DOI: 10.33067/SE.2.2024.

Adrian Chojan*

Brexit and Its Consequences for the European Union

and Member States, With Particular Emphasis
on the Visegrad Group Countries:
A Neorealist Analysis

Abstract
This article focuses on analysing the consequences of Brexit for the
European Union and its Member States, with particular emphasis on the
Visegrad Group (V4) countries. Through the prism of neorealism theory,
the changes in the balance of power and international dynamics resulting
from Great Britain’s exit from the EU are analysed. The aim is not only to
identify specific Brexit outcomes but also to understand the mechanisms
influencing relations among European states, especially in the future.
In this context, neorealist analysis becomes a particularly valuable tool,
allowing us to view Brexit not only as a one-time incident but also as
a manifestation of broader trends in global international relations which
may adopt disintegrative stances in the future.

Keywords: Brexit, European Integration, Neorealism, Visegrad Group

Countries

The Theoretical Foundations of Neorealism

and Its Criticism in the Context of European Integration
Several years have passed since the passing of a decision by the British
people that led to the United Kingdom’s departure from the European
Union. Since the announcement of the referendum results in 2016, Brexit
has become not only a key event in the history of the United Kingdom but

*
Adrian Chojan – Lazarski University, e-mail: adrian.chojan@lazarski.pl,
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0132-1274.

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also a significant turning point for the entire European Union. Questions
began to arise regarding the reasons behind the British people’s decision
and the potential consequences (Clarke, Goodwin, Whitely, 2017). The
United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU structures has sparked a flurry of
inquiries regarding the future of European integration, political stability,
and the economic development or regression of the EU. In particular, the
Brexit process necessitates a thorough analysis from the perspective of
international relations theory, particularly neorealism, which focuses on
dynamic interactions among sovereign actors in conditions of international
anarchy (see Somai, 2018).
Neorealism is one of the dominant theories in the field of international
relations, which analyses the world from the perspective of the structure
of the international system, international anarchy, and the balance of
power among sovereign actors. Key issues constituting the core of the
neorealist approach to international relations include the acceptance of
the structure of the international system as a key determinant of relations
between states (Waltz, 1979). The structure of the system is a crucial factor
explaining the dynamics and processes occurring in international relations.
International systems are anarchic and decentralised (Kaczmarski, 2015),
and their structure is shaped only by major actors, and, as a result of
their mutual influence, states become similar to each other and adopt
roles determined by their relative power, hence, new states entering
the international system find it difficult to achieve their intended roles
(Thies, 2010). What is also important for neorealists is to consider the
balance of power and the rationality of states from the perspective of their
national interest. Neorealists believe that the international system lacks
central authority, thereby eventually leading to anarchy. The absence of
a global government means that states must rely on their own capabilities
to ensure their security. Brexit can therefore be seen as a result of the
decision of a United Kingdom which decided to leave the EU structures
and regain greater control over its affairs. This decision can be interpreted
as an attempt to adapt to the changing international situation, using
sovereignty as a way to minimise potential threats. Consequently, Brexit
reflects the neorealist assumption that sovereignty and nationalist policies
remain important. Therefore, when we look at Brexit and the current state
of European integration from the perspective of neorealism, we must look
for independent variables at the macro level of international politics and
treat the entire European integration as a dependent variable (Saeidabadi,
Mohammadpour, 2020).
Neorealism assumes that states seek to achieve a balance of power
to avoid the dominance of other states and minimise the risk of armed

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conflict. This pursuit of equilibrium leads to the necessity of reacting to

the actions of other states. Brexit can thus be interpreted as an attempt by
the United Kingdom to regain control over its own destiny, particularly
in the context of sovereignty and immigration control, which was one of
the reasons behind the entire process. As a result, the decision to leave
the EU can be seen as a way to maintain a balance of power in the face of
increasing European integration and the growing role of EU institutions.
In the context of the European Union, larger Member States such as
Germany and France seek to maintain their dominant positions within
the EU structure, while smaller states, including the V4 countries, strive
to secure their interests through collective action and negotiations.
Within the V4, we can also observe a pursuit of a balance of power among
individual countries to prevent any one entity from dominating over the
others.
Finally, supporters of the neorealist approach argue that states act
rationally, seeking to maximise their own interests regardless of ideologies
or other types of goals. State decisions are usually the result of an analysis
of the costs and benefits of decisions made and actions in international
relations. While classical realism considers the maximisation of power as
its main goal, neorealism puts the balance of power first (Czaputowicz,
2014). In the context of the EU, Member States make decisions based on
a cost/benefit analysis, seeking to maximise their influence and secure
their interests. Within the V4, these countries act collectively when they
perceive it to be beneficial to their own national interests, thereby seeking
to enhance their negotiating power vis-à-vis the EU. In the context of
European integration, one could theoretically assume that the neorealist
approach should effectively explain the European reality and the
processes taking place within it. However, this theory mainly focuses on
relations between states, overlooking the significant role of supranational
institutions such as the European Commission or the European Court of
Justice in the process of European integration. These institutions have the
ability to influence the decisions of Member States and form EU policy,
which is not taken into consideration in neorealist analysis. Neorealism
assumes that states strive to maximise their sovereignty and security,
which may lead to conflicts or at least a lack of willingness to cede some
competences to EU institutions. However, in the case of the EU, Member
States voluntarily decide to limit their sovereignty in order to reap the
benefits of integration, which is not easily explained by neorealist logic.
Finally, neorealism often overlooks the analysis of specific features of the
international system, such as the European integration system, which
is characterised by unique mechanisms of cooperation and interaction

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among states. Therefore, neorealist generalisations cannot fully explain

the complex integration processes taking place in the European Union,
especially with a precedent such as Brexit.

The Political Context of Brexit

From a Neorealist Perspective – Selected Aspects
The political context of Brexit originates from societal attitudes
and messages conveyed to the British people by critics of European
integration and the United Kingdom’s membership in the European
Union. When considering this in a political context, one can use the
theory of neorealism, which analyses the decisions of states in the
context of the previously mentioned, i.e., international anarchy and
the implementation of their own national interests, including the pursuit
of sovereignty. In this approach, the key elements of the political context
of Brexit include Euroscepticism and the anti-EU sentiment prevailing in
Great Britain, fuelled by, among others, Nigel Farage, the main supporter
of Brexit. Long-standing Eurosceptic sentiment had existed in the UK,
fomented by concerns about sovereignty loss, increased immigration,
and constraints on national policy. Media messages, especially in certain
tabloid outlets, often emphasised the negative aspects of EU membership,
reinforcing Eurosceptic societal attitudes (Simpson, Startin, 2022). In
the construction of Eurosceptic narratives, the referendum campaign
and the media’s participation played significant roles. During the Brexit
referendum campaign, both supporters and opponents of the United
Kingdom’s EU membership conducted intensive propaganda campaigns.
Eurosceptics focused on conveying the negative consequences of European
integration, emphasising sovereignty loss, uncontrolled immigration, and
membership costs. On the other hand, proponents of remaining in the EU
argued for the benefits of membership, such as access to the single market
and strengthening the UK’s international position. The media, in turn,
often conveyed content favourable to Eurosceptic views, portraying the
EU as a bureaucratic, controlling institution that restricts the sovereignty
of its Member States. This narrative contributed to solidifying negative
attitudes towards the EU and strengthening the belief in the necessity of
leaving EU structures (more: Kubin, 2018).
In the political context of Brexit, it is important to note that neorealism
emphasises states’ pursuit of sovereignty and independence. In the
context of Brexit, Eurosceptic societal sentiments were often linked to
the desire to regain full control over national affairs. As a sovereign actor,
the United Kingdom made the decision to leave the EU in response

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to these sentiments, expressing the will to reclaim full sovereignty,

which, according to Eurosceptics, was lost upon joining the European
Communities. Akin to many other countries, the United Kingdom has
experienced a rise in nationalism in recent years. Nationalist sentiment
often coincides with an emphasis on national identity, independence, and
sovereignty, with the latter lying at the heart of the Brexit referendum
(Niblett, 2016). In the context of Brexit, nationalism was strongly present
in the campaign of those advocating to leave the EU, arguing that the UK
should regain control over its borders, the right to make independent
decisions, and shape its immigration and trade policies. In this convention,
Brexit reflects the neorealist assumption that sovereignty and nationalist
policies remain relevant in international relations. Consequently, when
examining Brexit and the current state of European integration from
a neorealist perspective, one must look for independent variables at the
macro level of international politics and consider the entire European
integration as a dependent variable (Saeidabadi, Mohammadpour, 2020).
Brexit was also an expression of cultural and identity issues that
have long been present in British society. Some proponents for the
UK’s departure from the EU argued that EU membership violates
British national identity and traditions, and influences the country’s
independence in cultural and legal matters. The pursuit of sovereignty is,
therefore, a bond of nationalist and cultural attitudes that contributed to
Brexit. It was also pointed out that the autonomy of the UK depends more
on the complex network of economic, social, and cultural interactions
with the rest of the world than on the formal political power of the British
government. These interactions inevitably weaken the ability of the
government and citizens of the UK to make independent, unrestrained
decisions (Bryant, 2018).
For the European Union, the political context of Brexit generated many
difficulties and uncertainties about the future of the European project.
Brexit posed serious challenges to the EU in maintaining integration
and cohesion in the face of the departure of one of its largest and most
important Member States. The UK’s decision to leave the world’s largest
trading bloc was a signal to the EU that there are real threats to the
European project and that EU institutions must take action to counter
any further increases of Euroscepticism and nationalism. In response
to Brexit, some Member States and EU institutions called for the need
to strengthen European integration and build a stronger and more united
Union. However, the way of looking to the future varied significantly
among individual countries in this regard. For example, Germany and
France spoke of the need for further convergence and closer cooperation

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in areas such as defense, security, and crisis management. Authorities

in Berlin advocated for the creation of a European armed forces, while
France talked about the need to establish a European defense fund.
On the other hand, Visegrad Group countries emphasised the need to
preserve Member-State sovereignty and strengthen the role of national
states within the EU. Meanwhile, among the Benelux countries, voices
dominated as regards the need for EU reform, especially in the areas
of economic and social policy as well as the creation of common fiscal
mechanisms, a strengthening of the banking union, and combating the
phenomenon of social dumping.
In other words, Brexit served as a catalyst for debates about the future
of European integration (Gotham, 2019) (Fabbrini, 2021) (Moskal,
2018), prompting some states to assert their own interests and attempt
to harmonise them, thereby shaping their positions within the EU and
attempting to fill the void left by the United Kingdom. Therefore, the
political context of Brexit for the European Union and its Member States
can be analysed through the prism of the balance of power, international
anarchy, and the rationality of Member States’ actions, which was all very
well illustrated by the example of the Visegrad Group countries. Further
erosion of the EU (considered by the Visegrad countries as a guarantor
of economic and political security) would pose direct threats to their
security and position in Europe. Hence, some of them, such as Poland and
Hungary, clearly spoke about the need for greater respect for sovereignty
and the need to strengthen the national dimension of integration. This
would aim to counter arguments used by Brexit supporters in the United
Kingdom.

The Effects of Brexit on the European Union

and Its Member States
From the perspective of neorealist approach, Brexit has had and
continues to have significant implications for the European Union and its
Member States, both politically and economically. Brexit created a space for
weakening the unity and cohesion of the entire organisation. The departure
of the United Kingdom from the bloc reduced the number and strength
of Member States understood as a single integrative entity, altering the
balance of power within the EU itself. From a neorealist perspective, this
reduction in the number of Member States leads to increased competition
among the remaining states not so much for a dominant position within
it, as this position remains reserved for Germany and France, but for the
chance to fill the gap left by the United Kingdom. This entails competition

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for influence. The reduction in the number of Member States implies less
diversity among the states themselves, which, in the long run, may result
in increased competition for influence and dominant positions within EU
institutions and decision-making processes.
Those Member States still remaining in the EU may seek to increase
their political weight and influence on decisions made at the EU level.
This will likely be particularly evident during the preparation of a new
European treaty, which will be yet another reform of the EU. The
reduction in the number of Member States may lead to increased tensions
in the struggle for a dominant position within the EU. States with stronger
economic and political positions may seek to strengthen their role in EU
structures at the expense of other Member States, which may lead to
further divisions and conflicts. As mentioned earlier, neorealism assumes
the existence of a balance of power between states in an international,
anarchic system. The reduction in the number of Member States may also
disrupt this balance, leading to attempts by some states to dominate others.
This, in turn, may lead to the formation of alliances and counterweights
among states, increasing rivalry and tensions within the European Union,
eventually leading to a so-called “multi-speed” union. This is particularly
significant given that Brexit and, latterly, the COVID-19 pandemic have
highlighted persisting divisions among Member States and a number of
growing difficulties in dealing with them, considering the limitations
of intergovernmental coordination (Fabbrini, 2021).
The country that theoretically stands to gain the most in the medium
and long term from Brexit is Germany. From the perspective of early 2024,
it is difficult to unequivocally indicate that Berlin has fully exploited the
potential that was available after the UK’s departure from the EU. Several
factors have influenced this state of affairs, starting from a change of
power and Angela Merkel’s departure (being replaced by Olaf Scholz), as
well as the international assessment of Germany’s role in matters related
to the Russo-Ukrainian war, where initially the international community
heavily criticised the German government’s inaction. Nevertheless, in
the context of the effects of Brexit for the EU and for Germany itself,
in the medium and long term, Germany is the country that has the most
arguments to fill the spaces left by the United Kingdom, even though
their leadership is becoming increasingly limited (Schweiger, 2018).
The government in Berlin could take advantage of the post-Brexit
situation to strengthen its leadership position in the European Union,
and the country’s strong economy and political stability could enable
them to play a more active role in shaping EU policy and deciding on
the priorities and directions of European integration. The reduction

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in the number of Member States implies fewer opponents and greater

political power for Germany in the struggle for its interests and priorities
in the EU. The growing role of Germany after Brexit can be interpreted
as the result of strengthening its position in the EU at the expense of
weakening another potential leader, namely, France. Germany may aim
to exploit this situation to strengthen its hegemony among the bloc
of EU Member States, and the increase in Germany’s role may lead to
competition with France for leadership in the EU. Limiting France’s role
could be interpreted as a consequence of this rivalry, whereby Germany
may strive to weaken France’s position in favour of its own interests.
One’s understanding of these processes is aided by neorealism, which
assumes that the rivalry between states is caused by the structure of the
international system and the processes taking place within it, and the main
goal of states’ functioning is to maximise security, understood not only in
strictly military terms. Jacek Czaputowicz, in one of his works, writes that
the dependent variable in the neorealist approach is “the results on the
international stage”, and that “states behave the same way under specific
conditions” (Czaputowicz, 2014). In essence, all EU Member States
(not only Germany) attempted to take the place of the United Kingdom
and, as a result of Brexit, sought to achieve specific outcomes related to
improving their position in the international structure represented by
the EU. The issue of material and non-material resources will be crucial
in determining to what extent they will be able to achieve their goals
and realise their stated interests. The desire to have greater influence on
EU relations is explained not by neorealism but by neoclassical realism,
which assumes that the goal of a state’s functioning is precisely to increase
its influence in international processes. According to this approach, as the
power of a given state increases, so does its activity in the international
arena in order to increase its influence on the external environment
in a way that is consistent with its interests and ensures its security
(Taliaferro, 2006). The growing role of Germany and the simultaneous
limitation of France’s role can be interpreted as the effect of asymmetry,
where Germany leverages its stronger position in the international system
to achieve greater influence on the international stage, in this case, within
the European Union. The disadvantaged parties of this state of affairs
will be the smaller EU Member States whose potential significantly lags
behind that of Germany and France.
The actual effects of Brexit will only be known during the negotiations
of the new reform treaty and in the next perspective, when the establishing
of the new Multiannual Financial Framework occurs after the end of the
current 2021–2027 perspective. The increase in competition between

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states as a result of the post-Brexit international structure taking shape in

the form of a new balance of power in the EU may also result in a struggle
for resources and funds available within the organisation. States seeking
to strengthen their position will vie for a greater share in EU programs
and funds, potentially leading to increased tensions and conflict among
one another. Brexit thus poses a threat to the neorealist balance of power,
which Member States are attempting and will continue to attempt to
shape, but which, truth be told, has never truly existed in the EU.
As a result of Brexit, the structure of the international system, which
to some extent is the European Union, has changed. The countries
that remained attempted to revise it in order to obtain specific results
in European policy, e.g., pushing through issues that were important to
them from the perspective of national interests. In light of the events that
occurred post-Brexit, namely, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and
the Russo-Ukrainian war, their functioning aims primarily at ensuring
security based on the power they possess, consisting of a range of material
and non-material resources. All these assumptions of neorealism are
confirmed by the political practice of the 27 EU Member States after
the departure of the United Kingdom. It is worth mentioning that the
concept of European integration, in its essence, is a classical process
aimed at achieving a balance of power in Europe, which, as mentioned,
is fundamental to neorealism. Cohesion policy, aimed at narrowing
the development disparities between Member States, or solidarity in
the distribution of budgetary funds for less developed countries, is one such
example. The division between net contributors and net beneficiaries in
relation to contributions to the EU budget, where wealthier states allocate
their resources to support poorer ones in the name of European solidarity
and equalising opportunities and potentials, also serves as an illustration
of building a balance of power. From this idealistic perspective, we could
assume that the concept of balance of power is being implemented in the
EU. However, at the political level, there is a deep asymmetry in terms
of influence on decision-making processes within European institutions.
Some EU Member States have greater political influence on decisions
made within the Union than others, and Brexit has only exacerbated these
disparities. States with strong economic and military-political positions,
such as Germany and France, may have a greater influence on shaping the
EU agenda, which also contributes to the imbalance of power within the
EU. In the context of qualified majority voting – as noted by J. Szymańska
and Sz. Zaręba – Britain’s exit from the EU means that meeting the
criterion of 55% of EU countries will require not 16 but 15 states, and
in terms of population, the already-strong position of the most populous

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states, especially Germany and France, will be further strengthened. When

the EU consisted of 28 Member States, their influence was 29%, which
increased to 33% after Brexit. All of this makes it much easier for large
Member States to build coalitions supporting projects of the European
Commission, moreover, those of a communal nature, and it will also be
easier for them to form coalitions of several states to block initiatives put
forward by the Commission.
It is also worth noting that Brexit does not necessarily have only negative
consequences for the EU. Reflection and consideration of what does not
work in the European project can be an extremely valuable contribution
to preparing for its next reform, this time without the United Kingdom
but with greater participation from those states that have so far relatively
conservatively approached this issue, such as those gathered within the
Visegrad Group. Furthermore, the departure of the United Kingdom may
also bring about significant benefits to EU security and defense. Member
States can pursue deeper cooperation plans and maximise their security
and defense interests. Moreover, the UK’s departure may, in the longer
term, enable the EU to build up its military power to such an extent that
it will be able to balance the power of global superpowers such as the USA
or China.

The Effects of Brexit as Regards the Visegrad

Group Countries
The Visegrad Group has never been and will never be a cohesive bloc
of states willing to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of the
group itself. It is more the media and experts who have tried over the years
to build the image of the V4 as a bloc that is able to transcend political
and national divisions. The utility of the Visegrad Group in the formula
envisaged in the joint declaration signed on February 15th 1991, outlining
the goals and conditions of mutual cooperation, was exhausted on May
1st 2004, when the V4 countries became part of the European Union.
After May 1st 2004, each of the Visegrad capitals began deconstructing
their positions independently in the new international structure, which
was then the European Union. Over the years, they gained experience
in conducting European policy on so-called “European” principles to be
ready to enter – to use boxing terminology – the heavyweight category
and political significance in the EU. That moment came in 2016 when
Europe recognised the results of the referendum in the United Kingdom.
It must be openly stated that Brexit surprised the Union, but more than
that, it worried the so-called “new” Member States, including Poland,

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Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, now Czechia. The departure
of Great Britain from the European Union, in the opinion of the Visegrad
Group countries, was a weakening and, at the same time, an undermining
of the stability of the European security system, on every level, i.e., that of
the political, economic, social, and military. Therefore, for the Visegrad
countries, Brexit was not only incomprehensible, but for some capitals it
was a great surprise, generating changes in foreign policy strategy. One
such country in 2016 was Poland. It suffices to quote here a fragment of
Witold Waszczykowski’s expose, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, who
said at the beginning of 2016 – “We will maintain dialogue and regular
consultations at various levels with the most important European partners
– first and foremost with the United Kingdom, with which we share not
only understanding of many important elements of the European agenda
but also a similar approach to European security issues. Our common
perception of European problems was confirmed during my recent visit
to the United Kingdom” (Waszczykowski, 2016). Hungary, under Viktor
Orbán’s rule, considered the referendum results a “truly black Sunday
and a sad day for the European Union”. The Hungarian prime minister
lamented in particular that a country that contributed a significant
amount of money to the EU budget is leaving, and its absence will make
the Union poorer, resulting in less money for Hungary (Orbán, 2018).
From the perspective of early 2024, it is difficult to assess the effects
of Brexit on the Visegrad Group countries in the short term. No key
processes have yet taken place that would allow for a clear assessment of
who lost and who gained. However, it is possible to analyse the potential
consequences in the medium and long term, including the place and
position of the V4 countries within the EU. From the perspective of
neorealism theory, the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union
may have several effects on the Visegrad Group. The first effect, albeit
indirectly related to the Visegrad states, is a weakening of the so-called
“broader construction” of the European Union. From a neorealist point
of view, the European Union is treated as a system in which states act
primarily to protect their own interests. The United Kingdom was one of
the main players in the EU, both economically and politically and, in this
context, its departure in the long term weakens the EU structure because
it leaves gaps in the dominance of states. Currently, there is no other
state in the EU structure as strong as the United Kingdom which would
support the intergovernmental model of European integration and which,
in theory, restrains the community initiatives of France and Germany in
accordance with the theory of balance of power. The United Kingdom
was one of the main allies of the Visegrad Group in the EU, especially

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in matters related to competitiveness, market regulation, or migration

policy. Its departure weakened the potential of the Visegrad Group in
negotiations and decision-making within the EU (Chojan, 2021). On the
other hand, the imbalance of power in the EU after Brexit may lead to
greater pressure from stronger states, such as Germany or France, on the
Visegrad Group countries regarding the aforementioned policies. This,
in turn, could significantly affect the autonomy and freedom of action
of the Visegrad Group countries in the Union and ultimately lead to
a deterioration of relations and, in an ultimate scenario, to the emergence
of disintegrative tendencies (especially in an era of growing populism and
the return of nationalism in foreign policies).
The above takes on particular significance in the context of the
future of the EU as an economic/political entity and its international
significance. After a period of strategic and conceptual drifting, and
after overcoming the effects of the pandemic and ending – as quickly
as possible – the war between Ukraine and Russia, the Union will
have to make a decision about the direction it wants to take and which
reforms to implement. One could be convinced, even border on the
verges of certainty, that this will be a direction in which the integration
process will be tightened and made even more communitarian, and
thus, the creation of a so-called “multi-speed union” project will be
carried out. In this regard, the absence of the United Kingdom may
be particularly felt for the Visegrad countries, or at least for a number
of them; stronger states in the EU, such as Germany or France, have
significant economic dominance, giving them greater influence over
forming EU economic and trade policy. Therefore, they are likely to
use their position to impose their preferences on the Visegrad Group,
especially in matters concerning market regulations, structural funds,
budgetary policy, or even the rule of law, thus regulating what can be
described as the “rules of the game” in the Union. In this regard, the
potential consequences of such decisions should be cause for concern.
An example in this context is the Green Deal, which, although prepared
by the European Commission, is only now, at the threshold of 2024,
being realistically perceived by various social groups in Member
States. Mass protests by farmers, among others, in Poland calling for
a withdrawal from the agreed arrangements are just a small example that
not everything accepted at the community level must be accepted by the
societies of Member States. The United Kingdom, as the largest of these
contesting states, was a strong advocate for the Visegrad countries, but
also a balance against overly enthusiastic approaches to decisions made
in the EU. Many Euro-enthusiasts underestimated the existence of what

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has been described as a “more contesting” group of Member States and

viewed it as a sign of the European project weakening.
Finally, Brexit may have implications for the Visegrad Group itself
and for its cohesion both within the European Union and in general.
The effects of Brexit will be accompanied by increased competition for
influence in the EU, including among the Visegrad Four themselves.
This could lead to greater internal competition for a dominant position in
the EU, and this may result from several presumptions. Firstly, regional
ambitions are beginning to play an increasingly important role. Visegrad
countries, especially those with stronger economies and greater military-
political capabilities such as Poland, may aspire to strengthen their role as
leaders in the Central and Eastern European region, essentially returning
to the 1990s when the Visegrad Group, in reality, did not function due to
similar tendencies. Secondly, there are increasingly divergent interests
and approaches to the European integration process among the Visegrad
countries. An example is the Polish-Hungarian alliance in the EU during
the Law and Justice government’s tenure, which, as of early 2024, and
following a change of government in Poland, has now become history.
Poland, once a Eurosceptic country, is becoming pro-European, with
a completely different political perspective than it did from 2015 to 2023,
while Viktor Orbán has remained true to his standpoint to European
politics based on “taking and contesting” everything that is uncomfortable
for Hungary or contrary to its national interests.
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that at present, the Visegrad
Group countries will not follow the path of the United Kingdom, even
despite the oft-emerging Eurosceptic voices emanating from their
capitals, and this even applies to Hungary under the rule of Viktor Orbán.
Functioning within the European Union has become one of the tools for
wielding power in those countries for the Visegrad Four, and national
egotisms appearing from time to time in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary
serve more as a so-called “bugaboo” and a tool of foreign policy rather
than reflecting the true intentions of the leaders of those countries.
Narrative trials attempting to increase their importance and significance
in European politics are a manifestation of increased competition for
influence among the Visegrad countries post Brexit. From the perspective
of neorealism, this reflects those countries’ aspirations to strengthen their
role in the EU structure by occupying more dominant positions after the
departure of the United Kingdom. However, this competition could also
lead to conflicts and tensions not only between the Visegrad countries and
the remaining EU Member States, but also amongst themselves.

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 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 2/2024

Conclusions
Neorealism – like any other theory of international relations – is not
able to fully explain the issues occurring in the processes of European
integration. This refers especially to such difficult and ambiguous
issues including the voluntary withdrawal of a state from the European
Union. Indeed, this theory can explain the behaviour of states within the
international system in which they operate only to a certain extent. This
is well illustrated by the example of the Visegrad Group countries which
are trying to fill the vacuum left by the British, although given the time in
which they have to do so, that task will not be an easy one. Essentially, it
can be stated that the time for building positions and constructing a new
balance of power in the EU is just beginning. Finally, it can be concluded
that Brexit may be a necessary shock for the EU, which will not only help
it as an organisation, but also help its Member States to reap even greater
benefits from having an alliance which each country wants to be a part
of. Perhaps in the future it will also lead to a reduction in resistance to
changes occurring in the integration process.

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