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Derek Parfit

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Derek Parfit's essay on personal identity, as detailed in the provided document, embarks on an

exploration of personal identity, challenging conventional beliefs and presenting sophisticated,


albeit often counterintuitive, concepts. Parfit targets two main beliefs for his critique:

1. **The Nature of Personal Identity**: Parfit disputes the idea that questions about personal
identity must always have clear answers. Unlike objects or nations, whose identities we might
question under certain conditions without expecting definitive answers, we often assume that
personal identity is an exception, bound by necessity to have clear outcomes in any given
scenario. Parfit argues against this by suggesting that there are cases, potentially made
possible by scientific advances, where traditional criteria for personal identity fail, yet this does
not present a problem as these situations would not undermine our understanding or functioning
regarding personal identity.

2. **The Importance of Personal Identity**: Parfit challenges the belief that understanding
personal identity is crucial for answering significant questions about survival, morality, and
responsibility. He proposes that many of these questions presuppose a stable concept of
personal identity when, in fact, they should not. By detaching these concepts from the necessity
of a singular, continuous personal identity, Parfit aims to demonstrate that concerns over
personal identity may not hold the importance we typically ascribe to them.

**Key Concepts Introduced by Parfit**:

- **Q-memory**: A concept introduced to illustrate a type of memory that does not necessarily
imply the same person is both the experiencer and the rememberer of an event. This concept
helps in understanding cases where psychological continuity is preserved without implying strict
personal identity.

- **Psychological Continuity vs. Psychological Connectedness**: Parfit differentiates between


these two concepts to further dissect the idea of personal identity. Psychological continuity
refers to a connection over time that may involve overlapping chains of psychological
connections, such as memories, intentions, and character traits. Psychological connectedness
refers more to direct psychological links between past and present experiences within an
individual's life. Parfit argues that what truly matters for our survival and moral considerations is
psychological connectedness rather than strict numerical identity.

**Parfit's Alternative to Our Conception of Personal Identity**:


Parfit presents an alternative view that focuses on psychological continuity and connectedness,
rather than a singular, unchanging essence of self. He suggests that our identity is less about
being a particular person and more about being within a spectrum of connected experiences
and memories. This view accommodates the possibility of our future selves being different from
our current selves in significant ways without losing what matters about our identity. Parfit's
perspective implies that personal identity is not binary (you either are or are not the same
person) but rather a matter of degree and relational properties.
**Is Parfit’s Alternative Reasonable?**
Parfit’s alternative conception of personal identity is compelling in its ability to accommodate
complex scenarios of identity, such as those involving hypothetical cases of brain division and
fusion, that traditional views struggle to address coherently. It challenges the notion that
personal identity must be a rigid, all-or-nothing matter and instead offers a more flexible,
nuanced understanding that emphasizes psychological relations over strict numerical identity.
This approach is particularly useful in discussions of ethics, morality, and the self, offering a
framework that aligns more closely with our intuitions and experiences regarding change,
growth, and the continuity of self over time.

​ John Locke: Parfit engages with Locke's classical theory of personal identity,
especially Locke's emphasis on memory as a crucial component for
understanding personal identity. Locke's work, "An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding," particularly the chapter on identity and diversity, is a foundational
text in discussions of personal identity.
​ Thomas Reid: Reid is mentioned in opposition to some of Locke's ideas,
particularly challenging the memory criterion for personal identity. Reid's
arguments are found in his essays on the intellectual powers of man, where he
introduces the concept of the "brave officer" paradox to critique Locke's
memory-based approach.
​ S. Shoemaker: Sydney Shoemaker's work is referenced, especially his
contributions to the concept of psychological continuity and the idea of
"quasi-memory." Shoemaker has been influential in expanding the discussion
beyond the traditional frameworks of personal identity to include psychological
aspects.
​ David Wiggins: Parfit discusses Wiggins' contributions, particularly his book
"Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity," which offers an analysis of identity that
Parfit engages with. Wiggins introduces scenarios and concepts that Parfit uses
to challenge and refine his own views on personal identity.
​ Bernard Williams: Parfit references Williams' arguments, particularly from
Williams' essay "The Self and the Future," which explores thought experiments
related to personal identity and moral responsibility. Williams' work contributes to
the philosophical debate on what matters in personal identity and how this
relates to our ethical and moral considerations.
​ Hume: Although not directly related to the specific argument about personal
identity, Parfit ends his essay with a reflection that echoes Hume's skepticism
and his thoughts on the self and personal identity, found in Hume's "A Treatise of
Human Nature" and his essays. Hume's skepticism about the existence of a
permanent self serves as a backdrop to the broader discussion.

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