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5 - Hazop

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PROCESS SAFETY HAZARD AND Hazard and Operability

ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE Analysis (HAZOP)


OVERVIEW
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic technique
for system examination and risk management.
In particular, HAZOP is often used as a technique for identifying potential hazards in
a system and identifying operability problems likely to lead to nonconforming
products.
HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk events are caused by deviations from
design or operating intentions.
Identification of such deviations is facilitated by using sets of “guide words” as a
systematic list of deviation perspectives.
This approach is a unique feature of the HAZOP methodology that helps stimulate the
imagination of team members when exploring potential deviations.
HAZOP OBJECTIVES
1. Identify all deviations from the way a system is intended to function: their causes,
and all the hazards and operability problems associated with these deviations.
2. Decide whether actions are required to control the hazards and/or the operability
problems, and if so, identify the ways in which the problems can be solved.
3. Identify cases where a decision cannot be made immediately, and decide on what
information or actions are required.
4. Ensure that actions decided are followed up.
5. Make operator aware of hazards and operability problems.
DEFINITIONS
Hazard - Potential source of harm. Deviations from design or operational intent may
constitute or produce a hazard. Hazards are the focus of HAZOP studies, and it
should be noted that a single hazard could potentially lead to multiple forms of
harm.
Harm - Physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or
the environment. Harm is the consequence of a hazard occurring and may take many
forms: patient or user safety, employee safety, business risks, regulatory risks,
environmental risks, etc.
Risk - Combination of probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that
harm. In a strict sense, “risk” is not always explicitly identified in HAZOP studies since
the core methodology does not require identification (also referred to as rating) of
the probability or severity of harm. However, risk assessment teams may choose to
rate these factors in order to further quantify and prioritize risks if needed.
USAGE
HAZOP is best suited for assessing hazards in facilities, equipment, and processes and is
capable of assessing systems from multiple perspectives:
Design
 Assessing system design capability to meet user specifications and safety standards
 Identifying weaknesses in systems

Physical and operational environments


 Assessing environment to ensure system is appropriately situated, supported, serviced, contained, etc.

Operational and procedural controls


 Assessing engineered controls (ex: automation), sequences of operations, procedural controls (ex: human
interactions) etc.
 Assessing different operational modes – start-up, standby, normal operation, steady & unsteady states,
normal shutdown, emergency shutdown, etc.
ADVANTAGES – DISADVANTAGES
HAZOP
METHODOLOGY
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Definition Phase
The Definition Phase typically begins with preliminary identification of risk assessment
team members. HAZOP is intended to be a cross-functional team effort, and relies on
specialists from various disciplines with appropriate skills and experience who display
intuition and good judgment. Specialists should be carefully chosen to include those with
a broad and current knowledge of system deviations.
HAZOP should always be carried out in a climate of positive thinking and frank
discussion. During the Definition Phase, the risk assessment team must identify the
assessment scope carefully in order to focus effort. This includes defining study
boundaries and key interfaces as well as key assumptions that the assessment will be
performed under.
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Preparation Phase
The Preparation Phase typically includes the following activities:
1. Identifying and locating supporting data and information
2. Identification of the audience and users of the study outputs
3. Project management preparations (ex: scheduling meetings, transcribing proceedings,
etc.)
4. Consensus on template format for recording study outputs
5. Consensus on HAZOP guide words to be used during the study
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS

HAZOP guide words work by providing a systematic and consistent means of


brainstorming potential deviations to operations.
EXAMPLES OF PROCESS PARAMETERS
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Examination Phase
The Examination Phase begins with identification of all elements (parts or steps) of the
system or process to be examined. For example:
1. Physical systems may be broken down into smaller parts as necessary
2. Processes may be broken down into discrete steps or phases
3. Similar parts or steps may be grouped together to facilitate assessment

The HAZOP guide words are then applied to each of the elements. It must be noted that
not all combinations of guide words and elements are expected to yield sensible or
credible deviation possibilities. As a general rule, all reasonable use and misuse conditions
which are expected by the user should be identified and subsequently challenged to
determine if they are “credible” and whether they should be assessed any further.
HAZOP EXAMINATION
PHASE PROCESS
FLOW
HAZOP METHODOLOGY
Documentation & Follow-up Phase
The documentation of HAZOP analyses is often facilitated by utilizing a template
recording form. Risk assessment teams may modify the template as necessary based on
factors such as:
1. Regulatory requirements
2. Need for more explicit risk rating or prioritization (ex: rating deviation probabilities,
severities, and/or detection)
3. Company documentation policies
4. Needs for traceability or audit readiness
5. Other factors
HAZOP RECORDING TEMPLATE
RISK REVIEW
On a long-term basis, operational feedback should confirm that the assessment and
control steps are adequately addressing the risk question. If this is not the case, it may be
necessary to review all assumptions. Feedback should correspond to ensuring that
assumptions made about the level of residual risks are still valid. Residual risks are risks
that are expected to remain after risk control strategies have been exercised. It is also
important to note that new risks may arise from risk control practices. Sometimes risks that
were not originally identified or may have been filtered out during the initial risk
assessment can become aggravating factors due to the implementation of risk control
measures.
RISK COMMUNICATION
HAZOP is a powerful communication tool. The output of the tool should always be
presented at a level of detail appropriate for the various stakeholders. This is important
not just for presenting results, but also for obtaining early buy-in on the approach.
HAZOP Results:
1. Improvement of system or operations
 – Reduced risk and better contingency
 – More efficient operations

2. Improvement of procedures
 – Logical order
 – Completeness

3. General awareness among involved parties


4. Team building
HAZOP EXAMPLE
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REFERENCES
1. IEC 61882. “Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) – Application
guide”. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva.
2. Crawley, F., M. Preston, and B. Tyler: “HAZOP: Guide to best practice. Guidelines
to best practice for the process and chemical industries”. European Process Safety
Centre and Institution of Chemical Engineers, 2000.
3. Kyriakdis, I.: “HAZOP – Comprehensive Guide to HAZOP in CSIRO”, CSIRO
Minerals, National Safety Council of Australia, 2003.
4. Rausand, M. “Risk Assessment Theory, Methods, and Applications”. Wiley, 2011.
5. PQRI. “HAZOP Training Guide”. 2015
6. Yulianto. “K3LL Bab#4 Process Safety”. 2011

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