UNSC Study Guide

LAKSHMIPAT SINGHANIA ACADEMY
STUDY GUIDE
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
Discussing the Syrian Civil War with special
emphasis on preventing the spread of extremism.
(Freeze Date: October 1, 2015)
AGENDA
Discussing the Syrian Civil War with special emphasis on
preventing the spread of extremism.
(Freeze Date: October 1, 2015; 12:30 pm)
***
EXECUTIVE BOARD
CHAIRPERSON – YUTIKA DOOGAR
+91 74391 71436 |doogaryutika@gmail.com
VICE CHAIRPERSON- SAANVI AGARWAL

+91 91238 08138 |agarwalsaanvi1704@gmail.com
DIRECTOR- RAUNAK AGARWAL

+91 91239 30079 |agarwalraunak0406@gmail.com
RAPPORTEUR- MAANVI VORA

+91 79802 36339 |maanvi.vora12@gmail.com
***
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1
INDEX
Sr. No. Topic Page No.
1. Chairperson’s Address 3
2. About the Committee 4
3. Committee Overview 5
4. Mandate 6
5. Agenda Overview 8
6. Historical Context 13
7. Major Parties Involved 15
8. Key Issues 18
9. International Response 23
10. Other Proxy wars 27
11. Cross Border Terrorism 31
12. Possible Solutions and Challenges 34
13. UN Actions and Resolutions 40
14. Timeline 42
15. Notes on Paperwork 47
16. Resources 48

CHAIRPERSON’S ADDRESS
Distinguished Delegates,
It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to this session of the United Nations Security
Council focusing on the Syrian Civil War at LSAMUN, 2024.
We have gathered here to deliberate upon one of the most complex crises to prevail on
the global forum. This conflict dates back to 2011; the massive humanitarian
catastrophes, huge dislocation, and regional instability has been continually fueled by a
multiplicity of international factions and actors, giving rise to huge threats to
international peace & security.
As of October 1st, 2015, this conflict has become a round table conference of proxy
wars. A platform for countries and extremist forces alike to create factions and further
their political ideology. The humanitarian catastrophe unfolds as various actors including
the Syrian Government, the Free Syrian Army, and extremist groups like ISIS and Al-
Nusra Front vie for territorial control. Meanwhile, international organizations struggle to
address the refugee crisis, OPCW works to verify chemical weapons elimination, and
numerous NGOs attempt to provide humanitarian assistance under increasingly
dangerous conditions.
As representatives of the international community's most powerful decision-making body,
you have twin responsibilities: to protect the refugees and civilians, along with having
discussions which further diplomacy and promote actions which would usher in a
sustainable peace. The escalation, or the de-escalation of the conflict is now in your
hands. Action must be taken, and it must be taken now.
The Executive Board expects thoroughly researched delegates, a variety of diplomatic
negotiations and a collaborative spirit in tackling this challenging agenda. An overall
understanding of the conflict as of present-day is necessary too. A fast-paced, research-
based committee awaits you. Find your factions or form them, either way, it is only
together that we can solve this issue!
Best regards,
Yutika Doogar
Chairperson, UNSC

ABOUT
THE COMMITTEE
The United Nations Security Council, established by the UN Charter, bears primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It can convene anytime
peace is threatened. Unlike other UN organs, the Security Council's decisions are binding
on all member states. Its actions range from recommending peaceful resolutions to
enforcing decisions through sanctions or military action. The Council can investigate
disputes, dispatch missions, appoint envoys, and issue ceasefire directives. It may also
implement economic sanctions, arms embargoes, or authorize collective military action.
The Council aims to focus its measures on those responsible for condemned policies
while minimizing impact on civilian populations. Its ultimate goal is to harmonize
nations' actions in pursuit of global peace and security.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the
United Nations, primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It
plays a critical role in addressing crises that threaten global stability through diplomatic,
economic, and, in some cases, military measures.
The UNSC consists of 15 member states:

5 Permanent Members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. These members hold veto power.
10 Non-permanent Members: Elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with
no immediate re-election. The non-permanent seats are distributed among different
regions to ensure geographical representation.
Voting procedures in the UNSC require a majority of at least nine out of fifteen
members for decisions to be adopted. However, a negative vote (veto) from any of the
five permanent members blocks the adoption of substantive resolutions.

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW
The UNSC at LSAMUN will deliberate on one of the most complex and confronting
crises seen internationally in this century, which is the Syrian Civil War. It began in 2011,
causing massive humanitarian catastrophes, huge dislocations, and regional instability.
What was once a highly complicated situation with a multiplicity of international factions
and actors has now made the conflict one of the most visceral challenges to global peace
and security.
Taking their place as members of the UNSC, delegates will have to deal both with
pressing humanitarian aspects such as civilians and safeguards needed for access to aid,
and support for refugees while at the same time going about the overall political, military,
and diplomatic actions that would usher in a sustainable peace. Some of the major issues
include international coalitions, superpowers like Russia and the United States,Turkey,
Iran,and extremist forces that sprouted in the region.
The course is an exercise in the following: In negotiating and voting on resolutions and
debating, participants will look for innovative solutions on ending violence and rebuilding
Syria in a manner that creates a pathway for a sustainable and inclusive peace process.
Participants shall navigate complex alliances, competing national interests, and the UNSC
responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
This UNSC session will be a testing session for the delegates, as they need to dive deeper

MANDATE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: MANDATE AND
FUNCTIONS
Establishment and Purpose
The United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations,
including the Security Council. It grants primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security to the Security Council, which may convene whenever
peace is threatened.
According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:
1. To maintain international peace and security;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations;
3. To cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human
rights;
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.
All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to
member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member
states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.
Maintaining Peace and Security

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first
action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach an agreement by peaceful
means. The Council may:
- Set forth principles for such an agreement;
- Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- Dispatch a mission;
- Appoint special envoys; or
- Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of
the dispute.
When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an
end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:
- Issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
- Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate
opposing forces, and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.
Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:
- Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel
bans;
- Severance of diplomatic relations;
- Blockade; or
- Even collective military action.
A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices
condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures
taken on other parts of the population and economy.

AGENDA OVERVIEW
Among the most disastrous wars in the last few decades, the Syrian Civil War began in
2011. As of October 2015, many actors, including domestic and international actors,
pursued their own varying political, military, and ideological goals in the war. At the
freeze date—5 AM, October 1, 2015—the conflict had thus evolved into a messy and
fractured battlefield involving the Syrian government, opposition forces, extremist groups
such as ISIS, and foreign powers. It not only created a humanitarian crisis but spread
extremist ideologies in every nook and cranny of the region and around the world.
This study guide plans to advance a comprehensive understanding of the Syrian Civil
War as of October 2015, stressing the rise of extremism within the conflict and
examining the role the United Nations Security Council might play in stopping its
spread. We'll discuss the history of the war, the nature of the mix between factions, the
rising extremist groups, and the international response. This summit will aim to empower
those attending with a full understanding of complexities within the conflict and assist in
ways to help develop strategies to put an end to the spread of extremism but more
importantly, promote peace.
BACKGROUND OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

These movements of the Arab Spring of 2011 thus directly linked to the outbreak of the
Syrian Civil War. These protests for political reforms and democratic freedoms had been
brought about in the Middle East and North Africa. Anti-regime non-violent protests
started in Syria in March 2011; they were calling for an end to corruption in the
government, the emancipation of political prisoners, and the application of democratic
reforms by the country's leaders. The regime of Assad reacted very brutally towards the
crackdowns, and things just went downhill from there until protests became an armed
uprising. What started as a strictly local revolt eventually became a full-blown civil war
with dimensions regional and international over time.
The anti-Assad forces were a combination of different groupings; the political fringe-the
more moderate rebel factions, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Kurdish forces-
belonged to. This collapse aided in the intensification of war catalysis into extremist
elements such as Jabhat al-Nusra- an al-Qaeda affiliate and ISIS who seized the
opportunity to increase hegemony and occupy the ground in Syria. By 2015, the battle

had reached the level of a multi-dimensional struggle wherein each faction of rebels,
extremist groups, and governments had support from multitudes of foreign actors where
the stakes of volatility reached new heights.
ROLE OF EXTREMISM IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

It has become a very fertile area for the development of extremities, especially in jihadist
movements. Organizations like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra exploited the instability and
power vacuum created by the Syrian Civil War and recruited fighters, took control over
territories, and spread their radical perception of Islamic teaching. Their advance can be
attributed to a number of reasons, including the brutal suppression of dissent by the
Syrian regime, ineptitude and incompetence among moderate rebel factions, and
international meddling by powers whose intent is often shrouded in a focus on other
secondary objectives.
For instance, ISIS declared itself the so-called "caliphate" in 2014 and began to flourish
as a strong power, with its capital in Raqqa, Syria.
By the autumn of 2015, ISIS had taken immense portions of Syria and Iraq and also
inducted thousands of foreign fighters to their cause. The group's brutal massacres-from
executing victims in public and enslaving people, to the destruction of historical cultural
heritage-shocked the international community. Secondly, ISIS applied an extremely
advanced propaganda machine for terrorist strikes that fell outside the narrow horizon of
the Middle East and pushed extremism far beyond the scope of the Syrian conflict. Jabhat
al-Nusra was an al-Qaeda affiliate, apparently differing ever so slightly in ideological
orientation to overthrow Assad, not to found a transnational jihadist state. Both, however,
presented a threat to the stability of Syria and the rest of the region, appealing equally to
local community members frustrated by decades of war and international recruits,
especially from Europe, North Africa, and Central Asia.
It has been a disjointed response by the world community toward the Syrian Civil War
and the growth of extremism as many interests continue to stake out competing interests.
This allows it the safe haven with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah-all of whom treat the
Syrian government as a vital partner in the region. The Russian military campaign started
in September 2015 and marked the turning point of the conflict as it had provided
essential air support to government forces that sought to recapture lost ground. Moscow
claimed that its intervention was needed to confront terrorism, with a focus on ISIS, but
in reality targeted other rebel groups that received supplies from Western powers.

On the other hand, the United States and its allies, which include European countries,
Gulf states, and Turkey, provided their support to the various factions of opposition. The
US-led coalition launched airstrikes in Syria, pursuing the strategic goal of weakening
ISIS's capabilities and overthrowing its leadership, within the framework of Operation
Inherent Resolve. Yet, it was universally indicted for its lack of coordination with the
other land forces on the grounds and was set back by the tangled structure of interlocking
alliances characterizing the Syrian opposition.
Things became interesting only with the involvement of regional powers. Turkey, for
example, has followed a two-pronged policy: it attacked Assad while it attacked Kurdish
groups with whom it shares a perception of linkage with the PKK, branded now as a
terrorist group. Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar among them have been arming and
financing Islamist opposition elements with which some are linked through extremist
circles.
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has been involved in the ending of the Syrian Civil War, specifically
through the UNSC. However, its ability is a joke because of how easily it can be hindered
by the permanent members and their conflicting interests. Since the fight began, the
UNSC has passed many resolutions, including the humanitarian crisis, chemical weapons,
and the rising tide of terror.
Resolution 2170 passed in August 2014 targeted ISIS and al-Nusra explicitly, demanding
the dismantling of their financing networks and recruitment operations. Yet, the
implementing capacity of the United Nations Security Council remains low due to
political differences between the powerful countries engaged including the United States
and Russia. The United Nations has supported diplomatic efforts, for example, the peace
talks in Geneva, but such efforts have sometimes collapsed because of the problem of how
to get all relevant factions to the negotiating table. At that point, in October 2015, hopes
for a political solution that would end the Syrian civil war were little to non-existent, and
the continued spread of terrorism within Syria and across its borders underlined an acute
need for a more integrated and coherent international response.
Perhaps one of the bigger challenges in being able to tackle the Syrian conflict is the
prevention of extremism not only in the country under siege but in the larger region. The

political instability, social fragmentation, and economic deprivations laid bare by the
Syrian Civil War all tend to foster extremist organizations. So any strategy that's going to
combat extremism needs to fulfil military, political, social, and economic initiatives.
An anti-extremism policy will therefore be comprised of an all-encompassing strategy

that:
1. Political Reconciliation: The political outcome of the Syrian crisis can work much
towards countering extremism. It is due to fragmentation between the Syrian
government and opposition forces that extremist organizations have survived so
well. A negotiated settlement that will encompass a transitional government and
real political reforms can help work against extremist ideologies.
2. Economic Reconstruction: War has totally devastated the economy of the Syrian
nation, rendering millions jobless and also poor. Economic hardship is a smooth
phenomenon for radical forces; every young man joins the radical forces in search
of economic survival. The international reconstruction efforts of the economy of
Syria, jobs, and even strengthening the economy can save local communities from
radical forces.
3. Counter the propaganda: From ISIS to terrorist organizations, the ways through
which social media has been weaponized and advanced, sophisticated machinery of
propaganda has been used in recruiting fighters around the world and spreading its
message. Preventive international efforts are urgently needed before extremist
narratives rise again, especially on online platforms.
4. Humanitarian Aid: The humanitarian crisis in Syria, causing more and more
displacements, lack of food, and scarce health access, has put people in the region
under severe social pressures and enabled the rise of extremism. Humanitarian
assistance needs to be delivered urgently to affected populations while attention is
paid to the source of the crisis to calm the region and have a lesser share of
extremist groups. The future for the UNSC:
As of October 2015, the UNSC encounters strenuous tasks when attempting to find a
way out of the Syrian Civil War and halt the further expansion of extremism. The
Council must balance competing interests between its permanent members, the United
States and Russia, in the need to articulate what it calls for unified action beyond military
solutions.

International cooperation is now a necessity with ISIS and other terror groups of the same
acumen; differing aims by both regional and global powers have thus far barred an
effective global response in this regard.
Going forward, the UNSC should be concerned with the diplomatic efforts that might
lead to a political solution to the Syrian crisis through continuing humanitarian aid to the
victims. In addition to that, the Council should support activities that describe the causes
of extremism from the roots; economic insecurity, political oppression, and social
disintegration. The international community must always continue with long-term efforts
toward preventing the spread of extremism, however, with a combination of all means,
UNSC will play a vital role in the restoration of peace and stability in the country and its
surroundings.
As of October 2015, the Syrian Civil War is among those complex and complex conflicts
that strongly influence regional stability and the balance of security in the world. Spread
extremism propelled by organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra forms one of the
biggest challenges toward attaining peace, and thus, the international community needs to
rise and face the root causes of radicalism. The UNSC, though important in this regard,
has a very important mandate in securing a political resolution and enhancement of
humanitarian outreach efforts while not furthering extremist ideologies.

Map 1: Syria in conflict, 2015

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Syrian Civil War is one of the most devastating conflicts of the 21st century and the
cause of the worst humanitarian crisis in recent history. It stems from the ruling Al-Assad
Regime and a series of opposition rebel groups
The history of Syria dates back to the Neolithic period. Much of its early history is
rooted in bloodshed and battle by various foreign empires such as the Hittite Empire,
Egyptian Empire, Assyrian Empire, Persian Empire, and the Greek Macedonian Empire.
In the mid-7th century, the Umayyad dynasty placed the capital of the empire in
Damascus and made Arabic the official language. In 1516, the Ottoman Empire invaded
and incorporated Syria into its empire. Under the Ottomans, the people of Syria
experience a period of peaceful coexistence. During the First World War, the Ottomans
joined the war on the side of Germany. Upon the loss, the Ottoman Empire crumbled
and lost control of its territories. The control of Syria went to France. Despite several
revolts, Syria would only receive independence from French rule upon the fall of France
in 1940 during the Second World War. In 1956, Syria signed a pact for weapons with
the Soviet Union. This established relations between the two states. A series of coups
from 1961 to 1970 ended with Hafez Al-Assad, the former Minister of War, as
president of Syria. Hafez al-Assad died on 10 June 2000 with his son, Bashar Al-Assad,
succeeding him as he ran for president unopposed. His election would lead to intense
political and social resentment. It would come to a head ten years later with the start of
the Syrian Civil War sparked by the Arab Spring movement.
The majority of the Syrian rebel opposition desired to reshape Syria into a secular and
democratic state. The Arab Spring movement was a series of nonviolent demonstrations
pursuing democratic change due to the oppressive regimes in the Middle Eastern region
and the low standards of life of the majority of the population. The movement started in
Tunisia before spreading to other nations including Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and
Bahrain. These demonstrators were eventually met with lethal force by pro-government
groups which caused these peaceful demonstrations to transform into violent armed
rebellion
Inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East, Syrian adolescents in
southern Daraa scrawled anti-regime graffiti on public walls. They were arrested, held for
days, and tortured, in turn prompting local demonstrations that called for their release.
Peaceful protests rapidly spread across Syria as the focus shifted to the regime of
President Bashar Assad. As the marches gained momentum, the regime unleashed its
military firepower. By 2012, an array of poorly organized opposition groups had formed

rebel brigades—many armed by foreign patrons—that seized key cities in the north,
including parts of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. As the government lost territory in 2013,
Lebanon’s Hezbollah openly deployed its fighters and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) dispatched military advisors to prop up the Assad government.
In 2014, the creation of the Islamic State caliphate—which claimed roughly a third of
Syrian territory, with Raqqa as its capital—In 2014, the creation of the Islamic State
caliphate—which claimed roughly a third of Syrian territory, with Raqqa as its capital
generated a different set of flash points and frontlines. It was, basically, a different war. It
also prompted direct U.S. military intervention. Meanwhile, moderate rebel groups
fighting the government were increasingly eclipsed by extremist factions. Up to October
2015, the Syrian Civil War had already taken at least 250,000 lives and driven millions
from their homes; the country had lost much of what it was. By then, everything was now
in place for the conflict to drag on with even more foreign intervention and humanitarian
suffering.

MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED

1. SYRIAN GOVERNMENT
The Syrian government, the opposition, and the SDF have all received support—
militarily, logistically, and diplomatically—from foreign countries, leading the
conflict to often be described as a proxy war. The government portrayed itself as
fighting terrorism, and it received substantial support from Russia and Iran.
Atrocities committed by the Assad regime have been described as the "greatest war
crimes of the 21st century", with chilling revelations of torture, massacres and
extermination being leaked through the 2014 Ceaser Report, which contained
photographic evidence gathered by a dissident army photographer who worked in
Ba'athist military reports.
2. FREE SYRIAN ARMY (FSA) AND REBEL GROUPS

Free Syrian Army began forming across the country, marking the beginning of
the Syrian insurgency. By mid-2012, the crisis had escalated into a full-blown civil
war.
FSA was one of the first organized military opposition forces that emerged to fight
the Assad Regime. The FSA aimed for the establishment of a democratic
government by the removal of Bashar al-Assad. They had support from various
Western Countries and Regional Powers like Turkey, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
etc.
3. JIHADIST GROUPS
a) AL QAEDA
Leader – Ayman al-Zawahiri (served as the second general amir of Al-Qaeda
from 2011-2022)
In Syria, the adverse consequences of al-Qaeda’s expansion strategy reached a
new level, as its Iraqi branch turned fully against the group. ISIS became the
most serious organized challenger to al-Qaeda’s authority within the jihadi
camp, with gains that eclipsed anything al-Qaeda had ever achieved. Intriguingly,
the ISIS challenge came at the time al-Qaeda concluded that it must exhibit
greater pragmatism to remain relevant and take advantage of the opportunities
created by the Arab Awakening, and after its new Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra
(JN), established itself as a dominant force among Syria’s Sunni rebels. The
chapter discusses the introduction of JN and traces the emerging conflict

between the branch and al-Qaeda Central (AQC) on one side, and ISIS on the
other. Rather than sending large numbers of operatives, these networks are
providing operational support, including trainers and bomb makers, in order to
capitalize on the instability in Syria and expand their influence in the region.
b) JABHAT AL NUSRA
Syria’s homegrown Salafi-jihadist group has important links to al-Qaeda
affiliates and demonstrates a higher level of effectiveness than many other rebel
groups. Jabhat Nusra has demonstrated sensitivity to popular perception and
they are gaining support within Syria. The emergence of indigenous Salafi-
jihadist groups such as Jabhat Nusra is far more dangerous to the long-term
stability of the Syrian state than foreign jihadist groups because it represents a
metamorphosis of a Salafi-jihadist ideology into a domestic platform that can
achieve popular resonance. The UN reported that in 2014 in Yarmouk
Camp 20,000 residents faced death by starvation due to blockade by the Syrian
government forces and fighting between the army and Jabhat al-Nusra, which
prevents food distribution by UNRWA. On 22 August 2014, Jabhat al-Nusra
released a video of captured Lebanese soldiers and demanded Hezbollah
withdraw from Syria under threat of their execution.
c) JAYSH AL-SUNNA
In October 2016, it was reported that Jaysh al-Sunna released a video that
featured child soldiers at an unidentified training camp. They often operated in
collaboration with other rebel factions, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-
Nusra, and were part of various coalitions that sought to challenge both the
Assad regime and ISIS. It was part of larger alliances like the Army of Conquest
(Jaish al-Fatah), a powerful coalition formed in 2015 that included groups such
as Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate) and Ahrar al-Sham. The Army of
Conquest managed to capture significant areas in northwestern Syria, including
the provincial capital of Idlib in 2015.
d) ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)

The U.S. military has set up bases near gas pipelines in Syria, purportedly to
fight ISIS but perhaps also to defend their own natural gas assets, which have
been allegedly targeted by Iranian militias. In August 2016, a confidential
report by the United Nations and the OPCW explicitly blamed the Syrian
military of Bashar al-Assad for dropping chemical weapons (chlorine bombs) on
the towns of Talmenes in April 2014 and Sarmin in March 2015 and ISIS for

using sulphur mustard on the town of Marea in August 2015. ISIS forces have
also been criticized by the UN of using public executions and killing of captives,
amputations, and lashings in a campaign to instill fear. "Forces of the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham have committed torture, murder, acts tantamount to
enforced disappearance and forced displacement as part of attacks on the civilian
population in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates, amounting to crimes against
humanity", said the report from 27 August 2014. ISIS also persecuted gay and
bisexual men.
4. Hezbollah
Russia and Hezbollah support the Syrian Arab Republic militarily, with Russia
conducting airstrikes and ground operations in the country since September 2015.
Israel has exchanged border fire and conducted repeated strikes against Hezbollah
and Iranian forces, whose presence in western Syria it views as a threat. Hezbollah
provided active support to the Ba'athist government forces. By 2012, the group
escalated its involvement, deploying troops across Syria. In 2013, Hezbollah
publicly acknowledged its presence in Syria, intensifying its ground commitment.
This involvement included an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 fighters at any given time,
comprising Special Forces, standing forces from all units, part-time fighters and
new recruits with accelerated combat training.
In August 2012, the United States sanctioned Hezbollah for its alleged role in the
war. General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah denied Hezbollah had been fighting on
behalf of the Syrian government, stating on 12 October 2012 that "right from the
start the Syrian opposition has been telling the media that Hezbollah sent 3,000
fighters to Syria, which we have denied".
In September 2014, the UN stated that the number of Syrian refugees had
exceeded three million. According to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
Sunnis are leaving for Lebanon and undermining Hezbollah's status.
Hezbollah, backed by the Syrian military, attacked three neighbouring Sunni
villages controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA). An FSA spokesman said,
"Hezbollah's invasion is the first of its kind in terms of organization, planning, and
coordination with the Syrian regime's air force ".
In 2012, Hezbollah fighters crossed the border from Lebanon and took over eight
villages in the Al-Qusayr District of Syria.
On 25 May 2013, Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah is fighting in the Syrian
Civil War against Islamic extremists and "pledged that his group will not allow
Syrian militants to control areas that border Lebanon".

KEY ISSUES
Though the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, by October 2015, it had reached the
international crisis level-- at least defined by widespread displacement, rights
violations, and even terrorist groups like ISIS, Islamic State of Iraq, and Syria. The
freeze date of October 1, 2015, marks a tipping point in the war. Here, the UNSC
should prima facie engage with the intricate nature of the war and take concrete
measures during this stage. The key issues concerning the Syrian Civil War are an
increasingly relevant factor of extremism, the involvement of foreign powers,
humanitarian tragedy, and a challenge in reaching any form of political solution.
EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF RADICALISM IN

SYRIA
The biggest problem the UN Security Council faces, in connection with Syria, is
the spread of extremist groupings in the context of the Syrian Civil War.
The contest had prepared fertile ground for the jihadist movements by 2015, most
notably ISIS, which had proclaimed its "caliphate" in 2014, and Jabhat al-Nusra,
affiliated with al-Qaeda, operating within Syria. Much of the rapid expansion of
these groups must be attributed to the fragmentation of state power throughout
much of the Syrian nation, wherein the Assad regime ceded influence and
opposition forces showed themselves incapable of providing unified rule. ISIS was
the most ruthless and coordinated terror group. It had already, in October 2015,
occupied large areas of territory in Syria and Iraq and had announced the city of
Raqqa as its capital of declared caliphate. ISIS used opportunism based on
sectarianism as well as absolute chaos produced by the bigger civil war. They
resorted to radical violence-public executions, slavery and the likes-not only for the
purpose of instilling fear but also to gain international attention. Its well-equipped
internet-based propaganda and recruitment machinery facilitated attracting
thousands of foreign fighters from the different parts of the planet in order to
intensify the international character of the conflict.
The UNSC needs also to discuss how it can curb further development of terrorist
ideology emanating from Syria.
Extremism, increasingly under the banner of jihadism, poses a threat not only to the
stability in one region but also to global security because most foreign fighters often
return home after being radicalized. To prevent this proliferation, there needs to be
a discussion of the fundamental causes associated with radicalization: political
instability, economic depravity, and social fragmentation that stem from protracted
conflict. The UNSC should, therefore focus on both the military strategies to break
the extremist networks and non-military solutions to counter radicalization at its
root.
ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS AND PROXY

CONFLICT
By 2015, the Syrian Civil War had practically transformed into a proxy war
involving most of the regional and international powers but each with strategic
interests. This way, the involvement of various actors has made the conflict complex
and expanded the war as much as it has allowed extremism to spread.
The two key allies of the Assad regime are Russia and Iran. Russia actually started
direct military attacks on Syria already in September 2015. Its representatives
declared that the airstrikes attacks of its bombers represented involvement in global
war against terrorism, concentrating on the fight against ISIS. Yet this fight
includes not or just ISIS but other rebel factions supported by the Western world,
such as the FSA. Russia wants to preserve Assad for reasons of historical continuity,
in which one of its former allies survives in Damascus and does its duty in
defending military interests in the region, mainly regarding the naval base in Tartus
port city. Iran has been providing critical military and financial support to the
Assad regime, which it views as an essential component of its regional axis of
influence that it conducts through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon with Hezbollah.
The United States and its allies have, to weaken both ISIS and the Assad regime,
been providing aid to competing opposition factions. However the fragmentation
of the opposition and the presence of extremist groups in their ranks have
complicated United States policy.

The US-led coalition has made airstrikes under the cover of Operation Inherent
Resolve against ISIS in Syria, but they have been marred by much criticism because
they seem inefficient and hardly address the crisis at its real political and
humanitarian stages.
Turkey, the other major player, has been a multi-faceted actor in the Syrian conflict.
Turkey is afraid its rhetoric against the Assad regime and its support for all of the
different rebel factions could really lead to a Kurdish ascendancy across the border
with it. It fears that an independent Kurdish region may provoke similar ambitions
among its Kurdish population. This has led to dual policy, where Turkey at the
same time finds itself on the same side with the war against ISIS, yet it continues its
military operations against Kurdish groups, especially the SDF. The SDF forms
part of the components of the YPG, an insurgence group that Turkey accuses of
having links with the PKK, known to be a listed terrorist group.
This has led to foreign entities making Syria a battlefield for clashing geopolitical
interests. Thus, the United Nations Security Council should coordinate the
overlapping interventions while seeking some common grounds as a means to solve
the conflict. The international strategy remains unagreed, thus risking foreign
interventions to protract the war while opening a way to spread more extremism.
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND ITS TIE WITH

EXTREMISM.
The Syrian Civil War has reached one of the most tragic humanitarian crises in the
21st century: more than 250,000 people have been killed, and more than 11
million displaced from their homes, 4 million of whom the United Nations found
refuge in neighbouring states. The general savagery of the war has destroyed civilian
infrastructure-including hospitals, schools, and homes-leaving the population
without access to essential services and therefore generating suffering on a large
scale. Without a doubt, the humanitarianization of the conflict and the spread of
extremism are interrelated. This protracted war creates fertile ground for terrorist
organizations because prospects for people becoming vulnerable to radical thoughts
increase when their groups are not only disenfranchised but also threatened. In
regions under the self-proclaimed authority of ISIS, it has offered services like food
and medical care and it belongs to the integration program, and co-joining into a

set group. For people who had everything taken from them and were left with
nothing like those in Syria, joining extremist groups may seem the only way out.
The United Nations Security Council must combine humanitarian assistance with
being firmly against the proliferation of extremism.
It is imperative to help the internally displaced and most affected areas of Syria not
only to alleviate the pain of the human population but also to take away their
recruitment tool. Humanitarian aid should be provided regularly, on a schedule, and
without discrimination between government and rebel control zones. The
humanitarian process should also be de-politicized and less vulnerable to
exploitation by either party to the conflict, something that the UN Security
Council must ensure.
THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
One elementary problem in the UNSC handling of the Syrian Civil War is that
there never really was a clean political settlement to the crisis. Since October 2015,
several rounds of peace talks have been held, with the most notable being the
Geneva Process, but all these attempts have continually hit a snag because of the
intransigence of both the Assad regime and the fragmented opposition. Moreover,
the insistence of the extremist elements, which are not party to the negotiations,
complicates the peace process further. The Assad regime has thus far refused to
bargain, digging in and defining itself with the fight against terrorism as the civil
war rolls on. For many rebel groups-much less those connected with the more
moderate opposition-the removal of Assad from power is an unconditional
condition for achieving peace. The presence of such organizations as ISIS and al-
Nusra provided an alibi for the brutal actions of Bashar al-Assad, as the war is
presented as a battle to protect the Syrian state from jihadist forces.
The main challenge for the United Nations Security Council is to create conditions
conducive to constructive dialogue among the warring factions. Any political
solution must guarantee a transitional government, which will ensure the legitimate
demands of Syria's opposition and the protection of all religious and ethnic
minorities. What is paradoxical is that within this fight for peace, some of the most
powerful actors on the ground do not include, at least in this process, ISIS, among

others. The UNSC, moreover, has to balance the interests of foreign powers that
have long sunk much political and military capitals in Syria. Russia and Iran, as the
two important allies of Assad, would probably be against any peace roadmap that
would undermine their influence over the region. On the other hand, the United
States and its allies would back away from any plan that would let Assad keep his
power in Syria. Such contradictory interests have always frustrated UNSC
resolutions, pushing diplomacy into a deadlock. Anti-Terrorism Measures and
Militaristic Solutions The UNSC decision also incorporates the effectiveness of the
military option in bringing an end to extremism in Syria. Military action against
ISIS has barely been successful in its own right, but it has gained an impetus from
international efforts in the form of air strikes and ground fighting by local forces. It
has been able to just shift its bases to the villages or merge within the population,
which has made its elimination without unacceptable damage to the collateral only
more difficult. The test for the UNSC, therefore, becomes one of endorsing
counterterrorism strategies that, to be sure, are effective in dismantling some of
these extremist networks, without exacerbating or contributing to further civilian
casualties. These include intelligence sharing among member states, the capacity
building of local forces to fight against extremism, and breaking the financial
networks that feed organizations like ISIS. That is to say, it means doing so with
the understanding that military interventions do not compromise long-term peace
efforts. That would make things worse by probably promoting further violence and
radicalization, already the standard trend of the Syrian war to date.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
UNITED NATIONS (UN)
The United Nations has made a whole host of diplomatic efforts at trying to get lasting
peace into the country of Syria, such as the initial round of discussions in Geneva I in
2012 and further on with discussions held during Geneva II in 2014. In a nutshell, it was
a political solution meant to be accepted by the Assad regime and the many other
opposition groups fighting against it. Unfortunately, this effort was quite a failure, as
divisions and conflicts proved to be too deep within both the warring factions themselves
as well as the international benefactors supporting it. The United Nations was calling for
a power transition to happen by the end of the year 2012, insisting that this must happen.
But the Assad regime refused point blank that they would not even entertain any
negotiations on his stepping down from power.
The United Nations Security Council was effectively paralyzed on Syria, mainly because
vetoes from Russia and China vetoed a large number of resolutions aimed at sanctioning
the Assad regime or authorizing military intervention. No way of deploying coordinated
international action toward an end to the bloodshed was left, nor did it provide an
opportunity to subject Assad to any alleged war crimes.
UN involvement in the resolution came after the Ghouta chemical attack took place in
August 2013 when reportedly hundreds of civilians were killed. The probe about the use
of chemical arms involved the UN. Syria's dismantling of declared chemical weapons
followed from a deal between the U.S and Russia.
WESTERN POWERS
Support to the Movements of Opposition. The United States, the United Kingdom, and
France have been offering political support as well as logistics to the different forces in
Syria that make up the different strands of the opposition. For instance, the CIA has been
running an unclassified program code-named "Timber Sycamore," specifically intended at
training, arming and equipping some of the more moderate factions of the various rebel
groups. The disjointed and fragmented nature of the groups that made up the opposition
greatly hindered and impeded initiatives to progress. Additionally, the situation was
further negatively affected by the emergence and establishment of extremist factions-

Jabhat al-Nusra as an offshoot of the international terrorist group al-Qaeda, and later
ISIS.
Military Intervention against ISIS: Since ISIS quickly took over a large territory in Syria
and Iraq in 2014, the U.S. took the lead of an international coalition to fight ISIS. This
military intervention was at the behest of the counterterrorism interest, rather than a
priority in "supporting opposition forces against Assad." Coalition airstrikes targeted
ISIS positions in Syria but conducted them in such a way that it had no influence on the
Assad regime.
Scant Direct Action Against Assad: The U.S. and its allies insisted that Assad step down
but signaled that own preferred course continued to be against direct action against him.
In 2013 after the chemical weapons attack, President Obama had set a redline regarding
the use of chemical weapons but instead chose military strikes as an option before a deal
with Russia to dismantle Syrian chemicals arsenal, widely condemned because this left
Assad in charge.
ANTI-ASSAD BLOCK
TURKEY
One of the most vocal and strident critics of Assad in the whole region has undoubtedly
been Turkey. Ankara initially resorted to a diplomatic approach for the situation, asking
Assad to implement reforms designed according to Eastern ideals. As the unrest turned
into violent and bloody conflict, Ankara changed its strategy and started actively
supporting the different factions within the Syrian opposition. In this regard, Turkey
took substantial measures by supplying arms and training to the groups of Syrian rebels,
while also giving them shelter on its own territory and allowing opposition fighters to
cross freely from Syria into Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's support has become
very complicated as it is increasingly restless over the emergence and gain in strength of
various Kurdish groups in the region, especially those like the People's Protection Units
that remain in northern Syria. This reason, for instance makes the situation a significant
threat to Turkey since these groups have closely related to the PKK, short for Kurdistan
Workers' Party. Due to these fears, Turkey started advocating the enforcement of a no-fly
zone over northern Syria as well as the establishment of 'safe zones' aimed at protecting
civilians from any harm. However, what is worth noting here is that, as of now, these
demands haven't received enough international support.

QATAR
Qatar was supporting the Syrian opposition forces, but being more overtly favoring
Islamist factions, with some related to the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha has provided
financially and diplomatically abroad support to the opposition, highlighted exposure and
airtime for the rebel leaders and has utilized its media network Al Jazeera to report
atrocities by the regime of Assad. Their role incited a tough pressure within the GCC, and
was strongly felt, especially by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who were never fond of Doha
relations with other Islamist groups.
PRO ASSAD BLOCK

IRAN
The most important regional ally President Assad had was certainly Iran. During the
intervening years, Iran had laboriously built up relations that were quite militarily,
financially, and even politically closely tied to the Syrian government, and they had built a
relationship deeply in mutual interest. Tehran was counting nearly entirely on Assad,
believing that his leadership would be pivotal in ensuring that Iran's immense influence
within the region would not only be maintained but also effectively sustained over time.
Iran's involvement in the regional war is a critical part of a larger strategic policy that is
inherently centered on ensuring the continued vibrancy and potency of what is often
termed the "Axis of Resistance." The axis includes several powerful actors, most notably
Syria, the militant group Hezbollah, and numerous other factors that all share a common
opposition to the very existence of Israel and the influence of the Sunni powers emanating
from the Gulf region. Perhaps this strategic perspective is best put in the terms of one of
the most powerful Lebanese Shia movements present in the country. Hezbollah has been
running military operations in favour of Bashar al-Assad forces, Syria's president, and has
played a crucial role in placing fighters along vital battle lines, especially during the heavy
clashes in Qusayr in 2013.
IRAQ
While Iraq appears to have been thoroughly diverted by the all-encompassing civil war
within its own borders, which, of course, has been largely directed against the powerful
Islamic State, it has, in somewhat of a low-key fashion, provided support for the Bashar
Assad regime. This assistance came in the form of unfettered access for Shia militias
fighting on behalf of the loyalists to Bashar Assad. In fact, many of these militias were
Iranian proxies, thus a part of a far larger and more complex regional dynamic that was
playing out in this volatile region. The government of Iraq, with a Shia majority and run
by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initially and since 2014 by Haider al-Abadi, had
enjoyed relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria that were extremely favorable
and cooperative. Based on that perception, they regarded Assad's government as an
important and strong bulwark against the dangers unleashed by Sunni extremism, which
comprises such harmful organizations as ISIS.

OTHER PROXY WARS

The Iraq War changed the regional balance of the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Turkey rose to powerful regional players. These states have the power to shape outcomes
in the regional system however, for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the
projection of this power is more negative than for other regions. Regionalization of
security describes how regional states and other actors have engaged with local security
dilemmas by becoming providers of security replacing or complementing the role of great
powers or the UN. However, the demarcation of the region also creates the illusion of a
common interest in cooperation which is not present in the case of the Insecurity and
interdependences, however high, do not provide enough incentives for the states to
cooperate more broadly and especially more effectively. Rather, this push for cooperation
from external involvement in the region creates more tensions and incompatibilities
among the states that lead to fragmentation and ephemeral results. States of the Middle
East have a record of being "poor balancers and weak hegemons".
The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, became a complex battleground for various
regional and global powers, leading to the emergence of multiple proxy wars. This
conflict catalyzed for competing interests to play out on Syrian soil, with different actors
supporting various factions to further their own strategic goals.
One of the primary proxy conflicts that emerged was between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran,
seeking to maintain its influence in the region and support its ally, the Assad regime,
provided military advisors, weapons, and financial support to the Syrian government.
They also mobilized Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon and Shi'a militias from Iraq to
fight alongside Assad's forces. In response, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states,
backed various rebel groups opposing Assad, including some Islamist factions, in an
attempt to counter Iranian influence and potentially install a Sunni-friendly government
in Syria.
Another significant proxy war developed between Russia and the United States. Russia,
aiming to protect its naval base in Tartus and maintain its influence in the Middle East,
provided crucial military support to the Assad regime, including air strikes against

opposition forces. The United States, on the other hand, supported moderate rebel
groups and Kurdish forces, particularly in the fight against the Islamic State (IS), while
also conducting its own air campaign against IS target
Turkey also became heavily involved in the conflict, initially supporting various rebel
groups against Assad, but later focusing its efforts on preventing Kurdish autonomy along
its border. This led to direct military interventions in northern Syria, targeting both IS
and Kurdish forces, creating tension with its NATO ally, the United States, which was
supporting Kurdish groups.
The involvement of these various actors turned Syria into a complex web of proxy
conflicts, with each power pursuing its own agenda. This resulted in a prolonged and
intensified conflict, with different factions receiving support from external powers,
making reconciliation and peace negotiations extremely challenging. The proxy nature of
the war also led to the proliferation of weapons and the rise of extremist groups, as
various actors sought to gain advantage through local proxies.
These proxy wars extended beyond Syria's borders, affecting neighbouring countries like
Iraq and Lebanon, and contributing to regional instability. They also exacerbated
sectarian tensions across the Middle East, as the conflict increasingly took on a Sunni-
Shi'a dimension due to the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Syrian conflict
thus became a microcosm of broader regional power struggles, with devastating
consequences for the Syrian people and long-lasting implications for the geopolitical
landscape of the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia, a key Sunni power, saw the Syrian Civil War as an opportunity to curb
Iran’s growing influence in the region, which was expanding through its support for Shiite
factions. Saudi Arabia supported Sunni rebel groups, such as the Free Syrian Army, in an
effort to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, who is backed by Iran. This intervention
was motivated by Saudi Arabia’s broader geopolitical rivalry with Iran, as both countries
compete for influence in the Middle East.
However, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War had unintended
consequences. As Saudi Arabia funnelled arms and financial support to various Sunni
rebel groups, extremist groups like al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and ISIS gained
strength. These groups not only posed a threat within Syria but also threatened Saudi

Arabia’s own security. The Kingdom’s eastern provinces, home to a large Shiite
population, experienced unrest, which Saudi officials blamed on Iranian influence. As a
result, Saudi Arabia viewed Iran’s involvement in Syria as part of a broader strategy to
destabilize the Kingdom by stirring up sectarian tensions.
Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Syria exemplifies the double-edged sword of proxy wars.
While seeking to counter Iranian influence, the Kingdom inadvertently empowered
extremist groups that threatened its own stability. Terrorism, in this sense, became both a
tool and a threat in the broader geopolitical struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
For Iran, the Syrian Civil War was crucial to maintaining its regional influence, especially
its alliance with the Assad regime, which provides a vital link to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran’s involvement in Syria can be seen as part of its broader strategy to project power
across the Middle East through a network of proxy groups, including Hezbollah, various
Iraqi Shiite militias, and, more recently, Houthis in Yemen.
Iran’s support for Assad involved the provision of military advisors, financial aid, and
even direct military involvement through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
and its elite Quds Force. Additionally, Iran leveraged Hezbollah to fight on behalf of
Assad, seeing the survival of his regime as crucial to its influence in the Levant. Iran’s
proxy war in Syria was thus not only about supporting Assad but also about maintaining
a corridor of influence that stretched from Tehran through Baghdad to Damascus and
Beirut, often referred to as the “Shiite Crescent.”
However, Iran’s involvement in Syria has not come without costs. The war, alongside its
regional ambitions, has drained resources and provoked backlash from Sunni powers like
Saudi Arabia, as well as from extremist Sunni groups like ISIS. Indeed, ISIS, which views
Iran and Shiites as apostates, explicitly targeted Iranian interests in Syria and Iraq. Tehran
has been forced to confront ISIS both on the battlefield and within its borders, as
terrorist cells linked to the group have carried out attacks in Iran. This underscores how
Iran’s proxy war in Syria has drawn it into a broader conflict with Sunni extremist groups,
further complicating its security landscape.
Turkey’s involvement in Syria, while initially aimed at supporting rebel groups opposed
to Assad, has been primarily driven by concerns over the Kurdish question. Turkey feared
that the power vacuum created by the Syrian Civil War would enable Kurdish groups,

particularly the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s
Protection Units (YPG), to establish an autonomous region along Turkey’s southern
border. The PYD/YPG is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which
has waged a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state.
As a result, Turkey’s primary goal in Syria has been to prevent the formation of a Kurdish
statelet that could inspire similar ambitions among its own Kurdish population. This fear
led Turkey to support various rebel groups, including Islamist factions, as a way to
counter both Assad and the Kurdish militias. Turkey has also carried out direct military
interventions in Syria, such as Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, aimed at pushing ISIS
out of northern Syria while simultaneously preventing Kurdish forces from gaining
ground.
Turkey’s involvement in Syria has also led to an increase in terrorist attacks within its
own borders. Both ISIS and Kurdish militants have carried out attacks in Turkey,
exploiting the chaos of the Syrian Civil War. The rise of terrorism within Turkey, much
like in Saudi Arabia and Iran, illustrates how proxy wars can have a destabilizing effect on
the countries involved, particularly when extremist groups are empowered as a result.

CROSS BORDER TERRORISM

The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011, has been a catalyst for widespread cross-
border terrorism, significantly impacting the security landscape of the Middle East. This
complex conflict has drawn in various state and non-state actors, leading to a proliferation
of terrorist activities that transcend national boundaries. This essay will explore the
multifaceted nature of cross-border terrorism in the context of the Syrian Civil War,
focusing on events and developments up to October 1, 2015.
The roots of cross-border terrorism in the Syrian conflict can be traced to the early stages
of the war when the initial peaceful protests against the Assad regime transformed into an
armed rebellion. As the conflict intensified, it created power vacuums and ungoverned
spaces that terrorist organizations exploited. The porous borders of Syria, particularly
with Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon, facilitated the movement of fighters, weapons, and
resources, turning the country into a hotbed of terrorist activity.
One of the most significant developments in cross-border terrorism during this period
was the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL or Daesh.
ISIS emerged from the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and expanded rapidly across Syria
and Iraq in 2013 and 2014. By June 2014, ISIS had captured Mosul, Iraq's second-
largest city, and declared a caliphate that straddled the Syria-Iraq border. This
development marked a new era in cross-border terrorism, as ISIS effectively erased the
border between Syria and Iraq, creating a contiguous territory under its control.
The expansion of ISIS had severe implications for regional security. The group's ability to
move freely between Syria and Iraq allowed it to exploit resources, recruit fighters, and
launch attacks in both countries. ISIS also attracted thousands of foreign fighters from
around the world, many of whom entered Syria through Turkey. According to a report by
The Soufan Group, by 2015, an estimated 30,000 foreign fighters from over 100
countries had joined extremist groups in Syria, with a significant portion aligning with
ISIS.
The flow of foreign fighters into Syria represented a significant aspect of cross-border
terrorism. These individuals not only bolstered the ranks of terrorist organizations but
also posed a threat to their home countries upon return. European countries, in particular,
faced a growing concern about the radicalization of their citizens and the potential for
terrorist attacks by returning fighters. The November 2015 Paris attacks, although
occurring after our cutoff date, were a stark reminder of this threat.
Another critical player in cross-border terrorism was the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's
affiliate in Syria. While primarily focused on fighting the Assad regime, Al-Nusra also
engaged in cross-border activities, particularly in Lebanon. The group conducted several
attacks in Lebanon, including suicide bombings in Beirut, aiming to punish Hezbollah for
its support of the Assad regime. These attacks highlighted how the Syrian conflict spilled
over into neighbouring countries, destabilizing the entire region.
The involvement of Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shi'a militant group, in the Syrian conflict
further complicated the cross-border terrorism landscape. Hezbollah fighters crossed into
Syria to support the Assad regime, engaging in battles against various rebel groups and
ISIS. This involvement not only blurred the lines between state and non-state actors but
also exacerbated sectarian tensions in the region, particularly between Sunni and Shi'a
communities.
Turkey's long border with Syria became a critical factor in the spread of cross-border
terrorism. Initially, Turkey's open-border policy, intended to support Syrian refugees and
opposition groups, inadvertently facilitated the movement of extremists into Syria. The
town of Tal Abyad, on the Syrian-Turkish border, became a key transit point for foreign
fighters and supplies entering Syria to join ISIS. By 2015, under increasing international
pressure, Turkey began to tighten its border controls, but the damage had already been
done.
The Kurdish factor added another layer of complexity to the cross-border terrorism issue.
The Kurdish YPG (People's Protection Units) in Syria, while fighting against ISIS, was
viewed as a terrorist organization by Turkey due to its links with the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers' Party). This led to a situation where Turkey was simultaneously combating
ISIS and trying to prevent Kurdish autonomy along its border, sometimes at cross-
purposes with US-led coalition efforts against ISIS.
The refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian conflict also had implications for cross-
border terrorism. By 2015, millions of Syrians had fled to neighbouring countries,
primarily Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. While the vast majority were genuine refugees
fleeing violence, there were concerns about terrorists exploiting refugee routes to enter
other countries. This fear led to increased border security measures and complicated
international efforts to address the humanitarian crisis.
The use of social media and online platforms by terrorist groups, particularly ISIS,
represented a new frontier in cross-border terrorism. ISIS's sophisticated propaganda
machine used the internet to recruit fighters, spread its ideology, and inspire lone-wolf
attacks in various countries. This online dimension of terrorism transcended physical
borders, making it a global threat.
The international response to cross-border terrorism in Syria was multifaceted. The US-
led coalition, formed in September 2014, conducted airstrikes against ISIS targets in both
Syria and Iraq. However, the effectiveness of these strikes was limited by the lack of
reliable ground forces and the complex political landscape of the conflict. Russia's
military intervention in support of the Assad regime, which began in September 2015,
added another layer of complexity to the situation.
Regional powers also played significant roles in the cross-border terrorism dynamic. Iran
provided support to the Assad regime and Shi'a militias, while Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf states backed various rebel groups. This proxy war element fuelled the conflict and
contributed to the proliferation of armed groups, some of which engaged in terrorist
activities.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
AND CHALLENGES
CEASEFIRE ATTEMPTS
1. EARLY CEASEFIRE ATTEMPTS
The Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria or the six-point peace plan for Syria was
launched in March 2012 by the Arab League and the United Nations (UN), when
the violent Syrian Civil War had raged for a year.
After the initiators had believed for some days end of March and beginning of
April that the Syrian government was willing to comply with the peace plan, new
signs of war and statements of politicians gradually cast discouraging shadows over
those hopes. By the first of May 2012, the UN had to admit that the peace plan
was in dire straits. Heavy government violence on 25 May, and the promise of
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on 1 June to resume its ‘defensive operations’, made
clear that this peace initiative had, for the time being, run aground. Several new
peace initiatives would follow, recently the attempt in 2012–2013 at a Geneva
II Middle East peace conference and the Russian initiative in November 2013
for peace talks in Moscow.
2. EID AL-ADHA CEASE FIRE ATTEMPT

On 17 August 2012, Brahimi was appointed by the United Nations as the new
peace envoy to Syria, replacing Kofi Annan. Following initial consultations and
meetings of Lakhdar Brahimi with Syrian President Assad, Russian, Chinese, as well
as other officials, a cease fire attempt was announced towards late October, in order
to respect the Muslim holiday of Eid-al-Adha.
Brahimi appealed on both the Syrian government and the armed opposition to stop
the violence during the Islamic festival of Eid-al-Adha, which fell that year
probably on 26 October 2012, and 3 or 4 days after it. The government and most
opposition groups agreed, but fighting soon resumed when the parties accused each
other of continued violence.

3. HOMS CEASEFIRE (2014)

The siege of Homs was a military confrontation between the Syrian Military and
the Syrian opposition in the city of Homs, a major rebel stronghold during
the Syrian Civil War. The siege lasted three years from May 2011 to May 2014,
and ultimately resulted in an opposition withdrawal from the city.
4. MOADAMIYAH CEASEFIRE (2014)

The siege of Darayya and Muadamiyat was launched by the Syrian Armed Forces in
late 2012 after rebels took over most of the Damascus suburbs
of Darayya and Muadamiyat al-Sham in November 2012. Since then, the power
grid in the area was cut off as the government attempted to storm the towns
multiple times. During the siege the towns were continuously hit by airstrikes from
the Syrian Air Force. The truce was fragile and did not fully end the fighting, but it
provided some relief to civilians who had been suffering under siege conditions.
5. EASTERN GHOUTA CEASEFIRES (2014–2015)

Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area outside Damascus, was subject to several local
ceasefire agreements between government forces and opposition groups in 2014
and 2015. This ceasefire often aimed at reducing violence temporarily, particularly
to allow humanitarian aid deliveries to besieged civilian populations. However,
violations were common, and the ceasefires tended to be short-lived, with fighting
resuming soon after the agreements were reached. The siege of Eastern Ghouta was
a siege that was laid by Syrian Government forces in April 2013, to the area in
eastern Ghouta held by anti-government forces since November 2012, during
the Syrian Civil War. The cities and villages under siege
were Douma, Mesraba, Modira, Eftreis, Jisrin, as well as suburbs of Damascus Beit
Sawa, etc.
De-escalation Efforts by Regional Powers
TURKEY
Turkey supported certain rebel factions, especially the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and
attempted to broker local ceasefires in northern Syria, particularly in areas near the
Turkish border. However, Turkey’s primary focus was on preventing the rise of Kurdish
forces along its southern border, complicating its role as a neutral mediator.
IRAN
Iran, a key ally of the Assad government, focused on helping the Syrian military recapture
strategic areas. While it occasionally facilitated local ceasefires, particularly in areas where
its proxy militia Hezbollah operated, its involvement was primarily military. Iran
supported ceasefire agreements in certain areas to consolidate government control rather
than to genuinely reduce the overall conflict.
QATAR AND THE ROLE OF GULF STATES

Qatar and other Gulf states, which supported various rebel factions, occasionally
participated in ceasefire negotiations, particularly in southern Syria and Damascus
suburbs. However, these efforts were often undermined by conflicting objectives among
the rebel groups.
Political Transition
FIRST ATTEMPT
The Arab League presented for the first time a plan to resolve the crisis in Syria on 6 September 2011.
Its provisions stipulate the holding of multi-candidate presidential elections in 2014, the date of the
end of the current president's term. It also calls on the Syrian government to immediately stop acts of
violence against civilians and to withdraw military manifestations from the cities. It also demands
compensation for those affected, reparation for all forms of harm to citizens, and the release of
detainees who did not participate in the violence. The initiative calls for launching a political dialogue
between the president and Syrian Opposition forces, such as the National Coordination Committee.
SECOND ATTEMPT
On 2 November 2011, the Syrian government agreed to an Arab League peace plan to the effect that
its army would no longer be deployed in violent crackdowns against peaceful demonstrators, tanks
would be withdrawn from the cities, all political prisoners be released, a dialogue with the opposition
begun within two weeks, and Arab League and foreign media allowed to monitor the situation. When
on 6 November at least 23 demonstrators were killed, the Arab League considered this a first breach
of promise by Syria.
On 12/13 November Syrian opposition groups counted 300 demonstrators and other opponents of
the government allegedly killed since 2 November. The Arab League therefore threatened to suspend
Syria's membership of the League if it wouldn't execute the peace plan before 16 November.
On 16 November, the Arab League formally suspended Syria's membership of the League.
November additionally saw the Arab League impose economic sanctions on Syria. These sanctions saw
asset freezes and travel restrictions on senior regime officials, a ban on Arab funding for development
projects in Syria and restrictions in trading with Syria's central bank. Only Iraq and Lebanon refused
to enact these sanctions.
THIRD ATTEMPT
19 December 2011, Syria signed another Arab League peace plan that called for withdrawal of the
Syrian army and the rebel forces from the streets, the release of political prisoners, admittance of Arab
League monitors to Syria, and the start of talks between the government and dissidents.
26 December 50 Arab League Monitors began arriving in Syria. One of them told already on 26
December to Al Arabiya broadcaster by telephone: "This regime is taking revenge on its people what's
happening in Syria is genocide". The following weeks, the Arab League mission was heavily criticized
because Damascus did not keep its promises. Critics said, the Arab League monitors' presence
imparted legitimacy to the violent actions of the Syrian army.
Around 20–22 January 2012, the Arab League decided to extend the mission, which had technically
expired 19 January, for another month, add more members to it, and provide them with more
resources. This decision prompted Saudi Arabia on 22 January to pull its monitors from the Arab
League mission and call on Russia, China, Europe, the U.S. and the Islamic states for "all possible
pressure" on Syria to adhere to the Arab peace plan.
Around 23–24 January, Assad turned down another Arab League plan to stop the bloodshed. The
other Gulf States: Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates now concluded that
the bloodshed hadn't abated, and therefore the Arab League observer mission was useless, and decided
to also withdraw their observers from Syria. On 27 January, the head of the Arab League mission,
Mustafa al-Dabi, warned that violence in Syria had intensified considerably in recent days. On 28
January 2012, the Arab League suspended its monitoring mission because of the worsening violence.
FAILURE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION EFFORTS BY 2015

ASSAD’S REFUSAL TO STEP DOWN:
Assad’s refusal to step down from power or to meaningfully engage in the transition process was the
single biggest obstacle to a political solution. Backed by Russia and Iran, the Assad regime maintained
that it was fighting terrorism and rejected calls for a negotiated transition that would remove Assad
from office.
FRAGMENTED OPPOSITION:
The opposition, both political and military, was deeply divided by 2015. Moderate factions had lost
ground to more radical Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, and the Syrian National

Coalition had little influence on the ground. The fragmentation of the opposition made it difficult to
present a unified front in negotiations.
INTERNATIONAL DIVISIONS:
The international community was deeply divided over the fate of Assad and the appropriate strategy
for achieving a political transition. Western powers, led by the U.S., continued to insist on Assad’s
departure, while Russia and Iran backed Assad and prioritized fighting terrorism. These divisions
paralyzed diplomatic efforts and made it difficult to achieve any meaningful progress in the UN-led
talks.
FOCUS ON MILITARY SOLUTIONS:
By late 2015, the focus of both the Assad regime and its international backers (Russia and Iran) was
on securing military victories rather than pursuing a political solution. The rise of ISIS and the
subsequent focus on counterterrorism further sidelined the political transition process.
COUNTER TERRORISM
The Assad regime labelled all armed opposition groups, including the moderate rebels supported by
the West, as "terrorists." This tactic was aimed at delegitimizing the entire opposition movement and
positioning Assad as a bulwark against extremism. This also served to attract support from some
international actors under the banner of counterterrorism. The Syrian government relied heavily on
support from Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite militia, and Iran, which provided both military and
financial assistance. Both Iran and Hezbollah shared a counterterrorism objective of fighting Sunni
extremist groups, particularly ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as protecting Shiite and Alawite
communities. Their operations, however, also aligned with the Syrian regime's broader goal of ensuring
Assad's survival.
REFUGEE CRISIS
After over a decade of conflict, Syria remains the world’s largest refugee crisis. Since 2011, more than
14 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety. More than 7.2 million
Syrians remain internally displaced in their own country where 70 percent of the population is need of
humanitarian assistance and 90 percent live below the poverty line. Approximately 5.5 million Syrian
refugees live in the five countries neighboring Syria—Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.
Germany is the largest non-neighboring host country with more than 850,000 Syrian refugees.
TURKEY
By 2015, Turkey had become the largest host of Syrian refugees, sheltering over 2 million
Syrians. The Turkish government established a network of refugee camps, particularly
along its southern border with Syria, and provided health care and education to refugees.
Turkey had a relatively open-door policy, but the sheer scale of the crisis overwhelmed its
resources. Urban centers, especially in Istanbul and border cities like Gaziantep, saw an
influx of refugees, which placed immense pressure on local services, housing, and the labor
market.
LEBANON
Lebanon, with a population of just over 4 million, hosted more than a million Syrian
refugees, making it the country with the highest per capita refugee population in the
world. The Lebanese government resisted establishing formal refugee camps and instead
allowed refugees to settle informally in urban areas and in makeshift camps.
JORDAN
Jordan hosted over 600,000 Syrian refugees by 2015, with the majority living outside
formal refugee camps. The Zaatari refugee camp, one of the largest refugee camps in the
world, housed around 80,000 people but was only a small fraction of the total refugee
population in Jordan.
IRAQ
Iraq hosted around 250,000 Syrian refugees in the Kurdish-controlled northern region.
Camps were established to accommodate some of these refugees, but Iraq’s ongoing war
with ISIS and internal displacement of its population meant the country struggled to
provide adequate support.

UN ACTIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS
Peace Initiatives and Negotiation Efforts
1. GENEVA I CONFERENCE ON SYRIA
Geneva I Conference on Syria, or known as an “action group” conference before,
was held on 30 June 2012 in Geneva, it was initiated by the United Nations peace
envoy to Syria Kofi Annan (Brahimi, 2013), and was attended by the Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, Russia Foreign Minister Lavrov, the representative of China,
British Foreign Secretary William Hague, and Kofi Annan himself (BBC, 2012). In
these talks, Annan made an official statement, saying that the participants of the
conference agreed on the need for a "transitional government body with full
executive powers" which included the members of Syria government and the
opposition (BBC, 2012). Later on, this talk was condemned by Hassan Abboud,
the leader of Ahrar al-sham
2. GENEVA II CONFERENCE ON SYRIA
Geneva II Conference on Syria or also known as Geneva II Middle East Peace
Conference was the second meeting of Geneva Peace Talk. It was held for 16 days
straight. The first meeting was held on January 22nd 2014 in Montreux, then it
was continued on January 23rd – 31st 2014 in Geneva, Switzerland and the last
was held on February 10th – 15th 2014 in Geneva .This talk aimed to put an end
to the crisis/ civil war in Syria by bringing together the Syrian government and the
Syrian opposition to discuss
3. GENEVA III CONFERENCE ON SYRIA
Geneva III Conference on Syria is the intended peace talks between the Syrian
government and the Syrian opposition under the United Nations aegis or auspices.
The talks of the third round was prepared by the International Syria Support
Group, negotiations of foreign powers that started in Vienna in October 2015 at
the level of foreign ministers to put an end to the crisis in Syria.

UN RESOLUTIONS
Resolution 2118 was adopted by United Nations Security Council, in September 2013,
in response to the 2013 Ghouta chemical attack., making the destruction of the chemical
weapons arsenal of Syria an obligation that marked a step forward toward disarmament.
Resolution 2139 adopted on February 22, 2014, demanded unconditional access for aid,
halting the deterioration of the humanitarian catastrophe with an end to all attacks on
civilians immediately. This is a reflection of the interest of the international community's
growing concern for the plight of Syrian civilians.
Later, Resolution 2235, adopted in August 2015, established the Joint Investigative
Mechanism to identify people who were found to have perpetrated chemical weapons
attacks in Syria. That only strengthened further efforts to hold perpetrators accountable
and curb the use of banned weapons.
Besides, when Syria denied access to humanitarian aid reaching the opposition-held
territories, UNSC passed Resolution 2165 on July 14, 2014, which legalized cross-
border deliveries of aid from four entry points from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq- and
bypassed Syrian government control. In this respect, this resolution provided millions of
civilians with access to aid, though humanitarian workers were exposed to extreme danger;
a number of them lost their lives inside the war zone while distributing the much-needed
help.

TIMELINE
DETAILED BELOW IS A TIMELINE OF THE MAJOR
EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR TO CURRENT DAY (1ST
OCTOBER, 2015):
March 15, 2011: Protests begin in Daraa after the arrest and torture of teenagers who
painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall.
March 18, 2011: Security forces open fire on protestors in Daraa, killing four people.
April 25, 2011: The Syrian Army begins siege of Daraa.
May 6, 2011: Mass protests erupt in Homs, Hama, and suburban Damascus.
July 29, 2011: Seven officers led by Colonel Riad al-Asaad announce the formation of
the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
August 18, 2011: U.S. President Obama calls for Assad to step down.
October 4, 2011: Russia and China veto a UN Security Council resolution

condemning Syria.
November 12, 2011: The Arab League votes to suspend Syria's membership.
November 27, 2011: Arab League approves sanctions against Syria.

February 4, 2012: Russia and China veto another UN Security Council resolution on
Syria.
February 22, 2012: Marie Colvin and Rémi Ochlik, Western journalists, are killed in
Homs.
March 15, 2012: Syria launches a military assault on Idlib province.
April 12, 2012: UN-backed ceasefire comes into effect, but quickly breaks down.
May 25, 2012: Houla massacre occurs, with over 100 civilians killed.
June 22, 2012: Syrian forces shoot down a Turkish jet, increasing regional tensions.
July 18, 2012: A bombing in Damascus kills several senior regime figures, including
Assad's brother-in-law.
July 19, 2012: Russia and China veto a third UN Security Council resolution on Syria.
August 2, 2012: Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League envoy to Syria.
August 20, 2012: President Obama warns that use of chemical weapons would be a
"red line."
December 11, 2012: U.S. recognizes the National Coalition as the legitimate
representative of Syrians.
January 6, 2013: Assad gives a speech refusing to step down and calling rebels
"terrorists."
March 19, 2013: Chemical weapons allegedly used in Khan al-Assal, Aleppo.

April 8, 2013: Al-Nusra Front pledges allegiance to al-Qaeda.
May 27, 2013: EU lifts arms embargo on Syrian rebels.
June 5, 2013: Government forces, backed by Hezbollah, recapture Qusayr.
August 21, 2013: Major chemical attack in Ghouta, Damascus suburbs, kills hundreds.
September 14, 2013: U.S. and Russia agree on a deal to eliminate Syria's chemical
weapons.
October 31, 2013: Syria meets the deadline to destroy chemical weapons production
equipment.
January 22, 2014: Geneva II Conference on Syria begins.
February 15, 2014: Geneva II talks end without progress.
March 19, 2014: Syrian government forces capture Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold
in the Qalamoun mountains.
June 3, 2014: Assad wins a controversial presidential election.
June 29, 2014: ISIS declares a caliphate in its controlled territories.
August 8, 2014: U.S. begins airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq.
September 22, 2014: U.S. and allies begin airstrikes against ISIS in Syria.
September 26, 2014: UK Parliament votes to join airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, but
not Syria.

January 26, 2015: Kurdish forces push ISIS out of Kobani after a four-month battle.
March 28, 2015: Idlib city falls to rebel forces, including al-Nusra Front.
May 20, 2015: ISIS captures the ancient city of Palmyra.
June 16, 2015: Kurdish YPG forces capture Tal Abyad from ISIS.
July 27, 2015: Turkey allows U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base for strikes against ISIS.
August 7, 2015: UN Security Council authorizes probe into chemical weapons attacks
in Syria.
September 27, 2015: France begins airstrikes against ISIS in Syria.
September 30, 2015:

- Around 10:00 AM (local time): Russia begins airstrikes in Syria, claiming to target ISIS.
- 11:30 AM: Russian Defense Ministry announces the start of airstrikes.
- 1:00 PM: U.S. State Department receives official notification from Russia about the
airstrikes.
- 3:00 PM: Reports emerge that Russian strikes hit areas controlled by non-ISIS rebels.
- 5:00 PM: U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter expresses concern about Russian targets.
- 8:00 PM: Emergency UN Security Council meeting convened to discuss Russian
intervention.
October 1, 2015:
00:01 - US, UK, France, Germany, and Gulf Arab allies issue a joint statement calling on
Russia to cease attacks on the Syrian opposition.
02:00 - Russian Defense Ministry releases initial battle damage assessment of airstrikes.
04:00 - Pre-dawn Russian airstrikes reported in Idlib province.
06:00 - Syrian government forces, backed by Russian air support, begin ground
operations in Hama province.
08:00 - Turkish President Erdogan criticizes Russian intervention in a televised speech.
09:00 - Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov holds a press conference at the UN,
defending the airstrikes.
10:00 - Syrian opposition groups report new civilian casualties from overnight and
morning Russian airstrikes.
11:00 - NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg expresses concern over Russian

airstrikes and calls for de-escalation.
12:00 - Russian Defense Ministry announces second day of airstrikes, claiming to target
ISIS command centers.

NOTES ON PAPERWORK
Committee Email Address: unsclsamun24@gmail.com
Please note that in this committee, United Nations Security Council, Position
Paper is due on the 19th October, 11:59 pm. The format of the position
paper is given in the conference handbook.
Along with this, delegates are allowed only 2 pre-committee communiques
which are to be sent by the 22nd October, 09:11 pm.
This committee will be accepting the following forms of paperwork:
● Position Paper
● Public/Private Communique
● Presidential Statement
● Draft Resolution
● Action Order

RESOURCES
1. https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war
2. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
3. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria
4. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
5. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-syria
6. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/28/how-did-isis-rise-and-
how-was-it-defeated
7. https://www.theguardian.com/world/isis
8. https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-global-competition-for-syria/
9. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/russia-
syria/408676/
10. https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12169.doc.htm
11. https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html
12. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/30/world/middl
eeast/syria-peace-talks.html
13. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-
mediterranean/syria

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LAKSHMIPAT SINGHANIA ACADEMY

VICE CHAIRPERSON- SAANVI AGARWAL

DIRECTOR- RAUNAK AGARWAL

RAPPORTEUR- MAANVI VORA

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The UNSC consists of 15 member states:

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Maintaining Peace and Security

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BACKGROUND OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

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ROLE OF EXTREMISM IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

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ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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An anti-extremism policy will therefore be comprised of an all-encompassing strategy

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Map 1: Syria in conflict, 2015

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MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED

2. FREE SYRIAN ARMY (FSA) AND REBEL GROUPS

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d) ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)

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EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF RADICALISM IN

ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS AND PROXY

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HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND ITS TIE WITH

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THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

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PRO ASSAD BLOCK

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OTHER PROXY WARS

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CROSS BORDER TERRORISM

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2. EID AL-ADHA CEASE FIRE ATTEMPT

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3. HOMS CEASEFIRE (2014)

4. MOADAMIYAH CEASEFIRE (2014)

5. EASTERN GHOUTA CEASEFIRES (2014–2015)

De-escalation Efforts by Regional Powers

QATAR AND THE ROLE OF GULF STATES

FAILURE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION EFFORTS BY 2015

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