the environment and the community’s welfare. The process is undertaken by,
permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.
prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan.
Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; Service Contracts; Oil Explorations;
the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented. While Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which
a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmentally Critical Area; Environmental Impact the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may
Statement System; The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañ on Strait is a
prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) area.—SC-46 was not
any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the President or his duly resources in the Tañ on Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and
authorized representative.—The Environmental Impact Statement System obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in
(EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree
any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. Pursuant to the utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas, through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañ on Strait is a NIPAS area. Since
Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in
to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, the Tañ on Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in
while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing said protected seascape.
Rules and Regulations (IRR).
Mercado v. Hon. Lopena, GR No. 230170, June 6, 2018
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2003-30 ISSUE: Whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
defines an environmentally critical area as “an area delineated as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are cases.
expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located,
developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any activity, RULING:
regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment,” is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an Environmental The Petition is procedurally infirm; availability of plain, speedy, and
Impact Assessment (EIA) to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its adequate remedies; failure to state material dates
stages on the environment.—DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines
an environmentally critical area as “an area delineated as environmentally For a petition for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that
sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary
types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented course of law.
in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,” is Here, the cases before the public respondents are still pending. Thus, there still
undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the exists in law a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners — which is to
likely impacts of all its stages on the environment. An EIA is described in detail participate in said cases and await the judgment of the RTC.
 Moreover, a petition filed under Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board
And, if the RTC renders an unfavorable judgment against petitioners, they may or officer exercising judicial or quasi -judicial functions that has acted without
appeal the cases to the CA. or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, as to the complaints filed before the OCP of Quezon City, the same
may be elevated via petition for review before the Secretary of Justice and Relief in such a petition merely takes the form of correcting any error of
thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor’s finding of probable jurisdiction committed by the tribunal or officer.
cause is ultimately upheld, the case may then proceed to trial.

In the same vein, petitioner Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief
under R.A. No. 9262 in case of a violation of the PPO dated February 19, 2016 The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against
issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a women and children under R.A. No. 9262
violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules. The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No.09-6-8-SC).
The Court is a court of last resort. This policy must be strictly observed so as not
to unduly burden the Court with cases that may be resolved by the lower courts In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases
vested with concurrent jurisdiction. claimed to have been filed merely as a harassment suit against environmental
actions.
The Court’s original jurisdiction may only be invoked when serious and
important reasons exist that necessitate the same. Transposed to this case, the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules
as the Petition has no relation at all to “the enforcement of environmental laws,
Parenthetically, on the issue of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the Court finds protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.”
the direct filing with the Court unwarranted under the circumstances. Generally,
a direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary R.A. No. 9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons children, is not among those laws included under the scope of A.M. No. 09-6-8-
therefor. SC.

The Court will only relax the application of the rules for the most compelling The public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion; writs of
and exceptional reasons, none of which are existent in this case. Based on the certiorari and prohibition are not available remedies to petitioners
foregoing, the Petition should therefore be dismissed.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary
The Court’s rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 remedies that may be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
petition judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts is vested by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise
Constitution. of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
Hence, being plenary in nature, the Court cannot be called upon by a private refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
citizen to exercise such power in a particular manner, especially through the as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
vehicle of a petition for certiorari or prohibition, which is intended for an of passion or hostility.
entirely different purpose.
Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that petitioners herein utterly prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the
failed to establish their entitlement to a corrective writ of certiorari or petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
prohibition. course of law.

It bears stressing that a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition seeks Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a motion for
solely to correct errors of jurisdiction and not merely errors of judgment made reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
in the exercise of jurisdiction. extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside in the ordinary course of law; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a motion for
of the respective jurisdictions of public respondents; there was no showing that reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
the subject matters of the said cases were not properly cognizable by the offices extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
of public respondents. reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
Instead, petitioners merely argue that public respondents committed grave in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an
abuse of discretion in the taking of cognizance of the subject cases despite the opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived
issuance of the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado. This is serious error. error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the
While the PPO indeed enjoins private respondent Go from committing acts mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
amounting to physical, psychological, and emotional abuse, and from harassing, without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or
annoying, contacting, or communicating with petitioner Mercado, such directive prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve
can hardly be construed to extend to public respondents in their act of the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of
dispensing the functions of their office. the lower court or agency. x x x.” In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to
the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of
There is absolutely nothing that precludes public respondents from exercising a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for
their respective jurisdictions over the complaints or cases filed before them; prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
anything less would be tantamount to an abdication of their public offices. court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
Further, neither does the issuance of the PPO prevent private respondents from proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
seeking redress from the courts for any alleged offense committed by the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
petitioners against them. an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
All told, as correctly submitted by both private and public respondents in their subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
respective Comments, in taking cognizance of the subject cases, public motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
respondents were merely fulfilling their respective duties in the administration of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
of justice. This, the Court finds, does not amount to abuse of discretion, much case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
less a grave one. Hence, the dismissal of the Petition must follow. the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
merit. raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 217126-27, Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
November 10, 2015 raised at any stage of the proceedings.—Albeit raised for the first time by the
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A common Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue
requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken on the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court
of and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be preliminarily which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main C.A.- findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase
G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all “application for remedy” or the word “findings” refers to; and (2) it does not
subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the
Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, as same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the
he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Ombudsman’s Memorandum. That being said, the Court perceives no
reasonable objection against ruling on this issue. Same; Statutory Construction; In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
Ombudsman Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the
is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court [SC]) from issuing law.—As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning.
the Ombudsman.—The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to
against any court (except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted, albeit not
to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. controlling in the interpretation of the law.
Generally speaking, “injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby
a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main Same; Same; As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.” (RA) No. 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the
Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension of an Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the
action while the main case remains pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of remedy” against the same.—As a
in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range
consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal
no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of
matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the remedy” (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the
Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials phrase “application for remedy,” being a generally worded provision, and being
of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the separated from the term “appeal” by the disjunctive “or,” refers to any remedy
exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by understood in a general sense. By the same principle, the word “findings,” which
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if is also separated from the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would
warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or provisional), except a decision. The subject provision, however, crafts an
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of
Sandiganbayan. Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against “the decision
or findings of the Ombudsman,” a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the
Same; The second paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 provides only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on “pure questions of law,” whether
that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court (SC) on
pure questions of law.—On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, Doctrine of Non-Interference; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the
Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman.—Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. When a court has subject
and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court
upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called
alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” judicial power.
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule
45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme
errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally Court (SC) and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the
vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also “totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and
increased this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it decides a case.”—Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other
gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth courts established by law, has been defined as the “totality of powers a court
paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above cited), which was invalidated in the exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.” Under
case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998). Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes “the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
Same; Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
constitutionally vested unto the courts.—The concept of Ombudsman of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical Same; While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be exempt from an incident of promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
judicial power — that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the
suspension order — clearly strays from the concept’s rationale of insulating the Supreme Court (SC).—Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s
office from political harassment or pressure. exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court.
Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari; The Court of Appeals’ In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
(CA’s) certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also concurrent with the exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911), the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) (under Section 21[1], Chapter II of Batas Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject
Pambansa [BP] Blg. 129), and the Supreme Court (SC) (under Section 5, Article matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the
courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
courts should be followed.—Note that the CA’s certiorari jurisdiction, as above cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
(under Section 21[1], Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the matter.” While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
concurrence of these courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma, 172 to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
SCRA 415 (1989), the doctrine was explained as follows: [T]his concurrence of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the exclusively to this Court.
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction; It is well-
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the preliminary injunction (WPI), whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.—A temporary
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute
temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject
the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision,
heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court
substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and
act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of
hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a
sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted Same; Judicial Power; To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated
by the interim acts of the parties. by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly promulgated rules of
procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute.—It should
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) rules that when Congress passed be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
the first paragraph of Section 14, Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 and, in so doing, injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only
took away from the courts their power to issue a Temporary Restraining Order undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to enjoin an investigation court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon the Court’s constitutional easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is
rule-making authority.—With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired
when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory.
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution,
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this cannot be enervated due to a court’s inability to regulate what occurs during a
Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, proceeding’s course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject
by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof
the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the should be unclipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated
province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly promulgated rules of
regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be
right since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should
right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its
litigation. sole prerogative over the same.

Political Law; Separation of Powers; When Congress creates a court and delimits Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; A preventive suspension order is
its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by not a penalty but only a preventive measure.—By nature, a preventive
the Court through the rules it promulgates.—That Congress has been vested suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v.
with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277 (2005), the Court explained the
various courts under Section 2, Article VIII, supra, as well as to create statutory distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended
courts under Section 1, Article VIII, supra, does not result in an abnegation of from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
the Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
under Section 5(5), Article VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these prosecution of the case against him: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut
powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions,
and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent corruption.” Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants
the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his under the regime of a dictator,the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy.
vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or be accountable to the people at all times: Section 1. Public office is a public trust.
dismissed. This is the penalty. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act
Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an SCRA 1 (2013), it was explained that: [t]he aphorism forged under Section 1,
investigation.—The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “public office is a public
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an trust,” is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government
investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of
following circumstances coexist with the first requirement: (a) The charge the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people’s trust. The
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x. (Emphasis supplied) The
performance of duty; (b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of
or (c) The respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed the Civil Service Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical
against him. Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking, condonation has Same; Same; For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline,
been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.”—Generally of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code
speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on
forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had January 1, 1992.—For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
been no offense.” The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in
of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government
not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from Code of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect
the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 on January 1, 1992: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action.—An elective
(Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution. local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of
the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b)
Same; Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in
554 SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense
apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prisió n mayor;
disenfranchise.—The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g)
disenfranchise. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status
of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be
Civil Service; Public Officers; The 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified provided in this Code and other laws. An elective local official may be removed
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
officers to be accountable to the people at all times.—After the turbulent
decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the Same; Same; Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) states that
1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be
Policies in Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the disqualified from running for any elective local position.—Related to this
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and provision is Section 40(b) of the LGC which states that those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local
any elective local position: Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. Thus, at
are disqualified from running for any elective local position: x x x x (b) Those all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is
removed from office as a result of an administrative case. condoned.—At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is actually official’s prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for reelection.
bereft of legal bases.—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of This treatment is similar to People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55 Cal. App.
dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), and Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40
disqualification from holding public office: Section 52. Administrative S.W.2d 418 [1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer
Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The penalty of dismissal shall cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However,
carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local
perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. Thus, at
civil service examinations. In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is
penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local condoned.
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) abandonment of the
pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that
Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
by the fact of reelection: Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x. x x x x reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.—This Court
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from
shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Reading the 1987 rendered obsolete by — the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time
Constitution together with the above cited legal provisions now leads this Court for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from
to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo v.
bases. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996),
Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999), and Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,
Same; Same; Same; Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative 586 SCRA 799 (2009), which were all relied upon by the CA. It should, however,
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
a prior term.—The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, 618 SCRA 639
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term (2010): Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different them.
term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to administrative offenses. jurisdiction.—It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of Same; Same; Same; In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. It has subject of discussion moot.—The defense of condonation has been consistently
also been held that “grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.” against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court
that “for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the
Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; The Supreme Court (SC) Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground
deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its alleged misconduct — involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct — were placed beyond the reach of
doctrine.—This Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.” Evidently, this
regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not
does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its evade review. In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the
abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and
“‘the moot and academic principle’ is not a magical formula that can may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution,
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; discussion moot.
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; Loloy Unduran, et. al. v. Ramon Aberasturi, et. al., G.R. No. 18124, October
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.” 20, 2015
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus
Same; Same; Same; It would be a violation of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) own standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the question.—Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice
condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent.—It would on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the “real parties-
be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it in-interest” rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of
were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2, Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules
become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the of Procedure before the NCIP. That petitioners are the real parties-in-interest
condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the Case to
Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP filed by the NCIP Special Transition
that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged
therein that the respondents’ complaint for recovery of ownership (accion
Same; Same; Same; The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in
creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of
administrative liability.—The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-
creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous
administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation,
doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional petitioners presented a certification that the disputed land is within the area
character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig
has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.
the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners’
that paramount public interest is involved. claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents’
contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is without however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
merit. have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The nature of an action, as well as which court or body participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled petition with the NCIP. On the matter of NCIP’s jurisdiction and of procedures
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.—In resolving the for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the
pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1
respondents’ amended complaint, foremost in the Court’s mind is the principle states: Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.—All conflicts related to the
in “that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is disputed ancestral domain or land is located. All conflicts related to the
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. All decisions of the NCIP may be
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.
asserted therein.”
Same; Same; Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; A careful review of Section 66
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Regional Trial Courts; Under Section 19 of Batas shows that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) only when they arise between or
civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.—A careful review of Section 66
estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to
interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that “no
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
Pesos (P50,000.00).—Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification
Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive original shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt
jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.” The
of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be
property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the
rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict
Indigenous Cultural Communities; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
Jurisdiction; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), through customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be
its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized
rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).— human rights.
The NCIP’s jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows: Sec.
66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples’
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, Rights Act (IPRA) defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an
accepted and observed by respective Indigenous Cultural administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs).—Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III,
customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and void
and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA
by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As
is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the above the Court held in Padunan v. DARAB, 396 SCRA 196 (2003), “[j]urisdiction over
said two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of
different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as
customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the above a matter of law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
said two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.” In the above said
member who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to
nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly
fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by the Council of
ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute
according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; When such claims and disputes arise between
or among parties who do not belong to the same Indigenous Cultural
Community/Indigenous People (ICC/IP), i.e., parties belonging to different
ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).—Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP
shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only
when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When Re Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, A.M. No. 12-8-07-
such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to CA
the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the Executive Department; Longevity Pay; Salaries; Longevity pay under Section 42
parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 is treated as part of salary and extended to
Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners certain officials in the Executive Department who are, by law, granted the same
belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary.—Herein ponente had already
even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located thoroughly and extensively discussed in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 the bases for her position — now adopted
RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case. There are, by the Court — that longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over is treated as part of salary and extended to certain officials in the Executive
such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same Department who are, by law, granted the same salary as their counterparts in
ICC/IP. the Judiciary.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the Same; Same; Same; It was Congress which enacted Republic Act (RA) Nos. 9417,
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act-Implementing Rules and Regulations (IPRA- 9347, and 10071, granting certain officials of the Executive Department the
IRR), Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the National same salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary, and “salary” refers
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Rules as null and void insofar as they to basic monthly pay plus longevity pay per the plain language of Section 42 of
expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129.—Clearly, the foregoing ratiocination does not
disputes where the parties do not belong to the same Indigenous Cultural constitute judicial legislation. It is firmly grounded on existing laws,
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).—Considering the general rule that jurisprudence, and executive contemporaneous construction. It was Congress
the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes which enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, granting certain
and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their officials of the Executive Department the same salary as their respective
counterparts in the Judiciary, and “salary” refers to basic monthly pay plus Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a
longevity pay per the plain language of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. prohibition by statute, the tax power of municipal corporations must be deemed
Justice Brion opines that the grant of longevity pay to executive officials would to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.
effectively be a misplaced exercise of liberality at the expense of public funds
and to the prejudice of sectors who are more in need of these funds. It bears to In conformity to the dictate of the fundamental law for the legislature to enact a
stress though that it is irrefragably within the legislative power of Congress to local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
enact Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, and it is beyond the judicial accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
power of the Court to question the wisdom behind said legislations. decentralization, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, Congress
enacted the LGC, Book II of which governs local taxation and fiscal matters and
Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, GR No. sets forth the guidelines and limitations for the exercise of this power.
203754, October 15, 2019
It is provided under the LGC that “all revenue collected pursuant to the
ISSUE: W/N RA 9167 is unconstitutional provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the
disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless
RULING: otherwise specifically provided by the LGC”

RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy It is in the application of the adverted fourth rule, upon which the present
controversy grew.
The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty,
belongs, as a matter of right, to every independent government, and needs no CASE AT BAR:
express conferment by the people before it can be exercised. It is purely
legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated to the executive and judicial branches The City of Cebu had the authority to issue its City Ordinance No. LXIX and
of government without running afoul to the theory of separation of powers. impose an amusement tax on cinemas pursuant to Sec. 140 in relation to Sec.
151 of the LGC.
It, however, can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the
principle that legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in Sec. 140 states, among other things, that a "province may levy an amusement
respect of matters of local concern. The authority of provinces, cities, and tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
municipalities to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at
therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent that such a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from
power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. admission fees."

Fiscal autonomy was defined as the power of LGU: By operation of said Sec. 151, which extended the authority of provinces and
 to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable municipalities to levy certain taxes, fees, and charges to cities, respondent city
share in the national taxes released by the national government, government, may therefore validly levy amusement taxes subject to the
 as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their parameters set forth under the law.
own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in tum have to work within the constraints thereof." However, pursuant to the amendment by RA 9167, the present rule is that
 ALL amusement taxes levied by covered cities and municipalities shall be given
The 1973 Constitution gave LGUs the "power to create its own sources of by proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres and cinemas to FDCP, which
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by shall then reward said amount to the producers of graded films.
law.'' This authority was further strengthened in the 1987 Constitution, through
the inclusion in Section 5, Article X thereof of the condition that "such taxes, In other words, per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to levy
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to local governments." amusement taxes, albeit at the end of the day, they will derive no revenue
therefrom.
Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
Congress did in this instance was not to exclude the authority to levy part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand-and be
amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if enforced. The exception to this is when the parts of a statute are so mutually
not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, in which case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the
This, to Our mind, is in clear contravention of the constitutional command rest.
that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is
repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with Here, the constitutionality of the rest of the provisions of RA 9167 was
their priorities. never put in question. Too, nowhere in the assailed judgment of the RTC
was it explicated why the entire law was being declared as
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress, broad as unconstitutional.
they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of the Constitution.
Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its power to enact, amend, and It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case, which
repeal laws, it should do so without going beyond the parameters wrought by the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional. This
the organic law. being the case, and in view of the elementary rule that every statute is
presumed valid, the declaration by the R TC, Branch 5 of the entirety of RA
In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is improper.
9167, the income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not
and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not even partially, despite being Amounts paid by Colon Heritage need not be returned (Doctrine of
the taxing authority therefor. Operative Fact)

Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its plenary legislative power, the It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
amendment being violative of the fundamental law's guarantee on local rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
autonomy. inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.

Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the entire RA 9167 as unconstitutional Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the return of all
the amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers of graded films, by all
Noticeably, the RTC, Branch 5, in its September 25, 2012 Decision in Colon of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of millions, if not
Heritage v. FDCP, ruled against the constitutionality of the entire law, not just billions.
the assailed Sec. 14.
An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact,
In this regard, it is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of the which applies as a matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the
law is free from the taint of unconstitutionality, then it should remain in effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the
force and effect if said law contains a separability clause. existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It
A separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is on those who have relied on the invalid law.
not, however, controlling and the courts, in spite of it, may invalidate the
whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and IN SUM:
workable.  The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a
legal provision prior its being declared as unconstitutional and
Moreover, a perusal of RA 9167 easily reveals that even with the removal legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of
of Secs. 13 and 14 of the law, the remaining provisions can survive. considerations of practicality and fairness.
  In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision in ruling on the merits of the original Decision or of the subsequent Resolution.
which was just recently declared as unconstitutional by the At that point, only Justices Peralta and Bersamin were left because all the other
Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be Members of the original ruling groups had retired. Since under the IRSC and
highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who Section 4(3), Article VIII of the Constitution, the case should have been decided
have relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was by the Members who actually took part in the deliberations, the ruling on the
struck down. merits made by the ruling Division on September 7, 2011 was effectively void
and should appropriately be recalled.
CASE AT BAR:
Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already Statutory Construction; The general rule on statutory interpretation is that
received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, as a
provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts received to the respective taxing statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial whenever possible.—The general rule on statutory interpretation is that
burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, as a
the legislative fiat subject of this case. For these reasons, We are of the statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
considered view that the application of the doctrine of operative facts in the whenever possible. Only after the failure at this attempt at reconciliation should
case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having complied with the one provision be considered the applicable provision as against the other.
legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers of graded films who have
already received their tax cut prior to this Decision for having produced top- Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
quality films. (IRSC); Section 3, Rule 8 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) is the
general rule on inhibition, but it must yield to the more specific Section 7, Rule 2
In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13 and of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) where the obtaining situation
14 of RA 9167: is for the review on the merits of an already issued decision or resolution and
1. All amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of the the ponente or writer is no longer available to act on the matter.—Section 3,
finality of this decision shall remain legal and valid under the operative fact Rule 8 of the IRSC is the general rule on inhibition, but it must yield to the more
doctrine. specific Section 7, Rule 2 of the IRSC where the obtaining situation is for the
2. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this review on the merits of an already issued decision or resolution and the
decision shall be remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of ponente or writer is no longer available to act on the matter. On this basis, the
finality. ponente, on the merits of the case on review, should be chosen from the
3. Thereafter, amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be remaining participating Justices, namely, Justices Peralta and Bersamin.
remitted to the local governments.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any clear personal malicious participation,
Flight Attendants v. PAL, GR No. 178083, March 13, 2018 it is neither correct nor proper to hold the Chief Justice personally accountable
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Nominal for the collegial ruling of the Court en banc.—A final point that needs to be fully
Ponente; Raffle of Cases; Since the inhibiting Justice was only the Member-in- clarified at this juncture, in light of the allegations of the Dissent is the role of
Charge and was technically merely a nominal ponente in so far as the case is the Chief Justice in the recall of the September 7, 2011 Resolution. As can be
concerned (because he was not the writer of the Decision and Resolution under seen from the above narration, the Chief Justice acted only on the
consideration), the raffle should have been confined among the Members who recommendation of the ruling Division, since he had inhibited himself from
actually participated in ruling on the merits of the original Decision or of the participation in the case long before. The confusion on this matter could have
subsequent Resolution.—With Justice Velasco’s subsequent inhibition, a legal been brought about by the Chief Justice’s role as the Presiding Officer of the
reason that the involved officials and Justices should have again recognized is Court en banc (particularly in its meeting of October 4, 2011), and the fact that
the rationale of the rule on replacements when an inhibition or retirement the four most senior Justices of the Court (namely, Justices Corona, Carpio,
intervenes. Since the inhibiting Justice was only the Member-in-Charge and was Velasco and Leonardo-De Castro) inhibited from participating in the case. In the
technically merely a nominal ponente in so far as the case is concerned (because absence of any clear personal malicious participation, it is neither correct nor
he was not the writer of the Decision and Resolution under consideration), the proper to hold the Chief Justice personally accountable for the collegial ruling of
raffle should have been confined among the Members who actually participated the Court en banc.
Same; Same; Same; If no detailed reference to internal Court deliberations is
made in this Resolution, the omission is intentional in view of the prohibition
against the public disclosure of the internal proceedings of the Court during its
deliberations.—As a final word, if no detailed reference to internal Court
deliberations is made in this Resolution, the omission is intentional in view of
the prohibition against the public disclosure of the internal proceedings of the
Court during its deliberations. The present administrative matter, despite its
pendency, is being ventilated in the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona before
the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court, and any disclosure in this
Resolution could mean the disclosure of the Court’s internal deliberations to
outside parties, contrary to the clear terms of the Court en banc Resolution of
February 14, 2012 on the attendance of witnesses from this Court and the
production of Court records.

the letters or pleadings to merit the Court’s extraordinary or special treatment

in reopening for a third time, a unanimously-agreed upon Decision and to assign
as new ponente, either of the two Justices who had twice agreed with that
Decision. Nothing can be more unconstitutionally deprivatory of the winning
party’s right to enforcement of a final judgment.