MODULE 3 THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal

grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces

Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
Territory reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
Clyde embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
● Magallona v Ermita, G.R. 187167 (2011) ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
country’s waters landward of the baselines to
Facts: maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and
In 2009, Congress amended Republic Act No. national security, contravening the country’s
3046 (RA 3046) a law demarcating the maritime nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
State by enacting RA 9552. The change was provisions.
prompted by the need to make RA 3046
compliant with the terms of the United Nations Commenting on the petition, respondents
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance
III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving
February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III Philippine territory over the KIG or
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like 9522 does not undermine the country’s security,
the Philippines and sets the deadline for the environment and economic interests or
filing of application for the extended continental relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah..
shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the Respondents also question the normative force,
location of some basepoints around the under international law, of petitioners’ assertion
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent that what Spain ceded to the United States
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of all the waters found within the boundaries of the
islands" whose islands generate their own rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of
applicable maritime zones. Paris.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and Issue 1: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional
a legislator, in their respective capacities as
"citizens, taxpayers" as the case may be, assail Ruling 1: No, RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign Territory.
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) large portion of the national territory" because
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
of the baselines to maritime passage by all Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine and related treaties, successively encoded in
sovereignty and national security, the definition of national territory under the
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners
and damaging marine resources, in violation of theorize that this constitutional definition
relevant constitutional provisions. trumps any treaty or statutory provision
denying the Philippines sovereign control over
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at
a legislator, in their respective capacities as the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain
"citizens, taxpayers. As the case may be, assail supposedly ceded to the United States.
Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
technical description, Philippine sovereignty enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
over territorial waters extends hundreds of sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
nautical miles around the Philippine 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area living resources in the exclusive economic zone
delineated in the Treaty of Paris. (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Here, UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the Issue 2: Whether RA 9522 use of framework of
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a Regime Islands to determine the Maritime
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal is
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the not consistent with the Philippine’s claim of
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the Sovereignty over the Areas.
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and Ruling 2: No, RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. of Regime of Islands to Determine the
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades- Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
long negotiations among United Nations Shoal is not Inconsistent with the Philippines’
members to codify norms regulating the Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas.
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and The configuration of the baselines drawn under
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522
limited span of waters and submarine lands merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
along their coasts. 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA
9522 skipped to optimize the location of
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline
9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation
to mark-out specific basepoints along their on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines
starting points to measure the breadth of the drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out
of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a
could not be any clearer: statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the relevant for this purpose.
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. – The Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous square nautical miles of territorial waters" under
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
continental shelf shall be measured from law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance the location of basepoints, increased the
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to miles.
delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the lies outside Philippine territory because the
international community of the scope of the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the
maritime space and submarine areas within KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, law commits to text the Philippines’ continued
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’
under the Republic of the Philippines
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over consistent with Article 121"of UNCLOS III
which the Philippines likewise exercises manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be observance of its pacta sunt servanda
determined as "Regime of Islands" under the obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article
Republic of the Philippines consistent with 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on of land, surrounded by water, which is above
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG,
qualifies under the category of "regime of
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as islands," whose islands generate their own
constituted under Presidential Decree applicable maritime zones.
No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Evan

Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied) ● Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, SCRA 402 (2008)
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to
emphasize the foregoing during the Senate Facts:
deliberations:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and which is scheduled to be signed by the
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our Government of the Republic of the Philippines
archipelagic baseline because if we put them and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases
inside our baselines we might be accused of violating bearing the same subject matter were
the provision of international law which states: "The consolidated by this court namely:
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration ● GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato
of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang declare unconstitutional and to have the
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be
sila sa atin although we are still allowed by open for public consultation.
international law to claim them as our own. ● GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et
al on its prayer to declare null and void
This is called contested islands outside our said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to
configuration. We see that our archipelago is the BJE.
defined by the orange line which [we] call[] ● GR 183893 by the City of Iligan
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo enjoining the respondents from signing
ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is the MOA-AD and additionally
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. ● GR 183951 by the Province of
Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to
pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para declare null and void the MOA-AD and
lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila without operative effect and those
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United respondents enjoined from executing
Nations because of the rule that it should follow the the MOA-AD.
natural configuration of the archipelago. ● GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and
Pimentel III, praying for a judgment
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ prohibiting and permanently enjoining
claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, respondents from formally signing and
 executing the MOA-AD and or any into treaties of amity and commerce with
other agreement derived therefrom or foreign nations." It then mentions for the first
similar thereto, and nullifying the time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
MOA-AD for being unconstitutional which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
and illegal and impleading Iqbal. over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the
entered into by and between the government BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they geographic region, involving the present
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in
Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The
the General Framework of Agreement of Intent territory is divided into two categories, “A”
on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the which will be subject to plebiscite not later than
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao another separate agreement. Embodied in the
del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It over the internal waters-15kms from the
was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have
when the negotiation regarding peace in "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond
Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
however, this negotiation proceeded when the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and
government of Malaysia interceded. Formal south west of mainland Mindanao; and that
peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its within these territorial waters, the BJE and the
military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 government shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After authority and management over all natural
the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal resources. There will also be sharing of minerals
took over his position, the crafting of MOA-AD in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
in its final form was born. internal waters.

MOA-AD Overview Included in the resources is the stipulation that

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP the BJE is free to enter into any economic
and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of cooperation and trade relations with foreign
this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, countries and shall have the option to establish
organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international trade missions in those countries, as well as
laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN environmental cooperation agreements, but not
Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e to include aggression in the GRP. The external
compact right entrenchment (law of compact, defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and
treaty and order). The body is divided into obligation of the government. The BJE shall have
concepts and principles, territory, resources, and participation in international meetings and
governance. events" like those of the ASEAN and the
specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the entitled to participate in Philippine official
definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous missions and delegations for the negotiation of
peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. border agreements or protocols for
These people have the right to self- governance environmental protection and equitable sharing
of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of
have exclusive ownership by virtue of their water adjacent to or between the islands forming
prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA- part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also
AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people have the right to explore its resources and that
as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and the sharing between the Central Government
with a system of government having entered and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the The SC emphasized that the petitions are
BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or alleging acts made in violation of their duty or
modify concessions and TLAs. in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled
jurisprudence states that acts made by authority
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD which exceed their authority, by violating their
claims that the relationship between the GRP duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of
and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make
shared authority and responsibility. This a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition,
structure of governance shall be further and Mandamus, and an actual case or
discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When
stipulation which was highly contested before an act of a branch of government is seriously
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
build, develop and maintain its own institutions, becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the details of which shall be discussed in the the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside
comprehensive compact as well. from the fact that concrete acts made under the
MOA-AD are not necessary to render the
Issues: present controversy ripe and that the law or act
in question as not yet effective does not negate
1. WON the petitions have complied with the ripeness.
procedural requirements for the exercise of
judicial review With regards to the locus standi, the court
upheld the personalities of the Province of
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte,
statutory provisions on public consultation and City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in
the right to information when they negotiated intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
and later initialed the MOA-AD; and Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have
locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated affected in whole or in part if include within the
the Constitution and the laws BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers,
Ruling: assert that government funds would be
expended for the conduct of an illegal and
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
and the Constitution. territory. On that score alone, they can be given
legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a
On the Procedural Issue standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC Movement for Peace and Development, an
upheld that there is indeed a need for the advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
exercise of judicial review. peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
The power of judicial review is limited to actual government organization of Muslim lawyers
cases or controversy, that is the court will since they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in
decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned the resolution of the petitions regarding the
problems or mere academic questions. Related MOA-AD.
to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The On the contention of mootness of the issue
contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has
ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only already been suspended and that the President
a proposal and does not automatically create has already disbanded the GRP, the SC
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and
was denied. academic principle is a general rule only, the
exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise mandate of the State to be accountable by
moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a following such policy. These provisions are vital
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
situation is of exceptional character and essential to hold public officials at all times
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the accountable to the people.
constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the Also, it was held that such stipulation in the
bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
repetition yet evading review; and that where safeguards —the effectivity of which need not
there is a voluntary cessation of the activity await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is
complained of by the defendant or doer, it does essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or
not divest the court the power to hear and try process of communication between the
the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking government and the people. It is in the interest
for damages or injunctive relief. of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the government may perceive and be responsive to
MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did the people's will.
not render the petitions moot and academic. The
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments The idea of a feedback mechanism was also
including possible Constitutional amendments sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights
more than ever provides impetus for the Court to information and disclosure. And feedback
to formulate controlling principles to guide the means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the per the contention of the respondents. Clearly,
government and its negotiating entity. what the law states is the right of the petitioners
to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over to the constitutional right to information and
most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon
reasonable expectation that petitioners will committed grave abuse of discretion for failing
again be subjected to the same problem in the to carry out the furtive process by which the
future as respondents' actions are capable of MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
repetition, in another or any form. But with contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
and academic considering that parties have thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of
already complied thereat. executive privilege because he already waived it
when he complied with the Court’s order to the
On the Substantive Issue unqualified disclosure of the official copies of
the final draft of the MOA-AD.
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a
matter of public concern, involving as it does the In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, be involved in matters related to such peace
which directly affects the lives of the public at talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-
large. AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
information guarantees the right of the people to pervasively and drastically result to the
demand information, and integrated therein is diaspora or displacement of a great number of
the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to inhabitants from their total environment.
give information even if nobody demands. The
policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the
ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs right to participate fully at all levels on decisions
in a genuinely open democracy, with the that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
have observed the free and prior informed down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. permanent population, a defined territory, a
More specially noted by the court is the excess in government, and a capacity to enter into
authority exercised by the respondent—since relations with other states. As such the MOA-
they allowed delineation and recognition of AD clearly runs counter to the national
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
compromise; such power cannot be found in Republic.
IPRA or in any law to the effect.
On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the territory included in the BJE includes those areas
MOA-AD, there can be no question that they who voted in the plebiscite for them to become
cannot be all accommodated under the present part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas
provisions but the very concept underlying need not participate in the plebiscite is in
them: contrary to the express provision of the
Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he
On matters of the Constitution. creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the
Association as the type of relationship votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
governing between the parties. The parties called for the purpose, provided that only
manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
term association was adapted from the favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
international law. In international law, the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that
association happens when two states of equal the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it
power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the would still run afoul the wordings of the law
one state, the associate, delegates certain since those included in its territory are areas
responsibilities to the other, principal, while which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and
maintaining its international status as state; free not to the BJE.
association is a middle ground between
integration and independence. The MOA-AD On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity.
contains many provisions that are consistent The respondents contend that the powers vested
with the international definition of association to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-
which fairly would deduced that the agreement paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution
vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in
or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
The court vehemently objects because the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC
principle of association is not recognized under ruled that such conferment calls for amendment
the present Constitution. of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation
will not concur with the Constitution. Take for
On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. instance the treaty making power vested to the
The concept implies power beyond what the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear
Constitution can grant to a local government; that only the President has the sole organ and is
even the ARMM do not have such recognition; the country’s sole representative with foreign
and the fact is such concept implies recognition nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
of the associated entity as a state. There is authority to negotiate with other states, the
nothing in the law that contemplate any state former provision must be amended
within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine consequently. Section 22 must also be amended
State, much less does it provide for a transitory —the provision of the law that promotes
status that aims to prepare any part of national unity and development. Because
Philippine territory for independence. The court clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD
disagrees with the respondent that the MOA- does not epitomize national unity but rather, of
AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in semblance of unity. The associative ties between
the BJE and the national government, the act of rights amounting to what was discussed above
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a as the right to internal self-determination; have
status which, in international practice, has the right to autonomy or self-government in
generally been a preparation for independence, matters relating to their internal and local
is certainly not conducive to national unity. affairs, as well as ways and means for financing
their autonomous functions; have the right to
On matters of domestic statutes. the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of used or acquired.
ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of Bangsamoro people used in the Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required
MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes the State to guarantee the indigenous people
between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal their own police and security force; but rather, it
peoples that is contrary with the definition of shall be the State, through police officers, that
the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous will provide for the protection of the people.
people of Mindanao. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, indigenous peoples the near-independent status
the delineation and recognition of the ancestral of a state; since it would impair the territorial
domain is a clear departure from the procedure integrity or political unity of sovereign and
embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is independent states.
the term of reference of the MOA-AD.
On the basis of the suspensive clause.
On matters of international law.
o It was contented by the respondents that
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since
principle of international law as part of the law the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall
of the land. In international law, the right to self- not take effect until the necessary changes to the
determination has long been recognized which legal framework are effected.
states that people can freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive
social, and cultural development. There are the clause runs contrary to Memorandum of
internal and external self-determination— Instructions from the President stating that
internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to
the external which takes the form of the the territorial integrity of the country—such was
assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This negated by the provision on association
principle of self-determination is viewed with incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this,
respect accorded to the territorial integrity of the suspensive clause was also held invalid
existing states. External self-determination is because of the delegated power to the GRP
only afforded in exceptional cases when there is Peace panel to advance peace talks even if it will
an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the require new legislation or even constitutional
right to internal self-determination. amendments. The legality of the suspensive
International law, as a general rule, subject only clause hence hinges on the query whether the
to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that President can exercise such power as delegated
the right of disposing national territory is by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of is the rule that the President cannot delegate a
every state. power that she herself does not possess. The
power of the President to conduct peace
On matters relative to indigenous people, negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the
international law states that indigenous peoples Constitution but is rather implied from her
situated within states do not have a general powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
right to independence or secession from those chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
states under international law, but they do have general responsibility to promote public peace,
and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.
specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion
and lawless violence. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an
international agreement or unilateral declaration
As such, the President is given the leeway to binding on the Philippines under international
explore, in the course of peace negotiations, law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
solutions that may require changes to the amendments is, by itself, already a
Constitution for their implementation. At all constitutional violation that renders the MOA-
event, the president may not, of course, AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
unilaterally implement the solutions that she document that can bind the Philippines under
considers viable; but she may not be prevented international law notwithstanding, respondents'
from submitting them as recommendations to almost consummated act of guaranteeing
Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
constitutional amendment and revision. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they
considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
While the President does not possess constituent the creation of a state within a state, but in their
powers - as those powers may be exercised only brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress
by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the and the sovereign Filipino people would give
people through initiative and referendum - she their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
may submit proposals for constitutional change such an act would amount to authorizing a
to Congress in a manner that does not involve usurpation of the constituent powers vested
the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
the principle may be inferred that the President - or the people themselves through the process of
in the course of conducting peace negotiations - initiative, for the only way that the Executive
may validly consider implementing even those can ensure the outcome of the amendment
policies that require changes to the Constitution, process is through an undue influence or
but she may not unilaterally implement them interference with that process.
without the intervention of Congress, or act in
any way as if the assent of that body were Philippine Citizenship
assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is
limited only to the preservation and defense of
the Constitution but not changing the same but Joyce
simply recommending proposed amendments ● Republic v Chule Lim, GR No. 153883
or revisions.
Facts:
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is
not a suspensive condition but is a term because The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate
it is not a question of whether the necessary daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina
changes to the legal framework will take effect; mother, who never got married due to a prior
but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory subsisting marriage of her father. The
for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal respondent petitioned that there were few
framework –which changes would include mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to
constitutional amendments. Simply put, the wit:
suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits
of the President's authority to propose 1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as
constitutional amendments, it being a virtual “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all of her
guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of school records and in her marriage certificate.
the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be 2. That her father’s name in her birth record was
adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should
found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).”
down as unconstitutional.
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese that prohibiting the respondent to use her
when it should have been Filipino considering father’s surname would only sow confusion.
that her father and mother got married. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on which regulates the use of aliases as well as the
her birth certificate when in fact, it should have jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a
been illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court person to use a name “by which he has been
of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition. known since childhood”. Even legitimate
children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children
Issue: of their father from using his surname. While
judicial authority is required for a chance of
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the name or surname, there is no such requirement
decision to the Supreme Court on the following for the continued use of a surname which a
grounds: person has already been using since childhood.
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in The doctrine that disallows such change of name
ordering the correction of the citizenship of as would give the false impression of family
respondent Chule Y. Lim from “Chinese” to relationship remains valid but only to the extent
“Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never that the proposed change of name would in
demonstrated any compliance with the legal great probability cause prejudice or future
requirements for election of citizenship. mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in involved or to the community in general. In this
allowing respondent to continue using her case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu
father’s surname despite its finding that family in China would probably be prejudiced
respondent is an illegitimate child. or be the object of future mischief.

Held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant

petition brought by the Republic is DENIED. The
1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
not comply with the constitutional requirement
of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached Pabs
the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, ● Republic v Nora Sagun, GR 187567 (2012)
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section
1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Facts:
Supreme Court held that the two above
provisions only apply to legitimate children. Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S.
These do not apply in the case of the respondent Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo,
who was an illegitimate child considering that a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8,
her parents never got married. By being an 1959, in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
respondent automatically became a Filipino 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married
upon birth, and as such, there was no more need to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered Said document was notarized but was not
as a voter inside the country when she reached recorded and registered with the Local Civil
18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, Sagun applied
and the participation in election exercises for a Philippine passport. Her application was
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine denied due to the citizenship of her father and
citizenship. there is no annotation on her birth certificate
2. No. The Republic’s submission was that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration
respondent to use her father’s surname. What it of her election of Philippine citizenship averring
did allow was the correction of her father’s that she was raised as a Filipino she is a
misspelled surname which she has been using registered voter in Baguio City, and had voted
ever since she can remember. The court held in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
her positive acts, she has effectively elected Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
her to the issuance of a Philippine passport. citizenship. Being a legitimate child, the
After the hearing, the trial court granted the citizenship followed that of her father who is
petition and declared Sagun a Filipino citizen. Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. For
petition for review on certiorari, pointing out the respondent to be considered a Filipino
that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
before a notary public, there was no affidavit of citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
her election of Philippine citizenship. Based on the foregoing circumstances, the
Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was respondent clearly failed to comply with the
not registered with the nearest local civil procedural requirements for a valid and
registry was executed when she was already 33 effective election of Philippine citizenship.
years old or 12 years after she reached the age of Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of
majority. suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Issues: Philippine citizenship since the law specifically
lays down the requirements for the acquisition
1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial of citizenship by election. All that is required of
declaration of Philippine citizenship the elector is to execute an affidavit of the
procedurally and jurisdictionally election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
permissible? file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Having failed to comply with the foregoing
2. Has Norma complied with the requirements, the respondent’s petition before
procedural requirements in the election the trial court must be denied.
of Philippine citizenship?
Clyde
Rulings: ● In Re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)

1. No. There is no proceeding established by law

or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the Facts: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of
citizenship of an individual. There is no specific the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
legislation authorizing the institution of a Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
judicial proceeding to declare that a given Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
erroneous for the trial court to make a specific Philippines.
declaration of the respondent’s Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not In 1998, Ching, after having completed a
within the court’s competence.2. When the Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the University in Baguio City, filed an application to
governing charter was the 1935Constitution, take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution
which declares as citizens of the Philippines of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
those whose mothers are citizens of the allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to
Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship the condition that he must submit to the Court
upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV proof of his Philippine citizenship.
of the 1935 Constitution reads: Section 1. The
following are citizens of the Philippines:(4) In1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations
Those whose mothers are citizens of the were released and Ching was one of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of successful Bar examinees but because of the
majority, elect Philippine citizenship. Under questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he
Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he Issue: Whether a legitimate child born under the
was required to submit further proof of his 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of alien father validly elects Philippine citizenship
the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age
a comment on Ching's petition for admission to of majority.
the bar and on the documents evidencing his
Philippine citizenship. Ruling: No, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
625 did not prescribe a time period within
The OSG filed its comment in1999, stating that which the election of Philippine citizenship
Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese should be made. The 1935 Charter only
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 provides that the election should be made
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age majority then commenced upon reaching
of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" in twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the
strict compliance with the provisions of Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to dilemma was resolved by basing the time period
Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by on the decisions of this Court prior to the
a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best decisions, the proper period for electing
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
which he could perfect by election upon pronouncements of the Department of State of
reaching the age of majority." In this regard, the the United States Government to the effect that
OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must the election should be made within a
concur in order that the election of Philippine "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has
mother of the person making the election must been interpreted to mean that the election
be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said should be made within three (3) years from
election must be made upon reaching the age of reaching the age of majority.
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning
of the phrase "upon reaching the age of Here, Ching, having been born on 11 April
majority:" 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
has been construed to mean a reasonable time (14) years after he had reached the age of
after reaching the age of majority which had majority. Based on the interpretation of the
been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching be stated, in this connection, that the special
has not formally elected Philippine citizenship circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
and, if ever he does, it would already be continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by Philippines and his being a certified public
present jurisprudence. However, due to the accountant, a registered voter and a former
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's elected public official, cannot vest in him
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of Philippine citizenship as the law specifically
the standing rule on the construction of the lays down the requirements for acquisition of
phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance Philippine citizenship by election.
of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. plight of Ching. However, even if we consider
the special circumstances in the life of Ching like
his having lived in the Philippines all his life and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain elected representative of the second district of
us to disagree with the recommendation of the Northern Samar. The records show that in
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed the year 1895, the private respondent's
to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time from China. Ong Te established his residence in
he reached the age of majority until he finally the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
expressed his intention to elect Philippine which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
citizenship is clearly way beyond the As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to
contemplation of the requirement of electing obtain a certificate of residence from the then
"upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Spanish colonial administration. The father of
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
his election of Philippine citizenship. The born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In
painstaking process. All that is required of the Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the easy assimilation into the community. As Jose
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
his election cannot be simply glossed over. Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Philippine citizenship can never be treated Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina,
like a commodity that can be claimed when Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
needed and suppressed when convenient. One thereafter, got married in 1932 according to
who is privileged to elect Philippine Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such eight children, one of whom is the private
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right respondent who was born in 1948. The
with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. private respondent's father never emigrated
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his from this country. He decided to put up a
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, hardware store and shared and survived the
as a result. this golden privilege slipped away vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business
from his grasp prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a
result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila.
In the meantime, the father of the private
Evan respondent, unsure of his legal status and in
● Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast
his life and family, filed with the Court of
Facts: First Instance of Samar of application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April
The petitioner is asking for the setting aside 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
and reversal of a decision of the House of Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The
HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a Issue:
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for citizen of the Philippines
the second district of Northern Samar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for
the position of representative in the second Ruling:
legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
YES. Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
citizens as: "Natural-born citizens are those among other, "rendering service to or accepting
who are citizens of the Philippines from commission in the armed forces of a foreign
birth without having to perform any act to country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in Philippine citizenship through repatriation
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Article was elected as the Representative of the Second
IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
Constitution provides that: "Section 1. The elections. He won over petitioner Antonio
following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . Bengson III, who was then running for
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of reelection.
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority."
ISSUE:
It would appear then that the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a
natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural
the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino born citizen of the Philippines in view of the
mothers as to their children becoming constitutional requirement that "no person shall
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, be a Member of the House of Representative
after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers
DECISION: Dismissed
(with alien spouse) are natural-born Filipino
citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers
prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect RATIO DECIDENDI: Respondent is a natural
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born from the lengthy process of naturalization,
Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
the attainment of the age of majority, may be oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
made before or after 17 January 1973. This Philippine and registering said oath in the Local
interpretation appears to be in consonance with Civil Registry of the place where the person
the fundamental purpose of the Constitution concerned resides or last resided. This means
which is to protect and enhance the people's that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
individual interests, and to foster equality citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
among them. a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
Joyce he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
● Bengson v HRET, GR 142840 restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
FACTS:
Pabs
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born ● So v RP, 513 SCRA 267 (2007)
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino Facts:
parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act
United States Marine Corps and without the (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the
an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a following in his petition:
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
• He was born on February 17, 1982, in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into
Manila; law. So insisted that he has all the qualifications
• He is a Chinese citizen who has lived in and none of the disqualifications to become
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since Filipino. This was clearly established by his
birth; witnesses.
• As an employee, he derives an average Republic alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free administrative naturalization filed with the
board and lodging and other benefits; Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted
• He is single, able to speak and write that even in the absence of any opposition, a
English, Chinese and Tagalog; petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
• He is exempt from the filing of CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of dismissed the petition for naturalization without
the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of prejudice. So’s motion for reconsideration was
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, denied.
because he was born in the Philippines, and
studied in a school recognized by the Issues:
Government where Philippine history,
government and culture are taught; and 1. WON So was entitled to become a
• He has all the qualifications provided Filipino citizen
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications 2. WON R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended. for naturalization by judicial act; and
No one opposed the petition. 3. WON the witnesses presented by
petitioner are "credible" in accordance
So also testified and attempted to prove that he with the jurisprudence and the
has all the qualifications and none of the definition and guidelines set forth in
disqualifications to become a citizen of the C.A. No. 473.
Philippines.
Ruling:
RTC: Granted the petition. The trial court ruled
that the witnesses for So had known him for the NO. Under current and existing laws, there are
period required by law, and they had affirmed three ways by which an alien may become a
that So had all the qualifications and none of the citizen by naturalization:
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. (a) Administrative naturalization pursuant
Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had to R.A. No. 9139;
satisfactorily supported his petition with (b) Judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A.
evidence. No. 473, as amended; and
(c) Legislative naturalization in the form of
Republic, through the OSG, appealed the a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine
decision to the CA. That Adasa and Salcedo citizenship to an alien.
were not qualified witnesses, and that So is not
qualified to be admitted as citizen of the FIRST. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
Philippines. So failed to prove that he possesses separate and distinct laws – the former covers all
all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of aliens regardless of class while the latter covers
the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. native-born aliens who lived here in the
473. Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they
So avers that the requirements for naturalization were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the
relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and customs and traditions.
1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine
government entered into diplomatic relations To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
with the People’s Republic of China; the enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process
requirements were further relaxed when of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious,
less technical and more encouraging which is Thus, So failed to show full and complete
administrative rather than judicial in nature. compliance with the requirements of
There is nothing from which it can be inferred naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the
that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended decision of the CA denying the petition for
or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. The only naturalization without prejudice.
implication is that, a native born alien has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative
naturalization, subject to the prescribed Clyde
qualifications and disqualifications. ● David v Agbay, GR 1991113, Mar 18, 2015

In the instant case, So applied for naturalization

by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of Facts: In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada
his petition, administrative naturalization under where he became a Canadian citizen by
R.A. No. 9139 was already available. naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner
Consequently, his application should be and his wife returned to the Philippines and
governed by C.A. No. 473. bought a residential house. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where
SECOND. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. they built their house is public land and part of
No. 9139 would be made applicable even to the salvage zone. In 2007, petitioner filed a
judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
would be broadened since it would then apply the subject land with the Department of
even to aliens who are not native born. It must Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at
be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to the Community Environment and Natural
aliens who were born in the Philippines and Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
have been residing here. said application, petitioner indicated that he is
a Filipino citizen.
THIRD. One of the qualifications set forth in
R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed
the Philippines and should have been residing the application on the ground that petitioner, a
herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
but left the country, though resided for more She also filed a criminal complaint for
than ten (10) years from the filing of the falsification of public documents under Article
application is also disqualified. On the other 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No.
hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications 08-6463) against the petitioner.
under each of the two laws, an alien who is not
qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
naturalized under C.A. No. 473. citizenship under the provisions of Republic
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly Act No. 9225, (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07. issued
qualifications and disqualifications set forth by the Consulate General of the Philippines
therein are maintained. (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of In 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
the applicant to prove not only his own good petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
moral character but also the good moral subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
character of his/her witnesses, who must be citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
credible persons. This implies that such person which was void ab initio.
must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that The Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s
he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A.
that his word may be taken on its face value, as 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended
a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v.
Commission on Elections on the retroactivity of While Section 2 declares the general policy that
one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship Filipinos who have become citizens of another
to the date of filing his application therefor country shall be deemed "not to have lost their
cannot be applied to the case of herein Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by
petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of the phrase "under the conditions of this Act."
argument that such doctrine applies in the Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
present situation, it will still not work for categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to
petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he in the first and second paragraphs. Under the
had not alleged, much less proved, that he had first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
already applied for reacquisition of Philippine who have lost their citizenship by
citizenship before he made the declaration in naturalization in a foreign country who shall
the Public Land Application that he is a re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon
Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
falsification of public document, it is not the Philippines. The second paragraph covers
necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure those natural-born Filipinos who became
a third person be present. As to petitioner’s foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who
defense of good faith, such remains to be a shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
defense which may be properly raised and taking the same oath. The taking of oath of
proved in a full- blown trial. allegiance is required for both categories of
natural-born Filipino citizens who became
Issue: Whether the re-acquisition of Filipino citizens of a foreign country, but the
citizenship under RA 9225 has retroactive effect terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for
upon the time he filed the Miscellaneous Lease the first group, and "retain" for the second
Application when he declared that he was a group.
Filipino but when in fact he was a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. The law thus makes a distinction between those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
Ruling: No, the re-acquisition of Filipino citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
citizenship under RA 9225 has no retroactive 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is
effect. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the
"Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act authors of the law intentionally employed the
of 2003, terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the
legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens from the title of the law using both re-
who become citizens of another country shall be acquisition and retention.
deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act. In fine, for those who were naturalized in a
foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
provision of law to the contrary was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the naturalization in a foreign country is one of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine ways by which Philippine citizenship may be
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed 63 by doing away with the provision in the old
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon law which takes away Philippine citizenship
taking the following oath of allegiance to the from natural-born Filipinos who become
Republic. naturalized citizens of other countries and
allowing dual citizenship, and also provides
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, for the procedure for re-acquiring and
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine those who became foreign citizens after R.A.
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign Evan
citizenship provided they took the oath of ● Philippine Agila Satellite v Lichauco, G.R.
allegiance under the new law. No. 134887 (2006)

Here, the petitioner was naturalized as a Facts:

Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly
born Filipinos under the first paragraph of organized corporation, whose President and
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re- consortium of private telecommunications
acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking carriers which in 1994 (June 6) had entered into
the required oath of allegiance. a Memorandum of Understanding with the
DOTC, through its then Secretary (July 1992-
For the purpose of determining the citizenship March 1996) Jesus Garcia, concerning the
of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo into outer space. The Philippine government,
and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats to secure from the International
those of his category as having already lost Telecommunication Union the required orbital
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to slots and frequency assignments for the
those natural-born Filipinos who became Philippine satellite.
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy They requested the then DOT Secretary Amado
that considers Filipinos who became foreign S. Lagdameo, Jr. (Apr 1996-1997) for official
citizens as not to have lost their Philippine government confirmation of the assignment of
citizenship, should be read together with Philippine orbital slots 161ºEand 153ºE to PASI
Section 3, the second paragraph of which for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28,
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after 1996.
the new law’s effectivity.
When it was confirmed, PASI undertook
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the preparations for the launching, operation and
MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino management of its satellites by, among other
citizen at the time of the filing of said things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital,
application, when in fact he was then still a conducting negotiations with its business
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing partners, and making an initial payment. When
law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian they requested the Land bank’s confirmation of
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was its participation in a club loan for the
among those ways by which a natural-born government’s assignment to PASI of orbital slots
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he 161ºE and 153ºE, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. T. Lichauco sent a letter to the bank
9225 six months later, the falsification was controverting the said assignment, clearly
already a consummated act, the said law having stating that orbital slot 153°E can no longer be
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a
citizenship status is concerned. Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including
153ºE in December 1997.

The Doctrine of State Immunity PASI, claiming that the offer was without its
knowledge and that it subsequently came to
learn that another company whose identity had
o Suits vs the Philippine State not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won
the award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January
23,1998 a complaint7before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one
Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to
injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East
153ºE, declare its nullity, and for damages. Longitude; and one for damages against
Lichauco herself.
PASI filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman against As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the
Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his performance of official functions by an officer of
affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged the government will result in a charge against or
Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of financial liability to the government that the
Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the complaint must be regarded as a suit against the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as State itself. However, the distinction must also
amended, reading:(e) Causing any undue injury be raised between where the government official
to any party, including the Government, or concerned performs an act in his/her official
giving any private party any unwarranted and jurisdictional capacity and where he
benefits, advantage or preference in the performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of
discharge of his official, administrative or discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In
judicial functions through manifest partiality, the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable availability of judicial review, and it is the
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers official concerned who should be impleaded as
and employees of officers or government the proper party- defendant or respondent.
corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions. Because a As to the first two causes of action, the Court
prejudicial question was found by the ruled that the defense of state immunity from
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation suit do not apply since said causes of action
Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed cannot be properly considered as suits against
and reconsideration was denied by Order dated the State in constitutional contemplation. These
July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for causes of action do not seek to impose a charge
review on certiorari, arguing that the or financial liability against the State, but merely
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint. the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the
Issue: revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing
Whether or not the suit is against the state. more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally
sought damages in relation to said causes of
Ruling: action, the suit would have been considered as
one against the State. Had the petitioner
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated
the performance of official functions against an government agency, and not Lichauco herself,
officer of the government by a private citizen the suit would have been considered as one
that would result in a charge against or financial against the State. But neither circumstance
liability to the government must be regarded as obtains in this case.
a suit against the State itself, although the latter
has not been formally impleaded. However, The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court
government immunity from suit will not shield of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears
the public official being sued if the government to prohibit only suits against the state without
no longer has an interest to protect in the its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer filed against officials of the state for acts
is personal because it arises from a tortious act allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
in the performance of his duties. their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three against such officials will require the state itself
causes of action against Lichauco: one for to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
injunction against her performing any act in such as the appropriation of the amount needed
to pay the damages awarded against them, the engineer)
suit must be regarded as against the state itself o It was approved by the Secretary of Public
although it has not been formally impleaded. It Works and Communications.
must be noted, however, that the rule is not so
all-encompassing as to be applicable under all  May 5 1967: a canvass or public bidding was
circumstances.” conducted.
o The committee on award accepted the bid of
It is a different matter where the public official is the Singkier Motor Service [owned by
made to account in his capacity as such for acts respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of P43,530.00.
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice
Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of  it was approved by the Secretary of Public
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et Works and Communications
al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of  the Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier
government officials or officers are not acts of Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to
the State, and an action against the officials or immediately deliver the items listed therein for
officers by one whose rights have been invaded the lot price of P43,530.00.
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the  It would appear that a purchase order signed
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning
same tenor, it has been said that an action at law Officer and the Procurement Officer, was
or suit in equity against a State officer or the addressed to the Singkier Motor Service.
director of a State department on the ground
that, while claiming to act for the State, he  Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of
violates or invades the personal and property Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit.
rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional o He then made inquiries about the
act or under an assumption of authority which reasonableness of the price.
he does not have, is not a suit against the State o After finding from the indorsements of the
within the constitutional provision that the State Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
may not be sued without its consent.' The Public Highways that the prices of the various
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of spare parts are just and reasonable and that the
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument requisition was also approved by no less than
for perpetrating an injustice. the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with the verification of V.M.
RATIONALE: Secarro, a representative of the Bureau of
When a public officer acts without or in excess Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for
of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the
own personal liability and cannot be imputed to retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00.
the State. (p.34, Political Law, Isagani Cruz)
 His reason for withholding the 20%
equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the
Joyce voucher with the supporting papers to the
● Sayson v Singson 54 SCRA 282) Supervising Auditor, which he did.

Facts:  June 9, 1967: The voucher was paid on in the

amount of P34,824.00 to the respondent Singson.
 January, 1967: the Office of the District
Engineer requisitioned various items of spare  June 10, 1967, Sayson received a telegram
parts for from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a
the repair of a D-8 bulldozer telegraphic message of the General Auditing
o The requisition was signed by the District Office which states: 'In view of excessive prices
Engineer, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil
charge for purchase of spare parts and Pabs
equipment shown by vouchers already ● UP v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, 679 SCRA 54,
submitted this Office direct all highway auditors 23 August 2012
refer General Office payment similar nature for
appropriate action. Facts:
o when the voucher and the supporting papers
reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the • In 1990, the UP through its President
spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, Abueva entered into a General Construction
particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the Agreement with Stern Builders Corp.
exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the o For the construction of the extension
caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. building and the renovation of the College of
o Said firm thus submitted its quotations at Arts and Science Building in the Ccampus of
P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the UPLB.
price of the Singkier. • In the course of the implementation of
the contract, Stern Building submitted 3
 July 18, 1987: The GAO took up the matter progress billings corresponding to the work
with the Secretary of Public Works accomplished by the UP paid only 2 of the
o The Secretary then circularized a telegram billings.
holding the district engineer responsible for o The 3 billing was not paid because it
overpricing." was disallowed by the Commission on Audit.
• Despite the lifting of the disallowance,
 Charges for malversation were filed against the UP failed to pay the billing. Such failure
the district engineer and the civil engineer prompted Stern Building to file an action against
involved. the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect
the unpaid billing and to recover various
 Singson filed a mandamus case to compel the damages.
payment of the balance.
RTC: Ordered UP to pay Stern Building
 Lower court: in favor of Singson • UP filed a MR, but it was denied by the
RTC on the ground that irs notice of appeal was
 Thus the present appeal filed out of time.
• Thereafter, the RTC issued the writ of
Issue: execution and accordingly, the sheriff served the
writ of execution and notice of demand upon
Whether or not the State can be sued. the UP.
CA: Aggrieved, UP assailed the denial of its
Ruling: appeal to the CA but the CA dismissed the
same.
No. The State cannot be sued without its • As a recourse, the UP sought
consent. reconsideration from the SC
o SC’s decision: Denied the petition for
With the facts undisputed and the statute far review; such decision became final and
from indefinite or ambiguous, the appealed executory.
decision defies explanation. It would be to • Meanwhile, Stern Builders filed their
disregard a basic corollary of the cardinal motions for execution despite their previous
postulate of non-suability. It is true that once motion having already been granted and despite
consent is secured, an action may be filed. There the Writ of execution having already issued.
is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such o Thus, acting upon Stern’s motion,
statutory grant, to require that certain another motion for execution was issued by the
administrative proceedings be had and the RTC
exhausted. • Implementing the writs, the sheriff, on 2
different occasions, served notices of
garnishment on the UP’s depository banks
namely: LandBank (Buendia Branch) and the institution performing a legitimate government
DBP (Commonwealth Branch) function.
• UP assailed the garnishment through an o In enacting RA 9500, Congress has
Urgent Motion to Quash the notices of declared the UP as the UP as the national
garnishment. = RTC denied the UP’s urgent university dedicated to the search for truth and
motion to quash. knowledge as well as the development of future
• In the instant case, UP filed a leaders.
supplemental petition alleging that the RTC • Irrefragably, UP is a government
gravely erred in ordering the immediate release instrumentality, performing the State’s
of the garnished amount despite the pendency constitutional mandate of promoting quality
of the petition for review in the SC. and accessible education.
o As a government instrumentality, the
Issue: UP administers special funds sourced from the
fees and income enumerated under Act 1870
WON the funds of the UP were the proper and Sec 1 of EO 714.
subject of garnishment in order to satisfy the o All the funds going into the possession
judgment award. of the UP, including any interest accruing from
the deposit of such funds in any banking
UP’s Argument: Insists that the decision was institution, constitute a special fund, the
inconsistent with the rulings in Commissioner of disbursement of which should always be
Public Highways vs San Diego to the effect that aligned with UP’s mission and purpose and
government funds and properties could not be should always be subject to auditing by the
seized under writs of execution or garnishment COA.
to satisfy judgment awards. • TRUST FUNDS; As per PD 1445: a fund
• UP contends that the CA contravened that officially comes in the possession of an
Sec 5Art 14 of the Consitution by allowing the agency of the government or of a public officer
garnishment of UP funds, because the as trustee, agent or administrator or that is
garnishment resulted in a substantial reduction received for the fulfillment of some obligations.
of the UP’s limited budget allocated for the • The funds of the UP are government
remuneration, job satisfaction and fulfillment of funds that are public in character. They include
the best available teachers. the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only
Respondent’s Argument/s: Averred that the for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
petition was fatally defective for its failure to o Hence, the subject funds could not be
mention the other cases upon the same issues validly made the subject of the RTC’s Writ of
pending between the parties Execution or garnishment.
• that the ruling in Commissioner of o The adverse judgment rendered against
Public Works v. San Diego had no application the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
because there was an appropriation for the consented was not immediately enforceable by
project; execution against the UP, because the suability
• that the UP retained the funds allotted of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
for the project only in a fiduciary capacity; that • Suability vs Liability
the contract price had been meanwhile adjusted o Suability- depends on the consent of the
to ₱ 22,338,553.25, an amount already more than state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
sufficient to cover the judgment award and the established facts. The circumstance that
the state is suable does not necessarily mean that
Rulings: it is liable
o Liability: not conceded by the mere fact
• Up was founded through Act 1870 to that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
provide advanced instruction to deserving the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
students. Despite the establishment as a body only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it
corporate, UP remained to be a chartered can, that the defendant is liable.
• The Court reiterated that in Republic vs Clyde
Villasor, where the issuance of an alias writ of ● DOTC v Sps. Abecina, GR 206484, Jan 29,
execution directed against the funds of the AFP 2016
to satisfy a final and executory judgment was
nullified. Facts: The Department of Transportation and
o It was held that the universal rule that Communications (DOTC) and Digitel entered
where the State gives its consent to be sued by into several Facilities Management Agreements
private parties either by general or special law, it (FMA) for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain,
may limit claimant’s action only up to the and develop the RTDP and NTPI-1 facilities
completion of the proceedings anterior to the comprising local telephone exchange lines in
stage of execution and that the power of the various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, were later converted into Financial Lease
since government funds and properties may not Agreements (FLA) in 1995.
be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment. Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
o UP correctly submits here that the Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two
garnishment of its funds to satisfy the judgment hundred (1,200) square-meter parcel of land to
awards of actual and moral damages was not the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP
validly made if there was no special in the municipality. However, the municipality
appropriation by Congress to cover the liability. erroneously included portions of the
o It was, therefore, legally unwarranted respondents’ property in the donation. Pursuant
for the CA to agree with the RTC’s holding in to the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone
the order issued on April 1, 2003 that no exchange on the property which encroached on
appropriation by Congress to allocate and set the properties of the respondent spouses.
aside the payment of the judgment awards was
necessary because "there were already an The respondent spouses filed an accion
appropriations earmarked for the said project." publiciana complaint against the DOTC and
o The CA and the RTC thereby Digitel for recovery of possession and
unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction damages.
imposed on the trust funds of the Government
and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used In its answer, the DOTC claimed immunity
exclusively to fulfill the purposes for which the from suit and ownership over the subject
trusts were created or for which the funds were properties.
received except upon express authorization by
Congress or by the head of a government The DOTC asserts that its Financial Lease
agency in control of the funds, and subject to Agreement with Digitel was entered into in
pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations pursuit of its governmental functions to
promote and develop networks of
Dispositive Portion: communication systems. Therefore, it cannot
• The Court GRANTS the petition for be interpreted as a waiver of state immunity.
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals The DOTC also maintains that while it was
under review; ANNULS the orders for the regrettable that the construction of the telephone
garnishment of the funds of the University of exchange erroneously encroached on portions of
the Philippines and for the release of the the respondent’s properties, the RTC erred in
garnished amount to Stern Builders Corporation ordering the return of the property. It argues
and Servillano dela Cruz that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the
• The Court orders Stern Builders to performance of its mandate, took private
redeposit the amount of ₱ 16,370,191.74 within property without formal expropriation
10 days from receipt of this decision. proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an
exercise of eminent domain.
On the other hand, the respondents counter function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s
that the state immunity cannot be invoked to contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall
perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They within the cloak of state immunity.
also maintain that because the subject properties
are titled, the DOTC is a builder in bad faith However, as the respondents repeatedly
who is deemed to have lost the improvements it pointed out, this Court has long established in
introduced.24 Finally, they differentiate their case Ministerio v CFI,33 Amigable v. Cuenca, 34the
from Heirs of Mateo Pidacan v. ATO because 2010 case Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO, 5and more
Pidacan originated from a complaint for recently in Vigilar v. Aquino36that the doctrine
payment of the value of the property and rentals of state immunity cannot serve as an
while their case originated from a complaint for instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
recovery of possession and damages.25 citizen.

Issue: Whether the DOTC can invoke the State The Constitution identifies the limitations to
immunity. the awesome and near-limitless powers of the
State. Chief among these limitations are the
Ruling: No, the State through then DOTC may principles that no person shall be deprived of
not be sued without its consent. This life, liberty, or property without due process of
fundamental doctrine stems from the principle law and that private property shall not be
that there can be no legal right against the taken for public use without just
authority which makes the law on which the compensation. These limitations are enshrined
right depends. This generally accepted principle in no less than the Bill of Rights that guarantees
of law has been explicitly expressed in both the the citizen protection from abuse by the State.
1973 and the present Constitutions. But as the
principle itself implies, the doctrine of state Consequently, our laws require that the State’s
immunity is not absolute. The State may waive power of eminent domain shall be exercised
its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be through expropriation proceedings in court.
made expressly or by implication. Whenever private property is taken for public
use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
Over the years, the State’s participation in concerned office or agency to initiate
economic and commercial activities gradually expropriation proceedings. By necessary
expanded beyond its sovereign function as implication, the filing of a complaint for
regulator and governor. The evolution of the expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.
State’s activities and degree of participation in
commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular
traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it procedure upon discovering that it had
became necessary to distinguish between the encroached on the respondents’ property, it
State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure would have initiated expropriation proceedings
imperii) and its private, commercial, and instead of insisting on its immunity from suit.
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state The petitioners would not have had to resort to
immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure filing its complaint for reconveyance.
imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered
as a waiver of immunity.
o Suits vs Foreign States
Here, the DOTC encroached on the respondents’
properties when it constructed the local Evan
telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. ● Arigo v Swift, G.R. 206510 (2014)
The exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to
the National Telephone Program. We have no Facts:
doubt that when the DOTC constructed the
encroaching structures and subsequently ● A petition for the issuance of a Writ of
entered into the FLA with Digitel for their Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance
maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign of a Temporary Environmental Order
 (TEPO), otherwise known as the Rules ● The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, mine countermeasures ship of the US
involving violations of environmental Navy.
laws and regulations in relation to the
grounding of the US military ship USS ● In December 2012, the US Embassy in
Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs. the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel "to enter
● Tubbataha is composed of two huge and exit the territorial waters of the
coral atolls - the north atoll and the Philippines and to arrive at the port of
south atoll. The reefs of Tubbataha are Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
considered part of Cagayancillo, a ship replenishment, maintenance, and
remote island municipality of Palawan. crew liberty.”

● Tubbataha was declared a National ● While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation ran aground on the northwest side of
No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No
Aquino on August 11, 1988. cine was injured in the incident, and
there have been no reports of leaking
● Tubbataha was inscribed by the United fuel or oil.
Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a ● U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice
World Heritage Site. It was recognized Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret
as one of the Philippines' oldest for the incident in a press statement.
ecosystems; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and ● US Ambassador to the Philippines
biological processes; and an area of Harry K. Thomas, Jr., "reiterated his
exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic regrets over the grounding incident and
importance. assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert
F. del Rosario that the United States will
● On April 6, 2010, Congress passed provide appropriate compensation for
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 damage to the reef caused by the ship.”
otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" ● By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led
"to ensure the protection and salvage team had finished removing the
conservation of the globally significant last piece of the grounded ship from the
economic, biological, sociocultural, coral reef.
educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the ● The above-named petitioners on their
enjoyment of present and future behalf and in representation of their
generations." Under the "no-take" respective sector/organization and
policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is others, including minors or generations
strictly regulated and many human yet unborn, filed the present petition
activities are prohibited and penalized against US Respondents in their official
or fined, including fishing, gathering, capacities as US Navy Officers and PH
destroying and disturbing the resources Respondents, including President
within the TRNP. The law likewise Benigno S. Aquino III in his official
created the Tubbataha Protected Area capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Management Board (TPAMB) which AFP and others in their official
shall be the sole policy-making and capacities.
permit-granting body of the TRNP.
Issues:
 1. Whether or not the petitioners have resulting in the unfortunate grounding
legal standing to file the present of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
petition. committed while they were performing
2. Whether or not this court has official military duties.
jurisdiction over the US respondents
who did not submit any pleading or Considering that the satisfaction of a
manifestation in this case. judgment against said officials will
3. Whether or not there is a waiver of require remedial actions
immunity from suit found in the VFA. and appropriation of funds by the US
4. Whether or not the present petition had government, the suit is deemed to be
become moot. one against the
5. Whether or not the present petition is US itself.
the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of VFA’s provisions. 3. NO. There is no waiver of immunity
from suit found in the VFA.
Rulings:
The waiver of State immunity under the
1. YES. The Petitioners have legal standing VFA pertains only to criminal
to file the present petition. jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for
This Court ruled that not only do issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
ordinary citizens have legal standing to
sue for the enforcement of 4. YES. The petition had become moot.
environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future This petition has become moot in the
generations. Their personality to sue in sense that the salvage operation sought
behalf of the succeeding generations can to be enjoined or restrained had already
only be based on the concept of been accomplished when petitioners
intergenerational responsibility insofar sought recourse from this Court.
as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Still, petitioners are entitled to these
reliefs notwithstanding the completion
Needless to say, every generation has a of the removal of the USS Guardian
responsibility to the next to preserve from the coral reef.
that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful 5. NO. The present petition is not the
ecology. Put a little differently, the proper remedy to assail the
minors' assertion of their right to a constitutionality of VFA’s provisions.
sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang
obligation to ensure the protection of Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the
that right for the generations to come. VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been
2. NO. This court does not have recognized as a treaty by the United
jurisdiction over the US respondents States as attested and certified by the
who did not submit any pleading or duly authorized representative of the
manifestation in this case. United States government.

The US respondents were sued in their The VFA being a valid and binding
official capacity as commanding officers agreement, the parties are required as a
of the US Navy who had control and matter of international law to abide by
supervision over the USS Guardian and its terms and provisions.
its crew. The alleged act or omission
 The Court cannot grant the additional
reliefs prayed for in the petition to order
a review of the VFA and to nullify Issue:
certain immunity provisions thereof.
Whether the petitioner Holy See is immune from
Conclusion: suit from its act of entering into a contractual
relations centering on the sale of lot to a private
The petition for the issuance of the person.
privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED. Held:

Joyce Yes, Holy See is immune from suit in the case at

● The Holy See v Rosario, (December 17, 1994) hand.
The burden of the petition is that respondent
Facts: trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner,
being a foreign state enjoying sovereign
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises immunity. On the other hand, private
sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, respondent insists that the doctrine of non-
and is represented in the Philippines by the suability is not anymore absolute and that
Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak
Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation when, of its own free will, it entered into a
engaged in the real estate business. commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of
The petition arose from a controversy over a land located in the Philippines.
parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the
(Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations
with the Philippine government since 1957. This
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, appears to be the universal practice in
through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as international relations.
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his In a community of national states, the Vatican
rights to the sale to private respondent. In view City represents an entity organized not for
of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to international objects. Despite its size and object,
who of the parties has the responsibility of the Vatican City has an independent
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. government of its own, with the Pope, who is
Complicating the relations of the parties was the also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the
sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its
Properties and Development Corporation traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
(Tropicana). world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and
Advertisement activities of the Vatican City are such as to make
it in a sense an “international state.”
Respondent filed a complained for the
annulment of the sale of the land and damages As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987
against the petitioner, as represented by the Constitution, the country has adopted the
Papal Nuncio and other defendants. generally accepted principles of International
Petitioner answered, saying that the complaint Law. Even without this affirmation, such
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction principles of International Law are deemed
based on sovereign immunity from suit. incorporated as part of the law of the land as a
Respondent contended that the petitioner “shed condition and consequence of our admission in
off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the the society of nations.
business contract in question.” In the absence of legislation defining what
activities and transactions shall be considered
“commercial” and as constituting acts jure not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely
gestionis, we have to come out with our own wanted to dispose off the same because the
guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the squatters living thereon made it almost
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state impossible for petitioner to use it for the
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. have occupied and are still occupying the lot,
The logical question is whether the foreign state and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
is engaged in the activity in the regular course of premises, has been admitted by private
business. If the foreign state is not engaged respondent in its complaint.
regularly in a business or trade, the particular
act or transaction must then be tested by its WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act 183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
IV. Philippine Constitutional Principles and
Advertisement Policies
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and Principles and Policies
sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, Pabs
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and ● Pable Ocampo v HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)
subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for
profit but claimed that it acquired said property Facts:
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
respondent failed to dispute said claim. 1997 Rues of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed
by petitioner Pablo V. Ocampo. He alleged that
The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, in issuing case no. 01-024, Pablo Ocampo vs.
necessary for the creation and maintenance of its Mario Mark Jimenez Crespo.
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations On May 23, 2001, the Manila City Board of
(Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Canvassers proclaimed private respondent
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez, the duly
Philippines on November 15, 1965. elected Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic He was credited with 32,097 votes or a margin
envoy is granted immunity from the civil and of 768 votes over petitioner who obtained 31,329
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state votes.
over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of On May 31, 2001, petitioner filed with the HRET
the receiving state which the envoy holds on an electoral protest against private respondent,
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of impugning the election in 807 precincts in the
the mission. If this immunity is provided for a 6th District of Manila on the following grounds:
diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason (1) misreading of votes garnered by petitioner;
should immunity be recognized as regards the (2) falsification of election returns; (3)
sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy substitution of election returns; (4) use of
See. marked, spurious, fake
and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots
The decision to transfer the property and the written by one person or two persons (docketed
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed as HRET Case No. 01-024). Petitioner prayed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did that a revision and appreciation of the ballots in
the 807 contested precincts be conducted; and winner as he could not be considered the first
that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly among the qualified candidates.
elected Congressman of the 6th District of
Manila.

On June 18, 2001, private respondent filed his

answer with counter-protest vehemently
denying that he engaged in massive vote Clyde
buying. He also opposed petitioner’s allegation ● Maquiling v COMELEC, G.R. 195649 (2013)
that there is a need for the revision and
appreciation of ballots. DOCTRINE: The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
March 6, 2003, the HRET, in HRET Cases Nos. and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
01-020, Bienvenido Abante & Prudencio nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Jalandoni vs. Mario Crespo, and 01-023, Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but
Rosenda it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to
Ann M. Ocampo vs. MarioCrespo, issued qualify one to run for an elective position.
Resolutions declaring that private respondent is
ineligible for the Office of Representative of Facts:
Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in
the district and ordering him to vacate his office, Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
Private respondent filed a motion for citizen. However, as a consequence of his
reconsideration but was denied. subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino
March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to citizenship.
implement Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646
which reads; Section 6 Effects of Disqualification Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. 9225
Case. before the Consulate General of the Philippines
in San Francisco, and took the Oath of
Issues: Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of
1) Whether massive vote-buying was committed Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
by the private respondent acquisition was issued in his favor.
2) Whether petitioner can be proclaimed the
duly elected Representative of the 6th District of On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
Manila (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
Rulings: his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection
1) Yes, HRET issued a Resolution holding that with the 10 May 2010 local and national
private respondent was guilty of vote-buying elections.9
and disqualifying him as Congressman of the
6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue of Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not
whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
elected Congressman that he is a foreigner, attaching a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
2) No, it is settled jurisprudence that the April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado
subsequent disqualification of a candidate who as "USA-American." Balua also presented in his
obtained the highest number of votes does not Memorandum a computer-generated travel
entitle the candidate who garnered the second record from 2009 indicating that Arnado has
highest number of votes to be declared the been using his US Passport in entering and
winner. The latter could not be proclaimed departing the Philippines, records showing trips
from April to November 2009.
 substantially complied with the requirements of
COMELEC (First Division) required the R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using
respondent to personally file his answer and his US passport after renouncing his US
memorandum within 3 days from receipt. After citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua his Affidavit of Renunciation." Arnado’s
moved to declare him in default and to present continued use of his US passport is a strong
evidence ex-parte. indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only
Neither motion was acted upon, having been executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado him to run for office.
garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground
Norte. that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the
Resolution and that the said Resolution is
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado contrary to law."
filed his verified answer, wherein he presented:
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling, another
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines garnered the second highest number of votes in
dated 03 April 2009; the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time Maquiling argued that while the First Division
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of
conspicuously and continuously residing in his succession under Section 44 of the Local
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan; Government Code is not applicable in this case.
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation
of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of
dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado candidate who obtained the highest number of
went to the United States in 1985 to work and lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
returned to the Philippines in 2009; winner.
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from
the Municipal Local Government Operations COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of
Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall
Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of
February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and the candidate whose qualifications for office is
5. Voter Certification issued by the questioned."
Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that
Arnado has been a registered voter of The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009. treatment by the First Division of the petition as
one for disqualification, and ruled that the
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for petition was filed well within the period
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy prescribed by law.
based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First
Division considered it as one for However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and
disqualification. In the matter of the issue of set aside the ruling of the First Division and
citizenship, the First Division disagreed with granted Arnado’s MR, on the following
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen, premises:
stating that "although Arnado appears to have
1. By renouncing his US citizenship as xxxx
imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though (2) Those seeking elective public in the
he never became a citizen of another country. It Philippines shall meet the qualification for
was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the holding such public office as required by the
respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
again. The use of a US passport … does not of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
prior to his renunciation as there is no law all foreign before any public officer authorized
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US to administer an oath.
passport does not operate to "un-renounce"
what he has earlier on renounced. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to
2. In his Separate Concurring Opinion, qualify to run for a public office. He took the
COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
the use of foreign passport is not one of the citizenship. There is no question that after
grounds provided for under Section 1 of performing these twin requirements required
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which under Section 5(2) of R.A. 9225 or the
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
3. On the other hand, Commissioner Rene 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
V. Sarmiento dissented, saying respondent
evidently failed to prove that he truly and After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship,
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
United States. The latter’s continued use of his executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges completing the requirements for eligibility to
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a
to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
Philippine citizenship. renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to However, this legal presumption does not
run for public office despite his continued use of operate permanently and is open to attack
a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship,
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty the citizen performs positive acts showing his
race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his
Issue: citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s passport to travel in and out of the country
qualifications to run for public office. before filing his certificate of candidacy.

Ruling: The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a

hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
YES. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides: an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine civil and political rights granted by the foreign
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil country which granted the citizenship.
and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under While the act of using a foreign passport is not
existing laws of the Philippines and the one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth
following conditions: Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation closed, for the purpose of exterminating vices in
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also the city. The women were kept confined to their
a citizen of another country to be qualified to houses by the police while the city authorities
run for a local elective position. made arrangements with the bureau of labor for
This act of using a foreign passport after sending the women to Davao as laborers. Later
renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to at midnight of October 25, the police, Anton
Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively Hohmann and the Mayor descended upon the
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an houses and placed them aboard the steamers.
elective local position. The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings and thought that they would be
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by brought to the police station for an investigation.
which foreign citizenship is acquired through a They have not been asked if they wish to depart
positive act of applying for naturalization. This from the region and neither been asked of their
is distinct from those considered dual citizens by consent for the deportation.
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing Upon their arrival in Davao, the provincial
of the certificate of candidacy already carries governor of Davao had no previous notification
with it an implied renunciation of foreign that the women were prostitutes who had been
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on expelled in the city of Manila. Then the relatives
the other hand, are required to take not only the of the deportees presented an application for
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the habeas corpus to the SC. The application alleged
Philippines but also to personally renounce that the women were illegally deported by the
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a order of Lukban. Lukban and Hohman admitted
candidate for public office. certain facts but prayed that the writ should not
be granted because the petitioners were not
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US proper parties to the case that it should have
passport after renouncing his American begun in Davao because the women are not in
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of their custody now.
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is According to the fiscal attachment, the women
disqualified not only from holding the public were destined to be laborers at good salaries on
office but even from becoming a candidate in the hacienda of Ynigo and governor sales. Fiscal
the May 2010 elections. also admitted that the deportation was without
consent of the women.
DISPOSITVE: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Issue:
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the authority
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y in expelling the prostitutes in his city (Manila)
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any without due process of law.
local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly Ruling:
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
in the 10 May 2010 elections. NO. Law defines power. No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a
grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
Evan prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
● Villavicencio v Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
Facts: officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change
The Lukban as mayor of Manila ordered the his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are
segregated district for women of ill repute be still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as Manila to Davao, the same officials must
every other citizen. Their choice of profession necessarily have the same means to return them
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may from Davao to Manila.
make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable
but it does not authorize anyone to compel said The Supreme Court said that the women were
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
the human race. These women have been fundamental right not to be forced to change
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to their place of residence.
Davao without even being given the In resume — as before stated, no further action
opportunity to collect their belongings or, on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
worse, without even consenting to being respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax,
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et. al Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
must be severely punished. contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found
in contempt of court and shall pay into the office
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five
Penal Code in force in these Islands provides: days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The
motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by from the record the Replica al Memorandum de
law or by regulations of a general character in los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted.
force in the Philippines who shall banish any Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
person to a place more than two hundred ordered.
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be
by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task,
punished by a fine of not less than three may we not be permitted to express the hope
hundred and twenty-five and not more than that this decision may serve to bulwark the
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. fortifications of an orderly government of laws
Any public officer not thereunto expressly and to protect individual liberty from illegal
authorized by law or by regulation of a general encroachment.
character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro Joyce
and a fine of not less than six hundred and ● Pamatong v Comelec GR No. 161872 (2004)
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.) FACTS:

Court reasoned further that if the chief executive When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong,
of any municipality in the Philippines could filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presidency,
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and the Commision on Elections (COMELEC)
place him beyond the boundaries of the refused to give the petition its due course.
municipality, and then, when called upon to Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration.
defend his official action, could calmly fold his However, the COMELEC again denied his
hands and claim that the person was under no request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong,
restraint and that he, the official, had no along with 35 other people, as nuisance
jurisdiction over this other municipality, then candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election
the more the writ of habeas corpus should be Code. The COMELEC noted that such
enforced. candidates “could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are either not nominated by a
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed political party or not supported by a registered
has illegally parted with the custody of a person political party with national constituency.”
before the application for the writ is no reason Pamatong argued that this was against his right
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and to “equal access to opportunities for public
the chief of police, acting under no authority of service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the
law, could deport these women from the city of Constitution, and that the COMELEC was
indirectly amending the Constitution in this assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision of the
manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
“most qualified among all the presidential 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
candidates” and supported the statement with 2008Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel
wage national and international campaigns, and Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty
his government platform. Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
Advertisement
FACTS:
ISSUE:
• Fringer (American citizen) and Albios
Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
along with the grounds for such refusal, violate Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
the right to equal access to opportunities for Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-
public service. 1588.3

• Albios filed with the RTC a petition for

RULING: declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
NO marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had
The Court noted that the provisions under any intention of entering into a married state or
Article II are generally considered not-self complying with any of their essential marital
executing. As such, the provision in section 26, obligations. She described their marriage as one
along with the other policies in the article, does made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
not convey any judicially enforceable rights. initio.
Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action” by presenting • The RTC declared the marriage void ab
ideals/standards through the policies presented. initio. The RTC was of the view that the parties
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run married each other for convenience only. Giving
for public office, one that is subject to limitations credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
provided by law. As long as these limitations are that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
enforced without discrimination, then the equal marriage to enable her to acquire American
access clause is not violated. The Court justified citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
the COMELEC’s need for limitations on agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
electoral candidates given the interest of after the ceremony, the parties went their
ensuring rational, objective, and orderly separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
elections. In the absence of any limitations, the United States and never again communicated
election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
including those who are clearly unqualified to the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
hold a government position, is allowed to run. petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
Note: Pamatong presented other evidence that that when marriage was entered into for a
he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The purpose other than the establishment of a
Court however stated that it is not within their conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
power to make such assessments. should not be recognized from its inception. CA
affirmed.

Pabs ISSUE:
● Republic v Albios, 707 SCRA 584 (2013)
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
NATURE: This is a petition for review on acquiring American citizenship in consideration
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent? Neither can their marriage be considered
voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Entering into a
HELD/RATIO: marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of
No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code for the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given Article 4 7 (3 ), the ground of fraud may only be
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
officer. But consent was not lacking between present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered the sham marriage.
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
understood the nature and the beneficial and September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
their consent was freely given is best evidenced DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit.
by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was
a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all

analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound
in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status
and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.

Although the Court views with disdain the

respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.