SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.]

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III , petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-

SUNTAY, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera. 1 We now find a need to
replace the decision. cEaCTS

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel

Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision 2 in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration
to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a
bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a
determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties,
and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs. 3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the

parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4
June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and Cristina's only child, Emilio A.
Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel's parents, Emilio
I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel's parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for
parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually
acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as
null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco
on the finding that:cEaSHC

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined

in the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of
parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the
hospital[,] he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs

mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made
themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened
with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-
psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and
wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties

was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had
set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. Â (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of

the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the
marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Â That either party was of unsound mind,

unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant

knew about the mental condition of plaintiff, and there is proof that
plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very
complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in
reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico

and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a
month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes,
and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel's testimony in court
that her grandparents' visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.
5
 On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. CHcTIA

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina's estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedent's estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his
son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had
administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect
the integrity of the decedent's estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel's allegation that
some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to
the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a
result of Isabel's parents' marriage being declared null and void. However, in
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer
the decedent's estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration
issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-in-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather's opposition, alleging
that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent
to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. AScHCD

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent
Cristina's intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED

and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby

appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon
the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as
follows:

(1) Â To make and return within three (3) months, a true and
complete inventory;
 (2) Â To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all
debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) Â To render a true and just account within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court, and

(4) Â To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of

Administration be issued in his favor. 6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision

dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay
III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-
]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her
favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos. 7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set

aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina's estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico's
estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and Isabel, we
considered that: TaHIDS

1. Â Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Â Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Â Cristina's properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the
conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Â Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share
in the distribution of the latter's estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of
Appeals' Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status
as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must
be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse
interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate
grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto,
Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the
estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III's
actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9
November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the
order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there
is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or
factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as
between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent's estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable
interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010. HSIaAT

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a

decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Â When and to whom letters of administration

granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) Â To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may

be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) Â If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may

be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) Â If there is not such creditor competent and willing

to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of

preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference,
which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. 8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator's interest in
the estate. 9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes
into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 10 In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent's estate must demonstrate not only an interest
in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. aTSEcA

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in

the administration of a decedent's estate presupposes the surviving
spouse's interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming
part of the decedent's estate. 11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent 12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her
share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent's estate, that the appointment
of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer
to Section 6 (a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court which say that ". . . [w]hen an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, . . . ."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein. 13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person's suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment. 14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of
co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented; 15 (2) where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or,
from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 16 (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for
the best interests of the estate; 17 and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office. 18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the
appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal
for the probate of the decedent's will. Pending the probate thereof, we
recognized Matias' special interest in the decedent's estate as universal heir
and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in
the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands
that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent,
consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent's
estate. 19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held
that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties
and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would
be unfair to her proprietary interests." 20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura 21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew
a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin
in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio

Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin"
has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the
statute of distribution to the decedent's property [citations
omitted]. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the
choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest
of kin is to be preferred.'" [citations omitted]

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme

Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely:
Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes
and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order
to represent both interests. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals , 23 we maintained that the order of

preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate child's
appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular
administrator, of the decedent's estate as against the surviving spouse who
the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia 24 as good law,
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate. EHSADc

In Valarao v. Pascual, 25 we see another story with a running theme of

heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set
aside the probate court's refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz,
even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and
represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by
the probate court pointed to Diaz's being remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Surveying
the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we
clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v.

Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete ,
cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases
do not establish an absolute right demandable from the
probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would
represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather,
the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the
probate court to designate not just one but also two or more
special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are
fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona a n d Vda. de Dayrit

hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests
of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias
this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator
because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix
designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest"
deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite
significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it
best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave
abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the
applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.

I n Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's

choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve
and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her
will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-
administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the
presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per
se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator
as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of
Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds
of "impracticality and lack of kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of

the decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our
considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of
the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her
 husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate
prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary
interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special
administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of
Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than
any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate
since she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal
partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may
affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership
thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular
administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the
probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration." caHASI

Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in

Matias, Corona a n d Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the
independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of
the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand
for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents. 26
(Emphasis supplied)

I n Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the

mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance
of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the

order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate
court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive
without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. 27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 28 we expounded on the

legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of

administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
"next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose
relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an
heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and pass[ed] upon the claimed relationship
of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. 29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals, 30 we took into consideration the size

of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III's
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III's demonstrable interest in
Cristina's estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of
such position by the foregoing survey of cases. cDIaAS

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the

estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate
of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 31 Given
Isabel's unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent's
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
Court 32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the
case. 33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances
of this case even as we reiterate Isabel's and her sibling's apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. Â The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between
Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the
time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;
2. Â Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio
III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedent's estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Â Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina's estate, has not looked after the estate's welfare and has acted to
the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio III's appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001,
he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following: AHDaET

1. Â Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories 34 he filed therewith
properties of the estate 35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank
deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal
properties, contrary to Section 1, 36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
2. Â Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against
Federico's settlement of the decedent's estate which adjudicated to himself
a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or
partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave
any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her
estate. 37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III
to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Â [Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until
November 14, 2002;
2. Â [T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include
several properties of the decedent;
3. Â [T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found
their way to different individuals or persons; several properties to
Federico Suntay himself; and
4. Â [W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio
III], by reason of falsified documents; 38
Emilio III refutes Isabel's imputations that he was lackadaisical in
assuming and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina's estate:
1. Â From the time of the RTC's Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously
opposed Emilio III's assumption of that office, arguing that "[t]he decision of
the [RTC] dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized
by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"
2. Â The delay in Emilio III's filing of an inventory was due to Isabel's
vociferous objections to Emilio III's attempts to act as administrator while the
RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. Â The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in
the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
settlement of a decedent's estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete
and total listing of the decedent's properties; and STIHaE

4. Â The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where

Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify,
leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio
dismissal of the cases.
 While we can subscribe to Emilio III's counsel's explanation for the
blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature
thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedent's estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel's accusation that
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability
as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return . . . a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico's exclusion of Cristina's other compulsory heirs, herein
Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent's
estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed
to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III's omission and inaction
become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and
the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and
respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother's estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that
Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive
home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More
importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent's estate to appoint a co-
administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested
in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply
a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent's estate, we
here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests
in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, 39 we mapped
out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
ECDAcS

xxx xxx xxx

4. Â Section 6 40 of Rule 87, which allows an individual

interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of
the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent's title or interest therein;"

5. Â Section 10 41 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time

 and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator's
account "to persons interested;"

6. Â Section 7(b) 42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to

give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a
petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the
estate; and

7. Â Section 1, 43 Rule 90, which allows "any person

interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution
of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations
are either satisfied or provided for. 44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Â Court may remove or accept resignation of executor

or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. — If
an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him
to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him.
If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may
be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial

restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent
Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar
r u l e is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels

us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing
the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and
Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains

good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is

premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are
entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the
stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.aSTcCE

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
 foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. Â When order for distribution of residue is made. — . . .

. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs. 45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental

Comment 46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation
of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the
Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June
2010 on the petition filed by him:

7. Â The question is: who created the Special Second Division

in Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme
Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and
another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second
Division of the Supreme Court in Manila. 47

For Emilio III's counsels' edification, the Special Second Division in

Baguio is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16
June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a
different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura's retirement on 13
June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
provides:

Sec. 7. Â Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or

clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and
incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division . —
Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed
resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the
case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the
Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the

Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen
among the new Members of the Division who participated in
the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who
concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who
 participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the
new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the

decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the
Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on
the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen
from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as
replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new
Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
Member of the Special Division. AaEcHC

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by

raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a
Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered
the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court,
the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion
shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the

denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall
be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the
other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time
said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a

change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April. 48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is
MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, * C.J., Carpio, Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur.
Â
Footnotes

*Per raffle dated 4 July 2011.

1.The Papal Bull mentioned in our Decision of 16 June 2010 ( Suntay III v.
Cojuangco-Suntay; G.R. No. 183053, 16 June 2010, 621 SCRA 142, 144).
2.Penned by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now retired) with
Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta,
Roberto A. Abad and Jose Portugal Perez of the Second Division, concurring.
Rollo , pp. 231-246.

3.Id. at 244-245.

4.Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932, 936-937 (1998).

5.Rollo , pp. 43-44.

6.Id. at 60.

7.Id. at 31.

8.Uy v. Court of Appeals , 519 Phil. 673 (2006); Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 506
Phil. 347 (2005); Valarao v. Pascual, 441 Phil. 226 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 188 (1999).

9.Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete , G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA
608, 612; Corona v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. L-59821, 30 August 1982, 116
SCRA 316, 320; Matias v. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858 (1957).

10.Gonzales v. Aguinaldo , G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 112,
117-118.

11.See Articles 91 and 106 of the Family Code.

12.See Article 887, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.

13.Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete,

supra note 9.

14.Uy v. Court of Appeals , supra note 8 at 680; Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, supra

note 8 at 365; Valarao v. Pascual, supra note 8 at 234; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 8 at 210-211.

15.Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at 118-119.

16.Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 681; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413, 423 citing Copeland v. Shapley,
100 NE. 1080.

17.Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, id.

18.In re Fichter's Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.

19.Supra note 9.

20.Supra note 9 at 612.

21.243 Phil. 952 (1988).

22.Id. at 962-963.

23.Supra note 8.
24.44 Phil. 711 (1923).

25.Supra note 8.

26.Id. at 233-235.

27.Supra note 16 at 420.

28.Supra note 8.

29.Id. at 365.

30.Supra note 8.

31.Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at 117.

32.Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416, 419-
420.

33.Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 211.

34.Annexes "3," "5," and "6," of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo , pp.
318-331.

35.Annex "4," of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. Id. at 326.

36.Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters, Amount, Conditions. — Before

an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and
letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such
sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows: (a) To make and return to
the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come
to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for
him;

37.Annexes "1," and "2," of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo , pp.
318-321.

38.Id. at 407.

39.G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 464.

40.Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently

conveyed. — If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other
individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court
having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or
chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has
knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which
contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of
the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the
deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and
may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person
so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such
interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt,
and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The
 interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in
writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office.

41.Section 10. Account to be settled on notice. — Before the account of an

executor or administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to persons
interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the same; and
such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or by
advertisement in a newspaper or newspapers, or both, as the court directs.

42.Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise

encumber estate. . . . .

   (a) . . .

   (b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such
petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for
the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by
mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be
given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.

43.Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon
notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to be distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.

   No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations

above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or
any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

44.Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at 472-473.

45.Rollo, pp. 243-244.

46.Id. at 442-445.

47.Id. at 443.

48.See Resolution dated 9 February 2012, A.M. No. 12-2-7-SC Re: 2012 Summer
Session in Baguio City.