ACDC vs. Tulabot

4/13/24, 8:37 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 457
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 317

Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs.
Tulabut
*
G.R. No. 161904. April 26, 2005.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NOEL T. TULABUT, doing
business under the name and style of N.T. TULABUT
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, respondent.
Appeals; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions

of law may be raised, for the simple reason that the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts—the findings of the trial court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Supreme Court;
Exceptions.—The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are
factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised, for the simple reason that the Court is not a trier
of facts. The findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are
conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of the recognized
exceptional circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
(11) the findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
Actions; Burden of Proof; In the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or
the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff.—The respondent, as the plaintiff, was obliged to
establish the material averments of his complaint by a
preponderance of evidence. The petitioner as the defendant was
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018ed788148a5e45f329000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/13
burdened to prove its defenses that the respondent had failed to

complete the project.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Tulabut
While the respondent, as the plaintiff, adduced testimonial and

documentary evidence to prove his claim that he had completed
the projects and that the petitioner had approved and accepted
the same but failed to pay the balance of its account despite
demands, the petitioner opted not to adduce a morsel of evidence
in its behalf. Conformably, the petitioner must bear the
consequence. In Manongsong v. Estimo, the Court stressed: . . .
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden
of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty
or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The
concept of “preponderance of evidence” refers to evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Contracts; The terms and conditions of the contract between
the parties unequivocally expressed in the purchase orders and
progress billings must govern their contractual relation for these
serve as the terms of the agreement, which are binding and
conclusive between them.—The terms and conditions of the
contract between the petitioner and the respondent unequivocally
expressed in the purchase orders and progress billings must
govern the contractual relation of the parties, for these serve as
the terms of the agreement, which are binding and conclusive
between them. As the Court ruled in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals: .
. . When the words of the contract are clear and readily
understandable, there is no room for construction. The contract is
the law between the parties. Said this Court: “ ‘A contract,’

according to Article 1305 of the Civil Code, ‘is a meeting of the
minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.’
Once, the minds of the contracting parties meet, a valid contract
exists, whether it is reduced to writing or not. And, when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement . . . .”
319
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 319
Same; Contract must bind both contracting parties—their

validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.—
The petitioner is estopped from evading its pecuniary obligation
by merely asserting without proof that the respondent failed to
complete the projects and the non-payment of its principal. With
the signatures of its duly authorized representatives on the
subject documents, the genuineness and due execution of which
have not been contested, the petitioner, in effect, freely and
voluntarily affirmed all the concurrent rights and obligations
flowing therefrom. Viewed in this light, it is barred from claiming
the contrary without transgressing the principle of estoppel and
mutuality of contracts. Needless to state, contracts must bind
both contracting parties; their validity or compliance cannot be
left to the will of one of them.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Alex M. Ganitano for petitioner.
Raul F. Macalino for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of1

the Revised Rules of Court for the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73124 and
its resolution
2 which affirmed, with modification, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 45, in Civil Case No. 11820.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate

Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina.
320

Tulabut
Factual Antecedents
In January 1998, petitioner Asian Construction and

Development Corporation (ACDC) was awarded the
development of the Philippine Centennial Exposition
(Theme Park Project) at Clarkfield, Pampanga.
Subsequently, in February 1998, the petitioner ACDC
contracted the services of respondent Noel T. Tulabut,
doing business under the name and style of N.T. Tulabut
Construction Supply. The latter was to supply labor,
materials, tools, equipment and supervision for other
necessary works for the construction of two cafeterias, two
fast food take-out stands and a snack stand, all located at
the Food Plaza of the project site. The petitioner bound and
obliged itself to pay the price of the project in the amount of
P3,414,058.60 through progress billing. Construction
ensued and, as of June 8, 1998, the petitioner had paid the
cost of the project save for a small balance of P3,246.12.
Subsequently, the petitioner again contracted the
services of the respondent for the construction of two
additional cafeterias via Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 73-985,
the net cost of which amounted to P400,000.75. In partial
payment of the project, the petitioner drew and issued, on
July 15, 1998, Land Bank Check No. 0000074516 and
delivered the same to the respondent. However, the said
check was dishonored upon its presentment for payment on
the ground that it was drawn against insufficient funds.
The respondent was able to complete the project and
turned the same over to the petitioner. The total amount
due as of the final billing dated November 26, 1998 was
P486,409.45. However, despite the respondent’s written
demand for payment, the petitioner failed to settle the
balance of its obligation.
The respondent then filed a complaint for collection
against the petitioner with the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga. The complaint alleged that as of May 29, 1998,

the account of the petitioner in favor of the respondent had
amounted to
321
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 321

Tulabut
P900,000.00, exclusive of damages, plus attorney’s fees.

The respondent prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted after an
attachment bond of P1,400,000.00 was posted. There being
a third party claimant, the respondent posted an additional
bond of P500,000.00.
In its answer with counterclaim, the petitioner averred
that the respondent had not yet fully completed nor turned
over the project subject of the contracts. It claimed that it
had already settled its outstanding account equivalent to or
even more than the percentage of the work actually
accomplished. It was added that settlement of the billings
in question was dependent upon its (petitioner’s) receipt of
payment from the government as the owner of the project;
as of the filing of the complaint, the government had not
yet paid the petitioner for its billings on the corresponding
work accomplished. The petitioner thus prayed that the
complaint be dismissed.
The respondent adduced testimonial and documentary
evidence, and in the course thereof admitted having
received P125,571.81 as partial payment from the
petitioner upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, the petitioner opted not to adduce any evidence in its
behalf.
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the
respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of [respondent], hereby ordering the [petitioner]
to pay [respondent] the following:
1. The balance of [its] obligation in the amount of

P364,083.76, exclusive of the 10% retention;
2. Legal rate of interest thereon reckoned from April 5, 1999;
3. 25% of P364,083.76 as attorney’s fees; and
4. Costs of litigation.
3
SO ORDERED.”
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 64.
322

Tulabut
The petitioner appealed to the CA, contending that if it

was, indeed, liable for the claims of the respondent, the
same should be reckoned only from the lapse of one year
after the issuance of a certificate of completion of the
project, as was the standard practice in the construction
industry. It averred that the respondent had not been able
to establish that the project had been fully completed since
it was unable to show that a certificate of completion in its
favor had been issued by the petitioner. The petitioner also
argued that there was no legal and factual basis for the
award of attorney’s fees.
The CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and
affirming the appealed decision with modification. The CA
ruled that the petitioner was estopped from denying
liability for the respondent’s claims since its officers had
approved the pertinent purchase orders and billings. The
appellate court also held that the petitioner failed to prove
that it was a common practice in the construction industry
for the subcontractor to pay the retention billings only
upon the main contractor’s issuance of a certificate of
completion of the projects agreed upon. However, the CA
reduced the award for attorney’s fees to 10% of the amount
due.
The petitioner now seeks relief from this Court via its
petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AND
PRESUMED THE COMPLETION OF THE
PROJECT OR WORKS UNDERTAKEN BY
RESPONDENT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONER ACTED IN GROSS AND
EVIDENT BAD FAITH IN REFUSING TO
SATISFY RESPONDENT’S CLAIM4 THEREBY
AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES.
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 13.
323
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 323

Tulabut
The petitioner alleges that the CA erred when it affirmed

the trial court’s finding that the project or works
undertaken by the respondent had been fully completed,
considering that such finding was based solely on the
petitioner’s approval of purchase orders and final billings.
The petitioner asserts that the doctrine of estoppel must
not be applied because although its officers irrefutably
approved the purchase orders and billings of the
respondent, the same had nothing to do with the actual
completion of the works which the latter was obliged to
accomplish. The petitioner avers that such approval did not
amount to prove that the projects had been completed. In
fact, the respondent failed to adduce proof that the projects
had actually been completed.
As regards the issue of the award of attorney’s fees, the
petitioner insists that its failure to fund the Land Bank
check with the face amount of P400,000.00 is not proof of
its gross and evident bad faith. The petitioner posits that
the respondent himself is guilty of fraud since the amount
he demanded was way beyond what was actually proven
and what the trial court eventually awarded.
The petition is barren of merit.
The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are
factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions
of law may be raised, for the simple reason that the Court
is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA are conclusive on this Court, absent5
proof of any of the recognized exceptional circumstances
such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
_______________
5 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, 8

December 2003, 417 SCRA 196; Duremdes v. Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256,
12 November 2003, 415 SCRA 684; Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, 7
August 2003, 408 SCRA 484; Tugade, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120874, 31 July 2003, 407 SCRA 497; Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 123896, 25 June 2003, 404 SCRA 639.
324

Tulabut
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based

on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of
absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence
on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11)6 the findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
These exclusions notwithstanding, we find no compelling
reason to treat the instant case as falling under any of the
aforementioned exceptional circumstances.
The trial court concluded that the respondent had
completed the project and that the project had been
approved and accepted by the petitioner, sans any plaint.
The petitioner even made partial payment in the amount of
P125,571.81 7 after the complaint was filed against it in the
trial court. In affirming the findings of the trial court, the

CA ratiocinated as follows:
It should be noted that there existed a contract between the

plaintiff-appellee and the defendant-appellant and the same was
expressed in the purchase orders and final billings which bear the
signatures of the officers of the appellant corporation. This fact is
not disputed by the appellant corporation (Answer, par. 2,
Records, p. 66). While defendant-appellant argues that the project
has not been completed, it did not deny the aforesaid purchase
orders and final
_______________
6 Zaragoza v. Nobleza, G.R. No. 144560, 13 May 2004, 428 SCRA 410; Pastor v.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 141316, 20 November 2003, 416 SCRA 283;
Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, 27
February 2003, 398 SCRA 203; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Duremdes v. Duremdes, supra; Larena v. Mapili, supra; Tugade, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Serrano v. Court of Appeals, supra.
7 Rollo, pp. 26 and 63.
325
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 325

billings as well as the authority of the persons whose signatures

appeared thereon who made the approval thereto, to act and sign
in behalf of the appellant corporation. It is also significant to note
that the amount for which the appellant corporation is liable, is
clearly stated therein which bears the signatures of the officers of
the appellant corporation. Thus, it cannot escape its pecuniary
obligation by merely denying the completion of the project
because by signing the aforesaid purchase orders and progress
billings, the appellant corporation manifested its approval to the
matters stated therein and it is thereby precluded to deny it
subsequently by principle of estoppel.
In one case, it was held that “the application of the principle of

estoppel is proper and timely in heading off plaintiff’s shrewd
efforts at renouncing his previous acts to the prejudice of parties
who had dealt with him honestly and in good faith” (Pureza v.
Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 110). It is provided, as one of the
conclusive presumptions under Rule 131, Section 3(a), of the
Rules of Court that, “Whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.” (Supra).
Hence, when the appellant corporation manifested its approval in
the purchase orders (Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “D” and “E,” Folder of
Exh.) and progress billings (Exhibits “H” and “J,” Folder of Exh.),
it cannot, thereafter, refute such act or renege on the effects of the
same to the prejudice of the appellee who merely relied on it.
As to the allegation of the appellant that the plaintiff-appellee
corporation should have secured a certificate of completion as the
same is the practice in the construction industry, is a fact that
cannot be taken judicial notice of. Thus, as it is the appellant who
alleges such fact, it has the burden of proving it. However, in the
instant case, such allegation is not proven by evidence. Therefore,
it cannot refute the clear and convincing evidence presented by
the plaintiff-appellee corporation confirming the appellant’s
obligation under the progress
8 billings as the same was approved
and signed by its officers.
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 29-30.
326

Tulabut
The petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to

controvert that of the respondent, which evidence proved
that the project had been completed and turned over to the
petitioner, and that it had accepted the same.
The respondent, as the plaintiff, was obliged to establish
the material averments9 of his complaint by a
preponderance of evidence. The petitioner as the defendant
was burdened to prove its defenses
10 that the respondent had
failed to complete the project. While the respondent, as
the plaintiff, adduced testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove his claim that he had completed the
projects and that the petitioner had approved and accepted
the same but failed to pay the balance of its account despite
demands, the petitioner opted not to adduce a morsel of
evidence in its behalf. Conformably, the petitioner 11must
bear the consequence. In Manongsong v. Estimo, the
Court stressed:
. . . Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden
of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty
or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The
concept of “preponderance of evidence” refers to evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is 12offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
_______________
9 Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence.

10 Ibid.
11 G.R. No. 136773, 25 June 2003, 404 SCRA 683.
12 Id., at p. 693, citing Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495 (1998).
327
VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 327

Tulabut
Thus, the terms and conditions of the contract between the

petitioner and the respondent unequivocally expressed in
the purchase orders and progress billings must govern the
contractual relation of the parties, for these serve as the
terms of the agreement, which are binding and conclusive
between 13them. As the Court ruled in Tuazon v. Court of
Appeals:
. . . When the words of the contract are clear and readily

understandable, there is no room for construction. The contract is
the law between the parties. Said this Court:
“ ‘A contract,’ according to Article 1305 of the Civil Code, ‘is a meeting of

the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some service.’ Once, the
minds of the contracting parties meet, a valid contract exists, whether it
is reduced to writing or not. And, when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-
in-interest, no evidence14 of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement . . . .”
Indeed, the petitioner is estopped from evading its

pecuniary obligation by merely asserting without proof that
the respondent failed to complete the projects and the non-
payment of its principal. With the signatures of its duly
authorized representatives on the subject documents, the
genuineness and due execution of which have not been
contested, the petitioner, in effect, freely and voluntarily
affirmed all the concurrent rights and obligations flowing
therefrom. Viewed in this light, it is barred from claiming
the contrary without transgressing the principle of estoppel
and mutuality of contracts. Needless to state, contracts
must bind both contracting
_______________
13 G.R. No. 119794, 3 October 2000, 341 SCRA 707.

14 Id., at p. 718, citing National Irrigation Administration v. Gamit, 215
SCRA 436 (1992).
328

Tulabut
parties; their validity

15 or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them.
On the same vein, there is no error of judgment
committed with regard to the grant of attorney’s fees.
Surely, the petitioner is evidently wanting in good faith as
to the fulfillment of its just and valid obligation. Extant
from the records are the following facts: (a) the petitioner
feigned ignorance of the existence of the bounced check it
issued and the receipt of the demand letter dated March
10, 1999; (b) it did not advise the respondent as to the
insufficiency of its funds in the Land Bank prior to the
presentment of the check for payment; and (c) it did not
make a prompt commitment to the respondent, such as
offering to replace the dishonored check or tendering even
partial payment of the unsettled amount. Not one of these
was contradicted by the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and

Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—A void or inexistent contract cannot be

validated either by time or by ratification. (Palmera vs.
Civil Service Commission, 235 SCRA 87 [1994])
The party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. (Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 495 [1994])
——o0o——
_______________
15 Article 1308 of the New Civil Code.
329
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4/13/24, 8:37 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 457

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 317

G.R. No. 161904. April 26, 2005.

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Appeals; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions

burdened to prove its defenses that the respondent had failed to

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Tulabut

While the respondent, as the plaintiff, adduced testimonial and

the law between the parties. Said this Court: “ ‘A contract,’

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 319

Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs. Tulabut

Same; Contract must bind both contracting parties—their

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of1

1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In January 1998, petitioner Asian Construction and

Pampanga. The complaint alleged that as of May 29, 1998,

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 321

P900,000.00, exclusive of damages, plus attorney’s fees.

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

1. The balance of [its] obligation in the amount of

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioner appealed to the CA, contending that if it

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 323

The petitioner alleges that the CA erred when it affirmed

5 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, 8

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based

trial court. In affirming the findings of the trial court, the

It should be noted that there existed a contract between the

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 325

billings as well as the authority of the persons whose signatures

In one case, it was held that “the application of the principle of

8 Id., at pp. 29-30.

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to

9 Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence.

VOL. 457, APRIL 26, 2005 327

Thus, the terms and conditions of the contract between the

. . . When the words of the contract are clear and readily

“ ‘A contract,’ according to Article 1305 of the Civil Code, ‘is a meeting of

Indeed, the petitioner is estopped from evading its

13 G.R. No. 119794, 3 October 2000, 341 SCRA 707.

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

parties; their validity

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and

Notes.—A void or inexistent contract cannot be

15 Article 1308 of the New Civil Code.

© Copyright 2024 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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