Disarmament &

Security Committee

Agenda 1: Methods to Prevent

and Terminate the Proliferation
of SALWs in the Sahel Region of
Africa
Agenda 2: Discussing the use of
Artificial Intelligence and
Remote Drones in Covert Warfare
BACKGROUND GUIDE
Letter from the Executive Board
Dear Delegates,
We are honored and pleased to welcome you all to the
United Nations General Assembly Disarmament and
International Security (First Committee) at Future MUN
2024. As representatives of member nations of the DISEC,
you are tasked with debating, deliberating, and reaching a
consensus on the agenda at hand.

This background guide has been designed to help you get

started on your research. However, this document shouldn’t
be your only source of research. Building upon the outlook
presented by this guide, you are expected to carry out your
research through authentic sources and make sure to
engage in comprehensive and pragmatic debate throughout
the sessions.

The Executive Board will not interfere in the flow of debate

unless required. Therefore, the onus to ensure that the
committee does not stagnate lies on the delegates. We
strongly believe that with good research, delegates will be
able to steer the committee in the right direction. Please do
not hesitate to get in touch with the Executive Board at any
time before or during the conference in case you have any
queries about the agenda or the rules of procedure.

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We request the delegates not to view this conference as a
zero-sumgame. Model UN conferences are collaborative
rather than competitive and we would like to keep this spirit
alive during our committee. Our goal isn’t to solve the
world’s problems in three days, but rather to educate
ourselves about them, thereby ensuring that we go on to
become a generation of sensitized leaders, equipped with
the skills and will to make our world a better place.

With that being said, we wish you all good luck and eagerly
look forward to the conference.

With warm regards,

Yash Nikhil Mutnalkar Sahit S Bangre Raghavendra K

Co-Chairperson Co-Chairperson Moderator

Executive Board
Disarmament and International Security Committee (First
Committee)

Disarmament & Security Committee

Overview
The First Committee deals with disarmament, global
challenges, and threats to peace that affect the international
community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the
international security regime. It considers all disarmament
and international security matters within the scope of the
Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other
organ of the United Nations; the general principles of
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and
security, as well as principles governing disarmament and
the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative
arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability
through lower levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United

Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee
of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records
coverage.

Mandate and Mechanisms

In general, DISEC, like other GA committees, discusses

those issues for which the Security Council may carry out
enforceable decisions and measures such as economic
sanctions. In other words, DISEC may not impose sanctions
or authorize military action in its resolutions, but rather
serves as a recommendatory body, voicing the opinions of

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UN member states on critical security issues to bodies that
can take action based on these recommendations, such as
the Security Council.

Nature and Proof of Evidence

Documents from the following sources will be considered as

credible proof for statements that require verification:

• Reuters: Documents and articles from the ReutersNews

agency will be used to corroborate or refute controversial
statements made in committee.

• UN Documents: Documents by all UN agencies will be

considered sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies
including treaty-based bodies will also be accepted.

• National Government Reports: Government Reports of a

given country used to corroborate an allegation on the same
aforementioned country will be accepted as proof. The
documents stated above will hold a binding nature of the
establishment.

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UN member states on critical security issues to bodies that
can take action based on these recommendations, such as
the Security Council.

Nature and Proof of Evidence

Documents from the following sources will be considered as

credible proof for statements that require verification:

• Reuters: Documents and articles from the ReutersNews

agency will be used to corroborate or refute controversial
statements made in committee.

• UN Documents: Documents by all UN agencies will be

considered sufficient proof. Reports from all UN bodies
including treaty-based bodies will also be accepted.

• National Government Reports: Government Reports of a

given country used to corroborate an allegation on the same
aforementioned country will be accepted as proof. The
documents stated above will hold a binding nature of the
establishment.

Disarmament & Security Committee

Agenda 1: Methods to Prevent and
Terminate the Proliferation of
SALWs in the Sahel Region of
Africa
Since independence, African states have found themselves
in a vicious circle of conflict, violence, and full-fledged
wars. The sources and causes of conflicts transformed in
time, from the coup infested decades of the 1960s and 70s,
to the cold war influenced civil wars of the late 1980s and
1990s.18 Although the continent managed to show progress
in decreasing full-fledged wars in the 2000s, it, however,
saw an upsurge in terrorist operations, post-election
violence and secessionist movements which produced as
many fatalities as the wars in the previous decades. This
agenda primarily highlights the severity and complexity of
the challenge at hand, encompassing a vast and diverse
continent and exerting profound degrees of impact on the
lives of millions while posing threats to regional and global
stability.

Armed terrorism in Africa manifests in various forms, with

groups like Boko Haram in West Africa and Al-Shabaab in
the Horn of Africa, along with other jihadist organizations
operating across the Sahel region. The consequences of this
trade of weapons, primarily SALWs are dire, resulting in

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loss of life, mass displacement, and hindrances to socio-
economic development. Despite relentless efforts by African
governments, regional organizations, and the UN, the threat
persists and, in some instances, intensifies.

The absence of a comprehensive solution underscores the

urgency of this committee's deliberations. Our discussions
must acknowledge that weapons smuggling, trafficking, and
subsequent terrorism in Africa require a holistic approach
addressing underlying causes, promoting effective control
and precaution to help foster development. This agenda
builds upon prior UN initiatives and resolutions aimed at
promoting peace in Africa, including measures to combat
the proliferation of illegal arms trade. Our role as delegates
is to assess previous endeavors, identify existing gaps, and
collaboratively chart a path forward. We must strive to
engage in constructive dialogue and cooperative action,
ultimately working towards a more peaceful and secure
future for the African continent.

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I. Introduction
A. The Sahel Region of Africa
The Sahel region of Africa is a 3,860-kilometer arc-like land
mass lying to the immediate south of the Sahara Desert and
stretching east-west across the breadth of the African
continent. A largely semi-arid belt of barren, sandy and
rock-strewn land, the Sahel marks the physical and cultural
transition between the continent’s more fertile tropical
regions to the south and its desert in the north. Geographic
definitions of the Sahel region vary. Commonly, the Sahel
stretches from Senegal on the Atlantic coast, through parts
of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad,
and Sudan to Eritrea on the Red Sea coast. Culturally and
historically, the Sahel is a shoreline between the Middle
East and sub-Saharan Africa. This means it is the site of
interaction between Arabic, Islamic, and nomadic cultures
from the north, and indigenous and traditional cultures
from the south.

In the Sahel, it’s a buyer’s market for guns. Insurgency and

banditry plague the region, rooted in, among other things,
endemic intercommunal tensions, clashes between farmers
and herders, a spread of violent religious extremism, and
competition over such scarce resources as water and arable
land amid extreme climate shocks.

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B. SALWs - Definition and Types
What are SALWs? Small arms and light weapons (SALW),
refer to “any human-portable lethal weapon that expels or
launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily
converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by
the action of an explosive.”

Some examples of SALWs include pistols, revolvers,

submachine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns,
shotguns, and sniper rifles. These weapons are
characterized by their relatively compact size and ease of
portability, making them suitable for individual or small
group operations. Some pertinent models that are

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infamously traded in the Sahel since the past include:
• AK-47 (Kalashnikov)
• FN FAL (Fusil Automatique Léger)
• PKM Machine Gun
• RPG-7
• Uzi Submachine Gun
• M16 Assault Rifle
• Various Pistols and Revolvers

II. Historical Content

A. A Peek Into History
The illegal trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALWs) in the Sahel region during the 1960s to the 1980s
was intricately shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War.
Superpower involvement, particularly by the United States
and the Soviet Union, contributed to regional militarization
as they supplied weapons to allied governments. The
surplus of weaponry from these geopolitical rivalries readily
infiltrated black markets, exacerbating the proliferation of
SALWs. Proxy conflicts such as the Chadian Civil War and
the Western Sahara War served as battlegrounds for Cold
War ideologies, intensifying the demand for weapons and
further fueling the illicit trade in the region.

Internal conflicts within Sahelian countries played a crucial

role in driving the demand for SALWs during this period.
The rise of rebellions, driven by discontent with newly
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independent governments, was particularly notable in
countries like Chad, Mali, and Niger.

The sources of these illicit weapons were diverse and

contributed to the complexity of the issue. Weapons were
diverted from state stockpiles due to corruption, weak
security, and attacks by armed groups. Informal networks,
facilitated by smuggling routes across porous borders,
became established, enabling the flow of weapons from
North Africa, Eastern Europe, and conflict zones within
Africa. The consequences of this widespread illicit trade
were profound, leading to protracted conflicts, human
rights abuses, displacement, and economic devastation.
Specific examples, such as the Tuareg Rebellions and the
Chadian Civil War, highlighted the impact of the illegal
SALW trade on the region's stability and security.

Gaddafi’s Regime

SALW trade during Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya

and the subsequent Libyan Civil War was characterized by a
combination of state-sponsored arms trafficking, diversion
of weapons, and the exploitation of existing smuggling
networks. Gaddafi's regime was accused of engaging in
state-sponsored arms trafficking, providing weapons and
support to various rebel groups and insurgencies. This
included supplying arms to movements in Africa, such as
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and

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the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA). These actions not only fueled regional conflicts
but also contributed to the proliferation of SALWs. While
Libya maintained significant stockpiles of weapons, and
during Gaddafi's rule, there were instances of diversion of
these weapons to non-state actors. Corrupt practices, weak
security measures, and the complicity of certain elements
within the military and security forces facilitated the
diversion of arms. These diverted weapons often found their
way into black markets, contributing to the broader illegal
SALW trade in the region.

B. State Actors and their role

State Actors have played a significant role in the overall

scheme of things today - In some cases, states in the Sahel
region have armed militias or other non-state actors to help
communities defend themselves against extremist groups.
However, these weapons are more likely to be diverted than
those entrusted to official national security structures.
According to a UN News article from 2023, shoppers in
Mali's Gao, Timbuktu, and Ménaka regions can buy a
variety of illegal weaponry, including AK-pattern assault
rifles and smuggled French and Turkish machine guns.
[Source]

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III. Current Situation
A. SALW Proliferation
Libya to Nigeria and more:

After the fall of Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi in

2011, southward arms flows from Libya rose significantly. In
2012, this enabled Mali’s Tuareg rebels and armed groups
operating in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin to acquire
weapons and ammunition in a period of widespread
regional turmoil.

The weapons, transported from the Libyan south-west by

Tuareg fighters and traffickers, were moved along the
Algerian and Nigerien borders. They were transported along
the roads that cross the Agadez, Tahoua and Tillabéri
regions, joining Mali via the Niger-Mali-Burkina Faso tri-
border area and Lake Chad Basin via Niger’s Diffa Region.
But the military presence in northern Niger and the
outbreak of Libya’s second civil war in 2014 saw arms flows
to the south slow down. As demand for guns in Libya
increased, Jihadist groups looked elsewhere – escalating
attacks on army barracks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
to loot their arms and ammunition stockpiles.

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Several drivers of insecurity in northern Niger facilitate the
trafficking of Libyan arms. Vehicles of civilians and gold
transporters have been attacked in the Aïr area. On 21
March 2021, armed bandits killed 137 people in various
attacks in the Tillia commune. The violence prompted the
population of the Agadez, Tahoua, and Tillabéri regions to
arm themselves in self-defense. Infuriated by the state’s
failure to keep them safe, some civilians have explored the
creation of militias for protection.

Source: Institute for Security Studies (Linked in

References)

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B. Key Actors and Armed Groups
1. Tuareg Rebels: Various Tuareg rebel movements, such as
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA) and other factions. Tuareg rebels in Mali and
Niger have been involved in armed conflicts, often seeking
autonomy or independence. They have been known to
acquire weapons through illicit means to further their
objectives.

2. Boko Haram: Boko Haram has been notorious for its

involvement in terrorism and insurgency in the Lake Chad
Basin, which includes parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad,
and Niger. The group has relied on the illegal arms trade to
sustain its operations.

3. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): AQIM is an

affiliate of Al-Qaeda operating in North Africa. AQIM has
been linked to various armed activities in the Sahel,
including kidnapping, drug trafficking, and arms
smuggling. The group's involvement in the illegal SALW
trade contributes to regional instability.

The alliance between the Malian leadership and local

notables based on organized crime also applied to AQIM’s
kidnapping for ransom business. These arrangements go a
long way to explain why the Malian security apparatus by
and large stopped short of confronting AQIM and its

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practice of using northern Mali as a safe haven for its
hostage cases.

In northern Mali, the government lost all credibility in view

of widespread evidence of collusion with AQIM and
organized crime. Northern leaders, including future key
players in the Tuareg rebel MNLA, publicly denounced
such collusion.36 Even former senior government officials
recognize today that complicity with criminal interests had
“entirely taken over government policy in the north” in the
final years of President Amadou Toumani Toure’s rule.

4. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS): ISGS is an

affiliate of the Islamic State operating in the Sahel region.
ISGS has been involved in attacks and insurgency in the
Sahel. The group's activities include the acquisition of
weapons through illicit channels, contributing to the
proliferation of SALWs in the region.

5. Fulani Militant Groups: Some Fulani militant groups

have been involved in intercommunal conflicts, often with
ethnically or religiously driven motives. The acquisition of
weapons through illicit means has played a role in the
violence perpetrated by these groups.

These are but a large fraction of the net total of armed

groups and non-state actors that have been contributing to
the proliferation of illegal SALW trade in the Sahel.

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State-Criminal Collusion

Though the entire Sahel and Sahara region is affected by

state-criminal collusion, the role of organized crime in
northern Mali’s descent into conflict is particularly vivid,
and it offers lessons not just for Mali’s donors but also for
neighboring states. Organized criminal activity escalated in
northern Mali during a period when the country was a major
recipient of foreign assistance from the United States, the
European Union (EU), and individual EU member states.
External security-related aid was heavily focused on
counterterrorism and state capacity, with donors providing
training and technical assistance. Leading donors—
particularly the United States and France—grew
increasingly frustrated by the Malian leadership’s
reluctance to tackle AQIM but saw this mainly through the
lens of counterterrorism, paying much less attention to the
wider problem of state complicity with organized crime.

In Niger, the government is treading carefully in its

approach to the thriving smuggling networks in the
country’s north because upsetting the vested interests at
stake can easily provoke renewed instability in the region.
As in Mali and Mauritania, Niger’s government finds itself
having to choose between allowing its political allies to
benefit from smuggling and risking that a zero-tolerance
policy spawns the rise of hostile smuggling networks.

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Recent Developments

Weapons seizures increased by 105 per cent between 2017

and 2021, and sting operations continue, said Amado Philip
de Andrès, UNODC’s regional representative for West and
Central Africa. Joint investigations and cross-border
cooperation are a winning combination, he said. One such
operation crushed a terrorist network’s firearms supply
route in December, and new partnerships are flourishing,
including Niger’s military cooperation agreements with
Benin and Burkina Faso.

C. Recent Conflicts
Recent Conflicts contribute greatly to the pertaining issue at
hand. Here is a breakdown of some recent and ongoing
conflicts that delegates need to remain cognizant of whilst
developing solutions:

Mali:
• Ongoing insurgency: Since 2012, Mali has been grappling
with an Islamist insurgency linked to al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State, who heavily utilize SALWs in attacks against
Malian security forces and civilians.
•Intercommunal violence: Clashes between ethnic groups
over resources and access to power are also prevalent, often
involving the use of SALWs to settle disputes.

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Burkina Faso:
• Jihadist insurgency: Similar to Mali, Burkina Faso faces an
ongoing insurgency from militant groups affiliated with al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State, employing SALWs in their
attacks.
• Military coups and instability: Political instability fueled
by military coups and internal power struggles further
creates an environment conducive to the proliferation and
use of SALWs.

Niger:
• Boko Haram insurgency: The Nigerian militant group
Boko Haram continues to conduct
sporadic attacks in western Niger, utilizing SALWs in their
operations.

Central African Republic (CAR):

• Civil war and armed groups: The ongoing civil war in CAR
involves numerous armed groups vying for control, many of
whom rely heavily on SALWs to maintain their power.

Chad:
• Internal conflicts: Political tensions and occasional clashes
between rebel groups and the government sometimes
involve the use of SALWs.

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War in Sudan:
• The ongoing conflict in Sudan is a civil war between the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid
Support Forces (RSF). The conflict began on April 15, 2023,
and has been concentrated in the capital city of Khartoum
and the Darfur region.
• This conflict has led to a fluster of illegal arms flowing into
the wrong hands, with various reports from the UN Mission
in South Sudan recording children handling SALWs as
dangerous as RPGs.

IV. Contributing Factors

Contributing factors for arms trade can vary in reason from
the grassroots level of society to the very upper echelon of
governance. It is important for delegates to be aware of the
various modus operandi of armed groups, networks,
smugglers, etc. to be able to devise appropriate strategies
and international frameworks to deal with the crisis at hand.

A. Weak Governance
Weak governance and state fragility in the Sahel have
significantly contributed to the proliferation of SALWs. In
Mali, for example, a coup in 2012 led to political instability
and the collapse of state authority in the northern regions.
The resulting power vacuum allowed various armed groups
to gain control, creating an environment conducive to illicit
arms trade. Weak governance structures also enable
corruption within security forces, leading to the diversion of
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weapons from state stockpiles. Instances of poorly regulated
arms depots and insufficient control mechanisms further
exacerbate the problem. Similarly, in Niger, challenges
related to governance and state capacity have allowed armed
groups to operate with relative ease, obtaining weapons
through corrupt channels and exploiting the porous borders
of the Sahel region.

B. Cross-border Smuggling
Networks
Cross-border smuggling networks play a pivotal role in the
illicit SALW trade in the Sahel. The vast and often
unmonitored borders between Sahelian countries provide
ample opportunities for the movement of weapons. In the
aftermath of the Libyan Civil War in 2011, a surge in
weapons availability occurred due to the looting of Libyan
arsenals, and these weapons found their way into the hands
of Sahelian armed groups through established smuggling
routes. Notably, the Ténéré desert, stretching across Niger,
Libya, Chad, Sudan, and Mali, has become a hotspot for
smuggling activities. Criminal networks exploit the
challenging terrain and lack of effective border controls to
transport weapons undetected. Additionally, the region's
historical trade routes, once used for legitimate commerce,
have been repurposed for smuggling SALWs, linking North
Africa to the Sahel and facilitating the movement of arms
across vast distances. Efforts to counter SALW proliferation

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must address these sophisticated smuggling networks and
strengthen regional cooperation on border security.

C. External Support
External support and proxy conflicts have played a
significant role in fueling SALW proliferation in the Sahel.
During the Cold War, superpower involvement in the region
contributed to militarization and armed conflicts, leaving a
legacy of weapons that continue to circulate today. In the
Chadian Civil War (1965-1979), for instance, the involvement
of external actors such as France, Libya, and the United
States heightened the demand for weapons, leading to the
proliferation of SALWs. More recently, the complex web of
proxy conflicts in the Sahel involves external actors
supporting various armed groups for strategic reasons. In
Mali, for example, the involvement of jihadist groups has
links to external support, including funding and the
provision of weapons. The Sahel has become a battleground
for competing interests, further complicating efforts to
control the flow of SALWs.

D. Socioeconomic Factors
Socioeconomic factors and ethnic tensions contribute to
SALW proliferation by creating conditions that drive
communities towards armed resistance. In Mali and Niger,
marginalized ethnic groups, such as the Tuaregs, have
engaged in rebellions against central authorities, seeking
greater autonomy and representation. These grievances,
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often rooted in economic disparities and perceived neglect,
lead to the mobilization of armed factions, which then
require weaponry for their campaigns. The interplay
between ethnic tensions and arms acquisition is evident in
conflicts like the Tuareg Rebellions, where communities
have resorted to acquiring SALWs through various means,
including illicit trade and raids on government stockpiles.
Economic factors, such as poverty and lack of development,
also contribute to the appeal of armed groups, as they may
promise economic opportunities and social justice.
Addressing SALW proliferation in the Sahel requires not
only disarmament efforts but also comprehensive strategies
that address the underlying socioeconomic issues and
ethnic tensions that drive communities toward armed
resistance.

V. International Efforts and

Framework

A. UN Resolutions and Initiatives

In the context of the Sahel Region, several UN resolutions
and initiatives have aimed to mitigate the impact of SALW
proliferation and enhance regional stability.

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• UNSC Resolution 2420 (2018):
This resolution specifically addresses the issue of SALWs in
the Sahel and emphasizes the importance of regional
cooperation, security sector reform, and addressing the root
causes of conflict.
• UNSC Resolution 2455 (2019):
Focuses on the importance of preventing the illicit transfer
and circulation of SALWs, particularly in conflict zones,
and highlights the need for effective controls and
regulations.
• UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS):
The UNISS, launched in 2013, encompasses a holistic
approach to address various challenges in the Sahel,
including security issues related to SALWs. It emphasizes
the importance of governance, development, and security
coordination.
• Various UN Missions in Conflict Zones

B. Regional Organizations
Regional organizations have played a significant role in
addressing SALW proliferation, with the African Union
(AU) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) being key actors in the Sahel Region.

• AU Silencing the Guns by 2020 Initiative:

Launched in 2013, this initiative aims to achieve a conflict-

free Africa and emphasizes the need to prevent and control

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the illicit flow of SALWs. It encourages member states to
strengthen their legal frameworks and implement effective
control measures.

The initiative emphasizes the need for member states to

strengthen their legal frameworks and enhance control
measures to prevent the illicit flow of SALWs. This involves
improving border controls, implementing effective arms
tracking mechanisms, and establishing measures to curb the
diversion of weapons.

The initiative promotes Security Sector Reforms to enhance

the professionalism and accountability of security forces.
This includes reforms in the defense, police, and other
security institutions.

• ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons:

The Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) has been at the forefront of regional efforts to
curb SALW proliferation, particularly through the adoption
of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials.

Adopted in 2006, the ECOWAS Convention is a legally

binding instrument that outlines measures to control the
manufacture, trade, and circulation of SALWs in the West
African region. It serves as a framework for member states

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to harmonize their national legislation in line with the
regional commitments. Member states commit to
harmonizing their national laws and regulations on SALWs
to ensure consistency and effectiveness. This includes
measures related to licensing, registration, and penalties for
illicit trafficking.

The convention encourages member states to establish

National Commissions on Small Arms to coordinate efforts
at the national level, enhancing collaboration between
governments, civil society, and international partners.

C. Relevant Instruments
1. Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty is a landmark international

instrument that seeks to regulate the international trade in
conventional arms, including SALWs. While not region-
specific, its principles and guidelines are applicable to the
Sahel context.

Some important information about the ATT is mentioned

below:
Adoption: Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013
and entered into force in 2014.
Signatories: As of February 5, 2024, 140 states have signed
the Treaty, and 112 have ratified it.

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Core Provisions:
• Requires States Parties to assess the potential human
rights impact and risk of diversion before authorizing an
arms transfer.
• Prohibits transfers if they would contribute to terrorism,
organized crime, serious violations of human rights, or
humanitarian law.
• Requires States Parties to establish and maintain a
national control system for authorizing arms transfers.
• Requires reporting, marking, and record-keeping on
authorized arms transfers.
The ATT today faces major challenges in enforcement, with
transparency, and with accountability.

2. UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALWs

Adopted in 2001, this program provides a comprehensive

framework for addressing SALW proliferation. It includes
measures for national legislation, international cooperation,
and information exchange to prevent the illicit trade of
SALWs.

Other important international instruments include:

1. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and
Ammunition (Firearms Protocol)
2. Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons

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3. Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms
and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and All Parts and
Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture,
Repair, or Assembly
4. The OAS Model Regulations

VI. Challenges

A. Enforcement and Implementation

Gaps
Enforcement and implementation gaps pose significant
challenges in effectively addressing the proliferation of
SALWs in the Sahel Region. This refers to the difficulties in
translating existing laws, regulations, and international
agreements into concrete actions on the ground.

Despite the existence of regional and international

agreements, there are instances where national authorities
lack the capacity or resources to enforce regulations
effectively. Insufficient border controls and weak law
enforcement mechanisms allow the illicit movement of
SALWs across borders, contributing to their proliferation.

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Enforcement gaps may stem from inadequate training,
corruption within security forces, or a lack of political will.
In some cases, the vast and porous borders in the Sahel
Region make it challenging for authorities to monitor and
control the flow of weapons effectively.

B. Lack of Coordination and

Information Sharing
The lack of coordination and information sharing among
countries and relevant international bodies hampers efforts
to combat SALW proliferation. Coordination is essential for
a unified and effective response to the complex challenges
posed by the illicit arms trade.

Instances of corrupt officials turning a blind eye to illegal

arms shipments or actively participating in trafficking
activities have been reported. This compromises the
effectiveness of national and regional efforts to curb SALW
proliferation. The involvement of state actors in SALW
trafficking can further exacerbate conflicts, as weapons may
end up in the hands of non-state actors or terrorist groups.

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D. Economic Implications of Arms
Trade
The economic implications of the arms trade in the Sahel
Region contribute to the persistence of SALW proliferation.
The illicit arms trade can have wide-ranging economic
consequences, including diversion of resources from
development, exacerbation of poverty, and hindrance to
economic growth. Governments allocating substantial
resources to address security challenges related to SALWs
may divert funds from essential social services, such as
education and healthcare. This diversion can perpetuate
socioeconomic disparities and contribute to grievances that
fuel conflicts. The economic consequences of SALW
proliferation create a vicious cycle where insecurity
hampers development, and economic challenges, in turn,
contribute to the conditions conducive to the illicit arms
trade. Breaking this cycle requires addressing both the
security and development aspects comprehensively.

D. Economic Implications of Arms

Trade
Enforcement and Implementation Gaps: Mali

Mali has faced challenges in enforcing and implementing

measures to control SALW proliferation. Despite having

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national regulations and being a party to regional
agreements, Mali struggled to effectively enforce these
measures, particularly in the context of internal conflicts
and political instability. Weak governance structures and
the inability to secure vast and porous borders have
contributed to difficulties in preventing the illicit movement
of weapons.

Lack of Coordination and Information Sharing: Nigeria

Nigeria has experienced challenges related to the lack of

coordination and information sharing among its various
regions and security agencies in addressing SALW
proliferation. Inconsistent communication and
collaboration have hindered the development of a unified
strategy. Additionally, the Boko Haram insurgency in the
northeastern part of the country has exposed disparities in
regional responses, highlighting the need for improved
coordination.

Corruption and State Complicity: Democratic Republic of

the Congo (DRC)

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has grappled with

the issue of corruption and state complicity contributing to
SALW proliferation. There have been reports of government
officials and security forces being involved in the illegal
arms trade. The complicity of state actors has undermined

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efforts to regulate and control the flow of weapons,
contributing to ongoing conflicts in the region.

Economic Implications of Arms Trade: South Sudan

South Sudan illustrates the economic implications of the

arms trade, where resources that could have been allocated
to development have been diverted to address security
challenges. The diversion of funds for arms and military
expenditure has exacerbated economic challenges,
hindering the country's ability to invest in social services.
The resulting economic strain contributes to the
perpetuation of conflict and SALW proliferation.

VII. Existing Efforts

As of June 2023,
The UN, partners, and Sahelians themselves working for
peace in the Sahel are making inroadsand introducing new
efforts, including these:
• UN Peacekeeping adopted a strategy for disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.
• The UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in
Africa (UNREC) and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP), in a joint project, assisted nine Sahelian countries
in adopting a regional action plan to combat the illicit arms
trade.
• UNDP facilitated the voluntary surrender of over 40,000
small arms and light weapons in West Africa, built more
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than 300 houses, nearly 300 market stalls, and clinics and
schools in northeastern Nigeria, and provided livelihoods
for youth to protect them from sliding into poverty or being
recruited into violent extremism.
• The UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) supports
the regional G5 Sahel Force in a project focused on criminal
justice, border security management, and preventing
radicalization and violent extremism.
• A UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) programme helps
adolescents learn about the danger of small arms,
combining basic gun safety education with leadership
development, vocational training, and conflict resolution
techniques.
• UN regional directors and UNOWAS approved in
November the launch of a revamped “peace and security
offer” for the Sahel and works with the Timbuktu Institute
and the non-governmental organization Dialogue sans
frontières on an initiative aimed at strengthening traditional
dialogue and trust-building platforms between communities
in the border regions of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

VIII. Conclusion
It may be tempting for outside forces looking to take action
now to recommend a decisive crackdown on smuggling to
cut off funding sources and disrupt criminal networks. But
zero-tolerance policies toward smuggling are not only
unrealistic given the huge expanses over which these
networks stretch and the security forces’ limited resources;

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they are also counterproductive. In northern Mali and
Niger, there are no alternative sources of income and
employment that could rival those of contraband and drug
smuggling. The collapse of tourism in parallel with the
development of the kidnapping industry has further
aggravated the situation, and the return of that income
source will likely take many years even once the situation
has stabilized and abductions cease. Until there are viable
economic alternatives, clamping down on smuggling would
further alienate local communities from their states.
It is imperative for delegates to:
• Understand region-based solutions and causes for illegal
arms trade
• Be cognizant of the various trade routes across Sahel
• External factors contributing to the issue at hand
• Note the key actors and understand the best methods of
resolution

IX. QARMA (Questions a

Resolution Must Answer)
1. What is the specific scope of the resolution in terms of
geographic coverage and the types of SALWs included?
2. How can border control and customs cooperation be
strengthened?
3. How does the resolution encourage international
cooperation?

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4. Are there mechanisms proposed for information sharing
and joint efforts?
5. Are there specific recommendations for enhancing
regional mechanisms?
6. How does the resolution consider the humanitarian
impact of SALW proliferation, including its effect on
displaced populations and vulnerable communities?
7. Any recommendations for strengthening national
legislation to regulate SALWs?
8. How does the resolution address the need for capacity
building in terms of training, technology, and resources for
relevant institutions in the Sahel Region?
9. What mechanisms are proposed for monitoring the
implementation of the resolution?
10. How are reporting and transparency encouraged among
member states?

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X. Sources of Information
• All UNODC Reports regarding SALW Reports in Sahel
Region of Africa
• All Regional and International Reports on Arms trade in
Africa (SALWs)

• Some Important Links to go through:

1. Arms Trafficking: Fueling Conflict in the Sahel
2. Small arms trafficking in the Sahel: the role of tri-border
towns
3. Firearms Trafficking in the Sahel - UNODC
4. Arms Trade from Libya to Nigeria
5. Sahel and Organized Crime

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Agenda 2: Discussing the use of
Artificial Intelligence and
Remote Drones in Covert Warfare

I. Introduction
The use and development of remote drones in warfare has
evolved significantly in the last many decades, over
numerous conflicts - both for overt and covert warfare.

Artificial intelligence is among the many hot technologies

that promise to change the face of warfare for years to come.
Articles abound that describe its possibilities and warn
those who fall behind in the AI race. Visions exist of AI
enabling autonomous systems to conduct missions
achieving sensor fusion, automating tasks, and making
better, quicker decisions than humans. AI is improving
rapidly and some day in the future those goals may be
achieved. In the meantime, AI’s impact will be in the more
mundane, dull, and monotonous tasks performed by our
military in uncontested environments.

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A. Artificial Intelligence in Covert
Warfare
Artificial intelligence is a rapidly developing capability.
Extensive research by academia and industry is resulting in
shorter training time for systems and increasingly better
results. While AI today may be heavily intelligence on
provision of extensive context and pools of data, the growth
of AI on fronts beyond image, data, and video analytics is
astonishing. Better decision making, flawless functionality,
and best-case strategies stand as a major threat for large
governments today, with the entire world shifting their
knowledge online.

Artificial intelligence may not have direct military

applications on-ground yet, but potentially stands as a
defining differential leading to devastating consequences.
AI has and can be used today in drone warfare to perform a
variety of functionalities, from lethal functions like guerilla
attacks, electronic warfare, and targeted strikes, to non-
lethal functions such as search and rescue, recon, and
surveillance.

On one hand, this technology could make war less lethal

and possibly strengthen deterrence. By dramatically
expanding the role of AI-directed drones in air forces,
navies and armies, human lives could be spared. Already,

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the U.S. Defense Department is experimenting with AI bots
that can fly a modified F-16 fighter jet, and Russia has been
testing autonomous tank-like vehicles. China is rushing to
roll out its own AI-run systems, and the effectiveness of
armed drones will also take off in coming years. One of the
largest, although still nascent, efforts to advance AI is a
secretive U.S. Air Force program, Next Generation Air
Dominance, under which some 1,000 drone “wingmen,”
called collaborative combat aircraft, operate alongside 200
piloted planes.

B. Remote Drones in Covert

Warfare
Remote drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), are aircraft operated without a human pilot on
board. They can be controlled remotely by a human
operator or autonomously through pre-programmed flight
plans. Drones are equipped with various sensors and
cameras, enabling them to capture data, images, or video
footage for diverse purposes, such as surveillance,
agriculture, filmmaking, search and rescue operations and
warfare. The ability to navigate and perform tasks remotely
makes drones versatile tools in both commercial and
recreational applications, fostering advancements in
technology and expanding their role in various industries.

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Remote Drones have multiple use cases today:

1. Surveillance and Reconnaissance:

• Persistent Surveillance: Drones, equipped with high-

resolution cameras and other sensors, provide persistent
surveillance over target areas, helping military forces gather
intelligence without risking human lives.
• Real-time Data: The real-time transmission of data allows
military commanders to make informed decisions based on
the most recent information.

2. Targeted Strikes:
• Precision Strikes: Armed drones can be equipped with
precision-guided munitions for targeted strikes against
enemy assets, minimizing collateral damage.
• Strategic Importance: Drones have been used in various
conflicts for targeted assassinations of high-profile
individuals or to eliminate specific threats.

3. Force Multiplier: Supplementing Manned Aircraft:

Drones act as force multipliers, extending the reach and
capabilities of manned aircraft, conducting operations in
areas that might be too dangerous for human pilots.

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4. Electronic Warfare and communication disruption:
Drones can be used for electronic warfare, disrupting enemy
communication systems and interfering with electronic
signals.

5. Search and Rescue: Drones are utilized in humanitarian

missions for search and rescue operations, surveying
disaster-stricken areas, and delivering supplies.

The use and development of remote drones in warfare

continue to evolve, with ongoing debates about their ethical,
legal, and strategic implications. The international
community faces the challenge of adapting existing legal
frameworks to address the unique aspects of drone warfare.

II. International Debate and

Discussions

A. Remote Drones in Covert

Warfare
The use of remote drones in covert warfare is a highly
contentious issue, sparking ongoing debate and discussions
within and between nations. Here's a breakdown of the key
perspectives:

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Arguments For:

• Precision: Proponents argue drones offer greater precision

compared to traditional airstrikes, minimizing civilian
casualties.
• Reduced Risk: Drone operators face no physical danger,
potentially lowering military deaths and injuries.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Compared to manned aircraft, drones
are cheaper to produce and operate, offering a cost
advantage.
• Counterterrorism: Some see drones as effective tools
against elusive terrorist groups operating in remote regions.

Arguments Against:
• Legality: Critics question the legality of covert drone
strikes, arguing they violate international law and national
sovereignty.
• Accountability: Lack of transparency and accountability
around drone programs raises concerns about civilian
casualties and extrajudicial killings.
• Psychological Impact: Critics argue drone attacks create
fear and anger among civilian populations, fueling
radicalization.
• Escalation: Covert drone operations risk miscalculation
and unintended escalation, potentially drawing more actors
into conflict.

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Consequences:

• Civilian Casualties: Despite claims of precision, civilian

casualties from drone strikes remain a major concern,
generating humanitarian and legal consequences.
• International Norms: The widespread use of covert drones
erodes established international norms regarding warfare,
potentially setting a dangerous precedent.
• Technological Proliferation: As drone technology
proliferates, concerns grow about their use by non-state
actors and rogue states.

III. Existing Instruments

For Remote Drones:

Several initiatives focus on regulating drone use, including:
• UN Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems.
• Conventional Weapons Convention (CWC): Restricts
specific types of drones equipped with lethal weapons.
• Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW): Regulates the use of incendiary weapons,
potentially applicable to certain drone payloads.
• Montreux Document on Applicable International Law
governing Unmanned Military Aircraft Systems (UMAS):

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Non-binding guidelines on responsible state behavior
regarding drone use.
• Wassenaar Arrangement: Aims to limit the spread of
conventional weapons and dual-use goods, potentially
including advanced drone technology.
• International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW):
Advocates for responsible explosive weapons use, including
in drone strikes.

For Artificial Intelligence in warfare:

• International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Established
principles like proportionality, distinction between
combatants and civilians, and unnecessary suffering apply
to any weapon, including AI-powered systems used in covert
operations. However, specific interpretations and how AI
might fit within these principles are open to debate.
• Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
its Protocols: Regulate specific types of conventional
weapons, with potential implications for AI-powered
delivery systems.
• UN Guidelines on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
(LAWS): Aim to guide the development and use of
autonomous weapons to ensure human control and
accountability. While not legally binding, they represent an
emerging international consensus on responsible behavior.
• OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence: Promote
responsible development and use of AI, highlighting
principles like human oversight, fairness, and transparency.
They can inform assessments of AI usage in covert warfare.
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• European Union's Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI:
Similar to the OECD principles, they offer a framework for
ethical AI development and application, providing
additional considerations for covert AI use.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI)

and remote drones in covert warfare represents a complex
and evolving landscape. The synergy of AI technologies,
including machine learning and autonomous systems, has
ushered in unprecedented capabilities for intelligence
gathering, target identification, and precision strikes in
military operations. This has significantly altered the
dynamics of covert warfare, providing advantages in terms
of reduced risk to human personnel and enhanced
operational efficiency. However, ethical concerns
surrounding civilian casualties, privacy infringements, and
the potential for autonomous decision-making raise
profound questions about the responsible use of these
technologies.

The development and deployment of AI-driven remote

drones necessitate careful consideration of international
laws and norms, as well as transparent governance
frameworks. Striking a balance between military
effectiveness, ethical considerations, and adherence to legal

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standards remain an ongoing challenge as these
technologies continue to evolve and shape the landscape of
covert warfare.

It is important for delegates in this committee to:

• Understand the implications of the consequences of AI
and Remote Drones in warfare.
• Discuss measures to control and monitor their growth and
implementation.
• Discuss existing and required international instruments
and reference points for the management of AI and Remote
Drones in warfare.

V. QARMA
1. What measures can be implemented/recommended for
the control of the implementation of AI in covert and overt
warfare?
2. How can AI be used in non-lethal ways by States and state
actors?
3. What internal measures/legislation can Member States
look to implement for the control of AI being involved in
warfare?
4. How can member states ensure that the use of AI and
remote drones in covert operations adheres to international
humanitarian law and human rights principles?
5. Should there be international regulations or standards for
the development and deployment of AI in covert warfare?
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6. What role should the United Nations play in overseeing
and regulating the use of AI and remote drones in covert
operations?
7. How can member states enhance their capabilities to
attribute covert actions involving AI and remote drones?
8. Should there be requirements for reporting on the
deployment of such technologies in covert operations?
9. What measures can be taken to prevent an AI and drone
arms race that may escalate tensions among member states?

VI. References and Must-Reads

1. Tallinn Manual
2. Armscontrol Article on Emerging Tech
3. AI in Future Warfare
4. ICRC on Remote Drones

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