JCMS 2016 pp. 1–17 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.

12443

Arguing Sanctions. On the EU’s Response to the Crisis in

Ukraine*
HELENE SJURSEN and GURI ROSÉN
University of Oslo – ARENA Centre for European Studies

Abstract
Despite diverging perspectives and interests, the EU’s Member States have forged a common re-
sponse to the Russia–Ukraine crisis. How can this be? In this article, we suggest that in order to
explain the Member States’ ability to reach agreement in this case, we must take into account
the normative force of the arguments presented in favour of a common response. We find that nei-
ther a concern for security (as would be expected from a realist perspective) nor the institutional-
ization of a norm of cohesion (which would be the constructivist expectation) triggered the
collective response. Instead, agreement was established due to concurrence over a fundamental
breach of the Ukrainians’ right to self-determination. This finding is significant in theoretical terms
in that it confirms that norms may trump interests. It does not, however, allow for definite conclu-
sions with regard to the robustness of integration in EU foreign policy.

Keywords: EU foreign policy; constructivism; deliberative perspective; Ukraine; EU cohesion

Introduction
The EU’s ability to agree on a response to the crisis in Ukraine was unexpected
(United Kingdom, House of Lords, 2015, p. 345). It is generally assumed that the
EU is only capable of collective action on issues of low salience in international poli-
tics, and that any cohesion will evaporate in the face of major crises (Gegout, 2010;
Hoffmann, 1966, 1982; Hyde-Price, 2006; Menon, 2013). As Schimmelfennig and
Thomas (2011, p. 190) note, ‘Sceptics often deride talk of an EU foreign policy as little
more than wishful thinking’. In this article, we discuss why cohesion was achieved
with regard to the crisis in Ukraine and, more specifically, why the EU Member States
managed to agree on imposing sanctions against Russia. What enabled this agreement
to come about?
There were many reasons to expect that the Union would fail to establish a common
stance in response to events in Ukraine. EU Member States have diverging interests
and policy priorities with regard to Russia, with some states heavily dependent on
Russian energy exports. Whereas countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom ad-
vocated strong sanctions against Russia from the start of the crisis, others (such as Italy,
Greece and Hungary) repeated their scepticism throughout (MacFarlane and Menon,
2014). How is it, then, that in spite of all these differences and the cost to Member States,
they managed to agree on what to do?

*This article is a contribution to the EURODIV project of ARENA - Centre for European Studies, financed by the
Norwegian Research Council. Many thanks to Erik O. Eriksen for comments on an earlier version of the article, to three
anonymous referees, as well as to Mai’a Davis Cross and other participants in the 2015 and 2016 workshops on
Europe’s Parallel Foreign Policy: The Ukraine-Russia Crisis.

© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

We find that collective action was anchored in an agreement on the need to sanction what
was seen as a clear breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as Ukrainian citizens’
right to self-determination. This finding, which suggests that norms trumped interests, is
in line with the insights of ‘constructivist’ scholarship on EU foreign policy (Juncos and
Pomorska, 2006, 2011; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Meyer, 2006; Smith, 2001, 2004;
Tonra, 2003). But how can we account for such an outcome? Why are norms important
and how do they lead to a determinate outcome? Drawing on a deliberative perspective,
we suggest that in order to explain the agreement it is necessary to identify the substantive
argument that made it possible (Eriksen, 2014/2013). We further suggest that a deliberative
perspective provides the theoretical ammunition lacking in constructivist scholarship: it en-
ables us to counter realist and rationalist expectations that unless they are subject to coercion,
EU Member States will never agree on a policy beyond the lowest common denominator.
I. The Approach
The EU and its Member States have been criticized for their handling of relations with
Russia and Ukraine. It has been suggested that the Union underestimated Russian security
concerns and failed to consider that offering an association agreement to Ukraine might
be seen as an infringement on Russia’s sphere of influence (Kissinger, 2014; MacFarlane
and Menon, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2015).1 Such criticisms are frequently ac-
companied by suggestions that in response to Russian aggression, the EU and ‘the West’
need to return to a foreign policy inspired by a logic of geopolitics and take into account
what the authors consider ‘the realities of power’ (Auer, 2015; Mearsheimer, 2014;
Rynning, 2015; Sakwa, 2015).
Rather than contribute to this normative discussion on what the EU ‘ought’ to do, we seek
to explain the choices that were actually made. We aim to determine why the EU’s Member
States agreed on a common response and, more specifically, how they managed to concur on
imposing sanctions against Russia.2 As noted in the introduction, this agreement was
surprising for many reasons. Since the end of the Cold War, most of the EU’s Member States
have developed close economic and political ties with Russia. Indeed, according to a hearing
in the UK House of Lords, ‘EU Member States and Russia are heavily economically inter-
dependent’ (United Kingdom, House of Lords, 2014). For example, at the beginning of the
crisis, France was on the brink of selling two military ships to Russia, and the Italian Energy
Company (ENI) was planning the South Stream pipeline with Gazprom. The financial
sectors in many EU Member States and capitals, including the City of London, have close
ties with Russian financial elites. Several of the East European Member States depend
heavily on Russian natural gas imports. Russia also constitutes an important market for
agricultural exports from Member States such as Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. These
various economic ties confirm the potential costs involved for most Member States in
confronting Russia, and also suggest that these costs would be higher for some countries
than for others.3 Furthermore, there are enormous differences in the Member States’
1
See also the investigation in the British House of Lords (United Kingdom, House of Lords 2015), which concluded that
the EU was ‘sleepwalking into the Ukraine crisis’.
2
The EU’s response to the crisis encompasses a number of political, diplomatic and economic initiatives. The key element
in the EU’s response – and what is most difficult to explain – is the sanctions against Russia, which were imposed in three
increasingly wide-ranging stages. It is the agreement on these sanctions, as well as the EU’s ability to sustain them, that this
article aims to explain.
3
On the expected costs of sanctions, see also EurActiv (2014) and BBC (2014).

© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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historical experiences with Russian power, as well as in their views on how best to organize
relations with Russia. In Member States such as Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands and
Germany, the question of how to deal with Russia was also domestically divisive for
political as well as economic reasons, whereas in the United Kingdom and Sweden, the line
chosen by the executive was uncontroversial.
It is particularly difficult to understand how the agreement on sanctions came about be-
cause there are no formal opportunities for coercion within the EU’s foreign policy sys-
tem. Due to the intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), there is in principle little room for the supranational institutions to shape policy,
and no possibility for them to enforce compliance. In addition, because each Member
State has an equal right to veto decisions it disagrees with, in theory the more powerful
states cannot dictate policy. In this policy-making system, a collective decision on what
to do must come about voluntarily. Classical realists (Hoffmann, 1966, 1982; Menon,
2013), structural realists (Hyde-Price, 2006) and rational institutionalists (Gegout,
2010) converge in predicting that, in the absence of coercion, ‘Co-operation in the second
pillar will remain limited to a set of “second order” concerns agreed on the basis of the
lowest common denominator’ (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 231). However, Ukraine was not
an issue of ‘second order concern’ for the EU and its Member States, and the outcome
was clearly beyond the lowest common denominator of Member State preferences.
Drawing on a constructivist approach, some scholars have pointed to a fundamental trans-
formation in European foreign policy-making, finding that Member States have developed
similar understandings, a sense of community and belonging, and even a sense of common
purpose (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, 2011; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Meyer, 2006;
Tonra, 2003). They further highlight the importance of EU institutions and structures in shap-
ing the positions of Member States (Allen, 1998; Howorth, 2003, 2010; Smith, 2001, 2004).
When seeking to account for the observed changes, these scholars draw on a concept
of socialization (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2001). As Ana Juncos and
Karolina Pomorska have suggested, ‘Socialisation would (…) lead group members to a
consistent compliance with the groups’ norms’ (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011). Or, as
Tonra asserts, ‘processes of social learning […] mediate the position of individual agents
and the regime as a whole, with the result that these agents have a commitment to, and an
investment in, the protection of the rules and norms underpinning the policy structure’
(Tonra, 2003, p. 749). To the extent that these observations are correct, they may help
us to understand how certain minimum conditions for achieving agreement came to be
in place. However, if we are to understand an agreement on what to do with regard to a
concrete issue, such as the crisis in Ukraine, references to socialization are insufficient.
This is so because the idea of socialization points to a process of transformation that is
indeterminate (Eriksen, 2013/2014). Even if socialization has been at work, and Member
State perspectives have become more similar, this does not mean that they will agree on
what to do in all instances. In order to explain a specific agreement, the decisive factor
that triggered that agreement must be identified.
What is more, the concept of socialization is theoretically underspecified. It does not
identify the mechanism whereby Member States might be convinced to change their po-
sitions on a specific issue. Nor does it provide a theoretical account of what could trigger
the longer-term transformation in national perspectives and the development of common
views that is implied in this concept.
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
4 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

Realists would suggest that the decisive factor triggering agreement was some form of
coercion. In order to seriously consider the possibility that there was a voluntary agree-
ment on sanctions, we draw on a deliberative perspective (Eriksen, 2013/2014). Although
the deliberative perspective shares with constructivist scholarship the assumption that
agreements can be achieved due to normative convergence, it departs from constructivism
in decisive ways (Eriksen, 2013/2014; Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). Most importantly, it
proposes a theoretical account of change by emphasizing the force of reason.
In a deliberative perspective, norms are considered ‘autonomous sources of motivation
owing their validity to their impartial justification i.e. that they can be defended in an
open, free and rational debate (among all affected)’ (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003). It is
through a deliberative process in which norms are rationally assessed that their relevance
and binding nature is established (Habermas, 1984). This diverges from constructivist ac-
counts, in which norm-following is linked to habit, a specific role conception or identity
(Checkel, 2005). Following a norm is instead conceived of as a `rational choice´, as ratio-
nality is linked to actors’ ability to justify and explain their actions and to the ability to
evaluate arguments presented by others (Eriksen and Weigård, 2003; Sjursen, 2003,
2006). Deliberation is thus seen as an action–co-ordination mechanism and one might
expect that support for sanctions was obtained through a process in which there was an
exchange of arguments and reasons. The agreement need not have been an ideal consen-
sus. Rather, we may conceive of a working agreement in which actors concur based on
different but mutually acceptable reasons (Eriksen, 2009, pp. 49–53).
But what kind of argument could have convinced states that from the outset were
against sanctions to comply with a joint sanctions regime? We distinguish between two
different types of norm based reasons that may have produced such a change. The first
type refers to value-based norms, which are linked to ideas of a common good that are
grounded in the identity of a specific community. The idea of a duty to cohesion could
be defined as a value-based norm, as it indicates what is considered appropriate behaviour
for countries that are part of the European Union. Rights-based norms, on the other hand,
refer to ideas of what is just or right regardless of an actor’s connection to a particular
community (cf. Habermas 1993). For example, rights-based norms may be linked to the
right to self-determination or to the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of states. These two norms differ to some extent, as the latter is a legal norm, but they
are also interconnected, as the right to sovereignty can only have normative justification
insofar as it ensures citizens’ right to self-determination in a democratic world. And, vice
versa, this right will be breached if the principle of sovereignty is overruled.

Methodology and Sources

In order to explain the agreement between the EU Member States, we have examined the
arguments that they put forward to justify their views on what should be done (Sjursen,
2002). Such an approach is particularly useful for establishing whether normative consid-
erations played any part in the decision to impose sanctions. It further leaves it open to
empirical investigation to determine the relative importance of different kinds of norma-
tive considerations as well as the importance of any pragmatic considerations concerning
costs and benefits. Thus, this approach provides a more nuanced understanding than anal-
yses that only consider material factors as relevant.
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Our approach follows the tradition of ‘explanation through interpretation’ in the

Weberian sense: social science in this view ‘is a science concerning itself with the inter-
pretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its
course and consequences’ (Weber, 1978, p. 4). This suggests that in order to understand
an action, we need to make the goals for which it was undertaken intelligible (Kratochwil,
1989, p. 24). In our case, the task is not only to understand how each individual Member
State saw the crisis, what obligations they believed they had with regard to the crisis and
how they individually thought that they should respond; we must also identify the
arguments that were used to ensure collective action. Only when these arguments are un-
covered will it be possible to reveal the basis upon which collective action was decided
(Sjursen, 2002).
Our analysis draws on relevant secondary literature, primary documents such as parlia-
mentary debates and speeches, and statements by government representatives.4 We have
also carried out ten semi-structured interviews with representatives of Member States and
EU institutions.5
Realists may often be correct in claiming that ‘talk is cheap’ and thus that the argu-
ments presented by the actors are not a reliable source of information. In order to compen-
sate for such potential shortcomings, we have checked all the written evidence for
consistency over time and in different contexts as well as across actors. Although it
may be easy to lie once or twice, it is more difficult to do so over time and in a variety
of contexts. It is even more difficult for different actors with different interests and values
to lie in a co-ordinated fashion. Further, the arguments in publicly available documents
have been compared to interview data as well as secondary literature. Analysis of the writ-
ten material permits a fairly precise quantitative indication of the arguments that were
most frequently used by all actors across different contexts. However, frequent repetition
does not necessarily mean that an argument becomes convincing. Consequently, the inter-
views were also important in that they allowed us to check which arguments the actors
found most difficult to rebut and why. In addition, even the most powerful politicians
are subject to expectations of consistency and coherent argumentation. Furthermore, in
order to be considered credible by their European colleagues political leaders must live
up to expectations of truthfulness and consistency also when they co-ordinate behind
closed doors.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. We first explore what insights into our research
question may be gained through constructivist and realist perspectives. Building on these
insights, we then discuss in the second step the extent to which it is possible to fill remain-
ing gaps and lacunas in the account by drawing on a deliberative perspective.

4
Systematic searches have been made in parliamentary and governmental databases in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Sweden and the UK. In addition, searches have been performed in the databases of the Foreign Ministries of the Czech
Republic and Latvia. The governmental databases encompass speeches by ministers – mainly prime ministers and foreign
ministers – as well as the ministries’ reports and press releases that match the search terms. The material from the parlia-
mentary databases is mainly plenary debates and parliamentary questions (oral and written), but also includes inquiries
and minutes from committee meetings. All official documents for the period from November 2013 to December 2014 were
collected. The broad range of Member States was selected in order to cover states that were in favour of a strong reaction
(the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Baltic States and Poland), those that held more of a middle ground (Germany, France)
and those that were relatively reluctant to impose sanctions (Austria, Hungary).
5
The interviews were conducted between September 2015 and March 2016. The interviewees were high-level diplomats
from the EU institutions and/or the Member States. All interviewees were promised anonymity. In order to clarify whether
quotes come from the same or different interviewees, the interviews are numbered from 1 to 10.

© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
6 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

II. The Possibility of Ideational Consensus

It is not entirely self-evident how constructivists’ emphasis on socialization can be trans-
lated into a concrete hypothesis on a specific issue such as why there was agreement on
sanctions against Russia. Leuffen et al. (2013) take the constructivist proposition to be
that integration in foreign policy is the result of an ideational consensus on the appropri-
ateness of a European approach (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 205). In a similar manner,
Schimmelfennig and Thomas (2011, p. 180) suggest that constructivists posit preference
convergence. However, it is far from clear that this is consistent with the claims made by
constructivist analyses of EU foreign policy.6 Constructivist scholarship on EU foreign
policy has identified changes in the ways in which national perspectives are defined.
Moreover, they point to an expectation of unity and a commitment to seek agreement.
They also find evidence of Member State behaviour that is consistent with efforts to com-
ply with this commitment. While they attribute these observations to processes of
socialisation, they do not suggest that socialization has brought about (nor do they expect
to find) convergent preferences or indeed an ideational consensus (Howorth, 2010; Juncos
and Pomorska, 2011; Tonra, 2003).
Our findings do confirm much of what is suggested by constructivist scholars. Member
States factored in the views of their partners when defining their own positions. A state-
ment by then-Foreign Minister Hague to the House of Commons in early March 2014 il-
lustrates the quest for collective responses. Hague emphasized the importance of a co-
ordinated EU response to the crisis in Ukraine and declined requests to elaborate on the
UK’s position before the European Council had agreed on a position (United Kingdom,
House of Commons, 2014a). Similar statements were made by German government rep-
resentatives. For instance, in its answer to an inquiry from Die Linke on the topic of
Russian sanctions, the government referred to the abolition of sanctions as a political is-
sue that had to be determined ‘in the circle of the 28 Member States of the EU’ (Germany,
Bundestag, 2014c). Statements by Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt also indicated the need
for consultation. Bildt did not want to enter into a discussion about who to sanction before
Catherine Ashton had made her recommendations – ‘then we’ll decide on our position’
(Sweden, Riksdagen, 2014a).
To be sure, these statements could merely be evidence of the executives’ efforts to pre-
vent critical scrutiny of their policies; on their own, they do not prove any real intent to
co-ordinate with European colleagues. However, the Member States’ commitment to en-
gage in a permanent process of information sharing and to test and assess what might be
considered an acceptable course of action from the perspectives of other Member States
comes across very strongly in the interviews (I #7, 8, 9, 10). While acknowledging that
they did not have any formal commitments, interviewees stressed that in their view, mem-
bership entails a normative obligation. As one interviewee put it when explaining why it
was necessary to seek consensus, ‘We are members of a Union’ (I #7). Interviewees also
confirmed instances in which they had to change their initial position after learning the
positions of their European colleagues (I #7, 10). Furthermore, in line with such a culture
of consensus, Member States were also concerned about not isolating countries that had
difficulties with a specific policy (I #7, 8).

6
We would like to thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out to us.

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Further in line with constructivist scholarship, our findings also suggest that the Brus-
sels-based institutions have gained considerable autonomy to define policy, and that they
used this to push for a cohesive response. Although the decision to sanction was made by
the Member States, these institutions were directly involved in working out the specific
list of measures to be undertaken (I #5). In order to pin down a final agreement on eco-
nomic sanctions, the Commission made separate country fiches that outlined the cost of
sanctions for each of the Member States. These were not shared amongst the States, but
provided the basis for bilateral discussions between each Member State and the Commis-
sion on what kinds of sanctions should be introduced. Subsequently, the list of sanctions
was presented to COREPER in a closed session. Member States were given 10 minutes to
consult with their home ministries over the list prepared by the Commission before the
meeting started. Similar time constraints were placed on the Member States by the
European External Action Service (EEAS), which prepared the list of people who would
ultimately be subject to political sanctions (I #9, 10).
The close interactions between the Member States, as well as the involvement of the
EEAS and the Commission, probably facilitated agreement. But it is difficult to conclude
that they alone ensured it. As noted in the introduction, such processes of interaction are
indeterminate and cannot therefore explain how Member States ultimately agreed on a
specific course of action (Eriksen, 2013/2014); In order for Member States’ commitment
to seek common solutions to have triggered agreement, it would have had to overrule the
many divergent preferences, perspectives and values involved. There is not sufficient ev-
idence to suggest that it did. Most IR scholarship would then assume that agreement did
after all come about due to some form of coercion, either from the most powerful states
within the Union or from the EU’s external environment. Was this the case?

III. The Limited Role of Coercion

Security Concerns: The Importance of a Sense of Threat
Realists would suggest that agreement was not due to any particular normative commit-
ment; rather, they would consider it due to a purely pragmatic assessment of the cost of
standing alone in a situation in which national security was at stake (Hyde-Price, 2006;
Menon, 2013; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). Member States that under normal circumstances
operate independently might have considered that in a global context of contestation and
competition for power, threats to national security weighed more heavily than anything
else. Such extraordinary circumstances could trigger what would most likely be a tempo-
rary agreement on common action. It is reasonable to assume that incentives to co-operate
were particularly high for this crisis, as the United States signaled from the outset a desire
to play a minor role. This meant that there was no obvious alternative venue for European
states with a desire to demonstrate strength in the face of an external security threat.
To be sure, security concerns were critical for several of the Member States from the
very onset of the crisis. In particular, Russia’s close neighbours and former members of
the Warsaw Pact (such as Poland and the Baltic States) defined the Ukrainian crisis pri-
marily in terms of security. In early March 2014, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaité
was reported as stating that ‘having occupied Crimea, Russia is trying to redraw the
neighbouring states’ borderlines, and that Moldova, the Baltic States and Poland could
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8 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

be next in line’ (Lithuania Tribune, 2014). In line with this perspective, these countries
actively sought reassurance from its partners. However, it was not only states geograph-
ically close to Russia or with past experiences of Russian dominance that stressed the se-
curity dimension of the crisis; the UK and Sweden also raised security issues in their
justifications for why the EU needed to develop a collective response to the crisis
(United Kingdom, House of Commons, 2014b; Sweden, Riksdagen, 2014a).
These states (Poland, the Baltic States, the United Kingdom and Sweden) played a par-
ticularly important role in the first phase of the crisis in terms of pushing the issue onto the
EU’s agenda (I #7, 9, 10). The UK was also an outspoken supporter of an EU weapons
embargo and, according to Foreign Minister Hague, decided to start suspending licences
bilaterally in March 2014 (United Kingdom, House of Commons, 2014b; also Sweden,
Riksdagen, 2014b). It would seem, though, that the Swedish and British governments
were mainly driven by a sense of solidarity with the Central and East European states,
rather than by a concern for the security of their national territories. For example, in a de-
bate in the House of Commons in late July, UK Prime Minister David Cameron argued
(United Kingdom, House of Commons, 2014d):
‘When one sits in the European Council and listens to the testimony of the Baltic states or
countries such as Romania, with their concerns about what is happening in Transnistria,
one can see that if we do not act on this occasion firmly, clearly and consistently, while
totally changing the approach we have taken, there will be other such problems to come’.

In a similar manner, in a meeting with the Visegrad countries, the German Foreign
Minister is reported to have said that their concerns were ‘not Hungarian, or Czech,
or Slovak or Polish worries but European worries, and therefore our concerns, too’
(Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a).
Security concerns unquestionably drove some of the Member States to press for collec-
tive action. There is some evidence of security concerns being directly linked to EU co-
hesion. According to German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, ‘Europe must stand as one
and issue a common reply. Russia knows that, if splits were to arise within Europe on
such a key issue, this would put an end to Europe’s common foreign policy before it ever
began’ (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; see also United Kingdom, House of
Commons, 2014c). However, neither the publicly available documentation nor the inter-
views suggest a unanimous understanding of the Ukrainian crisis as raising security con-
cerns for the EU’s Member States. Many governments clearly stressed that they did not
consider the events in Ukraine to entail any threats to their own territory (I #7, 8, 9,
10). In a statement to the Bundestag in March, German Chancellor Angela Merkel con-
firmed that any further destabilizing actions on the part of Russia would be seen as a threat
to its European neighbours (Germany, Bundestag, 2014a). At the same time, German au-
thorities emphasized to the parliament that the crisis was not seen as a threat to German
security (Germany, Bundestag, 2014b). Member States such as Hungary and Slovakia,
who share a border with Ukraine, sent at best contradictory signals with regard to the po-
tential security threat. In an interview with Die Welt, the Hungarian Foreign Minister
insisted that ‘at present, we are not as threatened as the Baltic republics’. At the same
time, however, he stressed that when NATO – in response to a Baltic bid for reassurance
– made a show of its presence in the Baltic area, Hungary could also feel safe (Die Welt,
2014). Although these somewhat ambivalent statements indicate that Hungary might have
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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been feeling threatened as well, it does not seem to have been a decisive factor in the def-
inition of their position.
Paradoxically, much of the Realist critique of the EU’s policies during the crisis con-
firms that security was not a vital concern. The Realist argument is that the EU ought to
take the security threats seriously. However, by promoting this claim, they confirm that
the events were not understood as a security crisis by the EU. Instead, as Realists also
stress, the crisis represented a clash of worldviews between Russia and the EU (Auer,
2015; Mearsheimer, 2014; Rynning, 2015). As Auer argues, ‘In order to challenge Putin’s
Russia effectively, I argue, Europe and Germany should indeed reclaim geopolitics for
their own purposes’ (Auer, 2015, p. 958).
Consequently, while there were concerns for national security as a result of the events
in Ukraine, there is little evidence to suggest that these concerns alone produced agree-
ment amongst the EU’s Member States.

Internal Threats and the Possibility of a Great Power Directoire

But if external coercion, in the form of a security threat, does not account for the agree-
ment, could it have come about as the end result of some form of internal coercion? It
is often argued that EU foreign policy is run by a Great Power Directoire (Gegout,
2010), and it is usually assumed that the United Kingdom and France are the dominant
foreign policy powers. To the extent that such a Directoire was at work during the
Ukrainian crisis, it would have acted through the so-called ‘Normandy format’, which
consisted of France and Germany (not the UK), as well as Russia and Ukraine. However,
the Normandy negotiations over how to resolve the situation in Ukraine only started in the
summer of 2014; it therefore had nothing to do with the EU’s agreement on sanctions (I
#6, 9, 10). Normandy could potentially have influenced the discussion on the continuation
of sanctions beyond 2014, but that lies beyond the scope of this article.7
There is no evidence of a concerted effort by France, the UK and Germany to force
through sanctions. Although the UK played an important role internally in pushing for
a strong reaction, it appears to have been acting separately from France and Germany.
In the early stages of the crisis, both France and Germany were reluctant to take a hard
line. For Germany’s part, this was linked to internal divisions between Chancellor Merkel
and her Foreign Minister, Steinmeier. Ultimately, Merkel’s pro-sanctions stance won out.
Furthermore, the UK was not included in the many démarches concerning Ukraine. This
is widely considered to be due to the country’s conflict with Russia and President Putin
over the Litvinenko affair. Nevertheless, states that pushed for a strong reaction early
on in the crisis confirm that it was important to have the support of the United
Kingdom. They further confirm that the resistance of larger states (such as Italy) was more
challenging than that of smaller states (such as Hungary). This suggests that size matters,
but there is no evidence to suggest it was decisive in this case. In fact, contrary to the ex-
pectation that the size of a country determines its influence, interviewees also stressed for
example that the Netherlands, despite being a small country, is ‘a country that is listened
to’ (I #9, 10).
7
The potential for great power coercion would be important in particular if Germany and France had struck a deal with
Russia in the Normandy format, as they would most likely have needed the other Member States to back up the agreement
for example by easing the sanctions regime.

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10 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

Arguably, there was an element of arm-twisting in the way in which the EEAS and the
Commission ensured agreement on the specifics of the sanctions. Yet, the idea that the su-
pranational institutions coerced Member States into agreement does not at all match the
conception of EU foreign policy as run by a Great Power Directoire. Moreover, the Com-
mission could have considered it to be in its own interest to protect commercial interests
in Russia, suggesting that it would oppose sanctions on these grounds. Most importantly,
however, in order for the realist inspired conception of EU foreign policy as determined
by the most powerful states to be confirmed, there would have to be a specific interest on
the part of the great powers to drive through an agreement on sanctions. Even realists
themselves have confirmed that this was not the case: ‘Others (Germany and the United
Kingdom) have long had substantial trade, investment and financial ties to Russia and
fear that these would be jeopardised by robust retaliation’ (MacFarlane and Menon,
2014, p. 100).
In sum, drawing on Constructivist and Realist insights, it was possible to identify some
factors that may have contributed to facilitating agreement. But these are not sufficient to
explain how agreement came about. Firstly, the decisions on sanctions appears to have
been taken through intensive consultation; however, the fact that consultation took place
on a large scale (and involved state and non-state actors) cannot have been decisive. We
need to identify the specific factor that ensured agreement. Second, the larger states did
play an important role; however, there is no evidence to suggest that they imposed a spe-
cific course of action on other states, nor that they bought off reluctant states. We cannot
explain agreement with reference to their influence alone. Can the remaining gaps and la-
cunas in the explanation be filled by drawing on a deliberative perspective?
Deliberative theory posits the ability of actors to act on generalizable reasons. It thus
suggests an explanation based on the insight that impartial arguments can explain collec-
tive decisions. This need not imply the establishment of an ideal consensus. Actors may
agree with different, but mutually acceptable arguments (Eriksen, 2009). From this per-
spective then, the challenge is to identify the substantive argument that convinced Mem-
ber States that it was necessary to respond with sanctions. In the first part of the article,
we sought to refine the general reference to ‘normative arguments’ in constructivist
scholarship by suggesting a distinction between two types of arguments, building on dif-
ferent normative evaluations. The first of these arguments were ethical political argu-
ments that could be revealed through references to values and traditions seen as
constitutive of European identity. Concretely, this might include references to particular
obligations that the EU and its Member States had towards Ukraine as a European state.
The second argument was moral, suggesting a reference to justice and rights that would
have a broader appeal, beyond any specific identity. Could such arguments have trig-
gered agreement?

IV. Sovereignty and Self-determination

We find that collective action was anchored in an agreement across all Member States that
fundamental principles of international law were breached. The arguments in this regard
point unambiguously towards agreement on the unacceptability of a breach of Ukrainian
sovereignty and territorial integrity, accompanied by arguments concerning the need to
respect human rights and Ukrainian citizens’ right to self-determination.
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
 11

In all countries we investigated, heads of state and government justified the EU’s sanc-
tions with reference to international law and territorial sovereignty. Such arguments
played a particularly important role in countries like Austria, where the government had
to defend its support for sanctions in parliament. In the words of Foreign Minister Kurz,
‘the Bundeskanzler was completely right in agreeing to the three stage-plan in Brussels,
because to be neutral, militarily neutral, does not mean to have no opinion, and it does
not mean to recognize violations of international law’ (Austria, National Council,
2014b). The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Martonyi, expressed general support for the
EU’s sanction regime on the grounds that the ‘territorial integrity and sovereignty of
states must be respected, international laws must be obeyed, and there is no compromise
possible in these matters. If the EU sets clear boundaries as to how far things can go, it
must follow through consistently’ (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b).
In a similar manner, in speaking to representatives from the House of Lords, Dr.
Heusgen, Foreign Policy and Security Adviser to Chancellor Merkel, was reported to
have said that ‘he felt that the EU had a moral obligation to support countries under pres-
sure from Russia. This included helping the citizens of Ukraine, who should have a sov-
ereign right to choose the future path of their country’ (United Kingdom, House of Lords,
2015, p. 119). Merkel herself described the conflict as a clash of global perspectives,
portraying the EU and its Member States as committed to international law: ‘The right
of the mighty is put up against the strength of law, unilateral geopolitical interests against
understanding and cooperation. (...) It is about the territorial integrity of a neighbouring
European country, about the respect for the principles of the United Nations, about
principles and methods for balancing interests in the twenty-first century’ (Germany,
Bundestag, 2014a).
In the words of one interviewee, a key reason why it was necessary for the EU to stand
united was to send a uniform message to Russia that ‘you just cannot behave this way;
you cannot break international law (…) and invade other countries’ (I #1). Another inter-
viewee confirmed that ‘it was indeed very difficult for those that did not want sanctions to
argue against this principle’, and ‘When they argue against sanctions, they never mention
Crimea. Instead they talk about Russia as an important neighbour’ (I #10). Another inter-
viewee stressed, ‘The overall climate towards Ukraine was so positive that it was totally
unacceptable to put forward one’s own interest’ (I #9). The same interviewee highlighted
the dramatic change in the positions of both Germany and France with regard to Russia
that took place as events in Ukraine unfolded, claiming that ‘It is linked to the bloody
events in Maidan plus the Russian intervention which was a clear breach of international
law’.
Although the downing of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014 further
strengthened Member States’ commitment to sanctions, it was not decisive (I #9, 10). In-
stead, interviewees argued that a point of no return was reached once it was clear what
had actually happened in Crimea: ‘We lost six weeks because we did not know what re-
ally happened in Crimea’ (I # 10). When the truth was known, it became difficult to resist
sanctions. As British Foreign Minister Hammond put it, Russia’s actions represented ‘a
clear violation of the hitherto well-observed principle of international law that we do
not resolve border disputes in Europe by force of arms’ (United Kingdom, House of
Commons, 2014e). In announcing the extension of sanctions at the end of July 2014,
the European Council (2014b) stated that it was intended as a severe warning: ‘… illegal
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
12 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

annexation of territory and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country

cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe’.
Arguments referring to a particular moral obligation to uphold certain principles do
seem to have been the key to agreement amongst the Member States. They did trump in-
terests, and paved the way for a collective stance on sanctions. Still, citizens’ right to self-
determination is jeopardized regularly in many parts of the world, without this leading to
such a clear and cohesive policy response from the EU’s Member States. So why did the
concern for these principles have such a unifying effect this time? Arguments emerge in a
particular context, and it would seem that the particular context of this crisis was vital for
the agreement to come about. The references to the importance of respecting the territorial
integrity of Ukraine and the Ukrainians’ right to self-determination did not stand alone;
often they were combined with references to the fact that these principles were breached
in Europe.

V. …and a Particular Duty to Europe

What comes across in a number of statements from Member States is the sense of a par-
ticular responsibility to contribute to resolving the conflict due to the EU’s strong involve-
ment with Ukraine, as well as the fact that Ukraine is so geographically close to the
Union. The EU thus had to act collectively in the Ukraine crisis because ‘It’s the
neighbourhood’ (I #8).
For example, in announcing the decision on the first round of sanctions, the European
Council declared that the EU ‘has a special responsibility for peace, stability and prosper-
ity in Europe’ (European Council, 2014a). This statement resonates with how inter-
viewees stressed the long history of close co-operation between the EU and Ukraine.
One interviewee described it as ‘completely natural’ that the EU should respond, given
that it was Ukraine’s ambition to join the Union that prompted the crisis in the first place
(I #1). The EU could not have chosen to remain passive in the conflict because the Union
had become closely tied to Ukraine through the preparations for an association agreement
and the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) (I #1). Other interviewees
also emphasized the historical ties between the EU and Ukraine, and how the EU has been
engaged and invested in Ukraine over the past several years (I #8).
Similar assertions are found in the written documentation. Polish Foreign Minister Si-
korski contended that Poland was engaged in the Ukraine crisis because the Ukrainians
were neighbours, fighting for the same rights as the Poles did in 1989 (Der Spiegel,
2014; Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Italian Foreign Minister Mogherini ech-
oed this sense of responsibility in her statement to the Italian Parliament in March 2014,
in which she argued that the European Union ‘in particular’ would have to take action to
support the Ukrainian government and its people (Italy, National Assembly, 2014a). Four
months later, she stated that this was a crisis ‘around our European borders (…), and so
there is a direct responsibility of the European Union’ to engage (Italy, National Assem-
bly, 2014b).
Even Hungarian Foreign Minister Martonyi referred to the concept of a collective duty
on the part of the EU. When commenting on the EU’s response to the crisis, he argued that
the EU can ‘only respond’; it ‘must stand by its values and principles and put aside internal
disputes amid the current state of affairs’ (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b).
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
 13

In the same vein, EU governments also described Europe’s relations with Russia as
different from those of the US. British Prime Minister Cameron stressed that EU sanctions
against individuals require a legal underpinning, which may create differences between
the foreign policies of the EU and the US (United Kingdom, House of Commons,
2014c). Austrian Foreign Minister Kurz emphasized that the EU’s strategy was to
threaten sanctions rather than to introduce them immediately (Austria, National Council,
2014a). And Sweden’s Prime Minister Reinfeldt highlighted the fact that Europe’s inte-
gration with Russia was enormous – financially, economically and in terms of energy:
‘We need to remember that when the US is talking about economic sanctions against
Russia, they do not have the same relationship with Russia that many of the European
states have. It would be a very big move to go through with both in breadth and depth.
Still, that is what we are preparing’ (Sweden, Riksdagen, 2014b).
Arguments referring to the need to react to a violation of the right to self-determination
seem to have been the key to ensuring agreement amongst Member States. Nevertheless,
the many references to Europe indicate that an additional reason why agreement was
reached had to do with the fact that it was European citizens who were suffering. We can-
not conclude from this that Member States would not have agreed if this had concerned a
country further from home; however, all things otherwise being equal, it certainly sug-
gests that agreement would have been far more difficult to achieve with regard to a crisis
outside Europe.

Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to determine how EU Member States managed to agree to
impose sanctions on Russia in response to the crisis in Ukraine. In accordance with a tra-
dition of explanation through interpretation we have examined the different reasons pre-
sented by the actors involved. On the basis of our analysis, we found that Member States
accepted the political and economic costs of sanctioning Russia due to a sense of collec-
tive commitment to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. This finding ech-
oes constructivist scholarship in international relations in that it suggests that agreement
was due to normative convergence. However, it moves beyond this scholarship in partic-
ular in two ways. Firstly, it moves beyond the simplistic dichotomy between interests and
norms upon which most constructivist scholarship rests. To be sure, agreement did not
stem from concerns for the territorial integrity of the EU itself or of its Member States,
nor was it due to coercion from internal actors, as there was little evidence of threats or
considerations of the costs of non-compliance. But this does not mean that a general ref-
erence to ‘normative convergence’ suffices as an explanation. In fact, there were heated
disagreements within the EU both over the cost of sanctions and divergent political and
normative assessments of how best to respond to the events. Thus we have distinguished
between different types of normative arguments and found that agreement was only made
possible due to the references made to the specific norms of sovereignty and self-
determination.
Secondly, the analysis moves beyond constructivist scholarship by highlighting the
normative force of arguments as a key mechanism that can trigger a change in position.
This emphasis on an argumentative process provides a theoretical underpinning for the
general concept of processes of socialization within EU institutions, and it also allows
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
14 Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén

for a theoretical account of agreement that is on par with that of bargaining. Thus, it fa-
cilitates the investigation of concrete cases of decision-making within foreign policy that
would allow constructivists to counter the standard objection of realists and rationalists,
who claim that ‘Socialisation is possible, but its impact is either nil or negligible’
(Gegout, 2010, p. 181; also Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2011, p. 180).
Perhaps paradoxically, the findings here raise some doubts regarding the robustness of
European foreign policy cohesion that is often implied in constructivist scholarship. Al-
though the EU turned out not to be weak or divided with regard to this particular crisis,
this does not mean that Member States will be able to maintain cohesion in future crises.
In fact, our analysis suggests that the CFSP is an unsettled political system. On the one
hand, there is a constant risk of great power dominance, as is visible in particular through
the Normandy format. On the other hand, the decision-making process was characterized
by ad hoc solutions, which deviated significantly from the prescribed procedures of the
CFSP. While this might point to a necessary flexibility in times of crisis, it could also
imply that there is an element of unpredictability and uncertainty in the system. In sum,
cohesion does seem linked to the specificity of this crisis.
Correspondence:
Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén, University of Oslo – ARENA, Postbox 1143, Blindern, Oslo
0317, Norway
email: helene.sjursen@arena.uio.no; guri.rosen@arena.uio.no

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