Paguirigan Notes Civ Rev 1 2022 2023

CIVIL LAW REVIEW – JEDI NOTES
Dean Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
Issue:
CIVIL CODE
1. Whether or not laws should be published.
Art. 2. Law shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication 2. What is referred to in the Article 2 “unless
either in the Official Gazette, or in a otherwise provided”? Does it refer to the
newspaper of general circulation in the requirement of publication or the date of
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. effectivity of the law?
(As amended by E.O. 200)
RULING: The Supreme Court said that the
Publication: Indispensable phrase “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
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refers to not to the requirement of publication but
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Principle: Complete publication or no publication to the date of the law which means that the
- -
at all. legislature may shorten or extend the 15-day

-
period stated in article 2 but publication is
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Effectivity Date: May be determined by law. indispensable in any case.
Objective: To give the public adequate or enough Example:

- -
notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Q: If the law provides that it should take
effect one year after the publication, is that
Without such notice, there would be no case for valid?
the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non
excusat. A: Yes; provided, there is publication.
“It would be the height of injustice to punish or Can the law provide 5 days after the
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression publication?
of a law of which he had no notice.”
IS INDISPeNSABLE
A: Yes. FARON
>-
Effect of Publication: Presumption of knowledge
The one referred to in Article 2 means to the date
TAÑADA v TUVERA (1985) of effectivity so - the 15-day period can be
shortened or
- - -
extended but publication is
Dean: In the two Tañada v Tuvera (1985, indispensable in every case.
1986) cases, the provision of Article 2 is
involved. TAÑADA v TUVERA (1986)
In the first case, the petitioners, then Senator Dean: The petitioners went to the Court and they
Tañada and other petitioners filed a case were seeking clarification on what laws are
questioning the validity of various issuances of covered by publication and when should
then President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. on the publication be made considering that according to
ground that they were not published. them, the Official Gazette is published at
irregular intervals.
The government on the other hand, argued that
under Article 2, these letters of instruction, One of the contentions is the requirement of
presidential decrees, presidential proclamations publication in the Official Gazette would not serve
need not be published because under Article 2, it the purpose.
says that “unless otherwise provided”.
The Supreme Court said that all laws whether
So, the main argument of the government there general or local application needs to be published
is that since the law provides “unless otherwise as a condition for their effectivity because this is
provided”, that means that publication can be in compliance with the due process clause of the
dispensed with. That is the main argument. Constitution, which means that every citizen
must have at least presumptive knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern them.
1
WHY?
This requirement of publication is related to the
principle of ignorantia legis neminem excusat. So Dean: Kasi nga yung Official Gazette, hindi
it would be unfair to charge a citizen of the naman available to ordinary citizens like us. So,
violation of the law if they have no presumptive you have to go somewhere to access the Official
knowledge of the law. Gazette. Unlike publication of newspaper of
general circulation, the newspaper is available
For as long as the law has been published, everywhere.
regardless of the citizen has read it or not, hindi
sinasabi ng Article 2 na dapat basahan ng citizen. ----
E.O. 200 provided for the publications of laws in
Basta na-publish yan, ang presumption, binasa newspaper of general circulation. That is why it is
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mo. allowed now that the law may be published not

only in the Official Gazette but also in a
All laws should be published whether of general newspaper of general circulation and that would
or local application ---
except interpretative rules have complied with the requirement under Article
and regulations, internal instructions issued by 2. (June 18, 1987)
--
the head of administrative agency.
TAKE NOTE: Chapter 2, Book 7, Sections 3 and
Example: - Administrative or memorandum 4 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
circular of DepEd head requiring all the requires every administrative
- - agency
- to furnish
employees of the DepEd to attend flag ceremony the UP Law Center, where the National
-
every 1st Monday of the Month or wearing of Administrative Register is located, copies of every
---
-
school uniform. These are internal instructions rule adopted by that agency, within three (3)
and need not be published. months from adoption.
The purpose of publication is to give the citizens ---

Without proof that these issuances of
knowledge of laws that are supposed to govern administrative agency, particularly those which
them in compliance with the due process clause --
are punitive in character, were on file with the UP
of the Constitution. ---
Law Center, it cannot become the basis of any
sanction against any party or person.
-
Q: If the law is published in a series, if it is
voluminous, and published in a series, i.e. PHILSA V. CA
the 1st part was published Jan. 05, 2nd part
on Jan. 10 and the 3rd on Jan. 15. When do Petitioner here is a private recruitment agency
you count the 15-day period or whatever engaged in recruiting workers for overseas
period is provided for by the law as the date employment, and there is a certain POEA
of its effectivity? Memorandum Circular regulating the amount of
placement fees that the private recruitment
Dean: You count it from the publication of the agencies may charge to prospective overseas
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last of the series. contract workers.
So, kung na publish yung last part ng Jan. 15, Private respondents De Mesa and Mikin were
the reckoning point of the counting of the period made to sign contracts here in the Philippines in
would be the publication of the part. Because preparation for their departure to work in a
publication must be &
- -
in full otherwise, there
= =
foreign country. They were charged by the
is
- no publication
-
at all. MUST BE
* PUBLICANON IN FULL petitioner more than the allowable fees under the
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2.
- -
-
Article 2 was amended by EO 200, June 17,

1987, issued by Pres. Cory Aquino, pursuant Based on that circular, the maximum allowable
to the Tanada v. Tuvera Case, because there was charge must be P2,500, but the private
a suggestion by the Supreme Court that respondents were charged more than that. In
publication in a newspaper of general circulation fact, one respondent was charged P6,000 and the
would better serve the purpose of informing the other was charged P4,000.
public.
2
They were repatriated because upon reaching the in the Official Gazette in 1995 and 2006 but they
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did not publish -

- -
foreign country, they were made to sign another -

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it prior to the start of the 14th
-
-
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contract which contained onerous terms and Senate.

conditions not stipulated in the original contract
-
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they signed in the Philippines. So, they were saying, no amendment has ever
been made in the rules of procedure of the
They refused to sign the contract and because of Senate since the time it was published in 2006
that, they were repatriated to the Philippines. and at any rate, these rules of the Senate are
available on the internet and are therefore
Upon repatriation, they sued the petitioner for effective. *Each Senate DISTINCT
IS
illegal exaction stemming from their violation of FROM THE

ONE BEFORE It
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2. RULING: SC said that even if they were
published in 1995 and 2006, they should have
During the trial, it was proven that this POEA been published before the 14th Senate began,
Memorandum Circular No. 2 was never published because -each Senate is distinct from the one -
as required by Article 2 and was also not on file before it, and
- - the one after it. So, lahat ng
with the UP Law Center. composition ng Senate is considered a new
NO PUBLICANON
NO LAW =
Senate and they should publish the Rules of

*
RULING: The Court ruled that even assuming Procedure before they start.
that the petitioner violated that circular, it cannot
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be punished for violating the same because it Because of that, the SC said that they cannot
E
was never effective for failure to publish as proceed with the inquiry in aid of legislation and
required by Article 2. that the publication of the law in the internet by
-
the invocation of the E-commerce Act is

GARCILLANO V. HOR misplaced. According to the SC, the E-commerce
Act merely accepts the electronic form as
Q: Can laws be published on the internet? admissible evidence, but it does not allow
publication of laws through the internet. It
A: No. considers the electronic data as a functional
equivalent of the original document for purposes
The Garci tapes allegedly contain the private of evidence but it does not allow the publication
conversation between former President Gloria of the laws through the internet.
Macapagal-Arroyo and the then sitting chairman
of the COMELEC Virgilio Garcillano, whereby The SC said that the invocation of the E-
allegedly, President Arroyo was giving commerce Act to support their claim that the
instructions to Garcillano to make sure that she rules of the Senate are effective because it is
will win the elections against FPJ. available on the internet is WRONG.
Because of this scandal, the Senate proceeded to Unless Article 2 is amended, we have to follow
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. Article 2. We have to publish it either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules of the Senate circulation.
with respect to the procedure in inquiry in aid of
legislation have been published. Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
The Senate admitted that they did publish the
rules of procedure in 1995 and 2006, but the
= -
Basis: Upon the assumption that evasion of the
inquiry here was being conducted in the year law would be facilitated and the successful
-
2007.
->
administration of justice defeated if persons
accused of crimes could successfully plead
Remember, we have 13th, 14th, 15th Congress ignorance of the illegality of their acts. (20 Am.
and so on and so forth. Jur. 209, 210).
In this case, we are talking of the 14th Congress, If ignorance of the law is a valid excuse for its
and they are saying that the rules were published non-performance or compliance, then, it would
3
be very easy for a person to escape scot-free Notable Reasons: Article III of the 1987
from liability for the commission of a wrong. The Constitution expressly prohibits the imposition of
reason is founded on public policy. ex post fact laws, to wit:
NOTE: Mistakes in the application or SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill
- -
interpretation of difficult or doubtful provisions of of attainder shall be enacted.

- -
law may be the basis of good faith. (Articles 526, -
2155 of the New Civil Code) ----

Ex post facto is most typically used to refer to a
criminal statute that punishes actions
This only applies to Philippine Laws. As a general ---
-
retroactively, thereby criminalizing conduct that
-----
-
rule, there should be >no conclusive -presumption was legal when originally performed.
of knowledge of foreign laws.
- -
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
Art. 4. Law shall have no retroactive effect mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
unless the contrary is provided. except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
Q: When do we say that the law is
retroactive? Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order,
A: When it is made to apply to acts or public policy, morals, or good customs or
transactions already done before the passage of prejudicial to a third person with a right
the law. * PROSPECTVE APPLICANON ONLY recognized by law.
GENERAL RULE: Laws

-
are given &
only Dean: Now whether a right is procedural or
prospective application.
. . .
substantive, they are subject to waiver, or they
may be waived.
-
We do not normally allow retroactive application

of the law. We only allow PROSPECTIVE Limitations of waivers to one’s rights:
application.
The waiver must not be:
XPN: Retroactive application. If the laws:
1. contrary to law, public order, public policy,
Exceptions: morals, or good customs, or
1. Penal laws favorable to the accused
P
- Who is not a habitual delinquent, as 2. prejudicial to a third person with a right
defined by the RPC. recognized by law.
R 2. Remedial and procedural statutes CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

- There are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. Therefore, if it is a FACTS: Emetrio Cui was a law student of
procedural law, it may be made to Arellano University, and his uncle was then the
apply to cases pending as of the time Dean of the College of Law. He was granted an
of passage of the law. academic scholarship upon admission because he
was a good student. But before he was given the
S 3. Special express mandate of law scholarship, he was made to sign a waiver, which
contained a provision relinquishing his right to
S 4. Statutes creating new rights transfer to another school, otherwise, in case he
- If the law creates substantive rights transfers to another school, he will refund to the
for the first time university all the amount of the scholarships he
received in the previous years. That was the
C 5. Curative statutes tenor of the waiver.
Note: In all retroactive application of laws, it While on his third year of law school, his uncle
must not impair vested rights. decided to transfer to another school. He followed
his uncle, and when he tried to apply for his
4
APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY
* NEW OURISPRUDENCE
transfer credentials, the school refused to release
them, unless Cui refunds the amount of This article refers only the decisions of the High
scholarships he received for the past three years. Court.
He paid under protest to get his credentials, able
transfer schools, graduate and pass the bar. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is
His first case was this case, seeking to recover adopted, the new doctrine is applied
what he paid under protest. He sued the school prospectively, and should not apply to parties
e n
after passing the bar. who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
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faith thereof.
-
ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver executed by

Cui in favor of Arellano is valid. 1. APPLICATION TO CIVIL CASES
Dean: The Supreme Court held that the waiver is UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE V. CA
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invalid for being -
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contrary to -
public policy since
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the
-
scholarship granted to him was based on FACTS: Several students of Unciano Paramedical
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merit and fitness. College where denied enrollment in the second
semester of 1989. They violated school rules as
There are several types of scholarshipsc – it is to the establishment of student organizations.
not limited to academic scholarships. But in the
case of Cui, it was an academic scholarship. The parents of the students affected filed a case
to compel the school to readmit their children.
The Court said that scholarships are supposed to
- -
be granted based on merits and fitness, and not

---- Prior to 1989 - In May 1988, the SC decided the
-
to serve as a propaganda- measure of the schools case of PSBA v. Alcuaz where it adopted the
to keep the good students. So, the Court ruled
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Termination of Contract Theory. Under this
-
that the waiver executed by Cui in favor of theory, whenever a student enrolls in the school,
Arellano is void for being contrary to public he is only enrolled for one semester only. Thus,
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policy. the school can refuse reenrollment in the

succeeding semesters.
Trivia: Emetrio Cui later became a Court of
Appeals Justice. The RTC decided in favor of the school. The
parents appealed to the CA. However, while the
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent appeal in the CA is pending, the SC reversed its
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall decision in PSBA v. Alcuaz in the case of Ariel
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al.
to the contrary.
Under the Non Doctrine, the SC said that
STARE DECISIS whenever a student enrolls in a school, it is
understood to be for the entire term that the
- -
If we are going to apply the laws prospectively, student

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is expected to finish his course assuming
then we must also apply doctrinal rulings that
-
the student complies with all the academic
(jurisprudence) of the SC prospectively. (Article and
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other requirements of the school.
8)
PSBA v. Alcuaz was decided in May 1988, while
E
If an old doctrine is abandoned and a new Non v. Dames was decided in May 1990.
doctrine is adopted, that new doctrine shall be
applied prospectively and should not apply to In view of the ruling of the SC in the case of Non
----
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted v. Dames, the CA reversed the decision of the
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on the faith thereof. Trial Court and ordered Unciano to readmit the
students.
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution Issue: Whether or not the new doctrine of Non
shall form a part of the legal system of the can be applied retroactively to the students
Philippines. affected?
5
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render

Ruling: NO. The Non doctrine cannot be applied judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
retroactively. Since the prevailing doctrine at the insufficiency of the laws.
time Unciano refused enrollment to the students
was the doctrine laid down in PSBA v. Alcuaz, The court will decide based on:
g
then this should be applied to the case, not the ARTCLEI
*
new one. - The Non doctrine was non-existent E

1. Equity
-
when -
the facts of this case happened, or when I 2. Justice
the case was filed against the school. Non 3. Customs of place (Art. 12)
Doctrine cannot be applied to compel the school a 4. Good morals
to accept the students.
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law,
2. APPLICATION TO CRIMINAL CASES public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
PEOPLE V. JABINAL -
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
FACTS: Jabinal was appointed as a secret agent according to the rules of evidence.
by the Provincial Commander of Batangas, and
he possessed a firearm without the requisite Art. 13. It shall be understood that:
license.
&
In 1964, during his term as secret agent, he was S
1. Years = 365 days each
-
2. Months = 30 days
3.-
-
charged with illegal possession of firearms. Days = 24 hours

4. &
-
Nights = from sunset to sunrise

-
Prior to his indictment in 1964, the SC in the

cases of People v. Lucero (1957) and People v.
- >
Exception: If months are designated by their
Macarandang (1958), acquitted the accused who
- -
name, they shall be computed by the number of
are also appointed as secret agents; thus, they days which they respectively have.
were exempted from securing license. Ex. August = 31 days, September = 30 days
In 1967, while the case is pending against
-
Jabinal, the SC abandoned the doctrine in Lucero In computing a period, the first day shall be
and Macarandang and decided the case of People excluded, and the last day included. (ex. Sept. 1
v. Mapa. judgment. Appeal may be made until Sept. 16)
The new doctrine in People v. Mapa was applied Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security
by the lower court in convicting Jabinal. On and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
appeal, he argued that the new doctrine cannot and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
be applied to him since the cases of People v. principles of public international law and to treaty
Lucero and People v. Macarandang were stipulations.
prevailing when he was indicted.
NATIONALITY THEORY
ISSUE: Whether or not Jabinal is entitled to an
acquittal? Dean: Pursuant to the new cases on Article 26 of
the Family Code, Nationality Theory would now
RULING: YES. He is entitled to an acquittal be limited to its application.
because, again, whenever a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled or abandoned, this --
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,
--
new doctrine should be applied e only prospectively ---
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
and not -retroactively. Just like provisions of the persons are binding upon citizens of the
-
law, we only apply, as a rule, prospectively and -

Philippines, even though living abroad.
not retroactively.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal- -
property is -
-
-
subject to the law of the country
-
LEX
-
where
- it is situated.
-
-
REI SITAE
-
-
6
SINATED
property IS
AREAL [ personal prop-where
↳ BUT With Regards to successION , Nanonary shall

GOVERN
1996, a married woman who previously used her

However, - intestate and - testamentary surname in her passport can only drop the
successions,
- both with respect
n
to the order of e e
surname of her husband if she can prove that she
-
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
is divorced, annulled or her first husband died.
-
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
Given that there was a divorce, it is not
automatic that you can already ask for a change
of surname unless you first file the petition or the
property and regardless of the country wherein appropriate petition for the recognition of foreign
said property may be found. divorce.
Ex. Property of A is in Canada. It is subject to The Court ruled that she cannot compel the DFA
Canadian law. Once A dies, the intestate and to change her surname in her passport unless
testamentary successions will be regulated by she can prove compliance with the law on
Philippine Law. recognition of foreign judgment.
ANDO v. SECRETARY OF With respect to family right, duties and status

FOREIGN AFFAIRS whether the person is married or not, legal
capacity whether a person is an adult or still a
Facts: This involves Edelina, a Filipina who first minor, it is still governed by our Philippine laws.
married a Japanese named Kobayashi. After a So, wherever a Filipino might be, the PH law
few years, they secured a divorce in Japan. applies with respect to his status, condition and
Thinking that she is now capacitated to remarry, legal capacity.
she got another Japanese husband, Masatome
Ando. LEX SITUS RULE
Under Article 16
She, thereafter, filed an application in the DFA so
that she could drop the last name Kobayashi Simply states that real property as well as
from her passport. DFA denied her application personal property shall be governed by the law of
because she was not able to present the proof the place where it is situated.
that she has secured a foreign divorce.
Q: Why does it make sense?
Instead of appealing the decision of the DFA, she
filed a petition for declaratory relief before the For example, the land is in Makati. We can’t say
regular courts. that it shall be governed by the laws of Bulacan.
Hindi pwede.
ISSUE: Whether or not she is entitled to have
her name in her passport changed given that she Similarly, in case of personal property and real
had already divorced her former husband. property shall be governed by the place where
they are situated.
RULING: As to the remedy, she is wrong
because instead of going directly to the RTC by Exception: If we are talking of questions on
filing the petition for declaratory relief, she SUCCESSION, under 2nd paragraph of Article
should have appealed the decision of the DFA 16.
Secretary to the Office of the President. And for
example, if there is an adverse decision, then The following aspects of & succession shall be
-
that is the time she can go to court to question --

governed by the national law of the deceased
the decision of the DFA. regardless of where the properties of the
-
deceased may be found and regardless of the
In addition to that, the SC said that she should nature of the property.
-
have filed a petition for-

recognition of the foreign -
divorce. Since there was no compliance with this

E Even if the property is located here in the PH, it
requirement, they cannot fault the DFA in will not be subject to the laws of the PH with
refusing to change her surname in her passport respect to the amount of successional right,
because under the Philippine Passport Act of intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
7
INTRINSIC
#
I
↳
VALIDIM
~
NATIONALIT
--
-
capacity to succeed and order of succession,

under Article 1039. The illegitimate children were saying that they
were deprived of their legitimes under Philippine
Article 1039.--
Capacity to succeed is governed Law.
by the law of the nation of the decedent.
-
ISSUE: Whether or not the Filipino Illegitimate
-
Hence, even if the property is situated in the Children of Amos Bellis, who is a citizen and a
Philippines, if the decedent is not a citizen of the resident of Texas, invoke Philippine Law on
Philippines, the distribution of his properties will succession to bolster their claim that they were
not be governed
e l e
- =
by the Philippine Law, rather, his deprived of their legitimes.
national law. This brings us to the case of Bellis
-
v. Bellis and Llorente v. CA. RULING: No. Because Under Texas Law, which is
the governing law, there are no forced heirs or
LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS legitimes.- The order of succession as well as the
-
amount of successional rights and the intrinsic
FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente was a former Filipino - -
validity, including the capacity to -
succeed shall all
citizen. He acquired Filipino citizenship sometime --
be governed by the national law of the
in 1943. He is married to a Filipina by the name deceased.
-
-
of Paula. In 1953, he discovered the infidelity of

his wife and then filed for divorce. * Since the deceased is a Texan citizen, his
national law applies with respect to these
After the divorce, Lorenzo married another questions.
Filipina wife by the name of Alicia. By the time of
the 2nd marriage, he was no longer a Filipino AZNAR v. GARCIA
CASE
citizen and now a naturalized American citizen. * REN VOI DOCTRINE
-
-
FACTS: Decedent was an American (citizen of

The 2nd marriage of Lorenzo lasted until his California) but he was domiciled in the Philippines
death. The first wife was claiming the properties for a long time before his death. He left
left by Llorente contending that under Philippine properties in the Philippines. He has an
Law, divorce is not recognized and she should illegitimate daughter (Helen) in the Philippines, to
still be considered the wife of the decedent. whom he gave a measly amount of (Php
3,600.00) and the rest of his estate was given to
-
RULING: Llorente is no longer a Filipino citizen his legitimate daughter (Mary Lucy). When he
and the question as to who may inherit shall not
-
died, his will was presented, and his estate was
be
- -
governed by the Philippine laws on succession being settled. Helen complained and said she was
----
but in accordance with his own national law which deprived of her legitime based on Philippine law.
is American law.
Dean: In Bellis, the decedent was both citizen
-
·
Not being anymore a Filipino citizen, the and resident of Texas. In Aznar, the decedent
⑱
successional rights of his heirs as well as the was domiciled in Philippines.
amount of the portion they will receive from
the estate of Lorenzo -should be decided by his In our conflicts rule, Art. 16 refers all these
-
national law. questions to national law of the deceased. But
upon presentation of the foreign law (California
The case was remanded to the lower court for law), it contains TWO sets of rules –
further proceedings.
First rule: Califrornia citizens who died IN
BELLIS v. BELLIS California and domiciled therein, in which case
the internal law of California on succession is
FACTS: Amos Bellis is a citizen of Texas. He left applied.
several properties here in the Philippines. He also
has illegitimate children, with a partner who was Second rule: CONFLICTS rule of California applied
a Filipina. When he died, he did not give much to whenever a California Citizen is domiciled
the illegitimate children. OUTSIDE California at the time of his death,
8
which happens to be the case Edward being settled when Richard died, the settlement
Christensen. involved common properties.
SC: Since the conflicts rule of the PH and Calif. The law office of Ancheta submitted a project of
clashed (i.e. our conflicts rule references foreign partition with respect to the estate of Audrey.
law while the Calif. conflicts rule references local However, instead of giving the entire Forbes Park
=-
law), there was a referring back, or a renvoi. property to Richard, the project of partition
divided it into ¾ for Richard and ¼ for
-
Renvoi Doctrine Kyle.
The SC said if we will -- not accept the referring They did not follow the will of Audrey. Instead of
back, the case will not be settled. The most giving the whole property to Richard, the
-
-
-
prudent thing for the court to do is for our courts, partition divided the half of the wife into equal
since Calif. law refers the question back to OUR portions and gave the other half to Kyle.
law (the law of Edward’s domicile) is to apply PH
internal law on succession, which recognizes When the lawyer of Candelaria discovered that,
legitimes. they filed a petition for annulment of the order in
the special proceedings pertaining to Audrey’s
Dean: We only apply renvoi when there is a estate.
-
referring back. When there is a foreign element
involved who happens to have a different Dean: Anong ibig sabihin? Qinuquestion nila
conflicts rule, and then referring back to the ngayon ung project of partition which was made
domicile country. by the law office of Ancheta giving a portion of
the Forbes Park Property to the adopted daughter
* If citizen and resident of the same state, there is because none was stated in the will of the wife
no application of Renvoi, because no one will (first wife).
refer.
RULING: Under Article 16, particularly the 2nd
ANCHETA v. DALAYGON paragraph, it is not Philippine law that will apply
-
in the distribution of the estate of either Audrey

-
FACTS: This case involves the estate of two US ----

or Richard, it is supposed to be governed by their
citizens who are domiciled in the PH, Richard and national law. Since the wife bequeathed all her
-
Audrey. Both were citizens of Maryland at the properties to her husband, then the entire Makati
time of their death. They resided in the property should have been given to the husband
Philippines and purchased a house and lot at which in turn the husband gave it to the second
Forbes Park in Makati. They had no legitimate or wife. Therefore, the entire Forbes Park property
illegitimate issue. They only had an adopted should have pertained to the 2nd wife.
daughter, Kyle. In her will, Audrey left all her
properties to Richard, and nothing to their So hindi tama ung hinati nila because that was
adopted daughter Kyle. not provided for in the will, and that was not how
she intends to bequeath her property.
Candelaria Dalaygon, the second wife, and
Richard got married. After two years, they had SC said that the entire Makati property should
two children and on the third year, Richard died. have pertained to the 2nd wife or to the husband,
Before he died, he executed a will wherein he which in turn the husband bequeathed the
gave all his properties to Candelaria except property to the 2nd wife. The entire Forbes Park
for shares of stock which he gave to his adopted Property should pertain to Candelaria-Dalaygon
daughter, Kyle. as inheritance from her husband.
Ancheta was appointed as ancillary administrator ** Did you not notice that they were able to acquire
for the Philippines properties. After the wills of a house and lot even if they’re foreigners? The
the two Americans were probated abroad, they Supreme Court said in this case –-if a land or a
were submitted for reprobate here in the --
real property is invalidly transferred to an
Philippines. Since the estate of Audrey was still > -
alien, but it was subsequently transferred to
-
a Filipino, the flaw in the original
-
9
* NO STANDING TO
SUE/DIVORLE IS VALID

-
-
transaction is cured. Thus, the SC did not Philippines, but in accordance with the national
anymore delve into the validity of acquisition of law of Richard Upton, divorce is recognized and is
the Makati property by the Spouses Richard and considered valid.
Audrey because the important thing is that it is
now back in the hands of a Filipino Citizen, which In fact, if he were to go to in any of the states in
is Candelaria-Dalaygon. the US, he cannot seek any affirmative relief
EXTRINSIC VALIDI from the courts in his own country as an
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of aggrieved husband, precisely because his
contracts, wills, and other public national law does not anymore consider him as
instruments shall be governed by the laws husband of Alice, whom he divorced.
of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are - The Court ruled that the Filipina should not be
discriminated in her own country if the ends
executive before the diplomatic or consular of justice is to be served. So therefore, the
- -
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in Court ruled in favor of the Filipina and denied
a foreign country, the solemnities relief to Richard.
established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution. HUMAN RELATIONS AND ABUSE OF
RIGHTS
Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have Dean: There are 3 articles actually very
for their object public order, public policy important in the sphere of Human Relations, and
and good customs shall not be rendered these are Articles 19-21. There is no moral wrong
ineffective by laws or judgments without a remedy because of these articles.
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
country. of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his
Dean: Pursuant to Article 15 and prohibition due, and observe honesty and good faith.
against divorce, Article 15 is usually involveB (Standard of Conduct)
whenever a divorce is obtained by a Filipino
against another. Before the new rulings of the SC Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
on Article 26 of the Family Code, if the Filipino willfully or negligently cause damage to
spouse filed the divorce, such divorce is not
>
rendered valid because our law does not
another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. (Contrary to law)
-
recognize divorce.
Art 21. Any person who willfully causes loss
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs, or public
Facts: Alice Van Dorn was first married to policy shall compensate the latter for the
Richard Upton, an American. After quite some damage. (Contrary to morals)
time, they secured a divorce. She, then
remarried to another American named Theodore In Article 19, which speaks of the principle of
Van Dorn. Alice and Theodore went home to the abuse of rights, every person every person must,
Philippines, and established a business in Ermita. in the exercise of his rights and in the
When Richard, the first husband was made aware performance of his duties, act with justice, give
that the business was doing well, he filed a case everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
against Alice and said that since Philippine law faith.
does not allow divorce, Alice is still considered his
spouse under the Philippine law, and thus owned There is a primordial limitation in the exercise of
one-half of whatever Alice owns. one’s rights or in the performance of one’s duties
and these are the norms stated in Art. 19. Ano
RULING: The Supreme Court, however, said that yun?
even if divorce is not allowed here in the
10
A
G
●
●
Act with justice
~
Give everyone his due
But eventually, the matter of her sabbatical leave
was denied. So, matagal siyang naghintay for the
⑧ ● Observe honest and good faith r processing but her sabbatical leave was denied.
Therefore, even if you are exercising a right, or She now sued the Dean and the Department
performing a duty, if you do not observe the Chair for abuse of rights.
standards mentioned in Article 19, you may be
held liable for damages for the injury caused to ISSUE: Are the elements of abuse of rights are
another. present? Leave
SABBACaL
*
LMERE PRIVILIGE
↳
For there to be an abuse of right, there must be: RULING: NO. The elements are:
● A right/duty ● There must be a right/duty

● Exercised in bad faith ● Exercised in bad faith
● For the sole purpose of causing prejudice to ● For the sole purpose of causing prejudice to
another another
Remember, - -
bad faith implies malice. A sabbatical leave is not a right. It is a C
-
mere
privilege granted by the school. To be entitled by
-
DIAZ v. ENCANTO a sabbatical, you must show to the satisfaction to

-
-
the school authorities that you are entitled to it.
FACTS: This case involves Elizabeth Diaz who There are certain requirements that you must
was an associate professor in Mass comply with before you may be given a
Communication at UP Diliman, and sometime sabbatical leave.
during her stint in UP she applied for a sabbatical
leave with pay. Unfortunately, in her case, she was not able to
present the requirements that she qualify for the
But since there was a shortage of teachers at the sabbatical.
time he applied for her sabbatical leave, the
Department Chair of College of Mass Not having a right, she cannot compel the school
Communication just recommended to the Dean of to grant the sabbatical leave. There can be no
-
-
the College, Dean Encanto, that she be granted =

abuse of right, if there is no right in the first
- -
whatever leave credits she may be entitled to, place.

-
--
BUT NOT A SABBATICAL. Kasi yung sabbatical
mahaba yun. She may not return for a year or ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
so, and they were badly in need of teachers at
that time. So she was not recommended by the Case of mistaken identity between a father and a
Department Chair. son.
The matter was referred to then UP President FACTS: Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel
Abueva. But after a long process, her name was plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. somewhere
stricken from the list of faculty for that particular in V. Mapa, Manila. It was paid by means of a
semester where she applied for her leave, and check drawn against the account of EL
her salaries was not paid for the succeeding Woodworks. But the address where they
months. So, nabayaran pa siya ng first month of delivered the mild steel plates was in Guaranteed
that semester of 1988. But given that she had Industries. When the check was presented for
already expressed her unwillingness to teach payment, the check was dishonored due to
during the semester, and the past experience of insufficient of funds.
the College of Mass Communication (sa kanya
siguro may konti siyang attitude, kapag sinabi So, they tried to investigate who was the issuer
niyang ayaw niya, ayaw niya). So, her name was of the check since it was delivered to Guaranteed
stricken from the roster of the faculty, and she Enterprises, they check the records (wala pang
did not received her salaries for the succeeding Data Privacy Act noon, pwede kang pumunta sa
months. SEC at iverify mo sino may-ari, kung ano
pangalan ng may-ari, address, kasaysayan).
11
Tobias then filed a case for Illegal Dismissal

They went to SEC, and discovered that the against the company.
President of Guaranteed Industries was one
Eugenio S. Baltao. They now filed a case for While the case was pending, Tobias tried to apply
violation of BP 22 against Eugenio Baltao, Sr., for another job in a rival company, RETELCO
who was the registered President of Guaranteed (because it was almost certain that he will not
Industries. regain his job at Globe Mackay).
Eugenio denied issuing the check, and also did Without any request from RETELCO, the manager
not disclosed that it was actually his son, of Globe Mackay, Hendry, volunteered
namesake: Eugenio Baltao, Jr., who ordered the information, called RETELCO, and said “Do not
-
mild steel plates, and asked to be delivered in hire Tobias, because he is a crook and
-
-
-
a swindler.
Guaranteed Industries, which is also the address You will regret it if you hire him.”
-
of EL Woodworks. After the criminal case was

dismissed, it was then that Eugenio Baltao Sr. This was the last straw and prompted Tobias to
filed a case against Albenson for Malicious file another case against the company, this time,
Prosecution and Abuse of Right. a civil case for damages based on abuse of
rights.
ISSUE: Is there an abuse of right here? Was the
petitioner motivated by malice or intent to Globe Mackay interposed its defense which said
prejudice Baltao Sr. when it filed the criminal that they were merely exercising their right to
case for B.P. 22? dismiss and erring employee.
RULING: NO. The matter could have been RULING: Supreme Court clarified that the
- --
clarified if only Baltao Sr. disclosed that there are exercise of a right to dismiss an erring employee
two (2) persons by
-
the
---- name of Eugenio Baltao, should not be confused with the manner in which
Sr. it is exercised.
-
- -
- -
The Supreme Court also ruled that the case also Even if you are exercising a right to dismiss, if
- -
does not fall under Malicious Prosecution because you do it abusively, you can be held liable for
they acted with probable cause, because there damages under Article 19.
was a check which was dishonored. They had no
reason to suspect or to think that there were Q: What were the acts of abuse?
actually two persons with the same name,
holding office in the same address. A: Even before he was proven guilty, he was
already forced to pay a leave of absence without
Therefore, there was no abuse of right. pay.
GLOBE MACKAY V. CA All his personal belongings in his office were

searched by Globe Mackay. Pina-iwanan sa
Q: Can you dismiss an employee any way kanyang open lahat ng drawers and filing
you want? cabinets, etc.
FACTS: Globe Mackay (which is now Globe He was sued criminally, and even if the cases
-
Telecom) attributed fictitious purchases in the were dismissed, he was still dismissed from
e e
company against one of its employees, Restituto employment. Worse, he was trying to start a new
-
Tobias. Criminal cases were filed against him. life by applying for a new job, and yet, Globe
Mackay seem to not move on and wants to
But after the handwriting expert testified that the destroy Tobias til the end.
signatures appearing in the fictitious purchases
do not belong to Tobias, the case was dismissed. The Supreme Court said, this certainly is not
within the bounds of the standards of Article 19.
Despite the dismissal of the criminal cases, Therefore, SC held Globe Mackay liable for
Tobias was still dismissed from employment. damages.
12
BARONS MARKETING V. CA Dean: Quiñones was a reservation and ticketing

agent at Cebu Pacific in Robinsons Cebu Branch.
Dean: Kung may utang ka, ang terms ng While on a break, she went to a Guess store
contract niyo ay payable in cash, tapos di ka inside the mall and fitted four (4) items. One of
makabayad then nagrequest ka ng payment on the items she fitted was black jeans. After
installment without interest. Pag hindi pumayag returning the three (3) items, she went to the
ang creditor, abuse of right ba yon? counter and paid for the jeans. Allegedly, she
paid for the jeans. She already had the receipt in
FACTS: Respondent here is Phelps Dodge Phils. her possession and the item was already inside
Inc, a supplier of electrical wires and cables. One the bag. She was walking outside the Guess store
of its customers is petitioner Barons Mktg. and while she was approaching the walkway
towards the Cebu Pacific office, she noticed that
A certain quantity of wires and cables were the two (2) employees of Guess store were
already delivered. Based on their contract, more following her and were running after her. When
than Php 500,000 worth of cables would be paid confronted, they said that she forgot to pay for
for in cash. her item. But she insisted that she paid as she
already has the receipt and walked out of the
However, Barons Mktg. was not able to comply store.
with its obligation to pay and it requested for
payment on installment without interest. Of Apparently, she said that she invited the two (2)
course, Phelps Dodge refused. employees to go to their office but still there was
no resolution because one party is saying that
Eventually, Phelps Dodge filed a case for she paid and the other party is saying she did
collection against Barons Mktg. not. So, what the employees of Guess did was to
write a letter to the employer of Quiñones stating
By way of counterclaim, Barons Mktg. contended the material facts which happened and
that Phelps Dodge was guilty of abuse of right. insinuating that she did not pay for the jeans. A
similar letter was also written by the petitioner to
Q: According to Barons Mtkg., what was the the management of Robinsons Mall.
abuse of right?
Quiñones filed a case because of the humiliation
A: That Phelps Dodge refused to accept their she suffered. She was branded as someone who
offer of settlement of their loan obligation on is a shoplifter because she did not pay for the
installment basis without interest. jeans.
ISSUE: Is that an abuse of right? ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty
of abuse of rights; 2) Can they be held liable for
RULING: NO, because based on the tenor of the damages based on their act of writing a letter?
contract, there was--
no stipulation on payment on
installment.
-
-
RULING: From the point that they followed
-
Quiñones and they were trying to clarify whether
Of course, if the contract stipulates the form of she had actually paid, in fact they asked her to
payment, the creditor has the perfect right to open her wallet and she gladly opened her wallet
enforce the tenor or the contract in accordance and showed the receipt to the employees of
with its literal tenor. Guess, up to that point, the SC said it was still
okay, there was no abuse of right there.
Phelps Dogde’s refusal to accept payment on
installment was not motivated by malice or bad The malice consists in the writing of the letter to
-
faith or ill-will; but merely, plain and simple the management of the mall and to the superior
a
enforcement of the terms of the contract.
-
of Quiñones who had nothing to do at all with the
Therefore, there is no abuse of right. transaction. The Court said that on this,- there is
>
--
malice present because their intent was not really
to have the item paid for but more of to humiliate
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING v. QUIÑONES >
the respondent to-compel her to pay.
13
The SC said that there was an abuse of right mapuntahan yung mga private respondents who
which entitles Quiñones to damages. are the tenants.
RELLOSA v. PELLOSIS So, the SC said that implementing the writ of

demolition or an order of demolition even before
FACTS: This involves a property which is being it has become final, is certainly an abuse of rights
leased to tenants. Tenants are the private because C &
it-
deprived the private respondents of -
respondents and the former owner sold it to the benefits ofI

appeal.
-
Cynthia Ortega. As the new owner, Cynthia

-
Ortega applied for the demolition of the building. NPC v. PHILIPP BROTHERS
She was saying that the building is in danger of
falling and it is already dilapidated, therefore, FACTS: Napocor or NPC submitted or published
there is a need to take it down and to rebuild it. invitations to bid for the supply of coal for the
generation of energy. The private respondent,
The officer in the city hall issued an order of Philipp Brothers, is one of the participating
demolition and it was served upon the private bidders in that exercise and they won the
respondents. The private respondents filed an bidding.
appeal from the order of demolition. One day
after perfecting their appeal to the city building However, despite their winning bid, the private
official, the petitioner, Cynthia Ortega, and her respondent failed to comply with their contract
father Rellosa plus some armed men with Napocor. In other words, wala silang
implemented the writ of demolition and naisupply na coal.
destroyed the building totally.
Since Napocor badly needed the coal at that
The respondents filed a case for damages based time, what they did was to issue second
on abuse of right but pending that case, the writ invitations to bid for the purpose of having a new
of demolition was affirmed on appeal. set of bidders who can comply with the contract.
Cynthia Ortega then said that she is telling the Philipp Brothers again filed an application to
truth that this building is in need of demolition prequalify and bid, but this time, their application
because it is already dilapidated. This is shown by was denied by Napocor. So, because of this
the fact that the order of demolition was affirmed denial, they filed a case for damages on the basis
by no less than the city building official. of abuse of right.
ISSUE: Whether or not she is guilty of abuse of ISSUE: Whether or not there was an abuse of
rights. right because they were denied the right to cast
their bid for the supply of coal? DENIAL WAS RECORD
DUE TOTHE
*
BAD TRACK
.
RULING: Yes, she guilty of abuse of rights. It’s & NO ABUSE OF RIGHT
not a question of whether she is correct in saying

that the building is dilapidated but the point is
⑲
RULING: The denial was not prompted by any ill
will or malice on the part of Napocor, but it was
she implemented the writ of demolition even -
due to the--bad track record of Philipp Brothers in
before it has become final and executory. She
-
-
failing to comply with their commitment under
-
practically deprived the private respondents, who -

their contract with Napocor.
are the tenants, from the benefits of the appeal
because the judgment was not yet final at the The elements of abuse of right are not present in
time that the writ was implemented. this case considering that the respondent failed
to comply with their contract. No person in his
Q: What if the writ of demolition was right mind would accept him again as a
reversed and in the meantime they had prospective bidder when hindi pa nga niya
already demolished it? Can you repair the nacocomply yung first contract niya, magbibid na
damage? naman siya.
A: No more. It was being used as an abode. So So that is not prompted by any malice or ill will.
tirahan, ang ginawa nila dinemolish nila, walang Hence, the court ruled in favor of Napocor.
14
CARPIO v. VALMONTE Not only that, the body search and car search
without any evidence at all. By her own account,
FACTS: Valmonte was a wedding coordinator and nobody knew that she was carrying jewelry inside
Carpio was an aunt of one of the parties to the the paper bag. Maybe she was only saying that
marriage. there was jewelry inside, but in fact there was
The bride and the entire bridal entourage were none.
accommodated at the Manila Hotel, and Carpio
arrived in style carrying a paper bag. She did not The Court held her liable for damages and
disclose to anyone what that paper bag required her to pay Php 100,000.00.
contained.
Dean: If the act does not constitute an abuse of
She went directly to the restroom, allegedly right, it may still justify the award of damages if
placed the paper bag under the sink, which the act is contrary to law, under Article 20.
according to her, contained the jewelry which she
was supposed to wear during the ceremony. ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
Everybody was inside the room, including another, shall indemnify the latter for the
Valmonte, when Valmonte was summoned by same.
someone to go downstairs to talk to the band
that will be performing during the reception. Q: What is the difference between Article 20
and 21?
Before she went down, she used the restroom
and when she went back to the bride suite, she A:
was verbally lambasted by Carpio, “Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang nagnakaw ng Article 20 Article 21
alahas ko.” The act is contrary to
The act is not contrary
>
law. to law; but it is
-
Carpio was not contented, she ordered the guard contrary

- to morals,
of the hotel to conduct a body search on
Valmonte, and the search yielded nothing. She
- or
good customs,
public policy.
-
also instructed the guards of the Manila Hotel to It-may be committed It is done willfully.
trail her during the entire event and conduct a
-
willfully, or with
- -
search on the car of Valmonte, without a search malice, or through

warrant. negligence.
When the search yielded nothing, Valmonte still ARDIENTE v. PASTORFIDE

complied with her duty as wedding coordinator
until the event was finished and after that she FACTS: Pastorfide purchased a property (house
demanded a public apology because she was and lot) from Joyce Ardiente. By agreement of
humiliated. the parties, the buyer, Pastorfide, would also
effect the transfer of all the utilities under the
But Carpio adamantly refused to apologize, name of Joyce Ardiente, into her own name.
insisting she was the one thieved. So, she filed a Pagkatapos ng bilihan, ang usapan, it-transfer
case for damages against Carpio on the basis of niya yung water, electric bill sa pangalan ni
abuse of rights. Pastorfide.
ISSUE: Was there an abuse of rights? Pastorfide used and occupied the property and
paid the utilities for four (4) years under the
RULING: Yes, because you cannot point an
-
name of the former owner Ardiente without any
accusing finger against anyone on the basis on
- - interruption or problems, until she allegedly
mere suspicion and verbally lambast her, and
- - defaulted in the payment of her water bill with
brand
-
her as a thief without any solid evidence to the Cagayan de Oro Water District.
back-up her claim.
-
15
Since it was still under the name of Ardiente, from Hepatitis B and therefore, did not get the
Ardiente personally went to the Cagayan de Oro job. The father suffered a heart attack. She
Water District to request for the disconnection of brought her father to a hospital. While at the
the water service in the house of Pastorfide. hospital, she underwent a ->
confirmatory testing.
She was not convinced that she was suffering
-
This prompted Pastorfide to file a case for from any illness because she was not feeling
-
-
damages against Ardiente. anything.

e
Ardiente’s Defense Q: Ardiente said that she This time, the result conducted at the hospital
was merely enforcing or trying to enforce the showed a negative result. She then confronted
contractual commitment of Pastorfide that she CDC, and when they repeated the test, the result
will transfer all the utilities in her name. That is was negative.
why she cannot be held liable for damages.
She filed a case for damages against CDC for the
Q: Is Ardiente correct? sleepless nights she suffered thinking she was
sick, and for the expenses that she incurred in
RULING: No. According to the SC, if it were true undergoing the confirmatory test.
that the intention was merely to force or to
require Pastorfide to transfer the utilities in her ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia and CDC should
name, then she could have simply asked her to be held liable for damages under Article 20.
comply with the contract, and not ask for the
direct disconnection of the water service of the RULING: Every person who, contrary to law,
respondent. willfully or negligently causes damage to another
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
There is liability for damages under the provision
of Article 20. Upon the examination of the records, the Court
found that CDC was not supervised by a licensed
There was malice in her act requiring physician which is required by the Clinical
disconnection kasi hindi nagj-jive yung kanyang Laboratory Law. It was only supervised by a
purpose. Bakit hindi mo sinabi na ang ka- medical technologist, not a licensed physician.
kontrata mo ay ito. Although she can do that, the That by itself is a violation of the provisions of
-
Cagayan de Oro Water District cannot be faulted the Clinical Laboratory Law.
for disconnecting it because based on their
- -
records, it was still Ardiente who was their

-
The results were released without the signature
registered customer. of a licensed physician which is another violation
of the Clinical Laboratory Law. Apparently, the
The SC held that there was liability on the part of mistake was committed because it was not
petitioner Ardiente for damages. verified by a licensed physician.
GARCIA v. SALVADOR Therefore, the SC held that Garcia should be held

liable for damages under Article 20 because there
FACTS: Ranida Salvador was a trainee at Limay was a provision of the law which they willfully
Bulk Terminal, Bataan. As a precondition to violated and thereby caused damage to Ranida
employment, she was required to undergo the Salvador.
usual medical test. The accredited clinic to do
that for Limay Bulk Terminal was Community MERALCO v. CA
Diagnostic Center (CDC), which is owned by
petitioner Garcia. FACTS: This involves the Chavezes. Both father
and son are lawyers. They had several unpaid
When Salvador was tested by CDC, she was Meralco bills, and when the personnel of Meralco
confronted with the result that she was suffering went to their house, they said to not disconnect
from Hepatitis B, and as a result of that medical since they will pay the bills in the afternoon.
exam, she was not hired. She went home to her
father. Since she was the breadwinner, she told They did pay but left one bill unpaid. There were
her father of the bad news that she was suffering 3, they paid the 2, and they retained 1 unpaid
16
or
NoncE
C48DISCONNECTION
HOUR
SERVICE CIVIL LAW REVIEW – JEDI NOTES

NOMCE
* PUBLI
ISCONNECTON RIGHT Dean Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
-
o
-
D
* NO
-
ABUSE
bill. Thereafter, Meralco proceeded with
disconnection -without the written notice of There was no relationship between the two
-
disconnection. because she was 10 years older. Eventually,
however, the sexual act repeated until she
They sued Meralco. The defense of Meralco is became pregnant. She told Chris about her
that they cannot be held liable for damages pregnancy. It was first time that she heard the
because the customer did not pay and yet they words “Don’t worry, I will marry you”.
are the ones being demanded.
Chris did get married to his girlfriend but not to
According to Meralco, the respondents are in Soledad. Because of that, Soledad filed a case for
arrears in the payment of bills. Naturally, it is damages against him.
their right to disconnect to force them to pay.
RULING: Breach of promise to marry is not
RULING: Even if the customer is in arrears, it is actionable per se – if there is no carnal
no defense on the part of Meralco to disconnect -
knowledge, there is no pregnancy, resignation
without the written notice of disconnection.
-- from job, or actual expenses incurred; you
- -
-
cannot recover damages. Per se (or on its own),
-
- - -
-
Under the-
-
Public Service Act, the law requires it is not actionable.

that the utility company must give a 48-hour
written notice of disconnection before the actual Here, there was carnal knowledge. To constitute
disconnection. a cause of action for damages, there must be at
least moral seduction.
-
It is not a defense on the part of Meralco that the

customer is in arrears. They have to comply with However, if there is any person guilty of
the 48-hour written notice of disconnection. If seduction;-it is not the -
man, it is the-
woman. She
they do that without 48-hour written notice of wanted the benefit of marriage before the benefit
-
-
disconnection, they are liable under Article 20 --

of clergy. She is not entitled to damages for
and Public Service Act. breach
-
of promise to marry.
Dean: If the act does not constitute an abuse of

- - WASMER v. VELEZ
right, it may also give rise to cause of action of
-
damages if there is injury caused &to another and FACTS: Francisco Velez was about to be wed to
-
-
-
the act is contrary to morals, good customs, or

-
Beatriz Wasmer. Everything was set already, the
--
public policy. invitations were out, the gown and outfit of the
-
-
-
man were prepared. Two (2) days before the
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY celebration of the wedding itself, Beatriz received
a short note from the would-be-husband “I’m
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable sorry but we will have to postpone our wedding
wrong. Per se (on its own), break of promise is because my mother was opposed to it”.
not actionable. You cannot sue someone for
breaching or not fulfilling the promise to marry It was too late because the whole community was
you. There was a case on Wasmer v. Velez, already aware that they were getting married in
Hermosisima v. CA, and Gashem v. CA. 2 days.
HERMOSISIMA v. CA She filed a case for damages against Francisco

Velez. To the defense of Velez, it was not
FACTS: Soledad was a public school teacher in actionable.
Cebu at the time she met Chris Hermosisima who
was 10 years her junior (girl is older than boy). RULING: To walk out of the wedding only 2 days
She really had her eyes fixed on Chris before it is actually solemnized is an act which is
Hermosisima. He was training as an apprentice &
contrary to morals.
-
-
pilot, and to be noticed, she was the one who

-
performed the first move - she will bring in food What justifies the award of damages, apart from
at the cabin of Chris, visit him, have chat with that, is the fact that Beatriz also spent money –
him, etc. there was actual damages incurred by Beatriz
17
Wasmer in spending for part of the expenses of In fact, -

-
there was fraud involved making Marilou
= -
the wedding. believe he would fulfill his promise of marriage

- - -
- -
when
--- in fact he had no intention to do so at all.
Thus, she was entitled to damages – - not for -
-
breach of promise to marry; but for the act of The SC awarded damages to Marilou.
-
walking out of the wedding two (2) days before.
- -
GASHEM v. CA DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
FACTS: Marilou De Guzman is a waitress at a There is damage caused to one but in

local canteen, and petitioner Gashemi is an contemplation of law, there is no legal injury.
Iranian national who was a medical exchange
student in the Philippines. These terms, injury, damage, and damages
should be differentiated:
Gashem usually eats in the canteen where
Marilou was working as a waitress. She was a
barrio girl, and not used to anyone paying
Injury
Damage
illegal invasion of a legal right
-
lost, harm, hurt by reason of injury
attention until Gashem came. She was courted by Damages the recompense or the amount of
Gashem, and they formed a bond. Gashem money awarded to the person who
promised, “I will marry you” and “I want to meet suffered the damage ~
your family”.
Marilou introduced Gashem to her parents and CUSTODIO v. CA

were permitted to sleep together that night
where something happened to them and it was FACTS: Custodio and Santos are owners of a
repeated. parcel of land which were located in front of the
property of Pacifico Mabasa (Dominant estate -
When Marilou asked Gashem about the plans of landlocked by the properties of Custodio and
their marriage, Gashem now turned abusive, and Santos).
said that he can no longer fulfill the promise to
marry Marilou because he was already married. This property of Mabasa was leased to tenants
and allegedly, these tenants were causing too
She filed a case of damages against Gashem. much inconvenience to Custodio and Santos –
they would drive their vehicles at a fast speed
Take note: Marilou was already of age, in fact and sometimes their personal belongings are lost.
more than the majority age but she was not used That was the common complaint of Custodio and
to the city life; in fact, she was a barrio girl. Santos.
The Supreme Court here said that she is entitled As owners of these respective properties, they
to damages because if it were not for the promise talked with each other and decided to construct a
to marry, she would not have surrendered herself concrete fence along their property.
to Gashem.- There was moral seduction
-
involved in this case, considering the As they did so, as a consequence, the pathway
personality of the woman, and the court also leading to the property of Mabasa was effectively
noted the character of Gashem who said that made narrower which caused the tenants of
Marilou was interested to marry him because he Mabasa to leave.
would soon be a doctor. This shows that he
-
has no regard for Filipino women, and the

e n Mabasa filed an action for damages and
-
fact that he admitted that he could no longer
marry Marilou because he was already married to -
-
establishment of Iright of way against Custodio
-
and Santos.
someone else all the more complicates his -
situation because from the very start, he had no

- The Trial court granted the easement but refused
intention to fulfilling the promise of marrying
- - -
to award damages to Mabasa for unrealized
Marilou.
-
18
income. On appeal, the CA awarded the damages Carbonell spouses filed a case for damages
to Mabasa by reason of loss of income. against Metrobank.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Custodio and The expert witness testified that the notes
Santos in constructing fences in their own presented appeared to be near genuine that it
property would justify the payment of damages could not be deciphered by the naked eye. So
to Mabasa because he lost the income from the even a expert can be duped given the
tenants.
man appearance of the dollar bills which is almost
IS
exactly the same as the original bills.

RULING: Prior to the decision of the RTC
granting the easement, there was really no such RULING: The Supreme Court here refused to
right to easement in Mabasa’s favor. award damages to the Carbonells on the ground
that, in the principle of Damnum Absque Injuria,
---
Easement is not automatic. You may be given the the damages incurred would be solely for the
right to demand if the servient estate refuses, person who suffered the damage.
but only upon payment of proper indemnity.
This is because in contemplation of the law, it
In this case, there was no easement existing in does not award damages for something which
Mabasa’s favor – that is precisely why he had to does not involve a violation of a legal right.
file the case before the trial court which granted
him the easement. We mentioned a while ago that there are three
(3) terms that you must know:
There being no right on the part of Mabasa to use
that passageway (he is not even paying for the 1. The injury which is the legal invasion of
passage way, Custodio and Santos was merely legal right
giving him the courtesy of using the same), the 2. Damage
Court said that he is not entitled to damages by 3. Damages
reason of loss of income because prior to the
decision of the RTC, there is no right to easement According to the Supreme Court, you cannot fault
in favor of Mabasa. the bank in releasing the supposed dollar bills to
the Carbonells as far as they are concerned, they
There being no right violated, and the are genuine notes.
=>
construction of the fences by the petitioners is
merely an act of ownership were exercised under
- Dean’s Opinion: Isn’t that banks are required to
Art. 430; Mabasa is not entitled to damages, only exercise extraordinary diligence rather than mere
---0
the easement. ordinary diligence in dealing with the accounts of
their clients.
Dean: Damnum Absque Injuria provides that the
law affords no remedy or right to damages for I’m just surprised that in this particular case, the
damages which does not amount to legal injury. Supreme court said that the Carbonells are not
entitled to damages because the Court said that
CARBONELL V. METROBANK the bank exercise the proper precautions.
FACTS: The spouses sued Metrobank because Yet, it still ended up releasing counterfeit notes?
they apparently went on a trip to Thailand and So, pagka-ganun kasi nangyari na na-exonerate
before they went on the trip they withdrew ang bank to release counterfeit notes, who can
$1,000.00 from Metrobank. When they went to a we trust? Eh sila yung bank?
store in Thailand, he said that the merchant said
that “you Filipinos cannot be trusted” because To my mind lang, it is not a controlling doctrine.
apparently, of the ten (10) $100, four (4) turned Because the concept of banks is that they are
out to be counterfeit.” required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
When they went home to the Philippines because At any rate, in that case the Supreme Court said
of the alleged humiliation they suffered, the the law does not award damages for something
19
⑪
which does not amount to a legal injury, so it did RULING: The Principle of Unjust Enrichment will
not award damages to the Carbonells. not apply if the alien-- knowingly violated the
Constitution
- -
by purchasing a parcel of land and
UNJUST ENRICHMENT putting it in the name of the Filipina.
- -
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of The court awarded the parcels of land to Catito
performance by another, or any other because the alien should not be permitted to do
means, acquires or comes into possession of indirectly what he cannot do directly.
something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the REYES v. LIM
same to him.
FACTS: Reyes is the seller of a parcel of land for
Principle of solutio indebiti – No one shall -
enrich 28 Million and the buyer was Lim. They stipulated
-
- -
himself at the expense of another that 10 Million will be paid as initial payment.
-
-
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing Since the property was being leased to tenants at
-
damage to another’s property was not due the time of the sale, there was a provision in
- -
to the fault or negligence of the defendant, their

-
sale contract that if Reyes fails to eject the
the latter shall be liable for indemnity if tenants within a certain period, he would pay a
-
through the act or event he was benefited. penalty to the buyer Lim of 4% of the down
- -
payment (Php 400,000.00).
FRENZEL v. CATITO - -
Allegedly, Lim, the buyer, connived

- -
with the
FACTS: This case involves unjust enrichment tenants and talked to them not to leave the
- - -
claim of an alien seeking the recover the money premises. This way, the balance of Php
-
that he used to pay for the land placed in the 18,000,000.00 would be consumed by the
name of a Filipina. penalty.
Frenzel is an Australian national who met Catito Reyes now sent a letter to Lim rescinding the
who is a Filipino. Unknown to Frenzel, Catito was sale.
already married to another foreign national
(German). In reality, however, he sold the property to
another buyer, that is why he wanted to rescind
Frenzel courted Catito and promised to finance the sale.
whatever business she wants in the Philippines.
He fulfilled this promise when he purchased Reyes eventually filed a case for rescission of the
parcels of land and placed it in the name of the sale before the trial court. By way of motion,
Catito. buyer Lim requested the court to require the
seller to deposit the Php 10,000,000.00 in court
When Frenzel knew of Catito’s marriage, the pending litigation.
relationship turned sour and he now filed a case
to recover not the lands (because he knew he Reyes argued he cannot be compelled to do that
was not qualified to own lands in the Philippines), because there is no provisional remedy under the
rather, the money used to purchase the parcels Rules of Court which would require the seller to
of land that were placed in the name of Catito on deposit the amount of down payment pending
the ground that if he is not allowed to recover, litigation. (and it is correct)
Catito will be unjustly enriched at the expense of
an alien. RULING: The Court said that based on the
principle of Unjust Enrichment, the seller who is
-
ISSUE: Whether or not he can invoke the suing for rescission of the sale cannot hold on to
-
-
principle of Unjust Enrichment to justify his claim the

-
down payment pending litigation.
for reimbursement given that he was aware of
the Constitutional Prohibition. Siya ang nagpapa-rescind eh, dapat ready siya to
return. >
Rescission requires mutual restitution.
-
-
20
In the meantime that the case is pending, he seizure is certainly a legal condition of the
cannot continue to hold on to the Php property.
10,000,000.00, use it for whatever purposes
while the buyer has nothing – no possession of So, the Court ruled that the defense is untenable.
land nor the Php 10,000,000.00. Under the principle of unjust enrichment, the
seller, who did not -
-
disclose said tax liabilities to
There is unjust enrichment when a person the buyer, should pay because these were
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of
liabilities&
-
incurred =
-
O
prior to
=
the sale.
another against the fundamental principles of It would have been a different story if the unpaid
justice, equity and good conscience. tax liabilities were disclosed openly to the buyer
and the buyer assumed liability to pay the same.
Based on the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, However, in this case, there
- was non-disclosure,
-
Reyes may be required to deposit the Php it was E
- concealed – perhaps even to the point of
-
10,000,000.00 which was the down payment of fraud.

the buyer.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal
NDC v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORP. prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
* NON-DISCLOSURE OF
-
LIABILITES
guilt has not beenob
-
proved beyond reasonable
-
FACTS: National Development Company, the -

doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
petitioner, is the owner of National Shipping act or omission may be instituted. Such action
Corporation. requires -only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
Pursuant to a negotiated sale that it entered into require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
with Madrigual Wan Hai, the latter purchased damages in case the complaint should be found
National Shipping Corporation – of course, it to be malicious.
involves vessels. i
Dean: Correlate this provision with the provision
Unknown to the buyer Madrigal Wan Hai, National of prosecution of offenses under the Rules of
Shipping Corporation has outstanding tax Court (Criminal Procedure) and Article 100 of the
liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service of the Revised Penal Code – every person criminally
US (US IRS) – more than US$ 600,000.00. These liable shall also be civilly liable. ① STATE
tax liabilities were incurred by National Shipping ② OFFeNDeD
Corporation prior to the sale. Whenever a person commits a crime, it is party
presumed that he offends two (2) entities: 1) is
To note, there was threat of seizure of the the State; and 2) the private offended party.
vessels. To prevent this, Madrigal Wan Hai paid
the tax liabilities to the US IRS under protest. General Rule: When-- one institutes a criminal
case
-
against the accused, -the civil action =arising
After payment, they demanded reimbursement
from National Development Company. NDC
---
from
-
the crime is implied instituted as well.
CHEAD
* FILED
#N
refused to pay, and the case went to court. -
EXPRESS ReseRVARON
XPN: *
NDC: claimed they should not be held liable to 1. When the civil action is -
filed ahead of the -
pay the outstanding tax liabilities of the NSC criminal action; or

because the negotiated sale between NDC and
-
Madrigal was on an - “as is, where is” basis. You

- - 2. When the offended party made an e express
take it as you find it. * UNJUSTENRICHMENT- --
reservation to file a separate civil action
-
-
-
- >
for the same act or omission of the

-
RULING: The Supreme Court, however, said that accused.

-
the “as is” condition only refers to the physical

condition of the property, and not to the Under the Rules of Court, extinction of the penal
legal liabilities. So, the unpaid tax liability action does not carry with it the extinction of the
which would put the vessels under the threat of civil action; unless, the extinction proceeds from
-
pronouncement
Be
* THERE MUST
a
)
21
a declaration in the final judgment of the criminal

e
value of the destroyed stall and the goods taken
case that the fact from which the civil liability in the amount of P9,600.
might arise does not exist.
But the mayor was saying that he has already
--
Generally speaking, acquittal in the criminal been acquitted and therefore he is not supposed
--
case does not mean that the accused is also
freed
- of civil liability. There must be a
to be civilly liable to the private respondents.
pronouncement in the criminal case that the fact ISSUE: Whether or not the mayor is correct that
from which the civil liability of the accused may his acquittal also extinguishes his civil liability.
arise does not exist. Meaning to say, walang
basis to hold the accused civilly liable. You will RULING: NO. - There is basis -to hold him civilly
find it in Rule 110. ⑳
liable because >
there is evidence to -
prove that
they were the ones who performed the acts
-
- -
Example: If Pedro was sued by Pablo for estafa complained of such as the destruction of the
-
because he issued a check in payment of a pre- stalls and the carting away of goods.
existing obligation. There was already a loan of -
Pedro to Pablo amounting to P100,000. There is no question that they were the ones
guilty of the acts complained of. It is only that
After several months, he was asked for payment the elements of grave coercion were not
and instead of paying cash, he issued a sufficiently proven that’s why they are acquitted
postdated check to Pablo, which when presented of the charge.
for payment was dishonored.
The extinction of the penal action -
* does not carry
Instead of suing for B.P. 22, Pablo decided to file with it the-
extinction of the civil action. *
--
a criminal case for estafa against Pedro.
-
Similarly, if it is proven that you are the one who

Pedro was acquitted of the criminal charge for performed the act complained of, only that the
estafa because the elements were not proved. crime does not constitute the crime of estafa;
you can still be held civilly liable.
Q: In that particular case, is there a basis to
hold Pedro civilly liable despite his acquittal But if there is a statement in the criminal case
based on the provision of the Rules of that the accused could not have committed the
Court? crime because he was outside of Philippine
jurisdiction at the very day and time that that
A: Yes. There was a pre-existing obligation. crime was committed, then certainly there can be
no basis to hold him civilly liable.
There was a contract of loan between the parties.
Even if he was acquitted of estafa charge does DALURAYA v. OLIVA
not mean that civil liability is extinguished.
FACTS: Marina Oliva was crossing along EDSA
PADILLA v. CA sometime in 2006. She was hit by Nissan Van
allegedly driven by Antonio Daluraya.
FACTS: Padilla is a mayor of a town and the
private respondents here were owners of stalls The heirs filed a criminal case against Daluraya.
which they were leasing from the local They rested their case but the MeTC acquitted
government. Allegedly, the stalls were nuisance. Daluraya of the crime of reckless imprudence
The mayor and his armed men destroyed the because there was no evidence presented by
stalls of the private respondents and carted away prosecution that he was the one driving the van.
the goods. If the case is reckless imprudence, the first thing
to do is to identify the driver of the vehicle.
They filed a criminal case for grave coercion
against the mayor and his men. The mayor was On appeal, the RTC affirmed the acquittal. But,
acquitted including his men, but they were held the CA awarded damages to the heirs of the
civilly liable to pay the private respondents the victim.
22
ISSUE: Whether or not there was basis to hold FACTS: Donato was first married to Rosaltin. At
Daluraya civilly liable to the heirs. the time that the marriage was still subsisting,
Donato contracted a second marriage with Paz
RULING: NO. If the terms of the acquittal Abayan without seeking the dissolution of the
show that the accused was not the author of first marriage.
the crime, then there could be no basis to
hold him liable. The second marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license and in lieu of a marriage license,
In this case, Daluraya was -- not positively they executed an affidavit of cohabitation that
---
identified as the one driving the van that fatally they have been living as husband and wife for at
hit the victim. Hence, he cannot be held civilly
- least five (5) years.
liable.
This case prompted a bigamy case filed against
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION Donato.
CAMENDED)
# Art. 36. Prejudicial questions, which must Paz Abayan (2nd wife) later filed a petition for
be decided before any criminal prosecution declaration of nullity of marriage for being
may be instituted or may proceed. ** bigamous.
Atty. Cruz: The -

issues are -
the same -
or they are By way of defense in the Bigamy case, Donato
-
- -
intimately related to each other so much so that said that his consent to the 2 nd marriage was
E
the resolution of the Civil case will determine if
the criminal case will prosper or not. The
-
obtained by force.
resolution of the civil action will determine the He moved to suspend the criminal case because
-
innocence or guilt of the action; which is why we

-
in the meantime the second wife filed a case for
have to settle first the civil action before we annulment. It was also the 2nd wife who instituted
proceed to the criminal case. the bigamy case after discovering that he was
married to 1st wife.
Dean: It is a question which arises in a case, and
it is a logical antecedent to the issue involved ISSUE: Whether or not there is prejudicial
therein and the cognizance pertains to another question sufficient to suspend the criminal case
tribunal. of bigamy.
Under the ROC, to constitute a prejudicial RULING: NO. Remember that it was the second
question, the civil case which is considered wife who sued for bigamy and also sued for
prejudicial question, must have been filed nullity of the second marriage on the grounds of
ahead of the criminal case. it being bigamous.
Before, this is not required but the Court noticed The parties to the 2nd marriage were married
that, mostly in bigamy cases, when an accused is without a marriage license on the strength of the
sued for bigamy they will thereafter file petition affidavit of cohabitation.
for annulment of the first marriage and raise it as
a defense in the criminal case. The SC did not accept the defense of Donato that
his consent to the second marriage was obtained
It is like an afterthought to file petition for nullity by force. It noted that he executed an affidavit
to evade the criminal consequences of bigamy. cohabitation, which would imply that he was
When they revised the Rules of Court, particularly forced by Paz Abayan to live with her for five (5)
Criminal Procedure, they made it a requirement years. Clearly, that cannot be the case.
to be considered as prejudicial question, the civil
case must have been instituted ahead of the On the assumption that it was Donato who filed
criminal case. the case for annulment of the second marriage
on the ground of force and it was proven that he
DONATO v. LUNA (1988) was forced to marry the wife, then that would
have been a different story.
23
In the case of Donato, the second wife was the by the Land Tenure Administration to the private
one who instituted the criminal case and the case respondent.
to assail the validity of the second marriage. The
only defense of Donato is that he was forced by There was an agreement to sell executed by the
the second wife. The fact that he executed an LTA in favor of private respondent. But due to the
affidavit of cohabitation with his second wife, failure of the private respondent to comply with
debunks his theory of the case that he was forced the terms of the contract, the LTA cancelled the
to marry the second wife. So, there is no agreement to sell.
prejudicial question.
Subsequently, there was a case filed by the
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE respondent questioning the propriety of the
cancellation of the agreement to sell.
FACTS: Beltran was sued. So, he initiated a case
for a nullity of his marriage on the ground of After that, the lot which was previously awarded
psychological incapacity. was awarded to petitioner Quiambao. Quiambao,
then took possession of the land.
While the case was pending, Beltran cohabited
with a woman and the wife retaliated by filing a Private respondent now filed a case seeking to
criminal case for concubinage against him. eject Quiambao from the property. They were
claiming they had a better right.
His defense: The concubinage case must be
suspended because the civil case for the ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case
declaration of nullity of his marriage is a pending wherein the issue is the propriety of the
prejudicial question to his liability for cancellation of the agreement to sell constitutes a
concubinage. prejudicial question to the ejectment case.
Q: Did the Supreme Court sustain it? RULING: Technically speaking, there is no
prejudicial question, because the cases involved
RULING: NO, it is not a prejudicial question in this particular case are administrative cases
because the mere filing of the case for nullity of and civil cases.
marriage does not justify his cohabitation with
other woman not his wife during the pendency of But, given that the purpose of the prejudicial
the proceedings. The Supreme Court said that question principle is to avoid conflicting decisions,
there is no prejudicial question. there is a possibility that in the administrative
case, the LTA will uphold the cancellation.
Dean: Prejudicial question determines that the Therefore, if it is upheld, it means that the
issue in the civil case -is so intertwined with the
-
private respondents would have no right to
----
issue in the criminal case, in such a way that it possess the land, then it follows that they have
determines
-or - it will determine
- whether
- or not no right to eject Quiambao.
the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
-
The Supreme Court said that >

prejudicial question
&
-
In this case of Beltran, the Supreme Court said strictly applies to criminal and civil cases. But in
0 = = =
no because until the marriage is set aside, only this case, it applied by analogy the prejudicial
the Court can say that it is void. question principle to avoid conflicting decisions.
The presumption is that the marriage is valid and The propriety of the cancellation of the
therefore, you cannot still cohabit with another agreement to sell which is the pending
woman not your wife during the pendency of the administrative case is a prejudicial question to
proceedings. the civil case of ejectment filed against
Quiambao.
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
APA v. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: The petitioner Quiambao was the 2nd
awardee of the lot which was previously awarded FACTS: The petitioner filed a civil case for
annulment of title of the private respondent
24
Rosita Tigol on the ground that the property therefore, it foreclosed the property when they
which they are occupying was co-owned should not have foreclosed it.
property, which they inherited from their
predecessors. ISSUE: Whether or not the pending case for
annulment of foreclosure may constitute a
The annulment of the TCT was based on the prejudicial question to the civil case for issuance
alleged fraud committed by Rosita Tigol in of a writ of possession.
securing title in her name alone without including
her co-owners and co-heirs in the Title. RULING: NO. In the first place, the first element
of prejudicial question is not present because the
That civil case was already pending when Rosita cases involved here are both civil cases.
Tigol filed a criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law against the petitioners. Remember, they applied prejudicial question
even if a case is administrative and civil provided
The petitioners in the criminal case moved to that the issues are intertwined.
suspend the proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question – which is the pending civil In this case, however, the only issue in the
case for annulment of title wherein the very issue petition for the issuance of writ of possession is
is the ownership of the land which they are whether the one (1) year period to redeem the
occupying. foreclosed property has expired. In fact, the
issuance of the writ of possession to the
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial purchaser at the foreclosure sale is a ministerial
question. function on the part of the court. Walang
discretion ang court diyan. The only thing that
RULING: YES because if in the annulment case, the petitioner should prove is the lapse of period
the court declares that the petitioner is a co- of redemption.
owner of the private respondent, then the
petitioner would have equal right to possess the After the period has lapsed, it is a ministerial
land together with Rosita Tigol. And therefore, as function on the part of the court to issue the writ
co-owner, he cannot be held guilty of squatting of possession.
on his own property.
In the civil case, the issue is whether or not the
SPS. PAHANG vs. METROBANK statutory requirements for foreclosure of
mortgage have been complied with. Thus, they
FACTS: The Spouses Pahang borrowed money are not intertwined. In fact, the first element is
from Metrobank and as a security to the absent.
obligation, they mortgaged a parcel of land in
their names. The Court then ruled that the pending case for
annulment of foreclosure is not a prejudicial
Due to their failure to pay the obligation, question to the petition for issuance of a writ of
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage on the possession.
property and ended up as the highest bidder.
Kung gusto nila later on ma-recover pag napa-
After the period of redemption has expired, the annul na nila, they file a case for recovery of
bank now filed a petition in court for the issuance possession.
of a Writ of Possession.
But as far as the court is concerned, it cannot
It was at this time that the Spouses Pahang filed suspend the petitioner for the issuance ng writ of
a civil case for the annulment of the foreclosure possession just because there is a pending
proceedings on the ground hat Metrobank bloated petition for the annulment of foreclosure.
their account. The allegations was that their
account was not really that big and due to the CIVIL PERSONALITY
unconscionable interest imposed by the bank, it
bloated the account of the Spouses Pahang and ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but
25
(aRT 725) CART 1025)
PRISUmpTVE personality
.
.
NBA Be ↳
caN
& Still IN ME woms -
- - CIVIL LAW REVIEW – JEDI NOTES
By Legal Representatives
OF THE CHILD
the conceived child shall be considered born for In short: If a fetus is prematurely born [less
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it than seven (7) months], the law requires that the
be born later with the conditions specified in fetus survives for the -full 24 hours from the
the following article. cutting of the umbilical cord for it to be
----
considered born and possessed of Civil
There is a presumptive personality of an unborn Personality.
fetus even if it is en ventre de sa mere (still in
the womb). Q: If the fetus was born seven (7) months
and above; provided, it was born alive
Even if the fetus yet unborn, the law accords the (narinig mong umiyak), but died after one
fetus the presumptive personality; but this is (1) minute. Did it acquire civil personality?
limited for purposes favorable to the child.
A: YES.
The child, who is unborn, can be a donee; and
under Article 725, the donation may be accepted Q: Why is that relevant?
by persons who would legally represent the child
if they were already born. A: Because of Article 1025 or Article 725. The
fetus may be instituted as an heir.
They may also be instituted as an heir in
accordance with Article 1025 in relation to Article ARTICLE 1025. x x x - SION
40 and 41; provided, that they are born under

the conditions specified by the Article. A child already conceived at the time of the
death of the decedent is capable of succeeding
Juridical Capacity from Capacity to Act provided it be born later under the conditions
prescribed in article 41.
Juridical Capacity – fitness to be the subject of
legal relations. It is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death.
xxx ⑰ -
ARTICLE 725. Donation is an act of liberality

Atty. Cruz: Even a conceived child or a fetus can whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a
already be a donee or heir provided it would be thing or right in favor of another, who accepts
born according to provisions of Art. 41. it.
Presumptive Personality - for conceived child or GELUZ v. CA

fetus
FACTS: This involves a case for damages filed by
Atty. Cruz: For all intents and purposes favorable Oscar Lazo, the husband of Mita Villanueva, who
to the unborn child, he will be considered born in sued Dr. Geluz for aborting their third child. He
accordance with Art. 41. was then running for public office at the time he
filed the case for damages.
ARTICLE 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is
considered born if it is alive at the time it is However, Lazo was also aware of the first two (2)
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. abortions performed by the same doctor on his
However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life wife, and yet he did nothing.
of less than seven months, it is not deemed
born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its The CA awarded damages to the husband in the
complete delivery from the maternal womb. form of death indemnity under Art. 2206 – death
indemnity awarded for the death of the person.
If the fetus had an intrauterine life of less than Whenever a person dies and you are the cause of
seven (7) months, it is not deemed born; unless his death, you are automatically liable for the
it survives for the full 24 hours from complete death indemnity mentioned in the said article.
separation from the mother’s womb or the This is part of-
Actual Damages.
&
cutting of
- the umbilical cord.
26
But, by jurisprudence, that has been raised from  Minors cannot enter contract of marriage
Php 3,000.00 to Php 50,000.00.  Blind, deaf, dumb cannot witness to a will
 Husband or Wife cannot donate to each
ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the CA awarding other except moderate gifts in time of
damages to the husband was proper. family rejoicing
 Insolvency, civil interdiction, prodigality
RULING: No, the ruling was not proper. -
The cannot manage property, not allowed to
0
fetus never acquired personality. have parental authority
-
There is no question that the fetus was dead at Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by
the time it was aborted. It was only 2 months old death.
when Geluz performed the abortion.
The effect of death upon the rights and
Since damages on account of injury is personal to obligations of the deceased is determined by
the person injured, it is easy to see that if no law, by contract and by will.
such action accrues in favor of the child, precisely
because he did not acquire personality, no CITIZENSHIP
derivative action could also accrue to its parents.
Q: Who are citizens of the Philippines?
Supreme Court ruled that the CA committed an
error in awarding damages to the husband for A: Under the 1987 Constitution:
the death of the fetus because the fetus never
acquired personality since it was dead at the time ● Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
it was expelled from the mother's womb. the time of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution;
Capacity to Act – Power to do acts with legal ● Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
effects. It may be acquired and may be lost. of the Philippines;
-
● Those born before January 17, 1973 of
mothers -
-
Requirements:
C
-
Filipino who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
1. Sound Mind
=
and
2. Legal Age (18 yrs. Old and above) ● Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the
state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil NOTE: Under the 1987 constitution, it included
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to those who were born prior to January 17, 1973
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
person from certain obligations, as when the citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
latter arise from his acts or from property now that was carried over to the 1987
relations, such as easements. constitution,- because if you were born prior to
January 1973 January 17 of a Filipino mother
Article 39. The following circumstances, -
and a foreigner father, you are covered by the
among others, modify or limit capacity to act: -
1935 constitution and under the 1935
-
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a constitution, if your mother is a Filipina your
father is a foreigner you have to ⑳
- -
deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family elect
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
-
trusteeship. The consequences of these majority.
circumstances are governed in this Code, other
-
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. At the time the 1987 Constitution was adopted
Capacity to act is - not limited on -- account of (February 1987), there may still be children born
religious belief or political opinion.
--
to a Filipino Mother and a Foreigner Father who
are minors (14 yrs. old = 1987 – 1973), and they
-
Examples: have not yet elected Philippine Citizenship at the

time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
27
So to give them a chance to elect Philippine By using his American passport, that indicates
Citizenship by the time they reach the age of 21, that he still identifies himself as a citizen of the
that was carried over to the 1987 Constitution. United States, and the United States, on the
other hand, still recognizes him as one of its
The election of Philippine citizenship, as ruled in citizens.
the case of Republic v. Chule Lim,- applies only to
>
a legitimate child. Therefore, the SC said he's not qualified to run as
Mayor of Kauswagan.
REPUBLIC v. CHULE LIM
ELeCTON only applies
children
lequmate
FAMILY CODE
to
*
FACTS: Chile Lim was an illegitimate child of a

Filipino mother and a Chinese father. So she filed
TITLE I. MARRIAGE
a petition to correct the entries in her birth
certificate, particularly her misspelled surname
Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage
from “Yo” to “Yu” and her citizenship from
Chinese to Filipino.
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of
But the Republic was saying you're not entitled to permanent union between a man and a woman
change your citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, entered into in accordance with law for the
because you are already of age at the time that establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
you filed the petition and you failed to elect the foundation of the family and an inviolable
Philippine citizenship when you reached the age social institution whose nature, consequences,
of 21. and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage
RULING: The requirement of election of settlements may fix the property relations
Philippine citizenship of children born to Filipino during the marriage within the limits provided
mothers and foreigner fathers - will not apply to by this Code.
Chule Lim because her parents - were never
MARRIAGE AS A CONTRACT
-
-
-
married, and therefore, being an illegitimate

-
child, she follows the citizenship of her mother.

Marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary
MAQUILING v. COMELEC contract. But it is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
FACTS: Arnado ran for mayor of Kauswagan, and and obligations of which rest not upon the
he was naturalized as an American citizen and agreement of the parties but upon general law
when he planned to run for Mayor of Kauswagan, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties
he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the
the Philippines under the provisions of R.A. 9225. maintenance of which in its purity the public
policy is deeply interested. (Goitia v. Campos
After that, he filed the certificate of candidacy Rueda)
and Linog C. Balua, another candidate, was
assailing his candidacy on the ground that he still Well-entrenched is the rule that a husband is not
continues to use his American passport in merely a man who has contracted marriage – he
entering the US and exiting the US. is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and
respect his wife and remain faithful to her until
ISSUE: Whether or not his renunciation of death. (Narag v. Narag)
American citizenship was effective.
If there is one aspect of marriage that the parties
RULING: The local government code here can stipulate on, it is with respect to their
applies not any other American law. property relations, not with respect to any other.
Under the local government code, to run for For example [not subject to stipulation between
public office, you must be solely a Filipino. =
You the parties]:
must not be possessed of dual citizenship.
=>
28
1. Term of the marriage Q: Why is it that they were not able to

2. Ground for dissolution for marriage present the marriage contract? What they
presented was the canonical marriage
It is also considered under the Constitution as a certificate, but it was not considered as a
basic unit of society. It is, in fact, a social public document.
institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. R: They presented the marriage contract, but it
was a photocopy.
Given that the Constitution itself considers
marriage as inviolable social institution, all Dean: Here we have a photocopy of the marriage
doubts should be resolved in favor of its validity certificate which cannot be presented as a
or existence. general rule based on the Rules on Evidence.
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
Q: When will the parties to the marriage be
The laws presume that a man and a woman, permitted to present secondary evidence of
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have the existence of the marriage? What does
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a the party need to prove before they be
child born in lawful wedlock, there being no allowed to prove secondary evidence?
divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
legitimate; and that things have happened Dean: They need to- prove why the primary
according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life. -=
evidence is not available either by lost or
destruction such that it can no longer be
recovered. In those instances, the court may
-
So much so that once a man and a woman have allow the parties to present other evidence to
lived as a husband and wife and such relationship prove the existence of marriage.
is not denied or contradicted, the presumption of
their being married must be admitted as a fact. Secondary evidence does not mean that you
(Alavado v. City Gov’t of Tacloban) need to present another document, but it can be
testimonial evidence because that is also be
EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE secondary evidence.
Best Evidence of Marriage – Marriage Certificate

-
The primary evidence is the marriage contract
but the parties, in some instances, may be
-
Other evidences: allowed to present secondary evidence like

testimonial evidence of the solemnizing officer or
 Testimony by one of the parties to the
- -
parties who attended the ceremony.
marriage
-
 Testimony by witnesses to the marriage

-
BALOGBOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
 Testimony by the solemnizing officer
-
Here, private respondents proved, through

Note: Failure to present a marriage contract or
- testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina
marriage certificate --
- is NOT proof that no were married in 1929; that they had three
marriage took place. children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
-
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died;

-
CALIMAG v. MACAPAZ and that their children, private respondents

herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and
It is well settled that other proofs can be offered by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the fact of The Court upheld the marriage even in the
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence absence of marriage certificate. Although a
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even marriage contract is considered primary evidence
①
a - person's birth certificate, being a public of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof
document, may be recognized as competent
-
that no marriage took place—other evidence may
- -
evidence of the marriage between his parents. be presented to prove marriage.
-
29
An ---
exchange of vows can be presumed to have bigamous? Can this presumption also
been
- made from
- the testimonies
- of the
- witnesses establish the nullity of a second marriage
who state that a wedding took place, since the
- - -
contracted by the husband?
very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange
vows of marital commitment—it would indeed be AVENIDO v. AVENIDO
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange
of vows and quite unnatural for people not to A: YES. A marriage certificate is the primary
notice its absence. evidence of marriage, but not the only one.
Jurisprudence teaches us that marriage can be
The law favors the validity of marriage, because proven by other evidence aside from a marriage
the State is interested >
- in the preservation of the
-
certificate. Even a birth certificate can be used to
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter
- -
prove a couple's marriage.
of constitutional concern.
-
-
-
Dean: Even without the original marriage

Q: Are you saying that even without a certificate, the Court declared the subsequent
marriage contract, if the parties are marriage of Eustaquio as void for being
reporting themselves as husband and wife, bigamous.
there is a presumption that they are In this case, there was secondary evidence
married, right? presented in the form of a certification by the
official custodian of the documents that the
R: (Answer of Reciter) Yes, according to the law, original marriage certificate can no longer be
marriage contract is not only the conclusive proof presented as it was lost because of the war.
that there was indeed a marriage between the
parties since it is not an essential element of a ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
valid marriage.
Article 2. Essential requisites are present:
Q: If the parties even without a marriage
contract can be presumed married, can you 1. -
Legal capacity of the contracting parties
tell us the reason or the wisdom behind the who must be a male and a female; and
presumption that parties reporting 2.⑳Consent freely given in the presence of
themselves as husband and wife are the solemnizing officer
presumed to be in fact married? Why does Essential Requisites :
*
① Legal Capacity -
the law presume that and not the other way LEGAL CAPACITY ② CONSENT V
around?  parties must have attained the age
requirement;
Dean: If we presume the contrary, we are  that there should be no legal impediment to
presuming that parties living together are living marry each other; and
in a state of sin and immorality. Even in other  contracting parties must be ORIGINALLY male
laws or in civil law, you always presume good and FEMALE.
faith.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
So similarly, in the case of marriage, the
presumption is that, when a man and a woman FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Silverio had a sex
are conducting or deporting themselves as reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. Now
husband and wife, they are presumed to be engaged with his American fiancé, he filed a
married. That is the presumption established by petition for the change of his first name and sex
law. in his birth certificate.
Even without a marriage contract, the existence ISSUE: Whether or not a person’s first name and
of marriage can be proved by other evidence. sex in the birth certificate can be changed on the
ground of sex reassignment.
Q: On the strength of this presumption of
marriage, can the court declare a RULING: NO. A person’s sex is an essential
subsequent marriage contracted by the factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
husband void on the ground of being
30
part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. take its natural course. The Court said that the
Furthermore, the changes sought by petitioner changes prayed for only coincides with her
will have serious and wide-ranging legal and preferred gender classification, which was male.
public policy consequences.
Dean: But there is a new subject now under the
Dean: One of the wide-ranging legal new curriculum, Gender Sensitivity, because it is
consequences is that to grant the petition will the reality, you know? As future lawyers, we
essentially allow the marriage of a man and a have to be exposed to the different classifications
man, on the ground of sex reassignment. That of gender, because there must no longer be
could not have been the intent of the law when it discrimination.
allowed the change of name.
* SILVERIO CASE CONSENT
The change of name does not carry with it the - must be IFS
change of sex that will allow a man to marry
another man or a woman to marry another  Intelligent
woman.  Free
 Spontaneous
REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
Given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for
correction of entries in the birth certificate in Voidable Marriages
RTC, alleging that she was registered female at
birth but while growing up, she developed If consent is vitiated by:
secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal  Fraud
-
Hyperplasia (CAH). Thus, she prayed that her  Intimidation

-
birth certificate be corrected so that her gender  Etc.

-
be changed from female to male and her first

name be changed from Jenifer to Jeff. NOTE: VALID until annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan may change REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS

her gender and first name.
Liberty Albios, a Filipina, got married with Daniel
RULING: YES. The Court held that where the Fringer, an American citizen, with the former
person is biologically or naturally intersex the paying the latter $2,000 for purposes of attaining
determining factor in his gender classification a green card, or for immigration purposes.
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
reason thinks of his/her sex. their marriage on the ground that they never
really lived as husband and wife and that their
Dean: Gender classification in naturally intersex marriage is a jest since it is only for convenience
individuals is inconclusive at birth. It is what the in order for her to acquire American citizenship,
individual who has reached the age of majority therefore, null and void ab initio. On the other
thinks of himself or herself as his/her preferred hand, Republic argues that consent is different
gender which is controlling. from motive and that motive is inconsequential to
the marriage.
In this case, Jennifer is born and baptized female,
but she developed more of the features of the Ruling: Their marriage is VALID because there
man. was a valid consent.
Q: What differentiates Cagandahan case Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to
with that of Silverio? be valid, it must be freely given and made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer.
-
A: Cagandahan did not use medical science to
change what nature gave her. She just let nature
31
A "freely given" consent requires that the  Authority

contracting parties willingly and deliberately  License
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in  Ceremony
the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under I. AUTHORITY (ARTICLE 7)
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of 1. Any incumbent member of the
intelligently understanding the nature of, and Judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act. Their understanding should not be 2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or church or religious sect duly
hypnotism.
In this case, the Court said that consent was not

0-
* Civil
Registra
general
-
authorized by
religious sect and --
his church or his
registered with the
civil registrar general, acting within the
lacking in the said marriage, because the consent limits of the written authority granted him
was freely given, best evidenced by the purpose by his church or religious sect and
of the marriage, which was to acquire an provided that > at least one of the
American citizenship. There was a clear intention -
contracting parties - belongs = to the
into entering a real and valid marriage, so that -solemnizing officer’s
- -
church or
they could fully comply with the requisites of - religious sect;
having an American citizenship.
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only
Dean: The Supreme Court also mentioned that in cases mentioned in Art. 31;
only a genuine marriage to be bound by the
bonds of marriage can support a petition for
foreign citizenship. They are aware and have Article 31. Marriage in articulo mortis between
both freely given their consent. They know both passengers or crew members may also be
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane
entering into a marriage. pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at
Thus, the Court ruled that there was a valid ports of call.
consent. It was not also considered as a marriage
in a jest. 4. Any military commander of a unit to which
a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of
FORMAL REQUISITES the latter, during the military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in
Article 3. The formal requisites of marriage Art. 32
are:
Article 32. A military commander of a unit,
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer who is a commissioned officer, may solemnize
(S.O.) marriages between persons in articulo mortis
2. A valid marriage license (M.L.) -
within the zone of military operation, whether
3. A marriage ceremony which takes place members of the armed forces or civilians.
with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer Commissioned Officer = rank of 2nd Lieutenant
and their personal declaration that they
take each other as husband and wife in Even the one in articulo mortis survives,
the presence of not less than two marriage is valid. -
Reckoning point is that, during
witnesses of legal age. -
the marriage, the person is at the point of death.
(Art. 27) -
Formal Requisites - ALC

↳ *
*
avionty
LICENSE
* CERMONY
32
* MUNICIPC CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT

5. Any consul-general, consul or vice consul Article 33. Marriages among Muslims or
in the case provided in Art. 10; among members of the ethnic cultural
communities may be performed validly without
Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens the necessity of marriage license, provided
abroad may be solemnized by a consul- they are solemnized in accordance with their
general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic customs, rites or practices.
of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage
license and the duties of the local civil registrar 8. Article 7 of FC in relation to Section 444 of
and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the LGC
the celebration of marriage shall be performed
by said consular official. 9. Lex Loci Celebrationis: If the marriage
--
-
was solemnized in a place where there is

The authority of consul-general, consuls or vice- =no need for a ceremony, - it will also be
consuls ---
are limited only to the country where considered a Cvalid marriage.
they
- are assigned.
-
NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY
So, if one of them is temporarily in a - vacation in
the Philippines, he-- or she has no authority to Respondent Judge Domagtoy solemnized the
solemnize
- Filipino citizens in the Philippines. wedding between Tagadan and Borga, despite
-
knowledge that the groom is merely separated
NOTE: Following the cases on solemnizing from his first wife. Second, respondent judge
officers who are members of the judiciary, who performed a marriage ceremony between
solemnizes a marriage outside of their territorial Sumaylo and del Rosario in outside his court’s
jurisdiction, it may also be, by parity of jurisdiction.
reasoning, considered a valid marriage if the
marriage is solemnized by a consul not while he On the first issue, the Court said that even if the
was on his station but while he was in the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
Philippines. *IRReqUlaRIT
-
absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
-
Consequence: It will then be an -- irregularity in death is necessary in order to contract a

-
-
the formal requisite which will not affect the subsequent marriage. In the case, Tagadan did
validity of the marriage. --Rather, it will subject the not institute a summary proceeding for the
>-
solemnizing officer or the person responsible for declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death.
-
the irregularity to civil, criminal, or administrative Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
-
->
sanctions. married to his first wife. Thus, the second
marriage contracted by Tagadan is bigamous and
6. Mayor void.
Municipal Mayors – Sec. 444 On the second issue, the Court ruled that under
City Mayors – Sec. 445 Article 8 of the Family Code, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge’s chambers or
Family Code effectivity: August 3, 1988 courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
- It removed the authority of the Mayors to the point
-
of death; (2) in remote places in
-
solemnize marriages accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon request

- -
of both parties in a sworn statement to this

Restored only when the Local Government Code effect.
was promulgated on January 1, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Domagtoy showed
7. Marriages among Muslims or among gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
members of the ethnic cultural and ignorance of the law in solemnizing two
communities provided they are marriages.
solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. (Art. 33) RULING: Yes. Based on the Family Code, before
solemnizing a subsequent marriage, there should
33
first be a judicial declaration of nullity of the first

marriage. Therefore, he already committed a s xxx
misconduct in this case.
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
A judge has limitation wherein he can only authorized to perform marriages unless such
solemnize a marriage within his jurisdiction. marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the
Q: What is the jurisdiction of Judge solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
Domagtoy? Al Circuit TRIA COURT
do so;
*
A: MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao Del xxx

Norte.
SAMPLE PROBLEM: Parties A and B went to the
He solemnized the marriage in his House located City Hall of Manila, at around 4 o’clock in the
in Dapa, which does not fall within his afternoon. They were in a hurry to get married,
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. right after getting their marriage license, they
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 went to the sala and wait for the judge, whoever
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, is available. Example, in Branch 27 of RTC
Surigao del Norte. Manila, not knowing that Judge X just left his
courtroom. After Judge X left the court, the
Q: What did the SC say on the effect of the cleaner who is a law student wore the robe of the
solemnization of the marriage by a judge judge and sat on his bench.
outside his territorial jurisdiction?
Q: On the assumption that the cleaner did
A: It is still valid because it is >
-
only an irregularity. not disclose his true identity to parties A
The judge was only administratively liable, but and B and thereafter solemnized the
the marriage is still valid. message, what is the status of the
marriage?
Similar issue to the Case of Beso v. Daguman,
where the judge also solemnized a marriage A: It is valid. [Art. 35(2), Family Code] It is a
outside of his territorial jurisdiction. mistake of fact. The parties are mistaken as to
the facts, thinking that the cleaner was actually
BESO v. DAGUMAN an RTC judge.
NOTE: THIS IS A MISTAKE OF FACT. There was a

The penalty varies depending on whose the mistake in the identity of the judge.
deciding magistrate.
Q: Suppose A and B went to the Office of the
In Domagtoy, he was fined 20,000. In Beso, he Mayor to request the mayor to solemnize
was fined 5,000 only. their marriage. Instead, they found one of
the councilors and asked him to solemnize
SUMMARY their marriage. B said he honestly believed a
THE PARTIES
councilor has authority to solemnize a
OF
XPN GOOD FAIH
:
GR: If the solemnizing officer had no authority, marriage. What is the status of the
marriage is VOID for lack of formal requisite. marriage? * VOID NOT MISTAKen to TE
-
FACTS
XPN: Art. 35 (2) says that even if the A: It is void. You cannot make mistake of law as
solemnizing officer has no authority,* if one or a basis of good faith since everyone is presumed
--
both parties believed in
- good faith that the to know the law. (Art. 3, NCC)
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
-
so, then the marriage is-

VALID. NOTE: THIS IS A MISTAKE OF LAW. The parties
were not mistaken as to the facts, rather they
Article 35. The following marriages shall be were mistaken as to the authority of the councilor
void from the beginning:
34
to solemnize a marriage, which is a matter of A: The marriage is void since the marriage
law. license is a spurious license.
II. LICENSE (ARTICLE 7) Spurious

- not being what it purports to be; false or
The law is stricter when it comes to the formal fake; illegitimate.
requisite of a license. While in authority, there is
room for the application of good faith, in the Q: What is your standard that it is a spurious
marriage license, there is no room for the one, instead of an irregularly issued license?
application of good faith. The fact that the parties
thought that the license was valid is not a basis A: If the license is procured from an officer or
of good faith. officer who is --
not vested an authority to issue it,
then that would be a spurious license. Therefore,
Validity of Marriage License = 120 days from the any marriage celebrated using that spurious
issue date. The expiry date shall be stamped in license would also be void.
bold characters on the face of every license
issued. (Art. 20) Unlike if you go to Civil Registrar, apply for a
license, give him a bribe of 5K, to issue a license
Article 20. The license shall be valid in any on the same day you applied, he complied,
part of the Philippines for a period of one without requiring you to comply with the
hundred twenty days o
-
from the date of issue, documents necessary, and you got married using
and shall be deemed automatically cancelled at that license, what is the status of the marriage?
the expiration of the said period if the
contracting parties have not made use of it. A: The marriage is still valid since there is still a
The expiry date shall be stamped in bold license, although it was irregularly issued.
characters on the face of every license issued.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Q: If the parties made use of the license
after that period, what is the status of the FACTS: Angelina Castro sought the judicial
marriage? VOID ABSENCE OF A LICENSE
* :
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.

Cardenas on the ground that no marriage license
A: Void, on the grounds that there is an absence was ever issued to them prior to the
of the license, which is one of the formal solemnization of their marriage.
requisites. (Art. 4)
It was Cardenas who personally attended to the
Article 4. The absence of any of the essential
-
processing of the documents required for the
or formal requisites shall render the marriage celebration of the marriage, including the
void ab initio, except as stated in Art. 35 (2). procurement of the marriage license. Since their
marriage was not known to Castro’s parents, the
-
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall couple did not live together after their marriage
and it was only when Castro got pregnant that
-
render the marriage voidable as provided in

the couple decided to live together. However,
-
Art. 45.
such cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
- -
affect the validity of the marriage but the party In filing for the annulment of her marriage, her
lawyer found that there was no marriage license
-
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall

be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of
their marriage, as evidenced by a certification
Q: On the assumption that the parties from the Civil Register of Pasig that the license
secured or procured a marriage license cannot be located and does not appear from their
from one of the forgers in Quiapo Ilalim, and records.
they got married using that marriage
license, is the marriage valid? DOCTRINE: The law provides that - no marriage
shall be - solemnized -without a >- marriage license
first issued by a >-
-
- local civil registrar. Being one of
35
the essential requisites of a valid marriage,

absence of a license would render the marriage A: 25 years.
void ab initio.
Dean: They are 25 years married in this case, as
Dean: The certification coming from the local compared to the case of Angelina and Edwin,
civil register in this case categorically stated that which their marriage only lasted for 4 months.
despite diligent search, the license purportedly
issued to Angelina and Edwin could not be found But in the case of Sevilla vs. Cardenas, the
in their records. husband woke up after 25 years and realized that
he has no marriage license.
SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS
So, he filed to declare his marriage void.
Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Carmelita on the grounds that Q: What did he present?
it was procured through machination, duress, and
intimidation. Furthermore, it invoked the lack of R: He presented three (3) certifications from the
marriage license of their marriage based on the 3 local civil registrar basically saying that the civil
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registry. registrar failed to locate the book where the
The Supreme Court uphold the marriage of Jaime marriage license was entered.
and Carmelita, and ruled that the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registry do not Q: On what ground they failed to locate it?
categorically declare that their marriage lacks a
marriage license. Absence of diligent efforts to R: The employee was already retired, and they
look for the marriage license does not mean that do not have the time to give their full effort in
it is not present. The Court upheld their marriage finding the book.
because marriage is a social institution, not just a
mere ordinary contract, that the State is So, the Supreme Court said the marriage was
interested to protect. valid because in order for the certification to be a
proof of lack of marriage license, there must be a
-
DOCTRINE: The & -

absence of the logbook is not due diligence in -
- searching for the - book, which in
⑳
conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage this case, the certification only provides that they
License No. 2770792. - -
It can also mean, as we -
failed to give their> full 0
effort or put time to locate
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook the marriage license or book where the records of
-
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing marriage license is contained.

of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same Dean: In other words, the certification did not
also means non-existence or falsity of entries state that the license number did not appear in
therein. their records, but they were just too busy to
locate it.
The rule is settled that every intendment of the
law or fact leans toward the validity of the Q: Was that sufficient to prove that the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage Marriage License does not exist?
bonds. The courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; A: NO. The Court said that it does not mean that
on the contrary, the presumption is of great there was really non-issuance of the marriage
weight. Our Constitution is committed to the license, rather, it just cannot be found.
policy of strengthening the family as a basic ABBAS V. ABBAS
social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a Dean: It’s also about the existence of the
social institution in which the State is vitally marriage license between the parties – Gloria
interested. Abbas and Syed Abbas.
Q: How many years they were married FACTS: Petitioner Syed, a Pakistani citizen, was
before the husband filed a petition to initially married to respondent Gloria, a Filipino
declare his marriage void? citizen, in Taiwan.
36
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was

During his stay in Manila in the house of Gloria’s valid, and that the required marriage license had
mother, the latter went home with two (2) men. been secured.
Therein they had a ceremony, which turned out
to be one of marriage. In the absence of any other proof that the
marriage license was issued (in fact, they were
However, the marriage licensed used in the waiting for proof coming from Gloria that there
marriage contract turned out to be inexistent. was in fact an issuance of the marriage license).
Moreover, said license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a place where neither one of the parties Meanwhile, Syed was able to prove that there
resided, nor applied for a marriage license. was no marriage license issued when they got
married. Total absence of a formal requisites will
Q: It was the husband who filed the petition render the marriage void ab initio.
to declare his marriage void on the ground .
of marriage license. What did he present to Q: What if the parties did not secure a
show that they had no marriage license? license but they just merely executed an
affidavit of cohabitation, which is false?
A: A certification issued by the Municipal Civil Would that be considered as an irregularity
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to the effect that or should the marriage be considered void?
the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract was the number of another
marriage license issued to a different couple.
-=
A: False affidavit is tantamount to absence of
marriage license.
-
-
RTC: Ruled the marriage was void ab initio by REPUBLIC V. DAYOT

virtue of the absence of a valid marriage license.
It also took into account the fact that neither Jose and Felisa were married without a marriage
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the license. In lieu of the marriage license, they
place where Marriage License was issued, in executed a sworn affidavit of marital
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. cohabitation, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being
CA: held that the certification of the Municipal unmarried, they had lived together as husband
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a and wife for at least five (5) years.
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said Later on, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment
certification could not be accorded probative and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
value. contending that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham as he was asked to sign the affidavit
Q: Did the SC agree with the CA? without knowledge of its true contents.
RULING: NO. The SC held that the certification According to Jose, he came to live as a boarder in
of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no Felisa’s house. Some three weeks later, Felisa
record of a marriage license was adequate to requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
prove the non-issuance of said license. City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At
Diligent Search the Pasay City Hall, they were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package
The fact that the marriage license does not could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to
correspond to the names of Gloria and Syed do so. However, Felisa cajoled him. It was in
proves that in fact that there was diligent search. February 1987 when he discovered that he had
Otherwise, how are they able to find out that it contracted marriage with Felisa.
was issued to another couple?
Q: They were introduced to each other in
SC ruled that the presumed validity of the June 1986, right?
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and
that it became the burden of the party alleging a R: Yes.
37
But in the second case, if the affidavit of

Q: When did they get married? cohabitation is false and they are not really
exempt from the license requirement, they
R: November 1986. They were married for five should have secured one. In the absence of the
(5) months, not five (5) years. license, that would fall under total absence and
not irregularity.
The RTC ruled that the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid, which was The SC said there is no point of comparison
affirmed by the CA. because in the first case there was a license,
although irregularly issued and in the second
Jose filed Motion for Reconsideration on the case, there is no license at all. That will be total
grounds that the affidavit of marital cohabitation absence of a formal requisite which would render
executed by him and Felisa was false. The CA the marriage void ab initio.
reversed its decision. It relied on the
-
jurisprudence stating -
the importance of five (5) Question from a student: On the authority of
- -
years of continuous cohabitation as husband and the local civil registrar to issue a marriage
wife before such sworn affidavit be availed of as
-
license, what if the officer is a de facto officer
an exception to the requirement of marriage since we have learned that acts of a de facto
license. officer is valid but does that result in an
irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license?
ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of marital
cohabitation that was executed shall affect the Dean: No. His acts as a de facto officer should
validity of their marriage. not affect private interests like the contracting
parties to the marriage. The license should still
RULING: YES, because under Article 76, it is be considered valid.
necessary that the man and the woman have
attained the age of majority and lived in Student Q: Regarding the solemnizing
continuous cohabitation for at least five (5) officer especially on judicial officers: There
years. In contrast with the facts, their are authorities stating that the decision in
cohabitation was only for five (5) months before Navarro v. Domagtoy, the part where it says
the marriage was celebrated without the benefit that the marriage was valid, they are saying
of a marriage license. that it is a mere obiter dictum since it is an
administrative case and the main issue that
Q: There is a comparison between marriages should be addressed and should be used as
that is solemnized with an irregularly issued a doctrine is the one finding the judge
license and this case of Dayot with a false administratively liable. For purposes of
affidavit of cohabitation. What did the SC answering the bar, should we stick to what
say? Is there a point of comparison between the SC said that the marriage is valid or that
these two (2) cases where there is variance the comment/opinion by other civilist is
in the facts? faulty?
A: The Republic was saying that if an irregularly Dean: We should be careful in saying that one
issued license is not sufficient to set aside the opinion is faulty. Depending on how you argue
marriage, so does a false affidavit of your case, you will be judged according to the
cohabitation. merits of your arguments not necessarily the
correctness of your arguments.
Q: What is the fallacy of that argument?
The decision in Navarro v. Domagtoy, although
Dean: If there is an irregularly issued license, there other opinions, you can always use Article
there is a license although it was irregularly 35 (2) that if there is good faith on the part of
issued. Pursuant to the law itself, the law one, that would be enough to render the
considers the marriage valid without prejudice to marriage valid. It’s not only the Navarro case
the liability of the issuing officer. that you can use but also Art. 35 (2).
38
Q: Regarding the case of Abbas v Abbas: In Where: On a bulletin board outside the office of
the case, it stated that during trial it was the LCR located in a conspicuous place within the
proven that they were married in Taiwan at building and accessible to the general public.
a Taipei Mosque in 1992 prior to the The M.L shall be issued after the completion of
disputed marriage that happened in the the period of publication.
Philippines. Why is it not mentioned in the
decision that there was a prior marriage Art. 21. Foreigners’ requirement: Submit a
before the disputed one without license? certificate of legal capacity to contract a
marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or
Dean: There are things we cannot disclose, and consular officials.
this is particularly one of them.
Stateless persons or refugees to submit an
The second marriage should have been affidavit stating the circumstances showing
ceremonial, that’s my opinion. Ang validity of the capacity to contract marriage.
marriage should be judged based on the first.
III. MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Q: Building on Navarro v. Domagtoy,
previously the SC has ruled that notary The law does not require any particular form or
publics which notarize documents outside religious right for a marriage to be valid, all that
-
their jurisdiction are not notary publics --

it requires is that the parties -
must appear before
>
-
therein. Therefore, those documents don’t a

> solemnizing officer and
- personally
= declare that
have the same as notarized documents. they take each other as husband and wife.
. . - -
-
- -
Dean: Yes, the only effect of that would be to RONULO v. COURT OF APPEALS
render the document private, not public.
Dean: This has nothing to do with marriage but
Q: Could an analogy be made in the the court discussed the validity of the marriage.
authority of the notary public and the judge This is actually a criminal case against a priest.
concerning his jurisdiction and outside his
jurisdiction, which lead the SC to rule that FACTS: This case involves the marriage
he’s not a judge strictly speaking. solemnized by father Ronulo, who is an Aglipayan
Therefore, he had no authority to solemnize priest. The parties here are claire and joey. They
marriage outside of jurisdiction, rendering it were about to be wed in a catholic church, but
void? when the priest asked their marriage license,
they cannot present any. So, the catholic priest
Dean: The difference between a notary public refused to solemnize their marriage.
and a judge is that a notary public notarizing a
private contract, and we said that a marriage is Siyempre naka-gown at barong na, and all the
not an ordinary contract, so you cannot compare guests were there. They did not want to cancel
an ordinary contract with defective notarization everything, so what they did was to go to a
with a marriage. nearby Aglipayan church and found Father
Ronulo, who agreed to accommodate the parties.
TLC NOTES:
He knew that the parties -= were not armed with a
Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the -
marriage license. Yet, he solemnized the
local civil registrar of the city or municipality marriage. So after that, he was sued criminally
where either contracting party habitually resides. for-
illegal solemnization of marriage under the
RPC, particularly Article 352.
Art. 17. LCR shall prepare a notice which shall
-
contain the full names and residences of the One defense raised by father Ronulo was he did
applicants for M.L. and other data given in the not conduct a marriage ceremony. He did not
applications. marry the parties. What he did was merely to
bless the parties.
Publication: 10 consecutive days
39
RULING: The SC, using Article 6 of the Family contracting parties, not having been
Code, said that the law does not require any emancipated by a previous marriage, are
particular form or religious right for a marriage between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one,
ceremony to be valid. All that it requires is for they shall, in addition to the requirements of
the parties to appear before a solemnizing officer the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil
and personally declare that they take each other registrar, the consent to their marriage of their
as husband and wife. father, mother, surviving parent or guardian,
or persons having legal charge of them, in the
For giving an official church recognition to the order mentioned. Such consent shall be
cohabitation between Joey and Claire, Father manifested in writing by the interested party,
ronulo in fact conducted a marriage ceremony. who personally appears before the proper local
Therefore, he is liable for violating Article 352 of civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
the RPC.* Performance OF illegal mariage ceremony made in the presence of two witnesses and
attested before any official authorized by law to
Dean: Ordinarily, the judge should solemnize the administer oaths. The personal manifestation
marriage inside his chambers or in the court shall be recorded in both applications for
room. But the parties may request for the marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is
solemnization of the marriage outside under executed instead, shall be attached to said
Article 8. applications.
* BELOW 18-VOID
parental (VOIDABLe #FX)

Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized
consent
DEFECTS
* 18-21 -
21-25-PaRenial ADVice (suspensed

publicly in the chambers of the judge or in *
For go Days
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or Requisites for age: iF x)

in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, --
1.) Below 18 – void ab initio
except in cases of marriages contracted on the Minority means ABSENCE of consent, as
point of death or in remote places in minors are INCAPABLE of giving consent.
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or
-
2.) 18 to 21 – Parental Consent (Art. 14)
If not complied with, the marriage is voidable.
⑧
-
place designated by them in a sworn statement 3.) 21 to 25 – Parental Advice (Art. 15)
to that effect. If not complied with, LCR will suspend the
issuance of Marriage License for 90 days.
If there is a written request by the contracting
parties that the marriage may be solemnized Note: But after the --3-month period, the LCR
outside the courtroom or chambers of the judge. must issue the license -
- - -
-
with or without the
parental advice -
-
because suspension
- -
cannot take
However, Article 8 only modifies the -
venue and forever. LCR is only authorized to suspend for 3
-
- -
not the-
-
- -
jurisdiction of the judge.
-
months, not for more than 3 months.
- -
Example: In other words, if you are from Manila Q: If a party is exactly 21, does he need
and you want your marriage solemnized in QC, parental consent and parental advice?
you should get a judge in QC.
Dean: No, they only need parental advice and
Example: If you want your marriage to be not parental consent because if you are 21 and
solemnized in a hotel and you are from QC, you you secured the advice, it presupposes that if the
cannot choose a hotel located in Pasay and ask a advice is given, the consent is also given.
Judge of QC to solemnize your marriage in Pasay.
You have to correlate Article 14 with Article 45
Hence, you should & choose a venue which is
- -
paragraph 1. Under Article 14, ages between 18
0
within the
--- jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer. and 21 ang nakalagay so that might create a
confusion that if a party is 21, he would need
ARTICLE 14. In case either or both of the both parental consent and parental advice. But
40
under Article 45, the law mentions 18 but below purposes of family rights, duties, status,
21. condition, and legal capacity.
Therefore, if a party is exactly 21, only parental The 2nd one is bigamous marriages under Article
-
advice but not parental consent. 35(4). * Wherever celebrated,* it is void in the
Philippines.
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in Article 35 (5) where there is mistake in the
-
force in the country where they were identity of one of the contracting parties; and
-
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also

be valid in this country, except those prohibited Article 35 (6) those subsequent marriages that
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5), (6), 36, 37, and are void under Article 53.
38.
So even if it is validly celebrated, it is regarded
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen as void in the Philippines. comply
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a *
must
wit
**
/
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by Article 36 on psychological incapacity is included;
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to Article 37 on incestuous marriages; and Article
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity 38 on public policy marriages. All those
to remarry under the Philippine law. marriages,- even if validly celebrated, would be
=
considered void in the Philippines.
TLC NOTES:
Q: Ano yung hindi kasali?
Lex loci celebrationis
A: Lack of authority and lack of license. These
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
-
two (2) void marriages under Article 35, if the
--
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a -
divorce is marriage was celebrated between Filipinos
---
thereafter validly obtained abroad - by the alien abroad without a license, and the law of the
country where the marriage was solemnized does
=
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to not require one, the marriage is valid pursuant to
--
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by lex loci celebrationis rule.
-
E.O. 227)
-
Similarly, if a marriage was solemnized outside

Republic vs. Obrecido the Philippines by a person who is not authorized
to solemnized marriages here in the Philippines,
-
The burden of proof is on- the petitioner to prove if validly celebrated, it would be considered valid
-==
the divorce law granted to the defendant by the in the Philippines.
Courts abroad.
The 2nd paragraph is the one which has changed.
Dean: It is the lex loci celebrationis rule. It If a marriage is validly celebrated, and divorce is
considers valid a marriage celebrated abroad thereafter validly obtained by the alien spouse
except when the marriage falls under Articles 35 capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
(1) on lack of legal capacity. Wherever celebrated shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under
between Filipino citizens, if they are below the Philippine law.
marriageable age or they lack legal capacity, the
marriage is void under Philippine law. Article 26 was originally intended to apply to a
mixed marriage, Filipino and foreigner. But that
Kung 16 sila, they got married in Argentina and interpretation was changed in the case of
they are considered adults in Argentina, the -
Republic v. Orbecido, where the SC clarified that
marriage is void-
- because the legal-capacity would the reckoning point for determining whether
be dictated by the Philippine law under Article 15
- -
Article 26 applies or not is not the citizenship of
in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code. the parties at the time the marriage was
celebrated, but the citizenship of the parties at
-
Article 15 of the Civil Code is still relevant for

the time the divorce is obtained by the alien
spouse.
41
free to marry under the laws of his or her

If former Filipino citizen siya married to another countr. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
Filipino citizen, so they are both Filipino, and later foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
on one embraced foreign citizenship, in the decree dissolving the marriage bond and
Republic v. Orbecido, the SC said if the person capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
who obtained the divorce is no longer a Filipino at will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
the time he obtained the divorce, that divorce effectively be without a husband or wife. A
would be considered as valid. Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding
is in the same place and in like circumstances as
Therefore, the Filipino spouse should be a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both
However, the interpretation that it should only be instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
applied to mixed marriage is changed including the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree
as to the person who should secure a divorce. on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operations of their alien
REPUBLIC v. MANALO spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.
FACTS: Respondent Manalo was married to a
Japanese national. However, Manalo filed for Q: Based on the wording of Article 26, if you
divorce in Japan, and after due proceedings, a will just not read Manalo, who should obtain
divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese the divorce?
Court.
A: The foreign spouse.
Manalo went back to the Philippines and filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage. Q: How did the Court explain why it should
not be the foreigner who should obtain the
The trial court, however, denied the petition and divorce?
held that the Philippine law does not afford
Filipinos the right for a divorce. However, CA Dean: There was a pronouncement by the Chief
overturned the decision, and held that Article 26 Justice that the law does not require that it
is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for should be the alien spouse who should seek the
divorce against her Japanese husband. divorce. It was in the decision.
RULING: The SC said that based on a clear and Even assuming that the law requires that it
plain reading of Article 26, it only requires that should be the alien spouse who should obtain the
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. It divorce, the Court will not follow the letter of the
does not demand that the alien spouse should be law if it would result to absurd consequences. A
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the Filipina who is at the receiving end of alien
divorce decree was granted. divorce initiated proceeding and the one who
initiated the divorce against a foreign spouse is
Q: Who filed for divorce? on the same place.
R: Manalo. If the divorce is granted, they would remain

married without a husband and a wife. The intent
Q: How did the SC explain the different of Art. 26 (2) is to free the Filipino spouse from a
interpretation of Article 26? marital bond if the divorce has already been
obtained validly abroad.
A: The Court said that the purpose of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation The SC ruled that regardless of whether it is the
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the Filipino who obtained the divorce, that would call
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree for application of Art. 26 and would capacitate
that is effective in the country where it was the Filipino to remarry under Philippine law.
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is MORISONO v. MORISONO
42
FACTS: Luzviminda was married to Ryoji CA initially affirmed this ruling but in 2016, it
Morisono in Quezon City. While living in Japan, recalled and instead ruled that the second
Luzviminda and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by requisite under Art 26 was missing. This is
Agreement" before the City Hall of MizuhoKu, because the divorce herein was consensual in
Nagoya City, which was eventually approved on nature, obtained by agreement of the parties,
and duly recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku. and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a
Luzviminda filed a petition for recognition of the Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein,
foreign divorce decree before the RTC of Quezon said divorce cannot be recognized in the
City, so that she could cancel the surname of her Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that
former husband in her passport and for her to be petitioner's failure to present authenticated
able to marry again. copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her
cause.
The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held
that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien Issue: WON the Petition for Judicial Recognition
spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – of Foreign Judgment should be granted.
provided that such decree is valid according to
the national law of the alien – the same does not Ruling: No. While it is true that the issue has
find application when it was the Filipino spouse, already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
i.e., petitioner, who procured the same Republic v. Manalo whereby the Court ruled that
the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly denied proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien
Luzviminda’s petition for recognition of the spouse would depart from the true intent of the
foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji. legislature, the Court said that petitioner must
still comply with certain guidelines before the
Ruling: No. In the Orbecido case, it must be court may recognize the foreign divorce.
proven that there was a valid marriage
celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, Under Rule 132, what is required is proof, either
there was a valid decree obtained abroad. by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
Pursuant to Manalo case, the foreign divorce by the officer having legal custody of the
decree obtained to nullify marriages may be filed documents. If the copies of official records are
by either spouse. In this case, the Court not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
remanded the case back to the RTC to allow accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
Luzviminda to prove there was a divorce decree diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
obtained in Nagoya City. foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
Dean: It reiterated the ruling in Republic v. the seal of his office.
Manalo.
R: They would be part from the true intent of the
JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC law, and it was held by the SC that petitioner
must still comply with the guidelines before the
FACTS: The divorce was initiated by both parties. court can recognize the foreign divorce and in
They agreed to dissolve their marriage in Japan. this case, proof is required – attestation of the
Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got officer having the custody of the documents
married in 2000 in Japan pursuant to the which was not submitted as evidence
wedding rites therein. After 2 years, the parties,
by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said Dean: Even if the SC liberalized the application
country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on of Art. 26, as in so far that it now allows in the
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition Abel v. Rule case citing Galapon v. Republic, the
of Foreign Judgment before the RTC, Camarines SC clarified that Art. 26 henceforth will now apply
Norte. if the divorce was obtained by:
RTC granted the petition and recognized the

divorce between the parties as valid and effective
1. By the alien spouse
/
2. By the Filipino spouse
under Philippine Laws. 3. By both the alien and Filipino spouse ~
43
/  Lex Loci Celebrationis

Whether it is solely the Filipino or solely the alien,
or both, Article 26 will now permit the Filipino 1. Articulo mortis - either or both of the
spouse to remarry if the divorce obtained is legal contracting parties are at the point of death. (Art.
and valid in the laws of the country of the alien 27)
spouse.
To be considered as in Articulo Mortis, there must
However, it is not as simple as obtaining a be consciousness of impending death. Death is
divorce because our courts cannot take judicial imminent in other words.
notice of foreign judgements, you have to obtain
divorce in accordance with the rules of evidence: Hindi yung nagkasinat eh pero kapag nung Covid
time magkasinat ka lang at the point of death ka
1. Present an official copy or publication of na diba? So that’s one symptom but in ordinary
the divorce decree; cases kung walang pandemic kung sinipon ka
2. If the record is in the other country, there lang or medyo sininat ka lang you are not at the
must be a copy that is authenticated by point of death.
the proper consular official situated in the
foreign country; So, the important thing is that there must be
3. Present proof of foreign law on divorce; consciousness on the impending death of either
4. Present proof that the court which vested or both the contracting parties and the marriage
the divorce decree is vested with remains valid even if the ailing party
jurisdiction to issue it. subsequently survives. The party who is at the
point of death need not die for the marriage
If you are able to prove this, it is the only time to be valid.
that the court will recognize the foreign
judgement, therefore the Filipino will be Q: What’s the effect if the party who is at
capacitated to remarry. the point of death did not die. Will the
marriage be affected?
In fact, in Manalo v. Republic, the SC did not rule
on whether she can remarry but explained only, No, the marriage will not be affected as it is not
she was not able to present the proof required for required that the party at the point of death die.
the recognition of the foreign divorce, the case Mag-aadd tayo ng requirement if sinabi nating
was remanded to the lower court for further mamatay.
proceedings.
As to ship captains or airplane chief or military
Kaya lang diniscuss na ng SC yung applicability of commander of the unit, these are the persons
Art. 26 even if the Filipina was the one who filed who are authorized to solemnize marriage under
for divorce is para hindi na babalik kasi nga Articulo Mortis under the specific conditions
naresolve na ng SC. stated therein. Any solemnizing officer for that
matter, like members of the Judiciary, can
As a general rule before, divorce obtained by solemnize Articulo Mortis marriages.
Filipino, art. 15 applies. This was changed by the
ruling in Manalo. But in case of the ship captains, airplane chiefs,
and military commanders; there are additional
Chapter 2. Marriages Exempt from the requirements under Art. 7.
License Requirement
2. Remote area - if the residence of either party
Exemption from Marriage License - ARMML is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear
-
 Articulo Mortis personally before the LCR. (Art. 28)
~
 Remote Area / Places
- Muslims and Other Members of Ethnic Q: When is a place considered Remote?
Cultural Communities
V Marital Cohabitation There is a legal definition of a remote place.
Places is considered as remote if there is &
no
44
a -ne
means of transportation to enable the contracting
parties to enable before the Local Civil Registrar
2. That there must be no impediment existing
between the parties not only at the time of
for purpose of-
securing the license.
- -
marriage but also during the duration of the
five (5) year cohabitation;
-
-
-
If there is a means of transportation, it is not 3. Cohabitation must be continuous and

considered as remote except if it is too exclusive.
prohibitive or say for example there is a means of
transportation through a horse or a carabao, but Situation: Pablo is living with Susan – Monday,
it would take you 3 ½ months to reach the Local Wednesday, and Friday and he also goes home to
Civil Registrar's Office. Ana – Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday. This went on
for a number of years, let us say 5 ½ years.
So, when you consider a remote place, remember
the definition “not Carabao”. Q: Are Pablo and Ana exempt from license
requirement or Pablo and Susan exempt
It is remote if there is no means of transportation from license requirement?
to enable the contracting parties to appear before
the Local Civil Registrar. A: None of them is exempt from the license
requirement because the cohabitation is not
exclusive because Pablo is living with two women
at the same time which is Ana and Susan.
3. Ethnic Cultural Communities - Among
Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural Q: Now. what if it is an on-and-of
communities provided they are solemnized in relationship? You lived together for two
accordance with their customs, rites or practices. years and broke up and you met again and
(Art. 33) lived for 1 year and you broke up and met
and reconciled and lived again for 2 years.
Dean: It must be done by the cultural practices. Is that allowable? Are you exempt from
25 YEGR COHABITANON) - IMPERIMENT-CONTINOUS &UNBROKEN license requirements?
4. C5 – Those who lived together for at least

5 years and without any legal impediment to A: You are not exempt from the license
marry each other. requirement since the cohabitation must be
characterized by the exclusivity and that there
Requisite: Affidavit of Cohabitation (Art. 34)
-
must be continuous cohabitation. In this
example, since they are in an on and off
-
TLC NOTES: relationship.
Therefore, if there was a legal impediment to 5. Lex Loci Celebrationis

marry each other during the period of
cohabitation, no matter how long it may be, the If the marriage is solemnized in another country,
marriage, if celebrated without a license, is VOID. and the license is not required and it is valid,
then it is valid in the Philippines.
Just the same, it is not enough that they have no
legal impediment to marry at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, it is necessary that Chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages
during the 5-year- CONTINUOUS AND UNBROKEN
>
period of cohabitation, they did not have any VOID MARRIAGES
legal impediment to marry. To say otherwise
would be to sanction immorality. Article 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
Dean: Article 34 requires that for the parties to
be exempt from the license requirement: (1) Below 18 yrs. of age even with consent
of parents or guardians
1. The parties must have lived together for at (2) S.O. not authorized to perform
least five (5) years as husband and wife; marriages
45
Exception: If either or both parties

believed in good faith that the S.O. had REQUIREMENTS: Articles 51 and 52
legal authority;
(3) No marriage license; Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages presumptive legitimes of all common children,
(5) Mistake in identity; and computed as of the date of the final judgment
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
void under Art. 53 property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially
LALBIS approved, had already provided for such
matters.
 Legal Capacity
 Authority The children or their guardian or the trustee of
 License their property may ask for the enforcement of
 Bigamous the judgment.
 Identity
 Subsequent The delivery of the presumptive legitimes
herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
Dean: For Legal Capacity, the Philippine law ultimate successional rights of the children
applies. Regardless if they are adults in another accruing upon the death of either of both of the
country, if they are below 18, their marriage will parents; but the value of the properties already
still be considered void. received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as
Q: What does mistake in identity refer to? Does it advances on their legitime. (n)
refer to the name or the person? Article 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
A: It refers to the mistake of the person. and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the delivery of the children's
Q: Let’s say Maria married Jose. So based on the presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
Birth Certificate of Jose, his name is Jose. But it appropriate civil registry and registries of
turned out that Jose is the wrong name, and his property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
real name is Peter. Is the marriage between third persons.
Maria and Jose aka Peter valid?
A: Yes. It is still valid because it is not the In short, if a marriage is set aside, either
mistake in name that is material. It is the annulled or declared void, the law requires that
mistake in identity. the parties to the dissolved marriage to comply
with certain requirements.
Remember, you get married to a person, not to a
name. Requirements:
Even if the name of the person turned out to not 1. Register the decree of nullity or
be the real name, the marriage is still valid annulment in the appropriate civil
because it is still not a mistake in identity. registries;
2. Liquidate the absolute community or
This also applies in qualifications. For example, if conjugal partnership;
a person misrepresent himself as a PhD 3. Partition the same;
graduate, this is still not a mistake in identity. 4. To deliver the presumptive legitimes of all
the common children.
Article 53. Either of the former spouses may
marry again after compliance with the Dean: If A and B secured a decree of annulment
requirements of the immediately preceding and B wanted to marry C after the annulment of
Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage his marriage with A, B should comply with all the
shall be null and void. requirements of Article 51 and 52; otherwise, his
46
subsequent marriage with C will be considered as & -

Ground should be existing e
prior to -
the marriage
- -
the subsequent marriage which is void under or, at the latest, -

-
during the solemnization of the
--
Article 53 in relation to Article 35 (6). marriage.
-
ILLUSTRATION: Basic requisites (Santos vs. CA):

(1) Gravity
If the parties are residing in Manila, there is a (2) Juridical antecedence
falling out, the two decided to separate de facto (3) Incurability
and the woman transferred to Quezon City
wherein she filed a case for nullity. Q: What is psychological incapacity?
Q: Where should she register the decree Dean: There is no statutory definition of
should the court grant it? Manila LCR or psychological incapacity.
Quezon City LCR?
The first case on psychological incapacity is the
A: Both in Manila and Quezon City because this case of Santos v. CA.
what Article 51 required. If one does not comply,
-
the subsequent marriage will be considered void SANTOS v. CA
for failing to register the decree before the LCR.
That psychological incapacity must be
-
Q: Is it in the Quezon City LCR or in the characterized by:

Manila LCR?
(a) gravity - the incapacity must be grave or
e n
A: She should register it both in Manila LCR serious such that the party would be incapable of
(where you got married) and in the Quezon City -carrying out the ordinary duties required in
(where you secured the decree of annulment) marriage;
-
LCR.
(b) juridical antecedence - it must be rooted
This is what -
-
Article 51 requires: -
registration, in the history of the party antedating the
-
E
liquidation, and - delivery of presumptive marriage, although the overt manifestations may
- - -
>
legitimes. emerge only after the marriage; and
-
If you do not comply, even when the previous (c) incurability - it must be-incurable or, even if
marriage was already annulled, the subsequent -
it were otherwise, the cure would -
be beyond the
marriage will be the subsequent marriage which --
means of the party involved.
is void under Article 53. -
This was the first case on psychological incapacity

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY where the SC refused to declare the marriage
void given that the allegations of husband did not
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party comply with the 3 characteristics of gravity,
who, at the time of the celebration, was juridical antecedence, and incurability.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, The old cases of Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Antonio
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity v. Reyes are the very few cases where the SC
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. granted the petition based on Article 36 until the
Tan Andal case.
TLC NOTES:
CHI MING TSOI VS. CA
Art. 36. Psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of the ISSUE: Whether a marriage can be declared
marriage void due to psychological incapacity because
the husband refuses to have sexual
intercourse with his wife despite being
married for 10 months.
47
DEAN: If a man, although capable of performing Rosanna presented the testimony of Dr. Fonso,
the sexual act, simply refuses to do it with his stating that Mario has narcissistic anti-social
wife, the Court said that it could be due to causes personality disorder and substance abuse
that are psychological in nature. Love is useless disorder with psychotic features.
unless shared with another.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between
ANTONIO v. REYES (2006) Mario and Rosanna is void due to psychological
incapacity.
Q: Whether persistent and constant lying of
the wife can be a ground of psychological RULING: YES.
incapacity to declare marriage as void?
NOTE: Psychological Incapacity still must be
A: Article 36 of the Family Code states that a proved through preponderance of evidence.
marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically ● Gravity
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital ● Juridical antecedence
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void ● Incurability
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization. The marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Rosanna was
One who is unable to adhere to reality cannot be able to prove with clear and convincing evidence
expected to adhere to any emotional that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
commitments as well, much less to perform the comply with his essential marital obligations.
essential marital obligation.
In amending the guidelines provided by the
7
The SC declared the marriage void on the ground Molina doctrine, the Court amended the second
of the psychological incapacity. Molina guideline and stated that psychological
incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a
TAN-ANDAL vs. ANDAL personality disorder that must be proven through
DOCTRINE
* CONTROLLING
expert opinion.
FACTS: Mario Victor Andal and Rosanna Tan
were married. A year later, Rosanna and Mario There must be proof, however, of the durable or
gave birth to a child. enduring aspects of a person's personality, called
"personality structure," - which manifests itself
During their marriage, Mario exhibited “emotional -
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
- -
immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and undermines-

-
the family. The spouse's personality
psychological imbalance”. structure must make it impossible for him or her
-
to understand and, more important, to comply

Mario had been caught under the influence of with his or her essential marital obligations.
prohibited drugs while in the presence of Ma.
Samantha (their daughter). With respect to gravity, the requirement is
retained, not in the sense that the psychological
Mario would leave the family home for days incapacity must be shown to be a serious or
unaccounted for, leaving Rosanna with the dangerous illness, but that "mild
burden of working and raising Ma. Samantha. characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
Moreover, Mario had prevented Ma. Samantha occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded.
from taking medications prescribed for her
illness. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Rosanna then filed a petition to nullify her Such incurability may be absolute or even
marriage with Mario. relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
Rosanna alleged that Mario is psychologically same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
incapacitated to fulfill his marital duties. relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
48
to marriage, like the exercise· of a profession or If is voidable or annullable, the ground is Article
employment in a job. 45.
Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity
case is still required to prove juridical With respect to property relationship
antecedence because it is an explicit
requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that For void marriages:
the psychological incapacity must be existing "at
the time of the celebration" of the marriage, The property relationship that would govern the
"even if such incapacity becomes manifest only liquidation and the partition of the properties
after its solemnization." would be Article 147 or 148 depending whether
there is an impediment or there was no
Q: Is psychological incapacity, a medical impediment on the part of the parties.
condition or mental illness? If not a medical
concept, what is it? * CONCEPT If there is no impediment, 147 will apply.
If there is an impediment, 148 will apply.
DEAN: Psychological incapacity is a legal concept
rather than a medical concept. For voidable marriages:
The Court said that it must be shown through a If a marriage was declared annulled by the court,
preponderance of evidence that it was existing whatever property relationship they have
prior to the time of the celebration of the adopted at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. It must
- be caused by one’s personality marriage will govern the liquidation of their
-
structure, not just a medical, clinical or mental properties.
state that can just be defined by medical experts.
EXAMPLE: Sps. Anna and Alex contracted
Q: As a legal concept, does it require the marriage in 2018 and they were governed by
presentation of expert witness? 0 conjugal property of gains.
A: NO. The concept of the Tan-Andal, the If the marriage was annulled in 2021, the
interpretation of the Supreme Court by Justice liquidation of the properties will be governed by
Leonen is different from the previous cases on the provisions of the conjugal partnership of
psychological incapacity. gains.
DEAN: I would consider it revolutionary.

↑ With respect to status of children
It is not considered as a medical concept but a For void marriages:

legal concept; and therefore, it is possible that
you are psychological incapacitated but only in GR: Children born out of that marriage are
relation to a particular partner, not necessarily illegitimate.
with respect to all partners.
XPNs:- Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity) and
That was how Justice Leonen explained it. -
Article 53 (non-compliance with requirements).
-
Only these two void marriages produce
CONTROLLING DOCTRINE: Tan-Andal v. Andal LEGITIMATE children.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Under Art. 36, when a marriage is invalidated by

reason of psychological incapacity, the children
A void marriage is different from a voidable born out of the marriage are still considered
marriage. legitimate.
First, with respect to grounds, a voidable As to all the rest (ex: make as a ground lack of
marriage, the grounds are: Article 36, 37, 38. marriage license or bigamy), after court declares
the marriage void, the judgment will carry with it
the order of the court to the local registrar
concerned to amend the birth certificate of all the
49
children born during that void marriage to reflect

their new status from legitimate to illegitimate. In the Niñal case, there was a direct petition filed
by the Children of Pepito Niñal after his death.
Personal Notes: After his death, the children of the first marriage
sued to declare the second marriage of their
Dean: Some would go as far as proving father void on the ground that they were not
Psychological Incapacity for the sake of the exempt from the license requirement when they
children. After all, even when the marriage got married.
becomes void ab initio, children would stay as
legitimate children. According to the children, although the marriage
was celebrated after the death of their mother,
For voidable marriages: their father Pepito and Norma Bayadog did not
secure a marriage license. In lieu of the license,
Children will always be legitimate. they executed an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for five (5) years.
With respect to prescription
But this subsequent marriage was celebrated
For void marriages, imprescriptible. after only 18 months after the death of the first
For voidable marriages, Article 47 shall govern. wife, which would mean that during their
supposed five-year cohabitation, the first wife
QUIAZON v. BELEN was still alive. Therefore, there was an overlap.
Q: Whether or not the decedent’s marriage Personal Note:

to the petitioner is void for being bigamous.
Assuming the affidavit was true, there was still
RULING: YES. In this case, at the time of the a legal impediment during the other 42 months
celebration of the marriage of the decedent, the they were cohabiting as husband and wife.
law in effect was the civil code and not the family
code. Thus, the court applied the ruling in Niñal Assuming the affidavit was false, Pepito and
v. Bayadog which emphasized that in any void Norma would not have been exempt from
marriage, it is as if no marriage has taken place. securing a marriage license, because of lack of
Hence, it cannot be a source of any right. Any continuous cohabitation.
interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. NOTE: This case was decided in 2000.
In this case, the previous marriage of the And then the SC promulgated the rules on
petitioner to another man was sufficiently Declaration of Nullity of Marriages, which
established marriage certificate which is provides that if the marriage is void, only the
considered as a competent evidence of marriage. husband or the wife can file a petition to declare
Without showing that the marriage has been it void (direct petition).
dissolved at the time of the petitioenr and
decedent’s marriage, the conclusion of the court BUT, other parties (ex. children) to the void
is that the subsequent marriage is void ab initio. marriage can still raise it by way of defense in a
different action. They may attack it collaterally,
Dean: Under the Rules of Declaration of Nullity, but not directly.
which was prior to the Niñal case, only the
husband or the wife can file a petition for nullity GR: Only husband and wife can file a direct
of marriage. petition.
In other words, the ruling in Niñal, if it was XPN: Juliano Llave case.
decided today, would have to be decided
differently. The issue in that case is whether the first
husband can file a petition to declare the second
Niñal v. Bayadog
50
marriage void on the grounds of it being which were the basis in the ruling of the Supreme
bigamous. Court in the case of Tee vs. Court of Appeals to
uphold the validity of the marriage between the
CASTILLO v. CASTILLO husband and the second wife because the first
marriage of the husband was void ab initio.
SUMMARY: Petitioner and Respondent are
married but such marriage was contracted According to the Supreme Court, - >Article 40
without the first marriage of Respondent Lea with cannot be applied
- - retroactively to prejudice the
- - -
Bautista being judicially declared as null and second wife and their children.
-
void. Petitioner is now filing a Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage against respondent on the Similarly, in this case, of Castillo v. Castillo, both
ground that their marriage was void for being marriages were celebrated before the effectivity
bigamous. of the Family Code which were in 1972 and 1976.
Supreme Court ruled in favor of respondent Lea The first marriage was apparently void for the
averring that Civil Code applies since both lack of marriage license and the second was void
marriages were celebrated prior the enactment of for being bigamous.
the Family Code. Under the Civil Code, there is
no requirement that a declaration of absolute The Supreme Court in this case said that since
nullity of marriage of the first marriage is both marriages were celebrated before the Family
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a Code, the ruling in Mendoza, Aragon, Odayat
marriage. may properly apply. It will be decided based on
-
the prevailing doctrine at the time that both

-
DOCTRINE: The validity of a marriage and all its marriages were celebrated.
-
incidents must be determined in accordance with

the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. RULING: The Court held that children conceived
The children of the parties were also born while of voidable marriages before the decree of
the Civil Code was in effect thus, the Court must annulment shall be considered legitimate.
resolve the case using the provisions under the
Civil Code. DEAN: Having established her status as a
legitimate child because she was born in a
DEAN: There is no equivalent provision of Article voidable marriage, as opposed to a void
40 of the Family Code in the Civil Code. marriage, she is qualified to act as the
Administratix of the grandmother’s estate and in
The cases of Odayat v. Amante, People v. addition, she can represent [her father Emilio].
Mendoza, People v. Aragon were decided prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. TERRE v. TERRE
Prior to that activity of the family code, the FACTS: Dorothy Terre left her first marriage with
decisions of the Supreme Court on whether there another man without having it annulled and
is a need to declare avoid marriage judicially void married Jordan Terre since the latter told her that
were conflicting. her former marriage was void ab initio because
she and her husband were first cousins. However,
So, there are cases where you see that the Dorothy later on learned that Jordan was married
Supreme Court would say that even if the to another woman.
marriage is void, you still need to go to court to
have it declared void. And there are also other Thus, she filed a case for bigamy against Jordan.
cases, which say that even if the marriage is In his defense, Jordan claimed that he was
unaware of Dorothy’s first marriage. He then
↳
⑲ void, there is no need to have it declared void.
contracted the second marriage, believing that
And these are the three cases: Odayat vs his marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio
Amante, People vs Mendoza, People vs Aragon; because of her prior subsisting marriage.
51
RULING: The subsequent marriage of Jordan Thus, the Court accepted the certification even
with another woman is void ab initio because without the testimony of the records custodian.
when it was entered into while Jordan’s prior
marriage with Dorothy was subsisting, no judicial FUJIKI v. MARINAY
action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior FACTS: Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national,
marriage. married Maria Marinay in the Philippines.
However, the marriage did not sit well with
Likewise, the Court disbarred Jordan and held Fujiki’s parents. As a result, Fujiki cannot bring
that Jordan, being a lawyer, knew or should have Marinay to Japan, and the parties eventually lost
known that such an argument ran counter to the contact with each other.
prevailing case law which holds that for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to Later on, without the first marriage being
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration dissolved, Marinay married another Japanese
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio national. But Marinay allegedly suffered physical
is essential. abuse, thus, she left her husband and contacted
Fujiki.
IWASAWA v. CUSTODIO
Fujiki and Marinay were able to re-establish their
FACTS: Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, relationship; hence, Fujiki helped Marinay
and Felisa Custodio got married. However, Felisa obtained a declaration of nullity of Marinay’s
later on confessed that she is married to another subsequent marriage with the other Japanese
man in the Philippines. national. Subsequently, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC seeking judicial recognition of foreign
Thus, Iwasawa filed a petition for declaration of judgment. However, the trial court dismissed the
his marriage to Felisa as null and void on the petition, maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality
ground of bigamy. to file the petition.
However, the trial court ruled that there was RULING: The Court held that Fujiki has the
insufficient evidence to prove Felisa’s prior personality to file a petition to recognize the
existing marriage and held that while Yasuo Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
offered the certificate of marriage of Felisa to the marriage between Marinay and the other
other man, it was only Yasuo who testified about Japanese national. There is no doubt that the
the said marriage. prior spouse has a personal and material interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
RULING: The Court held that Yasuo and Felisa’s contracted and the property relations arising
marriage is void. Likewise, there is no question from it. The interest derives from the substantive
that the documentary evidence submitted by right of the spouse not only to preserve his most
Yasuo are all public documents. As public intimate human relation, but also to protect his
documents, they are admissible in evidence even property interests that arise by operation of law
without further proof of their due execution and the moment he contracts marriage.
genuineness. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, these deserve to be given Dean: Under the rules, it's only the husband, or
evidentiary weight because they constitute a the wife who can file the petition for Declaration
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. of Nullity, --
but the exception is in cases of
-
bigamous marriages.
Dean: Under the Rules of Court, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of Necessarily, the legal husband or wife, as the
official duties. So, this presumption, although case may be, is a proper party to question the
rebuttable, without any other proof to the validity of the second bigamous marriage
contrary, it will be deemed as valid and because that will affect his or her status as the
admissible as evidence of the facts stated legal spouse of the other contracting party.
therein.
ILLUSTRATION:
52
So A married B. During the subsistence of B's A: It was proven by a document examiner. The
marriage to A, B contracted marriage with C. examiner testified that the signature appearing in
the contract was actually forged.
The parties to the 1st marriage are A and B,
the parties to the second marriage are B and C. Q: What was the objection of the Republic
to the petition filed by a Olaybar?
So, if we strictly follow the rules, A cannot
question the marriage between B and C Dean: According to the Republic, it is a petition
because he is not a party to it. actually to nullify the marriage under the guise of
Correction of Entry.
But that's an exception according to the
Supreme Court in Fujiki and also in the case of Q: Did the Supreme Court agree?
Juliano that--
if you are the legal spouse, you are
necessarily >
- a proper party-- to question the-
A: NO. The Supreme Court denied the contention
-
subsequent bigamous marriage contracted by
- -
of the OSG and ruled in favor of Olaybar.
your spouse.
-
The Supreme Court ruled that in Rule 108
So, it's not covered by the rules on Declaration petition, even substantial errors in a civil registry
of nullity by way of exception. may be corrected as long as all the procedural
rules and guidelines under Rule 108 are complied
REPUBLIC v. OLAYBAR with.
FACTS: This case involves a petition for In this case, since Olaybar was able to prove that
correction of the entry in the Civil registry she was able to comply with all the requirements
because respondent Olaybar allegedly contracted under rule 108, she indeed can use the petition
a marriage when in fact, she did not. to change her status.
Olaybar requested from the NSO a CENOMAR or Furthermore, as ruled by the Supreme Court in
a certificate of no marriage as one of the this case, there was really no marriage to speak
requirements for her to contract a marriage with of in the first place because she was not even
her boyfriend. present in the marriage ceremony and that she
was not really the one who got married.
Upon receipt of the CENOMAR, she discovered
that she was already married to a certain Korean Dean: It can be considered as a petition to
national. For this reason, she filed a petition for declare the document void, not the marriage
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract. because according to the Supreme Court, there's
no marriage to speak of precisely because she
In her allegations, she denied having contracted was not a party to that marriage.
a marriage with this Korean national and claimed
that she did not know her alleged husband. Having satisfactorily shown that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was not hers,
However, she revealed that she recognized some the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Olaybar and
of the witnesses to the marriage as she had met debunked the contention of the Republic that it
them when she was working in a pension house. was actually a petition to nullify the marriage.
She also claimed that she did not appear before a
solemnizing officer because she was still working VOID MARRIAGES:
in Makati City. She also alleged that her INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES
signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and that it was forged. Apart from Articles 35 and 36, Articles 37 and 38
also belongs to the category of void marriages.
Q: Was she able to prove that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was not Article 37. Marriages between the following
her signature? are incestuous and void from the beginning,
53
whether relationship between the parties be

legitimate or illegitimate: (5) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopting parent and the adopted child;
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of
any degree; and (6) Between the surviving spouse of the
adopted child and the adopter;
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate
the full or half blood. child of the adopter;
TLC NOTES: (8) Between adopted children of the same

adopter; and
Art. 37. The ff. marriages are incestuous and void
from the beginning, whether the relationship (9) Between parties where one, with the
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
(1) Bet. ascendants & descendants
(2) Bet. brothers & sisters whether full or TLC NOTES:
half-blood
Art. 38. The ff. marriages shall be void from the
Dean: Marriages between first cousins, although beginning for reasons of public policy:
still prohibited, are no longer considered
incestuous but contrary to public policy. (1) Bet. collateral blood relatives, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the 4 th civil
Q: Why do you think marriages between degree;
close blood relatives are prohibited? (2) Bet. step-parents and step-children;
(3) Bet. parents in law and children-in-law;
A: Because it has been shown by medical (4) Bet. the adopting parent and the adopted
research that the offspring of close blood child;
relatives show some birth defects, sand if we will (5) Bet. the surviving spouse of the adopting
allow the continued union between close blood parent and the adopted child;
relatives, it might result into the deterioration of (6) Bet. the surviving spouse of the adopted child
the human race eventually. So usually those with and the adopter;
birth defects, either not much blood or they have (7) Bet. an adopted child and a legitimate child of
close blood relations so that's why it's the adopter
prohibited. (8) Bet. the adopted children of the same
adopter;
VOID MARRIAGES: (9) Bet. parties where on, with the intention to
MARRIAGES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY marry the other, killed that other person’s
spouse or his or her own spouse.
Article 38. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy: KEYWORD: CASSPALPS CVOID Marridass against priuc policy)
- Collateral up to 4th civil degree


(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil 
V Adopting parent and adopted child
degree;
* CASSPALPS v Surviving spouse of the adopted child and the

adapter
~ Surviving spouse of the adapter and the

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
adopted child
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in- 
D Parents-in-Law and children-in-law
law; v Adopted children of the same adapter

~ Legitimate child and adopted child of the

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adapter
adopted child;
54
A Parties where with intention of marrying the

 subsequent to the marriage, either B or C
other, killed his or her own spouse or the adopts?
other person's spouse
 Step-parents and step-children
* This is a loophole. This is not covered by the
law.
SITUATION: Suppose A is married to B, with
son S. C is married to D with daughter E. Few cases involving bigamy and under the Civil
Code provisions, there are conflicting decisions of
If A and D, the spouses of B and C both died, B the SC on whether there is a need to seek judicial
and C later on got married. May S and D marry recognition of nullity of a void marriage.
each other? Will they fall under public policy
marriages? Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
A: They can validly get married because their
-
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
relationship is stepbrother and stepsister and the
-
judgment declaring such previous marriage
prohibition under article 38 of the Family Code is void.
-
only stepparents and stepchildren. It does not
include stepbrother and stepsister. TLC NOTES:
Q: If after marrying each other either B In short, even if the previous or first marriage is
-
adopted D or C adopted S, can S and D still a void marriage, -

- a subsequent marriage cannot
get married? be contracted BEFORE the nullity of the previous
- - -
marriage. There must be a prior FINAL

A: No. Because it will result in a marriage E
JUDGMENT declaring the previous or first
- - -
-
between the adopted child and the legitimate marriage VOID. Lest, assume the risk of being
>
child of the adopter. prosecuted for the crime of bigamy.
Dean: Even if only one parent adopts either S or Rationale: The parties cannot decide by
D, it will already fall under Article 38. They are
- themselves the validity, or invalidity, of their
widow and widower, both with children from their
- marriage. It should be a competent court which
respective marriages, their children, -
-
e
strictly should declare the nullity of any marriage.
-
speaking, are not- -
prohibited from marrying each
other under article 38.
-
NOTE: This is for the purposes of remarrying.
However, -when either of the spouses to the

m e a n
DOMINGO v. CA
second marriage decides to adopt the child of the
-
-
other, it automatically qualifies as marriage FACTS: Domingo claimed that the Petition for
between legitimate child and adopted child of the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is not necessary
adopter. because the marriage was already void.
Therefore, they will now be prohibited from RULING: Supreme Court ruled that said Judicial
-
marrying each other under Article 38. Declaration is necessary. For purposes of action
- -
for
-
liquidation, partition, distribution and
Q: Can it be considered for us violation of separation
- - -
of property between the erstwhile
public policy if ever S and D would marry spouses,
- evidence needs - must be adduced,
each other, but they are not adopted? - ---
testimonial or documentary, to prove the
----
existence of grounds rendering such a previous
A: No.
=
marriage an absolute nullity.
Basis: exclusio unius est exclusio alterius (what

-
Dean: Crucial to the interpretation of Article 40 is
the law does not include,-
it excludes)
- -
-
the placement of the word “solely”.
-
Illustration: B and C got married. Si S and D,

hindi sila adopted, and then nagpakasal. What if,
55
Q: What is modified by the word ‘solely’? Is the pendency of the appeal, the first marriage of
it final judgment or for purposes of Mercado was declared void by the trial court.
remarriage?
So, he was invoking this judgment of the trial
DEAN: The phrase -- ‘on the basis solely’ means court in the nullity case to seek his acquittal in
that if you intend to remarry, by invoking that
-
the bigamy case pending before the Supreme
your previous marriage which is void, the sole
- -
Court.
acceptable
-
proof of the nullity of your previous
-
marriage =
would be the final judgment declaring RULING: He is - still liable for bigamy even if his
-
-
that previous marriage void.
-
first marriage was declared void, because at the
time of the celebration of the second marriage,
-
It does not follow that you can only file a petition the first marriage has not yet been legally
e
to nullify your marriage if you intend to remarry, -

dissolved.
as argued by the husband of Delia Domingo. It is
not the correct interpretation. SC CONCLUSION: By the time he contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage was still
Article 40 has been used by the Supreme Court in subsisting, the elements of the crime of bigamy
criminal cases. would have concurred.
If you read the cases of Mercado v. Tan, Bobis v. BOBIS v. BOBIS

Bobis, and Pulido v. People, there are so many
cases on bigamy like Vitangcol v. People, Dean: This involves a case of concubinage
Santiago v. People, you add that to the case of against Isagani Bobis. At the time he was
Mercado v. Tan, Manuel v. People, in all these charged with concubinage, he had already
cases, the accused was convicted of bigamy or previously filed a petition for the declaration of
the case was remanded to the trial court for nullity of his first marriage.
further proceeding, even if the accused in the
bigamy case was invoking that his or her His wife retaliated and filed a case of concubinage
marriage is void and therefore, there could be no against him. He was arguing that the criminal
liability for bigamy if the first marriage is void in case for concubinage should be suspended on the
the first place. That was the argument is these ground that the pending petition for the nullity of
cases. marriage is a prejudicial question to his liability
for the crime of concubinage.
But the Supreme Court, using Article 40 said that
precisely Art. 40 requires that before a party RULING: Even if there is a pending case for the
remarry on the basis that his previous marriage nullity of marriage, that does not entitle the
is void, he or she must seek a judicial declaration accused to cohabit with another woman not his
of nullity. wife, during the pendency of the proceedings.
In all those cases, there was either conviction or * This is because until the court declares that the
remand of the case to the lower court to marriage is void,= the presumption is that, the
=
determine the criminal liability of the accused in marriage -is valid and subsisting.
=
bigamy.
-
PULIDO v. PEOPLE
MERCADO v. TAN (2000)
FACTS: Luisito Pulido married Nora S. Arcon in a
FACTS: Mercado was charged with bigamy by civil ceremony (prior to the effectivity of the
the 2nd wife Consuelo Tan after the 2 nd wife Family Code).
discovered that there was a prior subsisting
marriage of Vincent Mercado. Upon confrontation, Arcon learned that Pulido
and Rowena Baleda entered into marriage (after
There was also a pending case for nullity of the the effectivity of the Family Code).
first marriage and while the trial court convicted
Vincent Mercado of the crime of bigamy, during Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy. In
his defense, Pulido insisted that he could not be
56
held criminally liable for bigamy because both his Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute
marriages were null and void. nullity of the first and/or second marriages
presented by the accused in the prosecution for
The first marriage being contracted without a bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the
marriage license. Baleda alleged that even prior time within which they are secured.
to the filling of the bigamy case, she already filed
a Petition to Annul her marriage with Pulido. In sum, the Court ruled that the prevailing
doctrine now is the nullity of the first marriage
The RTC convicted petitioner of Bigamy and can now be a defense in a charge of bigamy.
acquitted Baleda.
However, this only applies when the first
ISSUE: Whether or not the nullity of the first marriage is null and void.
marriage due to the lack of marriage license can
be interposed as a defense in a charge of When the first marriage is VOIDABLE, then by
bigamy. the time a second marriage is celebrated without
a judicial declaration of annulment of the first
RULING: In overturning Mercado v. Tan, the marriage, then the accused can still be convicted
Court ruled that a judicial declaration of absolute of bigamy since the element of the valid and
nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio subsisting marriage is present.
prior and subsequent marriages in bigamy case.
Dean: In other words, the court limited the
Justifications: application of Article 40 from the Civil Law
standpoint of contracting a subsequent marriage
1. By nature of void ab initio marriages, its - that you need a judicial declaration of nullity of
nullity will retroact to the time the marriage your prior marriage before contracting a
was solemnized – it is as if there was no subsequent one.
marriage at all to speak of or that it never did
exist. Therefore, since there was no marriage But since Article 40 does not preclude or does not
to speak of in the first place, one of the prohibit the accused in a criminal case from
elements of bigamy, particularly the existence raising the defense of the nullity of a previous
of a valid subsisting marriage, is not present. marriage in a bigamy charge, then it would be
2. The Court looked at the legislative intent of unfair and unjust if the court will say otherwise.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which is to
confine its application for purposes of To my mind, the application of Article 40 now is
remarriage. According to the Court, the lack limited only to civil cases – that is precisely for
of a judicial declaration of the nullity of the purposes of contracting a subsequent marriage.
marriage was only required for the purpose of
remarriage and for no other purpose. It would Opinion: Ang worry ko lang is that it can now
then be unfair for the accused if he would not be raised as a defense and it can be raised as a
be able to interpose the nullity of his first prejudicial question, baka some will contract
marriage if the purpose is not remarriage; marriage deliberately with some formal or
rather, the repelling of the charge of bigamy essential requisites lacking like a marriage
filed against him. license and raise it as a defense later on when
3. The Court also reiterated that penal laws are he or she is sued criminally.
strictly construed against the State and in
favor of the accused. In this case, since But remember that under the rules on criminal
bigamy is penal in nature and there is no procedure, before a civil case may be
express declaration in the statute itself considered a prejudicial question to the issue in
requiring the first marriage be judicially a criminal case, that civil case must have been
declared null, then the construction of the previously instituted to the criminal case. So
statute would be against the accused if the pwede rin naman ma-bar yung civil case for
defense of the nullity of the first marriage is nullity, meaning hindi pwedeng i-raise as a
not allowed as a defense to the charge of prejudicial question kapag nauna yung bigamy
bigamy. case.
57
marriage, on the ground of lack of marriage

Situation: Let’s say the accused contracted a ceremony. At this time, he was also prosecuted
subsequent marriage, without dissolving the for bigamy.
first marriage. He was then sued for bigamy.
Remember, bigamy is a public crime. It may be
According to the Pulido case, the accused can instituted not only on the instance of the private
raise it as a defense even if there is no prior party, but also at the instance of the State.
judicial declaration of nullity. On the
assumption that during the pendency of the RULING: The SC acquitted the Morigo on the
criminal action for bigamy, the accused in that charge of bigamy. I don’t know exactly what’s
criminal case also filed a petition for nullity of the difference between a void marriage
first marriage. And in that civil case for nullity, celebrated without a valid license, and a void
the court held that the first marriage is valid. marriage without a marriage ceremony. To my
However, in the criminal case, he was mind, they are the same – both void.
acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
In this case, the SC made a distinction by saying
Ano na ngayon ang mangyayari? This is the that there is no semblance of marriage at all
problem that I foresee. Two courts of equal between Lucio and Lucia because they just signed
jurisdiction rendered different decisions, and a marriage contract without appearing before a
we will have a problem kung ano yung Solemnizing Officer.
magpre-prevail. Just a thought.
Dean’s Opinion: The reason for his acquittal is
The Pulido case was penned by your future Bar the marriage has already been previously
Chair. So, for purposes of your bar exam, follow dissolved by the divorce decree of the foreign
the Pulido case. court. The dissolution of the marriage was the
deciding factor why the Supreme Court acquitted
Question from Student: What is the standard him.
of proof needed if the nullity of the first marriage
is used as a defense in a criminal case for Remember, in Mercado v. Tan, there was no
bigamy? divorce obtained. The only fault of Lucio was that
Morigo was that he did not file for the recognition
Dean: Since it is a criminal case and the main of the foreign divorce decree before contracting
issue is whether he committed the crime of the subsequent marriage. If he did, he could
bigamy, you need to prove all the elements of have legally married already under Article 41.
bigamy. If you are for the prosecution, you need
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond Dean: You cannot compare Morigo with Olaybar,
reasonable doubt. I do not see that a different because in Olaybar, Olaybar herself was not a
standard will be applied considering this is a party to the marriage. Somebody else signed the
criminal case. marriage contract. In Morigo, they both signed.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE Article 41. A marriage contracted by any

person during subsistence of a previous
FACTS: This is a case involving Lucio Morigo, marriage shall be null and void, unless before
who married his college sweetheart Lucia. Less the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
than a year later, they divorced. the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has
Lucia filed a petition for divorce before a foreign a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
court, where she is a resident of an area within was already dead. In case of disappearance
its jurisdiction. After their divorce, Lucio where there is danger of death under the
contracted another marriage with Maria. circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
However, less than a year after contracting the only two years shall be sufficient.
second marriage, Lucio filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage of his first For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
58
marriage under the preceding paragraph the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
spouse present must institute a summary default of children, the innocent spouse;
proceeding as provided in this Code for the (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall
declaration of presumptive death of the remain valid, except that if the one
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
reappearance of the absent spouse. donations made to said done are revoked
by operation of law;
TLC NOTES: (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who acted
Art. 41. Presumptive death in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation
Requisites: be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the
(1) Absence subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent
General Rule: 4 years spouse by testate and intestate
Exception: Where there is danger of death under succession.
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Art. 391 of the Civil code, an absence of only 2 Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent
years shall be sufficient. marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall
be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
(2) Well-founded belief that the absent marriage and testamentary dispositions made by
spouse was already dead. one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
For purpose of remarriage, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding for the Dean: This is a new provision of the Family
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Code. There is no counterpart provision in Civil
Code.
The recording of the affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse, which will have to be at the Under the Civil Code, after an absence of seven
LCR of the residence of parties, shall years, it being unknown whether or not the
automatically terminate the subsequent absentee is still alive, he should be presumed
marriage. (Art. 42) dead for all purposes, except for succession.
Hence, even for purposes of remarriage. There
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent was no requirement under the Civil Code that you
marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall need to seek a judicial declaration of presumptive
produce the following effects: death of the absent spouse.
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage But now, there is such a requirement under
conceived prior to its termination shall be Article 41, the present spouse, who wants to
considered legitimate, and their custody remarry, must first file a petition for declaration
and support in case of dispute shall be of presumptive death of the absent spouse:
decided by the court in a proper
proceeding;  After an absence of four years; or
(2) The absolute community of property or  After an absence of only two years, if the
the conjugal partnership, as the case may absent spouse disappeared under
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if circumstances where there is danger of death.
either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO
profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be Dean: You cannot apply Article 41 of the Family
forfeited in favor of the common children Code retroactively considering the second
or, if there are none, the children of the marriage was celebrated in 1958. Clearly, it was
under the regime of the Civil Code.
59
Year of promulgation: April 6, 2000 The efforts fell short to the stringent standard
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.
Reason for asking date of promulgation: The
case took long enough that the lower court Because of the following reasons:
applied the Family Code instead of the Civil Code. 1. The respondents did not actively look for
her missing husband.
Dean: Now, Art. 41, for purposes of the 2. She did not report Jerry’s absence to the
declaration of presumptive death, requires a police or did she seek the aid of
stricter standard. authorities to look for him
3. She did not present, as a witness, any of
REPUBLIC v. CANTOR Jerry's relatives, neighbors or friends.
4. There was no corroborative evidence to
FACTS: Maria and Jerry got married in 1997. support respondents' claim that she
However, in January 1998, they had a violent conducted a diligent search.
fight for reasons of sexual incompatibility and
Jerry’s expression of animosity toward Maria’s In summary, the SC viewed that the respondent
father. merely engaged in a passive search. The SC
ruled that the respondent has no well-founded
Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and belief that Jerry is already dead.
never came back. After more than four years,
Maria filed a petition for a judicial declaration of REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO
presumptive death, alleging that: (a) she had
inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in- Note: First case under Art. 41.
law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail, and (b) she also FACTS: A Filipino seaman, Gregorio Nolasco,
allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ married a Foreigner, Janet Monica Parker. Since
directory whenever she went to a hospital. he was a seaman, he met Janica in a foreign
country and they decided to get married.
Ruling: Jerry should not be declared
presumptively dead. Under Article 41 of the They went home to PH while Janet was pregnant.
Family Code, there are four (4) essential Gregorio again went on a trip as a seaman. When
requisites for the declaration of presumptive he returned, his wife was no longer living in their
death: conjugal dwelling in Antique and he was told that
after she gave birth to their child, she never
1. That the absent spouse has been missing returned.
for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance After the required number of years lapsed,
occurred where there is danger of death Gregorio filed a case for declaration of
2. That the present spouse wishes to presumptive death of an absent spouse.
remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well- He said that he wrote letters which were never
founded belief that the absentee is dead; responded to by Janet and were tagged as
and “Return to Sender.” But he did not bother to
4. That the present spouse files a summary present the letters in court. He also said that he
proceeding for the declaration of went to the place where they first met, which is a
presumptive death of the absentee bar.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded Mostly his evidence is his own testimony that he
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a inquired to Janet’s friends and relatives but he
petition for declaration of presumptive death can never bothered to inquire in the British Embassy
be granted. Thus, mere absence of the spouse the whereabouts of his missing spouse.
(even for such period required by the law), lack
of any news that such absentee is still alive, RULING: The SC denied the petition for
failure to communicate or general presumption of declaration of presumptive death. The evidence
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. presented by Nolasco was too sketchy to form a
60
reasonable and well-founded belief that the to the house of his parents-in-law on February
absent spouse is dead. 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had
just been there but that she left without notice.
REPUBLIC v. ALEGRO
Lastly, respondent did report and seek the help
FACTS: In 2001, Alan Alegro filed a Petition in of the local police authorities and the NBI to
the RTC for the declaration of presumptive death locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought.
of his wife, Lea Julaton. At the hearing, Alan
deduced that he and Lea were married in 1995 Dean: There are so many factors which will
in Samar. defeat the claim of the husband that he had a
well-founded belief that the spouse is already
During the hearing, Alan testified that Lea arrived dead. First is that he reported it too late – only
home late in the evening and he berated her for six (6) years later. Second, he did not even
always being out of their house. He told her that bother to inquire from his parents-in-law and
if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would announce the disappearance on the radio.
be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea
did not reply. REPUBLIC v. CATUBAG
Alan narrated that, in 1995, when he reported for FACTS: In the case at bar, private respondent
work the following day, Lea was still in the house, first took a leave of absence from his work in
but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea the United Arab Emirates and returned to the
was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then
merely went to her parents' house in Bliss, Sto. proceeded to inquire about his wife's
Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not whereabouts from their friends and relatives in
return to their house anymore. Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent
aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known
Alan further testified that when he went to the radio station, regarding the fact of disappearance
house of Lea’s parents, Lea’s friend but she was of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited
not there. He even sought the help of Barangay various hospitals and funeral parlors in
Captain Juan Magat as well as inquired about her Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.
whereabouts but to no avail. He likewise reported
Lea’s disappearance to the local police station RULING: No well-founded belief. Taken
and to the NBI in year 2001. together, the Court is of the view that private
respondent's efforts in searching for his missing
What’s peculiar about this case, aside from the wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive.
delayed reporting of the husband to NBI, is that
the husband did not go to the parents-in-law. The Private respondent could have easily convinced
parents-in-law also are owners of radio station. the Court otherwise by providing evidence which
corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent proves explanation or justification was given for these
that he has well-founded belief. glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it by some other
RULING: No. The belief of the present spouse means than mere allegations.
must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the Stripped of private respondent's mere
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether allegations, only the act of broadcasting his wife's
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. alleged disappearance through a known radio
station was corroborated. This act comes
In the case at bar, respondent failed to present a nowhere close to establishing a well-founded
witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At
The respondent even failed to present Janeth most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that
Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person she abandoned the family.
from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea
to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, To accept private respondent's bare allegations
the respondent admitted that when he returned would be to apply a liberal approach in complying
61
with the requisite of establishing a well-founded It terminates the subsequent marriage, and the
belief that the missing spouse is dead. consequent effects of Art. 43 would follow. But it
would not erase the other effects of a person
MANUEL v. PEOPLE being declared presumptively dead.
FACTS: Manuel was married to Ruby. Allegedly, The SC said, since it was filed in the proper
Ruby was incarcerated because of conviction of a period, she could no longer avail of the remedies
crime. 21 years later, he took a 21 year old of appeal or petition for relief because she filed it
bride. more than 2 years after the court declared her
presumptively dead. Then, annulment of
The second wife entertained doubts as to the judgment is the appropriate remedy.
marital status of her husband. Thus, she
investigated and found out that the husband has The status of subsequent marriage contracted by
been actually previously married to Ruby in 1976. the husband of Celerina is void for being
As such, a bigamy charge was instituted. bigamous.
One of the defenses raised by Manuel has to do TLC LECTURE:

with the presumption of death. According to him,
the first wife was convicted of a crime sometime The filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance is
in the 1970s and since then, he never heard from not the proper remedy on the grounds that it
her again. According to Manuel, the presumption effectively admits that the spouse was indeed
of death should automatically arise upon the absent.
lapse of the period in Art. 41 without need of
judicial declaration. Since the spouse acted in bad faith, annulment
of judgment would be the proper remedy. With
RULING: The SC did not agree. Since the second this, the spouse in good faith may bring the
marriage was celebrated after the effectivity of spouse who was in bad faith to court with
the Family Code, he should have complied with criminal charges of bigamy or concubinage, or
Article 41 by filing the appropriate petition for adultery, whichever is appropriate, and obtain
declaration of presumptive death. It is also for his the consequences of having any children that
own protection and the protection of the they may have had become illegitimate or
subsequent spouse. making their property regime a simple co-
ownership under Article 148 instead of a
If you do not secure the judicial declaration of community property regime.
presumptive death, even if your spouse is
absent, you risk being prosecuted for bigamy. Santos v. Santos as distinguished from Article 44
SANTOS v. SANTOS Article 44. If both spouses of the subsequent

marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall
In a case where the spouse was declared be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
presumptively dead through fraudulent marriage and testamentary dispositions made
machinations, when in fact she was well alive, by one in favor of the other are revoked by
what is the proper remedy? operation of law.
RULING: The Supreme Court said that the filing On the other hand, Article 44 requires BOTH
of affidavit of reappearance would only have the parties to be in bad faith, before the subsequent
effect of terminating the subsequent marriage, marriage is void ab initio. If only one spouse to
and no other. It will not erase the effects of the the subsequent marriage was in bad faith, the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. marriage shall be treated as valid, essentially for
It would not be appropriate if she will file an the protection of the innocent spouse.
affidavit of reappearance because the effect of
affidavit of reappearance is limited to those However, in the Santos case, the SC ruled that if
mentioned in Art. 43. the petition for declaration of the presumptive
death was procured by the present spouse in bad
62
faith, the subsequent marriage the present Dean: I have an issue with this. Paano nga kung
spouse contracted would be void ab initio for good faith yung subsequent spouse? Paano kung
being bigamous because only a subsequent isa lang yung bad faith? Because, regardless,
marriage contracted in good faith is protect by they will be illegitimated.
law.
Paragraph 2
On the other hand, it is the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance which would have the The absolute community of property or the
effect of terminating the subsequent marriage, conjugal partnership existing in that subsequent
not the mere fact of reappearance. marriage shall be dissolved and liquidated,
Q: What would be the effects if there is such without prejudice to the forfeiture of the share of
a recording of the affidavit of reappearance? the spouse in bad faith, in the net profits of the
ACP or the CPG.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article Definition of Net Profit [Cross-reference to Article
shall produce the following effects: 102 (4)]
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage - Difference in value between the market value
conceived prior to its termination shall be of the properties at the time of the
considered legitimate; celebration of the marriage and the market
value of the properties at the time of the
(2) The absolute community of property or the dissolution.
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either Clarification: Kung walang pinagsimulan
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, (walang properties at the time of the marriage),
his or her share of the net profits of the whether the parties are governed by ACP or CPG,
community property or conjugal partnership everything they acquire will be treated as profits.
property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the Because, if we say difference in value between
children of the guilty spouse by a previous the market value at the time of the celebration of
marriage or in default of children, the innocent the marriage and the market value of the
spouse; properties at the time of the dissolution, if there
are no properties to begin with, all of them will
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall be treated as net profits upon the dissolution of
remain valid, except that if the donee the marriage.
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by Q: Why is that important?
operation of law;
Illustration: Sps. A and B started with Php
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the 500,000 as the market value of their common
designation of the other spouse who acted in properties.
bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy,
even if such designation be stipulated as At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the
irrevocable; and properties are now worth Php 1,500,000.
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent A was declared as the spouse in bad faith.
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and Q: What portion of the Php 1,500,000 will he
intestate succession. forfeit?
Discussion of Effects under Art. 43 - CADIS A: The difference in value between the market
value at the time of the celebration of the
Paragraph 1 marriage and the market value of the properties
at the time of the dissolution, if there are no
properties to begin with, all of them will be
63
treated as net profits upon the dissolution of the

marriage, which is Php 1,000,000. Dean: There is no such proceeding the sole
purpose of which is to declare a person
He will lose his share in the profits of Php presumptively dead. You appoint a representative
1,000,000; but he will retain his share in the Php of the absentee for purposes of taking charge of
500,000. the affairs or the properties of the absentee. If
your only purpose is to declare the absentee
However, if they started with nothing, and then presumptively dead, wala lang, that’s not an
at the end of the marriage, they have Php authorized proceeding. There is no such
1,000,000; everything will be treated as profits. proceedings under our rules for the declaration of
presumptive death of a person.
Therefore, the forfeiture will be in the entire Php
1,000,000; hence, he ends up with nothing. RULING: The AFP can make its own
determination on the basis of the presumption
TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC established by Art. 390 or 391, whether they
would grant death benefits to the claimant. Kasi
Doctrine: The presumption of death under nag layout naman ang mismong law when a
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by person is presumed dead. All they need to do is
operation of law, without need of a court to look at the provision and determine the facts
declaration, once the factual conditions surrounding the disappearance of Estrellita’s
mentioned in the said articles are established. husband and from there they can make their own
decision on whether to grant the death benefits
Summary: Wilfredo Matias, a member of the or not.
Philippine Constabulary, has been missing for
more than 30 years. But to require her to still to file for a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is uncalled for
Petitioner-spouse Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed for because there is no such thing as a petition solely
a petition for a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of declaring a person
of her husband in the RTC of Tarlac in order to presumptively dead.
claim benefits.
Question from student: The proper procedure
The RTC granted the petition under Art. 41 of the assuming that if PVAO really requires it, proper
Family Code. The CA set aside such decision procedure is for the settlement of the estate and
stating that Art. 41 will only apply for purpose of then to move to declare the husband as
remarriage and that what is used should either presumptively dead so she should properly get
be Art. 390 or 391 of the Civil Code. the declaration?
Furthermore, the CA held that the petition should
have been dismissed outright by the RTC as such Dean: No. Why would you secure a declaration of
action cannot be the subject of an independent presumptive death? Sinabi na nga ng SC na the
action or proceeding. The SC affirmed the CA’s AFP can determine kasi sila naman nag-assign
decision. dun sa tao nila kung saan nila pinapuntang
lupalop yun. Bakit mo irerequire eh kayo nag
Q: What should instead be done by the AFP assign. So saan mo ba pinadala. Dapat kayo
in order for it to grant the death benefits to merong record kung saan yung last assignment
Estrellita? ng asawa ni Estrellita.
A: The SC held that the AFP and PVAO should Follow up: Other cases assigned about
have asked for any proof of evidence from the presumptive death, the SC is consistent in ruling
claimant who is seeking for the death benefits. In that certiorari is the only remedy from the ruling
this case, the AFP and PVAO may consider the of the RTC declaring the spouse presumptively
invocation of Estrellita of the presumptive death dead.
of her husband and from there, decide whether
they will grant the benefit or not instead for Dean: It is not appealable by the way. A
asking for the petition for declaration of judgement declaring a person presumptively
presumptive death dead under Art 41 following Lorino v. Republic is
64
not appealable because it is covered by summary

proceedings and under Art 247 of the FC: Annulment of marriage is based on the following
Judgements rendered by the court in cases grounds:
covered by summary proceedings are
immediately final and executory. 1. Lack Parental Consent
2. Unsoundness of mind
But it doesn’t mean that you cannot assail the 3. Fraud
judgment of the trial court declaring a person 4. Force, Intimidation, Undue Influence
presumptively dead. You just do not do it by 5. Incapability
ordinary appeal but by certiorari under Rule 65. 6. Sexually Transmissible Disease
Q: With regards Art 40: If for example, the TLC NOTES:

second marriage, there was a judgment
convicting the accused with the crime of bigamy, Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of
can the second spouse use that judgment as the following causes, existing at the time of the
proof of final judgment when she wants to marriage:
remarry or kailangan may separate declaration,
civil action instituted? 1) That the party in whose behalf it is
sought to have the marriage annulled
Dean: Meron. Dapat separate. was 18 yrs. of age or over but below 21,
and the marriage was solemnized
NOTE: It will not cause multiplicity of suit due to without the consent of the parents,
the nature of the case. (Criminal v. Civil) guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that
Question on the Manuel case: The SC made a order, unless after attaining the age of
discussion on the requirement of intent for 21, such party freely cohabited with the
bigamy to be consummated. Ang resolution ng other and both lived together as husband
SC sa Manuel is hindi naman siya requires as and wife;
long as there is a subsequent marriage
celebrated while the first marriage is subsisting Action for Annulment (Art. 47)
regardless of intent. May rulings ang SC na when
the marriage is voidable because the second By: The party whose parent of guardian did not
marriage was entered into by the accused give his or her consent
through fraud, intimidation, violence or other
undue influence then there is no bigamy because When: Within 5 years after attaining the age of
the accused is merely forced to remarry into the 21
second marriage.
By: The parent or guardian or person having
Dean: Yes, but it depends on who was forced. If legal charge of the minor
it was the accused, then that would constitute a
prejudicial question. You are talking about When: At any time before such party has reached
Landicho case. (Landicho v Relova) the age of 21
Pag yun ang circumstances, ikaw yung pinilit. At Sample Problem: Let’s say a marriage
gun point, you were forced to marry the second between A (18 years old who did not secure
spouse, then that even if it’s voidable then that parental consent) and B (26 years old).
can constitute a defense in a bigamy case.
Q: Can B file a petition for annulment?
Follow up: Isn’t that an admission of the SC that
intent is required for conviction in bigamy cases? A: No because he is not a proper party
pursuant to Article 4. Only A or the parents of
Dean: To enter into the second marriage. A can do that.
ANNULMENT
65
2) Was of unsound mind, unless such party Action for Annulment (Art. 47)
after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife; By: The injured party
Action for Annulment (Art. 47) When: Within 5 years after the marriage
By: (1) The sane spouse who had no knowledge Dean: I’d like to emphasize the ground of fraud
of the other’s insanity and STD and incapability to consummate.
(2) Any relative guardian or person having legal The same definition with your laws on contracts
charge of the insane regarding force, intimidation, or undue influence
would also apply.
When: At any time before the death of either
party (or during the lifetime) In Fraud, the circumstances enumerated under
the law are limited and these are only 4
By: The insane spouse circumstances under Article 46.
When: During a lucid interval or after regaining Article 46. Any of the ff. circumstances shall
sanity constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding article:
3) Consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards, with (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by
full knowledge of the facts constituting final judgment of a crime involving moral
the fraud, freely cohabited together as turpitude;
husband and wife; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was
Action for Annulment (Art. 47) pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
By: The injured party (3) Concealment of a STD, regardless of its
nature, existing at the time of marriage; or
When: Within 5 years (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
4) Consent of either party was obtained by existing at the time of marriage.
force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 46
cohabited with the other as husband and
wife; Item 1
Action for Annulment (Art. 47) Hindi kasali jan ang jaywalking,violation of the
anti-smoking law. Moral turpitude involves the
By: The injured party moral depravity of the character of the offender.
For example, murder or rape.
When: Within 5 years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or The non-disclosure must be for a conviction by
ceased final judgment. So if at the time of the marriage,
the judgment is not final, that is not considered
5) Physically incapable of consummating as fraud under Article 46 in relation to Article 45.
the marriage, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be Item 2
incurable; or
REPUBLIC v. VILLACORTA
6) Afflicted with an STD found to be (2021)
serious and appears to be incurable.
66
FACTS: Melvin and Janufi Villacorta were in a burden of proving that Janufi acted with bad faith
relationship which ended in 2001. and fraudulent intent with clear and convincing
evidence. The OSG correctly holds that while
A month after they reconciled, Janufi got Janufi may have misrepresented the state of
pregnant and began living together. After almost her chastity prior to her and Melvin's
three years, Melvin and Janufi finally got married reconciliation, it appears that she honestly
in 2004 and had a second child. believed in good faith that Mejan Dia was
the child of Melvin. As there was no bad faith
Due to a series of quarrels regarding the issue of on her part, she cannot be guilty of concealment.
paternity as to their first child, Melvin decided to
finally take a DNA test, which revealed that he Dean: Even if the woman has an illegitimate
was not the father of the first child. child by a prior relationship and it was concealed,
and later on, years after the marriage, the
He filed for annulment which was granted by the husband discovered the existence of the
RTC. The Supreme Court reversed the decision illegitimate child, that would not also constitute
ruling that the circumstances of fraud that fraud.
warrant annulment of marriage are exclusive and
restrictive. As Janufi's purported fraud does not Q: What category does this fall?
squarely fall under Article 46 (2), the same A: No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
cannot serve as a ground for annulment. character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity will
give rise to a cause of action for annulment of
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between marriages.
Melvin and Janufi should be annulled on the basis
that Janufi concealed her pregnancy of another Q: What is the danger sought to be avoided
man’s child. by making the concealment of pregnancy as
a ground to annul the marriage? Kasi yung
Ruling: In the instant case, the facts readily concealment ng illegitimate child is also bad, but
reveal that Mejan Dia was already almost three it is not considered fraudulent. Parang ang kasal,
years old when Melvin and Janufi got married on parang corporation din yan, meron due diligence.
August 4, 2004. As Janufi was not pregnant at Investigate the background.
the time of the marriage, any purported fraud
she may have committed to induce Melvin to A: The law seeks to prevent the scenario where
marry her cannot be considered the fraudulent the husband ends up supporting a child that is
concealment contemplated under Article 46(2). not his child. Yun ang danger kaya siya ginawang
ground for annulment.
Indeed, the Court has held that not all fraudulent
acts can be invoked to annul a marriage. The The concealment must have been possible or
circumstances of fraud under Article 45(3) are believable like in the case of Aquino v. Delizo.
exclusive and restrictive.
AQUINO v. DELIZO
As Janufi's purported fraud does not squarely fall
under Article 46 (2), the same cannot serve as a FACTS: Ferdinand filed a complaint for
ground for annulment. It is of no moment that annulment on the ground of fraud. He alleged
the RTC found that Melvin would probably not that Conchita, concealed from the latter that fact
have married Janufi had he known that he was that she was pregnant by another man, and
not the father of Mejan Dia. sometime in April 1955, or about four months
after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her
Not falling within the restrictive grounds provided answer, defendant claimed that the child was
under Article 46, the wisdom of whether Janufi's conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and
purported fraud should likewise be considered a the plaintiff.
ground for annulment is a policy question better
left to the political branches of the government. Fernando, on MR, prayed for a New Trial on the
ground on new evidence including Affidavit of
Even assuming that Article 46(2) was applicable, Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-
the Court finds that Melvin failed to discharge his law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant
67
was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the
married her, and with whom defendant has contents of the motion and its annexes, the same
begotten two more children, aside from her first can best be determined only after hearing
born, in common-law relationship) admitting that evidence. In the circumstance, we think that
he is the father of defendant's first born, justice would be better served if a new trial were
Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and ordered.
defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the
time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant. Dean: The Court in Aquino v. Delizo annulled the
marriage. But in Buccat v. Buccat, it refused to
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annul. Considering that at 7 months, you can
annulled on the ground of concealing pregnancy hardly conceal it, so it is no longer considered
of another man’s child before marriage. fraud.
RULING: Under the new Civil Code, concealment No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
by the wife of the fact that at the time of the character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity will
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than constitute such fraud as to give rise to a cause of
her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for action for annulment of marriages. If prior to the
annulment of marriage. marriage, the woman or even the man had
sexual relationship with another like in Anaya v.
Here, the defendant wife was alleged to be only Paraloan.
more than four months pregnant at the time of
her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are ANAYA v. PARALOAN
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was FACTS: Defendant Fernando divulged to plaintiff
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. Aurora that he had a pre-marital relationship with
a close relative of his. As a result, Aurora filed a
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th nullification of their marriage on the ground of
month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a non-divulgement of the pre-marital relationship.
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus,
that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the Issue: Whether or not the pre-marital
lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly relationship is a ground for the annulment of
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only marriage.
to fat formation on the lower part of the
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of Ruling: NO. For fraud to be a vice of consent, it
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's must come under the enumeration provided for
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, under the Civil Code. In the case, the prevailing
making the roundness of the abdomen more law was the Civil Code. However, the same
general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, provision was adopted in the Family Code. The
defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly provision has a restricted enumeration, and it
be expected to know, merely by looking, whether says that if none of the circumstances appear in
or not she was pregnant at the time of their the provision of the law, it shall not be one of the
marriage more so because she must have grounds for fraud. Pre-marital relationship is
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. not one of the enumerated grounds; hence,
the marriage cannot be annulled on the said
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be ground.
introduced at the new trial, taken together with
what has already been adduced would, in our Item 3 and 4
opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged
by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, Dean: The other concealment or fraud mentioned
therefore, not have denied the motion praying for in Art. 46 is concealment of lesbianism,
new trial simply because defendant failed to file homosexuality, or drug addiction of the
her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant respondent.
cannot be taken as evidence of collusion,
especially since a provincial fiscal has been Drug addiction, alcoholism, or lesbianism or
ordered of represent the Government precisely to homosexuality may either be a ground for
68
declaration of nullity under Art. 36 if it is a Q: For example, a person wants to marry

physical manifestation of psychological who is homosexual. He wants to get married
incapacity; or, it may be a ground for annulment to fulfill wishes of the family. The
if it was existing at the time of the marriage but community knows that he is homosexual
it was concealed. Or it could also be a ground for and he did not conceal the homosexuality.
legal separation under Article 55 if it existed only The wife did not ask. Will it be a ground for
after the solemnization of the marriage. annulment?
Q: Is homosexuality or lesbianism inherent Dean: If you say that he did not conceal and he
or acquired? was vocal about it and it is common knowledge,
how can it be concealment?
A: It can be inherent or acquired through social
interactions. Q: So the marriage cannot be annulled?
Dean: That bolsters the provision of Art. 45 in Dean: You go through another route.
relation to Art. 46, and Art. 55 that it may not be
existing at the time of celebration of marriage. It Q from student: On impotency, under Art. 45
may have existed after the celebration of of the FC, what is considered as an
marriage. impotent? Author say that it is the inability
to perform sexual act. For example the
Now, it is acceptable because they are now a partner can perform the sexual act but for
community (LGBTQIA+). some reason they cannot produce children
or the male cannot perform the act totally or
Q: On the concealment of sexually have an erection. What does Art. 45 refer?
transmissible disease at the time of
celebration of marriage, how does this differ Dean: It is the inability to consummate the
from STD under Art. 45 paragraph 6? marriage. If there’s a possibility that either the
man or a woman can have a little erection, that is
A: As an independent ground for annulment, the not a ground for annulment.
STD must be existing at the time of the marriage
and it must be incurable. Q: For example, the male can have an
erection. That is not a ground for annulment
If you are going to make use of fraud, the STD even if they cannot have children?
regardless of whether it is curable or not and it
was concealed, the correct ground is fraud and Dean: No, it is not a ground. Inability to
not STD. consummate the marriage or impotency as
others refer the condition is the inability to
Q from student: Regarding fraud for copulate. The other situation who cannot have
concealment of pregnancy of a woman, children is an inability to procreate. Those are 2
what if during the marriage the woman is different things. “Baog” is not included. The FC
already pregnant and she did not tell her says is inability to consummate the marriage
husband. However, later on she aborted the which refers to the performance of the sexual
child or it died without knowledge of the act, not the inability to bear children.
husband. Can it still be a ground for
annulment? In the Jimenez case, it was the woman who was
allegedly not able to consummate the marriage
Dean: If the husband can prove that at the time because there was something wrong with her
of celebration of the marriage the wife was reproductive organ, the wife did not undergo the
pregnant, it is possible. The point of the matter is medical examination. The SC can not rely solely
how can he prove if the child was already on the testimony of the husband.
aborted. As long as you can prove that there was
a concealment of pregnancy by a person other In case of sexual transmissible disease or
than the husband, that’s possible. incapability to consummate, 5 years fixed is the
prescriptive period. After the lapse of the period
from the date of the marriage, you can no longer
69
seek annulment because there has been a there is only one act of physical violence it must
ratification for that ground of nullification. be for the purpose for the spouse to change the
political or religious affiliation.
TITLE II
LEGAL SEPARATION Item 8
KEY: RAFPALCASA Unlike the Civil Code, the Family Code makes
sexual infidelity as a ground of legal separation
Article 55. A petition for legal separation may without necessarily proving the elements of
be filed on any of the following grounds: adultery or concubinage.
1) Repeated physical violence or grossly Q: What kind of infidelity is referred to in

abusive conduct directed against the Article 55? In a virtual world, is infidelity
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the possible? If what is involved is virtual
petitioner; infidelity, would that count as a ground?
2) Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change religious or Dean: Yes, it does not make it less of an offense
political affiliation; regardless of whether if it is actual or virtual.
3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce Even if there is no physical contact, it should be
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of considered as a ground for legal separation.
the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or Perversion is any abnormal coitus. Any act which
inducement; is not supposed to be normal human intercourse,
4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent will be considered as an act of perversion.
to imprisonment of more than six years, However, it is a relative term.
even if pardoned;
5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the Q: What do you understand by relative term?
respondent;
6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the A: Susceptible to different interpretations
respondent;
7) Contracting by the respondent of a Q: Let us say couple X and Y, they both enjoy
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in physical violence during the sexual act. Can
the Philippines or abroad; either of them complain?
8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9) Attempt by the respondent against the life A: No, because if they have the same sexual
of the petitioner; or orientation, neither of them can complain that
10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent the other is guilty of perversion.
without justifiable cause for more than one
year. Hindi lang pwede is pag hindi kayo match, that
would create a problem. But if pareho kayong
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" pervert, then walang problema kasi pareho kayo
shall include a child by nature or by adoption. ng sexual orientation.
TLC NOTES: Usual example given by authors is having sex

with animals, but that really is the highest level
Prescriptive period: 5 yrs. from the time of the of perversion.
occurrence of the cause. (Art. 57)
DEFENSES
DEAN:
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall
Item 2 be denied on any of the following grounds:
The physical violence may be repeated, or it may C – Condonation of aggrieved party

only constitute one act of physical violence, but if C – Consent of aggrieved party
70
C – Collusion securing the decree

C – Connivance Example: The spouse Example: Parties may
R – Recrimination (Commission of the same asked his guard to just make it appear
offense) seduce his wife. in court, husband and
P – Prescription (Art. 57) wife agree that the
Brought the downfall of wife will say this and
Cooling-off period: 6 months (Art. 58) the other spouse by the husband will not
employing third person contend. May or may
Defenses in legal separation to commit marital not be marital
offense. offense.
C4P2
NOTE:
 Condonation
 Consent Collusion in legal separation means there is an
 Connivance agreement. There would be collusion if the
 Collusion parties had arranged to make it appear that a
 Prescription OFF matrimonial offense had been committed
In Pari delicto * COOLING
 although it was not, or if the parties had
perIoD connived to bring about a legal separation even
CONDONATION in the absence of grounds therefor.
When we speak of condonation, there must have PRESCRIPTION

been the commission of a marital offense which
the other party has forgiven. That’s why it is Article 57. An action for legal separation shall
condonation. It comes after the commission of
e be filed within five years from the time of the
the marital offense, -
but consent comes before. occurrence of the cause.
So even before the spouse commits the marital
offense there’s already the consent given by the Any action for legal separation must be filed
other. That would also defeat a petition for legal within 5 years from the date of occurrence of the
separation. cause. Within 5 years from the date not of
discovery but occurrence of the cause.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital
offense constituting a ground for legal separation Pari Delicto (Mutual Guilt)
or, as stated in I Bouver’s Law Dictionary, p. 585,
condonation is the “conditional forgiveness or ONG v. ONG
remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial
offense which the latter has committed“. FACTS: William Ong and Lucia Ong has been
married for 20 years. Lucia argued that William
CONNIVANCE has been abusive to her and to their children,
struck physical and words of violence to her. As a
CONNIVANCE COLLUSION result, she left her husband.
Passive permission is The party consents to
given to the spouse to the commission of a The trial Court and CA found the testimonies of
commit the marital marital offense and Lucia, her sister, and Dr. Elinzano credible.
offense and it usually the difference is that
involves the there may be or may RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the
participation of a third be not the findings of fact of the lower and appellate courts
person which was hired commission of the as it was established that Lucia left William due
or connived with the marital offense. to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
other spouse precisely abandonment contemplated by the said
to secure the Parties will make it provision; thus, there is no pari delicto.
commission of the appear that there
marital offense of the was a marital offense Doctrine: Following Art. 56, par. (4) of the
other. for the purpose of Family Code which provides that legal separation
71
shall be denied when both parties have given The husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife
ground for legal separation. The abandonment for two (2) nights despite his alleged belief that
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment she was unfaithful to him, amount to a
without justifiable cause for more than one condonation of her previous and supposed
year. In pari delicto does not apply in this case. adulterous acts.
Dean: It is more of a self-preservation on the Q: Will condonation cover future acts of

part of the wife Lucia that’s why she left the infidelity?
conjugal dwelling. It is not the abandonment that
would constitute a ground for legal separation. A: No. Condonation only covers the present acts.
The Court said that William’s defense is
untenable. Q: How about consent?
OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO A: Yes. So, if husband and wife gave each other
permission to seek their respective sexual
Summary: Action for legal separation by Jose de partners, while the agreement is void in the eyes
Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of the law, this might be a good defense in legal
of adultery. The CFI of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. separation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was
a confession of judgment, plus condonation or Dean: In condonation, there must be
consent to the adultery and prescription. condonation each time. Before the court grants
it, however, there must be a “cooling period”. To
Doctrine: Collusion in legal separation means let the parties’ emotion settle down to make sure
there is an agreement. There would be collusion that the parties really wanted to legally
if the parties had arranged to make it appear that separate.
a matrimonial offense had been committed
although it was not, or if the parties had connived However, under RA 9262, it dispenses with
to bring about a legal separation even in the cooling off period, if the ground raised in the
absence of grounds therefor petition is physical violence. Once there is a
petition for legal separation on the ground of
Q: In this case, the wife practically physical violence, the court would no longer wait
admitted, should that prevent the court for 6 months cooling off period.
from issuing a decree of separation just
because there was an admission? Dean: If there is physical violence involved,
Court may issue a TPO or Temporary Protection
A: No, the admission of the wife is not the Order, which is issued ex parte, but even prior to
confession contemplated by the law because that under the VAWC Law, the victim can also file
there are still other evidences to prove/support a petition for BPO or Barangay Protection Order,
the commission of the marital offense, then the which is also issued ex parte, and it should be
court should still grant it. issued by the barangay officers on the same day
that it was applied for. Similar to TPO, it should
Dean: Kaya kung kayo aking mga creditors, ang also be issued even without hearing. But a
dami kong utang sa inyo then perhaps, I could Permanent Protection Order shall only be issued
negotiate sa inyo. after notice and hearing.
BUGAYONG v. GINES If the legal separation is granted, the spouses

shall now be entitled to live separately from each
RULING: The Supreme Court agreed with the other. The absolute community or the conjugal
trial judge that despite his belief that his wife was partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated
unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended without prejudice to the forfeiture of the spouse
spouse, of any action for legal separation against who was declared the guilty spouse in the net
the offending wife, because his said conduct profits of the absolute community or the conjugal
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the partnership.
Civil Code.
72
Q: Is it possible that even after the decree is mandatory provisions of said Article 372 of the
issued that spouses reconcile? New Civil Code.
Dean: Yes, it is possible. They may have to file a After the legal separation has been granted, the
joint manifestation under oath in the Court which woman should continue using the surname
issued the decree that they have decided to employed before the legal separation was issued
reconcile but any liquidation of the absolute because there was no severance of marital bond.
community or conjugal partnership or separation To allow her to change her surname after the
of properties shall remain after they have issuance of the decree might give the impression
reconciled unless they also agree to revive their that the marriage bond was already dissolved.
former property regime.
ILLUSTRATION:
As to children, once decree is issued, ordinarily,
children are awarded to innocent spouse without Q. Supposed Maria Cruz is married to Jin
prejudice to the provisions on parental authority Tan. What would be the wrong name to
under Article 213 particularly the maternal use?
preference rule.
Maria Cruz Maria Cruz Tan
One other effect of legal separation is that it Maria Tan Mrs Maria Tan
disqualifies the guilty spouse to inherit from the Mrs Jin Tan
innocent spouse by intestate succession and if
there is a will in favor of the guilty spouse, the A: Mrs Maria Tan is wrong. I am the mistress
provisions in the will of the innocent spouse in of, Mrs is mistress of, you cannot be mistress
favor of the guilty spouse are revoked by of yourself. The correct version is Mrs Jin Tan.
operation of law (pursuant to Article 63). But If you insist on using Mrs Maria Tan, put the
what the law speaks about is a will executed by Mrs in parenthesis so others would know that
the innocent spouse BEFORE the issuance of the you know that it is the incorrect version.
decree of legal separation.
Q: Is it the obligation of the wife to use the
You cannot revoke something which was not surname of the husband?
existing before the issuance of the decree of legal
separation. If the will was executed AFTER the A: No. However, once the wife uses the
decree was issued by the court, that is not husband's surname, should continue using it. It is
covered by the revocation. like jurisdiction, it attaches.
Q: Will that not constitute unworthiness on Q. What does a woman change when she
the part of the guilty spouse? marries?
Dean: It may constitute an act of unworthiness A: Civil status not the name. hence no obligation
but the unworthiness there was erased because to use the surname of husband. Remember,
the institution of the guilty spouse operates as a jurisdiction yung surname. Once you use it, it
written pardon. Therefore, guilty spouse will attaches.
inherit.
Q from student: What if I obtain a decree of
Q: After the decree of legal separation is legal separation and later on, I want him to
granted, can the wife resume or change her be declared psychological incapacitated, can
surname if she uses the surname of her I file under Article 36?
husband?
Dean: Yes. There are cases decided by the
LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC Supreme Court.
RULING: Legal separation alone not ground for TLC NOTES:

wife’s change of name because to hold otherwise,
would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
73
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed the support of the family. The expenses for
unless the Court has taken steps toward the such support and other conjugal obligations
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, shall be paid from the community property
despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly and, in the absence thereof, from the income
improbable. or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from
corresponding joint manifestation under oath the separate properties.
duly signed by them shall be filed with the court
in the same proceeding for legal separation. Art. 71. The management of the household
shall be the right and the duty of both spouses.
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the The expenses for such management shall be
preceding Article shall have the following paid in accordance with the provisions of Article
consequences: 70.
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still Dean: They are enumerated on Article 68 to 71:
pending, shall thereby be terminated at
whatever stage; and ● To live together
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall ● Observe mutual love, respect and fidelity;
be set aside, but the separation of and
property and any forfeiture of the share of ● Render mutual help and support.
the guilty spouse already effected shall
subsist, unless the spouse agree to revive These obligations, except the obligation to give
their former property regime. support, are considered to be purely personal to
the spouses and it cannot be compelled by court
The court’s order containing the foregoing shall action. Only support can be compelled by court
be recorded in the proper civil registries. action since these deal with money and
properties. This can be filed by court action by
All the creditors will have to be included in the appropriate action for support.
verified petition for the revival of the former
property regime. The addresses and amount ARROYO v. ARROYO
owed to the creditors. The courts will protect the
creditors who gave you money or credit. FACTS: The parties were married in 1910 and
lived together as man and wife until 1920, when
TITLE III the wife went away from their common home
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN with the intention of living separately.
HUSBAND AND WIFE
The husband then instituted an action to compel
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to the wife to return to the matrimonial home.
live together, observe mutual love, respect and However, the wife averred by way of defense and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. cross-complaint that she was forced to leave
because of cruel treatment on the part of her
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the husband.
family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide. ISSUE: Whether or not a spouse can be
compelled his/her spouse, through court
The court may exempt one spouse from living action, to live together.
with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons RULING: It is not within the court to attempt
for the exemption. However, such exemption one of the spouses to cohabit and render marital
shall not apply if the same is not compatible obligations and conjugal rights to the other.
with the solidarity of the family.
The obligation to live together cannot be
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for compelled by any proceedings in the court. The
74
reason is that it is a mere voluntary act of the

spouses. In case, one of the spouse decides to ILUSORIO v. ILUSORIO
leave the conjugal home, the other spouse
cannot seek an order to compel the other spouse ISSUE: Whether Erlinda can secure a Writ of
to return. Habeas Corpus to compel her husband to live
with her.
Q: Is the wife entitled to be supported by
the husband outside the conjugal dwelling? Ruling: NO. Marital rights including living in a
conjugal dwelling cannot be enforced through a
R: In this case, it has been held that the wife petition for habease corpus because the court is
cannot be entitled to the alimony because there not empowered to compel the husband to live
is evidence showing that there is jealousy on the with his wife and this is a matter beyond judicial
part of the wife which was an aggravating authority and is best left to the discretion of the
degree. While the court cannot compel her to man and the woman.
return home, it also did not find any reason to
grant the giving of the alimony to the wife. Dean: The SC said that it’s not a case of a parent
wanting to visit a child, so why would the CA
Q: How would you distinguish this from the grant visitation rights?
Goita vs. Campus-Rueda case? In that case,
the wife also left the conjugal home. It was improper for the CA to have done that
because this is a case of a wife wanting to visit
GOITIA v. CAMPUS-RUEDA her husband. No court in the Philippines or in
the world can compel the husband to see
RULING: As opposed to the case of Arroyo, the the face of his wife if he doesn’t want to.
court granted the support prayed for despite the
wife being outside the conjugal home. Kung ayaw makita, ang tawag doon, “move on”.
The Supreme Court, in this case, explained that PELAYO v. LAURON

the mere act of marriage creates an obligation on
the part of the husband to support his wife. This ISSUE: Whether the defendants Marcelo Lauron
obligation is founded not so much on the express and Juana Abella are the ones liable for the
or implied terms of the contract of marriage as expenses incurred for the medical assistance of
on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an their daughter-in-law.
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such
vital concern to the state itself that the law will Ruling: No. For the rendering of medical
not permit him to terminate it by his own assistance in case of illnesses, it is comprised
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek among the mutual obligations to which the
protection in the parental home. spouses are bound by way of their mutual
support. It is no question that when one of the
Dean: In the first, since the leaving from the spouses is ill, it should be the obligation of the
conjugal dwelling was without justifiable cause, other to furnish the necessary services so that
the SC refused to grant support outside the the other may be cured or restored to health. The
conjugal dwelling. But in the Goitia vs. Campos- party that is bound to furnish that support is the
Rueda case, the court was saying that it’s not one liable to all that expenses including medical
really requiring to leave the spouses separately, expenses.
but there was justifiable reason for the spouse to
leave the conjugal dwelling. In this case, the person who is liable to pay the
fees of Dr. Pelayo is the husband and not the
Hence, the court veered away from the usual father-in-law and mother-in-law.
ruling that the support should be in the conjugal
dwelling. Dean: He should have filed it not against the
parents-in-law who are considered strangers, but
So, it granted support to the wife outside the as against the husband of the patient.
conjugal dwelling. Ang tawag doon ay separate
maintenance.
75
Each spouse may exercise any legitimate properties from the operation of the absolute
profession, business, or activity without the need community.
of the consent of the other.
A: These are enumerated in article 92
The other spouse may only object to the exercise ● Property acquired by gratuitous title
of that profession, business or activity only on during the marriage as well as the income
valid and serious or moral grounds. or frauds of these properties,
. ● Property for personal or exclusive use of
Now, if there is any aspect of a marriage which either spouse except jewelry.
can be subject to stipulation between the parties ● Property acquired by a spouse who has
we mentioned that that is with respect to their legitimate descendants by a previous
property relationship. marriage.
Q: So, what governs the property Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from
relationship between the spouses? the community property:
A: It may be governed either by their marriage (1) Property acquired during the marriage by
settlement, which they voluntarily execute, or by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits
their inaction, the absolute community governed as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it
them by not executing a marriage settlement and is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
it also governed by the customs of the place. grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
However, I have some reservations with respect
to applicability of customs. If the spouses did not (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of
execute a marriage settlement, the automatic either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part
property relationship will be the absolute of the community property;
community, which is a complete departure from
what the Civil Code provides which is conjugal (3) Property acquired before the marriage by
partnership of gains. either spouse who has legitimate descendants
by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as
TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS the income, if any, of such property.
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
If you are you inherit something or something
A. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY was donated to you, that would be your exclusive
property including the fruits or income of the
ABSOLUTE CONJUGAL property.
COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP OF
GAINS Second is property for personal and exclusive use
The spouses bring into the spouses place in a except jewelry.
the marriage, common fund place
whatever they own at the fruits of their Q: Why is jewelry included even if it's for
the time of the separate property, the personal use of the wife or the husband?
celebration of the and the income from
marriage, and that is their work or industry A: Because of its value.
at the precise moment and the same is to be
that the exchange divided between them Q: Can the parties override Art 92 by saying
vows equally, generally, that jewelry should be excluded?
upon the dissolution of
the marriage or the A: Any property for that matter can be excluded
partnership from the absolute community by executing a
marriage settlement.
Q: So what are the exclusions from the absolute
community? Even if you did not say that these Dean: Any property for that matter can be
are excluded it is the law which exclude these excluded from the absolute community. So let’s
76
say you have a property, a business you don’t R: The Court said that the net profits are what is
want your spouse to be involved in, then you can divided equally between the two spouses. But in
include that as your separate property by this case, it was established that the spouses had
executing a marriage settlement. But if you just no separate properties.
let absolute community govern without executing
a marriage settlement, anything you own Dean: This is the meat of the controversy there.
practically goes to the pot; magiging combined They started with nothing so everything they own
lahat yun, regardless of whether you own P5.00 at the termination of the marriage would
or P5,000,000,000.00. So kung after a month, technically be considered profits for which he
nag separate kayo, nag liquidate kayo, yung would not be entitled to a share precisely
P5.00 niya [magiging] P2,500,000,002.50. Be because he is the guilty party. Magkakaroon lang
careful in choosing your property relationship. siya ng share if they started with something.
Even if he is declared the guilty party in a legal
The third paragraph of Art. 92 of the Family Code separation or under Art. 43 for that matter, he
means that if a spouse has legitimate will still be entitled to a share, not in the profits,
descendant… please take note that “descendants” but in the capital. Although we do not use capital
is the word used, not necessarily children. Let us anymore. So kung saan kayo nag simula, even if
say na lolo na siya and he decided to marry again you are declared the guilty spouse, you will still
after being a widower and he has legitimate apos have a share in those properties, but not with
in the previous relationship, all the properties respect to the profits earned by the absolute
which he owned in that prior marriage shall be community or conjugal partnership.
considered exclusive to him even if they are
governed by absolute community in the Q: What is the reason why Brigido was
subsequent marriage. In other words, yung invoking that it is Art. 102 that should apply
absolute community ng widower who’s getting and not Art. 109?
married again, and he has legitimate descendants
by that previous marriage, would start only from A: Brigido claimed that Art. 102 should apply
the celebration of the marriage because because at the start of their marriage, the Family
everything else is considered exclusive. Code was not present yet. So, the law states
there that if you did not have any marriage
What is the purpose of the law in excluding settlement, what would govern your marriage
them? To protect the descendants of the previous would be the system of conjugal partnership of
marriage. gains.
QUIAO v. QUIAO Q: But article 102 is an article on Absolute

Community. Why would he invoke that?
The Court ruled that since it was already There is a particular reason why he is saying
established that the spouses have no separate that Article 102 applies.
properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them; the listed properties are considered part of A: He invoked 102 because he still wanted to
the conjugal partnership. Thus, what remains in gain something from their separation.
the properties should be divided equally between
the spouses and/or their respective heirs. Dean: And one other thing is because it is the
However, since the trial court found Brigido the article which contains the definition of net profit.
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the So sabi niya wala namang ibang articles sa
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the Family code na nag-dedefine ng net profit. So, it
common children, pursuant to Art. 63(2) of the must be article 102 that should apply and
Family Code. therefore it should be Absolute Community.
Q: The law mentions “net profits.” Whether But, regardless of whether they would be
they are governed by absolute community governed by ACP or CPG, he would still end up
or conjugal partnership of gains, what with nothing because there were no properties at
would constitute the net profits? the beginning of the marriage.
77
The Supreme Court, in the end, did not award A: In separation of property, para lang kayong
him anything. Any properties or the share in the living under one roof but what is yours is yours,
net profits (practically everything counts as what is his is his. However, you have an
profits) would go to the children or to the obligation to share in the expenses. So parang
innocent spouse. walang merger na mangyayari sa properties
because if you choose to be governed by
Absolute Community is clear – that it involves separation of property, each spouse shall still
everything that the spouses own at the beginning own, dispose and administer his or her own
of the marriage and whatever they acquire after separate estate without the need of the consent
of the other but subject to the obligation to share
B. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS in the family expenses.
In conjugal partnership, it is called under the Old Dean: How will you do the sharing kapag
Law "Relative Community" precisely because the separation of property? Lugi ka dito kapag mas
spouses retain the ownership of all the properties malaki sweldo mo, sa separation of property,
that they own at the beginning of the marriage, because the more you earn, the more you share.
and only the fruits of this properties will initially Tandaan niyo yung concept ng separation of
be part of the conjugal partnership. property - the more you earn the more you share
in the family expenses.
So dun sila magsisimula, sa profits of their
separate properties. In ACP, everything is ILLUSTRATION:
contributed to the pot whereas in CPG, if you own
a Land and your husband owns a factory. Your So if the family expenses a month is 100,000
land is still exclusive to you and if you rent out and the husband earns 150,000 and the wife
this land, but then the rentals are conjugal, the earns 50,000. Ang sharing is 2:1.
land is exclusive. Similarly, the factory is
exclusive and whatever is earned by the factory So doon sa 100,000 expenses, the proportion
would be conjugal. There is lesser transmission in of the wife and the husband would also be two
a regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains. is to one. 333.33. Two plus one equals three.
You divide the 100,000 by three and whatever
Dean: Why the framers of the Family Code the result is, you will multiply it by 2 - that's
choose Absolute Community because according the share of the husband. So, the husband will
to them, it is more in consonance with the share 66,666, and 33,333 for the wife.
solidarity of the family. That's why, ginawa nilang
instead of CPG, ACP ang naging default property So that's separation of property.
regime.
COMMENCEMENT
Q: When will ACP govern?
Dean: Either CPG or ACP or Separation of
(1) If the parties have chosen it; property, it commences at the precise moment
(2) if the parties did not execute a marriage that the marriage is celebrated.
settlement, and
(3) if they choose a property regime, but the But in all these property regimes, Article 89 is
property regime is void. common among the three.
Dean: On the other hand, CPG can only govern There shall be no waiver of rights, interest,
the parties if they execute a marriage settlement shares and effects in the absolute community or
agreeing to be governed by CPG. conjugal partnership until after the marriage is
dissolved or annulled.
C. COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
So hindi pwede yung donations between spouses
Q: What is the concept of separation of under article 87 and this prohibition on donation
property? between spouses also applies to parties who are
78
merely living together as husband and wife If it is conjugal property, no one among the
without the benefit of marriage. spouses may dispose or encumber it without the
written marital consent of the other spouse.
Q: Why this rule?
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
A: Because if we will allow donations between contracted by the husband or the wife before or
parties living together without marriage to donate during the marriage shall not be charged to the
to each other, then they would be in a better conjugal partnership except insofar as they
position than the legal spouses. So that's the redounded to the benefit of the family.
ruling, in Joaquino v. Reyes.
Regime of Separation of Property
TLC NOTES:
Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
I. With benefit of marriage administer and enjoy his or her own separate
estate, without the need of the consent of the
3 Property Regimes: other. (Art. 144)
1. Absolute Community of Property II. Property Regime of Unions Without

2. Conjugal Partnership of Gains Marriage
3. Regime of Separation of Property
Property Regime under Art. 147
In the absence of marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of The parties are legally capacitated to marry each
absolute community of property shall govern. other but there is no marriage, or the marriage is
(Art. 75) void.
Absolute Community of Property Properties are EQUALLY divided upon dissolution

of their cohabitation, even if one of them did not
The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the actually contribute to the acquisition of the
absolute community of property. (Art. 90) property but only took care of the children or
managed the household.
Properties excluded (Art. 92):
Co-Ownership under Art. 148
1. Gratuitous Title
2. Personal use (Undergarments except The parties or one of the parties possesses a
Jewelries) legal impediment to the marriage of the parties.
3. Property acquired by a previous marriage
Distribution of properties that they have acquired
Conjugal Partnership of Gains during cohabitation based on their actual
contribution of money, property or industry to
Governed by contract of partnership (Art. 108) the acquisition of the said property.
The spouses retain ownership of their separate If they did not contribute to the acquisition of the
property. (Art. 110) property, they do not get any share at all.
However, only the product, proceeds and fruits

are placed in a common fund; which will be the TITLE V. THE FAMILY
one distributed later on in the termination of the
marriage. (Art. 106) Chapter 1. The Family as an Institution
General Rule: If a property is acquired during the Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the
marriage, it is conjugal property. (Art. 116) nation, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law.
79
(2) Debts incurred prior to the constitution of

Art. 150. Family relations include those: the Family Code;
(3) Debts secured by mortgages for Family
(1) Between husband and wife; Home even before the Family Code;
(2) Between parents and children; (4) Debts to people who helped you build your
(3) Among other descendants and Family Home.
ascendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of (Art. 160) The Family home can be subject to a
the full or half-blood. Writ of Execution. What must you prove to be
able to get the family home subject of execution
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same sale?
family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest (1) That you are a judgment creditor. That
efforts toward a compromise have been made, you have a valid claim because the
but that the same has failed. If it is shown that spouses are your debtors.
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must (2) Because of the improvements that were
be dismissed. done by the owners of the Family Home,
the actual value of the Family Home is no
Exceptions: If a stranger is involved in the longer Php 300,000 in urban areas, no
controversy. longer Php 200,000 in rural areas. It has
exceeded the statutory limits provided
under the Family Code.
Chapter 2. The Family Home
How to apply the proceeds:
There can only be ONE family home even when
there are several family residences. This is the (1) Value of the Family Home (Given to
FAMILY DWELLING. owner)
(2) Obligation (Paid to the creditor)
Who are the beneficiaries of the Family Dwelling? (3) Remains (Given to owner)
Everyone actually residing in the family home.
(Art. 154) Example:
Who may constitute the family home? Proceeds = Php 1,000,000.00

The husband or the wife or the unmarried head of Value of Family Home = Php 300,000.00
the family (Art. 156), whether judicially or extra- Obligation = Php 500,000.00
judicially. Remains = Php 200,000.00
Upon effectivity of the Family Code on the 3 rd day Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite
of August 1988, all family residences became the death of one of both spouses or of the
Family Homes provided there are actual residents unmarried head of the family for a period of 10
therein. years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
Actual value of the family home (Art. 157): same unless the court finds compelling reasons
Urban areas: Php 300,000.00 therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
Rural areas: Php 200,000.00 whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
What is the importance of Family Home (Art.
155)? TITLE VI. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
General Rule: Exempt from execution, Chapter 1. Legitimate Children

attachment or sale.
Art. 163. Children conceived or born during the
Exceptions: marriage of the parents are legitimate.
(1) Non-payment of taxes;
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Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence
to: of proof to the contrary:
(1) Bear the surnames of the father and Child of the former marriage if:
mother; 1. Born before 180 days after solemnization
(2) Receive support from parents, of subsequent marriage
ascendants, and in proper cases, brothers 2. Born within 300 days after termination of
and sisters; former marriage
(3) Be entitled to a legitime and other
successional rights Child of the subsequent marriage if:
1. Born after 180 days following the
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned solemnization of subsequent marriage
only on the following grounds:
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
(1) It was physically impossible for the born after 300 days following the termination of
husband to have sexual intercourse with the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges
his wife within the first 120 days of the such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child because of: Art. 170. The prescriptive period to impugn the
legitimacy of the child from knowledge of birth or
(a) The physical incapacity of the husband its recording in the civil register:
to have sexual intercourse with the
wife; (1) Within 1 year if the husband or any of his
heirs are residing in the municipality
(b) The fact that the husband and wife where the birth took place or where it was
were living separately in such a way recorded;
that sexual intercourse was not (2) Within 2 years if the husband or any of his
possible; or heirs are not residing in the place of birth
or where it was recorded, if they are
(c) Serious illness of the husband, which residing in the Philippines
absolutely prevented sexual (3) Within 3 years if the husband or any of his
intercourse. heirs are living abroad
(4) If the birth was concealed or unknown to
(2) That it was proved that for biological or the husband or any of his heirs, the period
other scientific reasons, the child could shall be counted from the discovery or
not have been that of the husband, except knowledge of the birth or of the fact of
in the instance provided in the 2nd registration whichever is earlier.
paragraph of Art. 164; or
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn
(3) That in case of children conceived through the filiation of the child within the period
artificial insemination, the written prescribed in the preceding article only in the
authorization or ratification of either following cases:
parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue (1) If the husband should die before the
influence. expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate (2) If he should die after the filing of the
although the mother may have declared against complaint without having desisted
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an therefrom; or
adulteress. (3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband.
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the
mother contracted another marriage within 300
days after such termination of the former Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
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Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is handwritten instrument is made by the father.
established by any of the following: Provided, that the father has the right to institute
an action before the regular courts to prove non-
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil filiation during his lifetime. (As amended by R.A.
register or a final judgment; or 9255, Mar. 4, 2009)
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
instrument and signed by the parent consist of ½ of the legitime of a legitimate child.
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the Chapter 4. Legitimated Children

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
General Rule: Children conceived and born
(1) The open and continuous possession of outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the status of a legitimate child; or conception of the former, were not disqualified by
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of any impediment to marry each other, may be
Court and special laws. legitimated. (Art. 177)
General Rule: Legitimacy may be brought by the Exception: If the parents were so disqualified
child during his or her lifetime and shall be only because either or both of them were below
transmitted to the heirs should the child die 18 years of age. (As amended by R.A. 9858,
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these December 20, 2009)
cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5 years
within which to institute the action. Art 178. Legitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
The action already commenced by the annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect
child shall survive notwithstanding the death of the legitimation.
either or both of the parties. (Art. 173)
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the
same rights as a legitimated child.
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a to the time of the child’s birth.
valid marriage are illegitimate.
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their before the celebration of marriage shall benefit
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the their descendants.
same evidence as legitimate children.
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by
General Rule: Illegitimacy may be brought by the those who are prejudiced in their rights, within 5
child during his or her lifetime. (Art. 173) years from the time their cause of action accrues.
Exception: If the action is based on Paragraph 2

of Art. 172 in which case the action may be Title VII. ADOPTION
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Domestic Adoption Law – any Filipino citizen
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the qualified under the law
surname and shall be under parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support. Qualification of Filipino Adopters
Illegitimate children may use the surname of F – Filipino of legal age

their father if their filiation has been expressly E – Emotionally and psychologically capable
recognized by the father through the record of N – Not having been convicted of a crime
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an involving moral turpitude
admission in a public document or private G – Good moral character
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I – In a position to care for his or his children expenses in going to and from school, or to and
F – Full civil capacity and civil rights from place of work.
16 – 16 years old older than the adoptee
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the
Alien adoption succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extend set forth
D – Diplomatic relations with PH in the preceding article:
M – Maintains residence in PH until adoption
decree is granted (1) The spouses;
A – Allows the adoptee to enter country of (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
adopter (3) Parents and their legitimate children and
C – Certification of Legal Capacity to Adopt the legitimate and illegitimate children of
S – Same qualifications of PH Adopters the latter;
3 – 3 continuous years of maintaining residence (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and
in PH prior to application the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter;
Exception to residence and certification: (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether
of the full or half-blood.
(1) Former Filipino citizens seeking to adopt a
relative within the 4th civil degree Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately
(2) One who seeks to adopt a legitimate son related, whether full or half-blood, are likewise
or daughter of his or her Filipino spouse bound to support each other to the full extent set
(3) One who is married to a Filipino citizen forth in Art. 194 except only when the need for
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her support of the brother or sister, being of age, is
spouse a relative within the 4th civil due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault
degree of the Filipino spouse or negligence.
Only the adopted child can file for the rescission Art. 197. For the support of the:
of the adoption
1. Legitimate ascendants;
4 grounds 2. Descendants (whether legitimate or
illegitimate);
Disinherit the child Art. 919 of Civil Code 3. Brothers and sisters (whether legitimately
or illegitimately)
Intercountry Adoption Law – any foreigner who is
qualified under this law Only the separate property of the person obliged
to give support shall be answerable provided that
Parental Authority of Natural Parents is severed. in case the obligor has no separate property, the
Parental Authority is now on the adopters. absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
if financially capable, shall advance the support,
which shall be deducted from the share of the
TITLE VIII. SUPPORT spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the
absolute community or of the conjugal
Art. 194. Support comprises everything partnership.
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal
transportation, in keeping with the financial separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
capacity of the family. declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses
and their children shall be supported from the
The education of the person entitled to be properties of the absolute community or the
supported referred to in the preceding paragraph conjugal partnership. After final judgment
shall include his schooling or training for some granting the petition, the obligation of mutual
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the support between the spouses ceases. However, in
age of majority. Transportation shall include case of legal separation, the court may order that
83
the guilty spouse shall give support to the

innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
upon the following persons in the order herein has a right to receive support. The latter
provided: alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a
moral or legal obstacle thereto.
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; Art. 205. The right to receive support under this
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; Title as well as any money or property obtained
and as such support shall not be levied upon on
(4) The brothers and sisters. attachment or execution.
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support fall Art 206. When, without the knowledge of the
upon 2 or more persons, the payment of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a
same shall be divided between them in stranger, the latter shall have the right to claim
proportion to the resources of each. the same from the former, unless it appears that
he gave it without any intention of being
In case of urgent need and by special reimbursed.
circumstances, the judge may order only one of
them to furnish the support provisionally, without Art. 207. When the person obliged to give
prejudice to his right to claim from the other support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
obligors the share due from them. support when urgently needed by the latter, any
third person may furnish support to the needy
When two or more recipients at the same time individual, with a right of reimbursement from
claim support from one and the same person the person obliged to give support. This Article
legally obliged to give it, should the latter not shall apply particularly when the father or mother
have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the of a child under the age of majority unjustly
other established in the preceding article shall be refuses to give support or fails to give support to
followed, unless the concurrent obliges should be the child when urgently needed.
the spouse and a child subject to parental
authority, in which case the child shall be Art. 208. In cases of contractual support or that
preferred. given by a will, the excess in amount beyond that
required for legal support shall be subject to levy
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases on attachment or execution.
referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver Furthermore, contractual support shall be
and to the necessities of the recipient. subject to adjustment whenever modification is
necessary due to changes in circumstances
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
preceding article shall be reduced or increased parties.
proportionately, according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and
the resources or means of the person obliged to TITLE IX
furnish the same. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be Chapter 1. General Provisions
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from duty of parents over the person and property
the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. of their unemancipated children, parental
authority, and responsibility shall include the
Support pendente lite may be claimed in caring for and rearing of such children for civic
accordance with the Rules of Court.
84
consciousness and efficiency and the Q: What is the scope of parental authority?
development of their moral, mental and A: This refers to the natural and primary right of
physical character and well-being. the parents over the person and property of their
children. This parental authority is supposed to
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility be exercised jointly by the father and mother.
may not be renounced or transferred except in
the cases authorized by law. Only in case of absence, death or unsuitability
DAU of both parents that other persons may
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall exercise substitute parental authority.
jointly exercise parental authority over the
person of their common children. In case of The rule is that both parents should exercise
disagreement, the father’s decision shall concurrent or joint parental authority over their
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the children but in the event of death, absence or
contrary. unsuitability of one, the parent present or
suitable continues to exercise parental authority.
Children shall always observe respect But in the event that both of them are dead,
and reverence towards their parents and are absent, unsuitable, the persons mentioned under
obliged to obey them as long as the children Article 216 of the Family Code can now exercise
are under parental authority. substitute parental authority.
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental
parent, the parent present shall continue Authority
exercising parental authority. The remarriage
of the surviving parent shall not affect the Art. 216. In default of the parents or a
parental authority over the children, unless the judicially appointed guardian, the following
court appoints another person to be the persons shall exercise substitute parental
guardian of the person or property of the authority over the child in the order indicated:
children.
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, in Art. 214;
parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall (2) The oldest brother or sister, over 21
take into account all relevant considerations, yrs. of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
especially the choice of the child over 7 years and
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (3) The child’s actual custodian, over 21
yrs. of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
No child under 7 years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court Whenever the appointment of a judicial
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or preference shall be observed.
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving Dean: Please note that parents are still preferred
grandparent. In case several survive, the one over any other person and get custody from the
designated by the court, taking into account parents, you have to show that both of them are
the same consideration mentioned in the dead, absent or unsuitable DAU.
preceding article, shall exercise the authority.
Q: Who are the persons entitled to exercise
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in substitute parental authority?
a criminal case, to testify against his parents
and grandparents, except when such testimony A:
is indispensable in a crime, against the
descendant or by one parent against the other. 1. The surviving grandparent
● The grandparent chosen by the court)
85
● The Court will decide for the best interest 5. Entity

of the child who is the grandparent who 6. Institution
should be awarded custody.
Engaged in childcare shall exercise special
2. Oldest brother and sister of that minor over parental authority over the MISC.
21
● Unless unfit or disqualified 1. Minor child under their
2. Instruction
3. The child’s actual custodian over 21 years of 3. Supervision
age 4. Custody
● Unless unfit or disqualified
Dean: For the liability to attach to the school,
Parental authority cannot be renounced except first the child must be a minor and under the
that in cases authorized by law. instruction, supervision, custody of the school.
Q: What are instances when it can be The special parental authority is exercised by the
renounced? school while the child is under the instruction or
A: Transferred or terminated. Let us say, for supervision or custody and this applies to all
example, if the child is put into adoption activities whether outside the school or inside the
voluntarily committed to the National Authority school provided that it is authorized by the
for Child Care (NACC), previously DSWD. school. This applies to all authorized activities
whether on on-campus or off-campus.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CARAM v. ATTY. SEGUI (2014)
In the event of the minor under the supervision,
custody or instruction of the school, there is yet The petition for Writ of Amparo is an incorrect
another type of authority which is the special remedy to get the custody of the child. In this
type of authority. case, there was no enforced disappearance, or
extralegal killings involved. It was not an
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and enforced disappearance because there was no
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution arrest, detention or abduction that deprived the
engaged in child care shall have special liberty of her son.
parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, Caram is actually notified by the memorandum of
instruction or custody. the DSWD, which states that the child is actually
with the Medina spouses. Likewise, in the court,
Authority and responsibility shall apply they showed Julian to Caram.
to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or Q: What do you understand about tender
institution. age presumption?
A: This is under Article 213 wherein the child
Tip: Minsan pinapadefine lang nila kung ano yung below the age of seven (7) should not be
special, substitute, as simple as that. I guess, he separated from their mother.
would give some of the definitions. Pag hindi niyo
alam yung distinctions, alin ang alin, you will Q: Why does the law prefer the mother as
have time answering your questions. the custodian of the child if the child is
below 7?
Q: Who exercises special parental authority?
A: SATEII A: The mother can give more care because
children of tender age need their mother during
1. School the time of growing up.
2. Adminsitrators
3. Teachers ● The reason it’s called tender age presumption
4. Individual is precisely because of the age of the child.
86
● A child of tender years is best left to the care children. In case of absence or death of either
of the mother who is presumed by law to be parent, the parent present shall continue
the best custodian or best person who can exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
give the child the care and nurturing that it parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
needs. substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
● It is also the principle under Article 213 which
is the maternal preference rule. Q: What is the reason why the lower courts
granted custody to the grandparents?
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the A: Because the grandparents took care of the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall child since he was born and the grandparents are
take into account all relevant considerations, well-off.
especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Ruling: The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their
No child under seven years of age shall be common children. In case of absence or death of
separated from the mother unless the Court either parent, the parent present shall continue
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
substitute parental authority be exercised by the
The choice of the parent to whom custody must surviving grandparent.
be awarded is not a mere ministerial function on
the part of the COurt. Because in all cases of The grandparents’ wealth is not a deciding factor,
custody, the Court should take all relevant particularly because there is no proof that at the
considerations including the choice of the child present time, petitioner is in no position to
over seven (7) years of age, unless the parent support the boy. The fact that he was unable to
chosen is unfit or disqualified to have custody. provide financial support for his minor son from
birth up to over three years when he took the
As I said under Article 213, the presumption of boy from his in-laws without permission, should
the law is that the child is best left to the mother not be sufficient reason to strip him of his
if the child is below seven (7) years of age. But permanent right to the child's custody.
this presumption is rebuttable.
Q: What is the main objection of the
SANTOS v. CA and SPS. BEDIA grandparents why they did not want the
father to have the custody?
Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia had one son.
Julia left for the US and cannot be located A: It has something to do with his job. He is not
anymore. From the time the boy was released well-off, and he is not always present by nature
from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he of his job because he is part of the army. He
had been in the care and custody of his maternal cannot take care of his child because of his
grandparents who paid for all the support for the military assignments.
boy. Later on, Santos allegedly kidnapped his
own child from his parents-in-law (grandparents). The SC held that his being a soldier is likewise no
bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
The lower courts awarded custody to the many men in uniform who are assigned to
grandparents. different parts of the country in the service of the
nation, are still the natural guardians of their
However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of
Santos, Sr. holding that he should not be authority, care and custody over their children
deprived of custody. Being a military man cannot merely because of the normal consequences of
detract from being a father. Moreover, the law their duties and assignments, such as temporary
vests on the father and mother joint parental separation from their families.
authority over the persons of their common
87
Dean: Merely delegating custody, say to his age, the paramount criterion must always be the
sister, is not enough to disqualify him from child's interests.
having custody of his child. While he may be
remiss of his duties as a husband, he is trying to In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of
make up and start by having custody of their the child, courts are mandated by the Family
child. The SC granted him custody over Leouel Code to take into account all relevant
Santos Jr. considerations. If a child is under seven years of
age, the law presumes that the mother is the
ESPIRITU V. CA best custodian. The presumption is strong but it
is not conclusive. It can be overcome by
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his
married each other. Their relationship produced choice is paramount but, again, the court is not
two (2) children: Rosalind Therese and Reginald bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court
Vince. The family used to live in the US. may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third
Reynaldo and Teresita separated. Teresita party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
blamed Renaldo for the break-up, stating that he
was always nagging her about money. On the In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald
other hand, Reynaldo contended that Teresita are now over seven years of age. Both are
was a spendthrift who bought expensive jewelries studying in reputable schools and appear to be
and antique furniture instead of attending to fairly intelligent children, quite capable of
household expenses. thoughtfully determining the parent with whom
they would want to live. Once the choice has
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children, while been made, the burden returns to the court to
Renayldo brought the children home in the investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to
Philippines Unfortunately, he had to leave his assume parental authority and custodial
children with his sister because his assignment in responsibility.
Pittsburgh (USA) was not yet completed.
Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the
Teresita claimed that he did not immediately choice of the children and rather than verifying
follow her children because Reynaldo filed a whether that parent is fit or unfit, the CA simply
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was followed statutory presumptions and general
afraid of being arrested. The judgment of propositions applicable to ordinary or common
conviction in the bigamy case was actually situations. The seven-year age limit was
rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita, mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off
meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines period and not a guide based on a strong
and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition presumption.
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two
petitioners to gain custody over the children. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the
RTC when it gave greater attention to the choice
The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas of Rosalind and considered in detail all the
corpus. On the other hand, the CA reversed the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
decision of the RTC and granted the custody to It considered that statements of:
Teresita. 1. A psychologist which stated that
Rosalind’s responses toward her mother
Issue: Who between the parents is qualified were very negative.
2. A social welfare officer which stated that
Ruling: The father. Rosalind refused to go back to the US and
to be reunited with her mother because
The SC held that the task of choosing the parent she felt unloved and uncared for. The child
to whom custody shall be awarded is not a was found suffering from emotional shock
ministerial function to be determined by a simple caused by her mother's infidelity.
determination of the age of a minor child.
Whether a child is under or over seven years of The children are now both over seven years old.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer
88
to stay is clear from the record. From all

indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are
meeting the two requirements found in the first entitled to the sole parental authority of their
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The illegitimate children (such as Queenie),
presumption under the second paragraph of said notwithstanding the father’s recognition of the
article no longer applies as the children are over child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers
seven years. Assuming that the presumption are consequently entitled to keep their
should have persuasive value for children only illegitimate children in their company, and the
one or two years beyond the age of seven years Court will not deprive them of custody, absent
mentioned in the statute, there are compelling any imperative cause showing the mother’s
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
custody to the mother. The children understand
the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and In addition, Article 213 of the same Code
have been affected in their emotional growth by provides for the so-called tender-age
her behavior. presumption, stating that “no child under seven
(7) years of age shall be separated from the
Q: When is the reckoning point in mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
determining the age of the child? Is it the to order otherwise.”
age at the time of filing of the petition or the
time of the granting of the custody? Dean: The custodial regime under Article 213 is
limited in duration, lasting only in the child’s 7th
Dean: The Court clarified that it should be the year. In the 8th year up to the age of majority,
age of the child at the time that the custody is the spouses subject to the usual contractual
awarded to the parent, and not the age of the limitations may decide on the custody of the
child when the petition was filed. child.
PEREZ v. CA The court is also not bound by the choice of the

child if the parent chosen by the child is unfit.
Dean: So, even if the child is being brought by
the mother in a day care center while she works It will also be based on all relevant
as a nurse, that does not prove that she is unfit, considerations. One of them is the choice of the
because that was basically what the father was child unless the parent chosen is unfit to have
alleging. custody.
The SC said that it is not enough to declare a Parents are the ones preferred in the matter of
mother unfit to care for their child. In the past custody. The moment they are both DAU, the
the following grounds have been considered grandparents can now have custody of their
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody children.
and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual But between the parents and grandparents, the
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the parents have greater custody over the child.
child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease. VANCIL v. BELMES
MASBATE v. RELUCIO FACTS: Bonifacia Vancil here is the grandmother

of the illegitimate children of Redeer Vancil, his
MASBATE v. RELUCIO predeceased child. Ellen Belmes here is the
respondent, the mother of 2 illegitimate children
RULING: As a general rule, the father and the of Redeer.
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. When Redeer died, Bonifacia wants to take
However, insofar as illegitimate children are custody of the children of Ellen Belmes and take
concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states them to the US.
that illegitimate children shall be under the
parental authority of their mother.
89
ISSUE: Who is preferred in the custody of the

child? RULING: The parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
RULING: the SC said it is Helen because as the criminal offenses committed by their minor
illegitimate mother under Art. 176, the children under their legal authority or control, or
illegitimate child shall be under the sole parental who live in their company, unless it is proven
authority of the mother. that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages.
Q: How do you get custody from the mother
considering that Art. 176 confers upon her However, under the Family Code, this civil
the sole PA over the child? liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and
A: You have to go through the channel of proving those who exercise parental authority over the
that she is unfit for custody. minor offender. For civil liability arising from
quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same
SC: Respondent, being the natural mother of the rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180
minor, has the preferential right over that of and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
petitioner to be his guardian. Indeed, being the
natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has In the case at bar, whether the death of the
the corresponding natural and legal right to his hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony
custody. or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to
exercise substitute parental authority only in case the preceding modifications of the premises relied
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
Considering that respondent is very much alive imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
and has exercised continuously parental authority findings that said petitioners failed to duly
over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris
asserting her right to be the minor's familias to prevent such damages.
guardian, respondent's unsuitability.
The liability of parents are PRIMARY and not
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing subsidiary
evidence showing that respondent is not suited to
be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely We believe that the civil liability of parents for
insists that respondent is morally unfit as quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
guardian of Valerie considering that her contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
(respondent's) live-in partner raped Valerie primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
several times. But Valerie, being now of major Article 2194 of said code which provides for
age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
proceeding. responsible for the act or omission, in this case
the minor and the father and, in case of his death
LIABILITY OF THOSE EXERCISING of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
Q: Why do you think it is important for us to 2180 provides that "(t) he responsibility treated
determine who is exercising parental of in this article shall cease when the persons
authority at any given point? herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to
A: If the child is under the parental authority of prevent damages."
the parents, then the parents shall be civilly
liable for the acts or omissions of the minor child That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the
causing damage to another due to the principle of parents primarily respond for such damages
vicarious liability. is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in
both codes that the minor transgressor shall be
LIBI v. IAC answerable or shall respond with his own
90
property only in the absence or in case of consent until the age of 21

insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability
ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Nothing in this Code shall be construed to
Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing derogate from the duty or responsibility of
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . parents and guardians for children and wards
. shall be answerable with his own property in an below 21 years of age mentioned in the second
action against him where a guardian ad litem and third paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil
shall be appointed." Code.
Dean: Primary liability devolves upon the Dean: Emancipation terminates parental
parents. authority, and the child shall be qualified for all
acts of civil life.
Q: Will this hold true even if the child is over
18? The law itself terminates parental authority once
the child reaches 18 years old.
A: YES. In this case, the child was still living with
the parents. But, under the same Article 236, it refers to Art.
2180 for purposes of determining civil liability or
Dean: Parental liability is based on parental persons civilly liable for the act of the child. And
authority. under Art. 2180, the parents are liable if the
child, although over 18, is below 21.
However, under the present provision of Family
Code, particularly Article 236, the FC still makes Q: Do we have a case for parental liability
reference to Art. 2180 as the governing article for without parental authority? Wag ka lumabas
purposes of determining civil liability for a quasi- sa definition ng 236.
delict committed by a child.
R: Yes, Mam. In this case there is civil liability
If the child is over 18, but below 21, and living in even though there is no parental authority.
the company of the parents, the parents are still
liable. Dean: Kasi di naman nila sinabing yung
emancipation nabago yung definition kasi ang
Q: Do you think that we have a case of definition nila, ay the effect of emancipation is to
parental liability without parental terminate parental authority. And yet, the law
authority? makes the parents liable for the acts of the child
although emancipated.
R: There should be parental authority for the
parents to be held liable because this holds true Do you follow? Parang, it seems absurd the law
in our culture because normally ages 18 is still declares the child emancipated, which by the way
living with the parents. In other cases, there are terminates parental authority, and therefore,
also instances where the parents of a child over technically, there is no parental authority, hence
18 is also liable because the child is still living there is no parental liability.
with the parents.
But here we have a case of parental liability
Q: Does merely living with the parents without parental authority.
modify the definition of Article 236?
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall
terminate parental authority over the person FAST FACTS: Sherwin Carpitanos, son of
and property of the child who shall then be respondents Carpitanos, died in an accident
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, caused by the detachment of the steering wheel
save the exceptions established by existing guide of the jeep owned by respondent
laws in special cases Villanueva. The vehicle was then driven by James
Daniel II, a minor. The incident occurred during
Contracting marriage shall require partental an enrollment drive conducted by petitioner
91
academy where Sherwin was a student. Dean: Yes, but the adoption was granted later.
Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages The incident happened before the grant of
against petitioner and the other respondents. The adoption. That is why in Tamargo, the liability
trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's parents was still with the natural parents.
ordering petitioner to pay civil indemnity for the
loss of life of Sherwin, actual and moral Ang effect lang niya, nag-retroact siya, but if you
damages, and attorney's fees under Articles 218 come to think of it, how can the adopting parents
and 219 of the Family Code, and declared exercise parental authority over the adopted child
respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable. if the child is still under the custody of the natural
Respondent Villanueva was absolved from any parents at the time of the incident?
liability.
Note: Custody here is PHYSICAL custody.
RULING: The Court held that there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to Student Q: In Vancil vs. Belmes, the SC noted
drive the jeep and that the proximate cause of that Bonifacio was abroad, so he just delegated
the accident was a mechanical defect in the parental authority to another person.
vehicle, thus, petitioner may not be held liable for
the death of Sherwin. However, as the registered In this case, the SC frowned upon the delegation.
owner of the vehicle, Villanueva was held But in Santos, the Court seemed to be cool with
primarily liable for the death of Sherwin. the fact that the parent delegated the authority
to another?
DEAN: So, it is not enough that there is damage
or injury cause to another by the minor while Dean: You cannot compare the case of an
under the supervision of the school. Because to illegitimate grandmother over a father. In
make the school liable, the negligence of the Santos, that is the FATHER – the biological,
school must be the proximate cause of the injury, natural and legitimate father.
and not merely the remote cause.
In the Vancil case, the one claiming custody over
In this case, the Court said that it is not the the minor is an illegitimate grandmother.
proximate cause of the death of Sherwin,
because kahit school yan, the school cannot be Thus, there is no comparison between the two
an insurer of all risks. case.
Student Q: Could the Tamargo case be Student Q: So if biological parent, the rule is
considered a case where there is no parental that it could be delegated to another person?
authority but there is no parental liability? Since
in that case, the adoption has terminated the Dean: YES. Alangan namang pag nag-asawa ka
parental authority but still the natural parents nakabantay ka na lang sa mga anak mo na hindi
were made liable since the child was still in their ka na kikilos.
custody?
Student Q: Based on jurisprudence, the
Dean: The natural parents still had custody at relationship between the school and the student
the time the accident happened, that is why they is contractual. Based on that contractual
were still be liable. You cannot charge the relationship, it is included therein, among other
adopting parents of negligence at the time they things, the safety of the student. In the St.
had no physical custody of the child. Mary’s case, when the child suffered an accident
in the school, why was it the burden of the
The parental authority is still exercised by the student to prove the negligence of the school?
natural parents.
Dean: What is the primary obligation of the
Student Q: Yes but under the law, isn’t it that school based on the contractual relationship?
the parental authority is already terminated by
virtue of the effective decree of adoption? A: To educate and to provide safety while on
campus.
92
Dean: Between remote and proximate cause, in guard of the school but the SC in that case, FEU
any case, even in vehicular accidents, it is always ang defendant dun, did not hold the school liable
proximate cause that is considered by the courts but the security agency who is the employer of
in determining who is the person liable. the security guard. Ang allegation ng plaintiffs-
students is that there was failure on the part of
In the case of St. Mary’s, wala silang bolang the school to provide a healthy and safe
crystal na hawak, to know that the person driving environment pero the school was exonerated by
the jeepney would actually handover the wheel to the court in that case.
a minor child. The school, although it is bound to
protect and to educate the children, they cannot TLC NOTES IN PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
be an insurer of all risk.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and
EXAMPLE: Let’s suppose a student while on responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
campus was going downstairs. Bumababa ng principally and solidarily liable for damages
hagdan. Walang obstruction sa stairs, biglang caused by the acts or omissions of the
nadulas ang bata, nahulog. unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute
Do you mean to say automatically the liability will parental authority over said minor shall be
attach to the school or let’s say tinulak ng subsidiarily liable.
kaklase, liability will attach to the school? In all
cases where you award damages, you have to The respective liabilities of those referred
prove negligence. to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it
is proved that they exercised the proper diligence
In this particular case, unfortunately, the plaintiff required under the particular circumstances.
failed to prove the negligence of the school.
All other cases not covered by this and the
Q: Kasi kung quasi-delict, anong elements preceding articles shall be governed by the
ng quasi-delict? provisions of the Civil code on quasi-delicts.
A: There’s an act or omission causing damage to

another due to fault or negligence. So without Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the
the third element, fault or negligence, there could Persons of the Children
be no quasi-delict.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
Dun naman sa contractual relationship, the parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
primary obligation is to provide the education of injuries and damages caused by the acts or
the student. The ratio of the SC is not the omissions of their unemancipated children living
negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause in their company and under their parental
of the death of the student. authority subject to the appropriate defense
provided by law.
Dean: Basta minor lang yung Article 218 class. If
you read 218, MISC nga eh (Minor under Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of
Instruction, Supervision and Custody). the child’s property, or a guardian ad litem when
the best interests of the child so require.
Q: College is considered under the custody
of parents - May parental liability pa rin ba Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or
ang school for college students for the acts incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
or omission casing damage to another inside exercising parental authority, may petition the
the school/university? proper court of the place where the child resides,
for an order providing for disciplinary measures
Dean: Basta the child is a minor kasi sa Article over the child. The child shall be entitled to the
218 nakalagay dun minor pero the Article 218 is assistance of counsel, either of his choice or
not only the source of liability. Pwedeng ibang appointed by the court, and a summary hearing
source ang kuhanan. Pwedeng quasi-delict. Like shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the
in one case, the student was shot by a security child shall be heard.
93
However, if in the same proceeding the Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated
court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of child earned or acquired with his work or industry
the merits of the petition, or when the or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to
circumstances so warrant, the court may also the child in ownership and shall be devoted
order the deprivation or suspension of parental exclusively to the latter’s support and education,
authority or adopt such other measure as it may unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
deem just and proper.
The right of the parents over the fruits
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the and income of the child’s property shall be limited
preceding article may include the commitment of primarily to the child’s support and secondary to
the child for not more than 30 days in entities or the collective daily needs of the family.
institutions engaged in child care or in children’s
homes duly accredited by the proper government Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management
agency. or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such
The parent exercising parental authority property shall belong to the owner. The child
shall not interfere with the care of the child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in
whenever committed but shall provide for his an amount not less than that which the owner
support. Upon proper petition or at its own would have paid if the administrator were a
instance, the court may terminate the stranger, unless the owner grants the entire
commitment of the child whenever just and proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds
proper. thus given in whole or in part shall not be
charged to the child’s legitime.
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the
Property of the Children
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly Authority
exercise legal guardianship over the property of
their unemancipated common child without the Art. 228. Parental authority terminates
necessity of a court appointment. In case of permanently:
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. (1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
Where the market value of the property or (3) Upon emancipation of the child.
the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000,
the parent concerned shall be required to furnish Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final
a bond in such amount as the court may judgment, parental authority also terminates:
determine, but not less than ten per centum
(10%) of the value of the property or annual (1) Upon the adoption of a child;
income, to guarantee the performance of the (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
obligations prescribed for general guardians. (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment
of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
The petition shall be docketed as a (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court
summary special proceeding in which all incidents divesting the party concerned of parental
and issues regarding the performance of the authority; or
obligations referred to in the 2nd paragraph of this (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
Article shall be heard and resolved. incapacity of the person exercising
parental authority.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall
be merely suppletory except when the child is Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon
under substitute parental authority, or the conviction of the parent or the person exercising
guardian is a stranger, or parent has remarried, the same of a crime which carries with it the
in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
shall apply. automatically reinstated upon service of the
94
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court,
offender. the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring
Art. 231. The court in action filed for the purpose summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
or in a related case may also suspend parental decided on an expeditious manner, without
authority if the parent or the person exercising regard to technical rules.
the same:
Chapter 2. Separation in Fact Between Husband
(1) Treatment with excessive harshness or and Wife
cruelty;
(2) Gives corrupting orders, counsel or Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated
example; in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one
(3) Compels the child to beg; or of them seeks judicial authorization for a
(4) Subject the child or allows him to be transaction where the consent of the other
subjected to acts of lasciviousness. spouse is required by law but such consent is
withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition
The grounds enumerated above are may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
deemed to include cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent or the Art 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon
person exercising parental authority. proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised
by the proper court authorized to hear family
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court
or the welfare of the child so demands, the court or its equivalent, sitting in the place where either
shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority of the spouses resides.
or adopt such other measures as may be proper
under the circumstances. Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
The suspension or deprivation may be
revoked and the parental authority revived in a Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority
case filed for the purpose or in the same
proceeding if the court finds that the cause Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed
therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. in the proper court of the place where the child
resides.
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental
authority has subjected the child or allowed him
to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary
shall be permanently deprived by the court of Proceedings.
such authority.
Art. 253. Summary proceedings govern the
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute below:
parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents. 41 – Declaration of Presumptive Death
51 – Delivery of Presumptive Legitime
In no case shall the school administrator, 69 – Fixing the Family Domicile
teacher or individual engaged in child care and 73 – Exercise of Profession
exercising special parental authority, inflict 96 – Disposition or Encumbrance of ACP
corporal punishment upon the child. 124 – Disposition or Encumbrance of CPG
217 – Parental Authority over Foundlings
223 – Disciplinary Measures over the Child
Title XI. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 225 – Judicial Bond over Property of Child
IN THE FAMILY LAW 239 – Judicial Authorization to Transact w/o
Consent of the other spouse
Chapter 1. Scope of Application
Use of Surnames
95
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children surnames between ascendants and descendants,
shall principally use the surname of the father. the word “Junior” can be used only by a son.
Grandsons and other direct male descendants
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname shall either:
of the adopter.
(1) Add a middle name or the mother’s
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree surname, or
annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III and so on.
the surname of the father.
Art. 376. No person can change his name or
Art. 370. A married woman may use: surname without judicial authority.
(1) Maiden first name and surname and add Sufficient grounds to change one’s own name:
her husband’s surname
Ex. Mary Michelle A. Guinto-Dizon (1) Name is ridiculous or tainted with
dishonor; extremely difficult to write or
(2) Maiden first name and her husband’s pronounce
surname (2) When the right to a new name is a
Ex. Mary Michelle G. Dizon consequence of a change of status, like
where a natural child is acknowledged and
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a legitimated
word indicating that she is his wife, such (3) When the change is necessary to avoid
as “Mrs.” confusion
Ex. Mrs. Noel Jedidiah D. Dizon (4) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of a former alien nationality
Art. 371. In case of annulment: which unduly hamper social and business
life
If the wife is guilty party, she shall resume her
maiden name and surname. Art. 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may
be the subject of an action for damages and
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume other relief.
her maiden name and surname.
Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of
However, she may choose to continue employing another person’s surname gives a right of action
her former husband’s surname, unless: to the latter.
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or General rule: No person shall use different names
(2) She or the former husband is married and surnames. (Art. 380)
again to another person.
Exception: Pen names or stage names is
Art. 372. When legal separation has been permitted, provided it is done in good faith and
granted, the wife shall continue using her name there is no injury to third persons. Pen names
and surname employed before the legal and stage names cannot be usurped. (Art. 379)
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased

husband’s surname as though he were still living.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and

surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to
use such additional name or surname as will
avoid confusion.
96
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 2 Dean: The petitioners went to court and

they were seeking clarification on what
ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after laws are covered by publication and when
fifteen days following the completion of should publication be made considering
their publication either in the Official that according to them, the Official Gazette
Gazette or in a newspaper of general is published at irregular intervals.
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. One of the contentions is the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette would
TAÑADA v TUVERA (1985) not serve the purpose.
Dean: In the two Tañada v Tuvera The Supreme Court said that all laws
(1985, 1986) cases, the provision of whether general or local application needs
Article 2 is involved. to be published as a condition for their
effectivity because this is in compliance
In the first case, the petitioners, then with the due process clause of the
Senator Tañada and other petitioners filed Constitution, which means the every citizen
a case questioning the validity of various must have at least presumptive knowledge
issuances of then President Ferdinand of the laws that are supposed to govern
Marcos, Sr. on the ground that they were them.
not published.
So this requirement of publication is related
The government on the other hand, argued to the principle of ignorantia legis neminem
that under Article 2, these letters of excusat. So it would be unfair to charge a
instruction, presidential decrees, citizen of the violation of the law if they
presidential proclamations need not be have no presumptive knowledge of the law.
published because under Article 2, it says
that “unless otherwise provided”. For as long as the law has been published,
regardless of the citizen has read it or not,
So, the main argument of the government hindi sinasabi ng Article 2 na dapat
there is that since the law provides “unless basahan ng citizen. Basta na-publish yan,
otherwise provided”, that means that ang presumption, binasa mo.
publication can be dispensed with. That is
the main argument. All laws should be published whether of
general or local application except
Issue: interpretative rules and regulations,
1. Whether or not laws should be internal instructions issued by the head of
published. administrative agency.
2. What is referred to in the Article 2 Example:

“unless otherwise provided”? Does Administrative or memorandum circular of
it refer to the requirement of DepEd head requiring all the employees of
publication or the date of effectivity the DepEd to attend flag ceremony every
of the law? 1st Monday of the Month or wearing of
school uniform. These are internal
The Supreme Court said that the phrase instructions and need not be published.
“unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
refers to not to the requirement of The purpose of publication is to give the
publication but to the date of the law which citizens of laws that are supposed to govern
means that the legislature may shorten or them in compliance with the due process
extend the 15-day period stated in article 2 clause of the Constitution.
but publication is indispensable in any case.
Q: If laws are published in a series, if
Example: it is voluminous, and published in a
If the law provides that it should take series, i.e. the first part was published
effect one year after the publication, is Jan. 05, 2nd on Jan. 10 and the 3rd on
that valid? Jan. 15. When do you count the 15-day
Yes. Provided there is publication. period or whatever period is provided
for by the law as the date of its
Can the law provide 5 days after the effectivity?
publication?
Yes. Dean: You count it from the publication of
the last of the series. So kung na publish
The one referred to in Article 2 means to yung last part ng Jan. 15, the reckoning
the date of effectivity so the 15-day period point of the counting of the period would be
can be shortened or extended but the publication of the part. Because
publication is indispensable in every case. publication must be in full otherwise, there
is no publication at all.
TAÑADA v TUVERA (1986)
2
4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Article 2 was amended by EO 200, June the other was charged P4,000. They were
17, 1987, issued by Pres. Cory Aquino, repatriated because upon reaching the
pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera Case, foreign country, they were made to sign
because there was a suggestion by the another contract which contained onerous
Supreme Court that publication in a terms and conditions not stipulated in the
newspaper of general circulation would original contract they signed in the
better serve the purpose of informing the Philippines. They refused to sign the
public. contract and because of that, they were
repatriated to the Philippines. They sued
Kasi nga yung Official Gazette, hindi naman the petitioner for illegal exaction stemming
available to ordinary citizens like us. So you from their violation of POEA Memorandum
have to go somewhere to access the Official Circular No. 2.
Gazette. Unlike publication of newspaper of
general circulation, the newspaper is During the trial it was proven that this
available everywhere. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 was
never published as required by Article 2
EO 200 provided for the publications of and was also not on file with the UP Law
laws in newspaper of general circulation. Center.
That is why it is allowed now that the law
may be published not only in the Official The Court ruled that even assuming that
Gazette but also in a newspaper of general the petitioner violated that circular, it
circulation in the Philippines. That would cannot be punished for violating the same
have complied with the requirement under because it was never effective for failure to
Article 2. publish as required by Article 2.
TAKE NOTE: GARCILLANO V. HOR
Chapter 2, Book 7, Sections 3 and 4 of the Q: Can laws be published on the

Revised Administrative Code, which internet?
requires every administrative agency to A: No, the case of Garcillano v. House of
furnish the UP Law Center which were the Rep.
National Administrative Register is located.
The Garci tapes allegedly contain the
Copies of every rule adopted by that private conversation between former
agency, within 3 months from adoption, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
and without proof that these issuances of then sitting chairman of the COMELEC
administrative agency, particularly those Virgilio Garcillano, whereby allegedly,
which are punitive.. President Arroyo was giving instructions to
Garcillano, to make sure that she will win
the elections against FPJ. Because of this
Copies of every rule adopted by that scandal, the Senate proceeded to conduct
agency, within 3 months from adoption, an inquiry in aid of legislation.
and without proof that these issuances of
the administrative agency, particularly The issue here is whether or not the rules
those which are punitive in character were of the Senate with respect to the procedure
on file with the UP Law Center. It cannot in inquiry in aid of legislation have been
become the basis of any sanction against published, and are therefore valid?
any party or person.
The Senate admitted that they did publish
the rules of procedure in 1995 and 2006,
PHILSA V. CA but the inquiry here was being conducted
in the year 2007. Hindi ba meron tayong
Petitioner here is a private recruitment 13th, 14th, 15th Congress and so on and
agency engaged in recruiting workers for so forth. In this case, we are talking of the
overseas employment, and there is a 14th Congress, and they are saying that
certain POEA Memorandum Circular the rules were published in the Official
regulating the amount of placement fees Gazette in 1995 and 2006 but they did not
that the private recruitment agencies may publish it prior to the start of the 14th
charge to prospective overseas contract Senate. So they were saying, no
workers. Private respondents De Mesa and amendment has ever been made in the
Mikin were made to sign contracts here in rules of procedure of the Senate since the
the Philippines in preparation for their time it was published in 2006 and at any
departure to work in a foreign country. rate, these rules of the Senate are available
They were charged by the petitioner more in the internet, and are therefore effective.
than the allowable fees under the POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2. Based on that The Supreme Court (SC) said that even if
circular, the maximum allowable charge they were published in 1995 and 2006,
must be P2,500, but the private they should have been published before the
respondents were charged more than that. 14th Senate began, because each Senate
One respondent was charged P6,000 and is distinct from the one before it, and the
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
one after it. So lahat ng composition ng STARE DECISIS
Senate is considered a new Senate and If we are going to apply the laws
they should publish the Rules of Procedure prospectively, then we must also apply
before they start. jurisprudence, or doctrinal rulings of the
SC, prospectively.
Because of that the SC said that they
cannot proceed with the inquiry in aid of If an old doctrine is abandoned and a new
legislation and that the publication of the doctrine is adopted, that new doctrine shall
law in the internet by the invocation of the be applied prospectively and should not
E-commerce Act is misplaced. According to apply to parties who relied on the old
the SC, the E-commerce Act merely doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
accepts the electronic form as admissible
evidence, but it does not allow publication ARTICLE 8. Judicial decisions applying
of laws through the internet. It considers or interpreting the laws or the
the electronic data as a functional Constitution shall form part of the legal
equivalent of the original document for system of the Philippines.
purposes of evidence but it does not allow
the publication of the laws through the ● The judicial decisions referred to in
internet. Article 8 are the decisions of the
Supreme Court, and not the lower
The SC said that the invocation of the E- courts.
commerce Act to support their claim that ● Unciano v. CA – application of Article 8
the rules of the Senate are effective in a civil case.
because it is available on the internet is ● People v. Jabinal – application of Article
WRONG. 8 in a criminal case.
Unless Article 2 is amended, we have to UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE V.

follow Article 2. We have to publish it either CA
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Several students of Unciano Paramedical
College where denied enrollment in the
second semester of 1989. They violated
school rules as to the establishment of
student organizations.
RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
The parents of the students affected filed a
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive case to compel the school to readmit their
effect, unless the contrary is provided. children.
Q: When do we say that the law is Prior to 1989 - In May 1988, the SC decided
retroactive? the case of PSBA v. Alcuaz where it adopted
A: When it is made to apply to acts or the Termination of Contract Theory. Under
transactions already passed before the this theory, whenever a student enrolls in
passage of the law. the school, he is only enrolled for one
semester only. Thus, the school can refuse
GENERAL RULE: Laws are given only reenrollment in the succeeding semesters.
prospective application.
● retroactive application is the The RTC decided in favor of the school. The
exception parents appealed to the CA. However, while
the appeal in the CA is pending, the SC
NOTE: We do not normally allow reversed its decision in PSBA v. Alcuaz in
retroactive application of the law. We only the case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho
allow PROSPECTIVE application. Dames II, et al.
EXCEPTIONS: Under the Non Doctrine, the SC said that

1. If the law creates substantive rights whenever a student enrolls in a school, it is
for the first time, provided that no understood to be for the entire term that
vested rights will be impaired; the student is expected to finish his course
2. If the law is remedial in nature, assuming that the student complies with all
because there are no vested rights the academic and other requirements of
in rules of procedure. If it is the school.
procedural law, it may be made to
apply to cases pending as of the PSBA v. Alcuaz was decided in May 1988,
time of the passage of the law. while Non v. Dames was decided in May
3. In case of curative statutes; or 1990.
4. In case of penal laws, which is
favorable to the accused who is not In view of the ruling of the SC in the case
a habitual delinquent as defined of Non v. Dames, the CA reversed the
under the Revised Penal Code. decision of the SC and ordered Unciano to
readmit the students.
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Dean: Now whether a right is procedural or
Issue: Whether or not the new doctrine of substantive, they are subject to waiver, or
Non can be applied retroactively to the they may be waived.
students affected?
Limitations of waivers to one’s rights:
Ruling: NO. The Non doctrine cannot be The waiver must not be:
applied retroactively. Since the prevailing 1. contrary to law, public order, public
doctrine at the time Unciano refused policy, morals, or good customs, or
enrollment to the students was the doctrine 2. prejudicial to a third person with a right
laid down in PSBA v. Alcuaz, then this recognized by law.
should be followed. The Non doctrine was
non-existent when the facts of this case CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
happened, or when the case was filed
against the school. Non Doctrine cannot be Facts: Emetrio Cui was a law student of
applied to compel the school Arellano University, and his uncle was then
the Dean of the College of Law. He was
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of granted an academic scholarship upon
this Court is overruled and a different view admission because he was a good student.
is adopted, the new doctrine is applied But before he was given such, he was made
prospectively, and should not apply to to sign a waiver, which contained a
parties who relied on the old doctrine and provision relinquishing his right to transfer
acted on the faith thereof to another school, otherwise, he will refund
to the university all the amount of the
PEOPLE V. JABINAL scholarship he received in the previous
years.
Jabinal was appointed as a secret agent by
the Provincial Commander of Batangas, While on his third year of law school, his
and he possessed a firearm without the uncle decided to transfer to another school.
requisite license. In 1964, during his term He followed his uncle, and when he tried to
as secret agent, he was charged with illegal apply for his transfer credentials, the
possession of firearms. school refused to release them, unless Cui
refunds the amount of scholarship grant he
Prior to his indictment, the SC in the cases received for the past three years. He paid
of People v. Lucero (1958) and People v. under protest. He was able to transfer
Macarandang (1959), acquitted the schools, graduate and pass the bar.
accused who are also secret agents. They
were exempted from securing license. His first case was this case, seeking to
recover what he paid under protest.
While the case is pending against Jabinal,
the SC abandoned the doctrine in Lucero Issue: Whether or not the waiver executed
and Macarandang in the case of People v. by Cui in favor of Arellano is valid.
Mapa (1967).
Dean: The Supreme Court held that the
The new doctrine in People v. Mapa was waiver is invalid for being contrary to public
applied by the lower court in convicting policy, since the scholarship granted to him
Jabinal. On appeal, he argued that the new was based on merit and fitness. There are
doctrine cannot be applied to him since the several types of scholarships, right? It is
cases of People v. Lucero and People v. not limited to academic scholarships. But in
Macarandang were prevailing when he was the case of Cui, it was an academic
indicted. scholarship. So the SC said that
scholarships are supposed to be granted
Q: Is he entitled to an acquittal? based on merits and fitness, and not to
serve as a propaganda measure of the
Dean: The Supreme Court said yes. He is schools to keep the good students. So the
entitled to an acquittal because, again, Court ruled that the waiver executed by Cui
whenever a doctrine of the Supreme Court in favor of Arellano is void.
is overruled or abandoned, this new
doctrine should be applied only Trivia: Emetrio Cui later became a Court of
prospectively and not retroactively. Just Appeals Justice.
like provisions of the law, we only apply, as
a rule, prospectively and not retroactively.
Dean: Moving on to the Nationality
ARTICLE 6 (NCC). Rights may be Theory. Pursuant to the new cases on
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to Article 26 of the Family Code, Nationality
law, public order, public policy, morals, Theory would now be limited to its
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third application.
person with a right recognized by law.
ARTICLE 15 (NCC). Laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
are binding upon citizens of the

Article 16. Real property as well as
Philippines, even though living abroad.
personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is stipulated.
ARTICLE 17 (NCC). The forms and
solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
However, intestate and testamentary
public instruments shall be governed by
successions, both with respect to the
the laws of the country in which they are
order of succession and to the amount of
executed.
successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall
When the acts referred to are executed
be regulated by the national law of the
before the diplomatic or consular officials
person whose succession is under
of the Republic of the Philippines in a
consideration, whatever may be the
foreign country, the solemnities
nature of the property and regardless of
established by Philippine laws shall be
the country wherein said property may be
observed in their execution.
found.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, ANDO v. SECRETARY OF
their acts or property, and those which FOREIGN AFFAIRS
have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be Facts: This involves Edelina, a Filipina who
rendered ineffective by laws or first married a Japanese named Kobayashi.
judgments promulgated, or by After a few years, they secured a divorce in
determinations or conventions agreed Japan. Thinking that she is now capacitated
upon in a foreign country. to remarry, she got another Japanese
husband, Masatome Ando. She thereafter
Dean: Pursuant to Article 15 and filed an application in the DFA so that she
prohibition against divorce, Article 15 is could drop the last name Kobayashi from
usually involve whenever a divorce is her passport. DFA denied her application
obtained by a Filipino against another. because she was not able to present the
Before the new rulings of the SC on Article proof that she has secured a foreign
26 of the Family Code, if the Filipino spouse divorce.
filed the divorce, such divorce is not
rendered valid because our law does not ISSUE: Whether or not she is entitled to
recognize divorce. have her name in her passport changed
given that she had already divorced her
CASE: VAN DORN v. ROMILLO former husband.
Facts: Alice Van Dorn was first married to RULING: As to the remedy, she is wrong
Richard Upton, an American. After quite because instead of going directly to the
some time, they secured a divorce. She, RTC by filing the petition for declaratory
then remarried to another American named relief, she should have appealed the
Theodore Van Dorn. Alice and Theodore decision of the DFA Secretary to the OP.
went home to the Philippines, and And for example if there is an adverse
established a business in Ermita. When decision, then that is the time she can go
Richard, the first husband was made aware to court to question the decision of the
that the business was doing well, he filed a DFA.
case against Alice and said that since
Philippine law does not allow divorce, Alice In addition to that, the SC said that she
is still considered his spouse under the should have filed a petition for recognition
Philippine law, and thus owned one-half of of the foreign divorce. Since there was no
whatever Alice owns. compliance with the this requirement, they
cannot fault the DFA in refusing to change
Dean: The Supreme Court, however, said her surname in her passport because under
that even if divorce is not allowed here in the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a
the Philippines, but in accordance with the married woman who previously used her
national law of Richard, divorce is surname in her passport can only drop the
recognized and is considered valid. In fact, surname of her husband if she can prove
if he were to go to in any of the states in that she is divorced, annulled or her first
the US, he cannot seek any affirmative husband died.
relief from the courts in his own country, as
an aggrieved husband. Precisely because Given that there was a divorce, it is not
his national law does not anymore consider automatic that you can already ask for a
him as husband of Alice, whom he change of surname unless you first file the
divorced. So the SC said that the Filipina petition or the appropriate petition for the
should not be discriminated in her own recognition of foreign divorce.
country if the ends of justice is to be
served. So therefore, the Court ruled in So the SC ruled that she cannot compel the
favor of the Filipina and denied relief to DFA to change her surname in her passport
Richard. unless she can prove compliance with the
law on recognition of foreign judgment.
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
citizen when he married his second wife
With respect to family right, duties and and a naturalized American citizen.
status whether the person is married or
not, legal capacity whether a person is an The second marriage of Lorenzo lasted until
adult or still a minor, it is still governed by his death. The first wife was claiming the
our Philippine laws. So wherever a Filipino properties left by Llorente contending that
might be, the PH law applies with respect under PH Law, divorce is not recognized
to his status, condition and legal capacity. and she should still be considered the wife
of the decedent.
ARTICLE 16
LEX SITUS RULE SC: Llorente is no longer a Filipino citizen
and the question as to who may inherit
Simply states that real property as well as shall not be governed by the PH laws on
personal property shall be governed by the succession but in accordance with his own
law of the place where it is situated. national law which is American law.
Why does it make sense? Not being anymore a Filipino citizen, the
For example, the land is in Makati. We can’t successional rights of his heirs as well as
say that it shall be governed by the laws of the amount of the portion they will receive
Bulacan. Hindi pwede. from the estate of Lorenzo should be
decided by his national law.
Similarly, in case of personal property and
real property shall be governed by the The case was remanded to the lower court
place where they are situated. for further proceedings.
Exception: If we are talking of questions BELLIS V. BELLIS

on SUCCESSION, under 2nd paragraph of
Article 16. Amos Bellis is a citizen of Texas. He left
several properties here in the Philippines.
The following aspects of succession shall be He has illegitimate children. The partner
governed by the national law of the was a Filipina. When he died, he did not
deceased regardless of where the give much to the illegitimate children.
properties of the deceased may be found
and regardless of the nature of the The illegitimate children were saying that
property. they were deprived of their legitimes under
Philippine Law.
Even if the property is located here in the
PH, it will not be subject to the laws of the ISSUE: Whether or not the Filipino
PH with respect to the amount of Illegitimate Children of Amos Bellis who is
successional right, intrinsic validity of a citizen and a resident of Texas invoke
testamentary provisions, capacity to Philippine Law on succession to bolster
succeed and order of succession, under their claim that they were deprived of their
Article 1039. legitimes.
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is
RULING: No. Because Under Texas Law,
governed by the law of the nation of the
which is the governing law, there are no
decedent.
forced heirs or legitimes. The order of
succession as well as the amount of
successional rights and the intrinsic
Q: What is Article 1039? validity, including the capacity to succeed
A: Capacity to succeed is governed by the shall all be governed by the national law of
law of the nation of the decedent. the deceased.
Hence, even if the property is situated in Since the deceased is a Texan citizen, his
the Philippines, if the decedent is not a national law applies with respect to this
citizen of the PH, the distribution of his question.
properties will not be governed by the
Philippine Law. This brings us to the case of AZNAR v. GARCIA
Bellis v. Bellis and Llorente v. CA.
Decedent was an American (citizen of
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS California) but he was domiciled in the PH
before his death. He left properties in the
Lorenzo Llorente was a former Filipino PH. He left his illegitimate child Helen in the
citizen. He acquired Filipino citizenship PH a minimal amount (P3,000) and the rest
sometime in 1943. He is married to a of his estate was given to his legitimate
Filipina by the name of Paula. He daughter. When he died, his will was
discovered the infidelity of his wife and presented and his estate was being settled.
then filed for divorce. After the divorce, Helen complained and said she was
Lorenzo took another Filipinar wife by the deprived of her legitime based on PH law.
name of Alicia. He was no longer a Filipino
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Dean: In Bellis, the decedent was both Richard died, the settlement involved
citizen and resident of Texas. In Aznar, the common properties.
decedent was domiciled in PH.
The law office of Ancheta submitted a
In our conflicts rule, Art. 16 refers all these project of partition with respect to the
questions to national law of the deceased. estate of Audrey. However, instead of
But upon presentation of the foreign law giving the entire Forbes Park property to
(Calif. law), it contains TWO sets of rules – Richard, the project of partition divided it
into ¾ for Richard and ¼ for Kyle.
First rule: Calif. citizens who died IN
California and domiciled therein, in which They did not follow the will of Audrey.
case the internal law of Calif. on succession Instead of giving the whole property to
is applied. Richard, the partition divided the half of the
wife into equal portions and gave the other
Second rule: CONFLICTS rule of Calif. half to Kyle.
applied whenever a Calif. Citizen is
domiciled OUTSIDE Calif. at the time of his Dean: Anong ibig sabihin? Qinuquestion
death. In this case, the law of the domicile nila ngayon ung project of partition which
is applied. (The case of Edward Christensen was made by the law office of Ancheta
in Aznar) giving a portion of the Forbes Park Property
to the adopted daughter because none was
SC: Since the conflicts rule of the PH and stated in the will of the wife (first wife).
Calif. clashed (i.e. our conflicts rule
references foreign law while the Calif. The Supreme Court said that under Article
conflicts rule references local law), there 16, particularly the 2nd paragraph, it is not
was a referring back, or a renvoi. Philippine law that will apply in the
distribution of the estate of either Audrey
Renvoi or Richard, it is supposed to be governed
by their national law. Since the wife
The SC said if we will not accept the bequeathed all her properties to her
referring back, the case will not be settled. husband, then the entire Makati property
The most prudent thing for the court to do should have been given to the husband
is for our courts, since Calif. law refers the which in turn the husband gave it to the
question back to OUR law (the law of second wife. Therefore, the entire Forbes
Edward’s domicile) is to apply PH internal Park property should have pertained to the
law on succession, which recognizes 2nd wife.
legitimes.
So hindi tama ung hinati nila because that
Dean: We only apply renvoi when there is was not provided for in the will, and that
a referring back. If there is no referring was not how she intends to bequeathed her
back, no application. property. So the Supreme Court said that
the entire Makati property should have
ANCHETA v. DALAYGON pertained to the 2nd wife or to the husband,
which in turn the husband bequeathed the
This case involves the estate of two US property to the 2nd wife. So the entire
citizens who are domiciled in the PH, Forbes Park Property should pertain to
Richard and Audrey. Both were citizens of Candelaria-Dalaygon as inheritance from
Maryland at the time of their death. They her husband.
resided in the Philippines and purchased a
house and lot at Forbes Park in Makati. Did you not notice that they were able to
They had no legitimate or illegitimate issue. acquire a house and lot even if they’re
They only had an adopted daughter, Kyle. foreigners? The Supreme Court said in this
In her will, Audrey left all her properties to case – if a land or a real property is invalidly
Richard, and nothing to their adopted transferred to an alien, but it was
daughter Kyle. subsequently transferred to a Filipino, the
flaw in the original transaction is cured. So
Candelaria Dalaygon, the second wife, and the SC did not anymore delve into the
Richard got married. After two years, they validity of acquisition of the Makati
had two children and on the third year, property by the Spouses Richard and
Richard died. Before he died, he executed Audrey because the important thing is that
a will wherein he gave all his properties it is now back in the hands of a Filipino
to Candelaria except for shares of stock Citizen, which is Candelaria-Dalaygon.
which he gave to his adopted daughter.
Ancheta was appointed as ancillary HUMAN RELATIONS AND ABUSE OF

administrator for the PH properties. After RIGHTS
the wills of the two Americans were
probated abroad, they were submitted for Dean: There are 3 articles actually very
reprobate here in the PH. Since the estate important in the sphere of Human
of Audrey was still being settled when Relations, and these are Articles 19-21.
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
There is no moral wrong without a remedy So the matter was referred to then UP
because of these articles. President Abueva. But after a long process,
her name was stricken from the list of
Article 19. Every person must, in the faculty for that particular semester where
exercise of his rights and in the she applied for her leave, and her salaries
performance of his duties, act with was not paid for the succeeding months. So
justice, give everyone his due, and nabayaran pa siya ng first month of that
observe honesty and good faith. semester of 1988. But given that she had
already expressed her unwillingness to
Article 20. Every person who, contrary teach during the semester, and the past
to law, wilfully or negligently causes experience of the College of Mass
damage to another, shall indemnify the Communication, (sakanya siguro may konti
latter for the same. siyang attitude, kapag sinabi niyang ayaw
niya, ayaw niya). So her name was stricken
Article 21. Any person who wilfully from the roster of the faculty, and she did
causes loss or injury to another in not received her salaries for the succeeding
manner that is contrary to morals, good months.
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage But eventually, the matter of her sabbatical
leave was denied. So matagal siyang
In Article 19, which speaks of the principle naghintay for the processing, but her
of abuse of rights, every person every sabbatical leave was denied.
person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act She now sued the Dean and the
with justice, give everyone his due, and Department Chair for abuse of rights.
observe honesty and good faith.
Issue: Are the elements of abuse of rights
There is a primordial limitation in the are present?
exercise of one’s rights or in the
performance of one’s duties and these are Dean: The Supreme Court said no because
the norms stated in Art. 19. Ano yun? the elements are:
● Act with justice ● A right/duty
● Give everyone his due ● Exercised in bad faith
● Observe honest and good faith ● Sole purpose of causing prejudice to
another
So even if you are exercising a right, or
performing a duty, if you do not observe A sabbatical leave is not a right said by the
the standards mentioned in Art. 19, you SC. It is a mere privilege granted by the
may be held liable for damages for the school and to be entitled by a sabbatical,
injury caused to another. you must show to the satisfaction to the
school authorities that you are entitled to
For there to be an abuse of right, there it. There are certain requirements that you
must be: must comply with before you may be given
● A right/duty a sabbatical leave. Unfortunately, in her
● Exercised in bad faith case, she was not able to present the
● Sole purpose of causing prejudice to requirements that she qualify for the
another sabbatical. So the SC said, not having a
right, she cannot compel the school to
So bad faith implies malice. grant the sabbatical leave. There can be
no abuse of right, if there is no right in
DIAZ v. ENCANTO the first place. So the SC ruled in favor of
Encanto.
Dean: This case involves Elizabeth Diaz
who was an associate professor in Mass ALBENSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Communication at UP Diliman, and
sometime during her stint in UP she applied Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel
for a sabbatical leave with pay. But since plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc.
there was a shortage of teachers at the somewhere in V. Mapa, Manila. It was paid
time he applied for her sabbatical leave, by means of a check drawn against the
the Department Chair of College of Mass account of EL Woodworks. But the address
Communication just recommended to the where they delivered the mild steel plates
Dean of the College, Dean Encanto, that was in Guaranteed Enterprises. When the
she be granted whatever leave credits she check was presented for payment, the
may be entitled to, BUT NOT A check was dishonored due to insufficient of
SABBATICAL. Kasi ung sabbatical mahaba funds. So that they tried to investigate who
yun. She may not return for a year or so, was the issuer of the check since it was
and they were badly in need of teachers at delivered to Guaranteed Enterprises, they
that time. So she was not recommended by check the records (wala pang Data Privacy
the Department Chair. Act noon, pwede kang pumunta sa SEC at
iverify mo sino may-ari, kung ano pangalan
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
ng may-ari, address, kasaysayan). So they Without any request from RETELCO, the
went to SEC, and discovered that the manager of Globe Mackay, Hendry,
President of Guaranteed Enterprises was volunteered information, called RETELCO,
one Eugenio S. Baltao. So they filed a case and said “Do not hire Tobias, because he is
for violation of BP 22 against Eugenio a crook and a swindler. You will regret it if
Baltao, Sr., who was the registered you hire him.”
President of Guaranteed Enterprises.
This was the last straw, and prompted
Eugenio denied issuing the check, and also Tobias to file another case against the
did not disclosed that it was actually his son company, this time, a civil case for
namesake, Eugenio Baltao, Jr., who damages based on abuse of rights.
ordered the mild steel plates, and asked to
be delivered in Guaranteed Enterprises, Globe Mackay interposed its defense which
which is also the address of EL Woodworks. said that they were merely exercising their
After the criminal case was dismissed, it right to dismiss and erring employee.
was then that Eugenio Baltao Sr. filed a
case against Albenson for Malicious RULING: Supreme Court clarified that the
Prosecution and Abuse of Right. exercise of a right to dismiss an erring
employee should not be confused with the
Q: Is there an abuse of right here? Was manner in which it is exercised.
the petitioner motivated by malice or
intent to prejudice Baltao Sr. when it Even if you are exercising a right to
filed the criminal case for B.P. 22? dismiss, if you do it abusively, you can be
held liable for damages under Article 19.
A: NO. The matter could have been clarified
if only Baltao, Sr. disclosed that there are Q: What were the acts of abuse?
two (2) persons by the name of Eugenio
Baltao, Sr. A: Even before he was proven guilty, he
was already forced to pay a leave of
The Supreme Court also ruled that the case absence without pay.
also does not fall under Malicious
Prosecution because they acted with All his personal belongings in his office
probable cause, because there was a check were searched by Globe Mackay. Pina-
which was dishonored. They had no reason iwanan sa kanyang open lahat ng drawers
to suspect or to think that there were and filing cabinets, etc.
actually two persons with the same name,
holding office in the same address. He was sued criminally, and even if the
cases were dismissed, he was still
Therefore, there was no abuse of right. dismissed from employment. Worse, he
was trying to start a new life by applying
GLOBE MACKAY V. CA for a new job, and yet, Globe Mackay seem
to not move on and wants to destroy Tobias
Q: Can you dismiss an employee any til the end.
way you want?
The Supreme Court said, this certainly is
FACTS: Globe Mackay (which is now Globe not within the bounds of the standards of
Telecom) attributed fictitious purchases in Article 19. Therefore, SC held Globe
the company against one of its employees, Mackay liable for damages.
Restituto Tobias. Criminal cases were filed
against him. BARONS MARKETING V. CA
But after the handwriting expert testified Dean: Kung may utang ka, ang terms ng
that the signatures appearing in the contract niyo ay payable in cash, tapos di
fictitious purchases do not belong to ka makabayad then nagrequest ka ng
Tobias, the case was dismissed. payment on installment without interest.
Pag hindi pumayag ang creditor, abuse of
Despite the dismissal of the criminal cases, right ba yon?
Tobias was still dismissed from
employment. FACTS: Respondent here is Phelps Dodge
Phils. Inc, a supplier of electrical wires and
Tobias then filed a case for Illegal Dismissal cables. One of its customers is petitioner
against the company. Barons Mktg.
While the case was pending, Tobias tried to A certain quantity of wires and cables were
apply for another job in a rival company, already delivered. Based on their contract,
RETELCO (because it was almost certain more than Php 500,000 worth of cables
that he will not regain his job at Globe would be paid for in cash.
Mackay).
However, Barons Mktg. was not able to
comply with its obligation to pay and it
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
requested for payment on installment jeans. A similar letter was also written by
without interest. Of course, Phelps Dodge the petitioner to the management of
refused. Robinsons Mall.
Eventually, Phelps Dodge filed a case for Quiñones filed a case because of the
collection against Barons Mktg. humiliation she suffered. She was branded
as someone who is a shoplifter because she
By way of counterclaim, Barons Mktg. did not pay for the jeans.
contended that Phelps Dodge was guilty of
abuse of right. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of
abuse of rights. Can they be held liable for
Q: According to Barons Mtkg., what damages based on their act of writing a
was the abuse of right? letter?
A: That Phelps Dodge refused to accept Ruling: From the point that they followed
their offer of settlement of their loan Quiñones and they were trying to clarify
obligation on installment basis without whether she had actually paid, in fact they
interest. asked her to open her wallet and she gladly
opened her wallet and showed the receipt
ISSUE: Is that an abuse of right? to the employees of Guess, up to that
point, the SC it is still okay. There was no
RULING: NO, because based on the tenor abuse of right there. There was no malice
of the contract, there was no stipulation on there.
payment on installment.
The malice consist in the writing of the
Of course, if the contract stipulates the letter to the management of the mall and
form of payment, the creditor has the to the superior of Quiñones who had
perfect right to enforce the tenor or the nothing to do at all with the transaction.
contract in accordance with its literal tenor. The Court said that on this, there is malice
present because their intent was not really
Phelps Dogde’s refusal to accept payment to have the item paid for but more of to
on installment was not motivated by malice humiliate the respondent to compel her to
or bad faith or ill-will; but merely, plain and pay. The SC said that there was an abuse
simple enforcement of the terms of the of right which entitles Quiñones to
contract. Therefore, there is no abuse of damages.
right.
RELLOSA v PELLOSIS
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING v QUIÑONES This involves a property which is being

leased to tenants. Tenants are the private
Dean: Quiñones was a reservation and respondents and the former owner sold it
ticketing agent at Cebu Pacific in Robinsons to Cynthia Ortega. As the new owner,
Cebu Branch. While on a break, she went Cynthia Ortega applied for the demolition
to a Guess store inside the mall and fitted of the building. She was saying that the
four (4) items. One of the items she fitted building is in danger of falling and it is
was black jeans. After returning the three already dilapidated, therefore, there is a
(3) items, she went to the counter and paid need to take it down and to rebuild it.
for the jeans. Allegedly, she paid for the
jeans. She already had the receipt in her The officer in the city hall issued an order
possession and the item was already inside of demolition and it was served upon the
the bag. She was walking outside the private respondents. The private
Guess store and while she was approaching respondents filed an appeal from the order
the walk way towards the Cebu Pacific of demolition. One day after perfecting
office, she noticed that the two (2) their appeal to the city building official, the
employees of Guess store were following petitioner, Cynthia Ortega, and her father
her and were running after her. When Rellosa plus some armed men implemented
confronted, they said that she forgot to pay the writ of demolition and destroyed the
for her item. But she insisted that she paid building totally. The respondents filed a
as she already has the receipt and walked case for damages based on abuse of right
out of the store. but pending that case, the writ of
demolition was affirmed on appeal.
Apparently, she said that she invited the
two (2) employees to go to their office but Cynthia Ortega then said that she is telling
still there was no resolution because one the truth that this building is in need of
party is saying that she paid and the other demolition because it is already
party is saying she did not. So what the dilapidated. This is shown by the fact that
employees of Guess did was to write a the order of demolition was affirmed by the
letter to the employer of Quiñones stating city building official.
the material facts which happened and
insinuating that she did not pay for the
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The question is whether she is guilty of
abuse of rights. The answer is yes, she CARPIO V VALMONTE
guilty of abuse of rights. Bakit? It’s not a
question of whether she is correct in saying Dean: Valmonte was a wedding
that the building is dilapidated but the point coordinator and Carpio was an aunt of one
is she implemented the writ of demolition of the parties to the marriage. The bride
even before it has become final and and the entire bridal entourage were
executory. She practically deprived the accommodated at the Manila Hotel, and
private respondents, who are the tenants, Carpio arrived carrying a paper bag. She
from the benefits of the appeal because the did not disclose to anyone what that paper
judgment was not yet final at the time that bag contained. She went directly to the
the writ was implemented. restroom, allegedly placed the paper bag
under the sink, which according to her,
Dean: What if the writ of demolition was contained the jewelry which she was
reversed and in the meantime they had supposed to wear during the ceremony.
already demolished it? Can you repair the Everybody was inside the room, including
damage? No more. It was being used as an Valmonte, when Valmonte was summoned
abode. So tirahan, ang ginawa nila by someone to go downstairs to talk to the
dinemolish nila, walang mapuntahan yung band that will be performing during the
mga private respondents who are the reception. Before she went down, she used
tenants. So, the SC said that implementing the restroom and when she went back to
the writ of demolition or an order of the bride suite, she was verbally lambasted
demolition even before it has become final, by Carpio, “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
is certainly an abuse of rights because it kwarto, ikaw ang nagnakaw ng alahas ko.”
deprive the private respondents of the Carpio was not contented, she ordered the
benefits of appeal. guard of the hotel to conduct a body search
on Valmonte, and the search yielded
nothing. She also instructed the guards of
NPC VS. PHILIPP BROTHERS the Manila Hotel to trail her during the
entire event and conduct a search on the
Dean: Napocor or NPC submitted or car of Valmonte, without a search warrant.
published invitations to bid for the supply When the search yielded nothing, Valmonte
of coal for the generation of energy. The still complied with her duty as wedding
private respondent, Philipp Brothers, is one coordinator until the event was finished
of the participating bidders in that exercise and after that she demanded a public
and they won the bidding. However, apology. But, Carpio adamantly refused to
despite their winning bid, the private apologize. So, she filed a case for damages
respondent failed to comply with their against Carpio on the basis of abuse of
contract with Napocor. In other words, rights.
wala silang naisupply na coal. So, since
Napocor badly needed the coal at that time, Issue: Was there an abuse of rights?
what they did was to issue second
invitations to bid for the purpose of having The SC said, yes, because you cannot point
a new set of bidders who can comply with an accusing finger against anyone on the
the contract. So, Philipp Brothers again basis on mere suspicion and verbally
filed an application to prequalify and bid, lambast her, and brand her as a thief
but this time, their application was denied without any solid evidence to backup her
by Napocor. So, because of this denial, claim. Not only that, the body search and
they filed a case for damages on the basis car search without any evidence at all.
of abuse of right. Nobody knew that she was carrying jewelry
inside the paper bag. Siya lang
Issue: Is there an abuse of right because nakakaalam. Baka she was saying that
they were denied the right to cast their bid there was jewelry inside, but in fact there
for the supply of coal? was none.
The SC said that the denial was not Dean: If the act does not constitute an
prompted by any ill will or malice on the abuse of right, it may still justify the award
part of Napocor, but it was due to the bad of damages if the act is contrary to law,
track record of Philipp Brothers in failing to under Article 20.
comply with their commitment under their
contract with Napocor. The elements of ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary
abuse of right are not present in this case to law, willfully or negligently causes
considering that the respondent failed to damage to another, shall indemnify the
comply with their contract. No person in his latter for the same.
right mind would accept him again as a
prospective bidder when hindi pa nga niya Q: What is the difference between
nacocomply yung first contract niya, Article 20 and 21?
magbibid na naman siya. So that is not
prompted by any malice or ill will. Hence, Dean: In 20, the act is contrary to law. It
the court ruled in favor of Napocor. may be committed willfully or with malice
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
or through negligence. But, in article 21, medical test. The accredited clinic to do
the act is not contrary to law but it is that for Limay Bulk Terminal was
contrary to morals or good customs or Community Diagnostic Center (CDC),
public policy and it is done willfully. which is owned by petitioner Garcia. When
Salvador was tested by CDC, she was
confronted with the result that she was
Dean: It is willful under Article 21. In suffering from Hepatitis B, and as a result
Article 20, it can be willful or with malice or of that medical exam, she was not hired.
committed through negligence. She went home to her father. Since she
was the breadwinner, she told her father of
ARDIENTE V PASTORFIDE the bad news that she was suffering from
Hepatitis B and therefore, did not get the
Pastorfide purchased a property (house job. The father suffered a heart attack. She
and lot) from Joyce Ardiente. By agreement brought her father to a hospital. While at
of the parties, the buyer Pastorfide would the hospital, she underwent a confirmatory
effect the transfer of all the utilities under testing. She was not convinced that she
the name of Joyce Ardiente into her own was suffering from any illness because she
name. Pagkatapos ng bilihan, ang usapan, was not feeling anything. The result
it-transfer niya yung water, electric bill sa conducted at the hospital showed a
pangalan ni Pastorfide. Pastorfide used and negative result. She then confronted CDC,
occupied the property for 4 years, and paid and when they repeated the test, the result
the utilities for 4 years under the name of was negative. She filed a case for damages
the former owner Ardiente without any against CDC for the sleepless nights she
interruption or problems until she allegedly suffered thinking she was sick, and for the
defaulted in the payment of her water bill expenses that she incurred in undergoing
with the Cagayan de Oro Water District. the confirmatory test.
Since it was still under the name of
Ardiente, Ardiente personally went to the Issue: Whether Garcia and CDC should be
Cagayan de Oro Water District to request help liable for damages under Article 20.
for the disconnection of the water service
in the house of Pastorfide. This prompted We said awhile ago that every person who
Pastorfide to file a case for damages contrary to law willfully or negligently
against Ardiente. causes damage to another shall indemnify
the latter for the same. So upon the
Q: What was the defense of Ardiente? examination of the records, the Court
A: Ardiente said that she was merely found that CDC was not supervised by a
enforcing or trying to enforce the licensed physician which is required by the
contractual commitment of Pastorfide that Clinical Laboratory Law. It was only
she will transfer all the utilities in her name. supervised by a medical technologist, not a
That is why she cannot be held liable for licensed physician. That by itself is a
damages. violation of the provisions of the Clinical
Laboratory Law. The results were released
Q: Is Ardiente correct? without the signature of a licensed
A: No. According to the SC, if it were true physician which is another violation of the
that the intention was merely to force or to Clinical Laboratory Law. Apparently, the
require Pastorfide to transfer the utilities in mistake was committed because it was not
her name, then she could have simply verified by a licensed physician. Therefore,
asked her to comply with the contract, and the SC held that Garcia should be held
not to asked for the direct disconnection of liable for damages under Article 20 because
the water service of the respondent. there was a provision of the law which they
willfully violated, and caused damage to
There is liability for damages under the Ranida Salvador.
provision of Article 20. There was malice in
her act requiring disconnection kasi hindi MERALCO V CA
nagj-jive yung kanyang purpose. Bakit
hindi mo sinabi na ang ka-kontrata mo ay Even if the customer is in arrears, it is no
ito. Although she can do that, the Cagayan defense on the part of Meralco to
de Oro Water District cannot be faulted for disconnect without the written notice of
disconnecting it because based on their disconnection.
records, it was still Ardiente who was their
registered customer. The SC held that This involves the Chavezes. Both father
there was liability on the part of petitioner and son are lawyers. They had several
Ardiente for damages. unpaid Meralco bills, and when the
personnel of Meralco went to their house,
GARCIA V SALVADOR they said to not disconnect since they will
pay the bills in the afternoon. They did pay
This case involves Ranida Salvador who but left one bill unpaid. There were 3, they
was a trainee at Limay Bulk Terminal, paid the 2, and they retained 1 unpaid
Bataan. As a precondition to employment, bill.
she was required to undergo the usual
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Thereafter, Meralco proceeded with
disconnection without the written notice of The SC said if there is any person guilty of
disconnection. They sued Meralco. The seduction, it is not the man. It is the
defense of Meralco is that they cannot be woman. She wanted the benefit of
held liable for damages because the marriage before the benefit of clergy. She
customer did not pay and yet they are the is not entitled to damages for breach of
ones being demanded. promise to marry.
According to Meralco, the respondents are A juridical person is generally not entitled
in arrears in the payment of bills. Naturally, to moral damages because, unlike a natural
it is their right to disconnect to force them person, it cannot experience physical
to pay. suffering or such sentiments as wounded
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
The SC said under the Public Service Act, moral shock.
the law requires that the utility company
must give a 48-hour written notice of WASMER V VELEZ
disconnection before the actual
disconnection. It is not a defense on the Francisco Velez was about to be wed to
part of Meralco that the customer is in Beatriz Wasmer. Everything was set
arrears. They have to comply with the 48- already, the invitations were out, the gown
hour written notice of disconnection. If they and outfit of the man were prepared. 2
do that without 48-hour written notice of days before the celebration of the wedding
disconnection, they are liable under Article itself, Beatriz received a short note from
20 and Public Service Act. the would-be-husband “I’m sorry but we
will have to postpone our wedding because
Dean: If the act does not constitute an my mother was opposed to it”.
abuse of right, it may also give rise to
cause of action of damages if there is injury It was too late because the whole
caused to another and the act is contrary community was already aware that they
to morals, good customs, or public policy. were getting married in 2 days.
Breach of promise to marry is not an She filed a case for damages against
actionable wrong. Per se (on its own), Francisco Velez. To the defense of Velez, it
break of promise is not actionable. You was not actionable.
cannot sue someone for breaching or not
fulfilling the promise to marry you. There According to the SC, to walk out of the
was a case on Wasmer vs. Velez, wedding only 2 days before it is actually
Hermosisima vs. CA, and Gashem vs. CA. solemnized is an act which is contrary to
morals. What justifies the award of
HERMOSISIMA V CA damages is the fact that Beatriz also spent.
There was actual damages incurred by
Soledad is a public school teacher in Cebu Beatriz. She was entitled to damages not
at the time she met Chris Hermosisima who for breach of promise to marry but for the
was 10 years her junior (husband is act of walking out of the wedding 2 days
younger than wife). She had her eyes fixed before.
on Chris Hermosisima, He noticed she was
the one who performed the first move. She GASHEM vs CA
will bring in food at the cabin of Chris, visit
him, have chat with him, etc. There was no Dean: An Iranian national who was a
relationship between the two because she medical exchange student in the
was 10 years older. Philippines, He ate in the canteen where
the girl was working as a waitress. She was
The sexual act repeated until she became courted by Gashem and they formed a
pregnant. She told Chris about her bond. Gashem promised, I will marry you,
pregnancy. It was first time that she heard I want ot meet your family. Marilou
the words “Don’t worry I will marry you”. introduced Gashem to her parents and
Chris did get married to his girlfriend but were permitted to sleep together that night
not to Soledad. Because of that, Soledad where something happened to them. When
filed a case for damages against him. Marilou asked Gashem about the plans of
their marriage, Gashem said that he can no
The SC said that breach of promise to longer fulfill the promise to marry Marilou
marry is not actionable per se. If there is because he was already married.
no carnal knowledge, there is no
pregnancy, resignation from job, or actual She filed a case of damages against
expenses incurred, you cannot recover Gashem. Take note that Marilou was
damages. Per se, it is not actionable. already more than the majority age but she
was not used to such acts, in fact she was
In here, there was carnal knowledge. To a barrio girl. The Supreme Court here said
constitute a cause of action for damages, that she is entitled to damages because if
there must be at least moral seduction. it were not for the promise to marry, she
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
would not have surrendered herself to Mabasa’s favor, that is why he had to file
Gashem. There was moral seduction the case before the trial court which
involved in this case, considering the granted him the easement. So, there being
personality of the woman, and the court no right of him to use that passageway, the
also noted the character of Gashem who court said that he is not entitled to
said that Marilou was interested to marry damages by reason of loss of income
him because he would soon be a doctor. because prior to the decision of the RTC
This shows that he has no regard for there is no right being violated, since such
Filipino women, and the fact that he act done by Custodio and Santos were
admitted that he could no longer marry exercised under Art. 430. Hence, he is not
Marilou because he was already married to entitled to damages.
someone else all the more complicates his
situation because from the very start he Dean: Damnum Absque Injuria provides
had no intention to fulfilling the promise of that the law affords no remedy or right to
marrying Marilou. The SC awarded damages for damages which does not
damages to Marilou. amount to legal injury.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Dean: There is damage caused to one but
in contemplation of law, there is no legal Dean: Every person who through
injury. an act or performance of another acquires
or comes into possession of something
These terms, injury, damage, and damages without just or legal ground shall return the
should be differentiated same thing.
INJURY illegal invasion of a legal

right FRENZEL vs CATITO
DAMAGE lost, harm, hurt by reason of
injury This case involves unjust enrichment claim
of an alien seeking the recover the money
DAMAGES the recompense or the
that he used to pay for the land placed in
amount of money awarded
the name of a Filipina. Frenzel is an
to the person who suffered
Australian national who met Catito who is a
the damage
Filipino. Unknown to Frenzel, Catito was
already married to another foreign
national. Frenzel courted Catito and
purchased parcels of land and placed it in
CUSTODIO vs CA the name of the Filipina. When Frenzel
knew of Catito’s marriage, the relationship
Custodio and Santos are owners of a parcel turned sour and he now filed a case to
of land which were located in front of the recover the money used to purchase the
property of Mabasa (Dominant estate - parcels of land that was placed in the name
landlocked by the properties of Custodio of Catito on the ground that if it not be
and Santos). recovered, Catito will unjustly enrich at the
expense of an alien. The SC said that the
The property of Mabasa was leased to principle of unjust enrichment will not apply
tenants and allegedly these tenants were if the alien knowingly violated the
causing too much inconvenience to Constitution by purchasing a parcel of land
Custodio and Santos. As owners of these and putting it in the name of the Filipina.
respective properties, they talked with The court awarded the parcels of land to
each other and decided to construct a Catito because the alien should not be
concrete fence along their property, and as permitted to do indirectly what he can not
a consequence, the pathway leading to the do directly. So the Supreme Court ruled in
property of Mabasa was effectively made this case that he is not entitled to damages
narrower which caused the tenants of but entitled to the easement. Not the
Mabasa to leave. Mabasa filed an action for damages.
a right of way. The Trial court granted the
easement but refused to give damages to Dean: Every person who through an act or
Mabasa for unrealized income. On appeal, performance or another acquires or comes
the CA awarded the damages to Mabasa by into possession of something without just
reason of loss of income. or legal ground shall return the same to
him.
The SC clarified that prior to the decision of
the RTC granting the easement, there was ARTICLE 22. Every person who through
really no such right to easement in an act of performance by another, or any
Mabasa’s favor. Easement is not automatic, other means, acquires or comes into
you may be given the right to demand if possession of something at the expense
the servient estate refuses, but only upon of the latter without just or legal ground,
payment of proper indemnity. In this case, shall return the same to him.
wala pa talagang easement existing in
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
turned out to be counterfeit. So when they
Dean: Provides that the law affords no went home to the Philippines because of
remedy or right to damages or damages the alleged humiliation they suffered, the
with does not amount to legal injury. There Carbonell spouses filed a case for damages
may be damage to one person but in against Metrobank.
contemplation of law there is no legal injury
So the expert witness testified that the
So the case of Frenzel v. Catito involves the notes presented appeared to be near
application of unjust enrichment of an alien genuine that it could not be deciphered by
seeking to recover the money that he used the naked eye. So even a expert can be
to pay for the land placed in the name of duped given the appearance of the dollar
Filipina. Frenzel is an Australian national bills which is almost exactly the same as
when he met Ederlina Catito who is the the original bills.
Filipina and unknown to Frenzel, Ederlina is
already married to another foreign So the Supreme Court here refused to
national, which is a German national at that award damages to the Carbonells on the
time that he met Ederlina. ground that in the principle of Damnum
Absque Injuria the damages incurred would
Of course this is not disclosed by Ederlina be solely for the person who suffered the
and Frenzel courted Ederlina and promised damage because in contemplation of the
to finance whatever business she wants in law, it does not award damages for
the Philippines and in fact, he fulfilled his something which does not involve a
promise by purchasing parcels of land and violation of a legal right.
placed them in the name of Ederlina. So
when he discovered that Ederlina is already We mentioned a while ago that there are
married to someone else, the relationship three (3) terms that you must know:
turned sour and he now filed a case not to 1. The injury which is the legal
recover the land because he admitted that invasion of legal right
he is not qualified to own lands in the 2. Damage
Philippines but he was seeking to recover 3. Damages
the money that he used to purchase the
parcels of land which were placed in the According to the Supreme Court, you
name of Filipina on the ground that if he cannot fault the bank in releasing the
was not allowed to recover the money, The supposed dollar bills to the Carbonells as
Filipina will be unjustly enriched at the far as they are concerned, they are genuine
expense of an alien. notes.
The issue is whether he can invoke the To my mind lang, isn’t that banks are
doctrine of unjust enrichment to justify his required to exercise extraordinary diligence
claim for reimbursement given that he was rather than mere ordinary diligence in
aware of the Constitutional prohibition. dealing with the accounts of their clients.
I’m just surprised that in this particular
The Supreme Court said the principle of case, the Supreme court said that the
unjust enrichment will not apply if the alien Carbonells are not entitled to damages
knowingly violated the Constitution by because the Court said that the bank
purchasing a parcel of land and putting in exercise the proper precautions, but it still
the name of the Filipina so the Court ended up releasing counterfeit notes so
awarded the parcels of land to Ederlina pagka-ganun kasi nangyari na na-
Catito because the alien should not be exonerate ang bank to release counterfeit
permitted to do indirectly what he cannot notes, who can we trust? Eh sila yung
do directly. So what he cannot do directly bank? To my mind lang, it is not a
to recover the lands but if we allowed him controlling doctrine. Because the concept
to recover the money he paid for the lands of banks is that they are required to
it si as if we are allowing him to do exercise extraordinary diligence.
indirectly what he cannot do directly which
is to get the parcel of land. At any rate, in that case the Supreme Court
said the law does not award damages for
CARBONELL V. METROBANK something which does not amount to a
legal injury, so it did not award damages to
Dean: In Carbonell v. Metrobank, the Carbonells.
Carbonell Spouses sued Metrobank here for
damages. Ito ay related to damnum REYES v LIM
absque injuria. The spouses sued
Metrobank because they apparently went Dean: It involves the principle of unjust
on a trip to Thailand and before they went enrichment. Reyes is the seller of a parcel
on the trip they withdrew $1,000.00 from of land for 28Million and the buyer was Lim.
Metrobank. So when they went to a store They stipulated that 10Million will be paid
in Thailand, he said that the merchant said as initial payment and since the property
that you Filipinos cannot be trusted was being leased to tenants at the time of
because apparently some of the ten $100 the sale, there was a provision in their sale
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contract that if Reyes fails to eject the complaint should be found to be
tenants within a certain period, he would malicious.
pay a penalty to the buyer Lim of 4% of the
down payment. Dean: Correlate this provision with the
provision of prosecution of offenses under
The principle that no person may unjustly the Rules of Court and Article 100 of the
enrich himself at the expense of another is Revised Penal Code – every person
embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. criminally liable shall also be civilly liable.
This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural So whenever a person commits a crime, it
remedies. One condition for invoking this is presumed, too, that he offends two
principle is that the aggrieved party has no entities: one is the State; and the other is
other action based on contract, quasi- private offended party.
contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
provision of law. There is unjust GR: It is impliedly that when one institutes
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a criminal action, there is civil action.
a benefit to the loss of another, or when a XPN:
person retains money or property of 1. When the civil action is filed ahead
another against the fundamental principles of the criminal action; or
of justice, equity and good conscience. 2. When the offended party made an
express reservation to file a
separate civil action for the same
NDC v MADRIGAL GR NO. 148332 act or omission of the accused.
Dean: In this case, after purchasing 100% Under the Rules of Court, extinction of the
stock ownership of the National Shipping penal action does not carry with it the
Corporation of the Philippines, respondent extinction of the civil action, unless, such
was surprised to receive from the US proceeds from the final judgment of the
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue criminal case that the fact from which the
Service (US IRS), a Notice of Final civil liability might arise does not exist.
Assessment against NSCP for deficiency
taxes on gross transportation income
derived from US sources for the years Generally speaking, acquittal in the
ending 1990, 1991 and 1992. Respondent criminal case does not mean that the
paid the deficiency taxes under protest and accused is also freed of civil liability. There
demanded reimbursement from the must be a pronouncement in the criminal
petitioner, but NDC denied. By way of case that the fact from which the civil
defense, NDC said they are not liable to pay liability of the accused may arise does not
because the sale was on “as is where is” exist. Meaning to say, walang basis to hold
basis. It is your the accused civilly liable. You will find it in
Rule 110.
The Supreme Court, however, said that the
“as is” condition only refers to the physical Example:
condition of the property, and not to If Pedro was sued by Pablo for estafa
the legal liabilities. So the unpaid tax because he issued a check in payment of a
liability which would put the vessels under pre-existing obligation. There was already
the threat of seizure falls under the legal a loan of Pedro to Pablo amounting to
liabilities. SC the held that the case at bar P100,000. After several months, he was
calls to mind the principle of unjust asked for payment and instead of paying
enrichment — Nemo cum alterius cash, he issued a postdated check to Pablo
detrimento locupletari potest. No person which when presented for payment was
shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly dishonored. Instead of suing for BP22,
at the expense of others. This liablity was Pablo decided to file a criminal case for
incurred prior to the sale. It would have estafa against Pedro. Pedro was acquitted
been a different story if the unpaid tax of the criminal charge for estafa because
liabilities were disclosed to the buyer and the elements were not proved.
agreed to pay the same. However, in this
case, it was concealed. Q: In that particular case, is there a
basis to hold Pedro civilly liable
Article 29. When the accused in a despite his acquittal based on the
criminal prosecution is acquitted on the provision of the Rules of Court?
ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action A: Yes. There was a pre-existing
for damages for the same act or omission obligation. There was a contract of loan
may be instituted. Such action requires between the parties. So even if, he was
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon acquitted of estafa charge does not mean
motion of the defendant, the court may that civil liability is extinguished
require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the PADILLA v. CA
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Padilla is a mayor of a town and the private Ruling: If the terms of the acquittal show
respondents here were owners of stalls that the accused was not the author of the
which they were leasing from the local crime, then there could be no basis to hold
government. Allegedly, the stalls were him liable. In this case, Daluraya was not
nuisance. The mayor and his armed men positively identified as the one driving the
destroyed the stalls of the private van that fatally hit the victim. He cannot be
respondents and carted away the goods. held civilly liable.
They filed a criminal case for grave coercion
against the mayor and his men. The mayor PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
was acquitted including his men but they
were held civilly liable to pay the private It is a question which arises in a case, and
respondents the value of the destroyed it is a logical antecedent to the issue
stall and the goods taken in the amount of involved therein and the cognizance
P9,600. But the mayor was saying that he pertains to another tribunal. Under the
has already been acquitted and therefore ROC, to constitute a prejudicial question,
he is not supposed to be civilly liable to the the civil case which is considered
private respondents. prejudicial question must have been filed
ahead of the criminal case. Before, this is
ISSUE: Whether or not the mayor is not required but the Court noticed that
correct that his acquittal also extinguishes mostly in bigamy cases, when an accused
his civil liability. is sued for bigamy they will thereafter file
petition for annulment of the first marriage
RULING: NO. There is basis to hold him and raise it as a defense in the criminal
civilly liable because there is evidence to case. It is like an afterthought to file
prove that they were the ones who petition for nullity to evade the criminal
performed the acts complained of such as consequences of bigamy. When they
the destruction of the stalls and the carting revised the ROC, they made it a
away of goods. There is no question that requirement to be considered as prejudicial
they are the one guilty of the acts question, the civil case must have been
complained of it is only that the elements instituted ahead of the criminal case.
of grave coercion were not sufficiently
proven that’s why they are acquitted of the DONATO VS LUNA (1988)
charge. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the Facts: Donato contracted a second
civil action. marriage with Paz Abayan without seeking
the dissolution of the first marriage. The
Similarly, if it is proven that you are the one second marriage was celebrated without a
who performed the act complained of. Only marriage license and in lieu of a marriage
that the crime does not constitute the license, they executed an affidavit of
crime of estafa, you can still be held civilly cohabitation that they have been living as
liable. husband and wife for at least 5 years. Paz
Abayan later filed a declaration of nullity of
But if there is a statement in the criminal marriage with Donato contending that she
case that the accused could not have did not know that there was a prior
committed the crime because he was marriage. This case prompted a bigamy
outside of PH jurisdiction at the very day case filed against Donato. By way of
and time that that crime was committed defense in the bigamy case, Donato said
then there is certainly there can be no basis that his consent to the second marriage
to hold him civilly liable. was obtained by force. He moved to
suspend the criminal case because in the
DALURAYA v. OLIVA meantime the second wife filed a case for
annulment. It was also the second wife who
Marina Oliva was crossing along EDSA. She instituted the bigamy case after
was hit by Nissan Van. Allegly driven by discovering that he was married to first
Antonio Daluraya. The heirs filed a criminal wife.
case against Daluraya. They rested their
case but the MeTC acquitted Daluraya… Issue: W/N there is prejudicial question
sufficient to suspend the criminal case of
bigamy
of the crime of reckless imprudence
because there was no evidence presented Ruling: No, remember that it was the
by prosecution that he was the one driving second wife who sued for bigamy and also
the van. If the case is reckless imprudence, sued for nullity of the second marriage. The
the first thing to do is to identify the driver SC did not accept the defense of Donato
of the vehicle. that his consent to the second marriage
was obtained by force. If you execute an
Issue: W/N there is a basis to hold affidavit cohabitation, does it mean to say
Daluraya civilly liable to the heirs. that he was forced by Paz Abayan to live
with her as husband and wife for 5 years?
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On the assumption that it was Donato who co-owned property which they inherited
filed the case for annulment of the second from their predecessors.
marriage on the ground of force and it was
proven that he was forced to marry the That annulment of TCT was based on the
wife. Then that would have been a different alleged fraud committed by Rosita in
story. In the case of Donato, the second securing the title in her name alone without
wife was the one who instituted the including her co-owners and co-heirs.
criminal case and the case to assail the That civil case was already pending when
validity of the second marriage. The only Rosita Tigol filed a criminal case for the
defense of Donato is that he was forced by violation of the Anti-Squatting Law against
the second wife. The fact that he executed the petitioners.
an affidavit of cohabitation with his second
wife, debunks his theory of the case that he The petitioners in the criminal case, moved
was forced to marry the second wife. So, to suspend the proceedings on the ground
there is no prejudicial question. of prejudicial question and the prejudicial
question, is the pending civil case for
BELTRAN v. PEOPLE annulment of title wherein the very issue is
the ownership of the land in which they are
Dean: In Beltran v People of the occupying.
Philippines, Beltran was sued. So, he
initiated a case for a nullity of his marriage ISSUE: Is there a prejudicial question?
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING: The Supreme Court said yes
While the case was pending, Beltran because if in the annulment case, the Court
cohabited with a woman and the wife declares that the petitioner is a co-owner of
retaliated by filing a criminal case for the private respondent, then the petitioner
concubinage against him. would have the equal right to possess the
land together with Rosita Tigol. Therefore,
Q: What was his defense? as co-owner, he cannot be held guilty of
squatting on his own property.
Dean: That the concubinage case must be
suspended because the civil case for the The Supreme Court ruled that there is a
declaration of nullity of his marriage is a prejudicial question.
prejudicial question to his liability for
concubinage. PAHANG vs. METROBANK
Q: Did the Supreme Court sustain it? Dean: The Spouses Pahang here borrowed
money from Metrobank and as a security to
Dean: The Supreme Court said “no”, it is the obligation, they mortgage a parcel of
not a prejudicial question because the mere land in their names. Due to their failure to
filing of the case for nullity of marriage pay the obligation, Metrobank foreclosed
does not justify his cohabitation with other the mortgage on the property and ended
woman that his not his wife during the up as the highest bidder. After the period
pendency of the proceeding. The Supreme of redemption has expired, the bank now
Court said that there is no prejudicial filed a petition in court for the issuance of
question. a Writ of Possession. It was at this time that
the Spouses Pahang filed a civil case for the
So, prejudicial question determines that annulment of the foreclosure proceedings
the issue in the civil case is so intertwined on the ground hat Metrobank bloated their
with the issue in the criminal case, in such account. The allegations what that their
a way that it determines or it will determine account was not really that big and due to
whether or not the accused is guilty of the the unconscionable interest imposed by the
crime charged. bank, it bloated the account of the Spouses
Pahang and therefore it was foreclosed.
In this case of Beltran, the Supreme Court
said no because until the marriage is set Issue: Whether or not the pending case for
aside, only the Court can say that it is void. annulment of foreclosure may constitute a
The presumption is that the marriage is prejudicial question to the civil case for
valid and therefore, you cannot still cohabit issuance of a writ of possession.
with another woman, not your wife, during
the pendency of the proceedings. Ruling: The SC said that in the first place,
the first element of prejudicial question is
not present because the cases involved
QUIAMBAO vs. OSORIO here are both civil cases. They applied
prejudicial question even if a case is
The petitioner here filed a civil case for administrative and civil provided that the
annulment of title of the private issues are intertwined. In this case,
respondent, Rosita Tigol on the ground that however, the only issue in the petition for
the property which they are occupying was the issuance of writ of possession is
whether the 1 year period to redeem the
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
foreclosed property has expired. In fact, ● Those who are citizens of the
the issuance of the writ of possession to the Philippines at the time of the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale is a adoption of the 1987 Constitution
ministerial function on the part of the ● Those whose fathers or mothers are
court. citizens of the Philippines,
● Those born before January 17, 1973
CIVIL PERSONALITY
of Filipino mothers who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
Dean: Birth determines personality but the the age of majority and
conceived child shall be considered born for ● Those who are naturalized in
all purposes favorable to it. There is a accordance with law.
presumptive personality of an unborn fetus
even if it is en ventre sa mere (still in the NOTE:
womb). Even if the fetus yet unborn, the
law accords the fetues a presumptive Under the 1987 constitution, it included
personality but is limited to purposes those who were born prior to January 17,
favorable to the child. 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
The child, who is unborn, can be a donee age of majority now that was carried over
and under 725, the donation may be to the 1987 constitution, because if you
accepted by persons who would legally were born prior to January 1973 January
represent the child if they were already 17 of a Filipino mother and a foreigner
born. They may also be instituted as an heir father, you are covered by the 1935
in accordance with Art. 1025 in relation to constitution and under the 1935
Art. 40 and 41 provided that they are born constitution, if your mother is a Filipina
under the conditions specified by the your father is a foreigner you have to elect
article. Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.
If the fetus had an intrauterine life of less
than 7 months, it is not deemed born
unless it survives for the full 24 hours from REPUBLIC v CHULE LIM
complete separation from the mother’s
womb or the cutting of the umbilical cord. The election of Philippine citizenship, as
ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of
GELUZ v CA Republic versus Chule Lim applies only to a
legitimate child. In this case of Chule Lim,
This involves a case for damages filed by Chile Lim was an illegitimate child of a
Oscar Lazo, the husband of Mita Villanueva, Filipino mother and a Chinese father. So he
who sued Dr. Geluz for aborting the their she filed a petition to correct the entries in
third child. The CA awarded damages to the her birth certificate, particularly her
husband in the form of the death indemnity misspelled surname from “Yo” to “Yu” and
under Art. 2206 or the death indeminity her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino. But
awarded for the death of the person. the Republic was saying you're not entitled
to change your citizenship from Chinese to
Issue: Whether the ruling of the CA Filipino, because you are already of age at
awarding damages to the husband was the time that you filed the petition and you
proper. failed to elect Philippine citizenship when
you reached the age of 21. So the Supreme
Ruling: No, the ruling was not proper. The Court said that the requirement of election
fetus never acquired personality. The fetus of Philippine citizenship of children born to
was dead at the time it was aborted and it Filipino mothers and foreigner fathers will
was only 2 months old. Since damages on not apply to Chule Lim because her parents
account of injury is personal to the person were never married, and therefore, she's
injured, it is easy to see that if no such an illegitimate child therefore she follows
action accrues in favor of the child, the citizenship of her mother.
precisely because he did not acquire
personality, no derivative action could also
accrue to its parents. MAQUILING VS COMELEC
Supreme Court said that the Court of Arnado ran for mayor of Kauswagan, and
Appeals committed an error in awarding he was naturalized as an American citizen
damages to the husband for the death of and when he planned to run for mayor of
the fetus because the fetus never acquired Kauswagan, he took an oath of allegiance
personality, since it was dead at the time it to the Republic of the Philippines under the
was expelled from the mother's womb. provisions of 9225.
CITIZENSHIP After that he filed the certificate of

candidacy and Linog C. Balua. another
Q: Who are citizens of the Philippines candidate was assailing his candidacy on
A: Under the 1987 Constitution: the ground that he still continues to use his
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
American passport in entering the US and they are legitimate children of Anastacio,
exiting the US. Sr.
ISSUE: Whether or not his renunciation of Supreme Court ruled that the fact of
American citizenship was effective. marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage
RULING: The Supreme Court said that the certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
local government code here applies not any certificate, being a public document, may
other American law. Under the local be recognized as competent evidence of
government code, to run for public office, the marriage between his parents.
you must be solely a Filipino. You must not
be possessed of dual citizenship. By using Q: Why is it that they were not able to
his American passport, that indicates that present the marriage contract? What
he still identifies himself as a citizen of the they presented was the canonical
United States, and the United States, on marriage certificate but it was not
the other hand, still recognizes him as one considered as a public document.
of its citizens, and therefore the Supreme
Court said he's not qualified to run as R: They presented the marriage contract
Mayor of Kauswagan but it was a photocopy.
Dean: Here we have a photocopy of the

FAMILY CODE marriage certificate which cannot be
MARRIAGE presented as a general rule based on the
Rules on Evidence.
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and Q: When will the parties to the
a woman entered into in accordance with marriage be permitted to present
law for the establishment of conjugal and secondary evidence of the existence of
family life. It is the foundation of the the marriage? What does the party
family and an inviolable social institution need to prove before they be allowed
whose nature, consequences, and to prove secondary evidence?
incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that Dean: They need to prove why the primary
marriage settlements may fix the evidence is not available either by lost or
property relations during the marriage destruction such that it can no longer be
within the limits provided by this Code. recovered. In those instances, the court
may allow the parties to present other
Dean: It is not an ordinary contract. In evidence to prove the existence of
fact, it is not like any other contract, marriage.
because the incidents of marriage are all
governed by law except that parties may Dean: Secondary evidence does not mean
establish their property relations during the that you need to present another document
marriage. but it can be testimonial evidence because
that is also be secondary evidence.
If there is one aspect of marriage that the
parties can stipulate on, it is with respect The primary evidence is the marriage
to their property relations, not with respect contract but the parties, in some instances,
to any other. may be allowed to present secondary
evidence like testimonial evidence of the
For example [not subject to stipulation solemnizing officer or parties who attended
between the parties]: the ceremony.
1. Term of the marriage
2. Ground for dissolution for marriage BALOGBOG v COURT OF APPEALS
It is also considered under the Constitution The petitioners denied knowing the
as a basic unit of society. It is, in fact, a respondents. They alleged that Gavino died
social institution which public policy single and they are not aware that he has
cherishes and protects. two sons. The petitioners further
questioned the validity of marriage
Given that the Constitution itself considers between their brother and Catalina.
marriage as inviolable social institution, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of its The Court upheld the marriage even in the
validity or existence. absence of marriage certificate. Although a
marriage contract is considered primary
CALIMAG v MACAPAZ evidence of marriage, the failure to present
it is not proof that no marriage took place—
This is about a certificate of live birth as other evidence may be presented to prove
proof of marriage. Petitioner countered that marriage.
certificates of live birth they presented to
the court do not conclusively prove that
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
An exchange of vows can be presumed to rights to the properties acquired by
have been made from the testimonies of Eustaquio.
the witnesses who state that a wedding
took place, since the very purpose for During the trial, Tecla presented
having a wedding is to exchange vows of testimonial and documentary evidence but
marital commitment—it would indeed be without the marriage certificate. The RTC
unusual to have a wedding without an denied Tecla's petition, as well as
exchange of vows and quite unnatural for Peregrina's counter-claim over her
people not to notice its absence. marriage to Eustaquio. The CA ruled in
favor of Tecla, and declared the marriage
Q: Are you saying that even without a between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be
marriage contract, if the parties are bigamous.
reporting themselves as husband and
wife, there is a presumption that they The SC affirmed the CA ruling. The
are married, right? marriage of Tecla and Eustaquio is valid. A
R: (Answer of Reciter) Yes, according to the marriage certificate is the primary evidence
law, marriage contract is not the conclusive of marriage, but not the only one.
proof that there was indeed a marriage Jurisprudence teaches us that marriage can
between the parties since it is not an be proven by other evidence aside from a
essential element of a valid marriage. marriage certificate. Even a birth certificate
can be used to prove a couple's marriage.
Q: Okay, so if the parties even without
a marriage contract can be presumed
married, can you tell us the reason or Dean: Even without the original marriage
the wisdom behind the presumption certificate, the Court declared the
that parties reporting themselves as subsequent marriage of Eustaquio as void
husband and wife are presumed to be for being bigamous. In this case, there was
in fact married? Why does the law secondary evidence presented in the form
presume that and not the other way of a certification by the official custodian of
around? the documents that the original marriage
A: (Dean) If we presume the contrary, we certificate was lost because of the war.
are presuming that parties living together
are living in a state of sin and immorality. REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Even in other laws or in civil law, you
always presume good faith, isn’t it? Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless
these essential requisites are present:
So similarly, in the case of marriage, the
presumption is that, when a man and a (1) Legal capacity of the contracting
woman are conducting themselves as parties who must be a male and a
husband and wife, they are presumed to be female; and
married. That is the presumption
established by law. So, even without a (2) Consent freely given in the presence
marriage contract, the existence of of the solemnizing officer.
marriage can be proved by other evidence.
Essential Requisites:
Q: On the strength of this presumption 1. Consent
of marriage, can the court declare a 2. Legal Capacity – not only
subsequent marriage contracted by pertaining to the age of the parties,
the husband void on the ground of but also the absence of an
being bigamous? Can this presumption impediment, like the ones under
also establish the nullity of a second Article 37 or Article 38, or that there
marriage contracted by the husband? is no prior existing marriage.
A: Let’s hear the case of Avenido v.
Avenido Furthermore, they must be
originally male and female. In a
AVENIDO v. AVENIDO marriage contract, the parties must
be male and female; unlike in an
This case involves a contest between two ordinary contract who may be male
women both claiming to have been validly and male, female and female, etc.
married to the same man, Eustaquio. Tecla
Avenido alleged that her marriage to SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
Eustaquio was solemnized on 30
September 1942 in rites officiated by the Rommel Jacinto Silverio had a sex
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol but records reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
of the marriage were lost due to World War Thailand. Now engaged with his American
II. Tecla discovered in 1979 that her fiancé, he filed a petition for the change of
husband Eustaquio had married another his first name and sex in his birth
woman named Peregrina, a marriage she certificate.
claims must be declared null and void due
to bigamy in order to protect her children's
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
The RTC granted the petition, and held that other hand, Silverio used the intervention
no harm, injury, or prejudice will be caused of medical science to change his physical
to anybody or the community in granting body.
the petition. However, the CA reversed the
RTC decision and held that there is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex Q: How do you define pansexual?
in the certificate of birth on the ground of Dean: They are attracted to everyone.
sex reassignment through surgery. They can be in love to a lesbian, gay, man
or a woman. In other words they cannot
Issue: Whether a person’s first name and decide who they want.
sex in the birth certificate can be changed
on the ground of sex reassignment? Dean: But there is a new subject now
under the new curriculum, Gender
Ruling: NO. A person’s sex is an essential Sensitivity, because it is the reality, you
factor in marriage and family relations. It is know? As future lawyers, we have to be
a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil exposed to the different classifications of
status. Furthermore, the changes sought gender, because there must no longer be
by petitioner will have serious and wide- discrimination.
ranging legal and public policy
consequences. TOPIC: REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Dean: One of the wide-ranging legal Art. 2 (FC). No marriage shall be valid,
consequences is that to grant the petition unless these essential requisites are
will essentially allow the marriage of a man present:
and a man, on the ground of sex
reassignment. The change of name does (1) Legal capacity of the contracting
not carry with it the change of sex that will parties who must be a male and a
allow a man to marry another man, or a female; and
woman to marry another woman.
(2) Consent freely given in the presence
REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN of the solemnizing officer.
Facts: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition Essential requisites:

for correction of entries in the birth 1. Legal capacity
certificate in RTC, alleging that she was 2. Consent
registered female at birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male For consent to be valid, it must be IFS:
characteristics and was diagnosed to have . Intelligent
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). a. Free
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate b. Spontaneous
be corrected so that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be Q: So, if there is any vice of consent
changed from Jenifer to Jeff. present, like the presence of force,
intimidation, undue influence, fraud or
Issue: Whether or not Cagandahan may mistake, what is the resulting
change her gender and first name. marriage?
Ruling: YES. The SC held that where the R: The resulting marriage if the consent
person is biologically or naturally intersex was not what the law wants it to be, it
the determining factor in his gender would be voidable, Ma’am.
classification would be what the individual,
like respondent, having reached the age of Dean: Okay, it would be a voidable
majority, with good reason thinks of marriage. Consent must be freely given,
his/her sex. and in the presence of a solemnizing
officer.
Dean: Gender classification in naturally
intersex individuals is inconclusive at birth. REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS
It is what the individual who reached the Liberty Albios, a Filipina, and Daniel
age of majority thinks of himself or herself Fringer, an American citizen, got married,
as his/her preferred gender which is the former paying the latter $2,000. Albios
controlling. Jennifer is born and baptized filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
female, but she developed more of the their marriage on the ground that they
features of the man. never really lived as husband and wife and
that their marriage is a jest since it is only
Q: What differentiates Cagandahan for convenience in order for her to acquire
case with that of Silverio? American citizenship. On the other hand,
Republic argues that consent is different
A: Cagandahan did not use medical science from motive and that motive is
to change what nature gave him. He let inconsequential to the marriage.
nature take it naturally course. On the
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Ruling: Their marriage is valid, because to section 16 of this Code, the municipal
there was a valid consent. Under Article 2 mayor shall:
of the Family Code, for consent to be valid,
it must be freely given and made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The SC 1. Exercise general supervision and
explained that to be freely given, it is control over all programs, projects,
required that the contracting parties are services, and activities of the
both willingly and deliberately entering into municipal government, and in this
the said marriage. It must be real in the connection, shall:
sense that it could not be proven to be
defective under Art. 45 and 46 of the xxx
Family Code. Here, the SC said that
consent was not lacking in the said (xviii) Solemnize marriages, any
marriage, because the consent was freely provision of law to the contrary
given, best evidenced by the purpose of the notwithstanding.
marriage, which was to acquire an
American citizenship. There was a clear xxx
intention into entering a real and valid
marriage, so that they could fully comply Dean: On authority of mayors: The
with the requisites of having an American Family Code, which took effect on August
citizenship. 3, 1988, removed the authority of mayors
to solemnize marriages. But it was restored
Dean: The Supreme Court also mentioned under the LGC, which took effect January
that only a genuine marriage to be bound 1, 1992. Therefore, from August 3, 1988 to
by the bonds of marriage can support a December 31, 1991, mayors were not
petition for foreign citizenship. They are authorized to solemnize marriages
aware and have both freely given their
consent. They know both the beneficial and Art. 7 (FC). Marriage may be
inconvenient consequences of entering into solemnized by:
a marriage. So, the Court said that there
was a valid consent. It was not also (1) Any incumbent member of the
considered as a marriage in a jest, right? judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
Hindi lang yan joketime.
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister
Art. 3 (FC). The formal requisites of of any church or religious sect duly
marriage are: authorized by his church or religious sect
and registered with the civil registrar
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; general, acting within the limits of the
written authority granted by his church
(2) A valid marriage license except in the or religious sect and provided that at
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this least one of the contracting parties
Title; and belongs to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect;
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes
place with the appearance of the (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief
contracting parties before the only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as (4) Any military commander of a unit to
husband and wife in the presence of not which a chaplain is assigned, in the
less than two witnesses of legal age. absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases
Formal Requisites of Marriage – ALC mentioned in Article 32;
1. Authority
2. License (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-
3. Ceremony consul in the case provided in Article 10.
Q: Who are authorized to solemnize Dean: Apart from mayors, we also have:
marriages? 1. Any incumbent member of the
Dean: These are enumerated under Article judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction
7 (FC) and Sec. 444 (LGC), wherein mayors ● “Incumbent,” meaning those
are now authorized to solemnize marriages retired or resigned justices/judges
can no longer solemnize marriages
Sec. 444 (LGC). The Chief Executive: 2. Military commander of a unit to
Powers, Duties, Functions and which a chaplain is assigned, in the
Compensation. – (a) xxx absence of the latter, during a military
operation
(b) For efficient, effective and 3. Any ship captain or airplane chief
economical governance the purpose of ● Not only while the ship is at sea or
which is the general welfare of the plane is in flight, but also during
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant stopovers at ports
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
● meaning, even when they are on a upon request of both parties in a sworn
layover, a marriage solemnized statement to this effect.
under articulo mortis by a ship
captain between members of the ISSUE: WON Judge Domagtoy showed
crew or passengers, would be gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
considered valid. office and ignorance of the law in
4. Marriages among Muslims or members solemnizing two marriages.
of ethnic cultural communities:
Provided that the marriage was SC: Yes. Based on the Family Code, before
solemnized in accordance with their solemnizing a subsequent marriage, there
customs, rights or practices should first be a judicial declaration of
5. Lex Loci Celebrationis: If the marriage nullity of the first marriage. So he already
was solemnized in a place where there committed a s misconduct in this case.
is no need for a ceremony, it will also
be considered a valid marriage, A judge has limitation wherein he can only
solemnize a marriage within his
Q: The provision of Article 7 in relation jurisdiction.
to Section 444 of the Local
Government Code, who else are Q: What is the jurisdiction of Judge
authorized to solemnize marriages? Domagtoy?
A: MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
A: Consul, consul general, vice consul. But Del Norte.
their authority is limited only to the country
where they are assigned. He solemnized the marriage in his House
located in Dapa, which is outside of his
If a consul is temporarily on vacation in the jurisdiction.
Philippines. He is a consul in Japan but he
temporarily took a vacation here, strictly Q: What did the SC said on the effect
he has no authority to solemnize a of the solemnization of the marriage
marriage between a Filipino citizen here. by a judge outside his territorial
jurisdiction?
Following the cases on solemnizing officers A: it is still valid. Because it is only
who are members of the judiciary, who irregularity. The judge was only
solemnizes a marriage outside of their administratively liable but the marriage is
territorial jurisdiction, by parity of still valid.
reasoning, considered a valid marriage if
the marriage is solemnized by a consul not Similar issue to the Case of Beso v.
while he was on his station but while he Daguman, where the judge also
was in the Philippines. solemnized a marriage outside of his
territorial jurisdiction.
NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY
The penalty varies depending on whose the
Respondent Judge solemnized the wedding deciding magistrate.
between Tagadan and. Borga, despite
knowledge that the groom is merely In Domagtoy, he was fined 20,000. In
separated from his first wife. Second, Beso, he was fined 5,000 only.
respondent judge performed a marriage
ceremony between Sumaylo and del EXAMPLE:
Rosario in outside his court’s jurisdiction.
On the first issue, the Court said that even Parties A and B went to the City Hall of
if the spouse present has a well-founded Manila, at around 4 o’clock in the
belief that the absent spouse was already afternoon. They were in a hurry to get
dead, a summary proceeding for the married, right after getting their marriage
declaration of presumptive death is license, they went to the sala and wait for
necessary in order to contract a the judge, whoever is available. Example,
subsequent marriage. In the case, Tagadan in Branch 27 of RTC Manila, not knowing
did not institute a summary proceeding for that Judge X just left his courtroom. After
the declaration of his first wife’s Judge X left the court, the cleaner who is a
presumptive death. Absent this judicial law student wore the robe of the judge and
declaration, he remains married to his first sat on his bench.
wife. Thus, the second marriage contracted
by Tagadan is bigamous and void. On the
second issue, the Court ruled that under Q: What is the status of the marriage?
Article 8 of the Family Code, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge’s chambers or A: It is valid. (Art. 35(2), FC) It is a
courtroom only in the following instances: mistake of fact. The parties are mistaken
(1) at the point of death; (2) in remote as to the facts, thinking that the cleaner
places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) was actually an RTC judge.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Q: Suppose A and B went to the Office Q: On the assumption that the parties
of the Mayor to request the mayor to secured or procured a marriage
solemnize their marriage. Instead, license from one of the forgers in
they found one of the councilors and Quiapo Ilalim, and they got married
asked him to solemnize their using that marriage license, is the
marriage. B said he honestly believed marriage valid?
a councilor has authority to solemnize
a marriage. What is the status of the R: No, the said marriage license is obtained
marriage? illegally.
A: It is void. You cannot make mistake of Dean: Is that an irregularly issued license
law as a basis of good faith since everyone or is that a spurious one?
is presumed to know the law. (Art. 3, NCC)
In this case, the parties are mistaken as to R: It is a spurious one.
the authority of the councilor to solemnize
a marriage, which is a matter of law. Dean: Why? What is your standard that it
is a spurious one, instead of an irregularly
issued license?
NOTE: R: Because Quiapo Ilalim has no power to

issue a valid marriage license
If the solemnizing officer had no authority,
general rule, the marriage would be void Dean: The better reason would be if the
for lack of formal requisite. license is procured from an officer who is
not vested an authority to issue it, then
However, the law under Article 35 that would be a spurious license. Therefore,
paragraph 2, says that even if the any marriage celebrated using a spurious
solemnizing officer has no authority, if one license would also be void. Unlike if you go
or both the parties believe in good faith to Civil Registrar, apply for a license, give
that the solemnizing officer had authority him a bribe of 5K, to issue a license on the
to do so, then the marriage wouldl be same day you applied, he complied,
considered valid. without requiring you to comply with the
documents necessary, and you got married
using that license, what is the status of the
MARRIAGE LICENSE marriage?
The law is more strict when it comes to the R: The status of marriage is valid.
formal requisite of a license. While in
authority, there is room for the application Dean: There is a license, although it was
of good faith, in the marriage license there irregularly issued.
is no room for the application of good faith.
The fact that the parties thought that the REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
license was valid is not a basis of good
faith. Angelina Castro sought the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to
The license is valid only for a maximum Edwin F. Cardenas on the ground that no
period of 120 days and this date of marriage license was ever issued to them
expiration shall be stamped on the face of prior to the solemnization of their
the license. marriage.
Q: If the parties made use of the It was Cardenas who personally attended
license after that period, what is the to the processing of the documents
status of the marriage? required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the
A: If there is total absence of any of the marriage license. Since their marriage was
formal or essential requisites, that would not known to Castro’s parents, the couple
be considered a void marriage. did not live together after their marriage
and it was only when Castro got pregnant
If there is a defect or irregularity in any of that the couple decided to live together.
the essential requisites, that would render However, such cohabitation lasted for only
the marriage voidable. If there is an 4 months.
irregularity in any of the formal requisites,
the marriage remains valid, but the officer In filing for the annulment of her marriage,
responsible for the irregularity would be her lawyer found that there was no
subject to sanctions. marriage license issued to Cardenas prior
to the celebration of their marriage, as
evidenced by a certification from the Civil
00:52:33-00:61:04 Register of Pasig that the license cannot be
located and does not appear from their
records.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Dean: They are 25 years married in this
DOCTRINE: The law provides that no case, as compared to the case of Angelina
marriage shall be solemnized without a and Edwin, which their marriage only lasted
marriage license first issued by a local civil for 4 months.
registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a But in the case of Sevilla vs. Cardenas, the
license would render the marriage void ab husband woke up after 25 years and
initio. realized that he has no marriage license.
Dean: The certification coming from the So he filed to declare his marriage void.
local civil register in this case categorically
stated that despite diligent search, the Q: What did he present?
license purportedly issued to Angelina and
Edwin could not be found in their records. R: He presented 3 certifications from the
local civil registrar basically saying that the
SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS civil registrar failed to locate the book
where the marriage license was entered.
Sevilla filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Carmelita on Q: On what ground they failed to locate it?
the grounds that it was procured through
machination, duress, and intimidation. R: The employee was already retired, and
Furthermore, it invoked the lack of they do not have the time to give their full
marriage license of their marriage based on effort in finding the book. So the Supreme
the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Court said the marriage was valid because
Registry. The Supreme Court uphold the in order for the certification to be a proof of
marriage of Jaime and Carmelita, and ruled lack of marriage license, there must be a
that the certifications issued by the Local due diligence in searching for the book,
Civil Registry do not categorically declare which in this case, the certification only
that their marriage lacks a marriage provides that they failed to give to put full
license. Absence of diligent efforts to look effort or put time to locate the marriage
for the marriage license does not mean that license or book where the records of
it is not present. The Court upheld their marriage license is contained.
marriage because marriage is a social
institution, not just a mere ordinary Dean: In other words, the certification did
contract, that the State is interested to not state that the license number did not
protect. appear in their records, but they were just
too busy to locate it
DOCTRINE:
The absence of the logbook is not Q: Was that sufficient to prove that the
conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License does not exist?
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at A: NO. The Court said that it does not mean
bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. that there was really non-issuance of the
In the absence of showing of diligent efforts marriage license, rather, it just cannot be
to search for the said logbook, we cannot found.
easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries ABBAS V. ABBAS
therein.
Dean: It’s also about the existence of the
The rule is settled that every intendment of marriage license between the parties –
the law or fact leans toward the validity of Gloria Abbas and Syed Abbas.
the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this FACTS: Petitioner Syed, a Pakistani citizen,
presumption with great favor. It is not to was initially married to respondent Gloria,
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan.
presumption is of great weight. Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of During his stay in Manila in the house of
strengthening the family as a basic social Gloria’s mother, the latter went home with
institution. Our family law is based on the two (2) men. Therein they had a ceremony,
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, which turned out to be one of marriage.
but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. However, the marriage licensed used in the
marriage contract turned out to be
Q: How many years they were married inexistent. Moreover, said license was
before the husband filed a petition to secured in Carmona, Cavite, a place where
declare his marriage void? neither one of the parties resided, nor
applied for a marriage license.
A: 25 years.
Q: It was the husband who filed the petition
to declare his marriage void on the ground
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
of marriage license. What did he present to A: False affidavit is tantamount to absence
show that they had no marriage license? of marriage license.
A: A certification issued by the Municipal

Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to the
effect that the marriage license number REPUBLIC V. DAYOT
appearing in the marriage contract was the
number of another marriage license issued Jose and Felisa were married without a
to a different couple. marriage license. In lieu of the marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit
RTC: Ruled the marriage was void ab initio attesting that both of them had attained
by virtue of the absence of a valid marriage the age of maturity, and that being
license. It also took into account the fact unmarried, they had lived together as
that neither party was a resident of husband and wife for at least five years.
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License was issued, in violation of Article 9 Later on, Jose filed a Complaint for
of the Family Code. Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage contending that his marriage with
CA: Held that the certification of the Felisa was a sham as he was asked to sign
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to the affidavit without knowledge of its true
categorically state that a diligent search for contents.
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said According to Jose, he came to live as a
certification could not be accorded boarder in Felisa’s house. Some three
probative value. weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
Q: Did the SC agree with the CA? ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi
RULING: NO. The SC held that the Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, they were
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that told that Jose needed to sign the papers so
their office had no record of a marriage that the package could be released to
license was adequate to prove the non- Felisa. He initially refused to do so.
issuance of said license. However, Felisa cajoled him. It was in
February 1987 when he discovered that he
Diligent Search had contracted marriage with Felisa.
The fact that the marriage license does not Q: They were introduced to each other
correspond to the names of Gloria and in June 1986, right?
Syed proves that in fact that there was
diligent search. Otherwise, how are they R: Yes.
able to find out that it was issued to
another couple? Q: When did they get married?
SC ruled that the presumed validity of the R: November 1986. So they were married
marriage of the parties had been for 5 months, not 5 years.
overcome, and that it became the burden
of the party alleging a valid marriage to The RTC ruled that the marriage celebrated
prove that the marriage was valid, and that between Jose and Felisa was valid, which
the required marriage license had been was affirmed by the CA.
secured.
Jose filed Motion for Reconsideration on the
In the absence of any other proof that the grounds that the affidavit of marital
marriage license was issued (in fact, they cohabitation executed by him and Felisa
were waiting for proof coming from Gloria was false. The CA reversed its decision. It
that there was in fact an issuance of the relied on the jurisprudence stating that the
marriage license). importance of five (5) years of continuous
cohabitation as husband and wife before
Meanwhile, Syed was able to prove that such sworn affidavit be availed of, as an
there was no marriage license issued when exception to the requirement of marriage
they got married. Total absence of a formal license.
requisites will render the marriage void ab
initio. ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of
. marital cohabitation that was executed
Q: What if the parties did not secure a shall affect the validity of their marriage.
license but they just merely executed
an affidavit of cohabitation, which is RULING: NO (?), because under Article 76,
false? Would that be considered as an the SC held that it is necessary that the
irregularity or should the marriage be man and the woman have attained the age
considered void? of majority and lived in continuous
cohabitation for at least five (5) years. In
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
contrast with the facts, their cohabitation that result in an irregularity in the issuance
was only for five (5) months before the of a marriage license?
marriage was celebrated without the
benefit of a marriage license. Dean: No. His acts as a de facto officer
should not affect private interests like the
contracting parties to the marriage. The
Q: What was the argument of the license should still be considered valid.
Republic? The Republic was for the
sustaining the validity of the marriage. Follow-up: We discussed earlier that since
What did the Republic say? the license was procured from an officer
A: The Republic said the all the essential who is not in fact authorized, so in this case
and formal requisites were complied with it was not an irregularity even though the
and it deserves a scant consideration. de facto officer was not in actuality
authorized it is a mere irregularity instead
Q: There is a comparison between of spurious license?
marriages that is solemnized with an
irregularly issued license and this case of Dean: You can argue it that way. I look at
Dayot with a false affidavit of cohabitation. the way you argue. Even the pleadings in
What did the SC say? Is there a point of court, the way they argue it would sway the
comparison between these two (2) cases court to rule in their clients’ favor.
where there is variance in the facts?
A: The Republic said that the falsity of the Another question from a student:
statements in the affidavit will not affect Regarding the solemnizing officer
the validity of the marriage since all the especially on judicial officers: Their
essential and formal requisites are authority is stating that the decision in
complied with. Navarro v Domagtoy, the part where it says
that the marriage was valid. They are
Q: The Republic was saying that if an saying that it is a mere obiter dictum since
irregularly issued license is not sufficient to it is an administrative case and the main
set aside the marriage so must a false issue that should be addressed and should
affidavit of cohabitation? be used as a doctrine is the one finding the
A: Yes. judge administratively liable. For the
purpose of answering the bar, should we
Q: What is the fallacy of that argument? stick to what the SC said that the marriage
A: The SC ruled that without the formal is valid or that the comment/opinion by
requisite of the marriage license and since other civilist is faulty?
Jose and Felisa was not able to meet the Dean: We should be careful in saying that
requirements as stipulated in Art 76 for the one opinion is faulty. Depending on how
sworn affidavit that they should have lived you argue your case, you will be judged
together for at least 5 years. They shall be according the merits of your arguments not
exempted for the requirement of marriage necessarily the correctness of your
license. arguments. The decision in Navarro v
Domagtoy although there other opinions,
Dean: If there is an irregularly issued you can always use Article 35 paragraph 2
license, there is a license although it was that if there is good faith on the part of one
irregularly issued. Pursuant to the law as that would be enough to render the
itself. The law considers the marriage valid marriage valid. It’s not only the Navarro
without prejudice to the liability of the case that you can use but also that article.
issuing officer. But in the second case, if
the affidavit of cohabitation is false and Another question: Regarding the case of
they are not really exempt from the license Abas v Abas: In the case, it stated that
requirement, they should have secured during trial it was proven that they were
one. In the absence of the license, that married in Taiwan at a Taipei Mosque in
would fall under total absence and not 1992 prior to the disputed marriage that
irregularity. happened in the Philippines. Why is it not
mentioned in the decision that there was a
The SC said there is no point of comparison prior marriage before the disputed one
because in the first case there was a without license?
license, although irregularly issued and in Dean: There are things we cannot disclose
the second case, there is no license at all. and this is particularly one of them.
That will be total absence of a formal
requisite which would render the marriage The second marriage should have been
void ab initio. ceremonial, that’s my opinion. Ang validity
of the marriage should be judged based on
Question from a student: On the the first.
authority of the local civil registrar to issue
a marriage license, what if the officer is a Question from a student: Building on
de facto officer since we have learned that Navarro v. Domagtoy, previously the SC
acts of a de facto officer is valid but does has ruled that notary publics which notarize
documents outside their jurisdiction are not
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
notary publics therein. Therefore, those solemnizing officer and personally declare
documents don’t have the same as that they take each other as husband and
notarized documents. wife.
Dean: Yes, the only effect of that would be For giving an official church recognition to
to render the document private, not public. the cohabitation between joey and claire,
father ronulo in fact conducted a marriage
Could an analogy be made in the authority ceremony. Therefore, he is liable for
of the notary public and the judge violating Article 352 of the RPC.
concerning his jurisdiction and outside his
jurisdiction, which lead the SC to rule that Dean: Ordinarily, the judge should
he’s not a judge strictly speaking. solemnize the marriage inside his
Therefore, he has no authority to solemnize chambers or in the court room. But the
marriage outside of jurisdiction, rendering parties may request for the solemnization
it void? of the marriage outside under Article 8.
Dean: The difference between a notary Article. 8. The marriage shall be

public and a judge is that a notary public solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
notarizing a private contract, and we said judge or in open court, in the church,
that a marriage is not an ordinary contract, chapel or temple, or in the office the
so you cannot compare an ordinary consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
contract with defective notarization with the case may be, and not elsewhere,
the marriage. except in cases of marriages contracted on
the point of death or in remote places in
MARRIAGE CEREMONY accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both of the parties request the
The law does not require any particular solemnizing officer in writing in which case
form or religious right for a marriage to be the marriage may be solemnized at a house
valid, all that it requires is that the parties or place designated by them in a sworn
must appear before a solemnizing officer statement to that effect.
and personally declare that they take each
other as husband and wife. If there is a written request by the
contracting parties that the marriage may
RONULO V COURT OF APPEALS be solemnized outside the courtroom or
*Not in the case list chambers of the judge.
Dean: This has nothing to do with marriage However, article 8 only modifies the venue
but the court discussed the validity of the and not the jurisdiction of the judge.
marriage. This is actually a criminal case
against a priest. Example: In other words, if you are from
Manila and you want your marriage
This case involves the marriage solemnized solemnized in QC, you should get a judge
by father Ronulo, who is an Aglipayan in QC.
priest. The parties here are claire and joey.
They were about to be wed in a catholic Example: If you want your marriage to be
church, but when the priest asked their solemnized in a hotel. You are from QC.
marriage license, they cannot present any. You cannot choose a hotel located in Pasay
So, the catholic priest refused to solemnize and ask a judge of QC to solemnize your
their marriage. Siyempre naka gown at marriage in Pasay.
barong na, and all the guests were there.
They did not want to cancel everything, so Dean: You should choose a venue which is
what they did was to go to a nearby within the jurisdiction of the solemnizing
Aglipayan church and found father Ronulo, officer.
who agreed to accommodate the parties.
He knew that the parties were not armed ARTICLE 14. In case either or both of
with a marriage license. Yet, he solemnized the contracting parties, not having been
the marriage. So after that, he was sued emancipated by a previous marriage, are
criminally for illegal solemnization of between the ages of eighteen and
marriage under the RPC, particularly Article twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the
352. requirements of the preceding articles,
exhibit to the local civil registrar, the
One defense raised by father Ronulo was consent to their marriage of their father,
he did not conduct a marriage ceremony. mother, surviving parent or guardian, or
He did not marry the parties. What he did persons having legal charge of them, in
was merely to bless the parties. But, the the order mentioned. Such consent shall
SC, using Article 6 of the Family Code, said be manifested in writing by the
that the law does not require any particular interested party, who personally appears
form or religious right for a marriage before the proper local civil registrar, or
ceremony to be valid. All that it requires is in the form of an affidavit made in the
for the parties to appear before a presence of two witnesses and attested
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
before any official authorized by law to

administer oaths. The personal Dean: It is the lex loci celebrationis rule. It
manifestation shall be recorded in both considers valid a marriage celebrated
applications for marriage license, and the abroad except when the marriage falls
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall under Articles 35 (1) on lack of legal
be attached to said applications. capacity. Wherever celebrated between
Filipino citizens, if they are below the
Article 14 requires the parties between 18 marriageable age or they lack legal
to 21 to secure the parental consent and if capacity, the marriage is void under
they are 21 but below 25, they should Philippine law.
secure parental advice.
Kung 16 sila, they got married in Argentina
Q: If a party is exactly 21, does he and they are considered adults in
need parental consent and parental Argentina, the marriage is void because the
advice? legal capacity would be dictated by the
Philippine law under Article 15 in relation to
Dean: No, they only need parental advice Article 26 of the Family Code. Article 15 of
and not parental consent because if you are the Civil Code is still relevant for purposes
21 and you secured the advice, it of family rights, duties, status, condition,
presupposes that if the advice is given, the and legal capacity.
consent is also given.
The 2nd one is bigamous marriages under
Dean: You have to correlate Article 14 with Article 35(4). Wherever celebrated, it is
Article 45 paragraph 1. Under Article 14, void in the Philippines. Article 35 (5) where
ages between 18 and 21 ang nakalagay so there is mistake in the identity of one of the
that may create a confusion that if a party contracting parties; and Article 35 (6)
is 21, he would need both parental consent those subsequent marriages that are void
and parental advice. But under Article 45, under Article 53. So even if it is validly
the law mentions 18 but below 21. celebrated, it is regarded as void in the
Therefore, if a party is exactly 21, only Philippines.
parental advice but not parental consent. Article 36 on psychological incapacity is
included; Article 37 on incestuous
Parental consent if not secured or not marriages; and Article 38 on public policy
obtained when needed would render the marriages. All those marriages, even if
marriage voidable. The parental advice is validly celebrated, would be considered
not a requirement per se. It is not one of void in the Philippines.
the essential or formal requisites. It is one
of the requirements in securing a marriage Q: Ano yung hindi kasali?
license. If the parties are not able to give A: Lack of authority and lack of license.
the parental advice when required by the These 2 void marriages under Article 35, if
LCR, the LCR should refrain from issuing the marriage was celebrated between
the license for a period of 3 months. That Filipinos abroad without a license, and the
is the only effect. Isu-suspend niya na law of the country where the marriage was
muna yung issuance of the license for a solemnized does not require one, the
period of 3 months if the parties cannot marriage is valid pursuant to lex loci
represent parental advice when required by celebrationis rule. Similarly, if a marriage
law. But after the 3-month period, the LCR was solemnized outside the Philippines by
must issue the license with or without the a person who is not authorized to
parental advice because suspension cannot solemnized marriages here in the
take forever. LCR is only authorized to Philippines, if validly celebrated, it would be
suspend for 3 months, not for more than 3 considered valid in the Philippines.
months.
The 2nd paragraph is the one which has
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized changed. If a marriage is validly
outside the Philippines in accordance celebrated, and divorce is thereafter validly
with the laws in force in the country obtained by the alien spouse capacitating
where they were solemnized, and valid him or her to remarry, the Filipino shall
there as such, shall also be valid in this likewise have the capacity to remarry
country, except those prohibited under under Philippine law.
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5), (6), 36, 37, and
38. Article 26 was originally intended to apply
to a mixed marriage, Filipino and foreigner.
Where a marriage between a Filipino But that interpretation was changed in the
citizen and a foreigner is validly case of Republic v. Orbecido, where the SC
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter clarified that the reckoning point for
validly obtained abroad by the alien determining whether Article 26 applies or
spouse capacitating him or her to not is not the citizenship of the parties at
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the time the marriage was celebrated, but
capacity to remarry under the Philippine the citizenship of the parties at the time the
law. divorce is obtained by the alien spouse.
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to absurd consequences. A filipina who is at
If former Filipino citizen siya married to the receiving end of alien divorce initiated
another Filipino citizen, so they are both proceeding and the one who initiated the
Filipino, and later on one embraced foreign divorce against a foreign spouse is on the
citizenship, in the Republic v. Orbecido, the same place.
SC said if the person who obtained the
divorce is no longer a Filipino at the time If the divorce is granted, they would remain
he obtained the divorce, that would be married without a husband and a wife. The
considered as valid. Therefore, the Filipino intent of Art. 26 is to free the Filipino
spouse should be capacitated to remarry spouse from a marital bond if the divorce
under Philippine law. However, the has already been obtained validly abroad.
interpretation that it should only be applied
to mixed marriage is changed including as The SC ruled that regardless of whether it
to the person who should secure a divorce. is the Filipino who obtained the divorce,
that would call for application of Art. 26 and
REPUBLIC V MANALO would capacitate the Filipino to remarry
under Philippine law.
Respondent Manalo was married to a
Japanese national. However, Manalo filed MORISONO V. MORISONO
for divorce in Japan, and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree was Luzviminda was married to Ryoji Morisono
rendered by the Japanese Court. Manalo in Quezon City. While living in Japan,
went back to the Philippines, and filed a Luzviminda and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce
petition for cancellation of entry of by Agreement" before the City Hall of
marriage. The trial court denied the MizuhoKu, Nagoya City, which was
petition, and held that the Philippine law eventually approved on and duly recorded
does not afford Filipinos the right for a with the Head of Mizuho-Ku. Luzviminda
divorce. However, CA overturned the filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
decision, and held that Article 26 is divorce decree before the RTC of Quezon
applicable even if it was Manalo who filed City, so that she could cancel the surname
for divorce against her Japanese husband. of her former husband in her passport and
The SC said that based on a clear and plain for her to be able to marry again.
reading of Article 26, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It
It does not demand that the alien spouse held that while a divorce obtained abroad
should be the one who initiated the by an alien spouse may be recognized in
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was the Philippines – provided that such decree
granted. is valid according to the national law of the
alien – the same does not find application
Q: Who filed for divorce? when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e.,
R: Manalo petitioner, who procured the same
Q: How did the SC explain the different Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly
interpretation of Article 26? denied Luzviminda’s petition for
A: The ruling in Manalo did not uphold the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
validity of the marriage. she procured with Ryoji.
Q: Based on the wording of Article 26, Ruling: No. In the Orbecido case, it must
if you will just not read Manalo, who be proven that there was a valid marriage
should obtain the divorce? celebrated between a Filipino and a
foreigner, there was a valid decree
A: The foreign spouse. obtained abroad. Pursuant to Manalo case,
the foreign divorce decree obtained to
Dean: That is clear in the wording of Article nullify marriages may be filed by either
26. pouses. In this case, the Court remanded
the case back to the RTC to allow
Q: How did the Court explain why it Luzviminda to prove there was a divorce
should not be the foreigner who decree obtained in Nagoya City.
should obtain the divorce?
Dean: It reiterated the ruling in Republic v.
A: There was a pronouncement by the Manalo.
Chief Justice that the law does not require
that it should be the alien spouse who JUEGO-SAKAI V. REPUBLIC
should seek the divorce. It was in the
decision. The divorce was initiated by both parties.
They agreed to dissolve their marriage in
Dean: Even assuming that the law requires Japan. Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and
that it should be the alien spouse who Toshiharu Sakai got married in 2000 in
should obtain the divorce, the Court will not Japan pursuant to the wedding rites
follow the letter of the law if it would result therein. After 2 years, the parties, by
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agreement, obtained a divorce decree in
said country dissolving their marriage. Whether it is solely the Filipino or solely the
Thereafter, on petitioner filed a Petition for alien, or both, Art 26 will now permit the
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment Filipino spouse to remarry if the divorce
before the RTC, Camarines Norte. obtained is legal and valid in the laws of the
country of the alien spouse. However, it is
RTC granted the petition and recognized not as simple as obtaining a divorce
the divorce between the parties as valid because our courts can not take judicial
and effective under Philippine Laws. notice of foreign judgements, you have to
obtain divorce in accordance with the rules
CA initially affirmed this ruling but in 2016, of evidence:
it recalled and instead ruled that the second
requisite under Art 26 was missing. This is
because the divorce herein was consensual 1. Present an official copy or
in nature, obtained by agreement of the publication of the divorce decree.
parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since 2. If the record is in the other country,
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained there must be a copy that is
the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be authenticated by the consul situated
recognized in the Philippines. In addition, in the foreign country
the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to 3. Present proof of foreign law on
present authenticated copies of the Civil divorce
Code of Japan was fatal to her cause. 4. Proof that the court which vested
the divorce decree is vested with
Issue: WON the Petition for Judicial jurisdiction to issue it.
Recognition of Foreign Judgment should be
granted. If you are able to prove this, it is the only
time that the court will recognize the
Ruling: No. While it is true that the issue foreign judgement, therefore the Filipino
has already been resolved in the landmark will be capacitated to remarry.
ruling of Republic v. Manalo whereby the
Court ruled that the word "obtained" to In fact, in Manalo v Republic, the SC did not
mean that the divorce proceeding must rule on whether she can remarry but
actually be initiated by the alien spouse explained only, she was not able to present
would depart from the true intent of the the proof required for the recognition of the
legislature, the Court said that petitioner foreign divorce, the case was remanded to
must still comply with certain guidelines the lower court for further proceedings.
before the court may recognize the foreign Kaya lang diniscuss na ng SC yung
divorce. applicability of Art. 26 even if the Filipina
was the one who filed for divorce is para
Under Rule 132, what is required is proof, hindi na babalik kasi nga naresolve na ng
either by (1) official publications or (2) SC.
copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of As a general rule before, divorce obtained
official records are not kept in the by Filipino, art. 15 applies. This was
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied changed by the ruling in Manalo.
by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM
Philippine foreign service stationed in the THE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. A – Articulo Mortis
R - Remote Places
R: They would be part from the true intent M - Muslims and Other Members of Ethnic
of the law, and it was held by the SC that Cultural Communities
petitioner must still comply with the M - Marital Cohabitation
guidelines before the court can recognize L - Lex Loci
the foreign divorce and in this case, proof
is required – attestation of the officer ARTICULO MORTIS
having the custody of the documents which
was not submitted as evidence Dean: So those are the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Of
Dean: Even if the SC liberalized the course, in Articulo Mortis is the first, for
application of Art. 26, as in so far that it practical reason the law exempts the
now allows in the Abel v Rule case citing parties from the requirement of license
Galapon v Republic, the SC clarified that precisely because one or both parties are
Art. 26 henceforth will now apply if the at the point of death.
divorce was obtained by:
1. By the alien spouse To be considered as in Articulo Mortis, there
2. By the Filipino spouse must be consciousness of impending death.
3. By both the alien and Filipino spouse Death is imminent in other words.
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Article. 8. The marriage shall be

Hindi yung nagkasinat eh pero kapag nung solemnized publicly in the chambers of
Covid time magkasinat ka lang at the point the judge or in open court, in the church,
of death ka na diba? So that’s one symptom chapel or temple, or in the office the
but in ordinary cases kung walang consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
pandemic kung sinipon ka lang or medyo the case may be, and not elsewhere,
sininat ka lang you are not at the point of except in cases of marriages contracted
death. on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this
So the important thing is that there must Code, or where both of the parties
be consciousness on the impending death request the solemnizing officer in writing
of either or both the contracting parties and in which case the marriage may be
the marriage remains valid even if the solemnized at a house or place
ailing party subsequently survives. The designated by them in a sworn
party who is at the point of death need not statement to that effect.
die for the marriage to be valid.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party
There was one who asked me that exactly is so located that there is no means of
who is a member of the Judiciary and I was transportation to enable such party to
quite surprised because what’s the effect if appear personally before the local civil
the party who is at the point of death did registrar, the marriage may be
not die. Will the marriage be affected? solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license. (72a)
No, the marriage will not be affected as it
is not required that the party at the point Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the
of death die. Mag-aadd tayo ng two preceding articles, the solemnizing
requirement if sinabi nating mamatay. officer shall state in an affidavit executed
before the local civil registrar or any
Yung ship captain, or airplane chief, or other person legally authorized to
military commander of the unit, these are administer oaths that the marriage was
the persons who are authorized to performed in articulo mortis or that the
solemnize marriage under Articulo Mortis residence of either party, specifying the
under the specific conditions stated barrio or barangay, is so located that
therein. Any solemnizing officer for that there is no means of transportation to
matter can also like members of the enable such party to appear personally
Judiciary can solemnize Articulo Mortis before the local civil registrar and that
marriages but in case of the ship captain, the officer took the necessary steps to
airplane chief, and military commander ascertain the ages and relationship of the
there are additional requirements under contracting parties and the absence of
Art. 7 legal impediment to the marriage
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: There is a legal definition of a remote place.
Places is considered as remote if there is no
(1) Any incumbent member of the means of transportation to enable the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction; contracting parties to enable before the
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister Local Civil Registrar for purpose of securing
of any church or religious sect duly the license. If there is a means of
authorized by his church or religious sect transportation, it is not considered as
and registered with the civil registrar remote except if it is too prohibitive or say
general, acting within the limits of the for example there is a means of
written authority granted by his church transportation through a horse or a
or religious sect and provided that at carabao but it would take you 3 ½ months
least one of the contracting parties to reach the Local Civil Registrar's Office.
belongs to the solemnizing officer’s Parang kang si Long Ranger nun sa tagal
church or religious sect; ng byahe mo by horse.
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief
only in the case mentioned in Article 31; Which brings me to a joke. Ano ba yung
(4) Any military commander of a unit to joke sa horse or carabao:
which a chaplain is assigned, in the A lawyer was very fond of the
absence of the latter, during a military postponement of his cases and he ran out
operation, likewise only in the cases of reasons and asked for the postponement
mentioned in Article 32; of one of his major cases.
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-
consul in the case provided in Article 10. JUDGE: What is your ground this time for
the postponement, Counsel?
REMOTE PLACES COUNSEL: Your Honor, the Carabao of my
client is sick
Dean: Second is Remote Places, when is a
place considered Remote? That was his reason and the Judge asked
him and the counsel did not expect this
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JUDGE: Counsel, what has the client’s sick So let us say for example, Pablo is living
carabao got to do with the trial of this case? with Susan – Monday, Wednesday, and
COUNSEL: You Honor my client lives in a Friday and he also goes home to Ana –
remote place and there is no means of Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday. This went on
transportation to enable my client to come for a number of years, let us say 5 ½
before the court except for the Carabao years.
This one is the clincher. The Judge asked Q: Are Pablo and Ana exempt from license
the Counsel. requirement or Pablo and Susan exempt
from license requirement?
JUDGE: Counsel, do you have a medical A: None of them is exempt from the license
certificate to prove that the Carabao of requirement because the cohabitation is
your client is sick not exclusive because Pablo is living with
COUNSEL: None, Your Honor two women at the same time which is Ana
and Susan.
-MOTION DENIED-
Q: Now what if it is an on-and-of
So when you consider a remote place, relationship? You lived together for two
remember the definition not Carabao. years and broke up and you met again and
lived for 1 year and you broke up and met
It is remote if there is no means of and reconciled and lived again for 2 years.
transportation to enable the contracting Is that allowable? Are you exempt from
parties to appear before the Local Civil license requirements?
Registrar
A: You are not exempt from the license
requirement since the cohabitation must be
MARRIAGES AMONG MUSLIMS AND characterized by the exclusivity and that
OTHER MEMBERS OF ETHNIC there must be continuous cohabitation. In
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES this example, since they are in an on and
off relationship.
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or
among members of the ethnic cultural
communities may be performed validly
without the necessity of marriage MARITAL COHABITATION
license, provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
practices. outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country
Dean: It must be done by the cultural where they were solemnized, and valid
practices. there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under
MARITAL COHABITATION Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38. (17a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who Dean: So, the last exemption is lex loci. If
have lived together as husband and wife the marriage is solemnized in another
for at least five years and without any country, and the license is not required
legal impediment to marry each other. and it is valid, then it is valid in the
The contracting parties shall state the Philippines
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer VOID MARRIAGES
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the Dean: Take note of, LALBIS:
qualifications of the contracting parties Legal Capacity
are found no legal impediment to the Authority
marriage License
Bigamous
Dean: Article 34 requires that for the Identity
parties to be exempt from the license Subsequent
requirement:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
(1) The parties must have lived together for void from the beginning:
at least 5 years as husband and wife (1) Those contracted by any party below
(2) That there must be no impediment eighteen years of age even with the
existing between the parties not only at the consent of parents or guardians;
time of marriage but also during the (2) Those solemnized by any person not
duration of the 5 year cohabitation legally authorized to perform marriages
(3) Cohabitation must be continuous and unless such marriages were contracted
exclusive with either or both parties believing in
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good faith that the solemnizing officer appropriate civil registry and registries of
had the legal authority to do so; property; otherwise, the same shall not
(3) Those solemnized without license, affect third persons.
except those covered the preceding
Chapter; Dean: If A and B secured a decree of
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous annulment and B wanted to marry C after
marriages not failing under Article 41; the annulment of his marriage with A,
(5) Those contracted through mistake of B should comply with all the requirements
one contracting party as to the identity of Article 52 and 5, otherwise, his marriage
of the other; and with C will be considered as subsequent
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are marriage.
void under Article 53
ILLUSTRATION:
Dean: For Legal Capacity, the Philippine Q: If the parties are residing in Manila,
law applies. Regardless if they are adults in there is a falling out, the two decided
another country, if they are below 18, their to separate de facto and the woman
marriage will still be considered void. transferred to Quezon City wherein
she filed a case for nullity. Where
Q: What does mistake in identity refer to? should she register the decree should
Does it refer to the name or the person? the court grant it? Manila LCR or
Quezon City LCR?
A: It refers to the mistake of the person.
Q: Let’s say Maria married Jose. So based A: Both in Manila and Quezon City because
on the Birth Certificate of Jose, his name is this what Article 51 required. If one does
Jose. But it turned out that Jose is the not comply, the subsequent marriage will
wrong name, and his real name is Peter. Is be considered void for failing to register
the marriage between Maria and Jose aka the decree before the LCR.
Peter valid?
A: Yes. It is still valid because it is not the Q: Is it in the Quezon City LCR or in the
mistake in name that is material. It is the Manila LCR?
mistake in identity. Even if the name of the
person turned out to not be the real name, A She should register it both in Manila LCR
the marriage is still valid because it is still (where you got married) and in the Quezon
not a mistake in identity. City (where you secured the decree of
Dean: This also applies in qualifications. annulment) LCR. This is what Article 51
For example, if a person misrepresent requires na registration, liquidation, and
himself as a PhD graduate, this is still not a delivery of presumptive legitimes. If you
mistake in identity. do not comply, kahit na annulled ‘yung
marriage mo, ‘yung subsequent marriage
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the mo will be the subsequent marriage which
presumptive legitimes of all common is void under Article 53.
children, computed as of the date of the
final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
trustee of their property may ask for the party who, at the time of the celebration,
enforcement of the judgment. was psychologically incapacitated to
The delivery of the presumptive comply with the essential marital
legitimes herein prescribed shall in no obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
way prejudice the ultimate successional void even if such incapacity becomes
rights of the children accruing upon the manifest only after its solemnization.
death of either of both of the parents;
but the value of the properties already Q: What is psychological incapacity?
received under the decree of annulment
or absolute nullity shall be considered as Dean: There is no statutory definition of
advances on their legitime. psychological incapacity.
The first case on psychological incapacity is

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or the case of Santos v. CA. We still need to
of absolute nullity of the marriage, the discuss this even if we have the Tan Andal
partition and distribution of the case so that you know the change in the
properties of the spouses and the interpretation.
delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the SANTOS v. CA
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Mario exhibited “emotional immaturity,
That psychological incapacity must be irresponsibility, irritability, and
characterized by (a) gravity - the psychological imbalance”. Mario had been
incapacity must be grave or serious such caught under the influence of prohibited
that the party would be incapable of drugs while in the presence of Ma.
carrying out the ordinary duties required in Samantha. Mario would leave the family
marriage; (b) juridical antecedence - it home for days unaccounted for, leaving
must be rooted in the history of the party Rosanna with the burden of working and
antedating the marriage, although the raising Ma. Samantha. Moreover, Mario had
overt manifestations may emerge only prevented Ma. Samantha from taking
after the marriage; and (c) incurability - medications prescribed for her illness.
it must be incurable or, even if it were Rosanna then filed a petition to nullify her
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the marriage with Mario. Rosanna alleged that
means of the party involved. Mario is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his marital duties. Rosanna presented
This was the first case on psychological the testimony of Dr. Fonso, stating that
incapacity where the SC refused to declare Mario has narcissistic antisocial personality
the marriage void given that the allegations disorder and substance abuse disorder with
of husband did not comply with the 3 psychotic features.
characteristics of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. ISSUE: Is the marriage between Mario and
Rosanna void due to psychological
The old cases of Chi Ming Tsoi v CA and incapacity?
Antonio v. Reyes are the very few cases
where the SC granted the petition based on RULING: YES.
Article 36 until Tan Andal case.
NOTE: Must be proved through
CHI MING TSOI VS. CA preponderance of evidence.
● Gravity
Whether a marriage can be declared ● Juridical antecedence
void due to psychological incapacity ● Incurability
because the husband refuses to have
sexual intercourse with his wife The marriage between Rosanna and Mario
despite being married for 10 months? is void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Rosanna was able to prove with clear and
If a man, although capable of performing convincing evidence that Mario was
the sexual act, simply refuses to do it with psychologically incapacitated to comply
his wife, the Court said that it could be due with his essential marital obligations.
to causes that are psychological in nature.
Love is useless unless shared with another. In amending the guidelines provided by the
Molina doctrine, the Court amended the
ANTONIO VS REYES (2006) second Molina guideline and stated that
psychological incapacity is neither a mental
Whether persistent and constant lying incapacity nor a personality disorder that
of the wife can be a ground of must be proven through expert opinion.
psychological incapacity to declare
marriage as void? There must be proof, however, of the
durable or enduring aspects of a person's
Article 36 of the Family Code states that a personality, called "personality structure,"
marriage contracted by any party who, at which manifests itself through clear acts of
the time of the celebration, was dysfunctionality that undermines the
psychologically incapacitated to comply family. The spouse's personality structure
with the essential marital obligations of must make it impossible for him or her to
marriage, shall likewise be void even if understand and, more important, to
such incapacity becomes manifest only comply with his or her essential marital
after its solemnization. obligations.
One who is unable to adhere to reality With respect to gravity, the requirement is
cannot be expected to adhere to any retained, not in the sense that the
emotional consequences much less to psychological incapacity must be shown to
perform the essential marital obligation. be a serious or dangerous illness, but that
The SC declared the marriage void on the "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
ground of the psychological incapacity changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
are excluded.
TAN-ANDAL vs. ANDAL Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or
Mario Victor Andal and Rosanna Tan were incurable. Such incurability may be
married. A year later, Rosanna and Mario absolute or even relative only in regard to
gave birth to a child. During their marriage, the other spouse, not necessarily
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
absolutely against everyone of the same liquidation of the properties will be
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be governed by the provisions of the
relevant to the assumption of marriage conjugal partnership of gains.
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise· of a QUIAZON v BELEN
profession or employment in a job.
Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a Q: Whether the decedent’s marriage to
nullity case is still required to prove the petitioner is void ab initio fo being
juridical antecedence because it is an bigamous.
explicit requirement of the law. Article 36
is clear that the psychological incapacity Ruling: The SC ruled in the affirmative. In
must be existing "at the time of the this case, at the time of the celebration of
celebration" of the marriage, "even if such the marriage of the decedent, the law in
incapacity becomes manifest only after its effect was the civil code and not the family
solemnization." code. Thus, the court applied the ruling in
Niñal v Bayadog which emphasized that in
Q: Is psychological incapacity, a any void marriage, it is as if no marriage
medical condition or mental illness? If has taken place. Hence, it cannot be a
not a medical concept, what is it? source of any right. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or
R: A legal concept. SC: must be shown collaterally.
through a preponderance of evidence that
it was existing prior to the time of the In this case, the previous marriage of the
celebration of the marriage. Must be petitioner to another man was sufficiently
caused by one’s personality structure. established marriage certificate which is
considered as a competent evidence of
Dean: The concept of the Tan-Andal, the marriage. Without showing that the
interpretation of the Supreme Court by marriage has been dissolved at the time of
Justice Leonen is different from the the petitioenr and decedent’s marriage, the
previous cases on psychological incapacity. conclusion of the court is that the
subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
It is not considered as a medical concept
but a legal concept and therefore, it is Dean: Under the Rules of Declaration of
possible that you are psychological Nullity, which was prior to the Niñal case,
incapacitated but only in relation to a only the husband or the wife can file a
particular partner. petition for nullity of marriage. In other
words, the ruling in Niñal, if it was decided
(recorder lost connection) today, would have been different. In the
Niñal case, there was a direct petition filed
A void marriage is different from a voidable by the Children of Pepito Niñal after his
marriage. death. So after his death, the children of
the first marriage sued to declare the
First, with respect to grounds, a voidable second marriage of their father void on the
marriage, the grounds are: Article 36, 37, ground that they were not exempt from the
38. If is voidable or annullable, the ground license requirement when they got
is Article 45. married. Although the marriage was
celebrated after the death of their mother,
With respect to property relationship, If a their fatiher Pepito and Norma Bayado…
marriage is declared void, the property
relationship that would govern the Under Art. 36, when a marriage is
liquidation and the partition of the invalidated by reason of psychological
properties would be Article 147 or 148 incapacity, the children born out of the
depending whether there is an impediment marriage are still considered legitimate.
or there was no impediment on the part of
the parties. If there is no impediment, 147 As to all the rest (ex: make as a ground
will apply and if there is an impediment, lack of marriage license or bigamy), after
148 will apply. On the other hand, if the court declares the marriage void, the
marriage is voidable and it was so declared judgment will carry with it the order of the
annulled by the court, whatever property court to the lcoal registrar concerned to
relationship they have adopted at the time amend the birth certificate of all the
of the celebration of the marriage will children born during that void marriage to
govern the liquidation of their properties. reflect their new status from legitimate to
illegitimate.
● For example, spouses Anna and Kaya ang Art. 36 (Psychological incapacity)
Alex contracted marriage in 2021 is the most used and abused ground.
and the marriage was annulled and Pinakamadali is lack of marriage license.
they were governed by conjugal
property of gains. So, if the SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
marriage was annulled on 2021, the
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Emilio Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco- first marriage was null and void ab initio is
Suntay’s marriage was declared null and essential.
void under Art. 85 of the Civil Code (now
Art. 45 of the Family Code). IWASAWA v. CUSTODIO
Five years later, Emilio’s daughter, Isabel, Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national, and
filed a petition for the issuance in her favor Felisa Custodio got married. However,
of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Felisa later on confessed that she is
Estate of her late grandmother Cristina, married to another man in the Philippines.
alleging that she is one of the legitimate Thus, Yasuo filed a petition for declaration
grandchildren of the decedent. However, of his marriage to Felisa as null and void on
Federico, Emilio’s father, opposed and the ground of bigamy. However, the trial
claimed that he is the surviving spouse of court ruled that there was insufficient
the decedent. Likewise, he averred that evidence to prove Felisa’s prior existing
Isabel should not be appointed as marriage and held that while Yasuo offered
administrator because under Art. 992 of the certificate of marriage of Felisa to the
the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no other man, it was only Yasuo who testified
right to succeed by right of representation about the said marriage.
the legitimate relatives of her father or
mother. Federico contends that as a The Court held that Yasuo and Felisa’s
consequence of the declaration by the trial marriage is void. Likewise, there is no
court that the marriage of Isabel’s parents question that the documentary evidence
is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate submitted by Yasuo are all public
child. documents. As public documents, they are
admissible in evidence even without further
The Court held that children conceived of proof of their due execution and
voidable marriages before the decree of genuineness. Moreover, not only are said
annulment shall be considered legitimate. documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they
Dean: Having established her status as a constitute a prima facie evidence of the
legitimate child because she was born in a facts stated therein.
voidable marriage, as opposed to a void
marriage, she is qualified to act as Dean: Under the Rules of Court, there is a
administratix of the grandmother’s estate presumption of regularity in the
and in addition, she can represent [her performance of official duty. So this
father Emilio]. presumption, although rebuttable, without
any other proof to the contrary, it will be
TERRE v. TERRE deemed as valid and admissible as
evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus,
Dorothy Terre left her first marriage with the Court accepted the certification even
another man without having it annulled and without the testimony of the records
married Jordan Terre since the latter told custodian.
her that her former marriage was void ab
initio because she and her husband were FUJIKI v. MARINAY
first cousins. However, Dorothy later on
learned that Jordan was married to another Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married
woman. Thus, she filed a case for bigamy Maria Marinay in the Philippines. However,
against Jordan. In his defense, Jordan the marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s
claimed that he was unaware of Dorothy’s parents, and the parties eventually lost
first marriage. He then contracted the contact with each other. Later on, without
second marriage, believing that his the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio married another Japanese national. But
because of her prior subsisting marriage. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse,
thus, she left her husband and contacted
The Court ruled that the subsequent Fujiki.
marriage of Jordan with another woman is
void ab initio because when it was entered Fujiki and Marinay were able to re-establish
into, Jordan’s prior marriage with Dorothy their relationship; hence, Fujiki helped
was subsisting, no judicial action having Marinay obtained a declaration of nullity of
been initiated or any judicial declaration Marinay’s subsequent marriage with the
obtained as to the nullity of such prior other Japanese national. Subsequently,
marriage. Likewise, the Court disbarred Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC seeking
Jordan and held that Jordan, being a judicial recognition of foreign judgment.
lawyer, knew or should have known that However, the trial court dismissed the
such an argument ran counter to the petition, maintaining that Fujiki lacks
prevailing case law which holds that for personality to file the petition.
purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second The Court held that Fujiki has the
marriage, a judicial declaration that the personality to file a petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
nullifying the marriage between Marinay signature in the marriage certificate was
and the other Japanese national. There is not hers and that it was forged.
no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in Q: Was she able to prove that the
maintaining the integrity of the marriage signature appearing in the marriage
he contracted and the property relations contract was not her signature?
arising from it. The interest dervies from A: It was proven by a document examiner.
the substantive right of the spouse not only The examiner testified that the signature
to preserve his most intimate human appearing in the contract was actually
relation, but also to protect his property forged.
interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. Q: What was the objection of the
Republic to the petition filed by a
Dean: Under the rules, it's only the Olaybar?
husband, or the wife who can file the A: The objection of the Republic of the
petition for Declaration of Nullity, but the Philippines as represented by the office of
exception is in cases of bigamous the Solicitor General is that the petition for
marriages. Necessarily, the legal husband cancellation of entry cannot be used as a
or wife, as the case may be, is a proper circumvention of the requirements of the
party to question the validity of the second law because it is tantamount to making the
bigamous marriage because that will affect marriage as void, well, in fact, there is a
his or her status as the legal spouse of the separate law providing for that.
other contracting party
Q: So, according to the Republic, it is a
ILLUSTRATION: petition actually to nullify the marriage
under the guise of Correction of Entry. Did
So A married B. During the subsistence of the Supreme Court agree?
B's marriage to A, B contracted marriage A: The Supreme Court denied the
with C. The parties to the 1st marriage are contention of the OSG and ruled in favor of
A and B, the parties to the second Olaybar. The Supreme Court ruled that in
marriage are B and C. So, if we strictly Rule 108 petition, even substantial errors
follow the rules, A cannot question the in a civil registry may be corrected through
marriage between B and C because he is a petition, as long as all the procedural and
not a party to it. But that's an exception guidelines under rule 108 is complied
according to the Supreme Court in Fujiki therewith. In this case, since Olaybar was
and also in the case of Juliano that if you able to prove that she was able to comply
are the legal spouse, you are necessarily a with all the requirements under rule 108,
proper party to question the subsequent she indeed can use the petition to change
bigamous marriage contracted by your her status. Furthermore, as ruled by the
spouse. So, it's not covered by the rules on Supreme Court in this case, there was
Declaration of nullity by way of exception. really no marriage to speak of in the first
place because she was not even present in
the marriage ceremony and that she was
not really the one who got married.
REPUBLIC V OLAYBAR
Dean: It can be considered as a petition to
This case involves a petition for correction declare the document void, not the
of the entry in the Civil registry because marriage because according to the
respondent Olaybar allegedly contracted a Supreme Court, there's no marriage to
marriage when in fact, she did not. Olaybar speak of precisely because she was not a
requested from the NSO a CENOMAR or a party to that marriage. So having
certificate of no marriage as one of the satisfactorily shown that the signature
requirements for her to contract a marriage appearing in the marriage contract was not
with her boyfriend. Upon receipt of the hers, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
CENOMAR, she discovered that she was Olaybar about the contention of the
already married to a certain Korean Republic that it was actually a petition to
national. For this reason, she filed a nullify the marriage.
petition for cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract. In her allegations, she INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES
denied having contracted a marriage with
this Korean national and claimed that she Art. 37. Marriages between the
did not know her alleged husband. following are incestuous and void from
However, she revealed that she recognized the beginning, whether relationship
some of the witnesses to the marriage as between the parties be legitimate or
she had met them when she was working illegitimate:
in a pension house. She also claimed that
she did not appear before a solemnizing (1) Between ascendants and
officer because she was still working in descendants of any degree; and
Makati City. She also alleged that her
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(2) Between brothers and sisters, Dean: Suppose A is married to B, with

whether of the full or half blood. son S. C is married to D with daughter.
So if A and D, the spouses of B and C
Dean: Marriages between first cousins, both died, B and C later on got married.
although still prohibited are no longer May S and D marry each other? Will they
considered incestuous, but contrary to fall under public policy marriages? The son
public policy. of a widow and the daughter of a widower
who got married - would they fall under
Q: Why do you think marriages article 38? What do you think is the
between close blood relatives are relationship between S and D? Kung anak
prohibited? sa una ni A and B. Then anak sa una din D
A: Because it has been shown by medical and C and then both the spouses B and C
research that the offspring of close blood died, sila ngayon yung tagpo, sila ngayon
relatives show some birth defects, sand if yung nag-asawa. Will there respective
we will allow the continued union between children from their previous marriages be
close blood relatives, it might result into capacitated to marry each other?
the deterioration of the human race
eventually. So usually those with birth A: They can validly get married because
defects, either not much blood or they have their relationship is stepbrother and
close blood relations so that's why it's stepsister and the prohibition under article
prohibited. 38 of the Family Code is only step parents
and stepchildren. It does not include
stepbrother and stepsister.
MARRIAGES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
Q: If after marrying each other either
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be B adopted D or C adopted S, can S and
void from the beginning for reasons of D still get married?
public policy: A: No. Because it will result in a marriage
1. Between collateral blood relatives between the adopted child and the
whether legitimate or legitimate child of the adopter.
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree; Dean: Even if only one parent adopts
2. Between step-parents and step- either S or D, it will already fall under
children; Article 38. They are widow and widower,
3. Between parents-in-law and both with children from their respective
children-in-law; marriages. Their children, strictly speaking,
4. Between the adopting parent and are not prohibited from marrying each
the adopted child; other under article 38. However, when
5. Between the surviving spouse of either of the spouses to the second
the adopting parent and the marriage decides to adopt the child of the
adopted child; other, it automatically qualifies as marriage
6. Between the surviving spouse of between legitimate child and adopted child
the adopted child and the of the adopter. Therefore, they will now be
adopter; prohibited from marrying each other under
7. Between an adopted child and a Article 38.
legitimate child of the adopter;
8. Between adopted children of the Q: Can it be considered for us violation
same adopter; and of public policy if ever S and D would
9. Between parties where one, with marry each other, but they are not
the intention to marry the other, adopted?
killed that other person’s spouse, A: No.
or his or her own spouse.
Dean: Same example: B and C got
Dean: CASSPALPS. married. Si S and D, hindi sila adopted, and
then nagpakasal. What if, subsequent to
C - Collateral up to 4th civil degree the marriage, either B or C adopts? This is
A - Adopting parent and adopted child a loophole. This is not covered by the
S - Surviving spouse of the adopted child law.
and the adapter
S - surviving spouse of the adapter and the
adopted child Few cases involving bigamy and under the
P - Parents-in-Law and children-in-law Civil Code provisions, there are conflicting
A - Adopted children of the same adapter decisions of the SC on whether there is a
L - Legitimate child and adopted child of need to seek judicial recognition of nullity
the adapter of a void marriage.
P - Parties where with intention of
marrying, killed his or her own spouse or WIEGEL v SEMPIO DIY (1986)
the other person's spouse
S - Step-parents and step-children Justice Diy was the respondent because of
her decision not to allow the Filipina wife of
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Karl Wiegel to present proof that there was Q: What is modified by the word
force and intimidation in her first marriage ‘solely’? Is it final judgment or for
before she contracted the second marriage purposes of remarriage?
with Karl Wiegel.
The phrase ‘on the basis solely’ means
It is essentially a suit by the German that if you intend to remarry, by invoking
husband questioning the status of their that your previous marriage which is void,
marriage because according to him, it is the sole acceptable proof of the nullity of
void and bigamous because his wife is your previous marriage would be the final
previously married to another man at the judgment declaring that previous marriage
time she contracted marriage with him. void.
In that suit for nullity of marriage, the wife It does not follow that you can only file a
of Karl Wiegel tried to introduce evidence petition to nullify your marriage if you
that the first marriage was attended by intend to remarry as argued by the
force and intimidation employed by the first husband of Delia Domingo. It is not the
husband. She was trying to introduce correct interpretation.
evidence that she was merely forced to
marry the first husband. Article 40 has been used by the Supreme
Court in criminal cases.
But Judge Diy denied that introduction of
evidence because according to the judge, If you read the cases of Mercado v Tan,
even if the wife proves that there was force Bobis v Bobis, and Pulido, there are so
and intimidation in the first marriage, that many cases on bigamy like Vitangcol v
would be immaterial for purposes of People, Santiago v People, you add that to
determining the validity of second marriage the case of Mercado v Tan, Manuel v
to Karl Wiegel. People, in all these cases, the accused was
convicted of bigamy or the case was
Why is that? Because on the assumption remanded to the trial court for further
that the first marriage was attended by proceeding, even if the accused in the
force, and the first marriage would only be bigamy case was invoking that his or her
voidable, and not void. marriage is void and therefore, there could
be no liability for bigamy if the first
The judge also went on to state that even marriage is void in the first place. That was
assuming that the first marriage is the argument is these cases.
void, a judicial declaration of nullity is
essential for purposes of contracting a But the Supreme Court, using Article 40
subsequent marriage. said that precisely Art. 40 requires that
before a party remarry on the basis that his
That case became the basis of Article 40 of previous marriage is void, he or she must
the Civil Code. seek a judicial declaration of nullity.
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous In all those cases mentioned, there was
marriage may be invoked for purposes of either conviction, remand of the case to the
remarriage on the basis solely of a final lower court to determine the criminal
judgment declaring such previous liability of the accused in bigamy.
marriage void.
MERCADO v TAN (2000)
DOMINGO v CA
Mercado was charged with bigamy by the
Domingo claimed that the Petition for 2nd wife Consuelo Tan after the 2nd wife
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is not discovered that there was a prior subsisting
necessary because the marriage was marriage of Vincent Mercado, so there was
already void. also a pending case for nullity of the first
marriage and while the trial court convicted
Supreme Court ruled that said Judicial Vincent Mercado of the charge of bigamy,
Declaration is necessary. For purposes of during the pendency of the appeal, the first
action for liquidation, partition, distribution marriage of Mercado was declared void by
and separation of property between the the trial court. So he was invoking this
erstwhile spouses, evidence needs must be judgment of the trial court in the nullity
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to case to seek his acquittal in the bigamy
prove the existence of grounds rendering case pending before the Supreme Court.
such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. Supreme Court said that he is still liable for
bigamy even if his first marriage was
Dean: Crucial to the interpretation of declared void, because at the time of the
Article 40 is the placement of the word celebration of the second marriage, the
solely. first marriage has not yet been legally
dissolved.
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
The conclusion of the Supreme Court is previous marriage in a bigamy charge, then
that: By the time he contracted the second it would be unfair and unjust if the court
marriage while the first marriage was still will say otherwise.
subsisting, the elements of the crime of
bigamy would have concurred. To my mind, the application of Article 40
now is limited only to civil cases, and that
BOBIS v. BOBIS is precisely for purposes of contracting a
subsequent marriage.
Dean: The Bobis case, on the other hand,
involves a case of concubinage against Dean: Ang worry ko lang is that it can now
Isagani Bobis. At the time he was charged be raised as a defense, and it can be raised
with concubinage, he had already as a prejudicial question. Baka some will
previously filed a petition for the contract marriage deliberately with some
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. formal or essential requisites lacking like a
marriage license and raise it as a defense
His wife retaliated and filed a case of later on when he or she is sued criminally.
concubinage against him. He was arguing That is a possibility.
that the criminal case for concubinage
should be suspended on the ground that But remember that under the rules on
the pending petition for the nullity of criminal procedure, before a civil case may
marriage is a prejudicial question to his be considered a prejudicial question to the
liability for the crime of concubinage. issue in a criminal case, that civil case must
have been previously instituted to the
The Supreme Court said that even if there criminal case. So pwede rin naman ma-bar
is a pending case for the nullity of yung civil case for nullity, meaning hindi
marriage, that does not entitle the accused pwedeng i-raise as a prejudicial question
to cohabit with another woman not his wife, kapag nauna yung bigamy case.
during the pendency of the proceedings
because until the court declares that the
marriage is void, the presumption is that, Let’s say the accused contracted a
the marriage is valid and subsisting. subsequent marriage, without dissolving
the previous, first, marriage. He was then
PULIDO v. PEOPLE sued for bigamy. According to the Pulido
case, the accused can raise it as a defense
Luisito Pulido married Nora S. Arcon in a even if there is no prior judicial declaration
civil ceremony (prior to the effectivity of of nullity. On the assumption that during
the Family Code). Upon confrontation, the pendency of the criminal action for
Arcon learned that Pulido and Rowena bigamy, the accused in that criminal case
Baleda entered into marriage (after the also filed a petition for nullity of first
effectivity of the Family Code). Arcon marriage. In that civil case for nullity, the
charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy. In court held that the first marriage is valid.
his defense, Pulido insisted that he could However, in the criminal case, he was
not be held criminally liable for bigamy acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
because both his marriages were null and
void. The first marriage being contracted Ano na ngayon ang mangyayari? This is the
without a marriage license. Baleda alleged problem that I foresee. Two courts of equal
that even prior to the filling of the bigamy jurisdiction rendered different decisions,
case, she already filed a Petition to Annul and we will have a problem kung ano yung
her marriage with Pulido. The RTC magpre-prevail. Just a thought.
convicted petitioner of Bigamy and
acquitted Baleda. The Court ruled that a This is penned by your future Bar Chair. So
judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not for purposes of your bar exam, follow the
necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and Pulido case.
subsequent marriages in bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of Question from Student: What is the
absolute nullity of the first and/or second standard of proof needed if the nullity of
marriages presented by the accused in the the first marriage is used as a defense in a
prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, criminal case for bigamy?
irrespective of the time within which they
are secured. Dean: Since it is a criminal case and the
main issue is whether he committed the
Dean: In other words, the court limited the crime of bigamy, you need to prove all the
application of Article 40 from the Civil Law elements of bigamy. If you are for the
standpoint of contracting a subsequent prosecution, you need to prove the guilt of
marriage - that you need a judicial the accused beyond reasonable doubt. I do
declaration of nullity of your prior marriage not see that a different standard will be
before contracting a subsequent one. But applied since this is a criminal case.
since Article 40 does not preclude or does
not prohibit the accused in a criminal case MORIGO v. PEOPLE
from raising the defense of the nullity of a
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Dean: This is a case involving Lucio For the purpose of contracting the
Morigo, who married his college sweetheart subsequent marriage under the
Lucia. Less than a year later, they divorced. preceding paragraph the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as
Lucia filed a petition for divorce in a foreign provided in this Code for the declaration
court where she is a resident. After their of presumptive death of the absentee,
divorce, Lucio contracted another marriage without prejudice to the effect of
with Maria. reappearance of the absent spouse.
However, less than a year after contracting Dean: This is a new provision of the Family
the second marriage, Lucio filed a petition Code. There is no counterpart provision in
for declaration of nullity of marriage of his Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, after an
first marriage, on the ground of lack of absence of seven years, it being unknown
marriage ceremony. At this time, he was whether or not the absentee is still alive,
also prosecuted for bigamy. he should be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for succession. Hence,
Remember, bigamy is a public crime. It even for purposes of remarriage. There was
may be instituted not only on the instance no requirement under the Civil Code that
of the private party, but also on the you need to seek a judicial declaration of
instance of the State. presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The SC acquitted the Morigo. I don’t know But now, there is such a requirement Art.
exactly what’s the difference between a 41, that is, in order to remarry, the present
void marriage celebrated without a valid spouse must first file a petition for
license, and a void marriage without a declaration of presumptive death of the
marriage ceremony. To my mind, they are absent spouse:
the same. . After an absence of four years, or
a. After an absence of only two years,
However in this case, the SC held that the if the absent spouse disappeared under
mere private act of signing a marriage circumstances where there is danger of
contract bears no semblance to a valid death
marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO
without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for Facts: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of
which petitioner might be held liable for Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial intestate in April 1992 leaving several
declaration of nullity before he contracts a parcels of land estimated value of
subsequent marriage. P604,750.00. He was the second husband
of Marietta who was previously married
In my opinion, what clinched the acquittal with William Bounds in January 1946. The
of Morigo is the fact that there was a latter disappeared without a trace in
divorce already, unlike in the case of February 1947. After 11 years from the
Mercado v. Tan. Morigo could have married disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and
already under Article 36 if he filed a petition Teodorico were married in May 1958
to recognize the divorce decree before without Marietta securing a court
contracting a subsequent marriage. But declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
that’s just my opinion. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister
of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF the sole surviving heir of the latter and that
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF THE ABSENT marriage between Marietta and his brother
SPOUSE being allegedly bigamous is thereby null
and void. She prayed that her son
Art. 41 (FC). Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator,
without bond, of the estate of the deceased
A marriage contracted by any person and inheritance be adjudicated to her after
during subsistence of a previous all the obligations of the estate would have
marriage shall be null and void, unless been settled.
before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been Ruling: The marriage between the
absent for four consecutive years and the respondent and the deceased was valid, it
spouse present has a well-founded belief being solemnized in May 1958 where the
that the absent spouse was already law in force at that time was the Civil Code
dead. In case of disappearance where and not the Family Code which only took
there is danger of death under the effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the
circumstances set forth in the provisions Family Code itself limit its retroactive
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an governance only to cases where it thereby
absence of only two years shall be would not prejudice or impair vested or
sufficient. acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws. Since Civil Code
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
provides that declaration of presumptive Because of the following reasons:
death is not essential before contracting 1. The respondents did not actively
marriage where at least seven consecutive look for her missing husband.
years of absence of the spouse is enough 2. She did not report Jerry’s absence
to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with to the police or did she seek the aid
Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a of authorities to look for him
right can claim portion of the estate. 3. She did not present, as a witness,
any of Jerry's relatives, neighbors or
The second marriage is valid. The incidents friends.
happened several years back and it was 4. There was no corroborative
overtaken by the Family Code, the trial evidence to support respondents'
court applied the Family Code in this case. claim that she conducted a diligent
search.
Dean: Now, Art. 41, for purposes of the
declaration of presumptive death, requires In summary, the SC viewed that the
a stricter standard. What do we mean by respondent merely engaged in a passive
that? Let’s hear the Cantor case. search. The SC ruled that the respondent
has no well founded belief that Jerry is
REPUBLIC v. CANTOR already dead.
Maria and Jerry got married in 1997. REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO

However, in January 1998, they had a *not in the case list
violent fight for reasons of sexual
incompatibility and Jerry’s expression of A Filipino seaman, Gregorio Nolasco,
animosity toward Maria’s father. married a Foreigner, Janet Monica Parker.
Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal Since he was a seaman, he met Janica in a
dwelling and never came back. After more foreign country and they decided to get
than four years, Maria filed a petition for a married. They went home to PH while Janet
judicial declaration of presumptive death, was pregnant. Gregorio again went on a
alleging that: (a) she had inquired from her trip as a seaman. When he returned, his
mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her wife was no longer living in their conjugal
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and dwelling in Antique and he was told that
friends, but to no avail, and (b) she also after she gave birth to their child, she never
allegedly made it a point to check the returned.
patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. After the required number of years lapsed,
Gregorio filed a case for declaration of
Ruling: Jerry should not be declared presumptive death of an absent spouse.
presumptively dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four (4) essential He said that he wrote letters which were
requisites for the declaration of never responded to by Janet and were
presumptive death: Return to Sender. But he did not bother to
1. That the absent spouse has been present the letters in court. He also said
missing for four consecutive years, that he went to the place where they first
or two consecutive years if the met.
disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death Mostly his evidence is his own testimony
2. That the present spouse wishes to that he inquired to Janet’s friends and
remarry; relatives but he never bothered to inquire
3. That the present spouse has a well- in the British Embassy the whereabouts of
founded belief that the absentee is his missing spouse.
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a RULING: The SC denied the petition for
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. The
declaration of presumptive death of evidence presented by Nolasco was too
the absentee sketchy to form a reasonable and well
founded belief that the absent spouse is
The Family Code prescribes as "well dead.
founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. Thus, REPUBLIC v. ALEGRO
mere absence of the spouse (even for such
period required by the law), lack of any In 2001, Alan Alegro filed a Petition in the
news that such absentee is still alive, RTC for the declaration of presumptive
failure to communicate or general death of his wife, Lea Julaton. At the
presumption of absence under the Civil hearing, Alan deduced that he and Lea
Code would not suffice. The efforts fell were married in 1995 in Samar.
short to the stringent standard degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence. During the hearing, Alan testified that Lea
arrived home late in the evening and he
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
berated her for always being out of their Ludyson filed a petition for declaration of
house. He told her that if she enjoyed the presumptive death of his wife after seven
life of a single person, it would be better for years from her disappearance.
her to go back to her parents. Lea did not
reply. Alan narrated that, in 1995, when he In the case at bar, private respondent first
reported for work the following day, Lea took a leave of absence from his work in
was still in the house, but when he arrived the United Arab Emirates and returned to
home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He
be found. Alan thought that Lea merely then proceeded to inquire about his
went to her parents' house in Bliss, Sto. wife's whereabouts from their friends
Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol. Next,
did not return to their house anymore. private respondent aired over Bombo
Radyo Philippines, a known radio station,
Alan further testified that when he went to regarding the fact of disappearance of his
the house of Lea’s parents, Lea’s friend but wife. Finally, he claims to have visited
she was not there. He even sought the help various hospitals and funeral parlors in
of Barangay Captain Juan Magat as well as Tuguegarao City and nearby
inquired about her whereabouts but to no municipalities.
avail. He likewise reported Lea’s
disappearance to the local police station SC: No well-founded belief. Taken
and to the NBI in year 2001. together, the Court is of the view that
private respondent's efforts in searching
What’s peculiar about this case, aside for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely
from the delayed reporting of the husband passive. Private respondent could have
to NBI, is that the husband did not go to easily convinced the Court otherwise by
the parents-in-law. The parents-in-law also providing evidence which corroborated his
are owners of radio station. "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or
justification was given for these glaring
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact has
proves that he has well founded belief. the burden of proving it by some other
means than mere allegations.
RULING: No. The belief of the present
spouse must be the result of proper and Stripped of private respondent's mere
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to allegations, only the act of broadcasting his
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent wife's alleged disappearance through a
spouse and whether the absent spouse is known radio station was corroborated. This
still alive or is already dead. act comes nowhere close to establishing a
well- founded belief that Shanaviv has
In the case at bar, respondent failed to already passed away. At most, it just
present a witness other than Barangay reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she
Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even abandoned the family.
failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson
Abaenza or any other person from whom To accept private respondent's bare
he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to allegations would be to apply a liberal
corroborate his testimony. On the other approach in complying with the requisite of
hand, the respondent admitted that when establishing a well-founded belief that the
he returned to the house of his parents-in- missing spouse is dead.
law on
February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told MANUEL v. PEOPLE
him that Lea had just been there but that
she left without notice. Manuel was married to Ruby. Twenty-one
years later, he took a twenty-one year old
Lastly, respondent did report and seek the bride. The second wife entertained doubts
help of the local police authorities and the as to the marital status of her husband.
NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an Thus, she investigated and found out that
afterthought. the husband has been actually previously
married to Rubylus. As such, a bigamy
Dean: There are so many factor which will charge was instituted.
defeat the claim of the husband that he had
a well founded belief that the spouse is One of the defenses raised by Manuel has
already dead. First is that he reported it too to do with the presumption of death.
late. It was only after 6 years. Second, he According to him, the first wife was
did not even bother to inquire from his convicted of a crime sometime in the 1970s
parents-in-law and announce the and since then, he never heard from him
disappearance on the radio. again. According to Manuel, the
presumption of death should automatically
REPUBLIC v. CATUBAG arise upon the lapse of the period in Art. 41
without need of judicial declaration.
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SC: Untenable. Since the second marriage domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go
was celebrated after the effectivity of the to an employment agency in February
Family Code, he should have complied with 1995. She also claimed that it was not true
Art. 41 by applying for a declaration of that she had been absent for 12 years.
presumptive death. It is also for his own Ricardo was aware that she never left their
protection and the protection of the conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he
subsequent spouse. If you do not secure who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008
the judicial declaration of presumptive to cohabit with another woman.
death, even if your spouse is absent, you
risk being prosecuted for bigamy. Dean: So what was the issue in this case
of Santos when she filed a petition for
The Court rejects petitioner's contention annulment of judgment in the Court of
that the requirement of instituting a Appeals? What did the CA rule?
petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code The CA ruled that petitioner Celerina
is designed merely to enable the spouse availed of a wrong remedy. According to
present to contract a valid second marriage the CA, she should have filed an affidavit of
and not for the acquittal of one charged reappearance.
with bigamy. Such provision was designed
to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the But Celerina was saying that why would I
Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the file an affidavit of reappearance when I did
confusion spawned by the rulings of this not disappear.
Court and comments of eminent authorities
on Criminal Law. (Manuel v. People, supra.) Q: So what’s the issue now ruled by the
SC? Did she availed of the correct remedy
SANTOS vs. SANTOS of annulment of judgment? Or is CA correct
that the mere filing of an affidavit of
In his petition for declaration of absence or reappearance would erase the effects of
presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he declaration of presumptive death?
and Celerina rented an apartment
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; The Supreme Court said that the filing of
after they had gotten married. After a year, affidavit of reappearance would only have
they moved to Tarlac City. They were the effect of terminating the subsequent
engaged in the buy and sell business. marriage, and no other. It will not erase the
Ricardo claimed that their business did not effects of the declaration of presumptive
prosper and as a result, Celerina convinced death of the absentee. It would not be
him to allow her to work as a domestic appropriate if she will file an affidavit of
helper in Hong Kong. In 1995, she left reappearance because the effect of
Tarlac and was never heard from again. affidavit of reappearance is limited to those
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted mentioned in Art. 43.
efforts to locate Celerina. He went to
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, It terminates the subsequent marriage,
but they, too, did not know their daughter's and the consequent effects of Art. 43 would
whereabouts. He also inquired about her follow. But it would not erase the other
from other relatives and friends, but no one effects of a person being declared
gave him any information. Ricardo claimed presumptively dead. So the SC said, since
that it was almost 12 years from the date it was file in the proper period, she could
of his Regional Trial Court petition since no longer avail of the remedies of appeal or
Celerina left. He believed that she had petition for relief because she filed it more
passed away. than 2 years after the court declared her
presumptively dead. Then, annulment of
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a judgment is the appropriate remedy.
petition for annulment of judgment before
the Court of Appeals on the grounds of The status of subsequent marriage
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She contracted by the husband of Celerina is
argued that she was deprived her day in void for being bigamous.
court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge
of her true residence, misrepresented to
the court that she was a resident of Tarlac Art. 44. If both spouses of the
City. According to Celerina, her true subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
residence was in Neptune Extension, said marriage shall be void ab initio and
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This all donations by reason of marriage and
residence had been her and Ricardo's testamentary dispositions made by one
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo in favor of the other are revoked by
left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's operation of law.
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the Dean: Art. 44 says one thing. The Santos
petition declaring her presumptively dead. case says another. Why?
Celerina claimed that she never resided in
Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a
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Sa Art. 44 ang requirement para maging spouse by testate and intestate
considered void ung subsequent marriage, succession. (n)
both parties should have been in bad faith.
Discussion:
So if 1 party is in good faith, and the other
one is in bad faith, the marriage should be Effects under Art. 43 (CADIS)
treated as valid pursuant to Art. 44. That is
of course for the protection of the innocent Paragraph 1
spouse.
Dean: I have an issue with this. Paano nga
In the Santos case, the SC said that if the kung good faith yung subsequent spouse?
petition for declaration of presumptive Paano kung isa lang yung bad faith?
death was procured by the present spouse Because, regardless, they will be
in bad faith, the subsequent marriage he illegitimated.
contracted would be void ab initio for being
bigamous because only a subsequent Paragraph 2
marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law. The absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership existing in that
On the other hand, it is the recording of the subsequent marriage shall be dissolved and
affidavit of reappearance which would have liquidated, without prejudice to the
the effect of terminating the subsequent forfeiture of the share of the spouse in bad
marriage, not the mere fact of faith, in the net profits of the ACP or the
reappearance. CPG.
Definition of Net Profit [Cross-reference to

Article 102 (4)]
Q: What would be the effects if there is ● Difference in value between the market
such a recording of the affidavit of value of the properties at the time of
reappearance? the celebration of the marriage and the
market value of the properties at the
Art. 43. The termination of the time of the dissolution.
subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the Clarification: Kung walang pinagsimulan,
following effects: ibig sabihin walang properties at the time
of the marriage, whether the parties are
(1) The children of the subsequent governed by ACP or CPG, everything they
marriage conceived prior to its acquire will be treated as profits.
termination shall be considered
legitimate; Because, if we say difference in value
between the market value at the time of
(2) The absolute community of property the celebration of the marriage and the
or the conjugal partnership, as the case market value of the properties at the time
may be, shall be dissolved and of the dissolution, if there are no properties
liquidated, but if either spouse to begin with, all of them will be treated as
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his net profits upon the dissolution of the
or her share of the net profits of the marriage.
community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in Q: Why is that important?
favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty Let us say, Sps. A and B started with Php
spouse by a previous marriage or in 500,000 as the market value of their
default of children, the innocent spouse; common properties.
(3) Donations by reason of marriage At the time of the dissolution of the

shall remain valid, except that if the marriage, the properties are now worth Php
donee contracted the marriage in bad 1,500,000.
faith, such donations made to said donee
are revoked by operation of law; A was declared as the spouse in bad faith.
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the Q: What portion of the Php 1,500,000
designation of the other spouse who will he forfeit?
acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such A: The difference in value between the
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; market value at the time of the celebration
and of the marriage and the market value of the
properties at the time of the dissolution, if
(5) The spouse who contracted the there are no properties to begin with, all of
subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be them will be treated as net profits upon the
disqualified to inherit from the innocent
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
dissolution of the marriage, which is Php an authorized proceeding. There is no such
1,000,000. proceedings under our rules for the
declaration of presumptive death of a
He will lose his share in the profits of Php person.
1,000,000; but he will retain his share in
the Php 500,000. The AFP can make its own determination on
the basis of the presumption established by
However, if they started with nothing, and Art. 390 or 391, whether they would grant
then at the end of the marriage, they have death benefits to the claimant. Kasi nag
Php 1,000,000; everything will be treated layout naman ang mismong law when a
as profits. person is presumed dead. All they need to
do is to look at the provision and determine
Therefore, the forfeiture will be in the the facts surrounding the disappearance of
entire Php 1,000,000; hence, he ends up Estrellita’s husband and from there they
with nothing. can make their own decision on whether to
grant the death benefits or not. But to
require her to still to file for a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is
TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC uncalled for because there is no such thing
as a petition solely for the purpose of
Wilfredo Matias, a member of the Philippine declaring a person presumptively dead.
Constabulary, has been missing for more
than 30 years. Petitioner-spouse Estrellita Question from student: The proper
Tadeo-Matias filed for a petition for a procedure assuming that if PVAO really
declaration of presumptive death of her requires it, proper procedure is for the
husband in the RTC of Tarlac in order to settlement of the estate and then to move
claim benefits. The RTC granted the to declare the husband as presumptively
petition under Art. 41 of the Family Code. dead so she should properly get the
The CA set aside such decision stating that declaration?
Art. 41 will only apply for purpose of Dean: No because why would you secure a
remarriage and that what is used should declaration of presumptive death. Sinabi na
either be Art. 390 or 391 of the Civil Code. nga ng SC na the AFP can determine kasi
Furthermore, the CA held that the petition sila naman nag-assign dun sa tao nila kung
should have been dismissed outright by the saan nila pinapuntang lupalop un. Bakit mo
RTC as such action cannot be the subject of irerequire eh kayo nag assign. So saan mo
an independent action or proceeding. The ba pinadala. Dapat kayo merong record
SC affirmed the CA’s decision. kung saan yung last assignment ng asawa
ni Estrellita.
NOTE:
Follow up: Other cases assigned about
The presumption of death under Articles presumptive death, the SC is consistent in
390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by ruling that certiorari is the only remedy
operation of law, without need of a court from the ruling of the RTC declaring the
declaration, once the factual conditions spouse presumptively dead.
mentioned in the said articles are
established. Dean: It is not appealable by the way. A
judgement declaring a person
presumptively dead under Art 41 following
Q: What should instead be done by the AFP Lorino v Republic is not appealable because
in order for it to grant the death benefits to it is covered by summary proceedings and
Estrellita? under Art 247 of the FC: Judgements
A: The SC held that the AFP and PVAO rendered by the court in cases covered by
should have asked for any proof of summary proceedings are immediately
evidence from the claimant who is seeking final and executory but it doesn’t mean that
for the death benefits. In this case, the AFP you cannot assail the judgment of the trial
and PVAO may consider the invocation of court declaring a person presumptively
Estrellita of the presumptive death of her dead. You just do not do it by ordinary
husband and from there, decide whether appeal but by certiorari under Rule 65.
they will grant the benefit or not instead for Question from another student: With
asking for the petition for declaration of regards Art 40: If for example, the second
presumptive death marriage was there was a judgment
convicting the accused with the crime of
Dean: There is no such proceeding the sole bigamy, can the second spouse use that
purpose of which is to declare a person judgment as proof of final judgment when
presumptively dead. You appoint a she wants to remarry or kailangan may
representative of the absentee for separate declaration, civil action
purposes of taking charge of the affairs or instituted?
the properties of the absentee. If your only Dean: Meron. Dapat separate
purpose is to ideclare mo siya
presumptively dead, wala lang, That’s not
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NOTE: It will not cause multiplicity of suit Let’s say a marriage between A (18 years
due to the nature of the case. (Criminal vs old who did not secure parental consent)
Civil) and B (26 years old). Can B file a petition
for annulment? No because he is not a
Question on the Manuel case: The SC proper party pursuant to Article 4. Only A
made a discussion on the requirement of or the parents of A can do that.
intent for bigamy to be consummated. Ang
resolution ng SC sa Manuel is hindi naman Dean: The prescriptive period differs
siya requires as long as there is a depending on who will file the petition.
subsequent marriage celebrated while the
first marriage is subsisting regardless of If the parents would file the petition – they
intent. May rulings ang SC na when the should do it before A reaches 21.
marriage is voidable because the second If A would file it – he or she has a period of
marriage was entered into by the accused 5 years from attainment of age 21 within
through fraud, intimidation, violence or which to file the petition.
other undue influence then there is no
bigamy because the accused is merely For Unsoundness of mind:
forced to remarry into the second
marriage. Dean: Either the sane party who had no
Dean: Yes but it depends on who was knowledge of the other’s insanity or the
forced. If it was the accused then that insane spouse during a lucid interval, or the
would constitute a prejudicial question. You parents or guardians of the insane spouse
are talking about Landicho case. (Landicho but the petition should be filed during the
v Relova) Pag yun ang circumstances ikaw lifetime.
yung pinilit. At gun point you were forced
to marry the second spouse, then that even You cannot file it anymore after death.
if it’s voidable then that can constitute a
defense in a bigamy case. For Fraud:
Follow up: Isn’t that an admission of the Dean: for five years after the discovery of
SC that intent is required for conviction in the fraud and it can only be filed by the
bigamy cases? party defrauded.
Dean: To enter into the second marriage
For Force, Intimidation, or Undue
ANNULMENT Influence:
Dean: So annulment of marriage is based Dean: it is the party who was forced to
on the following grounds: give his consent or by the party
1. Lack Parental Consent intimidated.
2. Unsoundness of mind
3. Fraud Prescriptive period – five years from the
4. Force, Intimidation, Undue time the force, intimidation or undue
Influence influence disappeared or ceased.
5. Incapability
6. Sexually Transmissible Disease For Incapability to Consummate the
Marriage and STD:
Lack of Parental Consent: if the party is 18
but below 21 and he/she contracted Dean: they have a common prescriptive
marriage without the consent of the period, which is 5 years from the date of
parents, then that would result into a the celebration of the marriage.
voidable marriage.
Dean: Unsoundness of mind is not the
01:28:21 - 01:38:10 same as psychological incapacity because
the courts made it clear in Tan that
psychological incapacity is not a mental
ARTICLE 47 illness. It is a legal concept. Madaming
bagong ideas ang SC.
Q: Who can assail that voidable
marriage? Dean: I’d like to emphasize the ground of
fraud and STD and incapability to
For Lack of Parental Consent consummate.
Dean: Under paragraph 1 (Article 47), The same definition with your laws on
either the party who is required to secure contracts regarding force, intimidation, or
parental consent, and he did not, and the undue influence would also apply.
parents of the party who did not give their
consent when required by law. In Fraud, the circumstances enumerated
under the law are limited and these are
ILLUSTRATION: only 4 circumstances under Article 46.
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
relation to Article 45, it must be noted that
Article 46 of the Family Code enumerates
ARTICLE 46 the grounds wherein fraud may be used as
a ground for annulment.
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in Number In the case, Melvin was already married
3 of the preceding Article: with Janufi when he found out that Mejan
Dia was not his child. According to the SC,
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction even if Melvin was not the father of Mejan
by final judgment of the other party of a Dia, Melvin was not able to discharge the
crime involving moral turpitude; burden of proving that there was bad faith
on the part of Janufi, who truly believed
that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia.
Dean: Hindi kasali jan ang
jaywalking,violation of the anti-smoking Ultimately, the SC ruled that in order for
law. Moral turpitude involves the moral the concealment of the child to be
depravity of the character of the offender. considered as fraud, it must be existing at
For example, murder or rape. the time of the marriage of the parties
since the provisions of Articles 45 and 46
The non-disclosure must be for a conviction are restrictive in nature.
by final judgment. So if at the time of the
marriage, the judgment is not final, that is Dean: Even if the woman has an
not considered as fraud under article 46 in illegitimate child by a prior relationship and
relation to article 45. it was concealed, and later on, years after
the marriage, the husband discovered the
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that existence of the illegitimate child, that
at the time of the marriage, she was would not constitute fraud.
pregnant by a man other than her
husband; Q: What category does this fall?
A: No other misrepresentation or deceit as
to character, health, rank, fortune, or
REPUBLIC V VILLACORTA (2021)
chastity will give rise to a cause of action
for annulment of marriages.
Melvin and Janufi Villacorta were in a
relationship which ended in 2000. A month
Q: What is the danger sought to be
after they reconciled, Janufi got pregnant
avoided by making the concealment of
and began living together. After almost
pregnancy as a ground to annul the
three years, Melvin and Janufi finally got
marriage? Kasi yung concealment ng
married in 2004 and had a second child.
illegitimate child is also bad, but it is not
Due to a series of quarrels regarding the
considered fraudulent. Parang ang kasal,
issue of paternity as to their first child,
parang corporation din yan, meron due
Melvin decided to finally take a DNA test,
diligence. Investigate the background.
which revealed that he was not the father
A: The law seeks to prevent the scenario
of the first child. He filed for annulment
where the husband ends up supporting a
which was granted by the RTC. The
child that is not his child. Yun ang danger
Supreme Court reversed the decision ruling
kaya siya ginawang ground for annulment.
that the circumstances of fraud that
warrant annulment of marriage are
The concealment must have been possible
exclusive and restrictive. As Janufi's
or believable like in the case of Aquino v.
purported fraud does not squarely fall
Delizo.
under Article 46(2), the same cannot serve
as a ground for annulment.
AQUINO V DELIZO
Issue: WON the marriage between Melvin
Ferdinand filed a complaint for annulment
and Janufi should be annulled on the basis
on the ground of fraud. He alleged that
that Janufi concealed her pregnancy of
Conchita, concealed from the latter that
another man’s child.
fact that she was pregnant by another man,
and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
Ruling: The marriage should not be
months after their marriage, gave birth to
annulled because at the time the parties
a child. In her answer, defendant claimed
got married, Mejan Dia was already 3 years
that the child was conceived out of lawful
old.
wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
Under the Family Code, a marriage may be
The trial court dismissed the complaint on
annulled on the basis of fraud through
the basis that concealment of pregnancy
concealment only if, at the time of the
as alleged by the plaintiff does not
marriage, the wife was pregnant and she
constitute such fraud sa would annul a
concealed the fact that such pregnancy was
marriage. Through a verified "petition to
by a man other than her husband. The SC
reopen for reception of additional
clarified that not all fraudulent acts must be
evidence", plaintiff tried to present the
the basis for annulment of marriages. In
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4C A.Y. 22-23
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certificates of birth and delivery of the child Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by
born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he
which documents, according to him, he had could hardly be expected to know, merely
failed to secure earlier and produce before by looking, whether or not she was
the trial court thru excusable negligence. pregnant at the time of their marriage
The petition, however, was denied. more so because she must have attempted
to conceal the true state of affairs.
On appeal, CA held that that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to Upon the other hand, the evidence sought
have had sexual intercourse during their to be introduced at the new trial, taken
engagement so that the child could be their together with what has already been
own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient
claim that he did not notice or even suspect to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The
that defendant was pregnant when he Court of Appeals should, therefore, not
married her, the appellate court, have denied the motion praying for new
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the trial simply because defendant failed to file
complaint. Moreover, court held that there her answer thereto. Such failure of the
has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's defendant cannot be taken as evidence of
inability to present the proof of the child's collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal
birth, through her birth certificate, and for has been ordered of represent the
that reason the court a quo erred in Government precisely to prevent such
denying the motion for reception of collusion. As to the veracity of the contents
additional evidence of the motion and its annexes, the same
can best be determined only after hearing
Fernando, on MR, prayed for a New Trial on evidence. In the circumstance, we think
the ground on new evidence including that justice would be better served if a new
Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) trial were ordered.
(defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's
brother, with whom defendant was living at Dean: The Court in Aquino v. Delizo
the time plaintiff met, courted and married annulled the marriage. But in Buccat v.
her, and with whom defendant has Buccat, it refused to annul. Considering
begotten two more children, aside from her that at 7 months, you can hardly conceal it
first born, in common-law relationship) so it is no longer considered fraud.
admitting that he is the father of
defendant's first born, Catherine Bess No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity
pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of will constitute such fraud as to give rise to
plaintiff's marriage to defendan a cause of action for annulment of
marriages. If prior to the marriage, the
Issue: WON the marriage may be annulled woman or even the man had sexual
on the ground of concealing pregnancy of relationship with another like in Anaya v.
another man’s child before marriage Paraloan.
Ruling: Under the new Civil Code, ANAYA V PARALOAN

concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant Defendant Fernando divulged to plaintiff
by a man other than her husband Aurora that he had a pre-marital
constitutes fraud and is ground for relationship with a close relative of his. As
annulment of marriage. a result, Aurora filed a nullification of their
marriage on the ground of non-
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be divulgement of the pre-marital
only more than four months pregnant at relationship.
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her Issue: Whether or not the pre-marital
pregnancy was readily apparent, especially relationship is a ground for the annulment
since she was "naturally plump" or fat as of marriage.
alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of Ruling: No. For fraud to be a vice of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's consent, it must come under the
abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that enumeration provided for under the Civil
is to say, the enlargement is limited to the Code. In the case, the prevailing law was
lower part of the abdomen so that it is the Civil Code. However, the same
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be provision was adopted in the Family Code.
attributed only to fat formation on the The provision has a restricted enumeration,
lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the and it says that if none of the
6th month of pregnancy that the circumstances appear in the provision of
enlargement of the woman's abdomen the law, it shall not be one of the grounds
reaches a height above the umbilicus, for fraud. Pre-marital relationship is not
making the roundness of the abdomen one of the enumerated grounds; hence, the
more general and apparent. (See Lull,
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
marriage cannot be annulled on the said wants to get married to fulfill wishes
ground. of the family. The community knows
that he is homosexual and he did not
Dean: The other concealment or fraud conceal the homosexuality. The wife
mentioned in Art. 46 is concealment of did not ask. Will it be a ground for
lesbianism, homosexuality, or drug annulment?
addiction of the respondent.
Dean: If you say that he did not conceal
Drug addiction, alcoholism, or lesbianism and he was vocal about it and it is common
or homosexuality may either be a ground knowledge, how can it be concealment.
for declaration of nullity under Art. 36 if it
is a physical manifestation of psychological Q from student: So the marriage
incapacity. Or it may be a ground for cannot be annulled?
annulment if it was existing at the time of
the marriage but it was concealed. Or it Dean: You go through another route.
could also be a ground for legal separation
under Article 55 if it existed only after the Q from student: On impotency, under
solemnization of the marriage. Art. 45 of the FC, what is considered as
an impotent? Author say that it is the
Q: Is homosexuality or lesbianism inability to perform sexual act. For
inherent or acquired? example the partner can perform the
sexual act but for some reason they
A: It can be inherent or acquired through cannot produce children or the male
social interactions. cannot perform the act totally or have
an erection. What does Art. 45 refer?
Dean: That bolsters the provision of Art. 45
in relation to Art. 46, and Art. 55 that it Dean: It is the inability to consummate the
may not be existing at the time of marriage. If there’s a possibility that either
celebration of marriage. It may have the man or a woman can have a little
existed after the celebration of marriage. erection, that is not a ground for
annulment.
Now, it is acceptable because they are now
a community (LGBTQIA+). Q from student: For example, the male
can have an erection. That is not a
Q: On the concealment of sexually ground for annulment even if they
transmissible disease at the time of cannot have children?
celebration of marriage, how does this
differ from STD under Art. 45 Dean: No, it is not a ground. Inability to
paragraph 6? consummate the marriage or impotency as
others refer the condition is the inability to
A: As an independent ground for copulate. The other situation who cannot
annulment, the STD must be existing at the have children is an inability to procreate.
time of the marriage and it must be Those are 2 different things. “Baog” is not
incurable. included. The FC says is inability to
consummate the marriage which refers to
If you are going to make use of fraud, the the performance of the sexual act, not the
STD regardless of whether it is curable or inability to bear children.
not and it was concealed, the correct
ground is fraud and not STD. In the Jimenez case, it was the woman who
was allegedly not able to consummate the
Q from student: Regarding fraud for marriage because there was something
concealment of pregnancy of a wrong with her reproductive organ, the
woman, what if during the marriage wife did not undergo the medical
the woman is already pregnant and examination. The SC can not rely solely on
she did not tell her husband. However, the testimony of the husband.
later on she aborted the child or it died
without knowledge of the husband. In case of sexual transmissible disease or
Can it still be a ground for annulment? incapability to consummate, 5 years fixed
is the prescriptive period. After the lapse of
Dean: If the husband can prove that at the the period from the date of the marriage,
time of celebration of the marriage the wife you can no longer seek annulment because
was pregnant, it is possible. The point of there has been a ratification for that ground
the matter is how can he prove if the child of nullification.
was already aborted. As long as you can
prove that there was a concealment of LEGAL SEPARATION
pregnancy by a person other than the
husband, that’s possible. RAFPALCASA
Q from student: For example, a person

wants to marry who is homosexual. He
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ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal orientation, neither of them can complain
separation may be filed on any of the that the other is guilty of perversion.
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly Hindi lang pwede is pag hindi kayo match,
abusive conduct directed against the that would create a problem. But if pareho
petitioner, a common child, or a child of kayong pervert, then walang problema kasi
the petitioner; pareho kayo ng sexual orientation.
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure
to compel the petitioner to change Usual example given by authors is having
religious or political affiliation; sex with animals, but that really is the
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or highest level of perversion.
induce the petitioner, a common child, or
a child of the petitioner, to engage in Defenses in legal separation:
prostitution, or connivance in such C4P2
corruption or inducement; Condonation
(4) Final judgment sentencing the Consent
respondent to imprisonment of more Connivance
than six years, even if pardoned; Collusion
(5) Drug Addiction or habitual alcoholism Prescription
of the respondent; In Pari delicto
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent; Dean: When we speak of condonation,
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a there must have been the commission of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether marital offense which the other party has
in the Philippines or abroad; forgiven. That’s why it is condonation. It
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; comes after the commission of the marital
(9) Attempt by the respondent against offense, but consent comes before. So
the life of the petitioner; or even before the spouse commits the
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by marital offense there’s already the consent
respondent without justifiable cause for given by the other. That would also defeat
more than one year. a petition for legal separation.
For purposes of this Article, the term
"child" shall include a child by nature or CONNIVANCE
by adoption. (9a)
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation
(2) The physical violence may be repeated, shall be denied on any of the following
or it may only constitute one act of physical grounds:
violence, but if there is only one act of (1) Where the aggrieved party has
physical violence it must be for the purpose condoned the offense or act complained
for the spouse to change the political or of;
religious affiliation (2) Where the aggrieved party has
(8) Unlike the Civil Code, the Family Code consented to the commission of the
makes sexual infidelity as a ground of legal offense or act complained of;
separation without necessarily proving the (3) Where there is connivance between
elements of adultery or concubinage. the parties in the commission of the
offense or act constituting the ground for
Q: What kind of infidelity is referred to legal separation;
in Article 55? In a virtual world, is (4) Where both parties have given
infidelity possible? If what is involved ground for legal separation;
is virtual infidelity, would that count as (5) Where there is collusion between the
a ground? parties to obtain decree of legal
Dean: Yes, it does not make it less of an separation; or
offense regardless of whether if it is actual (6) Where the action is barred by
or virtual. Even if there is no physical prescription.
contact, it should be considered as a
ground for legal separation. Dean: What is the difference of connivance
versus collusion?
Perversion is any abnormal coitus. Any act
which is not supposed to be normal human CONNIVANCE COLLUSION
intercourse, will be considered as an act of Passive permission is The party consents
perversion. However, it is a relative term. given to the spouse to to the commission
commit the marital of a marital offense
Q: What do you understand by relative offense and it usually and the difference is
term? involves the that there may be or
R: Susceptible to different interpretations participation of a third may be not the
person which was commission of the
Dean: Let us say couple X and Y, they both hired or connived with marital offense.
enjoy physical violence during the sexual the other spouse Parties will make it
act, can either of them complain? No, precisely to secure appear that there
because if they have the same sexual the commission of the was a marital
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marital offense of the offense for the the parties had connived to bring about a
other. purpose of securing legal separation even in the absence of
the decree grounds therefor
Example: The spouse Example: Parties
asked his guard to may just make it Q: So in this case, the wife practically
seduce his wife. appear in court, admitted, should that prevent the
husband and wife court from issuing a decree of
Brought the downfall agree that the wife separation?
of the other spouse by will say this and the
employing third husband will not A: No, the admission of the wife is not the
person to commit contend. May or confession complated by the law because
marital offense. may not be marital there are still evidence to prove/support
offense. the commission of the marital offense, then
the court should still grant it.
PRESCRIPTION
Dean: Kaya kung kayo aking mga
Art. 57. An action for legal separation creditors, ang dami kong utang sa inyo
shall be filed within five years from the then perhaps, I could negotiate sa inyo.
time of the occurrence of the cause
CONDONATION
Dean: Any action for legal separation must
be filed within 5 years from the date of Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital
occurrence of the cause. Within 5 years offense constituting a ground for legal
from the date not of discovery but separation or, as stated in I Bouver’s Law
occurrence of the cause. Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
“conditional forgiveness or remission, by a
MUTUAL GUILT husband or wife of a matrimonial offense
which the latter has committed“.
ONG v ONG
BUGAYONG v GINES
William Ong and Lucia Ong has been
married for 20 years. Lucia argued that Benjanmin Bugayong was married to
William has been abusive to her and to Defendant Leonila Ginez. He began
their children, struck physical and words of receiving information about Leonila’s acts
violence to her. As a result, she left her of infidelity. He filed a complaint for legal
husband. The trial Court and CA found the separation against his wife. The lower court
testimonies of Lucia, her sister, and Dr. dismissed the case on the ground that the
Elinzano credible. The Supreme Court adultery was condoned by the husband.
affirmed the findings of fact of the lower The Supreme Court agree with the trial
and appellate courts as it was judge that despite his belief that his wife
established that Lucia left William due was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the
to his abusive conduct, such does not offended spouse, of any action for legal
constitute abandonment contemplated separation against the offending wife,
by the said provision thus there is no because his said conduct comes within the
in pari delicto. restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The husband’s attitude of sleeping with his
Doctrine: Following Art. 56, par. (4) of wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief
the Family Code which provides that that she was unfaithful to him, amount to
legal separation shall be denied when a condonation of her previous and
both parties have given ground for supposed adulterous acts.
legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for Q: Will condonation cover future acts
more than one year. In pari delicto does of infidelity?
not apply in this case.
A: No. Condonation only covers the present
Dean: It is more of a self-preservation on acts.
the part of the wife Lucia that’s why she left
the conjugal dwelling. It is not the Q: How about consent?
abandonment that would constitute a
ground for legal separation. So the Court A: Yes. So, if husband and wife gave each
said that William’s defense is untenable. other permission to seek their respective
sexual partners, while the agreement is
NOTE: void in the eyes of the law, this might be a
good defense in legal separation.
Collusion in legal separation means there
is an agreement. There would be collusion Dean: In condonation, there must be
if the parties had arranged to make it condonation each time. Before the court
appear that a matrimonial offense had grants it, however, there must be a
been committed although it was not, or if “cooling period”. To let the parties’
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emotions settle down to make sure that the executed AFTER the decree was issued by
parties really wanted to legally separate. the court, that is not covered by the
revocation.
However, under RA 9262, it dispenses with
cooling off period, if the ground raised in Q: Will that not constitute
the petition is physical violence. Once there unworthiness on the part of the guilty
is a petition for legal separation on the spouse?
ground of physical violence, the court
would no longer wait for 6 months cooling Dean: It may constitute an act of
off period. unworthiness but the unworthiness there
was erased because the institution of the
Dean: If there is physical violence guilty spouse operates as a written pardon.
involved, Court may issue a TPO or Therefore, guilty spouse will inherit.
Temporary Protection Order, which is
issued ex parte, but even prior to that Q: After the decree of legal separation
under the VAWC Law, the victim can also is granted, can the wife resume or
file a petition for BPO or Barangay change her surname if she uses the
Protection Order, which is also issued ex surname of her husband?
parte, and it should be issued by the
barangay officers on the same day that it LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC
was applied for. Similar to TPO, it should
also be issued even without hearing. But a Legal separation alone not ground for wife’s
Permanent Protection Order shall only be change of name because to hold otherwise,
issued after notice and hearing. would be to provide an easy circumvention
of the mandatory provisions of said Article
If the legal separation is granted, the 372 of the New Civil Code.
spouses shall now be entitled to live
separately from each other. The absolute After the legal separation has been
community or the conjugal partnership granted, the woman should continue using
shall be dissolved and liquidated without the surname employed before the legal
prejudice to the forfeiture of the spouse separation was issued because there was
who was declared the guilty spouse in the no severance of marital bond. To allow her
net profits of the absolute community or to change her surname after the issuance
the conjugal partnership. of the decree might give the impression
that the marriage bond was already
Q: Is it possible that even after the dissolved.
decree is issued that spouses
reconcile?
ILLUSTRATION:
Dean: Yes, it is possible. They may have to
file a joint manifestation under oath in the Q. Supposed Maria Cruz is married to Jin
Court which issued the decree that they Tan. What would be the wrong name to
have decided to reconcile but any use?
liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership or separation of Maria Cruz Maria Cruz Tan
properties shall remain after they have Maria Tan Mrs Maria Tan
reconciled unless they also agree to revive Mrs Jin Tan
their former property regime.
A: Mrs Maria Tan is wrong. I am the
As to children, once decree is issued, mistress of, Mrs is mistress of, you cannot
ordinarily, children are awarded to innocent be mistress of yourself. The correct version
spouse without prejudice to the provisions is Mrs Jin Tan. If you insist on using Mrs
on parental authority under Article 213 Maria Tan, put the Mrs in parenthesis so
particularly the maternal preference rule. others would know that you know that it is
the incorrect version.
One other effect of legal separation is that
it disqualifies the guilty spouse to inherit
from the innocent spouse by intestate Q. Is it the obligation of the wife to use
succession and if there is a will in favor of the surname of the husband?
the guilty spouse, the provisions in the will A. No. However, once the wife uses the
of the innocent spouse in favor of the guilty husband's surname, should continue using
spouse are revoked by operation of law it. It is like jurisdiction, it attaches.
(pursuant to Article 63). But what the law
speaks about is a will executed by the Q. What does a woman change when
innocent spouse BEFORE the issuance of she marries?
the decree of legal separation. A. civil status not the name. hence no
obligation to use the surname of husband.
You cannot revoke something which was Remember, jurisdiction yung surname.
not existing before the issuance of the Once you use it, it attaches.
decree of legal separation. If the will was
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which was an aggravating degree. While
Q from student: What if I obtain a the court cannot compel her to return
decree of legal separation and later on, home, it also did not find any reason to
I want him to be declared grant the giving of the alimony to the wife.
psychological incapacitated, can I file Q: How would you distinguish this
under Article 36? from the Goita vs. Campus-Rueda
case? In that case, the wife also left
Dean: Yes. There are cases decided by the the conjugal home.
Supreme Court
GOITIA vs. CAMPUS-RUEDA
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE R: In the case of Campus-Rueda,
Dean: They are enumerated on Article 68 FACTS: Eloisa Goitia (plaintiff) and Jose
to 71: Campos-Rueda (defendant) were married
● To live together in 1915, and lived together. One month
● Observe mutual love, respect and after their marriage, defendant demanded
fidelity; and from plaintiff that she perform unchaste
● Render mutual help and support. and lascivious acts on his genital organs.
However, plaintiff spurned the obscene
These obligations, except the obligation to demands and refused to perform any act
give support, are considered to be purely other than legal and valid cohabitation. The
personal to the spouses and it cannot be defendant, continually on other successive
compelled by court action. Only support dates, made similar lewd demands on his
can be compelled by court action since wife, who always refused them. Due to the
these deal with money and properties. This refusal, the defendant maltreated her by
can be filed by court action by appropriate word and deed, and inflicted injuries upon
action for support. her. The plaintiff was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the
ARROYO vs. ARROYO home of her parents.
The parties were married in 1910 and lived The plaintiff filed an action against her
together as man and wife until 1920, when husband for support outside of the conjugal
the wife went away from their common domicile.
home with the intention of living
separately. As opposed to the case of Arroyo, the court
granted the support prayed for despite the
The husband then instituted an action to wife being outside the conjugal home.
compel the wife to return to the
matrimonial home. However, the wife The Supreme Court, in this case, explained
averred by way of defense and cross- that the mere act of marriage creates an
complaint that she was forced to leave obligation on the part of the husband to
because of cruel treatment on the part of support his wife. This obligation is founded
her husband. not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the
ISSUE: Whether or not a spouse can be natural and legal duty of the husband; an
compelled his/her spouse, through court obligation, the enforcement of which is of
action, to live together. such vital concern to the state itself that
the law will not permit him to terminate it
RULING: It is not within the court to by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife
attempt one of the spouses to cohabit and to seek protection in the parental home.
render marital obligations and conjugal
rights to the other. (continuation)
The obligation to live together cannot be Dean: In the first, since the leaving from
compelled by any proceedings in the court. the conjugal dwelling was without
The reason is that it is a mere voluntary act justifiable cause, the SC refused to grant
of the spouses. In case, one of the spouse support outside the conjugal dwelling. But
decides to leave the conjugal home, the in the Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda case, the
other spouse cannot seek an order to court was saying that it’s not really
compel the other spouse to return. requiring to leave the spouses separately,
but there was justifiable reason for the
Q: Is the wife entitled to be supported spouse to leave the conjugal dwelling.
by the husband outside the conjugal Hence, the court veered away from the
dwelling? usual ruling that the support should be in
the conjugal dwelling. So it granted support
R: In this case, it has been held that the to the wife outside the conjugal dwelling.
wife cannot be entitled to the alimony Ang tawag doon ay separate maintenance.
because there is evidence showing that
there is jealousy on the part of the wife
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ILUSORIO v ILUSORIO
Q: So, what governs the property
Issue: Whether Erlinda can secure a Writ relationship between the spouses?
of Habeas Corpus to compel her husband
to live with her. A: It may be governed either by their
marriage settlement, which they
Ruling: No. Marital rights including living voluntarily execute, or by their inaction,
in a conjugal dwelling cannot be enforced the absolute community governed them by
through a petition for habease corpus not executing a marriage settlement and it
because the court is not empowered to also governed by the customs of the place.
compel the husband to live with his wife however, I have some reservations with
and this is a matter beyond judicial respect to applicability of customs. If the
authority and is best left to the discretion spouses did not execute a marriage
of the man and the woman. settlement, the automatic property
relationship will be the absolute
Dean: The SC said that it’s not a case of a community, which is a complete departure
parent wanting to visit a child, so why from what the Civil Code provides which is
would the CA grant visitation rights? It was conjugal partnership of gains.
improper for the CA to have done that
because this is a case of a wife wanting to
visit her husband. No court in the ABSOLUTE CONJUGAL
Philippines or in the world can compel the COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP OF
husband to see the face of his wife if he GAINS
doesnt want to. The spouses bring the spouses place in
into the marriage, a common fund place
Kung ayaw makita, ang tawag doon, “move whatever they own the fruits of their
on”. at the time of the separate property,
celebration of the and the income from
PELAYO v LAURON marriage, and that is their work or
at the precise industry and the
Issue: Whether the defendants Marcelo moment that the same is to be divided
Lauron and Juana Abella are the ones liable exchange vows between them
for the expenses incurred for the medical equally, generally,
assistance of their daughter-in-law. upon the dissolution
of the marriage or
Ruling: No. For the rendering of medical the partnership
assistance in case of illnesses, it is
comprised amongthe mutual obligations to Q: So what are the exclusions from the
which the spouses are bound by way of absolute community? Even if you did not
their mutual support. It is no question that say that these are excluded it is the law
when one of the spouses is ill, it should be which exclude these properties from the
the obligation of the other to furnish the operation of the absolute community.
necessary services so that the other may
be cured or restored to health. The party A: These are enumerated in article 92
that is bound to furnish that support is the ● Property acquired by gratuitous title
one liable to all that expenses including during the marriage as well as the
medical expenses. income or frauds of these
properties,
In this case, the person who is liable to pay ● Property for personal or exclusive
the fees of Dr. Pelayo is the husband and use of either spouse except jewelry.
not the father-in-law and mother-in-law… ● Property acquired by a spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a
Dean: He should have filed it not against previous marriage.
the parents in law who are considered
strangers but as against the husband of the
patient. Art. 92. The following shall be excluded
from the community property:
Each spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, business or activity without the (1) Property acquired during the
need of the consent of the other. marriage by gratuitous title by either
spouse, and the fruits as well as the
The other spouse may only object to the income thereof, if any, unless it is
exercise of that profession, business or expressly provided by the donor, testator
activity only on valid and serious or moral or grantor that they shall form part of the
grounds. community property;
. (2) Property for personal and exclusive
Now, if there is any aspect of a marriage use of either spouse. However, jewelry
which can be subject to stipulation between shall form part of the community
the parties we mentioned that that is with property;
respect to their property relationship.
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(3) Property acquired before the Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal
marriage by either spouse who has separation against Brigido Quiao, to which
legitimate descendants by a former the trial court granted, thereby declaring
marriage, and the fruits as well as the that all remaining properties shall be
income, if any, of such property. divided equally between the spouses.
However, Brigido’s share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is
If you are you inherit something or forfeited in favor of the common children
something was donated to you, that would because he was the offending spouse.
be your exclusive property including the Thus, Brigido questioned the same.
fruits or income of the property.
The Court ruled that since it was already
Second is property for personal and established that the spouses have no
exclusive use except jewelry. separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them; the listed properties
Q: Why is jewelry included even if it's for are considered part of the conjugal
the personal use of the wife or the partnership. Thus, what remains in the
husband? properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their
A: Because of its value. respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found Brigido the guilty party, his
Q: Can the parties override Art 92 by share from the net profits of the conjugal
saying that jewelry should be excluded? partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Art. 63(2) of
A: Any property for that matter can be the Family Code.
excluded from the absolute community by
executing a marriage settlement. Q: The law mentions “net profits.”
Whether they are governed by
Dean: Any property for that matter can be absolute community or conjugal
excluded from the absolute community. So partnership of gains, what would
let’s say you have a property, a business constitute the net profits?
you don’t want your spouse to be involved
in, then you can include that as your R: The Court said that the net profits are
separate property by executing a marriage what is divided equally between the two
settlement. But if you just let absolute spouses. But in this case, it was established
community govern without executing a that the spouses had no separate
marriage settlement, anything you own properties.
practically goes to the pot; magiging
combined lahat yun, regardless of whether Dean: This is the meat of the controversy
you own P5.00 or P5,000,000,000.00. So there. They started with nothing so
kung after a month, nag separate kayo, everything they own at the termination of
nag liquidate kayo, yung P5.00 niya the marriage would technically be
[magiging] P2,500,000,002.50. Be careful considered profits for which he would not
in choosing your property relationship. be entitled to a share precisely because he
is the guilty party. Magkakaroon lang siya
The third paragraph of Art. 92 of the Family ng share if they started with something.
Code means that if a spouse has legitimate Even if he is declared the guilty party in a
descendant… please take note that legal separation or under Art. 43 for that
“descendants” is the word used, not matter, he will still be entitled to a share,
necessarily children. Let us say na lolo na not in the profits, but in the capital.
siya and he decided to marry again after Although we do not use capital anymore.
being a widower and he has legitimate apos So kung saan kayo nag simula… even if you
in the previous relationship, all the are declared the guilty spouse, you will still
properties which he owned in that prior have a share in those properties, but not
marriage shall be considered exclusive to with respect to the profits earned by the
him even if they are governed by absolute absolute community or conjugal
community in the subsequent marriage. In partnership.
other words, yung absolute community ng
widower who’s getting married again, and Q: What is the reason why Brigido was
he has legitimate descendants by that invoking that it is Art. 102 that should
previous marriage, would start only from apply and not Art. 109?
the celebration of the marriage because A: Brigido claimed that Art. 102 should
everything else is considered exclusive. apply because at the start of their
marriage, the Family Code was not present
What is the purpose of the law in excluding yet. So, the law states there that if you did
them? To protect the descendants of the not have any marriage settlement, what
previous marriage. would govern your marriage would be the
system of conjugal partnership of gains.
QUIAO v. QUIAO
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Q: But article 102 is an article on marriage settlement agreeing to be
Absolute Community. Why would he governed by CPG.
invoke that? There is a particular
reason why he is saying that Article SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
102 applies.
A: He invoked 102 because he still wanted Q: What is the concept of separation of
to gain something from their separation. property?
A: In separation of property, para lang
Dean: And one other thing is because it is kayong living under one roof but what is
the article which contains the definition of yours is yours, what is his is his. However,
net profit. So sabi niya wala namang ibang you have an obligation to share in the
articles sa Family code na nag-dedefine ng expenses. So parang walang merger na
net profit. So it must be article 102 that mangyayari sa properties because if you
should apply and therefore it should be choose to be governed by separation of
Absolute Community. But, regardless of property, each spouse shall still own,
whether they would be governed by ACP or dispose and administer his or her own
CPG, he would still end up with nothing separate estate without the need of the
because there were no properties at the consent of the other but subject to the
beginning of the marriage. The Supreme obligation to share in the family expenses.
Court, in the end, did not award him
anything. Any properties or the share in the Dean: How will you do the sharing kapag
net profits (practically everything counts as separation of property? Lugi ka dito kapag
profits) would go to the children, or to the mas malaki sweldo mo, sa separation of
innocent spouse. property, because the more you earn, the
more you share. Tandaan niyo yung
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS concept ng separation of property - the
more you earn the more you share in the
Dean: Now, what about the concept of family expenses. So if the family expenses
conjugal partnership? Absolute Community a month is 100,000 and the husband earns
is clear – that it involves everything that 150,000 and the wife earns 50,000. Ang
the spouses own at the beginning of the sharing is 2:1.
marriage and whatever they acquire after
the celebration of the marriage. But in ILLUSTRATION:
conjugal partnership, it is called under the
Old Law "Relative Community" precisely So doon sa 100,000 expenses, the
because the spouses retain the ownership proportion of the wife and the husband
of all the properties that they own at the would also be two is to one. 333.33. Two
beginning of the marriage, and only the plus one equals three. You divide the
fruits of this properties will initially be part 100,000 by three and whatever the result
of the conjugal partnership. is, you will multiply it by 2 - that's the
share of the husband. So, the husband will
So dun sila magsisimula, sa profits of their share 66,666, and 33333 for the wife. So
separate properties. In ACP, everything is that's separation of property.
contributed to the pot whereas in CPG, if
you own a Land and your husband owns a
factory. Your land is still exclusive to you
and if you rent out this land, but then the COMMENCEMENT
rentals are conjugal, the land is exclusive.
Similarly, the factory is exclusive and Dean: Either CPG or ACP or Separation of
whatever is earned by the factory would be property, it commences at the precise
conjugal. There is lesser transmission in a moment that the marriage is celebrated but
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains. in all these property regimes, article 89 is
common among the three. There shall be
Dean: Why the framers of the Family Code no waiver of rights, interest, shares and
choose Absolute Community because effects in the absolute community or
according to them, it is more in consonance conjugal partnership until after the
with the solidarity of the family. That's why, marriage is dissolved or annulled. So hindi
ginawa nilang instead of CPG, ACP ang pwede yung donations between spouses
naging default property regime. under article 87 and this prohibition on
donation between spouses also applies to
Q: When will ACP govern? parties who are merely living together as
A: (1) If the parties have chosen it; (2) if husband and wife without the benefit of
the parties did not execute a marriage marriage.
settlement, and (3) if they choose a
property regime, but the property regime Q: Why this rule?
is void. A: A: Because if we will allow donations
between parties living together without
Dean: On the other hand, CPG can only marriage to donate to each other, then
govern the parties if they execute a they would be in a better position than the
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legal spouses. So that's the ruling, in But under Section 23(c), it provided that
Joaquino vs Reyes. they may opt to revive their former
property regime or adopt a different
PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP regime.
Dean: We said that it can be agreed upon Legal Separation is an exception.

by the parties in their marriage settlement. Reconciliation is also an exception.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in REMEDIES OF SPOUSE IN CASE OF

the marriage settlements may be valid, it ABANDONMENT
must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligation to the family, the
GR: You cannot change your property aggrieved spouse may petition the court
relationship during the marriage. for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for authority to be the sole
That is not permitted under Article 76. If administrator of the conjugal partnership
you want to execute a marriage property, subject to such precautionary
settlement, or if you want to change you conditions as the court may impose.
marriage settlement, technically and
legally, you should have done that before The obligations to the family mentioned in
getting married. the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations.
XPNS: Article 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned
the other when he or she has left the
Q: Why are these articles considered conjugal dwelling without intention of
as exceptions? returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three
Dean: Under Article 66, in relation to Art months or has failed within the same
67, it deals with legal separation. One of period to give any information as to his or
the effects of legal separation is to dissolve her whereabouts shall be prima facie
the absolute or the conjugal partnership presumed to have no intention of returning
but if the parties reconcile. to the conjugal dwelling.
Q: What happens after the legal Dean: Section 128, similar to Article 101 of
separation is issued? the Family Code, enumerated the remedies
of a spouse in case of abandonment.
Dean: If the parties are governed by ACP,
or Conjugal partnership before the legal One of the remedies of an abandoned
separation was issued, by the issuance of spouse is to ask for Judicial Separation
the decree of legal separation, they are of Property.
now governed by separation of property.
When you file for Judicial Separation of
Technically, again, they are modifying their Property, you do not necessarily disturb the
property relationship during the marriage marriage, you only want the property to be
because the legal separation does not separated and that is an option in case of
sever the marital paths. abandonment.
Also, in legal separation, if the parties Again, that is considered as an exception

reconcile, they can revive their former because the marriage still exists and yet if
property regime and under the Rules on you are governed by ACP and CPG, you
Legal Separation, they can adopt a may opt to change it to separation of
different regime under Section 23(c) on property during the marriage.
the Rules on Legal Separation.
CAUSES FOR JUDICIAL
Although I have reservations with respect SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
to that because the substantive law, which
is the Family Code, only provides the Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
revival of the property regime so if we considered sufficient cause for judicial
translate it to an example. separation of property:
If A and B secured a Decree of Legal (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has
Separation and prior to the Legal been sentenced to a penalty which carries
Separation, they were governed by ACP, with it civil interdiction;
they can only revive ACP after they
reconcile because you cannot revive (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has
something which do not exist. been judicially declared an absentee;
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(3) That loss of parental authority of the 3. Complete Separation of Property

spouse of petitioner has been decreed by
the court; Unlike the Civil Code, which adopted the
Relative Community or Conjugal
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has partnership as the default property regime,
abandoned the latter or failed to comply the Family Code, the adopted Absolute
with his or her obligations to the family as Community as the default property
provided for in Article 101; regime in case the parties fail to execute a
marriage settle.
(5) That the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements Instances when parties to the
has abused that power; and marriage are governed by ACP:
1. If they fail to execute a marriage
(6) That at the time of the petition, the settlement
spouses have been separated in fact for at 2. If the execute a marriage
least one year and reconciliation is highly settlement and adopted the
improbable. property regime of ACP
3. If the regime adopted upon is void.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1),
(2) and (3), the presentation of the final Example:
judgment against the guilty or absent Before the marriage, parties, before saying
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant their “I dos”, nag-usap sila sa labas ng
of the decree of judicial separation of simbahan. CPG nalang tayo para lahat ng
property. properties natin ay separate.
Dean: Again, pag nagfile kayo ng Petition Of course, that would not be a binding
under Art. 135, you are only asking the property relationship because the law
court to separate your properties without requires that it must be in writing. So that
touching your marriage. would be void and thus governed by ACP.
So you are permitted to shift from ACP/ ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY

CPG to Separation of Property during
marriage for causes enumerated in Article In ACP, all the properties that the parties
135. own at the time of celebration of marriage,
shall form part of their common properties.
VOLUNTARY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY Meaning to say, they will be merged into
one. So if you are the richer spouse, this is
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a not the ideal proper regime because by
verified petition with the court for the simply saying, “I do”, you make your
voluntary dissolution of the absolute spouse rich.
community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, and for the separation of their Meaning to say, they will be merged into
common properties. one. So if you are the richer spouse, this is
not the ideal property regime because by
All creditors of the absolute community or simply saying, “I do”, you make your
of the conjugal partnership of gains, as spouse rich.
well as the personal creditors of the
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and So kung may limang piso sya may limang
notified of the filing thereof. The court shall milyon ka, sinabi mo “I do”, instant
take measures to protect the creditors and millionaire yung spouse under a regime of
other persons with pecuniary interest. ACP. Worse case scenario kung 50 million
yung pera mo at wala siyang pera kahit 5
Dean: This provision permits the parties to pesos. By simply saying, “I do”, you make
your spouse rich. The rich movie actors and
file a voluntary petition for Judicial
actresses have this antenuptial agreement.
Separation of Property during the
marriage. So ACP/ CPG to Separation of
QUIAO v. QUIAO
Property.
For purposes of net profits, which is defined
Unlike Art 135, in Art 136, you do not
need any cause. It is the simple in Article 102, it is the difference of the
value between the market values of the
dissatisfaction with your current property
property at the time of marriage and at the
regime. Yun lang yung rason niyo.
time of dissolution.
THREE PRINCIPAL PROPERTY
If you started with nothing, you end up with
RELATIONSHIP UNDER
nothing if you are the guilty spouse in legal
THE FAMILY CODE
separation. Precisely because, there could
be no separate property in that case if you
1. Absolute community of Property
2. Conjugal partnership of Gains
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
earned it all during the marriage. Because second wife. All the properties he
everything will be treated as profits. acquired in the previous marriage
will be EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS FROM THE the lolo, pursuant to Art 92 (30)
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY of the Family Code.
e. The law seeks to protect the
descendants of the previous
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded marriage by excluding all the
from the community property: properties owned by a spouse
who has legitimate descendants
(1) Property acquired during the by a former marriage.
marriage by gratuitous title by either f. This provision cannot be
spouse, and the fruits as well as the overridden by the parties because
income thereof, if any, unless it is there is an underlying public
expressly provided by the donor, testator policy involved there, which is the
or grantor that they shall form part of the protection of the descendants of
community property; the previous marriage.
(2) Property for personal and Correlate Article 92 (3) with Article
exclusive use of either spouse. 103 and 130 of the Family Code.
However, jewelry shall form part of the
community property;
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by death, the community
marriage by either spouse who has property shall be liquidated in the same
legitimate descendants by a former proceeding for the settlement of the
marriage, and the fruits as well as the estate of the deceased.
income, if any, of such property.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall
Dean: liquidate the community property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one
1. So if you inherit something, or year from the death of the deceased
something is donated to you, unless spouse. If upon the lapse of the said
the donor specifies that it shall form period, no liquidation is made, any
part of the absolute community disposition or encumbrance involving the
2. Personal and exclusive use, except community property of the terminated
jewelry. marriage shall be void.
Q: Can the parties exclude
jewelry given that Article 92 Should the surviving spouse contract a
includes it as part of ACP? Can subsequent marriage without compliance
the parties override that? with the foregoing requirements, a
A: Yes, they can exclude jewelry mandatory regime of complete
and override the provision of Article separation of property shall govern the
92 (2). However, when it comes to property relations of the subsequent
Article 92(3), the parties cannot marriage.
override that.
0. Parties cannot override par. 3

because there is an underlying reason why Art. 130. Upon the termination of the
the law exempts the property of the spouse marriage by death, the conjugal
who has legitimate descendants by a partnership property shall be liquidated
former or previous marriage. in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the
a. If you marry a widow or widower deceased.
who has legitimate descendants.
b. NOTE: Descendants, NOT If no judicial settlement proceeding is
children. instituted, the surviving spouse shall
c. So kung tumibok ang puso ni lolo, liquidate the conjugal partnership
lolo na siya at wala siyang anak property either judicially or extra-
dahil na-predecease siya ng anak judicially within one year from the death
niya,pero may apo siya in the of the deceased spouse. If upon the
previous marriage. Then the lapse of the six-month period no
second wife of the lolo and the lolo liquidation is made, any disposition or
failed to execute a marriage encumbrance involving the conjugal
settlement. So, absolute partnership property of the terminated
community will govern their marriage shall be void.
property relationship.
d. BUT the absolute community of Should the surviving spouse contract a
lolo will only start with the subsequent marriage without compliance
properties he acquired with the with the foregoing requirements, a
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mandatory regime of complete children of either spouse; however, the

separation of property shall govern the support of illegitimate children shall be
property relations of the subsequent governed by the provisions of this Code
marriage. on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted

Q: Suppose A and B are married and A during the marriage by the designated
died. B married C without liquidating administrator-spouse for the benefit of
the properties in his marriage with A. the community, or by both spouses, or
So, in the second marriage, B and C did by one spouse with the consent of the
not execute a marriage settlement. other;
Assuming that B has 20 million worth
of properties when he married . To (3) Debts and obligations contracted by
whom will these properties pertain. Is either spouse without the consent of the
it exclusive to B? Is it part of his other to the extent that the family may
community property with C? have been benefited;
A: If B fails to liquidate within 1 year, it (4) All taxes, liens, charges and
pertains exclusively to him. expenses, including major or minor
repairs, upon the community property;
Q: So what property relation will
govern the marriage of B and C, given (5) All taxes and expenses for mere
that they failed to execute a marriage preservation made during marriage upon
settlement? the separate property of either spouse
used by the family;
A: If B fails to liquidate within 1 year, it
shall be governed by separation of (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
property. commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for
self-improvement;
Article 92(3) presupposes that there is
liquidation of the properties of the (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse
former marriage. insofar as they have redounded to the
● So ang nangyari, absolute benefit of the family;
community sila if they failed to
execute a marriage settlement, (8) The value of what is donated or
provided there was liquidation of promised by both spouses in favor of
the properties of the prior marriage. their common legitimate children for the
● Kasi magkadikit yan class eh, baka exclusive purpose of commencing or
matweak yung facts, iba na yung completing a professional or vocational
sagot. course or other activity for self-
● If there was dissolution of the first improvement;
marriage by death, the law
mandates the surviving spouse to (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse
liquidate the properties within 1 other than those falling under paragraph
year from death. (7) of this Article, the support of
● If the surviving spouse illegitimate children of either spouse, and
contracts marriage without liabilities incurred by either spouse by
liquidating the properties, then reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in
the second marriage will be case of absence or insufficiency of the
governed by the mandatory exclusive property of the debtor-spouse,
regime of Separation of the payment of which shall be considered
Property. as advances to be deducted from the
● Hindi lang yung properties niya in share of the debtor-spouse upon
the previous marriage will be liquidation of the community; and
exclusive to him but all other
properties he will earn or acquire (10) Expenses of litigation between the
during the marriage. Because ang spouses unless the suit is found to be
kanilang property relation ay groundless.
Separation of Property.
If the community property is insufficient
to cover the foregoing liabilities, except
CHARGES ON THE ABSOLUTE those falling under paragraph (9), the
COMMUNITY spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate
Art. 94. The absolute community of properties.
property shall be liable for:
Since properties are merged, all the
(1) The support of the spouses, their properties of the spouses shall be
common children, and legitimate responsible for:
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1. The support of the spouses after the responsibilities enumerated in
2. The legitimate children Article 121 have been covered. So in
conjugal partnership, there is preference.
Note: Only the separate properties of the That’s one difference.
spouse shall be responsible for the support
of illegitimate child. Second difference is that when it comes to
expenses for preservation of the separate
All kinds of debt can be charged against property of the spouses, under ACP it must
the absolute community. be used by the family. However, under CP,
there is no such requirement.
Note: Practically all debts, including ante-
nuptial debts by either spouse. Q: Why is there a difference?
A: Under the conjugal partnership, they
● Debts contracted by the designated retain ownership of the properties they own
administrator spouse. BUT the fruits of their separate properties
● Debts contract by one with the belong to the conjugal partnership.
consent of the other Therefore, the law allows the charging of
● Debts contracted by one without taxes or expenses for the preservation of
consent of the other, provided there the separate property in CP because there
is benefit to the family. is an ostensible benefit to the conjugal
● Ante-nuptial debts under paragraph partnership. The fruits will pertain to the
7 of Art. 94, insofar as they have conjugal partnership. Whether there is
redounded to the benefit of the actual fruit, it does not matter.
family;
● Expenses to enable either spouse or ADMINISTRATION
children to commence or complete a
professional or vocational course, or Article 96 and Article 124 are practically the
other activity for self-improvement same.
● Repairs on common property, as Administration
well as taxes.
● Ordinary expenses for the Art. 96/124 (FC). The administration
preservation of the property of each and enjoyment of the
spouse IF the property is used by community/conjugal property shall
the family. belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
● It must be used by the family. disagreement, the husband’s decision
● Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
other than those falling under court by the wife for proper remedy,
paragraph (7) of this Article which must be availed of within five
● In Par. 7, there is benefit to the years from the date of the contract
family. In Par. 9, it refers to ante- implementing such decision.
nuptial debts which did not redound
to the benefit of the family. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
GR: Fines and indemnities of either participate in the administration of the
spouse, including support for illegitimate common/conjugal properties, the other
children, ordinarily shall be charged spouse may assume sole powers of
against the separate properties of either administration. These powers do not
spouse. include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the
XPN: If the exclusive property of the written consent of the other spouse. In
debtor spouse is insufficient or has no the absence of such authority or consent,
exclusive property, the ACP may in the the disposition or encumbrance shall be
meantime pay. This will be treated as void. However, the transaction shall be
advances to be deducted from the share of construed as a continuing offer on the
the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the part of the consenting spouse and the
community third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the
Dean: There is no order of preference in court before the offer is withdrawn by
the satisfaction of the liabilities mentioned either or both offerors.
in Article 94.
Dean: Parehong-pareho class and Art. 96
But, compare to Art. 122, which also refers at 124 of the Family Code, so whatever we
to Par. 9 of Art. 94. As a rule, they shall not will say under Art. 96, we will also apply to
be charged against conjugal partnership. Art. 124.
However, if the debtor-spouse has no
exclusive property or is insufficient, they
may be charged to the conjugal property. 1. Administration and enjoyment of the
BUT, the law requires that it may only be absolute community or conjugal
enforced against the partnership assets partnership
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
● shall belong to both spouses public auction where Trinidad was the
jointly. highest bidder.
● In case of conflict, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to Ruling: The parcel of land is not a part of
recourse to the court by the wife for the conjugal property of Santiago and
proper remedy, which must be Consuelo. The presumption under
availed of within five years from the Article 160 of the Civil Code that all
date of the contract implementing property of the marriage belong to the
such decision. Patriarchal pa din conjugal partnership applies only
ang batas. Sexist ang batas, when there is proof that the property
because the husband’s decision will was acquired during the marriage.
prevail. Parang nirerecognize pa Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
din ng law yung superiority ng during the marriage is a condition sine qua
males. Agree ba kayo dun, girls? non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the
case at bench, there was no proof of such.
2. If one spouse is incapacitated or The petitioners have been unable to
unable to participate in the present any proof that the property in
administration of the ACP/CPG question was acquired during the marriage
● The other spouse may assume sole of Santiago and Consuelo. The fact that
responsibility and powers of when the title over the land in question was
administration issued, Santiago was already married to
● This does not include the power to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration
encumber, or to sell any property in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to
pertaining to the ACP/CPG without Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to
the other spouse’s written consent, establish the conjugal nature of the
or written authority of the court property.
Q: What do you do if you cannot secure Q: How much of the property which
the consent? Kung incapacitated nga may be attached to satisfy the
talaga yung spouse? obligation of Consuelo?
Dean: You have to apply to the court for R: Being the exclusive property of Santiago
an authority to sell, encumber properties Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in
belonging to the ACP/CPG. And that is question that formed part of his estate and
governed by a summary proceeding, under which passed to his ten heirs by
Art. 247, in relation to Arts. 239, 240 and compulsory succession upon his death. And
241. So summary proceeding yun class. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
what could therefore be attached and sold
Q: So what is the effect if there is an at public auction in the Civil Case was only
encumbrance or sale without written the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of
consent of the other spouse or written Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land.
authority of the court? The sale at public auction of the disputed
property in its entirety by the Sheriff in
Dean: The sale or encumbrance shall be favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above
considered void in its totality. the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo
Garcia is null and void, belonging as it does
So let’s hear the cases on conjugal to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and
partnership, in relation to administration. later to the spouses Atayan.
Kasi most cases are on the CPG. But it does
not really matter because the rule in Art 96 Dean: It was error for the trial court to
and 124 are practically the same. have ruled that 55% of the land may be
levied. According to the lower court, that is
ESTONINA v. CA the interest of the second wife in the parcel
of land. However, that presupposes that
Santiago Garcia owned a parcel of land the land is conjugal. Since the Court says
covered. After 6 years from his death, CFI that it is exclusive to Santiago, having
Manila issued an order granting Trinidad inherited it from his predecessors. Hence,
Estonina’s application for a writ of when he died, it formed part of his estate
preliminary attachment in a Civil Case she and divided among his 10 heirs. So only
filed against Consuelo Garcia, widow of 1/10 of the land may be subjected to levy.
Santiago Garcia. A notice of attachment 1/10 is the only leviable interest of the
was made on the parcel of land. While the second wife in the parcel of land, as heir of
case was pending, the children of Santiago husband Santiago.
Garcia sold their shares in the lot to
respondents Spouses Atayan. Trinidad WONG v. CA
Estonina obtained a favorable judgment in
the civil case hence an execution pending Romarico and Katrina got married in 1964.
appeal was made. The land was sold at They had three children, but even in the
early years of their marriage, they were
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living separately mos of the time. Romarico though they are living separately when the
stayed in Angeles City while Katrina lived in property was acquired.
Manila. In 1971, Romarico bought a 1,878
sqm land in Angeles City from his father Q: So having ruled that it is conjugal,
with money he borrowed from an can it now be answerable for the
officemates. obligation contracted by Katrina?
A: No. The SC said that notwithstanding
Meanwhile, Anita Chan consigned to the conjugal nature of the property, they
Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When ruled that it may not bind the property to
Katrina failed to return the jewelry within answer the obligation of Katrina.
the period agreed upon, Chan demanded
payment. The checks issued by Katrina Dean: Because as a rule if only one spouse
were dishonored. Thus, petitioners filed a contracted the obligation, it is incumbent
complaint for collection of sum of money upon the creditor to prove that there was
against Sps. Romarico and Katrina. benefit to the family.
Issue: Whether or not Romarico’s property In this case, there was no benefit because
may be levied in satisfaction of the it is only jewelry and it is not beneficial for
obligations incurred by his wife. the family. It was not shown that she sold
it and used the income for the family.
Held: NO. Romarico and Katrina had in Hence, the SC ruled that the obligation
fact been separated when Katrina entered cannot be charged against the parcel of
into a business deal with Anita Wong. land although the nature of the property is
Katrina’s rights over the conjugal
properties are merely inchoate prior to the AYALA INVESTMENT v. COURT OF
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The APPEALS
consent of her husband and her authority
to incur Respondent Alfredo Ching was the
such indebtedness had not been alleged in Executive Vice President of Philippine
the complaint and proven at the trial. Blooming Mills which contracted a loan with
Ayala Investment of around Php
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before 50.3Million. Alfredo Ching became the
the effectivity of the Family Code on August surety of this loan. PBM failed to pay the
3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal loan. Ayala chased them through the
partnership only when: process of the court.
. she purchases things necessary for
the support of the family, or The court ended up levying the properties
a. she borrows money for the purpose of Alfredo Ching and Encarnacion Ching
of purchasing things necessary for the despite the fact that it is only Alfredo
support of the family if the husband fails to contracted the surety in his own personal
deliver the proper sum; capacity. The 3 parcels of land were
b. when the administration of the eventually sold but then it was challenged
conjugal partnership is transferred to the by the Spouses.
wife by the courts or by the husband, and
c. when the wife gives moderate The CA reversed saying that the sale of the
donations for charity. 3 parcel of land, which are conjugal
property of the spouses, are null and void.
Having failed to establish that any of these In lieu of Article 161 of CC or Article 121 of
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may the FC saying that, there must be proof
not bind the conjugal assets to answer for that a loan obtained by a single spouse,
Katrina's personal obligation to them. either the wife or the husband, redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Dean: So the 2 Main Issues raised before There must be direct proof of this. It cannot
the Supreme Court: be presumed. The CA also said that
1. Whether the lands levied upon were basically there is no difference between
conjugal or exclusive. Article 161 of the Civil Code and Article 121
2. Whether the obligation contracted of the Family Code, saying whether to be
by Katrina can be charged against “redounded to the benefit of” or “benefited
these parcels of land. from”. It basically need that you have to
prove that there is direct benefit redounded
How did the SC rule? to the conjugal partnership.
A: So on the matter of ownership, the court Q: What was the contention of Ayala?
disagreed with the appellate court that the What was the supposed benefit that
said property was exclusively owned by accrued to the family?
Romarico. It was proven that the properties
were acquired during the marriage of A: Petitioner AIDC argues that the
Katrina and Romarico. So it is presumed to respondent Ching’s family would actually
belong to the conjugal partnership even benefited since Alfredo’s employment
would be prolonged; his shares of stock in
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4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
PBM would appreciate; and his career the benefit of the conjugal
would be boosted. partnership.
However, these are not the benefits (B) On the other hand, if the money or
contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil services are given to another person or
Code. The benefits must be one directly entity, and the husband acted only as a
resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be surety or guarantor, that contract
a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of "obligations for
Such benefits (prospects of longer the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
employment and probable increase in the The contract of loan or services is clearly
value of stocks) might have been already for the benefit of the principal debtor
apparent or could be anticipated at the and not for the surety or his family. No
time the accommodation agreement was presumption can be inferred that, when a
entered into. The alleged benefit, if any, husband enters into a contract of surety or
continuously harped by respondents- accommodation agreement, it is "for the
appellants, are not only incidental but benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof
also speculative. must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal
The probable prolongation of employment partnership.
in PBM and increase in value of its stocks,
would be too small to qualify the GUIANG v. CA
transaction as one "for the benefit" of the
surety's family. Verily, no one could say, Dean: Even if there is an amicable
with a degree of certainty, that the said settlement, it cannot cure the defect of a
contract is even "productive of some void sale. A void contract cannot be ratified
benefits" to the conjugal partnership. by an amicable settlement.
Dean: It would have been different if SC: The participation by some barangay
Alfredo Ching used it for the family authorities in the 'amicable settlement'
business. Regardless of the success of the cannot otherwise validate an invalid act.
family business, the obligation can still be Moreover, it cannot be denied that the
charged to the conjugal partnership. 'amicable settlement' entered into by
However, this case involves a pure plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant
corporate debt. spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct
offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights.
The 'benefits' contemplated by the By express provision of law, such a contract
exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is is also void.
that benefit derived directly from the
use of the loan. In the case at bar, the Neither can the "amicable settlement" be
loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM considered a continuing offer that was
and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner- accepted and perfected by the parties,
appellee-husband or his family. following the last sentence of Article 124.
The order of the pertinent events is clear:
SC: From the [previous] jurisprudential after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint
rulings of this Court, we can derive the for trespassing against private respondent,
following conclusions: after which the barangay authorities
secured an "amicable settlement" and
(A) If the husband himself is the principal petitioners filed before the MTC a motion
obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly for its execution.
received the money and services to be
used in or for his own business or his The settlement, however, does not mention
own profession, that contract falls within a continuing offer to sell the property or an
the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its
the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual tenor was to the effect that private
benefit may be proved. It is enough that respondent would vacate the property. By
the benefit to the family is apparent at no stretch of the imagination, can the Court
the time of the signing of the contract. interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
From the very nature of the contract of loan
or services, the family stands to benefit PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.
from the loan facility or services to be REYES
rendered to the business or profession of
the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, DOCTRINE: A spouse's consent is
his business or profession fails or does not indispensable for the disposition or
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband encumbrance of conjugal properties.
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly FAST FACTS: Venacio and Lilia Reyes were
so, that such obligation will redound to married in 1973. They acquired 3
properties all of which were conjugal
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properties under the Conjugal Partnership marriage. There is a specific enumeration
of Gains. These properties were mortgaged of what properties are excluded. The
to secure a loan with Petitioner PNB. Upon proceeds, products, income, and fruits of
failure to pay the loan, PNB foreclosed the their separate properties will form part of
mortgage and auctioned the properties. the conjugal partnership property. They
PNB was the highest bidder. Respondent retain ownership of whatever they bring.
Venacio Reyes, Jr. filed for annulment of
the loan and real estate mortgage. He Example: So if a husband owns a land
alleged that he did not consent to the being rented by tenants. The wife, on the
transactions and that his signature was other hand, owns a 10-door apartment
forged. being rented to tenant. The income from
these properties will form part of the
Issue: W/N the Real Estate Mortgage is conjugal partnership property. But the land
valid. itself and the apartment units will be their
exclusive properties.
Ruling: No. The real estate mortgage over
the conjugal properties is void for want of There are certain exclusions under Art.
consent from respondent. The Family Code 109:
is clear: the written consent of the spouse
who did not encumber the property is Art. 109. The following shall be the
necessary before any disposition or exclusive property of each spouse:
encumbrance of a conjugal property can be
valid. (1) That which is brought to the marriage
as his or her own;
The spouses Reyes were married in 1973,
before the Family Code took effect. Under (2) That which each acquires during the
the Family Code, their property regime is marriage by gratuitous title;
Conjugal Partnership of Gains; thus, Article
124 is the applicable provision regarding (3) That which is acquired by right of
the administration of their conjugal redemption, by barter or by exchange
property. Any disposition or encumbrance with property belonging to only one of
of a conjugal property by one spouse must the spouses; and
be consented to by the other; otherwise, it
is void. (4) That which is purchased with
exclusive money of the wife or of the
Dean: Can the conjugal partnership be husband.
held liable for the obligation? Remember
that a mortgage is an accessory contract.
It is declared void, but the principal (1) That which is brought to the marriage
obligation, which is the loan, is still valid. as his or her own
So can PNB collect from the conjugal
partnership? Dean: Ito ung sinasabi natin kanina na the
spouses retain the ownership of the
R: Yes. The Court ordered Lilia the properties they own.
reimbursement of the loan.
(3) That which is acquired by right of
Dean: Only the mortgage is void meaning redemption, by barter or by exchange
you cannot enforce against the conjugal with property belonging to only one of the
partnership property because the husband spouses;
did not consent.
Dean: So if the husband owns a yacht prior
But that does not mean that any conjugal to the marriage, and during the marriage
property cannot be held answerable for the he exchanges the yacht into a car, the car
loan. Let’s say there is an execution. remains exclusive to the husband.
However, the mortgage itself cannot be
considered valid for lack of consent of (4) That which is purchased with exclusive
Venancio. money of the wife or of the husband.
Once it is proven that there is benefit for Dean: How do you prove that it is
the family, then the creditor can charge the exclusive?
resulting obligation against the conjugal
partnership property. That goes with the evidence na. You have
to trace the source of the money used to
Ibig sabihin lang non, ung mortgage lang purchase the property.
ung hindi valid, pero pwede pa rin i-charge
sa conjugal partnership. Example: If you have a bank account,
which is your separate bank account prior
Remember that in a regime of conjugal to your marriage, once you get married
partnership, the spouses retain ownership under the regime of conjugal partnership,
of whatever properties they bring into the only the interest will form part of the
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conjugal partnership. You retain ownership Art. 118. Property bought on
of the money. installments paid partly from exclusive
funds of either or both spouses and
Whatever you buy using that money, it will partly from conjugal funds belongs to the
be your exclusive property. buyer or buyers if full ownership was
vested before the marriage and to the
(2) That which each acquires during the conjugal partnership if such ownership
marriage by gratuitous title; was vested during the marriage. In
either case, any amount advanced by the
Dean: It is also exclusive. That is partnership or by either or both spouses
reiterated in Art. 113, which is also an shall be reimbursed by the owner or
exclusion from the conjugal partnership owners upon liquidation of the
property. partnership.
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit
to the spouses, jointly and with payable within a period of time belongs
designation of determinate shares, shall to one of the spouses, the sums which
pertain to the donee-spouses as his or may be collected during the marriage in
her own exclusive property, and in partial payments or by installments on
the absence of designation, share and the principal shall be the exclusive
share alike, without prejudice to the right property of the spouse. However,
of accretion when proper. interests falling due during the marriage
on the principal shall belong to the
Dean: These are the statutory exclusions conjugal partnership.
from the conjugal partnership property. Art. 120. The ownership of
improvements, whether for utility or
For the specific enumerations or specific adornment, made on the separate
properties which are included, you have property of the spouses at the expense
Arts. 117, 118, 119, and 120. These are of the partnership or through the acts or
the Articles which contain what exactly efforts of either or both spouses shall
belong to the conjugal partnership pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to
property. the original owner-spouse, subject to the
following rules:
Art. 117. The following are conjugal
partnership properties: When the cost of the improvement made
by the conjugal partnership and any
(1) Those acquired by onerous title resulting increase in value are more than
during the marriage at the expense of the value of the property at the time of
the common fund, whether the the improvement, the entire property of
acquisition be for the partnership, or for one of the spouses shall belong to the
only one of the spouses; conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the
(2) Those obtained from the labor, property of the owner-spouse at the time
industry, work or profession of either or of the improvement; otherwise, said
both of the spouses; property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, reimbursement of the cost of the
due or received during the marriage from improvement.
the common property, as well as the net
fruits from the exclusive property of each In either case, the ownership of the
spouse; entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at
(4) The share of either spouse in the the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
hidden treasure which the law awards to partnership.
the finder or owner of the property where
the treasure is found;
Art. 117 – OLFHOLC (Dean’s
(5) Those acquired through occupation mnemonics)
such as fishing or hunting;
The following are conjugal partnership
(6) Livestock existing upon the properties:
dissolution of the partnership in excess
of the number of each kind brought to O - Those acquired by onerous title
the marriage by either spouse; and during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, for the partnership, or for only one of the
such as winnings from gambling or spouses;
betting. However, losses therefrom shall (Dean: using conjugal funds of course)
be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
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L - Those obtained from the labor, ....subject to the reimbursement of
industry, work or profession of either or whatever may have been spent by the
both of the spouses; Conjugal Partnership.
(Example: If you receive your
appearance fees or acceptance fees, it In a similar fashion, if the ownership was
would form part of the conjugal vested during the marriage, then the
partnership property) property will be conjugal. And the conjugal
partnership will now reimburse the buyer-
F - The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, spouse, whatever he or she may have paid
due or received during the marriage from for the purchase of the property.
the common property, as well as the net
fruits from the exclusive property of each Example: Husband bought a car, with a
spouse; down payment of Php 150,000 a month
(Dean: derive from either the before he got married.
exclusive or conjugal properties of the
spouses) But by the terms of the deed of sale, he
acquired ownership of the property despite
H - The share of either spouse in the the balance in the purchase price. And
hidden treasure which the law awards to then, he got married.
the finder or owner of the property where
the treasure is found; (relate to Art. 438 All the rest of the amortizations on the car
of New Civil Code – hidden treasure) were paid using the combined salaries of
the husband and the wife.
O - Those acquired through occupation
such as fishing or hunting; Q: Is the car conjugal or exclusive?
L - Livestock existing upon the dissolution
of the partnership in excess of the number Dean: If we follow Art. 118, it is exclusive
of each kind brought to the marriage by to the husband because he became owner
either spouse; prior to the marriage, subject to
C - Those which are acquired by chance, reimbursement.
such as winnings from gambling or betting.
However, losses therefrom shall be borne But if ownership was reserved by the seller,
exclusively by the loser-spouse. then that would be conjugal, and the
conjugal partnership will reimburse the
Dean: If the husband owns 20 carabaos at husband the Php 150,000.
the beginning of the marriage. The wife
owns 10 cows. At the end of the marriage, Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit
nag double yun, the excess would be payable within a period of time belongs
considered conjugal. They retain ownership to one of the spouses, the sums which
of whatever they own before the marriage. may be collected during the marriage in
partial payments or by installments on
For property bought on installment under the principal shall be the exclusive
Art. 118, please take note for that rule to property of the spouse. However,
apply, it must have been bought partly interests falling due during the marriage
from conjugal funds and partly by exclusive on the principal shall belong to the
funds. conjugal partnership.
Property bought on installment, partly from Example: X and Y were married. Y is

exclusive funds, and partly from conjugal engaged in personal lending business. So
funds, shall belong to the conjugal he lent money to a friend amounting to Php
partnership or to the buyer’s spouse 120,000, and it was supposed to be
depending on when the ownership was payable in one (1) year, with Php 1,000
vested. interest per month.
So if the ownership was vested on the So, per month, the friend is supposed to
buyer spouse before the marriage, then the pay Php 11,000.
property is his/her exclusive property
subject to reimbursement of whatever it The money was lent December 15, 2020.
may have been spent by the conjugal And it was supposed to be paid beginning
partnership. January 1, 2021 up to December 31, 2021.
In a similar fashion, if the ownership was The friend (debtor) did not pay up to 3
vested during the marriage, then the months of 2021. On 2021, X got married to
property will be conjugal. Then, the Y.
conjugal partnership will now reimburse
the buyer spouse whatever he may have On the 6th month, debtor paid Php 66,000.
purchased to the property…
(continuation) Based on Art. 119, which part of the
P66,000 is exclusive and which part is
conjugal?
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Dean: Only Php 3,000 is conjugal. The Dean: Ordinarily, when you own a land,
remaining Php 63,000 is still exclusive. and you build a house or an improvement
on the land, the land is considered still as
This is by virtue of Art. 119. Only interests the principal and whatever you build is the
falling due during the marriage shall for accessory. Accessory follows the principal.
part of conjugal partnership property.
Due to the specific rule in Art. 120,
Remember, the money lent was the whenever improvements are introduced on
exclusive property of the spouse. It’s not exclusive property belonging to one of the
converted into conjugal just because he got spouses, the ownership of the entire
married. Hence, anything paid on the property shall be determined based on the
principal shall still be his exclusive Art. 120 (2), which states:
property.
“When the cost of the improvement and the
Only the interests for the 3-month period resulting increase in value of the property
beginning April up to the time of payment are more than the value of the property at
in June will be conjugal property, because the time of the improvement, the entire
prior to the marriage, there is no conjugal property shall become conjugal, subject to
partnership existing yet. the obligation of the conjugal partnership
to reimburse the value of the exclusive
So, the interest for the first three (3) property at the time of the improvement.
months is still exclusive to Y.
This reimbursement shall be done upon
Based on the rule on Art. 107 in relation to liquidation of the conjugal partnership.’
Art. 88, the commencement of the
Conjugal Partnership (or Absolute This article presupposes that there is
Community of Property) shall begin at the exclusive property of one of the spouses,
precise moment that the marriage is and conjugal funds were used to introduce
celebrated – when the parties say “I Do.” improvements on the property.”
This scenario falls on the exclusions Discussion:

embodied in Art. 109 (1) in relation to
Article 119. In Property Law, if the property is a parcel
of land, the house is the accessory.
Art. 120. The ownership of
improvements, whether for utility or But that is not the rule in Conjugal
adornment, made on the separate Partnership.
property of the spouses at the expense
of the partnership or through the acts or If the land is Php 500,000, you introduce a
efforts of either or both spouses shall main house which is Php 300,000.
pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to
the original owner-spouse, subject to the Because of that improvement, the value
following rules: of..
Because of that improvement, the value of
When the cost of the improvement made the land increase by P100, 000. What will
by the conjugal partnership and any you add to determine who is the owner of
resulting increase in value are more than the entire property? Meaning, the land plus
the value of the property at the time of the improvement.
the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the So P500, 000 yung land, nag introduce ng
conjugal partnership, subject to improvement na P300, 000 and because of
reimbursement of the value of the that improvement, meron tayong plus
property of the owner-spouse at the time value or appreciation in value of the land
of the improvement; otherwise, said na P100, 000. You add the value of the
property shall be retained in ownership improvement which is P300, 000 and the
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to plus value or the appreciation value is less
reimbursement of the cost of the then P500, 000 which is the value of the
improvement. exclusive property. Who owns the
property? It will still be owned by the
In either case, the ownership of the owner-spouse. The owner-spouse will
entire property shall be vested upon the reimburse the conjugal partnership the
reimbursement, which shall be made at P300, 000.
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, if the cost of the
improvement is P400, 000 and there is a
This is the Principle of Reverse plus value of P150, 000, P550, 000 is
Accession. greater than P500, 000 which is the value
of the land. Therefore, the entire property
Q: Why reverse? will now be conjugal and there will be
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reimbursement to the owner-spouse of the improvements, then it must be Alfredo who
value of the property at the time of the must be reimburse the conjugal
improvement. partnership the costs of the improvements.
The subsequent owner of the property has
Q: What if the land is P500, 000, the no correlative obligation to reimburse. The
improvement is P400, 000, the plus value law is clear that it must be the owner
is P100, 000. Pag inadd mo yung P400, 000 spouse who must reimburse
at P100, 000, that is P500, 000 and the
value of the exclusive property of the Dean: The SC said that there is no cause
husband is also P500, 000. Who owns the of action against the respondent because
entire property? the law does not make the buyer
responsible. It is the owner spouse…
A: The property is still be with the husband,
the one who owns the land because under 01:20:27 - 01:29:13
Art 120, the accessory follows the principal.
Since the value of the land is greater than Dean: The supreme court said that there is
the accessory, then the accessory shall no cause of action against the respondent
follow the land even if there is an increase because the law does not make the buyer
in the valuation of the property. responsible, it is the owner-spouse or the
conjugal partnership depending on who will
Q: So is it equal or more than? be declared the owner of the entire
A: More than property.
Q: Why more than? Kasi P500, 000 yung So, Josefa cannot claim reimbursement
land, P400, 000 yung improvement, P100, from Manuel.
000 yung appreciation in value, so to whom
the entire property pertain? Modest house ALINAS V ALINAS
yung nabuild sa property worth P400, 000
using conjugal funds so who owns the Facts: Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas
property? (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982.
A: It should be the spouse because it is not They left behind two lots identified, one
more than anymore. The value of the with a bodega standing on it and the other
property is no longer more than with petitioners' house. Respondent Victor
Alinas is the brother of petitioner.
Dean: The requirement of Art 120 is that Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their
the value of the improvement or the cost of properties to respondents.
the improvement and the increase in the Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered
value of the property must be more than that their two lots were already titled in the
the value of the exclusive property. Equal name of the respondent spouses.
to is not more than. Give it still to the Onesiforo’s signature appeared in an
spouse who owns the exclusive property. Absolute Deed of Sale selling one of the lots
Kailangan sumobra ng piso. P500, 001, yun to respondent spouses. Records also show
magiging more than na yun. a notarized document whereby petitioner
acknowledged that his brother used his
FERRER v FERRER own money to redeem one of the lots
mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his
Facts: Manuel and Ismael, half-brothers of brother became the owner.
Josefa’s deceased husband bought the
parcel of land from Alfredo were a Issue: Whether or not the sale of Lot 896-
warehouse was constructed. Josefa claims B-9-B (with house) by Onesiforo is valid?
to have the right to the reimbursement
from the purchasers of his deceased Held: No. The sale of Lot 896-B-9-B (with
husband’s lot for the cost of improvements house) to respondent spouses by Onesiforo
made on a parcel of land where marital is void since the sale was done without the
funds were used to pay for such consent of his wife, Rosario. Although
improvements in accordance with Article petitioners were married before the
120 of the Family Code. enactment of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, the sale in question occurred in
Issue: WON Josefa has the right of 1989. Thus, their property relations are
reimbursement governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. By
Ruling: No, she has no right of express provision of Article 124 of the
reimbursement. The right of Family Code, in the absence of (court)
reimbursement under Art 120 of the FC authority or written consent of the other
pertains to the owner-spouse of the spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of
property. It must be the owner-spouse or the conjugal property shall be void.
the conjugal partnership depending on who
would be declared the owner. Since in a Dean: Remember that under Article 124
different case, it was declared that Alfredo the law does not require that the husband
was the owner of the property despite the and wife must always act together.
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In the Docena v. Lapesura case, the only TODA V CA

issue there is whether or not the husband
alone can sign the certification of non- Facts: Benigno and Rose Marie were
forum shopping to prevent the execution of married and blessed with 2 children.
the order of the lower court with respect to However, due to their individual differences
the conjugal property. The SC said that and alleged infidelity of Benigno, their
even if the wife did not sign the certification conjugal union was ruined. This prompted
of non-forum shopping, since the purpose Rose Marie to file a petition for termination
of filing the petition by the husband is to of conjugal partnership for alleged
protect the conjugal property from mismanagement and dissipation of
demolition order of the court, the SC said conjugal funds against Benigno. In order to
that the CA committed an error in avoid further disagreeable proceedings,
dismissing the case filed by the husband both parties filed a joint petition for judicial
without the signature of the wife because approval of dissolution of conjugal
administration does not require that the partnership. This petition embodied a
husband and wife always act together. compromise agreement allocating to the
Thus, the Court declared that the spouses their respected shares in the
certification of non-forum shopping signed conjugal partnership assets.
by the husband for the purpose of
protecting the conjugal property is The RTC granted the petition and the
considered valid. compromise agreement. The lower court
ordered Benigno to pay Rose Marie the
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V cash dividends of her shares. However, the
DAILO compromise agreement which was
designed to terminate the litigation,
Similarly, in the Homeowners Savings Bank spawned into 2 new petitions, with each
v. Dailo, that was also the issue. The party initiating one against the other. This
husband was able to mortgage the conjugal was because of their contradictory
property because he was the only one who interpretations of the agreement.
appeared as vendee. The wife discovered
the mortgage executed by the husband Rose Marie argued that the CA erred in
after the husband already died. But the SC holding that the compromise agreement of
declared that since the property mortgaged the parties became effective only after its
by the husband belongs to the conjugal judicial approval on June 9, 1981 and not
partnership, then it must be with the upon its execution on March 30, 1981.
consent of the wife, and the whole
transaction is treated as void if the other Q: Why was that an issue between the
spouse did not give the consent. spouses?
R: The CA ordered the payment of cash
SEPARATION DE FACTO dividends which was declared on July 1,
1981.
Separation de facto per se does not
dissolve or does not affect the absolute Dean: May pinagaawayan silang dividends.
community or the conjugal partnership. One is more than P2,000 and the other one
Anything you acquire, if you are married, is P40,000. But they have several houses
during your separation de facto, would abroad. They have a house in Madrid, in the
inure to the benefit of your existing US, P40,000 lang pinagawayan pa.
absolute community or conjugal
partnership. No matter how long you have Issues:
been separated de facto, if you did not 1. When did the compromise agreement
dissolve your existing property take effect?
relationship, any acquisition that you may 2. Whether or not the property relations
have during separation de facto still forms between Benigno and Rose Marie may
part of your absolute community or be resolved through an execution of a
conjugal partnership. contract or agreement.
Q: The parties have been separated de Ruling:

facto for 30 years. Itong husband mahilig The SC affirmed the CA in holding that the
tumaya sa lotto, nanalo ng 250M. The next compromise agreement became effective
day, he heard a knock on his door, “Honey, only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was
I’m home.” Separated de facto for 30 approved by the trial court, not on March
years, and suddenly, when the husband 30, 1981 when it was signed by the parties.
won the lotto, the wife came home. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code “in the
Conjugal or exclusive? absence of an express declaration in the
A: Conjugal kasi separated de facto lang. marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the
Q: What do you do? marriage shall not take place save in virtue
A: File a Petition for Judicial Separation of of a judicial order.” Hence, the separation
Property. of property is not effected by the mere
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execution of the contract or agreement of administration in the marriage
the parties, but by the decree of the court settlements will not again abuse that
approving the same. It, therefore, becomes power, authorizes the resumption of said
effective only upon judicial approval, administration;
without which it is void. Furthermore,
Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides (4) When the spouse who has left the
that the conjugal partnership is dissolved conjugal home without a decree of legal
only upon the issuance of a decree of separation resumes common life with the
separation of property. other;
The cash dividends declared on July 1, (5) When parental authority is judicially
1981 and July 25, 1981 should pertain to restored to the spouse previously
Rosemarie and that declared on April 25, deprived thereof;
1981 should be paid to Benigno.
(6) When the spouses who have
On the second issue, the Court ruled in the separated in fact for at least one year,
negative. The conjugal partnership of reconcile and resume common life; or
Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on 9 June 1981 (7) When after voluntary dissolution of
when the trial court approved their joint the absolute community of property or
voluntary dissolution of their conjugal conjugal partnership has been judicially
partnership. decreed upon the joint petition of the
spouses, they agree to the revival of the
Dean: Separation of property during the former property regime. No voluntary
marriage cannot take place unless upon a separation of property may thereafter be
judicial order. If the parties have chosen granted.
partnership, they cannot by mere If you take a look at Art. 141 paragraph 7,
agreement dissolve their absolute voluntary petition is only available to the
community or conjugal partnership. Either parties once.
they file a voluntary petition under Art. 136
if they find that their regime is not working In concept, there are 3 instances
for them or if any of the causes under Art. where separation of property governs
135 exist. the spouses:
The keyword is CALASA (Grounds for

judicial separation of property): 1. If they execute a marriage
● Civil Interdiction settlement adopting CSP as their
● Absence property regime.
● Loss of parental authority 2. If after the marriage, they filed a
● Abuse of the power of petition under Art. 135 or 136 for
administration judicial separation of property.
● Separation de facto 3. Under the provisions of Art. 103 if
● Abandonment for at least 1 year the marriage is terminated by death
and the surviving spouse remarries
If the Court grants a petition for dissolution without dissolving the properties of
of ACP or CPG, the parties may still revive the dissolve marriage. The
their property regime but they cannot file a subsequent marriage should be
second petition under Art. 136. Voluntary governed by mandatory regime of
dissolution of the ACP or CPG is available separation of property.
only once. It cannot be done twice. If the
second petition was for any of the causes Separation of property is easy because
under Art. 135, that is permitted. “kanya kanya” except in expenses. Under
the rule, the spouses shall be liable for
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same family expenses in proportion to their
proceedings where separation of income or in the absence of income in
property was decreed, file a motion in proportion to the value of their separate
court for a decree reviving the property properties. If the spouse has no properties
regime that existed between them or no income, the other spouse will end up
before the separation of property in any spending for everything.
of the following instances:
In separation of property, each spouse
(1) When the civil interdiction shall own, dispose, administer, or
terminates; encumber his or her own estate without the
need of consent of the other spouse. All the
(2) When the absentee spouse earnings from his profession and earnings
reappears; in properties he acquired shall belong
exclusively to him subject to the obligation
(3) When the court, being satisfied that to share in the family expenses in
the spouse granted the power of
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proportion to income or value of your ownership is either governed by Art. 147, if
properties. the parties have no impediment to marry
each other, or by article 148 if they have
VALDES V RTC impediments to marry each other.
Facts: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Q: What marriages that are void will be
Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. covered by Art. 147? And Art. 148?
Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, R: In art. 147, it will govern void
Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of marriages, with no legal impediments who
the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the are capacitated to marry. In art, 148, those
Family Code. After hearing the parties who have legal impediments who are not
following the joinder of issues, the trial capacitated to marry for example, if the
court granted the petition. spouse is already married to another.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of 147 148

that portion of the decision directing PL3S BITNA
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of
the Family Code. She asserted that the Psychological Bigamous
Family Code contained no provisions on the incapacity Incestuous
procedure for the liquidation of common Lack of license Public Policy
property in "unions without marriage." Lack of consent Non-age of majority
Lack of ceremony Adulterous
Issue: Whether or not Articles 50, 51 and Subsequent
52 of the Family Code should be held marriages that are
controlling void under art. 43
Ruling: No. The trial court correctly

applied the law. In a void marriage,
Art 147 (4) FC - When only one of the
regardless of the cause thereof, the
parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
property relations of the parties during
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
the period of cohabitation is governed
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
by the provisions of Article 147 or
common children. In case of default of or
Article 148, such as the case may be,
waiver by any or all of the common children
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a
or their descendants, each vacant share
remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
shall belong to the respective surviving
interpreted and so applied in previous
descendants. In the absence of
cases.
descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
shall take place upon termination of the
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the
cohabitation.
legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under Art 148 (2) FC: If one of the parties is
any of the impediments mentioned in validly married to another, his or her share
Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
Under this property regime, property partnership existing in such valid marriage.
acquired by both spouses through If the party who acted in bad faith is not
their work and industry shall be validly married to another, his or her
governed by the rules on equal co- share shall be forfeited in the manner
ownership. Any property acquired provided in the last paragraph of the
during the union is prima facie preceding Article.
presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of In 147, it is enough that a spouse is
the property shall still be considered engaged in the care or maintenance of the
as having contributed thereto jointly if household. 147 gives a share to the spouse
said party's "efforts consisted in the who is responsible for the care and
care and maintenance of the family maintenance of the household, even if he
household." Unlike the conjugal or she did not contribute anything, in
partnership of gains, the fruits of the money, property, or industry.
couple's separate property are not included
in the co-ownership. Unlike in 148, for purposes of a share in the
properties acquired during cohabitation,
Dean: There is a co-ownership created the party claiming a share in the properties
between parties who are married but their acquired must prove that there is a
marriage is void or parties who are merely contribution in money, property, or
cohabitating as husband and wife without industry. Kahit mag walis at maglinis at
the benefit of marriage, and the co- maglaba ka maghapon, hindi yan counted
as contribution in 148.
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distribution of the properties will be based
In 147, once all the properties acqwuired on Art. 147 or 148.
during the union, will be presumewd to
have been acquired by their joint efforts, There is a rule that if the parties acquired a
and in the absence of proof of contribution, property, it is presumed that it is bought in
the shares will be presumed equal. equal shares in 147 if you’re not able to
prove the actual contribution, then the
SALAS v. AGUILA contribution shall be presumed equal.
These properties regardless of the date of
Salas and Aguila were married. Five the marriage, if it is proven to have been
months after Aguila gave birth to their acquired by the parties during their
daughter on October 7, 2003, Salas left cohabitation even prior to the date of their
their conjugal dwelling and no longer marriage, it will be governed by co-
communicated with them. On October 7, ownership.
2003, Aguila filed a Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage citing psychological incapacity. FEHR v FEHR
The RTC granted the petition and declared
the nullity of the marriage between the Initially, the petitioner and the respondent
petitioner and respondent. When Aguila lived together without the benefit of
discovered that there were properties marriage, and their relationship bore fruit
wherein the registered owner was “Juan S. and their first child. During such time, the
Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas,” she couple purchased the subject condominium
filed a manifestation and a motion that property. Respondent was named as the
these properties are part of their conjugal buyer in the Contract to Sell, with
properties. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner also signing the contract as
the partition of the discovered properties as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado
ordered by the RTC and the CA should be Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership title to the condominium unit was issued in
and not on the regime of conjugal the name of petitioner. Two years later, the
partnership of gains. couple got married.
BARRIDO v NONATO When the couple’s marriage was declared

void ab initio on the ground of
In the course of their marriage, Leonardo psychological incapacity to comply with the
and Marrieta were able to acquire a parcel essential marital obligations under Article
of land. Eventually, their marriage was 36 of the Family Code, the trial court
declared void on the ground of declared that the subject condominium
psychological incapacity. Since there was property as respondent’s exclusive
no longer a reason to maintain their co- property. SC ruled that Article 147 applies
ownership over the property, Leonardo to unions of parties who are legally
asked Marrietta for partition but the latter capacitated and not barred by any
refused. The SC rules that the action of impediment to contract marriage, but
partition is just proper since Leonardo and whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in
Marrieta’s marriage had already been the case at bar. This provision creates a co-
declared void for psychological incapacity. ownership with respect to the properties
During their marriage, conjugal partnership they acquire during their cohabitation.
regime governed their property
relation. Although Article 129 provides for All the elements of Article 147 are present
the procedure in the dissolution of conjugal in the case at bar. It has not been shown
partnership, it is Art. 147 that covers that petitioner and respondent suffered any
effects of void marriages. Since the former impediment to marry each other. They
spouses agreed that they acquired the lived exclusively with each other as
subject property by their joint effort, work, husband and wife when petitioner moved in
or industry that it shall be presumed to be with respondent in his residence and were
jointly owned by them in equal shares. later united in marriage. Their marriage,
Therefore, the subject property remains however, was found to be void under
owned in common by Leonardo and Article 36 of the Family Code because of
Marrietta and should be divided in respondent’s psychological incapacity to
accordance with rules on co-ownership. comply with essential marital obligations.
Dean: Class, remember, if parties adopted DOCTRINE: Article 147 applies to unions
Absolute Community or Conjugal of parties who are legally capacitated and
Partnership, if their marriage is not barred by any impediment to contract
subsequently declared void either under marriage, but whose marriage is
Article 147 or 148, the properties will be nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This
divided according to the rules not in provision creates a co-ownership with
accordance with the liquidation in Art. 102 respect to the properties they acquire
or Art. 129. So kahit meron yan property during their cohabitation.
or marriage settlement if the marriage is
declared void, the dissolution or
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Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man ownership shall accrue to the absolute
and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to community or conjugal partnership
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with existing in such valid marriage. If the
each other as husband and wife; and (3) party who acted in bad faith is not validly
their union is without the benefit of married to another, his or her shall be
marriage or their marriage is void. forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
Dean: What was the reason by the trial The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
court when it excluded the condominium likewise apply even if both parties are in
from the co-ownership between Elna and both faith
Bruno?
Student : I think, initially, the reason of VENTURA v ABUDA

the trail court is that Bruno contented that
it was acquired by him at the time when Edilberto Ventura was the son of Socorro
they were not married and there was also prior to her marriage with Esteban. Esteban
an agreement what properties they own in purchased a parcel of land in Vitas, Tondo
common and at the same time what they and the remaining portion was purchased
own exclusively. by Evangeline, the daughter of Esteban.
Evangeline and Esteban also had a small
Dean: So basically the basis on the condo business in Delpan. Before the spouses
unit was acquired prior to 1985 which was died, Esteban sold both properties to
the year they got married. Was it proven Evangeline and her husband Paulino
that the condo unit was acquired prior their Abuda. The mother of Edilberto filed for
cohabitation? Annulment of Deeds of Sae and alleged
that the sale was fraudulent. Abudas
Student: Yes, I think it was on the contract claimed that the marriage between Socorro
to sell. Under the contract it showed that it and Esteban was null and void and hence,
was acquired in 1983 and during that time neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any
they were still cohabiting and not married right or interest over the properties
and it was on 19885 when they got married purchased by Esteban and respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents. CA
Dean: How did the SC rule on whether the sustained. The SC ruled that Ventura is not
condo unit should be excluded or included entitled to any right or interest over the
ion the co-ownership subject property citing Article 149 of the
Civil Code. It is necessary for each of the
Student: First, I think the SC clarified Art. partners to prove his or her actual
147 of the Family Code and they contribution to the acquisition of property
established the requisites. So all those to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
elements were present in the case. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
However the Court clarified that their contribution do not apply.
marriage was void by virtue of
Psychological Incapacity by ruling of the Dean: Edilberto’s claim is rooted on the
RTC and SC said that indication or argument that the property is part of the
circumstances would show that they got conjugal partnership of Socorro and
the condominium property during such Esteban. But Socorro is suffering an
time that they were still cohabiting but not impediment, she has to prove actual
married and it should be common property contribution to the property.
of the petitioner and respondent.
Remember that the phrase “married to” is
Dean: What is important is that it was not merely descriptive of the civil status, it
acquired during cohabiting. Remember Art does not prove that the property is
147 cover even parties who are not conjugal. Because it may happen that the
married. property was acquired prior to the
marriage, but the titling was done during or
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not after.
falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the MALLILIN v MALLILIN
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or The parties both were married and with
industry shall be owned by them in children, cohabitated even during the
common in proportion to their respective existence of their respective marriages.
contributions. In the absence of proof to They established a corporation during this
the contrary, their contributions and cohabitation. However, they later on
corresponding shares are presumed to separated. Estaquio filed a complaint for
be equal. The same rule and "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership
presumption shall apply to joint deposits Share, Accounting and Damages" against
of money and evidences of credit. Elvira. Elvira argued that Estaquio can’t be
If one of the parties is validly married to considered an unregistered co-owner of the
another, his or her share in the co- properties, since titles to the land are solely
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in her name, to grant petitioner’s prayer the house to the extent of what she had
would be to allow a collateral attack on the proven, P11,400. If she relied on the
validity of titles. The Supreme Court ruled presumption of equal shares, then she
that there is co-ownership. would have gotten half of the house. Her
share was limited because she presented
Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides construction receipts.
that the rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a ILLUSTRATION:
woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which Q: Supposed a union is covered by Art
is void ab initio, applies only if the parties 148. A & B cohabited. B is in bad faith
are not in any way incapacitated to contract because he is married to W. The
marriage, was actually repealed by the property relationship of B with W is
Family Code under Article 148, which complete separation of property
provides for a limited co-ownership in cases (CSP). In the event of termination of
where the parties in the union are co-ownership and the cohabitation,
incapacitated to marry each other. Article will there be forfeiture of the share of
148 of the Family Code provides that when B in the co-ownership and in whose
a man and a woman live together as favor will it be forfeited?
husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the A. There’s a loophole under Art 148
beginning, the property acquired by either because it says, “if the party who acted in
or both of them through their work or bad faith is not validly married to another”.
industry or their wages and salaries shall In the given example, B is married, can
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. there be forfeiture? That's a gap in the law
There is thus co-ownership even though because they did not contemplate a
the couple are not capacitated to marry situation where it may be governed by CSP
each other. and it cannot fall in the 2nd paragraph. In
the example, the guilty party is married.
Dean: The Court applied Art. 148 even if But if the intent is to penalize, it goes to
the cohabitation started prior to the the innocent spouse (advantage of being
effectivity of the Family Code because innocent – to get the property)
there was evidence to prove that all the
properties except for one piece of property
were all acquired after the effectivity of the Dean: The point here is he is the one who
Family Code. It applied Art. 148 is in the possession of the property and
retroactively. The SC said that the presumably, the property or the land on
contribution of Mallilin is his industry which the house was erected belongs to the
because he was the one who run and father of Jacinto.
established the business which in fact
enabled the parties to purchase the So, that’s how the court decided. Hindi
additional properties during the marriage. pwede hugutin yung 70, 000 kahit yung
yung claim niya kasi prinove niya lang ay
SAGUID v. CA 11, 400. So, mapupunta kay Jacinto.
The regime of limited co-ownership of ATIENZA vs. DE CASTRO

property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry Lupo Atienza, then the President and
each other, but who nonetheless live General Manager of Enrico Shipping
together as husband and wife, applies to Corporation and Eurasian Maritime
properties acquired during said Corporation, hired the services of
cohabitation in proportion to their respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
respective contributions. Co- ownership accountant for the two corporations. In the
will only be up to the extent of the proven course of time, the relationship between
actual contribution of money, property, or Lupo and Yolanda became intimate.
industry. Absent proof of the extent Despite Lupo being a married man, he and
thereof, their contributions and Yolanda eventually lived together in
corresponding shares shall be presumed to consortium. Out of their union, two children
be equal. were born. However, after the birth of their
second child, their relationship turned sour
Dean: Instead of relying on the until they parted ways.
presumption of equal contribution because
she was already able to prove her capacity Thereafter, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati
to contribute, she or her counsel at least City a complaint against Yolanda for the
decided to present receipts for construction judicial partition between them of a parcel
materials but they fell short of their claim of land. Lupo alleged that the subject
that she contributed P70,000 and because property was acquired during his union
of that they were bound by what they with Yolanda as common-law husband and
presented in Court. Such that the Court wife, hence the property is co-owned by
only declared declared Gina as co-owner of them. Lupo averred that the property in
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question was acquired by Yolanda using his
exclusive funds and that the title thereto FAMILY RELATIONS
was transferred by the seller in Yolanda’s
name without his knowledge and consent. Q: What does family relations include
In her answer, Yolanda said she acquired and why is it important to determine
the same property using her exclusive who belong to the same family?
funds. She insisted having bought it thru
her own savings and earnings as a R: Art. 150. Family relations include those:
businesswoman.
(1) Between husband and wife;
Article 148 governs. Here, although the (2) Between parents and children;
adulterous cohabitation of the parties (3) Among other ascendants and
commenced in 1983, or way before the descendants; and
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of
1998, Article 148 thereof applies because the full or half-blood.
this provision was intended precisely to fill
up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Q: Why is it important for us to
Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code determine who are within the term?
was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples R: The enumeration is important because
living in a state of adultery or concubinage. any disputes between them brought to
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the court should aver that there has been
acquisition of the property occurred before earnest efforts to reconcile between them.
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 Without that averment or efforts to
governs. reconcile or settle the dispute themselves,
the case would be premature for lack of
The applicable law being settled, the SC condition precedent.
reminded petitioner that the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as Q: Is the failure to allege earnest
determined by the pleadings or the nature efforts jurisdictional?
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the R: According to the SC it is not since it may
disputed property is without basis because be waived by the parties. If it is not waived
not only did he fail to substantiate his by the proper party at the opportune time
alleged contribution in the purchase thereof then it may be disregarded by the court.
but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary Dean: So in all suits between members of
proof redounds to the benefit of the the same family, so yung mga in-laws,
respondent. In contrast, aside from his hindi natin sinasama for purposes of the
mere say so and voluminous records of requirement of Art. 151.
bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed HONTIVEROS v RTC
to overcome his burden of proof.
Allegations must be proven by sufficient Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a damages against herein private
fact has the burden of proving it; mere respondents. In their complaint, petitioners
allegation is not evidence. alleged that being the owners of a parcel of
land they were deprived of the income
There can clearly be no co-ownership therefrom as a result of the filing of the
when, as here, the respondent sufficiently land registration case by the private
established that she derived the funds used respondents. Private respondents,
to purchase the property from her however, denied the allegations and
earnings, not only as an accountant but claimed that possession of the property in
also as a businesswoman engaged in question had already been transferred to
foreign currency trading, money lending petitioners. The trial court dismissed the
and jewelry retail. She presented her case on the ground that the complaint was
clientele and the promissory notes not verified as required by Art. 151 of the
evidencing substantial dealings with her Family Code and, therefore, it did not
clients. She also presented her bank believe that earnest efforts had been made
account statements and bank transactions, to arrive at a compromise. The Supreme
which reflect that she had the financial Court ruled that the inclusion of private
capacity to pay the purchase price of the respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
subject property. and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff
took the case out of the ambit of Art. 151
DEAN: In this case, it was declared that it of the Family Code. Under this provision,
was Yolanda who is the owner of the the phrase "members of the same family"
property given that documentary evidence refers to husband and wife, parents and
presented by Yolanda all pertains to the children, ascendants and descendants, and
transaction to the exclusion of Lupo. The brothers and sisters, whether full or half-
court awarded the property to Yolanda. blood. Private respondent Ayson, being the
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spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and A: Under 153 It must be constituted either
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, being the on exclusive property of either the spouses
spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, or on property belonging to the ACP or
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros through the conjugal partnership, or it may
family, for purposes of Art. 151. The also be constituted on the exclusive
absence of verification required in Art. 151 property of the head of the family.
do not affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the complaint. So, the definition says it's the dwelling
The verification is merely a formal house and the lot on which it is situated. So
requirement intended to secure an I have reservations as to whether a condo
assurance that matters which are alleged unit may qualify as a family home because
are true and correct. Hence, this petition by definition house and lot. The definition
was granted and the case was remanded to is restrictive of family home under the
the trial court for further proceedings. Family Code. So since you do not own a lot
in a condo, but you own the shares in the
NOTE: condo Corporation, there's a question mark
as to whether the unit can be constituted
The absence of the verification required in as a family home.
Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the Q: What is the benefit of a family home?
complaint. The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an A: It is exempt from execution for sale or
assurance that matters which are alleged attachment except for non-payment of
are true and correct. The phrase taxes or if you have incurred the obligation
"members of the same family" refers to the prior to the constitution of the family.
husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers Q: What's the reason for the second
and sisters, whether full or half-blood. obligation to be charged against the family
home?
GUERRERO v RTC OF ILOCOS May existing kang obligation. Let's say in

2018, you did not pay that obligation. Then
Petitioner filed an accion publiciana against you constructed your family home in 2021
private respondent. The complaint does not when you have not paid your obligation
allege that the parties exerted earnest incurred in 2018. That is not exempt. So
efforts towards a compromise and that the the family home would not be exempt.
same failed. Respondent Judge gave What is the ratio behind that?
petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion
and amended complaint" to allege that the A: The law is saying you pay your
parties were very close relatives, their obligation because if you can afford to build
respective wives being sisters, and that the a family home, certainly you can pay your
complaint to be maintained should allege obligation or if you have constituted a
that earnest efforts towards a compromise mortgage on the premises, that is deemed
were exerted but failed. Apparently, a waiver of the benefit of force sale since
respondent Judge considered this by mortgaging your property you are aware
deficiency a jurisdictional defect. that if you do not pay your obligation it will
be subject to foreclosure so under Article
Dean: Art. 151 is not applicable in this case 155 It is also not exempt.
because the suit is between brothers-in-
law. As we’ve said, brothers-in-law or any And the last is of course for debts due to
in-law for that matter would not be mechanics or those who have supplied
considered in the term family. labor or services for that construction of
that building or the materialman’s lien so
FAVIS v FAVIS the family home is also not exempt if the
obligation is due to laborers or to suppliers
DOCTRINE: A failure to allege earnest but of labor or materials for the construction of
failed efforts at a compromise in a the family home.
complaint among members of the same
family, is not a jurisdictional defect but Now if you are not among those listed in
merely a defect in the statement of a cause 155, you are an ordinary creditor. But you
of action. have reasons to believe that the family
home exceeds the maximum value which is
FAMILY HOME stated in 157, you may still apply for an
order from the court in which the case is
Dean: Family home- it is the house and the pending to order the sale of the family
law on which the family resides. home. The court will determine through a
summary hearing whether your allegation
Q: On what properties may the family is true that the family home's value
home be built? exceeds the value allowed by law and this
means that even if it complied with the
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original value of 300, but there are of the family. So kahit nakatira yung
improvements such that the value grandchild dun, it can still be partitioned.
exceeded 300,000 or 200,000, that will not
be exempt from execution with respect to If the youngest beneficiary, let’s say a child
the excess. So if the court orders the sale of the spouses is only two years old at the
of the family home, and judgment time of the death of the husband, then you
obligation, let's say is 1 million the family must have to wait until the child reaches
home was sold for 1.5 million, the first the age of majority before you may
300,000 or 200,000 shall be given to the partition the family home. That is the
spouses then the rest of the money shall be general rule. Of course, unless the court
delivered to the judgment creditor.1 million finds compelling reasons upon petition of
will be given and then the cost of suit will either the head of the family, presumably
also be satisfied out of the proceeds of the the surviving spouse. If the court finds
same and the excess if any shall be given compelling reasons to order the partition, it
again to the spouses. . may do so.
Q: Who are the beneficiaries of the family MODEQUILLO v. BREVA

home under Art. 154?
A writ of execution was issued against the
Dean: The husband and the wife, or the goods and chattels of Jose Modequillo to
unmarried head of the family, and their satisfy his debts to the Salinas spouses.
parents/ ascendants or descendants, but to Thus, the sheriff levied on a parcel of
qualify as a beneficiary, the person must be residential land in the name of Modequillo.
(1) actually living in, or actual residents of, However, Modequillo opposed and alleged
the family home, (2) dependent for legal that the residential land is where his family
support upon the head of the family, and home was built since 1969 and as such is
(3) among the persons enumerated in Art. exempt from execution, forced sale, or
154. attachment under Art. 152 and 153 of the
Family Code.
PATRICIO v. DARIO III
The Court ruled that Modequillo’s property
Marcelino Dario died intestate and was cannot be exempt since the debt which was
survived by his wife Perla and their two the basis of the judgment arose in 1976
sons Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III. and the money judgment arising therefrom
Among the properties he left was a parcel was rendered in 29 January 1988. Thus,
of land with a residential house. Perla and both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino Code on 3 August 1988. Consequently, the
III of their intention to partition the case does not fall under the exemptions
property and terminate the co-ownership. from execution provided in the Family
However, Marcelino III refused to partition Code.
the property contending that his minor son,
the grandson of the decedent, was still Dean: The liability by reason of the
residing in the property and hence a minor vehicular accident was incurred prior to the
beneficiary of the family home. effectivity of the Family Code. Under the
Civil Code, you need to constitute the
The Court held that there are three family home judicially by filing a petition in
requisites before a minor beneficiary is court, or extrajudicially by filing an affidavit
entitled to the benefits of a family home: before the Registry of Property, stating that
(1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 this particular property is your family
of the Family Code ;(2) they live in the home. If you did not comply with these two
family home; and (3) they are dependent modes of constituting the family home
for legal support upon the head of the under the Civil Code, it will still be
family. In this case, while Marcelino III’s considered as a family home beginning 3
son satisfied the first two requisites, the August 1988 but it will only be
third requisite is not present since he is prospectively exempt from execution,
dependent on legal support not from his forced sale, or attachment beginning 3
grandmother, but his father. Thus, despite August 1988. So kung may utang ka na
residing in the family home and his being a before 3 August 1988 and there is no proof
descendant of the decedent, Marcelino III’s that you constituted your conjugal dwelling
son cannot be considered a beneficiary as your family home, it will not be exempt,
contemplated under Art. 154. following the Modequillo case and the two
Manacop cases.
Dean: The Court said that there is no legal
obstacle for the partition of the family
home given that the grandchild does not MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS
qualify as beneficiary since the father of
that grandchild is still alive and therefore, Dean: [This case] also involves a claim of
the grandchild can only ask direct support exemption of the supposed conjugal
from the father and not from the dwelling of Manacop, which according to
grandmother who is considered as the head him is exempt from execution since the
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family occupied the property since the Dean: Even if it's exempt, they have to
1960s. But the Supreme Court did not raise it at the earliest opportunity. It is not
agree since they did not constitute the for the sheriff to determine whether the
conjugal dwelling as a family home under property levied upon is a family home. It is
the Civil Code provisions, therefore it is not for the defendant to raise it before the trial
exempt from execution since the contract court that the property levied upon is the
of Manacop was before the effectivity of the family home. Their failure to invoke the
Family Code. benefit of exemption is deemed a waiver of
the exemption. In fact, they entered into a
contract of lease with Acero after Acero
DE MESA V. ACERO bought it at public auction - an indication
that they recognized that Acero validly
Spouses De Mesa acquired a family home acquired ownership of the execution sale.
in 1987, prior the Family Code. Around
1998, they procured a real estate mortgage So hindi lang nila minortgage after it was
loan that they were not able to pay. Acero sold to Acero, they entered into a contract
then filed for violation of BP22. RTC of lease, and they did not pay the rent -
acquitted spouses De Mesa but were that is why Acero filed an ejectment case
ordered to pay the loan. Due to this, there against them. So the Supreme Court
was a writ of execution levied on the declared that without having raised it by
subject property. In 1994, the subject way of defense then the benefit of
property was sold on a public auction, with exemption cannot be involved this late.
Acero, being the highest bidder, finally
acquiring ownership of the property. He Dean: Under the Family Code, we have
was also able to obtain a final deed of sale legitimate and illegitimate filiation and with
and was able to transfer the title under his respect to illegitimate filiation, it no longer
name. After that, Sps. De Mesa filed to distinguishes the acknowledged natural
nullify the title on the basis that the subject and spurious children. So, they are simply
property is their family home. Hence, it referred to as illegitimate children.
should be exempt from the execution
because it cannot be validly levied for the In fact, in one case on Succession, the
purpose of satisfying the unpaid loan. court referred to them as non-marital
children. But that was just used in the case.
The court seeks to answer two questions:
(1) whether or not the said subject Under the Family Code, there are specific
property is the family home; and (2) grounds to impugn the filiation of a child
whether that subject property is exempt and as a rule, only the husband can impugn
from execution. the legitimacy of the child born to his wife.
No other person can impugn except the
In answering the first question, the Court heirs in specific instances mentioned in
ruled that the subject property is a family Article 171 of the Family Code.
home. The SC mentioned that in order to
determine whether or not a family home ARTICLE 171
should be exempt from execution,
distinction should be made as to what laws When can the heirs of the husband
apply based on when that family home was impugn the legitimacy of the child born
constituted. to the wife of the husband?
In this case, if its prior the family code ARTICLE 171. The heirs of the husband
(before August 3, 1988), the provisions of may impugn the filiation of the child within
the Civil Code applies. It should be the period prescribed in the preceding
established judicially and extrajudicially. If article only in the following cases:
it's after the implementation of the Family
Code, it will apply automatically without the (1) If the husband should die before the
need to have it judicially or extrajudicially expiration of the period fixed for bringing
constituted. In case the family home was his action;
constituted prior the family code, but still
exists after the implementation of the (2) If he should die after the filing of the
Family Code, the Family Code applies complaint, without having desisted
prospectively by operation of law. therefrom; or
In this case, the Court ruled that indeed the (3) If the child was born after the death of
subject property is a family home. the husband.
However, that does not automatically mean
that exception applies. The court said that Q: Why do you think it is the husband
for a family home to be exempted for who is given by law the right to
execution, they have to do the claiming impugn the legitimacy of the child?
prior or during the public auctions. This is a
stated in the case of Honrado v. CA.
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R: It is the husband who will be burdened Q: How do we impugn if you are the
with raising the child and the child will have husband?
his name. A: You take the date of birth of the child as
the point of reckoning. You count 300 days
Dean: It is the husband who will be backwards, and after you have determined
subjected to public ridicule if it turns out the first day of the 300 days, you now
that he is supporting a child which is not determine the first 120 of the 300.
his. It is the husband who is given the
primary right to impugn the legitimacy of Q: What is the significance of the
the child born to his wife. period 300 days and 120 days?
A: The period of gestation.
This is the rule that the husband is given ● If you subtract 120 from 300, the
the right to impugn, any child born to a result is 180 days which is
married woman is presumed to be the approximately 6 months. What
legitimate child of her husband. happens to a fetus when the fetus is
already 6 months?
If the husband does not do anything within ● 6 months is the shortest period of
the proper period stated in Article 170 of gestation, meaning, it has the
the Family Code, the status of the child will probability that the child will survive
become absolute and unassailable. outside the maternal womb.
Because more or less, the fetus is
Ano ang magiging status niya? Legitimate. already complete with 2 eyes, 2
ears, nose, lips, limbs, and heart.
So if he does not impugn the legitimacy, ● 300 days is the maximum period of
within 1,2,3 years as mentioned in Article gestation. Normally a child is born
170, the status of the child becomes fixed after 9 months or 270 days. But for
and unassailable. first born or in some cases, the
period of gestation extends up to
ARTICLE 166 300 days. Hindi pwedeng lumagpas
ng 300 days yan because pag
What are the specific grounds for lumabas yan baka nagbabasa na ng
impugning legitimacy? SCRA yan.
● 120 is the period of conception.
ARTICLE 166. Legitimacy of a child may That’s where the child is formed.
be impugned only on the following That’s why when you subtract it, it
grounds: is supposed to be the shortest
period as opposed to the maximum
(1) That it was physically impossible for period of gestation.
the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of During the entire 120 day period which is
the 300 days which immediately preceded the period of conception, doon nabubuo
the birth of the child because of: yung child. The husband must show that it
was physically impossible for him to have
(a) the physical incapacity of the sexual access to his wife, because if in any
husband to have sexual intercourse day of this 120 day period, there is
with his wife; possibility of sexual access, then you
cannot successfully impugn the legitimacy
(b) the fact that the husband and wife of the child.
were living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse was not ANDAL V. MACARAIG
possible; or
Emiliano Andal owned the parcel of land in
(c) serious illness of the husband, which question having acquired it from his
absolutely prevented sexual mother, Eduvigis Macaraig.Emiliano died
intercourse; on January 1, 1943.
(2) That it is proved that for biological or Subsequently, Mariano Andal brought an
other scientific reasons, the child could not action for the recovery of the ownership
have been that of the husband, except in and possession of the subject parcel of land
the instance provided in the second against Eduvigis. Mariano alleged that he
paragraph of Article 164; or was born on June 17, 1943 and was the
surviving son of Emiliano.
(3) That in case of children conceived
through artificial insemination, the written On the other, Mariano’s filiation to Emiliano
authorization or ratification of either is being disputed. Emiliano was already sick
parent was obtained through mistake, of tuberculosis on January 1941, and was
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue already bedridden. On September 10,
influence. 1942, Maria Duenas (Emilio’s wife) eloped
with Felix (Emilio’s brother). Since May,
1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
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intercourse and treated each other as Q: Can you remember what the
husband and wife Supreme Court said with respect to the
tendency of the husband being
Issue: Whether Mariano can be considered confined to his bed?
as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
R: Even if the deceased is bedridden due to
Ruling: YES. Since the boy was born on his tuberculosis, still they can have sexual
June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on intercourse because it did not render the
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to decease impotent.
be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his
wife, he having been born within three Dean: The Court became a little bit
hundred (300) days following the naughty and said that the husband’s
dissolution of the marriage. This tendency toward eroticism arises more
presumption can only be rebutted by proof from his confinement in bed rather than as
that it was physically impossible for the a consequence of his disease.
husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 next Dean: But please take note that the
preceding the birth of the child. grounds of impugning legitimacy, as well as
the period to impugn it, will only apply
There was no evidence presented that when it is alleged that the child is a child of
Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial the wife, but not of the husband. It does
period of conception, specially during the not apply to a case where the allegation is
period comprised between August 21, 1942 that the child is not the child of either the
and September 10, 1942, which is included husband or the wife. So, let’s now hear the
in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding case of Babiera v. Catotal and Benitez-
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the Badua v. CA.
contrary, there is enough evidence to show
that during that initial period, Emiliano BABIERA v. CATOTAL
Andal and his wife were still living under the
marital roof. Presentacion filed an action to declare
Teofista Babiera’s birth certificate void and
Although Emiliano was already suffering ineffective, and to order its cancellation,
from serious tuberculosis, experience alleging that the certificate is void because
shows that this does not prevent carnal the birth was simulated, the informant's
intercourse. There are cases where persons signature was forged, and it contained false
suffering from this sickness can do the entries. Teofista argued that she and
carnal act even in the most crucial stage Presentacion were full-blooded sisters, as
because they are more inclined to sexual showed in her birth certificate, baptismal
intercourse. As an author has said, "the certificate, and report card. She also
reputation of the tuberculosis towards argued that the petition stated no cause of
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably action, it being an attack on her legitimacy
dependent more upon confinement to bed as Hermogena and Eugenio's child, and
than the consequences of the disease." that she has no legal capacity pursuant to
Article 171 and was barred from
Dean: The date of birth here is June 17, prescription under Article 170 of the Family
1943. Again, to determine whether you can Code.
impugn the legitimacy, you take the date
of birth and count 300 days back. And after Issue: Whether or not the birth certificate
determining the first day of 300-day, you of Teofista is void.
count the first 120 days.
Held. YES. Presumption of Regularity
Dean: The date of birth here is June17, accorded to an Official Document has been
1943. So, I told you a while ago that to negated by evidence presented. While it is
determine whether you can impugn the true that an official document such as
legitimacy, you take the date of birth, petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the
count 300 days back from June 17, 1943, presumption of regularity, the specific facts
pabalik and bilang. After determining the attendant in the case, as well as the totality
first day of the 300-day period, you of the evidence presented during trial,
determine the first 120 of the 300. So, sufficiently negate such presumption.
during this entire 120-period, which is Relying merely on the assumption of
approximately four months, there must be validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner
physical impossibility of sexual access has presented no other evidence other than
between the husband and the wife, the said document to show that she is
because of the reasons mentioned. First is really Hermogena's child. Neither has she
the serious illness of the husband, but the provided any reason why her supposed
Supreme Court said in the Andal case that mother would make a deposition in another
tuberculosis is not sufficient to incapacitate case, stating that the former was not the
the husband to have sexual intercourse latter's child at all.
with the wife.
Notes:
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LEGAL STANDING; Presentacion had the The respondents were claiming that there
standing to initiate the present action. Sec. are no compulsory heirs of vicente and that
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides they should be the one to administer the
that a real party in interest is one who estate of Vicente.
stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled The trial court decided that Marissa was the
to the avails of the suit. The interest of biological daughter banking on Article 166
respondent in the civil status of and 170. The CA reversed saying that
petitioner stems from an action for Article 166 and 170 does not apply in this
partition which the latter filed against case because this case is wanting to prove
the former. The case concerned the if Marissa is a biological daughter of the
properties inherited by respondent from spouses.
her parents.
RULING: Petitioner Marissa was not the
PRESCRIPTION; Art. 171, FC, is not biological child or child of nature of the
applicable (presupposes that the child was spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel. The
the undisputed offspring of the mother) Court affirmed the findings of CA and
and the action involved does not impugn decided that the evidence was utterly
the legitimacy and has not prescribed. A insufficient to establish petitioner’s
close reading of this provision shows that it biological and blood kinship with the
applies to instances in which the father spouses.
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child.
The provision, however, presupposes that The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant
the child was the undisputed offspring of and growing big with child, as well as her
the mother. The present case alleges and delivering a
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to baby, are matters that cannot be hidden
petitioner. The prayer herein is not to from the public eye, and so is the fact that
declare that petitioner is an a woman never
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to became pregnant and could not have,
establish that the former is not the therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if
latter's child at all. Petitioner contended she is suddenly seen mothering and caring
that the action to contest her status as a for a baby as if it were her own, especially
child of the late Hermogena Babiera has at the rather late age of 36 (the age of
already prescribed. She cited Article 170 of Isabel when appellee Marissa Benitez was
the Family Code which provided the allegedly born), we can be sure that she is
prescriptive period for such action. The not the true mother of that baby.
Court debunked her argument. The present
action involves the cancellation of Further, the mere registration of a child in
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not his or her birth certificate as the child of the
impugn her legitimacy. The prescriptive supposed
period set forth in Art. 170, FC, does not parents is not a valid adoption, does not
apply. The action to nullify the Birth confer upon the child the status of an
Certificate does not prescribe, because it adopted child and the legal rights of such
was allegedly void ab initio. child, and even amounts of simulation of
the child’s birth or falsification of his or her
Dean: So the SC said that this is not birth certificate, which is a public
covered by the grounds for impugning as document.
well as the prescriptive period precisely
because the allegation of Catotal was that Dean: The Court held that Marissa is not
Babiera is not a child of either the husband the child of Sps. Vicente and Isabel.
or the wife. This is case for cancellation of
a void birth certificate and the action Apart from serious illness, there could also
therefore is imprescriptible. be physical incapacity on the part of the
husband.
BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF
APPEALS Example of Physical Incapacity:
(Walang sakit pero physically incapable
The parties in this case were fighting over sya)
the estate of Atty. Vicente Benitez.
Petitioner here is Marissa, alleging herself
to be the biological child of Benitez and his 1. Pwedeng impotency or he met with
wife Isabel. The respondents were the an accident and he was paralyzed
actual sister and nephew of Vicente. waist down.
2. Living separately in which case
The petitioner presented her birth sexual intercourse is impossible.
certificate, baptismal records, school Like if you are an OFW, but upon
reports and even SSS and tax statements returning home you already have 3
of Vicente stating that she is the daughter. children.
To rebut the presumption, the separation
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between the spouses must be such as to case in January 2021, can he still impugn
make marital intimacy impossible. This the legitimacy of the child?
may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces R: Since the period has lapsed, he could no
and they were never together during the longer impugn the legitimacy of the child.
period of conception. Or, the husband was Although, it could be argued that since the
in prison during the period of conception, facts is only apparent after the lapse of the
unless it appears that sexual union took prescriptive period, then he must be
place through the violation of prison granted the reasonable time to impugn the
regulations. (Concepcion v. CA and legitimacy of the child, especially since it
Almonte) has economic consequences for him, such
as to give support. It would be an injustice
BIOLOGICAL or SCIENTIFIC REASONS to give support to a child which has become
apparent that it is not his.
NOTE:
Dean: So he can impugn?
Surrogacy is not allowed in the PH. If you
register a child in the name of the mother R: Yes provided he does so within a
who used a surrogate, that is simulation of reasonable time or it could be argued that
birth. That is an offense under the Penal the 1 year period under the law.
Code
Dean: No, he child was born in 2019, and
EXAMPLE: Both parents are Chinese but he filed the case in 2021.
the wife delivered an African-American
baby. However, in this case, the family tree R: 1 year from knowledge.
may be traced to determine the
possibility/probability. Dean: Eh lagi nga sila magkasama eh.
Nanganak nga eh.
Presence of vices of consent in securing the R: The facts were not apparent before,
consent or ratification of the children BAI since it was only apparent after the DNA
testing.
Q: Why is the prescriptive period to
impugn relatively short? Dean: Does the law say “1 year from the
knowledge of the husband that the child is
A: Because the law seeks to protect the not his?” Is that the law was worded?
child and at some point the law wants to
settle the status of the child. Ang sabi ng batas 1 year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in
00:28:27 - 00:33:37 the civil register. Walang sinabi ang law na
from discovery of the husband that the
Q: Hypothetical case: child is not his.
Supposed Mario and Maria got married in R: If I will be lawyering the husband, I
2018. In 2019, Maria gave birth to a baby would argue that he could still file. But, if I
girl. In 2020, the girl got sick and were to argue for the other side, I would
contracted dengue, and needed blood say that..
transfusion. The husband was quick to offer
his blood. In turned out he cannot be a Dean: But what did the law say? I am
donor for the child because they do not asking you a straight question?
have the same blood type. He became
suspicious and because of this he asked the R: The law say 1 year from the knowledge
hospital to conduct a DNA test. It shows of the birth or its recording in the civil
that the child could not have been his register
child.
Dean: Precisely, the purpose of the
Q: Can the husband Mario impugn in 2020 prescriptive period is to protect the child,
or 2021? that is why it is short. You cannot impugn
anymore if the period has lapsed,
R: Since the daughter was born in a valid otherwise, we are disregarding the
marriage, he cannot impugn the legitimacy prescriptive period set by the law.
of the child despite the fact that they do not
have the same blood type. Also, in a 1 year: from the knowledge of the birth or
jurisprudence, blood testing does not its recording in the civil register, if they
establish paternity, only non-paternity. reside in the same city/municipality.
Dean: No, in my example, he got a DNA 2 years: if they do not reside in the same
test after having been suspicious that he city/municipality.
does not have the same blood type with his
child. So he discovered in 2020 that the 3 years: if abroad.
child is not his child. Let’s say he filed the
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Kahit na, na-discover ng late, kasalanan during WWII, Josefa met and lived an
mo yun. So you cannot anymore impugn. American soldier, a cohabitation resulting
to the birth of Ara. Later, Josefa met a
Dean: To prove filiation, you can either use certain Alfredo Garcia, whom she later
1st paragraph of 172: married, and gave birth to sons Ramon and
Willian Garcia. After Alfredo passed away,
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate Josefa met an Italian missionary named
children is established by any of the Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry
following: Rossi. On her part, Pizarro claims that she
is the only child of Josefa.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or Q: How late was the registration of
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in William’s birth certificate?
a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by Dean: It was 52 years late. He was already
the parent concerned. 52 years old when he registered himself as
the child of Josefa Ara, at the time when
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, Josefa was already dead.
the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by: Q: Can that constitute evidence of
filiation?
(1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or Reciter: No, because the late registration
of a Birth Certificate is not..
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws Q: Can that constitute evidence of filiation?
A: No, because the action must be brought
If you have a record of birth or final during the lifetime of the parent.
judgment, or private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent Dean: Not only that, even if he has a birth
concerned, or a public document admitting certificate that is entirely suspicious
that you are his/her child. because it was registered 52 years after his
birth. There is no reasonable explanation
If you do not have any of the documents why it was registered only after the death
mentioned in 1st paragraph of 172, a of the mother, the supposed mother. So
legitimate child can prove his legitimate the SC said that it cannot be accepted as
filiation by open and continuous possession evidence of filiation with respect to William
of a status of a legitimate child, or any and the rest of the petitioners.
other means allowed by the Rules of Court.
Q: Why can they not prove their filiation
Example: Family bibles, act/declaration anymore? The other petitioners, do they
about pedigree. have their birth record that they were born
to Josefa Ara? Do their respective birth
When it comes to illegitimate children, they certificate say otherwise?
can also use the same proofs of filiation; No Answer.
however, the limitation is that if the
illegitimate child does not have any of the Dean: Fely Pizarro presented the birth
documents mentioned in the first certificate of Ramon saying that he was
paragraph, and they merely base their born to another couple and not to Josefa
claim of filiation on open and continuous Ara. So the SC said that in the absence of
possession and any other means allowed the documents mentioned in Art 172, the
by the rules, they have to file the action for claimants merely proving or trying to prove
recognition during the lifetime of the their filiation through open and continuous
putative parent. possession can no longer do that after the
death of the putative parent. Yung Dead
ARA V. PIZARRO Man’s Statute, hindi na makaka kontra yan.
Patay na eh. You can no longer prove the
DOCTRINE: Delayed registration of birth illegitimate filiation if you do not have the
certificate made after the putative parent’s documents in the first paragraph of Art
death is tenuous proof of filiation. If filiation 172.
is sought to be proved under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family ARADO v ALCORAN
Code, the action must be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent. Facts: Raymundo Alcoran was married to
Joaquina and they had a son named
SUMMARY: Petitioners Ara and Garcia and Nicolas. Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married
respondents Pizarro and Rossi all claim to Florencia Limpahan, but they had no
be the children of the late Josefa who offspring. During their marriage, Nicolas
died in Nov. 18, 2002. Petitioners assert had an affair with Francisca Sarita, and
that after the death of Pizarro’s father
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gave birth to respondent Anacleto. SALAS V MATUSALEM
Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco
Facts: Matusalem filed a complaint for
Raymundo died leaving properties to Support against Salas. She claimed that
Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died Salas is the father of her son. Salas enticed
subsequently leaving the properties to his her as she was then only 24 years old,
illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly making her believe that he is a widower.
thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims Salas rented an apartment where
entitlement to the properties as the heir of Matusalem stayed and shouldered all
Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed expenses in the delivery of their child.
by Joaquina. However, when Matusalem refused the
offer of Salas’ family to take the child from
Dean: Ordinarily if the birth certificate her, Salas abandoned her and their child.
we’re talking about is that of a legitimate Salas prayed for support pendente lite and
child, there’s lesser complication even if it’s monthly support in the amount of ₱20k.
not signed by the father because the Salas denied paternity of the child. The RTC
presumption is that a child born to a ruled in favour of respondent to which the
married woman is a child of the husband. CA affirmed on
appeal.
But, when it comes to the birth certificate
of an illegitimate child, to constitute Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA
competent evidence of filiation, it must be erred in ruling that Matusalem’s evidence
signed by the putative father. An unsigned sufficiently proved that her son is the
birth certificate, kahit ilagay mo jan na ang illegitimate child of Salas.
tatay mo ay si brad pitt, tapos hindi naman
pinirmahan ni brad pitt, hindi pwede. Held: The SC ruled that A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative
AGUILAR V SIASAT father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the
Facts: Rodolfo Aguilar filed a civil case putative father had a hand in the
against Edna G. Siasat, praying for the preparation of the certificate.
surrender of the certificates of title to the
parcels of land of the deceased Spouses R: According to the SC, this does not
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat- render the case moot since it was filed
Aguilar. He alleged that he is the only son during the lifetime of Narciso. In this case,
and sole surviving heir of Spouses Aguilar. the rule under the Rules of Court on the
On the other hand, Siasat claims that substitution of parties applies. The SC
Rodolfo is not the son and sole surviving reversed the decisions of the RTC and CA,
heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere and ruled that Annabelle was not able to
stranger who was raised by the Aguilar sufficiently establish the filiation of the
spouses out of generosity and kindness of child in relation to Narciso.
heart. The RTC and CA dismissed the case
on the ground that the evidence presented Dean: The rule is that for a birth certificate
by petitioner failed to hurdle the “high of an illegitimate child to constitute
standard of proof” required for the success evidence of filiation, it must have been
of an action to establish one’s legitimate signed by the putative parent. However,
filiation. this rule has one exception that is, if the
father had a hand in the preparation of the
Issue: Whether or not Alfredo Aguilar’s birth certificate which is illustrated in the
SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for case of Ilano v. CA. This case is an
proof of filiation and relationship to the exception to the rule that the birth
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the certificate of the illegitimate child must be
Family Code. signed.
Held: The Supreme Court, however, ILANO V CA

reversed the decision and ruled that
Rodolfo was able to prove his legitimate Respondent Merceditas Ilano, represented
filiation with the spouses through Alfredo by her mother, Leoncia de los Santos filed
Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1, and that by itself, an action for support against Artemio Ilano.
said document constitutes an “admission of Leoncia and Artemio met while Leoncia was
legitimate filiation in a public document or working as secretary of an attorney, and
a private handwritten instrument and Artemio was one of his clients. Sometime
signed by the parent concerned” as in 1957, they met again. After years of
enunciated in Article 172 of the Family courtship, they eloped to Pampanga, and
Code. eventually transferred to San Juan. In
1962, she delivered a still-born child. After
Dean: The E-1 form is a public document. a year, Leoncia gave birth to another baby,
That constitutes evidence of filiation under Merceditas. In 1971, Artemio stopped
the first paragraph of Article 172 coming home.
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To prove the filiation of Merceditas, Leoncia sign it? Why was it considered by the
relied on the following evidence: Court?
1. Death certificate of the still-born
child bearing the sign of Artemio; A: There was testimonial evidence by one
2. Checks from Metrobank bearing the witness presented by Leoncia that he had
sign of Artemio, and which were the hand in the preparation of certificate of
given by Artemio as form of birth because he was the one interviewed
support; by the nurse. He was the one who supplied
3. Report cards of Merceditas bearing the details as to the mother, father, and
the signature of Artemio birth date of the child.
acknowledging himself as
Merceditas’ father; Dean: This is an exception to the rule
4. Pictures with handwritten notes because he was the one who supplied all
bearing the signature of Artemio; the information to be placed in birth
5. Testimonial evidence of witnesses certificate of the child. He had a hand in the
testifying as to the fact the at preparation of the birth certificate.
Artemio was present before, during, Ordinarily, if it is not signed, it cannot
and after the delivery of Leoncia, constitute evidence of filiation. However,
and Artemio was the one who this is the exception.
arranged and financed said
delivery. With respect to proving filiation, your cases
will not be limited to children born during
However, Artemio made a complete denial the family code.
of the evidence presented by Leoncia. He
presented his godson, Melencio, as witness TAYAG V CA
to testify that he was the real lover of
Leoncia. Melencio said that he was with Private respondent Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan,
Leoncia during her pregnancy, and he was in her capacity as mother and legal
the one who procured the needs of Leoncia. guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a
Artemio further argued that the Certificate complaint denominated "Claim for
of Live Birth could not be used as a Inheritance" against herein petitioner
competent evidence to prove the filiation of Corito Ocampo Tayag as the administratrix
Merceditas because it was not signed by of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo
him. Ocampo.
The RTC dismissed the complaint as it was Emilie alleged that she has been estranged
not fully satisfied that petitioner is the from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for
father of Merciditas. CA did not share the several years and during which time, she
same view as the trial court. and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had an illicit
amorous relationship with each other and
Issues: they begot a child who was christened as
1. W/N Merciditas Ilano is an Chad Cuyugan. And that and had been
acknowledged and recognized sired, showered with exceptional affection,
illegitimate child. (YES) fervent love and care by his putative father
2. W/N an adulterous child can file an for being his only son as can be gleaned
action for recognition and support. from indubitable letters and documents of
(YES) the late Atty. Ocampo wherein he vowed to
recognize Chad and be his heir, and
Ruling: showed his affection to the said child.
Respondent’s evidence to establish her Q: When did the father died, when was
affiliation was overwhelming to be the child born?
overcome by a mere denial of Artemio. The
evidence presented by Leoncia was from R: Chad was born in 1980, and his father
the genesis of her relationship with Artemio died 1983.
living together as husband and wife, the
birth of still born child, the circumstances Dean: It falls barely under the provision of
surrounding Merciditas, and the testimonial Art. 285, because if the parent died during
evidence that proves that Artemio was the minority of the child, the child still has
present during and after the birth of 4 years from the attainment of the age of
Merciditas was enough to prove the filiation majority within which to file the action for
of Merciditas to Artemio. recognition. The case was also filed by the
mother of the child prior to the effectivity
Melencio was merely a right hand man of of the Family code.
Artemio. Melencio merely followed the
instructions of Artemio to testify in this The right of Chad to prove his filiation
case that he was the lover of Leoncia. based on the provisions has already been
vested upon filing of the petition.
Q: With respect to the birth certificate, Therefore, he should be allowed, to prove
what did the SC say because he did not his legitimate filiation under the provisions
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of Art. 285, and not under the provisions of In the instant case, the petitioner has in no
Art. 175 of the FMAILY Code. way shown any arbitrariness, passion,
prejudice or personal hostility that would
Not only a birth certificate, but also other amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
evidence like DNA evidence, but blood part of the Court of Appeals. The
grouping test. respondent court acted entirely within its
jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and
resolution, and any error made would have
JAO v COURT OF APPEALS only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the
Q: What is the issue in the case of Jao respondent court, being firmly anchored in
v CA? law and jurisprudence, was correct.
R:
Dean: The blood grouping test is For too long, illegitimate children have
conclusive to prove non-paternity but been marginalized by fathers who choose
inconclusive to prove paternity. The fact to deny their existence. The growing
that a child has a blood type could be the sophistication of DNA testing technology
possible blood type of the child when the finally provides a much needed equalizer
blood of the mother and alleged father are for such ostracized and abandoned
cross-matched does not conclusive proved progeny. We have long believed in the
that the child is the child of the putative merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
father. expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing
So, this is different from DNA test. Let’s has finally evolved into a dependable and
hear the case of Agustin v. Prollamante. authoritative form of evidence gathering.
We therefore take this opportunity to
AGUSTIN v PROLLAMANTE forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin paternity.
Prollamante sued Martin's alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente The kernel of the right against self-
lite before the Regional Trial Court. Arnel incrimination is not against all compulsion,
denied having sired Martin because his but against testimonial compulsion. The
affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly right against self-incrimination is simply
ended in 1998, long before Martin's against the legal process of extracting
conception. The trial court denied the from the lips of the accused an admission
motion to dismiss the complaint and of guilt. It does not apply where the
ordered the parties to submit themselves evidence sought to be excluded is not an
to DNA paternity testing at the expense of incrimination but as part of object
the applicants. The Court of Appeals evidence.
affirmed the trial court. SC ruled that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining Q: With respect to the defense of
paternity. Agustin that taking specimen from him
is violative of his right against self-
Issue: Whether or not DNA paternity incrimination, what did the court say?
testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioner's A: The court said that the contentions of
constitutional right to privacy and right the petitioner have no merit. The kernel of
against self-incrimination. the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right
Ruling: YES. Historically, it has mostly been against self-incrimination is simply against
in the areas of legality of searches and the legal process of extracting from the lips
seizures, and the infringement of privacy of of the accused an admission of guilt. It
communication where the constitutional does not apply where the evidence sought
right to privacy has been critically at issue. to be excluded is not an incrimination but
Petitioner's case involves neither and, as as part of object evidence.
already stated, his argument that his right
against self-incrimination is in jeopardy FERNANDEZ v CA
holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy Petitioners filed a civil case for support
here for the simple reason that they are not against Carlito Fernandez who m they
in any way being violated. If, in a criminal alleged as their father. They presented
case, an accused whose very life is at stake documentary evidence which includes: (a)
can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, Certificates of Live Birth, identifying Carlito
we see no reason why, in this civil case, as their father; (b) Baptismal Certificate of
petitioner herein who does not face such Claro Antonio which states that his father is
dire consequences cannot be ordered to do Carlito; (c) Photographs of Carlito during
the same. the baptism of Claro; and (d) pictures of
Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
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Violeta, their mother. Carlito denied who is presently in the custody of her
Violeta’s allegations. He averred he only mother but nothing more and nothing less.
served as one of the sponsors in the
baptism of petitioner Claro and also RULING: The Supreme Court said that the
declared he only learned he was named in promissory note does not constitute as
the birth certificates of both petitioners as evidence of filiation, it’s just a document
their father after he was sued for support. promising to give support.
Ruling: The SC ruled that photographs Dean: Now, if the woman is married, any
showing the presence of the Carlito in the child born to the woman would be
baptism of Claro are far from proofs that he considered that of the husband. So, legally,
is his father. Baptismal certificates of Claro no other man can claim a child as his child.
naming Carlito as his father has scant
evidentiary value. There is no showing that Ratio: Because only the husband can
Carlito participated in its preparation and impugn the legitimacy of the child borne by
canonical records do not constitute the his wife. If you are the paramour, you are
authentic document prescribed by Arts. not the legal husband and therefore, you
115 and 117 to prove the legitimate have no personality to impugn.
filiation of a child. Certificates of live birth
of the petitioners identifying Carlito as their LIYAO vs. LIYAO
father are not also competent evidence on
the issue of paternity. Section 5 of Act No. William Liyao, Jr., represented by his
3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action
the Philippines explicitly prohibited, not for compulsory recognition as "the
only the naming of the father or the child illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
born outside wedlock, when the birth William Liyao" against herein respondents.
certificates, or the recognition, is not filed
or made by him. A birth certificate not Facts as alleged by petitioner:
signed by the alleged father therein Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but
indicated is not competent evidence of living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
paternity. Baptismal record cannot be held more than ten (10) years at the time of the
to be a voluntary recognition of parentage institution of the said civil case. Corazon
as canonical records do not constitute cohabited with the late William Liyao from
authentic documents prescribed by Art 115 1965 up to the time of William's untimely
and 117 to prove legitimate filiation of a demise on December 2, 1975. surnamed
child but only a proof of the act of the Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in
priest. A birth certificate not signed by the Quezon City and Manila. This was with the
alleged father indicated therein is not knowledge of William Liyao's legitimate
competent evidence of paternity. children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao- Ortiga, from his subsisting
Q. Can love letters constitute evidence marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao.
of filiation? The tenor of the love letter
"I promise to be a good husband and William Liyao visited and stayed with her
father to our unborn child" and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy).
A. Yes. In the case of Lim vs CA, Raymond All the medical and hospital expenses, food
Lim, courted this girl working in a and clothing were paid under the account
nightclub. The girl became pregnant at the of William Liyao. Corazon also presented
time she went to Japan. While she was in pictures in court to prove that that she
Japan, Raymond wrote love letters to her usually accompanied William Liyao while
"promised to be a good father to their attending various social gatherings and
unborn child". Later, he got married to other important meetings.
another woman, and disputed paternity
over the child. But the Court ruled that the Maurita Pasion (family friend) declared that
love letters of which are in the handwriting she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and
of Raymond are private document signed William Liyao who were godparents to her
by the putative parent therefore it is children. Gloria Panopio testified that she is
considered sufficient evidence of filiation. the owner of a beauty parlor and that she
knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors,
Q. Can promissory notes constitute William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the
evidence of filiation? latter being one of her customers. Enrique
A. It depends on the tenor. It was Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard
answered in the case of Benhur vs Lopez. from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time
that the latter abandoned and separated
NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ from his family. Enrique's testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo,
Nepomuceno vs. Lopez, the promissory who testified that the various pictures
note written by the petitioner did not showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not
contain any admission of filiation, he just have been superimposed and that the
promised to give support to the minor child negatives were in the possession of her
mother, Corazon Garcia.
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his own filiation. If the husband, presumed
Facts as alleged by respondents: to be the father does not impugn the
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her legitimacy of the child, then the status of
parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti- the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
Liyao, were legally married. Linda grew up choose to be the child of his
and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo mother's alleged paramour. On the other
Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
married; that her parents were not overthrown, the child cannot elect the
separated legally or in fact and that there paternity of the husband who successfully
was no reason why any of her parents defeated the presumption.
would institute legal separation
proceedings in court. Her father lived at Dean: Since the woman was married, any
their house in San Lorenzo Village and child born to Corazon is presumed to be the
came home regularly. Linda testified that child of Ramon, the legal husband.
she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to
Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally
separated from her husband and the DE JESUS v ESTATE OF DIZON
records from the Local Civil Registrar do
not indicate that the couple obtained any Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus
annulment of their marriage. got married and it was during this marriage
that Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christie
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In
parents were legally married and had never a notarized document, a certain Juan G.
been separated. Ramon Pineda, driver and Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
1974, who said that he usually reported for children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick Juan G. Dizon died intestate, leaving
up his boss at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. behind considerable assets, petitioners
Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office filed a complaint for Partition with
garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon
Yulo who was also asking about cars for estate with the RTC.
sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and
ISSUE: legitimate children of late Juan Dizon
1. Whether or not petitioner may sought the dismissal of the case, arguing
impugn his own legitimacy to be that the complaint would call for altering
able to claim from the estate of his the status of petitioners from being the
supposed father, William Liyao. legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
2. Whether or not the acts of Enrique Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
and Bernadette Yulo, the the illegitimate children of Carolina de
undisputed children of Corazon Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in
testifying for herein petitioner Issue: Whether or not, Jacqueline and
amount to impugnation of the Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizon’s own
legitimacy of the latter? illegitimate children
RULING: The fact that Corazon Garcia had Ruling: NO. The filiation of illegitimate
been living separately from her husband, children, like legitimate children, is
Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was established by (1) the record of birth
conceived and born is of no moment. While appearing in the civil register or a final
physical impossibility for the husband to judgment; or (2) an admission of
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one legitimate filiation in a public document or
of the grounds for impugning the a private handwritten instrument and
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis signed by the parent concerned. In the
that the grounds for impugning the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article (1) the open and continuous possession of
255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
by the husband, or in proper cases, his other means allowed by the Rules of Court
heirs under the conditions set forth under and special laws.
Article 262 of the Civil Code.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child
It is settled that a child born within a valid in a record of birth, a will, a statement
marriage is presumed legitimate even before a court of record, or in any authentic
though the mother may have declared writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
against its legitimacy or may have been acknowledgment of the child, and no
sentenced as an adulteress. Only the further court action is required. In fact, any
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, authentic writing is treated not just a
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
child born in a valid and subsisting itself a voluntary recognition that does not
marriage. The child himself cannot choose require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for
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recognition is predicated on other evidence impugned that the paternity of the
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., husband can be rejected.
outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential Dean: So the SC held that the status of
in order to establish the child's children whether legitimate or illegitimate,
acknowledgment. is to be decided by the provisions of the
law. It is not subject to stipulation between
A scrutiny of the records would show that the parties. Particularly in this case, the
petitioners were born during the marriage man who is claiming to be the father is not
of their parents. The certificates of live the legal husband. So he has no personality
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as to impugn the legitimacy of the child born
being their father. There is perhaps no to Carolina. Only after the legal husband
presumption of the law more firmly Danilo de Jesus has impugned the
established and founded on sounder legitimacy of these children can another
morality and more convincing reason than man claim the child as his.
the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS
of proof that there is physical impossibility
of access between the spouses during the A minor cannot be deprived of his/her
first 120 days of the 300 days which legitimate status on the bare declaration of
immediately precedes the birth of the child the mother and/or even much less, the
due to (a) the physical incapacity of the supposed father. In fine, the law and only
husband to have sexual intercourse with the law determines who are the legitimate
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and or illegitimate children for one’s legitimate
wife are living separately in such a way that or illegitimacy cannot ever be
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) compromised. Not even the birth certificate
serious illness of the husband, which of the minor can change is status for the
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. information contained therein are merely
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of supplied by the mother and/or the
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in supposed father. It should be what the law
proper cases Article 171, of the Family says and not what a parent says it is.
Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy Dean: Itong kaso na ito, it’s complicated.
of a child would no longer be legally Kapag yung man ang married tapos
feasible and the status conferred by the nagkaroon ng illegitimate child, parang
presumption becomes fixed and walang masyadong complication. But if the
unassailable. woman is married and the child was born
to that woman, then gugulo na ang mundo
In an attempt to establish their legitimate kasi hindi niya pwedeng i-register na
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, gagamitin ang apilyedo ng paramour
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their because as far as the law is concerned, any
legitimate status as being the children of child born to her is that of her husband.
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus.
This cannot be done because the law itself So the Supreme Court ruled that Gerardo
establishes the legitimacy of children never became the legal husband of Teresa.
conceived or born during the marriage of Therefore, he cannot claim the child as his
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy because he is not the legal husband to
fixes a civil status for the child born in impugn the legitimacy of the child Jose
wedlock, and only the father, or in Concepcion. So parang iniinsist niya nga na
exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can anak niya yan kasi kamukha niya diba? But
contest in an appropriate action the the Supreme Court said no, hindi mo yan
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, anak. Based on the law, the child is the
it is only when the legitimacy of a child has child of Mario and Teresa Almonte.
been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected. Dean: So did you notice that the Supreme
Court again insinuated that because of the
distance between the house of Teresa and
NOTE: the first husband Mario which is only four
kilometers away, it could have been
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil possible that they had sexual access with
status for the child born in wedlock, and each other even if they were estranged
only the father, or in exceptional instances because the third ground to impugn
the latter’s heirs, can contest in an legitimacy, the fact that the husband and
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child wife are living separately in such a way that
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the sexual intercourse was not possible, but
legitimacy of a child has been successfully according to the court, it is not impossible
kasi yung 4 kms, isang tricycle lang yun.
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Dean: Legitimate children have the right to should leave the middle name of the child
carry the surname of both the father and blank. And later on, if he was recognized by
the mother. It is not for the parents to the father, then he can use the surname of
decide whether the child should drop the the father and the middle name of the
middle name as held by the court in the mother.
case of in re Julian Lin Carulasan.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
IN RE: JULIAN LIN CARULASAN
authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this
Dean: In the case of Julian Lin Carulasan,
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
it was the mother of Julian who filed the
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
petition before the court to allow the child
legitimate child. Except for this
to drop the middle name Carulasan.
modification, all other provisions in the Civil
Code governing successional rights shall
Q: what was the reason given by the
remain in force.
mother?
A: The mother said that one would be
"discriminated" when he will be sent to D: Under Article 176, an illegitimate child
Singapore to study with his stepsister must not only be in the custody of the
mother, but must also follow the surname
Dean: When they move to Singapore of the mother unless the father recognizes
where the practice is not to carry a middle the illegitimate child by a private
name. handwritten instrument or in the record of
birth, in which case the child may carry the
Q: Did the court allow the dropping of the surname of the father. May is the operative
middle name of the child? word, because of the case of Grande v.
A: The court denied, the petition for Antonio.
dropping the Carulasan in Julian's name
because the mere fact that the possibility GRANDE v. ANTONIO
that Julian would be discriminated in
Singapore is not one of the proper and Petitioner Grande and Antonio had two
reasonable causes for change name to be children born out of their illicit relationship
given. The court emphasized that in When they got separated, Antonio filed a
changing one's name, it is a privilege and petition to recognize filiation of the two
not a right. The mere request of a person children with prayer to change the surname
to change their name or to change their of the children from Grande to Antonio. The
son, or daughter's name, should still be RTC granted the petition. The CA affirmed
scrutinized by the court. with modifications. Petitioner questions the
decision ordering the change of surname of
Q: If the child is illegitimate and not her children. The SC held that the use of
recognized by the father, what middle the word "may" in Art. 176 of the FC readily
name should the child carry? shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
A: If the child is illegitimate and not child is under no compulsion to use the
recognized by the father, the child should surname of his illegitimate father. The word
not carry or have any middle name. "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.
Dean: If you use the middle name of the
mother and the last name of the mother, Can the father compel the use of his
you will confuse the identity of the child, surname upon recognition of his
because it would seem that the mother and illegitimate children?
the child are siblings. So, you should leave
the middle name blank. Later on, if the A: No. The provision uses the word “may”,
child is recognized by the father, then the not “shall”. Hence, it is not compulsory for
child can carry the surname of the father the child to use the surname of the father.
and the surname of the mother as the Under the rules of statutory construction, if
child's middle name. the law uses the word “may” it is not
mandatory but only permissive.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
BRIONES v. MIGUEL
D: If the child is an illegitimate child not
recognized by the father, the child should Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition
not carry a middle name. for Habeas Corpus against respondents
Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda
I have clients na abot-abot na sermon ang Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child
inabot dahil ang ginawa ay yung middle Michael Kevin Pineda. Petitioner alleges
name at surname ng nanay ang nilagay. that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
That can’t be, because if you use that, you illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P.
will confuse the identity of the child Miguel.who was born in Japan on
because lalabas na kapatid mo yan. So you September 17, 1996. The petitioner further
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alleges that he caused the minor child to be LEGITIMATION
brought to the Philippines so that he could
Art. 177. Only children conceived and
take care of him and send him to school.
born outside of wedlock of parents who,
According to the petitioner, his parents,
at the time of the conception of the
who are both retired and receiving monthly
former, were not disqualified by any
pensions, assisted him in taking care of the
impediment to marry each other may be
child.
legitimated.
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P.
Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the D: Prior to RA 9858 which amended Article
house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on 177 of the Family Code, if a child is born to
the pretext that they were visiting the two minors, e.g. 16 years old, assuming
minor child and requested that they be that at age 18 they got married without the
allowed to bring the said child for consent of their parents, under the old 177,
recreation at the SM Department the child cannot be legitimated by
store. However, the respondents did not subsequent marriage. But now, the
bring him back as promised by them. amendment specifically provides that if the
child was born to parents who are
The petitioner prays that the custody of his disqualified to marry because of their age,
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him they can now be legitimated.
as his biological father and [as] he has
demonstrated his capability to support and Before, they had to go through the process
educate him. of adoption, now no more. If the child is
born to 16 year old parents, who are
Can the father insist on his custody of married at the time they reach 18, the child
his illegitimate child after his is legitimated.
recognition?
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place
A: No. Having been born outside a valid
by a subsequent valid marriage between
marriage, the minor is deemed an
parents. The annulment of a viodable
illegitimate child of petitioner and
marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall D: If assuming that the parents later on
use the surname and shall be under the separated, the status of legitimation
parental authority of their mother, and shall not be affected because a voidable
shall be entitled to support in conformity marriage is valid until annulled.
with this Code." This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity. May a dead child be legitimated?
Obviously, Michael is a natural
("illegitimate," under the Family Code) A: Yes, because the law provides for the
child, as there is nothing in the records retroactive effect of the legitimation of the
showing that his parents were suffering child (Article 180, FC). This is also
from a legal impediment to marry at the supported by Article 181.
time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained
Art. 181. The legitimation of children
and pursuant to Article 176, parental
who died before the celebration of the
authority over him resides in his mother,
marriage shall benefit their
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
descendants.
father’s recognition of him.
What is the effect of the father’s
recognition? D: In effect, the law extends the effect of
R: The father still cannot be awarded legitimation even to children who are
custody of the child but he may be already dead before the marriage of their
compelled to give support. parents. This means, this is extended to the
D: From recognition by the father, the descendants of the legitimated child.
illegitimate child is entitled to: NB: Legitimation is available to child of
parents:
1. Use of the father’s surname;
2. Support; and 1. Who had no impediment to marry
3. Successional rights. each other; or
2. Were so disqualified to marry
However, as to custody, the illegitimate because of age.
father, to get custody from the mother,
must prove that the mother is unfit to The time of the conception is the
have custody of the child. reckoning point to determine whether a
Thus, he cannot get custody because the child can be legitimated.
law provides that the illegitimate child shall X and Y are married. Y had an affair
be under the sole parental authority of the with A while married to X. A became
illegitimate mother. pregnant. Before A gave birth, X died.
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Y and A subsequently got married. Can been convicted of any crime involving
the child be legitimated? moral turpitude; is of good moral character
A: No. The reckoning point is the time of and can model the same; is emotionally
conception. Since Y was suffering an and psychologically capable of caring for
impediment with A when the child was children; at least sixteen (16) years older
conceived, then the marriage of Y and A than the adoptee; and who is in a position
after the death of X cannot legitimate the to support and care for adopted children in
child. keeping with the means of the family:
DE SANTOS v. RTC Provided, That the requirement of sixteen
SUMMARY: Conchita Talag De Santos (16)-years difference between the age of
(respondent) married Antonio de Santos the adopter and the adoptee may be
and gave birth to 11 children. During that waived when the adopter is the biological
time, Antonio de Santos was still married parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
to Sofia Bona, thus, his marriage to the adoptee’s parent;
Conchita is considered “void from the (b) The legal guardian with respect to the
beginning” for being bigamous, it having ward after the termination of the
been contracted when a prior valid guardianship and clearance of financial
marriage was still subsisting. Respondent accountabilities;
now avers that her natural children by legal (c) The legal guardians with respect to the
fiction be legitimized. foster child;
(d) Philippine government officials and
ISSUE: Whether the children of Conchita
employees deployed or stationed abroad:
can be legitimized?
Provided, That they are able to bring the
RULING: No. Article 269 of the Civil Code child with them; and
expressly states: “Art. 269. Only natural (e) Foreign nationals who are permanent
children can be legitimated. Children born or habitual residents of the Philippines for
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time at least five (5) years possessing the same
of the conception of the former, were not qualifications as above stated for Filipino
disqualified by any impediment to marry nationals prior to filing of the petition:
each other, are natural.” In other words, a Provided, That they come from a country
child’s parents should not have been with diplomatic relations with the Republic
disqualified to marry each other at the time of the Philippines and that the laws of the
of conception for him to qualify as a adopter’s country will acknowledge the
“natural child.” Certificate of Adoption as valid,
acknowledge the child as a legal child of
In the case at bench, the marriage under the adopters, and allow entry of the child
question is considered “void from the into such country as an adoptee: Provided,
beginning” because bigamous, contracted further, That requirements of residency
when a prior valid marriage was still may be waived for the following:
subsisting. It follows that the children
begotten of such union cannot be (1) A former Filipino citizen, habitually
considered natural children proper for at residing in the Philippines, who seeks to
the time of their conception, their parents adopt a relative within fourth (4th) civil
were disqualified from marrying each other degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
due to the impediment of a prior subsisting (2) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
marriage. child of the Filipino spouse; or
(3) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
How is the estate of Dr. De Santos
and seeks to adopt jointly with the spouse
divided?
a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
A: The legitimate child gets 7.5 million of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
the 15 million, and the rest, if Conchita is spouse.
alive, she will get a share in the other half. Spouses shall jointly adopt, except in the
The legitime of an illegitimate child is ½ of following cases:
the share of the legitimate child, but since (a) If one spouse seeks to adopt the
the estate is not enough, whatever remains legitimate child of the other; or
of the free disposal will be divided between (b) If one spouse seeks to adopt own
the children. But here, Conchita became a illegitimate child: Provided, That the other
legal heir of the husband. Thus, yung spouse has signified consent thereto; or
kanyang share kukunin sa free disposal. So (c) If the spouses are legally separated
ang matitira lang sa mga anak nya na from each other.
illegitimate children ay only ¼ divided by
11. Section 22. Who May Be Adopted. –
The following may be adopted:
ADOPTION (a) Any child who has been issued a
CDCLAA;
Section 21. Who May Adopt. – The (b) The legitimate child of one spouse by
following may adopt: the other spouse;
(a) Any Filipino citizen at least twenty-five (c) An illegitimate child by a qualified
(25) years of age, who is in possession of adopter to improve status of legitimacy;
full civil capacity and legal rights; has not
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(d) A Filipino of legal age if, prior to the 1. Filipino citizen at least 25 years
adoption, said person has been of age
consistently considered and treated by the ● The age now of the qualified
adopters as their own child for a period of adopter has been changed to
at least three (3) years; 25 years old. You cannot
(e) A foster child; adopt unless you’re 25.
(f) A child whose adoption has been (Significance of 25 years old
previously rescinded; unknown to Dean.)
(g) A child whose biological or adoptive ● Requirement of good moral
parents have died: Provided, That no character was retained.
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) ● The age gap requirement of
months from the time of death of said 16 years was retained. In
parents; or other words, if you’re 25, the
(h) A relative of the adopter. youngest child you can adopt
is 9 years old.
Adoption is formerly governed by RA 8552 ● The exceptions to the 16
which is the law on domestic adoption, and year age gap was also
RA 9523. These were both repealed by RA retained.
11642. 2. Legal guardian with respect to
the ward
Most of the provisions of 11642 were lifted ● After termination of
from 8552 with minimal differences. guardianship and clearance
of financial accountabilities
Most significant change: Courts will no
3. Legal guardian with respect to
longer accept petitions for adoption
foster child
because jurisdiction over adoption is
● Foster child - a child who
now with the National Authority for
temporarily resides in the
Child Care (NACC).
family and is taken care of as
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11642, January 06, a family member.
2022 4. Philippine Government officials
and employees employed abroad
“Domestic Administrative Adoption ● Additional provision from
and Alternative Child Care Act” DACA
● may adopt subject to the
RA 11642, 06 January 2022
condition that they may
DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATIVE
bring the child abroad.
ADOPTION AND ALTERNATIVE CHILD
● This presupposes that the
CARE ACT (DAACCA)
child adopted was from a
Section 4 (j). Certificate Declaring a foreign country from their
Child Legally Available for Adoption station.
(CDCLAA) refers to the final written 5. Foreign nationals
administrative order issued by the NACC ● permitted to adopt but
declaring a child to be abandoned and residency requirement was
neglected, and committing such child to expanded from 3 years to 5
the care of the NACC through a foster years, subject to exceptions.
parent, guardian, or duly licensed child- ● Provided their country has
caring or child-placing agency. The diplomatic relations with the
rights of the biological parents, PH and that the laws of the
guardian, or other custodian to exercise adopter’s country will
authority over the child shall cease upon acknowledge the Certificate
issuance of the CDCLAA of Adoption as valid,
acknowledge the child as a
legal child of the adopters,
D: There must be an issuance of a
and allow entry of the child
Certificate Declaring a Child Legally
into such country as an
Available for Adoption (CDCLAA) before
adoptee.
adoption.
● Purpose: para hindi
Once the CDCLAA has been issued, the madisplace yung
parental authority of biological parents child. There are cases
shall cease. So the rights of the biological when even if the child
parents or the guardian over the child shall was legally adopted
cease and shall no longer have the right to by the foreigner, the
exercise over the child. child is not allowed
entry in the country
As to who may adopt and who may be of the foreigner.
adopted:
ADOPTION
Who may adopt?
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b. If the spouses are legally

Section 21. Who May Adopt. – The separated from each other
following may adopt:
. Any Filipino citizen at least

DEAN:
twenty-five (25) years of age, who is in
… yung residency requirement sa aliens
possession of full civil capacity and legal
is 5 years, except former Filipino citizen
rights; has not been convicted of any
seeking to adopt a relative by
crime involving moral turpitude; is of
consanguinity or affinity within the 4th
good moral character and can model the
degree that is also present as an exception
same; is emotionally and psychologically
under the old DAA or if the alien seeks to
capable of caring for children; at least
adopt his or her Filipino spouse, that is also
sixteen (16) years older than the
present in the DAA and one who's married
adoptee; and who is in a position to
to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt a
support and care for adopted children in
relative by consanguinity or affinity of the
keeping with the means of the family:
Filipino spouse within the 4th degree. So
Provided, That the requirement of
those are the exceptions to the residency
sixteen (16)-years difference between
requirement.
the age of the adopter and the adoptee
So, either the foreign national is a
may be waived when the adopter is the
permanent resident of the Philippines or is
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
habitually residing in the Philippines for at
spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
least 5 years prior to the filing of the
a. The legal guardian with respect to
Petition for adoption.
the ward after the termination of the
Kasi sa DAA tatlong taon lang diba, if you
guardianship and clearance of financial
recall the provision of the 8552.
accountabilities;
b. The legal guardians with respect
Now the general rule is that also the
to the foster child;
spouses shall JOINTLY adopt. Again, the
c. Philippine government officials
exceptions are, also present in the DAA, ni-
and employees deployed or stationed
retain lang din nila yung exceptions to the
abroad: Provided, That they are able to
joint adoption between husband and wife.
bring the child with them; and
d. Foreign nationals who are
1. If one of the spouse seeks to adopt
permanent or habitual residents of the
his or her own illegitimate child.—
Philippines for at least five (5) years
you cannot compel your spouse to
possessing the same qualifications as
join you in the adoption because
above stated for Filipino nationals prior
that may be a constant reminder of
to filing of the petition: Provided, That
your act of indiscretion
they come from a country with
2. If one spouse seeks to adopt the
diplomatic relations with the Republic of
legitimate child of the other
the Philippines and that the laws of the
spouse.—- bakit there is no need for
adopter’s country will acknowledge the
you to adopt your own legitimate
Certificate of Adoption as valid,
child kasi the purpose of the
acknowledge the child as a legal child of
adoption is to raise the status of the
the adopters, and allow entry of the child
child to legitimacy. So if the child is
into such country as an adoptee:
already your legitimate child, lets
Provided, further, That requirements of
say by a former marriage there
residency may be waived for the
would be none for you to adopt your
following:
legitimate child.
.A former Filipino citizen, habitually
3. If the spouses are legally
residing in the Philippines, who seeks to
separated.
adopt a relative within fourth (4th) civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
i.One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the Filipino spouse; or
ii.One who is married to a Filipino citizen Section 22. Who May Be Adopted. –
and seeks to adopt jointly with the The following may be adopted:
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the . Any child who has been issued a
Filipino spouse. CDCLAA;
a. The legitimate child of one
Spouses shall jointly adopt, except in the spouse by the other spouse;
following cases: b. An illegitimate child by a
. If one spouse seeks to adopt the qualified adopter to improve status of
legitimate child of the other; or legitimacy;
a. If one spouse seeks to adopt own c. A Filipino of legal age if, prior to
illegitimate child: Provided, That the the adoption, said person has been
other spouse has signified consent consistently considered and treated by
thereto; or
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the parents of the adopter, the legitimate
the adopters as their own child for a
siblings of the adopter and the legitimate
period of at least three (3) years;
descendants of the adopter.
d. A foster child;
So klinaro nila yan na kasali na, kasi ang
e. A child whose adoption has been
relationship created by the adoption based
previously rescinded;
on the Sayson ruling and the old law is only
f. A child whose biological or
between the adopter and the adopted
adoptive parents have died: Provided,
child.
That no proceedings shall be initiated
That is why an adopted child cannot
within six (6) months from the time of
previously represent because there is no
death of said parents; or
link or relationship created between the
g. A relative of the adopter
adopted child and the legitimate relatives
of the adopter.
But now under Section 41, it is clear that
adoption will create a relationship between
the adopted child and the legitimate
As for the question of who can be legally siblings, legitimate descendants as well as
adopted the first on the list: the parents of the adopter. So yung Sayson
(1) Any child who has been issued a no longer applies.
CDCLAA; — or a certificate declaring a child
for adoption. Who else,
(2) A legitimate child of one spouse by the
other spouse.
Section 23. Whose Consent is
(3) An illegitimate child by a qualified
Necessary to the Adoption. – After being
adopter to improve status of legitimacy
properly counseled and informed of the
(4) A Filipino of legal age if, prior to the
right to give or withhold approval of the
adoption, said person has been
adoption, the written consent of the
consistently considered and treated by the
following to the adoption are hereby
adopters as their own child for a period of
required:
at least three (3) years; —- parang inch
lang to, pareho lang ito sa provisioN sa
. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of
DAA, (5) A foster child can also be
age or over;
adopted and (5) A child whose biological
a. The biological parents of the
or adoptive parents have died: Provided,
child, if known, or the legal guardian, or
That no proceedings shall be initiated
the proper government instrumentality
within six (6) months from the time of
which has legal custody of the child,
death of said parents; and
except in the case of a Filipino of legal
(6) an adopted child whose adoption has
age if, prior to the adoption, said person
been rescinded. So those are the persons
has been consistently considered and
who may be adopted under the DAA.
treated as their own child by the
adopters for at least three (3) years;
b. The legitimate and adopted
children, ten (10) years of age or over,
Section 41. Legitimacy. – the adoptee of the adopters, if any
shall be considered the legitimate child of c. The illegitimate children, ten (10)
the adopter for all intents and purposes years of age or over, of the adopter if
and as such in entitled to all the rights living with said adopter or over whom the
and obligations provided by law to adopter exercises parental authority and
legitimate children born to them without the latter’s spouse, if any; and
discrimination of any kind. To this end, d. The spouse, if any, of the person
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, adopting or to be adopted.
and support in keeping with the means
of the family. The legitimate filiation that Provided, That children under ten (10)
is created between the adopter and years of age shall be counseled and
adoptee shall be extended to the consulted, but shall not be required to
adopter’s parents, adopter’s legitimate execute within consent.
siblings, and legitimate descendants. The
adopter is also given the right to choose
the name by which the child is to be
known, consistent with the best interest
Whose consent is necessary to the
of the child.
adoption? — same as the old provision,
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over; (b) The legitimate children of the
adopter, ten (10) years of age or over, of
So one very important effect of adoption the adopters, if any;
now which overruled the Sayson vs CA (c) the illegitimate children of the adopter,
case, is SECTION 41 of the new law which ten years of age or over, if living with said
extends the relationship created by the adopter; (d) the spouse of the adopter and
adoption not only to the adopter but also to the adoptee if any
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(e) biological parents if known, legal adopter and they made it clear in section
guardian or the proper government agency 41 that the relationship should extend to
having legal custody of the child. So these the legitimate siblings, the parents of the
are the persons who should give the adopter and the legitimate descendants, all
consent to the adoption. the more yung kanilang intent is made
evident by the now that they extend the
relationship to the relatives of the adopter.
Tsaka class, alam nyo yung practical
reason, you do not really tell the adopted
Section 43. Succession. – In testate
na “oi, adopted ka”, normally we do not do
and intestate succession, the adopters
that, I do not know of any family na
and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
sasabihin direst sa child, lalo na kung bata
rights of succession without distinction
pa yung child ng inadopt na dinidisclose
from legitimate filiations. However, if
nila na adopted and the records of the
the adoptees and their biological
adoption are suppose to be seen.
parents have left a will, the law on
So if a child grew up in a family, the
testamentary succession shall govern.
adopting parent, do we mean to say that
we will unearth records just for purposes of
determining whether they would be
DEAN: qualified as a reservee or not. Tsaka yung
So successional rights hindi nila binago Reserva Troncal class dapat wala naman na
yung provision ng DAA. It simply says that talaga yan sa 1950 Code eh, siningit lang
in testate and intestate succession, the yan, kaya tingnan nyo parang hindi sya
adopters and the adoptee shall have kasali dun sa legitime portion diba, parang
reciprocal rights of succession without misplaced sya as part of chapter on
distinction from legitimate filiations. legitime because the intention was to
However, if the adoptees and their abolish all reserva.
biological parents have left a will, the law It’s not only Reserva Troncal, there’s
on testamentary succession shall govern. reserva adaptiva, which is a reservation in
Yon medyo hindi ado agree dun but in favor of the adopted child under the old
expound nila what exactly is the right of the code yun 1889 at yung Reserva Viudal,
adopting parents over the child. Kasi kung which is reserva in favor of a widow.
the law on testamentary succession will But instead of repealing all nireinsert nila
govern they should have specified which yung reserva troncal dun sa 1950 Civil
part dba… medyo vague yung provision ng Code. The main intention was to remove
DACA as well as the DAA with respect to all, but we do not know for one reason or
the successional rights between the another what happened during the time
adopter and the adoptee. that they adopted the 1950 Civil Code,
reserva troncal was there all the other
For the cases on adoption just read them, articles supporting reserva troncal were
yung CASTRO vs GREGORIO yun at a omitted. Kaya lonely sya diba Art. 89 wala
yung walang consent yung wife, is that it? syang ibang kasamang article.
Yung closet homo, is this the case, if I recall
the case correctly, closet homosexual who QUESTION: I have read the case po of
adopted the illegitimate children, his Cabatania vs Regodos, it was said that the
“alleged” illegitimate children, pero hindi child was not recognized as an illegitimate
naman totoo na illegitimate children. Ang child kung petitioner pero yung nakalagay
paramour nya yung lalaki, kasi nga closet sa birth certificate nya is yun yung tatay,
homosexual sya. So for cases on adotion pero sabi ng Supreme Court kasi nasal
you just read the cases on adoption yung nanny nya sa iba, given the ruling
anyway we discussed the noted differences mam na hindi nag sya illegitimate child
between the DAA and the DACA. kung petitioner pero yun ang nakalagay,
sino yung tatay nya, legally mam..?
QUESTION: With respect to the extension
of the legal fiction between the adopter and DEAN: The legal husband. Same as
the adopted the relatives, does that mean Concepcion vs Almonte. Kahit hindi yung
that the adopted child can now be a yung legal husband yung nakalagay sa
reservee in terms of reserva troncal birth certificate. Sabi ko sa inyo, status nyo
because now since the relation is sa Facebook lang na its complicated lang.
extended?
SUPPORT
DEAN: If we pair Section 41 with the
successional rights, since the intention of
Art. 194. Support compromises
the law is to make the child as a legitimate
everything indispensable for sustenance,
child, dapat wala ng exception, “dapat” ha,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
pero hindi ako Supreme Court, kaya hindi
education and transportation, in keeping
ko pwedeng sabihin na yun na yun, baka
with the financial capacity of the family.
sabhin ng SC hoy, mali ka. But my opinion
is that, since the intention is to treat the The education of the person entitled to
adopted child as the legitimate child of the be supported referred to in the preceding
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paragraph shall include his schooling or liability shall devolve upon the following
training for some profession, trade or persons in the order herein provided:
vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include 1. The spouse;
expenses in going to and from school, or 2. The descendants in the nearest
to and from place of work. (290a) degree;
3. The ascendants in the nearest
Art. 105. Subject to the provisions of degree; and
the succeeding articles, the following are 4. The brothers and sisters. (294a)
obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding Art. 200. When the obligation to give
article: support falls upon two or more persons,
the payment of the same shall be divided
1. The spouses; between them in proportion to the
2. Legitimate ascendants and resources of each.
descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate However, in case of urgent need and by
children and the legitimate and special circumstances, the judge may
illegitimate children of the latter; order only one of them to furnish the
4. Parents and their illegitimate support provisionally, without prejudice
children and the legitimate and to his right to claim from the other
illegitimate children of the latter; obligors the share due from them.
and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, When two or more recipients at the same
whether of full or half-blood time claim support from one and the
(291a) same person legally obliged to give it,
should the latter not have sufficient
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not means to satisfy all claims, the order
legitimately related, whether of the full established in the preceding article shall
or half-blood, are likewise bound to be followed, unless the concurrent
support each other to the full extent set obligees should be the spouse and a child
forth in Article 194, except only when the subject to parental authority, in which
need for support of the brother or sister, case the child shall be preferred. (295a)
being of age, is due to a cause imputable
to the claimant's fault or negligence. Art. 201. The amount of support, in the
(291a) cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196,
shall be in proportion to the resources or
Art. 197. In case of legitimate means of the giver and to the necessities
ascendants; descendants, whether of the recipient. (296a)
legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers
and sisters, whether legitimately or Art. 202. Support in the cases referred
illegitimately related, only the separate to in the preceding article shall be
property of the person obliged to give reduced or increased proportionately,
support shall be answerable provided according to the reduction or increase of
that in case the obligor has no separate the necessities of the recipient and the
property, the absolute community or the resources or means of the person obliged
conjugal partnership, if financially to furnish the same
capable, shall advance the support,
which shall be deducted from the share
of the spouse obliged upon the
liquidation of the absolute community or DEAN: Support covers everything from
of the conjugal partnership. (n) sustenance, food, clothing, medical
attendance, transportation in keeping the
Art. 198. During the proceedings for financial capacity of the family. Who are
legal separation or for annulment of obliged to support each other? Of course
marriage, and for declaration of nullity of not only the husband and the wife but the
marriage, the spouses and their children parents and the legitimate and illegitimate
shall be supported from the properties of children of the latter, parents and their
the absolute community or the conjugal illegitimate children, legitimate and
partnership. After the final judgment illegitimate children of the latter, brothers
granting the petition, the obligation of and sisters whether full or half-blood. In
mutual support between the spouses fact under Article 196 illegitimate brothers
ceases. However, in case of legal and sisters are also bound to support each
separation, the court may order that the other to the full extent mentioned in Art.
guilty spouse shall give support to the 194, big sabihin kung ano yung supporta
innocent one, specifying the terms of na binibigay natin sa legitimate sibling yun
such order. (292a) din ang dapat na support na binibigay sa
illegitimate siblings EXCEPT if the need for
Art. 199. Whenever two or more support of the legitimate brother or sister
persons are obliged to give support, the is imputable to his own fault or negligence.
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For example, if the sibling is of age, able towards having him fulfill the same.
bodied, hindi naman mangmang pero ayaw However, in 1995, Lea filed for support
magtrabaho gusto lang mag Netflix, you against Edward. RTC granted support
can refuse support if that is the reason why pendent lite and ultimately granted support
he is in need of support because under Art. in a cumulative amount of 2.45 Million for
196, its clear that if the need for support is the 18 years of support. The CA affirmed
due to a cause imputable to his own fault the RTC. SC ruled that there is no need for
or negligence you can refuse to give a judicial demand in order to establish a
support. demand for support and that it an be seen
from the evidence that Lea has already
What are the factors considered in exerted efforts to demand support.
granting support? Furthermore, the SC also ruled that Edward
It is always based on 2 things. First is the needs to reimburse Noel the brother of Lea
means of the giver and the necessities of the amount that he has given to support
the recipient. You cannot be compelled to the sisters.
give support in the amount of 50K if you
are only earning 30K because it is always DEAN:
based on what the giver can give and what So, the SC said a demand is no less than a
the receiver needs that is the basis of demand just because it was made in a form
granting support. Of course there is also an of a request or a plea. Hindi naman
order of preference when 2 or more kailangan na legal demand ang gagawin ng
persons are in need of support, the order lawyer because that was one of the main
mentioned in Article 199, spouses, arguments of the husband that he cannot
descendants nearest in degree, ascendants be liable for support in arrears because
nearest in degree and brothers and sisters. while support is demandable from the time
So if there are 2 persons in need of support, the children/person needs it not be paid
the resources of the giver are not sufficient except for judicial demand. So the main
to answer for all, the order established in argument was, there was no demand, so
Art. 199 shall be followed EXCEPT if the he cannot be held liable for support in
persons in need of support are the arrears. But that is not the correct
following: the spouse, a child under argument according to the Supreme Court
parental authority, kasi sa 199 na Ana yung because there was a demand only not in a
spouse, sumunod yung descendants under legalistic form that lawyers know of. So it
the nearest degree, pero kapag sila yung was a letter written by Lea requesting that
nangangailangan ng support, yung spouse Edward comply with his obligation to give
at descendants in the nearest degree, the support. So the court ruled that he is liable
child who is under parental authority will be for support in arrears in 2.4 Million pesos.
preferred over the spouse. So, kapag
kailangan ng beer ng daddy at kailangan ng
gatas ang anak, alam na this..ano yung
una, syempre gatas. So you do not ask
support from your parents if you are LIM-LUA VS LUA
married, you ask support from your
spouse. If your spouse cannot support, go Susan filed a petition against Danilo for a
to your nearest descendants and pag wala declaration of nullity of marriage with a
pa rin talagang means to give, you go to prayer for support pendente lite for herself
your ascendants, nearest in degree also and her two children amounting to
and lastly brothers and sisters. Wag P500,000.00 per month citing respondent’s
magtatampo sa mga siblings pag hindi huge earnings from salaries and dividends
makapagbigay ng allowance lalo na kung in several companies and businesses here
yung sibling nyo ay married kasi hindi kayo and abroad.
ang primary obligation ng sibling, yung
family nya, yung spouse nya, yung Dean: How much was granted? The
descendants nya not the brother or sister. support?
R: The RTC granted support pendent lite of
250,000.00
LACSON VS LACSON Dean: per month?
R: 250,000 per month
This case is about 2 sisters and their
mother, where from 1976 to 1994 or for a
period of 18, shuttled from one dwelling CA changed the amount of support to P
place to another not their own. It appears 115,000. CA ordered the deduction of the
that from the start of their estrangement, amount of a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from
Lea, the mother, did not badger her the current total support in arrears (larger
husband Edward for support, relying amount to be deducted from support in
initially on his commitment memorialized in arrears; because two expensive cars
a note dated December 10, 1975 to give bought by respondent for his children plus
support to his daughters.As things turned their maintenance cost, plus travel and
out, however, Edward reneged on his grocery expenses were included in the
promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts deduction). It held that the trial court
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should not have completely disregarded refusal to support his minor child with
the expenses incurred by respondent petitioner since 1995.
consisting of the purchase and
maintenance of the two cars, payment of The issue here is whether or not a foreign
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit national has an obligation to support his
card purchases involving groceries, dry minor child under Philippine law? The SC
goods and books, which certainly inured to rule in affirmative.
the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother as well. Dean: So will he be liable for violation of
RA 9262?
Issue: W/N certain expenses already R: Yes, he can be liable.
incurred by Danilo be deducted from the
support of total amount of arrears? The SC ruled, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Since the law of
The SC held that necessary for sustenance the Netherlands has not been properly
and household expenses already incurred pleaded and proved, it is presumed to be
by the respondent may be deducted from the same with Philippine law, which
the total support in arrears owing to enforces the obligation of parents to
petitioner and her children. Although the support their children and penalizing the
amount fixed by the trial court was reduced non-compliance therewith.
on appeal, it is clear that the monthly The Court further ruled that even if the law
support pendente lite of P115,000.00 of the Netherlands neither enforce a
ordered by the CA was intended primarily parent’s obligation to support his child nor
for the sustenance of petitioner and her penalize the non-compliance therewith,
children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of such obligation is still duly enforceable in
drivers and house helpers, and other the Philippines because it would be of great
household expenses. There is no injustice to the child to be denied of
controversy as to the sufficiency and financial support when the latter is entitled
reasonableness of monthly support thereto.
pendente lite as it was not appealed by The respondent may be made liable under
either party. The dispute concerns the RA 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to
deductions made by respondent in settling give support to petitioner’s son as this is
the support in arrears. The CA should not considered an act of violence against
allowed all to deduct the expenses from the women and children. As to the jurisdiction,
support pende lite. he territoriality principle finds application in
criminal law. It is indisputable that the
Dean: With respect to credit card alleged continuing acts of respondent in
expenses, what are the deductible refusing to support his child is committed
according from the SC? here in the Philippines as all of the parties
R: Those are dry goods such are groceries herein are residence of the Province of
may be deductible. Cebu City. As such, our courts have
Dean: Kasi part yan ng support by Article territorial jurisdiction over the offense
194 of FC or sustenance, dba? Clothing, charged against respondent. Jurisdiction
kasama yan from the support in arrears over the respondent was likewise acquired
and other expenses incurred through the upon his arrest.
use of credit card. The SC ruled that the CA
committed an error in deducting Dean: Okay, then therefore?
everything, di pwedeng i-deduct mo lahat R: The arrest made to respondent is valid.
yun noh. Dapat yung may kinalman lang sa Kasi territorial, kasi if he violates it, that is
support. our penal laws. Is he subject to our penal
laws?
DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM R: Yes, because of territoriality principle.
Dean: Kaya yan ginawang criminal offense,
This is a case for support where Norma maraming di nagsu-support based on RA
Del Socorro asked for support and 9262.
respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount CASE: DAVID VS CA
of 250 Guildene (equivalent to This is part of parental authority but it has
Php17,500.00 more or less), but never support part on it.
respondent did not fulfil his promise. Some
time later, respondent came to the The case involves Daisy David who had an
Philippines and remarried in affair with married man, Ramon Villar and
Pinamungahan, Cebu. He and his new wife children were born to them and later the
established a business known as Paree legal wife of Ramon Villar came to know the
Catering. relationship between her husband and
Socorro filed a complaint against Daisy David and in fact the youngest
respondent for violation of Section 5, par illegitimate child was introduced the family
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence and the wife of Ramon Villar became of
Against Women and Their Children Act of fond of the youngest Christopher such that
2004 or “VAWC”) for the latter’s unjust they were often bring the young
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Christopher to their family trips and once parental authority over the child in the
such trip was one trip to Boracay and after order indicated:
the trip to Boracay, the wife of Ramon Villar
refused to return the child to the mother, (1) The surviving grandparent, as
Daisy David. So there was a custody battle provided in Art. 214;
with Daisy David and Ramon Villar. It
ended with the CA awarded custody to the (2) The oldest brother or sister, over
father on the ground that the obligation to twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
give support can be fulfiilled in two disqualified; and
ways:one is by giving fixed monthly
allowance and second, by maintaining in (3) The child’s actual custodian, over
the family dwelling the person who has the twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
right to be supported. Apparently, the disqualified.
Court of Appeals shows the second option
which is to the custody to the illegitimate Whenever the appointment or a judicial
father and allowing him the child in the guardian over the property of the child
family dwelling. The CA’s decision was becomes necessary, the same order of
reversed by the Supreme Court. The preference shall be observed.
second alternative cannot be availed of as
a legal or moral obstacle theret. Child is Dean: Please note that parents are still
illegitimate, there is a legal obstacle preferred over any other person and get
because under Article 176 of F, illegitimate custody from the parents, you have to
child be under the sole parental authority show that both of them are dead, absent or
of the mother. The CA was wrong in unsuitable DAU.
awarding the custody of the child to the
father. And the only way to satisfy the Q: Who are the persons entitled to
obligation of the illegitimate father is by exercise substitute parental
giving a fixed monthly allowance. authority?
A:
PARENTAL AUTHORITY 1. The surviving grandparent
● The grandparent chosen by
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right the court)
and duty of parents over the person and ● The Court will decide for the
property of their unemancipated best interest of the child who
children, parental authority and is the grandparent who
responsibility shall include the caring for should be awarded custody.
and rearing them for civic consciousness 2. Oldest brother and sister of that
and efficiency and the development of minor over 21
their moral, mental and physical ● Unless unfit or disqualified
character and well-being. 3. The child’s actual custodian over 21
years of age
Q: What is the scope of parental ● Unless unfit or disqualified
authority?
A: This refers to the natural and primary Parental authority cannot be renounced
right of the parents over the person and except that in cases authorized by law.
property of their children. This parental
authority is supposed to be exercised Q: What are instances when it can be
jointly by the father and mother. renounced?
A: Transferred or terminated. Let us say,
Only in case of absence, death or for example, if the child is put into adoption
unsuitability DAU of both parents that voluntarily committed to the National
other persons may exercise substitute Authority for Child Care (NACC), previously
parental authority. DSWD.
The rule is that both parents should SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

exercise concurrent or joint parental
authority over their children but in the In the event of the minor under the
event of death, absence or unsuitability of supervision, custody or instruction of the
one, the parent present or suitable school, there is yet another type of
continues to exercise parental authority. authority which is the special type of
But in the event that both of them are authority.
dead, absent, unsuitable, the persons
mentioned under Article 216 of the Family Art. 218. The school, its administrators
Code can now exercise substitute parental and teachers, or the individual, entity or
authority. institution engaged in child are shall
have special parental authority and
Art. 216. In default of parents or a responsibility over the minor child while
judicially appointed guardian, the under their supervision, instruction or
following person shall exercise substitute custody.
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Authority and responsibility shall apply to A: The mother can give more care because
all authorized activities whether inside or children of tender age need their mother
outside the premises of the school, entity during the time of growing up.
or institution. ● The reason it’s called tender age
presumption is precisely because of the
Tip: Minsan pinapadefine lang nila kung age of the child.
ano yung special, substitute, as simple as ● A child of tender years is best left to the
that. I guess, he would give some of the care of the mother who is presumed by
definitions. Pag hindi niyo alam yung law to be the best custodian or best
distinctions, alin ang alin, you will have person who can give the child the care
time answering your questions. and nurturing that it needs.
● It is also the principle under Article 213
Q: Who exercises special parental which is the maternal preference
authority? rule.
A:
SATEII
1. School Art. 213. In case of separation of the
2. Adminsitrators parents, parental authority shall be
3. Teachers exercised by the parent designated by
4. Individual the Court. The Court shall take into
5. Entity account all relevant considerations,
6. Institution especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent
Engaged in childcare shall exercise special chosen is unfit.
parental authority over the MISC.
No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother unless the
1. Minor child under their Court finds compelling reasons to order
2. Instruction otherwise.
3. Supervision
4. Custody The choice of the parent to whom custody
must be awarded is not a mere ministerial
Dean: For the liability to attach to the function on the part of the COurt. Because
school, first the child must be a minor and in all cases of custody, the Court should
under the instruction, supervision, custody take all relevant considerations including
of the school. the choice of the child over seven (7) years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit or
The special parental authority is exercised disqualified to have custody.
by the school while the child is under the
instruction or supervision or custody and As I said under Article 213, the
this applies to all activities whether outside presumption of the law is that the child is
the school or inside the school provided best left to the mother if the child is below
that it is authorized by the school. This seven (7) years of age. But this
applies to all authorized activities whether presumption is rebuttable.
on on-campus or off-campus.
SANTOS v. CA and SPS. BEDIA
CARAM v ATTY. SEGUI (2014)
Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia had one
The petition for Writ of Amparo is an son. Julia left for the US and cannot be
incorrect remedy to get the custody of the located anymore. From the time the boy
child. In this case, there was no enforced was released from the hospital until
disappearance, or extralegal killings sometime thereafter, he had been in the
involved. It was not an enforced care and custody of his maternal
disappearance because there was no grandparents who paid for all the support
arrest, detention or abduction that for the boy. Later on, Santos allegedly
deprived the liberty of her son. Caram is kidnapped his own child from his parents-
actually notified by the memorandum of in-law (grandparents). The lower courts
the DSWD, which states that the child is awarded custody to the grandparents.
actually with the Medina spouses. Likewise, However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor
in the court, they showed Julian to Caram. of Santos, Sr. holding that he should not be
deprived of custody. Being a military man
Q: What do you understand about cannot detract from being a father.
tender age presumption? Moreover, the law vests on the father and
A: This is under Article 213 wherein the mother joint parental authority over the
child below the age of seven (7) should not persons of their common children. In case
be separated from their mother. of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising
Q: Why does the law prefer the mother parental authority. Only in case of the
as the custodian of the child if the child parents' death, absence or unsuitability
is below 7?
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may substitute parental authority be Reynaldo and Teresita separated. Teresita
exercised by the surviving grandparent. blamed Renaldo for the break-up, stating
that he was always nagging her about
Q: What is the reason why the lower money. On the other hand, Reynaldo
courts granted custody to the contended that Teresita was a spendthrift
grandparents? who bought expensive jewelries and
A: Because the grandparents took care of antique furniture instead of attending to
the child since he was born and the household expenses.
grandparents are well-off.
Ruling: The law vests on the father and Teresita left Reynaldo and the children,
mother joint parental authority over the while Renayldo brought the children home
persons of their common children. In case in the Philippines Unfortunately, he had to
of absence or death of either parent, the leave his children with his sister because
parent present shall continue exercising his assignment in Pittsburgh (USA) was not
parental authority. Only in case of the yet completed.
parents' death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be Teresita claimed that he did not
exercised by the surviving grandparent. immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy
The grandparents’ wealth is not a deciding against her and she was afraid of being
factor, particularly because there is no arrested. The judgment of conviction in the
proof that at the present time, petitioner is bigamy case was actually rendered only on
in no position to support the boy. The fact September 29, 1994. Teresita, meanwhile,
that he was unable to provide financial decided to return to the Philippines and on
support for his minor son from birth up to December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for
over three years when he took the boy from a writ of habeas corpus against herein two
his in-laws without permission, should not petitioners to gain custody over the
be sufficient reason to strip him of his children.
permanent right to the child's custody.
The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. On the other hand, the CA reversed
Q: What is the main objection of the the decision of the RTC and granted the
grandparents why they did not want custody to Teresita.
the father to have the custody?
Issue: Who between the parents is
A: It has something to do with his job. He qualified
is not well-off, and he is not always present
by nature of his job because he is part of Ruling: The father.
the army. He cannot take care of his child
because of his military assignments. The SC held that the task of choosing the
parent to whom custody shall be awarded
The SC held that his being a soldier is is not a ministerial function to be
likewise no bar to allowing him custody determined by a simple determination of
over the boy. So many men in uniform who the age of a minor child. Whether a child is
are assigned to different parts of the under or over seven years of age, the
country in the service of the nation, are still paramount criterion must always be the
the natural guardians of their children. It is child's interests.
not just to deprive our soldiers of authority,
care and custody over their children merely In ascertaining the welfare and best
because of the normal consequences of interests of the child, courts are mandated
their duties and assignments, such as by the Family Code to take into account all
temporary separation from their families. relevant considerations. If a child is under
seven years of age, the law presumes that
Dean: Merely delegating custody, say to the mother is the best custodian. The
his sister, is not enough to disqualify him presumption is strong but it is not
from having custody of his child. While he conclusive. It can be overcome by
may be remiss of his duties as a husband, "compelling reasons". If a child is over
he is trying to make up and start by having seven, his choice is paramount but, again,
custody of their child. The SC granted him the court is not bound by that choice. In its
custody over Leouel Santos Jr. discretion, the court may find the chosen
parent unfit and award custody to the other
ESPIRITU V. CA parent, or even to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances.
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding
married each other. Their relationship In the present case, both Rosalind and
produced two (2) children: Rosalind Reginald are now over seven years of age.
Therese and Reginald Vince. The family Both are studying in reputable schools and
used to live in the US. appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite
capable of thoughtfully determining the
parent with whom they would want to live.
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Once the choice has been made, the exercised by the parent designated by
burden returns to the court to investigate if the Court. The Court shall take into
the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume account all relevant considerations,
parental authority and custodial especially the choice of the child over
responsibility. seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
Instead of scrutinizing the records to
discover the choice of the children and CASE: PEREZ v. CA
rather than verifying whether that parent is
fit or unfit, the CA simply followed statutory The Spouses Ray and Nerissa Perez were
presumptions and general propositions married in Cebu in 1986. After six
applicable to ordinary or common miscarriages, two operations and a high-
situations. The seven-year age limit was risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth
mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20,
period and not a guide based on a strong 1992. Nerissa was a nurse in New York,
presumption. while Ray was a medical doctor, who was
not making enough money for their family.
The Supreme Court sustained the findings
of the RTC when it gave greater attention After Nerissa gave birth, they went home
to the choice of Rosalind and considered in in the Philippines. After a few weeks,
detail all the relevant factors bearing on the Nerissa went back to the United States to
issue of custody. It considered that work again as a nurse, and Ray stayed to
statements of: take care of his sick mother, with a promise
1. A psychologist which stated that to follow her with their baby. On the other
Rosalind’s responses toward her hand, Ray argued that they had agreed to
mother were very negative. reside permanently in the Philippines but
2. A social welfare officer which stated once Nerissa was in New York, she changed
that Rosalind refused to go back to her mind and continued working. She was
the US and to be reunited with her supposed to come back immediately after
mother because she felt unloved winding up her affairs there.
and uncared for. The child was
found suffering from emotional When Nerissa went back to the Philippines
shock caused by her mother's before her son’s first birthday, the spouses
infidelity. were no longer on good terms, and her son
is being kept away from her by her
The children are now both over seven years husband. Hence, she filed a petition for
old. Their choice of the parent with whom habeas corpus praying for the custody of
they prefer to stay is clear from the record. their son, which was granted by the RTC,
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit citing Article 213 of the Family Code. The
person, thus meeting the two requirements CA, however, reversed the RTC decision,
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 citing that it is of the best interest of the
of the Family Code. The presumption under child to stay in the Philippines in the
the second paragraph of said article no custody of his father.
longer applies as the children are over
seven years. Assuming that the Issue: Whether or not the custody of the
presumption should have persuasive value one-year old child Ray should be awarded
for children only one or two years beyond to the mother pursuant to Article 213 of the
the age of seven years mentioned in the Family Code.
statute, there are compelling reasons and
relevant considerations not to grant Ruling: Yes, custody over the minor Ray Z.
custody to the mother. The children Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein
understand the unfortunate shortcomings petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. When the
of their mother and have been affected in parents of the child are separated,
their emotional growth by her behavior. Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. The separation
contemplated in this provision is not limited
Q: When is the reckoning point in to legal separation. It can still apply if the
determining the age of the child? Is it parents are de facto separated.
the age at the time of filing of the
petition or the time of the granting of In addition, under the tender-age
the custody? presumption, the mother shall have the
parental over the child, especially if the
Dean: The Court clarified that it should be child is under seven years old. Only the
the age of the child at the time that the most compelling of reasons shall
custody is awarded to the parent, and not justify the court's awarding the
the age of the child when the petition was custody of such a child to someone
filed. other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental
Art. 213 (FC). In case of separation of authority.
the parents, parental authority shall be
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Dean: So, even if the child is being brought took Queenie from the school where he had
by the mother in a day care center while enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie
she works as a nurse, that does not prove back, Renalyn’s parents refused and
that she is unfit, because that was basically instead showed a copy of a Special Power
what the father was alleging. The SC said of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn
that it is not enough to declare a mother granting full parental rights, authority, and
unfit to care for their child. In the past the custody over Queenie to them.
following grounds have been considered Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition
ample justification to deprive a mother of for habeas corpus and child custody before
custody and parental authority: neglect, the RTC (petition a quo).
abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug A hearing was conducted where Renalyn
addiction, maltreatment of the child, brought Queenie and expressed the desire
insanity and being sick with a for her daughter to remain in her custody.
communicable disease.
RULING: As a general rule, the father and
CASE: MASBATE v. RELUCIO the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to children. However, insofar as illegitimate
Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been children are concerned, Article 176 of the
living together with Renalyn’s parents Family Code states that illegitimate
without the benefit of marriage. Three children shall be under the parental
years later, the relationship ended. authority of their mother.
Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving
Queenie behind in the care and custody of Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are
her father, Ricky James. entitled to the sole parental authority of
their illegitimate children (such as
Ricky James alleged that Spouses Renata Queenie), notwithstanding the father’s
and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn’s parents) recognition of the child. In the exercise of
took Queenie from the school where he had that authority, mothers are consequently
enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie entitled to keep their illegitimate children in
back, Renalyn’s parents refused and their company, and the Court will not
instead showed a copy of a Special Power deprive them of custody, absent any
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn imperative cause showing the mother’s
granting full parental rights, authority, and unfitness to exercise such authority and
custody over Queenie to them. care.
Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition
for habeas corpus and child custody before In addition, Article 213 of the same Code
the RTC (petition a quo). provides for the so-called tender-age
presumption, stating that “no child under
The RTC ruled that the custody of the seven (7) years of age shall be separated
three-year old Queenie rightfully belongs to from the mother unless the court finds
Renalyn, citing Article 213. The CA assailed compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
the RTC decision and remanded to the
lower court for determination of who should Dean: The custodial regime under Article
exercise custody over Queenie, stating that 213 is limited in duration, lasting only in
there was allegations of Renalyn neglecting the child’s 7th year. In the 8th year up to
Queenie. The CA cited ection 18 of A.M. No. the age of majority, the spouses subject to
03-04-04-SC, which states that, “after the usual contractual limitations may
trial, the court shall render judgment decide on the custody of the child. The
awarding the custody of the minor to the court is also not bound by the choice of the
proper party considering the best interests child if the parent chosen by the child is
of the minor,” the CA declared that the unfit.
dismissal by the RTC of the petition a quo
was not supported by the Rules. It will also be based on all relevant
considerations. One of them is the choice
of the child unless the parent chosen is
MASBATE v. RELUCIO unfit to have custody.
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Parents are the ones preferred in the
Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been matter of custody. The moment they are
living together with Renalyn’s parents *inaudible*, the grandparents can now
without the benefit of marriage. Three have custody of their children. But between
years later, the relationship ended. the parents and grandparents, the parents
Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving have greater custody over the child.
Queenie behind in the care and custody of
her father, Ricky James. VANCIL v. BELMES
Ricky James alleged that Spouses Renata Bonifacia Vancil here is the grandmother of
and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn’s parents) the illegitimate children of Redeer Vancil,
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his predeceased child. Ellen Belmes here is unless it is proven that the former acted
the respondent, the mother of 2 illegitimate with the diligence of a good father of a
children of Redeer. family to prevent such damages.
When Redeer died, Bonifacia wants to take However, under the Family Code, this civil
custody of the children of Ellen Belmes and liability is now, without such alternative
take them to the US. On the issue of who qualification, the responsibility of the
is preferred in the custody of the child, the parents and those who exercise parental
SC said it is Helen because as the authority over the minor offender. For civil
illegitimate mother under Art. 176, the liability arising from quasi-delicts
illegitimate child shall be under the sole committed by minors, the same rules
parental authority of the mother. shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180
and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
Q: How do you get custody from the
mother considering that Art. 176 In the case at bar, whether the death of the
confers upon her the sole PA over the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
child? felony or a quasi-delict committed by
Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err
A: You have to go through the channel of in holding petitioners liable for damages
proving that she is unfit for custody. arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding
modifications of the premises relied upon
SC: Respondent, being the natural mother by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
of the minor, has the preferential right over imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in
that of petitioner to be his guardian. its findings that said petitioners failed to
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor duly exercise the requisite
Vincent, respondent has the corresponding diligentissimi patris familias to
natural and legal right to his custody. prevent such damages.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, The liability of parents are PRIMARY and
can exercise substitute parental authority not subsidiary
only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering We believe that the civil liability of parents
that respondent is very much alive and has for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
exercised continuously parental authority contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil
over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In
asserting her right to be the minor's fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code
guardian, respondent's unsuitability. which provides for solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the
Petitioner, however, has not proffered act or omission, in this case the minor and
convincing evidence showing that the father and, in case of his death of
respondent is not suited to be the guardian incapacity, the mother, are solidarily
of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that liable.
respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Accordingly, such parental liability is
Valerie considering that her (respondent's) primary and not subsidiary, hence the last
live-in partner raped Valerie several times. paragraph of Article 2180 provides that "(t)
But Valerie, being now of major age, is no he responsibility treated of in this article
longer a subject of this guardianship shall cease when the persons herein
proceeding. mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
LIABILITY OF THOSE EXERCISING prevent damages."
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes
Q: Why do you think it is important for the parents primarily respond for such
us to determine who is exercising damages is buttressed by the
parental authority at any given point? corresponding provisions in both codes that
the minor transgressor shall be answerable
A: If the child is under the parental or shall respond with his own property only
authority of the parents, then the parents in the absence or in case of insolvency of
shall be civilly liable for the acts or the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi
omissions of the minor child causing delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil
damage to another due to the principle of Code states that "(i)f the minor causing
vicarious liability. damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
LIBI v. IAC property in an action against him where a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed."
SC: The parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising Dean: Primary liability devolves upon the
from criminal offenses committed by their parents.
minor children under their legal authority
or control, or who live in their company,
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Q: Will this hold true even if the child
is over 18? R: Yes, Mam. In this case there is civil
liability even though there is no parental
A: YES. In this case, the child was still living authority.
with the parents.
Dean: Kasi di naman nila sinabing yung
Dean: Parental liability is based on parental emancipation nabago yung definition kasi
authority. ang definition nila, ay the effect of
emancipation is to terminate parental
However, under the present provision of authority. And yet, the law makes the
Family Code, particularly Article 236, the parents liable for the acts of the child
FC still makes reference to Art. 2180 as the although emancipated.
governing article for purposes of
determining civil liability for a quasi-delict Do you follow? Parang, it seems absurd the
committed by a child. law declares the child emancipated, which
by the way terminates parental authority,
If the child is over 18, but below 21, and and therefore, technically, there is no
living in the company of the parents, the parental authority, hence there is no
parents are still liable. parental liability.
Again, the second question, do you think But here we have a case of parental liability
that we have a case of parental liability without parental authority.
without parental authority?
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS.
R: There should be parental authority for CARPITANOS
the parents to be held liable because this
holds true in our culture because normally
ages 18 is still living with the parents. In FAST FACTS: Sherwin Carpitanos, son of
other cases, there are also instances where respondents Carpitanos, died in an
the parents of a child over 18 is also liable accident caused by the detachment of the
because the child is still living with the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
parents. respondent Villanueva. The vehicle was
then driven by James Daniel II, a minor.
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause The incident occurred during an enrollment
shall terminate parental authority over drive conducted by petitioner academy
the person and property of the child who where Sherwin was a student. Sherwin's
shall then be qualified and responsible parents filed an action for damages against
for all acts of civil life, save the petitioner and the other respondents. The
exceptions established by existing laws trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's
in special cases parents ordering petitioner to pay civil
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin,
Contracting marriage shall require actual and moral damages, and attorney's
partental consent until the age of 21 fees under Articles 218 and 219 of the
Family Code, and declared respondents
Nothing in this Code shall be construed Daniel subsidiarily liable. Respondent
to derogate from the duty or Villanueva was absolved from any liability.
responsibility of parents and guardians
for children and wards below 21 years of The Court held that there was no evidence
age mentioned in the second and third that petitioner allowed the minor to drive
paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. the jeep and that the proximate cause of
the accident was a mechanical defect in the
Dean: Emancipation terminates parental vehicle, thus, petitioner may not be held
authority, and the child shall be qualified liable for the death of Sherwin. However,
for all acts of civil life. as the registered owner of the vehicle,
Villanueva was held primarily liable for the
So the law itself terminates parental death of Sherwin.
authority once the child reaches 18 years
old.
NOTE:
But, under the same Article 236, it refers
to Art. 2180 for purposes of determining The following shall have special parental
civil liability or persons civilly liable for the authority over a minor child while under
act of the child. And under Art. 2180, the their supervision, instruction or custody:
parents are liable if the child, although over (1) the school, its administrators and
18, but below 21. teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in childcare. This
So do we have a case for parental liability applies to all authorized activities, whether
without parental authority? inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity, or institution. They are
Kapag ba lumabas sa definition ng 236? principally and solidarily liable for damages
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caused by the acts or omissions of the part of the school to provide a healthy and
unemancipated minor while under their safe environment pero the school was
supervision, instruction, or custody. exonerated by the court in that case.
However, for petitioner to be liable, the act
or omission considered as negligent must So, it is not enough that there is damage
be the proximate cause of the injury or injury cause to another by the minor
caused because the negligence must have while under the supervision of the school.
a causal connection to the accident Because to make the school liable, the
negligence of the school must be the
Under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family proximate cause of the injury, and not
Code, for the school to be principally and merely the remote cause.
solidarily liable for the acts of its students,
the latter's negligence must be the In this case, the Court said that it is not the
proximate cause of the injury. proximate cause of the death of Sherwin,
because kahit school yan, the school
cannot be an insurer of all risks.
Dean: The person driving the jeepney
would actually hand over the wheel to a Student Q: Could the Tamargo case be
minor child. So as I have said a while ago, considered a case where there is no
the school, although it is bound to protect parental authority but there is no parental
and to educate the children, they cannot be liability? Since in that case, the adoption
an insurer of all risk. has terminated the parental authority but
still the natural parents were made liable
Let’s remove it from the factual scenario in since the child was still in their custody?
the St. Mary’s case. Let’s suppose a student
while on campus was going down stairs. Dean: The natural parents still had custody
Bumababa ng hagdan. Walang obstruction at the time the accident happened, that is
sa stairs, biglang nadulas ang bata, why they were still be liable. You cannot
nahulog. Do you mean to say automatically charge the adopting parents of negligence
the liability will attach to the school or let’s at the time they had no physical custody of
say tinulak ng kaklase, liability will attach the child.
to the school? In all cases where you award
damages, you have to prove negligence. The parental authority is still exercised by
the natural parents.
In this particular case, unfortunately, the
plaintiff failed to prove the negligence of Student Q: Yes but under the law, isn’t it
the school. Kasi kung quasi-delict, anong that the parental authority is already
elements ng quasi-delict? There’s an act or terminated by virtue of the effective decree
omission causing damage to another due to of adoption?
fault or negligence. So without the third
element, fault or negligence, there could be Dean: Yes, but the adoption was granted
no quasi-delict. Dun naman sa contractual later. The incident happened before the
relationship, the primary obligation is to grant of adoption. That is why in Tamargo,
provide the education of the student. The the liability was still with the natural
ratio of the SC is not the negligence, if any, parents.
was not the proximate cause of the death
of the student. Ang effect lang niya, nag-retroact siya, but
if you come to think of it, how can the
Question from student: In relation to adopting parents exercise parental
Article 218 authority over the adopted child if the child
Dean: Basta minor lang ung 218 class. If is still under the custody of the natural
you read 218, MISC nga eh (Minor under parents at the time of the incident?
Instruction, Supervision and Custody)
Note: Custody here is PHYSICAL custody.
Follow up: College considered under the
custody of parents - May parental liability Student Q: In Vancil vs. Belmes, the SC
pa rin baa ng school for college students for noted that Bonifacio was abroad, so he just
the acts or omission casing damage to delegated parental authority to another
another inside the school/university? person.
Dean: Basta the child is a minor kasi sa
218 nakalagay dun minor pero the 218 is In this case, the SC frowned upon the
not only the source of liability. Pwedeng delegation. But in Santos, the Court
ibang source ang kuhanan. Pwedeng quasi- seemed to be cool with the fact that the
delict. Like in one case, the student was parent delegated the authority to another?
shot by a security guard of the school but
the SC in that case, FEU ang defendant Dean: You cannot compare the case of an
dun, did not hold the school liable but the illegitimate grandmother over a father. In
security agency who is the employer of the Santos, that is the FATHER – the biological,
security guard. Ang allegation ng plaintiffs- natural and legitimate father.
students is that there was failure on the
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In the Vancil case, the one claiming Dean: To be considered a property, the
custody over the minor is an illegitimate thing or the object must have three (3)
grandmother. characteristics. What are the three (3)
characteristics? (U-S-A)
Thus, there is no comparison between the
two case. A: U-tility
S-ubstantivity
Student Q: So if biological parent, the rule A-ppropriability
is that it could be delegated to another
person? Q: Is the hair on your head a property?
A: (Answer of reciter) No, because it
Dean: YES. Alangan namang pag nag- cannot be considered as separate from me
asawa ka nakabantay ka na lang sa mga because it cannot be severed from my
anak mo na hindi ka na kikilos. head.
Student Q: Based on jurisprudence, the Dean: To be considered property as a thing

relationship between the school and the or an object must have utility, meaning it
student is contractual. Based on that must be of some use to man. It must have
contractual relationship, it is included substantivity or the capacity to exist on its
therein, among other things, the safety of own or otherwise known as individuality.
the student. In the St. Mary’s case, when And appropriability.
the child suffered an accident in the school,
why was it the burden of the student to CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS
prove the negligence of the school?
1. Res Nullius (belonging to no one)
Dean: What is the primary obligation of the - These things belong to no one
school based on the contractual because they are not yet
relationship? appropriated yet
2. Res Communes (belonging to
A: To educate and to provide safety while everyone)
on campus. - While these things are not
technically owned by anyone, these
Dean: Between remote and proximate things can be enjoyed by the
cause, in any case, even in vehicular mankind altogether, nonetheless.
accidents, it is always proximate cause that 3. Res Alicujus (Belonging to someone)
is considered by the courts in determining - These objects are intangible or
who is the person liable. tangible which are owned privately,
either in collective or individual
In the case of St. Mary’s, wala silang bolang capacity
crystal na hawak, to know that the person
driving the jeepney would actually Dean: Under the civil code, properties are
handover the wheel to a minor child. classified
PROPERTY 1. According to their nature: movable

or immovable
Dean: Property is an economic concept. It 2. According to owner
refers to the mass of things that are useful 3. According to consumability
to human activity and for which reason
they may be organized and distributed one 1. Movable v. Immovable
way or the other but always for the good of
man. To be considered property, things Dean:
are different from property.
First is the immovable property
Q: Why do we consider property different enumeration under Article 415: Land,
from things and which is the broader attached, trees, statues, animal houses,
concept? Is it property or things? machineries, fertilizer actually used on the
A: Things would be the broader term which soil, structures, and public roads.
also includes properties because things
include items or those which cannot be Movable property under 416: forces of
controlled by man. For instance, the nature, subject to appropriation,
universe or the moon, the stars. transported from place to place, and
special provision of law.
Dean: In other words, things refer to all
objects that exist even those which are not Under 417: Obligations and actions which
subject to appropriation. have the further purpose, movables or
demandable sums, and shares of stock.
A: Whereas properties are those which can
be appropriated by man or those which can Q: Why is it important for us to classify
be placed under control of man. property into movable and
immovable?
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A: Classifying properties into real or The petitioner then filed a collection suit
personal properties has an effect in against Compañia. This resulted to the
remedial law to classify whether an act is foreclosure of the same property in favor of
personal or real. It has the effect on which the petitioner. Upon the issuance of the
court has jurisdiction, also as to the venue. sheriff of the certificate of sale, the same
was registered by the petitioner to the
Q: What else? Registry of Real Property. Upon knowledge
A: In criminal law, personal properties are of the machinery company, it filed a sworn
subject to theft, while real properties are statement with the sheriff claiming
subject to usurpation of properties. ownership of the subject property, and
demanding the release of said property
Dean: It also has significance in from the levy. Thus, the petitioner
determining the validity of a contract if the executed the indemnity bond in favor of the
contract is required to be in a particular sheriff. The sheriff sold the property at
form. public auction to the petitioner, who was
the highest bidder. Thus, the petitioner
Importance of Classification of filed a case to recover possession of the
Properties building from the machinery company.
a. Rationale: Different laws govern as to Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the
the acquisition, possession, disposition, lawful owner of the subject property.
loss, and registration of immovables
and movables. Ruling: No. Under Article 1473 of the Civil
b. Jurisprudence: When parties into Code, If the same thing should have been
contract, the parties may treat real sold to different vendees, and it is a real
properties as personal properties, property, the ownership shall belong to the
however, this is only in relation with the person acquiring it who first recorded it in
application of estoppel. the registry. Should there be no entry, the
c. Civil Code: only the law which may property shall belong to the person who
consider the reclassification of first took possession of it in good faith, and
properties from real to personal in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
Another importance is on prescription.
Prescription of movables is 4 and 8 years, The registry referred to is the registry of
good faith and bad faith. If immovable real property. In the case, the machinery
property, 10 or 30 years. Those are the company registered in the chattel
some of the reasons why it is important for mortgage registry, which is not the one
us to classify property into movable or contemplated under the law. According to
immovable property. the SC, it is still the machinery company
who had better right. Even if the chattel
LEUNG V STRONG MACHINERY mortgage was registered by the machinery
company to the chattel mortgage registry,
Facts: Compañia Agricola Filipina it does not remove the right to property
purchased a rice-cleaning machinery from because the petitioner was a purchaser in
Frank Strong Machinery Company. bad faith. He has full knowledge of
Compañia Agricola executed a chattel possession of the subject property to the
mortgage to secure the payment of the machinery company prior to the
purchased price of the machinery. It acceptance of the petitioner of the sale.
included in the mortgage deed the building
of strong materials in which the machinery Q: May a chattel mortgage over an
was installed, without any reference to the immovable be considered valid? And to
land on which it stood. However, when the what extent?
indebtedness fell due, Compañia Agricola
failed to pay. So, the sheriff sold the A: It is valid only as between the parties.
mortgaged property and it was bought by
the machinery company, which registered Dean: The building is enumerated separate
the sale in the chattel mortgage registry. and distinct from the land on which it
stands. Therefore, a building by itself is an
Thereafter, the machinery company immovable property and may be subject of
possessed the building subject of the a real estate mortgage. It is real property
mortgage. However, at the time of the regardless of whether it was erected by the
execution of the chattel mortgage, person other than the owner of the land or
Compañia also executed another mortgage whether the building was erected by the
covering the same property in favor of lessee on the land. You cannot change the
petitioner to secure a payment of character of the building depending on the
indebtedness. However, the same ownership of the land.
indebtedness was also not paid by
Compañia. Strictly speaking, if you execute or
constitute a chattel mortgage over a
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CIVIL LAW REVIEW
building, it will only be valid between the faith even if the first mortgage as a chattel
parties. mortgage was registered. If he will check
the status of the property, he will go to the
Q: Does it mean that by executing a real estate registry and not with the chattel
chattel mortgage over an immovable mortgage registry. Therefore, the second
the nature of the building is changed? mortgagee who is a third person cannot be
prejudiced by a chattel mortgage over the
A: No. It does not change the character of building. The second mortgagee will be
the building as a real property. preferred over the building.
Q: What is the reason why the Court or Q: Are consumable and fungible
the law considers valid a chattel synonymous? What determines if a
mortgage over a building? What thing is consumable? What determines
principle is usually used by the Court? if a thing is fungible?
A: Estoppel. The parties cannot take an A: A thing is consumable is determined

inconsistent stand by claiming a chattel based on the nature of a property. A thing
mortgage over an immovable as void. If is determined if it is fungible based on the
the parties themselves treat the immovable intentions of the parties.
as a chattel by executing a chattel
mortgage thereon, they cannot be Q: Let’s say for example, A Johnny
permitted later on to dispute the nature of Walker Platinum. If the understanding
the property. As between them, it is valid. between X and Y that this bottle of
liquor will not be consumed but will be
Q: When will the chattel mortgage exhibited in a museum, to be returned
over an immovable void? after. Is it fungible or non-fungible?
A: If it affects third persons who acted in A: Non-fungible

good faith.
Dean: Because the intention there is for
Dean: Chattel mortgage over an mere temporary use of the thing and not
immovable is valid between the parties. for consumption of the thing.
But if there is a third person whose rights
will be prejudiced who acted in good faith, Q: What contract is that?
then we apply the general rule that a
chattel mortgage over the immovable is A: Commodatum.
void.
Dean: Second classification is according to
For example, if A and B entered into a the owner of the property. Property of
contract to sell a parcel of land. B being the public dominion or private property.
buyer was not granted the ownership at the
time of execution of the contract. In other Q: What are considered property of
words, it was payable on installment and public dominion?
he was not yet the owner but he was given
possession of the land. During the time of A: The property of public dominion are
his possession of the land he constructed a those that are intended for public use,
house. After constructing the house on the those that are not intended for public use
land which is not yet owned by him, B but for public service, and for the
executed a mortgage over the house in development of national wealth.
favor of M. The mortgage between B and M
is valid even if it is a chattel mortgage. Dean: Those intended for public use
such as roads, canals, rivers, roads
But after he has fully paid on the land, B etc. and those that belong to the state
executed a second mortgage which is a real that are intended for public service
estate mortgage over the house and the and development of national wealth.
land.
Q: Why is it important to determine
Both mortgages were registered. what properties belong to the public
dominion and what properties belong
Q: Can the chattel mortgagee claim a to private ownership
better right just because on the
principle of “first in time, priority in Dean: If the property is classified as
right”? public dominion
A: No. The registry referred by the Civil OPAV

Code pertains to registry of real property Outside commerce of man – cannot enter
and not in chattel mortgage registry. into a contract with respect
Cannot be acquired by Prescription
Dean: The third person who is the second Cannot be Attached and levied upon
mortgagee cannot be charged with bad because it is presumed solvent
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Can not be burdened with Voluntary whether personally or through their duly
easement authorized representatives: x x x (2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provision of
DBP VS CA existing laws. x x x”
Petitioner granted a loan in favor of Sps.

Olidiana secured with a REM over a parcel For acquisitive prescription to set in
of land subject of Free Patent Application pursuant to Section 14 (2) of Presidential
with the Bureau of Lands. When the Decree No. 1529, two requirements must
spouses defaulted, the petitioner be satisfied: first, the property is
foreclosed the subject property. The SC established to be private in character; and
held that at the time of the mortgage, the second, the applicable prescriptive period
property was still part of the public domain under existing law had passed.
as the free patent application was still Private property “consists of all property
pending. Thus, the spouses were not the belonging to private persons, either
registered owners of the said lot when the individually or collectively,” as well as “the
REM was executed, and no valid mortgage patrimonial property of the State,
was constituted over the same following provinces, cities, and municipalities.”
Art. 2048 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, only publicly owned lands
DOCTRINE: What divests the government which are patrimonial in character are
of title to the land is the issuance of the susceptible to prescription under Section
sales patent and its subsequent 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
registration with the Register of Deeds. It Consistent with this, Article 1113 of the
is the registration and issuance of the Civil Code demarcates properties of the
certificate of title that segregate public State, which are not patrimonial in
lands from the mass of public domain and character, as being not susceptible to
convert it into private property. prescription: “Article 1113. All things which
are within the commerce of men are
Dean: So it is the issuance of that patent susceptible of prescription, unless
which segregates the land from the mass provided. Property of the State or any of its
of the public domain. Meaning, since the subdivisions not patrimonial in character
spouses Oliviana mortgaged the land at the shall be the object of prescription.”
time when the patent was not issued, it is
still part of the public domain and DBP Contrary to petitioners’ theory then, for
cannot acquire any right over it. prescription to be viable, the publicly-
owned land must be patrimonial or private
DELFIN v NHA in character at the onset. Possession for 30
years does not convert it into patrimonial
property.
In a Complaint for “Payment of Parcels of
Land and Improvements and Damages,” For land of the public domain to be
the Leopoldo and Soledad Delfin (Delfin converted into patrimonial property, there
Spouses) claimed that they were the owner must be an express declaration – “in the
of a 28,000 square meter parcel of land in form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
Iligan City. The spouses demanded by a Presidential Proclamation in cases
compensation from NHA being the owner of where the President is duly authorized by
the subject land. The SC held that Section law” – that “the public dominion property is
48 of the Public Land Act enabled the no longer intended for public service or the
confirmation of claims and issuance of titles development of the national wealth or that
in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to the property has been converted into
own lands of the public domain or an patrimonial.”
interest therein. Attached to the present Petition was a copy
ISSUES: of a May 18, 1988 supplemental letter to
the Director of the Land Management
1) Whether Delfin Spouses is correct in Bureau. This referred to an executive
claiming title over the property based order, which stated that petitioners’
on acquisitive prescription under property was no longer needed for any
Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree public or quasi-public purposes. However,
No. 1529. a mere indorsement of the executive
secretary is not the law or presidential
No. Petitioners are erroneously claiming proclamation required for converting land
title based on acquisitive prescription under of the public domain into patrimonial
Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No. property and rendering it susceptible to
1529. prescription. There then was no viable
Section 14 reads in part: “Section 14. Who declaration rendering the Iligan property to
may apply. The following persons may file have been patrimonial property at the
in the proper Court of First Instance an onset. Accordingly, regardless of the length
application for registration of title to land,
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of petitioners’ possession, no title could Second, although the Delfin Spouses’
vest on them by way of prescription. testimonial evidence and tax declarations
showed that their possession went only as
2) Whether Delfin Spouses may claim far back as 1952, Deputy Public Land
title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.’s letters to the
Public Land Act. Director of Land nevertheless attest to a
Yes. Section 48 of the Public Land Act previous finding that the property had
enabled the confirmation of claims and already been occupied as early as June
issuance of titles in favor of citizens 1945.
occupying or claiming to own lands of the REPUBLIC v GUZMAN
public domain or an interest therein.
Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to Conflicting applications for confirmation of
those who “have been in open, continuous, imperfect title were filed by Norma
exclusive, and notorious possession and, Almanzor and private respondent Salvador
occupation of agricultural lands of the De Guzman over parcels of land located in
public domain, under a bona fide claim of Silang, Cavite. The subject parcels of land
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, were forest lands released as agricultural
1945”: land in 1965 and were possessed by private
“Section 48. The following-described respondents and their predecessors-in-
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands interest for 63 years at time the application
of the public domain or claiming to own any of their petition for confirmation of
such lands or an interest therein, but imperfect title was filed in 1991. The
whose titles have not been perfected or property subject of private respondents'
completed, may apply to the Court of First application was only declared alienable in
Instance of the province where the land is 1965. Prior to such date, the same was
located for confirmation of their claims and forest land incapable of private
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor appropriation. It was not registrable and
under the Land Registration Act, to wit: x x possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
x (2) Those who by themselves or through could not convert it
their predecessors-in-interest have been in into private property, (unless) and until
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious such lands were reclassified and considered
possession and, occupation of agricultural disposable and alienable.
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since In summary, therefore, prior to its
June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the declaration as alienable land in 1965,
filing of the application for confirmation of any occupation or possession thereon
title, except when prevented by war or cannot be considered in the counting
force majeure. These shall be conclusively of the thirty year possession
presumed to have been performed all the requirement.
conditions essential to a government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.”
Q: How many classifications of lands
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act are there under the 1987 Constitution?
therefore requires that two requisites be
satisfied before claims of title to public A: Four. Agricultural, forest, mineral, and
domain lands may be confirmed: first, that national parks. Of these classifications,
the land subject of the claim is agricultural only agricultural can be alienable, all others
land; and second, open, continuous, cannot be.
notorious, and exclusive possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Dean: Of this classification, only
agricultural lands maybe declared alienable
Whatever rights petitioners (and their and disposable. The rest cannot unless if
predecessors-in-interest) may have had they are reclassified. Under the present
over the Iligan property was, thus, not law, it is the President or the Executive
obliterated by Proclamation No. 2143. On Department who has the power to
the contrary, the Proclamation itself reclassify lands. Only agricultural lands are
facilitated compensation. alienable and may be subject of
Clearly then, petitioners acquired title over appropriation of private person.
the Iligan Property pursuant to Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act. MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC
First, there is no issue that the Iligan Prescription is recognized as a mode of

Property had already been declared to be acquiring ownership of patrimonial
alienable and disposable land. Respondent property. However, public domain lands
has admitted this and the Deputy Public become only patrimonial property not only
Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr.’s letters to with a declaration that these are alienable
the Director of Land attest to this. or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer
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retained for public service or the registration under PD1529. However, the
development of national wealth, under SC ruled that Diosdada failed to meet the
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when 30 year requirement under PD1529. One of
the property has become patrimonial can the requirements is that the individual
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of must be in possession and occupation for
property of the public dominion begin to 30 years for purposes of prescription. In
run. the case, Diosdada and her predecessors-
in-interest are short of 2 months. From
time the land was declared
as patrimonial property in 1965 to the
LANDBANK v. REPUBLIC filing of the application in 1995, it was only
(not part of syllabus – discussed by 29 yrs and 10 months so she is short for 2
Dean) months.
FACTS: Angelito Bugayong acquired a Dean: She miscalculated because the

parcel of land. Original Certificate of Title property was declared alienable in
was issued to him sometime in 1969 but September 1965 and filed the application
this parcel of land was actually part of for registration in July 1995, kinapos ng 2
Forest Land. For one readon or another, he months. The SC denied the application of
was able to acquire and OCT over this large Diosdada because she did not comply with
tract of forest land in Davao and he sold it the required 30 yr period of prescription.
to different buyers including the
respondents Spouses Du. After acquiring
this property, they used the property for NOTE:
their business which is Lourdes Farms.
They mortgaged the property to Landbank. Property of public dominion when no
The property was then foreclosed by longer needed for public use or service
Landbank due to the failure of the Spouses shall become patrimonial property of the
to pay their loan. However in the interim, State. However, there must be positive act
some residents of Davao City questioned or declaration by the State
the OCT issued to Bugayong knowing that
this property was actually part of forest
land. There is one exception to the Rule stated in
Article 422:
ISSUE: WON the property can be reverted
to the State and what is the effect of the GR: The general rule is that if it is
subsequent acquisition of the innocent no longer needed for public use and
purchasers for value from Angelito public service, it forms part of the
Bugayong? patrimonial property of the State.
RULING: YES. The property is not subject XPN: The exception is, in the case
to acquisition of private persons because it of abandoned river beds, if a river
is part of forest land. changes its course and flows to a
private estate, the old river bed is
property of public dominion.
Q: What is the effect of the subsequent
alienation of the land to innocent If the river changes its course, it is no
purchaser for value? longer needed or public use but it does not
become a patrimonial property of the
A: The subsequent purchasers even if they State. Rather, the abandoned river bed
are in good faith did not acquire any title belongs to the person whose land is
over the land which are public dominion. occupied by the new river bed in proportion
The OCT should be void and the property to the area lost. (Article 461 as an
be reverted to the State and consequently exception to the rule stated in Article 422)
all the derivative titles of OCT issued to
Bugayon are likewise void. The SC required On the other hand, property of private
the return of the property to the State. ownership besides the patrimonial property
of the State. The patrimonial properties of
provinces, cities and municipalities also
includes properties belonging to private
REPUBLIC VS GIELCZYK persons. Only properties owned by the
state in its patrimonial character may be
Respondent filed an application for subject
registration of 2 lots. She claimed to be the to alienation by the State, all others
owner of the lots and to prove her claim, cannot, including all other natural
she presented tax declaration and resources.
certificates alleging that she has been in
possession of the land for more than 30 TOPIC: OWNERSHIP
years including her predecessors-in-
interest. The RTC and CA granted the
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Dean: Ownership is the independent and to the extent of putting the property of your
general right of a person over a thing neighbor in danger.
particularly in its PEDR:
LEONG v SEE
- Possession,
- Enjoyment,
- Disposal and Spouses Florentino Leong and Carmelita
- Recovery. Leong owned a property in Quiapo. Elena
Leong, Florentino’s sister-in-law, stayed in
It is the independent and general right of a the property for 2 decades until it was
person over a thing particularly in its PEDR. razed by fire. When Sps. Leon immigrated
to the US and eventually had their marriage
There are several attributes of ownership dissolved, Florentino executed a waiver of
and we call them EDUPARE. If you are the his right, title and interest in the subject
owner of the thing, you have the right to: property to Carmelita. Carmelita sold the
subject property to Edna See, with the
- Enjoy knowledge that Elena Leong had
- Dispose constructed makeshift houses in the said
- Use property. Edna filed a complaint for
- Possess recovery of possession against Elena
- Abuse Leong. Florentino also filed a complaint
- Recover contending that the sale was without his
- Enclose, and consent. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of
- Encumber Edna See. The Supreme Court affirmed and
ruled that Edna See exerted due diligence
As an owner, you have the right to enjoy when she ascertained the authenticity of
and dispose the thing without any the documents attached to the deed of sale
limitations on those imposed by law and such as the marital settlement agreement
general rights in conflict with others with Florentino’s waiver of interest over the
property. She did not rely solely on the
We have the general limitations on the title. She even went to the Registry of
right of ownership and when we speak of Deeds to verify the authenticity of the title.
general limitations, we are referring to the These further inquiries make Edna See an
3 great powers of the State: innocent purchaser in good faith and for
value, who has the greater right to
- Police Power possession over the subject property than
- Eminent Domain Elena Leong.
- Power of taxation
NOTE:
Generally, as owner, you enjoy the use of
Section 44 of the Property Registration
the thing without limitations. But we have
Decree which recognizes innocent
to bear in mind that under the police power
purchasers in good faith for value and their
of the State, the use of your property may
right to rely on a clean title, to wit: “Every
be interfered with by the state for the
registered owner receiving a certificate of
general welfare.
title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent
Eminent Domain.
purchaser of registered land taking a
If you are the owner of the property, you
certificate of title for value and in good
can choose any person you wish to enter
faith, shall hold the same free from all
into a contract with respect to that property
encumbrances except those noted in said
but the moment the state takes the
certificate and any of the following
property for public use and exercises its
encumbrances which may be subsisting.
power of eminent domain, you cannot
xxx” Moreover, Article 428 of the Civil
(inaudible)
Code provides that: The owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
You are also bound by the power of
without other limitations than those
taxation. The right of ownership is limited
established by law. The owner has also a
by the general limitations and when we
right of action against the holder and
speak also of specific limitations, these are
possessor of the thing in order to recover
scattered provisions of the code
it.
particularly on easement (against
nuisance, intermediate distances, right of
way, relating to waters or lateral and Q: What is the doctrine of self-help?
subjacent support). These are all specific What is the remedy of an owner who is
limitations imposed by law. threatened with unlawful physical
invasion of his property?
So, even if you’re the owner, you are bound A: Under the Doctrine of Self-help, the
to follow this law on easements. In a way, owner has the right to use such force as
it restricts your right to use your property may be reasonably necessary to prevent or
because you cannot just make excavations
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repel an actual or threatened physical question
invasion or usurpation of his property. of possession
is
Requisites of the Doctrine of Self-help:
primordial,
1. There must be either a threatened while
or actual physical invasion of the the issue of
property ownership is
2. The force used by the owner to generally
prevent or repel the intrusion must unessential in
be resonably necessary to prevent unlawful
the usurper from entering his detainer.
property (Rosa Rica
3. There must be no delay in the Sales
pursuit Center v. Sps.
Ong,
G.R. 132197,
Dean: In the case of German Management August
Services (GMS) v CA, the spouses Jose 16, 2005)
Authorized GMS to develop their land into
a subdivision. But at the time that As to Plaintiff mustPlaintiff need
petitioner GMS entered the premises, there necessity prove not
were 20 occupants on the land headed by of proof of that he was in have been in
Villesa. prior prior prior
The petitioner bulldozed their houses and physical physical physical
the crops. When the respondent went to possessio possession possession.
court and sued the owner as well as GMS, n of the NOTE: The fact
both the MTC and RTC exonerated GMS and premises until that
Sps. Jose based on Art. 429. The CA he was petitioners are
reversed and ruled that Art. 429 only deprived in
applies… thereof by the possession of
defendant the lot
Q: What are the three actions to recover does not
real property? automatically
entitle them to
A: remain in
Accion interdictal possession.
Accion publiciana (Ganilla
Accion reinvindicatoria v. CA, G.R. No.
150755, June
28,
Q: What is accion interdictal? 2005)
Period to One-year One-year
A: It is a summary action to recover file period is period is
physical or material possession only and it generally counted from
must be brought counted the
within one year from the time the cause of from the date date of last
action arises. It may be: of demand
dispossession or last letter of
except if demand.
1. Forcible Entry the disposses
2. Unlawful Detainer sion is
Forcible Unlawful through
Entry Detainer strategy, or
As to Possession of Possession is stealth, the
when the inceptively better rule
possessio defendant is lawful would be one
n became unlawful but becomes year from
unlawful from the illegal discovery
beginning as from the time
he acquired defendant
possession by: unlawfully Q: How about accion publiciana, what
withholds is the issue and the prescriptive
Force possessions period?
Intimidation after
Strategy the expiration A: It refers to an ejectment suit filed within
Threat or 10 of cause of action or from the unlawful
Stealth termination of withholding of possession of the realty.
his (Gabriel Jr. v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 204626,
right thereto. June 9, 2014)
NOTE: The
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Q: For example, your property was 2. It may happen that neither the
taken by an intruder through stealth plaintiff nor the defendant is the
and you failed to file the action within owner; or
one year from discovery? Does it mean 3. [Based on the Rules of Evidence,] he
that you are barred from filing an who alleges must prove. Since you’re
action to recover it? the plaintiff, you’re claiming that you
are the owner, then the onus
A: You can still file it through accion probandi or the burden of proof is
publiciana within 10 years from when you upon your shoulders to prove that you
lost the possession. are the owner of the property.
Dean: If it’s accion reinvidicatoria, the

issue now is the ownership of the property VILLASI v. GARCIA
and it may be filed either 10 or 30 years
depending on whether the possessor is in Magdalena Villasi engaged the services of
good faith or in bad faith. Of course, no title FCGI to construct a seven-story
to registered land can be acquired by condominium building. However, for failure
prescription or adverse possession. So if of the petitioner to fully pay the contract
we're talking about titled property price, the respondent initiated a suit for
belonging to another person, you cannot collection of sum of money which it
acquire it by prescription. eventually won. Subsequently, the sheriff
levied on a building which while declared
MENDOZA v. SALINAS for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI,
the lots in which it was erected were
The petitioners opposed respondent’s registered in the names of the Spouses
application for the issuance of a writ of Garcia.
possession, claiming that they have been in
actual, physical possession of the subject Thus, the Spouses Garcia filed a motion to
property since 1964. However, the trial set aside the notice of sale on execution,
court ruled in favor of the respondent. arguing that the building covered by the
levy was mistakenly assessed in the name
The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of FGCI.
of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty
of the court in a decree of registration in an The Court ruled that the Spouses Garcia
original land registration proceeding. failed to prove that they have a bona fide
However, such ministerial duty ceases to title to the building in question. Aside from
be so with particular regard to petitioners the presumption under the law that they
who are actual possessors of the property are the owners of the improvements built
under a claim of ownership. Accordingly, thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable
jurisprudence provides that one who claims to adduce credible evidence to prove their
to be the owner of a property possessed by ownership. Thus, while it is a hornbook
another must bring the appropriate judicial doctrine that the accessory followers the
action for its physical recovery, not principal, in cases where there is a clear
summarily through a motion for the and convincing evidence to prove that the
issuance of a writ of possession. However, principal and the accessory are not owned
in this case, the respondent filed for a writ by one and the same person or entity, the
of possession in the land registration case. presumption shall not be applied and the
Thus, the RTC was erroneous for having actual ownership shall be upheld.
issued the writ of possession against the
petitioners. VILLASI V. GARCIA
NOTE: The court issued a writ of execution

commanding the sheriff to execute and, in
The rule is in actions to recover real order to satisfy the judgment, the sheriff
property, the plaintiff must rely on the levied a building under the name of FGCI.
strength of his title and not on the However, this building was erected over
weakness of the defendant’s claim. There the lot of spouses Filomeno Garcia
are three reasons why this is the rule, [to Emerlinda Halili (Sps. Garcia). Now, in
wit]: order to forestall the sale and execution,
spouses Garcia filed an affidavit of third-
1. Actual possession under claim of party claim. Now the argument of the
ownership places a disputable spouses, the respondents in this case, that
presumption of ownership. So if you as owners of the land they would be
are the actual possessor of a thing deemed under the law as owners also of
and you are claiming ownership over the building standing thereon. Second,
it, then Art. 433 applies, i.e., that you Sps. Garcia also asserted that the
cannot be summarily evicted if you construction of the building was financed
are claiming ownership; through their loan obtained in Metro Bank
and they merely contracted FGCI to
construct the building. Finally, Sps. Garcia
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argued that the tax declaration is an be injurious to the rights of others. One
erroneous assessment by the city assessor example is the case of Lunod vs. Meneses.
and cannot be the basis of ownershi. This involves the property of Menesses. So,
the water coming from the property of
On the contrary, Villasi argued that she Lunod usually flows through the property of
insisted that the levy effected by the sheriff Meneses. To prevent the flow of water to
was valid and proper since the subject his land, Menesses constructed a dam,
property or the building belongs to the which blocked the flow of water from Lunod
Judgment debtor FGCI, and to dispute the to his property. Due to this, the water
ownership of Sps. Garcia, Villasi also accumulated on Lunod's property and it
pointed out that the the levied property became flooded.
was declared for tax purposes under the
name of FGCI. Villasi even presented a
certification issued by the city, engineering So the Supreme Court, citing article 431 of
office of Quezon City that the building the code says that even if you're the owner
permit of the subject property was likewise you cannot use your property in a manner
issued under the name of FGCI. that would be injurious to the rights of
others.
The RTC issued, an order directing the

sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of Dean: Now as an owner, you also have the
sale and execution and Villasi moved for right to prevent interference with your use
reconsideration, but was denied. So the of your property but under the doctrine of
case was elevated to the Supreme Court. incomplete privilege.
Now, the main issue in this case is whether Q: What is the doctrine of incomplete
or not the building and the lot in which it privilege? It is also known as the doctrine
was elected should be treated as separate of the state of necessity.
property. A: The owner has no right to prevent
interference with his property if the
interference is necessary to prevent an
The SC ruled in the affirmative saying that imminent danger to others.
Sps. Garcia failed to prove that they have
a bona fide title to the building in question
because aside from their postulations that ILLUSTRATION:
as title holders of the land, the law
presumes them to be owners of There is a row of houses. 20 houses in one
improvements built thereon and Sps. row. House #5 is on fire, and to prevent
Garcia were unable to present credible, the fire from spreading to the other
evidence to prove ownership of the houses, from #1 to #4 and #6 to #20,
property. In contrast, Villasi was able to houses #4 and #6 were destroyed. The
satisfactorily established ownership of FGCI owners of houses #4 and #6 cannot
through the pieces of evidence presented. prevent interference with their property or
The Supreme Court also noted that FGCI is cannot prevent others from interfering
in actual possession of the building and as with the use of their property if the
for the payment of taxes with actual interference is necessary to prevent an
possession of the line, it is also covered by imminent danger to others, and the danger
that tax declaration. By this, it strongly compared to the danger arising to the
supports the claim of ownership. The owner of the property is much greater. So
Supreme Court also said that even the imagine if you do not destroy the houses
court processes in the earlier collection suit #4 and #6, all the rest of the houses will
was sent to the building named under be burnt. Which is more disadvantages, to
FGCI. let two houses burn or to allow 20 houses
to be burned?
Dean: The reason Sps. Garcia were DOCTRINE OF INCOMPLETE

claiming that they are the owners of the PRIVILEGE
building is to prevent the execution of the
judgment rendered against FGCI for What is the Doctrine of Incomplete
damages for the contract between Villasi Privilege?
and FGCI. So the Supreme Court ruled that A: Also known as the doctrine of the state
the building is owned by FGCI and not by of necessity. The owner has no right to
the Sps. Garcia. prevent interference in his property if the
interference is necessary to prevent
LUNOD V. MENESSES imminent danger to others (Art. 432)
Dean: One other limitation on ownership is Article 432. The owner of a thing has no
that even if you're the owner, you cannot right to prohibit the interference of another
use your property in a manner that would with the same, if the interference is
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necessary to avert an imminent danger When is a treasure hidden? Is it the

and the threatened damage, compared to same as forgotten treasure?
the damage arising to the owner from the A: Hidden treasure, requisites:
interference, is much greater. The owner 1. It is hidden when it is an unknown
may demand from the person benefited deposit of money, jewelry, or other
indemnity for the damage to him. precious object
2. Its lawful ownership of which does
not appear
ILLUSTRATION:
It is not the same as forgotten treasure.
There are 20 houses in one row. House Forgotten treasure is for example, you
number 5 is on fire. To prevent the fire stashed 1M in the ceiling of your house, you
from spreading to houses 1-4 and 6-20, totally forgot about it.
houses 4 and 6 were destroyed. The
owners of houses 4 and 6 cannot prevent Then you hired cleaners. The cleaners
others from interfering in their property to cannot say that “uy may 1M”. It is not a
prevent imminent danger to others, and hidden treasure, it is a forgotten treasure.
the danger to others is much greater than
the damage to the owner. If houses 4 and
6 would refuse interference, all the houses Q: What if there is an usufruct? Who
would be burned. So the damage is much owns the ½? Is it the owner of the land
greater, and it is more advantageous to let or the usufructuary?
their houses be put down.
A: The finder is entitled to ½ of the
treasure. The other half belongs to the
owner of the land because the usufructuary
What is the obligation of the houses
is not the owner of the land in which the
which were saved?
treasure is found, and he is only entitled to
Article 23. Even when an act or event the fruits, not to the hidden treasure
causing damage to another's property unless he is the finder.
was not due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant, the latter shall be liable for NB: The finding of the treasure must be by
indemnity if through the act or event he chance. If the search was done by a
was benefited. contract, Article 438 will not apply.
A: They have to pay or indemnify the
owners of houses 4 and 6 even if the ILLUSTRATION 1:
destruction is not through the fault of the
owners. ABC Corp. hired the services of X to
search for treasure in a particular property
owned by the corp., and based on the
What is the basis of recovery of agreement, he owns half of the treasure he
damages? may find in the land of ABC. That will be
A: Quasi-contract, Article 23. covered by the contractual stipulation, not
by Art. 438.
HIDDEN TREASURE ILLUSTRATION 2:
Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to Yamashita treasure. It is covered by a

the owner of the land, building, or other special law PD 1725, and whoever finds it
property on which it is found. is entitled only to 25%, 75% goes to the
government.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made
on the property of another, or of the State
or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, Thus, Article 438 does not apply when:
one-half thereof shall be allowed to the 1. The finding of the treasure is not
finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall by chance
not be entitled to any share of the 2. It is Yamashita Treasure
treasure.
Article 440. The ownership of property
If the things found be of interest to science gives the right by accession to everything
or the arts, the State may acquire them at which is produced thereby, or which is
their just price, which shall be divided in incorporated or attached thereto, either
conformity with the rule stated. (351a) naturally or artificially.
Article 439. By treasure is understood,

for legal purposes, any hidden and ACCESSION
unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or
other precious objects, the lawful
ownership of which does not appear.
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Article 441. To the owner belongs: Article 446.
(1) The natural fruits; All works, sowing, and planting are
presumed made by the owner and at his
(2) The industrial fruits; expense, unless the contrary is proved.
(359)
(3) The civil fruits. (354) Article 447. The owner of the land who
makes thereon, personally or through
Article 442. Natural fruits are the
another, plantings, constructions or
spontaneous products of the soil, and the
works with the materials of another, shall
young and other products of animals.
pay their value; and, if he acted in bad
Industrial fruits are those produced by
faith, he shall also be obliged to the
lands of any kind through cultivation or
reparation of damages. The owner of the
labor.
materials shall have the right to remove
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the
them only in case he can do so without
price of leases of lands and other
injury to the work constructed, or
property and the amount of perpetual or
without the plantings, constructions or
life annuities or other similar income.
works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner
of the materials may remove them in any
DEAN: The right of an owner over his event, with a right to be indemnified for
property extends to whatever is produced damages. (360a)
by the property and whatever is added or Article 448. The owner of the land on
incorporated thereto naturally or which anything has been built, sown or
artificially. The first is accession discreta or planted in good faith, shall have the right
the fruits and the second is accession to appropriate as his own the works,
continua. So accession maybe, with respect sowing or planting, after payment of the
to immovable property and accession with indemnity provided for in articles 546
respect to movable property. So since and 548, or to oblige the one who built
walang fruits na naproproduce ang or planted to pay the price of the land,
movable, except of course if it is leased and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
out. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is
So to the owner of the property belongs all considerably more than that of the
the natural, industrial and civil fruits. So if building or trees. In such case, he shall
we are talking of real property, natural pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
fruits are the spontaneous products of the land does not choose to appropriate the
soil like grass or cogon. Once there is building or trees after proper indemnity.
cultivation and employment of labor it The parties shall agree upon the terms of
becomes industrial fruits. So if you the lease and in case of disagreement,
deliberately plant apple trees that’s the court shall fix the terms thereof.
industrial fruits. Civil fruits would consist of (361a)
leases and rents of buildings. So that is Article 449. He who builds, plants or
accession discreta, immovable property. sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown
Accession continua, artificial with respect without right to indemnity. (362)
to immovable property refers to building, Article 450. The owner of the land on
planting or sowing. Whatever is built, which anything has been built, planted or
planted or sown on the land, as a rule sown in bad faith may demand the
belongs to the owner of the land. But of demolition of the work, or that the
course life is not always simple, sometimes planting or sowing be removed, in order
it gets complicated. Sometimes you build to replace things in their former condition
on a property which is not yours. So the at the expense of the person who built,
rights of the parties there would depend on planted or sowed; or he may compel the
whether the builder is in good faith or builder or planter to pay the price of the
whether the landowner is in good faith or land, and the sower the proper rent.
whether both of them are in bad faith, or (363a)
one is in good faith and the other one is in Article 451. In the cases of the two
bad faith. preceding articles, the landowner is
entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower. (n)
Article 445. Article 452. The builder, planter or
sower in bad faith is entitled to
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the reimbursement for the necessary
land of another and the improvements or expenses of preservation of the land. (n)
repairs made thereon, belong to the Article 453. If there was bad faith, not
owner of the land, subject to the only on the part of the person who built,
provisions of the following articles. (358) planted or sowed on the land of another,
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as early as 1972, there was no lease to
but also on the part of the owner of such
speak of, much less, a renewal.
land, the rights of one and the other shall
The second issue is whether the lessees
be the same as though both had acted in
were builders in good faith and entitled to
good faith.
reimbursement of the value of the house
It is understood that there is bad faith on
and improvements. It has been said that
the part of the landowner whenever the
while the right to let property is an incident
act was done with his knowledge and
of title and possession, a person may be a
without opposition on his part. (364a)
lessor and occupy the position of a landlord
to the tenant although he is not the owner
of the premises let. After all, ownership of
So, there are instances where the the property is not being transferred, only
builder himself is the landowner, that is the temporary use and enjoyment thereof.
covered by Art. 447, the problem in this Being mere lessees, the private
article is that the owner uses the materials respondents knew that their occupation of
of another, so that is the complication the premises would continue only for the
there. So under Article 448 the builder is a life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be
3rd person not the landowner but the considered as possessors nor builders in
builder acted in good faith. Under Article good faith.
449, is also a 3rd person but the builder
acted in bad faith. Under Article 453, the
builder is a 3rd person who acted in bad LESSEE IN GOOD FAITH
faith and the landowner acted also in bad
faith. And under Article 454, the builder is Q: Can you consider a lessee in good
a 3rd person who acted in good faith and faith? What is the definition of a
the landowner is the one who acted in bad building in good faith?
faith. So maraming variations yan parang
sayaw. A: One who builds on a property which he
believes to be his. If you are a lessee you
2:42:00 know that the property is not yours, you
There are there parties involved under cannot be considered as a builder in good
Article 455, the landowner, the builder faith (BiGF).
and the owner of the materials. To
understand the obligations of the parties, Q: If Article 448 will not apply to a
depends on who build to which property. lessee, what right does he have over
the useful improvements, ornamental
GEMINIANO VS CA or luxurious improvements introduced
on the property?
A 314 square meter lot was originally
owned by the petitioners' mother, Paulina A: Under Article 1678, the lessee may only
Geminiano. recover one-half of the value of useful
On a 12- square-meter portion of that lot improvements.
stood the petitioners' unfinished bungalow,
which the petitioners sold in 1978 to Dean: Useful improvements refer to those
private respondents with an alleged improvements which augment the value of
promise to sell to the latter that portion of the property.
the lot occupied by the
house. Subsequently, the petitioners' Q: If the lessor does not want to
mother executed a contract of lease over a reimburse, what is the remedy
126 square-meter portion of the lot, available to the lessee?
including that portion on which the house A: The lessee may remove the
stood, in favor of the private respondents improvement provided that he does in a
for P40 per month for a period of seven way that will not impair the property.
years. improvements and registered the
house in their names. Q: With respect to ornamental
After the expiration of the lease contract in improvements, for instance the mural.
1985, however, the petitioners' mother Lessee made a mural in the ceiling, what is
refused to accept the monthly rentals. the right of the lessee with respect to
Petitioners demanded private respondents ornamental improvements, is it to be
to vacate the premises and pay the rentals reimbursed?
in arrear. A: No, it cannot be reimbursed. The
general rule is he cannot have it
The issue in this case is whether there was reimbursed.
an implied renewal of the lease which
expired in November 1985. The court held Q: If the lessor decides to appropriate
that since the petitioners' mother was no the ornamental improvement, is he
longer the owner of the lot in question at obliged to reimburse the lessee?
the time the lease contract was executed in A: Yes.
1978, in view of its acquisition by Maria Lee
125
4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Q: But if you were the lessor, and you know Where the builder, planter or sower has
that the lessee cannot remove the acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
ornamental improvements, will you decide arises between the owners, and it becomes
to appropriate (practical question)? necessary to protect the owner of the
A: No. The lessee may not remove it improvements without causing injustice to
because with respect to ornamental the owner of the land. In view of the
improvements, the lessee only has a impracticality of creating a state of forced
limited right of removal meaning, he can co-ownership, the law has provided a just
remove the improvements provided that it solution by giving the owner of the land the
will not cause damage to the property. option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to
Dean: With respect to ornamental oblige the builder or planter to pay for the
improvements, if you're leasing a property land and the sower to pay the proper rent.
do not construct ornamental improvements It is the owner of the land who is authorized
because you will be at a disadvantage when to exercise the option, because his right is
you do that since you cannot remove if you older, and because, by the principle of
destroy the property or it will cause accession, he is entitled to the ownership
damage to the property. And of course the of the accessory thing.
lessor will also decide to not appropriate
because, why will he pay for something Q: It's not Technogas who built these
that he can get for free? (Ornamental walls right?
improvements) Dean: When they bought the property
from Pariz Industries, the walls were
AQUINO vs. AGUILAR already there. Since the builder was in
good faith, the predecessor Pariz Industries
Doctrine: Respondents cannot be was in good faith, the successor was also
considered as builders in good faith. presumed in good faith.
Petitioners, as the owners of the land, have
the right to appropriate what has been built A: The SC said that Technogas in thie case
on the property without any obligation to stepped into the shoes of Pariz industries
pay indemnity therefor and respondents so the same defense may be invoked by
have no right to a refund of any Technogas.
improvement built therein. However, they
are entitled to the necessary expenses but Q: Can Technogas compel the owner
has no right of retention over the premises. Uy to sell the land?
Thus, the SC remanded the case to the A: Here, the right to sell may be exercised
court a quo for the determination of the by the owner.
amount of necessary expenses to be
reimbursed to the respondents. Dean: Because by principle of accession,
the owner of the principal, owns the
Q: They cannot be considered as accessory. Since Uy is the owner of the
builders in good faith? land, whatever is BPS, the land is
A: Although they're not entitled to technically his. And the right of the land
indemnity, they are still to be reimbursed owner is older than Technogas.
the necessary expenses incurred for the
preservation of the property. A: This is why the builder cannot compel
the owner to sell the land. It is the land
Dean: Even if the builder acted in bad owner who has the right to choose from the
faith, I lost still allows him embarrassment two options 1) to appropriate the
of necessary expenses for preservation. encroaching portion of the building after
paying proper indemnity; and 2)
Q: Why do you think the law allows compulsory sale.
that even if the builder is in bad faith?
A: Even if the property was in possession Dean: The owner of the land can only
of the owner, he would've incurred it compel the builder to buy the land if its
anyway so to prevent unjust enrichment, value is not considerably higher than the
on the part of the owner since he will be building or the trees.
obliged to spend for these necessary
expenses because this is for preservation. Q: What if it is considerably higher
Hence, the law allows even the builder in than the building or the trees?
bad faith the reimbursement for necessary A: Forced lease will result and in case of
expenses under article 546. disagreement, the court will fix the terms
thereof.
TECHNOGAS vs. CA
Q: Can Uy compel Technogas to
Doctrine: In view of the good faith of both demolish? Why can the owner of the
petitioner and private respondent, their land NOT ask the builder in good faith
rights and obligations are to be governed to demolish?
by Art. 448. A: Because that is not one of the options
granted to the owner under Article 448. He
126
4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
only has 2 options 1) appropriate; or 2) to Dean: That is the main contention of the
sell the encroached portion to the builder. Ochoas. That they can no longer be
Demolition is out of the question. compelled to return Lot 1581 because the
action as prescribed but the Supreme Court
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT said that it cannot prescribe because it is
CORPORATION V. CA covered by a certificate of title.
Dean: I call this case the case of mistaken ERLINDA DELOS SANTOS VS.
identity ALBERTO ABEJON
Doctrine: Good faith consists in the belief Doctrine: Where both the landowner and
of the builder that the land he is building on the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad
is his and his ignorance of any defect or faith, they shall be treated as if both of
flaw in his title. And as good faith is them were in good faith.
presumed.
Dean: So if both parties acted in bad faith
Dean: Precisely the reason why Kee asked under Article 453, the law treats them as
the help of CT Torres Enterprises, so as to both act did in good faith and therefore the
prevent him from building on the wrong applicable provision would be Article 448.
land. But what he feared was actually what The builder there cannot exercise the
happened. Kaya nga sya humingi ng tulong option; it is rathe the owner of the land who
kasi, he does not know the location can exercise the option of either
particularly if the subdivision is new, they appropriating the building by being proper
don't know the technical description of the indemnity or to compel the builder to buy
land. the land if its value is not considerably
higher than the building.
It is not also correct to say that when the
property is covered by a certificate of title BPI VS. VICTOR SANCHEZ
-- the owner is pursuing to know the
boundaries. Unless you're still in the Doctrine: The second paragraph of the
science of surveying, you would not know Art. 453 clearly reads that a landowner is
what is 0.5 southwest of 0.2 -- certificate considered in bad faith if he does not
of title has metes and bounds of the oppose the unauthorized construction
property. We are not skilled and the thereon despite knowledge of the same. It
science of surveying and therefore we does not, however, state what form such
cannot know by merely reading the paper- opposition should take.
title the exact location and the exact
boundaries of the land, even though it is Q: At the time that the TSEI mortgaged
described in the certificate of title. the land to BPI, what title or they
actually mortgaging is it the title of
So the Supreme Court ruled that Wilson TSEI or was it the title of the
Kee is a builder in good faith and therefore Sanchezes?
cannot be compelled to demolish his house A: The Sanchezes
and his shop and everything else standing
there. The SC ruled that the options Dean: For the initial bank loan they
available are to: accepted the collateral even if the property
was registered in the name of the
Sanchezes. That makes them in bad faith.
1. appropriate; or Why why would you accept a property as
2. sell the land collateral if the one borrowing the money is
not a registered owner and does not even
OCHOA V. ALMAZAN have an SPA to the person the owner and
borrow the money from BPI.
Doctrine: Possession in good faith occurs
when one is not aware that there exists in Q: Why are the buyers of the
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw townhouses in bad faith?
which invalidates it. A: The contract of sale that they entered
into is registered in the name of the
Q: What about the issue on Sanchezes as well.
prescription which the Ochoa's were
raising that they can no longer be Dean: The Supreme Court says that the
compelled to surrender possession if right of action to recover whatever the
ever that is the option. We're talking of buyers have paid is with TSEI, they can
a property covered by a certificate of only seek reimbursement from TSEI and
title, what is the rule? not from the Sanchezes. So the blanks here
are considered land owners in good faith to
A: No title in derogation on that registered therefore they can ask the builder is in bad
owner can be acquired by prescription or faith to either demolish the structures or to
adverse possession buy the property.
127
4C A.Y. 22-23
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
LEVISTE MANAGEMENT VS. LEGAPSI
Doctrine: Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil

Code on builders in good faith are
inapplicable in cases covered by the
Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by
specific legislation on the subject property
(the Condominium Act), and by contract
(the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the
condominium corporation). Upon
acquisition of a condominium unit, the
purchaser not only affixes his conformity to
the sale; he also binds himself to a contract
with other unit owners.
Dean: The Court even added that it would

be unfair to require Legaspi Towers to
appropriate an illegal structure. Why would
they be required to appropriate when
based on their master-deed or the contract
between the condominium unit owner and
corporation, they are bound by all the
restrictions in the master-deed? The court
ruled that there is no room for application
of Article 448 but rather between a
General Law (NCC) and a Special Law
(Condominium Act or Act. 4726), the
Special Law will prevail. Hence, the Court
said that Legaspi Tower cannot be
compelled to appropriate the structure or
pay the expenses made by LEMANS.
128
4C A.Y. 22-23

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW – JEDI NOTES

Dean Viviana Martin-Paguirigan

at all. legislature may shorten or extend the 15-day

Objective: To give the public adequate or enough Example:

mo. allowed now that the law may be published not

The purpose of publication is to give the citizens ---

Article 2 was amended by EO 200, June 17,

did not publish -

foreign country, they were made to sign another -

contract which contained onerous terms and Senate.

illegal exaction stemming from their violation of FROM THE

Senate and they should publish the Rules of

the invocation of the E-commerce Act is

interpretation of difficult or doubtful provisions of of attainder shall be enacted.

law may be the basis of good faith. (Articles 526, -

2155 of the New Civil Code) ----

GENERAL RULE: Laws

We do not normally allow retroactive application

R 2. Remedial and procedural statutes CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver executed by

be granted based on merits and fitness, and not

policy. the school can refuse reenrollment in the

If we are going to apply the laws prospectively, student

Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render

new one. - The Non doctrine was non-existent E

charged with illegal possession of firearms. Days = 24 hours

Nights = from sunset to sunrise

Prior to his indictment in 1964, the SC in the

law, we only apply, as a rule, prospectively and -

↳ BUT With Regards to successION , Nanonary shall

1996, a married woman who previously used her

ANDO v. SECRETARY OF With respect to family right, duties and status

that is the time she can go to court to question --

have filed a petition for-

divorce. Since there was no compliance with this

capacity to succeed and order of succession,

of Paula. In 1953, he discovered the infidelity of

FACTS: Decedent was an American (citizen of

Renvoi Doctrine Kyle.

in the distribution of the estate of either Audrey

FACTS: This case involves the estate of two US ----

CIVIL LAW REVIEW – JEDI NOTES

● A right/duty ● There must be a right/duty

DIAZ v. ENCANTO a sabbatical, you must show to the satisfaction to

the College, Dean Encanto, that she be granted =

whatever leave credits she may be entitled to, place.

Tobias then filed a case for Illegal Dismissal

of EL Woodworks. After the criminal case was

GLOBE MACKAY V. CA All his personal belongings in his office were

BARONS MARKETING V. CA Dean: Quiñones was a reservation and ticketing

RELLOSA v. PELLOSIS So, the SC said that implementing the writ of

respondents and the former owner sold it to the benefits ofI

Cynthia Ortega. As the new owner, Cynthia

not a question of whether she is correct in saying

practically deprived the private respondents, who -

Carpio was not contented, she ordered the guard contrary

search on the car of Valmonte, without a search malice, or through

When the search yielded nothing, Valmonte still ARDIENTE v. PASTORFIDE

damages against Ardiente. anything.

records, it was still Ardiente who was their