International Political Science Review (2001), Vol 22, No.

1, 55-84
Multiculturalism and Social Integration in Europe
STEVEN DIJKSTRA, KARIN GEUIJEN, AND ARIE DE RUIJTER

ABSTRACT.
In an era of increasing cultural diversity within nation-sates
and the deterritorialization of cultures and peoples, the notion of a
national citizenship signifying a single, homogenized culture shared by
all citizens has become obsolete. A possible alternative is presented in
which an uncoupling of nationality and culture would lead to open and
equal communication between citizens and the development of
transmigrants' identities as members of a transnational and multicultural
global society who may have ties with two or more nation-states.
Key words. Cultural diversity * Multiculturalism * Postnational citizenship
* Refugee policies * Social integration

Introduction
In calling for the formal equality of all cultures within the purview of the state
and its educational system, multiculturalism represents a demand for the
dissociation (decentering) of the political community and its common social
institutions from identification with any one cultural tradition (Turner, 1993:
425).
The link between multiculturalism and social integration figures high on the
agenda of public administrators and researchers. This is not surprising, as present-
day societies and nation-states face rising cultural complexity and diversity. This
trend coincides with growing pressure on social exclusion, which in turn affects
1
social integration.'
We do not restrict multiculturalism to its demographic-descriptive usage (the
existence of ethnically diverse segments in the population of a society or state) or
to its programmatic-political usage (which refers to specific types of programmes
and policy initiatives designed to respond to ethnic diversity). Rather, we focus on
multiculturalism's ideological-normative meaning of "a slogan and model for
0192-5121 (2001/01) 22:1, 55-84; 015203 ? 2001 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

political action... emphasising that acknowledging the existence of ethnic

diversity and ensuring the rights of individuals to retain their culture should go
hand in hand with enjoying full access to, participation in and adherence to
constitutional principles and commonly shared values prevailing in the society"
(Inglis 1996: 16).
We define social integration here as the functional and effective link between a
system's different agents or components. Integration or cohesion is not to be
taken as being positive only. In various ways it is a double-edged sword. Internal
solidarity stimulates both cooperation and social control and possibly even
subordination to group norms. At the same time strong internal solidarity leads to
animosity toward the external, resulting in xenophobia or worse in extreme cases.
The spectrum ranges from feelings of identification (in which the distinction from
the other is eliminated) via tolerance to indifference, ostracism and violence. No
wonder that the integration issue associated with this "diabolic dynamism of
homogenization and heterogenization" (Schuyt, 1997) is both classical and
current and possibly even urgent. A nearly palpable fear exists among
politicians-and among others as well-that society is disintegrating.2
The definitions of social integration and multiculturalism that are applied

2
imply that the issue of citizenship plays an important role. Our core question
therefore concerns the way citizenship should be described in the situation
mentioned above.
First, we will outline the problem by describing the dual process of
globalization-localization and the related change in our concept of culture. Next
we will discuss its consequences for the notion of citizenship and nation-state, both
with respect to the area of law and to that of cultural identity. Then we will
illustrate this with a case in which the national state figures as an argument in
refugee policy. Finally, we will advocate learning to deal with diversity as a cor
competency of postmodern citizenship.

A Dual Process--Globaliuzation and Localization

Every society is built up of a multitude of social links between agents that differ
from one another. Each of these links has its own history, its own routines, its own
domain and thus its own specific attributes. At the same time the links have a
functional connection. They are interwoven and mutually dependent.
Dependency based on difference does not, however, automatically lead to a
bond; coordination mechanisms are indispensable for establishing a bond. A
plethora of these mechanisms and instruments exists at every level of organization
and management. State mechanisms include education, public administration,
law and care arrangements. The nation-state has in fact appropriated an
increasing amount of culture; with its very own way of classifying and interpreting
reality, culture is decisive in creating unity.
The emergence of the system of nation-states coincided with efforts to reduce
cultural diversity.3 During the nineteenth century newly formed national state
tried through nationalistic programmes to homogenize their entire territory
3
culturally and linguistically, as well as economically and socially (Gellner, 1983;
Brubaker, 1992). The state and the political community came to be equated
increasingly with "the national culture." Although theories about what constitutes
a nation differed between countries, the common view was that each nation
possessed a single specific culture. This opinion was also attributable to the
growing means for joint communication. People read the same newspapers and
books in the same language. In the twentieth century, radio and television became
available as well. All these facilities enabled depiction of the contemporaneous
existence of fellow-nationals, thereby giving rise to so-called "imagined
communities"4 (Anderson, 1991). Culture was thus cast in a national context and
turned into a political tool. "National consciousness in this sense consists of an
overriding identification of the individual with a culture that is protected by the
state" (Curtin, 1997: 14). Culture is not the only thing thus captured in national
contexts; the same applies to the individual: "With the French Revolution, the
nation-state emerged as the form of political organization and nationality as the
condition of membership in a polity. The Revolution codified individual rights
and freedoms as attributes of national citizenship, thus linking the individual and
the nation-state" (Soysal, 1994: 17).
The nation-state therefore becomes both a territorial organization and a
membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizens are members of the nation
and acquire equal rights through this membership. Anyone who wishes to have
equal rights within a certain state must therefore also be equal to all others in that
state: citizens must have the same identity. The ideal of equality is thus linked to
possession of a cultural-and in this case national-identity. The price of equality
through national citizenship is that not everyone can take part in it. Each link
implies separation, as classical thinkers such as Marx, Simmel, and Weber have
already taught us. Living together-at whatever level and in whatever way-must
4
be viewed as a series of processes in which a distinction is constantly made,
consciously or subconsciously, between within and without, between we and they,
between the self and the other. This filtering and classification underlies every
assignment of meaning, communication, and action.
The social effects of this ranking are significant. Drawing boundaries and
setting standards always entails the creation, legalization, regulation and
institutionalization of difference and inequality. Differences in age, gender, race,
social class, religion, culture and ethnicity are in fact construed and emphasized as
reciprocal relationships and dependencies grow. The process is exactly what the
dual process of globalization and localization shows.
Globalization means that the "world becomes smaller each and every day. We
see it turning into a global village" (McLuhan, 1964: 93). People and places
throughout the world have become linked to each other. We see growth in mutual
relations of dependence and a condensation of interactions between an ever-
growing number of agents. In this context multinationals become transnational
"global" organizations. People from practically all societies are confronted with
aspects of other societies and cultures through tourism, the media and consumer
goods. New styles of consumption (clothing, utilities, food), as well as
standardized time, money, and expert systems, are introduced everywhere. Capital,
human beings, ideas, and images travel at high speed through revolutionary
improvements in communications technology and transport. Apart from this
continuing acceleration, long-distance migration is also characterized by greater
distribution: increasingly, countries and regions become involved in networks that
span the globe. Political, ideological, religious or cultural trends that originally
appeared to be connected with a specific region, culture or period are being
echoed in large parts of the world. "The most obvious reasons for this change were
the growing capital-intensity of manufacture; the accelerating momentum of
5
technologies; the emergence of a growing body of universal users; and the
spreading of neoprotectionist pressures" (Brenner, 1996: 19). This globalization
concerns not only processes; the world as a whole is adopting systemic properties
in which characteristics of each particular entity must be understood within the
framework of the world as a whole (see, for example, Friedman, 1995; Robertson,
1992). "In short, a worldwide web of interdependencies has been spun, and not
just on the Internet" (De Ruijter, 1997).
Globalization has subjected the traditional functions of family, community,
church and nation-state to pressure. The advance of globalization leads many
people to revert to what they see as their own ethnic identity; they invoke
traditions and a history which they sometimes manipulate to promote individual
and group interests. In other words, increasing globalization fosters favorable
conditions for all sorts of particularization, localization and even fragmentation
(see, for example, Featherstone, 1990; Friedman, 1995; Giddens, 1990; Hannerz,
1992; Latour, 1994; Robertson, 1992, 1995).
As a result of the interaction between local and global elements and
mechanisms, new multiple and varying identities emerge. These identities are no
longer confined to a specific area-they are deterritorialized (Malkki, 1992).
Paradoxically, this rapid increase in the mobility of human beings themselves and
the mobility of meanings and meaningful forms through the media also gives rise
to the conditions for (and parallels all sorts of) localization. "The paradox of the
current world conjuncture is the increased production of cultural and political
boundaries at the very same time when the world has become tightly bound
together in a single economic system with instantaneous communication between
different sectors of the globe" (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, 1994: 29). This free
movement of cultural forms and images contrasts increasingly with the growth of
cultural boundaries. Apparently, a transnational system's emergence implies the
6
rebirth of nationalism, regionalism, and ethnicity (Anderson, 1992). As a result,
cultural differentiation within national societies is rising.
Here, we encounter localization, which is the other extreme. Apparently,
globalization and localization constitute and feed each other. In this era of time-
space compression, distant localities are linked in such a way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1994:
64). A state of "in-betweenness" results. As the "global and the local are two faces
of the same movement" (Hall, 1991), the culturally homogenizing tendencies of
globalization paradoxically imply continued or even reinforced cultural hetero-
geneity.
Closely related to this paradox is the precarious balance between "global flows"
and "cultural closure." "There is much empirical evidence to support the fact that
people's awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger a
search for fixed orientation point and action frames, as well as determined efforts
to affirm old and construct new boundaries" (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998: 602).
This "glocalisation" (Robertson, 1995) or "hybridisation" (Latour, 1994) or
"creolisation" (Hannerz, 1992) is a response via a permanent patchwork of
cultural material that happens to be available (see, for example, Robertson, 1992,
Beck, 1992). "The process of hybridization may create such multiple identities as
Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isadora
Duncan, a London boy of Asian origin playing for a local Bengali cricket team and
at the same time supporting the Arsenal football club, Thai boxing by Moroccan
girls in Amsterdam and Native Americans celebrating Mardi Gras in the United
States" (Hermans and Kempen, 1998: 1113).

From National to Transnational Culture

Clearly, this "glocalisation" phenomenon deeply affects our ideas about
7
multicultural society. Most of the impact has concerned the context of the nation-
state thus far. The policy has always been focused on stimulating adjustment to the
culture of the dominant majority. The desirability of a stable and harmonious
national multicultural society is the underlying motive. Territory, culture and
identity converge in the nation-state concept. The political community coincides
with the cultural community. In this view, each person naturally belongs to a
certain place and possesses a national identity. Almost everyone takes the central
elements in this idea for granted (see Malkki, 1992; Stolcke, 1993; and Clifford,
1994). A map of the world thus depicts areas with clear boundaries without any
overlap. Territory, culture and people are connected through natural links. The
concepts of ethnos and ethnicity assume this intrinsic link.
The three elements of territory, people, and culture combine to form "the
country." The ground is sometimes even literally linked to the people, such as
when someone takes along a handful of earth from his country when forced to
leave it or kisses the ground upon setting foot again on national soil. People
therefore belong to a single culture only. It is for this reason that words such as
"autochthonous" and, in relation to certain cultures, "native" and "indigenous"
are used. It expresses the relationship between being born somewhere and the
territory. They also convey a we-they distinction: "we" belong here, "they" do not.
Migrants may be here, but they do not come from here. The natural place of people
and cultures is often described in images derived from nature. Roots are an
especially popular metaphor: people and cultures are rooted in the soil, just like
trees; a nation is like a great family tree that is rooted in the ground; you can
belong to only one tree and thus to only one culture. In this view people should
continue to live in the place where they were born and raised, where their people
and their culture reside. Displacements only cause problems for those involved.
Should they be loyal to the nation and the state they have left or to the one where
8
they have arrived? Significantly, this view of human beings, culture, people, and
territory, which holds that people do not merely live somewhere but also belong
there, asserts that the description of the "natural" order also establishes a
standard, namely a moral justification of the existing situation (Gupta and
Ferguson, 1992).
Assuming that today's national, regional and village boundaries enclose
cultures and regulate cultural exchange, however, would be a mistake. Production
and distribution of mass culture are controlled largely by transnational companies
not bound to specific locations. People construct their identities partly in this
transnational mass culture. "Our" culture is increasingly permeated by aspects
from other cultures. As a result of the rapid technological changes of recent years,
such as the Internet, fax, mobile telephones, and extensive and inexpensive air
travel, today's migrants are better able to maintain links with their home
countries, for example through temporary remigration. Migration leads to
transnationalism, "the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain
multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and
settlement" (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, 1994: 7). They establish economic, social,
organizational, religious, political, and personal relationships that transcend
geographic, cultural and political boundaries. We see that transmigrants act, take
decisions and develop identities while embedded in networks of relationships th
International Political Science Review 22(1)
bind them simultaneously with two or more nation-states. They develop new
spheres of experiences and new kinds of social relations. In their daily lives they
link nation-states to each other, and their lives take place within these links.
Migrants maintain contact not only with those left behind in their country of
origin but also with other migrants who have ended up in other countries. Their
social network is not limited to a single host country but often covers several
9
countries, at times even several continents. This situation enables new forms of
transnational existence, or in other words "long distance nationalism"5 (Anderson,
1992). Transnational communities arise, consisting of people who feel emotionally
and culturally connected, who ignore-or at least try to ignore-the national
boundaries that separate them. The traditional image of emigrants who start a
new life in a new country, leaving their past far behind, is thus no longer current.
In the world that is emerging people may still live and shape their lives in a
specific national state but are no longer exclusively associated with and dedicated
to a specific national group culture of a certain national state. People of our time
who are committed to multiple cultures shape and elaborate their lives either across
the boundaries of national states or within a small part of those states. "Much of the
traffic in culture ... is transnational rather than international. It ignores, subverts,
and devalues rather than celebrates national boundaries" (Hannerz, 1989: 69).
The world, divided into separate national states, is yielding to a transnational
and multicultural global society, sometimes slowly but more often with abrupt
jolts. This new society is still organized, however, according to the principle of
separate national states. Members of transnational communities cannot escape
from the power of the nation-state as they try to create and maintain a collective
identity. In a sense the ideal of the "deterritorialized nation-state" is a new
nationalism. Transmigrants are not restrained by national boundaries, but the
world is nonetheless still divided politically into nation-states with unequal power.
For the time being, the nation-state system continues to exert an enduring
influence in a world that is becoming ever more transnational.

Perspectives on Multiculturalism

On the one hand, people establish transnational networks and form interesting
10
blends of different cultural sources. The concept of culture is acquiring a different
scope as a result. On the other hand, sometimes simultaneously and within that
same process, people revert to their "own" culture and confirm their "own"
ethnicity. This tendency of globalization, which goes hand in hand with
localization, has even more dimensions in the migrant situation than for those
who continue to live in one place. In a multicultural society we find a trans-
formation of culture rather than a loss of one's "own" culture, traditions, and
identity or a strict adjustment to "other" cultural identities. The outcome is a
decline of national cultures that were formerly considered relatively
homogeneous.
As a consequence, we see a transformation of the nation-state involving the
evaporation of the triad of territory, culture, and identity. The nation-state is losing
its "naturalness." Although the nation-state is still viewed as "a key socio-
psychological source of social cohesion" (Vertovec, 1997), its role as the casing for
social and cultural associations renders it subject to erosion. The "national order
of things"-that has been viewed in the modern West as the natural order of
things-has to be problematized (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Malkki, 1992).
"There is a transfer of formal state powers to continental 'power blocks' with, at
the same time, a steady increase in regulations and effects on regional and local
levels. In a period of 'open borders,' of advanced specialisation and division of
labour and of continually increasing physical and socio-cultural mobility, society is
becoming more pulled apart than ever has been the case" (Salet, 1996: 7).
The new situation is sometimes referred to as "a new great transformation,"
especially from the perspective of the West. Analogous to the nineteenth century,
when industrialization, urbanization, the formation of the core family, the
formation of the national state and its associated public domain were the
expressions of fundamental changes in social relations among people, a similar
11
transformation is alleged to be taking place right now. This is illustrated by the
interrelated transition to a restructured and open family, to a globalized
postindustrial network society driven by new technology, to the new urban duality,
to the new distribution of political power in which the national state relinquishes
sovereignty to local units, NGOs, and supranational associations, as well as to the
coexistence and blending of different cultures. This "great transformation"
subjects existing citizenship practices and traditions to pressure everywhere and
gives rise to a tremendous need for new forms and repertoires.
That need depends in part on the question of whether the present-day
hybridization or multiculturalization is temporary or permanent. Three
perspectives fight for priority here, convergence, divergence, and bricolage. Each
of these perspectives involves different views of our future (see Nederveen
Pieterse, 1996, on which we base our description).
The first perspective is that of cultural convergence or growing sameness. This
perspective represents the classical vision of modernization as a steamroller that
denies and eliminates the cultural differences in its way. Adherents of this
"McDonaldization" thesis believe that growing global interdependence and
interconnectedness will lead to increasing cultural standardization and uniformity.
The "almighty transnational corporations" will erase the differences through
rationalization in the Weberian sense-through formal rationality laid down by
rules and regulations. Combining efficiency, calculability, predictability, and
controllability, McDonaldization simultaneously represents the dual themes of
modernization and cultural imperialism.
The second perspective highlights the aspect ignored in the homogenization
thesis-the differences. Both a harmony and a conflict variant are identifiable
within this perspective. Supporters of both variants emphasize the sociocultural or
ethnic differences between various groups in their empirical studies, such as their
12
lasting and immutable nature, implying or articulating the problems that will
occur if these differences are denied or suppressed, and differing only in their
evaluation and interpretation of these differences. In the harmony variant,
stamping out cultural variety is seen as a "form of disenchantment with the world":
alienation and displacement become apparent (Nederveen Pieterse, 1996: 1389).
In the harmony variant, it is stressed that the presence of cultural differences and
cultural collectivities should not merely be tolerated but should be acknowledged
as permanent and valuable, and actively protected and promoted in law and
public policy (Taylor, 1992). In the conflict variant, difference is seen as
generating rivalry and conflict. The assumed decay of social integration within the
state is mentioned as an adverse effect of multiculturalization. This means that the
common national orientation is disappearing, due to the diminishing join
commitment of all to a single nation-state and its culture.
Multiculturalism can be an excuse for marginalization, exclusion and
oppression. All too often, it can be the occasion for violent conflict and even
campaigns of genocide and civil war. During the last decade most conflicts around
the world have been intrastate in nature, being linked to ethnic, religious or
cultural differences. People of different cultural backgrounds have difficulty
understanding each other; variety can evoke forces that either compel integration
or thwart it. After all, people do not easily form relationships with persons and
groups that differ from them. Processes of individualization lead many people to
retreat and to care only for themselves-the calculating citizen.
In theory, difference is disruptive. A well-known proponent of this rivalry and
conflict view is Samuel Huntington, who argues that "a crucial ... aspect of what
global politics is likely to be in the coming years . . . will be the clash of
civilisations" (Huntington, 1993: 38). This variant understandably borders on
racism, nationalism, religious or ethnic fundamentalism, and the associated
13
apartheid philosophy, as well as ethnic cleansing. The difference between the two
variants should not be exaggerated, however, at least not with respect to everyday
practice. Although multiculturalism as a form of state-sanctioned cultural
pluralism is "based on an ideology which holds that cultural diversity is tolerated,
valued and accommodated in society, within a set of overarching principles based
on the values normally associated with a liberal democracy-eg, the civic unity and
equality of all people within the state, and individual rights" (McAllister, 1997: 2),
we know that the practice of multiculturalism effectively reinforces domination by
one specific ethnic group. Diversity is domesticated, shaped, and harnessed to the
yoke of the dominant sociocultural order and economy.
The third perspective, which we embrace, stresses that the current bricolage of
cultures is structural. This bricolage thesis, also known as glocalization or
creolization, emphasizes the idea that the global powers are-and will always be-
quite vulnerable to small-scale and local resistances. Hybridization acknowledges
that "communities are always in flux, divided, contested; people are perpetually
escaping them as well as mobilizing to enforce them" (Kalb, 1997: 5).
Hybridization refers to a worldview "which is not frozen by global images and
metaphors, but which refers to the multi-localized (in the geographical and
institutional sense) resistances, to the vulnerabilities and tensions, in short to the
contradictions, of the ongoing struggle about living and working conditions"
(Maier, 1996). This formulation reminds us of the inherent tension between an
imagined ideal world and the actual practices of the existing social order. Briefly,
the dilemma we face in dealing with multiculturalism is as follows:
"Multiculturalism conveys the idea of 'many cultures,' distinct from each other,
implying boundaries rather than continuities; logically followed by separateness
and distinctiveness. This contrasts with the conscious mixing of language, race and
culture in much of contemporary societies. This implies that the boundaries
14
between groups must not be formalised and institutionalised" (McAllister, 1997:
20).
But that evokes penetrating questions. For instance, will formal
multiculturalism with its institutionalized boundaries lead to a categorization,
polarization or compartmentalization of people with greater ethnic stereotyping
and mobilization along ethnic lines? Is a formal recognition of cultural difference
required to facilitate reconciliation, redistribution of resources, and the
elimination of disadvantage? We do not know. We do know, however, that we face
pressing questions. How can we accommodate the complexities and meet the
challenges of pluralism? How will we balance the affirmation of particular
identities and the requirements of an increasingly interdependent world in which
we must all coexist and cooperate? Pluralism is an issue for all of us that needs to
be addressed at personal, social, cultural, and political levels. The personal level
reflects who we are and how we define ourselves; the social level concerns how we
interact with each other; the cultural level inevitably involves our beliefs, ideas,
and understandings; and the political level relates to the accommodation of
pluralism, which in turn involves the distribution of power and access to resources.
All these levels converge in the concept of "citizenship."

Citizenship

As we have seen, national citizenship has been one of the most influential
expressions of citizenship until our time. According to its present meaning,
citizenship is primarily the binding element of a national community. This
particular interpretation of citizenship will be discussed here. As it originated in a
world of separate and divided nation-states, we may rightly ask whether national
citizenship retains the same function in a world where those states have become
15
multicultural societies, and where the bonds that link people and groups
transcend national boundaries. Since this link prevents national citizenship from
accommodating cultural diversity, the right to be different is also at stake. So, we
do not reject citizenship as an institution, we do reject the citizenship's current
linkage of law with culture.

National Citizenship: Inequality and Equality

National citizenship draws boundaries between states. It is thus one of the most
powerful exclusion instruments of our time. State boundaries exclude unwelcome
inidividuals. The resulting reservation of certain privileges and rights to a select
few leads to unequal opportunities and thus inequality in the world.6 As Brubaker
(1992: x) argues: "In global perspective, citizenship is a powerful instrument of
social closure, shielding the prosperous states from the migrant poor."
National citizenship also draws boundaries within states, namely between
citizens and foreigners. "Every state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular
bounded citizenry, usually conceived of as a nation" (ibid.). By linking citizenship
rights to a specific national-cultural identity, the institution of national citizenship
leads to a situation in which not every resident of a state has access to full
citizenship and its corresponding rights.7
Although refugees and migrants have been accepted voluntarily by the country
where they have settled and live and work there, these "denizens" (Hammar, 1990)
all too often do not have the same rights as "real" autochthonous residents
because of their deviating cultural identities.8
In many cases the practice of withholding certain rights from legal residents of
a state has ceased. This is because the nation-state lies in the middle of a
transnational field of influence, where a struggle is taking place for
16
human rights instead of rights that are based on the nation. According
(1994), the group that receives citizenship rights is being increasingly e
include non-citizens or individuals who are not full-fledged citizens. Th
thus slowly accepting responsibility for all those who reside within its terr
The question then arises as to why formal citizenship is noneth
granted. Social rights are extended to non-citizens much more easily th
63
International Political Science Review 22(1)
rights. One probable factor is that, through the state, political aspects are quite
closely tied to the existence of the nation. The ever-powerful influence of the link
between political community and national culture surfaces here-granting
political rights to non-nationals endangers the nation itself.
Accordingly, not every legal inhabitant possesses full citizenship and the
corresponding political voting rights. Residents who are allowed to vote thus take
decisions that affect the future of legal residents without full-fledged citizenship.9
National Citizenship and Cultural Diversity
In present-day liberal and multicultural societies, attempts to achieve two
apparently opposing ideals are commonplace. First, in a multicultural society each
group and individual is ideally entitled to equal treatment as a citizen.
Simultaneously-and this is the second ideal-everyone has the right to be
different. This "being different" is viewed by some migrants, policymakers,
politicians and scientists in an essentialist way (see, for example, the divergence
perspective in our Introduction above and in Hall [1996]). We, however, see this
condition as the right to be different and unique, but also and above all to be
allowed to become a different person and to evolve continuously. In this sense,
several liberal authors have noted the importance of a personal cultural identity to

17
the ability to live a good life (see Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 1990).
Acknowledgment
of personal cultural identity is an especially important condition for a good life,
regardless of whether such identity is experienced individually or as a group
(Taylor, 1994).
National citizenship, however, turns the national majority culture into the
standard that migrants must meet to attain equal rights. As a result, migrants who
also wish to retain their own cultural identity cannot achieve full citizenship. The
national citizenship principle thus leaves little room for diversity within state
boundaries. Bauman (1988) maintains that migrants face demands that are
impossible to satisfy. They are given the prospect of equality and recognition, on
the condition that they change their cultural orientation. Expected to become
liberals in a liberal society, migrants are thus put into the position of someone who
must prove himself innocent. In this way migrants will always remain aliens.
Bauman therefore recommends that rather than expecting the aliens to become
as we are, we should realize that we too are aliens.
Moreover, differences are especially imputed between groups. Discussions
about culture thus degenerate into discussions between cultural groups that are
viewed as being quite different from each other, whereas in reality the people who
make up those groups are often in complete disagreement with each other.
Different individuals are thus reduced to being seen as a single group with a single
viewpoint. National citizenship thus turns the cultural-ethical discussion into a
debate between closed groups instead of among free individuals.
Postnational Citizenship: An Alternative?
The application of national citizenship in its traditional meaning thus leads, both
in individual multicultural states and in the multicultural world as a whole, to
inequality before the law and to denial of the diversity in individual identities. In a
18
multicultural society both results can lead to a decline in social integration. First,
an equal citizenship position is a precondition for being willing and able to
64
DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
communicate with "others." Second, a person communicates with the other only
when the other accepts his identity. National citizenship therefore results in the
opposite of what it is intended to achieve: instead of social integration, it generates
conditions that complicate social integration. A different view of the relationship
between justice, culture, and identity appears necessary to satisfy the multicultural
needs of our time.
Postnational citizenship is often mentioned as an alternative (see, for example,
Geoghegan, 1994; Donald, 1996). In the postnational view, anyone who reside
legally for a certain period of time within the territory of a state or settes ther
legally is granted equal rights. Possessing such rights and having the related dutie
does not necessitate a certain cultural identity. Nor does such a person need to
belong to a certain territory; being there is all that matters. This separation of
rights and culture can lead to equality before the law and greater acceptance of
different identities.
A principal difference from national citizenship is that, in the postnational
definition of citizenship, the interest and survival of the state are not the first
priority. Instead, the interests and means for survival of every person situated
within the territory of the state are looked after, regardless of individual identity.
Nor are predefined categories of aliens excluded. In a state that applies a
postnational citizenship principle, everyone is in a certain sense a stranger to
everyone else. Contrary to the situation with national citizenship, however, people
are then in any case not defined as certain types of aliens.
Postnational citizenship, however, leads to other problems. A multicultural state
19
with a postnational citizenship will face the issue of admittance: who shall be
accepted as new members, and who makes the decisions? The transition from
national to postnational citizenship displaces the problem in some respects. De-
nationalizing state citizenship does not eliminate the state's boundaries. Within
the state everyone may have equal rights, but group formation, which involves
exclusion of "others," is once again inevitable. Even an ideally organized
multicultural society has state boundaries.
Still, postnational citizenship aims to accomplish more than merely shift the
problems. First, it ensures greater acceptance and equality for all citizens within a
state. Second, it provides reasons for granting or excluding people from
postnational citizenship. The application of national citizenship leads the "other"
to obtain a specific identity, even an anti-identity, since this is compared to the
identity of the group that accepts but also excludes. If one individual is accepted
because of who he or she is, another one will be excluded for the same reason.
The idea of postnational citizenship supports an entirely different principle.
Acceptance or exclusion is based not on identity, whereby the "other" is mainly
reduced to the status of alien. Instead, postnational justice entails that the other is
especially a fellow world citizen, "one of us." From this perspective, none of us is a
stranger, or we are all strangers, which amounts to the same thing.
Continuing Power of the Nation-State
But how does the possibility of a postnational citizenship relate to the current
power and functions of nation-states? Does it lead directly to the end of the
national state? Important trends indicate that the nation-state is losing power. The
impact of globalization is causing its sovereignty to give way-a partially "forced"
process. Individual states have, for example, little influence over supranational
65
International Political Science Review 22(1)
20
effects that are inherent to developments in the fields of environment, economy
and finance. In part, the nation-state chooses to share its sovereignty more or less
"voluntarily," such as in the area of rules and agreements within the European
Union and in military issues. This voluntary character is limited, however, in the
sense that it constitutes an attempt to absorb the effects of globalization. In
addition, within the scope of these developments new, often transnational, agents
arise next to or in place of the national states, and new principles are developed to
define who belongs to these various agents and who does not.
A number of authors argue in fact that nation-states are coming under great
pressure. Eriksen (1997) even foresees their rapid downfall. In his opinion, the
accelerating increase of diversity in personal experience, combined with the
dislodgement of such experience from the symbolism of the nation, has resulted
in the shared national identity now standing on its last legs.
Also in the area of law, agents other than the nation-state are starting to play a
greater role. Treaties on human rights and other issues have great consequences
for the possibility of bringing national states into line or intervening in each
other's affairs. There is a growing sense that states should be unable to do
everything to their citizens that they would like to, and that the international
community has a responsibility to address human rights issues, even when states
call them "internal affairs." In actual practice, human rights that are not bound to
states are becoming ever more important, in addition to the civil rights that are
bound to the state. Individuals can increasingly indict their states through legal
courts or international commissions for violations of human rights. In that way
they too become subjects under international law. In addition, it has gradually
become more customary for states that are treaty partners to report periodically
about their progress in a given human rights area. Non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) are often then granted the opportunity to issue supplementary
21
reports. Also, special observers are appointed by organizations such as the United
Nations to investigate suspicions of human rights violations in specific states. Such
investigations are not only directed at human rights violations of individuals but
also of minority groups. State sovereignty is highly affected by these
developments.
States are also dependent on international organizations such as the United
Nations bodies. This applies not only to states that have voluntarily joined such
treaties, as was generally the case in the past, but increasingly also to states that
have not signed these. This is more and more being interpreted as common law
(Flinterman, 1996).
These developments are affecting a core function of the national states, that of
the judicial system. International organizations, such as the United Nations, the
European Union and the Council of Europe; transnational NGOs, such as Amnesty
International; and also transnational industrial organizations, are playing an
increasing role in this area, in addition to national states, whose role remains
important. The sovereignty of national states, which lies at the basis of admittance
policy, is also being affected.
But the power or powerlessness of the nation-state has a paradoxical twist that
arises from the conflict between two principles that will not budge-that of
national sovereignty and that of universal human rights. The transnational
collection of universal human rights we have just described is becoming
continuously more imperative and sometimes forces nation-states to expand the
arsenal of rights that is granted to non-nationals (Soysal, 1994). It is remarkable
then that these universal human rights, on which a potential postnational
66
DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
citizenship might be based, are continuing to be implemented for the time being
22
through the nation-state. Transnational organizations such as the United Nations
are still calling upon the nation-state and thereby in fact give it legitimacy. The
more or less forced granting of these human rights thus undermines the
sovereignty of the nation-state, while it is simultaneously reproduced thereby. In
the end, only the nation-states themselves are authorized to introduce legislation
to improve the legal position of groups of people within their territory. Even in a
time when international law is experiencing a shift from the right of self-
determination of nations to a more individual human rights approach, the
sovereignty of nation-states continues to hold a central position. A truly
postnational citizenship thus still belongs to the future. To use the words of
Brubaker (1992: 189): "The heralds of the budding postnational era are too hasty
in relegating the nation-state to the dumping ground."
Below we address the consequences of globalization and localization for
refugees. Literature on globalization tends to cover the well-educated, cosmo-
politan crowd employed in transnational firms and only temporarily residing
abroad. These individuals have no claim to citizenship. Instead, we will discuss a
different category-refugees in a transnational world.
Refugees in a Transnational World
Simultaneous globalization and localization leads both to the deterritorialization
of culture (causing the image that is used by the nation-state, in which territory,
people and culture converge) and to the creation of new cultural identities with
the attendant exclusion mechanisms. The result is a growing global diversity and
the existence of groups of people who form identities that cut across the
boundaries of existing nation-states. In order to concretize these developments,
we will now focus specifically on the approach by the European nation-states
toward migrants and in particular refugees.
Refugees and migrants, legal or otherwise, have increasingly become a
23
transnational "risk" that the state is unable to control. As a result of globalization,
more people are able to move over great distances, for example to Europe. The
end of the cold war has resulted in the former world powers no longer being able
to control conflicts, which can become uncontrollable without directly affecting
areas that lie at greater distances. However, the refugees who are victimized by
these conflicts do come to these more distant areas, whereupon attempts are made
to close the borders. To what extent is the superseded image of the triad of
territory, people, and culture used as an argument to exclude people? The
declining sovereignty of nation-states plays an important role in this context. How
does Europe deal with its search for a new sense of community? What are the
consequences for refugees of the immigration policy of the European states, and
how do their diverse cultural identities express themselves in a transnational
context?
The National State as an Argument in Refugee Policy
The exclusion of people through state boundaries works to a certain extent. But it
only works with many more laws, rules and public officials and at a higher cost.
Public policy within Europe reacts with involution-an accumulation of policy
measures that have only brief effects and an ever-continuing refinement of
67 International Political Science Review 22(1)
Cultural Identities in Refugee Policy
Although asylum policy always emphasizes that economic motives are irrelevant
in the protection of refugees, the restrictive policy in the determination of who
is a "real" refugee still appears to point toward economic considerations having
a certain impact. In addition to these factors, cultural considerations also play a
role, for example in the policy regarding the return of refugees. In this view,
people by nature belong to a certain culture that is rooted in a certain territory,
relocation is an anomaly. In the receiving country, refugees are said to be in a
24
strange world, while they felt at home in their own community; if people must
flee, it is therefore best to have them stay as close as possible to their original
place, or, if that is impossible, at least return to their own place as soon as it is safe
again. There they can pick up their old way of life, so that the situation becomes
normalized.
The place where the refugees used to live is wrongly idealized in this view, and
the asylum country as an option for refugees is depicted negatively. It cannot,
however, be taken for granted that refugees feel at home in their country of
origin: they fled because the situation had become hostile and threatening
Situations of ethnic conflict and gross violations of human rights cause people to
feel no longer at home. For the rest, one may rightly question whether asylum
countries are in fact such a totally strange world in this age of world-wide
communication.
In the immigration and asylum policy, this cultural image means that peopl
are pinned down to the area where they belong, even if it is a place of poverty and
impotence. Immigration control is a way of maintaining the "natural" order, since
migration supposedly blurs the distinction between culturally separate areas. Such
ideas legimitize the protection of the economic interests of the rich countrie
(Gupta and Ferguson, 1992).
An ethnic identity is, however, not an essence that people bear within
themselves. It is a social construction within a certain historical context. Group
and boundaries are shaped through social and political processes. For refugees
these are processes in their country of origin, processes in the country to whic
they have fled, and processes on a global scale, all at the same time. The
experience the tension that exists between the pain of their forced physical
separation from their homes, where they would have stayed in safe circumstances,
and the often just as difficult experience of shaping their lives in a differen
25
country. All this happens in a world that is undergoing great change through the
impact of globalization, to which those very refugees and other migrants are al
contributing. These are no longer totally separated worlds. Refugees live
transnational existence, and many factors influence the way in which they shap
their existence: it makes a great difference, for example, when someone who used
to live in the countryside first comes to a city. The reasons for fleeing play a
important role. Another influential factor is whether the country of origin has an
emigration tradition. The refugees from the former Yugoslavia could, for example,
fall back to some extent on the knowledge of fellow countrymen who ha
preceded them to Western Europe. Lastly, the image that people have of the
asylum country, or of Western Europe in general, is an important factor.
In Western policy too little attention is paid to globalization as it relates t
identities in a transnational context in the asylum country, and in relation to the
country of origin. Below we pursue each of these items.
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DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
Cultural Identities in a Transnational Context
Western European governments tend to ignore the fact that the continuing
globalization causes identities to change. The bond to a geographical location
lessens; identities become deterritorialized (Malkki, 1992). Many migrants live a
transnational existence. The world is changing due to these processes, not only for
those who move but also for those who stay. In addition, refugees and migrants
stay in touch not only with the "stay-behinds" in their former place of residence,
but also with other refugees and migrants from their former city or region who
have ended up in other countries. The dispersion is not confined to a single host
country, but often covers many countries, sometimes even continents, all
interconnected through these transnational communities.
26
Cultural differences have until now generally been mapped-and this applies
to asylum policy also-along the lines of geographical linkage. That is one of the
reasons why such importance is attached to the reception of refugees "in their own
region." But, as an Iranian refugee expressed it in the context of the debate about
whether refugees should be taken up in their own region: "To me, the region is
the big cities in the Western countries. I feel much more strongly attached to these
cities than to the rural areas in the countries around Iran." The geographical
linkage of identities must therefore be put into perspective; it has become less
"natural." This type of situation may enable forms of solidarity and identity that
are not based on geographical proximity (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 19).
Integration ? Identity Formation in the Asylum Countries
The second factor that West European governments need to consider in their
asylum policy is that identities of refugees are also shaped within the context of
the host country, which change over time. There are two approaches: on the one
hand, there is the receiving society with its many differences, and, on the other
there are the refugees with all of their own mutual differences. These two sides
obviously impact on each other constantly. Further, the processes of identity
formation are not univocal in this context and do not proceed along straight lines.
Instead, they are dissimilar, heterogeneous, and unpredictable. And government
policy does not take these differences among people into account.
In the Netherlands as an asylum country, for example, the debate deals mainly
with admission and with the purely legal aspects of refugee policy, while far less
attention is paid to what happens after admission. An important aspect in the
identity formation of refugees in asylum countries, for example, is the persisting
image of refugees as pitiable victims, groups in need of humanitarian aid. This is
in sharp contrast to the exiles of the past, who were strictly individual, almost
romantic heroes. The image of exiles, linked to political revolt and to cultural life,
27
is aesthetized and elitist. The exiles were seen as able to maintain a certain
freedom and power; the recent refugee who often belongs to a much large
is not considered to possess or desire freedom and power.
Of course, it is true that refugees have often suffered hardships and ha
had traumatic experiences. At times, however, this aspect is overemphas
that it seems as if refugees are unable to contribute in any way to their new s
This denial of value is found not only among the Dutch, but refugees the
sometimes utilize this victims' image in order to get certain things from
government. This victims' role is justified in only a limited way. Many refugee
71
International Political Science Review 22(1)
in fact quite active people who have overcome great difficulties in order to reach
their goal, safety. They try to shape their new situation creatively but if they are
pushed into the role of victims their dignity is lost.
The identity of refugees and migrants in the context of the host country is
undermined by their weak position on the job market, where it is extremely
difficult for them to find suitable work. If they find work at all, they are often
underemployed, which further damages their sense of self-esteem. As a result, they
are neither accepted nor valued as contributing fellow-members of Dutch society.
As the number of refugees grows, so grows the image of a burden too heavy for
society to bear.
Widespread admission of large numbers of refugees also contributes
significantly to their identity formation. Whereas until recently, taking in refugees
was the main issue, the emphasis now is on the return of people admitted in the
past. Receiving only temporary protection makes them feel unwelcome, especially
in the eyes of the autochthonous population and government. However, some
refugees, who formerly did not consider integration in an asylum country, after
28
years spent in a marginal position come to long for greater participation. A
Bosnian dentist, for example, said in a television documentary programme that,
during her first two years in the Netherlands, she only thought of returning to
Bosnia. In the meanwhile, however, her children have learned Dutch and gone to
school here. As the war continued and her children became more integrated, this
situation became unbearable. A sudden change in Bosnia, such as that offered by
the Dayton Agreements, could reverse this, so that return becomes a viable option
again, but that introduces new uncertainties.
In addition to these problematic aspects, which can affect the process of
identity formation in the context of the host country, positive creative forces also
can be addressed. The idea of a temporary stay leads to quite different views of
citizenship and participation in Dutch society from the idea of living in the
Netherlands for a longer period or even permanently. Someone who thinks that
he or she will be able to stay in the Netherlands only temporarily may prefer to
learn English, which in most countries is much more useful than Dutch. Often this
aspect changes as time passes. It is logical for a person to increase his focus on the
local environment as the time spent in the Netherlands becomes longer.
But even then the ties that migrants and refugees maintain with people in their
countries of origin or other host countries are regarded with suspicion by
government representatives. It is believed that such contacts counteract
integration. Multiple allegiances are abhorrent in the eyes of policymakers, even
though recent research in Rotterdam has shown, however, that refugees and
migrants are quite able to focus on two or more places simultaneously (Dijkstra
and van Eekelen, 1999). Ties to a particular country do not necessarily preclude
embedment in a different and new society.
The plight of migrants who are forced to leave their country and only slowly
adjust and assimilate in their new environment applies far less than it did in the
29
past. People find new and creative ways to construct their lives, often combining
cultural sources. Interesting blends can develop in this way. In the old centre of
Lyons, for example, a Turkish "McDoner" sits next to authentic Cambodian and
Moroccan restaurants.
The problematic experiences of refugees in the host country can also lead
positive new links that emphasize the unique characteristics, especially wh
related to colonial or neo-colonial history. In France, Algerians, Tunisians a
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DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
Moroccans nowadays develop a common Maghreb awareness, in which Rai music
is an important factor (Clifford, 1994).
Back to the Future? Returning to the Country of Origin
A third factor which needs more attention in the attitudes of the West-European
governments is that there is no question of refugees returning to the same
situation in their country of origin as that which existed previously, like a trip back
in time. The lives of the refugees involved did not stop during their residence
elsewhere, and this may well have been a period of several years. They have had
many experiences, and gone through many changes; in some cases their period of
refuge was easier than their lives before it. They do not automatically expect to go
back to find things as they used to be. Some refugees have lived in cities, followed
training courses, found work, and are not keen to go back to a country where they
would have scarcely any economic possibilities, even if this were the place from
which they originally came. The country from which they fled has also changed;
often conflicts have been going on for years. Houses, land, and other possessions
have been taken over by other people. Going back does not mean a return to the
old situation, but to a new situation in which they must build up a new life through
creativity, perseverance and will power. Some people are unwilling or unable to
30
take this step. They have developed a new transnational way of life which they
wish
to continue in the asylum country.
The return means different things for different people: amongst them there
are differences not only in their gender, age and duration of stay in the host
country, but also in the degree of involvement they have retained with their
country of origin. As already stated, globalization for refugees means, amongst
other things, that they can keep greater contact with their country of origin
through the people who did not flee for many reasons. Social and political
networks can be maintained or even set up transnationally. The fact that refugees
can, far more than used to be the case, stay involved with developments in their
countrie of origin means that the conflicts from which they fled continue to play
an important role in their asylum countries too. For example, many Bosnian
refugees in asylum countries redefine their identity partly on the basis of the
developments in the conflict in Bosnia. Some Muslims put a lot of emphasis on
their identity as Muslims, a sort of ethnicity. They call themselves Bosnjak, a
reference to the descendants of the Bosnjani, a Bosnian society in the Middle
Ages. In this way, an ethnic Muslim identity is constructed which provides a
connection with descent and territory. In Sweden, for example, the refugees did
not use specific Serbo-Croatian words used in parts of Bosnia associated with
groups posing the greatest threat or denoting their place of origin. Thus a family
from Mostar would avoid using Croatian words and a family from Banja Luka
would avoid using Serbian words (see Eastmond, 1998).
The refugees do not, therefore, consist of homogeneous groups, but have large
mutual differences and often contradictory interests. The transnational manner in
which culture, identity and idealisation of the homeland are elaborated varies.
In addition there are, of course, differences between what people say in public
31
that they consider to be important and the things about which they express their
doubts in private. In public, few deny that return is the ultimate objective, one of
the reasons being that they will then not be accused of double betrayal: you not
only fled, but you are not going back to help with the reconstruction either.
73 International Political Science Review 22(1)
Meanwhile, many refugees put their eggs in more than one basket: they help in
the asylum seekers' centre through which they can make contact with those who
work there, and thus build up a network. At the same time they request
recognition of their diplomas and apply for a passport from the Bosnian embassy.
Other important differences between people are their prospects given the
economic situation in their host country, and their opportunities in the land of
origin. Some people have found work or are following training courses; others feel
marginalized, nor do they have any prospect of providing for themselves in the
land of origin. All these differences between refugees affect the vision of their
return.
People ultimately denied admission (or no longer accepted) in a host countr
may decide not to return to a place that they no longer see as home, or where the
do not feel safe, but migrate to another country. Some Iranians, for examp
having trained in Sweden but being unabe to find work there and unwilling
return to Iran, are prepared to migrate to the United States or Canada (Graha
and Khosravi, 1998).
If people do return to their country of origin, how those who have staye
behind view the situation plays an important role. The latter may think th
refugees returning from Western Europe have had it easier that those who
remained or those who fled to a neighbouring country. People can brand them
"traitors, cowards, people who have run away." Sometimes other people hav
moved into a house that was left years ago, and the land is worked by someo
32
else. The relationship between losers and winners is also important in a (pas
conflict. Is the family that has returned seen as belonging to the winners or t
losers? This is important with regard to any reprisals, the loss of land, house, and
other possessions. In Bosnia certain people can no longer return to their place
origin because of the division according to ethnically-defined areas. Buildin
bridges between those who have stayed and those who are returning is enormously
important in the process.
Focusing on Refugees: From Fixed Core to Self-constructed Identity
Refugees not only find themselves in another place but also in a globalizing world.
They have been able to flee a long distance because of globalization; because of
they can lead a transnational life better than would have been possible in the past.
The cultural context plays an important role in the asylum country, but also in th
country of origin. Refugees experience hybrid transnational cultural identities
which traditional and new elements are united.
The formal grounds for any refugee policy, which take insufficient account of
these changes and the related large diversity amongst refugees, are therefore
based on points of departure which are becoming increasingly obsolete. The aims
for so-called durable solutions are a return to the country of origin or integration
in a host country. The problems associated with both are insufficiently recognised
in the policy. In a globalizing world it has become impossible to talk about
integration as though refugees simply switch from one culture to another, needing
an initial period of mourning for their loss and then becoming steadily better
adjusted in the course of time. Similarly, it is not realistic to think about return to a
home in which refugees can just reintegrate as though time had stood still.
Government policy which takes insufficient account of the factors described
above will not be effective, at least if it really wants to accomplish what it claims,
74
33
DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
that is, quality of integration and quality of return. This is a problem for the
government itself, and for the refugees, as also for the country to which they
return.
Further refinement of the existing rules, which has been done repeat
recent years, is not really what is necessary. This leads to involution and
treatment of the symptoms in the short term and on a very limited scale. Ano
perspective is necessary in forming refugee policy, in which the views of refu
with their changing cultural identities, become central. Where refugees no
primarily to be objects of the policy, they should become more the subjec
the prospect of a worthwhile existence in which dignity and self-sufficie
central concepts.
Conclusion: A Plea for Postnational Citizenship
National citizenship does not meet the requirements of a solution for th
integration problem in the multicultural communities for two reasons.
cannot achieve its objective, bringing about social integration by mea
divided culture, because it is based on an obsolete, static picture of culture
current world in which cultural meanings rapidly transcend borders in
people can simply travel to another area and maintain simultaneous
(transnational) contacts, cultural homogeneity is an illusion, while the creation of
new cultural identities is a fact. The theory of national citizenship does not fit in
with the practical diversity and multiple connections of a multicultural society.
Second, national citizenship hinders any possible alternative approach to the
social integration question. The cultivation of a common, national feeling
presents the changed (and repeatedly changing), glocalizing world with contrary
results. Legal inequality and denial of the individual's identity, the consequences
of national citizenship, are of course not a fruitful ground for social integration.
34
The policy which arises from the opinion that a plural society can only function
adequately if there is a consensus about fundamental values and orientations
between different groups in the society therefore overshoots its mark. The
plurality in normative orientations and the increasing international and
transnational orientation in the fields of economy and the law, as well as identity,
cannot be reversed. "Problems which are the result of the increasing diversity
cannot be solved by modelling the behaviour of citizens. The state cannot impose
a behaviour which is in accordance with the system (observance of rules,
willingness to sacrifice oneself, political participation) in the name of citizenship.
After all, this appeal is paradoxical: it tells free citizens how they should behave.
However, citizenship implies the autonomy of citizens, the freedom to judge for
oneself' (Van Gunsteren, 1992: 4).
We believe that rather than looking for an impossible cultural conformity,
attempts should be made to unite the differences and different groups in the
multicultural societies in another way than on the basis of culture. Social
integration between different groups can be organized in a social manner, without
this having to lead to cultural integration: perhaps cohesion leans more on social
equality than on cultural integration. Having common ideas and values is not a
functional condition for the society nor for communication between different
groups and individuals. The question must then be, not how cultural homogeneity
can be achieved but how the growing diversity can be united in such a way that
enough social integration is maintained. What new cultural competencies do
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International Political Science Review 22(1)
citizens need in order to live together in such a "differentiated society"? And what
role can the state and other (trans)national actors play here? In any case, the
presence of diversity means that the current view of citizenship, with its
35
homogenizing objective, must be brought up for discussion. We need another
attitude towards citizenship. And the objective of the discussion about this new
citizenship "should not be to realize a unity in society (shared standards and
values, common goals, brotherhood) but to organize plurality" (van Gunsteren,
1998).
Citizens and Cultural Diversity: Learning to Communicate
Citizens in these multicultural societies connected by transnational contact will
have to learn to deal with cultural diversity in a judicious manner. After all, in a
plural society the citizen will inevitably have to associate with people who have
different ways of thinking and acting. There is an urgent need to constantly
communicate with others, foreigners, both with regard to capacity and intention.
In a certain sense, for this to be the case, it is necessary that citizens also consider
themselves to be foreigners and realise that there is no longer a benchmark which
a cultural identity must meet.
The important question is, of course, how the citizen is to acquire the
necessities for such communication. The differences in the society may finally lead
to friction in the mutual contacts: people may be irritated by others, which results
in imminent threats. It is difficult to lay down the competence to deal with
diversity in formal rules. It has to do with the ability to deal with uncertainty, with
unknown situations, with limited means, with one's own shortcomings. The citizen
does not find his freedom in blindly observing rules nor in a self-evident
orientation toward the general interest, nor in the ability to do everything he
wants to do, but in the ability to actjudiciously under different specific conditions
(van Gunsteren, 1992).
The State and Diversity: Public Debate about Postnational Citizens
We feel that an important condition for the realization of the above-mentioned
open and equal communication between citizens is the uncoupling of law and
36
culture in the form of the postnational citizenship as described above. This
uncoupling leads to equality under the law and the recognition of different
identities. These are, of course, natural objectives in themselves, but they are
equally important conditions for learning to deal with differences in a
multicultural society. Free and desired communication can ultimately only take
place from equal power and legal situations. Besides these, equal citizenship rights
are an instrument with which further social integration can be achieved.
Citizenship is, after all, the main door to other entrances to the society.
As regards the characteristics a citizen needs to be able to live with "others" and
if possible to get to know them, it is in any case necessary that the diversity
of identities be recognized and valued within and by the state. This valuing of
diversity takes place under the law via national citizenship and via the concept
of the group. There is such a thing as a homogeneous groups metaphor, which
repeatedly goes under different names: the nation, the Dutch culture, the French
nationality. By this group thought, it is difficult to value difference without seeing
other groups of individuals as totally different and excluded from specific rights.
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DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
Postnational citizenship is, on the other hand, willing to accept cross-boundary
links, precisely because of the aspect of deterritorialized culture which is enclosed
within it. It makes membership of various groups possible, which in our opinion is
essential for life in a "differentiated society." Finally, someone can only learn to
accept and (if he chooses) value differences if he begins to be open to the open
ends in his own identity. A postnational citizenship could be the cement of a
multicultural society, in which the presence of diversity is actually recognized.
We must, therefore, let go of the idea of "commonality." It must be replaced by
a search for the capacity of differences to be united. Culture can then be
37
described as a means, an instrument with which diversity can be organized, both in
interests and standpoints. In such a vision, culture is not a system of fixed codes,
but an implicit contract with respect for diversity.
It is not necessary to organize plurality around a common basis, because society
would otherwise fall apart as cultural groups with calculating individuals fighting
each other. People or groups with different values and backgrounds may work
together very well in everyday practice by gradually developing the necessary
instruments to do so. People may design and observe rules for associating with one
another, without it being necessary to base them on a like-mindedness with respect
to standards and values, in other words a shared "civil religion."
This does not imply that a certain degree of commonality cannot be conducive
to the organization of plurality. If commonality is actually present people may try
to leave it intact. However making it a standard and a goal and trying to create it
where it is lacking is in conflict with the principle of citizenship, that is, autonomy.
In a plural society (and world) it is appropriate that we find ways to deal with
differences, that is to say, to deal with the absence of self-evident commonality.
Appealing for commonality when it is not present is to present the problem as the
answer to the problem. We should not remove differences, which is impossible
and unnecessary, but regulate and thus recognize and appreciate them. Only
compatibility is required, not a commonality of cultures and lifestyles. This
compatibility is not present from the very start, but should develop from practice.
Here the government, but perhaps not only the government, has a vital function.
It should cultivate compatibility. It can do this by stimulating and organizing
public debate-in which many segments participate- on views, definitions and
procedures with respect to the public domain. It should also teach the citizen to
recognize differences between standards and systems of values and deal with them.
The problem of the task of (post)modern open society is to develop the ability of
38
citizens to deal with changing environments. A consequence of this may be that
the other will not be denied (or excluded or ostracized), but treated and
respected like any other person (van Gunsteren, 1992, 1998).
The Participating Citizen
It is only partly possible to do justice to these citizenship lessons in formal
curricula; daily practice is the best experience. People will have to be able to
participate in the practice of citizenship in a moder multicultural society. This
means that the government will have to draw a clear line with respect to attempts
to segregate or ostracize groups of citizens. In other words, it means stimulating
contacts between groups with different identities, without asking these groups to
develop a common system of basic conditions.
Nevertheless it means guaranteeing and regulating access to and use of the
77
International Political Science Review 22(1)
competencies for participation necessary in our society. These competencies are
not distributed equally over the various segments of society; certain groups find
themselves in a basic situation of deprivation, lacking equal opportunities for
development and having a low degree of participation. Different authors point out
the danger of the possible formation of a permanent ethnic lower class (de Swaan,
1992; Wilson, 1991). In our opinion low participation is not connected to the
culture of those groups.
An important characteristic of a lower class is the limited social participation
and integration (Roelandt, 1994). The main cause can easily be identified.
Participation in modem industrial society is realized through an economic
dimension. Integrating while retaining one's own cultural identity is therefore
perfectly possible, because in our type of society it is not culture but economics
which is the determining factor. Work is the key to participation and integration in
39
society and education is the key to work. According to van Amersfoort (1986) and
Wilson (1991), successful participation in education is therefore of decisive
significance for (young) migrants for upward social mobility and career
development. It is here that there is a bottleneck.
The greatest problem for the participation and/or emancipation of ethnic
minorities lies not in their culture but in their level of education. Other decisive
factors include discrimination by employers and co-workers. There is still no true
management of diversity, which should be based first of all on the added value
arising from a knowledge of several languages and cultures for an organization in
a transnational world. Lack of networks is another obstacle to finding work. This is
especially true for refugees, whose network of family and friends to help them find
work or start a business is smaller than that of other migrants.
In addition to generating income, work organizes the individual's whole life
and provides a system of concrete expectations and objectives (Bourdieu, 1965).
The government, possibly in cooperation with NGOs, must therefore utilize
training and work as a means of participation for all citizens. Other areas of
importance include promoting appreciation for diversity within and outside
organizations and alternatives to the lack of networks.
Transnational Cooperation
Not only can states and citizens contribute to the changing citizenship and deal
with growing diversity, the question is whether the state is the only proper and
authorized institution to give form and content to the existing diversity. After all,
not only do we live in multicultural societies, but also in a multicultural world
linked by transnational connections. The recognition of multiculturalism has not
yet led directly to the recognition of boundary-crossing linkages. Often national
governments allow membership of and focus on only one political community. It
would seem that people prefer to live in a multicultural state rather than
40
recognize the existing multicultural world. For the time being it is still difficult to
think outside the grid of the national state. The important question is ultimately,
on which level, within what limits, do people want to organize social integration in
a multicultural world.
In Europe, for example, a complex interaction takes place between the
institutions of the EU and the institutions of separate nation-states. On top of this,
there are other factors such as intergovernmental organizations such as the UN,
(transnational) non-governmental organizations, private companies, regions, and
78
DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
the like, which all have a role in questions concerning immigration, exclusion,
asylum and the making of differences. Levels and centres of policy and
sovereignty
overlap. States do not disappear, but the sovereignty of states is affected.
Individuals are at the same time members of various communities which are not
mutually exclusive.
There is therefore a large diversity between, but also within, the actors. They all
have their own subinterests without having a common umbrella interest. There
however, a need to coordinate and combine these subinterests because otherwise
complex questions which transcend the separate actors, such as the problem o
refugees and the multiple connections of migrants, will not be considered.
It is precisely because of globalization that these different levels are n
separate but dependent on one another. There are consequently problems in t
terrain of harmonization in policy and jurisdiction, particularly with the ma
translevel matters. It is highly problematic if no institutions are able to coordin
and regulate the increasingly more complicated, intensive, and comprehensiv
dependency relationships across borders. The question is whether the Uni
41
Nations institutions can function as arbiters given the fragmentation of acto
with a plurality of ways of life, objectives, values, and definitions of reality.
The existing conceptualizations of identities and citizenship are, as ye
expressed as institutions which are based on a "we/they" distinction. Wi
globalization, there is a need to enrich these. The new conceptualizations a
practices concerning identities and citizenship require new institutions, whic
may be found in the recognition of a diversity of actors, at different levels wi
partially overlapping sovereignty. A postnational citizenship strikes us as being
important condition for dealing adequately with difference and equality i
multicultural world.
We see a world in which all sorts of individuals and groups of people with self-
created identities, more or less different from each other, more or less living in
fixed abodes, practising more or less transnational contacts, trying to live together.
If this equality of law and freedom of identity does not exist in the current world of
difference and if the nation-states (and also Europe) obstinately continue to place
"foreigners" in groups with big signs saying "not welcome here" in front of them
both within and outside of their borders, we should worry about a future without
cohesion.
Notes
1. During the recent period of globalization the West has exhibited a general
tendency
toward growing inequality and increasing poverty and exclusion. The trend toward
less
inequality came to a halt in the United States in the 1970s and in Europe in the
1980s.
Inequality in terms of income and capital is on the rise. Some analysts predict a
far-
42
reaching polarization of income levels, leading to a dichotomy within societies.
Others
expect a fragmentation of the class structure, either instead of, or as well as, the
above.
What appears to be taking place is the formation, at least in part, of a social
underclass.
"Besidesx, we see a gradual transformation from the 'state as centre of power'
which
assumes responsibility for the welfare of its citizens to the 'state as border,' in
which above all the criteria of membership of the society occupy a central place
and
in which an erosioin of collective responsibility is going on" (Detrez and
Blommaert,
1994).
2. Understandably, therefore, this theme links several projects within the
comprehensive
longitudinal multidisciplinary programme "The Dutch Multicultural and Pluriform
79
International Political Science Review 22(1)
Society," which is linked in turn to the international MOST research programme.
In this
programme, which is financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research
(NWO) and several universities and runs from 1997 to 2005, various Dutch
research
groups work together. In addition to a more synthetic and theoretical-conceptual
part,
43
five comprehensive clusters can be distinguished, namely (1) the construction of
identity, (2) the formation of networks, (3) law enforcement and the development
of
norms, (4) economic self-sufficiency and informalization, and (5) multicultural
healthcare. These themes are closely linked to the issue of citizenship. An
important
component of the programme concerns the theoretical underpinning of empirical
research and making the results of scientific research suitable for application. The
nature and functioning of pluralism in a theoretical sense are elaborated in these
primarily conceptual and synthetic studies.
3. This homogenizing activity within states brought about increasing differences
among
states.
4. Paradoxically, however, the latest developments of these media lead to a
fragmentat
of communality. The ever-increasing supply of television channels, for example,
resu
in fellow-countrymen watching ever fewer of the same programmes. Without shar
experiences, an imagined community is impossible. Instead everyone seems to b
forming their own community. While television was originally a gateway to the
entir
world, it is now used to shut oneself off from certain parts of that world. The
televis
buttton appears to be changing from a gateway into a barrier. The window to the
wo
is increasingly degenerating into a means to reduce the world. This development c
also be found in relation to the Internet.
44
5. This can also backfire, as Anderson (1992) indicates. The myriad means of
communication have allowed various forms of crossborder nationalism to emerge.
People in different countries maintain networks through which violent actions can
be
planned and implemented. Such forms of long-distance nationalism exist among
certain refugees as well. The violent attacks by various Kurdish groups in Western
Europe are a case in point.
6. Another relevant question is whether such privileges are perhaps acquired.
While
fostering inequality among people within the same state (or world) may be unjust,
forcing a group to make resources that it has acquired over time accessible to
members
outside that group may be at least as unfair.
7. This statement does not refer to people who according to the law reside illegally
in a
particular state. Proponents and opponents engage in heated debates about the
rights
of these so-called illegal aliens, such as to health care and education, but this
article
does not address that discussion. It deals instead with the different statuses for
people
who have been accepted voluntarily by a given state.
8. Walzer (1983) argues that a community is entitled to deny access to individuals
but that
it must treat them as full and equal citizens once it has admitted them. He views the
practice of granting different citizenship statuses to people living within one and
the same country as unfair. Glastra and Shedler (1996) mention the consequences
45
of
the new naturalization programme in the Netherlands. Its essence is an integration
paradigm, in which newcomers are required to attend courses in the Dutch
language
and sociocultural and job orientation, all in exchange for work at reates below the
minimum wage. According to the authors, the rights of a certain population group
are
thus restricted, and people are forced to engage in certain activities to be allowed to
become citizens. "In this context, citizenship is regarded not as a legal status but as
a
goal that the residents of a certain territory, in this case newcomers, can achieve
only
once they have met their obligations. Until then-much like young people-they lack
full citizenship rights" (ibid.: 178).
9. Not all residents automatically have the same rights and obligations in Europe
today.
This also has to do with the linkage of nationality to legal rights, even though a
supranationality is involoved in this case. In principle, Europeans may have certain
rights and obligations in every other member state. Membership in the European
80
DIJKSTRA/GEUIJEN/DE RUIJTER: Multiculturalism in Europe
Union is defined as being a citizen of one of the member countries, a simple fact
that
excludes at least 14 million legal residents from European citizenship. This shows
how
difficult it still is to consider citzenship in a postnational context.
10. The majority of the rules in this area are, however, intergovernmental rather
46
than set by
the European Community. The Treaty of Amsterdam sets a period of five years
within
which further thought must be given to the possibilities of transferring immigration
and
asylum policy from the third pillar (intergovernmental) to the first pillar
(community):
first harmonize, then set community rules for immigration and asylum policy.
Harmonization is presently under way.
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Biographical Note
STEVEN DIJKSTRA's research in cultural anthropology at Utrecht University was
on
the housing of asylum seekers in the Netherlands, and the international contacts
and activities of migrants and refugees in Rotterdam. Currently he is preparing a
PhD thesis, "From national citizenship to a right on individuality." In 1999 he
published, with Bregje van Eekelen, "Meervoudig verbonden: grensover-
schrijdende activiteniten van migranten-en vluchtelingenzelforganisaties in
Rotterdam" ("Multiple connections: transnational activities of migrant and
refugee organizations in Rotterdam.") ADDRESS: Bilstraat 50bis, 3572 BD
Utrecht,
53
The Netherlands [e-mail: meeroor@hotmail.com]
KARIN GEUIJEN, a cultural anthropologist, currently teaches on multiculturalism
at
the Centre for Policy and Management Studies at Utrecht University. Her research
interests include refugees and Dutch asylum policy. ADDRESS: Centre for Policy
and
Management Studies, Utrecht University, Muntstraat 2a, 3512 Utrecht, The
Netherlands [e-mail: k.geuijen@fss.uu.nl]
ARIE DE RUIJTER is professor of cultural and social anthropology and scientific
director of the national research school, CERES. He has published extensively on
theoretical and methodological issues. His research activities focus on identity
formation, citizenship, and ethnicity; recent publications include "Ambivalences
and Complexities in European Identity Formation," in A United Europe (1998),
and
"Ethnicity and Identity," in Culture, Ethnicity and Migration (1999). ADDRESS:
CERES,
PO Box 80.140, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands [e-mail: a.deruijter@fss.uu.nl]

54