Topic 13
Topic 13
Introduction
Both delict and contract can lead to recovering compensation and have existed side by side
Particularly relevant when it involves liability for negligent performance of professional services
- implied duty to act with reasonable car and skill
In cases where pure delictual actions are recognised, concurrence is not a problem
When is there concurrence and when does liability in contract EXCLUDE liability in delict?
Cases
Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A)
o Two independent actions are involved, each with its own requirements and purpose, they may
coexist and be instituted simultaneously.
o It was this view adopted in this case.
o The AD decided in this case that the failure of a provincial hospital to sterilise a married
woman for socio-eco reasons in terms of a contract, constituted a breach of contract.
o The Court said that this omission founded an action for damages for the loss she and her
husband suffered as a result of the maintenance of a child that was born because of the
omission.
o In this case compensation for pain and suffering not allowed under contractual remedy (non-
patrimonial)
o For this purpose the delictual action for P&S must be employed.
FACTS
o There would appear to be no authority in our law for the proposition that a breach of a
contractual duty to perform specific professional work with due diligence is per se a wrongful
act for the purposes of Aquilian liability (with the corollary that, if the breach were
accompanied by culpa , damages could be claimed ex delicto ).
o The examples in our common law of a concursus actionum are all cases where the defendant
satisfied the independent requirements of both a contractual and an Aquilian action.
o In general, contracting parties contemplate that their contract should lay down the ambit of
their reciprocal rights and obligations.
o If the Aquilian action were generally available for defective performance of contractual
obligations, a party's performance would presumably have to be tested not only against the
definition of his duties in the contract, but also by applying the standard of the bonus
paterfamilias , with untenable results.
o If it were, on the one hand, to be argued that the bonus paterfamilias would always comply
with the standards laid down by the contract to which he is a party, one would in effect be
saying that the law of delict can be invoked to reinforce the law of contract, and there is no
policy consideration which would justify such a conclusion.
o If, on the other hand, the standard imposed by law differed in theory from the contractual
one, the result must be that the parties agreed to be bound by a particular standard of care
and thereby excluded any standard other than the contractual one.
o It was held in the case that it would be undesirable to extend the Aquilian action to the duties
subsisting between the parties to a contract of professional service like the one in issue.
o These considerations did not fall away in view of the assignment of the contract: the same
arguments which militated against a delictual duty where the parties were in a direct
contractual relationship, applied where the relationship was tripartite, namely that a delictual
remedy was unnecessary and that the parties should not be denied their reasonable
expectation that their reciprocal rights and obligations would be regulated by their contractual
arrangements and would not be circumvented by delict.
o Held , accordingly, allowing the appeal, that the exception had to be allowed with costs,
respondent being given leave to amend its particulars of claim.
RELEVANT SECTION