by Lieutenant-Colonel David L.

Bashow, Colonel Dwight Davies,

Colonel André Viens, Lieutenant-Colonel John Rotteau, Major Nor man Balfe,
Major Ray Stouffer, Captain James Pickett and Dr. Steve Har ris
Canadian Forces Photo by: MCpl Danielle Bernier

MISSION READY:
CANADA’S ROLE IN THE KOSOVO
AIR CAMPAIGN

O
n 24 March, 1999, just before midnight ning of the most extensive Canadian Air Force combat
Adriatic time, four CF 18 Hornets operation since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Over the
launched from Aviano Air Base in Italy en- ensuing 78 days and nights, the six, then twelve, then
route to a pre-planned target located in eighteen Canadian CF 18s from Aviano flew a total of
Kosovo. These Canadian tactical fighters 678 combat sorties over nearly 2600 flying hours. They
were four of sixteen dedicated bombing aircraft situated delivered 532 bombs — nearly half a million pounds of
in the centre of a much larger strike package of NATO high explosive munitions — including 361 of the laser-
aircraft — Electronic Warfare (EW), Suppression of guided five-hundred and two-thousand-pound variants
Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and fighter escort aircraft. on a variety of targets throughout Kosovo and the
Communications jammers, Airborne Command, Control Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, all without loss to par-
and Communications (ABCCC), air-to-air refueling ticipating Canadian aircrew and aircraft. 1 This article
tankers and Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) will highlight the Canadian air operations over Kosovo,
aircraft provided additional vital support. The Canadian along with the lessons learned during the air campaign
Hornets of Task Force Aviano successfully navigated to and their implications for future planning and operations.
and positively identified their military target. The GBU-
12 Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) subsequently P R E LU D E T O WA R
delivered were five-hundred-pound bombs designed to
be laser guided to their targets. Of the four aircraft
involved in the attack, two hit their targets. Of the
remaining two aircraft, one missed the target, and the
D uring the past decade, air power has increasingly
been called upon in situations which have degen-
erated from peace to conflict as the initial ‘weapon of
fourth made a deliberate and prudent decision not to choice’ because of the inherent speed, flexibility, global
drop his bombs because he failed to achieve a complete- reach and precision engagement capability of combat
ly satisfactory identification of his aim point. aircraft. Air power is, of course, most effective when
applied in conjunction with land and maritime force.
The learning curve was very steep. This mission, con- But, as demonstrated with Canada’s commitment to the
ducted on Day One of the Balkan air campaign, repre-
sented the first Canadian air combat mission in Europe The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Colonel Rick Williams,
since the end of the Second World War, and the begin- Colonel Jim Donihee, Major Lowell Butters and Major Pepper Mintz in the
writing of this article.

Spring 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 55

1991 Gulf War and more recently, during conflicts in the Bosnia-Herzegovina, which seemed to have worked on
Balkans, bringing air power swiftly into an area of strife Slobodan Milosevic, provided a compelling solution.
to deter an aggressor and preserve international peace
and security has validated the continued need for a glob- In 1997, Canada deployed six Hornets from 416
ally mobile and combat-capable Canadian Air Force. Tactical Fighter Squadron (4 Wing) in Cold Lake to
Aviano, Italy for a one-time, three-month deployment.
Circumstances suggested the use of air power over the The experience gained on this exercise allowed the CAF
territory of the former Yugoslavia, particularly to pro- to react quickly to the deteriorating situation in the
mote stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But having Balkans in June 1998, which culminated in the re-
defined its role as one of “peacekeeping”, and not deployment of six CF 18s to Aviano, this time from 3
“peacemaking”, the United Nations role there was seri- Wing in Bagotville. Once back in the theatre, Task
ously undermined: “there was no peace to keep, because Force Aviano was well positioned to provide both a
hostilities had just started.” 2 Furthermore, the United Canadian presence and a credible and flexible Canadian
Nations ground presence was not equipped to alter the Forces reaction to the rapidly changing Balkan political
behaviour of the various local groups by force. As early landscape. The Alliance went to the brink of open con-
as February 1994, air forces provided by the North flict in October 1998, again in January 1999, and, after
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were in essence much sabre rattling by Serbian President Milosevic,
sub-contracted by the United Nations to monitor com- finally entered into combat as part of Operation
pliance with UN-defined exclusion zones — areas in “Echo”/Operation “Allied Force” during March. The
which military hardware was not permitted — and, from commencement of hostilities could not have come at a
August 1995, to maintain no-fly zones. worse time for Task Force Aviano, which was in the
process of a major change-over of personnel from 3
How these NATO air forces came to provide close air Wing Bagotville to 4 Wing Cold Lake. Compounding
support for UN troops, attack primarily Bosnian Serb the challenge to the unit was the governmental decision
artillery positions around Sarajevo, and even shoot to double the number of fighter aircraft committed, with
down Bosnian Serb aircraft is a story in itself. It a corresponding increase in personnel. That the Task
involved negotiations within the United Nations, Force was able to transition from a peacetime to a
between the United Nations and NATO, and among wartime footing despite these difficulties was one of its
other interested parties. And the decision to employ air many successes, attributable to the training, profession-
power was not taken easily. Early on, the countries with alism, good discipline, solid leadership and downright
sizeable army contingents in the area were the least gumption of all concerned.
likely to support the idea, for fear of retaliation against
their troops. Generally speaking, the United States, T O WA R I N H O R N E T S
which had no ground forces in the area at the time, was
the most willing to use air power. But, in the end, the I have never had the privilege to be part of a team
employment of air power in strictly limited missions that was so highly charged and dedicated to mission
against purely military targets seemed to bear fruit. It accomplishment.
caused the Bosnian Serbs to back away from Sarajevo,
and by 25 February 1994, NATO spoke of applying the Colonel D.A. Davies
“Sarajevo model” to other zones. 3 Indeed, it was not just Commander Task Force Aviano
the use of air power, but also the threat of its use, which
appeared to modify the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb
government and, it was assumed, of Slobodan
Milosevic, president of what was left of Yugoslavia. The
W hile Canada’s fighter force performed magnifi-
cently over the Balkans in their most intense com-
bat operation since the Second World War, and con-
success of the 1994 “Sarajevo model” was not long- tributed significantly to the success of the air campaign,
lived, but when NATO responded to the 28 August 1995 personnel and equipment were both stretched to the
mortar and grenade attack on Sarajevo, attacking the limit. Colonel Davies recalls that prior to the beginning
Bosnian Serb integrated air defence system in Operation of hostilities, the Joint Force Air Component
“Deliberate Force”, the success was again manifest. By Commander (JFACC), USAF Lieutenant-General Short,
mid-September 1995, the Bosnian Serb authorities had “... assembled all the senior national representatives and
signed a cease-fire agreement, which is still in effect. requested that we all tell our nations not to send or offer
any more day, Visual Flight Rules, air defence fighters.
When the horrors of reported ethnic cleansing in Kosovo He needed precision bombers, and particularly wanted
could not be ignored — and there was no realistic expec- multi-role aircraft that could be employed where and
tation that NATO or any other international grouping could when needed. He then singled out the CF 18s (with
move sufficient land forces to the area — the model of their day/night PGM [precision guided missile] capabil-

56 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2000

ity) from Canada as the exact capability for which he with the target identification or the possibility of collat-
was looking.” 4 The ability of Task Force Aviano to inte- eral damage. This aspect of aerial warfare is one of the
grate its operations with other NATO air forces and par- new challenges for today’s modern warriors.
ticipate each night as part of a multinational package of
dozens of coalition tactical fighters speaks highly of the Another unique and related characteristic of Operation
expertise developed over the years in exercises such as “Echo” has been highlighted by Colonel André Viens,
Maple Flag in Cold Lake, Red Flag in Nevada and Commander of Task Force Aviano for the latter portion
other NATO exercises in Europe. This ability to partici- of the air campaign. “The media coverage of the air cam-
pate competently in a coalition air operation is not a paign and subsequent news reports on collateral damage
skill that has been developed overnight. Canada’s long- were extremely intense”, wrote Viens. While every con-
standing joint and combined operations experience with ceivable effort was made to avoid collateral damage —
the United States Air Force, the United States Navy indeed, no Canadian involvement has been assigned to
and the Royal Air Force paid high dividends during the any of the war’s very limited number of high-profile
NATO air campaign. errors — Colonel Viens
However, Major Todd suggests that “...While
Balfe, one of the most expe- military forces must
rienced and successful remain accountable for
Canadian mission leads dur- their action, the general
ing the war, while not dis- expectation that intense
puting the significance of combat operations is pos-
the Canadian contribution sible without hurting any
Canadian Forces Photo by: MCpl Danielle Bernier

argues, “... the point must be non-combatants must be

made very clearly that it is appropriately balanced.” 6
not an indication of our true Further, it must be clari-
capability, nor was it sus- fied that the operational
tainable. On the contrary, security policy which
the Canadian contribution clothed NATO flyers in
was, I believe, an affirma- anonymity for the dura-
tion of training and tion of hostilities was not
resources spent in previous years when the fighter force was an attempt by the military authorities to provide impuni-
more robust. A key indicator of this was the varying per- ty to aircrew making errors of judgement during combat.
formance level of the pilots involved. There was a vast dis- Rather, this policy was instituted to protect the aircrew
crepancy in experience levels, and it’s safe to say that the and their families from very real threats of retribution
more senior aviators very much carried the younger ones. ”5 threatened by elements sympathetic to the Serbian cause,
in Canada and abroad. This additional stress factor,
Clearly, one new aspect of this bombing campaign which had also been an issue for Canadians during the
was the process by which targets assigned to Canadian 1991 Persian Gulf War, generated a further measure of
pilots were reviewed and validated. For every mission anxiety in men and women already under significant
flown and every bomb dropped, a Canadian Forces legal mental and physical strain from the rigours of combat.
officer examined the assigned target very carefully with
regard to its legitimacy and relevance to Canadian and The flexibility of a multi-role fighter such as the CF 18
international legal standards. There were cases where became readily apparent during this conflict. While most
the relevance of a target was questionable, or where of the coverage of the Canadian contribution has focussed
there just was not enough information to make a deter- on the air-to-ground bombing role with precision-guided
mination as to its legitimacy, which then resulted in a munitions, Canadian pilots also flew 120 sorties (18 per-
decision by the Canadian Task Force Commander to cent of all Canadian combat missions) in the air-to-air,
refuse that particular target. In addition, the pre-mission Combat Air Patrol role. Even during the bombing mis-
planning process for each bombing attack took into sions, all CF 18s were armed with both Sidewinder and
account the stringent requirement to avoid collateral Sparrow air-to-air missiles, which provided a potent self-
damage to infrastructure surrounding a specific target. defence capability. There were a few occasions when,
If at any time during the actual bombing attack the pilot returning from a bombing mission, Canadian fighters
was either uncertain about the target itself, or if he was were asked to divert back into Serbian airspace as air-to-
concerned about the potential for collateral damage, he air fighters to investigate “pop-up” enemy air activity.
was under very clear instructions to abort his mission Thus, air-to-air and air-to-ground tasking on the same
and bring his bombs home. This happened on many mis- mission. Our CF 18 pilots proved to be fully capable in
sions where Canadian pilots were either not comfortable both roles, unlike some of the other NATO air forces.

Spring 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 57

MISSIONS ACCOMPLISHED AND LESSONS pound laser-guided bombs, and made suggestions and
LEARNED adjustments to improve the safety and efficiency of
combat operations. Leading through tireless example,

R eturning to the 24 March mission, the first of so many

more to follow, there was clearly room for opera-
tional improvement. For the next 78 days, Canadian pilots
Sergeant Neal was frequently on the job for continuous
eighteen-hour days during the conflict. He established a
superb rapport with co-located USAF armament person-
were almost continually either airborne or preparing to fly nel, routinely negotiating for the loan of spare parts
missions against military targets in Kosovo or Yugoslavia. needed to sustain Canadian production of bombs.
As the intensity of the conflict increased, so did the
Canadian commitment to the NATO force. The first As the stocks of modern GBU bomb-guidance kits
increase doubled the number of aircraft in the contingent began to dwindle for all NATO forces, the allies were
to twelve, doubled the number of pilots to 24, and doubled compelled to use less-than-modern guidance kits. This
the number of combat sorties to twelve per day while only brought about a great deal of extra work for all national
increasing to 250 the total number of personnel in the Task contingents in Aviano as they required an individual
Force. The failure to increase the number of support per- laser code to be manually ‘burned’ into their circuits.
sonnel to a level commensurate with the increase in com- Faced with this problem, Sergeant Neal, on his own ini-
bat operations would eventually have a negative effect on tiative, became the local expert on this guidance system.
Through tireless research he determined that the
Americans were incorrectly using their own system to
burn laser codes, and then tactfully showed the USAF
armament technicians how to do it properly. This
enabled the Americans to salvage over 90 percent of the
bombs previously considered to be unserviceable, sav-
ing them literally tens of millions of dollars. Of greater
importance, Sergeant Neal’s initiative and ingenuity
saved the bombing campaign from suffering critical
shortages, as bomb stocks had been severely depleted by
this point. His efforts resulted in replacement bombs
Canadian Forces Photo by: MCpl Danielle Bernier

quickly becoming available where few had existed before.

With respect to combat operations, yes, there were

misses and there were malfunctions — inevitable by-
products of the fog of sustained conflict, no matter how
stringent the precautions — but not many. In fact, the 70
percent overall success rate is close to that of Canada’s
most proficient allies, even those possessing more
the health of the men and women from the overworked advanced weapons technologies. 7 Such confidence and
support side of the operation. The effects of stress and faith was placed in Canadian aircrew professionalism
burnout were intensified when the political decision was and expertise that, in this massively American-dominat-
made to increase the contingent size to eighteen aircraft ed air campaign and despite interoperability problems
and 32 pilots, and to commit to between sixteen and twen- due to lack of equipment commonality, Canadians were
ty combat sorties per day. This last increase brought the often selected to lead the strike ‘packages’:
size of the Task Force up to 300 personnel.
We led over half of all of the packages we flew.
As soon became clear, the support personnel could not While the Brits led some, the bulk of the remainder
keep pace with the tripling of the force. Extraordinary was led by US forces. This is indicative of the high
performance became commonplace, but some individu- degree of professionalism and excellent training of
als gave even more. One of these was Sergeant D. M. our pilots. Interoperability, given the absolute pre-
Neal of 1 Air Maintenance Squadron from Cold Lake. In dominance of the US forces, meant interoperability
addition to his full-time task of building some two with US procedures. We train frequently with them
dozen laser-guided bombs each day, Sergeant Neal often and have a capability second to none in this area.
visited the flight line where he would share his expert-
ise with newly-trained Weapons Load Officers, ensuring Colonel D. A. Davies
that they were fully prepared for the hectic pace of oper-
ations. He also set up training programs to qualify load Although the Canadian contingent was extremely for-
crews on the newly cleared GBU-10 two-thousand- tunate not to lose any aircraft or crews during this con-

58 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2000

flict, this was not the result of a benign defensive envi- our increasingly outdated equipment.” 10 Many Canadian
ronment. On the contrary, the Serb Integrated Air military aviators believe that the Canadian fighter force
Defence System proved to be both robust and redundant. made a truly important contribution to the campaign, but
The opposing fireworks of enemy AAA ground fire and this was possible only because of “… the vestiges of a
SA3 and SA6 surface-to-air missile launches accompa- time when we were capable of retaining greater readiness
nied virtually all missions flown into Kosovo and levels and overall expertise. We need to articulate the
Serbia. In fact, as that first NATO attack package, requirement for a credible fighter force and point clearly
including the four CF 18s, crossed into Kosovo on the to the manner in which it is atrophying as a result of a
first night, one of the first radio calls was from MAGIC, dwindling resource base.” 11 While Task Force Aviano
the NATO AWACS aircraft, warning the strike package contributed significantly to the air campaign, it should
that hostile MIG-29 Fulcrum fighters were closing on not in any way be used as an indicator of future perform-
them. The fighter escorts, Royal Netherlands
Air Force F 16s, promptly engaged them and
one was shot down. The absence of Canadian
combat losses in the Balkan air campaign, as
was the case in the Gulf War, will undoubtedly
lead to similar expectations in a future conflict.

Weather proved to be a serious limitation to

operations during Operation “Echo”. Of the
945 combat sorties planned, 176 (18.6 percent)
of them were cancelled because of weather
conditions at the target, an issue more predic-
tive of future combat operations than the
Allied Coalition experience during the Gulf
War. A further 85 missions were called off as a
result of a variety of operational factors.
However, a truly staggering statistic of the war
is that only six sorties (0.6 percent of those
planned) were cancelled because of mainte-
Canadian Forces Photo by: Vic Johnson

nance problems. This meant a 99.4 percent air-

craft-availability rate sustained over the entire
79-day period of combat operations; a com-
pelling testimonial to the tenacity, dedication
and resolve of the ground support staff. 8

While possessing only two percent of the

combat aircraft involved in the campaign, Canadian air- ance. Without further resources, the fighter force risks
craft flew in nearly ten percent of the Battlefield Air being marginalized, which is the precursor to extinction.
Interdiction (BAI) missions, arguably amongst the high-
est risk and most significant missions of the war. In addi- One of our strongest arguments, politically, for main-
tion to flying 120 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) sorties, the taining this credible force is manifest in the strategy of the
high-risk BAI missions and a significant number of Close air campaign itself, which was, of course, to avoid or min-
Air Support (CAS) taskings represent over 82 percent of imize the use (and attendant casualties) of ground forces.
the Canadian air effort — a higher percentage of these While it is expensive to maintain fighter forces in peace-
perilous missions than any of the other NATO nations. 9 time, it is politically much cheaper to use them in war. If
Canada, as a prosperous member of the First World wish-
While Canada can take great pride in the accomplish- es to make a meaningful contribution to the new world
ments of some very dedicated and highly-motivated peo- order, which has much more to do with peace enforcement
ple who were able to overcome daunting hurdles and than peace keeping, a credible fighter force is essential. 12
meet formidable challenges, significant investment in
personnel and equipment will be necessary to permit a During the Balkan air war, NATO did not follow its
war deployment of this nature in the future. In the words own doctrine in terms of the decisive application of air
of Colonel Davies, “As it sits, we could not repeat the power, that is, overwhelming use of force as opposed to
same level of activity, and in most scenarios we would carefully meted-out penny-size packages designed to
not be permitted to participate to the same extent, due to progressively test Serbian resolve while possessing

Spring 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 59

 undertones of political correctness. The result? The air As a result of the “limited PGM capability” that the
war lasted much longer than anticipated, and this signif- Air Force was able to fund, Canada did not have a war
icantly affected pilot manning, operational equipment stock, and had not been able to clear other than the
and ammunition availability. GBU-12 for use. Fortunately, the CAF was able to pur-
chase additional GBU-12s from the USAF before the
With respect to manning levels, it was quickly deter- initial lot had been exhausted. Despite repeated requests
mined that in order to sustain operations, at least two prior to the conflict to clear the 2000-pound GBU-10 for
pilots for each aircraft were needed for each daily mis- use, the CAF had been unable to devote the resources
sion. For the eventual sixteen sorties per day of flying, needed for this initiative. When it became evident that
the original requests were justified and
that the 500-pound GBU-12s were not
destroying the targets despite pilots
risking their lives to get to them and
getting direct hits, the entire Canadian
Forces machine leapt into action. In
record time, all the necessary things
were done to clear the weapon for use,
train the personnel, purchase the
weapons, and get them into the theatre.
This is a story of superhuman effort by
staffs that were already over-stressed
and over-tasked.
Canadian Forces Photo by: MCpl Danielle Bernier

Finally, without significant investment,

it must be stressed that Canada will not
be able to repeat this performance.
Canada was the only nation not
equipped with anti-jam radios, which
forced the entire NATO air strike effort
to use single-frequency, jammable
Canada thus needed at least 32 pilots, representing at equipment. Although the enemy did not demonstrate any
least half of all available CF 18 combat ready aircrew. significant jamming capability, had they done so, in all
Given the policy of holding a pilot in combat no longer probability Canada would have been told politely to go
than sixty days without a break, the Canadian Air Force home. The lack of night vision goggles reduced the Task
was committed at the highest possible activity rate. In Force’s overall effectiveness, resulting in a number of
short, the operational commitment pushed the available missions where the pilot flew into harm’s way and had to
pool of combat ready pilots to the limit. return with ordnance, having accomplished nothing for
his efforts because he could not find the target. Similarly,
The limited Precision Guided Missile (PGM) capability a Global Positioning System (GPS) would have eliminat-
purchased for the CF 18 fleet as a result of the Gulf War ed navigational drift, which would, in turn, have permit-
is what allowed Task Force Aviano to be “on the first ted aircrew to locate targets much more readily, again
team” with its valuable day/night capability to deliver reducing the need for pilots to return to base with their
laser-guided bombs. However, the limited Forward bombs after facing enemy defences and achieving noth-
Looking Infra Red (FLIR) pod purchase, an integral part ing. Since the most technologically-sophisticated air
of the capability, included only thirteen pods, with few forces are now riding the cusp of the Revolution in
spares and limited repair equipment. When one considers Military Affairs (RMA) with respect to the application of
the requirement to train replacement pilots in Canada, and air power, the absolute reduction or, ideally, the elimina-
to have spares available to sustain operations in theatre, tion of collateral damage will in future be a true measure
the CAF did not have enough equipment to outfit more of success in battle. The shortcomings identified need to
than the original six jets. In fact, the only reason be addressed to take this new combat direction and, coin-
Canadians were able to fly the sixteen-sorties-per-day that cidentally, to ensure Canadian interoperability with the
was eventually attained, was because additional pods forces of our southern neighbour. For the same reasons,
were acquired. Even at that, Task Force Aviano never had resources need to be dedicated to the acquisition of an
enough to outfit the final six aircraft that were deployed, improved FLIR with greater magnification, an
so they could be used only as spare aircraft, for air Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator and a
defence, or for missions that did not call for use of PGMs. secure data distribution system, such as the Joint Tactical

60 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2000

Information Distribution System (JTIDS), for real-time are now stretched, and highlighted the urgency underly-
targeting. In the words of Major Norm Balfe: ing the national need to reinvest in this capability. In
many ways, the Kosovo air campaign is more predictive
Aircraft were flying with this equipment in the air
campaign and I believe it will very much be the
standard in the next campaign. It is significant to
note that Rafale and Typhoon II (the Eurofighter)
are entering service shortly and will be the main-
stay of our European allies. Additionally, the
proper training must be parcelled out with these
improvements, and that translates into an increase
in minimum Yearly Flying Requirements (YFR)
for aircrew. At this juncture, the Air Force author-
izes a minimum of 187 flying hours per individ-
ual, which must be increased appropriately for
every additional sensor/capability added to the
weapons platform. 13

The Air Force recognizes Major Balfe’s assessment,

but “in this era of limited resources, the challenge is to
employ all means of training, including simulators and
synthetic trainers to maximum benefit.” 14

The Canadian participation in the campaign for

Kosovo was a significant demonstration of Canada’s of future conflicts than was the Gulf War. Canada and
resolve to support both NATO and the UN. It was a all Canadians can be justifiably proud of all that was
resounding success, and showed how magnificently accomplished by Task Force Aviano.
Canadian service personnel can rise to a critical situa-
tion. It also demonstrated how thin the Canadian Forces

NOTES

1. Major J.J.C. Ouellette, A4 Aircraft The Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, target hit probability percentage based upon one
Maintenance Officer, Task Force Aviano, Final Mt. Tremblant, 27 Sep 99. bomb per attack. Therefore a 70 percent hit prob-
Milestones/Statistics for the War, p. 1. 8. During the Second World War, the average ability in a non-permissive environment such as
2. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and Circular Error of Probability (CEP) for putting the Balkan theatre is a formidable improvement.
NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: Limits to ordnance on a 100 foot by 60 foot target was 9. The Americans contributed 28.62 percent of
Diplomacy and Forces. (The Hague: Netherlands approximately 3,300 feet using over 9,000 bombs. their operational missions in these specialities, the
Atlantic Commission, 1996), p. 9. By Korea, that distance had shrunk to 1,000 feet French, 50.11 percent and the British, 62.88 per-
3. ibid, p. 45. using 1,100 bombs and in Vietnam, a mere 176 cent. General Wesley K. Clark, Operation Allied
4. Colonel D.A. Davies, The Campaign for bombs were required to attain a CEP of 400 feet. Force Statistics, 6 January 2000, p. 3.
Kosovo-Canada’s Fighter Force in Action, In the Persian Gulf, a much more benign war due 10. Davies, p. 1
03 Feb 00, p. 2. to the decisive commitment of air power and the 11. Colonel M. J. Donihee, MJ@HQ@ColdLake,
5. Major T. Balfe, TN@AFTCC@ColdLake, 03 attainment of complete air superiority, only eight 02 Feb 00.
Feb 00, p. 1 aircraft dropping just thirty bombs were required 12. Balfe, p. 1.
6. Colonel A. Viens, Operation Allied Force Post to attain a CEP of two hundred feet. Richard P. 13. Balfe, p. 3.
Air Campaign Report, Task Force Aviano, 05 Aug Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf 14. Colonel Rick Williams, Director of Air
99, I-1-3/9. War, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, Strategic Plans, NDHQ Ottawa, 9 Feb 00
7. Lieutenant General D.N. Kinsman’s address to 1992), p. 283. By 1999, PGMs were providing a

Spring 2000 ● Canadian Military Journal 61