Ulstein SX195 Hull 315 U11126: Boatlabs As

Ulstein SX195
U11126
Hull 315
FMEA ANALYSIS
BOATLABS AS
As buildt 26.03.2020 C
Updated after sea trial 18.03.2020 B
Updated after comments from Class 28.02.2020 A
Issue after update of section 5.3 25.02.2020 2
REVISION DATE SIGN REV
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DRAWN: ASH 05.02.20
FMEA ANALYSIS NA
APPR.:
FORMAT: A4
YARD NO.: UVE.315
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Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne” – Failure Modes & Effect Analysis
BL.2019.F427.10.R04
Failure Modes & Effect Analysis
Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne”
Ulstein Verft AS
BL Doc. No.: BL.2019.F427.10.R04
Issue date: 2020-03-26
DNV GL Class notation: DYNPOS(AUTR)
Auditor: Erlend Erstad
NOTE
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BL.2019.F427.10.R04
DOCUMENT ISSUE AND DISTRIBUTION
Document Number BL.2019.F427.10

Document Title Failure Modes & Effect Analysis
Client Ulstein Verft AS
Job Number F427
Job Title
Copy Number
Revision Issue date Author Checked Authorised
R04 26 March 2020

Erlend Erstad Jens Urke Eldar Holm
Distribution of Copies
Copy Number Location
1 Ulstein Verft AS
2 DNV GL
R04 26 March 2020 Updated after closing of findings JU

Updated after Trial with results, amended Section 5.3
R03 18 March 2020 after Class comments and Rangeguard added as EE
reference system
R02 28 February 2020 Updated after comments from Class EE
R01 25 February 2020 Issue after update of Section 5.3 JU
R00 04 February 2020 Issue for Comment and Approval EE
REVISION ISSUE DATE DESCRIPTION BY
REVISION REGISTER
MEMBERSHIPS, CERTIFICATIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND REGISTRATIONS
Member
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BL.2019.F427.10.R04
1 SUMMARY
1.1 STATUS & CONCLUSION

Status
This FMEA analysis is updated after successfully conducted FMEA Proving Trials for DNV GL
Class DYNPOS(AUTR) Vessel Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne”.
All findings from the FMEA Proving Trial have been closed.
Conclusion
Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne” is fulfilling the DNV GL Class notation
DYNPOS(AUTR).
1.2 WORST SINGLE FAILURE
1.2.1 DG MODE
The worst single failure for Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne” is failure/ short-circuit/ loss of
690V Main Switchboard Port or 690V Main Switchboard Starboard.
Loss of 690V Main Switchboard Port will result in loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 and Main
Azimuth Thruster PS.
Loss of 690V Main Switchboard Starboard will result in loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 and
Main Azimuth Thruster SB.
This failure is in line with the Worst-Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI), and time restraints
for safely aborting operations are within the default minimum requirement of 30 minutes.
1.2.2 HYBRID MODE
When operating in Hybrid Mode (one DG and ESS), the worst single failure for Ulstein B315/
“Windea Jules Verne” is loss of the running DG.
Loss of the running DG will result in ESS having to supply all power needs to thrusters and
vessel “hotel load”, as long as the bus-tie remains closed, and manual intervention for
opening the bus-tie is not considered.
This failure will lead to faster draining the battery remaining capacity and time restraints for
safely aborting operations may be affected but should remain within the estimated time to
safely abort ongoing operations of approximately 10 minutes.
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1.3 SETUP DP OPERATION MODE

Following setup must be performed before entering DP Class 2 operations:
Generator/ Hybrid System configuration:

o Minimum two generator sets running and delivering to 690V Main Switchboard
o Generator 1 running and connected to 690V MSWB PS, and/ or
o Generator 2 running and connected to 690V MSWB PS, and/ or
o BESS running and connected to 690V MSWB PS
o Generator 3 running and connected to 690V MSWB SB, and/ or
o Generator 4 running and connected to 690V MSWB SB, and/ or
o BESS System running and connected to 690V MSWB SB
Power System configuration:

o 690V Bus-tie breaker MS6 TB6.1 can be OPEN or CLOSED
o 440V Bus-tie breaker MS4 TB4.1 must be OPEN
o 230V Bus-tie breaker MS2 TB2.1 must be OPEN
o Minimum two Bow thrusters must run
o Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 connected to 690V MSWB bus-bar PS, and/ or
o Fwd Azimuth Thruster connected to 690V MSWB bus-bar PS and SB, and/ or
o Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 connected to 690V MSWB bus-bar SB
o Main Azimuth Thruster PS must run and connected to 690V MSWB bus-bar PS
o Main Azimuth Thruster SB must run and connected to 690V MSWB bus-bar SB
o 690V Distribution Board HP01 service switch must be set to “Normal”
o UPS 20 and UPS 40 connected to Main supply, and no supply fault alarm active on IAS
o Emergency Generator in Standby and ready for automatic start
o Emergency Switchboard powered from 440V SWB bus-bar 1 (PS)
Pumps & Misc. Systems:

o SW Cooling Pump PS for Central Cooling Unit 1 must run
o SW Cooling Pump SB for Central Cooling Unit 2 must run
o SW Backup Cooling Pump for Chilled Water System running as needed
o One FW Cooling Pump for FW Cooling System PS must run
o One FW Cooling Pump for FW Cooling System SB must run
o FW LT Cooling Pump for Generators must run if engine runs and generator connected
o FW Cooling pump for Fwd Azimuth Thruster running as needed
o SW Cooling pump for Fwd Azimuth Thruster running as needed
o FW Cooling pump for BESS running as needed
o SW Cooling pump for BESS running as needed
o ME1 and ME2 must have FO supply from FO Service tank 1 (273)
o ME3 and ME4 must have FO supply from FO Service tank 2 (274)
o Starting Air Compressor 1 and Starting Air Compressor 2 must be in operation
o Crossover valves between redundancy groups in Compressed Air system, SW system,
FW system, FO system and LO System must be closed
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HVAC system
o AC-1 must be in operation
o AC-3 must be in operation
o Chilled Water System must be in operation
o Fan Coil FC-36 in Bridge Trunk must be in operation
o Fan Coil FC-35 in Instrument Room D-Deck must be in operation
o Fan Coil FC-33 in Instrument Room C-Deck must be in operation
o Fan Coil FC-30 in Engine Control Room running as needed
o Both Fan Coils FC-31 and FC-32 in Switchboard Room running as needed
o Both Fan Coils FC-40 and FC-41 in Bow Thruster Room running as needed
o Both Fan Coils FC-60 and FC-61 in Main Propulsion Room running as needed
o Both Fan Coils FC-50 and FC-51 in Battery Room running as needed
o Engine Room Fan S-40 and Engine Room Fan S-41 must run
o Supply Fan S-30 in Engine Control Room running as needed
o Supply Fan S-31 in Switchboard Room running as needed
o Supply Fan S-34 in Battery Room running as needed
o Supply Fan S-42 in Bow Thruster Room running as needed
o Supply Fan S-60 in Main Propulsion Room running as needed
Note! To achieve DP Capability Level 1 (9,7,8,6) all thrusters and generators must run.
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CONTENTS
1 Summary ..................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Status & Conclusion .......................................................................................... 3
1.2 Worst Single Failure .......................................................................................... 3
1.2.1 DG Mode ..................................................................................................... 3
1.2.2 Hybrid Mode................................................................................................. 3
1.3 Setup DP Operation Mode ................................................................................... 4
2 Introduction ................................................................................................ 8
2.1 General ........................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Scope ............................................................................................................. 8
2.3 DP Class Information ......................................................................................... 8
2.4 Objective ....................................................................................................... 10
2.5 Method ......................................................................................................... 10
2.6 Relevant IMCA Guidelines ................................................................................. 10
2.7 FMEA Management .......................................................................................... 11
2.8 DP Operations Manual ...................................................................................... 11
2.9 Vessel Data.................................................................................................... 12
2.10 Vessel Layout ................................................................................................. 14
3 Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 15
4 Power Generation ...................................................................................... 16
4.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 16
4.2 Main Engines & Generators ............................................................................... 16
4.3 Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) .............................................................. 18
4.4 Emergency Engine & Generator ......................................................................... 21
5 Power System ............................................................................................ 22
5.1 Switchboard Layout ......................................................................................... 22
5.2 Power Distribution System ................................................................................ 23
5.3 690V Main Switchboard .................................................................................... 23
5.4 440V Switchboard ........................................................................................... 29
5.5 230V Switchboard ........................................................................................... 32
5.6 230V Ship UPS System .................................................................................... 35
5.7 440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard .................................................................. 39
5.8 Distribution Boards.......................................................................................... 41
6 Control System .......................................................................................... 45
6.1 Main Engine Control System ............................................................................. 45
6.2 Generator Control System ................................................................................ 48
6.3 Power Management System .............................................................................. 50
6.4 Integrated Automation System .......................................................................... 53
6.5 Energy Management System (EMS) .................................................................... 55
6.6 Thruster Control System .................................................................................. 57
7 Seawater Cooling System .......................................................................... 61
7.1 SW Cooling System for FW Cooling system PS and SB ........................................... 61
7.2 SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth Thruster ........................................ 64
8 Freshwater Cooling System........................................................................ 66
8.1 FW Cooling System Engines, Generators, Thrusters & Auxiliaries ............................. 66
8.2 FW Cooling System for BESS............................................................................. 71
8.3 FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster ...................................................... 73
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9 Fuel Oil System .......................................................................................... 75

9.1 FO System Engines ......................................................................................... 75
10 Lube Oil System ......................................................................................... 78
10.1 LO System Main Engines .................................................................................. 78
10.2 LO System Thrusters ....................................................................................... 80
10.3 LO System Main Azimuth Thrusters .................................................................... 84
11 Compressed Air System ............................................................................. 87
11.1 Starting Air/ Instrument Air System ................................................................... 87
12 HVAC System ............................................................................................. 90
12.1 Overview ....................................................................................................... 91
12.2 Air Condition System ....................................................................................... 91
12.3 Ventilation Fan System .................................................................................... 93
12.4 Chilled Water System ...................................................................................... 95
13 Thruster System ........................................................................................ 99
13.1 Thruster Layout .............................................................................................. 99
13.2 Thruster Configuration .................................................................................... 100
13.3 Bow Tunnel Thrusters ..................................................................................... 100
13.4 Fwd Azimuth Thruster ..................................................................................... 102
13.5 Main Azimuth Thrusters .................................................................................. 105
13.6 Emergency Stop System for Thrusters ............................................................... 107
14 DP Control System ................................................................................... 108
14.1 General ........................................................................................................ 108
14.2 DP Software Control ....................................................................................... 112
14.3 Operator Stations and Controllers ..................................................................... 112
14.4 Network ....................................................................................................... 112
14.5 Mode Selection System ................................................................................... 113
14.6 Independent Joystick System ........................................................................... 113
14.7 DP Reference System ..................................................................................... 114
14.8 DP Sensors ................................................................................................... 115
14.9 Power Supply - DP Control System .................................................................... 116
15 Safety Systems ........................................................................................ 119
15.1 Emergency Stop System ................................................................................. 119
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2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 GENERAL
The presented FMEA is prepared by Boatlabs AS on received instruction from Ulstein Verft
AS.
The FMEA is based on a desktop analysis of available documents and drawings.
2.2 SCOPE
The scope of work consists of producing an FMEA analysis, FMEA proving trial program and
conduct of the FMEA proving Trial.
After the proving Trial the finding(s) to be reported and verified/ closed before issue of final
FMEA analysis and FMEA proving trial report.
2.3 DP CLASS INFORMATION

The vessel is built to comply with DNV GL Rules for Classification of Ships, Part 6, Chapter 3,
Section 1 – Dynamic Positioning Systems, Class notation DYNPOS(AUTR) from January 2018,
as well as Part 6, Chapter 2 – Propulsion, Power Generation and Auxiliary Systems, Class
notation Battery(Power).
Based on International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines for Vessels and Units with
Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems, the Classification Societies issue rules for dynamically
positioned ships in relation to IMO equipment Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3.
DYNPOS(AUTR) is characterised and structured in line with IMO Class 2, although additional
requirements to achieve higher availability and robustness will apply.
Description DP Class Classification Company

IMO ABS BV DNV GL LR
Automatic and manual position and heading control Class 2 DPS-2 DYNAPOS DPS(2) DP (AA)
under specified maximum environmental conditions. AM/ AT R
Has redundancy so that no single fault in an active
system will cause the system to fail. Loss of position
should not occur from a single fault of an active
component or system such as generators, thruster,
switchboards, remote controlled valves etc. But may
occur after failure of a static component such as
cables, pipes, manual valves etc.
Additional requirements to achieve higher availability DYNPOS
and robustness as compared to DPS(2) will apply. (AUTR)
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A synopsis from IMO MSC1/ Circ. 1580 for DP Classes follows below:
2.2 The equipment classes are defined by their worst-case failure modes as follows:
2.2.2 For equipment class 2, a loss of position and/or heading will not occur in the event of a single fault
in any active component or system. Common static components may be accepted in systems which
will not immediately affect position keeping capabilities upon failure (e.g. ventilation and
seawater systems not directly cooling running machinery). Normally such static components will
not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include, but are not limited to:
2.2.2.1 any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards, communication
networks, remote-controlled valves, etc.); and
2.2.2.2 any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) that may immediately
affect position keeping capabilities upon failure or is not properly documented with
respect to protection.
2.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be considered as a single fault if such
an act is reasonably probable.
On power systems with closed bus-ties, the IMO Guideline states the following:
3.2.3 For equipment class 2, the power system should be divisible into two or more systems so that, in
the event of failure of one sub-system, at least one other system will remain in operation and
provide sufficient power for station keeping. The power system(s) may be run as one system during
operation, but should be arranged by bus-tie breaker(s) to separate the systems automatically
upon failures which could be transferred from one system to another, including, but not limited to,
overloading and short circuits.
One of the requirements of the IMO Class 2 and 3 guidelines is a system of Online
Consequence Analysis to be incorporated in the DP system.
This function continually performs an analysis of the vessel's ability to maintain its position
and heading after a predefined, worst case failure during operation. Possible consequences
are based on the actual weather conditions, enabled thrusters and power plant status.
Typical worst-case single failures are:

o Failure in the most critical thruster
o Failure in one thruster group
o Failure in one power bus section
If the consequence of the predefined failure is a loss of position, it is reported to the operator
via the DP alarm system. The consequence analysis can operate for different configurations
and give Class 2 or Class 3 alarms and warnings.
A typical alarm message is “Consequence Analysis Drift-Off Alarm”. The associated

description reads: “Single worst-case failure will cause drift-off”. The analysis function
typically runs every minute and averages over the last minute.
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2.4 OBJECTIVE
The objective of the FMEA is to investigate activities in this analysis to recognise and
evaluate One Single Failures for all systems related to DP operation. E.g. machinery systems,
thrusters, processes, electrical systems, DP system et cetera and evaluate their effects on
the vessels position keeping performance.
Drawings/ illustrations included in this FMEA analysis does not show the entire systems, but
what is relevant for this FMEA and included to simplify the explanation of the various
systems. It is therefore important that these drawings/ illustrations are seen like that.
2.5 METHOD
In all conditions for the executed studies, the systems with relevance for DP operations have
been evaluated on basis of “Top-Down FMEA Philosophy” where redundancy has been based
on Running Machinery and Active Components.
Passive or static components for DP Class 2 (DYNPOS(AUTR)) have been considered as

defined by the Class rules.
2.6 RELEVANT IMCA GUIDELINES

The FMEA is prepared and performed in accordance with following IMCA Guidelines:
o IMCA M103 Guidelines for The Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned
Vessels
o IMCA M109 A Guide to DP-Related Documentation for DP Vessels
o IMCA M113 Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems (IMO MSC
Circular 645)
o IMCA M166 Guidance on Failure Modes & Effects Analyses (FMEAs)
o IMCA M182 International Guidelines for The Safe Operation of Dynamically
Positioned Offshore Supply Vessels
o IMCA M206 A Guide to DP Electrical Power and Control Systems
o IMCA M219 Example Specification for a DP FMEA for a New DP Vessel
o 245 IMO Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning (DP) Systems (IMO
MSC1/ Circular 1580)
o IMCA M247 Guidance to Identify DP System Components and their Failure Modes
o IMCA M250 Introduction to hybrid battery systems for DP vessels
It must be noted that additional IMCA Guidelines and other publications provides useful
information and must be made available for familiarisation and training as needed.
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2.7 FMEA MANAGEMENT

IMCA Guideline M166 addresses the importance of keeping the FMEA up to date. The FMEA
should grow and mature with the life of the vessel. Any changes to the design of systems
relevant to the DP should be analysed in line with the original FMEA and recorded as annexes
to the FMEA. At suitable intervals, depending on the number of relevant design changes
made, the FMEA should be formally updated.
It may not be necessary to update the FMEA formally on a regular basis, provided that any
changes that are made during the life cycle of the vessel are properly analysed, and the
FMEA is updated following a control management procedure.
The responsibility or ownership of the FMEA should be with the vessel operating company
that is responsible for the safe operation of the vessel. The vessel holds the FMEA, but the
vessel management team ashore owns the FMEA and is the responsible point for changes. It
is not an individual’s responsibility as such, though the vessel superintendent in the office
should be designated the focal point and should have a thorough understanding of the FMEA
management process.
The vessel’s key personnel have the responsibility to make the vessel management team
aware of any deficiencies or inaccuracies in the FMEA as they themselves become aware of
them. The vessel management team is responsible for ensuring that any such deficiencies or
inaccuracies in the FMEA are corrected in a timely matter.
2.8 DP OPERATIONS MANUAL

Per IMO Circ. 1580 and IMCA Guidelines, every DP vessel is required to have a DP Operations
Manual and checklists particular to the DP system, machinery system and the operating
practice of the owners or operators of the vessel.
It should cover all the work for which the vessel is designed or likely to be used, and
highlight any limitations of such operations.
The DP Operations Manual must be accompanied by decision support tools such as Activity
Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) which means guidelines on the operational,
environmental and equipment performance limits for the location and specific activity.
Further details to the suggested content of the DP Operations Manual, and relevant checklists
can also be found in IMCA Guideline M103 and M109, as well as in the DP Operations
Guidance issued by MTS. Guidance on The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel is
found in IMCA Guideline M117.
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2.9 VESSEL DATA

Vessel Class Notation:
The vessel is classified by DNV GL and has following class notation:
1A SF, E0, Offshore Service Vessel, Strengthened (DK, HA), DYNPOS (AUTR),
CLEAN(DESIGN), COMF(C-2,V-2), NAUT(OC), BWM(T), BIS, RECYCABLE, Battery(Power)
Vessel Facts:
Name Windea Jules Verne
Design Ulstein, SX195
Build by Ulstein Verft AS, Norway
Build number Yard No. 315
Year 2020
Flag Gibraltar
Port of Registry Gibraltar
Owner/ Manager Bernhard Schulte Offshore
Length 93,4 m
Breadth 18,0 m
Depth main deck 7,6 m
Design Draught 5,6 m
Gross tonnage 6081 GRT

NRT 1825 Net
DWT 3300 Ton
Weather deck area 500 m2

Max deck load 550 Ton
Main deck area 500 m2
Max deck load 1000 Ton
Fuel oil 780 m3
Fresh water 850 m3
IMO Number 9863584

DNV GL ID Number 40041
MMSI number 236734000
Call signal ZDRK5
Main Engines Four Caterpillar, 3512C – 1790bkW @ 1800 RPM
Main generators AVK, DSG 86 L1/4W – 1889kVA/ 1700ekW, 690V/ 60 Hz
Energy Storage System One Corvus, Orca ESS - 1600kVA/ 1500kW, 690V/ 60 Hz
Bow Tunnel Thrusters Two Kongsberg, TT2400 FP – 1500 kW

Fwd Azimuth Thruster One Kongsberg, TCNS/C 100 – 1500 kW
Main Azimuth Thrusters Two Kongsberg, US 205-P20 FP – 1500 kW
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The vessel has following sensors, references and control systems:
DP Reference System Three DGNSS (Veripos, LiD5-G)
- Correction signals from IALA and Spot L-band
One LASER (Guidance Marine, Cyscan Mark IV)
One RADAR (Guidance Marine, Rangeguard)
One GANGWAY INTERFACE (Motion interface from Gangway
Control system while “landed”)
DP Sensors Three Wind Sensors (Gill Windobserver II)

Three Heading Sensors (Raytheon Anschütz, Standard 22 Digital
Gyro Compass)
Three Motion Sensors (2x SMC, IMU-007, 1x SMC, IMU-008)
DP Control System Thrustmaster, Icon DP2
Independent Joystick Thrustmaster, Poscon
DP Capability Level 1 9,7,8,6
Thruster Control System Kongsberg, Helicon X3
IAS Control System Blue CTRL, Blue IAS (Remote PMS Interface)
PMS Control System Deif, Delomatic 4
EMS Control System Ulstein, EMS (Energy Management System)
BMS Control System Corvus, BMS (Battery Monitoring System)
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2.10 VESSEL LAYOUT

Figure 2.10
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3 ABBREVIATIONS
A/ AMP Ampere HMI Human Machine Interface
AC Air Condition HP High Pressure
ACC Accommodation HPR Hydro-Acoustic Positioning Reference System
AFE Active Front End HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
AHU Air Handling Unit HT High Temperature
AI Analogue Input IALA International Association of Lighthouse
AO Analogue Output Authorities
ASOG Activity Specific Operating Guideline IAS Integrated Automation System
AUX Auxiliary IGBT Insulated-gate Bipolar Transistor
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator IMCA International Marine Contractors Association
AZI Azimuth Thruster IMO International Maritime Organisation
BL Boatlabs AS IO In Out signal
BTT Bow Tunnel Thruster kV kilo Volt
CAMO Critical Activity Mode kVA kilo Volt Ampere
CAN Controller Area Network kW kilo Watt
CAT Customer Acceptance Test LAN Local Area Network
CP Controllable Pitch LO Lube Oil
CPP Controllable Pitch Propeller LP Low Pressure
CPU Central Processing Unit LT Low Temperature
DC Direct Current MCG Motion Compensated Gangway
DG Diesel Generator MCR Maximum Continuous Rating
DGU Deif Generator Unit ME Main Engine
DI Digital Input MRU Motion Reference Unit
DGNSS Differential Global Navigation Satellite System MSWB Main Switchboard
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System NC Normally Closed
DNV GL DNV GL AS NMD The Norwegian Maritime Directorate
DO Digital Output NO Normally Open
DOL Direct Online OS Operator Station
DP Dynamic Positioning PMS Power Management System
DP1 DYNPOS(AUT) or DPS(1) PRS Position Reference System
DP2 DYNPOS(AUTR) or DPS(2) PS Port Side
DP3 DYNPOS(AUTRO) or DPS(3) QCV Quick Closing Valve
DPC Dynamic Positioning Computer or Cabinet RPM Revolution Per Minute
DPO Dynamic Positioning Operator SAT Sea Acceptance Test
DU Display Unit SB Starboard Side
ECR Engine Control Room SOLAS International convention for the Safety-Of-Life-
EMG Emergency Generator At-Sea
ESWB Emergency Switchboard ST Stern Thruster
ER Engine Room SW Sea Water
ERN Environmental Regularity Numbers SWBD Switchboard
ERO Engine Room Operator TAM Task Appropriate Mode
FAT Factory Acceptance Test UPS Uninterruptible Power Source
FC Fan Coil Uvt Under Voltage Trip
FMEA Failure Modes and Effect Analysis V Volt
FO Fuel Oil VAC Volt Alternating Current
FRT Fault Ride Through VDC Volt Direct Current
FW Fresh Water VRS Vertical Reference Sensor
FWD Forward VRU Vertical Reference Unit
GSU Grid Support Unit WCF Worst Case Failure
GPS Global Positioning System WCFDI Worst Case Failure Design Intent
HC Heavy Consumer Y/D Star Delta
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4 POWER GENERATION
4.1 OVERVIEW
The vessel is equipped with two main engine rooms and one emergency generator room.
The main engine rooms consist of lower engine room arranged on the Tank Top and the
upper engine room located on Tween Deck. The emergency generator room is located Top of
wheelhouse.
The Engine Control Room and the switchboard room are located on Tween Deck.
4.2 MAIN ENGINES & GENERATORS

The main engines are numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. Engine 1 and 2 are placed Port side in lower
engine room, while engine 3 and 4 are placed Starboard in lower engine room.
Engine 1, 2, 3 and four are of make Caterpillar, type 3512C, with engine speed at 1800 RPM
and maximum continuous rating (MCR) of 1790 bkW.
Engine 1, 2 3 and 4 drives a generator of make AVK, type DSG 86 L1/4W, with output
capacity of 1889 kVA (cosφ 0,9) / 1700 ekW, 690V/ 60Hz.
The generators are named G1, G2, G3 and G4. G1 and G2 is serving Main bus-bar 1 (PS), G3
and G4 is serving Main bus-bar 2 (SB) of the 690V Main Switchboard.
The generator sets are designed to run as automatically controlled power stations, under full
command by the extended Power Management system with surrounding logic, including
Power Management control system and other related systems installed for the Main
Switchboard. The Control systems are described in chapter 6 of this document.
Full manual control is also possible by local control panels by the engines, and mimic in the
Main Switchboard.
All engines can be emergency stopped locally or from the engine control room.
Starting of the engines is performed by using starting air taken from the starting air system.
This system will be further described under chapter 11.
Cooling is provided through freshwater cooling, described separately in chapter 8.1.
Important Consumers
Table 4.2.1 - Important consumers for the Main Engines and Generators
CONSUMER PORT CIRCUIT CONSUMER STARBOARD CIRCUIT

Main Engine 1 230V L15 Main Engine 3 230V L14
Control Panel Main Supply Circ. 111 Control Panel Main Supply Circ. 112
Main Engine 1 230V UPS 30 Main Engine 3 230V UPS 40
Control Panel Backup Supply Circ. 108 Control Panel Backup Supply Circ. 109
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Generator No. 1 230V UPS 30 Generator No. 3 230V UPS 40
UPS Supply Circ. 111 UPS Supply Circ. 116
Failure Modes
Table 4.2.2 - Failure Modes of the Main Engines and Generators
FAILURE RESULT CONSEQUENCE

Alarm will be activated
Failure/ Loss of Main Engine Control Shutdown of affected engine No loss of position keeping
System Loss of affected generator set ability
In worst case, loss of affected side
Failure/ Loss of Generator Control No loss of position keeping
Loss of affected generator set
System ability
No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of SW Cooling No immediate effect
ability
Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of FW Cooling
In worst case, loss of affected side ability
Failure/ Loss of Fuel Oil Shutdown of affected engine
ability
Failure/ Loss of Lube Oil Shutdown of affected engine
ability
Failure/ Loss of Compressed Air
No affect on running machinery ability
Main Engines and Generators Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Main Engines and Generators will exceed the defined
worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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4.3 BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (BESS)

The vessel is fitted with a Hybrid system consisting of the Battery Energy Storage System
(BESS), Drive and transformer.
The BESS are installed in the Battery Room at Tween Deck.
The system has an output capacity of 1600 kVA/ 1500 kW (Cosφ 0,9) 690V/ 60 Hz.
The BESS may be connected to 690V Main Switchboard PS through breaker 5Q2, or 690V
Main Switchboard SB through breaker 7Q2.
Breaker interlocks are in place so that only one supply is active at a time.
Start, synchronisation and closing of breakers is handled by the PMS control system, via
remote interface through the integrated automation system.
The auxiliaries for the BESS are supplied via a dedicated change over and distribution
cabinet, called Bess Aux distribution unit.
The Change over and distribution cabinet may be connected to 440V Switchboard PS through
breaker 1Q20 and 230V Switchboard PS through 1Q14, or 440V Switchboard SB through
breaker 4Q20 and 230V Switchboard SB 2Q14.
A selector switch is arranged for choosing port or starboard power supply.
In case the 690V power supply, the 440V power supply and the 230V power supply is not
selected within the same redundancy group the PMS will initiate an alarm.
The Change over and distribution cabinet supplies 440V for the Battery Room Fan Coils,
Supply Fan, Battery Converter and Battery Packs. In addition, one 230V supply for the
control circuit is installed.
The control power supply for the Bess Aux distribution unit is supplied from 230V UPS 30,
Circ. 116, or 230V UPS 40, Circ. 114.
There is arranged a dual supply for the UPS power supplies, one from each redundancy
group. The dual supply is protected by AC/DC converters and one common diode bridge,
preventing propagation of a fault in one redundancy group to the other.
The BESS consist of one array by five battery packs, with 20 modules per pack. The modules
are connected in series to create a maximum voltage of 1000VDC. The packs are connected
in parallel in the array.
Five battery packs are connected in parallel to give a total of 565 kWh storage capacity.
Each battery cell is protected against high currents. The battery pack is also protected by a
500A fuse and internal contactor to isolate its power.
Further, the BESS delivers 660VAC to the 660/ 690VAC transformer T6.6.
The system has two modes of operation; peak shaving and spinning reserve.
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Control and monitoring of the BESS system is done by the Energy Management System
(EMS). The EMS will be separately described in chapter 6.5.
Cooling for the BESS is provided through the FW Cooling System, further described in
chapter 8.2.
Emergency stop of the BESS is fitted on the bridge, in ECR and outside Energy Storage
Room.
Important Consumers
Table 4.3.1 - Important consumers for the Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)

BESS - Transformer T6.6 690V MSWB PS BESS - Transformer T6.6 690V MSWB SB
Supply 1 Breaker 5Q2 Supply 2 Breaker 7Q2
440V BESS 440V SWB PS 440V BESS 440V SWB SB
Aux PS Circ. 1Q20 Aux SB Circ. 4Q20
230V BESS AUX 230V UPS 30 230V BESS AUX 230V UPS 40
Control Voltage Circ. 116 Control Voltage Circ. 114
CONSUMER CENTRE CIRCUIT

SW Cooling Pump 440V Bess Aux
BESS Circ. Q4
FW Cooling Pump 440V Bess Aux
BESS Circ. Q5
Fan Coil (FC-50) 440V Bess Aux
Battery Room Circ. Q1
Battery Converter 230V Bess Aux
Aux Power Circ. Q3
Battery Pack 1 230V Bess Aux
Blower Aux Power Circ. F10
Supply PDM 230V Bess Aux
Aux power Circ. F15
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Supply Fan (S-34) 230V Bess Aux
Battery Room Circ. F16
Failure Modes
Table 4.3.2 - Failure Modes of the Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)
FAILURE RESULT CONSEQUENSE

Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 440V Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
power supply for BESS In worst case, loss of BESS ability
power supply for BESS In worst case, loss of BESS ability
Loss of BESS No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of BESS
In worst case, loss of affected side and ability
half blackout
Failure/ Loss of BESS Controller
Loss of BESS ability
Failure/ Loss of BMS
In worst case, loss of BESS ability
Failure/ Loss of cooling for BESS
In worst case, loss of BESS ability
Failure/ Short circuit in dual supply Selectivity and diode isolation will No loss of position keeping
arrangement prevent propagation from one system to ability
another
Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical single failure in the Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) will
exceed the defined worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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4.4 EMERGENCY ENGINE & GENERATOR

The emergency engine and generator are located in the Emergency Generator room on Top
of wheelhouse. The engine is of make Caterpillar, type C9.3 with engine speed at 1800 RPM
and maximum continuous rating (MCR) of 275 bkW.
The engine drives an alternator of make Caterpillar, type LC6134B with output capacity of
280 kVA (cosφ 0,8) / 224eKW / 440V/ 60Hz. The emergency generator is named EG and is
serving the 440V/ 230V emergency switchboard located in Emergency generator room.
The emergency engine is fitted with a start battery system, and the start logic is located in
the emergency switchboard. It provides an auto-start in case of a blackout of the 440V
switchboard Port side.
The emergency engine is cooled by a closed internal FW system.
The emergency generator is not considered to be important for DP operations and will not be
considered further.
Important Consumers
None important electrical consumer for Emergency Engine & Generator is found to be
important for DP operation.
Failure Modes
None failure mode in Emergency Engine & Generator is found to be important for DP
operation.
Emergency Engine & Generator Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in Emergency Engine & Generator will exceed the defined
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5 POWER SYSTEM
5.1 SWITCHBOARD LAYOUT

Figure 5.1 Main One Line Diagram
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5.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

The power distribution system consists of the 690V Main Switchboard, 440V Switchboard,
230V Switchboard and 440/ 230V Emergency Switchboard. All switchboards are
manufactured by Ulstein Power & Control AS.
The 690V Switchboards are built for Icw80 kA, Ipk 176 kA with main bus bar dimension
4x10x100mm. The 440V Switchboard is built for Icw 30kA, Ipk 63 kA with main bus bar
dimension 2x10x50mm. The 230V Switchboard is built for Icw 30 kA, Ipk 63 kA with main bus
bar dimension 2x10x30mm. The 440/ 230V Emergency Switchboard is built for Icw 30 kA, Ipk
63 kA with main bus bar dimension 2x10x30mm.
The 690V Main Switchboard, 440V Switchboard and the 230V Switchboard are installed in
Switchboard room located on Tween Deck. The 440/ 230V Emergency Switchboard is
installed in the Emergency Generator room on Wheelhouse top.
5.3 690V MAIN SWITCHBOARD

The 690V Main Switchboard has two bus-bar segments, segregated by one bus-tie (breaker
6Q1).
The 690V Main Switchboard is configured to operate with CLOSED or OPEN bus-tie in DP
Class 2 operation.
o 690V Main bus-bar PS is for Bow Tunnel Thruster (BTT1), Fwd Azimuth Thruster
(BAZ), Main Azimuth Thruster PS (MP1) and consumers Port
o 690V Main bus-bar SB is for Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 (BTT2), Fwd Azimuth Thruster
(BAZ), Main Azimuth Thruster SB (MP2) and consumers Starboard
The Main Switchboard is configured in such a way that any major fault, e.g. short circuit on
one side of the switchboard will not affect the other bus-segments.
A Short Circuit and Discrimination analysis has been performed by Clean Marine
Switchboards (Doc. No.: P18049-300-013-01), as theoretic proof of the switchboards ability
to handle Closed bus-tie in DP Class 2 operations.
The discrimination analysis shows selectivity between the Main Azimuth Thrusters and any
combination of generators, as well as combination with any generator and ESS, in closed
bus-tie condition. This is achieved by installed overcurrent and short circuit protection units
of type Micrologic 5.0P installed on each of the breakers. In this situation, there is
documented time selectivity between bus-tie and generator/ ESS breaker.
According to data received from Ulstein Design & Solutions the ESS Drive will give a 2,2kA
short circuit contribution in a period of minimum 2 seconds.
When operating with the ESS and either one of the generators there will be two different
short circuit scenarios depending on which bus-bar segment the short circuit occurs.
If a short circuit occurs in the bus-bar segment where the ESS is connected the contribution
from the generator breaker will trip the bus-tie breaker and effectively isolate the faulty side.
If a short circuit occurs in the bus-bar segment where the generator is connected, the ESS
DGU 5 or DGU 6, depending on which side the ESS is connected, will detect fast overcurrent
at 125% for the ESS and trip the bus-tie after a delay of 300ms by UVT circuit tripping.
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This means that it will be sufficient to run in DP Class 2 with any one power source connected
on each main bus-bar.
In case of a major short circuit in the 690V Main Switchboard, there are several means to
detect and open the bus-tie. The bus-tie can detect a short circuit/ overcurrent after 300ms,
and the GPU’s can detect fast overcurrent after 200ms.
Installed blackout relays on each bus-bar opens the bus-tie without any delay, when the
voltage falls below 70-35%, with reaction time of approximately than 20ms which will open
the bus-tie by Uvt trip.
The bus-tie itself will need approximately 95ms to open. The voltage will then be restored
and stabilised within a default estimated transient time of maximum of 200ms, also
supported by the generator decrement curve.
The bus-tie breaker will such effectively isolate the affected segment of the Main Switchboard
within 115ms when released from the blackout relays.
The voltage dip fault ride through period is hereby calculated to be 315ms when released by
the short circuit detection relays. For additional safety, the design has considered that all
equipment shall be designed for a minimum ride through period of 500ms.
A ride-through analysis has been performed, for switchboard, drives and essential motor
starters:
o Doc. Philosophy of Ride Though Capability for UVE build 315 Design U11126 Type
SX195 by Ulstein
The main findings in this study is brought forward into this report.
The requirement is that the equipment not belonging to the redundancy group directly
affected by the failure shall ride through the transient period and be immediately available,
without operator intervention, when the system voltage is re-established. For motor starters,
this means that the main contactor shall stay closed during this transient period.
Thruster output power will be limited during a transient period until the fault is cleared, and
thrusters connected to the adjacent bus-bar will be unaffected, and continuously ready for
the DP control system.
A short circuit in one switchboard segment will be isolated before equipment in the other
switchboard segment trips, and the system has been designed to withstand a fault ride-
through (FRT) period, based on voltage drop down to “close to zero” (0V), and rise back up
again above Uvt (70%) within a specified time. Voltage rise will be controlled by each AVR,
to prevent overvoltage.
In case of a major short circuit in the 690V Main Switchboard, the Main Bus-tie breaker 6Q1
will be opened after 115ms and effectively isolate the faulty bus-bar segment.
Short circuit upstream in a generator will be cleared in 400ms, and short circuit downstream
of the thruster breakers will be cleared after 200ms. The study also declares that the supply
breakers for 440V Transformers, essential for the auxiliary systems power supply system,
are dimensioned to withstand maximum inrush current after transient voltage dip, and
ensure disconnection of downstream transformer short circuit after 100ms. Further
downstream faults in sub-distributions are cleared by documented selectivity and
switchboard segregation by means of open bus-ties.
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In short, the protective arrangement in the Switchboard is coordinated in four levels:
o Level 1 – Instant opening of bus-tie
o Level 2 – Short circuit, Over current and Differential protection
o Level 3 – Over/ Under voltage
o Level 4 – System stability Reverse power
Fwd Azimuth Thruster is connected to both bus-bar segments through a duel-feed frequency
converter with two sets of Active Front End inverters. Each IGBT inverter will prevent
common source transferrable faults to both bus-bar segments in case of an internal short
circuit in the DC bus-link of the drive by internal fast fuses.
Fwd Azimuth Thruster is also provided with a dedicated distribution board, fed from the
frequency converter drive unit, for auxiliary systems such as FW cooling, lubrication and
hydraulic oil module for steering. This system is provided with 1000ms ride through
capability.
Breakers for generators and thrusters are provided with under-voltage coils with tripping
level of 0.35-0.7 x Un. Time delay is set to 2s for both generators and for thrusters, and 1s
for the main bus-tie breaker.
Protection settings for under-voltage detection and trip are set to 3s at 70% for generator
breakers, and 1s at 85% for the main bus-tie breaker. Protection settings for over-voltage
detection and trip are set to 1,5s at 130% for generator breakers, and 1s at 115% for the
main bus-tie breaker.
Thruster frequency converters with its internal cooling system are built with 1000ms ride
through capability, and an internal UPS to ensure that the drive is kept running. This to
ensure thrusters not belonging to the redundancy group directly affected by the failure are
available after the fault has been isolated. All relevant control systems are supplied from
battery systems and are not affected by a transient voltage dip.
Starters for LO pumps to Bow Tunnel Thruster and steering system for Fwd Azimuth
Thrusters have an internal 24V DC power supply for the starter circuit. The LO pumps
frequency converters for Fwd Azimuth Thrusters have (UN-117) have uninterruptable control
voltage from UPS. LO pumps for the Main Azimuth Thrusters are built with a latching relay in
the control circuit, ensuring running pumps keep running when the power is back to normal
after the transient period.
Frequency converters for the Engine Room fans are set up with “coasting”, and “flying start”,
meaning that the motor will be left spinning in the voltage dip period and then catch the
motor again when the power situation is normal. Control power for fire dampers for engine
room fans are supplied from UPS.
FW LT circulation pumps for Main Engines have start/ stop signal from Engine running.
The DOL starters for FW cooling pumps and SW Cooling pump is fitted with a mechanical
time delayed holding contact in the control loop for at least 2 seconds ensuring running
pumps keep running when the power is back to normal after the transient period. The Chilled
Water pumps are working with a kinetic backup for the frequency converter. The control
voltage for the Chill Water pumps have kinetic backup by a built-in battery.
AC units are provided with mechanical holding contact for start signal, and Chiller units have
internal UPS for control power. Fan coils in Bow Thruster room, Propulsion room and
Switchboard room are provided with manual start switches, and fan coils in Instrument
rooms and Wheelhouse Trunk are equipped with UPS supply to ensure equipment are
unaffected and still running after a blackout or a transient voltage dip.
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Control systems for equipment important for DP operation are provided with supplies from
Uninterruptible Power Source (UPS). This includes control system for engines, generators,
drives, thrusters, as well as the DP control system itself, and PMS system and IAS.
Hence, the conclusion can be made that the system is designed to ride through a voltage dip
without unintentional disconnection of generators or thrusters.
Normally the switchboard is operated by the PMS control system, via remote interface
through the integrated automation system. The switchboard can also be operated in local
PMS mode, or manually without PMS mode, by means of panels and mimic mounted on each
switchboard panel cubicles.
Closing and opening of the bus-tie breaker in PMS control is by a pulse signal from a
potential free (DO) contact, and there is no signal interlock, meaning that the bus-tie may
receive closing command unintentionally should there be a fault in the “TB ON” signal
interface.
When the switchboard is operated in local, the manual synchro-scope with sync check relay
will enable closing of the bus-tie breaker when bus-bars are in phase. But in case there is a
fault in the sync check relay, it might be possible to close the bus-tie breaker while the bus-
bars are out of phase, should the operator press the “CLOSE BREAKER” prematurely.
A crash sync of the bus-tie will send fault current from one side through the bus-tie breaker,
and be detected and cleared if the peak current is high enough. If the fault current is lower
than the bus-tie breaker trip level, the transient fault current will remain until the generators
are in sync, and be compensated by the PMS speed control.
In Local operation, the fault may in worst case lead to disconnection of a generator breaker
in case of reverse power, or unbalanced active load in the switchboard if no action taken to
clear the fault.
See functional description of Power Management System, or PMS FMEA for description and
relevant failure modes.
Important Consumers
Table 5.3.2 - Important consumers in 690V Main Switchboard

Generator G1 690V MSWB PS Generator G3 690V MSWB SB
690V Supply to MSWB PS Breaker 2Q1 690V Supply to MSWB SB Breaker 8Q1
Generator G2 690V MSWB PS Generator G4 690V MSWB SB
690V Supply to MSWB PS Breaker 4Q1 690V Supply to MSWB SB Breaker 10Q1
BESS - Transformer T6.6 690V MSWB PS BESS - Transformer T6.6 690V MSWB SB
Supply 1 Breaker 5Q2 Supply 2 Breaker 7Q2
Fwd Azimuth Thruster 690V MSWB PS Fwd Azimuth Thruster 690V MSWB SB
Supply no. 1 Breaker 5Q1 Supply no. 2 Breaker 7Q1
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 690V MSWB PS Bow tunnel Thruster 2 690V MSWB SB
Main Supply - Drive Breaker 3Q2 Main Supply - Drive Breaker 9Q2
Main Azimuth Thruster PS 690V MSWB PS Main Azimuth Thruster SB 690V MSWB SB
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Transformer T4.1 690V MSWB PS Transformer T4.2 690V MSWB SB
440V Switchboard PS Circ. 3Q3 440V Switchboard SB Circ. 9Q3
690V MSWB PS 690V MSWB SB
Water Chiller Unit – C1 Water Chiller Unit – C2
Circ. 1Q06 Circ. 11Q6
HP01 Distribution Board 690V MSWB PS
PS Service Breaker Circ. 1Q10

Fwd Azimuth Thruster 690V HP01
FQ SW Cooling Circ. 101
FQ FW Cooling Circ. 102
HPU pump Circ. 301
LO pump Circ. 302
Failure Modes
Table 5.3.3 - Failure Modes in 690V Main Switchboard

Failure/ Loss of Generator or Energy No loss of position keeping
Reduced power on Main Switchboard
Storage System ability
Bus-tie will open (if closed)
Loss of generators port
Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 690V No loss of position keeping
Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 and Main
bus-bar port ability
Azimuth Thruster PS
Loss of consumers port
No affect on Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Loss of generators starboard
bus-bar starboard ability
Azimuth Thruster SB
Loss of consumers starboard
Loss of 440V Switchboard port
Failure/ Loss of 690V/ 440V No loss of position keeping
Transformer T4.1 ability
Azimuth Thruster PS
Loss of 230V Switchboard port
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Loss of 440V Switchboard starboard
Failure/ Loss of 690V/ 440V No loss of position keeping
Transformer T4.2 ability
Azimuth Thruster SB
Loss of 230V Switchboard starboard
Short circuit in heavy consumer in No loss of position keeping
Affected upstream breaker will open,
690V MSWB ability
other consumers unaffected
Fault will be cleared by opening bus-tie No loss of position keeping
Bus-tie breaker “crash sync”
or generator breaker ability
690V Main Switchboard Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the 690V Main Switchboard will exceed the defined worst-
case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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5.4 440V SWITCHBOARD

The 440V Switchboard is segregated by one bus-tie (breaker 2Q1).
440V Port bus-bar is powered from 690V Main bus-bar PS and 440V Starboard bus-bar is
powered from 690V Main bus-bar SB, each via a 690V/ 440V transformer rated at 650 kVA.
When the vessel is in DP operations the 440V bus-tie breaker must be OPEN in DP2.
The bus-tie breaker in 440V Switchboard is normally open, and closing is only possible if one
of the transformer breakers is opened
Important Consumers
Table 5.4.1 - Important consumers in 440V Switchboard

Transformer T4.1 690V MSWB PS Transformer T4.2 690V MSWB SB
Transformer T2.1 440V SWB PS Transformer T2.2 440V SWB SB
440V Emergency Switchboard 440V SWB PS
Supply Circ. 2Q3
440V SWB PS 440V SWB SB
Distribution board P05 Distribution board P04
Circ. 1Q3 Circ. 4Q2
Distribution board P07 Distribution board P06
Circ. 1Q4 Circ. 4Q3
UPS 10 UPS 20
Circ. 1Q9 Circ. 4Q9
UPS 30 UPS 40
Motor Control Center No. 1 Motor Control Center No. 2
AC1/ AC3 Control Panel CP-1 440V SWB PS AC1/ AC3 Control Panel CP-1 440V SWB SB
Supply A Circ. 1Q5 Supply B Circ. 4Q5
Engine Room Fans Engine Room Fans
Control Panel CP-4 Control Panel CP-4
Circ. 1Q7 Circ. 4Q7
Supply A Supply B
FW Backup Cooling Pump FW Backup Cooling Pump
440V MCC1 440V MCC2
FW Cooling Pump PS FW Cooling Pump SB
Starter 9 Starter 7
440V P05 440V P04
Starting Air Compressor No. 1 Starting Air Compressor No. 2
Circ. 303 Circ. 307
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440V P05 440V P04
SW Cooling Pump No. 1 SW Cooling Pump No. 2
Circ. 306 Circ. 310
440V P05 440V P04
SW Cooling Backup Pump SW Cooling Backup Pump
Circ. 307 Circ. 311
BESS 440V P04
SW Cooling Pump - FQ Circ. 330
Main Engine No. 1 440V P05 Main Engine No. 4 440V P04
FW LT Cooling Pump Circ. 312 FW LT Cooling Pump Circ. 312
FW LT Cooling Booster Pump Circ. 333 FW LT Cooling Booster Pump Circ. 332
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 Bow Tunnel Thruster 2
440V P05 440V P04
Drive Control, Cooling Pumps Drive Control, Cooling Pumps
Circ. 323 Circ. 328
and Pre-charge and Pre-charge
Fwd Azimuth Thruster Fwd Azimuth Thruster
440V P05 440V P04
Circ. 324 Circ. 327
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 440V P05 Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 440V P04
Hydraulic Oil Pump Circ. 308 Hydraulic Oil Pump Circ. 308
Main Azimuth Thruster No. 1 Main Azimuth Thruster No. 2
440V P07 440V P06
Circ. 308 Circ. 313
Main Azimuth Thruster No. 1 440V P07 Main Azimuth Thruster No. 2 440V P06
Lubrication Oil Pump Circ. 303 Lubrication Oil Pump Circ. 304
440V P07 440V P06
Frequency Converter Frequency Converter
Circ. 304 Circ. 305
Steering Motor 1 Steering Motor 1
440V P07 440V P06
Circ. 305 Circ. 306
Drive - Cooling Fan Circ. 309 Drive - Cooling Fan Circ. 314
440V P05 440V P04
Chilled Water Pump No. 1 Chilled Water Pump No. 2
Circ. 336 Circ. 334
Fan Coil (FC-32) 440V P05 Fan Coil (FC-31) 440V P04
Switchboard Room Circ. 301 Switchboard Room Circ. 302
Bow Thruster Room Circ. 302 Bow Thruster Room Circ. 305
Propulsion Room Circ. 301 Propulsion Room Circ. 301
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Failure Modes
Table 5.4.2 - Failure Modes in 440V Switchboard

Loss of 440V consumers Port
Azimuth Thruster PS
bus-bar Port ability
Loss of 440V/ 230V Emergency
Switchboard supply
Loss of 230V Switchboard Port
Loss of 440V consumers Starboard
bus-bar Starboard ability
Azimuth Thruster SB
Loss of 230V Switchboard Starboard
Failure/ Loss of 440V/ 230V Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Transformer T2.1 Loss of 230V Switchboard Port ability
Failure/ Loss of 440V/ 230V Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Transformer T2.2 Loss of 230V Switchboard Starboard ability
Single earth failure in the 440V Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
distribution system No loss of consumers ability
440V Switchboard Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in 440V Switchboard will exceed the defined worst-case
failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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5.5 230V SWITCHBOARD

The 230V switchboard is segregated by one bus-tie (breaker 2Q1).
230V Port bus-bar is powered from 440V bus-bar PS and 230V Starboard bus-bar is powered
from 440V bus-bar SB, each via a 440V/ 230V transformer rated at 250 kVA.
When the vessel is in DP operations the 230V bus-tie breaker must be OPEN in DP2.
The bus-tie breaker in 230V Switchboard is normally open, and closing is only possible if one
of the transformer breakers is opened.
The E01 Distribution Board is provided with an automatic changeover of power supply from
main to emergency in case the main supply is lost. Both supplies are monitored with alarms
connected to the IAS. The changeover supply is further based on fall-back mechanism, which
will ensure that the main supply is preferred when available.
Time delay relays will ensure that only one supply is connected at a time. The main supply
release relay is set to 0,2s, and the backup supply release relay is set to 0,5s.
Important Consumers
Table 5.5.1 - Important consumers in 230V Switchboard

Transformer T2.1 440V SWB PS Transformer T2.2 440V SWB SB
Distribution board L01 Distribution board L02
Circ. 1Q3 Circ. 2Q3
Circ. 1Q5 Circ. 2Q4
Circ. 1Q6 Circ. 2Q5
Circ. 1Q7 Circ. 2Q6
Circ. 1Q9 Circ. 2Q8
230V SWB PS
Distribution board L17
Circ. 1Q11
Distribution Board E01 230V SWB PS
Autoswitch Circ. 1Q13
230V L01 230V L02
DP UPS 1 DP UPS 2
Circ. 105 Circ. 105
PMS PS 230V L15 PMS SB 230V L14
Control Cabinet Circ. 104 Control Cabinet Circ. 106
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Cooling Compressor 1 230V L15 Cooling Compressor 2 230V L14
Control Panel Circ. 105 Control Panel Circ. 107
Viewcon Switch Cabinet UN20 230V L05 Poscon JS 230V L02
Main Supply Circ. 101 Supply 1 Circ. 124
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 230V L05 Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 230V L04
UN1 – Main Supply Circ. 102 UN1 – Main Supply Circ. 101
Main Azimuth Thruster No. 1 230V L05 Main Azimuth Thruster No. 2 230V L04
230V L15
Instrument Air Dryer
Circ. 119
Emergency Stop System 230V L15 Emergency Stop System 230V L14
Main Supply Circ. 110 Backup Supply Circ. 116
CP-1 Control Panel 230V L07 CP-1 Control Panel 230V L06
Supply B Circ. 101 Supply A Circ. 101
Supply Fan (S-42) 230V L13
Bow Thruster Room Circ. 103
Supply Fan (S-31) 230V L15 Supply Fan (S-60) 230V L12
Switchboard Room Circ. 101A Propulsion Room Circ. 101A
IAS Network Cabinet No. 1 230V L01
Supply 1 Circ. 103
IAS 230V L01 230V L14
IAS IO Cabinet 2
IO Cabinet 1 Circ. 104 Circ. 103
230V L17 230V L12
IAS IO Cabinet 3 IAS IO Cabinet 4
Circ. 102 Circ. 103
230V L15 230V L14
Circ. 102 Circ. 104
230V L13 230V L14
Circ. 102 Circ. 105
Failure Modes
Table 5.5.2 - Failure Modes in 230V Switchboard

Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 230V Loss of 230V consumers Port No loss of position keeping
bus-bar Port No loss of generators or thrusters ability
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Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 230V Loss of 230V consumers Starboard No loss of position keeping
bus-bar Starboard No loss of generators or thrusters ability
230V Switchboard Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the 230V Switchboard will exceed the defined worst-case
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
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5.6 230V SHIP UPS SYSTEM

There is a total of four 230V Ship UPS systems installed on board this vessel:
o UPS 10 and UPS 20 with distribution boards are located on Bridge Deck
o UPS 30 and UPS 40 with distribution boards are located in Switchboard Room on
Tween Deck
UPS 10 and UPS 30 are arranged as Port systems, while and UPS 20 and UPS 40 are
arranged as Starboard systems.
Each UPS is fitted with an alarm interface connected to the IAS system, provided alarm are
common alarm and auto switch failure.
Each UPS is provided with an automatic changeover of power supply from main to
emergency in case the main supply is lost. Both supplies are monitored with alarms
However, in DP Class 2 operations UPS 20 and UPS 40 must always be connected to the Main
supply, and it must be ensured that no power supply alarm is active.
Important Consumers
Table 5.6.1 - Important consumers for the 230V Ship UPS system
CONSUMER PORT CIRC. CONSUMER STARBOARD CIRC.

UPS 10 UPS 20
Circ. 1Q9 Circ. 4Q9
UPS 30 UPS 40
UPS Backup Supply 440V ESWB
440V Emergency Fuse Box Circ. 2Q8
UPS 10 440V Em. Fuse Box
Emergency supply Circ. F1
PMS PS 230V UPS 30 PMS SB 230V UPS 40
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CP-4 Supply Fan Engine Room, 230V UPS 30 CP-4 Supply Fan Engine Room, 230V UPS 40
Ctrl. Voltage Circ. 107 Ctrl. Voltage Circ. 107
Viewcon Switch Cabinet UN20 230V UPS 20
Backup Supply Circ. 113
Fwd Azimuth Thruster 230V UPS 10 Fwd Azimuth Thruster 230V UPS 20
UN1 – Main Supply Circ. 108 UN1 – Backup Supply Circ. 106
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 230V UPS 10 Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 230V UPS 20
UN1 – Backup Supply Circ. 107 UN1 – Backup Supply Circ. 107
Main Azimuth Thruster No. 1 230V UPS 10 Main Azimuth Thruster No. 2 230V UPS 20
230V UPS 10 230V UPS 20
Gyro No. 1 Gyro No. 2
Circ. 110 Circ. 110
230V UPS 10
Gyro No. 3
Circ. 111
Fan Coil (FC-33) 230V UPS 10 Fan Coil (FC-35) 230V UPS 20
Instrument Room D-deck Circ. 105 Instrument Room C-deck Circ. 105
Fan Coil (FC-36) 230V UPS 10
Wheelhouse Trunk Circ. 113
230V UPS 30 230V UPS 40
IAS OS No. 1 IAS OS No. 2
Circ. 104 Circ. 105
230V UPS 10
IAS OS No. 3
Circ. 101
IAS Network Cabinet No. 1 230V UPS 10
Supply 2 Circ. 102
230V UPS 10 230V UPS 40
Circ. 104 Circ. 101
230V UPS 30 230V UPS 40
Circ. 101 Circ. 102
230V UPS 30 230V UPS 40
Circ. 102 Circ. 103
230V UPS 30 230V UPS 40
Circ. 103 Circ. 104
230V BESS AUX 230V UPS 30 230V BESS AUX 230V UPS 40
Control Voltage Circ. 116 Control Voltage Circ. 114
EMS 230V UPS 30 EMS 230V UPS 40
230V UPS PS Supply Circ. 115 230V UPS SB Supply Circ. 115
440V Switchboard 230V UPS 30 440V Switchboard 230V UPS 40
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230V Switchboard 230V UPS 30 230V Switchboard 230V UPS 40
Failure Modes
Table 5.6.2 - Failure Modes in 230V Ship UPS system

Failure/ Loss of 230V supply for Ship UPS running on battery No loss of position keeping
UPS System Loss of UPS if no capacity of batteries ability
(hidden fault)
Automatic changeover to Emergency
supply
For UPS 10 and UPS 30 no affect
For UPS 20 and UPS 40 UPS supply from
Failure/ Loss of 230V Main supply for No loss of position keeping
wrong redundancy group
Ship UPS System ability
In worst case, loss of UPS Supply and
affected UPS running on battery if
changeover fails
Loss of UPS if no capacity of batteries
(hidden fault)
Failure/ Loss of 230V Emergency Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
supply for Ship UPS System No affect ability
UPS system Loss of UPS consumers ability
Loss off affected consumers
Failure/ Loss of power for outgoing No loss of position keeping
circuits for UPS 10 No loss of generators or thrusters ability
Loss of redundancy principle for Fwd
Azimuth Thruster
Loss off affected consumers
No loss of generators or thrusters
circuits for UPS 20 ability
Loss of redundancy principle for Fwd
Azimuth Thruster
Loss of 230V Swbd Port
Loss of engines and generators port
Failure/ Loss of power for outgoing Bus-tie will open (if closed) No loss of position keeping
circuits for UPS 30 Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 and Main ability
Azimuth Thruster PS
Loss of consumers port
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Loss of 230V Swbd Starboard
Loss of engines and generators
starboard
circuits for UPS 40 ability
Azimuth Thruster SB
Loss of consumers starboard
Single earth failure in the 230V UPS Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
230V UPS System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the 230V UPS system will exceed the defined worst-case
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
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5.7 440V/ 230V EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD

The 440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard comprises of one 440V emergency bus-bar and one
230V emergency bus-bar.
The 440V emergency bus-bar is normally powered from 440V switchboard bus-bar 1 (PS),
Breaker 2Q3. This system is therefore considered to be a Port system.
An UPS is provided between the 440V emergency bus-bar and the 230V emergency bus-bar
to provide uninterrupted power supply to 230V emergency consumers, while emergency
generator is starting, in case of blackout on the 440V emergency bus-bar.
The 230V emergency bus-bar is normally supplied from the 440V emergency bus-bar via a
system which consists of 440V/ 400V Transformer T4.5, Emergency UPS and 400V/ 230V
Transformer ET2.3.
A 440V/ 230V transformer EMT is provided to supply the 230V emergency bus-bar in case of
Emergency UPS failure.
In an event of a power loss on the 440V emergency bus-bar, a start signal will be sent to the
emergency generator which will then start up. When the generator voltage has come up, the
generator breaker will close to restore power on the 440V emergency switchboard.
For the purpose of this analysis, the capacity of the emergency generator is not considered,
and the emergency switchboard is seen only as a distribution board.
The E01 Distribution Board is provided with an automatic changeover of power supply from
main to emergency in case the main supply is lost. Both supplies are monitored with alarms
Important Consumers
Table 5.7.1 - Important consumers for the 440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard

440V Emergency Switchboard 440V SWB PS
Supply Circ. 2Q3
Transformer T4.5 440V ESWB
230V Emergency Switchboard Circ. 2Q2
Engine Room Fans 440V ESWB
Control Panel CP-4 Circ. 2Q7
UPS Backup Supply 440V ESWB
440V Emergency Fuse Box Circ. 2Q8
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Transformer T2.3 230V ESWB
230V Emergency Switchboard Circ. 3Q2
Distribution Board E01 230V ESWB
Backup supply Circ. 3Q3
Poscon JS 230V E01
Supply 2 Circ. 116
Failure Modes
Table 5.7.2 - Failure Modes in 440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard

Loss of 440V emergency consumers
230V emergency consumers running on
battery from emergency UPS
Emergency Switchboard ability
In worst case loss of 230V emergency
consumers
No loss of running equipment
Loss of 230V ESWB consumers
230V emergency consumers running on
Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of battery from emergency UPS No loss of position keeping
440/400V Transformer T4.5 In worst case loss of 230V emergency ability
consumers
Failure/ Loss of Emergency UPS Loss of 230V emergency consumers
ability
Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of No loss of position keeping
Loss of 230V emergency consumers
440/230V Transformer T2.3 ability
Single earth failure in the 440V ESWB
No loss of consumers ability
440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in 440V/ 230V Emergency Switchboard will exceed the
defined worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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5.8 DISTRIBUTION BOARDS

Various sub-distribution boards are located around the vessel for distribution of power to the
vessel’s numerous consumers.
o 690V Distribution boards have prefix HP

o 440V Distribution boards have prefix P
o 230V Distribution boards have prefix L
o 230V Emergency distribution boards have prefix E
Only the distribution boards important and relevant for DP operations are considered and
mentioned in this analysis.
The distribution boards are supplied from the following bus-bar systems:
Table 5.8.1 - Distribution boards
DISTRIBUTION BOARD PORT STARBOARD

690V MSWB PS - 1Q10
690V HP01 – Fwd Azimuth Thruster Pumps (Drive – Fwd Azimuth
Thruster)
440V P04 – Engine Room Upper 440V SWB – 4Q2
440V P05 – Engine Room Upper 440V SWB PS – 1Q3
440V P06 – Propulsion Room 440V SWB – 4Q3
440V P07 – Propulsion Room 440V SWB PS – 1Q4
230V L01 – Bridge 230V SWB PS – 1Q3
230V L02 – Bridge 230V SWB SB – 2Q3
230V L04 230V SWB SB – 2Q4
230V L05 230V SWB PS – 1Q5
230V L06 230V SWB SB – 2Q5
230V L07 230V SWB PS – 1Q6
230V L08 230V SWB SB – 2Q6
230V L09 230V SWB PS – 1Q7
230V L12 230V SWB SB – 2Q8
230V L13 230V SWB PS – 1Q9
230V L14 – Engine Room Upper 230V SWB SB – 2Q9
230V L15 – Engine Room Upper 230V SWB PS – 1Q10
230V L17 230V SWB PS – 1Q11
230V SWB PS - 1Q13/
230V E01 - Emergency Distribution
230V ESWB - 3Q3
Important Consumers
Important consumers in distribution boards will be treated under the respective systems and
chapters.
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Failure Modes
Table 5.8.2 - Failure Modes in Distribution Boards

Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 690V
Azimuth Thruster PS
bus-bar Port
Loss of 690V distributions Port
Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 690V Azimuth Thruster SB
bus-bar Starboard
Loss of 690V distributions Starboard
Azimuth Thruster PS
Failure/ Short circuit/ Loss of 440V Loss of 440V distributions Port No loss of position keeping
bus-bar Port Loss of 230V distributions Port ability
Loss of 440V/ 230V Emergency
Switchboard supply
Loss of 230V Emergency distributions
Azimuth Thruster SB
bus-bar Starboard ability
bus-bar Port Loss of 230V distributions Port ability
bus-bar Starboard Loss of 230V distributions Starboard ability
Loss of 230V Emergency distribution
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Loss of 690V Distribution board HP01
Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster ability
Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 No loss of position keeping
Loss of 440V Distribution board P04
In worst case, loss of generator 3 and 4, ability
and subsequently blackout Starboard
Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 ability
In worst case, loss of generator 1 and 2,
and subsequently blackout Port
Loss of Main Azimuth Thruster SB ability
Loss of Main Azimuth Thruster PS ability
Loss of 230V Distribution Board L01
No loss of thrusters or generators ability
Loss of 230V Distribution Board L07 ability
No loss of thrusters or generators
Loss of 230V Distribution Board L08 ability
No loss of thrusters or generators
Loss of 230V Emergency Distribution Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Board E01 No loss of thrusters or generators ability
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Distribution Boards Summary (assessment)
No electrical or technical failure in the Distribution boards will exceed the defined worst-case
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
Page 45 of 120
BL.2019.F427.10.R04
6 CONTROL SYSTEM
In this section the control systems for following components related to DP operations will be
described.
o Main Engine Control System

o Generator Control System
o Power Management System
o Integrated Automation System
o Energy Management System
o Thruster Control System
6.1 MAIN ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM

Each engine is equipped with an electronic engine control management system of make
Caterpillar, and type ADEM with electronic unit injector fuel system, electronic monitoring
and protection systems with self-diagnostic sensors.
The Engines are equipped with ADEM III. The ADEM system handles all strategic functionality
such as engine start, stop, and speed control and engine safety.
The control system comprises the following major control/ monitoring categories:
o Engine start- & stop management

o Starting of the engine
o Stopping of the engine
o Start blocking
o Automatic shutdown of the engine
o Load reduction request
o Local control through local command buttons
o Speed and load control
o Measuring engine speed and turbocharger speed
o Measuring and signal processing of monitoring- and safety sensors
o Readout of engine measurements on a local graphical display
o Hardwired interface signals with external systems (e.g. with power management
system, Main Switchboard and propulsion control system)
o Communication with ships alarm & monitoring system
o System diagnostics
Engine operation and control is normally handled by the PMS system. In addition, each
engine has installed a local control panel.
The control system for each engine has redundant power supplies from the vessel’s 230V
Distribution System and the 230V UPS system through the respective engine’s control
cabinet. The supplies are galvanically isolated by AC/DC converters.
Engine will initiate shutdown sequence in the event of the following:
o Cooling water High-High temperature

o Low-Low Lube Oil pressure
o Engine Overspeed
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Important Consumers
Table 6.1.1 - Important consumers for Main Engine Control System

Failure Modes
Table 6.1.2 - Failure Modes of the Main Engine Control System

Failure/ Loss of Main Power Supply Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
for Main Engine Backup supply still active ability
Failure/ Loss of Backup Supply for Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Main Engine Normal supply still active ability
Shutdown of affected engine
Failure/ Loss of Main Engine Control No loss of position keeping
System ability
In worst case Bus-tie will open, and loss
of affected Bus-bar
Failure/ Loss of one speed sensor No loss of position keeping
Redundant sensors and signals
signal for governor ability
No affect
ESS Hybrid Drive will compensate for
mean frequency on the Grid (when
connected)
Load sharing failure of Engine (speed Alarm will be activated on detection No loss of position keeping
control) Affected engine may trip if outside range ability
Loss of affected engine/ generator
Bus-tie will open
In worst case, loss of affected Bus-Bar
Shutdown of Main Engine Generator de-energise
ability
Loss of affected engine No loss of position keeping
Over-speed of Main Engine
Bus-tie will open ability
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Loss of affected engine No loss of position keeping
Under-speed of Main Engine
Bus-tie will open ability
Main Engine Control System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Main Engine Control System will exceed the defined
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
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BL.2019.F427.10.R04
6.2 GENERATOR CONTROL SYSTEM

The generator control system consists of the following components:
o Automatic Voltage Regulator (Basler, DECS-100)

o Differential Protection Guard (Deif, MDR-2)
o Check Sync Relay (Deif, CSQ-3) – For Manual SWBD Control
o Micrologic protection unit 5.0P (mounted on generator breaker)
The DECS-100 is an electronic, solid-state, microprocessor-based control device. It regulates

the output voltage of a brushless, AC generator by controlling the current into the generator
exciter field.
A Deif MDR-2 differential guard is installed to provide protection for differential current and
short circuit in the generator and on the connection between the generator and MSWB. The
differential guard will disconnect the generator breaker and enable generator de-excitation
causing voltage to drop.
Synchronising of the generators to the Main Switchboard can be executed by lamp synchro-
scope for manual operation. Check Sync Relay allows generator breaker to close when bus-
bar and generator are in phase. Automatic (PMS) synchronizing is handled by the engine
interface modules, Deif SCM 4.1.
In case of blackout on the main bus, blackout close commands can be issued to bypass the
synchronizers.
For overcurrent and short circuit protection Micrologic 5.0P units are installed in the
generator breakers. There are red lamps which will illuminate if the breaker trips at a fault.
An input to the PMS from the breaker protection unit will give alarm. Over current and short-
circuit protection unit can be reset on the breaker. Overload and reverse power re handled by
the PMS.
Each generator breaker is provided with an under-voltage coil with adjustable trip delay, in
case of blackout on the main bus-bar the generator breaker will automatically open.
Supply of control voltage for Generator Auxiliary systems in Main Switchboard is through an
internal supply from the generators and an external power supply from the vessels UPS’s.
The two independent power supplies to each generator is isolated by a diode bridge.
Important Consumers
Table 6.2.1 - Important consumers for Generator Control System

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Failure Modes
Table 6.2.2 - Failure Modes of the Generator Control System

Failure/ Loss of UPS power supply to No loss of position keeping
Internal power supply still active
Generator Control Voltage ability
In worst case, loss of affected generator
Failure/ Loss of Internal power supply No loss of position keeping
UPS power supply still active
to Generator Control Voltage ability
In worst case, loss of affected generator
Loss of affected generator No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of AVR
In worst case Bus-tie will open, and loss ability
of affected Bus-bar
ESS Hybrid Drive will compensate for
mean voltage on the Grid (when
connected)
Alarm will be activated on detection
Load sharing failure of Generator Affected generator may trip if outside No loss of position keeping
(voltage control) range ability
Loss of affected generator
Bus-tie will open
Bus-tie will trip No loss of position keeping
Under-excitation of Generator
In worst case, loss of affected side of ability
Main Switchboard and partial blackout
Bus-tie will trip No loss of position keeping
Over-excitation of Generator
In worst case, loss of affected side of ability
Main Switchboard and partial blackout
Load sharing failure on generator set
Connected engines trip to droop mode ability
Generator Control System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Generator Control System will exceed the defined
BOATLABS AS
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6.3 POWER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The vessel is equipped with Power Management System (PMS), type Deif Delomatic 4. The
system is based on modules, where on Deif Generator Unit (DGU) is arranged for each of the
generator, as well as there is one DGU for each breaker for the BESS. The DGU for the BESS
are named GSU (Grid Support Unit).
The plant is configured as a Double Master System, to make it possible to split the system
into two independent PMS parts controlled by the Master DGU’s (DGU-2 and DGU-3).
For this Double Master solution all automatic functions can continue on the “healthy” bus-bar
after separating the bus-bar electrically by means of the bus-tie breaker.
There is one Display Unit (DU) for each DGU. For DU 2, DU 3, DU 5 and DU 6, an Additional
Operator Panel (AOP’s) are arranged for plant mode selection, plant status information and
local control functions.
The internal communication between the DGU’s is carried out by ARC-network. This includes
the symmetrical load sharing functionality.
The Display Units are slave units of the DGU, meaning that all settings remain active even if
the control panel should break down.
Common functions controlled only by the master DGU are:
o Plant modes:
o Semi-Auto (PMS assisted mode)
o Automatic 1 (min. 1 DG connected)
o Information messages at the DU (Display Unit) for the operator in case of un-allowed
change of plant modes
o User-programmable start/ stop priority
o Load dependent start/stop based on power available calculation.
o Common black-out detection and subsequently black-out start of one or two
generator sets.
o Supervision of bus-tie breaker position
o Alarm logging
o Fast Dynamic Load share deviation protection:
o Blackout prevention in case of governor or AVR failures.
o Active and reactive load share deviation alarms.
o Selective trip of TB / GB in case of defective Governor / engine, by measuring
frequency and active load deviation. Preventing reverse power and over load
situations.
o Selective trip of TB / GB in case of defective AVR / generator, by measuring
voltage and reactive load deviation. Preventing over and under voltage
situations on the bus-bar.
o The alarm can select the faulty genset without any additional measuring
required.
o Analogue load limitation signal to dual feed thruster drives (Fwd Azimuth Thruster)
o Analogue load limitation signal to AMC Gangway
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Common functions are carried out by each DGU:
o Information messages at the Display Unit (DU).

o Selection of PMS control or SWBD control. In PMS the generator set is included in the
PMS functions. In SWBD control, the generator set is excluded from all automatic
functions and is only to be controlled manually.
o Frequency regulation
o Load sharing (active power):
o Asymmetrical load sharing
o Symmetrical load sharing
o Relay or analogue output for the speed governor
o Generator set load control
o Automatic and programmable start and stop sequence
o Synchronisation of the generators set to the bus-bar
The GSU have three operation modes:
o Local Mode, GSU connected to the grid without any control from PMS. Power
setpoint adjusted local on GSU drive.
o Idle Mode, GSU connected to the grid without any active grid support function, no
export/import of power.
o Grid Support Mode, GSU connected to the grid in grid support function.
Export / import of power depending on, moving average Total Consumed Power
Important Consumers
Table 6.3.1 - Important consumers for Power Management System

PMS PS 230V L15 PMS SB 230V L14
PMS PS 230V UPS 30 PMS SB 230V UPS 40
Failure Modes
Table 6.3.2 - Failure Modes of the Power Management System

Failure/ Loss of Control Panel for Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
DGU/ GSU No affect on PMS System ability
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Bus-tie breaker will trip (if closed)
Arc Network is split
Failure/ Loss of ARC Network for No loss of position keeping
DGU/ GSU Affected engines continue to run on last ability
droop curve adjustment
BESS lost for PMS Supervision and
remote control from IAS
Bus-tie breaker will trip (if closed)
Arc Network is split
Affected engine continue to run on last No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of DGU/ GSU
droop curve adjustment ability
BESS lost for PMS Supervision and
remote control from IAS
BESS transfer to Online Mode
Overload of Generator set
Power limitation by PMS ability
Loss of PMS Remote control via IAS No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of PMS Control Cabinet
No affect on PMS control or running ability
equipment
Failure/ Loss of IAS Operator Station No affect on other OS
ability
No affect on running equipment
Loss of IAS control/ monitoring of No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of IO Cabinet
affected equipment ability
Failure/ Loss of IAS network ring
Redundant Network ability
Redundant Network No loss of position keeping
Network Communication Fault
Babbling idiots isolated ability
Power Management System (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Power Management System will exceed the defined
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
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6.4 INTEGRATED AUTOMATION SYSTEM

The vessels Integrated Automation System (IAS) supplied from Blue Ctrl AS of type Blue IAS
is used for automation and control of auxiliary equipment, and remote-control interface for
PMS from the IAS operator stations in Engine Control Room, as well as on the bridge.
A PMS Control Cabinet PS and a PMS Control Cabinet SB communicates against the Deif
Delomatic system DGU2 and DGU3 for PMS interface and remote control. The PMS Control
cabinets are installed in the switchboard room.
The IAS system consists of Controllers, IO Controllers, Network Switches, Operator Stations
(OS), as well as Extension Alarm System (EAS) panels and buzzers.
The IAS has following functionalities:
o Alarm monitoring
o Power Management functionality
o Operation of engine room ventilation fans
o Operation of FO Pumps
o Operation of SW and FW pumps
o Tank sounding
o Operation of cargo valves
o Operation of cargo pumps
o Trending
The internal communication between component in the IAS system is based on dual
redundant ethernet network. Each system component is connected to both rings via separate
network switches.
The IAS operator stations are located in Engine Control Room, and on Bridge. The operator
stations are used for monitoring of signals, displaying of alarms and remote manual control
of equipment.
IAS EAS panels are installed in selected cabins, public area and bridge locations. EAS panels
are used to display ship alarms, dead man alarms and engineer calls.
Important Consumers
Table 6.4.1 - Important consumers for Integrated Automation System

230V UPS 30 230V UPS 40
IAS OS No. 1 IAS OS No. 2
Circ. 104 Circ. 105
230V UPS 10
IAS OS No. 3
Circ. 101
IAS Network Cabinet No. 1 230V L01
Main Supply 1 Circ. 103
IAS Network Cabinet No. 1 230V UPS 10
UPS Supply 2 Circ. 102
IAS IO Cabinet 1 230V L01 IAS IO Cabinet 2 230V L14
Main Supply Circ. 104 Main Supply Circ. 103
IAS IO Cabinet 1 230V UPS 10 IAS IO Cabinet 2 230V UPS 40
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Failure Modes
Table 6.4.2 - Failure Modes of the Integrated Automation System

Failure/ Loss of IAS Operator Station No affect on other OS
ability
Loss of IAS control/ monitoring of No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of IO Cabinet
affected equipment ability
Failure/ Loss of IAS network ring Redundant Network
ability
Failure/ Loss of IAS network cabinet Loss of IAS EAS panels
ability
Integrated Automation System (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Integrated Automation System will exceed the defined
BOATLABS AS
Phone: +47 483 20 888
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BL.2019.F427.10.R04
6.5 ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EMS)

The vessels energy management system (EMS) is supplied from Ulstein Design & Solutions
AS, type Ulstein EMS Mk1. The EMS is a standalone controller for supervision and control of
the BESS.
The BESS can be operated and monitored from the PMS operator stations or the EMS display.
The EMS system are controlled by the PMS by hardwired and Ethernet interface.
The EMS sends common alarm and measurements to the Alarm System (IAS).
In addition to this the EMS have control and interfaces to the followings systems:
o FW Cooling for BESS

o ESS room temperature sensor
o Battery Room fan coils and supply fan
Following functions are included:
o Local control of the EMS from EMS cabinet

o Control of the EMS operational modes
o Interface to PMS and IAS
The EMS has the following modes of operation:
o Offline Stop
• Operating condition where the GSU is disconnected from grid and stopped.
o Offline Running
• Operating condition where the GSU is disconnected from grid and running,
ready for closing main circuit breaker.
o Online
• A neutral operating condition where the GSU is connected to grid but without
energy flow to/from battery. When PMS is in AUTO and Mode Online request
command is given the sequence for starting and connection is performed
automatically.
o Grid support
• A mode where EMS calculates the power reference setpoint for the GSU when
performing load peak shaving. The PMS will be able to use a part of the GSU’s
power capacity added to the total power capacity for the power plant during
normal operation. Since the battery converter will operate in grid forming mode,
the fast response in case of loss of power generation capacity by diesel engines,
without any mode change will give “instant” replacement of power by the Grid
Support Unit. EMS will identify the “alone on grid” condition which allow the
battery converter to work with extended power setting, increasing the delivered
power to the grid to a level between 1300 and 1500kW dependent on SoC and
load demand. To activate the mode from the PMS must be set to “Auto” to
secure the automatic activation of standby genset control by PMS during this
mode and “all packs connected” status is identified by EMS.
o Charge
• A mode where the battery will be charged by a selected constant C-rate by EMS
until upper voltage limit by BC is reached.
o Discharge
• A mode where the battery will be discharge by a selected constant C-rate by
EMS until lower voltage limit by BC is reached or SoC cut-off level is reached by
BMS.
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At least the following parameters is monitored and presented at local HMI panel, but the
detailed extent of monitoring is adapted to the battery manufacturers instruction which also
have additional signals and statuses as mandatory requirements for each pack.
o Battery voltage, Bus voltage, Pack current

o Battery charge/discharge current limits
o Max/Min/Average cell voltage, Cells balance status
o Max/Min/Average cell temperature
o SoC, SoH
o Pack alarm status for warnings and faults/trips
The EMS has dual power supply from 230V UPS PS and SB, each via a 230V AC/ 24V DC
converter to a Diode redundancy module (Puls, YRM2.DIODE).
Each of the supplies is galvanic isolated trough AC/DC converters. A short circuit current will
be limited by the AC/DC converters and redundancy module capacity, this ensuring a failure
on the consumer side will not be transferred upstream, or from one redundancy group to the
other.
Important Consumers
Table 6.5.1 - Important consumers in Energy Management System

EMS 230V UPS 30 EMS 230V UPS 40
230V UPS PS Supply Circ. 115 230V UPS SB Supply Circ. 115
Failure Modes
Table 6.5.2 - Failure Modes in Energy Management System

Failure/ Loss of one 230V UPS Supply No loss of position keeping
Other UPS Supply still active
for EMS ability
No affect
Failure/ Loss of EMS
Failure/ Loss of EMS PLC
Failure/ Loss of IO Communication In worst case, loss of BESS
ability
Failure/ Short circuit in dual supply Selectivity and diode isolation will No loss of position keeping
arrangement prevent propagation from one system to ability
another
Energy Management System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical single failure in the Energy Management System will exceed the
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6.6 THRUSTER CONTROL SYSTEM

All thrusters are controlled by the Helicon-X3 control system, by Kongsberg Maritime CM AS.
The thruster control system is independent for each thruster.
The Helicon-X3 remote control system is microprocessor based. Following main functions are
included:
o Speed control, allowing accurate and reliable control of the motor speed (RPM)
o Direction control, allowing accurate and reliable control of the thrust direction
o Follow-up backup control from control lever
All thrusters and propulsion are of controllable RPM type.
The thruster control systems are powered from the vessels 230V and 230V UPS system. The
I/O cabinets (UN-10) in Bow thruster room and propulsion room are internally powered from
the main control cabinets (UN-1) in instrument room.
All thrusters can be individually controlled from Fwd Bridge console and Starboard Wing
console.
Operation of the system can be performed through the graphical interface (Viewcon). The
Viewcon screen-console consists of a 10.4” LCD colour display with touch-screen interface
and built-in display computer.
Important functions which can be performed through the Viewcon interface panel are:
o Start/ stop of thrusters, including reset of thruster converters, as well as steering

gears for azimuth thrusters
o Indication of thruster status and output
o Indication of thruster command & feedback signals
o Indication of control mode (DP, Joystick, Manual)
o Alarm monitoring
The control lever contains potentiometers and electronics for I/O's and control, both for
normal and backup system. The display in the control lever base shows set command
(direction) from the lever.
Network distribution cabinet UN20 are provided with dual supply.
Each of the supplies is galvanic isolated trough DC/DC converters and AC/DC converters. A
short circuit current will be limited by the DC/DC and AC/DC converters capacity, this
ensuring a failure on the consumer side will not be transferred from one redundancy group to
the other.
Important Consumers
Table 6.6.1 - Important consumers for Thruster Control System

Viewcon Switch Cabinet UN20 230V L05 Viewcon Switch Cabinet UN20 230V UPS 20
Poscon JS 230V E01 Poscon JS 230V L02
Supply 2 Circ. 116 Supply 1 Circ. 124
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Failure Modes
Table 6.6.2 - Failure Modes of the Thruster Control System

Failure/ Loss of Main power supply to Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Helicon X3 El. Unit UN-1 Redundant power supply ability
Failure/ Loss of Backup power supply Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
to Helicon X3 El. Unit UN-1 Redundant power supply ability
Failure/ Loss of Main power supply to Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Viewcon Cabinet Redundant power supply ability
Failure/ Loss of Backup power supply Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
to Viewcon Cabinet Redundant power supply ability
Failure/ Loss of UN22 Ethernet Switch
No affect (service network) ability
Failure/ Loss of Helicon X3 El. Unit Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
UN-1 Loss of affected thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Helicon X3 IO Cabinet Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
UN-10 Loss of affected thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Normal
communication between UN1 and
Loss of affected thruster in DP ability
UN10
Failure/ Loss of Backup Alarm will be activated
communication between UN1 and Loss of overhead indicators
ability
UN10 No affect on thrusters in DP
Loss of communication between No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of single network switch
affected thrusters and panels ability
No affect on thrusters in DP
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Failure/ Loss of Viewcon Cabinet
No affect on thrusters in DP ability
Failure/ Loss of Viewcon Screen
No affect on thrusters in DP ability
Thruster Control System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Thruster Control System will exceed the defined worst-
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Illustration of Thruster Control System
Figure 6.6.1
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7 SEAWATER COOLING SYSTEM

The seawater cooling system consists of ducts, pumps, heat exchangers, strainers, pipes and
valves.
There is arranged a total of two SW cooling systems for this vessel.
o SW cooling for FW Cooling System PS and SB

o SW cooling for Battery system and Fwd Azimuth Thruster
7.1 SW COOLING SYSTEM FOR FW COOLING SYSTEM PS AND SB

SW Cooling for FW Cooling System SB and PS are divided into two subsystems, one for FW
Cooling PS and one for FW Cooling SB.
Each system is equipped with a central cooler and a frequency-controlled SW cooling pump.
The circuits are protected by pressure indication alarms connected to the IAS.
One common backup pump with valves and crossovers pipes between the systems are
arranged. For correct configuration of the SW Cooling system, these valves (721V117 &
721V1118) must be normally closed during DP operation.
In addition, there is installed a branch off SW Cooling system for a Heat Exchanger, serving
cooling to the Chilled Water System. The branch of system is served by the SW Backup Pump
circuit. The SW Backup cooling Pump is powered by a changeover cabinet, with manual
changeover solution.
The Chilled Water System are further described in chapter 12.4.
The Central cooler for FW Cooling System PS provides cooling for Main Engine 1, Main Engine
2, Main Azimuth Thruster PS, Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 and Water Chiller unit 1.
The Central cooler for FW cooling System SB provides cooling for Main Engine 3, Main Engine
4, Main Azimuth Thruster SB, Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 and Water Chiller unit 2.
The FW Cooling system will be separately described in chapter 8.
The Sea Chest and Crossover Duct arrangement are common for these systems. A low
suction sea chest with duct arrangement on Port side of the vessel, and one high suction sea
chest with duct arrangement on Starboard side of the vessel.
Even unlikely to occur, caution must be shown to prevent total loss of cooling from SW
Cooling System. Potential scenario of seaweed intrusion, growth and accumulation of air
must be considered in a Sea Water Cooled system.
Air for blowing of sea chests and SW pumps are taken from the Working Air system.
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Important Consumers
Table 7.1.1 - Important consumers for the SW Cooling System for FW Cooling system PS and
SB

440V P05 440V P04
SW Cooling Pump No. 1 SW Cooling Pump No. 2
Circ. 306 Circ. 310
440V P05 440V P04
SW Cooling Backup Pump SW Cooling Backup Pump
Circ. 307 Circ. 311
Failure Modes
Table 7.1.2 - Failure Modes of the SW Cooling System for FW Cooling System PS and SB

Failure/ Loss of SW Cooling Pump In worst case, loss of affected cooling
ability
system
Loss of one power supply to SW No loss of position keeping
Change over to other supply
Cooling Backup Pump ability
No affect
Failure/ Blockage of Sea Inlet Strainer
Reduced cooling capacity ability
Failure/ Blockage of Central Cooler Reduced cooling capacity
ability
In worst case, loss of affected system
SW Cooling System for FW Cooling PS and SB Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the SW Cooling System for FW Cooling System PS and SB
will exceed the defined worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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Illustration of the SW Cooling System for FW Cooling System PS and SB
Figure 7.1
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7.2 SW COOLING SYSTEM FOR BESS AND FWD AZIMUTH THRUSTER

Each system is equipped with a central cooler and a frequency-controlled SW cooling pump.
The circuits are protected by pressure indication alarms connected to the IAS.
The Central cooler for BESS provides cooling for the FW Cooling for the BESS.
The Central cooler for the Fwd Azimuth Thruster provides cooling for the FW Cooling for the
Fwd Azimuth Thruster.
The FW Cooling system will be separately described in chapter 8.
The Sea Chest and Crossover Duct arrangement are common for these systems. A low
suction sea chest with duct arrangement on Port side of the vessel, and one high suction sea
chest with duct arrangement on Starboard side of the vessel.
Even unlikely to occur, caution must be shown to prevent total loss of cooling from SW
Cooling System. Potential scenario of seaweed intrusion, growth and accumulation of air
must be considered in a Sea Water Cooled system.
Air for blowing of sea chests and SW pumps are taken from the Working Air system.
Important Consumers
Table 7.2.1 - Important consumers for the SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth
Thruster

SW Cooling Pump 440V Bess Aux
BESS Circ. Q4
Failure Modes
Table 7.2.2 - Failure Modes of the SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth Thruster

Failure/ Loss of SW Cooling Pump In worst case, loss of affected cooling
ability
system
Failure/ Blockage of Sea Inlet Strainer
Reduced cooling capacity ability
Failure/ Blockage of Central Cooler Reduced cooling capacity
ability
In worst case, loss of affected system
SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth Thruster Summary (assessment)
No electrical or technical failure in the SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth
Thruster will exceed the defined worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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Illustration of the SW Cooling System for BESS and Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Figure 7.2
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8 FRESHWATER COOLING SYSTEM

The freshwater cooling system consists of expansion tanks, central coolers, heat exchangers,
preheaters, pumps, valves and pipes.
There are arranged a total of four FW cooling systems for this vessel.
o FW cooling system PS for Port side redundancy group

o FW cooling system SB for Starboard side redundancy group
o FW cooling system for BESS
o FW cooling system for Fwd Azimuth Thruster
8.1 FW COOLING SYSTEM ENGINES, GENERATORS, THRUSTERS &

AUXILIARIES
FW Cooling for engines, generators, thrusters and auxiliaries consists of FW Cooling System
PS and FW Cooling System SB.
FW Cooling system PS and SB are both provided with one central cooler as well as an internal
cooling system each.
A three-way thermostatic valve is arranged at each cooler for controlling the temperature in
the circuits. The valves have internal sensing and are set to predefined values.
Each cooling systems have one main FW cooling pump, providing circulation to respective
system, as well as the Main Engines HT circuits. The FW cooling pumps is equipped with
pressure alarms connected to the IAS.
PS and SB system share a FW Backup Cooling Pump. The FW Backup Cooling Pump can be
powered from both redundancy groups and are operated by a manual changeover solution.
There are arranged crossover valves for the backup pump. These valves (722V2104,
722V2108, 722V2208 and 722V2204) must be normally closed during DP operation.
FW Cooling system PS provides cooling for Main Engine 1 and 2, Main Azimuth Thruster PS,
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 and Water Chiller Unit 1.
In addition, PS system serve to Hydraulic unit for container securing system, HPU for Motion
Compensated Gangway (MCG) and crane, and Cooling aggregate 1. These are not relevant
for DP operation.
FW Cooling system SB provides cooling for Main Engine 3 and 4, Main Azimuth Thruster SB,
Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 and Water Chiller Unit 2.
In addition, SB system serves Provision Cooling aggregate 2, not relevant for DP.
The Main Engines each have a HT expansion tank. Main engine 1 and 2 share a LT expansion
tank, and main engine 3 and 4 share a LT expansion tank. Alarms will indicate if the FW
levels become low.
The FW cooling for Main Engines consists of a high temperature (HT) and a low temperature
(LT) circuit. The HT-circuit is cooling the jackets, cylinder block, turbo charger and lube oil.
The LT-circuit are cooling the charge air, generator, fuel oil and aftercooler.
The HT circuits are equipped with its own FW cooler. In addition, main engine 1 and 4 are
equipped with a de-aerator connected to the HT circuit.
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The temperature in all main engines HT and LT circuits is controlled by an engine internal
three-way thermostatic valve with internal sensing and are set to a predefined value.
Each engine is equipped with one built-on HT Circulation pump and one built-on LT
Circulation pump. In addition, there is one electrical driven LT circulation pump and LT
booster pump for each engine.
The LT pump provides cooling for the generator, as well as the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger.
Important Consumers
Table 8.1.1 - Important consumers for the FW Cooling System Engines, Generators,
Thrusters & Auxiliaries are as follows

440V MCC1 440V MCC2
FW Cooling Pump PS FW Cooling Pump SB
Starter 9 Starter 7
FW Backup Cooling Pump FW Backup Cooling Pump
Failure Modes
Table 8.1.2 - Failure Modes of the FW Cooling System Engines, Generators, Thrusters &
Auxiliaries are as follows

In worst case, loss of affected system on No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Blockage of Central Cooler
high temperature and subsequently ability
shutdown of affected main engines
Loss of temperature control in affected
circuit
Failure of Central Cooler Thermostatic No loss of position keeping
valve ability
In worst case, shutdown of affected
engine on high temperature
No alarm indication
Failure/ Blockage of Internal Cooler Reduced cooling capacity in affected
ability
system
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Failure/ Loss of Main FW Cooling In worst case, loss of affected FW No loss of position keeping
Pump cooling system and subsequent loss of ability
affected consumers
No alarm indication
Temperature will rise in LT Circuit
Failure/ Loss of engine driven FW LT No loss of position keeping
Alarm on high temperature in LT Circuit
Cooling pump ability
Alarm will be activated on low pressure
Temperature will rise in HT Circuit
Failure/ Loss of engine driven FW HT No loss of position keeping
Alarm on high temperature in HT Circuit
Cooling pump ability
Loss of cooling for generator and FO
Failure/ Loss of electrical driven FW LT No loss of position keeping
Heat Exchanger
Circulation pump for Main Engines ability
In worst case, loss of affected engine/
generator
Failure/ Loss of electrical driven FW LT Loss of booster pump No loss of position keeping
Booster pump for main engines In worst case, loss of affected engine/ ability
generator
Loss of temperature control in affected
Failure of HT/ LT Thermostatic valve circuit
ability
Failure/ Blockage of FW HT Cooler In worst case, shutdown of affected ability
FW Cooling System Engines, Generators, Thrusters & Auxiliaries Summary

(assessment)
No electrical or technical failure in the FW Cooling Engines, Generators, Thrusters &
Auxiliaries will exceed the defined worst-case failure design intent for DYNPOS(AUTR).
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Illustration of the FW Cooling System PS – Main Engines & Generators
Figure 8.1.1 – FW Cooling Main Engines & Generators PS
Illustration of the FW Cooling System PS - Thrusters and Auxiliary Equipment

Figure 8.1.2 – FW Cooling Thrusters and Auxiliary Equipment PS
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Illustration of the FW Cooling System SB – Main Engines & Generators
Figure 8.1.3 – FW Cooling Main Engines & Generators SB
Illustration of the FW Cooling System SB - Thrusters and Auxiliary Equipment

Figure 8.1.4 – FW Cooling Thrusters and Auxiliary Equipment SB
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8.2 FW COOLING SYSTEM FOR BESS

FW Cooling system for BESS provides cooling for BESS AFE Frequency Converter.
Cooling for the FW Cooling System for BESS are served from SW cooling system, described
further in chapter 7.2
A three-way thermostatic valve is arranged for controlling the temperature in the circuit. The
valve have internal sensing and are set to predefined values.
The system is equipped with one FW cooling pump for circulation. The FW cooling pump is
equipped with pressure alarms connected to the IAS.
The system is equipped with both pressure and temperature sensors, connected to the IAS.
There is arranged one Expansion tank for the system. The Expansion tank is protected by low
level alarm.
Important Consumers
Table 8.2.1 - Important consumers for the FW Cooling System for BESS

FW Cooling Pump 440V Bess Aux
BESS Circ. Q5
Failure Modes
Table 8.2.2 - Failure Modes of the FW Cooling System for BESS

In worst case, loss of system on high No loss of position keeping
temperature and subsequently ability
Loss of temperature control in circuit
Failure of Thermostatic valve Alarm will be activated
ability
In worst case, loss of BESS
Alarm will be activated on high
Failure/ Loss of FW Cooling Pump for No loss of position keeping
temperature
BESS ability
In worst case, loss of BESS
FW Cooling System for BESS Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the FW Cooling for BESS will exceed the defined worst-
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Illustration of the FW Cooling System for BESS
Figure 8.2 – FW Cooling system for BESS
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8.3 FW COOLING SYSTEM FOR FWD AZIMUTH THRUSTER

FW Cooling system for Fwd Azimuth Thruster provides cooling for Fwd Azimuth Thrusters
Frequency Converter, El. Motor, HPU and LO.
Cooling for the FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster are served from SW cooling
system, described further in chapter 7.2.
A three-way thermostatic valve is arranged for controlling the temperature in the circuit. The
valve has internal sensing and are set to predefined values.
The system is equipped with one FW cooling pump for circulation. The FW cooling pump is
equipped with pressure alarms connected to the IAS.
The system is equipped with both pressure and temperature sensors, connected to the IAS.
There is arranged one Expansion tank for the system. The Expansion tank is protected by low
level alarm.
Important Consumers
Table 8.3.1 - Important consumers for the FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster

Failure Modes
Table 8.3.2 - Failure Modes of the FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster

In worst case, loss of system on high No loss of position keeping
temperature and subsequently ability
Loss of temperature control in circuit
Failure of Thermostatic valve
In worst case, loss of Fwd Azimuth ability
Thruster
Alarm will be activated on high
Failure/ Loss of FW Cooling Pump for temperature No loss of position keeping
Fwd Azimuth Thruster In worst case, loss of Fwd Azimuth ability
Thruster
FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the FW Cooling for Fwd Azimuth Thruster will exceed the
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Illustration of the FW Cooling System for Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Figure 8.3 – FW Cooling system for Fwd Azimuth Thruster
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9 FUEL OIL SYSTEM

A healthy fuel oil handling policy is necessary to reduce risks of contamination and maintain
a reliable service of the vessel.
Regularly testing of tanks for microbiological contamination, chemical treating when needed,
regular procedures for sludging of the fuel oil tanks, as well as treating the system as a fully
split configuration as far as possible is highly recommended.
9.1 FO SYSTEM ENGINES

The fuel oil system consists of settling tanks, service tanks, drain tank, sludge tank, storage
tanks, pumps, separators, FO heat exchangers, filters, flow meters, pipes and valves.
FO service tank 1 (Tank 273) is serving Main engine 1 and Main engine 2, and FO service
tank 2 (Tank 274) is serving Main Engine 3 and Main Engine 4. There is arranged one settling
tank for each of the two fuel oil systems.
The supplies from the Fuel Oil Service Tanks are served by Remote Operated quick closing
valves, both from the FO Settling Tanks and the FO Service Tanks. From the FO Service
Tanks the Main Engine 1 is served by (700V1131), Main Engine 2 is served by (700V1132),
Main Engine 3 is served by (700V1509) and Main Engine 4 is served by (700V1510). The
Remote Operated valves (700V1127, 700V1128, 700V155 and 700V1504) from the FO
Settling tanks must be normally closed during DP 2 operations.
Crossover pipes with vales are arranged between service tanks, and for the main engines
Port and Starboard. To avoid cross contamination these valves (700V1523, 700V1503,
700V1142, 700V1141, 700V1166, 700V1543) must be normally closed during DP 2
operation.
Each main engine is provided with a duplex pre-filter, two engine driven FO pumps and a FO
filter after the engine driven pumps. Excess fuel oil is cooled down by a FO cooler and
returned to service tanks.
Overflow from FO settling tank 1 and FO settling tank 2 is directed to FO drain tank (Tank
275). Overflow flow from FO service tank 1 is directed to FO settling tank 1 and overflow
from FO service tank 2 is directed to FO settling tank 2.
FO service tanks, FO settling tanks is arranged above tank top and located in Starboard side
of the vessel hull.
FO settling tanks are protected by high and low-level alarms. FO settling tanks are also
equipped with level control high and level control low for auto start/ stop of transfer pumps.
FO service tanks are protected with high and low-level alarms.
FO service tank 1 supplies fuel oil to the emergency generator FO tank via a supply pump.
Overflow from emergency generator FO tank are returned to FO drain tank.
The vessel is fitted with one Hot Water Boiler, with one single supply line connected to both
FO service tanks, and in addition with a single return line connected to both FO service tanks.
As supply valves and return valves are not interlocked it carried a risk of cross contamination
if operated incorrectly.
Filling of fuel oil to the system is handled by two FO transfer pumps on two filling lines.
There is arranged a crossover pipe with valve between the two filling lines.
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FO transfer pump no. 1 may provide filling to FO settling tank 1 and FO service tank 1. FO
transfer pump no. 2 may provide filling to FO settling tank 2 and FO service tank 2.
However, due to risk of dirty oil contamination from storage tanks, filling should only be
performed to the settling tank and cleaned by the separator before transfer to the service
tank. This means that filling valves (700V1119 and 700V1518) for FO service tank 1 and 2
must be in normally closed position.
Separation of fuel oil is performed by one FO separator and one FO supply pump for each
system. The FO separators can separate fuel oil from the settling tank or the service tank
and return clean fuel oil to either of the tanks. It is important that fuel oil service tanks are
filled up in due time before entering DP operations. FO separation must only be performed
from the settling tank to each service tank at a time during DP operation.
There is arranged crossover pipes with valves between the systems. For correct configuration
of the FO separator system, these valves (700V1173, 700V1174, 700V1140) must be
normally closed during DP operation.
Remote operation and quick closing of the valves in the Fuel Oil system is performed by the
Main Engine Control System. Each Main Engine is supplied by its own Remote operated quick
closing valve from the dedicated FO Service Tanks, therefore a failure in one valve will not
affect the other redundancy group.
The illustration drawing of the Fuel oil system on figure 9.1 illustrates the FO system for main
engines.
Important Consumers
None important electrical consumer for FO System Main Engines is found to be important for
DP operation.
Failure Modes
Table 9.1.2 - Failure Modes of the FO System Engines

Failure/ Loss of engine driven Fuel Oil Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
pump In worst case loss of affected engine ability
Failure/ Loss of Fuel Oil supply for Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Main Engine Shutdown of affected engine ability
Failure/ Blockage of Fuel Oil filters
In worst case loss of affected engine ability
Failure/ loss of Remote operated In worst case, loss of affected engine No loss of position keeping
valve for Main Engines No affect on the other redundancy ability
group
FO System Engines Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the FO System Engines will exceed the defined worst-case
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Illustration of the FO System Engines
Figure 9.1
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10 LUBE OIL SYSTEM

The lube oil system consists of lube oil storage tanks, sludge tank, dirty oil tank, lube oil
sumps, pumps, coolers, filters, valves and pipes.
The lube oil system comprises following categories.
o LO System Main Engines

o LO System Thrusters
o LO System Main Azimuth Thruster
10.1 LO SYSTEM MAIN ENGINES

The lube oil system for each main engine is independent from each other.
Each main engine has its own sump, engine driven lube oil main pump and electric driven
pre-lubricating pump.
Both pumps have suction from the lube oil sump and effluence lube oil through temperature-
controlled circuit with an oil cooler and duplex-filter.
For filling of lube oil to engines, one lube oil storage tank and a LO Transfer Pump is
arranged to a common LO manifold, where there are individual filling lines to each main
engine.
The LO Storage tank for main engines are protected by a high-level alarm and level indicator.
All filling valves are to be normally closed to prevent dirty oil contamination.
Important Consumers
None important electrical consumer for LO System Main Engines is found to be important for
DP operation.
Failure Modes
Table 10.1.2 - Failure Modes of the LO System Main Engines/ Generators

Failure/ Loss of engine driven Lube Oil Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
pump Shutdown of affected engine ability
Failure/ Loss of cooling for Lube Oil
In worst case, loss of affected engine ability
Contamination of Lube Oil for Main No loss of position keeping
In worst case, loss of affected engine
Engines ability
Blockage of Engine Lube Oil filters
In worst case loss of affected engine ability
LO System Main Engines/ Generators Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the LO System Main Engines will exceed the defined worst-
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Illustration of the Lube Oil System Engines
Figure 10.1
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10.2 LO SYSTEM THRUSTERS

The lube oil system for the Bow Tunnel Thruster 1, Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 and Fwd Azimuth
Thruster are internal and split systems with filling from two lube oil storage tanks for Bow
thrusters.
The LO storage tank are protected by a high-level alarm and level indicator.
The Bow Tunnel Thruster use hydraulic oil for lubrication and cooling. A pressurized gravity
tank provides oil to the hydraulic oil unit. The hydraulic oil unit consists of an electric pump,
duplex filter and valves. A seal oil tank provides oil to the thruster seal.
Alarms will indicate if the pressure is too high or low in the hydraulic unit.
Gravity tank and seal oil tank is protected with a low-level alarm and a high-level alarm. In
addition, the gravity tank has a high-temperature alarm.
The Fwd Azimuth Thrusters are equipped with two hydraulic oil units, hydraulic oil tank,
gravity tank and seal oil tank.
One hydraulic oil unit is used for steering, lift/ lower and locking system and the other is
used for lubrication. Both hydraulic oil units consist of an electric pump, duplex filter and
valves.
The hydraulic oil circuit is protected with high and low-level alarms, as well as high-
temperature alarm.
Gravity tank and seal oil tank is protected with a high and low-level alarm. In addition, the
seal oil tank has a low-pressure alarm.
Air to the gravity tanks are supplied from the compressed air system described in chapter 11.
The air is supplied through “none return valves”, pressure loss in the compressed air system
will not drain the pressure in the tank
Cooling to the systems is provided through external coolers connected to the FW system,
described in chapter 8.
Important Consumers
Table 10.2.1 - Important consumers for the Lube Oil System Thrusters


HPU pump Circ. 301
LO pump Circ. 302
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Failure Modes
Table 10.2.2 - Failure Modes of the Lube Oil System Thrusters

No immediate effect
Failure/ Loss of Instrument air for No loss of position keeping
Gravity Tanks for thrusters After long time, reduced pressure of ability
seals might lead to sea water intrusion
and damage the thrusters
Failure/ Loss of Hydraulic system for Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Bow Tunnel Thrusters In worst case, loss of affected thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Hydraulic system for No loss of position keeping
In worst case, loss of Fwd Azimuth
Fwd Azimuth Thruster ability
Thruster
LO System Thrusters Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Lube Oil System will exceed the defined worst-case
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Illustration of the Lube Oil system Bow Tunnel Thrusters
Figure 10.2.1
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Illustration of the Lube Oil system Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Figure 10.2.2
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10.3 LO SYSTEM MAIN AZIMUTH THRUSTERS

The lube oil system for Main Azimuth Thruster PS and Main Azimuth Thruster SB are internal
and split systems with filling from a common lube oil storage tank.
The storage tank is protected with high-level alarm and level indicator, for filling there are
arranged a dedicated LO pump.
Each thruster is equipped with one Lubrication Unit and one Gravity Tank. The gravity tank is
protected with a low-level alarm.
The Lubrication unit have one electrical hydraulic pump.
The oil in the gravity tanks maintains the internal static pressure against water for the
propeller shaft and steering tube seal cavities. If any of these seals starts leaking the oil level
in the gravity tank drops which indicates the crew that there may be something wrong with
the seals. Failure of air supply to gravity tanks can After long time lead to sea water intrusion
and damage the thrusters, tanks are fitted with low level alarm.
Air to the gravity tanks are supplied from the compressed air system described in chapter 11.
The air is supplied through “none return valves”, pressure loss in the compressed air system
will not drain the pressure in the tank.
Cooling to the systems is provided through external coolers connected to the FW system,
described in chapter 8.
Important Consumers
Table 10.3.1 - Important consumers for the Lube Oil System Main Azimuth Thrusters

Failure Modes
Table 10.3.2 - Failure Modes of the LO System Main Azimuth Thrusters

No immediate effect
Failure/ Loss of Instrument air for No loss of position keeping
Gravity Tanks for thrusters After time, reduced pressure of seals ability
might lead to sea water intrusion and
damage the thrusters
Failure/ Loss of pump in oil system for No loss of position keeping
Loss of affected Main Azimuth Thruster
Main Azimuth Thruster ability
unit
Failure/ Loss of Lubrication Unit for No loss of position keeping
In worst case, loss of affected Main
Main Azimuth Thruster ability
Azimuth Thruster unit
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LO System Main Azimuth Thrusters Summary (assessment)
No electrical or technical failure in the LO System Main Azimuth Thrusters will exceed the
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Illustration of the Lube Oil system Main Azimuth Thrusters
Figure 10.3.1
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11 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM

The compressed air system consists of starting air compressors, working air compressor, air
bottles, strainers, reduction valves, relief valves, valves and pipes.
The compressed air system is divided in two sub-systems:
o Starting air/ Instrument air system

o Working air system
The working air system is not critical for DP operation it will not be further described in this
analysis.
11.1 STARTING AIR/ INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM

The two starting air compressors are of make Sperre Industri AS, type HL2/77 with 30 bar
operating air pressure and a capacity of 28m3/ hour each. Each compressor discharges via an
oil/ water separator into the starting air receivers.
The starting air system is arranged as a common system, where both starting air
compressors is serving both starting air receivers. Each starting air receiver has a capacity of
500 litres.
The starting air system is arranged as a common system and may be lost on one single
failure, as the system is not configured to operate fully split.
The compressors will automatically start/ stop on low/ high starting air pressure.
There is arranged a common supply line from both of the starting air receivers to non-DP
relevant consumers such as emergency closing SW inlets, cross flooding valves, window
washers and typhoons.
There is also arranged a common supply line from both of the starting air receivers to the
instrument air system via a pressure reduction panel which reduces the air pressure from 30
to 7,5 bar and an air drier element. An instrument air receiver of 60 litres is arranged after
the air driers.
The instrument air system provides air for the gravity tanks for thrusters, as well as non-DP
relevant consumers such as Main Azimuth Thruster shaft brake, ballast treatment, anti-
heeling system, consumption system, separators and remote operated valves.
The starting air/ instrument air system is protected by low pressure alarms connected to the
IAS.
There is also a backup line from the working air system to the instrument air system and a
backup line from the starting air system to the working air system. The pressure in working
air system is 7 bar, so normally the starting air will supply instrument air system.
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Important Consumers
Table 11.1.1 - Important consumers for the Starting Air/ Instrument Air System

440V P05 440V P04
Starting Air Compressor No. 1 Starting Air Compressor No. 2
Circ. 303 Circ. 307
230V L15
Instrument Air Dryer
Circ. 119
Failure Modes
Table 11.1.2 - Failure Modes of the Starting Air/ Instrument Air System

Failure/ Loss of Starting Air No loss of position keeping
Compressor ability
System failure/ Loss of Starting Air No loss of position keeping
Loss of starting air to main engines
System ability
No affect on running engines
Failure/ Loss of Instrument Air Drier Alarm will be activated
ability
Loss of instrument air to consumers
System failure/ Loss of Instrument Air No loss of position keeping
System No immediate effect on running ability
thrusters, after time low pressure in
gravity tanks
Starting Air/ Instrument Air System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Starting Air/ Instrument Air System will exceed the
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Illustration of the Starting Air/ Instrument Air System
Figure 11.1
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12 HVAC SYSTEM
Illustration of the HVAC System
Figure 12.1
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12.1 OVERVIEW
The vessel is equipped with supply fans, exhaust fans and AC cooling units/ fan coils located
over the various areas.
The illustration of the HVAC system on figure 12.1 shows the contents important for DP
operation.
Procedures must be established to maintain safe-guarding of equipment in compartments

where fans and/ or fan coils not connected to the IAS system provide needed redundancy.
Bridge Trunk, Instrument Room D-deck and Instrument Room C-deck has temperature
sensors connected to IAS. Alarm will be given when temperature reaches 50 °C. This limit is
to be verified sufficient during the vessel commissioning phase. Switchboard Room has also
temperature sensor with alarm connected to IAS.
Watch rounds and watch handover must verify correct system setup.
12.2 AIR CONDITION SYSTEM

There are four Air Handling Units, named AC-1, AC-2, AC-20 and AC-3, but only two who are
relevant for DP.
AC-1 is located in the AC Room on B-deck and supplies air for Engine Control room.
AC-3 is located Top of wheelhouse and supplies air for bridge deck.
All Air handling units gets cooling from Chilled Water System, described in chapter 11.4.
Important Consumers
Table 12.2.1 - Important consumers for the Air Condition System

AC1/ AC3 Control Panel CP-1 440V SWB PS AC1/ AC3 Control Panel CP-1 440V SWB SB
Supply A Circ. 1Q5 Supply B Circ. 4Q5
Failure Modes
Table 12.2.2 - Failure Modes of the Air Condition System

No alarm indication
Loss of cooling from AC-1 for Engine
Failure/ Loss of AC-1 Engine Control No loss of position keeping
Control room
room ability
Redundant cooling covered by S-30 and
FC-30
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No alarm indication
Failure/ Loss of AC-3 Wheelhouse Loss of cooling from AC-3 for
ability
wheelhouse
Air Condition System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Air Condition System will exceed the defined worst-
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12.3 VENTILATION FAN SYSTEM

The following rooms have air supply by means mentioned below:
o Engine room has two supply fans (S-40 and S-41)

o Engine Control room has one supply fan (S-30)
o Switchboard room has one supply fan (S-31)
o Battery room has one supply fan (S-34)
o Bow Thruster room has one supply fan (S-42)
o Propulsion room has one supply fan (S-60)
Important Consumers
Table 12.3.1 - Important consumers for the Ventilation Fan System

Engine Room Fans Engine Room Fans
Control Panel CP-4 Control Panel CP-4
Circ. 1Q7 Circ. 4Q7
Supply A Supply B
Engine Room Fans 440V ESWB
Control Panel CP-4 Circ. 2Q7
Supply Fan (S-30)
230V L13
Fan Coil (FC-30)
Circ. 601
Engine Control Room
CP-4 Supply Fan Engine Room, 230V UPS 30 CP-4 Supply Fan Engine Room, 230V UPS 40
Ctrl. Voltage Circ. 107 Ctrl. Voltage Circ. 107
Supply Fan (S-31) 230V L15
Switchboard Room Circ. 101A
Supply Fan (S-42) 230V L13 Supply Fan (S-60) 230V L12
Bow Thruster Room Circ. 103 Propulsion Room Circ. 101A

Supply Fan (S-34) 230V Bess Aux
Battery Room Circ. F16
Failure Modes
Table 12.3.2 - Failure Modes of the Ventilation Fan System

Failure/ Loss of CP-4 440V Supply A
Loss of Engine Room Supply Fan S-40 PS ability
Failure/ Loss of CP-4 440V Supply B
Loss of Engine Room Supply Fan S-41 SB ability
Failure/ Loss of CP-4 230V UPS 30 Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Supply No affect ability
Failure/ Loss of CP-4 230V UPS 40 Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Supply No affect ability
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No alarm indication
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Engine No loss of position keeping
Redundant ventilation from AC-1 and
Control room (S-30) ability
FC-30
No alarm indication
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan No loss of position keeping
Redundant ventilation from FC-31 and
Switchboard room (S-31) ability
FC-32
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Engine Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
room (S-40) Redundant ventilation from S-41 ability
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Engine Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
room (S-41) Redundant ventilation from S-40 ability
No alarm indication
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Bow No loss of position keeping
thruster room (S-42) ability
FC-41
No alarm indication
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Propulsion No loss of position keeping
room (S-60) ability
FC-61
Failure/ Loss of Supply Fan Battery No loss of position keeping
room (S-34) ability
FC-51
Ventilation Fan System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Ventilation Fan System will exceed the defined worst-
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12.4 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

The following rooms are equipped with AC-units/ fan coils connected to the Chilled Water
system:
o Wheelhouse Trunk has one fan coil installed (FC-36)

o Instrument room D-deck has one fan coil installed (FC-35)
o Instrument room C-deck has one fan coil installed (FC-33)
o Engine Control room has one fan coil installed (FC-30)
o Bow Thruster room has two fan coils installed (FC-40 and FC-41)
o Switchboard room has two fan coils installed (FC-31 and FC-32)
o Propulsion room has two fan coils installed (FC-60 and FC-61)
o Battery Room has two fan coils installed (FC-50 and FC-51)
The Chilled Water system gets cooling from FW Cooling Thrusters & Misc. Equipment,
described in chapter 8.1.
The Chilled Water system is arranged as a common system may be lost on a single failure, as
the system is not configured to operate fully split.
Two electrically driven pumps are arranged for circulation in the Chilled Water system.
One pump is in operation and the other pump is in standby. The system is equipped with a
low-pressure alarm.
Important Consumers
Table 12.4.1 - Important consumers for the Chilled Water System

690V MSWB PS 690V MSWB SB
Water Chiller Unit – C1 Water Chiller Unit – C2
Cooling Compressor 1 230V L15 Cooling Compressor 2 230V L14
Control Panel Circ. 105 Control Panel Circ. 107
440V P05 440V P04
Chilled Water Pump No. 1 Chilled Water Pump No. 2
Circ. 336 Circ. 334
Switchboard Room Circ. 301 Switchboard Room Circ. 302
Fan Coil (FC-36) 230V UPS 10
Wheelhouse Trunk Circ. 113
Bow Thruster Room Circ. 302 Bow Thruster Room Circ. 305
Supply Fan (S-30)
230V L13
Fan Coil (FC-30)
Circ. 601
Engine Control Room
Fan Coil (FC-33) 230V UPS 10 Fan Coil (FC-35) 230V UPS 20
Instrument Room D-deck Circ. 105 Instrument Room C-deck Circ. 105
Propulsion Room Circ. 301 Propulsion Room Circ. 301
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Failure Modes
Table 12.4.2 - Failure Modes of the Chilled Water System

Failure/ Loss of Chilled Water No loss of position keeping
Loss of affected Chilled Water
Compressor Main supply ability
Compressor
Reduced cooling capacity in Chilled
Compressor 1 ability
Water System
Reduced cooling capacity in Chilled
Compressor 2 ability
Water System
Loss of cooling from AC-1 No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of Chilled Water System
Loss of cooling from AC-3 ability
Loss of cooling from Fan Coils
Failure/ Loss of Chilled Water Pump In worst case, loss of Chilled Water No loss of position keeping
No. 1 System ability
No immediate effect
Failure/ Loss of Chilled Water Pump In worst case, loss of Chilled Water No loss of position keeping
No. 2 System ability
No immediate effect
In worst case, alarm will be activated on
Failure/ Loss of Fan Coil (FC-36) No loss of position keeping
high temperature in Bridge Trunk,
Bridge Trunk ability
before critical level
Failure/ Loss of Fan-Coil (FC-35) No loss of position keeping
high temperature in Instrument room D-
Instrument room D-deck ability
Deck, before critical level
high temperature in Instrument room C-
Instrument room C-deck ability
Deck, before critical level
No alarm indication
Redundant ventilation from Fan-Coil (FC-
Bow Thruster room ability
41) and Supply Fan (S-42)
No alarm indication
Bow Thruster room ability
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No alarm indication
Redundant ventilation from S-30 and
Engine Control Room ability
AC-1
No alarm indication
Switchboard room ability
No alarm indication
Switchboard room ability
No alarm indication
Propulsion room ability
No alarm indication
Propulsion room ability
Battery room ability
Battery room ability
Chilled Water System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Chilled Water System will exceed the defined worst-
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Illustration of the Chilled Water System
Figure 12.4
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13 THRUSTER SYSTEM
13.1 THRUSTER LAYOUT

Figure 13.1
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13.2 THRUSTER CONFIGURATION

Table 13.2 – Redundancy concept in the Thruster configuration
THRUSTER CONFIGURATION
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 (Thr. 1)
TRANSVERSE THRUST FWD Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 (Thr. 2)
Fwd Azimuth Thruster (Thr. 3)
Main Azimuth Thruster PS (Thr. 4)
TRANSVERSE THRUST AFT
Main Azimuth Thruster SB (Thr. 5)
Fwd Azimuth Thruster (Thr. 3)
LONGITUDINAL THRUST Main Azimuth Thruster PS (Thr. 4)
Main Azimuth Thruster SB (Thr. 5)
Redundancy is required for transverse thrust fwd and for longitudinal thrust after one single
failure.
13.3 BOW TUNNEL THRUSTERS

The Bow Tunnel Thrusters is manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime CM AS, type TT2400 FP
with fixed pitch propeller. The thrusters is driven by a variable speed electric motor.
The electrical drive motors are rated at 1500 kW with shaft speed at 0-1799 RPM.
The four-bladed propellers have a diameter of 2400 mm.
The Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 identified as BTT1 in the DP system.
The Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 identified as BTT2 in the DP system.
The Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 is supplied with power from 690V Main Switchboard Port breaker
3Q2.
The Bow Tunnel Thruster 2 is supplied with power from 690V Main Switchboard Starboard
breaker 9Q2.
Each thruster is equipped with a hydraulic power unit for lubrication of the thruster.
Important Consumers
Table 13.3.1 - Important consumers for the Bow Tunnel Thrusters are as follows

Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 690V MSWB PS Bow tunnel Thruster 2 690V MSWB SB
Bow Tunnel Thruster 1 Bow Tunnel Thruster 2
440V P05 440V P04
Circ. 323 Circ. 328
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Failure Modes
Table 13.3.2 - Failure Modes of the Bow Tunnel Thrusters

Failure/ Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Frequency Converter Loss of affected thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster
Frequency Converter Control, Pre-
Loss of affected thruster ability
charge and cooling supply
Failure/ Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster In worst case, converter overheat, and No loss of position keeping
Circulation Pump Converter drive shutdown, thruster stop ability
Loss of affected thruster
Failure in RPM order signal for Bow No loss of position keeping
Disabled automatically
Tunnel Thruster ability
Backup Command
Failure in RPM feedback signal for No loss of position keeping
Disabled automatically
Bow Tunnel Thruster ability
Normal Command
Bow Tunnel Thrusters Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Bow Tunnel Thrusters will exceed the defined worst-
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13.4 FWD AZIMUTH THRUSTER

The Fwd Azimuth Thruster is manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime CM AS, type TCNS/C 100
with fixed pitch propeller, driven by a variable speed electric motor.
The electrical motor is rated at 1500kW with shaft speed 0-1799 RPM.
The four-bladed propeller have a diameter of 2200 mm.
Fwd Azimuth Thruster is identified as BAZ1 in the DP system.
Fwd Azimuth Thruster is supplied with power from 690V Main Switchboard Port breaker 5Q1
and 690V Main Switchboard Starboard breaker 7Q1 via a dual feed frequency converter. The
power supply and protection are further described in chapter 5.3.
The dual feed for the Fwd Azimuth Thruster supplies the Active Front End drives for the
inverter, and in addition supplies a Static Frequency Converter (SFC) for the auxiliary
systems for the thruster. In case of a failure in the power supply for SFC for the auxiliary
systems for the thruster, the thruster will stop down the whole Fwd Azimuth Thruster.
If a case of a failure in either of the 690V Main Switchboards, the affected AFE will stop and
the IGBT breaker will open. The other AFE will take all consumed load running standalone,
and the thruster and auxiliary systems will continue in normal operation without any load
reduction.
The Fwd Azimuth Thruster drive has 440V supply from each redundancy group for Drive
Control, Cooling Pumps and Pre-charge. Only one supply is active at a time, and the drive
may change the supply in case one is lost by means of internal contactors. Internal faults in
the 440V auxiliary supply distribution will be cleared by internal fuses, or supply breakers. In
terms of transferrable faults in the drive, there has been considered to be no risk of
undetectable faults in the changeover supply arrangement.
The thruster control system for Fwd Azimuth Thruster is equipped with a dual power supply,
one from each redundancy group. Each supply is galvanic isolated trough AC/DC, and DC/DC
converters. A short circuit will be limited by the converter’s capacity, and cleared by internal
fuses, ensuring a failure on the consumer side will not be transferred from one redundancy
group to the other.
The thrusters are equipped with a hydraulic power unit which controls the rotation of the
thruster, lubricates the thruster, and supplies pressure to the lift/ lowering cylinders.
The retraction system is provided with proximity sensors for upper- and lower-cylinder
position and locking bolt indication. Only proximity sensors for cylinder in lower position and
locking bolt lower position are considered in this analysis. If feedback from either of these
two sensors are lost when the Fwd Azimuth Thruster are running and in in DP command, the
thruster will be lost from DP, RPM will go to lever command and azimuth will go to retraction
position.
Important Consumers
Table 13.4.1 - Important consumers for the Fwd Azimuth Thruster

Fwd Azimuth Thruster 690V MSWB PS Fwd Azimuth Thruster 690V MSWB SB
Supply no. 1 Breaker 5Q1 Supply no. 2 Breaker 7Q1
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Fwd Azimuth Thruster Fwd Azimuth Thruster
440V P05 440V P04
Circ. 324 Circ. 327

FQ SW Cooling Circ. 101
HPU pump Circ. 301
LO pump Circ. 302
Failure Modes
Table 13.4.2 - Failure Modes of the Fwd Azimuth Thruster

Failure/ Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster Changeover of supply No loss of position keeping
Frequency Converter Control, Pre-
Thruster still in operation ability
charge and cooling supply
Loss of independency
Failure/ Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Auxiliary Distribution HP01 Loss of thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Thruster lost for DP No loss of position keeping
Proximity sensor for locking bolt ability
RPM to zero
lower position
Thruster stop
Failure/ Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster
Thruster lost for DP No loss of position keeping
Proximity sensor for lifting cylinder
RPM to zero ability
lower position
Thruster stop
Failure in RPM order signal for Fwd No loss of position keeping
Thruster lost for DP
Azimuth Thruster ability
Backup Command
Normal Command
Failure in Rotation order signal for No loss of position keeping
Backup Command
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Failure in Rotation feedback signal for No loss of position keeping
Backup Command
Fwd Azimuth Thruster Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Fwd Azimuth Thruster will exceed the defined worst-
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13.5 MAIN AZIMUTH THRUSTERS

The Main Azimuth Thruster units are manufactured by Kongsberg Maritime CM AS, type US
205-P20 FP with fixed pitch propeller, driven by a variable speed electric motor.
The electrical motors are rated at 1500 kW with shaft speed 0-1200 RPM.
The four-bladed propellers have a diameter of 2400 mm.
Main Azimuth Thruster PS is identified as MP1 in the DP system.
Main Azimuth Thruster SB is identified as MP2 in the DP system.
Main Azimuth Thruster PS is supplied with power from 690V Main Switchboard Port breaker
3Q1.
Main Azimuth Thruster SB is supplied with power from 690V Main Switchboard Starboard
breaker 9Q1.
Each thruster is equipped with a lubrication unit with two lubrication pumps. One pump is
running when the thruster is running, and the other is in standby mode.
Important Consumers
Table 13.5.1 - Important consumers for the Main Azimuth Thrusters

Main Azimuth Thruster PS 690V MSWB PS Main Azimuth Thruster SB 690V MSWB SB
440V P07 440V P06
Circ. 308 Circ. 313
440V P07 440V P06
Circ. 304 Circ. 305
440V P07 440V P06
Circ. 305 Circ. 306
Drive - Cooling Fan Circ. 309 Drive - Cooling Fan Circ. 314
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Failure Modes
Table 13.5.2 - Failure Modes of the Main Azimuth Thrusters

Failure/ Loss of Main Azimuth Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Thruster Frequency Converter Loss of affected thruster ability
Failure/ Loss of Main Azimuth
Thruster Frequency Converter Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Control, Pre-charge and cooling Loss of affected thruster ability
supply
Failure/ Loss of Main Azimuth If Pump 1 running: Alarm will be
Thruster Converter Circulation Pump activated, in worst case loss of affected
ability
1 thruster
Failure/ Loss of Main Azimuth If Pump 2 running: Alarm will be
Thruster Converter Circulation Pump activated, in worst case loss of affected
ability
2 thruster
Thruster Steering Motor 1 Affected thruster still in operation ability
Thruster Steering Motor 2 Affected thruster still in operation ability
Failure in RPM order signal for Main No loss of position keeping
Azimuth Thruster units ability
Backup Command
Main Azimuth Thruster units ability
Normal Command
Failure in Rotation order signal for No loss of position keeping
Azimuth frozen
Failure in Rotation feedback signal for No loss of position keeping
Backup Command
Main Azimuth Thrusters Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the Main Azimuth Thrusters will exceed the defined worst-
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13.6 EMERGENCY STOP SYSTEM FOR THRUSTERS

Emergency stop panels for thrusters are arranged in Fwd Bridge console and Starboard Wing
console.
Each thruster has a separate push button and the wiring is independent for each thruster to
the Main Switchboard.
The circuit configuration is by one closed loop with two resistors, one resistor 1k Ω is
connected in series with the pushbutton and one resistor of 10k Ω in parallel with the
pushbutton.
Power supply to the emergency stop circuits are supplied internally from the Main
Switchboard.
The wiring is loop monitored, and if a wire break or short circuit occurs an alarm will be
activated in vessels IAS alarm system, but the thruster unit will not stop.
Failure Modes
Table 13.6 - Failure Modes of the Emergency Stop System for Thrusters

Short circuit in Thruster emergency Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
stop loop No affect ability
Wire break in Thruster emergency Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
stop loop No affect ability
Failure/ Loss of Thruster emergency Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
stop system No affect ability
Illustration of the Emergency Stop System for Thrusters

Figure 13.6 – One thruster used as example
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14 DP CONTROL SYSTEM
14.1 GENERAL
The computerised DP system is used for automatic position and heading control of the
vessel. The system controls the vessel with use of data from the vessel’s position references
and environmental sensor system.
Deviations from the desired heading and/ or position are automatically detected and
appropriate adjustments are made by the system.
Set points for heading and position are specified by the operator and are then processed by
the DP control system to provide signals to the vessel thrusters. The DP control system
always allocates optimum thrust to whichever propeller units are in use.
The DP control system also provides a manual joystick control which may be used for joystick
control alone or for combined manual/ auto control.
Without a position-reference system, the DP control system can provide automatic

stabilisation and control of the vessel heading using the gyrocompasses as heading
reference.
A mode selector system is installed in three control stations Fwd Bridge console, PS Wing
console, and SB Wing DP station. The system changes between Manual, DP and Joystick
mode. The system ensures safe mode transfer between each mode.
It is required that a DP Operation Manual, compiling all relevant information of the DP

system, as well as procedures, checklists and practice related to DP operations is established.
For equipment and system familiarisation, reference is given to the various user and operator
manuals for the relevant DP equipment, as well as to the independent FMEA for the DP
Control System by Thrustmaster of Texas, Inc.
Illustration of DP Forces by Boatlabs

Figure 14.1.1
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Block Diagram Topology of DP Control System
Figure 14.1.2
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Illustration of DP Control System
Figure 14.1.3
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Redundancy Principle
Table 14.1 – Redundancy Principle for DP Control System
Group A Group B Group C Crossovers

Powering
UPS A UPS B
24V Supply A1 24V Supply B1
24V Supply B2 24V Supply A2
24V Supply C1 24V Supply C2
Diode bridge A Diode bridge B Diode bridge C Diode Bridge A, B and C
Fuse card A Fuse card B Fuse card C
Sensors
Gyro 1 Gyro 2 Gyro 3
VRU 1 VRU 2 VRU 3
Wind Sensor 1 Wind Sensor 2 Wind Sensor 3
DGNSS 1 DGNSS 2 DGNSS 3
Cyscan 1 Rangeguard Gangway Interface
Power IO
Power IO A Power IO B Power IO C
Thruster Interface
Thruster LAN A Thruster LAN B Thruster LAN C
Thruster Switch A Thruster Switch B Thruster Switch C
Bow Thruster 1 Net Bow Thruster 2 Net Bow Azimuth Net
Main Azimuth Thruster 1 Main Azimuth Thruster 2
Net Net
Network
LAN 1 Switch A LAN 2 Switch A LAN 1 Fiber ring
LAN 1 Switch B LAN 2 Switch B LAN 2 Fiber ring
LAN 1 Switch C LAN 2 Switch C
DP A LAN 1 DP A LAN 2
DP B LAN 1 DP B LAN 2
DP C LAN 1 DP C LAN 2
IO A1 LAN 1 IO A1 LAN 2
IO B1 LAN 1 IO B1 LAN 2
IO C1 LAN 1 IO C1 LAN 2
OS1 LAN 1 OS1 LAN 2
OS2 LAN 1 OS2 LAN 2
UPS A LAN 1 UPS B LAN 1
DP Control System
DP A DP B DP C
IO A1 IO B1 IO C1
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14.2 DP SOFTWARE CONTROL

The vessel is fitted with a Dynamic Positioning control system from Thrustmaster of Texas,
Inc., type Icon DP2. The system is designed to satisfy class notations equivalent to Dynamic
Positioning Class 2.
The redundant Icon DP 2 system is based on a triple controller solution with a redundant dual
fibre-optic network. Interface to sensors and position reference systems, power system and
thruster system are split into logical groups based on class requirements and system
segregation.
The connected nodes do not need special functionality to handle network redundancy. With
the DP system integrity preserved, the DP network is separated from networks of other
applications.
In the control system, the redundancy is implemented by having three controller computers
working in parallel by voting principle.
The required reliability is achieved by the implemented diagnostics system that monitors all
input signals to the system. All critical results that are computed, such as position estimate,
are also checked between the computers.
In the triple redundant system, there is an automatic change-over to the other computer if a
critical software or hardware error occurs.
14.3 OPERATOR STATIONS AND CONTROLLERS

The vessel is fitted with two DP Operators stations; OS1 and OS2 are found at PS Wing DP
station.
The triple redundant DP controllers are located in DP Main Control Cabinet. All logic with
respect to safety control and monitoring is located in the controllers. The controller
compromises of controller DP-A with IO-A, controller DP-B with IO-B and controller DP-C with
IO-C.
Joysticks on OS stations are shared with the independent joystick system, internally the
joysticks are electrically divided into two independent systems, one for DP and one for
independent joystick.
14.4 NETWORK
There is an internal redundant fibre optic network (ring) in the main control cabinet for the
triple controllers. In addition, there are separate Dual Ethernet networks for each Controller,
see table 14.1 for details.
In case of failure in one of the fibre network, the other fibre network will handle all
communication and an alarm will be activated.
If both Controller networks to an Operation Station fail, the command can be transferred to
the other Operation Station.
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14.5 MODE SELECTION SYSTEM

A Manoeuvre Mode Selector (MMS) System is used for the selection of operational mode
(Independent Joystick control, DP control and Release to Manual).
A total of three MMS switches is installed on board; one in Fwd Bridge console, PS Wing
console, and SB Wing DP station.
The MMS system itself is used as a signalling device for enabling mode changes. The actual
mode switching is a result of signal communication between DP, Joystick and each of the
thruster cabinets. The communication protocol is based on the existing Ethernet
communication interface.
When a mode is selected, hardwire signals are sent to either the DP system or the
independent joystick system, depending on the mode selected. The DP or joystick system
then send request to the thruster control cabinets through Ethernet communication. The DP
or joystick system constantly keep sending the request signal, if communication is lost the
affected thruster(s) are released to manual command.
“Release to manual” signals are hardwired to each thruster cabinets. The “Release to
manual” is used as a fast disconnection will cause the separate thruster control systems to
be enabled and all thrusters will be controllable by the manual handles.
The “Release to manual” buttons consists of NO contacts to each thruster cabinet. Contact
failure will in worst case trip one thruster to manual or prevent release from the selected
mode. However, the failure will not affect any of the other control positions or available
modes.
14.6 INDEPENDENT JOYSTICK SYSTEM

The vessel is equipped with a Joystick system from Thrustmaster of Texas, Inc. The Poscon
joystick system controls the vessel thrusters, and the operator can control the vessel solely
by use of the joystick.
The joystick system enables manual combined manoeuvring of the vessel and consists of
following main components:
o One Poscon operator stations at Starboard wing DP station

o One electronic control cabinet, identified as JS Control Cabinet
One 230V main supply (L02, Circ. 124) and one 230V backup supply (E01, Circ. 116) is
arranged for the joystick system.
Gyro 1 provides heading signal for the joystick system. Loss of the gyro signal will lead to
loss of the heading reference for the joystick system.
DGNSS 1 provides surge and sway speed to the joystick system. The speed is only used to
inform the operator.
An alarm will come up and let the operator switch to either manual control in case of any
failure.
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14.7 DP REFERENCE SYSTEM

The vessel is fitted with following Position Reference System:
o Three DGNSS (Veripos LID5-G)

o One LASER (Guidance Marine, Cyscan Mark IV)
o One RADAR (Guidance Marine, Rangeguard)
o One GANGWAY (Interface to Gangway)
Illustration of DP Position Reference System

Figure 14.7
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14.8 DP SENSORS
The vessel is fitted with following DP Sensors:
o Three Wind Sensors (Gill Windobserver II)

o Three Heading sensors (Raytheon Anschütz, Standard 22 Digital Gyro Compass)
o Three Motion sensors (2x SMC, IMU-007, 1x SMC, IMU-008)
Illustration of DP Sensors
Figure 14.8
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14.9 POWER SUPPLY - DP CONTROL SYSTEM

The vessel is equipped with two 230V UPSs for the DP system.
Power supplies to the DP UPS’s:
o DP UPS 1: 230V L01 Circ. 105

o DP UPS 2: 230V L02 Circ. 105
Outgoing 230VAC power supplies from the DP UPS’:
EQUIPMENT PORT STARBOARD COMMENT

Main Control Cabinet Supply A 230V DP UPS1 - F01 230V DP UPS2 - F01
Main Control Cabinet Supply B 230V DP UPS1 - F02 230V DP UPS2 - F02
Main Control Cabinet Supply C 230V DP UPS1 - F03 230V DP UPS2 - F03
DP OS 1 230V DP UPS1 - F04 230V DP UPS2 - F04
DP OS 2 230V DP UPS1 - F05 230V DP UPS2 - F05
DGNSS 1 230V DP UPS1 - F06
Cyscan 1 230V DP UPS1 - F07
Rangeguard Sensors & Processor 230V DP UPS2 – F08
Rangeguard Monitor 230V DP UPS2 – F09
Network Printer 230V DP UPS1 - F08
Wind Sensor 1 J/B 230V DP UPS1 – F13
Wind Sensor 2 J/B 230V DP UPS2 – F13
Outgoing 24VDC power supplies from the DP Main Control Cabinets:
EQUIPMENT Dual Supply (PS & SB) COMMENT

VRU 1 JB 24VDC -U22-F06
Wind Display 1 24VDC -U22-F07
Wind 1 (Junction Box 1) 24VDC -U22-F08
MMS 24VDC -U22-F10
Each of the supplies is galvanic isolated trough AC/DC or DC/DC converters. A short circuit
current will be limited by the AC/DC converters capacity, this ensuring a failure on the
consumer side will not be transferred from one redundancy group to the other. Same
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arrangement is done for the independent joystick system, there one AC/DC converter on
main supply and one DC/DC converter on the backup supplies provide galvanic isolation and
limits the short circuit.
Important Consumers
Table 14.9.1 - Important consumers for the DP Control System

230V L01 230V L02
DP UPS 1 DP UPS 2
Circ. 105 Circ. 105
230V UPS 10 230V UPS 20
Gyro No. 1 Gyro No. 2
Circ. 110 Circ. 110
230V UPS 10
Gyro No. 3
Circ. 111
Poscon JS 230V E01 Poscon JS 230V L02
Supply 2 Circ. 116 Supply 1 Circ. 124
Failure Modes
Table 14.9.2 - Failure Modes of the DP Control System

Alarm will be activated in DP and IAS
Failure/ Loss of power supply to DP DP UPS running on battery No loss of position keeping
UPS’ Loss of UPS if no capacity of batteries ability
(hidden fault)
Alarm will be activated in DP and IAS No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of DP UPS
Loss of UPS consumers ability
Alarm will be activated in DP
Failure/ Loss of power supply Control No loss of position keeping
Redundant power supply from opposite
Cabinet ability
UPS
Alarm will be activated in DP No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of one DGNSS
Other Pos. Ref still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of Cyscan position Alarm will be activated in DP No loss of position keeping
reference system Other Pos. Ref still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of Rangeguard position Alarm will be activated in DP No loss of position keeping
reference system Other Pos. Ref still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of one Wind Sensor
Two Wind Sensor still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of one Gyro
Two Gyro still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of one VRU
Two VRU still enabled ability
Failure/ Loss of DP Communication No loss of position keeping
Redundant network handles all
Network ability
communication
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Failure/ Loss of DP Main Controller Redundant controllers handle all
ability
operations
Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 1, Main
Azimuth Thruster PS, Wind 1, Gyro 1,
VRU 1, OS 1 DP Joystick Device, DGNSS No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of DP I/O Controller A
1, Cyscan. Power limitation in DP system ability
disabled. Hybrid system PS: Power Load,
Power Capacity, Ready Signal, Breaker
status (PS)
Loss of Bow Tunnel Thruster 2, Main
Azimuth Thruster SB, Wind 2, Gyro 2,
VRU 2, OS 2 DP Joystick Device, DGNSS No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of DP I/O Controller B
2, Rangeguard. Hybrid System: Power ability
limitation in DP system disabled. Hybrid
system SB: Power Load, Power Capacity,
Ready Signal, Breaker status (SB)
Loss of Fwd Azimuth Thruster, Wind 3,
Gyro 3, VRU 3, DGNSS 3, Network No loss of position keeping
Failure/ Loss of DP I/O Controller C
Printer, Gangway Interface. Hybrid ability
system: Energy Capacity, DP Mode
Status, Safe time to terminate Alarm
Failure/ Loss of DP Operator Station Command can be taken on another
ability
Operator Station
Failure/ Loss of “DP Mode” input from Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
MMS Affected thruster become lost for DP ability
DP Control System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical failure in the DP Control System will exceed the defined worst-case
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15 SAFETY SYSTEMS
15.1 EMERGENCY STOP SYSTEM

An emergency stop system is provided for HVAC, Lube Oil system and Fuel Oil system, as
well as some other equipment not relevant for DP.
The system consists of emergency stop panels on various locations and one emergency stop
relay cabinet.
Each main engine can be emergency stopped locally and from ECR, the wirings are loop
monitored with alarm connected to IAS.
Emergency stop systems for thrusters are separately described in section 13.6.
Emergency stops
Table 15.1.1 – Emergency Stops
System Loop Description Activated from

Em. Stop for
1
EM. Stop Accommodation - AC-1 Control Panel
Bridge (SW1)
Ventilation Em. Stop for
2
- AC-2/ AC-20 Control Panel
Em. Stop for
1
EM. Stop Engine Room - Engine Room Supply Fan S-40 (Upper)
Bridge (SW2)
Ventilation Em. Stop for
2
- Engine Room Supply Fan S-41 (Lower)
Em. Stop for
- Container Room Main Deck Supply Fan S-56
- Container Room Supply Fan S-57
- Chemical Store Exhaust Fan E-45
- Owners Workshop Exhaust Fan E-46
EM. Stop Aft Ship - Garbage Room Supply Fan S-12
1 Bridge (SW3)
Ventilation - Workshop 2 Supply Fan S-54
- Workshop 1 Supply Fan S-45
- Lower Pump Room Supply Fan S-55
- Ship Store Tween Deck Exhaust Fan E-63
- Propulsion Room Supply Fan S-60
- Workshop Exhaust Fan E-47
Em. Stop for
- FO Transfer Pump No. 1
1 - LO Transfer Pump No. 1
- FO Transfer Pump to Deck
EM. Stop FO/ LO Pumps - FO Separator No. 1
Bridge (SW4)
and Separators Em. Stop for
- FO Transfer Pump No. 2
2 - LO Transfer Pump No. 2
- FO Separator No. 2
- CTV FO Separator No. 2
Em. Stop for
EM. Stop Boiler 1 Bridge (SW5)/ Local
- Hot Water Boiler
Em. Stop for
EM. Stop Sludge Pump 1 Bridge (SW6)
- Sludge Pump
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System Loop Description Activated from

Em. Stop for
- FO Cargo Pump 1
EM. Stop Cargo Pumps 1 - CTV FO Cargo Pump Bridge (SW7)/ Local
- FW Cargo Pump 1
- FW Cargo Pump 2
Note! Emergency Stop for Laundry and Galley has not been considered.
Important Consumers
Table 15.1.2 - Important consumers for the Emergency Stop System

Emergency Stop System 230V L15 Emergency Stop System 230V L14
Failure Modes
Table 15.1.3 - Failure Modes of the Emergency Stop System

Failure/ Loss of Normal Supply to Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Emergency Stop System Changeover to backup supply ability
Failure/ Loss of Backup Supply to Alarm will be activated No loss of position keeping
Emergency Stop System No affect ability
Failure/ Loss of Power to Emergency In worst case, emergency stop of No loss of position keeping
Stop System affected consumers not possible ability
No loss of equipment
Failure/ Short Circuit/ Wire Break of
In worst case, loss of affected No loss of position keeping
emergency stop loop in Emergency
equipment in not more than one ability
Stop System
redundancy group
Emergency Stop System Summary (assessment)

No electrical or technical single failure in the Emergency Stop System will exceed the defined
- END OF DOCUMENT -
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Ulstein SX195

Failure Modes & Effect Analysis

Ulstein B315/ “Windea Jules Verne”

BL Doc. No.: BL.2019.F427.10.R04

Issue date: 2020-03-26

DNV GL Class notation: DYNPOS(AUTR)

Auditor: Erlend Erstad

DOCUMENT ISSUE AND DISTRIBUTION

Document Number BL.2019.F427.10

Revision Issue date Author Checked Authorised

R04 26 March 2020

R04 26 March 2020 Updated after closing of findings JU

MEMBERSHIPS, CERTIFICATIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND REGISTRATIONS

1.1 STATUS & CONCLUSION

1.2 WORST SINGLE FAILURE

1.2.2 HYBRID MODE

1.3 SETUP DP OPERATION MODE

Generator/ Hybrid System configuration:

Power System configuration:

Pumps & Misc. Systems:

9 Fuel Oil System .......................................................................................... 75

The FMEA is based on a desktop analysis of available documents and drawings.

2.3 DP CLASS INFORMATION

Description DP Class Classification Company

Typical worst-case single failures are:

A typical alarm message is “Consequence Analysis Drift-Off Alarm”. The associated

Passive or static components for DP Class 2 (DYNPOS(AUTR)) have been considered as

2.6 RELEVANT IMCA GUIDELINES

2.7 FMEA MANAGEMENT

2.8 DP OPERATIONS MANUAL

2.9 VESSEL DATA

Gross tonnage 6081 GRT

Weather deck area 500 m2

IMO Number 9863584

Main Engines Four Caterpillar, 3512C – 1790bkW @ 1800 RPM

Main generators AVK, DSG 86 L1/4W – 1889kVA/ 1700ekW, 690V/ 60 Hz

Bow Tunnel Thrusters Two Kongsberg, TT2400 FP – 1500 kW

DP Sensors Three Wind Sensors (Gill Windobserver II)

DP Control System Thrustmaster, Icon DP2

Independent Joystick Thrustmaster, Poscon

DP Capability Level 1 9,7,8,6

Thruster Control System Kongsberg, Helicon X3

PMS Control System Deif, Delomatic 4

EMS Control System Ulstein, EMS (Energy Management System)

BMS Control System Corvus, BMS (Battery Monitoring System)

2.10 VESSEL LAYOUT

4.2 MAIN ENGINES & GENERATORS

Cooling is provided through freshwater cooling, described separately in chapter 8.1.

CONSUMER PORT CIRCUIT CONSUMER STARBOARD CIRCUIT

CONSUMER PORT CIRCUIT CONSUMER STARBOARD CIRCUIT

FAILURE RESULT CONSEQUENCE

Main Engines and Generators Summary (assessment)

4.3 BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (BESS)

The BESS are installed in the Battery Room at Tween Deck.

A selector switch is arranged for choosing port or starboard power supply.

CONSUMER PORT CIRCUIT CONSUMER STARBOARD CIRCUIT

CONSUMER CENTRE CIRCUIT

CONSUMER CENTRE CIRCUIT

FAILURE RESULT CONSEQUENSE