Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

2004 Go - v. - UCPB20240130 11 5p98l1

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 9

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156187. November 11, 2004.]

JIMMY T. GO, petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS


BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN, FRANCISCO C. ZARATE,
PERLITA A. URBANO, and ATTY. EDWARD MARTIN,
respondents.

Madayag Cañeda Ruenata Obligar & Associates for petitioner.


Poblador Bautista Reyes for respondents.
SYNOPSIS

Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko were granted by UCPB a credit line


accommodation secured by real estate mortgage on two lots located in
Mandaluyong City which were in the name of Looyuko and the company
owned by them. The bank canceled the credit line accommodation and
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the two lots. To protect his interest,
petitioner Jimmy Go filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City for cancellation of real estate mortgage and damages against the bank.
Instead of filing an answer, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
which was denied by the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on appeal. The CA directed the trial court to dismiss the case on
the ground of improper venue. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The issue for resolution in this case was whether petitioner's complaint for
cancellation of real estate mortgage was a personal or real action for the
purpose of determining the venue.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. According to the Court, the
cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of this case, was a real
action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. Therefore, the action
should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the
subject property lies. ITECSH

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL AND PERSONAL ACTION;


DISTINGUISHED. — In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or as provided for in Section 1 Rule 4, a real action is an action
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. These
include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property. The venue for real action is the same for regional trial courts and
municipal trial courts — the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the real property or any part thereof lies. Personal action is one
brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The
venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and
municipal trial courts — the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2
of Rule 4. It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining
venue for cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said
cases are filed.
2. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGE; NATURE
THEREOF AS REAL ACTION; JUSTIFIED. — The case of Carandang v. Court of
Appeals, is more particularly instructive. There, we held that an action for
nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
property is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of
the real action is before the court having jurisdiction over the territory in
which the property lies, which is the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In a
relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, it was
succinctly stated that the prayer for the nullification of the mortgage is a
prayer affecting real property, hence, is a real action. In sum, the
cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a
real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real
property by itself. An action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is
necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real
action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place
where the subject property lies.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2


dated 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62625, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders
dated June 7, 2000, August 9, 2000 and November 8, 2000 are SET
ASIDE.
Respondent judge is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 67878
on the ground of improper venue. 3
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noah's
Ark International, Noah's Ark Sugar Carriers, Noah's Ark Sugar Truckers,
Noah's Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah's Ark Sugar Insurers, Noah's Ark Sugar
Terminal, Noah's Ark Sugar Building, and Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery. 4
Sometime in August 1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T.
Looyuko applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred Million
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
(P900,000,000) Pesos, 5 and was favorably acted upon by the latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of
land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64070, located at
Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square meters, and registered in
the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong
City with an area of 14,271 square meters, registered in the name of Noah's
Ark Sugar Refinery.
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted
to petitioner was subsequently cancelled 6 by respondent UCPB. As a
consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB the return of the
two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real Estate Mortgages
earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have
the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and
caused the registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City on 02 September 1997.
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage 7 covered by TCT No. 64070, for nonpayment of the
obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result, the public auction sale of
the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against
respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan, Francisco C.
Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio
Sheriff Lydia G. San Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878. The
complaint was subsequently amended 8 on 22 May 2000. The amended
complaint alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy
T. Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT No. 64070, although the
title is registered only in the name of Looyuko; that respondent bank was
aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked to sign two deeds of real estate
mortgage covering the subject property; that the approved omnibus credit
line applied for by him and Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by
respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so that the pre-signed real estate
mortgages were likewise cancelled; that he demanded from respondent
bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him, but respondent
bank refused to do so; that despite the cancellation of the omnibus credit
line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had the two deeds of real estate
mortgage dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale
scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real
estate mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be
returned to him; and that respondent bank and its officers be ordered to pay
him moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. cECaHA

On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a


CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
motion to dismiss 9 based on the following grounds: 1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filing and docket
fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue; 3) an indispensable
party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint
states no cause of action; 4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and
5) that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient
and false certification of non-forum shopping.
On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order 10 granting petitioner's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction
sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000, was enjoined.
On 09 August 2000, the trial court denied 11 respondent bank's motion
to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878. A motion for reconsideration 12 was filed,
but the same was likewise denied in an Order 13 dated 08 November 2000.
Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari 14 dated 03 January 2001, alleging that the trial
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to dismiss and the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
On 31 July 2002, the Court of Appeals 15 set aside the Orders dated 07
June 2000, 09 August 2000 and 08 November 2000 issued by the trial court
and directed the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878 on the ground of
improper venue.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, 16 which was
denied in an order dated 14 November 2002. 17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 18
On 16 June 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition, and
required 19 the parties to file their respective memoranda. Respondents filed
their Joint Memorandum on 27 August 2003, while petitioner filed his on 25
September 2003 upon prior leave of court for extension. With leave of this
Court, private respondents filed their reply to petitioner's memorandum.
In his memorandum, petitioner raised a lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER BY ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTIONS FINDING THAT THE CASE A QUO IS A "REAL ACTION."
Simply put, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioner's
complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real
action for the purpose of determining venue.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as
provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, 20 a real action is an action affecting title to
or possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue
for real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts
— the court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
property or any part thereof lies. 21

Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property,


for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach,
or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person
or property. 22 The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the
regional and municipal trial courts — the court of the place where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as
indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4. 23
It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for
cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said cases are
filed. Thus:
1. I n Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 24 this Court ruled that "an action to redeem by the
mortgage debtor affects his title to the foreclosed property. If
the action is seasonably made, it seeks to erase from the title
of the judgment or mortgage debtor the lien created by
registration of the mortgage and sale. If not made
seasonably, it may seek to recover ownership to the land
since the purchaser's inchoate title to the property becomes
consolidated after [the] expiration of the redemption period.
Either way, redemption involves the title to the foreclosed
property. It is a real action."
2. I n Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 25 this
Court quoting the decision of the Court of Appeals ruled that
"since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a
conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest
bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold.
It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies."
3. In Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, 26 this court ruled that
"while it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the
recovery . . . of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which,
under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The
prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the
case on the ground of improper venue which was timely
raised."
4. In Ruiz v. J. M. Tuason Co., Inc., et al ., 27 the court ruled that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
"although [a] complaint is entitled to be one for specific
performance, yet the fact that [complainant] asked that a
deed of sale of a parcel of land . . . be issued in his favor and
that a transfer certificate of title covering said land be issued
to him, shows that the primary objective and nature of the
action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to
execute in favor of complainant the conveyance requested
there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the
land which in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue of
ownership. Hence, the action must be commenced in the
province where the property is situated . . . ."
5. In Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Inc. v. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, 28
this Court ruled that "an action praying that defendant be
ordered 'to accept the payment being made' by plaintiff for
the lot which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis
from the former, to pay plaintiff compensatory damages and
attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents from
repossessing the lot in question, is one that affects title to
the land under Section 3 of Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, and
'shall be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies,' because, although the
immediate remedy is to compel the defendant to accept the
tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious that this
relief is merely the first step to establish plaintiff's title to
[the] real property."
6. I n Land Tenure Administration, et al. v. The Honorable
Higinio B. Macadaeg and Alejandro T. Lim , 29 this Court ruled
that "where the lessee seeks to establish an interest in an
hacienda that runs with the land and one that must be
respected by the purchaser of the land even if the latter is
not a party to the original lease contract, the question of
whether or not the standing crop is immovable property
become[s] irrelevant, for venue is determined by the nature
of the principal claim. Since the lessee is primarily interested
in establishing his right to recover possession of the land for
the purpose of enabling him to gather his share of the crops,
his action is real and must be brought in the locality where
the land is situated."
7. In Espineli & Mojica v. Hon. Santiago and Vda. de Ramirez, 30
the court ruled that "although the main relief sought in the
case at bar was the delivery of the certificate of title, said
relief, in turn, entirely depended upon who, between the
parties, has a better right to the lot in question. As it is not
possible for the court to decide the main relief, without
passing upon the claim of the parties with respect to the title
to and possession of the lot in question, the claim shall be
determined . . . in the province where [the] said property or
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
any part thereof lies."
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, 31 is more particularly
instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the mortgage
documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that
affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before the
court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is
the Court of First Instance of Laguna. aHcACI

Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of


mortgage is a personal action and since he resides at Pasig City, venue was
properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by alluding to the case of
Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena. 32
Petitioner's reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural
Bank of Lucena 33 is misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an action to
compel the mortgagee bank to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to
release the mortgage. That action, which is not expressly included in the
enumeration found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and
now under Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not
involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a personal action and not a real
action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. The plaintiffs' title
is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. Hence, the
venue of the plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the
action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner was
primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the
properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank
had already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation by
the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997. The
prime objective is to recover said real properties. Secondly, Carandang
distinctly articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the
mortgaged property had already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, respondent bank had already initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the timely issuance
of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the same
would have already been sold at a public auction.
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals ,
34it was succinctly stated that the prayer for the nullification of the
mortgage is a prayer affecting real property, hence, is a real action.
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the
instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a
real right and a real property by itself. 35 An action for cancellation of real
estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the property. It
is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in
Mandaluyong City, the place where the subject property lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision dated 31 July 2002 and the Order dated 14 November 2002
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com
denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs. TIaDHE

SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., is on official leave.
Tinga, J ., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 9–37.
2. Records, pp. 704–714; penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Acting
Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos,
concurring.
3. Rollo , p. 714.
4. Records, pp. 177–179, Agreement dated 10 October 1986.
5. Rollo , p. 19.
6. Records, p. 161.
7. Records, pp. 101–109.
8. Records, pp. 110–122.
9. Records, pp. 189–208.

10. Records, pp. 82–84.


11. Records, pp. 76–80.
12. Records, pp. 426–451.
13. Records, p. 81.
14. Records, pp. 2–75.

15. Records, pp. 704–714.


16. Records, pp. 721–731.
17. Records, p. 746.
18. Rollo , pp. 9–37.
19. Rollo , p. 440.
20. 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
21. Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No.
129184, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 89.
22. Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Edition, p. 456, citing Hernandez v.
Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-31095, 18 June 1976, 71
SCRA 290.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com


23. 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
24. G.R. No. 125008, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 439, 450.
25. G.R. No. 76431, 16 October 1989, 178 SCRA 564, 568–569.

26. G.R. No. L-55729, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 331, 336.
27. G.R. No. L-18692, 31 January 1963, 7 SCRA 202, cited in Torres v. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-19668, 22 October 1964, 12 SCRA 174, 177.
28. G.R. No. L-17699, 30 March 1962, 4 SCRA 746.
29. 107 Phil 83 (1960).
30. 107 Phil 830 (1960).
31. G.R. No. L-44932, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 266.

32. G.R. No. L-29791, 10 January 1978, 81 SCRA 75.


33. Ibid.
34. G.R. No. 81024, 03 February 2000, 324 SCRA 533.
35. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, G.R. No. 141930, 10
September 2001, 364 SCRA 812.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2024 cdasiaonline.com

You might also like