ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Readings for the Course SOCI 341: Population

Movements: Migration and Resettlement

Compiled by: Ezana Amdework

November 2012

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1 Introduction
1.1 Historical Background of Population Movements

 Parnwell, Mike. 1993. Population Movements and the Third World. New York:
Routledge., Pages 1 -9
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_migration,

2 A Typology of Population Movements

 Parnwell, Mike. 1993. Population Movements and the Third World. New York:
Routledge., Pages 11 – 27

3 Theoretical Perspectives and Models

3.1 Theories of Migration

Migration theories can be classified according to the level they focus on. Micro-level theories
focus on individual migration decisions, whereas macro-level theories look at aggregate
migration trends and explain these trends with macro-level explanations. The meso-level is in
between the micro and macro level, e.g. on the household or community level and can explain
both causes and perpetuation of migration.

3.1.1 Macro-Level Theories

The neoclassical macro migration theories explain migration as part of economic development.
Internal migration occurs as a result of geographical differences in the supply and demand of
labour, mostly between the rural traditional agricultural sector and the urban modern
manufacturing sector.

1. The basic model (Lewis, 1954 and Ranis & Fei, 1961) that grew out of trade theory,
assumes perfect markets and a labour surplus in the traditional agricultural sector that is
absorbed by the modern sector. The modern sector grows through capital accumulation
and by poaching labour from the traditional sector. Rural workers are attracted by the
positive wage differential and migrate to the urban sector, i.e. they are pulled to migrate.
In these models migration occurs until wage equalisation has occurred.

2. Todaro and Harris (Todaro, 1969 and Harris & Todaro, 1970) augmented this model to
account for the significant urban unemployment that was found in many less developed
countries. Migration is not completely risk-free, because the migrant does not necessarily
get a job upon arrival in the city. Rural-urban migration occurs, as long as the expected
real income differential is positive. Expected income is a function of the rigid,
institutionally determined urban wages and the urban employment rate. Migration costs
can be included. The employment rate is the probability of finding a job, i.e. being

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 selected from the pool of labour, which increases over time, for example due to wider
networks of the migrants. Migration thus increases if urban wages increase or the urban
employment rate increases (ceteris paribus). The authors show that it can be perfectly
rational to migrate, despite urban unemployment, due to a positive expected income
differential. This model has clear predictions and while the significance of income
differentials is undisputable in labour migration decision, it is probably not as excessive
as Harris and Todaro describe it. The model assumes that an equilibrium will take place,
which we do not find in the real world and some of the other empirical predictions e.g.
wage equalization, have also not been found.

The formal statement of the equilibrium condition of the Harris–Todaro model is as follows:

• Let w r be the wage rate (marginal productivity of labor) in the rural agricultural sector.
• Let l e be the total number of jobs available in the urban sector, which should be equal to
the number of employed urban workers.
• Let l us be the total number of job seekers, employed and unemployed, in the urban sector.
• Let w u be the wage rate in the urban sector, which could possibly be set by government
with a minimum wage law.

Rural to urban migration will take place if:

Conversely, urban to rural migration will occur if:

At equilibrium,

Thus, with random matching of workers to available jobs, the ratio of available jobs to total job
seekers gives the probability that any person moving from the agricultural sector to the urban
sector will be able to find a job. As a result, in equilibrium, the agricultural wage rate is equal to
the expected urban wage rate, which is the urban wage multiplied by the employment rate.

Therefore, migration from rural areas to urban areas will increase if:

• Urban wages (w u ) increase in the urban sector (l e ), increasing the expected urban income.
• Agricultural productivity decreases, lowering marginal productivity and wages in the
agricultural sector (w r ), decreasing the expected rural income.

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Rural to urban migration causes overcrowding and unemployment in cities as migration rates
exceed urban job creation rates, with many people ending up in unproductive or underproductive
employment in the informal sector. However, even though this migration creates unemployment
and induces informal sector growth, this behavior is economically rational and utility-
maximizing in the context of the Harris–Todaro model. As long as the migrating economic
agents have complete and accurate information concerning rural and urban wage rates and
probabilities of obtaining employment, they will make an expected income-maximizing decision.

Limitations: One limitation of this model is that it assumes potential migrants are risk neutral, as
in they are indifferent between a certain expected rural income and an uncertain expected urban
income of the same magnitude. This assumption's reflection of economic realities is
questionable; poor migrants will likely be risk averse and require a significantly greater expected
urban income to migrate. However, the Harris–Todaro model can be adjusted to reflect risk
aversion through alteration of the expected urban income calculation. When the model assumes
risk aversion instead of risk neutrality, the results are virtually identical.

3. The dual labour market theory (Priore, 1979) explains migration as the result of a
temporary pull factor, namely strong structural labour demand in developed countries.
According to this not purely economic approach, there is economic dualism on the labour
market of developed countries and wages also reflect status and prestige. There is a
primary sector providing well-paid jobs and a secondary sector, for unskilled jobs, e.g.
manufacturing. The demand for migrant labour force stems from several factors. Due to
structural inflation, there are constant wage rises in the primary sector. Proportional wage
rises in the secondary sector are too expensive; the consequent lower pay makes the
secondary sector unattractive to native workers. Migrants are more motivated to work in
these low-status jobs, because they do not consider themselves as part of the destination
society. Employment in the secondary sector fluctuates according to the economic cycle,
making it unstable and uncertain work, again unattractive to native workers. Traditional
sources of labour in the secondary sector, women and teenagers are not available
anymore due to demographic changes. Women have joined the regular labour force and
there are smaller teenage cohorts. Therefore there is a strong demand for temporary
migrant labour that acts as a pull factor to migration. This model is important because it
explains some of the post-war migration trends in Europe and the United States, but the
focus is too narrow with only one pull factor being analysed and with no deeper analysis
of migrant decision making.

4. The world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974), which takes a historical structural
approach, stresses the role of disruptions and dislocations in peripheral parts of the world,
as a result of colonialism and the capitalist expansion of neoclassical governments and
multinationals. It thus takes account of structural factors that other theories neglect. The
capitalist expansion has had profound consequences for migration issues, as not only the
capitalist mode of production, but also the culture and stronger transportation,
communication and military links penetrate peripheries.

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 Land consolidation, new capitalist farming methods and manufacturing plants have
created a socially uprooted population with weakened attachments to their land and more
prone to migration. A strong immigrant labour demand in global cities acts as a pull force
to migration. According to this theory, migration follows the dynamics of market creation
and structure of the global economy, but more individual motivations are not considered.
The exact mechanisms of migration are also not clear. Recent examples of this theory are
globalization in general and the transition of Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of
Communism.

5. Another macro-level model explaining rural-urban migration in less developed countries

is Mabogunje’s (1970) migration as a system model, in which he explains migration as
a dynamic spatial process. Aggregate migration flows and interactions are modelled by
starting with a pool of rural potential migrants that is affected by various factors in the
decision to migrate. The rural control sub-system controls outflows (e.g. family or
community norms), the urban control sub-system controls inflows (e.g. through
employment agencies), feedback is channelled back to potential migrants and the
background environment also affects migration flows (social & economic conditions,
government policies, transport & communications infrastructure etc.).

6. Zelinsky’s hypothesis of mobility transition (1971) argues that migration is part of the
economic and social changes inherent in the modernization process. It is part of the wider
range of functionalist theories of social change and development, which try to link
theories to past empirical trends. He argues that patterns and rates of migration can be
closely linked to the stage of modernization (e.g. industrialization) and demographic
factors (e.g. high birth rates). He emphasizes that the preference for more personal
freedom is part of the modernization process. While his theories broadly make sense
when looking at past migration patterns in industrialized nations, it is vague and does not
allow differentiation of different types of migration and it does not consider the
individual migration decisions. This decision is the starting p4

The Zelinsky Model of Mobility Transition claims that the type of migration that occurs
within a country depends on how developed it is or what type of society it is. A
connection is drawn from migration to the stages of within the Demographic Transition
Model (DTM).

Model Stages

1. Phase one (“Premodern traditional society”): This is before the onset of the urbanisation,
and there is very little migration. Natural increase rates are about zero.

2. Phase two (“Early transitional society”): There is “massive movement from countryside
to cities... as a community experiences the process of modernisation”. There is “rapid rate
of natural increase”.

3. Phase three (“Late transitional society”): This phase corresponds to the “critical rung...of
the mobility transition” where urban-to-urban migration surpasses the ruralto- urban

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 migration, where rural-to-urban migration “continues but at waning absolute or relative
rates”, and a “complex migrational and circulatory movements within the urban network,
from city to city or within a single metropolitan region” increased, non-economic
migration and circulation began to emerge.

4. Phase four (“Advanced society”): The “movement from countryside to city continues but
is further reduced in absolute and relative terms, vigorous movement of migrants from
city to city and within individual urban agglomerations...especially within a highly
elaborated lattice of major and minor metropolises” is observed. There is “slight to
moderate rate of natural increase or none at all”.

5. Phase five (“Future superadvanced society”): “Nearly all residential migration may be of
the interurban and intraurban variety….No plausible predictions of fertility behaviour,...a
stable mortality pattern slightly below present levels”.
3.1.2 Meso-Level Theories

3.1.3 Micro-Level Theories

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 3.2 Theorotical Perspectives in Resettlement and Displacement (Based on Asfaw
Keno. 2006, MA Thesis; Cernea, M. 1999)

3.2.1 The Inherent Complexities Approach

The inherent complexity approach argues that there is complexity in resettlement, which arises
from interrelatedness of a range of issues of different orders: cultural, social environmental,
economic, institutional all of which are taking place in the context of imposed spatial change.
Understanding this complexity, and attempting to come to terms with it, seems to require a more
comprehensive and open-ended approach (De Wet, 2004: 62).

According to the inherent complexity model designer, Chris De Wet, threats (imminent harm,
danger or misery) may occur at various levels (individuals / household, community level, project
level, national /regional and internationals) of resettlement (De Wet, 2004:62). At the
individual/household level, these include: loss of access to services, loss of access to schooling,
loss civil human rights. And, these are related to the threat of the loss of natural, economic and
human capital (De Wet, 2004:62). At community level the danger or threat that could be
encountered include: disruption of the existing social fabric; patterns of social organization and
interpersonal, kinship groups, informal networks. Loss or lessening of access to communal
property resources, community service, and access to schooling could happen at community
level. However, different sections of the resettled group such as rich and poor, young and old,
men and women healthy and ill, will experience the threats inherent in resettlement with
different intensities. Creation of dependency syndrome is one of the threats that endanger the
settler community. The threats cited to hit resettlement projects include: critical shortage of
resources; and failure to meet project goal within a given span of time; at national level limited
proper legal and policy framework; lack of sufficient political will, and commitment; fiscal
restraint; absence of functional coordination between the various agencies responsible for
different aspects of resettlement; lack of proper plan, fund and fail to respect of the rights and
wishes of people are threats (De Wet, 2004:64).

To ensure genuine participation and improve settlement results, De Wet (2004: 66-67)
recommended the following:

1) A democratic participatory approach to project planning and implementation, involving;

Authentic participation which involves the ability to influence decisions; Decision making
criteria which move away from the purely economic to more dialogic, consensual considerations;
Recognition of resistance as a legitimate form of expression in the dialogue about development
options; Re-examination of the criteria allowing the state to relocate people and appropriate
property; Development of skills necessary for all parties to engage in open ended negotiation as
equal parties; Free flow of information at all stages of a development project which may cause
resettlement;

2) A wide range of resettlement and compensation options, involving: Approaches designed

to open out choices, allowing people to mix and match options to their needs; Appropriate and
just forms and levels of compensation determined in genuine consultation with affected people;

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Options that will not increase economic differentiation, while yet encouraging the rich to invest
in the resettlement area;

3) A flexible, learning oriented approach to resettlement projects: Project design so as to be

able to adapt as unexpected developments occur, and in response to ongoing input by affected
parties; the necessary range of skills in the implementation team, as well as sufficient funding, to
allow for flexibility;

4) That “an approach based on recognition of rights’ and ‘assessment or risks’

(particularly rights at risk) be developed as a tool for future planning and decision
making”.

Thus, in order to improve resettlement schemes and obtain better results, it is important to: make
decision making in all the resettlement stages participatory; make the programs heterogeneous
and keep equity and justice between setters and host community, compensations; be flexible in
incorporating lessons learned from doing and in allowing sufficient fund, and also respect human
right.

3.2.1 The Processual Analysis of Resettlement as a Sequence of Stages

Scudder and Colson (1982:274-275) have formulated a four-stage resettlement conceptual

framework dividing the relocation process into successive stages, namely, 1) The recruitment
stage, 2) the transition stage 3) the stage of potential development, and 4) the handing
over/incorporation stage.

The recruitment stage deals with the decision-making of the government and executing
agencies to move a given population and about where they shall go and how the move shall take
place. This stage does not directly involve the community. It is a stage in which the initiators of
relocation think about the socio-cultural characteristics of the population to be moved and how
these will affect their response to relocation and to the new environment. Decisions taken at this
stage will influence the length and stressfulness of the transition stage (Scudder and Colson,
1982:274).

The transition stage is characterized by the struggle to adjust to loss of homeland and to new
surroundings. This stage is characterized by multidimensional stress, higher morbidity and
mortality rates, anxiety about loss of home and what the future may bring, and temporary or
permanent loss of cultural inventory, including indigenous knowledge, customs, and institutions.
This stage, the adjustment and coping stage, usually continues for a minimum of two years
following removal (Scudder and Colson 1982:274; Scudder, 1993: 131).

The stage of potential economic and social development is characterized by economic

development where households increasingly pursue dynamic investment strategies initially,
begin shifting from a reliance on consumption crops to higher value cashes crops, diversify
production, engage in livestock management and small-scale non- farm enterprises. Places of
worship, funeral and other social welfare associations are established. Institutional developments
continue throughout stage three which is characterized by a resurgence of cultural symbols,

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almost a renaissance, as community members reaffirm control over their lives (Scudder and
Colson, 1982:275; Scudder, 1993:133,).

The stage of handing over and incorporation is also characterized by the devolution of
management responsibilities from specialized settlement agencies to the community of settlers
and various line ministries. Scudder and Colson’s resettlement theory has been criticized for its
being a “stress centered model” (Cernea, 1996: 21) and for its high level of generalization
which obscures the importance of societal and environmental variation how people behave
during the various stages its formulation to explain the similarities rather than the differences in
people’s reactions to involuntary relocation De Wet (1988:186) confirms the importance Scudder
and Colson model at the recruitment and transition stage, which are the most stressful stages of
relocation.

3.2.2 The Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) Model

The Scudder–Colson model focused on the different behavioural tendencies common to each of
a series of stages through which resettlers passed. In the 1980s and 1990s, the mounting evidence
of involuntary resettlement schemes that failed to pass through all four stages suggested that a
new model was necessary to explain the consequences of involuntary relocation. In particular, it
was recognized that a new theory was necessary to model what was increasingly seen as
predictable impoverishment in forced resettlement schemes.

Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model arose in the 1990s in response
to this recognition. In contrast to the Scudder–Colson model, the IRR model does not
attempt to identify different stages of relocation, but rather aims to identify the
impoverishment risks intrinsic to forced resettlement and the processes necessary for
reconstructing the livelihoods of displacees. It argues that resettlement goes wrong principally
because of a lack of the proper inputs: national legal frameworks and policies, political will,
funding, pre-resettlement surveys, planning, consultation, careful implementation and
monitoring. In particular, it stresses that, unless specifically addressed by targeted policies,
forced displacement can cause impoverishment among displacees by bringing about
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of access to
common property resources, increased morbidity and mortality, and community
disarticulation.

Lack of theses inputs leads to the following eight ‘impoverishment risks’:

1) Landlessness;
2) joblessness;
3) home lessens;
4) marginalization;
5) food insecurity;
6) increased morbidity;
7) lack of access to common property resources; and
8) community disarticulation

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[Note: “Education loss” has been added by the author in a 2002 revision of the IRR model as
another essential impoverishment risk]

Cernea argues that these risks can be controlled by policy responses. Cernea argues that proper
policy, political will, and provision with adequate fund can overcome the problems of
inadequacy of inputs and the impoverishment risks can then be turned into opportunities for
reconstruction (Cernea 2000:35).

Cernea (2002) characterizes resettlement risks as follows; expropriation of land removes the
main foundation up on which a people’s productive systems, commercial activities, and
livelihoods are constructed. This is the principal form of de-capitalization and pauperization of
displaced people, as loss of both natural and man-made capital (Cernea, 2000:22). Massive
population displacement threatens to cause serious declines in health levels.

Displacement-induced social stress and psychological traumas are sometimes accompanied by

the outbreak of relocation related illnesses, particularly parasitic and vector-borne diseases
such as malaria and schistosomiasis. Unsafe water supply and improvised sewage systems
increase vulnerability to epidemics and chronic diarrhea, dysentery, and so on. The weakest
segments of the demographic spectrum- infants, children, and the elderly are affected most
strongly. Forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into temporary or chronic
undernourishment, (Cernea, 2000:23).

For poor people, Particularly for the landless and asset less, loss of access to common property
assets that belonged to relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial
grounds, quarries, and so on) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels.
These losses are compounded by loss of access to some public services, such as school that can
be grouped within this category of risks (Cernea, 2000:23).

Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments
communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties: kinship groups
become scattered as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary
associations, and self-organized mutual service are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable
“social capital” that compounds the loss of natural physical and human capital. The social capital
lost through social disarticulation is typically unperceived and uncompensated for by the
programs causing it, and this real loss has long-term consequences (Cernea, 2000:25).

The IRR model advices to plan ahead to reverse the direction of the risks, for instant, to prevent
landlessness land-based resettlement must be conceived. Resettlement risks must be reversed to
livelihood reconstruction and development (Cernea, 2000:36).

The Components of Reconstruction

The primary objective of any induced involuntary resettlement process should be to prevent
impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of resettlers. In further examining
the components of this reconstruction, we will follow a slightly different sequence than in the
earlier discussion of risks. First, we will address the basic economic variables-land and
employment-then, those referring to community reconstruction, housing, and social services.

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 1. From Landlessness to Land-Based Reestablishment; and from Joblessness to
Reemployment
2. From Homelessness to House Reconstruction
3. From Disarticulation to Community Reconstruction; from Marginalization to Social
Inclusion; and from Expropriation to Restoration of Community Assets/Services
4. From Food Insecurity to Adequate Nutrition; and from Increased Morbidity to Better
Health Care

4 Involountary Population Movements

4.1 Refugees (Based on UNHCR. 2009)

4.1.1 Global and Regional Trends in the Situation of Refugees

By the end of 2008, there were an estimated 10.5 million refugees under UNHCR’s
responsibility. In 2008, the refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate dropped for the first
time since 2006. The decrease arose from two main sources. First, a number of refugees found a
durable solution during the year, in particular through voluntary repatriation. Second, estimates
for the Colombian and Iraqi refugee populations in Ecuador and the Syrian Arab Republic
respectively were revised downwards (-32%). This constitutes a decrease of almost one million
refugees compared to the year earlier (11.4 million).

By the end of 2010, there were more than 10.55 million refugees under UNHCR’s responsibility.
The number of returnees shows a divergent picture. While an estimated 2.9 million IDPs were
able to return home during the year, the highest level in at least a decade, only 197,600 refugees
repatriated voluntarily, the lowest number in more than 20 years.

Table 1 (below) shows that one third of all refugees were residing in the Asia and Pacific region,
with three quarters of them being Afghans. The Middle East and North Africa region was host to
about one fifth (22%) of all refugees (primarily from Iraq) while Africa (excluding North Africa)
and Europe hosted respectively 20 and 15 per cent of the world’s refugees. The Americas region
had the smallest share of refugees (8%), with Colombians constituting the largest number.

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 4.1.2 The Ethiopian Situation

4.1.3 Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees (Based on UNHCR,

2003)
The Framework for Durable Solutions aims to achieve, through Development Assistance for
Refugees (DAR); Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (4Rs) and
Development through Local Integration (DLI), sharing burdens and responsibilities more
equitably and building capacities to receive and protect refugees; and, redoubling the search for
durable solutions.

4.1.3.1 DAR- Development Assistance for Refugees

DAR is additional development assistance for improved burden-sharing for countries hosting
large numbers of refugees; promoting better quality of life and self-reliance for refugees pending
different durable solutions; and, a better quality of life for host communities.

DAR would be applied in protracted refugee situations equipping refugees for any of the three
durable solutions, i.e. repatriation to their country of origin, local integration in the country of
asylum or resettlement to a third country. The general aspect of DAR would be better quality of
life and self-reliance for refugees as well as a better quality of life for host communities.

The DAR approach is essentially one of broad-based partnerships between governments,

humanitarian and multi-and bilateral development agencies. The mix of partnerships may vary
from country to country, but an invariable and essential component will be the commitment of
the relevant host government and the related central and local authorities.

The overarching inspiration to promote additional development assistance for refugees is

improved burden sharing, improved quality of asylum and better quality of life for
refugees and their hosts. DAR aims to achieve and facilitate the following:

• burden sharing with the host country;

• compensation for the burden aspect of the host community;
• development of the host country;
• development of the host community;
• gender equality, dignity and improved quality of refugee life;
• empowerment and enhancement of productive capacities and self-reliance of
refugees, particularly of women, pending durable solutions

In order for refugees to attain an improved quality of life through empowerment and self-
reliance, there is a need for:
• political will of the host government to consider refugees as catalysts for and
contributors to local development; and,
• refugees to have access to socio-economic activities

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 4.1.3.2 4Rs- Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction
4Rs is a programme concept referring to the related repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation
and reconstruction processes of a given operation and which aims to ensure linkages
between all four processes so as to promote durable solutions for refugees, ensure poverty
reduction and help create good local governance. The concept provides an overarching
framework for institutional collaboration in the implementation of reintegration operations
allowing maximum flexibility for field operations to pursue country specific approaches.

The guiding principles and critical success factors for this integrated approach are:

a) ownership by host governments of the processes which the 4Rs concept embodies;
b) integrated planning process at the country level by the UN Country Team;
c) strong institutional cooperation and commitment to support punctually and at decisive
moments, the needs and efforts of country teams to bridge essential gaps in transition
strategies; and,
d) participation of the plethora of actors who form part of the development community -
UN agencies bilateral and multilateral institutions.

4.1.3.3 DLI- Development through Local Integration

As a process, local integration would be characterized by the following components:

Economic component: refugees become progressively less reliant on State aid or humanitarian
assistance, attaining a growing degree of self-reliance and becoming able to pursue sustainable
livelihoods. The process of local integration is greatly facilitated by refugees becoming
selfreliant, since they become better able to interact with the local population economically and
socially. Economically integrated refugees contribute to the economic development of the host
country rather than merely constituting a “burden”.

Social and cultural component: interactions between refugees and local communities enable
refugees to live amongst or alongside the host population, without discrimination or exploitation
and as contributors to the development of their host communities.

Legal component: refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements
by the host States which are commensurate, generally, with those enjoyed by local citizens.
These include freedom of movement, access to education and the labour market, access to public
services and assistance, including health facilities, the possibility of acquiring and disposing of
property, and the capacity to travel with valid travel and identity documents. Realization of
family unity is another important aspect of local integration. Over time the process should lead to
permanent residence rights and perhaps ultimately the acquisition of citizenship in the country of
asylum.

4.2 Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Internally displaced persons are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of

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human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognised State border."

Components of the IDP definition

The definition provided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement highlights two
elements:

1) The coercive or otherwise involuntary character of movement

The definition mentions some of the most common causes of involuntary movements, such as
armed conflict, violence, human rights violations and disasters. These causes have in common
that they give no choice to people but to leave their homes and deprive them of the most essential
protection mechanisms, such as community networks, access to services, livelihoods.
Displacement severely affects the physical, socio-economic and legal safety of people and
should be systematically regarded as an indicator of potential vulnerability.

2) The fact that such movement takes place within national borders.

Unlike refugees, who have been deprived of the protection of their state of origin, IDPs remain
legally under the protection of national authorities of their country of habitual residence. IDPs
should therefore enjoy the same rights as the rest of the population. The Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement remind national authorities and other relevant actors of their responsibility
to ensure that IDPs’ rights are respected and fulfilled, despite the vulnerability generated by their
displacement.

Causes of Internal Displacement

The causes of displacement – in Africa, as in other parts of the world – are of course manifold
and complex. Quite apart from natural disasters or development-induced displacement, in most
cases the root causes of displacement are those that have triggered, or at least contributed to,
armed conflict or situations of violence in the first place. Poverty, the effects of climate change,
scarcity of resources, political instability, and weak governance and justice systems may all be
catalysts for conflict-induced displacement.

Why are IDPs particularly vulnerable?

Although all persons affected by conflict and/or human rights violations suffer, displacement
from one's place of residence may make the internally displaced particularly vulnerable.
Following are some of the factors that are likely to increase the need for protection:

• Internally displaced persons may be in transit from one place to another, may be in
hiding, may be forced toward unhealthy or inhospitable environments, or face other
circumstances that make them especially vulnerable.

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 • The social organisation of displaced communities may have been destroyed or damaged
by the act of physical displacement; family groups may be separated or disrupted; women
may be forced to assume non-traditional roles or face particular vulnerabilities.
• Internally displaced populations, and especially groups like children, the elderly, or
pregnant women, may experience profound psychosocial distress related to displacement.
• Removal from sources of income and livelihood may add to physical and psychosocial
vulnerability for displaced people.
• Schooling for children and adolescents may be disrupted.
• Internal displacement to areas where local inhabitants are of different groups or
inhospitable may increase risk to internally displaced communities; internally displaced
persons may face language barriers during displacement.
• The condition of internal displacement may raise the suspicions of or lead to abuse by
armed combatants, or other parties to conflict.
• Internally displaced persons may lack identity documents essential to receiving benefits
or legal recognition; in some cases, fearing persecution, displaced persons have
sometimes got rid of such documents.

4.2.1 Global and Regional Trends in the Situation of IDPs

4.2.2 Approaches to Protecting and Assisting IDPs

4.2.2.1 The Collaborative Approach
The current system which is often referred to as the collaborative approach, shares the
responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs among the UN agencies, i.e. UNHCR, Unicef,
WFP, UNDP, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the inter-governmental
organization IOM, the ICRC and International NGOs. Coordination is the responsibility of the
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator in the country concerned.
They are assisted by the Inter-Agency Displacement Division which was created in 2004 and is
housed in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The original collaborative approach has come under increasing criticism. Roberta Cohen reports:
Nearly every UN and independent evaluation has found the collaborative approach deficient
when it comes to IDPs. To begin with, there is no real locus of responsibility in the field for
assisting and protecting...There is also no predictability of action, as the different agencies are
free to pick and choose the situations in which they wish to become involved on the basis of their
respective mandates, resources, and interests. In every new emergency, no one knows for sure
which agency or combination thereof will become involved.

In 2005 there was an attempt to fix the problem by giving sectoral responsibilities to different
humanitarian agencies, most notably with the UNHCR taking on the responsibility for protection
and the management of camps and emergency shelters.

15
 4.2.2.2 The Cluster Approach

As some have pointed out, one of the most flagrant problems of the collaborative response was
that “abnegation of responsibility is possible because there is no formal responsibility
apportioned to agencies under the Collaborative Response, and thus no accountability when
agencies renege on their promises.” The cluster approach – the successor to the collaborative
approach - tried to do away with this problem by designating individual agencies as ‘sector
leaders’ to coordinate operations in specific areas to try to plug those newly identified gaps. The
cluster approach was conceived amid concerns about coordination and capacity that arose from
the weak operational response to the crisis in Darfur in 2004 and 2005, and the critical findings
of the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) commissioned by the then ERC, Jan Egeland.
Egeland called for strengthening leadership of the sectors, and introduced the concept of
"clusters” at different levels (headquarters, regional, country and operational)’.

The cluster approach operates on two levels: the global and local. At the global level, the
approach is meant to build up capacity in eleven key ‘gap’ areas by developing better surge
capacity, ensuring consistent access to appropriately trained technical expertise and enhanced
material stockpiles, and securing the increased engagement of all relevant humanitarian partners.
At the field level, the cluster approach strengthens the coordination and response capacity by
mobilizing clusters of humanitarian agencies (UN/Red Cross-Red Crescent/IOs/NGOs) to
respond in particular sectors or areas of activity, each cluster having a clearly designated and
accountable lead, as agreed by the HC and the Country Team. Designated lead agencies at the
global level both participate directly in operations, but also coordinate with and oversee other
organizations within their specific spheres, reporting the results up through a designated chain of
command to the ERC at the summit. However, lead agencies are responsible as ‘providers of last
resort’, which represents the commitment of cluster leads to do their utmost to ensure an
adequate and appropriate response in their respective areas of responsibility. The cluster
approach was part of a package of reforms accepted by the IASC in December 2005 and
subsequently applied in eight chronic humanitarian crises and six sudden-onset emergencies.
However, the reform was originally rolled out and evaluated in four countries: DRC, Liberia,
Somalia and Uganda.

The clusters were originally concentrated on nine areas: 1) Logistics (WFP) 2) emergency
telecommunications (OCHA-Process owner, UNICEF Common Data Services, WFP – Common
Security Telecommunications Services) 3) camp coordination and management (UNHCR for
conflict-generated IDPs and IOM for natural disaster-generated IDPs) 4) emergency shelter
(IFRC) 5) health (WHO) 6) nutrition (UNICEF) 7) water, sanitation, and hygiene (UNICEF) 8)
early recovery (UNDP); and 9) protection (UNHCR for conflict-generated IDPs, UNHCR,
UNICEF, and OHCHR for natural disaster generated IDPs.

IASC Principles deemed it unnecessary to apply the cluster approach to four sectors where no
significant gaps were detected: a) food, led by WFP; b) refugees, led by UNHCR; c) education,
led by UNICEF; and d) agriculture, led by FAO.

The original nine clusters were later expanded to include agriculture and education.

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 4.3 Development Induced Resettlement
No precise data exists on the numbers of persons affected by development-induced displacement
throughout the world. Unlike for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), there are no
institutions or publications dedicated to tracking overall DIDR, either at the global or national
levels. For an indication of magnitude, most scholars, policy-makers, and activists rely on the
World Bank Environment Department’s (WBED) estimate that roughly 10 million people are
displaced each year due to dam construction, urban development, and transportation and
infrastructure programs.

The types of development projects that most often cause involuntary resettlement are those that
are predicated on a major change in land and water use. This commonly occurs in urban
development projects, water resource projects, in highway construction, mine development or In
Industry, where financing is provided for:

(a) Construction of dams for Irrigation, hydro-energy and water supply which create man-
made lakes on previously Inhabited areas;
(b) Construction of transportation corridors -- railways, highways, airports, transmission
lines, irrigation canal networks and others that require right of way;
(c) Construction of new ports and towns;
(d) Construction or Improvement of urban Infrastructure
(e) Inception of mining operations, particularly strip mining; and
(f) The protection of grazing areas and of transhumance routes.

Such projects are often of crucial Importance for national or regional development. They are but
one of a variety of situations in which national long term Interests may conflict with the Interests
of groups and individuals who are Immediately and adversely affected. The former usually
prevail. However, Inasmuch as these projects, In addition to their positive contribution to
national Interests, have also an unavoidable negative impact, means of reconciling the two sets of
conflicting Interests need to be found. Firm measures must be taken to protect the lives, welfare,
culture and human rights of those displaced, as well as to reduce/redress the loss of economic
potential incurred by the local or regional economy.

4.4 Resettlement in the Ethiopian Context (Based on Dessalegn, 2005. MA Thesis)

4.4.1 Resettlement during Imperial Rule

It was the self-initiated resettlement undertaking by individuals and small groups of people that
characterized most of the period prior to the 1974 (Kasahun, 2003:3). That is, planned
resettlement schemes took the smallest proportion of the people involved in the move (Ibid).
Despite such a low state and non-state involvement, however, more than one million people had
spontaneously settled in different part of the country (Ibid). This move was followed by
corresponding 25 percent increase in the total area of cultivated land in the country (Wood, 1982:
157).

17
The underlying causes for such a population mobility and resettlement in the pre 1974 Ethiopia
were: limited employment opportunities of the urban areas, high population pressure, the
traditional land tenure system-the major bottleneck to increased peasant production and
intensified land use, limited extension and marketing systems (ibid).

Less than 10 percent of the total population of the country had been urban residents with little
industrialization and existence of diversified employment opportunities both in the urban and
rural areas (Ibid). As the result, the growing labor force was little absorbed in the urban
employment sector and hence the wider chance of remaining in the rural areas. These have
increased pressure on the rural land in turn enhancing the demand for migration and resettlement.

Besides the internal forces, external forces have also worked to accelerate the resettlement
practices in the country. In the era of growth-with modernization, i.e., in the late 1950s,
agriculture was put aside from playing active role in the economic development of the less
developed countries (Staatz and Eicher, 1990:45). Rather, more emphasizes was given to Urban–
Industrial Development Strategy than on Rural and Agriculture (Ibid). In the five-year
development plan of the Ethiopia (1957-1961), it was written as (Dejene 1996:40): "To solve the
problem of agricultural backwardness [inEthiopia], there is no need to bring about fundamental
changes in the present mode of production, nor it is desirable to give up the kind of tools in use”.

In line with the then Urban-biased Development Policy of the World Bank and IMF, the Imperial
regime had paid little attention to the agricultural sector, particularly, agricultural extension
(Ibid). For instance, agriculture had received only 7.5 percent of the total monetary investment in
the first Five-year Development Plan of the country (Ibid)

Perhaps, this argument has discouraged the role of extension services and other modern
agricultural inputs to enhance the productivity of the sector. This situation has also forced the
people to search for virgin land through migration and resettlement (Wood, 1983:156).

In contrast to the 1950s, in the late 1960s, there was a worldwide movement that emphasized the
role of agriculture in the development strategy of the third world countries (Staatz and Eicher,
1990: 50). This movement, including in Ethiopia, has demanded land reform, the absence of
which was argued as the long-standing bottleneck to enhance the productivity of the peasant
farm in particular and the national economy in general (Dejene, 1996: 45, Eshetu and Mulat,
1988: 164). The then (1960s) international advisory group to the Emperor (Harvard Advisory
group) also directly advocated the abrogation of the land grant system and proposed a
comprehensive planned utilization of government land through appropriate [re] settlement
policy, particularly of planned low-cost resettlement program (Eshetu and Mulat 1988: 164).
Perhaps; this has also put an impetus to the already existing resettlement practices.

For fear of the political consequence of the proposed land reform, however, the Emperor had
opted to encourage large-scale commercial farms in the lowland areas of the country (Wood,
1982: 161). The growing implementation of the large-scale commercial farms has also led to the
growing practice of planned resettlement schemes through the eviction of tenants from where
these estates were established (Ibid). In this regard, the Karayu Oromos and Afar pastorals of the
Awash Valley are the best examples (Dejene, 1996: 46). This eviction also enhanced forced

18
displacement and resettlement. These developments, either directly or indirectly were the result
of donors (external assistance) influence on the development policy orientations of the country.

In spite of the internal and external forces at work, planned resettlement practice has remained
small (Kasahun, 2003:3). Only 7000 household units were accommodated under planned
resettlement schemes (Ibid). Though small, the program was disastrous.

Wood (1983), Alula (1990), Dessalegn (2003), have summarized the consequences as
accompanied by:

a. Extensive soil erosion, which was not only disruptive of the nation's resource but also
caused the settlers’ to frequently move in search for new farmland for continuous years
and continuous resource loss, particularly forest resource.
b. Disarticulation of the pastoral and some highlander population (ex. Karyau, Afar, Arsi
and Wolita)
c. Little consultation of the host population, a hot bed for host-settler population conflict.
d. Negligible contribution to Ethiopia's rural development.

4.4.2 Resettlement under Dergue Rule

Notwithstanding the problems of resettlement practices in the pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, the

program was continued as one of the top priority issue in rural development. In contrast to the
self-organized resettlement, planned resettlement project became the top priory agenda of the
government during the dergue. In a decade since the revolution, the sizes of planned schemes
grow to 88 with the total household unit and population size of 46,000 and 180,000, respectively
(Kasahun 2003: 3). The underlying causes for such a rapid growth in the size of schemes and the
consequent relocated population were the land act of the 1975 and the establishment of
government agencies responsible for the resettlement undertaking (Alemneh 1990, Alula 1990,
Kashaun, 2003).

The rationale behind the growing importance of planned resettlement program as a rural
development option of the Dergue was multi dimensional. These include economic, social,
ecological and political agendas (Wood 1983, Alula 1990, Alemneh, 1990). From ecological
point of view, relocating people from densely populated to the sparsely populated lowlands as
well as to the Southwestern highland was seen as a measure to relieve the problem of population-
resource imbalance in the former area (Alemneh, 1990:175). It was also a strategy used to move
people-off areas designated for State forest expansion and northern highland reclamation projects
(Ibid).From economic point of view, relocating people to "underutilized" areas was argued to
bring about “efficient utilization “of resources, particularly land and attain food security (Ibid).

The social rationale was tied with the land Proclamation act of the 1975, which called for
accessing landless peasants to land (Pausewang, 1990: 43). During the period of the Emperor,
land was concentrated within the hands of the Feudal lords and the landed gentry. Rural landless
peasants have got little chance of access to land except through the system of tenancy (ibid). The
land reform act has recognized the usufruct right of ,tenants,’ but with no whole to claim the

19
ownership of it. The need to remove the unwanted urban unemployment in the country was also
justified as the social rationale for then resettlement undertaking (Dessalegn 1988: cited in Alula
and Francois, 2004: 11).

There are two divergent arguments as to the Dergue’s political motive of the resettlement
undertaking in Ethiopia. Depopulating areas of support for the Tigrai People's Liberation Front
(TPLF) in the northwest and creating garrison buffers against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
in the West were argued as the covert motives of theprogram (Wood 1983, Alula 1990).

Similarly, planned resettlement of pastoral nomads, particularly in the Southeastern part of the
country was designed for double purposes: i.e., to introduce improved animal husbandry
techniques and implicitly also to serve as a strategic response to insurgency by the Somali
pastorals of Ogaden (Wood, 1983:157) Jansson 1990 cited in Gebre (2004: 94) on the other hand
argued that the political allegations about depopulating TPLF support-base was unfounded, in
that only 15 percent of the then 600,000 Dergue settlers have come from Tigrai province.
Promoting regional development through balanced distribution of population versus the available
resource in the country and development of growth centers were also some of the motives for the
move (Shileshi, 1988; Eshetu and Mulat, 1988).

With such overt and covert motives, the Dergue regime had continuously moved into the
program until the mid 1980's. Classified under "large–scale", "low cost" and integrated schemes,
about 600,000 people were resettled in the country, in which, about 81 percent of the total
relocates were held in the western part of the country: Ilubabor, Wallaga and Kefa (Alemneh,
1990: 175).

Temporary moratorium of the program was made in 1986 with acknowledged social, economic
and ecological costs. Social wise, the cost was so high that, of the total population resettled in
1980's, about 20,000 died (Brune, 1990: 26). Besides, 500 people were executed while on
escape, 5000 returned to their original home after a long suffering, about 250,000 families were
separated either from one or more of their family members, while 10,000 flew to Sudan (Dawit,
1989: 304). The settlers’ were also devoid of their religious freedom and right of travel (Alula
1990: 129).

On the side of the host population, resettlement involved forced labor for preparing infrastructure
facilities, supply of labor for production of food crops, expropriation of their common resource
pool areas (Dessalegn, 2003: VI). Generally, rather than being sites of hope for development,
resettlement schemes became the hot beds of hostilities between the host and Settler population
(Alula, 1990&2004, Eshetu and Mulat, 1988).

Environmentally, the program has led to massive deforestation and enhanced further
degradations both in the area of origin and destination (Alemneh, 1990:178). More than 370,000
hectare of dense forest in the western part of the country was bulldozed and converted into
farmland (Ibid). The resettlement program by and large has failed to achieve its fundamental
objective, i.e. the improvement of productive capacity of the peasant in the country (Alemeneh,
1990; Alula, 1990).

20
Similarly, Dessalegn, (1989: 5) argued that the results were poor compared to what the settlers
used to produce and to what can be expected with appropriate agricultural practices. Eshetu and
Mulat (1988: 193) also indicated that all the [re]settlement schemes whether large-scale (special)
and low-cost schemes, in Ethiopia, have exhibited low level of productivity compared with the
expected level of output as per the inputs made.

Politically, the practice was argued unpopular, enforced, i.e., without informed decision-making
power of the settler and, driven by political cadres (Alula, 2004: 13). Generally, the resettlement
program of the Dergue had involved considerable environmental damage and failed to recognize
the rights of the host population, hasty in planning and practices characterized by low
productivity, devoid of international political support and failed in most of its multifaceted
objectives including environmental, social, economic and political aspects (Dessalegn 2003,
Gebre 2004, Alula 1990).

4.4.3 Current Resettlement Programs

Despite its initial critique before its coming into power (Roberta et al, 2004:596), EPDRF, has
recently changed its mind pro-of launching planned resettlement schemes in the country,
particularly, in the after-math of the fourteen million people hard-hit by, and vulnerability to
food insecurity. Alike the past allegations, frequent food insecurity and famine, land degradation,
drought, high population pressure, low input subsistence agriculture, small farm size and
landlessness were put as the rationales for the current resettlement planning and practices in the
country (FDRE, 2003: 6).

To minimize the possible hard-pressing impacts of the problems, Western and Southwestern
parts of the country were selected as the areas of destination, argued, these areas are ‘sparsely
populated’ and "underutilized" (FDRE, 2003: 1). Accordingly, the main objective of the current
resettlement program was stated as “enable the chronically food insecure households attain food
security through improved access to land” (Ibid). In this program, about 2.2 million people
(440,000 household units) were planned to be relocated at an estimated cost of 1,867.5 million
birr (Ibid). Region wise, it was planned in such a way that 40,000, 200,000, 100,000 and 100,000
households would be relocated from and within Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nations
Nationalities and Peoples regions.

The design of the current program is put to be different from the design in the last two regimes in
that (FDRE, 2002: 5): (a) it rested on the voluntary option of the potential settlers (b) it is
implemented at intra-regional level (c) the settlers would retain their land use right and other
immovable properties at their area of origin up to three years of their initial relocation. (d) And,
the Settlers are optionally given the right to return to their area of origin whenever they get hang
of mind. The initiation of the current resettlement program also rested on four pillars: the
availability of ‘underutilized land’, voluntary option by potential settlers, consultation of the host
community and proper preparation (Ibid: 5-6).

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5 Voluntary Population Movements
5.1 Labor Migration

5.1.1 International Labour Migration

There are around 190 million people globally living in a country not of their birth. The ILO
estimates that there are more than 42 million migrant workers worldwide, not including the
millions of illegal migrants, many of whom are open to abuse and exploitation.

In the contemporary world, international migration continues to play an important (if often
unacknowledged) role in national, regional and global affairs. In many developing countries, the
remittances received from migrants constitute a more important source of income than Official
Development Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Throughout much of the
world, migrants are not only employed in jobs that nationals are reluctant to do, but are
also engaged in high-value activities that local people lack the skills to do. In certain
countries, whole sectors of the economy and many public services have become highly
dependent on migrant labour, and would collapse overnight if those workers were no longer
available.

The predominant form of migration varies considerably from one part of the world to another. In
Asia, for example, many migrants move on the basis of temporary labour contracts, while in
parts of the Americas and Africa, irregular migration is far more prevalent. Traditional countries
of immigration such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA continue to accept
migrants for permanent settlement and citizenship, while the countries of the Middle East usually
admit international migrants for fixed periods and without any expectation of integration. In
Europe, the major preoccupation of recent years has been the arrival of asylum seekers from
other parts of the world, the majority of whom do not qualify for refugee status.

• International migrants estimated at 214 million in 2010 represent only three per cent of the
global population;
• Women make up almost 50 per cent of international migrants;
• Migrant workers (economically active among total migrant population) are about 105
million in 2010; and,
• Migrant workers – who migrate for employment - and their families account for about 90
per cent of total international migrants.

5.1.1.1 Migration of Women

Women constituted just under half of all international migrants in 2000, and just over half of
those lived in more developed regions. Women are entering the global labour market in greater
numbers and increasingly migrate alone. Indeed, they are often primary breadwinners for the
families they leave behind. These trends will continue in the years to come, not least because of
increased demand in the industrialized states for labour in sectors that are traditionally associated

22
with women: domestic work, nursing and personal care services, cleaning, entertainment
and the sex trade, as well as retailing and labour-intensive manufacturing.

Negative attitudes in countries of origin towards divorced, widowed, childless and single
women, coupled with the fact that many women now have better access to education and a
greater awareness of their human rights, will provide further incentives for women at all levels of
education to seek jobs and new experiences abroad.

5.1.1.2 The migration of professional Personnel

Responding to the opportunities presented by a globalizing labour market, a growing number of

people with professional skills are moving to work abroad, both between developing countries
and from poorer to richer parts of the world. For the individuals concerned, international
migration represents a ‘race to the top’, an effort to realize their potential, increase their income,
improve their standard of living and add to the knowledge they have already gained.

For many countries, however, the departure of essential workers with professional skills can
have an adverse impact on society and the economy and represents a serious loss to states that
have made major investments in the education and training of such personnel. In many countries
in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the departure of essential workers has seriously impeded the
delivery of health services to local populations, especially those living in remote rural areas. If
this trend continues unabated it is likely to undermine the progress that has to be made in
achieving the health-related objectives of the Millennium Development Goals. The trend is less
acute, but is also of concern, in the education sector.
The migration of health personnel
The migration of professional personnel has a major impact on the health sector in sub-Saharan
Africa. Since 2000, for example, nearly 16,000 African nurses have registered to work in the UK
alone. Only 50 out of 600 doctors trained since Independence are still practicing in Zambia. And it is
estimated that there are currently more Malawian doctors practicing in the northern English city of
Manchester than in the whole of Malawi.

5.1.1.3 Migrant Remittances

Remittances evidently provide the most direct and immediate benefits to the people who receive
them, many of whom, the World Bank has established, are amongst the poorest members of
society. Remittances help to lift recipients out of poverty, increase and diversify household
incomes, provide an insurance against risk, enable family members to benefit from educational
and training opportunities and provide a source of capital for the establishment of small
businesses.

23
When remittances are used to purchase goods and services, or when they are invested in
community-based projects or in ventures that demand labour, they also benefit a broader range of
people than those who receive them directly from relatives working abroad.

5.1.2 Internal Labour Migration

Internal migration is important almost everywhere and in some countries is far greater than
international migration. Close to 120 million people were estimated to migrate internally in
China in 2001 against a mere 458,000 people migrating internationally for work (Ping 2003). In
Vietnam roughly 4.3 million people migrated internally in the five years before the 1999 census
whereas the number of international migrants was fewer than 300,000 (Anh et al 2003). In India
too, internal migration numbers run into millions while international migration is only a fraction
of this (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). There are references to the importance of internal
labour migration and remittances in many other countries, including Bangladesh (Afsar 2003);
Pakistan (Gazdar 2003); Cambodia (ADB 2001), Vietnam (Anh et al 2003, Government of
Vietnam 2003), Lao PDR (Acharya 2003), Mongolia (Tsogtsaikhan 2003), Ethiopia (RESAL
1999), Sub-Saharan Africa (Bryceson et al 2003), Lesotho, Maldives and Papua New Guinea
(Jerve 2001).

5.1.2.1 Patterns of Internal Labour Migration in Ethiopia

The process of migration in Ethiopia is not a new phenomenon. The various population
movements induced by trade, slave raids, natural disaster and warfare and expansion mark the
history of the country. Labor migration however, started relatively recently. Studies of labor
migration in Ethiopia are rather limited and most are around the capital and other urban centers
of the country (See Kassahun, 2000; Shimelis, 1997).

One of the earliest studies of farm labor migration is that of Kloos (1981) entitled. "Farm Labor
Migration in the Awash valley of Ethiopia". In this study he tried to identify the determinants
and patterns of labor migration. He found most migrants to belong to kembata and Hadya ethnic
groups (kloos 1981:139). Kloos suggested that population pressure, drought and famine, and
cultural variables partly explain the observed aggregate flow pattern. In this line Regassa (1993)
identifies a category of seasonal migration towards the commercial farms and coffee growing
regions of the country. According to him the original homes of the seasonal labor migrants to the
large scale commercial agriculture of the Awash valley were the densely populated regions of the
south where the Kembata, Hadya, Wolayita and Gurage constitute the largest Ethnic group
(Regassa 1993:20).

The extensive literature revised by Birru (1997) shows push factors in rural areas of Ethiopia to
dominate over the pull forces triggering rural out migration. In general labor migration is
considered to be induced by rural poverty which is a sum total of intricate problems in the rural
areas of Ethiopia. Kebede (1994) provides a list of these problems-landlessness, inadequate farm
inputs and land fragmentation; improper farm practices and absence of plough oxen; introduction
of commercial farms and the consequent eviction of farmers from their land (Kebede 1994:36).

Furthermore, most migrant in the country are observed to be less skilled and eke out their living
as daily laborers or doing other low paying low status jobs (ibid).

24