G.R. No.

L-23096 April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, Petitioners,

vs. ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE,
TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed
LORENZO, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972

DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO,

and, LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, Petitioners,
vs. MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, Respondents.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a

decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is
the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon 1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land,
four (4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy,
Parañaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow
of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children,
Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and
Lourdes, 2 who thereafter challenged the validity of such a
transaction. It was their contention that notwithstanding an order
authorizing the sale from the probate court on June 2, 1953, it
could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move.
Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, instituted on December 7,
1950, was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and
Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than
14 years of age. The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned
one-fourth of the property in question, 3 intervened in such action.
In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the
aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by the widow
being considered null and void insofar as they were concerned. The
rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla
to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were
likewise accorded recognition.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals

by the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent
Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the
deed of sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor
of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths,
without prejudice however to the children demanding from their
mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale of such
property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that
attended the challenged orders, starting with the two elder children
not being notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were
already above 14, as pointed out and stressed in their petition for
review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective power
of this Court. The original decision of the lower court has much
more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the children are fully
respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the
lower court, there is a corresponding modification of the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. So we decide. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision
thus: "After hearing the evidence, the lower court handed down
decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship
proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of
the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them
being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the
guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could
not have validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of the
requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and
void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be
considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the
land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the
sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed of sale ... upon
her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest
relatives, the third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister,
Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not prescribed 'because from the
death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party
complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed';
and that the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal
property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2
of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida
and the other half to their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal
shares." 4
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was

explained this way: "It is unquestioned that the property in question
formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters,
Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and brother, Meliton. When, after
the death of Florentino, that is, on December 6, 1943, the
document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was
executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of
Agueda and married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda,
Tomasa and the children of Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio
merely acquired the participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4
undivided part of said land, and became a co-owner to that extent
with Silvestra who did not execute said document and, therefore,did
not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4
undivided portion passed, upon her demise in 1952, to her nearest
relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano,
Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo,
the children of her deceased sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla,
then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this purchase
made by her deceased husband, and she had no right to mortgage
the whole land which, for taxation purposes was declared in her
husband's name, without the consent of aforenamed successors-in-
interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to
the defendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even
if authorized by the guardianship court, said authority having been
granted upon her misrepresentation, contained in her petition of
May 26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's herein, were
the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the
other 1/2 pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minor
plaintiffs were really the owners in common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided
part of the said land, and the other 1/2, to their mother and
guardian, the orders of the guardianship court authorizing the
guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and approving the
deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority must be
construed as referring to the correct real property of the said
minors." 5chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the

appealed judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the deed of
sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants
valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in
question is concerned, as to which portion, the defendants are
declared owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario, Alfredo,
Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed
Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the remaining
undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In all other respects, the
appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs." 6 chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla,
not being satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions
for review. As noted at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of
Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that
tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment
suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the
children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to
repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it
affirmed the lower court decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any infirmity.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines

is that it was the lower court and not the respondent Court of
Appeals that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It
is worded thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general
guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including
the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and
may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." 8 The
late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional
character. These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the
minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction
to appoint a guardian." 9 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of

First Instance, 10 a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear:
"There is no need for interpretation or construction of the word in
the case before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and
construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched
the meaning with which the English language has endowed the
word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would
accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where
language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to
give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by
judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and
contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making
them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done
or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise
their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it
has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and
construction.' " 11
chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its

assumption that the probate court could have authorized the sale in
question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome.
It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason
for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is quite
commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its
solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be
ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every
procedural principle being observed before their interest in property
to which they have a claim could be adversely affected. It does not
matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811,
in Salunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that
even a mother could have an "interest opposed to that of her
children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in this
case, but certainly from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals,
the Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were
notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then why
there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a
jurisdictional requirement, this is it. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens

patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or
individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care
of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It
cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of
the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether
that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has
no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted
by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and
the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most
beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves." 14 chanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court
and respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra
Ferrer 15 being entitled to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such
property in the capacity of trustee for them. At the time then that
the settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his
widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert any other
right, except that traceable to her late husband. Respondent Court
of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a
member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his vendor
could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is
much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as
to a trustee being incapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of
his principal. So it was announced in Severino v. Severino. 16 That is
in conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and
conscience. He should thus be held to the strictest degree of
acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved
criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery
spouses ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its
authoritative force whenever called for. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate

its inapplicability by the two principal errors assigned, namely, that
Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back as
1943 and that even if it were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo
and thereafter his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of
ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face of such alleged
errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded from
inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was decided
by respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to
the alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the
lower court in this fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa
Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because from the death of Silvestra
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on
September 3, 1958, barely six years had elapsed. Moreover, there
is no clear and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and his
successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open
possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion
corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive
prescription." 17 Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court of
Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it
recognized the rights of the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of
the land sold.
chan roblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above

set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro
and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners
to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in
question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery
and Leoncia L. de Leon.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982

LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal
Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated January 20, 1971 1 which revived and declared in full force and effect its decision on
August 20, 1970 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732,
entitled "Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag, et
al., " and pray that the decision dated April 15, 1969 3 and all subsequent orders 4 issued by respondent
Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be
declared as null and void.

This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a guardianship
proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya, Quezon, which originally pertained to
Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Quezon, then presided by the late Hon. Judge Vicente
Arguelles, 5 later on succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (now Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Hon. Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641 when the Secretary
of Justice authorized respondent Judge to help unclog the docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.

For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and material dates as it
appears in the records from the time respondent Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon took cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641.

On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of Fransisco
Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez), hereinafter referred to as private respondent, the
sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista, hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437
(613 sq. meters) and 4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively,
for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of the ward Soledad
Rodriguez.
On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of private
respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by TCT No. 16944 containing an area of
63,598 sq. meters, more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of the three (3) lots being
absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners.

On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the sale of Lot Nos.
3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent petition in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, praying
that an order be immediately issued requiring petitioners to appear before the court so that they can
be examined as regards the three (3) lots in question which are allegedly in danger of being lost,
squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to do so or to comply with any order that
may be issued in relation therewith to hold them in contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read
as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the abovenamed incompetent and

upon authorization by this Hon. Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan, Quezon, the titles
over the following realties belonging to his ward, namely:

a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya)

with the improvements thereon situated in the Municipality of Sariaya
... containing an area of Six Hundred Thirteen (613) sq. meters, more
or less;

b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya)

situated in the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of Four
Thousand And Sixty-Eight (4,068) sq. meters, more or less;

c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the Cadastral Survey of Sariaya)

situated in the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of Sixty-
three Thousand Five Hundred and Ninety-eight (63,598) sq. meters,
more or less.

2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he transferred the titles
thereto in favor of the recited spouses under a loan agreement (not an absolute sale
thereto and with the express commitment in writing that he can recover the same
within three (3) months from December 19, 1966, ...

That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three months, he tried to recover the
stated two parcels of land from them, however, the same was not carried out
because he was then transacting with them the sale of PARCEL THREE and under
the Agreement that they will not sell cede, or convey the mentioned two (2) lots to
anyone (except to petitioner now private respondent herein) and once the stated
PARCEL THREE has been sold at the price of P48,000.00 the borrowed amount of
P4,400.00 shall be deducted therefrom and said two parcels shall be returned to him;

3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in bad faith and in violation of
their agreement and of the trust and confidence which he had reposed upon them,
have fraudulently ceded and transferred the titles over the stated two parcels of land
to another person, allegedly for a price of (over P30,000.00) and in spite of his
 repeated request upon them to reconvey to him the titles thereto or to turn over to
him the total proceeds they have received (minus the sum of P4,400.00), they have
maliciously and unjustly refused to do so, and are intending to keep and retain said
amount for their own personal use and benefit;

4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph hereof, the mentioned

couple induced him to transfer to them the title of parcel three, so that they can sell
the same for the agreed price of P48,000.00 and believing in good faith that the cited
spouses are honest and trustworthy, he agreed and executed the requisite document
transferring the title to them subject to the following conditions:

a. They shall pay to him the amount of Twelve Thousand (Pl2,000.00)

Pesos after they have secured a buyer of the property, ...

b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and PURA AGCAOILE (who

are private respondent's agents and representatives in negotiating
the sale of parcel three) the sum of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos after they have sold the realty, ...

5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have already sold and ceded the
mentioned parcel three to another person, and despite his repeated request upon
them to pay and deliver to him or to Nieves Alcala the sum of money specified in the
foregoing paragraph, they have maliciously and unjustly failed and refused to do so,
and have fraudulently retained the said amount of money for thier own personal use
and benefit;

6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all the proceeds derived
therefrom, undeniably belonged to his ward as trust properties, which are subject to
the disposition of this Hon. Court, and due to the mentioned fraudulent, malicious
and dishonest acts of the above- named couple, are in danger of being lost,
squandered, concealed and embezzled;

xxx xxx xxx

In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others, that the three lots
have been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which were duly approved by the
guardianship court.

Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on September 6, 1968 but
was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on petitioners' counsel motion. On October 9, 1968,
both parties and their counsels appeared but failed to reach any amicable settlement. Again, the pre-
trial hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968 but was likewise postponed to January 8, 1969
at petitioners' counsel motion.

On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear although there was a
telegram requesting for postponement, respondent Judge issued an order, 6 authorizing private
respondent to present evidence before the Clerk of Court who was instructed to make the corresponding
report which shall be made as the basis of this decision.

In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the order of
January 8, 1969 pointing out, among others, that there was a First Order dated July 29,
1968, 7 issued by then Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance
of Quezon that said branch "will henceforth take cognizance of this case" and thus, asked for the transfer
of the incident sought before Branch IV to Branch I for proper action.

On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for reconsideration well-grounded,
issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the Court of First
Instance, Branch I, Lucena City, quoted below:

ORDER

Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel for the respondent on
February 4, 1969, considering that Hon. A. Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of
Branch 1, CFI, Lucena City, issued an order on July 29, 1968, the dispositive portion
of which is quoted as follows. 'WHEREFORE, it is hereby confirmed that this court
will henceforth take cognizance of this case,' and considering that this special
proceedings actually belongs to Branch I, although incidents therein were taken
cognizance of by the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV when he was holding court
session in Lucena City and notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 261 dated
October 7, 1968 which states that 'This administrative order shall not apply to cases
pending in the different salas which have been partially tried and shall remain therein
for final disposition', because to case was originally filed during the incumbency of
the late Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding therefore the said petition to be well-
grounded, the Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to transmit these records to the
Deputy Clerk of Court, CFI, Branch I, of Lucena City.

SO ORDERED.

Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February, 1969.

(SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge

On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a counsel, filed before Branch IV,
Court of First Instance of Quezon an amended petition praying that the three (3) lots subject matter
of the original urgent petition be ordered reconveyed to the ward in said Special Proceedings No.
2641 for he was informed that petitioners win transfer and properties to third person.

On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon, issued the
notice of hearing of the amended petition filed by private respondent dated March 24, 1969 notifying
counsel for both parties that the case will be heard before Branch IV on April 10, 1969 at 2:30 p.m.
at Calauag, Quezon. On the date set for hearing, counsels for both parties appeared but for failure of
the petitioners to appear respondent Judge issued an order 8 reiterating its previous order dated
January 8, 1969 allowing private respondent to present his evidence ex-parte and considered the case
submitted for resolution.

On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision 9 on the basis of the report of the Clerk of
Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land to private
respondent.

On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating, among others, that
respondent Judge has no authority to take cognizance of the case which, according to petitioners, is
an issue raised in the petition for reconsideration of the court order of January 8, 1969, and that the
decision was without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the case or incident be transferred to the
proper court which had taken cognizance of this case.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioners' counsel received the said order of denial on June 26, 1969.

Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion in Branch IV praying that
petitioners be required to appear before the court to be examined as regards the properties of the
ward and to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for not complying with a final order of
the court directing the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land to private respondent.

On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion, issued an order 10 directing
petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt of court pursuant to par. (b) Section 3
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the urgent motion for contempt of
court was premature considering that the decision ordering the reconveyance of the properties in
question has not yet become final and executory and is still subject to appeal. In their prayer for the
setting aside of the order of June 23, 1969, petitioners informed the court that they win appeal the
decision to the Court of Appeals and that the corresponding notice of appeal, appeal bond and the
record on appeal will be filed in due time.

The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal and appeal bond with a
manifestation that the record on appeal will be filed in due time.

On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order 11 denying for lack of merit petitioners' urgent
motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the order dated June 23, 1969 stands considering that
petitioners' right to appeal has already lapsed. In the same order, petitioners were given ten (10) days
upon receipt to explain why they should not be cited for contempt pursuant to Section 4, Rule 71 in
relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days to expire on July 20, 1969
within which to file the record on appeal. In an order 12 dated July 9, 1969, respondent Judge denied
the said petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for reconsideration of the decision
dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July 3, 1969 contending that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over
the raise from the time the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued by Judge A. Melencio-
Herrera; that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not authorize the Hon. Court (Branch IV)
to determine the question of right over the property or to order delivery thereof; that the purpose is
merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward; that if the court finds sufficient
evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper
action.

On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 9, 1969
was filed by petitioners claiming that all the pleadings related to the intended appeal were filed within
the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Court. After an opposition was filed, respondent Judge
issued an order on 13 July 18, 1969 denying the second petition for reconsideration for lack of basis and
on the ground that the period to appeal either the decision or any of the previous orders had already
expired.

On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the decision of the Court of First Instance, Branch IV,
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion in
denying their right of appeal.

On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for lack of merit. 14 On motion by
petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in a split resolution dated December 15, 1969 thereby giving
due course to the petition, and private respondent was required to answer.

After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their respective memoranda,
the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote decision 15 dated August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition.

On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in a split resolution 16 dated
October 10, 1970 granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the decision dated August
20,1970.

However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the Court of Appeals, in a
three-to-two vote resolution 17 dated January 20, 1971, reverted to its decision of August 21, 1970
dismissing the petition.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors, to wit:

THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RETENTION BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE OF BRANCH IV-CALAUAG OF THE CASE OF BRANCH I-LUCENA CITY
AFTER HE ORDERED THE RETURN OF THE CASE TO BRANCH I,LUCENA CITY
TO WHICH THE CASE BELONGS AND AFTER THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH I LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED AND EXERCISED HER JURISDICTION
OVER SAID CASE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD LEGALLY AND VALIDLY

RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY DESPITE
THE CIRCUMSTANCES ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR, THE
MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION OF
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR ORDER
RECONVEYANCE OF PETITIONERS' PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED
IN THEIR NAMES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF A
GUARDIANSHIP COURT.

III

THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND
APPROVAL OF THE SALES ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE VALIDITY AND
REGULARITY OF SAID SALES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST.

IV
 THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING BY SILENCE THE QUESTIONED ORDER
OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ENFORCING HIS DECISION BY CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS.

THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO
APPEAL.

This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during its trial stage where, as
borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, 9th
Judicial District assert jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641, which, when the decision
rendered by one branch was brought in the Court of Appeals on certiorari with preliminary injunction,
the Special Division of Five Justices, in a three-to-two vote resolution in four (4) occasions after its
dismissal for lack of merit on September 27, 1968, reconsidered the same and was given due
course on December 15, 1968, again dismissed on August 21, 1970, but again reconsidered on
October 10, 1970, until finally dismissed on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five
reverted to its August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally split on the issue
whether or not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag, Quezon, acting with limited
jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority
to adjudicate the question of ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land
in question to private respondent, guardian of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. On these two (2)
principal issues, We are called upon to finally resolve the legal controversy peculiar on this case.

After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed submitted for decision on
October 28, 1971.

In a Resolution 18 of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent manifestation and motion of
Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of Mario Rodriguez (brother of the ward) that the ward
Soledad Rodriguez died on September 15, 1970 and private respondent Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. died on
October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the ward be substituted as the private respondents in this case
was noted. To begin with, the principal issue al hand is whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take further action in Special
Proceedings No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I-
Lucena City asserted its jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 and respondent Judge
correspondingly ordered the return of the case to Branch I in an order dated February 20,1969.

Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon has no
power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 which, at its inception,
originally pertained to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon. To support such
chum, petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29, 1968 requiring private respondent
for an inventory and accounting of the ward's property confirms that the Presiding Judge of Branch I
has resumed its jurisdiction over said case, more so, when respondent Judge ordered on February
20, 1969 the transmittal of the records of the case to the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First
Instance, Branch I-Lucena City.

Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over
Special Proceedings No. 2641 contending, among others, that the two (2) orders dated July 29,
1968 issued by then Judge A. Melencio-Herrera are not sufficient bases for claiming that Branch IV
has been deprived of its, jurisdiction because jurisdiction is vested upon the court not upon any
particular branch or judge thereof and the issuance of such orders constitute undue interference with
the processes and proceedings already undertaken by respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty
of estoppel when they failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and when they
voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, filed their answer and other pleadings, and moved for
postponements of the scheduled dates of hearing.

We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular
branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts 19 one branch stands on the same level as the
other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In
the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having
as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction
should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments. 20 A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the
administration of justice. A judge is competent to act so long as the case remains before him, but after it
passed from his branch to the other, the case could be acted upon by the judge of the latter
branch. 21 Otherwise, an anomalous situation would occur at the detriment of the party litigants who are
likewise confused where to appear and plead their cause.

In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the subject matter, a guardianship proceedings under
Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court and Section 44(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. While it is
recognized that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches, 22 We are of the view however,
considering the unusual circumstances and incidents attendant in this case the situation in the case at bar
is different. Here, it must be noted that the Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and resumed its prior
jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders, one of which requires private respondent to render an inventory and
accounting of the property of the ward. On the other hand, respondent Judge of Branch IV, in
confirmation of such resumption of jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of Special Proceedings
No. 2641 to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon, but, instead of regularly
relinquishing jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge continued to take further action on the case in
total disregard of the two (2) orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch I. Should one branch be permitted
to equally assert, assume or retain jurisdiction over a case or controversy over which another coordinate
or co-equal branch has already resumed its jurisdiction, We would then sanction undue interference by
one branch over another. With that, the judicial stability of the decrees or orders of the courts would be a
meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice.

There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by respondent Judge were valid
and regular as they were admittedly authorized by the Secretary of Justice. It must be emphasized
however, that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 when respondent
Judge ordered the return of the records to Branch I after having been informed in a motion for
reconsideration filed on January 30, 1969 of the existence of the two (2) orders issued by the
Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point of time, all subsequent proceedings and processes in
connection with or related to Special Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge
became irregular. It amounted to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of
Branch I.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it may be observed that the
detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV stationed permanently in Calauag, Quezon to Branch I in
Lucena City, Quezon authoritatively rests on the provision of Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which reads:

Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.-Whenever a judge

stationed in. any province or branch of a court in a province shag certify to the
Secretary of Justice that the condition of the docket in his court is such as to require
the assistance of an additional judge, or when there is any vacancy in any court or
 branch of a court in a province, the Secretary of Justice may, in the interest of justice,
with the approval of the Supreme Court and for a period of not more than three
months for each time, assign any judge of any court or province, whose docket
permits his temporary absence from said court, to hold sessions in the court needing
such assistance or whether such vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall take
cognizance of any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the objection is
sustained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the court needing such assistance or where such
vacancy exists as if he is the presiding judge of that particular branch where the clogged docket or
vacancy exists. The detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as if he is the Presiding Judge of
the branch where he is originally or permanently designated. In the case before Us, respondent
Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the docket of Branch I stationed in Lucena City,
Quezon which at that time was rendered vacant due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When
respondent Judge Kayanan took cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending the
designation of a replacement, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province. In the event of designation of a new Presiding Judge of Branch 1, accepted
practice and procedure of speedy administration of justice requires that the detailed judge turns over
the cases he took cognizance of to the new Presiding Judge. Justification for the continued retention
of jurisdiction over those cases in the case at bar appears to be not convincing.

We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against petitioners. It is true that
petitioners filed their answer to the urgent petition of private respondent and appeared before
respondent Judge of Branch IV without questioning the latter's authority to hear the case. The
answer to the urgent petition of private respondent dated May 13, 1968 was filed by petitioners on
June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before Judge Melencio-Herrera of Branch I issued the two (2)
orders dated July 29, 1968 asserting jurisdiction over the case. The appearances of petitioners and
counsel in the sala of respondent Judge during the intervening period from July 29, 1968 were
apparently due to the fact that petitioners came to know only of the two orders of Branch I when they
examined the records of the case prompted by the manifestation of the counsel of private
respondent, in the course of the proceedings in Branch IV, to submit for an accounting in connection
with the administration of the properties of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. Petitioners manifested such
information to respondent Judge in a petition for reconsideration of the order of January 8, 1968
authorizing the presentation of evidence ex parte. The silence or inaction of petitioners was therefore
due to their lack of knowledge of respondent Judge's lack of authority to retain or take further action
on the case. Such lack of authority was confirmed when respondent Judge, acting on the petition for
reconsideration dated January 30, 1969, issued on February 20, 1969 an order authorizing the
return of the records of the case to Branch I. In claiming that the records referred to by the order
concern the first portion of the records of Special Proceedings No. 2641 and not the second portion
containing the urgent petition filed by private respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent would
then encourage split jurisdiction of courts which is abhorred by the law.

Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has jurisdiction over Special
Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the attendant circumstances adverted to earlier, We now
dwell on another issue, which standing alone would decisively resolve the assigned errors raised in
this petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited and special, jurisdiction as a
guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court has jurisdiction to order the
delivery or reconveyance of the three parcels of land in question to the ward, represented herein by
private respondent.
In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs. Piccio et al, 91 Phil. 712, this
Court laid the rule on the issue raised before Us as interpreted in the light of Section 6 Rule 96 of the
Rules of Court which reads:

Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing

property of the ward.— Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person
having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or
otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed
away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or
his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination
touching such money, goods, interests, or instrument, and make such orders as will
secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.

In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an
action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the
property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of
this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward,
where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of said title or
right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.

In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on the basis
alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez
over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the
fact that the sale of the properties in question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in
accordance with the provisions on selling and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule
97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968
prayed for the examination of petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and
embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24, 1969 asked for
reconveyance.

Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first two lots
was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject to
condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales
were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were
issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the
disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the determination of title or ownership of the three
parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be
threshed out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio
supra.

The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private respondent finds no
application in the instant case. As differentiated from the case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title
of the ward to the property in dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated to her
through compromise agreement approved by the court which title had the authority of res
judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the properties in question is in dispute
and as such should be determined in a separate ordinary action.
Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by laches to raise the issue of
jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such claim, private respondent invoked the exception laid
down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to the rule that the lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; that it is conferred only by law,
and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection on the lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by
the parties; and the infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent,
or win of the parties. 24

The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter case of Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, 29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the case at bar. In Tijam case, the appellant had all the
opportunity to challenged the court's jurisdiction in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals but
instead invoked its jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on
the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15)
years later from the inception of the case that it finally chose to raise the question of j jurisdiction. I t is
clear that t the circumstances present in Tijam case are not present here. The petitioners in the instant
case challenged the authority of the trial court to take further cognizance of the case the moment they
become aware of Branch I assuming jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was raised in a petition for
reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1969, in a petition for reconsideration of the decision dated
April 15, 1969, in a second petition for reconsideration of the said decision, and alleged as an additional
ground in the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. In any case, the operation of the principle of
estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist
as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. 25

As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the assigned errors
raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 is hereby reversed
and set aside, and the decision rendered by respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First
Instance of Quezon dated April 15, 1969 and the orders issued thereafter are declared null and void,
and the case is hereby remanded to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982

PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed guardian of the
minors Shirley and Leandro, both surnamed HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY
FISCAL OF TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban City, respondents.

RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an April 24, 1981 order of the
respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte which required the petitioner and
Conchita Dumdum to —

give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(PI0,000.00) more as additional consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the Tacloban
Cadastre which the court believes to be fair and reasonable price of the property.
This amount should be deposited with the clerk of this court on or before June 24,
1981; otherwise TCT No. T-13238 in the name of Patria Paciente now subject of a
mortgage in favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee an
obligation in the amount of P30,000.00, dated December 27, 1978, will be cancelled.

as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum of the aforesaid order and directed the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City —

to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in lieu thereof a new transfer
certificate of title to the following present owners of Lot 3085- G of the Tacloban
Cadastre: Patria Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing in Tacloban City,
1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban City, 1/3; and, Leandro
Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban City, Philippines, 1/3, subject to the
mortgage lien of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.

because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The facts of the case are as
follow:

In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor children,
Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City,
covered by TCT No. 12138. This lot which he had inherited from his deceased father, Felizardo
Homeres, has an area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square meters.

On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita Dumdum for
P10,000.00.

On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and
estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as
guardian on September 13, 1977,

On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had been titled in her name
under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently,
Patria Paciente was issued TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation for P30,000.00.

On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed a manifestation
informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the subject of the guardianship proceedings
had been registered in the name of the petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was mortgaged
to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of P30,000.00.

Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued an order on
November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to appear before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-13238,
covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be
cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court.

When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation did not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained to
the respondent court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the petitioner
without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement
regarding the properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court again issued an
order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to
explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial
authority before disposing of the said property.

At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband, apprised the court that the
petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. Respondent court then issued
the questioned order.

A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been denied, petitioner filed
the present petition.

The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship court has jurisdiction
to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the
issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner for her having failed to
comply with the court's order directing her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their property
that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.

Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco and Bautista vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a
petition for guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title. In the Cui
case, this Court ruled:

... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some relevancy is that
of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this case, the court made a distinction
between the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
now correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court.
This Court in that case said in effect that while in administration proceedings the
court under section 709 may only question the person suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate, section
593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue
such orders as maybe necessary to secure the estate against concealment,
embezzlement and conveyance, and this distinction is now given emphasis by
respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of the Code of Civil
 Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light of
the ruling laid down in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court
may issue an order directing the delivery or return of any property embezzled,
concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said ward
is clear and indisputable.

xxx xxx xxx

In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his
order of September 5, 1951, in the guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners
to deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing the latter to
collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of
obtaining information which may be used in action later to be instituted by the
guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.

and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:

In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted
by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the
property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a
categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided,
may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery
or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the
right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under
the Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons
said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in
a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings.

Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return of the property
conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the respondent court valid. The petitioner's
contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not support her
argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in
favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the
property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We
also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and indisputable the court
may issue an order directing its delivery or return.

In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable. They
inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-
owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs.
San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not exceed its
jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.

The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional consideration of P10,000.00 is a
different matter. It was issued without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property
but the time frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null and void.

It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the additional amount, the
second order directing the cancellation of the petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or
cancelled the first order. The second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land
inherited by Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title to one-third of the
property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of violations of due process and the
guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under guardianship, the
respondent court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable price
of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent
with the rights of all parties involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special Proceedings No. JP-
0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further
hearings of the case as above indicated.

SO ORDERED,

[G.R. No. L-42215. July 13, 1976.]

ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE LEONOR INES LUCIANO,
Presiding Judge, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, CRISTETA DE CUESTA and
GUADALUPE DE VIRAY, Respondents.

Santiago, Salunat & Agbayani for Petitioner.

Bengzon, Bengzon, & Villaroman & De Vera for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, probate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental incapacity of
the surviving widow, Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the decedent’s
estate. He prayed for appointment as administrator. However, upon a counter petition, the widow was
appointed administratrix and qualified as such. This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme Court in
Baluyut v. Judge Paño, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976, because the persons contesting her capacity to act
were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

Meantime, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two successive petitions were filed
to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship. The first petition, which was
filed by Alfredo Baluyut, was dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters, were given due course.
Acting on the latter petition, the court summarily declared the widow as incompetent on the basis of a report
of a psychiatrist who was not cross-examined, and without hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly
Mrs. Baluyut. The court denied a motion for reconsideration of the order making such declaration.

On a petition to review the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court, the Supreme Court held that
in consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of Quezon City, the guardianship
proceeding should be suspended and should await the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner’s competency to
act as administratrix pending with the probate court. The Court further held that the procedure laid down in
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians as to the time and place for hearing, wherein the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations should be heard and the giving of the
required notice, should have been adhered to strictly by the lower court.

Questioned orders set aside.

SYLLABUS

1. JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, JURISDICTION; EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

OVER GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING. — The Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to entertain guardianship proceeding.

2. ID.; ID.; SECTION 29-A OF THE CHARTER OF QUEZON CITY; EFFECT OF COURT’S JURISDICTION;
PURPOSE THEREOF. — Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction or
authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court has a
salutary purpose. That provision or exception is designed to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; DENIAL THEREOF, IN THE ABSENCE OF FAIRNESS. — Where the
guardianship court did not first set of hearing the psychiatrist’s report and examined the petitioner before
prematurely adjudging that she was an incompetent, its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its
derogatory implications was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.

4. GUARDIANSHIP; FINDING OF INCOMPETENCY SHOULD BE CLEAR AND POSITIVE. — A finding that a

person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.

5. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF PROSPECTIVE WARD NECESSARY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING. — While the
lower court could consult a psychiatrist, the normal procedure is to hear first the evidence of parties and
examine the prospective ward. The testimony of the alleged incompetent himself has peculiar cogency in the
determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship.

6. ID.; ID.; INCOMPETENCY TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR CAN NOT BE EQUATED WITH INCOMPETENCY AS
TO PLACE ONE UNDER GUARDIANSHIP. — The incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be
equated with the incompetency that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that
a person may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed
under guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the
incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship.

7. ID.; PROCEDURE IN APPOINTMENTS; STRICT ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURE UNDER RULE 93 OF THE

RULES OF COURT REQUIRED. — The lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the
petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the
alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has
been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective
allegations."

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut appealed by certiorari from (1) the order dated September 25, 1975 of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, declaring her an incompetent and scheduling a
hearing to determine who should he appointed as her guardian and (2) its order of December 10, 1975,
denying her motion to set aside the declaration of incompetency, which was issued before her counsel could
cross-examine the psychiatrist, and scheduling the cross-examination on January 21, 1976 (Special
Proceeding No. QC-00939). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows: chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Sotero Baluyut, a resident of 59 Quezon Boulevard Extension Quezon City, died at the age of eighty-six
years, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos. He was survived by Encarnacion
Lopez, his seventy-five-year old widow.

Soon after Sotero Baluyut’s death, his alleged nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, exerted efforts to control the
decedent’s estate. Assisting him in the attainment of that goal were the widow’s sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda.
de la Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez Viray. Their antagonists were the widow, and her ally, Jose G. Espino, an
alleged natural child of Sotero Baluyut.

On February 20, 1975, or forty-five days after Sotero Baluyut’s demise, Alfredo filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City for the settlement of the decedent’s estate. He alleged that Mrs. Baluyut
was mentally incapable of administering her affairs and the decedent’s estate or of acting as executrix of his
will, if any. He prayed that, after hearing, he be appointed administrator and, in the meantime, special
administrator (Special Proceeding No. Q-19794. See L-42088, Baluyut v. Judge Paño, May 7, 1976).

Alfredo did not content himself with the filing of the administration proceeding. On that same day, February
20, he filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a petition to declare Mrs. Baluyut an
incompetent and to place her under guardianship.

He alleged that due to a head injury she "has suffered impairment of her mental faculties" and that "she is
no longer competent, physically and mentally", to manage her affairs. He claimed that he was able, qualified
and ready to act as her guardian. Evidently, Alfredo sought to immobilize Mrs. Baluyut and prevent her from
administering the decedent’s estate, supposely a conjugal estate (Special Proceeding No. Q-00925).

After the petition was partially heard, Mrs. Baluyut learned of the guardianship proceeding. She filed a
verified opposition wherein she denied the allegations regarding her alleged mental incompetency. She
alleged that the petition was filed after Alfredo’s attempts to get possession of the decedent’s estate were
aborted and after Mrs. Baluyut’s residence was ransacked on February 12, resulting in the loss of important
papers and cash of not less than one hundred thousand pesos.

She alleged that the documents being used by Alfredo against her were "the product not only of an illegal
seizure but of a plain and simple robbery" ; that the filing of the petition was "an act of disrespect to the
deceased", since Alfredo and his cohorts were "cuddled and reared" by the spouses Sotero Baluyut and
Encarnacion Lopez; that there could be no justice in declaring her an incompetent just to enable Alfredo to
take her properties, and that because of the malicious petition she suffered sleepless nights and serious
anxiety.

On April 7 Alfredo filed a motion praying that Mrs. Baluyut be subjected to a neuro-psychiatric examination.
She filed a countermotion to expunge that motion from the record.

On April 15, Alfredo filed an amended petition praying that Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray be appointed
guardians of the person and property of their sister, Mrs. Baluyut. The latter vehemently opposed the
amended petition. Later, Alfredo moved orally that he be considered disqualified to act as guardian in view
of his appointment as special administrator.

The lower court in its order of April 28, 1975 granted Alfredo’s motions that he be considered disqualified to
act as guardian and that Mrs. Baluyut should undergo a neuro-psychiatric examination which was scheduled
on May 7 at the Philippine General Hospital before Doctors Lourdes V. Lapuz or Baltazar Reyes. The lower
court advised Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray to file their own petition for appointment as guardians of Mrs.
Baluyut.

The lower court in its order of June 20, 1975 dismissed Alfredo’s petition for guardianship. That ended round
one of the guardianship incident.

The second round started on May 6, 1975 when Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed in the same court their
petition dated April 28, praying that Mrs. Baluyut be declared an incompetent and that they he appointed as
her guardians. They repleaded the material allegations of Alfredo’s amended petition (Special Proceeding
No. QC-00939). *

On the following day, May 7, Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying that Mrs.
Baluyut be ordered to remain at the conjugal residence and that she be placed under the court’s protection
or in her sisters’ custody so that she could be available for psychiatric examination. Without hearing Mrs.
Baluyut, the lower court on May 8 granted the motion.

On May 16 Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed an amended petition dated May 8 to cure the deficiencies of
their original petition. On May 21 Mrs. Baluyut filed a motion to set aside the May 8 order. On the following
day, May 22, Mrs. Baluyut filed a motion to strike out the original petition for guardianship. The motion was
alternatively labelled as an opposition to the petition. Those motions were denied in the lower court’s order
of June 23, 1975.

On June 18 Mrs. Cuesta and Mrs. Viray filed a new petition for guardianship, without mentioning their
petitions of April 28 and May 8. Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel claims that no filing fee was paid for docketing the
petition.

On July 21 the lower court issued an order appointing Doctor Lapuz as commissioner to determine the
competency of Mrs. Baluyut at an examination scheduled on August 12 at her residence and to report
whether she should be placed under guardianship. On August 11 Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel manifested that she
was ready to submit to neuro-psychiatric examination at her new domicile, 53 East Maya Street, Phil-Am
Life Homes, Quezon City.

On September 25 the lower court issued the questioned order declaring Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent on the
basis of the report of Doctor Lapuz. Mrs. Baluyut was first examined by Ma. Paz U. Guzman, a psychologist.
The latter found that as of September 11 Mrs. Baluyut was "an integrated well-functioning individual", "an
aware and responsive individual who has a mind of her own", and "competent enough to understand her
position relative to the case involving her."

Doctor Lapuz found that Mrs. Baluyut was aware of what the present court case was all about; that Mrs.
Baluyut spontaneously declared that she preferred to associate with the Espino spouses because they
treated her kindly, and that Mrs. Baluyut said that her other relatives were probably envious and desired to
get hold of her assets.

The evaluations of the psychologist and the psychiatrist, which according to Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel do not
sustain the declaration of incompetency, are reproduced below: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph

"Psychological Evaluation

"Observation and Interview. — Subject came smartly dressed in a jersey gown and looking well groomed.
She was ,bejeweled with several bracelets on both arms, 5 rings, a necklace and watch. She appeared in
good physical condition. She walked and seated herself unassisted. She moved about with comfort. She took
the test independently except the Personal Data Sheet which she filled out with the assistance of Mr. and
Mrs. Espino.

"Her testing behavior was positive. She followed instructions without questions or signs of resistance. She
displayed appropriate affect, (sic) was coherent and spontaneously made several relevant remarks in
relation to the various test stimuli presented to her. She was friendly and pleasant. However, she reacted
indignantly when the Examiner encouraged her to try her best at the tests because the result would be
presented to Dra. Lapuz. She denied having met Dra. Lapuz and momentarily refused to go on with the
tests saying that she did not care if people thought she was crazy. She was appeased and reassured and
was able to resume working at the tests with her full cooperation. She later apologized to the Examiner for
her outbursts and for having taken so much of the Examiner’s time.

"Test Results. — The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale yielded a Performance Scale IQ of 80 which places
the Subject’s intellectual functioning at the Dull Normal range. This represent her current functioning and
how she compares with her peer group. The subject scores indicate her weakest area to be in visual-motor
functioning. This deterioration appears to be purely a function of impaired vision and reduced motoric speed
due to her advanced age rather than a psychogenically based depression.

"Similar impressions were gathered from the Bender-Gestalt reproductions of subject. Her figures showed
integration and accurate perception of the stimuli although her motoric expression is characterized by mild
tremors and poor control of the movements of her arm and hand.

"The subject’s immediate recall is impaired. However, her long term memory for past events appears to be
relatively intact. Specifically, she failed to reproduce from memory a single figure out of several she had
previously copied. However, she could recall and recount a conversation that she carried or with her
companion some 30 minutes earlier.

"The test data showed no signs of psychosis or severe personality disturbance. Her responses to the
projective tests showed that her perception of stimuli is very much like those of the majority. Her percepts
tended to be common place and ordinary but accurate. There were no bizarre responses. She is aware and
is in adequate touch with reality. Allowing for some neurological deterioration due to her age, the subject’s
cognitive and affective functioning indicates that she is intellectually and emotionally competent. She knows
what she wants, and is in control of her volition. However, although she has a strong will and is determined,
she is not often physically able to carry out her desires.

"Summary: — The subject’s test data point up an integrated well-functioning individual. She reaches Dull
Normal limits on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale in comparison to her age group. She is relevant and
in touch with reality. No gross pathology is gathered from the tests. Rather the results show an aware and
responsive individual who has a mind of her own. She is competent enough to understand her position
relative to the case involving her.

Submitted by: chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

Ma. Paz U. de Guzman

Clinical Psychologist"

"Psychiatric Evaluation

"Patient: Encarnacion Baluyot

Widow, 74 years old

Childless

"The patient was referred by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, for a psychiatric
evaluation to help determine her competence in handling her finances. She was seen twice by the
undersigned in the latter’s office at St. Luke’s Hospital. At each visit, she was accompanied by Mrs. Jose
Espino, a relative, but was interviewed alone.

"She is stylishly dressed and groomed, wearing much jewelry. She cooperates in a friendly manner but
grows impatient and irritable when the questions obviously test her capacity for intellectual concentrating on
the discussion, but on the whole, she gave relevant and coherent answers, which tended to be quite brief.
There was prolonged reaction time to questions which tested memory and orientation, indicating quite
clearly that memory and orientation are impaired. She seemed to best remember discreet tidbits about the
highlights of her life when her late husband was at the peak of his public career. However, she cannot
integrate such bits of memory into a full recollection of how her life was at that time. The same was true in
response to inquiry about any aspect of her life. She can give one or two very brief statements but fails to
pursue further the discussion. There is clearly an impairment of thought processes.

"She is aware however of what the present court case is all about. She declares quite spontaneously that
she likes being with the Espino’s because she is treated kindly and thoughtfully by them. She mentions
other relatives who are probably envious and wish to get hold of her assets.

"Her personal history, pieced together with information from Mrs. Espino, the wife of an adopted son,
indicate that she has been a mother to many of her late husband’s nieces and nephews, who were sent to
school and given a start in life by the couple. She has always been over-concerned with money to the point
of eccentricity but has a generous heart. Pampered by her husband, she has always enjoyed being with
friends, socializing and still goes off to dance sessions with friends her age. The death of her husband has
obviously made her even more dependent and helpless.

"In summary, the subject is a 74 year-old woman in whom the ageing process has rendered the intellectual
capacity sufficiently impaired to warrant a recommendation for kind and consistent guidance in the handling
of her affairs. She would best be helped by people who are truly interested in her welfare. Being of a kind
and dependent nature herself, she need to be looked after. She would be more confused and lost if
continuously in the center of hostilities. She needs a simple, well-directed life among kind people who will
tend to her day-to-day activities. She may be able to grasp a situation correctly and superficially but she will
need help regarding details and more complex procedures. Psychological testing (Weschler Adult
Intelligence; Bender-Gestalt; Roscharch) shows functions at the dull normal, but otherwise integrated and in
touch with reality. The tests also showed impairment for recent memory and in visual-motor functions.

Lourdes V. Lapuz, M.D." cralaw virtua1aw lib rary

Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel observed that the lower court’s order was "issued in a blitz manner", without any
hearing on the psychiatrist’s report, without giving notice to her, and without giving her a copy of the report.
On October 6 she filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order declaring her an incompetent. She
called attention to the fact that in the administration proceeding Judge Vicente G. Ericta had declared her
"competent" in his order of March 24, 1975 and that Judge Ernani Cruz Paño (the successor of Judge Ericta)
in his order of November 27, 1975 appointed Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix after concluding that she was
competent to act as such, considering the findings of Judge Ericta and of the psychologist and Doctor Lapuz.

The lower court had scheduled a hearing on October 8 to determine who should be appointed guardian of
Mrs. Baluyut. Her counsel did not appear at the hearing may be because of his pending motion for
reconsideration. At that hearing, Mrs. Cuesta, Mrs. Viray, her husband Atty. Fortunato Viray, Sr. and Alfredo
G. Baluyut testified upon direct examination by Atty. Fortunato Viray, Jr. The oral evidence was presented
for the purpose of proving that Mrs. Viray was competent to act as guardian of her sister, Mrs. Baluyut.

On October 20 the lower court motu proprio issued another order justifying its prior declaration that Mrs.
Baluyut is an incompetent. It scheduled the cross-examination of Doctor Lapuz on October 24. The hearing
was not held due to the indisposition of Doctor Lapuz. In the meantime, Mrs. Baluyut filed another motion to
set aside the declaration of incompetency.

On December 10 the lower court issued an order denying Mrs. Baluyut’s motion for reconsideration. It ruled
that, as a socio-legal court, it was duly empowered under section 29-B of the charter of Quezon City to avail
itself of the consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists and other qualified specialists (Republic Act
No. 4836, creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court by amending Republic Act No. 537, the
charter of Quezon City).

The lower court further held that the declaration of incompetency was interlocutory and that a prompt
resolution of the issue as to Mrs. Baluyut’s incompetency was imperative in view of the verified statements
of her two sisters and nephew-in-law that more than one million pesos had been "withdrawn by her through
the machinations of third persons."

The instant petition for review was filed on December 29, 1975. In that petition Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel
assails for the first time the lower court’s jurisdiction to declare her an incompetent. She contends that her
competency is involved in the administration proceeding pending in Branch XVIII of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City which court (not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) has jurisdiction over
the issue as to her competency. She invokes section 29-A of the Quezon City charter which provides that
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in guardianship cases
(paragraph 2), but which also provides an exception in its last sentence quoted below: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"If any question involving any of the above matters (the seven classes of cases over which the court has
exclusive original jurisdiction) should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said
incident shall be determined in the main case." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

The issues are (1) whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut’s
alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administration proceeding (pending in the probate
court) of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix and (2) whether she was denied due
process when the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court summarily declared her an incompetent just one
day after it received the psychiatrist’s report and before that report was set for hearing.

Jurisdictional issue. — The lower court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding for the
guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut as an alleged incompetent. (As to rulings on the original exclusive jurisdiction
of Juvenile and Domestic ,Relations Courts, see Perez v. Tuason de Perez, 109 Phil. 654; In re Angela
Tuason de Perez, L-28114, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 608; Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, L-18176, October
26, 1966; 18 SCRA 450; Paterno v. Paterno, L-23060, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 585; Bartolome v.
Bartolome, L-23661, December 20, 1967, 21 SCRA 1324; Eusebio v. Eusebio, L-39581, March 31, 1976).
However, as noted earlier, Mrs. Baluyut’s competency to act as administratrix is in issue in Special
Proceeding No. Q-19791 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII. That proceeding
was instituted by Alfredo G. Baluyut for the settlement of the estate of Sotero Baluyut, the deceased spouse
of Mrs. Baluyut. Alfredo alleged in his petition that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally incapable of administering the
estate. She characterized that allegation as libelous. She prayed in a counter-petition that she be appointed
administratrix.

The probate court appointed her as administratrix after finding that she was sui juris or was still in
possession of her capacidad de obrar o capacidad de ejercicio. In fact, she qualified as administratrix on
November 29, 1975. This Court in Baluyut v. Judge Paño, supra, set aside that appointment, not because
Mrs. Baluyut was an incompetent but because the persons contesting her capacity to act were not given an
adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

We hold that in consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the charter of Quezon City the
guardianship proceeding should be suspended and should await the adjudication of the issue as to Mrs.
Baluyut’s competency to act as administratrix.

It is true, as observed by Justices Barredo and Antonio during the deliberation on this case, that the
incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the
placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may be incompetent to act as executor
or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed under guardianship. But if a person is competent
to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of
guardianship.

Section 29-A in divesting the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve
questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court has a salutary purpose.
That provision or exception is designed to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by
the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Issue as to alleged denial of due process. — As previously stated, the lower court appointed Doctor Lapuz as
"commissioner to determine the competency" of Mrs. Baluyut. She was directed to recommend whether Mrs.
Baluyut needed a guardian for her person and property. Doctor Lapuz took her oath as commissioner. She
referred Mrs. Baluyut to Ma. Paz U. dc Guzman for psychological evaluation. The psychologist found that
Mrs. Baluyut was "an integrated well-functioning individual", "competent enough to understand her position
relative to the case involving her." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

Doctor Lapuz interviewed Mrs. Baluyut alone "for a psychiatric evaluation." The psychiatrist in her report did
not categorically recommend that a guardian be appointed for the person and property of Mrs. Baluyut.
Doctor Lapuz said that Mrs. Baluyut needed "kind and consistent guidance in the handling of her affairs" and
required "help regarding details and more complex procedures." (Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel volunteered the
hearsay information that the psychologist and psychiatrist were allegedly surprised that the court declared
her an incompetent on the basis of their reports, considering that their evaluations were favorable to her.
Pages 10 and 20 of memorandum).

The lower court did not notify the parties of the filing of the psychiatrist’s report, did not give them a chance
to register their objections and did not set the report for hearing as required in sections 9 to 11, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. Instead, on the day following the receipt of the report, the lower court declared Mrs.
Baluyut an incompetent within the meaning of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the word
"incompetent" includes "persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation" (Sec. 2).

The declaration was made although the guardianship court had not examined the alleged incompetent. Mrs.
Baluyut’s counsel in a pleading dated October 21, 1975 called the guardianship court’s attention to the fact
that in the administration proceeding Judge Ericta had already found in his order of March 24, 1975 that she
was "healthy and mentally qualified." That conclusion was based on the following examination made by
Judge Ericta: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"COURT: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

Will you (addressing Mrs. Baluyut) take the witness stand and we will find out if you are mentally deranged
as alleged in the petition (for letters of administration filed by Alfredo G. Baluyut).

Interpreter (To the witness): chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Q. Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Please state your name, age, address, civil status, and your other personal circumstances?

A. ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, 70 years old, widow, and residing at Quezon Boulevard, corner
Banawe, Quezon City.

Court:chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

Ready?

Atty. Santiago: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Yes, Your Honor.

Court:chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

No, I will be the one to ask the question. . . .

Court (to Mrs. Baluyut): chanrob1e s virt ual 1aw l ibra ry

When were you born?

A. 1901, sir.

Court:chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

The exact month and date?

A. March 25, 1901.

Q. (by Court): Where?

A. Lingayen, Pangasinan.

Q. Who is your father?

A. Jose Lopez.

Q. Who is your mother?

A. Carmen Escaño.

Q. Did you go to school?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. What is your highest educational attainment?

A. I am a teacher.

Atty. Salunat: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

At this juncture, your Honor, may we ask that the question(s) of the Court be translated in the Spanish
dialect (language)?
Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

She can answer and understand my question in English.

Atty. Salunat: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

She finds difficulty, your Honor.

Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

If she finds difficulty, advise her to do so.

Atty. Salunat: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

Yes, your Honor.

Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

All right. What is your highest educational attainment? — E. Lopez Vda. de Baluyut: I am a teacher but I
never teach. I don’t need to work.

Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

What?

A. I am a senior teacher, your honor.

Q. Do you have any children?

A. I had one who died.

Q. Do you have any grandchildren of that child of yours who died?

A. None, sir. He was very young when he died.

Q. How do you earn your livelihood?

A. From my properties.

Q. Where are your properties located?

A. They are in San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

Q. Where else?

A. In my house.

Q. Where is your house?

A. At the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Banawe, Quezon City.

Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

All right, I think that is enough in the meantime.

x x x

Court: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary

All right.
"ORDER

"Submitted for resolution is a motion dated March 19, 1975, asking for the setting aside of the appointment
of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator by order of the court dated February 24, 1975.

"This Court was misled in appointing him as special administrator by the allegation in the petition that the
widow Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de Baluyut is no longer mentally capable of administrator (administering) her
personal properties.

"During the hearing of this motion for reconsideration, the Court placed the widow Encarnacion Lopez Vda.
de Baluyut on the witness stand and asked a series of questions to determine her mental capacity.

"The cross-examination by the Court shows this woman is healthy and mentally qualified.

"In view hereof, the Court sets aside the order dated February 24, 1975, appointing Alfredo G. Baluyut,
petitioner here as special administrator. . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The lower court, upon being apprised of the foregoing conclusion of the probate judge, should have at least
tried to take judicial notice of what was happening in the administration proceeding. The voice of prudence
should have cautioned the guardianship court to avoid the issuance of a declaration contradicting the
probate court’s pronouncement on Mrs. Baluyut’s capacity to act.

As shown in Baluyut v. Judge Paño, supra, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, who succeeded Judge Ericta, confirmed
the latter’s finding in his (Judge Paño’s) order of November 27, 1975. After interrogating Mrs. Baluyut, he
was convinced of her "capacity and sufficient understanding." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The guardianship court denied Mrs. Baluyut’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed its declaration on her
supposed incompetency.

In this appeal, Mrs. Baluyut contends that she was denied due process of law when the guardianship court
summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-
examined the psychiatrist.

We hold that Mrs. Baluyut’s contention is tenable. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored
on clear, positive and definite evidence (Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That
kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion that
Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent.

Here, we have the sorry spectacle of two courts of Quezon City making divergent findings on Mrs. Baluyut’s
capacity to act (Art. 37, Civil Code). What the guardianship court did (as the saying goes) was to take the
second step before having taken the first step. It declared Mrs. Baluyut as an incompetent and then
scheduled the cross-examination of the psychiatrist so that the parties could ascertain whether the
declaration of incompetency is correct or not.

In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist’s report and
examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature
pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the
essence of due process.

Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of
Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix
a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be
present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the
court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).

In the instant case, the lower court before hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut,
immediately subjected her to a psychiatric examination. That unorthodox procedure was not warranted.
Undoubtedly, the lower court could consult a psychiatrist but the normal procedure is to hear first the
evidence of the parties and examine the prospective ward. The testimony of the alleged incompetent himself
has peculiar cogency in the determination of whether he should be placed under guardianship (22 ALR 2nd
762).
Issue as to filing and legal research fees. — Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel repeatedly asserts that Mrs. Viray and
Mrs. Cuesta did not pay the corresponding filing and legal research fees for the docketing of their petition for
guardianship.

The cover of the expediente of Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 shows that on May 6, 1975 the sums of
thirty-two pesos and two pesos were paid as docket fee and legal research fee under Official Receipts Nos.
8981855 and 8982309, respectively. Mrs. Baluyut’s counsel contends that those payments correspond to the
petition of Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta in Special Proceeding No. QC-00925 which was dismissed.

As Mrs. Baluyut did not ask the lower court to resolve this point squarely and as the orders being questioned
herein are silent on that matter, we hold that the lower court should first determine whether the legal fees
fixed in section 5[e], Rule 141 of the Rules of Court were duly paid by Mrs. Viray and Mrs. Cuesta.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s orders of September 25 and December 10, 1975 are set aside.

The Court a quo is directed to suspend the guardianship proceeding and to await .the final verdict of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII on the competency of Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de
Baluyut to act as executrix or administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Sotero Baluyut.

Should it be finally ruled therein that Mrs. Baluyut is competent to act as executrix or administratrix and
should there be no other supervening circumstances that justify the continuation of the guardianship
proceeding, then the same should be dismissed.

The lower court is further directed to determine whether Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe
Lopez Viray paid docket and legal research fees for their petition. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and
save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be
availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who
manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.

As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?

Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he
failed to control his outburst and blurted —

You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.

Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with
gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim.
Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year
and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed
on each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was
however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his
case to the Regional Trial Court.

On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated
in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —

. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words complained
of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing documents . . .
as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its
delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words must have been
uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion
or obfuscation.2

Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC
became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an
application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4

Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition
on the following grounds —
 Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions of
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation of the circular is
sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.

Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had asked
the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed to give the
court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error on the
matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the questioned
order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This failure
is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition (Santos v. Vda. de
Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).

Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious, arbitrary,
despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's application for
probation . . . .

Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .

Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal
has been taken . . . . 5

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in
dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as he now argues
before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the
MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of
the benefits of the Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was
such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the
judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by
the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7

The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after
appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of
the penalties imposed.

Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands
convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which
is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of
the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law
who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision,
offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to
any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused
from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable
limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en
banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—

. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that
appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal
interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the
spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the
history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe
that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which
have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true
legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are
charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely
essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to
be given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not
from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.

The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather than a
"liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No.
1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined
and principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority projected
when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly
visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's
face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need for
the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process
made necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which
shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and
apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court
in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will surely
follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to
achieve:

. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words

as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter,
is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and
contracts, cutting the words here and inserting them there, making
them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or
what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which
they do not ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and
coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as
 to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been
submitted to some court for its interpretation and construction.

The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp
of English is steadily attenuated. 12

Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said —

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction.
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced.

And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not
make exception the court should not except.

Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there
was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple
prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not,
and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an
applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set
out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the
penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D.
968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree
shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each
penalty separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to
have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four
(4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner
was probationable.

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on
the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just
because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and
serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended,
disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to
Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple
offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of
penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say,
thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one
outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been
found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as
minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin.
Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation.

Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not
have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now
precludes him from applying for probation.

And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the
penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the
Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty
would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six
(6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16
cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence,
following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
exceeds six (6) years.

The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are
only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16)
times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer —
"one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner
should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the
judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in
each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating
circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason
therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not
sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of
petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus —

Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is

AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the
Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law;
and to pay the costs. 16

Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or
absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of
thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed.
Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can
we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole
modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as
the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application
for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he
felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to
probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17

Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the
MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his
conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for
probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his
innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the
RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at
his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive
identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in
not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed
an error in relying on his positive identification considering that private complainants could not have
missed identifying him who was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a
good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were
uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients, not
one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could not
have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private complainants. 19

Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete

innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the
accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty
— to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after
asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By
perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of
an accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only
after failing in his appeal.

The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties.
Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be
worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the
negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the
period allowed by law.

Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed
against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4)
separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same
Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the
Information.

Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital
way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for
probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost
two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates
against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of
now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —

. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in point,
Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this

Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on
probation . . . .

Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one who
had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for
probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner
was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D.
No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed "within the period for
perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had passed, meaning
to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal
therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal from
the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the
judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and
was, in fact, up for actual execution before the application for probation was
attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his application for probation
before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation
was filed too late.

Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for
execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily
must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation
with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
probation after an appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed
penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an
application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise
eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.

I.

The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation is the
fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation. Reliance is
placed on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended, which provides as
follows:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or

a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for probation.
If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit
in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
mentioned in § 9, to wit:

Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended
to those:

(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public
order;

(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than
Two Hundred Pesos.

(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
 (e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this
Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.

Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as when
the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal
the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not be
denied the benefit of probation.

Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even encouraged — speculation on the
outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and
failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he
is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows
he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed.2

There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to the
choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is
to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the amendment, it bears
repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was principally
motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him,
what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as
alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties
imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of
imprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term
of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did
not appeal further although he could have done so.

The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from applying
for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the terms of the
judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go
against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)

To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is not — but to achieve
its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of
the law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford
[him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save
government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and
to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
Makasiar, J.)

The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:

Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended to limit
the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can avail of in
order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither does the
law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the
benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right
of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after the
penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became
qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was
afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was also there when
he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.

It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon being
arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise
eligible for probation.

It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the beginning,
later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who
appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for probation.

This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in which
it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply
for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have applied
for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision correccional did not disqualify him for
probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."

II.

It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted out
to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms
imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of § 9(a) which
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years."

I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on petitioner
was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in
each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral
defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he would have to
serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means
eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.

The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in cases
which are jointly tried and decided. For example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held
in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in
five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal
case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)

It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and the
penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral
defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty
of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more times. The
relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral
defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal.

III.

Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and that
is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the
execution of its decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await
the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had
become final.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's
application for probation.

VITUG, J., concurring:

While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on
him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to
second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their
totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue
Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for
probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within
the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been the
legislative intent.

Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.

I.

The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation is the
fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation. Reliance is
placed on the literal application of § 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended, which provides as
follows:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or

a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for probation.
If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit
in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
mentioned in § 9, to wit:

Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended
to those:

(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
 (b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public
order;

(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than
Two Hundred Pesos.

(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this
Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.

Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as when
the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal
the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not be
denied the benefit of probation.

Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even encouraged — speculation on the
outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and
failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he
is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows
he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed.2

There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to the
choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is
to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the amendment, it bears
repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was principally
motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him,
what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as
alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties
imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of
imprisonment allowed by § 9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total term
of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did
not appeal further although he could have done so.

The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from applying
for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the terms of the
judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of § 4: "No application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go
against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p. 9)

To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is not — but to achieve
its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of
the law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-
respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford
[him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save
government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and
to decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
Makasiar, J.)

The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:

Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended to limit
the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can avail of in
order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither does the
law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the
benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right
of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after the
penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became
qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was
afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was also there when
he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.

It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon being
arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise
eligible for probation.

It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the beginning,
later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who
appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for probation.

This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in which
it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply
for probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have applied
for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision correccional did not disqualify him for
probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."

II.

It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted out
to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms
imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of § 9(a) which
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years."

I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on petitioner
was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in
each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral
defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he would have to
serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
law.

It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means
eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months.

The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in cases
which are jointly tried and decided. For example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held
in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in
five criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal
case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)

It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and the
penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral
defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty
of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more times. The
relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral
defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal.

III.

Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and that
is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the
execution of its decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await
the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had
become final.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's
application for probation.

VITUG, J., concurring:

While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on
him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to
second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their
totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue
Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for
probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within
the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been the
legislative intent.

Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,

vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated
10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,3 dated
19 December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20
February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler
and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in
Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus,
reversed and set aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave
with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and
ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Nave’s successor-in-interest.

There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the Court
of Appeals to be as follows:

This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando,
representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman,
Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of
land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged
that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was
entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave]
reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment he
tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him
anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the
corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
damages.

[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the
corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she
was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her
signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her property
in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to
[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her
repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down
payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property in
good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale
siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action
against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a
party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in
interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being no
evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.

Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the
land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the
Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied
[Nave’s] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she
was adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernando’s] amended
complaint.

Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with Counterclaim and
Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-
defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that
she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of
the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the
trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to
Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale
siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient
based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra.
Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the
same was denied by the court a quo.

[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal Case No.
1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein as a defense her mental
deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract
entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the Second
Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should
be admitted.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case was
suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in
the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides with the
Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again at the National
Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation
report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of
the National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within
the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of
age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside
aid take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 1980.
She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner
is hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders
from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is
ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in
view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from
the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in
recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.

SO ORDERED."

Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the appeal
interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure
to pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary period.

In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].

On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C
(petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with
the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1)
they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by
 the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the
late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.

The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the court’s permission for his substitution for the late
defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-
trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging
that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by
a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not
a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him
on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling as
to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard
on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984 executed by

Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect;

2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly
S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and
effect;

3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property covered by TCT
No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;

4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the property in
favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in
their favor has been declared null and void;

5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the property to Ms.
[Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time they took over possession to
the time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said
income to the latter;

6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to pay Ms.
[Alamayri]:

a. attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and

b. the costs.6

S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997
Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the
amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred
in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February
1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando
Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation,

represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-
C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITY
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.

No pronouncements as to costs.7

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking the
Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980;
and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already became final
and executory when no one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already
judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered
into should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which
she executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June
1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said guardianship proceedings
through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19 November
1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents
to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.

Atty. Gesmundo, Nave’s surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration of the
10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Nave’s
incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the
subject property as owner upon Nave’s death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must be
remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to the
subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.

In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the Motions
for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.

Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S.
NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL

PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON
RESPONDENTS PABALES.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE

HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE
IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9

It is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer
be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly,
the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.

This Court is not persuaded.

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.10

It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which
read:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their
privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or
demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark
the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which
corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is
referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in
paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following enlightening
discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:

The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former
judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties
to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties
or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA
201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which
bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were
in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this
rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled
that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiated
between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of
the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties,
as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause
of action before the same or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination
of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same.13

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will
no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.

Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the instant

Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of parties

SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment
of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent,
the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take
care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation."14

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to wit:

Rule 93

APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. – Any relative,
friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or
 lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court
having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both,
of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in
the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health,
in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or

convenient;

(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent,
and of the persons having him in their care;

(d) The probable value and character of his estate;

(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.

The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the
issuance of letters of guardianship.

SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a petition for the appointment
of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and
shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition
residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.

SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. – Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray
that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any
suitable person named in the opposition.

SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition the alleged
incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice
has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their
respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it shall
appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties
hereinafter specified.

xxxx

SEC. 8. Service of judgment. – Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served
upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person
resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,
petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears
the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo,
petitioner, with no named respondent/s.

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain the
names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having
him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be
notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has
no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be
appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the
trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the supposed
minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring
for him.

It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be
likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the
proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will
only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so
as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated
to comply therewith.

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took part in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her.
Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the
hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually
did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayri’s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two
Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of
the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said Orders by
themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he
was authorized by his children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf.

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark additional
evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.

It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives
evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case,
Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001.
She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-
G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already
promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.

The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in
support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment.
Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute
the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not
present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if
she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general
rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to
expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And
while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress,
was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.20

Moreover, contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to
Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19
December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:

While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale siblings]
participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned
therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary
evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot
bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no
allegation to the effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that the
Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority
to represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was
not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which was
executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabale’s presence
at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said
proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.

Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then
any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

No identity of issues

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C
that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Nave’s competency in 1984,
when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.

In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time of filing
of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person
and estate.

In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-
C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale
void.
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be established at two
separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does
not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite
the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the
execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract.
Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition
in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient
proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.24

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the
RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent
until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the
appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed
to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject
property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of
proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the
22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having become severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no
basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision, prepared
by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated
20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain
syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when
Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave
was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave,
which made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of being manipulated,
on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC
Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Nave’s
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking
the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to
establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20
February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render
the said deed void.

All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Nave’s incompetency by the year
1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any
error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, Petitioner, v. HELEN G.

BELMES, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, In the Matter of Guardianship of
Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil,
Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant,
promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December
18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said
Decision.

The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its

Decision are:

Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a

Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had
two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over
the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only
6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death
pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.

Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar
Daily.

On July 15, 1987, Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal

and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen

Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition

with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody
of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at
Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper
venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil
was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A.
being a naturalized American citizen.

On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected
and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia
as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order
dated November 24, 1988.1 cräläwvirt ualib räry

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision

reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special
Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.

The Court of Appeals held:

Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under
the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article
225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements.
Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the
designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor
children without need of a court appointment and only for good
reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner,
there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes,
the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as
natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege
from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very
basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family
solidarity.2
cräläwvi rtual ibrä ry

On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present
petition, raising the following legal points:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the

preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the
persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing
jurisprudence.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor

Helen G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the
guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under
her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven
times by Oppositors live-in partner.

3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it

disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors
despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of
her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement
to become guardian.

At the outset, let it be stressed that in her Manifestation/Motion,

dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that
her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as
shown by her Birth Certificate. 3 Respondent thus prayed that this
case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a
proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said
Manifestation/Motion was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated
November 11, 1998.

Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has

become moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third legal
points raised by petitioner should be resolved.

The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and
grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent,

being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support
in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx.

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has

the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-
Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, 4 this Court held:

Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts

that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one
of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by
law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is
not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from
the nature of the parental relationship.

Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of

Vincent.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be
realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article
214 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,

substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx.

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 5

this Court ruled:

The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death
of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute

parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner
has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian,
respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
(respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor

Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It
bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as
a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner
has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been
controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction
of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal
Case No. CBU-16884 6 filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a
second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this
country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two
years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint
persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero
vs. Teran, 7 this Court held:

Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon

the theory that her appointment was void because she did not
reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which
requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with
the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is
no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are
not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

WHEREFORE , the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED,with

modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of
majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent
Helen Belmes.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.