CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES | ISSUE BRIEF

DECEMBER 2023

DISSECTING NATO
CHIEF’S REMARKS ON
UKRAINE RUSSIA WAR

Charunivetha Solai Gnanasekar

Edited by: Divyashree Jha
About the Author

Charunivetha Solai Gnanasekar is an undergraduate student at the Jindal Global Law School and is a
Research Intern at the Centre for Security Studies, JSIA.

About the Centre for Security Studies

The Centre for Security Studies (CSS) was established in 2020 as the Jindal School of International
Affairs’ first student-run research centre under the aegis of Prof. Dr. Pankaj K. Jha. Researchers at CSS
explore both regional and thematic topics in the broader field of international security studies to write issue
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also include topics like ethnic, sectarian, and religious conflict; civil wars and state failure; cyber and space
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IB2312005

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 2

Introduction
The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), remarked in an
interview with the German media group Funke, on 17, September 2023,

“Most wars last longer than expected when they first begin… Therefore, we must prepare
ourselves for a long war in Ukraine”1

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, intended by Russia to be a swift operation to
topple the Ukrainian government has evolved into a protracted and enduring conflict spanning
over a year and a half. History has witnessed much longer wars, such as the war in China between
the Han dynasty and the Xiongnu nation which lasted almost 300 years, the Crusades, fought
between Christians and Muslims that lasted around 200 years and more recently, the Korean War,
which is still technically ongoing due to the absence of a peace treaty, for 73 years now.2 However,
the Russia-Ukraine war’s prolonged nature begs questions as to why we witness such extended
wars and why there are stark disparities between initial expectations and the unfolding reality. The
Chief also added,

“There is no doubt that Ukraine will eventually be in NATO”3

1
NDTV, “Prepare for Long War in Ukraine, Warns Nato Chief,” NDTV.com, September 17, 2023,
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/prepare-for-long-war-in-ukraine-warns-nato-chief-4397032.

2
Kek Koon Wee, “Opinion: Russia-Ukraine War Seem Long? China’s Longest Dragged on for 300 Years,” South
China Morning Post, January 8, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/short-
reads/article/3205954/if-russia-ukraine-conflict-seems-long-already-consider-chinas-longest-war-lasted-nearly-300-
years?campaign=3205954&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article.

3
NDTV, “Prepare for Long War in Ukraine, Warns Nato Chief,” https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/prepare-for-long-
war-in-ukraine-warns-nato-chief-4397032.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 3

While Ukraine was vaguely promised future membership in 2008, there has been no substantial
timeline for such induction.4 Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be attributed in part to the perceived
expansion of NATO towards the east, despite previous assurances that such eastward expansion
would not occur.5 Thus, the Chief’s reassurance of Ukraine’s membership plays a substantial role
in the conflict.

NATO’s Role in the Conflict

Despite Ukraine not being a member of NATO, the organisation's and its members' assistance has
been substantial. NATO has pledged EUR 500 million for assistance in food, clothing, fuel,
communications, etc. Individual member countries have committed around EUR 100 million for
military and humanitarian assistance.6 The United States has emerged as the largest contributor at
$75 Billion. The United States assistance to Ukraine represents the most substantial aid package provided
to any nation by the U.S.7 Besides the United States, Germany, Denmark, Poland, and the Netherlands are
significant contributors. Compared in terms of the proportion of GDP, Norway and Lithuania have pledged

4
Adam Taylor, “That Time Ukraine Tried to Join NATO — and NATO Said No,” The Washington Post, September
4, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/04/that-time-ukraine-tried-to-join-nato-
and-nato-said-no/.

5
Becky Sullivan, “How NATO’s Expansion Helped Drive Putin to Invade Ukraine,” NPR, February 24, 2022,
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/29/1076193616/ukraine-russia-nato-explainer.
6
“NATO’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO, November 6, 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm.

7
Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts.,” Council on
Foreign Relations, December 8, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-
charts.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 4

the highest proportion of their GDP at around 1.5% of their GDP while the U.S. lies at around
0.3% of their GDP.8

The Reason for a Prolonged Conflict

To examine the Chief’s statements regarding the longevity of the war, we must realise that not all
wars are fought for the same reason, nor have the same longevity. Wars can range from those
waged for economic gains like the Opium Wars (1839-1860) and the Japanese Invasion of
Manchuria (1931-1932) or for territorial gains like the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) and
Serbo-Bulgarian War (1885-1886).9 Religious sentiments can also trigger some like the Greek
War of Independence (1821–1829) and the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and so do
nationalistic sentiments like the World Wars.10 While the threat posed by NATO’s continuous
expansion eastward can explain Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at the heart of the conflict lies an
ideological struggle. The Russia-Ukraine war, grappling with the contrasting views of the two
nations on the origins of Ukraine, rooted in cultural and historical similarities, can be classified as
an ideological war.

Ideological War
On 12th July 2021, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin published an article titled ‘On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’. In the article, he writes,

8
Henrik Pettersson, Rachel Wilson, and Lou Robinson, “Aid to Ukraine: Where the Money in Their War against
Russia Is Coming From,” CNN, October 6, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/05/world/ukraine-money-military-
aid-intl-dg/index.html.

9
Paul Goodman, “The 8 Main Reasons for War,” Owlcation, October 15, 2023, https://owlcation.com/social-
sciences/The-Main-Reasons-For-War.

10
Paul Goodman, “The 8 Main Reasons for War,” Owlcation, October 15, 2023, https://owlcation.com/social-
sciences/The-Main-Reasons-For-War.

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 “When I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and
Ukrainians were one people – a single whole.”11

Putin maintains a strong belief that Ukraine is a part of Russia. He contends that Russia and
Ukraine have shared history which lays down the foundations of their culture and that the Kievan
Rus period and the period of the Soviet Union point to the identity of the two nations as one.12
However, Ukraine argues that it cemented its statehood following a referendum in 1991 where
92.3% of voters preferred an independent Ukraine.13 When such contrasting sentiments exist, it is
hard to deny that the war can be categorised as an ideological one.

Ideological wars are prolonged because there is limited scope for realpolitik. Realpolitik is the
approach of governance, based on practical solutions rather than ideological beliefs and
sentiments. The difficulty of ideological wars lies in that, the parties are unable to settle due to a
fundamental disagreement. A war is only stopped when both parties agree that stopping the war is
a better alternative than its continuation.14 The countries in an ideological war cannot reach a state
where both parties can agree on such an agreement. A settlement is never reached because of the
absence of a middle ground. For the oppressor, a settlement that compromises their key objectives
for invasion is undesirable as their core beliefs will not align with a settlement. For the oppressed,

11
Vladimir Putin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘on the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,’” President
of Russia, July 12, 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.

12
Ibid.

13
Billy Perrigo, “How Putin’s Denial of Ukraine’s Statehood Rewrites History,” Time, February 22, 2022,
https://time.com/6150046/ukraine-statehood-russia-history-putin/.

14
Marnix Provoost, “What Is Russia’s Theory of Victory in Ukraine?,” Modern War Institute, March 31, 2023,
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-russias-theory-of-victory-in-ukraine/.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 6

a settlement depicts an implicit acquittal of the oppressor and their invasion.15 Such was the case
when the United States refused any offers of settlements with the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks.
When the Taliban offered a settlement, President George W. Bush said, “There's no need to discuss
it… There's nothing to negotiate about. They're harbouring a terrorist and they need to turn him
over."16

The same pattern can be seen with Russia and Ukraine. Despite several rounds of peace talks, the
settlements have stalled because neither side is willing to compromise. Henry Kissinger, former
US Secretary of State, proposed that Ukraine allow Russia to retain control over Crimea,
essentially restoring the situation to pre-invasion status.17 Mykhailo Podolyak, the Head of the
Office of the President of Ukraine, replied with,

“Mr. Kissinger still has not understood anything … neither the nature of this war, nor its
impact on the world order.”18

Ukraine agitated over Russia’s threats and invasions, is not willing to compromise on their
demands. Such is also the case with Russia, exhausted of its resources and pushing for a bigger
strategy of reviving the USSR. A settlement will not give either side, what they desire.

15
Christopher Blattman, “The Hard Truth about Long Wars,” Foreign Affairs, October 4, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/hard-truth-about-long-wars.

16
“U.S. Rejects New Taliban Offer,” ABC News, October 15, 2001,
https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80482&page=1.

17
Al Jazeera, “Kyiv Slams Kissinger over Call to Negotiate with Russia for Peace,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/19/kyiv-slams-kissinger-over-call-to-negotiate-with-russia-for-peace.

18
Ibid.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 7

The Geopolitics Involved
Another issue clouding the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the elaborate geopolitics behind the
invasion. Russia’s intentions on the regions it wishes to annex remain dubious. In 2014, Russia
annexed Crimea with the assistance of a pro-Russian President at the time, Viktor Yanukovych.19
Russia stationed their troops near the port of Sevastopol with ease after Yanukovych extended
Russia’s lease on the port till 2042.20 After the government was toppled due to popular protests,
Russia took the chance to enter Crimea, a primarily Russian region.21 A referendum held on 16th
March 2014, although doubted for its credibility, showed that 97% of the population in Crimea
wished for it to be a separate state.22 On 18th March, Putin signed a treaty which handed over the
control of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Although this did not receive significant international
recognition, it allowed Russia to make advancements in other parts of Ukraine.23

Also in 2014, Russia established pro-Russian, separatists in the Donbas region, in Eastern Ukraine
which were controlled by Moscow.24 The Donbas region, comprising Luhansk and Donetsk, is
primarily Russian speaking.25 However, a poll conducted by Interfax, a Ukrainian news agency,

19
“Crimea,” Encyclopædia Britannica, December 11, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/place/Crimea.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.

24
Nigel Walker, “Conflict in Ukraine: A Timeline (2014 - Eve of 2022 Invasion),” House of Commons Library, August
22, 2023, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9476/CBP-9476.pdf.
25
“What to Know about the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions,” Voice of America, February 21, 2022,
https://www.voanews.com/a/what-to-know-about-the-donetsk-and-luhansk-regions-/6452835.html.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 8

revealed that 82% of those who have lived in Russian-controlled territory since the invasion have
a negative attitude towards Russia and only 6% have a positive attitude.26

Figure 1 27

One view of Russia’s goal during the February 2022 invasion was to strengthen its control in the
Donbas region and to establish control in the Kherson region to the West of Crimea and in

26
“Some 92% of Ukrainians Have Negative Attitude towards Russia - Kiis ...,” Interfax - Ukraine, May 26, 2022,
https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/834975.html.

27
Al Jazeera, “Russia-Ukraine War in Maps and Charts: Live Tracker,” Al Jazeera, October 25, 2023,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/russia-ukraine-crisis-in-maps-and-charts-live-news-interactive.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 9

Zaporizhzhia.28 This would enable Russia to utilise the Port of Sevastopol to the fullest and to
control Europe’s biggest Power Plant, Zaporizhzhia.29 While this is a convincing prediction, we
find opposition in the Montreux Convention of 1936, which allows Turkey, a NATO country, to
control the Bosporus, the pathway to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. 30 Considering the
conflict, Turkey is highly unlikely to allow access to Russia. Beyond the Bosporus region, there exist
several such restrictions for Russia such as the Aegean Sea, the Gibraltar Straits, and the Suez Canal. 31
Therefore, inadequacies persist in this perspective. In return, Ukraine is focussing on attacks in Crimea to
weaken the epicentre of Russia’s supply lines.32 This not only neutralises the direct threat that is posed by
Russia but also is an attempt to re-capture Crimea.33

The alternative view that Russia is looking to annex the entire territory as the first step to revive
the former Soviet Union, seems to have lost credibility at this point in the conflict. 34 Following
Russia's initial objective in the early phases of the invasion, which aimed for a swift capture of
Kyiv and the establishment of a new government but encountered unforeseen challenges due to

28
Paul Kirby, “Donbas: Why Russia Is Trying to Capture Eastern Ukraine,” BBC News, May 26, 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544.

29
Ibid.

30
Tim Marshall, Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know about Global Politics
(London: Elliott & Thompson Limited, 2019), Russia.
31
Ibid.
32
“Ukraine’s Strategy to Weaken Russia’s Military, Logistics in Crimea | WSJ,” YouTube, October 2, 2023,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=su_oheT-RLc.

33
Ibid.

34
Paul Kirby, “Has Putin’s War Failed and What Does Russia Want from Ukraine?,” BBC News, February 24, 2023,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 10

Ukraine's robust counter-offensive, the prevailing view now suggests a shift in strategy. The new
focus appears to be on the Donbas and Kherson regions.

Moscow lacks transparency in its strategy which makes it difficult for Ukraine and the West to
reach settlements because there is fear of an undiscovered threat. Adding to this dubiousness is the
ever-changing state of the military affairs of both Russia and Ukraine, as the Ukrainian troops
continue to exceed expectations and deficiencies in the Russian military become apparent. 35

Military Affairs
The deviation of the conflict from initial expectations can be attributed to Russia’s inability to
adapt to the newfound strength of the Ukrainian military after aid from the West. 36 The inability
of either side to exercise sufficient control militarily to bring a decisive end to the war contributed
greatly to the drawn-out conflict we are witnessing.37

Ukraine's military gained a distinct advantage over the Russian forces through their adaptability,
in stark contrast to Russia's rigid strategy, as the leaders of the Russian military struggled to
produce effective solutions in response to changing circumstances.38 Adding to this flexibility was
the contrasting reception of the war in the two countries. As Russia’s resources for the conflict
were being exhausted, the public grew apprehension over the war whereas in Ukraine, the public

35
Christopher Blattman, “The Hard Truth about Long Wars,” Foreign Affairs, October 4, 2023,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/hard-truth-about-long-wars.
36
1. Thomas Graham, “Ukraine Has Held off Russia’s Invasion-so Far. Here’s How.,” Council on Foreign Relations,
February 17, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-has-held-russias-invasion-so-far-heres-
how#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20withstood%20and%20repelled,the%20country’s%20south%20and%20east.
37
Ibid.
38
Christopher Morris, “Ukraine War: Russia’s Problems on the Battlefield Stem from Failures at the Top,” The
Conversation, September 14, 2023, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-problems-on-the-battlefield-
stem-from-failures-at-the-top-189916.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 11

displayed substantial unity in dealing with the conflict.39 The subsequent sections delve into how
the conflict unfolded across the domains of land, air, and sea.

War on Land

Russia’s approach to ground operations on the northern front involved significant reliance on the
use of roads as opposed to the marshes and forests.40 While this allowed Russia to advance troops,
the information provided by the civilians to the military, on the positions and movements of the
Russians posed obstacles.41 Local civilians also proved to be greatly resourceful in Guerrilla tactics
employed by Ukraine such as hit-and-run or ambushes as they required minimal training as
opposed to sophisticated military activities.42

Further, the troops deployed by Russia were found to be much fewer than necessary to fight a
population that was united in its opposition, at 4 Russian soldiers for every 1000 inhabitants while
the requirement is estimated at 20 soldiers per 1000 inhabitants.43 In some conflicts, such as the
US invasion of Iraq, a lower ratio of 7 soldiers for 1000 inhabitants, can be successful. However,

39
“Why the War in Ukraine May Be a Long One,” Crisis Group, July 7, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-
central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/why-war-ukraine-may-be-long-one.
40
Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare,” CSIS, June 1, 2022,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare.
41
Ibid.

42
Vanshika Sirohi, issue brief, Military Strategy of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War (Centre for Security Studies,
November 2022), https://www.cssjsia.com/_files/ugd/348fae_08463555238f424998eaa864574714e3.pdf.

43
Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare,” CSIS, June 1, 2022,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 12

the nature of the troops in the two conflicts looked different.44 Russia deployed a large number of
conscripts with limited experience in combat which weakened the quality of personnel.45

However, the Ukrainian troops face difficulties of their own, the main concern of which is the
shortage of troops.46 This also reflects challenges in the effective deployment of these troops. It is
because of this that when Ukraine decided to regroup troops and concentrate on defending the
Donbas region, their counter-offence in other regions slowed down.47 They also face concerns in
communications and a lack of artillery and heavy weapon support.48

War in Air

Ukraine possesses an advantage over Russia with the modern air defence system it employs.49 The
Ukrainian Airforce are using drone technology to launch offences on Russia which are not detected
by their old radar systems.50 Old radar systems are not designed to detect small, slow-moving

44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.

Vanshika Sirohi, issue brief, Military Strategy of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War (Centre for Security Studies,
46

November 2022), https://www.cssjsia.com/_files/ugd/348fae_08463555238f424998eaa864574714e3.pdf.

47
Ibid.

48
Ibid.

49
Sakshi Tiwari, “Powerful, Modern & Effective: Ukraine’s Air Defense Operator Thrilled with ‘kill Rate’ of German
Iris-T System,” The Eurasian Times, January 23, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/powerful-modern-effective-
ukraines-air-defense-operator-thrilled/.
50
“Why Are Moscow’s Air Defences Performing so Badly?,” The Economist, August 14, 2023,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/08/14/why-are-moscows-air-defences-performing-so-
badly.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 13

objects such as drones which have become relevant in modern warfare. 51 To further weaken
Russia’s radars, Ukraine have included HARM (High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles) technology,
provided by the USA, which emits radiation transmissions at 3200 kilometres per hour.52 This
either destroys Russia’s radars or forces them to turn them off and has allowed Ukraine to launch
air strikes.53

The long-range S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, the Stinger man-portable air-defence
systems, medium-range SA-11 Gadfly (Buk-M1) and short-range SA-8 Gecko systems employed
by Ukraine, with the assistance of Western aid, also deterred the Russian military greatly.54

However, Ukraine lacks sufficient supplies of long-range missiles and cruise missiles which the
U.S. President, Joe Biden, promised to Ukraine in the coming months.55 In addition to this, the
Neptune Cruise Missiles that Ukraine itself is producing show promise.56 However, the quantity

51
Ibid.

52
Thomas Harding, “Why Are Moscow’s Air Defences Performing so Badly?,” The Economist, September 30, 2022,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/08/14/why-are-moscows-air-defences-performing-so-
badly.
53
Ibid.

54
Snehesh Alex Philip, “Why the Famed Russian Air Force Failed in Ukraine and the Vital Lessons IAF Can Draw
from It,” ThePrint, October 15, 2022, https://theprint.in/defence/air-denial-over-dominance-democratised-
technology-lessons-for-iaf-from-russia-ukraine-war/1167547/.

55
“Ukraine’s Strategy to Weaken Russia’s Military, Logistics in Crimea | WSJ,” YouTube, October 2, 2023,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=su_oheT-RLc.
56
Ibid.

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that can be manufactured remains dubious.57 The prospect of Ukraine exhausting its air defence is
a dangerous one as this domain is one of the great advantages they possess over Russia.

War at Sea

The Black Sea has been the most crucial region of maritime tensions between Ukraine and Russia.
The Sevastopol port, situated at the edge of the Black Sea, assumed a central role during the 2014
Russian invasion of Crimea because of the warm waters, which mainland Russia lacked.58

Figure 2 59

57
Ibid.

58
A. K. Chawla, “The Russia-Ukraine War – A Maritime Perspective,” SP’s Naval Forces, March 7, 2022,
https://www.spsnavalforces.com/experts-speak/?id=498&h=The-Russia-Ukraine-War-A-Maritime-Perspective.
59
John Psaropoulos, Alleged Attack on Crimea’s Sevastopol, Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, November 3, 2022),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/3/russia-backs-out-of-grain-deal-doesnt-attack-ships-rejoins.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 15

Russia’s primary maritime goal for the war was to dominate the Northern part of the Black Sea
which was achieved in the first 3 days of the invasion.60 This served dual objectives – it blocked
war supplies from the West to Ukraine by Sea and weakened Ukraine’s economy by stopping
maritime trade.61 Though the Montreux Convention allowed Turkey to prohibit Russian Naval
units from passing through the Bosporus Strait, effectively preventing them from entering or
exiting the Black Sea, Russia did not face significant obstacles because they had already
strengthened their Black Sea Fleet before the invasion.62

However, Ukraine has stepped up its attacks on the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. As mentioned
earlier, Crimea has been a major target of Ukraine.63 If their attacks on the Black Sea Fleet prove
successful, they will be able to effectively break down, arguably, by far the most successful
element of Russia’s military. Russia also lost the Flagship of this Fleet, the Moskva.64 Ukraine
contends that it was a direct effect of a strike by their Neptune anti-ship missile whereas Russia
argues that the ship sunk as it was being towed to the port during stormy weather. 65 Additionally,

60
A. K. Chawla, “The Russia-Ukraine War – A Maritime Perspective,” SP’s Naval Forces, March 7, 2022,
https://www.spsnavalforces.com/experts-speak/?id=498&h=The-Russia-Ukraine-War-A-Maritime-Perspective.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.

63
Pavel Polityuk and Oleksandr Kozhukhar, “Russian Warship Sinks; Ukraine Says Its Missile Is Responsible,”
Reuters, April 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-flagship-black-sea-fleet-badly-damaged-
by-blast-2022-04-14/.
64
Ibid.

65
Ibid.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 16

in a strike on 22nd September 2023, the Ukrainian military utilised long-range missiles to target
the Headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.66

Ukraine was facing challenges in the export of its grains since Russia withdrew from the Black
Sea Grain Initiative which allowed ships to export essentials like grains and fertilizers from
Ukraine through a humanitarian corridor.67 Thus, unable to use this corridor, Ukraine’s shipping
was limited through its small ports, which also came under attack in recent weeks.68 However, the
establishment of a new shipping corridor allowed the passage of ships and recovered Ukraine’s
exports.69

The military side of the Russia-Ukraine war shows that the conflict is at a stalemate, where neither
country possesses a strong enough military capability to defeat the other decisively. Still, both
countries have a substantially powerful defence to deter the enemy from establishing absolute
control. Furthermore, the underestimation of the Ukrainian military and the underperformance of
the Russian military create a perplexed state where it is difficult to predict the subsequent actions.
Hence, we see the protraction of this conflict.

Predictions for the End of the Conflict

66
Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “Amid Black Sea Threats, Ukraine Steps up Use of New Shipping Route,” The New York
Times, September 24, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/24/world/europe/ukraine-russia-news.html.

67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 17

The most recent round of peace talks held in Malta on 28th October 2023, saw officials from more
than 65 countries.70 However, Russia chose not to participate in the talks and dismissed the
initiative as they deemed it to be biased.71 The talks focussed on discussing 5 of the 10 points that
are a part of President Zelensky’s ‘10-point Peace Plan’72

The 10-point Peace Plan, announced during the 2022 G-20 summit, covers the following:
1. Radiation and nuclear safety
2. Food security
3. Energy security
4. Release of all prisoners and deportees
5. Implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the
world order
6. Withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities
7. Justice
8. Immediate protection of the environment
9. Prevention of escalation
10. Confirmation of the end of the war

The plan, published on Ukraine’s official website, makes it clear that it is unwilling to make any
changes for Russia.73

70
“Talks on Ukraine’s Peace Plan Open in Malta with Officials from 65 Countries - but Not Russia,” The Economic
Times, October 28, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/talks-on-ukraines-
peace-plan-open-in-malta-with-officials-from-65-countries-but-not-russia/articleshow/104786226.cms.
71
Ibid.

72
Ibid.

73
“Zelenskyy’s Peace Plan: 10 Essential Points - War.Ukraine.Ua,” Official Website of Ukraine, August 11, 2023,
https://war.ukraine.ua/faq/zelenskyys-10-point-peace-plan/.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 18

Russia’s demands from Ukraine at the beginning of the conflict involved denazification,
demilitarization, neutrality, recognition of Crimea as part of Russia and independent status for the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions.74 While Russia has not participated actively in peace talks, a recent
statement by the Foreign Minister clarifies their most crucial demand – Ukraine as a non-aligned
country, without membership in any military alliances. However, when Ukraine is still unwilling
to part with Crimea, the above compromise still would not satisfy them.75

A peaceful end to the conflict would warrant a compromise by both countries. Nonetheless, should
Kyiv accede to Russia's ultimatums, it would continue to confront security challenges, with no
assurance of its safety. Russia's apparent reluctance to make efforts towards the mere possibility
of a settlement is contributing to the lack of progress in resolving the conflict. The prospect of a
significant, war-ending strike by either of the countries, though improbable, cannot be negated.

NATO’s Eastward Expansion

The major reason cited by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine is the threat posed by the eastward
expansion of NATO.76 Russia contends that the West made a promise to expand ‘not an inch
eastward’ after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.77 Conversely, the West argues that such a
promise was never made, and the only agreement made was regarding a reunified Germany.78

74
Steven Pifer, “Russia-Ukraine: A Negotiated Settlement Will Be Difficult,” Brookings, April 5, 2022,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-ukraine-a-negotiated-settlement-will-be-difficult/.

75
Jackson Jon, “Russia May Have Just given Ukraine Terms for Ending War,” Newsweek, September 27, 2023,
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-may-have-just-given-ukraine-terms-ending-war-1829980.

76
Becky Sullivan, “How NATO’s Expansion Helped Drive Putin to Invade Ukraine,” NPR, February 24, 2022,
https://www.npr.org/2022/01/29/1076193616/ukraine-russia-nato-explainer.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 19

The West’s argument rests on the terms discussed in the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, the
then leader of the Soviet Union and James Baker, the then U.S. Secretary of State on February 9,
1990.79 Gorbachev asserts that there was no agreement that NATO would not expand eastward.80
They also contend that, if an agreement existed, it was only valid as long as Soviet troops remained
in Eastern Europe.81

Russia’s argument rests on the numerous discussions and documents passed between the former
Soviet Union and NATO. The absence of these issues in the official document did not negate the
existence of an agreement between the two parties.82

Ukraine’s Prospects in NATO

Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO was first brought to the table at the NATO Summit in
Bucharest in 2008.83 It was decided that Ukraine was not ready for membership at the time but
would be given membership later.84 2023 marks 15 years since the Bucharest summit and there is
still no timeline on when Ukraine can become a member.85 As Ukraine has started seeking

79
Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard,” National Security Archive,
December 12, 2017, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-
gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early.
80
Ibid.
81
Deutsche Welle, “Explained: Why Russia Has a Problem with NATO’s Eastward Expansion,” Frontline, February
24, 2022, https://frontline.thehindu.com/dispatches/explained-why-russia-has-a-problem-with-natos-eastward-
expansion/article65220258.ece.
82
Ibid.
83
Nato, “Enlargement and Article 10,” NATO, November 27, 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm.
84
Ibid
.
85
Steven Pifer, “Russia-Ukraine: A Negotiated Settlement Will Be Difficult,” Brookings, April 5, 2022,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-ukraine-a-negotiated-settlement-will-be-difficult/.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 20

membership more vigorously since the invasion, President Zelenskyy shares the same frustration
and has expressed the same multiple times.86 During the early stages of the war, when Russia’s
demand for Ukraine’s neutrality as mentioned earlier was being discussed, President Zelenskyy
remarked,

“We have heard for many years about the open doors, but we also heard that we can’t enter
those doors…. This is the truth, and we have simply to accept it as it is.”87

Again, in July 2023, Zelenskyy took to social media to voice his concerns.88 The President claims
that Ukraine’s NATO membership is used as leverage to bargain with Russia.89

The main reason for stalling Ukraine’s membership during the conflict is due to Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, the heart of the formation of NATO. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states,

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently, they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them…. will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith…. action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force….”

Therefore, if Ukraine joins NATO during the war, NATO will be drawn into an active war with
Russia. While Stoltenberg has expressed NATO’s willingness to discuss providing security
assistance to Ukraine, he remarked that security guarantees can only be given to member

86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Toluse Olorunnipa et al., “Zelensky Slams NATO for Omitting a Timeline for Ukraine to Join,” The Washington
Post, July 11, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/11/zelensky-nato-ukraine-membership-
timeline/.
89
Ibid.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 21

countries.90 Further, the U.S. President, Joe Biden has said that Ukraine still needed a series of
internal reforms before it could join the alliance. 91

However, Ukraine’s chances of becoming a member after the conflict seem brighter. As discussed
earlier, Russia’s original goal of establishing control over Kyiv and setting up a government
weakens by the day. If, Russia succeeds in controlling certain regions, mainly the Donbas region
and Kherson, and retains control of Crimea, Ukraine still retains chances of joining NATO.
Additionally, Stoltenberg has confirmed that a Membership Action Plan would not be required to
approve Ukraine’s membership. 92

Conclusion
The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his nightly address on 31st October 2023,
appealed for the patience of the world and also cautioned against expecting instant success from
the war.93 Zelenskyy’s stance aligns with that of the NATO Chief as both anticipate a prolonged
conflict. As experts and policymakers disagree with the future of the war, it is important to study
the intricacies of the Russia-Ukraine war as it provides insight into the deeply rooted ideological

90
Sabine Siebold, “What Would Happen IF Ukraine Joined NATO? | Reuters,” ed. Philippa Fletcher, Reuters, July
10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-would-happen-if-ukraine-joined-nato-2023-07-05/.

91
Toluse Olorunnipa et al., “Zelensky Slams NATO for Omitting a Timeline for Ukraine to Join,” The Washington
Post, July 11, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/11/zelensky-nato-ukraine-membership-
timeline/.

92
Nato, “Secretary General in Kyiv: Ukraine Is Closer to NATO than Ever Before,” NATO, September 28, 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_218847.htm.

93
“Zelenskiy Asks for Patience with Frontline Offensive | Reuters Video,” Reuters, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW462401112023RP1.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 22

disparities, the significance of geopolitics, the ever-evolving technologies wielded by major
military powers, and the power of international organisations like NATO.

The statement of the Secretary-General of NATO serves as a sobering reminder that the Russia-
Ukraine war is a complex and enduring conflict with no end in sight. As the two countries continue
to solidify their demands, and their military capabilities grow more unclear, the prospects of a
settlement become increasingly dim. Recognizing this reality is imperative for the international
community to steer the path towards a constructive and productive resolution. It is in the utmost
interest of the international community to contribute to the settlements as the conflict has the
potential to escalate into a broader, more far-reaching international crisis that threatens other
actors.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES DECEMBER 2023 23

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