APPENDIX B HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEETS

APPENDIX B: HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEETS

Two independent chlorination systems are installed at the Hanford 300-Area Water Treatment Facility. These systems can be operated separately or in parallel. Because they are normally operated separately, this HAZOP study assumes only chlorination system #1 is operating, and that valves G-12, G-1 1, G-10, G-8, G-4, G-3, S-2, and W-4 are closed. The following worksheets document the HAZOP study. The chlorination process was separated into four study nodes. These four nodes are shown on Figure B-1 (1Wdes 2 and 4) and Figure B-2 (Nodes 1, 3, and 4). Nodes 5 and 6 cover the procedures for change-out of chlorine cylinders (see Appendix A). The HAZOP worksheets for the six nodes use HAZOP guide words to determine possible deviations from process design conditions. Causes are describtxi, including positive and negative human factors influences ( +HF for positive influences and HF for negative influences). Consequences of accident scenarios are estimated qualitatively for each process deviation. Protection and mitigating fhctors are described, including positive and negative human factors influences. The action/comment column includes both action items and justifications for no further action.

B-3

*------- ---------------

------- ----------Solution Out

Chlorination Room

:------ .

------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -.-<

Chlorine Cylinder Storage Area ---

(Bidg - - - - - - - - - - 315B)-

-----G-7*

-----G-S*

------

------

G-3

de

-j+i-j I h .=. NO over NO

~ West Cylinder L- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Module ------- -------

East Cylinder ; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --4

I!l.QkS q - Position depends on which chlorinator or cylinder andlor chloine supply line is in-service NO - Normally open NS - Normally shut 39306007. 1A

Figure RI.

Chlorination Process, Study Nodes 2 and 4

B-5

Figure B-2. Chlorination Process, Study Nodes 1, 3, and 4

B-7

HA7CiD U?f)BKS14m

.. -. . .-,-----~LANT/OPERATION

Qmec n-a rmv= w-a

.lNE/VESSEf./NODE: )ESIQN INTENTION

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 1 Transfer C12 Vapor to Rotameter 20-60 lbs/day at 26-inch mercury vacuum at 65F through ambient CAUSE Valve closed (G-1, G-5, G-7, G-9, and G-1 3). . Failed closed. . Inadvertently closed, [ -HF: VdVOO booted dose to
each other I +HF: flOW indicated by vdw POOitiOIV VdVO handlaa dtiarmt.]
diractione

REVIEW

DATE:

DRAWING NO.:

5/1 8193 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2) K. Agee, J. Rude, S. Camp, F. Leverenz, K. Murphy, S. Kanth, D. Ortiz, J, Angyus, P. Pelto, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCEACTION / COMMENTS NARIO 1-1 Sufficient protection.

REVIEW

TEAM:

GUIDE WORD Uo

DEVIATION No
Flow

CONSEQUENCES Decreased Clz residual in water, violates state code (WAC 246-290). (Takes 1-2 hours to occur.)

PROTECTION 1 ) Automatic switch-over if the valves G-1 and G-5 are closed. 2) High vacuum alarm; the operator diagnoses and restores the system if possible.
thrn

If continued undetected, a bacterial problem could Poly line crimped by activity result with illness across (e.g., maintenance) in area. the site (within a day). Screen blocked in regulator on cylinder.

[-HF: many potential ems= for dorm; no procdwa for diagnoeis I + HF: time for diegnoeie N long; rotemetcu flow
irdcatiorr eids di~noeia.]

3) Low C12 residual during surveillance. a) The filter plant is checked every 2 hrs, b) The tour operator checks around the grid (at 12 points/shift).
[HF: oparetor normaify adjuate C12 flow via controller, could try to edjuat for IoW C12 without noticing rotanatar m at no flow I + HF: several chaoke by different operetore before conaaquance occure. ]

Mitigation: Restrict usage of potable water when low C12 is detected, More Less More flow Less flow No causes in this segment. Valves partially closed (same valves as #1-1). Same as #1-1 (no flow), except it would take longer. Same as Protection in #1 -1, 1 ) and 2) (if vacuum from restricted flow is high enough), and 3). 1-2 1-3 Protection sufficient.

q  rwuur wwrmunc= I DACE

,nw&
-,.

R.lr

LANT /OPERATION: lNENESSEL/NODE )ESIGN MENTION

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 1 Transfer C12 Vapor to Rotameter 20-60 lbs/day at 26-inch mercury vacuum at 65F through ambient CAUSE Valve S-1 closed. . Failed closed. . Inadvertently closed,
[-HF: VdVM kxmted CkWD to eech other I + HF: flow direction indiceted by velva position; valve hmdlee different.]

REVIEW DATE: DRAWING NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 8193 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2) K. Agee, J. Rude, S. Camp, F, Leverenz, K. Murphy, S. Kanth, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, P. Pelto, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCEACTION / COMMENTS NARIO Check on possibility of 1-4 backflow past rotameter and respond accordingly by modifying administrative procedures.

GUIDE WORD Jeverse

DEVIATION Reverse flow

CONSEQUENCES

PROTECTION

1 ) Check valve at ejector. Water enters the chlorine vapor system with damage 2) Low vacuum alarm. [-HF: mew potentiel cewes for to equipment and seals and this c&m, no procedure for there is potential for leaks diagnosrnl. later if it is not repaired: 3) Same protection as q In leakage of air when #l-1, 3). operating ejector q Small out leakage of Clz when vacuum from ejector is interrupted; minor irritation if staff present.

More .ess More .ess 4s well 3s

High Temperature Low temperature High pressure Low pressure Air into C12

No causes in this segment. No causes for temperature low enough to cause a problem. No causes in this segment. No causes in this segment. Leak in polyethylene tubing/pipe, valve stem, etc, (Replacement of tubing every two years reduces the likelihood of failure. ) Potential for dissimilar material to thermally expand or contract from temperature extremes.

1-5 1-6

Low Clz for water treatment. If continued undetected, a bacterial problem could result with illness across the site.

Check of Cl? residuals during surveillance may detect. a) The filter plant is checked every 2 hrs. b) The tour operator checks around the grid
[-HF: operetor norrndly edjuets C12 flow via controller, oould try to edjuet for low C12 without noticina rotcrneter lo et nc flew I +HF: several checke by different cperetore before consequence occurs.1

1-7 1-8 1-9

Consider adding procedures that verify the vacuum holds after system shutdown (to be use when tubing is replaced and chlorinators are changed each month).

(at 12 Points/shift).

Mitigation: Restrict usage of potable water when low C12 is detected.

. . ----- . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LANT/OPERATION: lNEAfESSELINODE )ESIQN INTENTION:

r-Mu K D- I I

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 1 Transfer C12 Vapor to Rotameter 20-60 lbs/day at 26-inch mercury vacuum at 65F through ambient CAUSE Leak in polyethylene tubing/pipe, valve stem, etc. (Replacement of tubing every two years reduces the likelihood of failure. ) Potential for dissimilar material to thermally expand or contract from temperature extremes. Leak in system after replacement of tubing.
[-HF: no procedure written for
replacement of tubing, or system integrity verification after replacement.]

REVIEW DATE DRAWINQ NO,:

511 8/93 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2)

REVIEW TEAM:

K. Agee, J. Rude, S. Camp, F. Leverenz, K. Murphy, S. Kanth, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, P. Pelto, J, Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTION / COMMENTS Minor consequences.

GUIDE DEVIATION WORD 4s well Air into C12 IS (cont. )

CONSEQUENCES Potential for damage to seals/corrosion from HCI forming due to moisture in air, Same as #1-40

PROTECTION Operator to check rotameter every 2 hrs. Can visually detect air, if familiar with its appearance. Vacuum gage on chlorinator may show decrease in vacuum.
[-HF: these require oparetor with enough experience to recognize q ornewhat subtle indicetimc; q novice not likely to detect. I

1-1o

Same as #l-9 and #l-IO.

Same as #l-9 and #1-10.

1-11

Same as #l-9 and #1-10.

Part of

No meaningful deviations

-.

avne

..--,..

WnDueum ,

PAGE B-1:
. ----

.-

lLANT/OPERATION: ,lNE/VESSEL/NOOE: )ESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 1 Transfer Clz Vapor to Rotameter 20-60 lbs/day at 26-inch mercury vacuum at 65F through ambient CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

-IEW

DATE

DRAWING NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 8193 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2) K. Agee, J. Rude, S. Camp, F. Leverenz, K. Murphy, S. Kanth, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, P, Pelto, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO 1-12 ACTION / COMMENTS Low likelihood.

GUIDE WORD )ther :han

DEVIATION

PROTECTION 1 ) Low vacuum alarm, may have Clz alarm; the operator diagnoses and switches to alternate supply.
[HF: mmy potential causaa for dim d.srrt; no Wocadurea for diagnok

Air into ejector Line break (either poly break Loss of Cl to water treatment i see #1-1 ). or schedule-80 steel break inside or outside of building). Maintenance activity could be the cause of failure, especially poly.

Cl release (up to 3/8-inch re t ease). Potential for injuries and fatalities near 315 Building and neighboring buildings.

2) Cl residual checks (See #7-1, Protection 3). Regulator shuts off on loss of vacuum. F%?lel%%;d? emergency response (alarm designed for leaks inside building). Chlorinator trouble alarm (31 5 common alarm) with tour operator response.

1-13

Low likelihood. Cause and sufficient protection. Verify that the adjacent buildings have received information on chlorine in their HAZCOM program.

Hawd and Operability Study Workahaat

HAZOP WORXSHEET

PAGE B-13

LANT/OPERATION: fNfE/VSSSEL/NODE MESfGN INTSNTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process

REVIEW DATE: DRAWING NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9193 Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figure B-1 ) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J, Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen

Node 2
Storage cylinder provides Cl gas to regulator at 65F to ambient, approximately 75 psig to 15~ psig (at 11 OF); 20-60 Ibs CIZ/day.

GUIDE WORD
40

DEVIATION
No Cl provlJed

CAUSE
Tank is empty. Tank valve is closed. Internal tank tubes are pluggedldefective

CONSEQUENCES
Same as #l-1. Same as #l-1. Same as #l-1.

PROTECTION Same as #1-1 and weight check. Same as #l-1. Same as #l-1.

SCENARIO 2-1 2-2 2-3

ACTIONS/COMMENTS Same as #l-1. Same as #l-l. Same as #l-1.

(blocked).
More .ess More Cl provide d Less C12 provided No causes. Valve partially closed
[HF: vdva doa not readily indicate

More

High temperature

Unount open.] Internal tank tubes partially c C u r plugged. Heater fails on during If the temperature is greater than 160 F, the fusible link summer heat. may release resulting in a Clz release. Potential for injuries and fatalities near the 315 Building and neighboring buildings.

Same as #2-2 and 2-3 except takes longer to

Same as #2-2 and 2-3.

2-4

Same as #2-2 and 2-3.

Tour operator notices high temperature in room during 2-hour check. [ + HF: operntor woukf likely note
temperature of 160 F in building.]

2-5

Mitigation: Same as #1 -13; cylinder repair kit to reduce size of release.

Calculate temperature based on heat input versus heat loss for this scenario. Base further recommendation items on the results,

HAZOP WORKSHEET

PAGE B-14

PLANT/OPERATION
LINEMESSEUNODE DESIGN WKNTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process

WIEW DATE:

5/1 9193 Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figure B-1 ) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO 2-6 ACTIONS / COMMENTS Fire is very unlikely.

Node 2 DRAWINQ NO.: Storage cylinder provides Cl gas to regulator at 65F to ambient, REVIEW TEAM: approximately 75 psig to 156 psig (at 11 OF); 20-60 lbs C12/day. CAUSE Fire CONSEQUENCES If fusible plug(s) work, None. release will occur via plug, If not, a BLEVE could result,

GUIDE WORD More [cont.)

DEVIATION

PROTECTION

Less

Low temperature High Pressure

More

The following reduces the likelihood of a fire: q Internal fire: no Same as #2-5. combustible or flammable materials are stored in the building, q External fire: there are no likely fire sources. q Housekeeping procedures are used to prevent combustible or flammable materials from entering the building. Heater fails in the Potential reduction in C12 feed rate; no significant winter/cold weather, consequence, Unknown Cylinder is received overfilled.

2-7

Minor consequences.

Check cylinder weight against the weight of a properly filled chlorine cylinder.
[-HF: prooeduro requiree operetor to zero - weight for new cylinder; mey not notice overweight.]

2-8

Check pressure potential from chlorine cylinder and the system (regulator) response. Determine whether the fusible plug will open with high pressure.

.ess

Low pressure

As well 3s

Other material added

Covered under low temperature (#2-7); no additional causes related to hazards. C12 contaminated.

2-9

Unknown

2-1o

Check with vendor regarding possible contamination material for scenarios 2-10 and 2-11. Take appropriate recommendation/action.

HAZOP WORKSHEET

PAGE B-1 5

PLANT / OPERATION: LINE/VESSEL /NODE DESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 2 Storage cylinder provides Cl gas to regulator at 65F to ambient, approximately 75 psig to 156 psig (at 11 OF); 20-60 Ibs CIZ/day. CAUSE Cylinder contains something other than chlorine (e. g., sulfur dioxide uses same size container), CONSEQUENCES Unknown

REVIEW DATE l) RAWIN(l NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9193 Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figure B-1 ) F, Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J, Angyus, R, Hansen SCENARIO 2-11 ACTIONS/COMMENTS See above.

GUIDE WORD Other than

DEVIATION Another material loaded

PROTECTION

Part of

No meaningful deviations

Hazard and Operability Study Worksheet

., ---- . . . .

.-------

VAUE D - l i

LANT/OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESIQN INTENTIoN

Water Treatment Facility/Chlorination Process Node 3 Provide Cl from storage cylinder to vacuum line at 25 inches of Hg at 65/ to ambient with 20-60 lb./day. CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

REVIEW DATE: DRAWlN(3 NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9193 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2) F. Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S, Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, Joe Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO 3-1 ACTIONS / COMMENTS Consider #1 -9 recommendation; would need to close the C12 cylinder block valve. The cause seems to have a low likelihood. The vendor should be contacted to determine the failure experience (corrosion, water, etc. ). If cause seems more likely after investigation, controls such as remote shutoff at Cl cylinder (and power t ad-safe] should be considered. Same as #2-4.

GUIDE WORD 40

DEVIATION No flow

PROTECTION Same as #1-9.

Wore

More flow

Broken diaphragm, stuck Loss of C12 flow (same as open relief valve, or leak in #1-12). vacuum side of regulator occurs. Release of Clz through the Regulator fails open. relief valve and vent (same as #1-13). Potential for injuries/fatalities near the 315 Building and neighboring buildings.

None.

3-2

ll~?~e~$i%;d?a emergency response (alarm designed for leaks inside building). Chlorinator trouble alarm (31 5 common alarm) with tour operator response. Same as #2-4 . 3-3 3-4

.ess ~everse

Low flow Reverse flow

Regulator doesnt open far Same as #2-4, enough. No causes in this segment.

More .ess More Low Part of

High temperature Low temperature High pressure Low pressure No meaningful deviation this segment

No causes this segment, No causes this segment. No additional causes (see 3-2). No additional causes (see 3-3).

3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-9

.. -. .

.-.-----

,nv& -,,

PLANT/OPERATIOM UNE/VESSEL/NODE DESIGN INTENTION

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 3 Provide Cl from storage cylinder to vacuum line at 25 inches of Hg at 65# to ambient with 20-60 lb./day. CAUSE Sand, water, bugs, dust, etc. CONSEQUENCES

REVtEW OATE
DRAWINQ NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9193 Automatic Gas Feed System (Figure B-2) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J, Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. ORiz, Joe Angyus, R, Hansen SCENARIO 3-10 ACTIONS /COMMENTS Verify that the screen is in place.

GUIDE WORD As well as

DEVIATION Material in the atmospheric side of the regulator

PROTECTION

Vent screen will protect Blocked vent line; if an over-pressure event occurs somewhat (same as xl-13). (3-2) the vacuum line could become over-pressured; the vacuum line may not hold under pressure (same as #1-13).

Hazard ad oPambilii Study Workshwt

-. WORKSHEET ----- .-. . LANT/OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESfGN INTENTION:

rnuc

0- I

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 4 Provide Cl to ejector at 25 inches of Hg, vacuum, 20-60 lb/$ay, 65F to ambient CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

~iEW OATE
ORAWINQ NO.: REVIEW TEAM

5/1 9/93 Automatic Gas Feed System and Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figures B-1 and B-2) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, Joe Angyus, R. Hansen SCEACTIONS/COMMENTS NARIO 4-1 Protection sufficient,

GUIDE WORD do

DEVIATION No flow

PROTECTION Same as #l-1.

Motor-controlled rate valve Same as #l-1. closed. . Failed closed. q Operator closes rate control valve inadvertently. [+ HF: up/down key pad with
diiitd readout diiplay of pocition.]

Ejector check valve failed closed. More More flow Valves plugged by dirt. Rotameter opened too far. . Rate valve opened too far. q ample or
[-HF: pasibks wror in rcsidud Ca!cukaon I +HF: up/down. key pad with ~i readout dmplsy of

Objectionable tasteslvapors in the water.

1 ) Operator checks visual flow on rotameter at tank. I -HF: operator uoucliy relbo on
dwitd m not likely uoad to ucing rotarrwtw flow indication.]

4-2

Minor consequence.

podtion.1 . Manual rate valve also opened. I -HF: confrmion of which

control to UCO.)
q

2) Surveillance of residuals (see Protection 3) for #1-1.

Operator does not reset to a lower value when the demand decreases.
[HF: operators depend on memory to cornc4ete actions.1

PLC controller fails.

.- . . . - w.nn .-. . . m -.. .. .. -. . . .

m-----

-----.. ,.= rrsu~

w .. a . D-LV

LANT /OPERATION: JNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 4 Provide Cl to ejector at 25 inches of Hg, vacuum, 20-60 lb/~ay, 65F to ambient CAUSE Plugged ejector. Rota meter closed too much, q Rate valve not opened enough.
[-HF: ponible WTOr m raidud sarnph or cdoufation I +HF: up/down key pod with d~d readout display of pocitionl.
q

REVIEW DATE
DRAWINQ NO.:

=IEW TEAM:

5/1 9193 Automatic Gas Feed System and Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figures B-1 and B-2) F. Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Oniz, Joe Angyus, R. Hansen SCEACTIONS /COMMENTS NARIO 4-3 Sufficient protection.

GUIDE WORD -ess

DEVIATION Less flow

CONSEQUENCES Same as #1-3.

PROTECTION Same as #l -3.

Operator does not reset to a higher value when the demand increases.
[-HF: opaatom depend on tWmWV t. cornpleto aotiorw. I

More/less High or low pressure

q PLC controller fails. Differential pressure regulator.

Unknown

4-4

How the differential pressure regulator operates is unknown. The valves operation should be checked and the potential for a pressure deviation should be assessed.

. ----- . . . . . . . . -----

HA7nP WnRKS4CCT

DACC R.71 ,-W.--,

LANT/OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE IESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 4 Provide Cl to ejector at 25 inches of Hg, vacuum, 20-60 lb/~ay, 65F to ambient CAUSE Chlorinator heater fails on in summer, CONSEQUENCES Possible water pipe rupture if the temperature exceeds the PVCs strength, Small chlorine release (no health effects expected),

REVIEW DATE DRAWN(3 NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9/93 Automatic Gas Feed System and Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figures B-1 and B-2) F, Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D, Ortiz, Joe Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO 4-5 ACTIONS/COMMENTS Minor consequences.

GUIDE WORD dore

DEVIATION High temperature

PROTECTION None.

PLC operational limits. The Same as #l-2 and #1 -3. PLC could malfunction if temperature is too high (see less/more flow scenario, #l-2 and #l-3).

4-6

(PLC operating range: 14 F-122 F,) Protection sufficient (#1 -3) and minor consequences (#1 -2).

-ess

Low temperature

Heater fails during cold weather [winter).

Out-of-service water pipe The operators 2-hour check breaks (water freezes in the of the facility. [-HF: operator may not note line].
crackdbroken line while it N *ill frozen I + HF: operator will likely note tarnpersture of Lddhg m low.]

4-7

Minor consequences.

Safety shower and eye wash freezes. There is potential for more serious injury if an incident occurs during unavailability. art of 4s well 3s No meaningful deviation Air into chlorine vacuum line 1 I--- ---- z*neverse now

Safety shower and eye wash lines are heat traced.

4-8

Low likelihood that an incident occurs the same time freezing occurs.

-..~everse

Leak in the line/fittings: potential for dissimilar material to thermally expand or contract from temperature extremes. . , 3 . .. --.4 1 Areaay coverea r I -4.

Same as #l-9 and #1-10.

Operator check of chlorine residuals, (Same as Protection 3 of #1 -1).

4-9

Same as #l-9 and #1-10.

A-fn Y-IV

C.-. . . U4 A I CJtzlll= a> w l--r,

-r..lIn. .. ,

r -G -c. &

LANT/OPERATION: ,ME/VESSEL/NOOE: )ESION INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Chlorination Process Node 4 Provide Cl to ejector at 25 inches of Hg, vacuum, 20-60 lb/~ay, 65F to ambient CAUSE Line break in vacuum line. Chlorine tank failure (e.g., structural flaw). CONSEQUENCES Same as $1-12. Release of contents. Potential for injury and fatalities of staff in the surrounding area.

REVIEW DATE: DRAWINQ NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/1 9/93 Automatic Gas Feed System and Chlorination Process Flow Diagram (Figures B-1 and B-2) F, Leverenz, S, Camp, J, Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, Joe Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO 4-11 4-12 ACTIONS / COMMENTS Same as #1-12. Low likelihood.

GUIDE WORD 3ther :han ~one

DEVIATION Air only into injector No level

PROTECTION Same as #1-12. None, %%l$Ze~5&li;ca emergency response (alarm designed for leaks inside building), Chlorinator trouble alarm (31 5 common alarm) with tour operator response. Regulator safety valve, Mitigation: (Same as #4-12).

Uo

Loss of utility (off-site power)

Loss of electric power; water pumps discontinue operating. (Loss of vacuum to chlorinator).

Clz is release through the vent, Clz contacts back flow preventers with potential damage to equipment. Up to 3/8-inch leak with potential for injuries and fatalities near 315 Building and neighboring buildings.

4-13

Note: the detector has battery backup and an alarm on standby power, Verify that the monthly PM includes checking the backup battery for the chlorine alarm. Note: there are plans to put water pumps on standby power, which will make this cause less likely,

{~Zd and oPembi~i $t@ Worksheet

,--0

.., .m, ,t. k ,

rmuc

D-za

LANT/OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE
DRAWING NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

iuide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20193 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J, Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D, Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

PROTECTION

(1) Notify the 3B4 Powerhouse and the Hanford Fire Department that the chlorine cylinder change-out is in progress. 40 Skip step Supervisor does not notify. May increase response timelreadiness of personnel because of no advanced warning. False response upon disconnect of regulator resulting in C12 alarm (Step 1 1)0 None, 5-1 Minor consequences.

(2) Start the 3 15B Building vent fan and operate it for 3 minutes before entering. Maintain the vent fan continuously. ~olless Skip step. (Operate less than 3 min. ) The C12 plant operator does not start the fan, Possible exposure if a leak exists and the detector failed, Possible irritation with low likelihood of injury. (3) Enter through the walk-through door. No meaningful deviation 5-3 Detector malfunction alarm alerts operator that detector has failed.
[HF: operator may proceed md assume no C12 is presmt.]

5-2

Low likelihood.

HAZOP WORKSHEET LANT/OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESIGN INTENTION:

PAGE B-24

Water Treatment Facilitv / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

mvlEW

DATE

DRAWING NO.:

REvlEW TEAM:

;uide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

PROTECTION

(4) Identify the empty cylinder by its weight, and verify the indication of no flow on the cylinder regulator. ;kip step 32 plant operator does not :heck cylinder weight and or indication of no flow. f the wrong cylinder is ielected, there is loss of C12 o the chlorinator (same as !1-1).

1) At Step 5 an alarm is
received on loss of vacuum.
[HF: may acsurrm this is q nornul durn for &mg*cut of Cyfindu.1

5-4

diner consequences.

2) Hoisting and rigging crew notices that tank is heavier than normal.
[+HF: orew m expariencad in chamgeart of CyklldW.]

31 At Step 9 alarm does not clear.

[-HF: reverse - indioaion N
More

lift+ to b nlidntupretad. I

lelease of contents of full :ylinder at Step 11.

njury/potential fatality of the plant operator. Injury/fatality potential in ~earby buildings.

1 ) At Step 5 cylinder valve is closed. 2) At Step 8 the chlorinator flow is checked. Actuated alarm has been checked. 3) At Step 11 plant operator checks for leaks when removing regulator
[-HF: thm step requira judgsrrmnt on how to remove to detect th- tank N still ofm.1

5-5

rotection sufficient.

Mitigation: personal protective equipment. Mitigation: observer radios HAZMAT team; emergency response initiated.

14 A7nD . . . . . . ..- . ., ---, . . Mlnuucl.lccf ~LANT/OPERATION: .lNE/VESSEL/NODE:

DACF R-7!i . --- - -.

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE: DRAWING NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

)ESIQN INTENTION:

Suide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F, Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS /COMMENTS

PROTECTION

(5) Close the engle (root) valve on the chlorine cylinder. Vo Skip step Clz plant operator does not close the valve. Release of the remaining cylinder contents at Step 11. Injury to plant operator. Mitigation: personnel protective equipment. Injury to staff in nearby buildings. Lesser consequence than #5-6. Injury to plant operator. Same as #5-6. Mitigation: observer radios hazmat team; emergency response initiated. At Step 11 check for leaks at disconnect.
[HF:
q

1 ) Step 8 chlorinator flow checkedlalarm actuated. 2) Step 11 slowly disconnect regulator and check for leaks.

5-6

Sufficient protection.

Less

Valve partially closed.

Plant operator does not close the valve completely.

[HF: vdvo provides no indication of position.]

5-7

Sufficient protection.

MW as X5-5, 3).1

Reverse

Valve opened all the way

Plant operator opens rather than closes the valve. [ HF: valve provides no indication of
position, and full open feels like full Chad.]

Mitigation: Personal protection equipment. Same as #5-6.

5-8

Sufficient protection.

(6) Isolate the automatic switch-over valve. (Close valves G5, G6, and G9). No Skip step Plant operator skips step. At Step 11 when disconnect slightly larger release of Clz. Minor irritation. At Step 8, flow/vacuum alarm check. 5-9 Sufficient protection.

-.

....

rmukz

D-AU

JLANT/OPERATION: .lNE/VESSEL/NODE )ESIGN INTENTION

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE:
DRAWINQ NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

3uide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5120/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S, Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

PROTECTION

(7) Verify that valves G8 and G4 are closed. Vo Skip step PIant operator skips this step. No consequences. 5-1o No consequences.

(8) Verify that valve G1 is open, and open valve G3. Wait 2 minutes and verify that there is no flow at the chlorinator in service. Verify that the high-vacuum alarm is actuated. Uo Skips step Plant operator skips this step. Same as #5-9. 1 ) Slow disconnect and leak check at Step 11.
[-HF: sea #5-5, 3).1

5-11

Sufficient protection.

.ess

Less time

Plant operator proceeds without waiting 2 min.

Lesser consequence than #5-n,

Mitigation: personal protective equipment. 1 ) Flow check at chlorinator. 2) High vacuum alarm at Step 11, 3) Slow disconnect and leak check at Step 11.
[HF: me #5-5, 31.]

5-12

Sufficient protection.

an of

Skips check on Plant operator skips step checks of vacuum alarm and flow. Skips opening Plant operator does not G3 open G3.

Loss of protection for this step and for previous steps, Same as #5-11.

Mitigation: personal protective equipment, None.

5-13

No direct consequence.

Same as #5-12.

5-14

Sufficient protection.

. ----

uA7nD ..r . ... ----WnnKwcEr

rnu~ 9-Lr

DA*C

n-97

lANT/OPERATION: JNE/VESSEl./NODE NESIGN INTENTION

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW OATE DRAWINQ NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

Guide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F, Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R, Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

PROTECTION

(9) Close valves G 1 and G3. Open valves G6 and G9, and verify that the high-vacuum alarm clears. ~o art of Skips step. Skips closing valves. Skips opening valves. Plant operator skips this step. Plant operator does not close G1 and G3. [ -HF: VdV- CbOO together and
easy to

cmfum.]

Same as #1-12 when line opened at Step 11. At Step 11 air is introduced into the system, reducing chlorination. Same as #l-1.

Low vacuum alarm occurs at Step 11. Low vacuum alarm occurs at Step 11. 1 ) High vacuum alarm does not clear. 2) Cl residual checks (see #/-l, Protection 3). Same as #5-15.

5-15 5-16

Minor consequence, Minor consequence.

Plant operator does not open G6 and G9.

[-HF: mrno = #S-16.l

5-17

Protection sufficient,

Dther than

Wrong valves are opened.

::;&9perator opens G5
[-HF:

Same as #5-15.

5-18

Minor consequence.

q an% = #5-16.l

(lo)
No

Chlorine serviceman dons the facamask respirator, and operator dons self-containad braathing apparatus (SCBA). Then they verify the operation of the personal protective equipment. Neglect to wear the personal protective equipment. Loss of protection for scenarios where needed. Observer reminds serviceman of need for personal protective equipment, 5-20 No direct consequence.

Skip step

. . ----- . . . . . . . . . . . .
HA7t)P WIIRKSHFFT

PACF R.7R . -------

LANT / OPERATION: lNE/VESSEL/NODE: )ESfGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE: DRAWlN(3 NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

;uide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION (11) ~o CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S, Camp, J. Rude, K, Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

PROTECTION

Slowly disconnect the regulator, check it for leaks, and set it on the floor. Serviceman does not disconnect the regulator. Hoses could be broken if cylinder is moved at Step 13. Small release; minor irritation, Loss of protection in previous scenarios, Observation that regulator is still connected, 5-21 Minor consequences.

Skip step

art of

Skip part of step.

Serviceman does not open slowly while checking for leaks. [ HF: experience required to judaa
dOWIY md to differentiate between a lock cnd raidud C12 in *O line.]

None,

5-22

No direct consequence.

4s well 3s

Unwanted action

Serviceman drops regulator after disconnect.

Damage regulator; possible cause for scenario in reconnection. Serviceman disconnects inuse cylinder with release of full cylinder contents (see 5-5). Potential for injuries and fatalities near 315 Building and neighboring buildings.

Serviceman alerts operations supervisor of drop. 1 ) Verify tank valves are closed.
I-HF: procedure doee not require check of cylinder valve I +HF: serviceman haa cowidedle experience].

5-23

No direct consequence.

3ther :han

Wrong cylinder Serviceman selects the wrong cylinder.

5-24

Sufficient protection. Existing tagging system to be incorporated into disconnect procedures.

2) Open slowly with ammonia check.

[HF: eoe #5-5, 3, Proteoticm.1

3) Low vacuum alarm and Cl alarm. [-6F: oparatw may .smume thii
k normal el=m for rkmnnect.]

HAZOP WORXSHEET . 8LANT/OPERATION: -lNENESSEL/NOOE )ESIGN INTENTION:

PACF R.7Q , -s. - --

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

RSVIEW

DATE

ORAWlNt3 NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

Suide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION (12) No CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5/20/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K, Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS / COMMENTS

PROTECTION

Install the cap on the cylinder angle valve, and install the protective hood. Serviceman does not install the cap, Loss of protection for Visual observation when valves and threads during cylinder is moved (Step 131. subsequent handling incidents. 5-25 Low likelihood.

Skip step

(13) Reverse

Position the crane and cylinder truck for loading; open the roll-up door; remove the chocks; and push tha cylinder out to the stops. Trucks are not in place when cylinder rolled out. Possibility of vehicle impact with the cylinder resulting in release of C12. Potential injuries in the area. None. 5-26 Low likelihood.

Reverse part of step

(14) No

Release the chain binders, and turn the cylinder over to the hoist and rigging crew. Chain binders are not released, Cannot load cylinder onto the truck; potential damage to the equipment. Hoist crew notes that the chain is connected, 5-27 Minor consequence. Note: hoisting and rigging crew has detailed procedure. Low likelihood.

Skip step

(15) Part of

Install the spreader bar, lift the cylinder, and place it on the flatbed truck. Partially hooked, The dropped cylinder is damaged resulting in a Clz release. Same as #5-26. Cylinder strikes object. Same as #5-28. Same as #5-28. Radio for hazmat support. 5-28

Incomplete installation

As well as Part of

Unwanted Crane operator mishandles the cylinder lift. action Fails during lift Crane or rigging fails (broken cables, etc.).

None. Same as #5-28.

5-29 5-30

Low likelihood. Low likelihood. Rigging is certified by nondestructive examination.

HAZOP WORXSHEET PLANT/OPERATION: UNE/VESSEL/NODE: DESIGN INTENTION:

PAGE B-30 Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 5 Removing Empty Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder) =IEW DATE
DRAWINQ NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

Guide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table, GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES

5120193 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, S. Camp, J. Rude, K. Agee, S. Kanth, K. Murphy, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, J. Piatt, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS II

PROTECTION

(16) Secure the cylinder and transpoti it.

No

I
(17) No

The cylinder is released during transport (e.g., falls off truck). Potential for cylinder failure, Clz release and injuries to people along \ the route.

None.

5-31

Low likelihood.

Close the roll-up door, and exit through the walk-through door. Plant operator does not close the doors. May compromise effectiveness of C12 detectors. Tour operator surveillance, 5-32 Low likelihood.

Skip step

Hmzud and oP@mbi~i Study Worhhaet

. ----- ---------- .
LANT/OPERATION ,fNE/VESSSL/NODE )ESQN INTENTION:

------ . Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)
REVIEW DATE: ORAWING NO.: REVIEW TEAM:

5/21 /93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A] F, Leverenz, J. Rude, S, Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS Note: Hoisting and rigging crew has detailed procedure. Insignificant consequences.

hide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION

(1) Turn on or verify that the storage room exhaust fan is on. 10 Skip step Plant operator does not turn Loss of prevention for Step 10 (entry of storage the fan on. building). Serviceman notes the fan is off before entry and turns it on.
[-HF: q
rvicemm works on mmy may not diffwmt installati0n8 d

6-1

think to oheok the fm.J

(2) Position the crane for unloading, Part of Mispositioned Difficulty in moving cylinder Other crew members, Crane is mis-positioned (would require extreme mis- to trolley; may delay replacement. It is possible positioning). that the cylinder could be damaged, Possible injuries and fatalities in area if release occurs from damage. 6-2 Low likelihood. Crane has considerable flexibility.

(3) Position the chlorine transport truck for unloading, Part of Mis-positioned Truck is mis-positioned (would require extreme mispositioning). Same as #6-2. Same as #6-2. 6-3 Low likelihood.

,-.

..-,-s.s ,-,

rnuc Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder) REVIEW DATE:
DRAWlNt3 NO.:

D-a L

PLANT/OPERATION: LINE/VESSEL/NODE DESIGN INTENTION

-~ TEAM:

5/21/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, J, Rude, S. Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R, Hansen < SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Guide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION

(4) Verify that tha chlorine cylinder trolley is in position to receive the cylinder. Part of Mis-positioned Trolley is mis-positioned and no correction occurs, (The worst case is when the trolley is off the track.) Same as #6-2. If it is off the track, it could roll. (The apron or concrete pad is sloped toward parking lot.) It would likely stop when the wheels run off the apron onto the gravel. Same as #6-2. 6-4 Low likelihood,

(5) Release the cylinder binder(s) on the transport vehicle. No Part of Driver does not release the binders. Driver only releases one Only one binder in place binder. Skip step Cannot remove the Hoist and rigging crew notice binder at Step 6, cylinder, One end of cylinder moves Same as #6-5. the other does not, same as #6-5. 6-5 6-6 Minor consequence. Minor consequence.

(6) Install the lifting bar, and lift the cylinder. Part of Incomplete installation Same as #5-28. Same as #5-28. None, 6-7 Low likelihood,

(7) Place the cylinder on the trollay. Part of Fails during lift Crane or rigging fails (broken cables, etc.). Unwanted action Crane operator mis-handles lift. Same as #5-30. None, 6-8 Low likelihood, Rigging is certified by nondestructive examination. Low likelihood.

As well as

Same as #5-29.

None,

6-9

HAZOP WORKSHEET PL LANT/OPERATION: NE/VESSEl/NOOE: Lll DIESIGN INTENTION

. --- Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)
REVIEW DATE: DRAWINQ NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

5/21/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, J, Rude, S. Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS / COMMENTS

Giuide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table.
GUIDE WORD CONSEQUENCES (8) Remove the lifting bar, removing it from the immediate area. NJo Skip step Bar is not removed. Delay in the replacement of the cylinder. None, 6-10 Minor consequence. PROTECTION

(9) Secure the cylinder to the trolley with chain binders (2}. Ndo Skip step Plant operator does not install chain binders. No consequences except chains dragging as trolley pushed into building. Sound of dragging chains. 6-11 Low likelihood. Primary reason for chain binders as seismic precautions; seismic activity is small (below seismic probability of zone 2).

(lo)

Enter the walk-through door, and open the rohp door.

No meaningful deviations (11) hdo Part of Push the trolley and the chlorine cylinder into the building and against the rail stop. Install the wheel chocks. Plant operator does not move the cylinder. Wheel chocks are not installed. Plant operator does not push the cylinder (on trolley) in far enough. Delay in replacement of cylinder. Precaution (against movement) not in place. When the regulator is installed lines are damaged by stretching. Low or no Cl flows to the chlorinator w i the cylinder is put in en use (see also #l-9). Position noted by rest of staff. Missing chocks noted by staff during routine checks.
[-HF: chocks ore not readly tilbla m they are under tank.]

Skip step Part of step skipped Not positioned

6-12 6-13

Minor consequences. No direct consequence.

1 ) Serviceman notes the position and requires correction.

[+HF: pocition m noted when lines do not readily red cylinder. ]

6-14

Sufficient protection.

2) Step 19 leak check,

-r..--9 . . .

. ---

WT

8LANT/OPERATIOW JW2VESSELINODE )ESIGN INTENTION:

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE: DRAWNO NO,:

REVIEW TEAM:

5121193 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, J. Rude, S. Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS / COMMENTS

Wide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD (12) No CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION

Request the chlorine serviceman to remove the protective hood from the chlorine cylinder. Serviceman does not remove hood. Delay in replacement. Noted by staff, 6-15

Skip step

(13) Observe the position of cylinder angle valves. If the valves are not in vertical alignment, loosen the chain binders and rotate the cylinder to obtain vertical alignment, and then tighten the chain binders. No Skip step Serviceman does not vertically align the cylinder. I-HF: ~wrnmt done by o~~~on
of cylinder conneotioru I + HF: sewicmnm h= cormiderabla experience with conneotiorm]

Potential to for liquid chlorine to enter the ejector and over chlorinate; potential for Clz release from the water. Release potential unknown. No consequence expected.

6-16 Consult the vendor on this scenario and the expected system response. Estimate the amount of C12 release potential. 6-17 No consequence expected.

Part of

Part of step

Chains are not tightened after alignment.

(14)

Chlorine serviceman dons the facemask respirator, and operator dons self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Then they verify the operation of the personal protective equipment. Neglect to wear personal protective equipment. Loss of protection for scenarios where needed. 6-18 No direct consequence.

No

Skip step

(15) No

Verify that the chlorine cylinder gas angle valve is closed. Serviceman does not verify it is closed. At Step 16, C12 is released At Step 16, the cap is when the cap IS removed if opened slowly while the valve is not fully closed. checking for leaks. [+ HF: serviceman experienced importmce of thrn check.] Same as #5-5. 6-19
with

Skip step

Sufficient protection.

Same mitigation as #5-5.

Hp7tW -. + =

..-,

,.. ,

rmuc

D-a

P *LANT/oPERATION:
.lNE/VESSEL/NOOE: L c KSfQN INTENTION: (Guide

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE: DRAWINQ NO.:

REVIEW TEAM:

5/21 /93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F, Leverenz, J. Rude, S. Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS / COMMENTS

Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. DEVIATION (16) CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION

GUIDE WORD

Check for leaks while slowly removing the protective cap from the cylinder gas angle valve. Serviceman opens the cap too quickly or does not check for leaks. [+ HF: mrvic.mcn experienced with
importance of thii check. 1

f More/ F Part of

Too fast/not check

If valve is open or leaking, Mitigation: C12 alarm with the release of Clz is possible emergency response and same mitigation as #5-5. (amount d e p e n d s o n valve opening). Same as #5-5.

6-20

Cause unlikely.

(17) Claan the sealing surface of the gas angle valve and the vacuum regulator. Visually inspect the regulator valve body for damage.
I No

Skip step

Serviceman does not cleantcheck sealing surface of angle valve or vacuum regulator,

Possible seal leak at Step 18 or leak from damaged regulator,

Leak check at Step 19. [ + HF: wvieoman experienced with

importance of this check.]

6-21

Low likelihood,

C12 release at Step 19 same :;:::::y :)5;:n:: ::dh as #5-5, same mitigation as #5-5. (18)
IPart of

Install a new lead seal. Attach the regulator to the cylinder gas valve, and secure it in place by tightening the yoke assembly. Serviceman does not install Same as #6-21, the lead seal or uses the old seal. [+ HF: experienced serviceman knows
importance of new coal.]

Incorrect lead seal installation Not tight enough

Same as #6-21.

6-22

Same as #6-21.

ILess

Serviceman does not tighten the yoke assembly enough, [+ HF: serviceman experienced with
cylinder yoke attachment. 1

Same as #6-21,

Same as #6-21.

6-23

Same as #6-21.

IMore

Too tight

Serviceman over-tightens the yoke assembly. I + HF: swviceman experienced with

cylinder yoke attachment. ]

Breaks the yoke; replacement of cylinder is delayed.

6-24

Low likelihood.

HAZOP woRKsHEEr LANT/OPERATIDN: lNE/VESSEL/NODE

PAGE B-36

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

~lEW

DATE

DRAWINQ NO.: RSVIEW TEAM:

IESIGN INTENTION

5121 /93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F. Leverenz, J. Rude, S. Camp, D. Orliz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO 6-25 ACTIONS / COMMENTS Low likelihood.

hide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table. GUIDE WORD ~::r DEVIATION Wrong angle valve CAUSE Serviceman installs regulator on the liquid valve. [+ HF: SCdViCWllO11 OXpOtitMOd With atteclwnent and mud imtali updda
down.]

CONSEQUENCES Same as #6-16.

PROTECTION 1 ) Same as #6-16. 2) Tour surveillance notices regulator upside down.

(19) art of Ylore

Check for leaks. Slowly open the chlorine cylinder gas supply valve. Loss of protection in previous scenarios. Releases more chlorine than None. necessary for leak detection. No health effects expected. Personal protective equipment for serviceman and operator. 6-26 6-27 No direct consequence. Low likelihood.

Not check for Serviceman does not check leaks for leaks. Opens too fast Serviceman opens valve too fast.

(20)

Adjust the cylinder weight scale to indicate 2,000 pounds of product available in the cylinder.

No meaningful deviations (21) 10 or art of Open system supply valves G-1 and G-5. Plant operator does not open the valves. Replacement chlorine not available; loss of chlorination. Same as #l-1. No consequence. 1 ) High vacuum alarm. 2] Residual C12 surveillance checks (see also #1-1, Protection 3). 6-28 Sufficient protection.

Skip step or part of the step Not opened completely Wrong valve selected

.ess

other [ban

Plant operator does not open one or both of the valves completely. Plant operator opens the G3 Draws Clz from both cylinders at the same time. valve instead of the G 5 Potential for loss of valve. [HF: several VOIVIM in one location.] \ chlorination (see #1 -1).

6-29 1 ) Surveillance checks weight of cylinders. 2) Surveillance checks rate indicators on regulators. Minor consequences.

6-30

hZOP WORKSHEET LANT/OPERATION: INEIVESSELINODE: ESIQN INTENTION:

PA(2F R-37 . ----- -.

Water Treatment Facility / Procedures Node 6 Install Replacement Chlorine Cylinder (west cylinder)

REVIEW DATE: DR.AWINO NO.:

REVIEW

TEAM:

5/21/93 Procedures for the Change-out of Chlorine Cylinders (see Appendix A) F, Leverenz, J. Rude, S. Camp, D. Ortiz, J. Angyus, R. Hansen SCENARIO ACTIONS/COMMENTS

;uide Words without meaningful deviations have been omitted from this table, GUIDE WORD DEVIATION (22) CAUSE CONSEQUENCES PROTECTION

Record in the log book the chlorine cylinder identification number and the scale weight.

No meaningful deviations (23) Report any deficiencies to the supervisor for initiation of necessary corrective action. I Notification not made. ] Delay in completing action. 6-31 I Minor consequences,

Uo

\ Skip step
(24)

Notify the Hanford Fira Department and the 364 Powerhouse that the chlorine cylinder change~ut activities are complete. ] Notification not made. I No consequence. 6-32 ] Minor consequence.

No

] Skip step (25)

Close the roll-up door, and axit through the walk-through door.

... maz.sra

ma

No meaningful deviations .upemamzy .away wormnehm . . . . . . ,, .,,,. ,