Law of Persons and Family 2nd Edition Sample Chapter
Law of Persons and Family 2nd Edition Sample Chapter
Law of Persons and Family 2nd Edition Sample Chapter
Edited by A Barratt
W Domingo, W Amien, R Denson, JD Mahler-Coetzee,
M Olivier, F Osman, H Schoeman, PP Singh
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.
In line with Pearson’s editorial policy this book has been blind peer reviewed.
Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders. The publishers apologise for any errors
or omissions, and invite copyright holders to contact us if any have occurred, so that they may
be credited.
Photo credits
Cover image: Peopleimages. iStock; p 23 chameleon: fivespots, Shutterstock; p 23 African
native offered in the slave market Congo basin: North Wind Picture Archives / Alamy; p 23
orangutan: Paul McKinnon, Shutterstock
Chapter 2 THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS – DEFINING WORDS AND CONCEPTS IN LAW
– Amanda Barratt 6
1 Defining words and concepts 6
2 What is a ‘person’ – and why does this matter? 7
3 What are rights, duties and legal objects? 8
3.1 Real rights 8
3.2 Personal rights 9
3.3 Personality rights 9
3.4 Constitutional rights 10
4 What is capacity? 10
4.1 Passive legal capacity 10
4.2 Capacity to perform juristic acts 11
4.3 Capacity to be held accountable for wrongdoing (delicts
and crimes) 12
4.4 Capacity to litigate 12
5 What is ‘status’? 13
6 Forms of liability 14
6.1 Contractual liability 14
6.2 Delictual liability 15
6.3 Unjustified enrichment 16
7 Useful remedies, defences and doctrines 17
8 Succession 19
Chapter 7 DOMICILE
– Amanda Barratt and Heidi Schoeman 116
1 What is domicile? 116
2 When is it important to know where a person is domiciled? 117
2.1 Which legal system applies? ‘Choice of law’ or ‘conflict of laws’ or
‘private international law’ 118
3 Where is a person domiciled? Domicile Act 3 of 1992 120
4 Domicile of choice 120
4.1 Is the person competent to establish a domicile of choice? 121
4.2 Has the person in fact established a domicile of choice? 121
5 Domicile of closest connection 124
6 Domicile of origin 126
7 Proving domicile 126
8 Exclusivity and tenacity of domicile 127
9 Excluding Renvoi 128
Chapter 4 ENGAGEMENTS
– Jacques Mahler-Coetzee 227
1 Common law and the contents of an engagement 227
2 Capacity to conclude a contract of engagement 228
3 Termination of the contract of engagement 228
4 Breach of contract of engagement 229
5 Damages for breach of contract of engagement 230
5.1 Breach of contract 230
5.2 Delictual damages: the actio inuiriarum 233
5.3 Reconsidering damages for termination of engagement? 233
6 Return of the engagement gifts 234
7 The fate of children 235
BIBLIOGRAPHY 464
TABLE OF STATUTES 479
TABLE OF CASES 488
INDEX 499
various types of legal literature. Again, the emphasis is on how to use the sources when solving
legal problems.
The book contains several design features which make it a useful learning resource for law
students: there are activity features in all the chapters and a ‘review your understanding’ section at
the end of each chapter. We also list core ‘further reading’ at the end of each chapter, and the book
has a full bibliography for those who wish to read beyond the ‘further reading’ lists. We use the
index instead of a formal, separate glossary. Some of the terms in the index are typed in bold, and
we provide the page number where you can find a full definition and explanation of the term.
We use the ‘Obiter’ feature for additional information and discussion. Many of the Obiter
discussions originate from questions asked by students during our lectures. The answers we gave
were not core to our lectures, but students found them interesting or useful, and we thought it
would be worthwhile to include parts of those discussions in this book.
Another core aim of a law school is to invite students to think critically about the law and its
rules. Everyone who works with the law should ask questions such as: ‘Is this a good rule?’; ‘Why
does the rule look like this?’; ‘Is this rule unfair?’; ‘Does this rule have the desired effect?’ In Part 1
of the book, we often use the Obiter boxes to ask critical questions like this.
Here is an overview of the chapters in the first part of the book.
Chapter 2 has two parts. The first part discusses the question: ‘What is a person – and why
does this matter?’ In the first part of Chapter 2 we define and discuss the concepts ‘person’, ‘rights’,
‘legal object’, ‘capacity’ and ‘status.’ These are foundational concepts for the law of persons.
The second part of Chapter 2 is really a reference resource. Here we discuss concepts that are
not core to the law of persons as such, but which originate in other branches of law such as the
law of obligations, the law of property, and the law of succession. In particular, we examine forms
of civil liability, important legal remedies, and the basic rules of succession. You will need to
know something about these concepts as you work through the book. In our experience, students
do not always find it meaningful to read the sections on forms of liability and remedies before
they start working with these concepts in the more focused contexts of the later chapters. You
might find it more useful to return to these sections later when you really need an explanation.
However, we have found that students find it very practical to have the forms of liability and the
most important remedies grouped together in one place. This enables them to see an overall
structure, and makes it easier to find (or compare) forms of liability or remedies when this is
relevant while reading other chapters in the book.
Chapter 3 expands on the concept ‘person’ or ‘legal subject’. We discuss how someone
becomes a ‘person’. What does the law regard as ‘live birth’ and why is this important? We learn
that the unborn can never have rights, but that under some circumstances, the law will take note
of the unborn and protect their potential interests. In the last part of the chapter we distinguish
between people (legal subjects) and other animals (legal objects). We end the chapter by making
you think hard about this distinction by considering the position of non-human animals in
relation to the legal system.
Chapter 4 is the longest chapter in Part 1. Here we focus on ‘minors’ – people below the age
of 18 – and explore how and why the law restricts the legal capacity of minors. How does the law
protect minors from the consequences of foolish or irresponsible acts? What about the other
people involved? Does the law offer them any protection when dealing with minors?
Chapter 5 looks at sex and gender. In the past, the law discriminated against women because
of their sex, particularly in the context of marriage law. Nowadays men and women are equal in
the eyes of the law, and the Constitution forbids any unfair discrimination against women.
Interestingly, however, it does permit some discrimination that is not unfair. We will examine
situations where the law treats people differently because of their sex and ask whether this
discrimination is fair or unfair. We will also explore how the law deals with gender and the issue
of sexual re-alignment in those who are born with the physical signs of one sex, but who believe
and feel themselves to be the opposite sex to the one they are biologically.
Chapter 6 looks at the limitations which the law places on the capacity to act of some other
categories of people. Here we focus particularly on the capacity of people who are mentally ill.
Can mentally ill people make valid wills? What about people who are so drunk that they don’t
know what they are doing? Can you get drunk and wake up legally married? We will also examine
restrictions on the capacity to act of people who are insolvent or have been declared prodigals. In
the last part of the chapter we look at how the law deals with people who have some physical
disability that makes it difficult for them to manage their affairs.
So far we have examined how age, sex and factors such as mental illness influence a person’s
capacity in the law. Chapter 7 deals with a factor that also has a significant effect on a person’s
status in the law – his or her place of domicile. As you will see, your domicile affects such matters
as your personal status, the property system under which you are married and what judicial
system operates in deciding how your estate will be settled when you die.
Chapter 8 is about death and the end of legal personality. Of course, death has important
legal implications. However, there is no clear and unambiguous legal definition of ‘death’.
What happens if someone disappears and everyone believes that they must be dead but can’t
produce a corpse to prove it? How can we create legal certainty about the death – and why is this
important? These are some of the questions we will examine in the section on presumption of death.
Chapter 9 looks at the law regarding the human corpse. Dead people have no rights. So why
is the law so concerned about the treatment of dead bodies? In this chapter we examine organ
donations and transplants, and the problem of trafficking in human tissue for commercial gain.
Words and concepts are the tools of the law. Unlike Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking
Glass, we are not free to decide what the words and concepts mean. In law, words and concepts
have very precise meanings – and this is what they mean, ‘neither more nor less’ as Humpty
Dumpty might say.
Lawyers are deeply concerned with definitions of words and concepts. They want to know
precisely what the words mean ... whole court cases sometimes hinge on the meaning of a
particular word.2 You will notice that Acts of Parliament often begin with a lengthy section called
‘definitions’. This section explains precisely what the words mean in the context of the statute.3
The first book on Roman-Dutch law, Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland (Inleiding
tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd) was written by Hugo Grotius. The first official publication
of this book (in 1631) began with a foreword addressed to ‘Dear Reader’, which explained that
the reason for publishing the book was that unscrupulous publishers had been printing
unauthorised copies that were ‘all imperfect and full of mistakes’. The reader is assured that this
author ‘has been careful to make definitions correspond with the words defined, a matter in
which the jurists often go wrong.’4 So there is evidence of the need to define legal words and
concepts precisely on the first page of the very first published work on Roman-Dutch law.
1 The quotation above is from Through the Looking Glass, a still popular book that was written for children in the
nineteenth century. (Carroll, 1998: 186).
2 See, for example, Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) where the Constitutional Court considers
the legal meanings of the words ‘husband’, ‘wife’, ‘spouse’, and ‘marriage’.
3 See, for example, section 1 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, which has several pages of definitions.
4 The quotations in this paragraph are from the Dear Reader foreword to Grotius’s Introduction to the Jurisprudence
of Holland as translated by R.W. Lee (Oxford University Press, 1926). Lee writes about the publishing history
of Grotius’s work in his own preface. He explains that Grotius wrote his book while imprisoned at the Castle of
Loevenstein between 1619 and 1621. Grotius did not intend to publish this work: he wrote it to teach his own
children about the laws of their country. However, defective copies of the book began to circulate in the 1620s, and
it was in response to this that Grotius decided to authorise the first official publication of the book in 1631.
of being recognised as a ‘person’ in the eyes of the law is that a person can have legal rights and
duties. We explain why this is so important to the operation of our legal system by examining the
concepts ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ in some detail.
The rights and duties of a legal person depend in part on that person’s ‘status’ in law and on
the ‘capacities’ that such status gives. ‘Status’ and ‘capacity’ are core concepts in the law of persons,
and are the subject of the longest chapter in the book, which looks at the capacities of people who
have the status of ‘minors’. This introductory chapter provides an introduction to the concepts
‘capacity’ and ‘status’ as background to this part of the book.
We also use this chapter to introduce and define words and concepts from other areas of
private law. It is not possible to study the law of persons without referring to ‘liability’. All the
chapters in Part 1 require the reader to have a basic knowledge of what it means to be ‘liable’, for
example, ‘liable in contract’ or ‘delictually liable’. In this chapter, we provide introductory
explanations for three forms of liability: (a) contractual liability, (b) delictual liability, and
(c) liability for unjustified enrichment.
Many of the chapters in Part 1 refer to important legal ‘remedies’ that arise from contract,
delict, or unjustified enrichment. We have grouped together some of the most important
remedies at the end of this chapter, where we explain them briefly.
Finally, we provide a brief introduction to the law of succession because readers will require
some knowledge of this area of law when reading later chapters.
When you have worked through this chapter, you should be able to answer the following
questions:
•• What is a person (legal subject)?
•• What is a legal object?
•• What are the various classes of rights?
•• What is legal capacity?
•• What are the various types of legal capacity?
•• What is legal status?
The last three sections of the chapter are intended primarily for future reference. As you work
through this book, you can return to these sections for introductions to:
1. Forms of liability:
a) contractual
b) delictual
c) unjustified enrichment
2. Useful legal remedies
3. Introductory rules for the law of succession.
Some writers prefer to use the term ‘legal subject’ rather than ‘person’.8 The term ‘legal subject’
means exactly the same thing as ‘person’, as Boberg defines it. In other words, a legal subject is a
being or other entity which is capable of having legal rights and duties.
You will also encounter the term ‘legal personality’. All persons have legal personality. This
phrase describes the quality of being a person (as defined above). Some writers prefer the term
‘legal subjectivity’, which emphasises the legal aspects of a person’s activities and existence. Legal
subjectivity is a synonym for legal personality.9
The importance of being a ‘person’ in the eyes of the law is that the law recognises that you
can have legal rights and duties. Only persons can have legal rights and duties. In law, ‘this is the
essential characteristic that distinguishes a person from a thing’,10 or from ‘legal objects’ more
specifically.
All legal rights give rise to corresponding legal duties. The kind of duty or obligation to which the
right gives rise depends on what kind of right is involved. This may be illustrated by using some
specific examples:
3.1 Real rights
Where the object of a right is a physical thing, the right is a real right. Ownership of a physical
thing is an example of a real right. The most interesting aspect of a real right is that it operates
against the whole world. For example, if a person owns a thing, everybody else in the world has a
corresponding duty towards him or her: they must not interfere with his or her real right of
ownership.
8 See, for example, Boezaart (2010: 3); Heaton (2012: 4); Hosten (1980: 281–283) using both terms.
9 See Boezaart (2010: 5), providing the following definition: ‘Legal subjectivity concerns the characteristic of being a
legal subject in legal intercourse.’ She contrasts this with their social or commercial activities.
10 Boberg (1999: 3).
11 This approach is clearly set out in Hosten (1980: 277–278); Boezaart (2010: 2–3); and Heaton (2012: 2–4).
12 Not all private law rights fit comfortably into these categories. Many writers also identify ‘immaterial property
rights’ as an independent category of rights. The objects of these rights are patents, copyrights, or other forms
of intellectual property protection (see, for example, Boezaart (2010: 2); Heaton (2012: 4); Hosten (1980: 278)).
Whether the literary work or invention to which the copyright or patent relates is in itself the object of the right is
an extremely complex and controversial issue. For a useful overview see Kamina (2001: 383).
Where the object of the right is one of these aspects of personality, the right is a personality right.
Personality rights operate against the whole world. Everyone else in the world has a corresponding
duty to respect these rights and must not interfere with them.
3.4 Constitutional rights
The rights we have examined above (real rights, personal rights, and personality rights) are
private law rights. Constitutional rights are public law rights. They are set out in the Bill of
Rights in the South African Constitution, 1996 (sections 7–39).14
The Constitution is the supreme law of the country and, in principle, no rule of law (whether
it comes from common law or from a statute) should violate any of the constitutional rights. In
this book, we will discuss what happens when common law or statutory rules are ‘unconstitutional’.
What happens when existing rules infringe someone’s constitutional rights?
4 WHAT IS ‘CAPACITY’?
In general terms, ‘capacity’ means ‘ability’ or ‘competence’. This is close to its legal meaning. In
law, ‘capacity’ refers to what a person is capable of doing in terms of the law. In other words,
what are the person’s legal abilities or legal competencies? Capacity is a complex legal concept
and has given rise to considerable debate among legal commentators.15
Boberg has a clear and straightforward approach to capacity: first, he distinguishes between
‘passive legal capacity’ and ‘active legal capacity’. Then he divides ‘active legal capacity’ into
various types or forms of active legal capacity. This chapter follows Boberg’s approach. This is the
overall structure:
•• passive legal capacity
•• capacity to perform juristic acts (for example, enter into contracts, get married, transfer
ownership of property)
•• capacity to be held accountable for wrongdoing (crimes and delicts)
•• capacity to litigate.
14 Human rights are often understood to give rise to three kinds of state obligations: states have obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil people’s human rights. Section 7(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘The state must protect,
promote and fulfil the rights of the Bill of Rights.’ This particular approach is often called the ‘tripartite typology’.
See, for example, Steiner and Alston (2000: 181). The rights in the South African Constitution also apply to
relationships between private individuals (see Currie and De Waal, 2005: 50, 64).
15 See the discussion in Boberg (1999: 65–74).
16 This is part of the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary.
17 Boberg (1999: 66).
18 See the definition of ‘person’ above.
body.19 A newborn baby might even have obligations. Boberg gives the example of the child’s
duty to support his or her parents if he or she has the means to do so and the parents are in need
of support (for example, if the child has a large inheritance).20
We will discuss whether or not various categories of people have the capacity to perform these
juristic acts in the various contexts of the chapters in this book. The longest discussion in the
following chapters concerns the minor’s limited capacity to perform juristic acts. There, we will
look particularly at the minor’s capacity to incur binding contractual obligations.
19 See, for example, the discussion in Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 (6) SA 215 (SCA).
20 See Boberg (1999: 66 fn 8). See Part 2, Chapter 2 for more information on the reciprocal duties of support between
parents and children.
21 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 146) defining juristic acts as ‘voluntary human acts to which the law attaches at least
some of the legal consequences willed by the party or parties performing the act’.
22 See Boberg (1999: 746).
23 Wille’s Principles (2007: 173).
24 Boberg (1999: 747).
25 As we discuss in the following chapters, age and mental disability have an enormous impact on a person’s capacity
to act. Marriage might impact on a person’s capacity to act (we look at this in Part 2). Sex has very little impact on
a person’s capacity to act (we discuss this in Part 1, Chapter 5 on sex and gender). Sometimes a man like the one
described here might be legally prohibited from entering into certain contracts. This might be the case if he is an
interdicted prodigal or insolvent. We discuss this in Part 1, Chapter 6 on diverse factors that might influence a
person’s status and capacities.
26 The list is modelled on Boberg’s table of contents.
Intention and negligence are complex concepts. They are defined simply here:
People act with intention if they do something ‘on purpose’ or deliberately: they know
what will happen, and they purposefully go about achieving this result. For example,
person Z knows that Mr Smit’s cat will die if he shoots it, and he deliberately achieves
OBITER
In this book, however, our concern is not so much whether people acted with intention or
negligence, but whether they were even capable of having legal intention or negligence. If the
person is capable of having the mental states of intention or negligence he or she can be held
accountable for his or her crimes and delicts. If they are not capable of having these mental states,
they can never be accountable for crimes or delicts.31
A person will be accountable (that is, capable of having ‘fault’ in the form of intention or
negligence) if
a) the person has the mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and
b) the person is able to act in accordance with this understanding.32
As you will see in the following chapters, some people are not regarded as accountable in this way
(for example, very young children and people suffering from mental illness). Because these
people are not accountable and cannot form the mental states of intention or negligence, they
cannot be held liable in delict33 or be found guilty of a crime. In Latin, if a person is accountable
(that is, capable of fault in the form of negligence or intention) he or she is culpae capax.34
27 For more information about delictual liability see section 6.2 of this chapter.
28 Note the exception of the actio de pauperie and similar delicts that do not require fault. We discuss this in Part 1,
Chapter 4 on minority.
29 This form of intention is defined as ‘dolus directus’ or ‘direct intention’.
30 See Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430.
31 There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as the actio de pauperie which we discuss in Part 1, Chapter 4.
32 Wille’s Principles (2007: 1122) citing Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 (1) SA 381 (A) at 403.
33 With the exception of strict liability delicts. See the discussion in Part 1, Chapter 4.
34 For a general discussion on accountability as requirement for delictual liability, see Neethling (2010: 125–126). For a
discussion on the requirements for criminal accountability, see Burchell (2005: 455–554); Snyman (2008: 159–162).
question is not whether the person has a good case in law – it is whether she or he can bring the
case to the court.
A person might have an excellent case, for example, it might be clear that X has committed a
delict against her by driving through a red robot and crashing into her car. But if she has no
capacity to litigate, she will not be able to sue X in court.
In Latin, people’s capacity to litigate is referred to as their locus standi in judicio.
5 WHAT IS ‘STATUS’?
In the legal context, the word ‘status’ means your standing in the eyes of the law.35 People’s legal
status determines their ‘ability or capacity to relate to the legal system’.36 Specifically, a person’s
status determines which legal capacities a person has in the eyes of the law37 – how do we know
if a person has the capacity to conclude contracts, get married, or litigate? This will depend on his
or her ‘status’.
A person’s legal status (and his or her consequent legal capacities) is based on membership of
a particular class or group.38 The law is not concerned with all kinds of groups. Paton points out
that it is possible to identify various groups of people – he uses the example of people with blue
eyes, or people who play bridge.39 But the law is not concerned with such groups.40 As we explain
in the following chapters, the law is primarily concerned with groups of people defined in terms
of age and mental disability (we also look at sex and gender, intoxication, prodigality, insolvency
and physical disability as factors that might affect status and capacity). Marriage also affects
people’s status, and might affect their legal capacities. People who marry in community of
property, for example, have limited capacity to perform some juristic acts.41
On the whole, it is not possible to choose which of these groups you belong to.42 All 17-year-
olds fall into the class ‘minors’ for example.43 Furthermore, once the law assigns you to a class and
thus gives you a particular status, you cannot change the capacities conferred by this status.44 The
various capacities associated with a status are ‘conclusively fixed’ by the law, not chosen by the
people who have a particular status.45 All minors have limited capacity to bind themselves in
contract.46 This is the legal consequence of their minority status.
The law decides which groups will be associated with legal status. In South African law, for
example, membership of the group ‘minors’ affects legal status; membership of the group ‘blue-
eyed people’ does not. South African law also decides which people fall into the various groups –
how do we know that a 17-year-old is a minor? This is a rule of South African law. The Children’s
Act provides that the age of majority is 18.47
In South African law, a person’s status is determined by their legal domicile.48 The law of the
country of domicile determines which groups are important, and which group the person
belongs to. We discuss this in the Chapter 7 on domicile.
6 FORMS OF LIABILITY
Many of the chapters in the law of persons’ part of this book refer to various forms of civil
liability. The most important forms of civil liability discussed in this part of the book are:
•• contractual liability
•• delictual liability
•• liability for unjustified enrichment.
As background to the discussions in the following chapters, we set out some of the foundational
principles of these forms of liability here. You might prefer to postpone reading this section on
liability until you need to understand a particular form of liability in the context of another
chapter.
6.1 Contractual liability
A contract is an agreement between two or more people that can be enforced by legal mechanisms
if necessary. A contract is a juristic act through which the parties agree that one or both of them
will incur legal obligations to carry out certain performances – for example, to give something or
do something.49 Most contracts are reciprocal. This means that the parties agree that their
performances will be offered in exchange for the other party’s performance.50 A typical example
of this is a contract of sale.
For example, Mr Lee is selling a special underwater camera in his shop for R10 000. Trixie
offers to buy the camera. Trixie and Mr Lee enter into a contract in terms of which Mr Lee will
deliver the camera to Trixie and Trixie will pay Mr Lee R10 000. These performances are
reciprocal.
Suing someone ‘ex contractu’ (that is, on the basis of contract) is a very powerful claim. In
principle, you can use a contractual claim to get everything the person agreed to pay or do in
terms of the contract. The court can order specific performance from the other contracting
party. For example, the court can order that person to pay all the money he or she owes in terms
of the contract; or deliver the goods he or she promised; or perform the services he or she
promised.51 In our example, a court could order Mr Lee to hand over the camera, or order Trixie
to pay R10 000.
Where there has been a breach of contract, the court can order the breaching party to pay
damages. These damages can be extensive; they are aimed at putting the innocent party in the
47 Children’s Act 38 of 2005, s 17. The age of majority was changed in July 2007. Before this date, the age of majority
was 21, and 20-year-olds were thus minors. Since July 2007, 20-year-olds are majors in the eyes of the law.
48 Wille’s Principles (2007: 53); Hosten (1980: 284–285).
49 See Hutchison (2012: 7).
50 Hutchison (2012: 7).
51 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 738). Note, however, that the court will not always order a specific performance. There
are ‘some types of performance that the law cannot enforce, and others that it will not enforce’ (see Wille’s Principles,
2007: 738). See also Eiselen (2012: 322–324).
same position they would have been in if the terms of the contract had been fully and faultlessly
performed.52
Mr Lee promises to deliver the special underwater camera before 5 January (the day
the expedition team leaves). Unfortunately, he fails to do so. There is no other suitable
camera available in the whole of South Africa. Trixie is unable to take the unique
photographs, and she loses her opportunity to earn the R100 000.
What damages can Trixie claim from Mr Lee? How much money could she claim to put
her in the position that she would have been in if there had been full and faultless
performance of the contract (that is, if Mr Lee had delivered the camera in good time)?
This book focuses on people who either lack contractual capacity altogether, or who have limited
capacity to contract. People who have limited capacity to contract (for example, unassisted
minors between the ages of seven and 18) cannot incur binding contractual obligations. This
means that the other party to the contract will be unable to sue them ex contractu (on the basis of
contract) and will not have the benefit of the powerful contractual remedies. In some cases (for
example, if the contract involves an infant under seven or a person who is mentally ill), the
contract will be entirely void in the eyes of the law. As far as the law is concerned, there is no
contract at all – nothing happened. The parties must be put back in the same position that they
were immediately before the purported (apparent) contract was entered into.53
6.2 Delictual liability
Delicts are civil wrongs.54 A good example of a delict is a car accident. For example, if Sophia
drives her car through a red light and crashes into Mr Larney’s BMW, Mr Larney might be able
to sue Sophia in delict. To bring a delictual claim against a person, you must prove all the
‘elements of delict’.
52 The aim of these damages is to put the person in the position that he would have been in if there had been ‘full
and faultless performance’ of the contract (Hosten, 1980: 427–428). See Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co v
Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD, holding that ‘the rule to be adopted is that it should be put in as good
position by the award of damages as it would have been in if the defendant company had carried out its contract’
(at 46); see also Wille’s Principles (2007: 882–883); Eiselen (2012: 329–340). We say that the person suing for breach
of contract is entitled to positive interesse. See Boezaart (2010: 56 fn 76).
53 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 738–739), noting that the purported contract is ‘worthless and non-existent’.
54 Boberg (1989: 1).
55 As explained above, infants (for example) are not legally capable of acting with either intention or negligence. This
means that this element of delict cannot be satisfied when the act of an infant causes damage to someone else.
You use specific delictual remedies to claim damages for different kinds of harm.57 We discuss
some of these delictual remedies in the section on ‘remedies’ below. In general, the law
distinguishes between ‘patrimonial’ and ‘non-patrimonial’ damages. You sue for patrimonial
damages when the defendant’s act causes you financial or monetary loss. In our example,
Mr Larney can bring a delictual claim for the money he spends fixing his car; and for receiving
treatment in hospital. The aim of these patrimonial damages is to put the plaintiff (Mr Larney) in
the same financial position that he would have been in if the delict had not been committed.58
You can also sue in delict for non-patrimonial damages (for non-monetary harm). For
example, Mr Larney might have experienced considerable pain and suffering as a result of his
accident. Mr Larney’s pain does not cause him any financial loss. However, the law will still
award him delictual damages (in the form of money) as compensation for the pain caused by
Sophia’s wrongful and negligent act.59 These are non-patrimonial damages. The aim of non-
patrimonial damages awarded for pain and suffering is to compensate the plaintiff: to somehow
‘make good the loss; to amend the injury’.60 People can also sue for non-patrimonial damages if
other personality interests have been infringed – for example if someone damages their
reputation, invades their privacy, or harms their body. The aim of an award of damages under the
actio iniuriarum is to ‘compensate for impairment of personality rights’.61
6.3 Unjustified enrichment
Unjustified enrichment claims are the ‘Cinderella claims’ of our legal system. In practice, these
tend to be the claims you use when all else fails.62 Compared to the powerful contractual claims,
unjustified enrichment claims are very weak. Sometimes you will see these claims referred to as
‘quasi-contractual’ claims. It is important to remember, however, that these are not contractual
claims. Also, you should note that if a party does have a valid contractual claim, he or she must
sue in contract (ex contractu) and cannot use an enrichment remedy.63
In general,64 an action on the grounds of unjustified enrichment arises where ‘one person’s
estate is increased at the expense of another without legal cause’.65 The basic requirements for the
remedy are:
1. The defendant has been factually enriched, and the plaintiff has been factually impoverished.
2. There is a causal link between the defendant’s enrichment and the plaintiff ’s impoverishment
(in other words, the defendant has been enriched at the plaintiff ’s expense).
56 These ‘elements of delict’ are set out in Wille’s Principles page 1094 and briefly discussed on pages 1094–1095. See also
Boberg (1989: 24–25). The question of ‘wrongfulness’ is particularly complex and controversial. For a brief introduction
and overview of wrongfulness see Wille’s Principles (2007: 1096–1102). See also Neethling (2010), generally.
57 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 1092).
58 Wille’s Principles (2007: 1133); Boberg (1989: 478).
59 Boberg (1989: 516); Wille’s Principles (2007: 1161).
60 Per Moseneke DCJ in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) at para 41.
61 Burchell (1998: 435).
62 See Visser (2008: 9), pointing out that enrichment claims are used ‘where the rules of contract, delict, and property
“run out”,’ but arguing that unjustified enrichment should be seen as ‘an autonomous area of obligations’. See also
Sonnekus (2008: 29), discussing the view of enrichment remedies as offering ‘the last ray of hope’.
63 See BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391. However, see also Visser’s
discussion on unjustified enrichment claims as ‘subsidiary’ to contractual claims (2008: 56–59).
64 It appears that South African law does not have a general ‘unjustified enrichment’ claim and that strictly speaking,
enrichment claims arise only in certain recognised situations (see Visser, 2008: 4–5). Sonnekus (2008: 17). These,
however, are the general principles that underpin the claim in these situations.
65 Visser (2007: 1041–1043), quoting Lotz & Brand.
3. There is no valid legal reason (cause) that justifies the enrichment of the defendant at the
plaintiff ’s expense, or that justifies the retention of the enrichment by the defendant.66
You can already see some of the reasons why this claim is weaker than a contractual claim. If
a person sues in contract, she or he can sue for the full amount owing in terms of the contract. In
unjustified enrichment, however, her or his claim is limited to the amount of the plaintiff ’s
factual impoverishment (see point 1 above).67 Imagine, for example, that a certain Mr Lee sells an
iPod to Bibi and the purchase price is R2 000. If Bibi is bound by her contract and doesn’t pay,
Mr Lee can sue Bibi ex contractu for the full amount owing. So if Bibi has not yet paid anything,
Mr Lee can sue Bibi for R2 000.
If Mr Lee is unable to sue Bibi on the contract (for example, if Bibi is an unassisted minor)
then Mr Lee could potentially bring a claim based on unjustified enrichment. Unjustified
enrichment claims are limited to the factual amount of the plaintiff ’s impoverishment.68 As it
happens, the real worth of the iPod is only R1 500. This means that the most Mr Lee will be able
to claim is R1 500. In fact, he has only been impoverished to the amount of R1 500-worth of iPod,
and the unjustified enrichment claim is based on factual impoverishment and not on the contract
price (that is, the enrichment claim is not based on the purchase price of R2 000).69
Another weakness of the unjustified enrichment remedy is that the plaintiff can sue only for
the amount that the defendant in fact remains enriched by, on the day that the plaintiff institutes
his or her action.70 This could be a problem for Mr Lee. Imagine for example that Bibi drops the
iPod into the ocean and it gets swept out to sea: now Bibi is no longer enriched by R1 500-worth
of iPod. This is unfortunate for Mr Lee – he is using an unjustified enrichment remedy, and his
claim is limited to the amount of Bibi’s factual remaining enrichment. Unfortunately for Mr Lee,
Bibi’s remaining enrichment is now zero.71
66 Visser (2007: 1041–1046). See also Visser (2008: 157). Sonnekus (2008: 1).
67 This is because of the ‘double cap rule’ (see, for example, Visser (2008: 8)). The plaintiff ’s claim is limited to the
extent of his impoverishment.
68 Visser (2008: 158–159).
69 But see Part 1, Chapter 4 discussing the rule that the contract price will set a maximum cap on what can be claimed
in situations where the true value of the thing is more than the contract price.
70 This is the other side of the ‘double cap rule’. Wille’s Principles (2007: 1049–1050); Visser (2008: 163).
71 We will look at other ways in which factual enrichment might be reduced or wiped out in Part 1, Chapter 4 on minority.
72 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 539); Silberberg (2006: 242–246).
73 See generally Visser (2008); and Visser (2007: 1041–1090); Sonnekus (2008).
offering to perform, B can raise the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus. This defence
gives B the right to withhold his performance until A has performed her side of the deal.74
The Aquilian action (called the actio legis Aquiliae in Latin) is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff
can use this remedy to claim damages for patrimonial loss caused by the defendant’s wrongful
act. The defendant must have acted with either intention or negligence.75
The actio iniuriarum is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff can use this remedy to claim non-
patrimonial damages when her or his personality rights have been infringed.76 The actio
iniuriarum requires fault in the form of intention; the plaintiff cannot use this remedy if the
defendant has been merely negligent.77
The action for pain and suffering is a delictual remedy. A plaintiff can use this remedy to sue
for non-patrimonial damages arising from physical injury (for example, caused in a car accident).
She or he can sue for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability and loss of amenities of life, and
shortened life expectancy.78 The defendant must have acted with either intention or negligence.79
The doctrine of estoppel provides that:
1. where A has lied, and
2. B has relied on A’s lie to B’s disadvantage, then
3. A will be prevented (‘estopped’) from relying on the truth in her or his defence.80
Note that some of these remedies are ‘actions’. X takes the initiative and brings the case to court
using the remedy, for example, the actio iniuriarum or the rei vindicatio. The exceptio non
adimpleti contractus, however, is only a defence (i.e., not an ‘action’). B can use this exceptio only
if and when A sues her for performance.
You should also distinguish between the property-based claim (the rei vindicatio) and the
personal claims. The rei vindicatio is part of the law of property. The rei vindicatio is based on
ownership of the thing. It can be brought against anyone who is in possession of the thing
without cause. It is a claim in rem (rem means, ‘thing’, in Latin).81 It is based on a real right.
Claims based on contract, delict, or unjustified enrichment are part of the law of obligations.
The contractual, delictual and enrichment remedies cannot be brought against just anyone – they
can be brought only against a particular person. These are claims in personam.
74 U-Drive Franchise Systems (Pty) Ltd v Drive Yourself (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 137 (D) at 149D. See Wille’s Principles
(2007: 827–828). This remedy is available only if A has contracted to perform before B or at the same time as B. See
Skead v Conradie 1995 (2) SA 111 (A) at 118I. See also Eiselen (2012: 316–321).
75 Boberg (1989: 268–269). In practice, most claims are based on negligence rather than intention (Boberg, 1989: 269).
See also Neethling (2010: 8).
76 Wille’s Principles (2007: 1166). Neethling (2010: 12).
77 Boberg (1989: 18).
78 See Boberg (1989: 516); Wille’s Principles (2007: 1161); Neethling (2010: 15).
79 Boberg (1989: 516).
80 See, for example, the definition provided in Miller v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) at para 18. See also Wille’s
Principles (2007: 552).
81 The Latin word for ‘thing’ is res. In Latin, the form of the word changes depending on the context. Rem is the same
word, and so is rei.
8 SUCCESSION
This is the area of private law governing what happens to your property when you die. You will
need to have a basic knowledge of the law of succession as you work through some of the chapters
in this book.82
The property of the person who dies is referred to as ‘the estate’. Your estate means everything
you own: this includes all your physical property, for example, house, farm, car, clothes, CD
collection, and so on, and all the money you have in the bank.
If you die without a valid will, you die
‘intestate’ and your estate will be divided up Intestate succession if not married
according to the rules of ‘intestate succession’. and have no children:
‘Intestate succession’ means inheritance where
A
there is no valid will. Leaves R12 000
The basic rule of intestate succession is that
the estate must be divided among the deceased’s
next of kin (closest family).83 Here are some
typical examples: Mother gets Father gets
In Example One, A is unmarried and she has R6 000 R6 000
no children. However, both her parents are still
alive. In this situation, her next of kin are her Figure 2.4: Example 1 Intestate succession
parents and they will share her estate equally.
In Example Two, B is married and has two Intestate succession married
children. His wife and two children share the with two children:
estate equally.
Testate succession means succession in B
terms of a will. The basic rule is that the wishes Leaves R12 million
expressed in the will must be carried out.84 The
person who writes the will is called the testator.
If the will fails for some reason (for example, the Wife gets Child D gets
R4 million R4 million
person who is supposed to inherit the entire
estate in terms of the will is already dead), then
the rules of intestate succession will apply.85 Child C gets
For all forms of succession, the estate ‘vests’ R4 million
(becomes due) on the day of the deceased’s
death.86 Figure 2.5: Example 2 Intestate succession
82 For more information on the law of succession see Jamneck and Rautenbach (2009), De Waal (2008) and Palekar
(2007: 666–729).
83 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 679–682) for a full explanation of who the ‘next of kin’ are in terms of South African
Law of Succession.
84 See Wille’s Principles (2007: 683–684).
85 Wille’s Principles (2007: 679).
86 Wille’s Principles (2007: 679).