Dialectical materialism

Collective of the Institute of Philosophy of the Communist Academy under the

leadership of M. B. Mitin
1934
Foreword
The creation of a textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy for colleges and universities is one of the
most important tasks that the Party has long put before the Communists working on the philosophical
part of the theoretical front. For a number of reasons, however, this crucial task has not yet been
resolved in any satisfactory manner.
The discussion on the philosophical front and the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU
(b) on the magazine “Under the banner of Marxism” placed in the center of attention of the workers of
the philosophical front the task of creating a party textbook on Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The task
was to provide a textbook with an in-depth and at the same time quite popular systematic exposition
of the foundations of dialectical and historical materialism, containing strong criticism of mechanistic
and Menshevik-idealistic distortions of Marxism-Leninism; to give a comprehensive exposition of the
social-fascist textbooks of Kautsky, Kunov, M. Adler, and others.
Two parts of this collective work is one of the first experiences in creating such a textbook. Authors
and editors set as their goal:
1) coverage of the main issues of dialectical materialism and its application to the history of society
and the world-historical practice of the proletariat, which received their development and classical
expression from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin;
2) the elimination of the gap created by the mechanists and the Menshevik idealists, between
theory and practice, between philosophy and the politics of the proletariat, between worldview and
method, between materialism and dialectics;
3) coverage of issues of dialectical and historical materialism based on criticism of bourgeois
philosophy and sociology, as well as modern social-fascist views,
4) highlighting the role of philosophy in the struggle for the general line of the party on two fronts
- with right and "left" opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, with mechanism and
Menshevik idealism as the philosophical basis of deviations from the general line of the party;
5) the discovery and coverage of the new that brings Marxism-Leninism in the person of Lenin and
Stalin to the common treasury of the philosophy of Marxism.
These are the goals that determine the content of the book and the nature of the layout of the
material presented in it.
The book is far from free from a number of serious flaws. Only further work on this material, only
the help and instructions of the entire reading mass, and first of all of all workers on the philosophical
front, only an expanded Bolshevik self-criticism will make it possible to make all the necessary
corrections and improvements to subsequent editions of the textbook.
In the work on the first part of the textbook took part TT. Basilevsky, Bobrovnikov, Vandek,
Lipendin, Mayogov, Makarov, Mitin, Sitkovsky, Tashchilin, Shevkin, Shorin, Cheremnykh. General
management, material processing and text editing belong to Comrade Mitinu.
Chapter 1. Marxism-Leninism - the worldview of the proletariat
1.1. Three sources and three components of Marxism
Marxism is a coherent coherent system of views - the ideology of the proletariat, which was
developed by Marx and Engels and further developed in relation to the new historical era - the era of
imperialism and proletarian revolution - Lenin and Stalin. This doctrine, distinguished by exceptional
depth and integrity, is comprehensive: it covers the whole body of knowledge, starting with the
problems of the philosophical world view and ending with the problems of strategy and tactics of the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Marxism indicates to the proletariat the path of liberation
from the shackles of capitalist slavery, the path of revolutionary destruction of the capitalist system,
the path of building a classless communist society.
The main thing in Marxism is the doctrine of the world-historical role of the proletariat as the
creator of a socialist society — the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxism-Leninism is
the only completely correct revolutionary doctrine. “In Marxism, there is nothing like“ sectarianism ”in
the sense of some kind of closed, ossified doctrine that has arisen aside from the high road of the
development of world civilization” [1] . Marxism is a brilliant continuation and completion of the three
most important ideological currents of the beginning of the XIX century, which were developed in
three main countries of Europe. Marxism gave a deeply scientific revolutionary answer to all the
questions that advanced human thought has already raised. The doctrine of Marxism is “the legitimate
successor of the best, which created mankind in the XIX century. in the face German philosophy,
English political economy, French socialism " [2] .
Marxism as a sociopolitical trend arose and took shape at a time when the proletariat matured
enough to set the task of liberation with all its intensity. Marxism arose in the period when the
proletariat began to enter the world-historical arena, when the contradiction between the social
character of production and the private-property appropriation characterizing the capitalist mode of
production and serving as the source of all the antagonistic contradictions of bourgeois society , was
sharply revealed .
In the three leading countries of Europe at that time - England, France and Germany, which stood
at different levels of capitalist development, these antagonistic contradictions of capitalism protruded
with different strength and from different sides. The three main trends of advanced human thought —
classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, French socialism in connection with
French revolutionary teachings in general — reflect the movement of these contradictions. In these
contradictions of bourgeois society and in social theories reflecting them, one should look for the
historical roots of Marxism.
The world outlook of Marx and Engels, first consistently set forth in “German Ideology”, “Poverty of
Philosophy” and “Communist Manifesto”, stood the historical test of the revolutionary practice of 1848
and the revolution of 1871 represented by the Paris Commune. In the future, it began to seize with
increasing speed more and more wide circles of followers in all countries, organizing them into the
international party of communists. By the 1970s, Marxism conquered all other ideologies in the labor
movement. But the trends expressed by these ideologies began to look for other ways and
“resurrected” as revisionism.
Marxism leads a merciless criticism of old theoretical principles. At the beginning of the
development of Marxism, this criticism mainly focuses on three sources of Marxism: German classical
philosophy, English classical political economy and French utopian socialism in connection with French
revolutionary teachings in general. At the same time, Marxism directs the fire of its theoretical
criticism to the main contradictions of the capitalist world and mobilizes the revolutionary labor
movement to change it. This two-sided process, which inextricably connects research and criticism,
characterizes the content of Marxism in all its three most important components. Marxism arose as
a continuation and development the three main directions of theoretical thought of the XIX
century. However, at the same time, it means, as Lenin repeatedly pointed out, the critical reworking
of these teachings from the point of view of the working class, its historical tasks, from the point of
view of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for building a classless communist
society. What are the constituent parts of Marxism?
Firstly, the philosophical doctrine is the newest materialism, consistent to the end. This
materialism, which did not stop at the level of the XVIII century. and on the contemplative
materialism of Feuerbach, and enriched by Hegel, freed from idealistic mysticism and critically revised
dialectic of Hegel, extended to the knowledge of human society. This finished materialism, which is the
scientific method of knowing and changing nature and society, is dialectical materialism .
Secondly, the economic doctrine is the disclosure of the laws of the origin, development and
destruction of the capitalist social formation. Marxism revealed the dual nature of labor, revealed
commodity fetishism as the materialization of social relations in a commodity, gave the key to a true
understanding of social relations of capitalist production. The economic theory of Marx exposed the
secret of the existence of capitalism, based on the exploitation of the proletarian class by the
bourgeois class, appropriating the unpaid labor of the worker as surplus value. Historical materialism
— Marx’s ingenious discovery — by overcoming the antihistorical and idealistic theories of the classical
economists, made political economics quite scientific.The theory of surplus value is the cornerstone of
Marx’s economic theory.
Third, scientific communism is the doctrine of class struggle, through the proletarian revolution and
the dictatorship of the proletariat leading to the destruction of classes, the doctrine of the strategy and
tactics of this struggle and the organization of the proletariat in the struggle for this dictatorship and
the implementation of its tasks. Only dialectical and historical materialism, which made it possible to
“objectively take into account the entire set of interrelationships of all classes of a given society, and,
consequently, take into account the objective stage of development of this society and take into
account the relationship between it and other societies” [3]only economic doctrine, which determined
the nature of class exploitation in general and capitalist in particular, created scientific
communism. Marxism merged the workers' movement with scientific communism, for the political
movement of the proletariat necessarily leads it to the consciousness that it has no other way out than
communism, and communism only becomes a material force when it is the goal of the proletarian
political struggle. Communism is not a state pre-established, as was the case with utopians, not an
ideal with which reality should conform, but a real movement that destroys classes. The main thing in
scientific communism is the doctrine of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat as the
creator of a communist society.
These three most important components of the Marxist understanding of the world are merged into
organic unity. “The application of materialistic dialectics to the processing of all political economy,
from its foundation, to history, to natural science, to philosophy, to the policy and tactics of the
working class, is what interests Marx and Engels most of all,” says Lenin make the most essential and
newest, that is their ingenious step forward in the history of revolutionary thought ” [4] .
From this unified, consistent system of views of Marxism, the truth of which is confirmed and
hourly confirmed by historical practice, no part can be removed or ignored with impunity without
falling into the bourgeois-reactionary swamp.
So, Marxism as a socio-political current emerged and took shape on the basis of the class struggle
of the proletariat, taking into account the revolutionary experience and revolutionary thought of all
countries of the world, in the conditions of the development of industrial capitalism. The story itself
announced the trial of the old world, and the proletariat made it the grave digger as the accuser and
the enforcer of his sentence. This death sentence in the economic, political and theoretical fields is
Marxism, which has merged into revolutionary dialectical unity revolutionary theory and revolutionary
practice.
Only dialectical materialism gave mankind, and the proletariat in particular, a great tool of
knowledge and action and indicated “a way out of spiritual slavery, in which all oppressed classes have
been living until now” [5] . Only the economic theory of Marxism explained the real position of the
proletariat in the general structure of capitalism. Only scientific communism in the doctrine of class
struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat has indicated to the proletariat a path into a society in
which "the free development of each will be a condition for the free development of all." The history of
the second half of the XIX century, still in the depths of capitalist society — represented by Marx and
Engels — laid the foundation for a new trend of theoretical thought — Marxism. And only
“walkingalong the path Marx's theory, we will approach the objective truth more and more (never
exhausting it); going in any other way , ”writes Lenin, a brilliant pupil and successor of Marxism,“ we
cannot come to anything except confusion and lies ” [6] .
1.2. Historical roots of Marxism
Marxism arose and took shape when the proletariat entered the world-historical arena, when the
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production became apparent with great urgency. What are
these contradictions?
The first contradiction , common to the advanced capitalist countries, but manifested with
particular force in England as a more developed capitalist country, is the antagonism of wage labor
and capital, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie .
The appropriation of the unpaid labor of the proletariat is the basis of the capitalist mode of
production. Freedom of competition increasingly revealed itself as the freedom to exploit the wage
worker. This caused and causes antagonism between the bourgeois class and the proletariat
class. Within this antagonism, the bourgeoisie is a conservative side, the proletariat is destructive and
revolutionary. From the first comes the action aimed at preserving the contradiction, from the second
- the action aimed at its destruction, the destruction of the society that gave rise to this contradiction.
The industrial revolution through the development of the steam engine turned the old manufactory
into an enterprise of modern large-scale industry. It gave it a wide scope for the development of
capital, increasing capitalist exploitation, but it also created a force that could resist this exploitation
— the factory-proletariat.
“Since in the living conditions of the proletariat,” wrote Marx and Engels in one of his early works,
“all the living conditions of modern society have reached the peak of inhumanity; because in the
proletariat man has lost himself, but at the same time not only gained theoretical consciousness of
that loss, directly still forced to revolt against this inhumanity dictates starkly, relentless, absolutely
imperious needs , the practical expression of necessity , that is why the proletariat can and should
free himself. But he cannot free himself without abolishing his own living conditions. He cannot abolish
his own living conditions without abolishingall inhuman life conditions of modern society, concentrated
in its own position. He is not in vain passes the harsh, hardening school of labor . The point is not
what the individual proletariat or even the entire proletariat sees its goal at the moment . The fact of
the matter is what the proletariat is and what it, in accordance with its existence , will historically have
to do. His goal and his historical action are most clearly and indisputably indicated by his own life
situation, as well as by the whole organization of modern bourgeois society. There is no need to dwell
on the fact that a considerable part of the English and French proletariat is now conscious their
historical task and is constantly working on the further development and final clarification of their self-
consciousness " [7] .
Gradually, the working class develops the consciousness of the need not only to limit competition
among workers or partially destroy it, but also to destroy thewhole system that generates
competition. In 1831 and 1834 there are uprisings of the French workers in Lyon in response to the
intensification of exploitation and the treachery of the bourgeoisie, manifested by it in the revolution
of 1830. During the uprising of 1831, the workers hold the city in their hands for several days. They
expose the famous slogan: “Toil or to die fighting”. The rebellion of 1834 was even more
important. These uprisings put the work question at the forefront. The demands of the workers,
although not yet directed against the very foundations of capitalism, nevertheless, with all the urgency
they raised the question of exploitation, the struggle against capitalism. In 1837–1840 the
first the British Chartist national labor movement , the first mass revolutionary movement of the
workers reaches its apogee. In 1844, the Silesian weavers revolted in Prussia. Finally, the events of
1848 "noisily and muddledly announced," says Marx, "the emancipation of the proletariat is this
mystery of the XIX century and its revolutions." Thus, developing with the growth of large-scale
industry and with the liberation from the influence of the surrounding petty-bourgeois environment,
the proletariat begins to resist the bourgeoisie as an independent force. He " abruptly, clearly,
mercilessly and imperiously declares publicly his opposition to the society of private property ."
The second contradiction , which characterizes bourgeois society and strenuously erodes it
especially since the second quarter of the XIX century, is theantagonism between the organization of
production in individual enterprises and the anarchy of production in all bourgeois society .
Bourgeois society has as its basis the production of goods. But "the peculiarity of every society
based on the production of goods is that in it producers lose power over their own social
relations" [8]. Production without a plan, to the market, without taking into account the real needs
entails anarchy of social production. The laws of commodity production are manifested in the external
public relations between commodity producers in exchange; they are revealed as the coercive laws of
"free competition" that prevail between capitalists. Being forced to introduce new machines under the
blows of free competition and expand production, capitalism creates an unheard of development of
productive forces, growth in the unprecedented levels of social wealth. At the same time, the ruin of
the urban craft and the peasantry and the crowding out of workers through the improvement and
introduction of new machines create a surplus of labor, human resources without employment and
livelihood. " Anarchy of bourgeois society forms the basis of the modern social order , as well as public
order, for its part, is the guarantee of this anarchy, Marx and Engels wrote then. “Since and to what
extent they contradict each other, to the extent and to the same strong degree they condition each
other” [9] .
The disorderly nature of bourgeois production in its whole, violating the proportionality between
different industries, creates an excess of the supply of goods over their demand. At one extreme are
the accumulated means of production and wealth in general, on the other, need, poverty,
exhaustion. All this finds its extreme expression in crises. They especially clearly manifest the
domination of the product over the producer, the material forces seem to acquire spiritual life, and the
people who created them descend to the degree of inert, dull material force. Crises characterize the
aggravation of the contradictions of the bourgeois order. “Demanding the denial of private property ,
the proletariat,” writes Marx in 1844, “merely elevates to the principle of society what society has
erected in itsthe principle that is embodied in it , besides its assistance, as a negative result of society
” [10] .
Crises, as a material protest of the productive forces against the relations of bourgeois property
that constrain their development, lead to an extreme deterioration in the condition of the workers,
making it highly fragile and unstable. But by doing so, they enormously revolutionize the
consciousness of the proletariat and make it necessary to fight not only for temporary and partial
improvements within capitalism, but also against the basis of these crises, that is, against the
capitalist mode of production itself.
So private property in the movement and development of its internal contradictions itself pushes
itself toward its own destruction. It comes to self-denial by giving birth to the proletariat, this
"conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty, poverty, this conscious of its rejection, and thus itself
the most abolishing rejection. The proletariat enforces a sentence that private property itself imposes
upon the birth of the proletariat, just as it executes a sentence that itself renders hired labor by
producing someone else’s wealth and its own poverty. Having won the victory, the proletariat in no
way becomes the absolute side of society, for it triumphs only by abolishing itself and its
opposite. With the victory of the proletariat disappear like the proletariat itself, [11] .
Such are the most important forms of manifestation of the main contradiction of capitalist society
— the contradiction between the social character of production and private-ownership
appropriation. But from this basic contradiction arise also other derivative contradictions, which,
however, are of no small importance for characterizing the capitalist reality of the first half of the 19th
century and for understanding the historical roots and causes of the emergence of Marxism.
One such contradiction, increasingly emerging in the process of the unfolding of the class struggle
in capitalist countries, especially in France with its wealth of political upheavals, was the contradiction
between the economic essence of bourgeois society and its external manifestation in its political
superstructure - between "civil society" and a democratic state.
The more the bourgeoisie adapted the political superstructure to the needs of its economy and
replaced the old feudal privileges with bourgeois law, the more pronounced the contradiction between
the formal equality proclaimed by it in the form of “democracy” and the actual inequality existing in its
economy. Political institutions were the most evil, most sobering caricature, says Engels, to the
brilliant promises of the philosophers of the 18th century. “Eternal justice was realized in the face of
bourgeois justice ... natural equality was limited to equality of citizens before the law, and the most
important of human rights was the right of bourgeois property. The rational state and the “social
contract” of Rousseau turned out to be and could be in practice only a bourgeois democratic republic.
[12]
.
“The contradiction between a democratic representative state and bourgeois society ,” Marx and
Engels should have noted early, “is a complete form of theclassic contradiction of the
public community and slavery . In the modern world, everyone at the same time is a member of the
slave system and the human community. It is precisely slavery of bourgeois society that, apparently ,
is the greatest freedom , because it seems to be a complete form of independence. an individual who
takes unbridled, not bound by any common bonds and no other person, the movement of his alienated
vital elements, such as property, industry, religion, etc., for his own freedom, while, on the contrary,
it represents his complete slavery and human rejection. To the place of privilege here became
the right” [13] .
The development of political struggle in the 40s of the XIX century. increasingly revealed the class
essence of bourgeois democracy. It turned out that from a political point of view, the state and social
structure are not two different things. The government discovered itself as the official expression of
class antagonism, the organization of the class of exploiters to protect "the general conditions of
production, and therefore forcible retention of the exploited class at the degree of subordination
required by this mode of production" [14] . This showed that evil is not only in one form or another of
the state, but in its essence, that is, in the structure of a society of private property.
When the proletariat enters the historical arena, when its struggle against the bourgeoisie comes
to the fore, the bourgeoisie finally throws itself into the arms of reaction and the proletariat acts as
the true representative of genuine democracy. He is ever more decisive in the experience of his
struggle comes to the conviction that real equality is primarily the destruction of the classes
themselves. But this equality is unattainable without the revolutionary overthrow of the existing
government, without the destruction of the bourgeois state. And that is why slogans emerge more and
more on the banners of the proletariat: “Peace to the huts is war to the palaces”, “ Political power is
our means, social prosperity is our goal ”.
Another, more particular contradiction arising from the difference in the level of economic status of
capitalist countries, is important because it makes it possible to break through the revolution in certain
parts of the bourgeois organism. This contradiction at the beginning of the XIX century. found its
expression in the Anglo-Russian domination over Europe and in the presence of a revolutionary
situation in Germany.
The originality of the situation was that in such capitalist countries, which were a kind of
“extremities” of the bourgeois organism — namely Germany of that time — only the tasks of assault
on absolutism and remnants of feudalism still arose, while in England and partly in France the
beginning of the end was played out of this assault, and against capitalism, the revolutionary
proletariat began a systematic struggle.
On the one hand, tsarist feudal Russia, a stronghold of reaction and absolutism, hung over
revolutionary Europe. On the other hand, England, the ruler of the world market at that time, who
turned whole nations into her wage workers, stood firmly like a rock on which continental
revolutionary waves broke. But at the same time, due to the difference in the level of the economy of
capitalist countries, England, expanding its economic ties and exerting economic pressure on the
backward states of the continent, acted as one of the causes that generated economic crises and
revolutionary waves in the continental countries of Europe. “The continent,” wrote Marx, “exports to
England incomparably more than to any other country. But export to England, in turn, depends on the
position of England, especially in overseas markets. Then England exports to overseas countries far
more than the entire continent, so the size of continental exports to these countries always depends
on the overseas exports of England. If, therefore, crises primarily create a revolution on the continent,
then their reason is still in England. In the limbs of a bourgeois organism, violent catastrophes should
naturally occur rather than in his heart, where there are more opportunities to compensate. ” [15] . One
of these limbs was Germany 40s.
Thus, if all of Europe felt Anglo-Russian domination, then this double oppression fell on Germany
with particular force, because at that time the economic and political border that separated East from
West lay through it. But it was precisely its position as one of the limbs of the bourgeois organism that
thickened the revolutionary atmosphere in it and created the possibility of the development of the
bourgeois revolution as a direct prologue to the proletarian one.
It is necessary to point out one more contradiction in the field of theoretical consciousness, which
arises from the already mentioned above contradictions. This contradiction was revealed with
particular force by the time of the emergence of Marxism also in Germany. This is the most
characteristic moment of bourgeois ideology, which is based on the contradictions of classes and the
contradiction between mental and physical labor - the gap between theory and practice .
The once bourgeois society, due to the internal needs of its development, as it was free from the
fetters of the feudal system, necessarily pushed its representatives onto the path of the development
of theoretical knowledge. The bourgeoisie sought with the help of scientific knowledge to destroy the
dominance of the Roman Catholic Church as an international center, cementing the feudal system. On
the other hand, through the knowledge of the properties of material bodies and the forms of
manifestation of the forces of nature, she set herself the task of developing productive forces. The
feudal society with its religion, theology and metaphysics was opposed by the bourgeoisie to the
alliance of natural science with materialistic philosophy. XVIII century. - the century of the Great
French Revolution and the industrial revolution in England - was a practical triumph of this theory.
By the beginning of the new century, antagonism between theory and practice is beginning to be
revealed in bourgeois ideology. This was facilitated by the growing isolation of the propertied classes
from the direct process of material production and their monopolization of theoretical work. Large-
scale industry separates science from labor as an independent production potency and forces it to
serve capital. Knowledge becomes an instrument capable of separating from labor and opposing it
against hostility. Antagonism between bourgeois industry and bourgeois theory, on the one hand, and
poverty created and ruin created by capital, on the other, is becoming increasingly apparent.
At the beginning of its development, the bourgeoisie, expressing objectively progressive tendencies
of social development, could give its science the appearance of superclassiness, the form of
universality and represented it as the only rational and generally significant one. But as the
antagonistic nature of bourgeois society is revealed, the dual nature of bourgeois science is also
revealed. By one side it is aimed at mastering and subjugating nature to human society, and the other
toward subordinating society to the ruling class in order to exploit the oppressed classes. The whole
exploiting character of bourgeois science and its separation of theory from practice, the gap between
mental and physical labor are revealed.
In the interest of securing the economic slavery of the working class, the bourgeoisie has already
betrayed the "anathema" of materialism. It appeals to religion in order to "curb" the godless
aspirations of the exploited, directed against capitalist property. Bourgeois philosophy turns into a
pillar of theology, idealism is strengthened in it. At the same time, philosophical materialism also finds
in its development a different class orientation. In the form of natural scientific vulgar materialism, it
dissolves in natural science and in this way is neutralized by the bourgeoisie, which drowns in
revolutionary creeping theoretical conclusions and perspectives that are creeping in creeping
empiricism. On the other hand, in the form of socialist and communist theories, materialism begins to
denounce bourgeois society and its inherent antagonisms.
The theoretical struggle develops between the classical economists as the scientific representatives
of the bourgeoisie and the communists — theorists of the working people.
Classical political economy is still engaged in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism. She
sees her task in showing how wealth is acquired in relations of bourgeois production and how much it
surpasses the production of wealth under feudalism. This pushes her to study the relations of
bourgeois production, and here she makes her great discoveries, laying the foundation for
the labor theory of value.
 But it is increasingly becoming clear, especially in connection with the consequences of the
industrial revolution, “that not only wealth is produced in the same relationship, but poverty, that in
the relations in which the development of productive forces takes place, a certain resistance force also
develops and these relations create the wealth of citizens, that is, the wealth of the bourgeois class,
only under the condition of non-stop destruction of the wealth of individual members of this class and
the creation of a non-stop growing proletariat . ” Therefore, bourgeois economists delimit their theory
from such revolutionary conclusions and gradually descend to the explicit defense and idealization of
bourgeois society.
French revolutionary doctrines, especially socialist and communist, disillusioned with the results of
the Great French Revolution, critically reveal the contradictions of bourgeois society, but they cannot
understand their nature and find the strength to resolve these contradictions in practice. They are
well aware of the existence of opposites of classes , as well as elements of decomposition within
modern society, but they do not see any historical initiative on the part of the proletariat, they “do not
head the political movement inherent to it”. During the struggle, they create a utopian theory of the
organization of the future society. This leads them to detach from the practice of the present, from the
class struggle.
Exposing existing antagonisms, utopian socialists dreamed of reconciling them, developed plans for
a socialist structure, hoping to realize the future without a struggle; they saw no other lever for the
reorganization of the present, except for the goodwill and consciousness of the people. They failed to
combine their theories with the social practice of the present, with the practice of the spontaneously
developing labor movement.
Bourgeois economists reject the unity of theory and practice, oppose the theory of revolutionary
practice. Utopian socialists have not yet come to the unity of theory and practice.
The former relate positively to the existing bourgeois world, regarding it as the best of all
worlds; the latter are negative, considering its existence as a mistake of reason. Some are apologetic
with respect to capitalism; others are critical. But both of them take an anti-historical point of view,
and both of them carry out metaphysics and idealism in their views on the history of social
development.
Classical German philosophy, under the influence of the Great French Revolution, breaks through
the metaphysical stalemate of bourgeois theory. But it breaks through metaphysics on
an idealistic basis, identifying the development of being with the development of thinking.
This phenomenon is largely explained by the social practice of semi-feudal Germany, where the
bourgeois revolution was still brewing.
Kant was the first to begin the philosophical revolution of classical idealism. Hegel completed it in
his system. “Ever since people think,” writes Engels, “there has not been such a comprehensive
system of philosophy as Hegel’s. Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit,
philosophy of law, religion, history — everything was put together in one system, everything was
reduced to one basic principle ” [16] .
This principle was development, understood as the struggle of opposites, which was conceived by
the idealist Hegel as the development of world consciousness, reason, absolute spirit.
The more bleak the German semi-feudal reality was, the more the philosophical thought strove to
rise above it. But not finding historically valid support for the bourgeois ideals she advanced, enjoying
her own independence and “creativity”, philosophical thought lost the firm ground of actual practice
and fell into the deadly embraces of abstraction.
German philosophical idealism, marking the disgusting separation of theory from practice and the
powerlessness of theory in the matter of explaining and changing practice, is incessant flight,
“progress to infinity” from actual practice, from the real world. Not “you can, because you should,” but
“you cannot, because you should” —this is the result of German classical idealism, as expressed in the
words of its finisher, in the words of Hegel. But Hegel himself, on the basis of his dialectic, plans a way
out of this impasse.
“In reality, rationality and the law are not at all in such a sad position that
they should only be” [17] ‚states Hegel. All that is rational is at the same time necessary; yet what is
necessary, must be, or at least become, is the result of his idealistic dialectic.
The Hegelian dialectic returns to reality. But it does not find the objective reality of nature and
society, but only the empty shell of thinking — the logical shadow of reality. Having identified being
and thinking, Hegel inevitably comes to the identification of practice with theory. Idealistic dialectics,
expressing the practical impotence of the German bourgeoisie, dissolved all the subject-practical
human activity in mental categories, leading to a conservative philosophy.
 The thunders of the July revolution of 1830 were the burial sounds of German classical idealism,
which approached the understanding of the meaning of practical activity, but failed to master actual,
material practice in order to change it.
The philosophy of Feuerbach, expressing the closeness of the bourgeois revolution, decisively
breaks with Hegel’s idealism and proclaims materialism: not thinking, but being of nature and man -
the initial moment of knowledge. But man and nature are considered by Feuerbach “only in the form
of an object or in the form of contemplation , and not as human sensory activity, practice ” [18] .
Putting forward the need for a union of philosophy with natural science and natural science with
philosophy, Feuerbach did not understand that the problem of the development of the theory rested
not only on the need to overcome religion, theology, metaphysics in general, but also to criticize
bourgeois politics.
By the 40th years of the XIX century. An encyclopedic task arose to investigate and summarize the
mass of accumulated material both in the field of the history of nature — natural science, and in the
field of the history of society — the history of people. The once revolutionary bourgeois theory, having
become conservative, was unable to cope with this task: by conserving bourgeois society as eternal
and “natural” and feeding this conservatism of spontaneously developing natural science, it rested on
a metaphysical impasse.
In Germany, the bourgeoisie was not yet in power due to the fact that the capitalist mode of
production matured only when its antagonistic nature was revealed in the acute conflicts of the
historical struggle that boiled in England and France. However, this feature of the historical
development of Germany not only did not exclude the possibility of criticism of bourgeois theory, but
required this criticism from the side of the class whose historical task was to replace capitalism with a
new mode of production and finally destroy the classes, ie, the proletariat. This criticism had to be
associated with politics. The political struggle was the main link for which it was possible to pull the
theory out of the swamp of feudal and bourgeois limitations on the path of objective and revolutionary
knowledge and thereby eliminate the gap and antagonism between theory and practice.
So there was this problem by the time of Marxism. Such, in the most general terms, are the
historical contradictions that prepared the rise of Marxism.
Marxism as a socio-political current did not arise aside from the high road of international
civilization. Both in its material and practical as well as theoretical roots, it is a product of international
development . Its emergence in Germany is explained, as we have seen, also by the international
situation.
Germany of that time was an interweaving of the above described contradictions. The still unsolved
contradictions of the new bourgeois economy and feudalism were replenished with internal
antagonisms of bourgeois society. Just as in the Roman Pantheon it was possible to find the gods of all
nations, in Germany it was possible to find the sins of various forms of economic and government.
In Germany, as already indicated, the capitalist mode of production matured after its antagonistic
character was revealed in England and in France. This circumstance determined the political and
theoretical impotence of the German bourgeoisie and the great political and theoretical consciousness
of the German proletariat, which had already relied on the experience of the British and French labor
movement. Comparing the "giant children's shoes of the proletariat" with the "dwarf worn-out political
boots of the German bourgeoisie," Marx, in 1844, saw in the German proletariat a "figure of an
athlete." Already "the Silesian uprising begins just as the French and British uprisings end‚- by the
consciousness of the essence of the proletariat". Germany, being on the eve of the bourgeois
revolution under more progressive conditions of European civilization in general, with a much more
developed proletariat than in England XVII and in France of the XVIII century, had the opportunity to
make this bourgeois revolution a direct prologue to the proletarian revolution. The center of the
revolutionary movement moved from the West to the East, and Germany was its vanguard. And
therefore, as the Communist Manifesto points out, “Communists pay their main attention to
Germany”.
Finally, only the German conscious dialectic — the greatest acquisition of classical idealism —
cleansed of the mystifying form, put on its feet by the greatest ideologue of the proletariat, made it
possible to pull the theory out of the metaphysical impasse of feudal and bourgeois limitations.
All these circumstances combined and explain to us why Germany of the second half of the XIX
century became the birthplace of Marxism , and the leaders of the German proletariat — Marx and
Engels, armed with materialist dialectics, critical and revolutionary in their very essence, its creators.
Marx and Engels, having passed through the “fiery flow” of Feuerbach materialism, through this
“purgatory” of that time, freeing from concepts and prejudices of idealistic philosophy, for the first
time brought back into the world, as opposed to “grumbling, pretentious imitation”, forgotten
dialectical method. They pointed out the connection of their method with the Hegelian dialectic, as well
as the direct opposite of this latter, showed the application of this method to the facts of empirical
science and to the conditions of the revolutionary struggle.
The bourgeoisie, as we saw above, at the time of its revolutionism in the person of its best
representatives, “pushing on nature”, concluded an alliance of natural science with philosophy, and
was in a materialistic and atheistic position. Marx and Engels, expressing the interests of the
proletariat, a class interested not only in changing nature, but also in a radical change in society,
require for ideological philosophy not only an alliance with natural science, but also its connection with
the history of mankind. “We know only one single science, the science of history. History can be
viewed from two sides and divided into the history of nature and the history of people. But both these
sides cannot be separated from each other , - Marx and Engels write in 1845, “as long as people exist,
the history of nature and the history of people determine each other ” [19]. The conscious attitude of
people towards nature determines their conscious attitude towards each other, and, conversely, their
conscious attitude towards each other determines their conscious attitude towards nature.
In a class society, people’s relations with each other, their social relations are far from
conscious. In bourgeois society, however, they represent “complete slavery and human rejection,” and
represent the main brake on conscious development in all respects. Therefore, Marx and Engels
directed the main fire on the social relations of capitalism, which were concentrated in the politics of
the bourgeoisie.
Criticism of Hegelian philosophy, miserable epigones of Hegelianism in the face of representatives
of the "German ideology" and "true socialism", criticism of contemporary socio-economic doctrines led
Marx "to the conclusion that legal relations, like the forms of the state, cannot be understood from
themselves , nor from the so-called universal development of the human spirit; on the contrary, they
are rooted in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of the
English and French of the XVIII century, united under the name of "civil society", and the anatomy of
civil society should be sought in political economy " [20] . "The mode of production of material life
determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life in general" [21] .
From this conclusion Marx follows highly revolutionary conclusions, opening up the prospects for
the greatest revolution of all times, not only for theory, but, what is especially important, for the
practice of the proletariat. At a certain stage of development, further points out Marx’s famous
preface, “On the Critique of Political Economy”, production relations from the “forms of development of
productive forces” become their fetters. “Then comes the era of social revolution. With the change in
the economic basis, a revolution takes place more or less quickly in the whole vast superstructure.
” “Bourgeois production relations are the last antagonistic form of the social production process,
antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but antagonism that springs from the social
conditions of life of individuals,
Therefore, the prehistory of human society ends with this social formation ” [22] .
1.3. Marxism-Leninism as a unity of theory and practice
“It is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social
being determines their consciousness” [23] . This position, brilliant in its depth, sounding so simply and
so clearly, was formulated by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin in a merciless struggle
against idealism and against metaphysical, mechanical materialism.
Idealism is distracted from real life, identifies it with consciousness. According to Marx, he turns
"real, objective chains into extremely ideal , extremely subjective, exclusively existing in me , and
therefore turns all external sensory battles into battles of pure ideas."
Metaphysical materialism such as Feuerbach does not go beyond the framework of simplified
"natural-scientific materialism." He views the existence of people chained by modern capitalist
relations as being the “man in general”. Therefore, he does not find in the very existence of a force
capable of breaking these chains, and thus dooms people to the further wearing of these “sober
hopeless chains”.
From the point of view of idealism, the development of being is determined by the development of
consciousness. Therefore, idealism considers the impact on people's minds, the propaganda of ideas a
necessary and quite sufficient condition for the transformation of being. For metaphysical materialism,
consciousness is determined by the development of being, but it understands being itself abstractly,
“only in the form of an object or in the form of contemplation , and not ashuman sensory activity,
practice , not subjectively” [24] . In so far as the metaphysical materialist remains in practice an
idealist, it is precisely where the communist materialist, the Marxist sees the need and at the same
time finds the conditions for the transformation of the world.
 Consciousness is determined by social being, and in turn it contributes to the further development
of being. However, people's consciousness can play such a role only through the practice
of man. “Ideas can never be brought beyond the boundaries of the old order: they always only bring
beyond the boundaries of the ideas of the old order. Ideas can not do anything at all . To fulfill ideas,
Marxism formulates its position, it requires people who must use practical force ” [25] . Marx and Engels
beat their opponents both for their idealistic disregard for the practical material activity of man, and
for the metaphysical opposition of being to consciousness, ignoring the change of nature and society
by man himself.
They did away with the metaphysical, Feuerbach abstract cult of nature, but they also relied on
natural science and its new discoveries: the discovery of the transformation of energy, which showed
that the unity of all forms of movement in nature is no longer just a philosophical statement, but a
natural science fact; the discovery of a cell that has thrown off the veil of secrecy that has enveloped
the process of the emergence, growth and structure of organisms; Darwin's discovery of the law of
evolution of the organic world. On the other hand, Marx and Engels, through criticism of politics,
oriented philosophical thought to the study of the history of human society. Having opened the
material content of political ideas, having summed up the scientific basis for his political ideology by
opening historical materialism, Marx and Engels thus created the missing link for an all-inclusive,
integral scientific materialistic worldview, from beginning to end. Relying on stubborn facts and at the
same time revealing their dialectical-materialistic connection, this world outlook makes
the philosophy that makes a claim to be higher than other sciences , a philosophy divorced from
concrete knowledge, philosophy as “science of sciences”, unnecessary .
Thus, the greatest merit of Marx and Engels and Lenin, who continued their work, is the creation
and further development of dialectical materialism as an integral, consistently revolutionary
worldview, encompassing dead nature, organic life, thought, and human society. In its development,
Marxism is built as such a holistic world view , containing “consistent materialism covering the area of
social life, dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound teaching on development, the theory of
class struggle and the world historical revolutionary role of the proletariat, creator of the new
communist society” [26]. Focusing on politics makes it possible for Marx and Engels to overcome the
purely contemplative nature of previous materialism and to unite philosophical materialism with
scientific communism . The realization of communism is the ultimate goal of the activities of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin and the practical materialism party created by them, i.e. communism.
Marxism banishes idealism from its last refuge — from the knowledge of human society; he
contrasts dialectical materialism with unilateral, half-hearted, deadly materialism of the past. Marxism
sets itself the task of ripping off “imaginary flowers from chains” not for the fact that oppressed by
class slavery, humanity carried “sober, hopeless chains” [27] , and then for it to shed these chains in a
revolutionary struggle.
But material chains can be completely dropped by material force. Marxism, having discovered the
laws of the development of human society and its class structure, having discovered the specific law of
the capitalist mode of production, the law of the production of surplus value, finds such strength in the
person of the proletarian class. This force, in contrast to all the historically preceding classes, striving
under the influence of “unvarnished, inexorable, absolutely imperiousneed , this practical expression
of necessity, ” cannot be freed from its inhuman living conditions, can not free itself by abolishing its
own living conditions, not abolishing " all inhuman life conditions of modern society, concentrated in
its own position " [28] . Marxism reveals all the antagonisms of modern society, tracing their evolution,
proving their transitory nature. While utopian socialists regarded the proletariat only as the most
suffering class, Marxism directly sets the goal of the proletariat’s class goals and the leadership of the
proletariat in its struggle, since only the proletariat is the only completely revolutionary class of
modern society. Marxism is the dialectical materialist result of the processing of the whole history of
mankind and especially the historical practice of the development and struggle of the proletariat itself.
Marxism, as a theory in its very essence critical and revolutionary, unites in itself an internally and
inseparably strict and supreme scientific nature with revolutionism. And this is because, first of all, it is
the only and only world outlook of the proletariat - the class called upon by history to eliminate the
separation of theory from practice and practice from theory in the process of revolutionary change in
the world. Expressing this aspiration, Marxism from the very beginning acts not only as a critic of the
world and its explanation, but also as a theory and practice of its change , including criticism and
explanation as its subordinate moments.
“Not criticism, but revolution is the driving force of history, as well as religion, philosophy, and any
other theory” [29] .
 “Philosophers only explained the world in various ways , but the fact is, - Marx wrote in 1845,“
to change it ” [30] . This in no way means that revolutionary change is possible without theoretical
criticism and explanation of the world. It only means the requirement to free the theory from
fetishistic covers, to save it, on the one hand, from subjectivist illusions that it “can do everything,
that it doesn’t care”, on the other hand, from creeping empiricism, from “objectivism” that doomed
the theory to "Tail" stumbling after the events and turned it into a tool to protect the existing old
world. Thus, this “only” is a whole revolution, freeing the theory from illusions and giving it
immeasurable power and strength.
Already at the beginning of its development, Marxism, defending a dialectical understanding of the
unity of theory and practice, led a merciless struggle with both subjectivist and objectivist distortions
of this view. He fought against the subjectivist "critical criticism" of the idealists of the Young
Hegelians, the Bauer brothers and Co., who reduced history to imaginary activities of imaginary
subjects who put these activities of individuals above the interests and movement of the masses. He
led the struggle against empiricism and objectivism, etc., of “true socialists” and historians who
viewed historical relations separately from activities that reduced history to a collection of dead facts
that ignored political activity, which in their party “impartiality” were above any class struggle.
Against these alien teachings of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism put forward a theory based on
" revolutionary, practically-critical activity ." The theoretical criticism of Marx and the explanation of
historical reality for them pose problems for the resolution of which there is only one means -
revolutionary practice . "We see," Marx wrote, "that the solution of theoretical opposites is
possible only through practical means, only thanks to the practical energy of man, and therefore, their
solution is not at all just a task of knowledge, but really a task of life that philosophy could not solve
precisely because she saw in her only a theoretical problem " [31]. True practice — and such is, first
and foremost, a sensory-objective activity — forms the basis of a real and positive theory, it is its
driving impulse and the criterion of truth. Marxism developed in constant ideological battles with
"friends" and with open enemies, in a bitter struggle with all the remnants of "socializing" petty-
bourgeois theories, defending in theory and practicing the dialectical unity of theory and practice
based on objective activity. Marxism reveals the roots of modern practice in the economic conditions
of a class society, and therefore mobilizes genuine theory and true revolutionary practice to overthrow
bourgeois practice. In the masses, in the practice of the masses, Marxism is seeking a way to
eliminate this disgusting gap.
Theory, in order to become a force, must master the masses. The masses, in order to become
capable of correct revolutionary action, must master the true theory.
But not every theory is capable of mastering the masses. The theory can do this only when “at the
same time it includes in the positive understanding of its negation, its necessary destruction, every
realized form is considered in motion, therefore also from its transitory side, since it does not bow
down and by its very essence is critical and revolutionary ” [32] , i.e. when it brings objective
knowledge to dialectical materialism, which cognizes things objectively and in essence, in their
revolutionary change and development.
The conclusion that theory of oppressing classes, in particular bourgeois theory, essentially cannot
be in unity with the practice of the oppressed masses follows from the same relationship between
theory and practice. The reasons for this impossibility lie in the living conditions of the bourgeoisie and
its exploiting essence. Deepening the antagonism between theory and practice, the class of exploiters
tries to inculcate the surrogates of their theories into the oppressed masses. One of these forms of
bourgeois influence is the theory of superclass and non-partisanship . Marxism-Leninism, who
discovered that the class struggle permeates the whole social whole, economics, politics and theory,
which exposed the lies of bourgeois theory, directly and openly declares itself to be the one and only
proletarian party theory.
“Marxism differs from all other socialist theories,” writes Lenin, “by the remarkable combination of
complete scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of affairs and the objective course of
evolution with the most resolute recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary
creativity, revolutionary initiative of the masses, and groups, organizations, parties, able to grope and
realize communication with certain classes ” [33] .
Marx, Engels and Lenin pin all their hopes on the proletariat, because “the proletariat, the lowest
layer of modern society, cannot rise, cannot straighten up without the entire superstructure of the
layers forming the official society, not taking off” [34 ] . He cannot free himself ‚without liberating at the
same time the whole of humanity. Then the place of the old world with its classes and class
antagonisms will be taken by the association, “in which the free development of each is a condition for
the free development of all” [35] . To achieve this goal, Marxism-Leninism arms the proletariat with a
solid world outlook and method of changing the world. With the help of a truly proletarian party, the
proletariat is organized into an independent force capable of not only throwing off chains, but also
changing the world.
From the very beginning, Marxism as a sociopolitical trend is inextricably linked with the
Communists, for “in the struggle of the proletarians of various nations they single out and defend the
common interests of the entire proletariat, not depending on nationality” [36] . At various stages of
development through which the struggle of the proletarians against the bourgeoisie passes, the
Communists "are always representatives of the interests of the movement as a whole" [37] .
“The Communists therefore,” wrote Marx and Engels in the “Communist Manifesto”, “are in fact the
most decisive, always encouraging a part of the workers' parties of all countries to move forward, and
theoretically they have an advantage in understanding the conditions, progress and general results of
the proletarian movement " [38] . Their task is to lead the proletariat in its real revolutionary
struggle. Under this condition, the theoretical and practical work of Marxist communists merges into
one work. The economic, political and theoretical struggle consists of three mutually connected fronts
of the liberation class struggle of the proletariat. Against the desire to turn Marxism into a dogma, a
symbol of faith, into a “petrified orthodoxy”, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin repeatedly stressed: “Our
teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action ”. “Nothing prevents us,” Marx wrote back in 1843, “to
connect our criticism with criticism of politics, with the interests of a particular political party, and
therefore to connect and identify our criticism with real struggle. In this case, we will not appear
before the world as doctrinalists with a ready-made new principle: “here is the truth, kneel before it!”
We develop the world new principles from its own principles. We do not tell the world: “stop fighting,
your whole struggle is nothing”, we give him the true slogan of struggle ” [39] . Against dogmatism and
sectarianism, Marx advanced connection with a certain party and participation in real struggle ; only
under this condition can the theory give a true slogan of struggle.
1.4. Leninism - a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism
The activity of Marx and Engels coincides with the period of preparation of the proletariat for the
revolution, when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct and immediate practical task. Their
activities coincide with the era of industrial capitalism, spreading it in the backward countries, colonial
seizure of agrarian backward areas by industrial capital. In the period of 1848, the center of the world
revolutionary movement moved to Germany, in which, as Marx and Engels thought then, the
bourgeois revolution could easily become the prologue to the proletarian revolution. This epoch
advanced the brilliant theorists and leaders of the international proletariat — Marx and Engels; In this
era, Marxism developed as a revolutionary theory of the proletarian struggle. She revealed the ways
and methods of the proletarian struggle, she put forward with all clarity the problem of the
dictatorship of the proletariat as the main content of the Marxist doctrine.
By the end of the life of Marx and Engels, new phenomena in the economy and politics of world
capitalism were discovered, which could not fail to attract their attention. So Engels, in his Anti-
Dühring, notes the growing importance of joint-stock companies and their future role in creating
capitalist monopolies. The center of the revolutionary movement is moving to the East: the attention
of Marx and Engels is increasingly directed to Russia, to the eastern colonial countries, where the
possibility of breaking through the chain of world capitalism becomes more and more likely.
The brilliant visions of Marx and Engels, as well as all aspects of their teachings, were further
developed by Lenin in the new era, which replaced the period of industrial capital, in the era
of imperialism .
In order to fully understand the socio-historical roots of Leninism and its international significance,
it is necessary first to clarify the historical significance of the struggle of Leninism against the
opportunism of the Second International and a whole strip of its undivided rule. An impassable gulf
separates the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin from Social Democratic
opportunism, which has now grown into social Fascism.
The teachings of Marx and Engels developed in a merciless struggle against bourgeois and petty-
bourgeois theories and views, which, being in reality "fundamentally hostile to Marxism", sought to
exert their influence on the labor movement: with Lassallism, Proudhonism, Bakunism, Durginism, etc.
A distinctive feature of the teachings of Lassalle, Proudhon and other authors of theories, spread
among the proletariat in the era of Marx and Engels, was the desire to go to reconciliation with
bourgeois society and the state, to reform for the better existing social relations without class
struggle, without a revolutionary change in the economic basis. Or, in these theories, an abstract,
petty-bourgeois, “left”, anarchic denial of the modern social system and state was manifested ,
without understanding, however, the real ways and means of replacing it with another social system
(Bakunin).
 Gradually, Marxism defeated these obviously hostile theories and ousted them from the ideology of
the labor movement. However, as soon as the theoretical victory of Marxism was designated , the
tendencies that found expression in the said teachings began to look for new ways for themselves.
The petty-bourgeois worldview began to dress up in “Marxist” vestments, began to emerge as
socialist opportunism within Marxism , “on the common ground of Marxism”.
The end of Engels’s life was already marked by the growth and domination of opportunism in the
social democratic movement and the Second International. Engels had to wage an open struggle with
the opportunist leadership of German Social-Democracy, which, hiding behind Marxist phrases, in fact
dissociated itself from the true spirit of the teachings of Marx and Engels; I had to lead the line to split
with opportunism.
Between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, Comrade Stalin indicated, and Lenin, on the other,
there is a whole band of undivided and actual domination of opportunism of the Second International,
despite the fact that such "orthodox" as Kautsky and Other Opportunists seek to turn Marx and Engels
into harmless "icons." They distort the revolutionary essence of their doctrine, replacing it with the
theory of "civil peace" and setting on reforms through the medium of bourgeois democracy. Bernstein
and Kautsky publish, with reductions and distortions, the works of Marx and Engels, or else they
completely ignore and conceal their works and letters of crucial importance. Opportunists pervert the
basic tenets of the revolutionary teachings of Marxism, relating to the dictatorship of the proletariat,
to the theory of the state, to the strategy and tactics of the class struggle. The main theoretical line of
opportunism was revisionism , that is, the desire to revise (revise) all the most important theoretical
propositions of Marx and Engels. Opportunists declare a revisionist approach against the foundations
of revolutionary theory, the philosophical foundations of Marxism, against materialism and dialectics,
seeking to return to philosophical idealism., to the doctrine of a calm and slow "evolution" of society.
The period of imperialism leads to the further growth of opportunism: its social base is expanding
along with the bourgeoisization of a part of the proletariat.
With the help of imperial superprofits derived from the robbery of colonies, capitalism is able to
bribe the better paid layers of workers, creating a working aristocracy . Capitalism makes the top of
the workers' professional movement obedient to themselves by bribing a professional
bureaucracy. This leads to the further development of opportunism and revisionism.
The previous petty-bourgeois illusions about the possibility of "correcting" capitalism by the
reformist "mending" of its contradictions are increasingly giving way to the openly bourgeois trend
within social democracy, seeking to adapt the labor movement to the interests of capitalists, staking
on the durable existence of capitalist relations. In England, this trend was expressed in English trade
unionism, which sought to detach the economic struggle of the working class from its political
struggle, in the policy of the British "workers" party. In Germany, it is expressed by the reformist elite
of the trade unions, parliamentary and municipal figures of social democracy, theoretically represented
years. Bernstein, Vollmar, David, Südekum, etc.
In Russia, the same trend is represented by the so-called "legal Marxists", who were direct
apologists of capitalism in the ranks of social democracy (Struve et al.), And the Mensheviks, such
frankly terry as its representatives, as "economists", "workers" and "liquidators" openly pursuing
liberal-bourgeois tendencies in the labor movement, adapting it to the interests of the bourgeoisie.
On the other hand, intermediate “centrist” groups are being created in international social
democracy, trying to occupy an intermediate, vacillating position between revolutionary Marxism and
opportunism. The social roots of centrism must be sought in a kind of division of labor among
opportunists, some of whom, while continuing to sow petty-bourgeois illusions in the proletarian
environment, clothe them in “Marxist”, sometimes “left” and “revolutionary” phraseology. Thus, along
with frankly terry opportunism, centrism arises (Kautsky in Germany, Trotsky in Russia), which is
especially dangerous and harmful, since it covers up frank opportunism, and in the course of further
development has revealed its entire counter-revolutionary Menshevik essence. Finally, a group of so-
called "left" Social Democrats (R. Luxemburg and others. Along with a more correct understanding of
the revolutionary perspectives, however, the roughest opportunist perversions of the theory and
practice of Marxism allowed. The “left”, “revolutionary” phraseology, petty-bourgeois in its content,
often turned out to be the worst form of revisionism.
On all the decisive questions of the theory and practice of class struggle, opportunism turned out
to be in glaring contradiction with Marxism. Kautsky and Hilferding’s “Marxism”, Russian Menshevik’s
“Marxism”, Trotsky’s “Marxism” has nothing in common with genuine revolutionary Marxism, despite
the fact that, unlike Bernstein, this “Marxism” often hides behind “Marxist” and “left” phraseology. We
shall further see what monstrous perversions of Marxism even such Menshevik theorists, such as
Plekhanov, allow.
 The further development of Marxism demanded, first of all, the restoration of the true teachings of
Marx and Engels and the struggle for his real theoretical foundations with all the opportunist
distortions of Marxism. This task is performed by Leninism, which both revives and moves forward the
revolutionary teachings of Marx and Engels. Continuing the work of Marx and Engels in the new
historical epoch, Lenin pursues a merciless struggle against all types of opportunism, leads the line to
split with open opportunism and with opportunism, covered with a "left" phrase, and centrism.
But Leninism is not only the restoration of the teachings of Marx and Engels, but also its
concretization and further development in relation to the new historical conditions of the struggle, to
the peculiarities of the era of imperialism. Imperialism, as the last and highest stage of capitalism,
while preserving all the basic contradictions of developed capitalism, sharpens them and brings them
to the highest limits. At the same time, the era of imperialism reveals new contradictions and unique
features in the capitalist economy. Imperialism leads to a change in the period of free capitalist
competition with a period of capitalist monopolies, to an increase in the role of finance capital, to the
creation of capitalist trusts and syndicates uniting individual capitalist enterprises, to the export of
capital to backward countries, to the struggle of imperialist states for sources of raw materials, for
colonies, for redistribution already divided by the capital of the world, to the inevitability of imperialist
wars. Capitalist monopolies become chains that hinder the further development of the productive
forces of society, cause a tendency to stagnation, to decay. The epoch of imperialism is the epoch of
dying, decaying capitalism.
As Comrade Stalin points out, imperialism brings to its extreme three main, most important
contradictions.
The first contradiction is the basic contradiction of capitalism, the contradiction between labor and
capital, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.. Under industrial capitalism, long periods of relatively
"peaceful" development were possible, when the working class used mainly the economic form of
struggle against the bourgeoisie exploiting it, when it prepared its forces for revolution, limiting itself
to using the parliamentary tribune and parliamentary struggle. Known economic concessions in the
form of shortening the working day or raising the wages of the workers were sometimes possible to
get from individual capitalists or capitalist groups through legislative reforms, trade union methods of
struggle, the organization of sickness funds and workers' cooperatives. This circumstance created, in
certain layers of well-paid or ideologically backward workers, political inertness, gave rise to
opportunistic sentiments in them, a tendency to reconciliation with capital.
Under imperialism, a completely different situation is created when individual capitalists are united
by powerful trusts, syndicates, when all-powerful banking capital makes them dependent on
themselves. Here the economic and political pressure of the bourgeoisie on the working class becomes
unlimited. At the same time, the growing mechanization of production and the methods of capitalist
rationalization lead to an increase in the staff of low-skilled labor, increase the army of the
unemployed, simplify the technical functions of the worker, finally turning him into an obedient slave
of the production process. Under these conditions, the working class proceeds with the task of
overthrowing capitalism and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.
“Imperialism,” says Comrade Stalin, “is the omnipotence of monopolistic trusts and syndicates,
banks and the financial oligarchy in industrial countries. In the fight against this omnipotence, the
usual methods of the working class — trade unions and cooperatives, parliamentary parties and
parliamentary struggle — proved to be completely inadequate. Either surrender to capital, stay the
same and go down, or take up new weapons - this is how imperialism poses the question to the
millions of proletariat. Imperialism brings the working class to the revolution ” [40] .
The second main contradiction of imperialism is rooted in the contradictions between the interests
of various capitalist groups , between the capitalist statesrepresenting and protecting these
interests . Replacing free competition by capitalist monopolies, imperialism, however, does not destroy
capitalist competition. Competition, as Lenin points out, persists alongside. with monopolies, and this
combination of competition and monopoly leads to an even greater aggravation of contradictions and
conflicts. Capitalist competition between individual world trusts, syndicates, between various groups of
finance capital is reflected in their bitter struggle for markets, areas of capital export and sources of
raw materials, for the redistribution of industrially backward areas already divided by world
capital. The struggle for the colonies is intensified thanks to the law of uneven capitalist development,
which is intensifying in the period of imperialism.. The unevenness and spasmodic character of
capitalist development lead to the fact that each time new powers, groups of powers and financial
groups act on the world stage as competitors of the existing monopolists. The inevitable desire to
seize foreign territories entails imperialist wars.
 The imperialist war weakens the economic power of the imperialists: it leads to the need for
capitalists to arm the many millions of working people, at the same time increasing their exploitation
with the burden of military burdens. This, in turn, creates the conditions and possibilities for turning
an imperialist war into a civil war. Thus, the competition of capitalist groups, according to Comrade
Stalin, “leads to a mutual weakening of the imperialists, to a weakening of the position of capitalism in
general, to an approaching moment of the proletarian revolution, to the practical necessity of this
revolution ” [41] .
Finally, the third contradiction of imperialism is the contradiction between the few dominant
imperialists of various countries and the masses of the colonial dependent peoples.. This contradiction
stems from the merciless and insolent exploitation and inhuman oppression with which imperialism
exposes the working people of the colonies and dependent countries. By exploiting the colonies as
sources of raw materials, foreign imperialism oppresses the broad masses of the colonial peasantry,
which is also subjected to exploitation by the local landlord feudal lords. Imperialism turns local feudal
lords into its agents, and this interweaving and the alliance of foreign imperialism with local feudalism
lead to a delay in the economic and political development of the colonies, causing opposition in the
form of peasant uprisings. But at the same time, imperialism makes the colonies the subject of
application of imported capital, it builds in them communications, factories and plants, and this
circumstance contributes to the industrial and commercial development of the colonies, the education
of the cadres of the national proletariat there, the creation of a local trade and, later, the industrial
bourgeoisie, the formation of a local intelligentsia and the growth of the national liberation
movement. At first, the national movements are headed by the local bourgeoisie and the petty-
bourgeois intelligentsia, but the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry, plays the role of the
fighting cadres in them. He leads the people's revolution as he betrays the national bourgeoisie, which
is easily satisfied with the handouts of the imperialists. Such is the basis of the broad revolutionary
movement in the colonies and dependent countries. but the role of combat personnel in them is
played by the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry. He leads the people's revolution as he
betrays the national bourgeoisie, which is easily satisfied with the handouts of the imperialists. Such is
the basis of the broad revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries. but the role
of combat personnel in them is played by the proletariat, which leads the working peasantry. He leads
the people's revolution as he betrays the national bourgeoisie, which is easily satisfied with the
handouts of the imperialists. Such is the basis of the broad revolutionary movement in the colonies
and dependent countries.
Thus, squeezing superprofits from the proletariat and the peasantry of the colonies, imperialism
creates all the conditions there for the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the working
peasantry headed by it. This circumstance, according to Comrade Stalin, “ fundamentally undermines
the position of capitalism, turning colonies and dependent countries from the reserves of imperialism
into reserves of the proletarian revolution ” [42] .
Such are the main contradictions of imperialism, which lead the working class to the revolution,
which make the proletarian revolution a practical necessity, which create the reserves of the
proletarian revolution. In these new conditions as compared with industrial capitalism, under the
conditions of rotting, dying capitalism, the revolutionary theory of the working class, Marxism, should
have its further development. Under these conditions, Leninism was born as the further development
of the teachings of Marx and Engels, as Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions .
However, the question arises: why precisely the Russian revolution could and should have
generated Leninism? Why precisely Russia could at the same time become the birthplace of Leninism,
the theory and tactics of Bolshevism?
“Therefore,” answers t. Stalin, to this question, “that Russia was the focal point of all these
contradictions of imperialism. Because Russia was pregnant with a revolution more than any other
country, and only she was able, in view of this, to resolve these contradictions in a revolutionary way
” [43] .
By the end of the 90s and the beginning of the 900s, Russia was already a country of developed
capitalism, which passed into its imperialist stage. In tsarist Russia, however, imperialism was closely
intertwined with feudal relations, with the despotic-autocratic police system, which condemned the
workers and peasant masses to particularly strong lawlessness, poverty, inhuman exploitation, and
cultural backwardness. Russian imperialism was, in Lenin's phrase, “feudal-military imperialism”; he
was "concentrating the negative sides of imperialism squared."
At the same time, the interests of tsarism and Russian capitalism were closely intertwined with the
interests of Western imperialism. Tsarist Russia was the greatest reserve and the most important ally
of Western imperialism. Western capitalism, along with Russian capitalism and intertwining with it,
carried out the economic enslavement of the Russian proletariat and held in their hands the most
important branches of the Russian national economy.
It should be noted that, due to the same reasons, the Russian labor movement hardly knew the
labor aristocracy; it was strongly its revolutionary traditions, it was supported by the peasant
revolution against landlordism. The contradiction between labor and capital in Russia was felt with
particular urgency and had the possibility of its revolutionary resolution: the Russian working class
was the closest to the revolution . Already the 1905 revolution was viewed by Marxist-Leninists as a
step towards the world proletarian revolution.
Representing a springboard for the application of Western capital, its agents in relation to the
millions of workers and peasants who inhabited Russia, Tsarist Russia at the same time pursued an
imperialist colonial policy both in relation to its foreign edges and its eastern neighbors (Persia, China,
etc.) d.). Tsarist Russia, therefore, was an absolutely necessary link in the imperialist chain , an
essential component of imperialist contradictions and imperialist wars, and moreover such a link
where the revolution was most of all a practical necessity.
Finally, in Russia, for the same reasons, the contradiction between the dominant nationality and
the peoples enslaved by tsarism (Ukraine, the Caucasus, Poland, Central Asia), deprived of elementary
rights and representing inexhaustible reserves of revolutionary ferment, was particularly strong. The
national revolutionary movement in Russia supplied the loyal reserves of the proletarian and peasant
revolution.
Back in 1902, in his work “What is to be done?” Lenin pointed out that history set the most
revolutionary task before the Russian proletariat — overthrowing the stronghold of reaction in Europe
and Asia and the struggle to transfer the revolution to proletarian rails. The fulfillment of this historical
task, said Lenin, will place the Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the world proletarian struggle
against imperialism.
From all that has already been said it is clear that it is fundamentally wrong to regard Leninism
only as a “practice,” and Marxism as a theory (Ryazanov). It is also wrong to regard Leninism as a
narrowly national, specifically Russian phenomenon (as the Social Democrats do), as the application of
Marxism to the Russian situation. It is wrong to say that Leninism is a theory of the proletarian
revolution, "directly started in a country dominated by the peasantry," and see in the question of the
role of the peasantry the main issue of Leninism (Zinoviev).
Leninism is a deeply international phenomenon in which the highest development of the theory
of Marxism is in the closest connection with the practice of the proletarian revolution. There is not and
cannot be for us a different Marxist theory in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution,
except for one, the only militant theory of the proletarian struggle - Leninism. And the slightest
departure from Leninism, both in theory and in practice, hits the most theoretical foundations of
Marxism.
"Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of
the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular ... Leninism is a further development of Marxism " [44] .
These provisions determine the content of Leninism. Leninism is based entirely on the theoretical
principles of Marx and Engels and at the same time represents something new in comparison with
what Marx and Engels gave. Leninism represents both the concretization and further development of
Marxism decisively in all areas of Marxist theory - the development of all three components of
Marxism: its philosophy, political economy, scientific communism. Lenin's questions related directly to
the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat were especially deep and complete: the question of
monopoly capitalism as a new phase of capitalism, the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and its state form, the question of methods of building socialism and the possibility of the victory of
socialism in one country, teaching about the party of the proletariat, its strategy and tactics,
Leninism means the creation of a new type of party of the proletariat capable of taking on the
fulfillment of the historical tasks of the proletariat in the new historical epoch.
Lenin’s method, as Comrade Stalin formulates it, “is not only restoration, but also the
concretization and further development of Marx’s critical and revolutionary method, his materialistic
dialectics” [45] . Leninism is a new and higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism -
the philosophy of dialectical materialism.. Like Marx and Engels, according to Lenin's characterization,
so also Lenin himself has a central point, to which the whole essence of the ideas expressed and
discussed by him is reduced - materialistic dialectics. Continuing and developing the teachings of Marx
and Engels, brilliantly applying the materialist dialectics to political economy, history, science,
philosophy, politics and tactics of the working class in the new historical conditions, Lenin is the surest
follower of Marxism.
 The Communist International and our party, led by Comrade Stalin, continue the work of Lenin, the
work of further developing the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution. Led by Comrade Stalin,
world communism continues the further development of the materialist dialectics, the philosophical
basis of Marxism-Leninism.
Chapter 2. Materialism and Idealism
2.1. Two lines in philosophy
Behind the verbal tinsel of numerous philosophical systems, behind the variety of variegated labels
pasted on their teachings by philosophers, lies the long and brutal struggle of two main lines in
philosophy: materialism and idealism. The history of philosophy, for all its complexity, is a history of
the struggle and development of these two antagonistic philosophical trends. All philosophies and
schools are the essence of their varieties. Every philosophical doctrine, whether it declares it openly or
tries to hide it in every way, must be adjacent either to the camp of idealism or to the camp of
materialism. Claims to become outside both directions, “above” them, “above” them, to create some
new, non-idealistic and non-materialistic philosophy - are only a maneuver used by some modern
bourgeois philosophers to hide their belonging to idealism, or shy fear of others to openly declare
materialism, or helpless trampling between the two, a philosophical jumble, eclecticism , confusion.
The history of philosophy does not flow in a closed world, outside the historical class
struggle. Philosophical teachings arise and develop in a particular human society, they are created by
people belonging to certain social classes, the consciousness of which is due to historically defined
social being. Philosophical teachings grow in a specific social environment and are determined by it,
expressing the needs and aspirations of certain social classes, reflecting the level of development of
the productive forces of society, the historical level of human knowledge of nature. Their fate depends
on the extent to which they meet the requirements of social classes, how perfectly they serve its
purposes.
The social roots of the existence throughout the history of two irreconcilable lines in philosophy
must be sought in the class, contradictory structure of society. Idealism arose initially as a product of
the limited and ignorant ideas of the primitive savage. The development of scientific knowledge, due
to all the subsequent development of the productive forces of society, it seemed, should have led to
the complete triumph of materialism and the suppression of all idealistic ideas. However, idealism not
only did not die, but continued to develop. The main reason for this is the division of society into
classes, the rule in the capitalist society of the bourgeoisie, which secures idealistic theories and
teachings for the sake of its interests .
In its historical development, idealism was an ideology of exploiting classes and, as a rule, played a
reactionary role. Materialism, the development of which was an expression of the worldview of the
revolutionary classes, had to make its way in class society in an incessant struggle against the
philosophy of reaction — idealism. Of course, one cannot establish any obligatory historical scheme
here. We know cases when immature social classes express their new revolutionary demands in the
language of idealism (German idealism of the beginning of the 19th century, theories of natural law, in
part - utopian socialism). On the other hand, the fighting French materialism of the 18th century was
the ideology of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie. The materialism of the seventeenth century, as
Engels pointed out, was of aristocratic origin.
Similarly, materialism at the present stage of historical development, if it has the form of a vulgar
or a form of mechanical materialism, can play a reactionary role in modern conditions. However, the
very essence of idealism makes it a particularly convenient weapon in the hands of reactionary
classes.
In class society, there is only class science. It functions in accordance with the tasks and interests
of certain classes. To the extent that the consciousness of the ruling class and its interests require a
true knowledge of reality in order to develop the productive forces, science contains materialistic
elements; to the extent that they require the concealment of truth in order to preserve and strengthen
their domination, idealism prevails in science. Since science reflects the studied area of being in
knowledge, since it is focused on the revolutionary transformation of reality and on the subordination
of the forces of nature by identifying the objective laws of the development of nature and society,
science cannot but be a materialistic science. Since the condition of the social being of the exploiting
classes makes it impossible for them to truly comprehend reality, because it distorts and limits their
views, since true knowledge threatens their class interests, so far their science is idealistic. He who
does not understand this will understand nothing in the vicissitudes of the philosophical struggle. He
who disputes the class character of science and philosophy tries to hide the class affiliation of his
philosophy.
 What is the fundamental difference between the main directions in philosophy? Which doctrines
belong to materialistic and which should be attributed to the number of idealistic?
The difference between materialism and idealism is rooted in the opposite resolution of the main
question of philosophy, the question of the relation of thinking to being . "Take Whether nature,
matter, the physical, the external world - and considered secondary consciousness, mind, sensation (-
experience ofcommon terminology of our time), mental, etc., -.. That is the root question which in
fact continues to divide philosophers into two big camps " [46]. All those philosophies that recognize
being, the objective world, nature, matter, are primary, independent of our consciousness, and the
thinking, subject, cognition, and spirit are secondary, derivative, belong to the materialistic camp. To
idealists are those who primary, basic, recognize the spirit, idea, subject, human consciousness, and
the external, objective world, the material reality considers dependent on consciousness,
secondary. One way or another, differences from the whole research path follow from the resolution of
this main issue. In this question, the core of philosophical differences. The place of individual
teachings in the struggle of philosophical views is mainly determined by what position they occupy in
the matter of matter and consciousness, which of them they consider primary and secondary, where
they see the key to understanding being and knowledge.
For an idealist, the world is either a collection of our sensations or a spiritual process, created by
our own or the world mind, consciousness, will; the external material world is either completely
declared as something imaginary, apparent, or is understood as an external envelope, as a material
expression of an active spiritual principle. For an idealist, human cognition is the self-activity of the
subject, the self-generation of thought, sensation, and will.
The materialist, on the contrary, sees "the unity of the world in its materiality." Consciousness,
thinking - one of the properties of matter, arising only at a certain, high level of its
development. Nature, matter, the objective world exist outside and independently of
consciousness. Cognition is a reflection by a thinking subject, that is, by a person, outside and
independently of an existing objective reality.
The resolution of the question of the relation of thinking to being is the only reliable criterion
(measure) for determining the essence of the considered philosophical doctrine. That is why
philosophers who seek to conceal the traces of the origin of their views, to push through idealism
under the guise of materialism, try to divert attention from this basic question, to replace it with a
different, unsuitable, imperfect measure. The last attempts of this kind include the statements of L.
Axelrod, I. Varyash and other modern mechanists that the fundamental difference between
materialism and idealism is the fundamental difference between materialism and idealism.. The
question of the primacy of matter or spirit is replaced by the mechanists with the question of whether
the philosopher adheres to a causal explanation of phenomena, reducing the explanation to one
mechanical reason, He who explains all occurring phenomena by their causal connection and at the
same time understands the causes as mechanical movements, belongs to, according to the
mechanists, to the materialists. Those who deny the possibility of a causal explanation are
idealists. There is no dispute, the materialistic understanding of causality is fundamentally different
from its idealistic understanding of it or from the complete rejection of causality by idealists. But in
order to clarify the essence of this difference, to understand what the basis of discrepancies on the
question of causality is, it is necessary to turn first to the main question of philosophy: What precedes
- being or thinking? - since it is precisely this that also determines the materialistic or idealistic
solution of the question of causality.
Only understood as a form of objective material connection between things, causality is
materialistically understood causation. Idealism, on the basis of the fact that matter is generated by
spirit, understands a causal relationship not as an objective connection of things, but as a form of
thinking or as their logical connection, as a special way of connecting the senses to the subject. Other
types of idealism completely deny a causal explanation, replacing causality with a will or some other
spiritual force or goal, supposedly driving the world. By putting the question of mechanical or non-
mechanical causality at the center of philosophy, opponents of dialectical materialism try to hide from
the question of an idealistic or materialistic starting point of view in understanding causality.
Idealism is directly related to religion. Like religion, idealism is a development, the development of
an animistic understanding of the world, that is, the spiritualization of things, endowing them with soul
and will in the image and likeness of man. Idealism and religion have not only common sources, but
also homogeneous social tasks and goals. Idealistic philosophy is more subtle, in scientific form it
performs the same ideological function ‚which is more simplified, rougher, is religion. Without
exception, all forms of idealistic philosophy, no matter how camouflaged, are a justification of religion,
since upon closer examination, the basic position of idealism turns out to be identical with the
foundations of religious ideology. Different idealistic teachings differ only in their form justify and
"justify" religion. We find in idealists that direct, logical proof of the correctness of religious tenets, the
depreciation of reason and the exaltation of faith, feeling, instinct, the delimitation of the spheres of
influence of science and religion for the purpose of their peaceful coexistence. The struggle against
religion therefore requires the disclosure of idealism, and the overcoming of idealism is a struggle
against clericalism in science.
Claiming that in knowledge we confine ourselves to the spiritual field, supposedly lying on the
“other side” of matter, idealism asserts false criteria of truth, wrong ways and methods of scientific
research. An idealistic mathematics is also being created, which extracts its principles from the pure
reason that is supposedly independent of the objective reality of reality, which studies the particular
ideal realm of mathematical concepts; idealistic physics dissolves all nature in the sphere of subjective
sensations; idealistic biology refers to the intangible, purposeful "life forces"; idealistic psychology
deals with the “soul”, the free “will” and the self-sufficient, independent world of mental
experiences. Idealism penetrates all the gaps, uses all the gaps that exist at this level of
knowledge. Idealism parasitizes on the weakness of science, on its underdevelopment , it speculates
on the difficulties of its growth, on the incompleteness of the quest, often taking place in the process
of revolutionary breaking of obsolete ideas.
Idealism overshadows the true state of things with the “philosophical fog”, which condemns the
reactionary class; he brings up the oppressed classes in the spirit of reconciliation with the hardship
and adversity of the material world in the name of the ideal world, "higher" values; he educates the
proletariat in the consciousness of the necessity of subordinating physical labor to the leadership of
representatives of the "spirit", "mind", "higher", "enlightened" classes; in the ruling classes
themselves, he educates the ideology necessary for consolidating their domination.
Idealism is not something "external" in relation to bourgeois science. It is not the case that
reactionary idealistic philosophy forces immaculate, classless science to serve the ruling classes. This
would mean that only philosophy is class science, and the rest of exact science is itself classless
science and can only be used in the interests of a particular class. Such an understanding, which is
peculiar in particular to “our” mechanists, implies their uncritical admiration for “science”, their
alignment “with exact science”, their struggle for the “liberation” of science from dialectic-materialistic
philosophy that allegedly corrupts it from the truth. In a class society, all science is class science by its
very essence: blind, uncritical following “science” is nothing else,
A brutal, implacable struggle must be waged with idealism. In this struggle it is necessary first of
all to expose the class nature of all idealism, its exploiting essence. It is necessary to discover his
clerical character, his protection of religious ideas. But it is also necessary to reveal what causes,
which are hidden in the peculiarities of human knowledge itself, contribute to idealistic distortion, it is
necessary to clarify the epistemological (epistemological) roots of idealism .
Human knowledge is the process of reflecting the laws of the objective world. But this reflection is
not frozen, not dead. No, the process of knowledge is movement, there is a split of one. In the very
process of knowledge lies the possibility of the departure of knowledge aside from objective truth.
Thinking a person applies general concepts. For example, the concepts: person, class, society,
formation, etc. Without operating with these concepts it is impossible to think. But on the other hand,
here the possibility of departure to the side and the danger of idealism are revealed. When we make a
judgment: Ivan is a man, then here it is possible to think separately and independently what is
common to all people without as to whether Ivan is he, Peter or Sidor. We cannot do without
operating the notion of “man”, since in this case we are not going further than the ideas that we have
about Ivan, but we just need to express the common thing that all people have, i.e. go into knowledge
from Ivan to Peter, Sydor, etc. In this way, knowledge divides, on the one hand, the particular —
Ivan, on the other, the common — man. The particular and the general are inextricably
linked. Breaking them means breaking away from objective truth expressed in the unity of the general
and the particular. The objective truth lies precisely in the fact that there is no common thing without
the private and the particular without the common. Ivan exists only as a man, and man exists only as
Ivan, Peter, Sidor, etc. The separation of the general from the individual, giving it the meaning of an
objectively existing reality is the transfer of knowledge to the side. When, along with really existing,
living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put " giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality is the
departure of knowledge aside. When, along with really existing, living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put
" giving it the meaning of an objectively existing reality is the departure of knowledge aside. When,
along with really existing, living people - Ivan, Peter, etc. - put "man in general ", man as such, and
Ivan, Peter, etc., are declared only as the form of existence of this person in general, then this is
idealism, because here the starting point is taken by the thought of man (abstraction: man in
general), and not real people . These are the techniques of all idealists. All idealists in place of matter,
that is, objective reality that exists independently of human consciousness, put consciousness, that is,
thought or sensation.
This perversion is beneficial to the exploiters. Through idealism, they sanctify exploitation; trying
to prove the eternity and inviolability of the existing order Thus, class interest reinforces the departure
of knowledge, seeks to perpetuate it, and to approve idealism as a universal worldview.
“The knowledge of man is not (there is no corresponding line), but a curved line, infinitely
approaching a series of circles, a spiral,” says Lenin. - Any passage, fragment, piece of this curved line
can be transformed (one-sidedly turned) into an independent, complete, straight line, which (if you
don’t see the forest for the trees) then leads to the marsh, to clericalism (where it is reinforced by
the class interest of the ruling classes) . Straightness and one-sidedness, woodenness and ossification,
subjectivism and subjective blindness voilà are the epistemological roots of idealism. ” "Philosophical
idealism is one-sided , exaggerated, (überschwengliches (Dietzgen)) development (bloating, swelling)
of one of the lines, sides, edges of knowledge into the absolute, cut off from mother, by nature,
deified. Idealism is clericalism. Right. But philosophical idealism is (“more correctly” and “besides”) the
road to clericalism through one of the shades of aninfinitely complex cognition of a (dialectical) person
” [47] .
That is why the struggle against idealism, a consistent, irreconcilable struggle against the theory
that prevailed over a huge segment of history, requires us not simply to discard the entire theoretical
content of the old idealistic philosophy, but to overcome critical overcoming idealism. We must, by
revealing the class roots of idealism, at the same time not dismiss the questions posed by idealistic
philosophy. By revealing the internal logic of one or another idealistic system and exposing it to
Marxist criticism, we find out the idealistic one-sidedness of resolving these issues, its subjective
blindness, the idealistic swelling of individual lines and aspects of phenomena.
Idealism is false. But idealism is not simply nonsense, nonsense, not having a support in the
peculiarities of our process of knowledge. Idealism could not fulfill its class purpose, if it were
absolutely groundless, meaningless, without points of support in the objective process of
knowledge. "Clericalism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has gnosiological roots, it is not
groundless, it is barrenness indisputably, but barren flowers growing on a living tree, alive, fruitful,
true, powerful, all-powerful, objective, absolute, human knowledge" [ 48]. Therefore, it is impossible to
simply erase, to regard, as it were, the former, all previous development of philosophy, which was
marked by the struggle against idealism. In their heyday, the exploiting classes contributed to the
development of knowledge, but this development was accomplished by them in a perverted,
mystifying, idealistic form. By destroying idealistic philosophy, modern materialism does not
undermine the living tree of knowledge, but removes empty space from it, dead growths: it is the heir
of everything true and valuable that was achieved in the preceding movement of science.
Dialectical materialism — the highest form of materialist philosophy — is the philosophy of the
proletariat.. Openly declaring his class, partisanship, dialectical materialism, at the same time,
exposes the class essence of the opposing views opposing him, tears off the covers of “classlessness”,
“purity” and “objectivity”. Dialectical materialism is the most consistent and irreconcilable form of
materialism, just as the proletariat is the most consistent and radical class in its revolutionism. The
materialism of the advanced classes of society that preceded the proletariat was already limited by
virtue of the conditional limited revolutionary nature of these classes. The progressive bourgeoisie,
waging a struggle against feudal reaction under the materialist banner, had to look with caution at
their "allies" —the proletarians; its revolution was the establishment of a new form of exploitation, a
new kind of class oppression. Her revolutionism was inherently flawed: it carried the germ of a new
subsequent reaction. The revolutionary character of the proletariat is radically different: it is directed
against all exploitation and oppression, it bears the destruction of the classes themselves to replace
class domination. Hence, to the end, the consistent dialectical materialism of the proletariat, to the
end the intolerant, hostile attitude towards all and every kind of idealism and religiosity, anti-science,
ideological reactionism.
The history of the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the history of an irreconcilable
struggle with reactionary philosophical idealism , whatever form it takes, whatever clothing it may
wear. "Marx and Engels, from the beginning to the end, were party in philosophy, they were able to
discover deviations from materialism and the concession to idealism and fideism in all and every"
modern "direction" [49]. For hypocritical phrases and verbal quirks, they caught the idealistic
enemy. They also found him when, pretending to be a friend of the proletariat, under the guise of
"deepening", "correcting" dialectical materialism, he replaced it with idealism. But they did not give
the descent to those materialists who evolved from the highest form of materialism to the less
consistent, pre-Marxist, vulgar mechanical materialism, long surpassed by the development of
knowledge and powerless in the fight against modern idealism. “Either materialism, consistent to the
end, or the lie and confusion of philosophical idealism — this is the formulation of the question that is
given” [50] in every page of Marx and Engels.
The struggle of parties in philosophy is one of the fronts of the struggle of classes. And in
philosophy there is a class against a class. The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution that we
are experiencing, the era of the deepest general crisis of capitalism, the utmost aggravation of its
contradictions, the era of rapid socialist construction in the USSR, the rise of the revolutionary
movement of the proletariat throughout the world, is the era of the most acute and bitter class
struggle that history knows.
Treason of the philosophical line of the proletariat, flirting with idealism is treason in the class
struggle, surrendering positions to the enemy. Idealist philosophers are learned clerks of theology,
idealist philosophers are certified lackeys of the bourgeoisie.
Dialectical materialists are the ideologues of the working class, which must put an end to the
enslavement of man by man, the class building socialist society. In the fierce struggle of classes there
can be no middle; it is not in philosophy either. Of all the parties, therefore, "the most vile is the
middle party." “Conciliatory charlatans” are agents of a weakening, wanting to delay the struggle and
gather strength with the enemy.
The scientists lackeys of the imperialists do not disdain in anything to aspire Marxism. “Solid”
professors in “solid” philosophical writings do not shun even “arguments” borrowed from the white
emigrants' garbage pit, combining the struggle against communism with the struggle against
materialism.
Thus, for example, the notorious herald of intervention, the ideologist of “pan-Europe”, Count R.
Kudengove-Kalergi, in the special book “Away from Materialism” he wrote intimidates the petty
bourgeoisie with immorality, immorality of materialism: “Since (for materialists) nothing exists except
matter, that is, neither God nor ideas, then every duty is fraud for them, every moral requirement is
fraud, every morality is fraud ... "The materialists" relate to people around either friendly or hostile,
but indifferent. Other people for them is only a means to increase their enjoyment of life. They treat
them no differently than good cigars, good wines and delicacies, or as annoying flies and poisonous
snakes ... ”This is the way the most advanced ideologists of imperialism“ overthrow ”materialism.
The reactionary nature of bourgeois philosophy now reaches its highest limit. Hitler's "ideologues"
directly proclaim the cry: "back to barbarism!". From the depths of the historical idealistic arsenal, the
infamous mystical systems are extracted. Reason refuses to serve bourgeois philosophy. She appeals
to the supramental, "frank", intuitive mysticism. The vile middle party, the bourgeois agents among
the proletariat - social democracy, finally reborn into the "left" party of the bourgeoisie, finally joins
with its masters, becomes a reliable pillar of fascism - this latest political stake of unbridled
imperialism. Accordingly, the philosophers of social fascism are also unbelted. Philosophical
revisionism — a concealed approach to the policy of the working class for an idealistic foundation with
the goal of emascuating its revolutionism — has now become a frank idealism among the official
philosophers of the Second International. Dialectical materialism is openly and unceremoniously
declared obsolete by them. Kant, Mach, Bergson, Freud — anyone will take social fascism into his
philosophical teachers in order to “end” Marx and direct proletarian thought to the bourgeois channel.
Communist parties, confidently and adamantly leading the proletariat to victory, must especially
vigilantly preserve the firmness of the principles of dialectical materialism - the philosophy of the
Comintern, must be merciless to the enemy and to connivance towards him.
But our radical and primordial enemy — idealism exists not only outside the Soviet Union, in
countries still dominated by capitalism, where the proletarian revolution still has to be accomplished —
its remnant remained in the pores of our Soviet country. The obscurant idealism of reactionary
philosophers like Losev, the reactionary attacks of representatives of various social and natural
sciences - Platonov, Berg, Savich, and many others - the wrecking interventionist machinations of the
Ramzins, Kondratievs and Grohmans - all are different faces of the same restorative ideology.
Our struggle against the enemy cannot be victorious if it is not combined with the struggle against
revisionism, which is trying to penetrate into the Marxist party ranks, hiding behind “Marxism”. Vulgar,
philosophical hardening backwards mechanism , disarming dialectical materialism in the face of
idealism,Menshevist idealism, replacing dialectical materialism with Hegelian idealistic dialectics —
these are the two main types of modern revisionism in the philosophy and theory of Marxism-
Leninism, both alien to the Bolshevik party and philosophy, providing the philosophical foundations of
counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, rightist and left-wing opportunism, playing for the people and the
people in the game, and playing the spirit of the revolutionary leftist opportunism, right and leftist
opportunism. The struggle against all these anti-Marxist doctrines is an immutable duty of the
dialectical materialists, since "without an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois theories based
on the Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over the class
enemies" [51] .
2.2. Mechanistic materialism
Materialism, as well as its antipode - idealism, does not remain unmoving and unchanged. He has
his own story. Materialism, went through various stages of development , before it acquired the
highest form in Marxism-Leninism. Materialism went through a series of stages, conditioned by social
development, the change of struggling classes, the nature and level of their struggle. Materialism did
not remain indifferent to the development of science and took a new look, transformed into a new
form in accordance with the revolutions in natural science, with the turning discoveries of science
making the era.
Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries, which developed in England, France and the
Netherlands, entered a glorious chapter in the history of philosophy. He was the brainchild of a young,
progressive, vital class, which replaced the feudal nobility. Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII
centuries. was a philosophy that expressed the desire for hegemony and the power of the new class -
the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie, matured in the depths of feudal society, shattered its economic,
political and ideological foundations from within, carried with it a new form of production relations and
an unprecedentedlypowerful development of productive forces.. It expanded the framework of the old
world, pulled new continents into the economic orbit of capitalism, it carried new political forms,
needs, ideas, set new tasks for science. The development of the productive forces — this historic
mission of the bourgeoisie — could not take place in the old social forms, in the close framework of
the feudal economy and medieval political institutions. The bourgeoisie had to overthrow the feudal
nobility domination, break the medieval economic forms and destroy the ideology generated by them
and consolidate them.
Revolution in natural science corresponded to the rapid development of the productive
forces . Navigation, military affairs, industry, and trade brought a whole series of great discoveries
and inventions to life, raised mathematics, mechanics, and physics to a level unattainable for previous
centuries. Mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries. was a philosophical expression of the
requirements of the development of productive forces and the level of a new science. It was a doctrine
corresponding to the new natural sciences, directed against the obsolete scholastic methodology of the
old natural sciences. The philosophy of revolutionary natural science could only be a materialistic
philosophy.
As the bourgeoisie grows stronger, as its needs and capabilities grow, it more and more firmly and
persistently expresses its revolutionary aspirations, openly opposes the whole complex of feudal ideas
and principles. Materialist philosophy ideally armed the revolutionary bourgeoisie. In the old
materialism, the social and political ideals of the bourgeoisie, the rejection by it of the old feudal
culture and the justification of the methodology of the natural science, the struggle against the
philosophical stronghold of feudalism — priesthood and idealism — went hand in hand.
As the bourgeoisie strengthens and direct revolutionary battles are approaching, atheistic fighting
motives sound louder and more resolute in its philosophy. In the 18th century, especially in France,
where the bourgeois revolution did not have such a half-compromise character as in England, combat
anti-religious propaganda and materialistic doctrines attain high development.
From Bacon, Gassendi, and Descartes' physical teachings, through Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke,
mechanical materialism was developed, reaching the teachings of 18th century French materialists. its
most complete and comprehensive development.
What are the guidelines of mechanical materialism in the form that it received in the philosophies
of the 18th century French materialists. - the teachings of Holbach, Helvetius, Lametri and Didro?
Materialism of the XVIIIth century above all, with all determination he fought against religion ,
considering it to be the greatest evil and the biggest obstacle to the progress of mankind. He opposed
the power of traditional baseless dogmas over the minds of people. Everything was judged by
reason . All ideas, beliefs, establishments had to justify themselves in the light of reason, to prove
their rationality. Reason became the measure of everything, and everything that could not withstand
its criticism was rejected. Of course this mind was the mind of a certain epoch, it was the bourgeois
mind, and that which did not correspond to the interests of the revolutionary bourgeoisie was declared
inappropriate to reason. Religion, a stronghold of feudal reaction, was recognized as the ideological
enemy of reason and the support of ignorance. Religion, in the opinion of the materialists of the
eighteenth century, grew up on the basis of ignorance and the darkness of people: since it was
perpetuated by the priests of ignorant masses. “Religion,” the old materialists said ‚“ was born from
the meeting of a fool with a priest ”.
From the sky, from the other world, materialism directed human interests and thoughts to the
world of this world, to physical reality. In the knowledge ofnature he saw the sole purpose of
science. Nature, of which man himself with his feelings is part, is the only reality. There is no other
world except the physical, material, earthly world. There is a single and only substance, that is, the
only thing that exists independently, by itself, is primary and does not need anything else for its
existence - the material substance is the basis and carrier of all the diversity of the existing. Intangible
substance - an absurd fiction. “Matter in general is everything that affects our senses in any way, and
the qualities we attribute to different substances are based on different impressions or different
changes they make in us” [52] . Thus, the primacy of being, matter, and the secondary nature of
thinking are affirmed.
The world, according to the views of these materialists, is a combination of material elements, the
combinations and movements of which form the fullness of reality. He does not need any
supernatural, intangible driving principles and forces. He lives according to the intrinsic nature of
matter itself, inviolable and eternal natural laws, to know which constitutes the task of the mind. The
main and inalienable properties of all matter are: length, mobility, divisibility, hardness, gravity, force
and inertia. From them there is all set of other derivative properties. Matter is mobile in nature, and
this movement is understood mechanically, that is, as the spatial movement of elementary parts and
complex body masses, as a change of place and position in space. All the diversity of qualities and
events that we see in the world is nothing but as diverse manifestations of the mechanical motion of
matter. Not only dead nature in all its manifestations, but also animals and even man are just more or
less complex mechanisms, the existence of which is reduced to various mechanical processes, to
combinations of mechanical movements. A man differs from a machine only in greater complexity and
subtlety of his design and can be exhaustively cognized as a perfect mechanism. Human A man differs
from a machine only in greater complexity and subtlety of his design and can be exhaustively cognized
as a perfect mechanism. Human A man differs from a machine only in greater complexity and subtlety
of his design and can be exhaustively cognized as a perfect mechanism. Human the will is not free , as
priests and idealists assure, but is a link in a chain of natural laws and its activity is determined by
material causes. The mechanism of human passions is as natural a process as any other
mechanism. There is no soul, as a special substance along with the body or even dominating it. Soul,
or rather sensitivity, isone of the properties of the body . Where there is no body, there is no
sensitivity. With the death of his organism, his “soul” is destroyed. The immortality of the soul, its
existence independent of the body, is a ridiculous and harmful superstition.
The materialists decisively rejected the idealistic doctrine of the existence, supposedly in the
human mind, of primordial, innate human ideas that were not acquired by means of the senses in
experience. The only source of knowledge materialists recognized the experience gained in the process
of the impact of nature on our sense organs. Man is born with a brain like a clean board (tabula rasa),
which experience fills with his letters. Materialists were sensationaliststhat is, they, in the senses,
exposed to the external world, saw the only channel through which knowledge is acquired. There is
nothing in the mind that has not come into it from sensation. The mind only processes the data of
experience. Therefore, in experimental knowledge, in observing nature and experimenting with it, the
materialists saw the main task of science.
The sensual theory of the knowledge of these materialists is determined by their understanding of
human development. If ideas, inclinations and beliefs are formed in the experience of a person, then
all people at birth are equal in their predispositions. The nature and psyche of people are entirely
determined by the nature of life experience, environmental conditions and upbringing. Man is a
product of the environment. You want to change people, eradicate ignorance and vices, - change the
environment, create social conditions that bring up rational and virtuous people. At this point, the
connection of the philosophical ideas of the French materialists with their revolutionary nature is
revealed with particular depth.
But here the bourgeois limitations and the class nature of the revolutionary materialism of the old
materialists are also revealed. There are two paths from this starting point. One path is the path to
socialism. Utopian socialists proceeded from the idea of innate equality of people and the need to
change the social environment in the development of their views. But the French materialists
themselves did not follow this path, otherwise they would cease to be bourgeois
revolutionaries. Instead of coming to an understanding of the material driving forces of the
development of the social environment, they remained at the point of view, proclaiming the "eternal",
"natural" ideals of bourgeois society, law and the state. Old materialists remain with an idealistic
understanding of social life.Social structure, social relations, the state of the environment, the
objective laws of social development, they explain with the opinions of people, their views, the ideas
dominating in society.
Thus ideas turn out to be the driving force of social life. In changing ideas, in educating and
eliminating ignorance, they see the key to transforming social order. By a change in social
consciousness they hope to cause a change in the old, feudal social being.
These are the guiding ideas of the French materialists. They opposed not only direct clericalism,
but also modern clericalism, clothed with philosophical attire, especially the subjective idealism of
Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume. The French materialism of the 18th century, as we see, expressed
the advanced aspirations of its era and its modern science. He must enter the history of philosophy as
a progressive step in the development of scientific thinking. But the same social relations and level of
knowledge that determined the historical merits of the old materialism also determined its historical
limitations . Thanks to its revolutionism, the philosophy of Holbach, Helvetius and their associates
became a link in the chain of ideas that ultimately led to the teachings of Marx. Thanks to the
bourgeois character of this revolutionism, this philosophy did not go beyond the framework of the
idealistic policy of enlightenment; she failed to conduct materialism in the sphere of social
phenomena. It fell into a vicious circle: ideas are determined by the social being of people, and at the
same time their being is determined by ideas. She was unable to resolve the dilemmas: the social
environment creates people, and at the same time, people create their own social environment.
Of all the science of that time, only mathematics and mechanics , mainly the mechanics of solids,
achieved significant development. The rest of the sciences were in their infancy, undeveloped
state. This imposed a stamp of mechanical limitations on old materialism. They applied the scale of
mechanics to all of nature, to all supermechanical, chemical, biological, etc. areas. They simplified,
discolored reality, reducing it to the simplest mechanical laws. Their materialism was
metaphysical. They did not understand the diversity of forms of movement, the principles of the
emergence of new and the complexity of the processes of change. The notion of nature was “about an
always equal to oneself whole, always moving in the same limited spheres” [53] according to the
constant number of eternal laws. Brilliant glimpses of thought, in which individual materialists of the
eighteenth century. towered over this concept (especially Diderot), do not change the general
metaphysical nature of their materialism.
The three main features of the historical limitations of the old materialism are as follows:
mechanism, metaphysical, inability to extend materialism to the field of social life. They had to
overcome a new form of materialism, which had grown at a different level of social relations connected
with the development of a new revolutionary class — the proletariat — and at a new level of scientific
development.
Materialistic philosophy has passed the mechanical stage in its development. From the old form of
metaphysical materialism, it has traveled the path of development to modern, dialectical materialism ,
corresponding to the current state of knowledge of nature and society.
However, even now there are people - and even imagining themselves Marxists - who seek to
galvanize, revive the already surpassed, obsolete forms of materialism, to oppose to the higher form
of materialism its lower forms, already overcome in the further development of materialism. Such
aspirations are inevitably reactionary: they pull back science and philosophy, retard their
development, discredit materialistic philosophy in the face of the demands made of the current state
of science. The advanced forms of materialism for their time are becoming reactionary in our time, at
a different level of knowledge, at a new level of philosophy, in a new social environment. Here we
mean the return to the old mechanical materialism of the XVII – XVIII centuries. (Hobbes, Holbach,
Helvetius, Lametri, etc.) among representativesmodern mechanical materialism (Bukharin, L. Axelrod,
A. Timiryazev, etc.).
In modern conditions, the protection of mechanical materialism, a return to the long-surpassed
philosophical ideas of the materialists of the XVII – XVIII centuries. mean the rejection of the
conquests of materialistic philosophy throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an attempt
to reduce materialism to its old, past stage. Mechanical materialism in the era of imperialism and
proletarian revolution is not only a philosophical atavism. Now, in the presence of dialectical
materialism, which has left far behind itself the historical limitations of old materialism, mechanical
materialism is reactionary. "Our" mechanical materialists (Bukharin, Timiryazev, Varyash, Axelrod) are
captivated by the ideas of old materialism. They are not able to understand the complex dialectic of
material reality, the richness of its contradictions, transitions and overflows, its qualitative diversity
and specificity of various areas. They reduce the highest qualitatively peculiar laws (social, biological,
etc.) to purely quantitative laws borrowed from mechanics, to the principle of balance and crossing of
oppositely directed forces. All the variety of qualitatively different forms of movement they try to put
in the scheme of spatial mechanical movement. Like their spiritual ancestors in the XVII – XVIII
centuries, they do not know a scale other than the scale of mechanics.
At the present stage of development, mechanistic materialism disorganizes the struggle of
materialism against idealism ‚facilitates the struggle of idealism against us, serves as a wedge, driven
in between the discoveries of modern science and materialistic philosophy. Dialectical materialism
must, therefore, with all the intransigence, fight against mechanistic materialism. This struggle is a
necessary condition for its development and victory over idealism.
Whether the mechanists want it or not, they inevitably turn into a hindrance to the ideological
struggle waged by the proletariat, become an obstacle in this struggle. In the following, we will dwell
in detail on the class roots of modern mechanical materialism, on its methodology and on the political
role it plays in Soviet conditions, being basically the philosophical basis of right-wing opportunism.
2.3. Subjective idealism, Machism, intuitivism
Diametrically opposed to the old materialism of the XVII and XVIII centuries. is his
contemporary subjective idealism of Berkeley and Hume's agnosticism . Subjective idealism
(phenomenalism) of Berkeley marked the intensification of reactionary clericalism, supported by the
bourgeoisie that had already won and established its rule. Hume's agnosticism is a product of the
transformation of the bourgeoisie from the revolutionary class into the conservative, the closure of
bourgeois and renewed feudal ideologies.
The considered idealistic doctrines reflected the interests and moods of the victorious English
bourgeoisie, ahead of its French sister and a century before its coming to power by ending with the
compromise of the English revolution, “bourgeois feudalism and giving feudal shape to bourgeois
society” [54] .
This feature with exceptional brightness is reflected in the philosophical doctrine of Bishop
Berkeley, which represents the adaptation of Protestantism to the level and new needs of the
bourgeoisie which has become a reactionary class.
An excellent analysis of Berkeley's views was given by Lenin in his book Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism. Berkeley proceeds from the fact that, apart from sensations, there is no other source of
knowledge about the world in man, that concepts, abstract ideas, because they are possible, are not
primary and are the product of sensations. But Berkeley denies that the real objective world is
reflected in these sensations, regardless of these sensations. From here, Berkeley comes to the
inevitable logical conclusion for him that the only thing known to man, the only possible object, the
object of knowledge, is our sensations.. Sensations are primary elements, from the combination of
which consists all that exists. A person in his cognitive activity cannot go beyond sensations, know
something other than them, beyond them, or different from sensations. In the process of knowledge,
we, according to Berkeley, are not dealing with things outside of us, not with the objective world,
reflected in our sensations, but only with our own sensations: sensations of redness, hardness, height,
roundness, etc. experience as a collection of sensations. We are not able to know anything besides our
own sensations, that is, subjective states of consciousness. Not things, but only sensations, that is,
something mental, are given in our experience.
According to subjectivists, we have no reason to assert that there is an external world regardless
of sensations. We have no right to talk about anything authentically real, that would be outside of our
sensations. The belief that an objective external world exists outside of our consciousness, according
to subjective idealists, is not at all based on experience, is a prejudice and does not stand up to
scientific criticism. The most we can allow is that our psyche is inherent in the idea of the existence of
the external world. But there is no reason to argue that this view really corresponds to something
outside the subject.
What we call a thing is from this point of view nothing but a bundle, the totality of our
sensations. The group of sensations (solid, round, blue, etc.), given together and repeated more or
less constantly, we call a thing. To suppose that a thing is something more, that behind our sensations
lies the body, substance, objective world that produces them - such an assumption, according to
Berkeley, is groundless.
“Being of things,” Berkeley formulates his views, “is their perceptibility. It is impossible for them to
have any existence outside of the spirit or thinking things that perceive them. True, there is a
strikingly common opinion among people that houses, mountains and rivers, in a word, all sensed
objects have a natural or real existence, different from their perceptibility by mind. But with whatever
confidence and general agreement this beginning is asserted, anyone who has the courage to subject
it to research will find, if I am not mistaken, that it contains a clear contradiction, for what are the
above-mentioned objects but things we perceive in sensations and what we perceive as not our own
ideas and sensations. And would it not be a complete contradiction to assume that some combination
of them exists without being perceived ” [55] .
Thus, Berkeley comes to the denial of matter, which he himself considers very important for the
struggle against materialism and the justification of idealism, this reliable support of religion. Matter
dissolves in the spirit, the object is reduced to the subject. “ To be, to exist is to be perceived ” (esse
is percipi) - and nothing more. If a thing is not felt, it does not exist. The existence of things for us,
for our consciousness, is the only reality; the ability to perceive things is the only evidence of their
being, as being for our consciousness.
“I do not deny,” wrote Berkeley, “the existence of not one thing that we can perceive through
sensation or reflex. The fact that the things that I see with my eyes or that I feel with my hands really
exist, I do not doubt at all. The only thing whose existence we deny is what philosophers call matter
or bodily substance ” [56] .
Such is the subjective-idealistic solution of the question of the relation between being and
thinking. Based on the same sensationalistic doctrine of sensations as the only source of knowledge,
subjective idealism gives it an idealistic character, bringing it to the absorption of an object by the
subject. The subject becomes the only reality. The world dissolves in the thinking subject. Object,
nature, matter is nothing but a product of mental activity, a product of the subject. The object of
perception is identified with the perception of the object. The source of sensations Berkeley recognizes
the Lord God himself, from which our soul receives its content.
Berkeley does not hide the fact that his entire philosophical structure has been erected with a
definite purpose - to hit the growing atheism and materialism that raised his head . In his diary, he
says bluntly that the desire to strengthen faith led him to invent his system.
Hume is sent from the same recognition of experience as the only source of knowledge as
Berkeley. He shares with Berkeley the denial of the possibility of our knowing the external material
world, the reduction of things to experiences.
Hume refuses to know anything besides subjective experiences, he cuts off science to the path
beyond the subject and limits its self-observation. His philosophy is agnostic , that is, he denies the
possibility of objective knowledge, the possibility of knowing the external world that exists
independently of us.
Hume especially pays much attention to the criticism of the materialistic concept of
causality . According to Hume, causality is not given in experience. We do not perceive it in a number
of qualities given to us in perception — color, form, sound. In experience we find only following one
after another of two or several sensations, the accompanying of one another, but not an active cause,
not the force causing the phenomena. From the habit of having two any phenomena connected with
each other in experience, a person is inclined to conclude about their necessary and constant
dependence. But such a conclusion, according to Hume, is inappropriate. We can talk about the
usualness of this following, we can consider it possible to repeat it, but not the right to argue
the need connection between the two phenomena. In experience there can be no guarantee that the
following of phenomena, observed a thousand times, will be repeated a thousand first time. Thus,
Hume is tied up with causality and regularity. The world turns into a chaos of phenomena, from which
knowledge has no way out.
Subjective idealism, being consistently brought to its limit, with fatal inevitability should lead
to solipsism . Solipsism is a view that asserts that only “I” exists, and everything else, including other
people, is a product of my sensations. I and my unreasonable and baseless sensations are the only
reality. Solipsism is extreme philosophical individualism. From the point of view of solipsism, the world
must be destroyed with me, and it exists only as far as I exist and feel. I am not in the world, but the
world is in me. The universe is me. A solipsist is like a mad feeling instrument who “imagined that he
was the only instrument in the world and that all world harmony was taking place in him” [57]. If we
only consistently pursue the principle of “immanence” of knowledge, that is, understanding the world
as the inner content of our consciousness, then we must inevitably come to the statement that the
subject can hourly, instantly destroy the world and re-create it from nothing. If I die, the whole world
will collapse with me, for it will cease to exist as a collection of my sensations, the other being is not
inherent in it. True, the subjective idealists themselves will not decide on such a frank sequence
either. Subjective idealists are trying to get out of this difficulty, pointing out that the world after the
death of the subject will not cease to exist in the perceptions of other people, but at the same time
they inevitably fall into intractable contradictions. Indeed, after all, other people, like all other things,
are nothing but complexes of my sensations, having no other reality, except subjective. Consequently,
if I cease to feel, then together with me, humanity must be destroyed, as a complex of my
sensations. Linking to other people means accepting the existence of things outside of my
consciousness, acknowledging being.
But what is “me”? Obviously not a physical being, since material existence is not accepted. In order
to be a consistent subjective idealist, one should recognize that my body, legs, hands, head, brains
are nothing but a complex of my sensations, and exist only as a phenomenon of consciousness, as an
intrapsychic reality. Thus, if you sail along a subjective-idealistic current, you will not only drown in
the swamp of solipsism, but, like Baron Munchhausen, you will have to extract your hair from
there. Not only does the universe dissolve into the “I”, but the “I” turns out to be quite ephemeral,
dissolves in its own perceptions, turns into a feeling that feels like.
The subjective idealism considered by us here, a reactionary product of the 18th century, was
revived and received great popularity by the beginning of our century. Modern materialists have to
wage a brutal struggle with subjective idealism.
The imperialist phase of capitalism is the social basis on which Berkeley-Humist idealism has been
revived; its nutritious juices are in the modern crisis of natural science. Imperialism leads not only to
the crisis of the economic system of capitalism, but also to the general crisis of the whole capitalist
culture. “We live in an extraordinary world,” the famous bourgeois physicist M. Planck exclaimed in
1930. “Wherever we look, in all areas of spiritual and material culture we are in a period of severe
crises that imprint numerous on our private and public life traits of anxiety and fragility ... As it has
long been in religion and art, so now also in science there is hardly a basis in which someone would
not doubt, hardly any nonsense in which anyone would not believe ... " [ 58]
The crisis of bourgeois natural science, which is an integral part of the general agony of bourgeois
culture, was already outlined by the first years of this century. The further development of knowledge
on the basis of material accumulated under capitalism by natural science can be accomplished only in
spite of the dominant bourgeois worldview. Modern natural science painfully gives rise to dialectical
materialism. It comes to him spontaneously, in incessant conflicts with the original philosophical
principles of the bourgeois scholars themselves, but nevertheless inevitably comes to the confirmation
of the correctness of the basic tenets of the philosophies of Marx and Engels. The starting
philosophical principles of bourgeois naturalists hostile to Marxism impede their full and correct
conscious understanding of the results of their research. This contradiction gives rise to the crisis of
bourgeois natural science, the social roots of which must be sought in the general contradictions of the
imperialist era.
The most significant of the already manifested in the late XIX and early XX centuries. attempts of
bourgeois thought to use a crisis of natural science for reactionary purposes, to give an idealistic
interpretation of new natural science theories and discoveries — is the restoration by Mach, Avenarius
and others of Berkeley’s subjective idealism under the banner of empirio-criticism. If natural science is
approaching "such homogeneous and simple elements of matter, the laws of motion of which allow
mathematical processing," modern subjective idealists repeat, "then matter has disappeared, only
pure mathematical relationships remain." The old, unchanging atom gave way to a system of moving
and changing electrons; therefore, the Machists say, "matter has disappeared." The primitive physical
laws are replaced by new, more perfect physical principles — the Machists say: "there is no objective
knowledge." Cosmic metaphysical ideas about space and time give way to a dialectical understanding
of the unity of time and space as a form of existence of the motion of matter - the idealists cry out:
“space and time have disappeared”. Meanwhile that they are the forms of the existence of matter,
that material motion is the unity of time and space, that our concepts of time and space change, are
refined and developed in connection with the general development of science . Therefore, modern
Machists also attach a rejection of causality to the rejection of matter, from substance. The newest
quantum mechanics deepens the concept of causality, introduces corrections to the old mechanistic
understanding of causality - empirio-critics say: “causality has disappeared”. The collapse of the old
mechanical-materialistic principles of natural science, the triumph of the highest form of materialism,
is presented by modern subjective idealists (Machists) as the end of materialism.
On this unsteady soil, the Machists resurrect only the reactionary philosophical ideas of the 18th
century that were slightly covered with new words: on the basis of subjective idealism they solve the
problem of being and thinking.
Empirio-criticism acts as a philosophy of " pure experience ." He denies the reality of all that is not
given directly in the experience of the subject. The only reality for him is the subjective sensations,
the true reality is directly “given” in perception. Everything else is baseless, uncritical "injections" of
the mind. Feelings of red, round, bitter, etc. - these are the real "elements" of reality. Matter, bodies,
things are no more than “complexes”, “bundles” of our sensations, having no being outside
sensations, outside our consciousness. In the same way, space and time are nothing but a special kind
of our sensations, experiences.Thus, everything physical is dissolved in mental elements, in
sensations.
The Machians ’denial of objective reality determines their understanding of the purpose and tasks
of knowledge. Since for them there is no objective world, so far as they do not exist and the task of
approaching the complete reflection of objective reality, set and resolved by materialism. The goal of
knowledge is for them only the systematic ordering of perceptions, the systematization of the diversity
of our sensations. The progress of science consists in the simplest description of a set of
sensations. The subjective idealist position of empirio-critics excludes the possibility of objective
knowledge, for them there is no objective truth. If all reality is only the content of consciousness, then
truths should be different for different consciousnesses. “Man is the measure of things,” as the ancient
Greek sophist Protagoras said. Cognition, truth - are subjective and relative (relative). Here the
Machians widely open the gates of obscurantism and superstition.
The Machists consider the basic principle of scientific knowledge to be the "principle of economy of
thinking" or "the principle of the least expenditure of energy . " According to this principle, from the
two systems describing our experience, from two different theoretical constructions one should choose
the most “economical” ones, describing the experience with the greatest simplicity.
For the sake of "economy", everything that complicates and clutters up the description of
sensations should be eliminated; therefore, matter, things that do not depend on consciousness, the
causal connection of phenomena should be eliminated.
The new Machists "deepen" this reactionary, anti-scientific philosophy with the "doctrine of signs"
and the "logic of relations." According to these “teachings,” the ordering, unambiguous description of
sensations or experiences is accomplished by science through “signs.” The knowledge system consists
of signs (Schlick). Science deals not with the reflection of objective things and their relations, but
with arbitrarily invented physical and mathematical signs, symbols denoting the relationship between
the experiences of the subject. From combinations of signs with the help of mathematical equations,
new combinations are deduced, denoted by new signs, etc. The development of science consists, in
the opinion of the Machists, in improving the construction of this system of signs.
The Machists want to replace the development of a living, objective knowledge of a multi-complex
reality with a reactionary game of abstract mathematical mathematics. Here it is especially clearly
seen how their subjective idealism is combined with mechanism .
To complete their philosophy, modern subjective idealists “invented” the logic corresponding to the
“doctrine of signs”. This is “mathematical logic” or “relationship logic” (Ressal). The logic of relations is
a new system of signs, invented to denote all possible relations between signs of the experimental
sciences. Logical signs and symbols are arbitrarily grouped into new equations in all ways. Philosophy
has never reached a more empty, emasculated, empty and barren constructions than the “logic of
relationships”. If there is any sense in this “logic”, then only one - to create one more quirk to deny
objective reality. The basic principle of this logical rubbish is the same expulsion of matter, the
negation of objective reality. The old logic is bad, they say, because it allowed things and their
properties. properties and deals with "pure" relations (ie, not with relations between things, but
with pure , meaningless relations, without related objects).
So, sparing no effort, modern idealists “clear” science ... from content, from meaning, from truth.
The first to understand the essence of modern crisis of natural science in its entire meaning,
discovered its roots, revealed true tendencies, exposed the reactionary maneuvers of empirio-criticism
and showed how to beat Machism, how to overcome the crisis and how the union of dialectical
materialism with the achievements of modern science should be overcome was Lenin . Verbal tricks
did not hide from him the anti-scientific, clerical nature of Machism. Not only did he much deeper,
more consistently than Plekhanov, fought against Machism, completely saturating it with its party
spirit, he made this struggle many times more fruitful in its results by establishing a link between
Machist ideas and the crisis of natural science theories and exposing the reactionary nature of the
empirio-critical game on this crisis.
Along the way, Lenin corrects the mistakes made by Plekhanov in the controversy with the
Machists, including the mistake in Plekhanov’s understanding of the central concept around which the
struggle is centered - the concept of experience . Plekhanov succumbed to the Machist trick, that
experience is understood by them not as a "means of knowledge," but as a "subject of
knowledge." Plekhanov believed that if the Machists had only held the understanding of experience as
a "subject of knowledge," this would have erased the line between Machism and materialism. But the
essence of the matter is not at all whether the experience is understood as a subject or as a means of
knowledge. The essence of the matter is basically a question of philosophy: experience is subjective or
objective.whether experience is an immanent generation of consciousness or experience is created in
the process of influencing the subject of the external world that is independent of it and the practical,
transformative influence of society on the external world.
Plekhanov in this matter slips from the materialist position. Satisfied with the definition of
experience as a "subject of knowledge", he had to come to an agnostic position - that the subject of
knowledge is experience, and not objective reality.
Lenin's struggle against Machism was of particular importance, since these bourgeois, subjective-
idealistic theories began to penetrate into the ranks of pre-war social democracy. First of all, the
influence of Machism affects the views of social fascism. Not only frank Machists such as Fr. Adler, but
also Kautsky, from the very beginning conciliatory to Machism, is now parallel with his transformation
into a social interventionist more and more linked with Machism in his philosophical convictions. In
those years when Lenin created his “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”, in the dark years of reaction
after the revolutionary storm of 1905, certain Bolsheviks took up the position of Machism and slipped
into the Mensheviks. A. Bogdanov (whose departure from dialectical materialism ended later with his
divergence from Bolshevism), comrade Lunacharsky, and others. transferred the fashionable
reactionary teaching to the Russian soil. Lenin's work dealt a crushing blow to all these theories, and
made scores with the "philosophical headless" who were led by an idealistic reaction.
Bogdanov's empirio-monism is nothing but a kind of subjective idealism , and is based on the same
Machist understanding of the relation of being to thinking. Terminological tricks of Bogdanov seek to
cover up the idealistic essence of his teachings, in no way eliminate his idealism. Bogdanov's "empirio-
monism" is nothing but a kind of Machism.
Bogdanov, like the rest of the Machists, does not go beyond the limits of experience. The initial,
primary for him is the chaos of elements. These elements — sensations already familiar to us, cut off
from the sensing person and from objects causing sensations — are pure sensations, sensations in
general, a deadly idealistic abstraction. Direct complexes, combinations of these elements form,
according to Bogdanov, mental experience. Thus, psychic experience is recognized as immediate,
existing before nature. Physical experience is the next, highest stage of development. It is derived in
relation to mental experience, transformation, reflection of the latter. Being a subjective idealist,
Bogdanov does not distinguish the objective, independent of experience and the physical world that
exists before any experience, from the physical experience of people. Instead of understanding the
mental as a derivative in relation to the physical, Bogdanov does the opposite: he declares the
physical world as a “permutation” area, in which the physical world is “substituted” by us for the
mental, that is, gives a psychological, idealistic explanation. Bogdanov’s “Universal Substitution
Theory” is only a new name for the old idealistic solution of the fundamental question of
philosophy. The final link of the Bogdanov's construction, following the "elements", mental and
physical experience, is our knowledge arising from it.
Such a subjective idealistic position inevitably leads Bogdanov to the denial of objective truth. and
the possibility of an objective criterion of truth. In fact, if there is no reality independent of
experience, then it is impossible to speak of truth independent of our consciousness as a reflection of
objective reality. Truth is understood by empirio-monism subjectively, as is what is true for
us. Bogdanov thought to eliminate the endless contradictions of the former subjectivism and avoid
solipsism by the fact that instead of individual experience he made the central concept of his
philosophy “socially organized experience”. He hoped in this way to distinguish the true, the scientific
from the false, the superstitious. Objectivity turns into his collectivity of experience, its validity for a
number of people. “The objectivity of the physical world is,” he wrote, “that it exists not for me, but
for everyone.” "The physical world is socially coordinated, socially harmonized, - in short, socially
organized experience. " But this Bogdanov in reality does not overcome idealism and a subjective
understanding of the truth. Consciousness of humanity, replacing the consciousness of the individual,
is still consciousness: the idealistic principle is preserved. The existence of the physical world is made
dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness
and preceding it. Generally significant, “socially organized” experience is not always objectively true at
all. After all, religious beliefs over the long period of history were “generally significant” and “socially
organized,” but this did not at all make them true. there is nevertheless consciousness: the idealistic
principle is preserved. The existence of the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness,
instead of being independent of any (also social) consciousness and preceding it. Generally significant,
“socially organized” experience is not always objectively true. After all, religious beliefs over the long
period of history were “generally significant” and “socially organized,” but this did not at all make
them true. there is nevertheless consciousness: the idealistic principle is preserved. The existence of
the physical world is made dependent on social consciousness, instead of being independent of any
(also social) consciousness and preceding it. Generally significant, “socially organized” experience is
not always objectively true. After all, religious beliefs over the long period of history were “generally
significant” and “socially organized,” but this did not at all make them true.
In his teaching that truth is nothing more than “an ideological form, organizing a form of human
experience,” empirio-monism thus opens the gates of religion and other reactionary lies.
In his later works, written by Bogdanov already after Lenin exposed the idealistic essence of his
“empirio-monism”, Bogdanov develops a supposedly new “tectological” teaching - “ universal
organizational science ”. Here Bogdanov completely remains on the same subjective-idealistic, Machist
position, in the realm of the elements - sensations and their system of complexes. Behind the many
new verbal twists lies an old philosophical concept. This, by the way, was not understood by Comrade
Bukharin, whom Bogdanov managed to deceive by ripping his teachings. Tov. Bukharin, as Lenin
pointed out, did not understand the idealistic identity of Bogdanov's "tectology" and his "empirio-
monism".
Remaining with the former solution of the basic question of philosophy, Bogdanov in the "General
Organizational Science" develops anti-dialectical mechanistic views on a subjective-idealistic
basis. . He criticizes the materialistic dialectic of Marx and Engels, replacing the principle of universal
development by the “organizational process”, the law of the unity of opposites - by mechanical
“collision of oppositely directed forces”, “activities”, dialectics - by the mechanistic theory of
equilibrium (it will be considered later). In Tectology, we again have a vivid example of how Machism
and Mechanism perfectly coexist with each other. Bogdanov is trying to establish universal forms of
organization of elements, regardless of the "content being organized." He invents scientifically fruitless
"universal laws", applied to all branches of knowledge without exception, without taking into account
their originality. In fact, all these laws of selection, conjugation, ingression, etc. are empty
mechanistic schemes, energy and biological labels,
It is not uninteresting to note that subjective-idealistic principles find refuge in the teachings of
"our" modern mechanists. Mechanistic understanding of the world, reducing nature to the movement
of identical, qualityless particles, with its reverse side must naturally have an acknowledgment of
the qualitative differences , given in experience, as purely subjective differences. Acknowledging the
subjectivity of the so-called secondary qualities, that is, asserting that sounds, colors, etc., are
nothing but our feelings, and not a reflection of objectively existing differences, L. Axelrod, S.
Sarabyanov and their colleagues came to more “General” conclusion about the subjectivity of quality
in general. For them, quality is a product of consciousness. Without a subject there is no quality
object. The qualitative certainty of an object depends on the differences of subjects and their points of
view . For example, comrade Sarabyanov denies objective truth. Truth, in his opinion, as much as
subjective attitudes, approaches.
The same elements of “bashful agnosticism”, according to Lenin, and subjectivism are also found in
Comrade Bukharin, for whom the dialectic is only one of many “points of view”. So a departure from
dialectical materialism entails a link with subjective idealism. Such a combination of mechanism and
subjective idealism, as we have seen, is by no means accidental. The history of philosophy shows that
such a combination is very usual and natural. The reduction of all phenomena to a mechanical,
qualityless identity serves for the subjective idealists as the guiding principle of systematization,
ordering, bringing to unity the complex diversity of our sensations. Denying objective reality,
subjectivists consider the task of science to systematize experience, the "organization" of
perception. The mechanism is for them the most convenient, economical principle of organization.
Subjective idealism is very close and interlocks with it in certain points of their views philosophical
intuitivism - a direction that has received the widest distribution in the bourgeois philosophy of recent
decades and which has generated a number of fashionable philosophical schools in various capitalist
countries. The most prominent representative of intuitivism is the philosopher of French imperialism,
Henri Bergson. The essence of his teaching, as well as all intuitivism, lies in the fact that the mind is
reduced and limited, rational logical knowledge in favor of a different, "higher" method of
comprehending the truth - direct instinct, intuition, instinctive penetration into the essence of things.
Science, according to intuitionists, is capable of delivering only limited, empirical truths that have
only practical value. With the help of intuition, Bergson promises complete comprehension of
objects. “Either philosophy is impossible at all,” he says, “and all knowledge of things is only practical
knowledge (not revealing their essence. - Auth. ), Aimed at extracting benefit from them (and not at
knowing the truth. - Auth. )‚ Or philosophizing is to penetrate the object itself with the help of the
tension of intuition ”.
By intuition, Bergson calls "that kind of feeling or sympathy, through which we penetrate into the
interior of the subject in order to merge with the fact that there is in it only and therefore
ineffable" [59] . The worst enemy of materialism, Bergson, furnishes his call for the search for the
"ineffable" by mystical "empathy" and his criticism of scientific knowledge of objective reality with a
multitude of supposedly learned considerations and subtle sophistry, falsifying natural-scientific data
for its own purposes.
So Bergson comes from the rupture of space and time. Time, the understanding of which Bergson
ideally distorts, giving him a purely psychological meaning, he opposes to space as a living principle to
the dead, moving, creative, spiritual - inert, lifeless materialism. At the same time moving, living
world, he understands in such a way that “ there are changes, but there are no things that
change. Changes do not need media. There is movement, but there is no need for unchanging objects
that move: movement does not contain any moving bodies ”.
This clearly affects the relationship of intuitivism and subjective idealism . The study of the
material motive forces of the universe, Bergson, replaces faith in the "vital impulse", which, according
to intuitivism, is the true basis of all vitality and development. Of course, everything ends with a
mystical belief in the underworld and the immortality of the soul and leads to direct clericalism. “From
all this,” writes Bergson, “clearly follows the concept of a creative and free god , who gives rise to
both matter and life, and whose striving for creation continues from the side of life by the
development of species and the formation of human personalities.”
Bergson is by no means an exception among modern-day bourgeois philosophers. The turn to
mysticism is characteristic of all modern bourgeois “lords of thought”. The same tendency, albeit in a
different form, is also found in another philosophical pillar of decaying capitalism — that of Edmund
Husserl striving for objective idealism but falling into subjectivism . Husserl proclaims a new science
- phenomenology, which he declares to be "basic philosophical science." Phenomenology is distracted
from the entire real world, it does not deal with real phenomena occurring in time and space. It deals
with “surreal phenomena”, with “ideal being”, with “meanings”, “meanings”, with “the world of eidos”
(ideal essence). Being directed towards consciousness, phenomenology means not real manifestations
of human consciousness, not mental processes. It "purifies" the consciousness of all individual,
mental, deals with the "pure", non-individual "I", with the "absolute consciousness", with the
"essence" of consciousness. Phenomenology Husserl - "science" is purely descriptive. It does not rely
on logic, does not have the latter as its premise. Phenomenology precedes logic. She explains nothing,
proves nothing, but only describes directly given in the "ideal intuition." Phenomenology, according to
Husserl, must be a purely descriptive discipline, exploring with the help of pure intuition the sphere of
transcendental pure consciousness. Direct "seeing the essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are the
methods of this, if I may say so, "science". “Philosophy,” asserts Husserl, “in his scientific work is
compelled to move in an atmosphere of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take
is the recognition that with a philosophical, in the true sense of the word intuition, with the
phenomenological comprehension of the essence, the infinite field of work opens " Direct "seeing the
essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are the methods of this, if I may say so,
"science". “Philosophy,” asserts Husserl, “in his scientific work is compelled to move in an atmosphere
of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take is the recognition that with a
philosophical, in the true sense of the word intuition, with the phenomenological comprehension of the
essence, the infinite field of work opens " Direct "seeing the essence", "pure ideal intuition" - these are
the methods of this, if I may say so, "science". “Philosophy,” asserts Husserl, “in his scientific work is
compelled to move in an atmosphere of direct intuition, and the greatest step that our time must take
is the recognition that with a philosophical, in the true sense of the word intuition, with the
phenomenological comprehension of the essence, the infinite field of work opens " [60] . This is one of
the last words of bourgeois philosophy.
2.4. Kant's dualism and modern Kantianism
Another trend of bourgeois philosophy, which has long led the struggle against materialism and,
until recently, has been advanced in opposition to materialism, is Kantianism.
Modern Kantian philosophy opposes Marxism not only in an open bourgeois form, but also in a
“socialist” one. Neo-Kantianism is the dominant philosophy in the social-fascist
environment. Bernstein, Vorländer, Adler, Bauer, Kautsky bring together the “Marxist” understanding
of social life with neo-Kantian philosophy. As a result, neo-Kantian philosophy is still the main form of
the influence of bourgeois philosophy on the proletariat. Neo-Kantian perversions sometimes seep into
Soviet science and philosophy. Hence, all the actual importance of exposing this type of idealism, this
philosophical weapon of the bourgeoisie and its agents in their struggle against the philosophical
foundations of the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat is clear.
By its social nature, the classical German idealism of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. was to
some extent a peculiar analogue of French materialism. Like the old materialism, he was a
philosophical herald of the bourgeois revolution. But the historical features of the preparation and
development of the bourgeois revolution in Germany were different from the French conditions, in
both cases the forces and class ratios were different. The German "enlighteners" still do not lead, like
the French, "an open war with all official science, with the church, often even with the state," they do
not break with religion and do not raise the banner of materialism. Their "revolutionary" half-hearted,
powerless, dreamy. This is the powerlessness and half-heartedness of the philosophy of the advanced
German bourgeoisie of the early 19th century. rooted in the backwardness of the social relations of
the then Germany and the weakness of the bourgeoisie. The productive forces of Germany in their
development lagged behind the industry of the advanced countries of Europe. The insignificant and
impotent German bourgeoisie, fragmented and disunited by many small independent feudal provinces,
had not dared to speak in full voice and think with revolutionary courage. She could only dream of
new social forms. It reached only "goodwill", the idea of due social order. Her philosophy is therefore
idealistic and compromise. It was not for nothing that Marx called the philosophy of Kant "the German
theory of the French Revolution." She overthrows God with one hand, raises him to the throne with
the other; she tries to push off from idealism, but recoils in horror from the materialism in front of her
and again plunges into the abyss of idealistic speculation.
Ancestor of German classical idealism was the famous Koenigsberg thinker Emanuel Kant. "The
main feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism , a compromise
between the two, a combination of heterogeneous, opposite philosophical trends in one
system" [61] . Any such attempt is doomed in advance, and Kant's teaching is a
split, dualistic system torn apart by internal contradictions .
From the very beginning, literally from the very first lines of the research, Kant tries to dissociate
himself from subjective idealism. “Without a doubt,” he writes, “all our knowledge begins with
experience, for what would the ability of knowledge to awaken to activity, if not objects that act on
our feelings and partly produce ideas, partly motivate our mind to compare them, to combine or to
divide and, thus, process the gross material of sensory impressions and the knowledge of objects,
called experience ” [62] . And in another place, he says: “Therefore, in any case, I recognize that there
are bodies outside of us, that is, things ... which we know from the ideas, aroused in us by their
influence on our sensuality” [63]. By such a statement, the “critical” idealism of Kant tries to isolate
himself from Berkeley and Hume. Our sensations suggest the existence of objective reality, which is
their source. The objective world really exists outside of our consciousness and affects our
consciousness. But, recognizing, with good reason, the existence of an object outside the subject,
Kant had to explain what the relationship between them was, how dependent the subject and object
were from each other, and what was the role of both in the formation of knowledge. Here Kant again
moves to the position of idealism.
Our experience, according to Kant, is the result of the interaction of an object and a subject. He is
a cross between these two principles. Things, influencing our sensuality, give us the content of
knowledge in the form of sensations. However, it depends on the organization of the subject, on the
characteristics of the perceiving apparatus, on the structure of our sensuality and mind, what this
material, given by external influence, will turn into in consciousness. The subject with its inherent
organization and functions is opposed to the object, it organizes, draws up, processes sensations
according to its inherent, subject, laws, in forms peculiar to consciousness. The impact of external
things gives ideas their content, our consciousness gives them shape. Such is the
initial, dualisticformulation of the question. The form consciousness is opposed to its content . The
forms of experience, that is, those forms of sensuality and categories of reason, with which experience
is formed, space, time, causal relationship, do not exist outside of us, but within ourselves, are the
actual forms of the subject, its integral original identity. They are a priori, originally inherent in our
consciousness, they are not brought into the mind from the outside, but our consciousness dictates
the experience of its form, the laws of its construction.
Already long before Kant, among the philosophers, the division (which is still maintained by the
mechanists) of all the qualities we perceive in things into primary and secondary, was
widespread . The secondary were called qualities that are supposedly not inherent in the things
themselves, but are due to the organization of the knowing subject himself. These qualities included
color, smell, taste, and so on. Primary qualities inherent in objective things — the length,
impermeability, shape, and movement — were distinguished from secondary ones. Kant focused his
criticism on exploring the relationships underlying the primary qualities themselves. The basis of this
relationship, as is easy to see, is space and time. as a form of existence of objective reality. Kant
seeks to prove that we cannot get an idea of space from experience, from single sensations, because
experience already presupposes the existence of this idea and is impossible without it. According to
Kant, space and time are not real forms of material existence, but the initial forms, inherent in our
own sensuality, are a priori , that is, pre-assumed, necessary forms of our contemplation , determined
by the nature of our consciousness .
Not because, according to Kant, our entire experience is spatial, that such are the things
themselves, but because such is the nature of our sensuality, that it cannot fail to clothe the content
of experience in the form of space and in the framework of time. Space, like time, are pure forms of
our sensuality and make sense only in relation to human experience, and not outside it. They are the
initial subjective conditions.defining the nature of our experience. On the basis of such an
understanding of space and time, Kant transfers the so-called primary qualities from the objective
world to the subjective one. Not only smells and sounds, but also the length and movement are
subjective, they are not inherent in things in themselves, but due to the organization of the subject,
since the length and movement are unthinkable without space and time. They are not the result of
experience, but its subjective conditions, premises.
Nature, however, is not a chaos of ideas, a disorderly diversity, but some sort of ordered,
organized unity: correctness and regularity are characteristic of it. What explains its causal
relationship and pattern? Kant is convinced that the content of experience is in itself chaotic and
erratic, that sensations are not the source from which we draw our beliefs about unity and order of the
world. This unity of perception is acquired through involvement in a single mind . The unity of the
knowing subject (the so-called “transcendental apperception”) is the basis of the unity of experience,
the center connecting all our perceptions. Thanks to its unity and constancy, reason brings order and
connection in the multiplicity of perceptions. Consciousness creates some orderly unity according to
the rules, according to the so-called categories of reason. The rules of nature, its connections,
including the causal connection of phenomena, its unity and its laws do not stem from things outside
of our consciousness, but represent the activity of the very reason. “Order and lawfulness are
introduced by ourselves into the phenomena that we call nature , and could not be found in
phenomena if we had not invested in them originally by ourselves or the nature of our
soul” [64]. Reason as the creator of the unity of experience and its order is the legislator of the world,
the source of the laws of nature, understood as the totality of our experience. We have no reason to
talk about patterns beyond our experience.
Thus, Kant gives the subject a more and more decisive role in cognition. One after another, all the
qualities and relationships that we perceive in nature are transferred by him from object to subject. As
a result of this research, the subject becomes everything, and the object, the things - nothing. Objects
that are the source of sensations, things themselves turned into an incorporeal shadow, elusive and
unnecessary for knowledge.
True, things that exist outside of us, affect our feelings and cause sensations. But sensations,
according to Kant, are not at all similar to the things causing them. There is even less similarity
between things and the phenomena caused by them than between fire and the smoke it causes,
between pain and the cry it causes. Sensations suggest things that cause them, but do not reflect
them, do not say anything about what they are - these things. To things, knowledge has no way
out; things themselves are unknowable . That which is knowable must be a subjective, wholly and
completely conditioned organization of the subject. To know that which is outside the subject, such as
it is in itself, is to wish to reason without reason, to contemplate without contemplation, to imagine
without representation. Our knowledge can deal only with phenomena, and not with things in
themselves, it finds in “nature” only what it invests in it. To things themselves, the path is cut off. We
know not the very things that awaken feelings for activity, but only the means of their influence on
us. Such is the final agnostic Kant's conclusion. Behind the phenomena "things in themselves" are
supposed, the world exists outside of our consciousness, but it is completely unknowable and
absolutely inaccessible to the subject. The subject of knowledge can and should be the world of
phenomena. The laws of nature are the laws of understanding and are valid only within the boundaries
of our subjective understanding. Nature as an object of knowledge loses its materiality. “Bodies and
movements,” says Kant, “do not exist as something outside of us, but only as representations in us,
and therefore the movements of matter do not produce representations in us, but the essence
themselves (just like based movements) only representations " [65] .
Kant's answer to the basic question of philosophy is dualistic. Objective reality opposes the subject
as an “thing in itself” independent of it. For its part, the subject with its “a priori” preserves its
independence from the external world and creates from itself the very special world. The subject is
detached from the object of perception from their cause, the “thing in itself” from the phenomenon,
cognition from the real world, the form of knowledge from its content, the experienced world from the
“super-experienced” Sensation and reason do not connect the subject with the object, but tear them
apart. Kant's agnosticism closes the path from object to subject. The contradiction between the
recognition of objective reality and the doctrine of its unknowability is a fundamental organic vice of
Kant's philosophical system.
Since, according to Kant, only the content of consciousness, the forms of sensuality and the
categories of reason are cognizable, science is completely locked into the sphere of the
subjective. Kant's agnostic dualism actually turns out to be an inconsistent subjective idealism , not
going beyond the limits of idealistically understood experience.
Kant's theory of knowledge is metaphysical. It is based on a non-historical approach to the subject
and its relation to the object. Kant takes the ready, frozen, once-given thinking of the modern man,
the contemporary bourgeois. He does not care that thinking only in the process of development has
become what it is. Kant does not consider cognition in its origin, movement, and change. He
metaphysically breaks the forms of knowledge and their content and explores completely isolated,
empty, "pure" logical forms. Instead of the indivisible unity of the content and form of knowledge,
Kant operates with dead, immovable, empty, ready, divorced from the object and content forms of
knowledge.
Plekhanov and even more A. Deborin reveal their misunderstanding of the essence of Kantian
agnosticism when they identify it with the teachings of the French materialists about knowledge . The
French materialists, in the opinion of Deborin, opposing the essence of a thing to its properties ,
expressed provisions that were supposedly identical with Kant's teaching about the “thing in itself” and
the phenomenon. In reality, the teaching of French materialists on knowability is the opposite
of Kant’s teachings. Kant asserts the absolute, principled unknowability of "things in themselves," old
materialism speaks only of the actual " unknowing"The essence of things in their era. Kant rejects any
possibility of penetration into the world of “things in themselves,” but old materialism believes thatwe
have learned the objective properties of things themselves , that through the manifestation of
properties we are approaching an understanding of their essence. For them, things in themselves are
material, extended and objectively regular; Kant, on the other hand, turns experience, the materiality
of things, their objective regularity, etc. into subjective forms. The Plekhanov-Deborin position on this
issue smoothes the fundamental contrast between materialistic and idealistic views. It brings
materialism closer to idealism instead of exposing their opposite in all its sharpness.
The teaching of Kant, like any non-materialistic teaching, opens the way to religion. By limiting
knowledge to phenomena, hindering the mind the way to things in itself, closing it in the subjective
world and rejecting its claims to have a judgment about objective reality, Kant's philosophy leaves
room for faith. Cognition covers only phenomena, “things in themselves” are inaccessible to him, they
are accessible only to faith. This establishes the cohabitation of faith and knowledge. Kant's philosophy
substantiates the ideological compromise between science and religion, between the theoretical tasks
of the progressive bourgeoisie and the reactionary ideology. Kantian dualism is the classic philosophy
of conciliation, social compromise, liberalism and reformism. This characterizes the social essence of
Kantianism and determines its further role in the class struggle.
The revolution of 1848, the appearance on the historical arena of the proletariat as an independent
force with special class interests, the consolidation of capitalism, the formation of the German Empire
— deprived the bourgeoisie of any remnants and up to that very relative “revolutionism”, sent its
ideology along the way of reaction . From the 60s of the last century, the "revival" of Kantian idealism
in bourgeois philosophy began. Neo-Kantianism, unlike Kant's philosophy itself, represents a turn from
all half-heartedness, ambiguity, flirting with vulgar materialism towards the most reactionary sides of
idealistic philosophy. "Restoration" of Kantianism is directed in a certain direction, - it must "finish"
with materialism (Libman, Lange, Cohen, Rickert, etc.).
Neo-Kantianism is just as different from the teachings of Kant himself, how different are the
interests of the bourgeoisie in different periods of its development. Neo-Kantianism is not the
restoration of the true dualistic doctrine of the historical Kant, but its reactionary publication,
undertaken by the "correction" on the right, the consistent development of Kant's teachings. In the
face of the developing class struggle, the bourgeoisie could not be satisfied with the petty-bourgeois
natural-scientific materialism that prevailed at that time. She appeals to the idealistic reactionary side
of Kant's teachings, “deepening” them and adapting them to her new tasks.
The main difference between neo-Kantianism and historical Kant is the transformation of the
inconsistent subjective idealism of Kant's dualistic philosophy into subjective idealism.. Despite the
fact that various representatives of neo-Kantianism retain in their views significant elements of
dualism (between being and ought, nature and history, purpose and means, etc.), yet basically they
“correct” Kant from the “right”, trying to root out from it all sorts of materialistic elements. The “thing
in itself” is rejected by the neo-Kantians. “The thing in itself” as a materialistic element in Kant, which
causes our sensations, is rejected and declared an unnecessary appendage, which should be removed
from philosophy (G. Kogen, P. Natorp, social-fascist M. Adler, etc.). "Thinking cannot have any origin
other than itself." “There are no things except in thinking and thanks to him” (G.
Cohen). Consciousness itself is the only true “thing in itself”. Moreover, it is not the consciousness of
specific real people, but the mystical "consciousness in general", independent of the brain
(Adler). Both form and content in knowledge, all “experience” and “nature” are depicted as spawn ,
thinking himself and his objects (Natorp). Thinking is not given anything other than what it itself
produced.
Bringing idealism to the end, neo-Kantianism rejects the distinction made by Kant between
“sensuality”, sensations and reason, between “view” and thinking. Visual representations, sensations
are reduced by neo-Kantians to thinking, to the products of logical "me". If, for Kant, the content of
experience is given to consciousness due to the influence of “things in itself” on it, then for neo-
Kantians nothing is given to consciousness, but everything is produced by thinking.. “Creative
sovereignty” of “pure” thinking (Natorp) is proclaimed. Being for neo-Kantians is only thinking. "The
world rests on the basis of the laws of thinking" (Kogen). It exists only to the extent and only since we
think (M. Adler). Thus, in its essence, according to the solution of the fundamental question of
philosophy, neo-Kantianism closely approaches clericalism. At the same time, the philosophers of the
Second International are not at all behind their masters.
The main scientific method, in the image and likeness of which the neo-Kantians develop logic,
they consider the idealistically distorted method of mathematical natural science. Cohen tries to rely
on the method of calculating the infinitely small that he distorts, which he declares to be the universal
method of genuine scientific thought. Nadorp proclaims "pure number" alpha and omega logic. The
number for him is "the purest and simplest way of thinking that justified science as exact." From the
"pure number" he makes the transition to the concepts of measurement and direction, from here he
"deduces" space and time as pure acts assumed by thought, and from "space" and time "deduces" the
"concept" of matter. It is necessary to pay attention to this connection of neo-Kantian idealism with
the principles of mathematical science that are being mutilated, since this way, with the help of the
concepts of number, quantity, etc. Neo-Kantian idealism is combined with mechanism .
Neo-Kantianism “corrects” Kantian dualism of form and content of experience by discarding the
real content of experience, remaining in the sphere of “pure” forms and relations. All reality is
dissolved in "pure" logical-mathematical relations and empty forms of thinking. The logical relation
"determines", "rely" - according to neo-Kantianism - related elements, "members of a relationship".
We settled on one of the main currents of neo-Kantianism, the so-called Marburg school. Another,
no less reactionary course is associated with the names of Windelband and Rickert. The main task of
their philosophy is to break the social and natural sciences and "substantiate" the impossibility of
studying social patterns. We will further dwell on this trend, which denies the law in the development
of social life and the possibility of its scientific research , when considering historical materialism.
The fight against relapses of Kantianism, especially in its reactionary neo-Kantian form, its
irreconcilability towards it is a matter of course the duty of modern materialists. However, even with
Plekhanov, who mainly pursued the philosophical line of dialectical materialism and fought against his
Kantianism of his Menshevik friends, we find not only the connivance of Kantianism, but also direct
Kantian errors. The theory of knowledge of Plekhanov, as Lenin showed with absolute certainty,
suffers from elements of agnosticism.
We have seen that, according to Kant, our ideas do not give a true depiction of things. Caused by
"things in themselves" representations do not reflect them. There is no similarity between things and
phenomena. Plekhanov, agreeing with the "theory of hieroglyphs", becomes on Kant's indicated
agnostic position. According to this theory, our sensations refer to things that cause them, like
symbols or hieroglyphs to the objects they designate. Symbols are not like the things they designate,
do not reflect, do not reproduce them. So the symbol "v" is not a reflection of the speed indicated by
it.or the hook on the music line is not at all similar to the sound it stands for. Similarly, the ratio of
things and their perception of hieroglyph theory represents. In our experience, signs and symbols of
things are given, but not their reflections. The world of experience is the realm of symbols, not at all
similar to the defiant objective world. In this, not reflecting the real world, the realm of signs, human
knowledge is closed. Plekhanov deeply imbued with this dualistic concept and although he later
admitted that he had made a mistake agreeing with the theory of hieroglyphs, he still did not
understand the essence of his mistake, did not overcome it. Plekhanov believed that this was only a
terminological mistake, whereas in fact he had a departure from the materialistic solution of the
fundamental question of philosophy. Having rejected the word "hieroglyphs", he continued to stand on
that point of view, communication , not a reflection of the consciousness of things, i.e., remained in
the same agnostic position. Plekhanov indicates that each symbol corresponds to the object
designated by it, but the fact is that, according to Plekhanov, the object is not reflected in
consciousness.
It is quite characteristic that both forms of the perversion of Marxism — mechanism and
Menshevist idealism — adhere to Plekhanov's agnostic errors. The mechanists (Sarabyanov, Axelrod)
on this crucial issue directly declare their disagreement with Lenin; insist on the Kantian hieroglyphic
theory, deepening Plekhanov's mistake. Menshevist idealists are in this issue in an idyllic alliance with
the mechanists. Deborin and Luppol, recognizing Plekhanov's mistake as “purely terminological,” cover
up the fundamental discrepancy on the main issue of philosophy, become advocates of Kantian
agnosticism.
If Plekhanov shamefully extended his finger to Kantianism, then the ideologists of modern social-
fascism gave him hands and a heart. Kantianism is the main form of conducting bourgeois influence
on the proletariat along the line of philosophy; it has become the official philosophy of the Second
International.
The very attitude of the social fascists to theory in general and philosophy in particular and the
understanding of their role in the class struggle are directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism. The social
fascists are separating theory from social practice, they do not see the necessary dependence between
the two. Philosophical views, like religious beliefs, they consider a private matter, indifferent to the
party and political activities. What theoretical base a social democrat brings under his political
program is his own business. This doctrine, which fundamentally contradicts the Marxist doctrine of
class ideology, is necessary for social traitors to directly replace Marxism with bourgeois
ideology. Breaking the link between their practice and Marxist theory, they make room for the
connection of this renegade practice with anti-Marxist idealist currents,
The ancestor of modern social betrayal E. Bernstein, at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries,
caught on the slogan of bourgeois philosophical reaction: “Back to Kant”. Since then, attempts to
“supplement” Marx with Kant, “correct” with his neo-Kantianism, and “deepen” with his idealistic
apriorism have become the leitmotif of social-traitorous philosophy. M. Adler attempts to idealistically
interpret Marxism, throwing the bridge between Marx and Kant in the form of a “social a priori,” that
is, a priori categories of reason, diluted by sociological phraseology. Vorlander brings a Kantian ethical
rationale under socialism. He is echoed by Bauer, who "enriches" Marxism with Kant morality and
"national apperception," that is, it applies the principle of the primacy of the subject to the national
question.
The "Sam", the disgusting social interventionist Kautsky, who for decades played the role of
"guardian of Marxist orthodoxy" in the Second International, does not lag behind the "spirit of the
times." Kant's "criticism", in his opinion, is capable of raising materialism to a higher level. He agrees
with the dualism of things and phenomena, and basically accepts the teachings of Kant about the
unknowability of "things in themselves." Certain things and their nature, according to Kautsky, are
unknowable. Cognizable relationship only between things, identity and the difference of things
between themselves. The identity or difference of symbols “expresses” the identity or difference of the
objects they designate, but, according to Kautsky, it says nothing about the objects hidden from us
behind the symbols. The differences we study, according to Kautsky, are the essence of the
differences of ideas among themselves, i.e. they are subjective, they are not taken out of the sphere
of phenomena. If Kautsky criticizes Kant, does not agree with him on some issues, then only in order
to “correct” Kant's teachings with the teachings of Mach, to “improve” one kind of idealism to
others. Kautsky’s eclectic philosophy is positivism, a teaching limited to experience in the subjectively
idealistic understanding of the latter. If Kautsky continues to use the term “materialism,” he also
considers Kant to be a materialist, since this term is for him only a synonym for the philosophical
method that remains within “pure experience”.
According to the social interventionists, social pests are equal in Soviet conditions. In unison,
Kautsky and the Bauers are echoed by the wrecking methodology of the Menshevik Rubin, which is
nothing more than a counter-revolutionary neo-Kantian doctrine, adapted to the use of Soviet "legal
possibilities." Rubin's scientific activity was an integral part of his entire counter-revolutionary
work. His wrecking role was to divert Soviet economic thought from the pressing issues of socialist
construction in the jungle of scholastic disputes. Preventing the ministry of economic theory from
building a socialist economy is the goal pursued by Rubin. In order to distract from Soviet reality,
Rubin followed a purely formalistic neo-Kantian methodology, “studying” “pure” non-material
economic forms, social relations abstract from class content. The historical was absorbed by the
logical, the social became formal, the class was supplanted. Short:
2.5. Absolute, objective idealism of Hegel and modern neo-Hegelianism
 German classical idealism reached its end in Hegel's philosophy, whose teaching represents the
highest peak of philosophical thought to which bourgeois idealistic thinking was capable of reaching .
The teaching of Hegel is a philosophical reflection of the further development of ideas, inspired by
the French revolution in German conditions, in the conditions of the backward development of the
bourgeoisie and the undeveloped class struggle. The further it was from the then Prussian reality to
the broadcast ideas of the French Revolution, the more attractive the ideals were, the more they
inspired the philosophical thought of the German idealists. In the transcendental heights of
philosophy, they accomplished great feats that they were powerless to accomplish in earthly
reality. If, for Kant, the realm of reason is still only the realm of the due, then for Hegel it already
becomes necessary.. He is deeply convinced of the rationality of reality, of the inescapable triumph of
reason. But while in the French materialists the mind was hostile to faith and incompatible with
religion, in Hegel religion turns out to be the highest stage of development of the spirit, reason only
purifies and elevates religion to philosophical heights.
Hegelian philosophy is a product of the era of bourgeois revolutions. It is a reflection in the
ideological sphere of the class struggle of the end of the XVIII and the first quarter of the XIX
century. Hegelian philosophy is a product of the epoch of the Great French Revolution. Marx,
describing the philosophy of Kant, pointed out that it was "the German theory of the French
Revolution." This characteristic can be attributed with a certain right to the philosophy of Hegel. Being
undoubtedly the product of the whole epoch of the bourgeois revolution at the turn of the 18th and
19th centuries, it was at the same time a product of the German conditions, the class relations of
Germany of this period. It is precisely these circumstances that explain the contradictions of Hegelian
philosophy, the contradictions between the reactionary and revolutionary side of his philosophy,
between the method and the system.
Hegel subjected Kant's philosophy to brilliant criticism. With all the insight available to idealistic
positions, he revealed the imperfections of Kantian dualism and subjectivism. But this criticism, which
has deeply damaged Kantianism, is being conducted by Hegel in the name of a more consistent and
deeper idealism, in the name of objective , dialectical idealism.
Hegel contrasts Kant's rupture of being and thinking with their identity . Kant fences off being from
thinking. Hegel turns the objective world, the universe, ofwhich only man and his consciousness are a
part, into a spiritual process, into the realization of the world mind . For Hegel, the original beginning,
the primary essence of the world is the objectively existing spirit, the world mind, the universal,
universal thinking.
The development of the universe is a rational development, accomplished according to the laws of
reason, according to logical laws. The evolution of the universe is a logical development of the world
mind. In the logic of the world mind, one should look for an explanation of everything that is
happening, the beginning and the cause of everything that is happening is rooted in it. The history of
nature and society is essentially nothing but the otherness of self-development, the self-movement of
eternal, absolute spirit according to its inherent logical principles. Everything that happens in the world
is nothing but a manifestation of the world mind. The history of the world is universal logic, various
stages, stages of development of an absolute idea.. The latter does not depend on our knowledge or
sensation. We think such a stage of the existence of the world mind, when there were no people and
no cognizing beings at all. On the contrary, the emergence of cognitive people is characterized by a
high level in the development of the world spirit. Not the world is our creation, but, on the contrary,
we, like everything that exists, are the embodiment of the world spirit, the stage of its self-
development.
Only the spiritual is real. Nature, things, the material world is nothing but a manifestation of the
realization of the world mind, one of the incarnations of the absolute idea. In this realization, the spirit
turns into the opposite of its own nature, it is realized in the form of unreasonable matter, in the form
of many things. Nature is, according to Hegel, the otherness of the spirit, its other being "in the form
of an indifferent external objectivity ... The formation of nature is the formation of its spirit." “Nature
should be considered as a system of steps, each of which necessarily follows from the others, but this
does not mean that each of them is naturally produced by the other. Such a sequence of them exists
only in the inner idea underlying nature " [66]. These words express with full clarity Hegel’s recognition
of the objective reality of the absolute idea. Thus Hegel affirms the primacy of the spirit, of thinking,
which forms the basis, the essence of objectivity itself. The subjective spirit, the “I,” is understood by
him as a derivative, secondary, but derived from the world spirit — the absolute, universal
spirit. Subjectivism is denied by Hegel on the basis of objective idealism . In nature, as we have seen,
the estrangement of the spirit from itself occurred, the spirit was realized in things.
 The next stage of his movement is the reverse transformation of nature into spirit, the return of
the spirit to itself in the form of a subjective spirit, self-consciousness.
What does science represent from this point of view? Knowledge is activity, manifestation of the
spirit. And the object, the object of knowledge - the same spirit in all the diversity of its
manifestations, including nature. Thus, in science, the knowledge of the spirit itself , self-
consciousness. A cognizing subject as one of the manifestations of the spirit knows its essence in its
various manifestations. Here the spirit is aware of itself, its principles, laws, its history. “A spirit that
knows itself in development as a spirit is science. It is his activity and the kingdom, which he builds
for himself in his own sphere ” [67]. Science differs from art or religion in that the comprehension of the
spirit is accomplished not in images or feelings, but in concepts. “Science is,” according to Hegel,
“comprehending in terms of the knowledge of the absolute spirit” [68] . And since scientific knowledge
is a logical process, and the knowable, that is, reality, the history of the universe is also a logical
process, then “knowledge is a concept that is the object of itself and comprehends itself". In this
identity of knowledge with its subject matter, in the fact that in science the spirit remains in its own
sphere, Hegel sees a guarantee of our correct knowledge of reality. The spirit learns not something
alien, inaccessible to him, but himself, his own laws as they are in reality. To understand the history of
nature and society, to comprehend its driving forces is to know the logical process of self-development
of the absolute idea underlying it. Logic is the science of science. The history of the world must be
understood as the logic of the world mind. In the face of the philosophical teachings of Hegel, the
spirit knew itself, understood its development and its principles.
This completes the self-development of the absolute idea.
The world mind of Hegel bears an undoubted resemblance to God, with a subtle, very idealized,
dematerialized god. Hegel’s idealistic solution to the problem of being and thinking is essentially a
scientific theology. Hegel himself does not conceal that his philosophy is the highest stage of the spirit,
immediately following religion, elevating it to a perfecting level.
In reality, the assumption of absolute spirit, the world mind, the attribution to the objective world
of the properties of the subject is nothing more than the humanization of nature. Objective idealism is
nothing more than a projection, the transference of human consciousness to the outside . The
property of man - thinking - turns into an independent world being here and gets an independent
existence outside of man.
Objective idealism puts on head the actual relationship between being and thinking. The mind,
which arose as a result of the long development of living beings, is detached from its base and is
portrayed as the first real. Objective idealism seeks to penetrate nature into the spiritual world,
concealed ostensibly behind its appearance. For him, the material world is a veil, through which
knowledge should penetrate into the world of true reality, into the realm of spirit. In reality, however,
objective idealism finds on the other side of things that which he himself placed there — transformed
into an absolute human consciousness. Hegel's idealism envelops the real world with a spiritual
envelope and, as a result, perceives nature through a hazy mystical veil. Marx and Engels needed to
remove this mystical veil from the world in order to see it as it really is.
In essence, the problem of being and thinking is not at all resolved by Hegel. If Kant "eliminates"
the problem by placing being and thinking in two different mutually impenetrable worlds, then Hegel,
with his objectively idealistic identity of being and thinking, discards one of the common principles and
leaves only the thinking that he inflates into an absolute.
Nevertheless, in evaluating Hegel's philosophy, one cannot detract from its historical
significance. In a reactionary mystical form, Hegel's philosophy "for the first time presented the whole
natural, historical and spiritual world as a process, that is, explored it in continuous motion, change,
transformation and development and tried to uncover the mutual internal connection of this
movement and development" [69] . Hegel’s teaching is dialectical idealism. Developing the dialectical
tendencies contained in the previous representatives of German classical philosophy, Hegel displayed
in a mystified form his dialectical logical doctrine controversial development of nature, society and
human thought. In an ugly idealistic form, he overcame metaphysics, which dominated the thinking of
philosophers and naturalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
But idealism is not in Hegel’s teaching something indifferent to the dialectical method, which does
not touch it. In the idealistic system of Hegel, his most dialectical method stands on his head, is
limited and blunted, is an idealistic dialectic.
Hegel's dialectic is an idealistic dialectic. Self-development and the contradictions that motivate it
are not material, but spiritual, the categories and forms of movement are connected by ideal-logical,
very often fictional, artificial connections. The historical is in Hegel, depending on the logical . History
is shredded in favor of logic; it becomes nothing more than applied logic .
 While the materialistic dialectic, which asserts universal variability, and therefore the need to
destroy the existing system, is a revolutionary methodology, theabsolute system and idealistic
dialectics led Hegel to justify the Prussian monarchy .
Hegel's dialectical idealism signified not only the completion of classical German idealism, but also
the whole of bourgeois philosophy. The current revival of Hegelianism is only a “repetitive course,” the
resurrection of Hegel’s dead idealism, the repetition of idealistic asses . At the same time, everything
that was progressive in the resurrected doctrine was emasculated, and everything that was
reactionary in it was aggravated.
Particular attention is paid by the modern representatives of the fascist neo-Hegelianism to
questions of the state, the nation . The Hegelian “Philosophy of History” and especially the “Philosophy
of Law” are used by these “theorists” in order to lay a theoretical foundation for the fascist
state. Hegel becomes the father of modern fascist theories of an authoritarian, corporate state, etc.
Twice the bourgeois philosophical thought was carried out by the movement from Kant to
Hegel. But for the first time it was a triumphal procession of developing idealism, in the second - its
final degeneration. The barren thought of decaying capitalism is not able to further move even
idealistic philosophy. Imperialist philosophy feeds on everything that was stillborn in the great idealists
of the bourgeois revolution, the products of the decomposition of their idealism. The ideologists of
imperialism, who are in the last line, no longer satisfy neo-Kantianism, the last years, the years of the
fascization of capitalist states, are characterized by a transition from neo-Kantianism to neo-
Hegelianism, which is the philosophy of the worst reaction, the philosophical expression of fascism.
The epoch of imperialism, when the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie reaches an extreme
level, is accompanied in the field of philosophy by a decisiveturn of bourgeois ideologists to complete
metaphysical and mystical systems . Half-hearted, compromise doctrines do not satisfy the ideologues
of imperialist reaction.
Bourgeois philosophy revives the most terry forms of obscurantism, resurrects everything that was
most reactionary in the history of idealism.
In recent years, in the years of the all-round exacerbation and deepening of the general crisis of
capitalist society and the growth of elements of the revolutionary crisis, bourgeois philosophy has
turned particularly intensely to Hegel's philosophy. Slandered and forgotten by the bourgeoisie, Hegel
became again a fashionable philosopher. Neo-Hegelianism occupied a prominent position in modern
bourgeois philosophy. Neo-Kantians, the philosophers of "life" and "culture", Husserlians, etc., are
more and more attached to neo-Hegelianism, which becomes the focus of reactionary aspirations of
modern bourgeois philosophy.
It would be a mistake to think that neo-Hegelianism is a complete and direct reproduction of the
philosophical doctrine of the historical Hegel. Far from it. Neo-Hegelianism is alien to and hostile to the
revolutionary tendencies of Hegelian dialectics, it rejects the rational core of his teachings, those truly
valuable elements that are contained in mystical form in Hegelian idealistic dialectics. Neo-
Hegelianism clings only to what is dead, reactionary, mystical in Hegel, to the husk, the rubbish of its
idealistic system, to the absolute idea — goddess. The modern bourgeoisie is seduced by absolute
idealism. Neo-Hegelianism exaggerates the reactionary elements of Hegel's teachings, inflates them,
brings clericalism contained in Hegel's system to the limit.
The views of the leader of neo-Hegelianism, the chairman of the international Hegelian union, R.
Kroner are very characteristic in this respect. Kroner strongly proves the irrational nature of
Hegelianism, that is, Hegel’s denial of rational knowledge. In the dialectic of Hegel, he finds the
highest form of irrationalism. “Before Hegel,” he writes, “there has never been an irrationalist who
would be so philosophical, so thinking, as scientifically as he is ... Hegel is without a doubt the
greatest irrationalist that history of philosophy knows. No thinker before him was able to so
irrationalize the concept, to enlighten the rational through the concept as he ... ”“ Hegel is an
irrationalist, for he is a dialectician, for dialectics is turned into a method made rational irrationalism‚-
for dialectical thinking is rational-irrational thinking. Hegelian philosophy was called “rational
mysticism,” which in fact marks its dual nature ” [70] . Mysticism, unreasonableness, irrationalism - this
is what captivates the Neo-Hegelians.
It is quite clear that Marxism cannot pass by this turn towards Hegel. Neo-Hegelianism acts as the
worst reactionary antipode of the revolutionary materialist dialectics. We are obliged to reveal the true
face of Neo-Hegelian philosophy, expose its class nature, its hierarchical clerical nature, tear off a
phraseological veil from the ideology of the enemy. We are obliged to expose the role and significance
of neo-Hegelianism in the modern class struggle, its hostility to the interests of the
proletariat.. Moreover, we must do this, because the main support of the bourgeoisie — the social
fascists are not far behind their masters and hurries to rebuild their philosophical lira in a Neo-
Hegelian way. Z. Mark, G. Markuze, K. Korsch and the like try to keep up with the philosophical
evolution of the bourgeoisie. They are trying to spread the poisonous philosophical "ideas" of Neo-
Hegelianism in the ranks of the working class.
It is not by chance that the modern bourgeoisie, in its search for a complete idealistic prototype for
its philosophy, turned to dialectical idealism. She is attracted to Hegel, preferably before other
idealists, by his idealistic dialectic, which modern reactionaries completely distort and emasculate and
in this form are used as an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary
materialistic dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.
The reason for the enthusiasm of the ideologists of the modern bourgeoisie by the idealistic
dialectic is rooted in the nature of the stage experienced by modern capitalism. The most severe
crisis, the deepest class contradictions, the extreme instability of capitalism, the collapse of all
bourgeois culture, the crisis of bourgeois science, “the most painful dissonances and almost intractable
antinomies that break reality” - this is the root of the appeal to Hegel. “Will we have a look,”
complains the Hegelian Husserlanean T. Lit, “for the external conditions by which our people’s
existence is limited to unforeseen time, or we turn to the internal division of tribes, estates, classes,
whether we ask about political, moral, religious beliefs, lurking in its depths, there is heavy struggle
everywhere, tension of restraint, everywhere confusion and irreconcilable elements, [71] .
On the basis of decaying capitalism, the most severe crisis of the capitalist system, reflected in the
collapse of bourgeois culture, the mystical dialectic of neo-Hegelianism grows. Having lost stability in a
hopeless crisis and “tragic and gigantic contradictions” (A. Liebert), bourgeois philosophy tries to
attain self-awareness in idealistic, mystical teachings about movement and contradictions of logical
categories, spiritual entities.
At the same time, we observe two important varieties of neo-Hegelianism, which are idealistic
representations of two different sides of the same process of decay and the crisis of capitalism:
the philosophy of hopeless despair and the philosophy of unbridled fascist "efficacy" . The first of these
trends is nothing but variations on the theme most pronounced by Spengler, the singer of the decline
of capitalist Europe and the death of bourgeois culture and at the same time the singer of fascism and
"fascist culture", criticism of bourgeois democracy, liberalism, pacifism and other "values" that have
lost their meaning to the fascizing bourgeoisie.
The sentiments expressed by Spengler are widespread among the modern bourgeois intelligentsia.
The connection between the hopelessness of the modern bourgeoisie and the turn towards
Hegelianism in the idealistic "tragic dialectic" of A. Libert is very pronounced. He, like I. Kohn,
understands dialectical contradictions as antinomies, that is, as insoluble contradictions , absolute,
eternal, insurmountable opposites and ruptures. Here the “dialectic” expresses unequivocally a sense
of hopelessness from chaos, a sense of hopelessness.
However symptomatic the course may be, it is nevertheless not dominant in neo-
Hegelianism. While the “tragic dialectic” in modern Neo-Hegelianism reflects in itself mainly the
moment of decay, the collapse of capitalism, the dominant form of Neo-Hegelianism, to which we will
now pass, puts forward the offensive tendencies of the bourgeoisie losing ground. This is
the militant neo-Hegelianism of the fascist thugs, the philosophy of the bitter struggle of the
reactionary bourgeoisie for the suppression of the revolutionary proletariat, for the preservation of
their domination at any cost and by any means, the philosophy of a deadly fight with the enemy.
The essence of the fascization of bourgeois democracy is "the process of transition of bourgeois
dictatorship to the open forms of suppression of the working people " [72] . “The main thing in fascism
is its open attack on the working class by all methods of coercion and violence, it is a civil war against
the working people ” [73] .
For a correct understanding of the essence of fascism as a dictatorship of monopoly capital, it is
necessary to understand the interpenetration of two sides in it. First, we should understand fascism
(and, accordingly, its ideology) as a product of rotting, hopelessly crisis imperialism . "The emergence
of the fascist movement in the current historical conditions suggests that capitalism has become
obsolete, all the prerequisites for the social transformation of society have matured ." Fascism is "one
of the symptoms of the disorientation of the ruling classes and their desire to suppress the working
class on the ways of suppressing the working class." “The ugliness of its ideological forms is influenced
by the fact that it is a political superstructure of decaying capitalism ” [74] .
The one who does not understand this aspect of fascism, the fact that it arises on the fragile soil of
decaying capitalism, who regard fascism as the usual offensive of the bourgeoisie, who sees in it signs
of the power of capitalism, inevitably slides into a right-opportunist position, falls into pessimism,
disbelief in the strength of the working class and the near victory of the socialist revolution.
 But it is equally wrong to see in fascism only one characterized side - rotting, decay,
degeneration. This would lead to a "left" error (in the form of the opposite, and essentially identical to
the right), to believe in the automatic fall of capitalism, in its very disintegration itself decomposition,
to opportunistically underestimate the importance of active revolutionary struggle as a necessary
condition for the death of capitalism. “Fascism is not only an expression of the crisis of capitalism and
the beginning of the disintegration of the ruling classes. To say this only means not to say
everything. Fascism is one of the forms of capitalist offensive.containing elements of overcoming this
crisis by methods of getting out of it on the capitalist roads. Fascism is both offensive and capital
defense ... The fascist movement is in fact one of the forms of capital attack in the midst of a general
crisis of capitalism and the incipient disintegration of the ruling classes. And this makes fascism a
special, unusual form of capital attack ” [75] .
Thus, for a correct understanding of fascism, it is necessary to clarify the dual unity expressed in it
by the offensive activity of the reactionary big capital and the conviction, the groundlessness of this
activity.
A typical example of fascist philosophy is the “teaching” of the life philosopher Mussolini, his
“spiritual maestro” and former Minister of Education J. Gentile.
The philosophy of Gentile - this "spiritual ancestor of fascism" - is a vivid expression of the
"ugliness of the ideological forms" of fascism. This is a clear and unambiguous philosophy of
“consolidated at the helm of state power” and fully “revealing itself as a terrorist dictatorship of big
business” fascism. Gentile Neo-Hegelianism is a clear philosophical reflection of the above reactionary
offensive of capital in the conditions of the deepest mortal general crisis of capitalism.
The starting point of Gentile's philosophy is Berkeley 's priestly subjective idealism , which Gentile
wants to combine with idealistic dialectics, free from inconsistency and contradictions and bring to a
logical end. Gentile does not hide the fact that his "actualism" - idealism brought to an extreme - is a
kind of mysticism and clericalism.
The basic principle of the Gentile philosophy is the unbridled implementation of idealism to the end,
the denial of objective reality independent of consciousness. “Once the world is the world of higher
experience, once the world of experience is the work of the I, and therefore the expression of both the
creative energy and the cognitive abilities of the same I ... reality, I am ... It is necessary with all
determination, meekly, courageously and with the passion of a person who is conscious of his
responsibility to assert this truth, containing all the rest: that we are the true world; being is
knowledge, knowledge which is being " [76]. The reality for the subjective idealist Gentile is an eternal,
primary, pure subjectivity. The object dissolves in the subject. Nothing exists outside of the
spirit. Thinking absolutely and independently. It needs no carrier, no thinking creature. Not only
things, but people do not exist outside of thinking. "Because we have known another ... our neighbor
ceases to exist outside of us." This thinking without a real thinking being, not needing a brain and
absorbing its neighbor "we," according to Gentile, "is not in space and time, on the contrary, space
and time, everything that is spatially and gradually, should be in time, within us " [77].
But this does not satisfy Gentile, is not sufficient for him. To be completely consistent, idealism
must take another step forward. And this step Gentile considers the most important feature of his
"teaching", the "new" that he made. This “new” is that not only material things, but also thoughts
dissolve into thinking. Thoughts conceivable as too “objective”, “objective”, “must give way to the
primacy of thinking as a“ pure act ”,” “pure subjectivity”. This act is the basis of the "dialectic".
The dialectic, according to Gentile, is inherent only in the spirit . Nature, things, are not dialectical,
they are dead, inert products of the dialectic of spirit , the result of the termination of the
process. Hegel's idealistic dialectic is imperfect for Gentile because it is the dialectic of a conceivable,
not a thinking, actual spirit, it is too “objective,” “subject,” “substantial.” For the fascist philosopher,
dialectic is pure subjectivity ; reality is never an accomplished exercise. I, the dialectic, is the freedom
of I.
Here we come to the principle that forms the core of the black-shirt philosophy, the principle of
"freedom." No matter how wild and absurd this phrase (freedom and fascism) was, the principle of
"freedom of the spirit" is a favorite philosophical fable of the ideologists of fascist executioners and
jailers. But what kind of "freedom" is it? It is clear that it is not about freedom from class
oppression. This is not about the curtsy of bourgeois “freedom” - the formal democratic “freedom” of
speech, press, assembly, which the bourgeoisie so bragged about; the ghostly remnants of such
freedom are being brutally attacked by the fascists. The fascist "philosophy of freedom" represents the
philosophy of the frenzied opposition to historical necessity.the desperate convulsive attempt of the
bourgeoisie, which had lost its ground, by all means hold up the wheel of history, hold on, resist the
inevitable fateful for it. Fascist actualism is a philosophy ofreactionary activity , the onset of losing
ground of the doomed class.
The reactionary class, condemned by history to death, the bourgeoisie, cannot rely on objective
necessity. This necessity is incompatible with its “freedom,” that is, with its class interests, and totally
contradicts it. That is why the philosophy of the modern bourgeoisie declares an objective necessity as
a ghost from which the bourgeoisie wants (but cannot) get free. And since this ghost makes it very
realistic to know about oneself, then bourgeois philosophy has no choice but to declare the holy
crusade of all the forces of black reaction against historical necessity. It creates "teachings", urging
the bourgeoisie to struggle, to activity, to use all means, all forces, to hold out and stand, despite and
against historical necessity. This is actualism Gentile. This actualism of pure subjectivity is the
philosophy of militant fascism, the philosophy of the last frantic battle of the doomed bourgeoisie for
the preservation and maintenance of its rule.
“Actualism” is a philosophical justification of fascist “effectiveness”: economic strangulation of the
working class, fascization of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, intensification of repression and
savage white terror, mass arrests of workers, closure of revolutionary organizations, shootings of
workers demonstrations, strikers, murders of revolutionary revolutionaries without trial and perennial
convictions (see resolution XII of the ECCI).
In its logical form Gentile's philosophy is closest to the subjective idealistic dialectic of Fichte, but it
is different in its reactionism from the philosophy of the German classical idealist Fichte that is
bourgeois revolutionary in its tendency. In both cases, there is a position of efficacy, activity on an
idealistic basis. But Fichte’s idealistic doctrine of effectiveness was an expression of the revolutionary
anti-feudal aspirations of the young German bourgeoisie, and at the same time its weakness,
limitations, backwardness. Therefore, revolutionary activity was transferred by him to the sphere of
pure spirit in the intelligible world, becoming an ethereal dream of efficacy. In Gentile, “actualism”
expresses a reactionary attack on the proletariat, and moreover an offensive of capitalism, losing
ground,
The theory of Gentile seeks to “free the spirit from all boundaries of space and time as well as from
any external conditions ...” [78] “Our only support is the creative, creative activity of the spirit itself,
agitated in us ...” [79] History is proclaimed a product of free creativity miraculous spirit. Such is the
meaning of “actual idealism” - the philosophy of the frenzied big bourgeoisie of the era of decaying
imperialism and the victorious socialist revolution, such is the meaning of the fascist “dialectics”.
Gentile does not hide the connection of his philosophy with politics. “To specifically philosophize
means to include your actual personality in the policy system of your country.” He glorifies the cult of
the fascist state, which embodies, in his opinion, an absolute and concrete universality, to surrender
to which, each person must identify with. This cult of the fascist state, “integrity” (O. Shpann),
allegedly “erases” class contradictions, passes through all the writings of the fascist “theorists”
recommending “concrete cooperation of citizens” instead of “abstract class struggle” calling for
sacrifice on the altar of absolute value states of frantic bourgeois dictatorship.
Neo-Hegelianism now spreads with great force in bourgeois philosophy, winning primacy from the
previously dominant idealistic currents, drawing all the forces of philosophical reaction from all sides
and in different ways.
As mentioned above, the social fascists in the general process of fascization of the bourgeoisie and
the turn of its philosophers to Hegel hurry to make their "contribution", not to fall behind the
bourgeois philosophy. Especially lately, the "interest" in Hegel on the part of the ideologues and
philosophers of social-fascism has increased. Elements of Hegelianism are sounding ever stronger in
Max Adler, in Kunov, who directly speaks of Marx's “Hegelianism,” in Kautsky. There are a number of
social-fascist philosophers who openly stand on the Neo-Hegelian positions (for example, G. Heller) or
combine Kant with Hegel (for example, Siegfried Mark).
Such are the trends in the development of modern bourgeois, social-fascist philosophy.
In the face of reactionary mysticism appealing to Hegel, the harm that has been done on the
ideological front of us, in the Soviet Union, is especially aggravated by a group of philosophers led by
A. Deborin who dragged Soviet philosophical thought from Marx and Lenin to Hegel . Despite the well-
known achievements of this group of philosophers in the struggle against mechanism, this struggle
cannot be considered satisfactory, since it was conducted from the wrong positions. Menshevist
idealists completely misguidedly solved the problem of studying Hegel’s dialectics, without being
“ materialistic ” friends of Hegelian dialectics.
If Western Neo-Hegelianism is a reactionary perversion of Hegel’s teaching, then Menshevist
idealism is a Hegelian revision of Marxism . The first is the fruit of fascist ideology, the second is the
form of petty-bourgeois influence on proletarian ideology. The first calls for the defeat of the labor
movement, the second objectively contributes to the ideological disarmament of the proletariat.
Menshevist idealism behind the screen of the development of dialectics
resumes idealistic dialectics, uncritically acquires the teachings of Hegel and tries to transplant his
ideas one after another on a socialist basis. The Deborinsky group, under the guise of deepening and
developing Marxism, revisited it, replaced it with Hegel's philosophy, put Marxism utterly. Instead of
clearing the logic of Hegel from the mysticism of ideas, to melt it in a materialistic crucible, "they took
it as a given". Instead of “reading Hegel materialistically,” reworking it in the light of the teachings of
Marx and Lenin, they read Marx in Hegelianism, combing it “under Hegel.” Instead of developing
dialectic categories, relying on the work of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of
party congresses, studying the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the
discovery of modern natural science, the group of Deborints closed into the sphere of “pure” self-
moving logical categories, separated from the material reality and the practice of class struggle . From
the height of Hegelian logic, concrete reality ceased to be distinguishable. Matter disappeared, turning
into "an infinite ... aggregate of mediation, i.e. relations and connections" (Deborin), non-material
"synthesis of space and time" (Hesse), moving matter was replaced by "moving motion"
(Tymyansky). In short: dialectical materialism, Marxism, has degenerated into Hegelianism, tinted by
Marxist phraseology.
On closer examination, Hegelian revisionism finds itself in close spiritual affinity with Menshevik
neokantianism; the philosophy of the Second International shows where Menshevist idealism is
growing. We see the same separation of theory from practice in Menshevist idealists. which is typical
of the Second International, the same departure from the reality of the class struggle, from its
theoretical understanding, the same separation of logical forms from concrete, material content, the
same inability to maintain harmony between the historical and the logical, the same autocracy of the
abstract-logical. The shattering of the materialistic foundations of Marxism, the introduction of
bourgeois idealistic philosophy into the proletarian worldview, the distraction from revolutionary
practice, from the defense of the general line of the party - such is the role objectively carried out by
Menshevist idealism.
The Menshevist idealism of the Deborinsky group returns the philosophy of Marxism to Hegel, the
mechanists are pulling us towards pre-Marxist materialism. We do not want to go back to Hegel, nor
to mechanical materialism, and we equally struggle with both types of revisionism. We do not reject,
like the mechanists, any dialectic, but only an idealistic dialectic. We "must organize a systematic
study of Hegel's dialectics from a materialistic point of view ... Relying on how Marx applied the
materialist Hegel dialectic , we can and must develop this dialectic from all sides" [80] .
In developing the materialist dialectic, we move philosophy forward along the lines drawn by Marx,
Engels and Lenin.
2.6. The materialistic philosophy of L. Feuerbach
The development of post-Hegelian philosophy followed two paths. The first path is reactionary,
idealistic imitation, back to Kant and again from Kant to Hegel. The second way is materialistic
criticism and processing of Hegelian dialectics. Feuerbach - the immediate predecessor of the
materialist philosophy of Marx - was a true successor of the 18th century French materialism. In the
struggle against classical German idealism, he continues the materialistic line in philosophy. During
the revolution of 1848, the advanced bourgeois democracy, the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, found
in Feuerbach’s philosophy an expression of its radical sentiments and ideals.
Teaching Feuerbach is materialism. Its guiding principle is the recognition that it is not thinking
that determines being, but, on the contrary, being that determines thinking. Nature exists
independently of thinking, by itself. It is primary, independent, infinite. The concrete, sensual world,
existing independently of consciousness and perceived through the medium of our five senses, is the
only real world. The task of science is to know this sensual material world as it is in itself. Man himself
is a part of nature, flesh of its flesh. Our sensations are caused by the influence of things on the
senses. Thinking, according to Feuerbach, is nothing more than a property of a living, bodily man and
his brain. The fact that the brain with which we think is itself part of the material world,
From this materialistic position, Feuerbach leads a tireless struggle against idealism and
religion. Idealism and religion, according to Feuerbach, are not two different enemies; idealistic
philosophy - the last refuge of religion, logically expressed theology. Therefore, the struggle against
religion requires the defeat of idealism. Idealism separates thinking from the whole material being, the
property of which it is, ascribes to it an independent objective being. The human property - thinking -
is alienated from man. That is the secret of idealism. The secret of religion is the same. Religion is the
belief in ghosts. God is nothing but the mystified idea of human power and intelligence. By creating
and worshiping him, man exalts his own being , alienated from man. "The objective being as
a subjective being of nature, as distinct from nature, as a human being , is what a divine being
is, what is a religion, what is the secret of mysticism and speculation ” [81] . Man creates God in his
own image and likeness. “God is the mirror of man,” his projection, says Feuerbach. Feuerbach pays a
lot of attention to clarifying the psychological foundations of religion, thereby exposing its falsity,
although it is not able to clarify its social, class roots. The idea of God arises, but his opinion, from a
sense of lack, from the experience of human need and imperfection. The feeling of lack of something
is connected with desire, with need. These unfulfilled desires that a person is not able to satisfy, give
rise to religious faith. In reality, the person transfers the impossible to the fantasy world invented by
him. In religion, a person dreams in reality. The other world is nothing but the unrealizable desires of
this world.
Thus, according to Feuerbach, the origin of religion is not rational, rational, but emotional —
religion gives rise to feelings, desires and fantasies.
Feuerbach emphasizes the importance of man’s dependence on nature . Creating the concept of
God, man expresses to them not only the dream of his own power, independence, immortality, but
also his own powerlessness against nature, infinite, powerful, indifferent to human joys and
sorrows. Such, according to Feuerbach, are the roots of religious illusions.
The central concept of the philosophy of Feuerbach is man . Not an abstract "I" of idealism, not a
skinny abstraction of "I" as pure thinking, pure sensation or pure will, but a person as a physical
being in flesh and blood, as part of nature , and not "I" should be the starting point of the theory of
knowledge, but "I" and "you" in their unity. This formulation of the question follows from the fact that
there is no such “I” that would not be with you at the same time and vice versa. In other words, the
object and the subject are not two severed, independent beings, but unity . The subject must be at
the same time the object. There is no subject without an object. “What for me, or subjectively, is a
purely spiritual activity,” says Feuerbach, “that in itself, objectively, is a material sensory act.”
The doctrine of Feuerbach was of great historical importance for the struggle of materialism against
idealism and for overcoming the “all-powerful” Hegelian philosophy.
With all the positive meaning that Feuerbach’s restoration of materialism in the heyday of idealistic
systems, with all the undeniable historical value of his struggle against religion in general and
Christianity in particular, opposing them to the sober materialism philosophy of drunken speculation of
idealism - with all that as his positive teaching, and criticism to them of their opponents bear the
imprint of historical limitations. Criticism of Feuerbach’s idealism, especially his criticism of Hegel,
does not give a materialistic transformation to the mystified idealism of dialectics and does not save it
in a revised form, but rejects it “from the threshold”. Feuerbach in the fight against idealism Hegel
underestimated the values of dialectics, failed to make it materialistic. As a result, his materialism did
not take on that higher form, which had already been demanded for the discovery of nineteenth-
century natural science. His materialism, representing a certain step forward in comparison with the
materialism of French thinkers of the eighteenth century, still did not rise, despite some brilliant
dialectic moments, to the height of dialectical materialism. Matter and history, nature and
development are scattered in his philosophy.
Feuerbach materialism has an abstract character. The man at the center of his attention, no matter
how Feuerbach emphasizes his concreteness, is nonetheless not a concrete historical person. This is a
man “in general”, an abstract representative of a biological species, and not a real person of a certain
historical epoch, social formation, or class. Therefore, Feuerbach “is forced to see, for example,
instead of healthy people, a crowd of scrofulous, torn-up and consumptive poor people, resort to“
higher contemplation ”and ideal,“ leveling in kind ”, ie, again falling into idealism just where
communist materialist sees the need and at the same time the condition for the transformation of
both industry and the social system ” [82] .
The naturalism and antihistoricism of the teachings of Feuerbach also determined the limitations of
his criticism of religion. Religion, according to Feuerbach, is generated by the essence of man. He did
not understand that religion is a product of a specific human society and is determined in each case by
specific social relations , in which the solution of religious systems should be sought. Therefore, he
limits his task to the destruction of religion, but does not come to the need to destroy its earthly basis.
In an effort to put the practice into the basis of the theory of knowledge, Feuerbach, however,
understands this practice naturally, only as a man’s struggle with nature, not seeing the true social
practice of social man, without revealing the historical, class foundations of his social
practice. Therefore, the materialism of Feuerbach, like all the preceding materialism, remains passive-
contemplative materialism. The world is not perceived by Feuerbach as an object of human activity ,
as an object of social practice . Reality is understood by contemplative materialism only as a source of
sensation, and not as something transformable.in the process of human activity, industry, exchange,
class struggle. The theory of knowledge of Feuerbach is based on the contemplative materialistically
understood experience. The unity of the subject and object, human thinking and nature is carried out
only in sensuality, in the process of receiving passive influences, in contemplation. Pre-Marxian
materialism has not yet reached the understanding that only in social practice, in the activity and
change of the world by man does a true unity of nature and man, object and subject, be achieved.
Another, closely connected with the abstractness of materialism, the most important feature of
Feuerbach's philosophy, which caused its insufficiency, is the limitation of materialism to the limits of
nature. Feuerbach lacks a materialistic understanding of social life. He, like the French materialists,
remains a materialist “from below,” in natural science, and an idealist from “above,” that is, in the
social field. He does not understand the material driving forces of social development. The change of
social forms is defined by him as a change of religious beliefs. He sees no other relationships between
people besides moral relations, love and friendship. Morality - the doctrine of morality - is at the
center of his social views. Man's love for man, the union of "I" and "you" - he does not go further than
this. He, however, is not satisfied with mere morality, but considers it necessary to sanctify it. “Man is
a god to man,” he proclaims and declares morality to be a true religion.
Thus, an idealistic understanding of history leads to the vulgarization of morality by a religious
label, which inevitably diminishes Feuerbach’s atheistic struggle.
All the shortcomings of Feuerbach’s philosophy were discovered early by Marx and Engels, who,
having overcome them in the development of their teachings, raised materialism to a new level,
created a new, higher form of materialism. However, in some of the post-Marxist works we find
remnants and recurrences of Feuerbachianism, a misunderstanding of the depth of the processing that
Marxism subjected to the preceding materialistic philosophy. Even in Plekhanov there is an inability to
rise above the contemplative materialism of Feuerbach type. Plekhanov did not understand the full
meaning of Marx Feuerbach’s critique, the turn from contemplative materialism to
dialectical. Remaining on this most important issue in the Feuerbach position, he cannot understand
Marx's criticism, it seems to Plekhanov unfair, he smoothes the difference between Feuerbach and
Marx. According to Plekhanov, “Marx was wrong when he reproached Feuerbach with the fact that he
did not understand“ practical-critical activity ”. It was clear to Feuerbach " [83] . Plekhanov did not
understand that Feuerbach only had scattered guesses about the significance of the practice, which
had an insignificant influence on his general outlook. Identifying Feuerbach’s statement that the world
is not only a matter of reasoning, but also a “object of desire”, with Marx’s doctrine of a revolutionary-
effective attitude towards the world, Plekhanov himself reveals an inability to completely overcome
Feuerbach’s passive materialism.
Another Feuerbach feature of Plekhanov’s philosophical works is not sufficiently deep
comprehension of his dialectic . Plekhanov rather formally recognizes the meaning of materialist
dialectics, uses it only for individual illustrations, does not grasp the core, the essence of
dialectics. Accordingly, the critique of idealism by Plekhanov bears the stamp of Feuerbachianism. He
does not correct idealistic reasoning, deepening it, but only “from the threshold” rejects these
reasoning. Plekhanov criticizes idealism from the point of view of materialism “in general,” that is, in
reality, vulgar materialism, and not dialectical materialism.
It is not difficult to reveal the Feuerbach limitation of the modern mechanists . They, like their
spiritual ancestors of the XVII and XVIII centuries. much closer to the materialism of Feuerbach than
Marx. Of course they are not the orthodox disciples of Feuerbach, we will not find in them the religion
of "love", but the type, form of their materialism is homogeneous with Feuerbach’s abstract,
contemplative materialism.
As far as the attitude to Feuerbachianism of Menshevist idealism is concerned , here we find the
reproduction, deepening and transformation into the system of Plekhanov's mistakes, or rather
Plekhanov's, semi-Feyerbach materialism. Representing mainly the idealistic, Hegelian revision of
Marxism, the eclectic philosophy of the Deborinsky group does not formally break with
materialism. Materialistic moments are interspersed with her Hegelian teaching, covering its true
nature. But even this materialistic cover is a reproduction of the principles of Feuerbach materialism.
The evolution of Deborin's philosophical views can be described as a movement from Feuerbachian
to Hegelianism. Therefore, if in later works only traces ofmaterialism remain , then in the early works
Feuerbach materialism prevails. This is clearly expressed in Deborin’s slogan: “Feuerbach’s time is
ahead.” What does this slogan after Marx and Lenin mean, if not a retrograde call to return to the
steps of materialistic philosophy passed? How else can the opposition to modern idealism be defined
not by Marxism, but by Feuerbachianism?
 Deborin fully adheres to the Plekhanov revision of Marx's criticism of Feuerbach. All the literary
activity of Feuerbach represents, in Deborin’s opinion, a relentless struggle against the theoretically
contemplative point of view of the preceding philosophy and the defense of a practical point of
view. Deborin finally breaks here with the Marxist assessment of Feuerbach materialism. The
historical-philosophical turning point in the development of materialism is accomplished, according to
Deborin, not by Marx, but by Feuerbach, whose simple heir to the ideas is Marx. Thus, the lines
between effective and contemplative materialism are erased, so that it is more convenient to return to
the petty-bourgeois viewpoint of feeling and contemplation.
A fundamental flaw in Menshevist idealism is the separation of theory from revolutionary activity ,
the alienation of theory from current tasks and the interests of the proletariat. Menshevist idealism
dissociates theory from practice. He does not understand the full significance of revolutionary practice
for the development of theory and is unable to make a theory worthy and valuable for revolutionary
practice. When Menshevist idealism dares to look into the field of socialist practice alien to him, he is
only capable of Feuerbachian babbling "about the collectivization of feelings".
And this restoration of passive and contemplative Feuerbach philosophy is accomplished by
Menshevist idealism during the agony of imperialism and the powerful offensive of socialism, in the
years of uprooting the roots of capitalism and building the foundation of socialism in the Soviet Union
and the unstoppable growth of the elements of the revolutionary crisis in capitalist countries. To
develop a theory outside of practical revolutionary activity, aside from it, is to present the cardboard
sword of scholastics instead of the steel blade of the revolutionary theory to the working class.
2.7. The development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels and the
transition to dialectical materialism
The first chapter already showed the socio-political conditions for the emergence of Marxism and
its theoretical sources. Let us dwell in more detail on the process of the development of the
philosophical views of Marx and Engels.
In 1841, Marx worked on his dissertation on the philosophy of Epicurus. As Lenin points out, in this
dissertation Marx still stands on a completely idealistic Hegelian point of view.
The greatness of Hegelian philosophy was that it was the first to fully formulate the idea of
development. That was her progressive side. Hegel's idea of universal development reflected the
liberation aspirations of the German bourgeoisie and was in its very essence directed against the dead
serf orders. But it is already known that Hegel was a consistent idealist, that in Hegelian idealistic
dialectics reflected the economic connection of the German bourgeoisie with serfdom, the weakness of
its socio-economic positions. Standing from 1841 on the positions of Hegel’s idealistic dialectic, Marx
also conducted it in his dissertation, giving Epicurus a preference over Democritus on the question of
atomic theory. In 1842, Marx's articles appeared in the Rhine newspaper, in which Marx is already
planning a transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democratism to
communism. Marx’s attempts to give the Hegelian doctrine of the state are already manifested here,
in which it could be used in favor of protecting the rights of the exploited masses, freeing politics from
theology, etc. In Berlin, he is adjacent to the circleLeft Hegelians ”(Bruno Bauer and others), who
sought to draw practical and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel’s philosophy.
In Hegel's philosophy of law, Hegel’s striving to reconcile the needs of capitalist development with
the feudal state structure of Germany at that time found its vivid expression. In “The Philosophy of
Law”, Hegel interprets the state as an expression of the development of an objective idea, which acts
in the form of the moral spirit of the people. The state, according to Hegel, is a political organism,
representing the unity of the universal spirit of the people with its special manifestations in the form of
the interests of individual citizens. The government is, according to Hegel, the “soul”, the “exponent of
the will” of the national spirit, and therefore its activities should be tested by citizens not as something
external, coercive, but as the discovery of their freedom, their own rational moral essence. From here,
Hegel dogmatically asserts the necessity of the unconditional, voluntary obedience of all citizens to
their government. Hegel in fact philosophically serves here the feudal dictatorship. It is not surprising
that Marx and Engels should have had an early sense of all the negative aspects of the Hegelian
philosophy of law and in 1842 began its revolutionary criticism.
From the very beginning of his theoretical activity, Marx and Engels, starting from the Hegelian
idea of development, remaining still in idealistic positions, were, however, the most revolutionary
thinkers of all Hegelians left . This position must be particularly emphasized in contrast to the
perverters of dialectical materialism, who argue that Marx in the early period of his activity was an
ordinary Young Hegelian and a bourgeois radical. The famous Menshevist historiographer of Marxism
Ryazanov, who eventually slipped into the direct betrayal of the interests of the working class, worked
especially hard in this direction.
The left-wing followers of Hegel, the so-called Young Hegelians, showed a negative attitude to the
right-wing Hegelianism, who tried to justify Hegel’s philosophy with the nationalist ideal of the
Christian-German state. But, in their polemics against the right-wing Hegelianism, the Young
Hegelians did not go beyond the limits of all the preceding German bourgeois education, and in
particular beyond the limits of Hegel’s philosophy. Following the example of their old enlighteners,
they limited their theoretical activity to only half-hearted criticism of religion, declared it the main
cause of all social evils, completely unaware that religion, like all old forms of consciousness, can be
destroyed not just by theoretical criticism, but revolutionary-practical revolution in the socio-economic
conditions of public life.[84] .
This criticism of religion by the Young Hegelians was extremely half-inconsistent and
inconsistent. We find in them a decisive criticism of religious tenets and at the same time philistine
worship of religion, attempts to prove that religion, “it is Christianity, is identical with the highest
philosophical truth” (Strauss), the idealistic deification of human thought, its transformation into a
mystical “self-consciousness” in the form of "critics makes history" (Bruno Bauer). We find the
exposure of the earthly roots of the heavenly deity, the deification of man, the statement that "man is
a god to man" (Feuerbach). On the one hand, the most consistent denial of all divine, the statement
that “for an egoist, there are no so exalted and independent objects that could make him adore
them, to live exclusively for them and sacrifice oneself for them ”, on the other hand, absolutization,
deification of egoism, through the religious statement that“ I ”, like God, is above all else, since“ I ”,
mine is“ everything ”, since i am the only one. “I” is nothing in the sense of emptiness, creative
nothing, from which I myself, as a creator, will create everything ” [85] . All Young Hegelians in one way
or another were held captive by the Hegelian system, for, says Marx, “none of these newest critics
have even tried to proceed to a thorough criticism of the Hegelian system” [86] . Their controversy with
Hegel and with each other was limited by the fact that everyone pulled out one side of the Hegelian
system and directed it against the whole system. "The only result of this philosophical criticism is
some - and even one-sided - studies on the history of the emergence of Christianity" [87] . The rest of
the critical activities of the Hegelians left themselves to fight "only against phrases," with a complete
misunderstanding of the fact that, "fighting against the phrases of this real world, they do not fight
against this world at all"[88].
According to Marx, these "sheep who considered themselves wolves, with all the hype of their
theoretical activity, only invested the German burghers in the philosophical jargon."
Marx’s early theoretical activity in its class character and trends in its development has a number
of features that differed sharply from the theoretical activity of other left Hegelians. Marx's political
and theoretical views were shaped in a huge dependence on the revolutionary mentality of the era of
the French Revolution and the mass revolutionary movements of the late 30s and early 40s of the last
century.
As Lenin points out, Marx and Engels became socialists from democrats, and the democratic feeling
of hatred for political arbitrariness was extremely strong in them. As early as 1842, they have
emerged as consistent advocates for the broad masses of working people, the urban and rural
poor. During this period, materialist tendencies made their way into their works.
On the experience of political struggle for a short period, Marx and Engels are convinced that it is
not “the contradictions of the Hegelian idea embodied in law and the state”, but the irreconcilable
struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the driving force of social reorganization and that
therefore not law and not the state, as Hegel taught, determine the forms the so-called civil society,
but, on the contrary, the dominant mode of production determines the forms of state institutions,
legal and religious, and all kinds of other ideas of people. This process of the transition of Marx and
Engels from the standpoint of a revolutionary democrat to the position of a proletarian revolutionary,
the process of their critical denial of Hegelian dialectics, the process of creating dialectical materialism
as a world view and method of the proletariat by them can be traced.
In one of his first articles in the Rhenish Newspaper, Marx expresses such provisions that clearly
reveal in him a consistent revolutionary democrat who is gradually shifting to communist
positions. The serf-reactionary statement that “only religion is the basis of the state” and that
therefore “newspapers should not discuss politics from the point of view of philosophy in the so-called
Christian state”, Marx contrasts this assertion with revolutionary argument. Philosophy, according to
Marx, should declare itself a “newspaper employee” and completely openly discuss all political issues
“not in the church or in salons, not in the family circle”, but in print, because “newspaper issues have
become the battle questions of the day. Philosophy should "change the ascetic priestly robe to light
fashionable clothes of newspapers", for “philosophers do not grow like mushrooms from the earth,
they are the product of their time, their people, the most subtle, precious and invisible juices of which
roam in philosophical ideas. The same spirit that builds railways with the hands of artisans builds
philosophical systems in the brain of philosophers. ” [89] . Philosophy does not hover outside the
modern world; on the contrary, it “invades the heart of contemporaries,” just as it does in the
“editorial board of newspapers.”
Starting from the Hegelian idealist position of the state as a "moral organism," Marx seeks to use
this provision to protect the freedom of the democratic press against serf censorship. "The state must
be built not on the basis of religion, but on the basis of the mind of freedom." "The newest
philosophy ... considers the state as a great organism in which legal, moral and political freedom must
be realized, and an individual citizen, obeying the laws of the state, obeys only the natural laws of his
own mind, human mind" [90]. In such an ideal state, the press must be free, because it is “the open
eye of the national spirit, the people's confidence in themselves, the eloquent link connecting the
individual to the state and the whole world ... She is the merciless confession of the people before
itself ... She is the spiritual a mirror in which people see themselves ... She is the light of the state of
the mind, which can penetrate every hut ... She is the ideal world, which, growing out of reality, in
turn, enriches and inspires this action totalness [91]. Marx strongly protests against the representatives
of those classes who "in order to save the particular freedoms of their privileges ... condemn the
universal freedom of human nature." Marx argues that the argument against freedom of the press,
which was developed in the Landtag by a representative of the nobility, as well as the argument of a
representative of the princely class, cannot be of any value, as it opposes the special privilege spirit to
the universal "historical spirit of the people". But Marx denounces his criticism not only of orators from
princes and noblemen, he no less sharply criticizes the representative of the bourgeoisie, who
demanded freedom of the press as “trade freedom”, that is, as an expression of property
freedom. “But,” says Marx, “is it free a seal that goes down to the level of a craft? ” [92] . “Let's open
the speaker's thought. To the question: what is freedom? he replies: trade freedom . It is as if a
student asked the question: what is freedom? would answer: " Free night " " [93] .
The idea of violence against the “freedom of the universal popular spirit” by the privileged classes
Marx expresses, however, in a somewhat different form, in his other article, written about the
promulgation of the law against the theft of firewood, in defense of the customary law of the
poor. Still firmly convinced that the state should embody “the freedom of the universal popular spirit”,
Marx demands that the law take care of protecting the interests not only of the owner of the forest,
but also of the violator of forest rules, “for the state must see ... a citizen. The state cannot lightly cut
off one of its members from all these functions, because the state cripples itself when it makes a
citizen a criminal ” [94] .
So teaches the Hegelian idealistic theory of state law. But Marx is already well aware that the
forest owner is guided not by ideal principles, but by practical interests. “A practical forest owner
argues in this way: this decree of the law is good because it is useful for me ...” [95]
However, it is important that Marx is no longer limited to criticizing forest owners. In contrast to
the feudal and bourgeois classes, Marx declared to the poor the legitimate bearer of his “ordinary
rights”. Marx argues that picking up a dead man in privately owned forests is a legitimate
manifestation of the “grab right” of the poor, who “in their very work ... finds an excuse for their
right” [96] . So Marx as a revolutionary democrat uses certain provisions of the Hegelian philosophy of
law. This meant that Marx followed the path of denying the Hegelian "idea" of the state, because
instead of expressing the freedom of the "universal popular spirit", Marx forces it to express
a particular, private, class spirit of the poor.
If at the beginning of his activity Marx was deeply convinced that the ideal state as the
embodiment of the universal popular spirit determines the forms of existence of the so-called civil
society, then during his work in the Rhine newspaper, in the process of practical political struggle Marx
came to the conclusion that “Means the mind is realized”, in fact “it falls into a contradiction between
its ideal purpose and its real data” [97] .
The further development of Marx and Engels, namely, their activities in the German-French
Yearbooks and their Critique of the Holy Family (1843–44), are aimed at exposing Hegelian
understanding of state and law. The appearance of the works of L. Feuerbach (1841–1843) helped
Marx and Engels to realize and formalize the materialistic provisions that had already been made
before them. As Engels notes, “we (that is, Marx and Engels) immediately became
Feuerbachians.” During this period, the final transition of Marx and Engels from idealism to
materialism, from revolutionary democratism to communism, takes place.
 It would be wrong to deny the well-known influence of Feuerbach’s materialism on the formation of
the materialist theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels. However, it would be no less a mistake to see
in Marx and Engels the orthodox Feuerbachians in the sense that they shared the limitations of
Feuerbach's views even in this early period of their activity. Since Feuerbach’s criticism of religion
helped Marx expose the ideal Hegelian state, he was Feuerbachian to the extent that he belonged to
Feuerbach’s philosophical views and defended Feuerbach from the attacks of noisy idealistic criticism
from the Young Hegelians. Marx placed Feuerbach immeasurably higher than the Young Hegelian
Critical Critique. But Marx was never an unconditional follower of Feuerbach, for from the very
beginning of philosophical development, Marx’s activity was directed against the basic vice of
Feuerbach’s philosophy — its contemplativeness, against the misunderstanding that religion can be
destroyed not by theoretical criticism, but by a revolutionary-practical revolution in social and
economic conditions of social life. That is why Marx, in connection with the appearance of Feuerbach's
Theses to Reform Philosophy, in one of his letters says: “In my opinion, Feuerbach’s aphorisms suffer,
in my opinion, that he is pushing too much on nature and too little on politics . Meanwhile, this is the
only union thanks to which the present philosophy can become ideological ” [98] .
In contrast to the inconsistent abstract-theoretical criticism of religion by Feuerbach, Marx, from
the very beginning of his work, advocated an practically effective philosophy. On the experience of the
political struggle, Marx is completely convinced that the Hegelian ideal state is an abstraction and, as
such, cannot be the cause of social development. During this period of its development, Marx argues
that "the German philosophy of law and the state" is "the ideal continuation of German history" and
that it is not, as Hegel believed, the cause of social development, but is only a "philosophical
reflection" of the social life of modern advanced peoples . Therefore, the criticism of the Hegelian
philosophy of law was for Marx not only criticism of the German serf orders, but also leads him to
criticize the already developed English and French capitalism at that time.
In this criticism of Hegel's philosophy of law, which took the stand of bourgeois political economy,
in the process of his study of economic theory and criticism of utopian socialism and
communism, Marx leaves the revolutionary-democratic positions and becomes the proletariat . In the
famous article “Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law”, Marx already appears as a
proletarian revolutionary, and therefore he now understands much more deeply the dependence of
theoretical criticism on practical revolutionary struggle. Marx writes that he is “a decisive opponent of
the former form of German political consciousness, the criticism of the speculative philosophy of law
does not flow in itself, but in tasks for the resolution of which there is only one means
- practice". “Weapons of criticism,” he says further, “cannot of course replace the critics of weapons,
material force must be overturned by material force; but the theory becomes a material force as soon
as it masters the masses ” [99] .
The following places confirm our thought: “Just as philosophy finds its material weapon in the
proletariat, so does the proletariat find its spiritual weapon in philosophy , and as soon as the lightning
of thought thoroughly hits this naive popular soil, the Germans will be emancipated into
people ” [100 ] . Trying to find out more specifically the ways of “emancipating Germans into people”,
Marx poses the question: “What is the positive possibility of German emancipation? Answer : in the
formation of a class linked by radical chains., a class of civil society, which does not constitute any
class of civil society; estate, which is a decomposition of all classes; a sphere that is universal in
nature due to its universal suffering and does not claim any special right , because it is not
any particular injustice that is being done , but injustice in general ; which can no longer refer to
the historical , but still only to the human right; which is not in any one-sided contradiction with the
results of the German state system, but in complete contradiction with the foundations of this system,
finally a sphere that cannot emancip itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society
and at the same time all other spheres of society; which, in a word, represents the total loss of
a person and, therefore, can only gain itself by a complete new rebirth of a person . This disintegrated
society, as a special class, is theproletariat ” [101] .
Marx here finally rejects Hegel’s thought that the ideal state determines the forms of social life. In
contrast to Hegel, Marx begins to look for the dependence of the forms of state institutions in the
pattern of social life, although at first it can only give a very general definition of this pattern. “Hegel
forgets,” says Marx, “that a special individuality is a human individuality, and state functions and
spheres of reality are human functions; he forgets that the essence of a personality trait is not its
blood, not its beard, but its social quality and that state functions, etc., are nothing but forms of being
and forms of manifestation of social qualities of people. It is therefore clear that, since individuals are
carriers of state function and state power, they are considered not by their private, but by their social
qualities. ”
 The next decisive step in their development is Marx and Engels in the Critique of the Holy Family,
where, whipping and exposing the followers of Hegelian idealism, they are finally strengthened as
proletarian revolutionaries in the positions of dialectical materialism. Marx shows here that the state,
law, religion, morality are determined by the implacable class struggle. In the Critique of the Holy
Family, Marx gives a class characteristic of the opposition between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie. Here Marx more clearly outlines the historical role of the proletariat, the need for its
struggle with the capitalist system, with the outrageous conditions of its existence. Marx and Engels in
The Critique of the Holy Family finally felt the main springs of social development - the material
production process and the associated law of class struggle, and thus laid the foundations of dialectical
materialism.
“German ideology” (1846) is a further step in the development of dialectical materialism. The
starting point of the " German ideology " is fundamentally opposed to the entire preceding pre-Marxist
philosophy in general, and in particular to German philosophy. Marx and Engels come out of “really
active people, trying to deduce from their real life process also the development of ideological reflexes
and reflections of this life process” [102] . The point of departure in the study of social life should not be
a fantastic representation of people, not an abstraction from reality, but “real people, their actions and
the material conditions of their existence, both existing and created by the activity of the people
themselves”.
“So we have this fact: certain individuals who produce in a certain way enter into certain social and
political relations” [103] . “The notions made up by these individuals for themselves are the essence of
the ideas either about their relationship to nature, or about their relationship to each other ...
intercourse, their social and political practice " [104] . The material existence of people is the actual
process of their life: “Consciousness can never be anything other than just a conscious
being” [105] . And Marx already gives here his classical formulation about the dependence of
consciousness on being. “It is not consciousness that determines life, but life determines
consciousness” [106] ‚he says.
Having thus formulated the basic principle of materialismMarx gives merciless criticism of the
philosophy that preceded him. Marx and Engels dealt particularly mercilessly with German philosophy,
which, instead of a concretely acting person, studied an abstract, fictional, imaginary, word,
fantastically represented person. "The thought of the German ideologues‚ - according to Marx, -
revolves in the realm of 'pure spirit', seeing in the religious illusion the driving force of history.
" German philosophy operates only in heaven, never descends to earth. But a truly scientific
knowledge of the path of its research must begin with the study of the real, with the study of the
production process, from a concrete person living on earth. We must proceed from a certain, historical
person in order to understand that the social conditions of production determine their ideological
mapping. Hence the philosophy
Thus, “phrases about consciousness disappear, real knowledge should take their place”. At best,
the place of philosophy can be “summation of the most general results”, abstracted from consideration
of the historical development of people. Therefore, the true and only science is history, which must
fully depict the process of changing social forms of production, and the tact of the various forms of
consciousness that depend on them.
To show that the development of material production is the main all-determining law of social life,
Marx and Engels repeatedly refer to the empirical fact tested by practice that people, in order to live,
must produce "the means necessary for their life" and thereby produce "indirect way "their material
life, for" this activity, this incessant sensual work and creativity, this production is as much the basis
of the whole sensory world as it now exists, for if it had stopped at least for one year only, then
Feuerbach would not only find great changes in the physical world, but very soon would have found
the whole human world, their own abilities and opinions, even his own existence " [107] .
But if production is the all-determining law of the development of society, then it is also a side that
establishes the difference between man and animal, because “people can be distinguished from
animals by consciousness, religion, anything. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from
animals as soon as they begin to produce the means necessary for their life ” [108] . Even at the lowest,
primitive stage of social development, production lies at the basis of human life.
Consciousness, on the first steps of social development, is directly dependent on practical human
activity, being “first of all the consciousness of the nearest sensory environment” [109] . Consciousness
and language arose in primitive man in the process of labor from the needs for practical-active
relationships with each other, and only when there was a separation of material and spiritual labor,
consciousness imagined, "that it is something other than the consciousness of existing
practice" [110] . “From this point on, it is able to free itself from the world and go on to the formation of
a" pure theory "" [111] , thus acquiring the form of the illusion of domination over man.
This division of labor is due to the historically evolving process of material division of labor . The
division of labor makes a person’s development one-sided, disfigures him, dominates a person in the
form of entrusting certain social functions to him. “According to the division of labor taking place,
everyone has a certain, exceptional range of activities that is imposed on him and from which he
cannot leave: he turns out to be a hunter, fisherman or shepherd ... or a critical critic” [112] . Marx and
Engels consider the division of labor between town and country to be especially negative for human
development. Because it "is a crude expression of the fact of an individual's subordination division of
labor and certain forcibly imposed on it, the activities, submission, converting one person in a limited
urban animal, the other - in a limited rustic animal" [113] .
In this way, Marx and Engels show us how the law of the division of labor causes the appearance of
the illusion of self-development of ideology, how the division of labor disfigures human development
by attaching it to individual professions. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels clearly formulate
the law of the division of labor as the basis for the formation of classes , for, they say, "the division of
labor and private property are identical expressions: in one case it says the same thing in relation to
activity, says in relation to the product of activity ” [114]. Therefore, "various forms of ownership at
each stage of the division of labor determine by themselves the relationship of individuals with respect
to the material, instrument and product of labor." Thus, in the “German Ideology,” Marx and Engels
fully disclose the reasons for the division of society into classes.
In the same place, they give a very specific definition of society as a socio-economic formation,
establish the dependence of their structures on the dominant form of ownership, and investigate the
class struggle developing specifically in them.
The struggle between the feudal aristocracy and bourgeois democracy, the struggle for universal
suffrage, equality and freedom of citizens, etc., are all deceptive forms that are the perfect expression
of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie.
On the example of the analysis of class struggle in the era of bourgeois revolutions, Marx and
Engels conclude that the class that materially dominates is always dominant and spiritual . The class
that owns the material means of production also owns the means of spiritual production. The thoughts
that prevail in this epoch are the ideal expression of the class relations prevailing in this
epoch. Therefore, Marx again and again emphasizes that the old forms of consciousness can be
destroyed not by spiritual criticism, but by a practical revolution in real public relations ... "Not
criticism, but revolution is the driving force of history ."
So in the "German ideology" Marx and Engels, along with the discovery of the basic laws of social
development, also clearly reveal the historical inevitability of the revolution. The revolution is the
inevitable result of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of
production; "The contradiction between the productive forces and the forms of intercourse ... had to
break through every time in the form of a revolution" [115]. Marx and Engels have repeatedly explained
the fact that all previous revolutions were limited only to the redistribution of property, without
affecting the very foundations of the rule of private property. This is one of the fundamental
differences of all previous revolutions from the future proletarian-communist revolution. Only the
communist revolution will finally destroy all class domination, because the proletariat, a class that has
the same interests in all nations, a class for which not only its relationship to the capitalist is
intolerable, but also the “division on itself all the burden of society, not using its benefits ", the class"
from which comes the awareness of the need for a communist revolution". The proletariat must make
a revolution "not only because it is impossible to overthrow the ruling class in any other way , but also
because the overthrowing class can only be cleansed in the revolution from all the dirt of the old
society and become capable of creating a new society " [116] . Consequently, “communism for us is not
a state to be established, not an ideal with which reality must conform. We call communism a real
movement that destroys the present state ” [117] .
Thus, the "German ideology" represents a significant step forward in the development of the
philosophical views of Marx and Engels. Here they spread materialism to the knowledge of society,
finish building materialism to the top, reveal the basic laws of social development and
thereby finally formulate dialectical materialism as a world view and method of the proletariat.
Before turning to a more detailed examination of dialectical materialism, let us dwell on those
views that distort the actual course of development of Marx’s philosophical views.
Plekhanov’s point of view is widespread and nevertheless fundamentally distorting the actual
process of the formation of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels . In his article “The
philosophical evolution of Marx,” Plekhanov states that “the whole of them (Marx and Engels) presents
three stages: the first stage is abstract Hegelian self-consciousness, the second stage is Feuerbach’s
concrete-abstract person and the last stage is real people living in real class society, in a certain socio-
economic environment. " From Hegelianism through anti-Hegelianism to the synthesis of Feuerbach's
materialism and Hegelianism on a new basis - to Marxism in the proper sense.
The fundamental defect of this point of view is that the philosophical development of Marx is
considered purely logical , as a simple development of ideas, regardless of class struggle, of the level
of development of science. We also showed that Marx and Engels created dialectical materialism in the
fight against Hegel and Feuerbachianism. Plekhanov did not understand that the philosophical
development of Marx was always subordinated to the tasks of the revolutionary struggle, that in the
revolutionary struggle Marx quickly understood the shortcomings of the Hegelian and Feuerbach
weapons.
Both the mechanists and the Menshevist idealists are adjacent to the Plekhanov scheme of Marx’s
philosophical development. , though significantly worsening it, bringing it to the point of
absurdity. Thus, in his book “Marx as a Philosopher” L. Axelrod writes: “In particular, Hegel’s disciple -
Feuerbach, who passed through his teacher’s system and learned the dialectical method of thinking,
spoke against idealism in general and Hegel’s idealism. Feuerbach with amazing skill took advantage
of the dialectical weapon with which he destroyed idealistic constructions. And where he graduated
from Feuerbach, Marx just started there. Marx fully shared the Feuerbach critique of idealism ... In
short, Marx created a higher synthesis, expressed in the combination of Hegel's dialectical method
with the materialistic basis of Feuerbach's knowledge. ” In essence, Axelrod here only more vulgarly
repeats Plekhanov, posing as a combination of Feuerbachianism and Hegelianism for dialectical
materialism.
Menshevist idealists entirely agree with the mechanists on the emergence of dialectical
materialism. They regard Marx’s dialectic as Hegel’s dialectic, corrected by Feuerbach’s materialism,
as a synthesis of Hegel’s dialectics and Feuerbach’s materialism (Deborinus).
What is the social meaning of these perversions of the history of the emergence of dialectical
materialism? All these perversions converge on one common statement for them: dialectical
materialism is the union of Feuerbach's materialism and Hegel's dialectic. But to assert this is to try
to dissolve the philosophy of the proletariat in the bourgeois worldview . Dialectical materialism is a
continuation and at the same time the complete opposite of all forms of bourgeois philosophy. The
path of its development is a struggle against all the philosophical theories of the bourgeoisie,
including, first and foremost, the idealistic dialectic of Hegel and the contemplative materialism of
Feuerbach.
One cannot be a dialectician "in general", but only either idealistic or materialistic dialectician. The
Menshevist idealists are among the first, the Marxist-Leninists represent the second. Mechanists do
not belong to either one or the other, and they are not dialectics at all .
We are the " materialistic friends of Hegelian dialectics." We do not reject this dialectic, but process
it and develop it as a materialistic dialectic. Although "a lot of mysticism and empty pedantry in
Hegel ... but the basic idea is ingenious: the world-wide, comprehensive, lively connection of
everything with everything and the reflection of this connection - materially put on Hegel's head - in
terms of man, which should also be chipped, broken off, flexible, mobile, relative, interrelated, united
in opposites, in order to embrace the world ” [118] . Marxism put Hegel's dialectic from "head to foot";
he extracted "a rational core from under its mystical shell." We are the dialectical materialist enemies
of Hegelian idealism.. We overcome the false, idealistic, mystical, theological dialectic of
Hegel. Ridding the dialectic of idealistic captivity, materialism acquires in it a natural ally and an
accomplice. Dialectics is by no means an accidental companion of materialism. Sequential materialism
is necessarily dialectical, as well as the only consistent dialectic - materialistic .
Chapter 3. Dialectical Materialism
3.1. Materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science
Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the new social class, on which history has entrusted the
great task of destroying classes. In dialectical materialism, the working class finds the spiritual
weapon of its struggle and its liberation, the philosophical basis of its views, which testifies to its
transformation from the class “in itself” to the class “for itself”. Dialectical materialism is a worldview
that can be properly and completely mastered only if one approaches the knowledge of the world from
the class positions of the proletariat and its party. It is these positions that are such that from them
the reality is cognized truly objectively. For only the philosophy of Marxism represents such a system
of views in which the highest and strict scientific character is combined with consistent and
irreconcilable proletarian revolutionism.
 The philosophy of Marxism is the historical result , the conclusion, the result of the entire previous
development of science and philosophy. But Marxism is not just mechanically combining previous
teachings, it is by no means (as the Menshevist idealists believe) a simple mechanical synthesis
of previous theories, but their critical processing . It is a new holistic philosophical doctrine, based on
the findings of the study of nature, history and practice of the class struggle.
Modern materialism is not a mere heir to the preceding philosophies; he was born and grew up in
the struggle against the previously dominant philosophy, in the struggle for the liberation of science
from idealism and mysticism that erode it. Marxism not only inherited what was fruitful in the
teachings of Hegel - the highest product of idealism, but also overcame the idealism of this doctrine,
reworked its dialectics materialistically. He not only appeared as a continuation of the whole previous
development of materialism and its completion, but also becomes an opponent of its limitations, an
opponent of mechanical, contemplative materialism. The philosophy of the proletariat inherits the
scientific results of the previous civilization and subject them to revolutionary processing.
Dialectical materialism as a philosophy of Marxism is also a method of knowing the world around
us and revolutionary action. Dialectical materialism is a unity of worldview and method. Just on this
issue, there are often wrong views that pervert Marxism. Representatives of the idealistic revision of
Marxism saw the whole being of dialectical materialism in that it is a “method”. Putting the question in
this way, they separated the method from the general philosophical world outlook , separated the
dialectic from materialism. The mechanistic point of view, which sees in the philosophy of
Marxism only general philosophical outlook, moreover, identical with the conclusions of mechanical
natural science, without understanding that our philosophy is not just materialism,
but dialecticalmaterialism.
Marx and Engels developed very deep thoughts on the question of the philosophy of Marxism and
its subject, unlike all previous philosophy, in their early works. So in “German Ideology” they wrote on
the question of philosophy: “Thus, where speculation stops, that is, at the threshold of real life, real
positive science begins, an image of practical activity, a practical process of human
development. Phrases about consciousness disappear, real knowledge should take their place. When
they begin to depict reality, their own philosophy loses its raison d'être (meaning) . In its place, at
best, the summation of the most general results , abstracted from consideration of the historical
development of people, may become ” [119] .
Marx and Engels directing the point of their teaching against the separation of philosophy from
reality and its transformation into some independent entity, the need for philosophy, which grows on
the basis of analysis of real life, real relationships, with particular force. They emphasize that
with such an understanding of philosophy, independent philosophy loses all meaning , that is,
philosophy that has only logical ideas and their self-generation as its subject. Thus, a positive
definition of the role and tasks of philosophy is given here, which gets a detailed development in the
subsequent works of Marx and Engels and in the works of Lenin. We are referring to the indication
that the task of philosophy should be the summation of general results.who abstract from
consideration and study of the historical development of people. Vulgarizers and perverters of Marxism
in general and Marxist philosophy in particular, who deny the right of philosophical science to exist, try
to refer to Engels' statements on this issue in the Anti-Dühring. In Engels it says: modern
“materialism is essentially dialectical and makes any philosophy unnecessarily pretending to become
higher than other sciences. When the requirement to find out its place in the general system of things
and knowledge is applied to each individual science, any particular science about this common
connection becomes superfluous ” [120] .
First of all, Engels emphasizes here that the philosophy of Marxism is not just materialism, but
dialectical materialism. Secondly, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, each science
requires an understanding of its place in the general process of our knowledge of the objective world
— given this position in philosophy, which is above other sciences, which is like a “science of sciences”
and inventing general connections without analyzing genuine material science, there is no
need. Such “Philosophy” in this old form of it disappears. However, there remains a need for a
philosophical science that has real content - in philosophy as a science about the laws of the
development of human thinking, reflecting the laws of the development of nature and human
society. That is why, speaking of dialectical materialism, Engels wrote: "Philosophy is thus" withdrawn,
"that is," buried, "" simultaneously destroyed and preserved. " Destroyed formally, preserved in its
actual content " [121] .
Thus we see that all sorts of opportunists and revisionists who deny Marxist philosophy distort the
views of Marx, Engels, Lenin. What, then, did the founders of Marxism-Leninism understand by
materialist dialectics as philosophical science?
 Marx, Engels, Lenin under the materialist dialectic understand the doctrine of development . Engels
in his works calls the dialectic the doctrine "of the universal laws of motion and development of
nature, human society and thinking" [122] . Lenin, like Marx and Engels, sees in dialectics "the most
comprehensive, rich in content and profound teaching on development" [123] . For Lenin, as well as for
the founders of Marxism, a different formulation of the principle of development is limited, empty and
"crippling the actual course of development ... in nature and in society" [124]. Dialectics is the most
profound and comprehensive study of development, because it most fully and comprehensively
reflects the leapfrog and contradictory nature of the processes of change in nature and society.
From philosophy, according to Engels, "there remains the doctrine of the laws of thinking, logic and
dialectics." But the laws of our thinking reflect the laws of the development of nature and society.
“Over all of our theoretical thinking,” says Engels, “the fact that our subjective thinking and the
objective world are subject to the same laws and that they cannot contradict each other in their final
results, dominates with absolute force , but must agree between by myself. This fact is an
unconscious and unconditional premise of our theoretical thinking " [125] . The very laws of thinking,
according to which our knowledge develops, reflect the development of nature and the history of
human society. Therefore, outside the nature and history of the laws of dialectics have no
meaning. The laws of thinking themselves are correct only because they reflect the development of
nature and history. "The so-called objective the dialectic, wrote Engels, reigns in all of nature, and the
so-called subjective dialectic, dialectical thinking , is only a reflection of the movement that dominates
the whole nature of movement by opposites, which determine the life of nature with their constant
contradictions and forms ” [126] .
Subjective dialectics, being a reflection in the consciousness of the development of the objective
world, is a method of thinking, as well as a method of practical activity of people, aimed both at
nature and at society. She, according to Engels, is the most correct form of thinking, “for it alone
represents an analogue and, therefore, an explanation method for development processes taking place
in nature, for nature’s universal connections, for transitions from one field of research to
another” [127] .
3.2. The materiality of the world and the form of existence of matter
Continuing and developing further the materialist line in philosophy, Marxism solves the
fundamental question of philosophy about the relationship between being and thinking, consistently
materialistically emphasizing the materiality of the world and the dependence of consciousness on
being. “The unity of the world lies in its materiality, and it is proved ... by the long and slow
development of philosophy and science” [128] .
The recognition of the primacy of being, the nature ‚of an object implies its independent
existence . Indeed, the first condition for belonging to materialism is the recognition of the existence
of the external world, of objective reality, outside and regardless of anyone's consciousness . The
object is not something secondary in relation to the subject, it is independent, primary. We have
already seen when familiarizing ourselves with subjective idealism, to what abyss of absurdities the
rejection of this principle leads to.
The proof of the existence of the objective world is the social practice of man, carried out in the
historical development of human society. Human activity and our very existence indisputably and
irrefutably prove the reality of the external world and its independence from the subject. The fact that
a person must daily, every hour, every minute encounter with the outside world, which he perceives
through the medium of his senses; the fact that the world is opposed to man as a disobedient, often
hostile force, which requires a tough, bitter struggle; the circumstance finally that a person not
only must overcome external obstacles, but also be able to to overcome them is the best proof of the
existence of an external world independent of consciousness.
The recognition of the material world, the dependence of consciousness on being, the primacy of
matter is the cornerstone of Marxist philosophy. But what ismatter ? To clarify this issue should clearly
distinguish between the philosophical and natural science concept of matter . These are not two
contradictory concepts, but the definition of matter in two different ways. The philosophical concept of
matter characterizes it in relation to cognition, to thinking, to the subject. Under the philosophical
concept of matter, it goes without saying that “acting on our senses produces a sensation; matter
is objective reality given to us in sensation. ” [129]. Matter - that which exists outside and independently
of our consciousness, causes our sensations and is reflected in them. The natural scientific concept of
matter has in mind the question of what this objective world is from the point of view of the level of
physical knowledge that is contemporary to us. If the philosophical concept of matter is inextricably
linked to the resolution of the question of the relationship between being and cognition, subject and
object , then the natural science concept of matter has in mind the structure of matter , the
characteristic of this physical structure, and this characteristic changes with the development of our
knowledge in various historical eras.
Matter is the whole world existing independently of us. The concept of matter is the most general
concept. All that is is different types of matter, but matter itself cannot be defined as a particular case
of some kind. For the same reason, it is not possible to indicate the species difference of matter. We
distinguish matter from consciousness, oppose them to one another, but this opposition is conditional
and makes sense only within the “gnoseological” formulation of the question , since we find its
particular property in matter itself as a property of highly organized matter — consciousness. The
juxtaposition of knowledge there being opposition cognizing matter knowable matter, but no more. A
completely legitimate and correct opposition of the subject to the object loses its meaning beyond the
limits of the theory of knowledge. If we began to oppose matter to the spirit from a natural-scientific
point of view, this would mean a betrayal of materialistic monism, a transition to a dualistic
position. There is only matter and its manifestations. The subject is also material. The knowing man
himself is one of the manifestations of matter.
In view of the universality and uniqueness of matter, to give its full definition is to list all its
properties and manifestations, that is, everything that exists in nature. That is why the natural-
scientific concept of matter can always be only a relative truth , since its exhaustive definition implies
the completion of the absolute cognition of nature, the exhaustion of its tasks by science. As physics
and chemistry progress, the natural science concept of matter is refined. It is absurd to demand from
philosophy what constitutes the striving and the task of the whole development of the natural
sciences.
Classical mechanics, physics and other sciences, speaking of matter, had in mind such properties
as mass, inertia, impermeability, gravity, etc. These properties of matter were considered as its
absolute, unchanging and original properties. This understanding was due in part to the level of
development of natural science itself.
Until the 20th century among naturalists dominated the views according to which the atom is the
last degree of divisibility of matter: the atom is further indecomposable. But at the beginning of our
century, in connection with the advances of physics, together with the discovery of the fact that the
atom will also decompose, that electrons are a further step in the divisibility of matter, it became clear
that the old atomic theory of the structure of matter is already insufficient, that it must be
supplemented and developed electronic theory. When the further development of physics at the end of
the XIX century radically changed the views of physicists and matter lost those properties that were
previously considered the main features of matter, a crisis broke out in physics: some physicists took
the position of idealism.
For bourgeois philosophers and naturalists, the discovery of the electronic structure of matter was
the reason for concluding that “matter disappeared”. Lenin, whose philosophical views were invariably
associated with the recognition that matter does not arise and does not disappear, that matter is an
objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness , came to a different conclusion. ““
Matter disappears, ”writes Lenin,“ it means that limit, to which we knew matter until now, disappears,
our knowledge goes deeper ; such properties of matter that previously seemed absolute, unchanging,
original (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) disappear and which are now found to be relative,
inherent only in certain states of matter ”[130] .
Philosophical materialism believes that "the only " property "of matter, with the recognition of
which philosophical materialism is associated, is the property of being an objective reality , existing
outside our consciousness" [131] , while physics and the natural sciences in general associate, as
already mentioned, the recognition of matter with recognition of a number of its physical and other
properties. Equally limited, he understood matter and metaphysical materialism of the 18th and 19th
centuries (French materialists, Büchner, Focht, Molleshot, etc.), associating its recognition with a
number of mechanical properties. Our mechanists did not get rid of such a metaphysical
understanding of matter (A. Timiryazev and others).
This of course does not mean that dialectical materialism rejects certain physical properties of
matter. He recognizes them. But he does not associate the recognition of matter with the recognition
that it must necessarily be weighty, have mechanical mass, etc., etc. He considers these properties to
be inherent only in certain states of matter, only in certain forms of material movement, and matter
itself determines as an objective reality that exists outside of our consciousness.
The difference between the philosophical and the natural science concept of matter consists in the
fact that the former is firmly and inextricably linked with "philosophical materialism", with dialectical
materialism. Natural-scientific views on matter have repeatedly changed, are changing and will
change in the process of developing specific knowledge about the structure of matter, etc.
 This position is confirmed by the entire history of the development of philosophy and science. As
Lenin correctly emphasizes, philosophical materialism has always been associated with the recognition
of matter as an objective reality that exists outside of our consciousness, while the ideas about the
structure of matter, about those specific forms and types in which matter can exist, have changed
many times depending on the level development of productive forces and directly from the level of
development of natural science and technology.
With the progress of knowledge, materialism changes its form , deepens and improves its
understanding of matter, coming closer and closer to its all-round cognition. The philosophical
formula, which speaks of the materiality of the world, its objective reality and its primacy in relation to
consciousness, remains unchanged. No matter how our views change on quality, on the structure of
objective reality, recognition of the existence of objective reality does not depend on this.
Another such fundamental fundamental position of dialectical materialism is Engels’s position
that “matter without motion is as unthinkable as motion without matter” [132] , that “motion is a form
of existence of matter” [133] , “mode of existence of matter”, “ intrinsic attribute of matter. " Lenin
expressed the same thing, but in a new way, in connection with his special formulation of the question
of matter and the further development of natural science: “To say: the world is moving matter or: the
world is a material movement, this does not change” [134]. Thus, Lenin believes that by materially
defining the world around us, we can say that he is a movement of objective reality, moving matter or
a material movement. Each of these definitions expresses the same thing.
These provisions of Marxism-Leninism are directed against:
1) assumptions of absolutely motionless matter or of any absolute rest, at least for a part of
objective reality,
2) attempts to think of motion without matter,
3) a simplified view of the movement of matter.
Matter is moving matter. There is no matter without motion, and there is no motion without
matter. Matter has not acquired this movement from the outside, by any external force. It was
originally mobile and was always moving matter. Movement is a universal, integral form of its
existence.. The question of "thanks to which" matter began to move is a ridiculous question. First of
all, this question assumes that something supernatural exists or existed, something other than matter
that drives this last one, that is, the material unity of the world, the universality of matter, the
uniqueness of material reality is rejected. Secondly, it is assumed here that the matter was in absolute
rest until the moment of impact. Thirdly, matter is understood in this question as a dead, lifeless
abstraction, and not as a concrete, amateur, self-moving matter, as it really is. Finally, the movement
itself is understood purely mechanically, as a result of an external impetus acting on the body, and not
as an internally necessary self-movement of matter. Modern physics, which has deeply penetrated into
the atomic depths of the atom, has discovered in it a complex,
Absolute rest assumption as such a state in which matter was originally located or may even be in
general, characteristic of metaphysical systems in philosophy and for the so-called metaphysical
period in natural science. In the new philosophy, for example, Descartes considered matter as a
dense, solid and absolutely resting body, "which could have taken place before God set it in
motion." Spinoza considered peace to be as necessary a mode as movement. Newton began his
mechanics with the laws in which peace was considered as the most normal state of matter, and
motion - as a consequence of some external "forces". On this basis, he recognized the need for a “first
shock” from the side of the deity. The need for a first push is shared by almost all metaphysicians. The
recognition of the primary impulse is the logical end and the beginning of all mechanical systems.
During the 16th – 17th centuries, the whole worldview characteristic of the natural science of this
period developed. According to the views of this worldview, "nature remains always the same." The
stars are resting, forever motionless in their places. In nature, there is no development at all. In the
18th century French materialism, all the main features of this metaphysical view were manifested.
Dialectical materialism does not recognize absolute rest. But of course he recognizes relative
peace , relative equilibrium as one of the moments of movement, as a special case of
movement. Dialectical materialism recognizes that "the possibility of relative rest of bodies, the
possibility of temporary equilibrium states is an essential condition for the differentiation of matter,
and therefore of life" [135] .
Attempts to think of motion without matter , force without the substance underlying it, are the
beginning and the main essence of philosophical idealism and clericalism. The movement is detached
from matter, from nature, turns into a thought and is deified. Lenin writes: “An attempt to think of
a movement without matter drags a thought that is cut off from matter, and this is philosophical
idealism” [136] .
 An attempt to think of a movement without matter is characteristic of idealistic physicists and
positivists and, in general, naturalists who hold idealistic positions, which Dietzgen also called
“diplomaed lackeys of priesthood”. Lenin paid great attention to the struggle against these attempts,
speaking against the idealists Pearson, Mach, Avenarius, against the Russian Machists — Bogdanov
and others, who dragged this same trend in philosophy, against similar mistakes made by the Ostwald
energetics, etc.
Among the part of modern physicists we observe the continuation of the same idealistic
tendencies. Many, in connection with the data of Einstein's theory of relativity, tend to depict motion
without matter (for example, Frenkel). We also find peculiar attempts to detach movement from
matter from Menshevist idealists. Tymyansky, for example, writes that the movement "is subordinated
to itself, embraces itself, moves itself " (our emphasis) and that "this concept: the movement of
movement ... is not alien to us." As we see, here the separation of motion from matter is presented in
a very subtle form: instead of material motion, there is a moving motion. What is the difference
between Menshevist idealists and those idealist physicists about whom Lenin wrote that they are
asking what is moving - rejected as ridiculous and consider - “moves and is basta” [137] . Essentially no.
Dialectical materialism believes that there can be no movement without matter as well as matter
without movement .
Dialectical materialism also does not allow a simplified view of motion, that is, the reduction of the
entire motion to one of the forms, for example, to mechanical motion. Such a simplified view is
characteristic of any mechanical world outlook in general, and in particular for modern Soviet
mechanists (A. Timiryazev, Tseitlin, etc.). A simplified view of motion, an understanding of motion as
soon as displacement, necessarily leads to the recognition of equilibrium as the only possible way of
existence of matter, and rest as a preferential state. In the end, it leads as the necessary logical
conclusion to the “first push” ...
Dialectical materialism believes that “the movement of matter is not reduced to only rough
mechanical movement, to simple movement; the motion of matter is also heat and light, electrical and
magnetic stress, chemical combination and decomposition, life and finally consciousness ” [138] . Non-
recognition of this, says Engels, leads to the negation of the law of conservation of energy. A view of
motion as the movement of unchanged bodies, the rejection of the study of qualitative differences in
the forms of motion is incompatible with the Leninist notion that the whole world is a material motion
in qualitatively different forms.
Speaking about the material movement, you must always keep in mind its specific forms. The
movement “in general”, matter as such (“in general”) - there is no such movement, there is no such
matter. We know only the various forms of matter and its movement. “Words, like matter and motion,
are simplyabbreviations in which we embrace, according to their common properties, various sense-
perceptible things” [139] .
But moving matter exists in space and time ; the motion of matter already assumes these forms of
existence of matter. Space and time are inseparable from the movement of matter. Space and time is
not something different from matter, independent of it. The expression “matter exists in space” does
not mean that there is some non-material, empty space filled with matter, something in which matter
is placed. It means that the matter itself is spatial and extended, that the material world is a world in
which inherent length. Space, like time, is neither an independent, intangible, nor a subjective form of
our sensuality. They are the essence of the form of material existence, the form of existence of matter
itself.. They are objective and do not exist outside of matter, just as matter does not exist outside of
them.
Together with Marx and Engels, Lenin defines space and time as forms of being of matter, forms of
its existence, independent of our consciousness. He's writing:
“While recognizing the existence of objective reality, that is, moving matter, regardless of our
consciousness, materialism must inevitably recognize also the objective reality of time and
space” [140] . Engels speaks about the same thing in the Anti-Dühring:
“The main forms of all being are space and time; and being out of time is just as nonsense as
being out of space ” [141] .
A look at time and space as a form of being is a consistent view of philosophical
materialism. Understanding of time and space by dialectical materialism is fundamentally the
opposite:
1) understanding of time and space by Kant and Kantianism, who, standing on the point of view of
subjective idealism, consider “time and space not an objective reality, but forms of human
contemplation ” [142] ;
 2) understanding of time and space by Hegelians, who believe that “the developing concepts of
time and space approach the absolute idea of both” [143] ;
3) it is also opposite to the understanding of time and space by Machism, which considers them to
be a “kind of sensations”, means of “harmonizing experience”, etc., etc.
All these trends do not recognize that the concepts of space and time reflect in their development
the forms of existence of matter.
Kantianism transforms space and time into properties of the perceiving subject. Machism interprets
space and time as purely auxiliary logical constructions, with the help of which we obtain a biologically
expedient orientation, order the chaos of our sensations and which can be eliminated in order to
describe the experience more economically. Hegelian idealism asserts that space appears only at a
certain stage in the development of an idea in the phase of its other being, in the form of
nature . Time is included in the Hegelian system even later - at the stage of development of the spirit.
All these idealistic quirks are rejected and refuted by dialectical materialism.
Concerning the Machist interpretation of space and time, Lenin wrote:
“If the sensations of time and space can give a person a biologically expedient orientation, then it
is only under the condition that these sensations reflectobjective reality outside a person: a person
could not biologically adapt to the environment if his sensations did not give him an objectively correct
idea of it " [144] .
The denial of the objective reality of time and space inevitably leads to clericalism and religion.
But not only idealistic distortions have to fight Marxism in this matter. We have to overcome the
outdated, mechanistic understanding of the issue , which was refuted in the process of the
development of natural science . As the natural science concept of matter was perfected, the
unacceptability of the metaphysicalunderstanding of space as an absolutely homogeneous container of
matter became clear . In particular, Newton considered space as independent of time, as a kind of
fixed frame, only containing matter in itself.
In contrast to metaphysical materialism and mechanists, dialectical materialism emphasizes the
development of our ideas about time and space.
“There is nothing in the world except moving matter, and moving matter can move only in space
and time,” Lenin says. - Human ideas about space and time are relative , but absolute truth is formed
from these relative concepts, these relative ideas, developing, follow the line of absolute truth ,
approach it. The variability of human ideas about space and time just as little disproves the objective
reality of both, as the variability of scientific knowledge about the structure and forms of motion of
matter does not refute the objective reality of the external world ” [145] .
Considering that our ideas about time and space should remain unchanged, as our mechanists
believe, to slip into the question of time and space to Descartes’s metaphysical concepts [146] or to the
mechanistic ideas of the Faraday school physicists, as A. Timiryazev does: mix the ether as one of the
forms of material movement with space, that is, the objectively real form of being, it means taking the
position of metaphysical materialism - the position of denying movement and development.
Dialectical materialism also fights against Menshevist idealism, which considers "matter as a
synthesis of space and time" [147] , which thus reduces the objective reality of matter to the forms of
its being, essentially becoming the position of Hegelianism.
The newest natural science has brilliantly confirmed the dialectical-materialist understanding of
space and time. The modern scientific concept of space associated with the name of Einstein
immutably establishes its materiality, the unity of space and time, the relativity of our ideas about
space and time. In this question, as in many others, the progress of natural science confirms
dialectically materialistic concepts.
3.3. Matter and consciousness. Dialectically-materialist theory of reflection
According to the views of dialectical materialism, consciousness, psyche, thinking is not some kind
of independent, second principle, located in external interaction with matter or existing parallel to
it. Consciousness is dependent on matter, is derivative with respect to it. Consciousness is inherent
only in a certain way organized matter. Only those higher representatives of the organic world who
are endowed with a nervous system of greater or lesser complexity possess consciousness. The
nervous system is a prerequisite for conscious activity. Consciousness is a property of certain
organized physical beings. A public person in all his materiality, in all his physical and social
concreteness, is the carrier of the highest forms of consciousness that develop as a result of human
labor and social activity of a person. Consciousness is one of the manifestations of the life of matter at
a certain stage of its development.
According to materialistic doctrine in full accordance with the irrefutable data of modern science,
there is not and cannot be a consciousness where there is no matter, and moreover, matter organized
in a special, definite way. Consciousness is nothing more than a special property of a certain type of
matter , very complex in its structure, which arose at a high level of the evolution of nature.
The stone can be moved, its position can be changed, but the stone, like the entire inorganic
world, as well as the plant world and the lower forms of animals, has no inherent ability to perceive
the processes that occur to them; they are unconscious. Only a certain way organized matter - the
substance of the higher nervous system of animals has the ability to perceive internally
reflect aware occurring on and off processes, ie to express these to be an objective study of the
processes occurring in the nervous system.. Special the way they flow for the sentient and thinking
being. The objective physiological processes in our nerve centers are accompanied by their internal
subjective expression in the form of consciousness. What is objective in itself, that there is some
material process, then for a creature endowed with a brain, there is at the same time a subjective,
mental act. Consciousness itself also has a long history of development. If the lower levels of animal
consciousness (instincts) are associated with the development of the nervous system in higher
animals, then the further development of consciousness is associated with the transition from animal
to human, with the development of social labor, which creates the conditions for the development of
the human brain.
Vulgar materialism believes that thought or desire is something material, secreted by the brain,
just as bile is secreted by the liver. Such a view completely distorts our views on this issue. Thoughts,
feelings, volitional act - is not something that can be measured, weighed, moved. Just as roundness is
not inherent in gravity, but both are different properties of the same body, so stretching and
consciousness are different properties of matter. The views of the materialists of antiquity, based on
the fact that man is inherent in the soul, consisting of the finest matter, of round, smooth and moving
fire-like atoms, refer to the infant period of science. We are very far from such an understanding of
the psyche. Sensation and consciousness is the internal state of moving matter, there isspecial
property to reflect the physiological process taking place in it, - inseparable from the objective
nervous process, but not identical to it. But we are no less far from recognizing thinking as a special
spiritual substance, as idealists want it to be.
There is no spirit, a special thinking substance, but there is a thinking matter , a brain. Conscious,
thinking matter is a specific, qualitatively peculiar matter, receiving its highest development along
with the development of language in human social life. We do not identify higher and lower types of
material organization, do not deny the consciousness and specificity of thinking beings. But we explain
them as forms and the historical product of the development of matter.. Emphasizing the dependence
of consciousness on the development of material production and the connection of consciousness with
the development of human speech, Marx and Engels wrote in their early work: consciousness "is not in
advance, as a 'pure' consciousness. In the "spirit" in advance the curse of "burdening" with its matter,
which acts here ... in the form of language ... Language, like consciousness, arises from the need to
communicate with other people.My attitude to my environment is my consciousness. Where there is a
relationship, it exists for me ” [148] . Consciousness is a historical product, inextricably linked with the
development of social production.
The dialectical-materialistic solution of the problem of consciousness (the so-called psychophysical
problem) is fundamentally different from the pseudo-Marxist theories of mechanists and Menshevist
idealists. Mechanists , connecting with some left-bourgeois trends in psychology — with the
reflexological school and the American school of biovihierism (the study of behavior),
essentially eliminate consciousness altogether. . They reduce consciousness to a physico-chemical,
physiological process. The study of the behavior of higher beings for them is fully and completely
exhausted by its objective physiological and biological study. Mechanists do not understand the
qualitative originality of thinking, conscious beings, they do not see in the mind the product of human
social practice. They replace concrete-historical unity of object and subject with their identity, one-
sided, mechanistic objectivism. This mechanistic position received a particularly vivid expression in the
so-called “enmenmenism”. Enchmen in his book “The Theory of New Biology” identified consciousness
with the physiological process, thereby eliminating essentially the main question of philosophy - about
the relation of thinking and being.
The position of Menshevist idealists on this issue is also incorrect. Deborin and others are trying to
replace the Marxist doctrine of consciousness with conciliatory theory, trying to reconcile materialism
with idealism. They are supporters of "synthesis", a combination of objectivism and subjectivism. To
the dialectical principle (neither mechanistic objectivism, nor idealistic subjectivism), Menshevist
idealism opposes the block of objectivism with subjectivism, mutual assistance of both methods — one
that studies only the physiological process, and the other that studies consciousness as a kind of
independent entity.
 Plekhanov’s errors in the problem under consideration should be noted. Not seeing that the
consciousness inherent in matter develops only at a certain historical level, Plekhanov arrives at
" hylozoism ", the doctrine of the universal animation of matter, that all matter has consciousness to
varying degrees . With all the sharpness, this is expressed in his aphorism: " And the stone
thinks ." For Plekhanov, consciousness did not arise in the development of matter, but was originally
inherent in all matter. The difference between the consciousness of man, the lower organism and the
stone is only to the extent. In this understanding of Plekhanov, the insufficiently deep assimilation and
realization of the materialist dialectics, the lack of understanding of the qualitative originality of the
thinking matter affects it.
In order to be a consistent materialist, it is not enough to recognize the primacy of matter, it is
necessary to recognize its knowability.. Materialistic dialectics makes it possible to correctly solve the
complex problem of knowability, over which the preceding philosophy was powerless. On the question
of the possibility of knowing the objective world, dialectical materialism takes a position that is
different from both agnosticism and the naive realism of the Machists. Above, we became acquainted
with the agnostic views of Hume and Kant, who sever the knowing subject from the object, consider it
impossible to go beyond the limits of the subject, see an impassable gulf between "things in
themselves" and ideas. The naive "realism" of the Machists, as we know, identifies objects with
sensations. He is convinced that the world is identical with our direct perceptions. The truth, in his
opinion, is given in finished form already in sensations. At the same time, the Machists not only do not
see in our sensations the products of the impact of the external world,
In the question of the knowability of the external world, dialectical materialism is based on a
consistently carried out materialist-dialectical theory of reflection. Consistently carried out by Marx
and Engels and received the further development and development of Lenin, the theory of reflection is
the "soul", the heart of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. It gives an affirmative answer to the
question of the knowability of objective reality. According to this teaching, our ideas and concepts are
not only caused by objective things, but also reflect them. Representations and concepts are not the
product of the subject’s self-development (as idealists say), not hieroglyphs (as agnostics think),
but their reflection, pictures, copies. Objective truth exists independently of the subject, although it is
not reflected in our perceptions and concepts immediately, in finished form. But the human
consciousness is able to reflect, to know this truth in the process of knowledge . The process of
knowledge is a complex process in which the still unknown “things in themselves”, reflected in our
sensations, ideas, concepts, thereby become “things for us”. Sensation and thinking do not block us
from the outside world, as Kant believed, but connect us with it, representing a reflection of the
objective external world. The ideal — our ideas and concepts — is nothing more than “material
material translated and processed in the human head” [149] . The material world in the movement of
knowledge is getting closer, more precisely, multifaceted and more deeply reflected in our knowledge.
There are no limits to our ability to know the world, but each time there are historically given limits
to our approach to absolute truth. The attainment of truth is accomplished in the historical movement
of human knowledge. "From the standpoint of modern materialism, ie. E. Marxism, historically
conditional limits of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth, but of course the
existence of the truth, of course that we are approaching it. The contours of the picture are historically
conditional, but it is certain that this picture depicts an objectively existing model ” [150] .
The theory of reflection, which received great development in the works of Lenin, is not however a
new principle in the philosophy of Marxism, introduced or established by Lenin. Marx and Engels were
entirely at the point of view of the dialectical materialist theory of reflection.
It is expressed in the following: Lenin regards knowledge as a reflection , but he understands this
reflection as a contradictory dialectical process . “The reflection of nature in human thought,” he
wrote, “must be understood not“ dead ”, not“ abstract ”, not without movement, not without
contradictions , but in the eternal process of movement, the appearance of contradictions and their
resolution” [151] .
Lenin pointed out that the process of reflection must be understood not in the narrowly empirical
sense of the word, in the sense of direct reflection in our sensations, as many tried to interpret Lenin,
as representatives of mechanism and Menshevist idealism wrote about it. The process of reflection is
not limited to sensations, ideas. The reflection of the objective world in our cognitive process is also
given in thoughts, in abstract concepts. On this occasion, Lenin says: “Knowledge is a reflection of
nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate , not a complete reflection, but a process of
a number of abstractions, formulation, formation of concepts, laws, etc. " [152] .
At the same time, Lenin pointed out - and in this paragraph they give an extremely clear
description of the dialectical materialist understanding of the relationship between the empirical and
rational moment in cognition - that the process of cognition and its movement from sensation to
thought are performed in steps. Many philosophers do not understand the leap that occurs in the
movement of knowledge from sensation to thought, from notion to notion. Understanding this
transition as an abrupt transition, as a transition as a result of contradictions, understanding the unity
of sensations and thinking as a dialectical unity - these are extremely important moments
characterizing the essence of the Leninist theory of reflection.
In fact, what is the limitation of sensationalistic empiricism? In that they dug a gulf between
sensation and concept . What are the limitations of the rationalistic trends in philosophy, down to
Hegel? The fact that they have the concept of divorced from the sensation. Only dialectical
materialism, which treats knowledge as a process, gives a genuine solution to these problems. Lenin's
interpretation of this question gives us a powerful weapon for the defeat of all idealistic theories.
The naive realist does not fit historically to cognition; he does not understand how a cognitive act
is performed, what are the relationships between a subject, a concept, and a concept. Lenin,
developing the Marxist theory of knowledge, revealed the dialectical transition not only from matter to
consciousness, but also from sensation to thought . Sensation, perception, representation give
a direct reflection of the sensed object. Concept, idea, thought is not immediate: they are connected
with the object through the medium of sensation. Making the transition from a visual representation to
a concept, consciousness seems to recede, move away from the subject. The feeling, the idea seems
to be closer to reality than thinking. But thinking seizes the subject inoverall , in his movement and
communication. It penetrates deeper into the object, reflects its essence. Thus, not being direct, it is
nonetheless more perfect, it reflects the subject more deeply. Thinking takes us further away from the
subject, but only to bring us closer to it. Such is the dialectical unity of sensation and thinking in the
process of cognition.
The next moment, which is extremely important for understanding the theory of reflection and its
development, which Lenin gave, is the understanding of reflection itself. Reflection is an image, a
copy, a snapshot that gives a correct display of reality. However, this correct reflection of reality is
obtained in the process of development, in the process of social practice. At the same time, Lenin,
emphasizing this circumstance, directed this point and sharpened it against agnosticism, in whatever
form it might appear. Lenin says: if we had more sense organs, could we know more? And indicates
that no. Responding in this way, Lenin believed that we had sufficient means at our disposal to
correctly understand the objective world, that all agnostic theories that give rise to doubt and
skepticism with respect to our knowledge should be categorically rejected and exposed. However,
knowledge does not give us a complete, absolute picture, the progress of knowledge goes through
relative truths to absolute ones.
Finally, one more important point characterizing the Leninist theory of reflection is needed to pay
attention to the question of how Lenin understands sensationitself . It was around this point that a big
struggle was unfolding against Lenin even when his work “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism” was
published, from Axelrod-Orthodox. Both the mechanists and the Menshevist idealists also distorted the
essence of the Marxist-Leninist approach to the question of sensation.
Sensation, according to Lenin, is primarily the result of the influence of matter on our
senses. Sensation is the transformation of the energy of external stimulation into a fact of
consciousness, a subjective image of the objective world. In this connection, an extremely important
question arises, how does the feeling as an image, the feeling as a snapshot, the mapping to what is
displayed relate? In what sense can we talk about the similarity of the display with the displayed copy
of the original? In order to understand this point, let us analyze Lenin's extremely interesting
statements on the question of the relationship between color and light.
Color is the result of a physical object, i.e., a light wave, on our retina. Color, however, is not a
hieroglyph, a symbol in relation to light - an objective process affecting our retina. Color is not
something purely subjective, as some of the mechanists, in particular, Sarabyanov, Axelrod, and
others, tried to present. The subjective form, in the form of sensation, reflects the objective quality of
the light wave. Color is similar to the light effect causing it, as an objective process, butrelative .
Lenin wrote on this issue in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, criticizing mechanists and
Bogdanovists: one-sided “idealism and go to the point of view of“ one-sided ”materialism. If color is
a sensation only depending on the retina (as natural science makes you admit), then the rays of
light falling on the retina produce a sense of color.. It means that outside of us, regardless of us and
our consciousness, there is a movement of matter, say, a wave of ether of a certain length and a
certain speed, which, acting on the retina, produce in a person a feeling of a particular color. So it is
natural science and looks. It explains the different sensations of a particular color by different lengths
of light waves that exist outside the human retina, outside of a person and independently of him. This
is materialism: matter, acting on our senses, produces a sensation. Sensation depends on the brain,
nerves, retina, etc., i.e., from a certain organized matter. The existence of matter does not depend on
sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness is the highest product of a specially
organized matter ” [153] .
In another place, Lenin says: “Color is the result of the impact of a physical object on the retina =
sensation is the result of the action of matter on our senses” [154] .
Thus, we see that Lenin does not identify the sensation of color and the ray of light causing this
sensation. But without identifying color and light (and this can be said with respect to our other senses
and other types of our sensations), Lenin at the same time gives a truly materialistic, excluding all
elements of agnosticism, interpretation of this question.
The slightest deviation from the theory of reflection inevitably leads to idealism and agnosticism. In
so far as the philosopher departs from the theory of reflection, he becomes a Kantian, Machist,
Hegelian, and ceases to be a dialectical materialist. Plekhanov, and after him both mechanists and
Menshevist idealists, also made a number of essential deviations from the theory of reflection towards
the anti-Marxist theory of hieroglyphs.
In this most important question of the materialist dialectic, Plekhanov admitted “a departure from
the wording of materialism given by Engels,” taking thehieroglyphic point of view in matters of the
theory of knowledge. The hieroglyphic point of view was formulated by Plekhanov in 1892 in the notes
to “L. Engels Feuerbach. Agreeing with the thought of the Russian physiologist I. Sechenov, “whatever
the external objects are in themselves, regardless of our consciousness, let our impressions of them
be merely conventional signs, in any case, we feel the similarity and difference of signs corresponding
to the similarity and difference valid " [155]. Plekhanov wrote: “Our feelings are a kind of hieroglyphs,
bringing to our attention what is really happening. Hieroglyphs are not similar to the events that they
transmit ” [156] . Later, namely at the beginning of 1899, Plekhanov, developing his view, argued that
"it would be very strange if the feeling and the presentation that grew on its soil resembled the thing
that caused it and which itself is not, of course, neither sensation nor representation ” [157] . “The
forms and attitudes of things in themselves,” wrote Plekhanov, “cannot be as they seem to us , that
is, as they are to us, being“ translated ”in our head. Our ideas about the forms and relations of things
are no more than hieroglyphs., but these hieroglyphs precisely designate these forms and relations,
and this is enough so that we can study the actions of things in us in ourselves and in turn influence
them ” [158] . In 1905, Plekhanov, essentially continuing to share Sechenov’s views, on the question of
the relation of consciousness to reality, spoke out against his terminology, arguing that “if a thing in
itself has color only when it is looked at, smell” only when they smell it, and so on, then, by calling our
idea of it with conventional signs, we give reason to think that, in our opinion, its color, smell, etc.,
existing in our sensations, correspond to the color in itself, some smell in itself, etc., - in a word,
some feelings in yourselfwhich can not be the subject of our sensations. " Rejecting the term
“hieroglyph”, Plekhanov essentially continued, and afterwards, that our sensations and ideas were not
similar to the objects by which they were caused.. Menshevist idealists took Plekhanov's mistakes
under their protection, which testifies to the closeness of the connection between their views and
Plekhanov's views in the theory of knowledge. And modern mechanists also took the theory of
hieroglyphs of Plekhanov under their protection, opposing it to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of
the questions of the theory of knowledge. As far back as 1909, L. I. Axelrod, in his review of Lenin’s
book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, categorically denied the theory of reflection. “Rejecting the
theory of symbols and considering sensation as images or“ inaccurate ”copies of things,” she
slandered Lenin in this review, “Plekhanov’s critic turns to dualistic ground, preaching Platonism inside
out, and not a materialistic philosophy emanating from a single beginning. If sensations were images
or copies of thingsthen what the devil, one wonders, would we need things that in this case would
really turn out to be things in themselves in the absolute sense of the word. To recognize sensations
as images or copies of objects means to create an impassable dualistic gulf between the object and
the subject ” [159] . Axelrod cannot understand that the dualistic abyss is created not by the theory of
reflection, but just by the theory of hieroglyphs, for this theory recognizes the existence of things in
themselves and symbols unlike them, in the representation of man. Vividly spoke out in defense of the
theory of symbols against the theory of reflection of the Sarabyans. “The process of learning,” he
writes, “is not the process of taking a copy from an object, but is a process of finding
a correspondence between objective and subjective phenomena” [160] . Sarabyanov repeatedly stated
directly: “In my books I clearly develop the Plekhanov point of view ... I resolutely stood up and stand
on the point of view of Plekhanov.”
In "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," Lenin pointed out that in matters of the theory of
knowledge, Plekhanov "made a clear mistake in presenting materialism."
 What, according to Lenin, is Plekhanov's mistake, and why is the theory of hieroglyphs
untenable? Plekhanov’s mistake is that he is slipping into an agnostic attitude.that is, distrust of the
indication of our senses, and therefore distrust of the knowledge of the objective world. In fact, if our
sensations and ideas are not like objects displayed by them, but are hieroglyphs, symbols, then we
cannot be sure that our knowledge really corresponds to the objective world to which they belong. We
can not be sure of the truth of the information that gives us scientific knowledge about the objective
world. In short, the hieroglyphic theory of knowledge leads to a denial of the existence of the external
world, since signs or symbols are possible with respect to imaginary objects. In this sense, the theory
of hieroglyphs is close to Hume's skepticism and Kant's agnosticism. This is the inconsistency of the
theory of hieroglyphs or the theory of symbols.
Lenin in connection with the analysis of the error Plekhanov gave an exhaustive criticism of the
theory of symbols. “It is indisputable that never,” he wrote, “cannot fully align with the model, but an
image is one thing, a symbol is another thing, a conventional sign . The image is necessary and
inevitably implies an objective reality of what is "displayed." "Conventional sign", symbol, hieroglyph
are concepts that introduce a completely unnecessary element of agnosticism " [161]. The theory of
symbols, which Lenin opposed, was, before Plekhanov, proclaimed in one of the works of the famous
natural scientist Helmholtz. Helmholtz, from the limitations of our vision, deduced evidence that the
eye gives us false information about the properties of the objects we see. Lenin therefore
acknowledged the correct statement of A. Rau (German philosopher, a follower of L. Feuerbach) that
the theory of the symbols of Helmholtz pays tribute to Kantianism. It is remarkable that Lenin’s
criticism of the Helmholtz theory of symbols literally coincided with its criticism given for the first time
by Engels in The Dialectic of Nature, published only in 1925.
3.4. Objective, absolute, relative truth
Lenin, developing the materialist dialectic as a theory of knowledge, figuring out the essence of
reflection as a process, gave a brilliant description of the relationship between relative, objective and
absolute truth . Refuting relativism (Bogdanov and others), according to the views of which the
relativity of our knowledge makes objective absolute knowledge impossible, Lenin revealed the
dialectical interpenetration of absolute and relative truth. Lenin found out that relative knowledge is
not the metaphysical opposite of the knowledge of the absolute, but a step on the way to absolute
knowledge, that it does not exclude absolute knowledge, but in its movement it increasingly comes to
absolute knowledge. Hence the objectivity of our knowledge .
But what proves the objectivity of our knowledge, where is the guarantee of the correct reflection
of the existence of thinking? “The question is,” answers Marx, “whether objective truth is inherent in
human thinking is not at all a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, a person must
prove the truth, that is, reality and power, the true side of his thinking. The debate about the reality
and the invalidity of thinking, isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question ” [162] .
The question of the possibilities and limits of knowledge can be resolved only in the process
of knowledge itself, which is determined by social practice. Just as the best and only possible evidence
that a person is able to swim will be the very result — the practice of swimming will clarify the
question of the strengths and possibilities of the floating person — the same way the question must be
solved with respect to knowledge. The application of knowledge, history and practice of science prove
its possibility and determine its historical boundaries. Science with its practical achievements solves
the question of the reliability of scientific knowledge.
The history of mankind, the history of science and technology are the best proof of the knowability
of the external world.
The theory of reflection, as we know, is the most important basis of the materialist and at the
same time dialectical theory of knowledge . The recognition of the primacy of matter and the
secondary nature of consciousness is inextricably combined in it with an understanding of the
contradictory, dialectical character of reflection. Cognition is seen as a historical process. From here
opens a wide prospect of studying knowledge in its dependence on social development.
Under objective truth, materialistic dialectics understands the objective content of our ideas, which
does not depend on consciousness — neither on man, nor on humanity. The objective truth reveals to
us the historically developing knowledge of the social man. Truth is not something frozen, but
a process . “Truth,” says Lenin, “is a process. From a subjective idea, a person goes to objective
truth through “practice” (and technique) ” [163] .
The doctrine of objective truth is of great scientific and practical importance. This teaching is the
best weapon in the fight against all kinds of idealistic and relativistic theories. For if there is no
objective, that is, independent of the subject, from man or from humanity, truth, then there can be no
assurance that regardless of people's awareness, there is an objective reality, which is the only
content of our knowledge. If our knowledge does not have such content that does not depend on
people, then one cannot be sure that the practical activities aimed at changing the surrounding world,
guided by theoretical predictions, correspond to the objective pattern that is reflected in these
theoretical predictions. The knowledge of objective truth, the recognition that scientific knowledge,
reflecting the real world,
Consequently, the denial of objective truth leads to the denial or there is a denial of existence
regardless of the knowledge of material reality, and, conversely, the recognition of objective truth is
equivalent to the recognition of objective reality that exists outside and without consciousness.
At one time, Bogdanov spoke against the Marxist doctrine of truth. As an advocate of subjective
idealism, reject, as we know, materialist proposition of consciousness independent of the existence of
the real world, Bogdanov wrote: "For me, Marxism contains a denial of the unconditional objectivity of
whatever truth ... the truth is an ideological form, an organizing form of human
experience". According to Bogdanov, truth is an ideological form of organization of experience. If so,
then truth depends on people's consciousness, that is, there is no objective truth. Essentially,
Bogdanov admits inconsistency when he uses the term “objective” truth; from his point of view, one
can only speak of subjective truth, at least not a single person, but the whole of humanity would be
taken as a subject. The concept of “objective”, according to Bogdanov, means not independent of
consciousness, but universally significant , that is, having the same meaning for many people, for all
of humanity.
According to Bogdanov, the objective truth will be such a representation, which is established "on
the basis of mutual verification and coordination of the statements of various people." It is not difficult
to see the absolute inconsistency of the Bogdanov idealistic point of view. Bogdanov gives such a
definition of objectivity, which includes religion and various prejudices as truth, although they are a
delusion, of a more general character, more common among people than, let us say, for example,
scientific discoveries expressing objective truth. and remaining unknown to most people. Rejecting the
existence of objective truth, Bogdanov opens the door to clericalism, "clears the place for" organizing
forms "of religious experience."
Bogdanov’s denial of objective truth is in close and consistent connection with his subjective
idealism . A point of view, similar to Bogdanov’s view of truth, was developed by relativists and
agnostics of various stripes, ranging from Hume and Kant to empirio-critics — Mach and
Avenarius. For all of them, rejecting directly or doubting the existence of objective reality given to
man, in his sensations, is characterized by denial of objective truth.
At present, the teaching of materialist dialectics on objective truth is being audited by individual
representatives of mechanism . T. Sarabyanov, for example, promoted the point of view according to
which “no objective truth exists at all, every truth is subjective”. “Why,” asks Sarabyanov, “I call all
truth subjective?” Because the truth is not objective being, that truth is our understanding of the
world, things, processes ” [164]. Sarabyanov, like a subjective idealist, considers the ideas of people
only to be subjective, that is, not having an objective content in them. Where does the content of our
ideas come from, then? It is not at all necessary to understand or consciously revise the position of
dialectical materialism in order to search for the content of our ideas not in the world around us, but in
the consciousness itself. For anyone who is not confused by the reactionary ideas of solipsism, it is
clear that the content of our ideas is nature and history. The content of our ideas, our knowledge,
independent of man and of humanity, is objective truth. Our knowledge belongs to us, to people, but
what is contained in this knowledge of ours is not ours, but is independent of us. This is not what
Comrade Sarabianov can or will not understand.
If the content of knowledge belongs to the subject, depends on it, as Comrade Sarabyanov thinks,
then the assertion of the science of the existence of the earth before humanity cannot be considered
objective truth, the teaching of Marxism-Leninism about the historically inevitable revolutionary
transformation of capitalist society into a communist society and so on cannot be considered objective
truth In a word, none of the scientific propositions can be considered true, besides those that are
proclaimed Sarabyanov.
So, according to the materialistic dialectic, the idea, knowledge of people
expresses objective truth. Now, one wonders, can our knowledge, expressing objective truth, give it
all at once, absolutely, absolutely, or does it express it approximately, not immediately? This question
is a question about the relationship between absolute and relative truth. We note first of all that the
materialist dialectic does not reject absolute truth. On the contrary, recognizing the objective truth, it
thereby somehow recognizes absolute truth. “To be a materialist,” says Lenin, “is to recognize the
objective truth revealed to us by the senses. To recognize the objective , that is, not dependent on
man and on humanity, truth ‚means in one way or another to recognize absolute truth " [165] . In fact,
when we say that the content of our knowledge is the objective world, this means the recognition that
our knowledge belongs to the eternal, absolute nature, that the content of our ideas is an eternal,
absolute world. "All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, infinite, and therefore it is
essentially absolutely" [166] . In this sense, Lenin writes that "one can deny the relative element in
certain human notions, not denying objective truth, but one cannot deny absolutetruth, without
denying the existence of objective truth" [167]. However, the objective, absolute truth is given to our
knowledge not immediately, not entirely, but in the endless process of the development of knowledge
itself, given through the medium of relative truths, the totality of which expresses absolute truth.
“Knowledge,” says Lenin, “is a reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not immediate,
not a complete reflection, but a process of a number of abstractions, formulation, formation of
concepts, laws, etc., which concepts, laws, etc. ... conditionally cover , approximately, the universal
pattern of the ever-moving and developing nature. . There really , objectively, three members:
1) nature
2) human knowledge = human brain (as the highest product of the same nature),
3) the form of reflection of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is the concepts, laws,
categories, etc.
A person cannot embrace = reflect = reflect the nature of the whole , completely, of her
"immediate wholeness", he can only come close to this forever , creating abstractions, concepts, laws,
scientific picture of the world, etc., etc. " [168 ] .
According to the materialist dialectic, “human thinking is by its nature capable of giving and giving
us absolute truth , which is made up of a sum of relative truths . Each step in the development of
science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific
position are relative, being either moved apart or narrowed by further growth of knowledge
” [169] . Absolute truth finds expression in relative truths, except by means of relative truths, the
absolute cannot be known. And in every scientific truth to which humanity comes, despite its relative
nature, the grains of absolute truth are enclosed. The materialistic dialectic does not deny the
relativity of all our knowledge, but only in the sense of the historical conventionality of the limits of
our knowledge’s approach to objective, absolute truth . “We can learn only under the conditions given
by our era and as far as these conditions allow ” [170] .
Historically conditional, limited, with respect to any scientific discovery, but it is certain that
scientific knowledge, in contrast to delusions, reveals, reflectsobjective truth, absolute nature.
This dialectical understanding of the relation between absolute and relative truth is fundamentally
different from the views of supporters of metaphysical materialism and the views of supporters of
relativism. Representatives of metaphysical materialism recognize absolute truth.. They proceed, as is
well known, from the position that the existing world is in an unchanging state, that it is an
unchangeable material substance. Further asserting the immutability of human thinking, metaphysical
materialists believe that in the minds of people this unchanging objective world is displayed
immediately, in its entirety. For example, Dühring recognized "eternal truths in the final instance." The
main defect of the metaphysical materialists is, as can be seen from what has been said, not that they
recognize absolute truth, dialectical materialism agrees with them, but that they take the objective
world and the knowledge of people outside their historical development. Therefore, metaphysical
materialists see the truth as something immobile, dead, not developing, according to their view, the
truth is only absolute. the development of human cognition , and each step forward of knowledge,
expressing the absolute content, has a relative value, i.e. it does not exhaust this content to the end.
Proponents of relativism are limited to recognizing the relative importance of
knowledge. Relativists reject the absolute truth. From their point of view, no scientific discoveries
contain absolute, and therefore objective truth. From such a point of view, one can sophistically justify
any delusion and nonsense. Such an extreme view of relativists on the truth arises from denial,
regardless of the people of the existing world.
On the point of view of relativism in the question of truth at the present time, some
representatives of the modern mechanistic world outlook and Menshevism idealism have
rolled. Tov. Sarabyanov, in almost all his works, explicitly stated that knowledge is only relative. The
very relativity of knowledge, comrade Sarabyanov, turns into an absolute. In fact, the Menshevist
idealists express the same view. One of the students of Deborin wrote that “knowledge is always
relative, it always just comes close to an object” [171] . Notice: " It always only approaches the
object ." There is nothing to say, the “Marxist” theory is good, according to which our knowledge
always only approaches the object. If our knowledge only approaches the object and never reaches
itthen it is impossible to be sure of the existence of people of the objective world outside the ideas ...
 According to Deborin himself, “any given truth is not absolute, but relative truth ... we never
possess the absolute truth itself . We are only getting closer to it in our knowledge and in our activity
” [172] . We are only approaching absolute truth and never grasping it. This position of Deborin directly
contradicts Lenin’s view, which we considered above.
But if the Menshevist idealists do not draw their own conclusions from their philosophy, then, on
the contrary, Sarabyanov spoke in a full voice. “Can a materialist assert,” he wrote, “that there are
ideas that do not correspond to the objective state of affairs?” Of course not. Consciousness
is always determined bybeing. Exceptions you will not find. God's representation corresponds to
objective processes ” [173]. From the fact that religious beliefs are rooted in the social conditions of
class society, Sarabyanov makes the wrong conclusion about the truth of those. The apparent
confusion of two different things: objective truth and class interest of exploiters, which, although
objectively exists, does not contain objective truth. Thus, the theory of a relativistic understanding of
truth justifies all sorts of illusions and delusions; it opens wide the doors of the Black-Hundred
clericalism and mysticism.
So, neither metaphysical materialism, nor idealistic relativism can correctly solve the question of
the relationship between absolute and relative truth. Only materialistic dialectics, giving the deepest
solution to the question of the relation of thinking to being and the most comprehensive substantiation
of the objective nature of scientific knowledge, also gives a correct understanding of the relationship
between absolute and relative truths.
3.5. Social practice as a criterion of knowledge. Party philosophy
The link between practice and the process of knowledge is by no means limited to the fact that
practice verifies the truth of knowledge. This relationship is deep and multilateral. Cognition, theories
arise from practice . A public person not only perceives the objective world, not only is exposed to its
influence, but also acts in relation to the external world as an object of its activity, changes and
transforms it. In the practical activities our sensations are accumulated and formed; in the same
activity, the ideas and theories that have arisen from them must prove their truth, and here the forces
that correct and improve them are laid. Knowledge grows from practice, is accomplished in unity with
it, and serves practice, organizing and perfecting it. In practical activities, the unity of the object and
the subject, nature and man, is realized: by acting on nature and transforming it, man changes his
own nature.
Why does practice give evidence in reality of our knowledge and why there is no criterion of the
truth of this knowledge outside practice? The fact is that the consciousness of people is only one of the
sides of social life, which has no meaning outside of it. The activity of people's consciousness would
cease immediately, as soon as the production of the material means necessary for human existence
ceased. At the heart of all aspects of social life is the material production, in the words of
Marx, sensual-practical, objective activity of people .
The knowledge of people will therefore be valid only when, in the process of social practice, first of
all in the process of material production, they achieve the result intended in thinking. If human
knowledge did not reflect the processes in the external world in the form in which they exist, then in
their practical activity people would not be able to achieve the results of this activity that were
supposed to be in consciousness. And practical activity, beyond which even the existence of human
society is impossible, will force people to change their perception of the world around them if it is
false. That is why the indicator of truth is in the practice of a public person, in his objective
activity. our ideas about the outside world. In the process of development of social, material
production , ideas and concepts that correctly reflect the objective world arise, develop , etc. Society
practically influences nature, changes its forms in it, and thereby changes itself and its concept of the
external world. As a result, the objective activity of people creates material objects that are integral
parts of material reality. According to Lenin, “ practice is above (theoretical) knowledge , for it has not
only the dignity of universality, but also immediate reality” [174]. The theoretical knowledge of people
about the outside world and the processes occurring in it, reveals the laws and trends of historical
development; but only social practice gives the theory a final confirmation, covers the subject in its
historical concreteness.
“Theoretical knowledge,” says Lenin, “must give the object in its necessity, in its all-round
relations, in its contradictory movement in and for itself. But the human concept of this objective truth
of knowledge "finally" grasps, captures, masters it only when the concept becomes "being for itself" in
the sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and mankind is a test, a criterion of the objectivity
of knowledge ” [175] . We must not forget that the objective material production activity of people is the
main one, which determines all others, a kind of practical activities. But social activity is not yet
exhausted by this type of activity, it is much more comprehensive. A public person participates in the
class struggle, lives a political life, creates science, in a word, participates in all areas of the practical
life of society. Therefore, the criterion of the truth of our knowledge is the totality of social
practice. "All human practice must enter into a complete" definition "of an object, both as a criterion of
truth and as a practical determinant of the connection of an object with that which a person
needs " [176].
In his works, Lenin repeatedly notes the need to see this dialectical relationship between theory
and practice. Thus, for example, in the notes on Bukharin's book “The Economy of the Transition
Period” regarding Bukharin’s statement: “since the collapse of capitalist production relations was really
given and once theoretically proved impossible to restore them,” Lenin notes: “The impossibility is
provable only practically. The author does not set a dialectical relation of theory to practice ” [177] .
But the knowledge of people, being one of the parties, one of the moments of social life, if it is
correct, is crucial for the practical activity of people. Proper knowledge illuminates the path of practical
activity of people. “The theory, if it is really a theory, gives practitioners the power of orientation,
clarity of perspective, confidence in work, faith in the victory of our cause” [178] . But in order for
theoretical knowledge to be correct, it must be based on practice, must be inextricably linked with it.
The practice of a social person does not remain unchanged, and each step of
its development requires new and new comprehension of its own, awareness. That is why the science
that currently does not meet the demands of the practice of socialist construction ceases to play a
positive role for it and turns into a theoretical weapon of class forces hostile to the proletariat.
Material reality is perceived not by an individual isolated from society, but by a social person
dependent on him as well. Human nature has a social character. The life of each individual person is
entirely determined by the life of society, the contradictions of the class struggle taking place in
him; it is connected with the life of a social class . An individual is a social being, therefore any
manifestation of his life, starting from practical activities and ending with theoretical knowledge of the
world around him, is a special manifestation and expression in the final account of social life. “Even
when I am engaged in scientific , etc. Activities, an activity that I can perform myself, without direct
communication with others, I still actin a social way , for acting like a man . I have not only been
given, as a social product, material for my activity, but in the same way the language with which the
activity of the thinker takes place, but also my own being is social activity; therefore, what I make of
myself, I make of myself for society, conscious of myself as a social being ” [179] .
The ability to not only feel, but also to think is a property of highly organized matter. This property
has only the brain of a social person. The activity of the senses and the activity of thinking a person
develops only in society. The feelings and thoughts of a person are therefore not forever given,
permanent properties. Being a product of social life, they undergo changes depending on the
development of society itself. And society is a part of nature, changing which it changes itself. The
basis of multilateral life, including the basis of knowledge, is the practical activity of people, the
production of material resources necessary for the existence of people. All the knowledge about the
world around which the human society has reached, it has reached thanks to the entire previous
history of the development of the material production , as a result of driving this development within
the class society of the class struggle.
Metaphysical point of view on questions of knowledge developed by Feuerbach. According to his
view, the essence of man lies in his body, the body, able to feel and think. Feuerbach was alien to the
idea that a man with his senses and thinking is a product of the historical development of society. He
took a person out of touch with society and therefore never got to the real-life active people, and
remained under the abstraction of man. Due to the fact that Feuerbach excluded his social nature
from man, he did not understand the dependence of knowledge on social practice. Cognition,
according to Feuerbach, was a constant reflection of an equally unchanging, once and for all given
nature. However, the consideration of the question of knowing outside the practice of people and
outside its historical development was the main drawback of not only Feuerbach’s materialism
So, according to the materialist dialectic, knowledge of a person must be taken in his dependence
on the development of social material production and the class struggle that drives it, depending on
social practice. That is why “the point of view of life, practice should be the first and main point of
view of the theory of knowledge ” [180] .
Human knowledge of material reality begins with sensory sensations caused by the effects of
objects of the world on the senses, begins with the testimony of our senses. However, sensory
cognition gives us only a random, empirical knowledge of the nearest sensory environment and limited
external connections. It still does not reflect the objective world in its many-sided relationships,
internal relations and in its wholeness. The real task of knowledge is the awareness of the laws of
reality. This awareness is achieved on the basis of the generalization of those sensations that we
receive in the process of interaction with this reality. The result of generalization and processing in the
mind of the material of direct contemplation are the concepts. This is the moment of logical
knowledge. Of course, the sensual and logical sides of knowledge are not separated from each
other. They always appear together, starting with the primary sensations. Moreover,
thinking arises from representations, without which it does not exist and cannot develop. The content
of our knowledge is the objective world. Our sensations connect us directly with this objective
world. Therefore, it is only on the basis of sensory representations that logical knowledge of the object
is possible, that is, thinking.
However, one cannot identify with each other sensual and mental moments of knowledge. Sensual
cognition does not go beyond the display of single things and external relations between them, while
cognition, mediated by thinking, seizes the internal connections of objects, reflecting them in their
objective unity.
“A submission,” notes Lenin, “cannot grasp movements as a whole , for example, does not grasp
movements with a speed of 300 thousand kilometers in 1 second, and thinking seizes and should
grasp” [181] . In his notes "Abstract", "The Sciences of Logic" by Hegel, Lenin, revealing the dependence
of thinking on the sensory moment in knowledge, pays special attention to the difference between
direct contemplation and thinking.
“Thinking, going from the concrete to the abstract,” he says, “does not depart - if it is right ... from
the truth, but approaches it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value ,
etc., - in a word, all scientific (correct, serious, non-healthy) abstractions reflect nature more deeply,
rather, more fully . From living contemplation to abstract thinking and from it to practice - this is the
dialectical way of knowing the truth , knowing the objective reality ” [182]. Thus, the sensual and mental
moments are the different moments of a single process of cognition, reflecting objective reality in our
thinking. This is the dialectical understanding of the relationship between the empirical and rational
moments of the cognitive process.
The Marxist theory, which emphasizes the crucial importance of practice for theoretical knowledge,
is the direct opposite of pragmatism, the modern idealist course of bourgeois philosophy, which is
especially popular in the United States. Pragmatism, founded by William James, is based on the
subjective idealistic concept of truth. For him, it is true not what reflects objective reality such as it is,
but what is useful, expedient for our practical activity. Truly what is practically useful. Utility is a
measure of truth. From here pragmatism comes to the relativistic theory of the multiplicity of
truths.. Different views can be equally true, since they best serve the interests of a certain epoch,
people, social group, individual. This philosophy justifies any lie, obscurantism, since they are useful
for the practice of the ruling classes. In the end, pragmatism leads to open clergy. “If it turns out,”
says James, “that religious ideas have a value for life, then from the point of view of pragmatism they
will be true, as they are suitable for this purpose.”
The position of Marxism is diametrically opposed to pragmatism. Based on objective truth and
rejecting relativism, Marxism considers not that true that is useful, but useful that which is true . In
material revolutionary-critical practice, objective knowledge of the world is born and tempered,
contributing to its further transformation.
Marxist theory is unthinkable in isolation from revolutionary practice. At the same time, Marxism is
deeply alien to the neglect of theory, vulgar practicality, and “headless division.” A revolutionary
theory growing in the thick of practice serves as a guide to practice. " Without a revolutionary theory,
there can be no revolutionary movement " [183]. Only the revolutionary practice illuminated by Marxist-
Leninist theory gains confidence, foresight, accuracy and depth of forecast, and flexibility to
maneuver. The communist strategy and tactics cannot rely on the empiricism of crusade, they are
guided by the most perfect of theories - dialectical materialism. It is only thanks to the leading role of
the theory that "the unification of the Russian revolutionary scope with the American businesslike" is
achieved, in which the "style of Leninism in party and state work" (Stalin) is achieved .
The greatest victory achieved by Marx and Engels is the spread of materialistic knowledge
to human society . Even the most consistent materialists before Marx did not extend their materialism
to the knowledge of the processes of social development, confining themselves to philosophical and
natural-scientific materialism. This was not a historical accident, but was determined by the class
essence of the old materialism. Discovering the truth of social life, discovering deep-seated
contradictions and driving forces — this was not on the shoulder of the ideologists of the exploiting
class, however revolutionary it may be. This task — to transform the history of human society into a
science, into a subject of materialistic knowledge — could only be accomplished by the creators of the
philosophy of the proletariat.
 The sensationalism of the French materialists led close to the materialistic understanding of
society, to the understanding that the social environment, the social being of people determines their
thinking, desires, interests. But the French materialists were slipping into historical idealism, since
they explained social life by the opinions and convictions of people.
Feuerbach, despite the fact that he had some insightful remarks, remained an idealist “from
above,” did not go beyond the ethical understanding of society. Calling his philosophy anthropologism,
that is, having made man the center of philosophy, he did not understand the social man. Like the
materialists of the XVII – XVIII centuries. Feuerbach believed that there was a certain eternal and
universal "nature of man", a special essence of man "in general".
Some representatives of the old materialism considered man to be good by nature, others - evil,
gave him one or another characteristic, but they all operated on the concept of an abstract, non-
historical human essence. The specific historical conditions of human existence could be
“unreasonable”, to diverge from “human nature”, then they “crippled” human nature, “spoiled”
people. It was necessary to bring social relations in line with “human nature”, to make them
“reasonable”. It is not difficult to find that the man about whom the old materialists spoke was
thought by them in the image and likeness of the bourgeois, that the capitalist essence for them was
the human essence, that the “ideal human nature” was only the embodiment of the bourgeois ideal.
Dialectical materialism ended Feuerbach’s anthropological metaphysics. The man to whom
Feuerbach addressed was understood by Marxism not as an abstract person, but as a concrete
historical person, as an aggregate of certain social relations . Historical materialism has given such an
understanding of social development, which consistently holds the principle of the primacy of social
being and the secondary nature of social consciousness. The creation of historical materialism, the
extension of materialistic knowledge to social being and social consciousness has turned materialism
into the foundation of all human knowledge. "Spirit" is expelled from the last refuge. Materialism has
involved all spheres of reality in its orbit.
The materialistic understanding of history has raised the struggle against religion to a higher
level. Reconciliation with religion in any form and measure, directly or indirectly, flirting with
clericalism or tolerance towards it is completely alien to Marxism and incompatible with it. Whether it
is Christianity or Judaism, a “living” or “inanimate” church, sectarianism, Tolstoyism, Feuerbachian
“religion of love” or “religious atheism” by Comrade Lunacharsky in 1908 - against all these forms of
reconciliation and flirting with religion, dialectical materialism leads an inexorable crushing
fight. “Every god is a cruelty - be it the cleanest, perfect, not sought for, but god built, it doesn't
matter” [184] .
While for the French materialists, religion was the product of people who were ignorantly deceived
by evil people, and for Feuerbach - a ghostly expression of the essence of man “in general” - Marxism
exposes the class essence of religion, finds its roots in social life and exposes its exploiting
function. Martial atheism of the Marxist-Leninist worldview regards the struggle against religion as one
of the forms of the great liberation struggle of the proletariat. For us, religion is not only stupidity or
meanness, it is a means to preserve class oppression, a weapon of enemies. In Marxist militant
atheism, the insight of understanding the essence of religion and a deep active hatred for it, as well as
its science-like echoes, idealistic philosophical systems, merge together.
These are the basic guiding principles of modern materialistic philosophy. It has nothing to do with
a passive worldview. “Philosophers only explained theworld in various ways , but the point is
to change it,” [185] said Marx about previous philosophy. Being a philosophy of the revolutionary
proletariat that transforms the world, dialectical materialism is an effective philosophy.. Philosophy for
us is not a quiet abode, but a front, one of the fronts of class struggle, driving the development of
society. The cognition of reality is not done out of curiosity, but to transform reality. Transformation of
reality requires an awareness of its laws. Guided by true theory, practice is the most perfect practice,
and the most perfect theory, correctly reflecting objective reality, is the most practical and fruitful
theory.
Marxism-Leninism is equally alien to unprincipled divisiveness and contemplative theorizing,
divorced from the practice of class struggle. Theory and practice develop in it in the closest unity,
mutually reinforcing each other. However, the primacy in this unity belongs to the practice ; The unity
of theory and practice is carried out on the basis of revolutionary practice. “A theory becomes
pointless if it does not associate with revolutionary practice, just as practice becomes blind if it does
not illuminate for itself the road of revolutionary theory ” [186] .
Marxist in the right to be called only such a theory that goes hand in hand with the practice of
proletarian struggle, which in the capitalist countries strengthens the will of the working class to
assault capitalism and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, arming it with the knowledge of the
enemy and shows the path to victory organizes the working class to uproot the roots of capitalism, to
build socialism, overcoming the resistance of the class enemy and its opportunist agents on the right
and the “left”. The unity of the practice of class struggle and Marxist-Leninist theory at each stage of
history finds its most perfect expression in the general line of the Communist Party , in decisions of
party congresses and conferences of the Central Committee of the Party, the Communist
International.
The teachings of Marx and Engels are not a dead dogma . It does not complete the history of
knowledge, but opens up gigantic prospects before it. The advancement of dialectical materialism and
its further development are the works of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin developed “Marxism further in the
new conditions of capitalism and the class struggle of the proletariat ... Leninism is Marxism of the
epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution” [187] . This is dialectical materialism, which has
reached a new and higher stage of its development on the basis of the experience of class struggle in
the era of imperialism and the socialist revolution and the generalization of the findings of the newest
natural science.
Dialectical materialism grew and developed in the tireless defense of the work of the working class,
in its tireless struggle with its opponents, with various anti-materialistic and anti-dialectical
teachings. In the battles for the general line of the Communist Party and the Comintern, in tireless
struggle with its opponents, with all the priests, idealistic and revisionist theories, dialectical
materialism will follow the path of new victories. Marx’s teaching is “ omnipotentbecause it is true . It
is complete and harmonious, giving people an integral world view, irreconcilable with no superstition,
with any reaction, with any defense of bourgeois oppression ” [188] .
3.6. Dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge
In bourgeois philosophy, especially in Kantian, it is customary to distinguish between several
separate, unrelated philosophical "problems", forming several independent philosophical
sciences. There are gnosiology or theory of knowledge, - the science of the boundaries and abilities of
human knowledge, of the sources and forms of knowledge. Then, logic is distinguished - an
independent science about the laws according to which human thought develops, about concepts,
judgments, and conclusions. Allocate further ontology - the doctrine of being, of the nature of the
objective world. The Kantians thus tear apart philosophical science into several opposing sciences.
In contrast to the Kantians, dialectical materialism establishes the unity and indissoluble integrity
of philosophical science. Dialectical materialism as a science is an inseparable whole, which is both
logic and theory of knowledge, and the theory of objectively real being of matter ... "In Capital, Lenin
says," logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge of materialism applied to science in one ( three words
are not necessary: they are one and the same) ” [189] . “Dialectics is the theory of knowledge (of Hegel
and) of Marxism: this is the“ side ”of the case (this is not the“ side ”of the case, but the essence of
the matter) that Plekhanov did not pay attention to, let alone other Marxists” [190] .
As we see, Lenin attaches great importance to the fact that in dialectical materialism coincide logic,
dialectics, theory of knowledge. Indeed, these Leninist provisions contain not only Lenin's reference to
dialectical materialism as a science, but also an indication of Lenin's understanding of the essence of
the tasks of philosophy. Lenin's thesis about the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge
is a special expression of the general position of dialectical materialism about the unity of theory and
practice. Such a view of dialectics as a theory of knowledge obliges, if only it is understood Leninist,
and not distorted in Hegelian, as the Menshevist idealists did, to link the development of dialectics
with the practice of socialist construction and world revolution, as stated in the decision Central
Committee of the CPSU (b) about the magazine "Under the banner of Marxism."
The reason for the rupture of logic and the theory of knowledge from the Kantians is that they
approach both logically and the theory of knowledge formally; they are taken outside of practice, not
historically. The logic of the Kantians is the science of the forms of thinking as such, irrespective of
their content. Formal logic is interested only in the form, but not in the content of thinking, and
therefore it is an idealistic logic. The theory of knowledge of the Kantians should explore the "abilities
and limits" of knowledge before any knowledge, isolating itself from the process of learning. Before
learning, it is necessary to investigate what knowledge is capable of and what it is not capable of —
this is the Kantian formulation of the question.
Hegel, who for the first time, albeit in an idealistic manner, understood that the logic and theory of
knowledge coincide, if they were taken not formally, but historically , subjected the Kantian
formulation of the question to criticism. “One cannot learn to swim without entering the water”, one
cannot determine the abilities of human knowledge, without seeing how knowledge works in practice ,
without examining the actual history of human knowledge . Base theoryknowledge is the history of
knowledge, the practice of knowledge. On the other hand, if we take logic, then it is equally
unreasonable to study the forms of human cognition, its concepts, judgments, and conclusions in
isolation from how these forms were used in practice, in the real historical process of cognition, as
they developed as knowledge developed. human knowledge, complicated, evolved. In a word, and for
logic, the basis must be sought in the history of knowledge. In this historic the approach of Hegel and
philosophy is the reason why, as in Marxism, Hegel has the same dialectic and theory of
knowledge. “Dialectics, in Marx's understanding, also agrees with Hegel, includes what is now called
theory of knowledge, gnoseology, which should consider its subject equally historically, studying and
summarizing the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from not knowledge to
knowledge” [191 ] .
To understand why Hegel has the same dialectic (logic) and the theory of knowledge, what has
been said is not enough. Both the theory of knowledge and logic - both must be studied on the basis
of the history of knowledge . However, they are not reduced simply to the history of knowledge. In the
theory of knowledge and logic, the history of knowledge must be taken as a whole, in a generalized
form, in terms of the result, the results of knowledge. In such cases, it is said that the historical must
be taken from a logical point of view, that is, from the point of view of general results. The resulting
logical will be the same story, the same process, but in generalWithout complicating details, discarding
any irrelevant random deviations. This is how Marx's "Capital" was built, which is the logic, that is, a
general theoretical analysis of capitalism . But at the same time, Marx's Capital also provides a
generalized, summarized history of the development of capitalist production relations. For example,
Marx himself points out: “ Commodity as the most elementary form of bourgeois wealth was our
starting point, the prerequisite for the emergence of capital. On the other hand, the goods now act as
a product of capital . This cycle of our presentation also corresponds to the historical development
of capital ” [192]. Summarizing Marx’s methodology in Capital, Engels also emphasizes the unity of the
historical and logical in Capital, which did not prevent, however, the interventionist Menshevik Rubin
from proving that Marx’s analysis of the goods is not historical, but only logical in
character [193] . Engels says: “The logical method was the only appropriate one. But in essence it is the
same historical method, only freed from its historical form and from violating accidents ” [194] .
When applied to the theory of knowledge and logic, this means that logic is a generalized and
summarized history of knowledge, is "the result, the sum, the conclusion of the history of knowledge
of the world." On the other hand, the theory of knowledge is, after all, also a summarized and
generalized, taken as a result of the development of the history of knowledge. This most common
result of the history of knowledge is both logic and the theory of knowledge. The categories of logic
are reflected in the human mind the laws of the material world. The logic and theory of knowledge
coincide.
We have one philosophical science - the dialectic, which is both a logic and a theory of
knowledge. In each category of logic should be shown:
1) what is the objective, in reality itself, attitude, this category reflects,
2) how this objective relationship is cognized by man.
Engels makes this distinction already in the definition of matter, in the question of the relation of
thinking and being. Engels first points out that materialism considers nature to be the main
principle. Matter is an objective reality that exists independently of cognition. “But the question of the
relationship between thinking and being,” says Engels, “ has another side : how do our thoughts about
the world around us relate to this world itself? Is our thinking able to know the real world? Are we able
in our ideas and notions about the real world to give the correct reflection of reality? ” [195] . Thus,
Engels, as we see, distinguishes two sides — the being of the objective world and its knowability.
Here it is necessary to point out the fundamental difference that exists between the Hegelian
idealist understanding of the coincidence of dialectics and the theory of knowledge and the
materialistic one. In both Hegel and Marxism, the dialectic and the theory of knowledge coincide as a
result of the history of knowledge. However, as an idealist Hegel, the history of knowledge is taken as
an independent process of the spontaneous development of the spirit, a certain world thought. For
Hegel as an idealist, the history of knowledge is divorced from the history of the development of the
material world and the material practice of mankind - its production activities and class struggle. For
dialectical materialism, on the contrary, the history of cognition is only historically reflected in the
human brain the history of the development of the most objective material world, knowable in the
material practice of man, changing and transforming the world.the change of nature by man , and not
one nature as such, and the human mind developed in proportion to how he learned to change nature
” [196] - this is materialistic, totally different from Hegel's, the question about the history of knowledge,
about the base on which in Marxism, logic and theory of knowledge coincide.
Chapter 4. The laws of materialistic dialectics
 4.1. The law of the unity of opposites
In "The Dialectic of Nature," Engels wrote: "(To develop the general character of dialectics as a
science of connections, as opposed to metaphysics).
Thus the laws of dialectics were diverted from the history of nature and human society. But they
are nothing but the most general laws of both these phases of historical development, as well as the
thinking itself. In essence, they boil down to the following three laws:
The law of the transition of quantity to quality, and vice versa.
The law of mutual penetration of opposites.
The law of negation of negation ” [197] .
Engels further points out that all these laws were already developed by Hegel, but in idealistic
manners , that is, they were not derived from nature and history, but were imposed on the latter as
necessary laws to which history and nature should obey. From here, inevitably, Hegel obtained a
"forced and often terrible construction."
Meanwhile, it is only materialist to approach these laws, as everything becomes, in the words of
Engels, simple and clear. These basic laws of dialectics are the real laws of the development of the
objective world, as well as the laws of knowledge of the world, since they are a reflection in our
consciousness of this very objective world itself.
We now turn to the consideration of the basic law of materialist dialectics - the law of the unity of
opposites.
The history of human thought knows two basic concepts of development . According to one of
them, development is understood as a decrease and increase , as a quantitative growth
and repetition. the same as before. Things, no matter how they arise from the very beginning, as well
as their mental representations in the human head, according to this concept, always remain their
own equal. Once a thing has arisen, while remaining unchanged in its nature, it makes a uniform path
of movement along the same unchanging circle. The development of any thing, the development of a
plant, animal, man is essentially reduced to growth, an increase in various aspects and properties that
he has in advance, but in a “small” embryonic form. In this view, devoid of a hint of the actual
historical character of the development of things, is the meaning of the metaphysical concept of
development, whose support ultimately lies in the study of the absolute invariance of nature,
completely dominated in the XVII and XVIII centuries. and which received in the XIX and XX
centuries. its rebirth in bourgeois vulgar evolutionary theories.
With this concept, inexplicable remain, firstly, the reasons for the diversity of objects that appears
to our eyes, the reasons for the emergence of a different,new, and change of old. Secondly, and most
importantly, the source of movement and development assumes an inexplicable nature . Unable to
explain the internal causes that give impetus, the impetus to development, the metaphysical concept
is forced to transfer this source out-of-out either under the guise of material metaphysical "entities"
and "forces", or under the guise of an overworld spirit!
Lenin points out that by the end of the 19th and 20th centuries, “everyone agrees” with the
principle of development, but that this is an external, superficial “agreement” that vulgarizes and
obscures the true understanding of this development. "If everything is developing, - Lenin says - then
everything changes from one to another, because the development is certainly not a
simple, universal and eternal growth, increase (or decrease), and so on ... It is necessary. More
accurately understand the evolution as the origin and destruction of all , mutual transitions " [198] . Not
understanding this basic development, the vulgar-evolutionary theories do not see the ways of the
development of our thinking, reflecting the development of being, do not understand the objective
meaning and role of the dialectic of knowledgeThey do not know how to connect the principle of
development with the materialistic principle of the unity of the world.
Not understanding that the development of any thing (and phenomena) is its own, internal
features of the thing itself, the conditioned transition from one toanother , the vulgar-bourgeois
concept of development does not see in the development of its own movement a thing, as expressed
by Hegel, self-movement. The development of a plant, animal, human, human society seems to
bourgeois evolutionists as a repetition in an enlarged form, as a simple growth, the unfolding of some
eternal, immutable properties and peculiarities, which are originally inherent in a given plant,
organism, society, and only previously hid in the bud. This growth, according to the theoreticians, is
accomplished under the influence of external conditions environment due to "pumping energy", thanks
to the plant, animal, human body food from the outside. The development of human society is
depicted by them as the repetition and deployment of some unchanging, eternal features
characteristic of the bourgeois societies with its capitalist exploitation, competition, individualism, etc.,
which bourgeois scientists manage to find in ancient slave-owning society and even among primitive
savages. Bourgeois science therefore either does not think at all about the reasons, the source, the
driving forces of the development of society, or explains it by the mental progress of humanity, which,
due to repeated repetition, begins to become better aware of the eternal and natural features of any
human community, or climatic conditions of life of various societies, conditions of "balance" of society
and the external environment!
In contrast to the evolutionary concept, dialectics requires the study of the “thing in itself” (Lenin),
its relation to other things; it considers the development of a thing as its spontaneous development,
that is, as an internally necessary independent, own movement of the thing, as its self-movement .
Regarding Hegel’s teaching on development as self-movement, Lenin wrote: “Movement and“ self-
movement ”(this is spontaneous (independent) spontaneous, internally necessary movement),“
change ”,“ movement and vitality ”, the impulse to “movement” and to “activity” is the opposite of
“ dead being ” - who will believe that this is the essence of “Hegelian”, abstract and abstrusen (heavy,
ridiculous?) Hegelianism ?? This essence had to be discovered, understood, saved, husked, cleaned,
as Marx and Engels did ” [199] . In the Hegelian idealistic doctrine of self-movement Marxism revealed
the rational core, cleared it of mystical ideas about purely logical development, understood as the law
of the development of the objective world.
Some external causes, taken by themselves, can only cause a mechanical change of this thing, an
increase or decrease in its volume, size, etc. But already the simple growth of a plant or animal
organism is not only a quantitative increase: it also implies a qualitative change in the organism, its
transition from one state to another. Approximately the same geographical and climatic conditions
have operated in Europe for many centuries and apparently not the development of society is
explained by them. On the contrary, the same geographical conditions would most likely cause the
monotony of social relations, the repetition of the same methods of work, etc., as the example of
many African and Asian tribes shows. Meanwhile, in Europe, for example, with approximately identical
conditions of the geographic environment, we have a huge variety and unevenness in the historical
development of individual countries. Obviously, the impact of external conditions is refracted
through internal features of this social formation. Only by identifying the inner, own driving forces of
development, only by discovering impulses, thrusts from within, given the development of the
subject’s own life, can one understand the real essence of development as self-movement of natural
phenomena, society, and human thought.
What is finally self-motion? Would it not be in the idea of the self-movement of things some taste
of mysticism and Hegelian idealism, as Comrade Bukharin, for example, thinks? In no case, if only to
approach the movement and development purely mechanically, not to see in it a simple movement or
a quantitative increase, if, on the other hand, to approach self-movement idealistically, not to see in it
a purely logical development, self-generation of concepts, understand that self-movement is self-
movement of the objective world. Self-movement has its own the movement of a thing, caused by
both internal and external circumstances, but occurring according to internal laws peculiar to the thing
itself, its transition due to internal impulses, its transformation into another thing. The study of any
object in self-movement saves us from idealistic ideas about higher external forces (God, world spirit)
or about higher inner spiritual entities. And at the same time, it does not at all relieve us of the need
to study also the role that external conditions play along with the internal causes for this
development. It is a view of development as the self-movement of things that makes our attention to
rush to the knowledge of the actual internal, own source ofdevelopment. This source, this motive
force, the materialistic dialectic finds ininternal contradictions of all existing, in the movement and
development of internal contradictions. Inconsistency in the thing itself, internal contradictory forces
and tendencies , sides in any phenomenon of nature and society is the main thing from which
materialistic dialectics comes in its understanding of development.
For metaphysics, for formal logic, contradictions are possible only in our thinking , and not in
objective reality. But these logical contradictions, in the view of formal logic, are precisely the evil that
must be avoided; Contradictions, according to formal logic, speak about the inconsistency of thoughts,
about the wrong course of thinking, they interfere with the proper development of thought. If the
bourgeois believes that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is directed against democracy,” then it will
be a logical contradiction for him to recognize at the same time that “the dictatorship of the proletariat
is the highest form of democracy”: these two thoughts are incompatible for him. For the dialectic
logic, the contradictions of thinking are a reflection of the contradictions of real objective being.: it is
not content with external definitions, the seeming inconsistency of two conflicting positions. The
materialistic dialectic penetrates into the inner essence of the studied subject and in the subject itself
finds the internal connection of contradictory forces, tendencies, parties, definitions. In the most
objective reality, Marxism reveals the contradictions characteristic of it and its motivations. The denial
of the old bourgeois democracy and the creation of a new proletarian democracy in the dictatorship of
the proletariat is a real bilateral contradictory process. “In the proper sense of dialectics,” Lenin
pointed out, “there is a study of the contradiction in the very essence of objects ” [200] .
The recognition of the inconsistency of things in metaphysics seems to be impossible, because it
considers things and phenomena outside of their connection, outside of their continuous interaction.
“But something quite different happens,” Engels points out, “when we begin to consider things in
their movement, in their change, in their life, in their mutual influence on each other. Here we
immediately run into contradictions . The movement itself is a contradiction ; even a simple
mechanical movement can only occur in such a way that the body is in one and the same moment of
time in one place and at the same time in another place, in the same place and not in it . And the
constant supposition and at the same time the resolution of this contradiction is precisely the
movement ” [201] .
The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the reality of contradictions, revealing these objective
contradictions also in the socio-historical life of the people, becomes the most important theoretical
basis of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat. It is not surprising that this doctrine
encounters violent attacks from bourgeois theorists. Numerous "critics" of Marxism have repeatedly
tried to refute Engels’s reduced position on motion as a contradiction. They referred to the fact that in
reality a moving object at different points in time passes supposedly different points in space. If we
divide, we proved “critics” (Struve, V. Chernov, and others), a spatial line continuously traversed by
an object, into a series of small segments, points, “interruptions” of space, then at every single
moment of time the object takes some one position in space, occupies one point corresponding
to one any segment of this space.
Lenin showed all the absurdity of this "criticism", which in fact reduces the continuous movement
to a series of interruptions of this movement in space and time, to a number of states of rest ,
motionless states of objects. In fact, each new position of an object is possible only as a result of
some movement from one point of space to another; critics do not understand that to move means to
be at a given point and at the same time not to be in it, that without this contradiction, without this
unity of continuity and discontinuity, the movement itself would be impossible, and to deny a
contradiction simply means to gloss over it. “This objection,” wrote Lenin, “is false :
1) it describes the result of the movement, not the movement itself ;
2) it does not show, does not contain the possibility of movement;
3) it depicts movement, as a sum, a connection of states of rest , i.e. (dialectical) contradiction is
not eliminated by them, but only covered, pushed, obscured, curtained ” [202] .
“Motion is the unity of continuity (time and space) and discontinuity (time and space). Movement is
a contradiction , there is a unity of contradictions ” [203] .
But the contradiction underlies not only the simplest and most common forms of
movement. Dialectical contradictions manifest themselves in the special forms of movement and
development of individual objects and processes.
It is not difficult to notice these contradictions driving development in any area: in nature, in
society, in thinking.
The process of life, Engels pointed out, is inextricably linked with the opposite process of death:
the constant death and renewal of cells is - and this is a contradiction! - the condition of life and
development of the whole organism. In mechanics, any action is internally contradictory, it causes
opposition and is inexplicable without the latter. Any value in mathematics is internally contradictory,
it can be both positive and negative. Any phenomenon in the social life of this society is permeated by
contradictions and class struggles penetrating all aspects of the life of a class society, be it the
purchase and sale of labor power or an exalted philosophical teaching. Vulgar bourgeois thinking only
notes the difference of things, not their opposite.; it is limited to indicating the diversity of our ideas,
but does not penetrate the very essence of things. Meanwhile, in every difference, in the diversity of
our ideas, one must be able to see the difference in essence, the opposite of the sides, forces, and
tendencies of the objective world. “The opposite of forces, sides, tendencies, enclosed in any thing, is
their negative attitude (negativity) to each other, there is their living contradiction, which gives
internal impulses to the self-movement of a thing.”
So, what is this internal contradiction of any thing (and phenomena)? In that it is a single subject
(process, phenomenon, etc.), in which at the same time opposites both mutually
exclude and penetrate each other. Opposites are internally linked in their development, one is a
condition for the existence of another opposition, and at the same time hostile to one another, they
are fighting among themselves .
 “The thinking mind (mind), - notes Lenin, - sharpens the blunted distinction of different, simple
variety of ideas to a significant difference, to the opposite . Only to climb to the top of contradictions,
diversity become mobile and live in relation one to another, - acquire the negativity that is the inner
pulsation of self-movement and vitality " [204] .
This bifurcation of a single , internal contradiction, observed in any phenomenon of nature, history
and spiritual life, from the time of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus noted by thinkers, Lenin
described as the essence of dialectics, as its main feature. The materialistic dialectic of Marx - Engels -
Lenin sees in unity (interpenetration) of opposites the fundamental law of dialectical development. He
gets his specific manifestation in the contradictions inherent in all special forms of movement.
The variety of things is explained by the specificity of the forms of movement, each of which
characterizes the special quality of a thing. We observe in nature a number of forms of motion, such
as: mechanical motion, light, heat, electricity, chemical combination and decomposition, etc. All these
forms of motion mutually condition each other, passing one into the other. Man's knowledge of matter
is exhausted by knowledge of the forms of motion of matter , because in addition to moving matter in
nature there is nothing. Each form of movement must be taken in its originality, qualitatively different
from others. The materialist dialectic finds out that any form of movement has a special, own
contradiction , its own unity and the struggle of opposites.. The knowledge of each given unity of
opposites, specific to a given area of phenomena, is the subject of separate sciences. So for
mathematics, the main opposites are positive and negative values, the differential and the
integral; for mechanics - action and reaction; in physics, positive and negative electricity, etc .; in
chemistry - the connection and dissociation of elements; in human society and social science - the
struggle of classes.
The dialectic concept of development understands development as “a split of one into mutually
exclusive opposites and the relationship between them” [205] . This “relationship” of opposites is
the internal source of movement. When this concept of "chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of " self"movement" [206] . A characteristic feature of this concept is
recognition due to the internal struggle of the opposites of the appearance of the new in place of the
old. While all bourgeois evolutionary theories, without denying the possibility of the emergence of a
new one, the main attention is paid to this commonwhat the old and the new have, they strive to
consider the new as enlarged and repeated in one respect or another the old, dialectical teaching
about development, on the contrary, emphasizes the peculiarity, the peculiarity of the new . The
limitations of every bourgeois-evolutionary theory, fundamentally opposite to the dialectical theory of
development, consists ultimately in reducing the new to the old , and therefore in identifying the
former with the latter. Meanwhile, it is the qualitativefeatures that actually give rise to the new, which
has emerged in the place of the old, to be called new. For the dialectic concept, development involves
the transformation of things, the transition from one quality to another.
The law of the unity of opposites , according to Lenin's definition, is “the recognition (discovery) of
contradictory, mutually exclusive , opposite tendencies inall phenomena and processes of nature (and
spirit and society including )” [207] .
The interrelationship - the interpenetration and struggle - of the opposing, contradictory sides
concluded in the subject, determines his life, gives him impulses to self-movement, to
development. That is why the law of unity, interpenetration of opposites is the main, most important,
decisive in dialectics. "The split of the single and the knowledge of the contradictory parts of it," says
Lenin, "is the essence of the dialectic" [208] . He calls the unity of opposites in his notes the core of
the dialectic.
The law of the unity of opposites is the most general law of the objective world and
knowledge. “The condition of the knowledge of all the processes of the world in their“ self-
movement ”, in their spontaneous development, in their living life,” says Lenin, “is the knowledge of
them as a unity of opposites” [209] .
Thus, the law of the unity of opposites is the basic law of dialectics. The law of the unity of
opposites, being the most general law, applies to all phenomena of the objective world and to the
process of cognition. Plekhanov's mistake, which Lenin points out in his fragment “On the Question of
Dialectics”, was that he did not understand the decisive and universal significance of this law as a law
of knowledge and a law of the objective world, that he reduced it to a “ sum of examples ”.
While Engels, in Anti-Dühring, cited a number of examples of this law in the interest
of popular exposition, while considering the interpenetration of opposites as the most general law of
development [210] , Plekhanov reduces this universal law to its particular cases and
manifestations. Plekhanov focuses his attention only on the law of the transition of quantity into
quality, on the contradiction of content and form. Often, accusing Lenin of not understanding
dialectics, Plekhanov, in his many works, failed to substantiate this core, the essence of dialectics,
failed even to understand the theoretical significance of Hegel's Logic, in which this law was developed
on an idealistic basis. Often, Plekhanov discovers an eclectic understanding of this law as a
"combination of opposites."
Dialectics is fundamentally hostile to any eclecticism: Marxism-Leninism would not be a guide
to action if it did not give precise and definite answers characterizing the essence of the subject or
process, no matter how “complicated” it may appear. Therefore, in the materialist dialectic, it is
extremely important to correctly understand what is the relationship between opposites. The unity of
opposites is at the same time their mutual penetration, their identity and their mutual exclusion,
denial, struggle .
Defining: “a thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of opposites ” [211] , Lenin wrote: “Not
only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of eachdefinition, quality, trait, hand, property
to each other (in its opposite ) ” [212] . “The usual idea,” Lenin said in another place, “captures the
difference and contradiction, but not the transition from one to another, but this is the most
important ” [213] . “ Dialectics ,” therefore formulated Lenin, “is a doctrine about how there can be and
how there are (how the opposites become) identical, - under what conditions they are identical,
turning into each other, - why the human mind should not take these opposites for the dead, frozen,
but for the living, conditioned, mobile, turning one into the other ” [214] .
Lenin considers the identity of opposites, their interpenetration, their mutual transition from one to
another to be most important for understanding the essence of dialectics. At the same time, he
emphasizes the conditional the nature of this identity of opposites, its possibility only under certain
conditions, the fact that the unity of opposites is relative, and their struggle is absolute. The process
of life and the process of death, it was stated above, is mutually continued one another in a certain
respect: the death of the cells of the body is a necessary condition for their renewal, a necessary
moment of the life process; the opposites — life and death — become, as it were, identical with one
another, mutually transmigrate one into another. But the conditional character of this identification is
clear: life is still life, not death; the elements of life win in this process the moments of extinction and
dominate them. Production and consumption, Marx pointed out, are not only opposites, but also
mutually penetrate each other in a number of ways. “Each is directly its opposite. However, at the
same time, there is a movement between the two that is mediating. ” [215] . Production makes it
possible to consume, creates a commodity, gives its consumption certainty and
character. Consumption completes the process of production of products, causes the need for
production, is an integral point of production. However, this does not mean that we can identify
production and consumption. Their immediate unity, says Marx, does not destroy their immediate
split.
The bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist society are external opposites hostile to each
other. However, these classes are inextricably linked in the economic structure of capitalism, and the
presence of one class is a condition for the existence of another. Without the bourgeoisie there can
also be no capitalism, as well as without the proletariat. The creation by the working class, deprived of
the means of production, of surplus value for the bourgeoisie that buys labor and the exploitation of
labor by the bourgeoisie, the owner of the means of production, is a single process that determines
the very existence of capitalist society. At the same time, the conditional nature of this unity,
“interpenetration” is obvious: about any unity of interests both classes can not speak; not a
coincidence of class interests, but, on the contrary, their struggle is the basis of social
development. Strengthening the proletarian state, indicates t. Stalin, is preparing the conditions for its
withering away in the future. Strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and the future withering
away of the state are thus not external opposites: strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat
is identical to preparing the conditions for its future withering away. However, it would be the greatest
mistake to forget about the antithesis of these stages and simply identify both processes, to consider
that with the strengthening of the proletarian state, its death directly occurs ...
Modern mechanism, Menshevik and Menshevist idealism fundamentally distort the correct Leninist
understanding of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. The mechanists, beginning with Dühring
and ending with Comrade Bukharin, regard all kinds of opposites that are in unity, as external to each
other, oppositely directed against one another . Mechanists identify any unity of opposites, any
contradiction with external contradiction, with antagonism of hostile forces, and they explain the
coexistence of these forces and the maintenance of contradiction by equilibrium. opposites. Engels
ridiculed the flat understanding of Dühring of contradictions as opposing forces. Lenin pointed out to
Comrade Bukharin, reading his “Economy in Transition”, that it is wrong to identify a contradiction
with antagonism, that under socialism, for example, class antagonisms will disappear and
contradictions between nature and society, productive forces and production relations will take place.
Antagonism is a special kind of contradiction, in which the parties treat each other as irreconcilable
extremes.
The best example of antagonisms of a social nature are class contradictions between exploited and
exploiting classes. But with the dialectical understanding of contradictions, we must look for and find a
possible inner connection even and between antagonistic opposites, otherwise it would be unthinkable
for some long-term coexistence of these extremes in one subject, phenomenon, society, etc. (see
above the example of the bourgeoisie and the working class). The entire transitional era permeates
the antagonism of dying capitalism and the revolution-born socialism. Nevertheless, at the early stage
of NEP during the recovery period, Lenin considered it possible to use the methods of state capitalism
controlled by the dictatorship of the proletariat, the use of the Nepmanian bourgeoisie for the rise and
development of productive forces under the condition of its complete subordination to the proletarian
laws and at the same time limiting and ousting it. The period of socialist reconstruction and the onset
of socialism on all fronts puts forward the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class, the destruction of
the remnants of capitalism in the economy and the minds of people: the antagonism of the capitalist
elements and the socialist structure makes it impossible for them to continue to coexist, the class
struggle escalates. The right-wing opportunists, who identify antagonisms and contradictions and
depict contradictory development as an equilibrium of antagonistic forces, delivered a
sermonreconciliation , the balance of the struggling forces, the capitalist and socialist sectors, with the
theory of attenuation of the class struggle in the Soviet economy in the process of "balancing" the
sectors.
Menshevism and Menshevist idealism also distort the correct understanding of the unity of
opposites. Menshevist idealists understand it as “subjectively applied flexibility,” as sophistry and
eclecticism. They view the unity of opposites as their eclectic combination. The Menshevist idealists,
moving away from the Leninist formulation of the law of the unity of opposites, draw a completely
mechanistic scheme, according to which we first have a simple distinction, then an opposite, and then
a contradiction. They do not understand that in every distinction there is already a contradiction,
they limit , like Plekhanov, the universal character of the law of contradictory
development. Meanwhile, Lenin, on the contrary, emphasizes the conditional, temporary, relative the
nature of unity, identity, interpenetration of opposites and the absolute nature of their mutual
negation, mutual exclusion of opposites, their struggle , which is the source of development .
A certain unity of opposing sides, tendencies in the subject each time is not absolute, it has a
relative value. But if temporarily, a relatively transitory unity ofopposites, which also do not remain
unchanged, like the object itself, then their struggle is absolute . Everything that exists on earth is
changed by the struggle of opposites, whatever the latter in nature.
“Unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites,‚ emphasizes Lenin, - conditionally ,
temporarily, transiently, relatively. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as
absolutely development, movement ” [216] .
And in the relative, relative there is the absolute, Lenin says in another place. And in the
interpenetration of opposites we must see their struggle : we must consider the very identity,
interpenetration of opposites as a manifestation of their struggle - and this is the deepest meaning of
Lenin's words about the transition from one to another as "the most important".
The emergence of a new object gives the resolution of contradiction, in which the old unity is
eliminated along with its opposites. Instead of the former phenomenon, its history begins a new one,
containing from this moment on its own, a new contradiction, moving it along the path of further
development.
The task of scientific research in any field is to, guided by this general law of materialist dialectics,
which is the conclusion, the result of the entire history of the development of human knowledge, each
time on the actual material to study the specific nature of the controversial development inherent in
this phenomenon of nature or society. Not a single principle of materialist dialectics can be turned into
an abstract scheme from which answers to specific questions can be derived from a purely
logical way. For materialistic dialectics requires a relentless concrete study of the processes occurring
in nature, society, and human thinking.
It teaches to capture not only the general features inherent in all objects and at all stages of their
development, but also the special features of the controversial development that characterize the
subject under study at this stage of its development. There can be no example of resolving a
contradiction that is valid for all times and for all cases. It is impossible, for example, to look for
explanations of the ways of transition from capitalism to socialism in the particular nature of resolving
social contradictions that took place when the feudal socio-economic formation turned into a capitalist
one.
Hegel, who for the first time gave expression to the law of the unity of opposites, understood him,
however, in an idealistically perverted way. Hegel considered the objects of knowledge to be the
stages of the development of thought — not real objects as they exist in the real world, but only
mental, abstract objects created in the same abstract thinking as the objects themselves. Therefore,
the law of the unity of opposites in Hegel meant the law of thinking, which is of the most general
nature, but divorced from the actual, concrete development of nature and history.
The interpenetration of opposites according to Hegel expresses the interpenetration of opposites
not in reality, but in thinking. And if Hegel appeals to the phenomena of the surrounding world for
examples, it is to confirm his logical construction, and not to explain, on the basis of the study of the
specific conditions of their real movement, under what conditions the resolution of contradictions
occurs and in what special way transition of the phenomenon to its opposite. That is why, in Hegel's
dialectic, the transitions of the concepts of one into another are arbitrary. The resolution of
contradiction in Hegel is arbitrary, illusory, introduced into reality from abstract thinking: it is only
a mental the resolution of contradiction and therefore abstract, divorced from the development of the
real world.
Thus, recognition of the law of the unity of opposites as the essence of dialectics, as well as other
laws of dialectics, giving us the key to dialectical knowledge, at the same time, does not eliminate the
careful study of the phenomena of nature and social life, but, on the contrary, necessarily requires
their specific study. A concrete analysis of the actual development of phenomena should serve as an
accurate justification and confirmation of this law, applied in its general form to any subjects. His
reverse understanding is the vulgarization of the materialist dialectic, its perversion. The law of the
unity of opposites, like the whole materialistic dialectic as a whole, is a guide to action and to scientific
research.
Marx and Engels put Hegel’s idealistic teaching on the unity of opposites "on their feet," reworked
it materialistically, made it the universal law of the development of the material world and the thinking
reflecting it. Applying this law to the knowledge of the historical process, they saw the main causes of
social development in the contradiction between the development of productive forces and production
relations, in the contradictions of the class struggle, in the contradiction derived from them between
the economic foundation and the political and ideological superstructure. Applying the materialist
dialectic to the knowledge of the economic structure of capitalist society, Marx revealed its main
contradiction - the contradiction between the social nature of production and the particular nature of
appropriation,
As an illustration, we present some samples from the dialectic of Marx's Capital. Only by
understanding the general idea of “Capital”, understanding “Capital” as a whole as a logic, dialectic
and theory of knowledge, can we trace the dialectic of individual economic categories of
“Capital”. Without this, we would be in danger of falling into the “sum of examples” from the dialectic
of Capital, which is so common for mechanists and Menshevist idealism.
The dialectics of the individual economic categories of Capital can be seen from the economic
movement of capitalist society as a whole. The transition from simple commodity production and
appeal to capitalist production and the further destruction of capitalism and the prerequisites for the
emergence of a new, socialist system are due to the duality and contradiction underlying the capital-
commodity production. This duality and contradiction determine the nature and all the individual
economic phenomena and categories : product, money, capital, value, etc.
Let's start with the goods. This product has a dual, i.e. contradictory nature. As a thing, it has
useful properties, referred to in an economic language as use value. On the other hand, as a
commodity it has a value, it can be exchanged for another commodity. If the use-value reveals the
qualitative side of the goods, then the quantitative side of the goods is expressed in the exchange
value. Due to the cost of goods can be equated to each other.
This product is a product of labor. Like a commodity, labor has two sides, two natures: concrete
(qualitative), relevant to use value, and abstract (quantitative), creating the value of goods. “If in
relation to the use-value of a commodity, only the quality of the labor contained in it matters , in
relation to the magnitude of value, only the quantity of labor is important ” [217] .
Others flow from this contradiction. Each commodity measures its value by another commodity
that possesses other , incommensurable useful properties (the doctrine of relative and equivalent
value), the value of the value of commodities is inversely proportional to the mass of goods produced
at a given socially necessary time, etc.
 Whatever the productive force, it can only change the form of the useful properties of various
substances. Productive force can not change the properties of the canvas, it can only give the canvas
a form of clothing. Changing the shape of various things depends on the specific type of work. But in
the society of commodity producers, labor has another side - the quantity of labor, acting as labor in
general, as abstract labor, creating value in general. "Labor is the father of wealth, the earth is his
mother."
A further dialectical movement of goods consists in turning goods into money, as Marx points out.
“The historical process of expanding and deepening the exchange develops the contradiction
between consumer value and value dormant in commodity nature. The need to give an external
expression to turnover for this contradiction forces one to look for independent forms for the
realization of commodity value and does not give rest until the task is finally solved by dividing the
goods into goods and money ” [218] .
Thus, the quantitative development of the exchange of goods leads to a new quality - monetary
form. The source of this movement lies in the contradiction of the commodity form, i.e. ultimately in
the contradiction between the social form of production and the private form of appropriation.
Money is also a commodity, but it is a commodity in the "removed" form. Money is a commodity
and at the same time denial of the goods. Money is the absolute commodity by which the values of all
other commodities are measured. As such, money turns into a means of circulation of goods. Here
comes a new contradiction . Being a product of historically defined social relations, money expresses
the totality of contradictions of a given society. Money is the unity of opposites. If we take money in
relation to ourselves as an identity, it immediately turns out that this identity is the source of a new
division, a new contradiction of money — as a medium of circulation and as an independent being of
the exchange value of an absolute commodity.
“The function of money as a means of payment is a direct contradiction. As payments become
equal, money functions only ideally, like counting money, or a measure of value. Since, indeed,
payments have to be made, money does not act as a means of circulation, not as just a fleeting
intermediary in metabolism, but as an individual embodiment of social labor, as an independent being
of exchange value, or an absolute commodity. This contradiction is revealed with particular force at
that moment of industrial and commercial crises, which is called the monetary crisis ” [219] .
Every movement is dialectical. Of particular interest from the point of view of dialectics is therefore
the movement, or, as Marx says, the metamorphosis ofgoods. Marx begins this chapter with the
following words, which are particularly important for understanding the dialectical method of “Capital”:
“We have seen that the process of exchanging goods involves conflicting and mutually
exclusive relationships. The development of this process, which reveals the dual nature of
the commodity, which is the use value and exchange value, and leads to the division of the
commodity world into simple commodities and money commodities, does not eliminate these
contradictions, but creates a form for their movement.
Such is the general method by which real contradictions are resolved ” [220] .
So the contradiction of the commodity form determines the form of movement of goods. The
commodity as value is exchanged through the medium of money for use value: T - D - T. This
circulation of goods has two opposite phases of movement. At the beginning of the commodity form is
converted into monetary. Then back: the money form turns into a commodity. There is a kind
of negation of negation . On the one hand, the commodity form is denied monetary, and the latter is
again denied by the goods. On the other hand, at the beginning of the cycle the commodity is not the
use value, at the final destination it is the use value.
If we take further the circulation of goods as a whole, then it is denied, in turn, the circulation of
capital . In the first case, we have the movement of goods, in the second - the movement of money
that has become capital. In the first case, the money was the medium of circulation, in the second
they are the goal. In the circulation of D - T - D, the commodity acts only as a necessary phase for the
transformation of one value (D) into another — a greater cost (D ').
“Cost becomes thus self-propelled value, self-propelled money, and as such it is capital. It leaves
the sphere of circulation, enters it again, maintains and multiplies itself in it, comes back in an
enlarged form, and again and again begins the same circuit ” [221] .
The circulation of capital is only a further development of the movement of goods, and therefore a
further development of the contradictions of social relations. As its historical prerequisites, capital has:
1) the accumulation of money
2) the emergence of a new product - labor .
 Labor power is the only commodity from all other commodities that, in the process of consumption,
is capable of creating surplus value in excess of its value in the labor process. Money spent on its
purchase, return to the capitalist with a profit.
But only a certain amount of surplus value received makes the owner of money a capitalist, and
therefore only a certain amount of money can become capital. We need just such a sum of money that
can provide for the purchase of labor that is capable of producing surplus value in the amount
necessary for the maintenance of the capitalist and the increase of both constant and variable
capital. Thus, capital as a new quality is associated with a certain amount .
The surplus value (quantity) has that particular form or quality that it expresses the exploitation of
the worker by the capitalist. Commodity production generates the circulation of goods on the basis of
equivalent exchange. The owner of the goods exchanges him for goods of the same value of another
owner. The picture “qualitatively” changes under capitalist production and circulation. Here the
capitalist, the owner of capital, appropriates the unpaid labor of the worker. This
new quality expresses a new form of value (quantity) - surplus value.
In a letter to Engels (August 24, 1867), Marx wrote:
“The best in my book (“ Capital ”):
1) in the first chapter, the emphasized feature of the dual nature of labor , depending on whether it
is expressed in use or exchange value (the wholeunderstanding of facts rests on this theory of the
dual nature of labor );
2) surplus value is considered regardless of its particular forms as profit, interest, land rent, etc.
" [222] .
It is understandable why Marx distinguishes these two points. They are crucial in understanding
the essence of the economy of capitalism. The duality, contradictory nature of labor under capitalist
production reflects the main contradiction of capitalist society — the contradiction between
the social nature of production and the private form of appropriation. Tracing the development of this
contradiction in economics, Marx finds in the capitalist society itself both the material possibility, and
the way and the strength to overcome this contradiction. This is the socialization of the means of
production; such an opportunity - the concentration of production; force - the proletariat, well-trained,
disciplined by capitalist production itself, seasoned and politically mature in class battles with the
bourgeoisie.
The doctrine of surplus value, considered regardless of its special forms, formed the basis for a
clear, sharp opposition of the antagonistic positions of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This made
it possible to emphasize the class contradictions between the proletariat and all the oppressed, on the
one hand, and between all groups of exploiters, on the other.
In these two points, Marx's dialectical method was most pronounced. The entire exposition of
Capital, relying on these two points, unfolds in a spiral, revealing the fetishistic nature of capitalist
relations, more and more revealing the internal contradictions of capitalist society, tracing the
economic basis and various forms of capitalist exploitation and the growth of antagonism between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, further and further further tracing the historical trend of the
destruction of capitalism and the development of the prerequisites of a new communist society. For
whom the dialectic of the theory of commodity and surplus value, based on the law of the unity of
opposites, is clear, he will easily understand the dialectic of Capital as a whole.
Lenin and Stalin raise the Marxist understanding of the law of the unity of opposites to a higher
level. Lenin pays special attention to the identification of the full significance of this law as an essence,
as the core of dialectics. “In short, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of
opposites. This will capture the core of the dialectic, but this requires clarification and development.
” [223]. Lenin explains and develops this essence of dialectics on the basis of the indissoluble unity of
theory and revolutionary practice, as applied to the analysis of the most important stages of the
proletarian struggle. The cognition of the internal contradictory development was of enormous
importance for Lenin's analysis of the development of the Russian revolution, for his teaching on the
development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The Bolsheviks viewed
the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution "as two links of one chain, as a single and coherent
picture of the scope of the Russian revolution" [224]. Lenin and Stalin emphasize all the uniqueness of
the Russian “military feudal imperialism”, which made it possible to combine the historical
development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution against tsarism and which was carried out under
the leadership and hegemony of the proletariat with capitalism. “From the democratic revolution,”
wrote Lenin, “we will immediately begin to shift and just to the best of our strength, the strength of a
conscious and organized proletariat, we will begin to shift to a socialist revolution. We stand for
continuous revolution. We will not stop halfway ” [225] .
 By emphasizing the unity of the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution in the historical
conditions of Russia's development, in contrast to the right-wing alarmists (Kamenev, Zinoviev) ,
Lenin at the same time struggles with a Trotskyist misunderstanding of the stages and transitional
stages in the development of the revolution, the attitude of the proletariat to the peasantry at various
stages of the revolution. “After completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution together with the
peasantry in general, the proletariat of Russia finally went over to the socialist revolution‚ when he
managed to split the village, take over its proletarians and semi-proletarians, unite them against the
kulaks and the bourgeoisie, including the peasant bourgeoisie ... ” [226] If the revolutionary proletariat
did not manage to take into account the class stratification of the village, “then it would be a Blanquist
distortion of Marxism, then it would be an attempt of the minority to impose its will on the majority,
then it would be a theoretical absurdity, a misunderstanding that the all-peasant revolution is still
a bourgeois revolution and that without a series of transitions, transitional stages , it is impossible to
make it socialist in a backward country ” [227] .
The law of the unity of opposites laid Lenin the basis of the analysis of imperialism as a special and
new stage in the development of capitalism. Here Lenin reveals the unity of the general and
the particular , the general laws and contradictions of capitalism and the features that are introduced
by the imperialist stage. Lenin shows that these special features of imperialism not only do not
abolish, but also reinforce the manifestation of general capitalist contradictions, that the unity and
interweaving of monopolies and competition not only do not reduce the severity of capitalist
contradictions, but also sharpen them more, contribute to the deepening and intensification of
capitalist competition. Lenin and Stalin establish thatthe dictatorship of the proletariat is the basic law
of the period of the struggle of the people who gave birth to communism with dying capitalism . Lenin
and Stalin reveal the dual nature of NEP as a policy that allows the struggle of socialist and capitalist
elements and is designed for the victory of socialism, "as a bilateral process of development of
capitalism and the development of socialism, a controversial process of struggle of socialist elements
with capitalist elements, the process of overcoming elements of capitalist socialist elements" [228 ] .
Tov. Stalin shows how the exacerbation of capitalist contradictions in the new era is accompanied
by the emergence of a new contradiction, no longer the intracapitalist order, but contradictions
between capitalism as a whole and the country of socialism under construction, as this last
contradiction “ reveals to the roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them into one
node , turning them to the question of the life and death of the capitalist order themselves. "
4.2. The law of the transition of quantity to quality and back
Another law of materialistic dialectics is the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice
versa. To understand the process of development, this law is of paramount importance, for in this law
of dialectics a revolutionary abrupt transition from one quality to another is expressed.
Quality should be understood as the certainty of phenomena , due to which they are separated
from each other and which makes them what they are. Scientific research achieves success if,
studying a certain object, it takes it in its qualitative originality in comparison with other subjects. The
certainty that characterizes a subject is quality. The qualitative diversity of objects of objective reality
is explained by the presence in the outside world of various forms of motion of matter.. Everything
that exists is in the form of a certain form of motion of matter. True, not one form of movement is
inherent in certain things, but a series of them. For example, the human body contains the forms of
movement of matter, ranging from mechanical and ending with thinking. But for each specific, definite
thing, one of the forms of movement is characteristic, which plays a decisive, decisive role for
it. Consequently, when we talk about quality, we mean the existence of qualities, not independent of
the objective world, but the very objects, phenomena that possess one quality or another. Quality is
objective; the qualitative certainty of things in nature exists independently of consciousness. Human
thinking only reflects this qualitative certainty of objective processes.
Due to their quality, things are different, delimited from each other. This border, however, is not
absolute, for there are no absolutely individual, absolutely single objects in nature. Each object
contains something in common with all other objects, with which it is always in inseparable
connection. The qualitative certainty of things is not something permanent, unchanging, as
representatives of medieval scholasticism thought. The qualitative certainty of the phenomena of
reality is constantly evolving, changing, becoming more complex.
In order to properly understand the category of quality, it is necessary to consider the issue
of quality and property . This question examines Hegel in his Science of Logic. He writes: “Quality is
a property first and foremost, primarily in the sense, since it reveals itself externally as an immanent
definition. ” [229]. Hegel's idea here is that, while quality expresses an immanent, that is, a certainty
inherent in a given phenomenon, process or object, the property expresses this certainty in relation to
other objects. For example, a rose as a flower has certain qualities as one of the plant species, and
this quality is its certainty, which distinguishes it from all other plants. This certainty is expressed in
a number of properties - in the smell of a rose, in color, etc.
Quality is inextricably linked with the very being of the thing. Without this or that property, a thing
still does not lose its definiteness, losing the same quality, a thing ceases to be what it is, it becomes
a different one. The qualitative certainty of a thing is expressed in a specific pattern that determines
the nature of its development. The scientific definition of a thing acquires a meaningful character only
when it catches its qualitative definiteness.
The knowledge of a thing, however, does not stop at one qualitative characteristic; it also captures
the quantitative certainty inherent in the object under investigation. What is the number? We turn first
to how Hegel determines the number.
He writes: “ Quality is generally identical with being, direct definiteness, in contrast to
the quantity considered after it , which is also definiteness of being, but not directly identical with the
latter, but indifferent to being, external to it” [230] .
Thus, Hegel defines quantity as indifferent to being, external definiteness. In this definition, the
seed of truth is that, for the time being, changes in quantity are really outward in relation to
quality. Despite the change in quantity, the quality remains the same. However, this is all only up to a
certain point, when a further change in quantity leads to a change in quality. In this case, this
certainty does not just increase or decrease, but, on the contrary, changes radically. The quantitative
definiteness of phenomena, like the qualitative, is objective. The concept of quantity is a reflection in
the consciousness of those quantitative relations that are peculiar to the phenomena
themselves. Therefore, scientific knowledge must grasp and reflect the real reality not only in its
qualitative, but also in its quantitative diversity. Quantitative definiteness of an object does not exist
outside its qualitative definiteness, it is always closely connected with the latter. Similarly, a certain
specific measure of quantitative measurements is characteristic of a certain quality.
So, in nature there is not just quality and quantity, there are things that possess both qualitative
and quantitative certainty. The quantitative and qualitative definiteness of the subject constitutes an
inseparable unity . But this unity is the unity of various determinations, the unity of
opposites. Therefore, according to Lenin, the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa is an
example of the mutual transition of opposites. A certain unity of quantity and quality inherent in one
thing or another of the world around is a measure.. The measure expresses the specific qualitative
definiteness of the subject, which also has a specific quantitative characteristic. However, quantitative
changes in objects occur on the basis of a certain quality that is appropriate for them. Quality also
limits for the time being the limits of quantitative changes in the subject. For example, the feudal
mode of production extremely limited the possibilities for the growth of the productive forces, material
wealth and the entire level of development of society. These feudal relations were eliminated as a
result of the bourgeois revolution that established the capitalist mode of production. In turn,
capitalism, having played a progressive role in history, has become, at the imperialist stage of its
development, an extreme obstacle to the further movement of society forward. new quality !
In a word, the quantitative change finds its basis and its limitation in the qualitative definiteness of
the subject. In turn, the quantitative change of the subject affects its qualitative side. A definite object
remains what it is only up to a certain point. The quantitative process of change, having reached the
limit for a certain quality and under the given certain conditions of the face, requires a change in
quality, causing a transition from one quality to another . At the same time, this transition is and
the transition quality in quantity, because through the destruction of the old quality, the possibility of
a new quantitative advance is now achieved. Under any possible conditions for quantitative growth in
a capitalist society, the realization of a socialist type of production relations is impossible. But in the
conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a new socialist form of production relations is created,
and even the simple addition of the means of production in collectivized agriculture gives an
incomparably greater quantitative increase in production.
The law of the transition of quantity into quality, like other laws of dialectics, was formulated by
Hegel in his Science of Logic. But in Hegel this law received anidealistic expression, as the law of self-
movement of categories, and not the law of the objective world.. It goes without saying that the
Hegelian idealistic understanding of the law of the transition of quantity into quality is absolutely
unacceptable for us. The founders of Marxism, proving the inconsistency of Hegel's understanding of
the law of the transition of quantity into quality, revealed a rational kernel in it, gave it a deeply
materialistic interpretation, as Engels puts it. “For this purpose, we can express this law in such a way
that qualitative changes can occur in nature - in a way specifically defined for each individual case -
only by quantitative addition, or quantitative reduction of matter or movement (so-called energy).
 All qualitative differences in nature are based either on different chemical composition, or on
different quantities or forms of movement (energy), or - which is almost always the case - on
both. Thus, it is impossible to change the quality of any body without adding or taking away matter, or
movement, that is, without a quantitative change of this body ” [231] .
In support of this thought, Engels and in the "Anti-Dühring" and in "The Dialectic of Nature" cites a
number of examples showing how a purely quantitative reduction or increase in the same chemical
elements turns into a qualitative difference.
Engels, referring to the law of transfer of quantity in quality and vice versa, indicates that “the law
of nature, discovered by Hegel, celebrates its greatest triumphs in the field of chemistry. Chemistry
can be called the science of qualitative changes in bodies that occur under the influence of changes in
the quantitative composition ” [232] . Then Engels gives the following examples: oxygen and ozone. Two
atoms are connected to the oxygen molecule, and three atoms - into the ozone molecule - a new body
is obtained, which differs in its properties from oxygen. “And what to say,” Engels writes further, “on
the various proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulfur and of which each gives a
body that is qualitatively different from all other bodies! How is laughing gas (nitrous oxide
N 2 O) different from nitric anhydride (nitrogen nitrate N 2 O5 )! The first is gas, the second at ordinary
temperature is a solid crystalline solid! Meanwhile, the whole difference between them in composition
is that the second body has five times more oxygen than the first, and between the two there are also
other nitrogen oxides (NO, N 2 O 3 , N 2 O 7 ), which all differ qualitatively from both of them and from
each other ” [233] .
These are examples from chemistry, which Engels cites as illustrations to the law of the transition
of quantity into quality. Engels believes that this law is of great importance for the chemical elements
themselves. The periodic system of elements discovered and developed by Mendeleev shows that the
quality of elements and their place in the system is determined by the number of their atomic weight.
So the quantitative changes of phenomena are, up to a certain limit, the character of the
continuous growth of the same thing in its quality of the subject. The subject, changing
quantitatively within the same measure , does not cease to be what it is. Only at a certain stage of its
development, under certain historical conditions, the object loses its quality, ceases to exist. The
transformation of one quality into another, as opposed to a continuous quantitative process of change,
does not occur gradually, but abruptly. The object, which has become a new quality, shows only its
many-sided properties, the parties, remain in their quality with the same subject until the struggle of
the opposite sides leads to a change in quality. Jump, break continuous process and there is a
moment of transition from one quality to another.
Only quantitative continuous change of phenomena never leads to the emergence of new
qualities. The recognition of only continuous change entails a denial of the possibility of the emergence
of qualitatively new things. And this would mean standing on the point of view of the immutability of
things that, once appeared, make a movement in an eternally immutable circle. In the same way, the
recognition of the qualitative development of phenomena alone would be untenable. Only qualitative
transitions without a corresponding quantitative change would mean the absence of a historical
connection between the different phases of a change in phenomena.
The dialectic concept of development, in contrast to the vulgar theory of evolution, recognizes the
intermittent, discontinuous nature of the changes in the phenomena of the world around us. A jump,
the transition of one quality to another, is not prepared immediately, but in the process
of gradually changing things. And in this gradual change lies the possibility of a break from the very
beginning, a jump that will come immediately, as soon as the quantitative changes necessary for each
case are sufficiently matured.
The law of the transition of quantity into quality and back causes particular hatred from the
enemies of Marxism, all kinds of reformists and opportunists, for this law, when applied to the
phenomena of social life, means the recognition of the need for revolutionary change in society, the
recognition of the need forleapfrogging. in the transition from one social formation to
another. Reformists and social-fascists, emasculation of the revolutionary content of Marxism, hold the
view that the transition to socialism is not at all obligatory through the revolution, through the
dictatorship of the proletariat, that the simple quantitative development of democracy will lead society
to socialism. Hitler's fascism personally showed where the development of bourgeois democracy leads,
and the whole value of the social-fascist "theoretical" fabrications on the issue of "gradual reform" of
capitalist society.
Under Soviet conditions, the teaching of materialist dialectics about the quality and quantity is
subject to revision by the mechanists and the Menshevist idealists .
 Proponents of the mechanistic worldview explain "any changes from place changes, all qualitative
differences from quantitative and do not notice that the relationship between quality and quantity is
mutual, that quality also goes into quantity, like quantity to quality, that there is an interaction" [234] .
Giving a brilliant refutation of the mechanistic world view, Engels shows that if we "reduce all
differences and changes in quality to quantitative differences and changes to mechanical movements,
then we need to come to the proposition that all matter is composed of are identical smallest particles,
and that all the qualitative differences in the chemical elements of matter are caused by quantitative
differences in the number and spatial grouping of these smallest particles when they are combined
into atoms ” [235]. But in this case, the question arises, where is the reason for the diversity, that multi-
quality, which we observe in nature? The mechanists cannot answer this question without getting into
the marsh of desperate metaphysics. For example, modern mechanists deny the qualitative
uniqueness of all forms of movement, reducing them to mechanical movement and explaining to the
latter positively all the phenomena of the reality surrounding us.
The denial by the mechanists of the fact that qualities are objective in nature leads, as their
inevitable consequence, to the denial of the abrupt development of phenomena. Indeed, if the objects
of the world are only definable from the quantitative side, their development may consist solely in a
quantitative increase or decrease , but not in the transformation of one quality into another, as the
dialectical concept of development teaches. Therefore, mechanists are restorers that have long
outlived themselves and, consequently, the reactionary now vulgar evolutionary theory, which reduces
development to an increase or decrease and denies leaps.
The vulgar theory of evolution, which denies the abrupt nature of development and the
transformation of one quality into another, is the theoretical basis of revisionism. The father of
revisionism, Bernstein, based on this theory at the time, advocated the blunting of class contradictions
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, denied the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and
the need for a proletarian revolution. Modern social-fascists argue their tactics with the vulgar theory
of evolution, pushing it against the doctrine of the proletarian revolution. Under the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the vulgar conception of evolution is a methodological prerequisite for the right-
opportunist theory of the attenuation of class struggle and the growth of the kulak in socialism. The
reactionary views of modern mechanists give a philosophical justification of the right opportunistic
conclusions.
In contrast to the mechanists, Menshevik idealists recognize in words the unity of quality and
quantity and the objective nature of quality. However, these categories, like all others, they turn into
abstract formulas and purely logical categories, divorced from the real world. The isolation of the
general categories of quality and quantity from their concrete, material content consists of an idealistic
understanding of the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. By imparting self-
sufficiency to the concepts of quality and quantity, Menshevist idealists deduce quantity-to-quality
conversions in a purely logical way, considering it possible to consider any specific transition
cases, regardless of conditions, time and place .
4.3. Denial of Denial
The law of negation of negation is one of the very general and widely-functioning laws of dialectics
and, at the same time, the specification of its basic law, the unity of opposites. In Hegel, the negation
of negation appears as the basic law in the construction of his entire philosophical system. In
materialistic dialectics, the negation of negation has such an important and general significance in the
development of nature, human society and thinking that Engels attributes it — along with the law of
the unity of opposites and the law of the transition of quantity into quality — and vice versa to
the most general laws of dialectics.
Further development of the Marxist understanding of the law of negation of negation and its
meaning for the materialist dialectic gives us Lenin, in his vivid characterization of dialectical doctrine
of development: "Development, - he says - as it repeats the stages already passed,
but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ( “Denial of denial”), development, so to speak, along a
spiral, and not along a straight line ” [236] . In another place, listing the elements of dialectics, Lenin
also points out: “a repetition in the highest stage of well-known features, properties, etc. lower
and supposedly return to the old (denial of denial) " [237] .
The unity of opposites, their interpenetration and their struggle reveal the source of self-
movement, development, its internal driving forces, internal impulses to development, given by
contradiction. The law of the transition of quantity into quality reveals the very process of
development, its qualitatively unique steps, the abrupt, revolutionary course of this development -
with interruptions of gradualness and the inseparable interdependence of quality and quantity. “Denial
of denial” further deepens our understanding of the development process. Speaking about the
negation of negation in development, the materialistic dialectic emphasizes that a certain sequence,
movement through various stages , stages, stages is observed in development . The course of
development is notstraightforward., but zigzagging, contradictory, and during the transition from one
stage to another, sharp turns are inevitable , so that the development of the internal contradictions of
the object or phenomenon leads at each next stage to their transition into its opposite.
In this contradictory development, each lower stage of development prepares for itself the
condition of its self-denial , its transition to the opposite, new,higher level; this negation —
overcoming each subsequent stage of the previous one — creates an internal connection between both
stages, signifies the preservation at the new stage of the positive results of the preceding
development.
In the transition to a new opposite, to the next, third stage, development seems to repeat the well-
known features and properties of the lower, first stage, supposedly returns to the starting point of the
process, but at the same time enriches it with the results of subsequent development, reproduces
these repeated features on a higher basis, and the whole process of development in general proceeds
in converging and diverging circles - in a spiral . Since every second stage of development is the
negation of the first stage, and the new, third stage, in turn, "denies" the second stage, all
development appears as a denial of denial. Such, in short, is the rich content that Marxism-Leninism
puts into the concept of the negation of the negation.
Often one has to deal with a misconception when one sees a rare case of development in the
negation of a negation and hardly finds examples of it. Meanwhile, as Engels notes, the denial of
denial is a very general and widely applicable law of the development of nature, society and human
thinking, a law inherent in each development process. Grain, the well-known example of Engels,
thrown into the ground, under normal conditions of its development turns into its negation - into an
ear, which, reproducing grains, in larger quantities and sometimes qualitatively improved, signifies, as
it were, a return to the starting point. But after all, the development of a tree, of any plant, of any
insect, of any plant and animal organism, is carried out in the same way. The height of a person and
his puberty, pregnancy of a woman, new childbirth and the development of a new person, subject to
certain laws of heredity ‚unless all these phenomena can not be seen as a manifestation of the same
great and universal law of negation of the old and the emergence of this old new, then the new denial,
which reproduces in one way or another the well-known features of the old on a qualitatively higher
basis? Engels rightly pointed out that the negation of negation takes place in the inorganic nature, for
example in the processes of development of the earth's crust, etc.
The law of negation of negation is expressed in the development of human society. From this point
of view, Marx and Engels view the historical preparation of socialist society from this point of view,
seeing in it the product of the whole past — the “denied” and “surmountable” historical
development. Such is the historical development of property — the transition from primitive communal
ownership of land to private land ownership — and — a new denial of this latter — public ownership of
land under socialism; This is the transition from ancestral property by uniting genera to ancient
“collective private property” and then to individual property, after which the concentration of private
property begins again.
In development through negation of negation, Marx, in Capital, summarized the main historical
"tendency of capitalist accumulation." Marx shows how small-scale production and private property,
based on his own labor, themselves prepare the conditions for their denial, their destruction. The
expropriation of direct producers is "the transformation of individual and fragmented tools of
production socially concentrated", but owned by the capitalist. Together with the victory of the
capitalist mode of production, the further socialization of labor and the means of production takes a
different form. The very immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production - through the
concentration of capital, the development of the cooperative form of the labor process and the
transformation of the means of production into those that can only be used socially, causing a rise in
poverty, exploitation and resentment of the ever-growing working class, trained, united and organized
by the capitalist production process itself, prepare a new denial: the expropriation of the
expropriators, the destruction of capitalism. Under socialism, public ownership of the means of
production is harmoniously combined with individual ownership of the means of consumption.
Finally, in the field of human thinking it is not difficult to notice the same stages of
development. Lenin portrayed the development of philosophical thought in the form of “circles”, and
pointed out that the matter was not in strictly chronological order, but in identifying the main lines of
thought development: Holbach’s materialism, the denial of the possibility of knowledge from Hume-
Kant, the denial of this denial in Hegel’s idealistic dialectic : Hegel’s idealistic dialectic, a return to
Feuerbach’s metaphysical materialism, the negation of denial in Marx’s materialistic dialectic, which
“repeats” Hegel’s dialectic, but also reprocesses enriching its materialist content. The same kind of
development shows Engels in the "Anti-Dühring". Ancient Greek naive dialectic is like the first
step, which is then denied the spread of metaphysical materialism in the subsequent period. But
metaphysical materialism is also denied. Modern materialistic dialectics is such a form of materialism
that holds all the positive things that were in the previous development, but in a transcended
form. And here the same rhythm of development - the previous stage in one way or another prepares
the transition to the opposite side and then to a new denial, as if returning to the starting point, but
on a higher basis.
The connection of this law of dialectics with the law of the unity of opposites is quite obvious . In
each case of the unity of opposites, we can, among the contradictory tendencies characterizing the
phenomenon, highlight a positive moment, affirming this phenomenon, contributing to the
preservation of the temporary, conditional unity of its opposites, and another moment - negative, the
development of which leads to the struggle of opposites, to overcome this form, to the resolution of
contradiction. In addition to the grain-forming nutrient, the grain contains an embryo of a future plant,
which absorbs this nutrient as it grows; The private ownership of the small commodity producer has
already laid the beginning of the future capitalist property - its denial. The negative moment of
development is in the internal connection with the positive moment. The old positive content of a
developing object is not rejected in vain, not completely destroyed in the process of its denial: it
serves as a prerequisite and the material to be processed and assimilated. A new stage of
development, using everything in it is valuable and viable, moving forward.
Denial in dialectics, as we already know, is by no means a bare, sly, empty negation. Dialectic
negation is also not questioning and not based on anything concrete, skeptical denial characteristic of
subjectivism, relativism, sophistry and eclecticism. Denial is the overcoming or, as Hegel puts it,
the removal of the old, old stage of development, that is, its denial with the retention of everything
positive created by the former development. Denial is the driving force of development; it is that “evil”
which, according to Marx, “leads forward”. But thus, the positive content of this phenomenon, which is
denied in the further development, not only prepares its own negation, but in a certain sense it
is preserved in the negative, it is overcome, processed by it, passes in its negation to a higher level.
In denial this way there is not a grain of subjectivism or bare skepticism. Denial is a certain
moment, a stage of objective development that requires certain answers and certain actions.
Emphasizing the unity, the connection of the negative with the positive, finding this positive in the
negative, Lenin wrote: “Not bare negation, not obvious negation, not skeptical denial, hesitation,
doubt is characteristic and significant in dialectics, which undoubtedly contains an element of negation
and, moreover, as the most important its element is not, but negation as a moment of connection, as
a moment of development, with retention of a positive , that is, without any hesitation, without any
eclecticism ” [238] .
Development through denial is only a different expression of development through the
interpenetration and struggle of opposites; denial of denial is a further concretization of the same law
in a number of stages of this development.
If the transition of quantity into quality explains to us the emergence of new qualities, then the
negation of negation shows how this new quality by self-denial arises from the old quality, reveals the
internal connection between the new and the old as successive stages of development. Only the
conscious application of all the laws of dialectics fully reveals to us the problem of the new, the
problem of development, the problem of revolution.
Summarizing the process of development in the formula “negation of the negation”, the
materialistic dialectic identifies in it three most important steps, the starting point, the step of the
negation and the third, higher step of returning to the starting point - the negation of the
negation. However, it would be erroneous to believe that this stage of denial ends the development
process: development knows no boundaries, denial of denial not only completes the course of previous
development, but in turn serves as a starting point for further development, for the emergence of new
contradictions, for new "denials."
This external form of the three stages of development, with a return to the starting point, has long
been noticed by a number of thinkers. The idea of development along three successive steps was
reflected in the ancient mystical and religious philosophy of the so-called Neo-Platonists. Later on the
development of "circles" taught the brilliant J. Vico. As Lenin notes, “both astronomical and
mechanical (on earth) movement and the life of plants, animals and humans - all this drove humanity
into the heads not only the idea of movement, but precisely movement with returns to the starting
points , that is, the dialectical movement” [239] . Hegel gave her expression in his famous " triad ""-
thesis (position), antithesis (opposition), synthesis (unity) - at the same time denial and preservation
of both positions. In the form of a “triad” according to Hegel, the self-development of the spirit, the
self-development of each logical category, is accomplished. Hegel overcomes in a purely mental way,
"removes", in accordance with this triadic scheme, the contradictions of concepts, without attaining,
however, a genuine resolution of the real contradictions of the objective world. The logical steps of the
"triad", "denying" one another, are connected in Hegel by artificial logical transitions that do not
reflect the real material, natural-historical, and socio-historical connection.
Revisionists of all interpretations have long blamed the Marxist dialectic for allegedly subordinating
the real development to the far-fetched scheme of the Hegelian “triad”: critics claim that in this purely
scholastic way, without any other evidence, Marxism allegedly seeks to justify the controversial course
of historical development and the inevitability of the revolution. With such an accusation at the
address of Marx's "Capital", his famous chapter on the law of capitalist accumulation, the mechanist
Duerg also spoke; Later, Russian populists like N. Mikhailovsky and others repeated this slander on
Marxism.
Engels, in his criticism of Dühring, gave a brilliant answer to all such accusations. Engels
emphasized that Marx does not prove anything by denying denial, but he only summarizes and
summarizes in this general dialectical formulation his long and careful study of the genuine, concrete,
historical process of development of capitalism and its historical tendencies, which were reflected in all
the enormous material “Capital ". It is only as a result of a concrete historical study, supported by a
huge amount of factual material, did Marx characterize this process additionally as taking place
according to a definite dialectical law. Covering the most diverse phenomena with a single universal
negation of negation, Engels pointed out, we do not say anything about the peculiarities each
individual development process. Meanwhile, it is necessary to deny not in vain, but in such a way that
the first and second “negatives” express the process of actual development : “the way of denial is
determined ... firstly, by the general , and secondly, by the special nature of this process” [240] . Only
a concrete , comprehensive study of each individual case of development on factual material can give
such a deep understanding of all the features and contradictory steps of this process that it becomes
possible to characterize this development in one particular respect or another as occurring according
to the general law of negation of negation.
Lenin also strongly rejects the accusation of the Marxist populists in reducing evidence to Hegelian
“triads” and the “indisputable” dialectical scheme. Lenin explained to Mikhailovsky that the very term
“negation of the negation” in Marx and Engels is only “a mode of expression”, indicating the
historical origin of thematerialist dialectics, which had one of its sources the dialectic of
Hegel. According to Lenin, Marx "recognized as the only criterion of the theory its loyalty to reality ." If
... at the same time, it sometimes turned out that the development of some social phenomenon fell
under the Hegelian scheme: position, negation - negation of negation, then there is nothing surprising
here, because it is not uncommon in nature ” [241]. Only with the Hegelian idealist understanding of
development, in which the development of reality is subject to the development of an idea, can one
interpret the meaning of the “triads”, the “indisputability” of the dialectic process. In the Marxist
dialectic "for triads, there is no other place as the role of the cover and the husk" [242] . The essence of
the law of negation of negation is not in the external form of “triads”, but in the concrete study of the
internal features of the process, which inevitably lead development to sharp turns, preparing its “self-
denial”, in studying the successive stages of development of the new from the old, higher stage.
And much later, Lenin argued with Comrade Bukharin, who abused the word "dialectical denial",
that "one cannot use it without first proving cautiously with the facts" [243] . At the same time, Lenin
raises the Marxist understanding of denial of denial, formulating its connection with the law of the
unity of opposites, stressing the sequence of inevitable stages of development, the course of
development in circles, in spirals , with inevitable turns, with returns , as a characteristic feature of
dialectical development. to the starting point, revealing the controversial path of development of the
new from the old and the connection of the new with the old in this development.
Studying the process of development of our party and party struggle, in particular, on the analysis
of materials of the Second Party Congress, Lenin showed that the development of party struggle is
subject to the same law of denial of denial and goes through contradictions: the minority at the
congress becomes the majority, the majority is a minority; the starting point of the ideological
struggle for the 1st paragraph of the statute is denied, giving way to non-fundamental issues, and
then the denial of denial begins, return to the starting point of the ideological struggle; but the
“thesis” has already been enriched with all the results of the “antithesis” and turned into a higher
“synthesis” when two different systems of views are associated with the right or wrong position on the
1st point, the revolutionary and opportunist wing of the party is revealed. “In a word,” wrote Lenin,
“not only oats grow but Hegel, but Russian Social Democrats also fight each other according to
Hegel” [244] .
However, this recognition of the contradictory development of the party struggle should not at all
justify the sophistry, eclecticism, zigzags and personal mistakes of politicians: “True dialectics does
not justify personal mistakes, but studies inevitable turns , proving their inevitability on the basis of
a detailed study of development in all its specificity” [245 ] .
The paths of development of the party struggle through contradictions were designated with
particular vividness during the transition period. The fight against the anti-Bolshevik, Menshevik
position of Kamenev and Zinoviev on the eve and in the period of October, the struggle against the
"left" communists after the victory of the proletarian revolution in the period of Brest, the
concentration of fire "left" against Trotskyism in the recovery period, then the transformation of right
opportunism into the main danger in the era socialist reconstruction, further "synthesis" of the right
and left in the "right-left" block, etc. Tov. Stalin further develops the Leninist doctrine of the
inconsistency of the process of development and the sequence of passable stages, of the controversial
ways of development of the Soviet state, national forms and the international content of culture, etc.
The mechanists understood outwardly the negation of negation, perceiving it as a Hegelian “triad”,
filling it with a different, mechanistic content: for example, Bukharin reduced the negation of the
negation to “imbalance” and then to a new “restoration” of this equilibrium, depending on the external
environment.
Menshevist idealists replaced negation with eclectic synthesis, the combination of pieces of
the old : dialectical materialism, according to Deborin, is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectics and
Feuerbach's materialism. From the point of view of right-wing opportunism, the entire transitional era
is the restoration of the balance broken by the October revolution; It is not surprising that, according
to Bukharin, all development takes place in the order of a smooth evolution, without class
contradictions, without the need to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotskyists and "left"
opportunists made logical "leaps" through the necessary stages of development.
Neither the right nor the "left" understood the new in the structure of socialist production relations,
the contradictory ways of its development, the role of the old in relation to the new in the
development of the proletarian revolution.
4.4. Essence, phenomenon, content, form
We have clarified in the previous chapters the basic laws of materialist dialectics. However, they by
no means exhaust the materialist dialectic as a science. It is necessary to find out why the scientific
knowledge of the objective world consists in knowing the laws of its development; it is necessary to
show how the laws of special forms of movement and development of this objective world reveal the
essence of the phenomena and processes occurring in it. In this regard, we must dwell on such
important categories of dialectics as phenomenon and essence.
The practice of a social person, which transforms the world, is the basis upon which our knowledge
of the internal connections of phenomena develops, not limited to their external appearance.
The task of scientific knowledge is to penetrate into the depths of things, to reveal their internal
connections, hidden by their external, direct visibility, to deepen our knowledge of the quality of things
by this way, to reveal their identity and difference behind reality, to discover the most common and
important in them - their basis, their essence , the necessary logical connection of phenomena. The
historical practice of social man, the practice of material production and class struggle generates and
consolidates the main categories of scientific knowledge — essence, law, causality, etc.
The most general and basic concept of scientific knowledge, indicating the penetration of
knowledge into the depths of things, is the concept of their inner connection, their essence , which is
opposed to immediate phenomena.
The concept of internal communication, patterns of phenomena, their essence, hidden behind the
immediate phenomena, appears already at the early stages of the history of human thinking, but only
gradually receives its materialistic content. Engels notes that the embryos of abstraction (the idea of a
genus) and analysis (breaking of nuts) are characteristic of animals. The labor process, which
distinguishes human society from nature, leads man to domination over nature, to the ability to
“comprehend and correctly apply its laws,” develops the ability to “foresee ... and regulate ... the
consequences ... of ordinary production processes” [246]. Engels, using the example of the theory of
heat, shows how slowly knowledge of internal connections and laws develops, capturing many
centuries and millennia. Already the ancient Greek philosophers (the Eleatic) sought to find the
essence of all things. The concept of essence acquires a metaphysical character in the Middle Ages
(the doctrine of unchanging "essences" of things, "elements", etc.). Only together with the successes
of physics and chemical analysis does the materialistic view of the essence of things strengthen. Kant,
as we have already seen, turned the essence of things into the world of unknowable “things in
themselves,” which he has been cut off from the world of phenomena. This metaphysical gap between
the essence and the phenomenon of things, held by Kant's philosophy, was subjected to the most
severe criticism by Hegel. Hegel overcomes the old, metaphysical view of essence as if it were
something otherworldly, unchanging, motionless ‚fundamentally fenced off from the world of visible
phenomena. Hegel sets the relative nature of the concept of "essence", its close interdependence with
the world of phenomena, with the "appearance" that is outwardly opposite to it: the inner essence of
things, Hegel points out, reveals itself only in phenomena. Hence the importance of studying
phenomena for understanding the very essence of things.
But the concept of "essence" received from Hegel a purely idealistic development: through logical
development, essence as it constructs its "reality". The genuinely deep, materialistic meaning of the
concept of essence is obtained only in the materialist dialectic, on the basis of the study by Marx and
Engels of the essence of social life, in the process of developing the class struggle of the
proletariat. Marx does not ignore the "essence", as some vulgar materialists and creeping empiricists
tend to do. “If,” he says, “the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then
any science would be superfluous” [247]. “Dialectics,” notes Lenin, “require a comprehensive study of
this social phenomenon in its development and information external, seeming to the fundamental
driving forces , to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle ” [248] . At the same
time, Lenin emphasizes the unity of essence and phenomenon, their transition from one to
another. “We see,” Lenin gives a materialistic description, “a transition, overflowing one into another:
essence is . The phenomenon is significant . The thought of man infinitely deepens from phenomenon
to essence, from the essence of the first order, so to speak, to the essence of the second order, and
so on without end ” [249] .
In Marx, Engels, Lenin we have the opposition of the internal connection of things to their
immediate "appearance", and at the same time the recognition of the unity of essence and
phenomenon, internal and external. The essence is not outside of phenomena, it is in them , although
not always this essence of things appears in phenomena entirely and directly . The essence of
phenomena is their relationship , their internal connection , it is a pattern penetrating phenomena,
the integral unity of a given set of phenomena. “Human essence,” Marx criticizes the abstract view of
Feuerbach, “is not an abstract characteristic of an individual individual. In its reality, it is the totality of
social relations." [250] .
Marx's "Capital" reveals to us all the enormous scientific significance of the category of
"essence." Investigating the essence of capitalist production, Marx begins his study with direct
existence, with the goods. The analysis of a commodity as a social relation, a logical and historical
analysis, verified by facts and practice, reveals in the commodity a unity of use value and value, a
unity of direct phenomenon and essence ; analysis reveals in various goods their common unity, due
to which various goods appear to be qualitatively the same, the cost, the measure of which is socially
necessary labor. “Labor,” says Marx, “is that the different goods are the same, their unity ,
their essence, the internal basis of their value " [251] . Various things, - he points out, - “should be
considered as respective incarnations, expressions of the same general unity , an element that is
completely different from their natural existence or phenomenon” [252] . Marx traces this unity of
essence and phenomenon in such economic categories as price and value, price, supply and demand,
wages and price of labor, etc.
The category of essence of Marx plays the same important role in the analysis of surplus
value. Analyzing the surplus value and its disintegration into parts, Marx points out that it takes on
special forms, independent of each other and regulated by various laws. Therefore, “their common
unity — surplus value — and therefore the nature of this common unity — becomes more and more
unrecognizable, it does not appear in the phenomenon , but should only be revealed as a hidden
mystery” [253] .
Considering the transformation of the rate of surplus value into a rate of profit, Marx notes that
“historically, the starting point has been the rate of profit. The surplus value and the rate of surplus
value are, relatively, something invisible, requiring substantial disclosure, while the rate of profit, and
therefore such a form of surplus value as profit, is found on the surface of the phenomenon
” [254] . “Profit is a form of manifestation of surplus value, and the latter can only be hatched out of the
first through analysis” [255] .
No less important is the notion of essence in the Marxist analysis of class production relations. So
for example, referring to the fact that in the last unfinished chapter of Capital, Marx speaks of "three
large social classes" [256] - landowners ‚capitalists and workers - receiving some rent, profit and salary,
some authors consider all these three classes major classes of bourgeois society, inextricably linked
with the capitalist mode of production. Of course, landowners play a very important role in the
development of capitalism: as Marx points out, large landowners act as the personification of one of
the most essential conditions of production, land; besides, the formation of large landed property is a
historical prerequisite for capitalism, which needs the expropriation of the working conditions of small
landowners and the formation of a class of wage workers. Nevertheless, we must consider the class of
large landowners as a derivative phenomenon, not arising from the essence of the capitalist mode of
production. "The capitalist and the wage worker are the only figures and factors of production whose
attitude and opposition to each other derives fromthe essence of the capitalist mode of production
" [257] . Capitalism is possible even if the land belongs to, say, the capitalist state, if only it does not
belong to the working class. Therefore, Marx considers “based on the essence of the capitalist mode of
production — and unlike the feudal, ancient, etc. — reduction of classes directly involved in production
... to capitalists and wage workers, with the exception of the landowner, who comes only post factum
due to property relations on the forces of nature that did not grow out of the capitalist mode of
production, but by the inherited "..." adequate theoretical expression of the capitalist mode of
production " [258]. Proceeding from this essence of capitalism, we must, however, have to consider the
important role that the class of landowners plays in the concrete historical conditions of the
development of capitalism, in capitalist reality, as the third major class of bourgeois society.
The concept of "essence" gets its further development in the works of Lenin and Stalin. In the
struggle with Trotsky and Bukharin on the issue of trade unions, where Lenin gives a brief description
of dialectical logic, he requires us to “ study : first, the essence of disagreement, and, second, the
development of party struggle. Both are necessary, ”said Lenin,“ because the essence of disagreement
is developed, explained, concretized (and very often and modified) in the course of the struggle ” [259] .
Lenin further develops the Marxist doctrine of essence, paying special attention to the development
of the essence and its concretization , finding out the connection of the essence with concrete
phenomena , with the visibility, with the insignificant - their relationship, their unity . Kant not only
severed the world of phenomena from the world of "things in themselves," but at the same time
turned the visibility of phenomena of reality into something purely subjective. Subjected to sharp
criticism of Kant's subjectivism, Hegel emphasized the objective significance of visibility, the
appearance of this particular world of phenomena itself. He showed that the appearance of a thing is a
manifestation of the thing itself, its essence in one of the moments of its movement, that the
appearance, the appearance of things is a special expression, a manifestation of their very
essence. Hegel showed that the inner essence of things is not something immovable, divorced from
the world of phenomena, that the appearance, the appearance of things is not “nothing” in the sense
of objectively non-existent, as Kantians think. The seeming, the visible are non-essential aspects of
the thing, “nothing,” but these non-essential moments simultaneously reflect a certainmoment in the
movement of the most objective. essence of things. But the idealist Hegel sees in the movement from
essence to appearance a purely logical movement - “from nothing to nothing”. Lenin corrects here the
idealist Hegel, pointing out that a movement even towards a disappearing “irrelevant” is always a
movement “from something”, while emphasizing the materialistic nature of the notion of essence and
its connection with the concrete world of phenomena, with the “unimportant”. “The insignificant,
seeming, superficial disappears more often,” Lenin commented and corrected Hegel, “it doesn’t hold
itself so tightly, it doesn’t hold itself so tightly as the essence. For example: the movement of the river
- foam above and deep currents below. But foam is an expression of essence ” [260] .
Not only the essence, but all the unimportant has an objective meaning: the essence expresses the
general unity, the necessary internal connection of things, and all the insignificant that we discard in
analyzing the essence are separate facts, a single, random, external existence of things. But the
external existence of each individual object also has its basis in the internal essence, in internal
relations, and laws of the given object. On the other hand, the general exists only in the individual, in
the individual, and the essence of things cannot be imagined outside of things themselves, without the
unity of essence and its manifestations, without mediating this essence, that is, without realizing it in
reality. The essence of a phenomenon must be studied in allconnections of the subject, in
its development , at the concrete levels of this development, in the process of struggle , which is
conducted during the course of its development.
In a whole series of Lenin's speeches in connection with the development of the 1917 revolution,
this one correct approach to the study of the class essence of historical phenomena can be traced. So
in the Letters on Tactics, criticizing Kamenev’s position, Lenin notes that the old Bolshevik formulas
about the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry
are generally confirmed by history, but their concrete implementation in fact, it turned out more
complicated. The February revolution meant the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie. However, at the
same time, a side government emerged and existed in the face of the councils of workers and soldiers'
deputies, voluntarily giving their power to the bourgeoisie. Already in April 1917, the indignation of
the masses deceived by the defencism began, and this is "the essence of the crisis, which must be
strictly distinguished from the opinions and assumptions of individuals and parties." Next, Lenin
analyzes the essence the maneuver of the bourgeoisie, which consists in turning the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries into an appendage to the bourgeois government. In this regard, he reveals
the class essence of the struggle of the Cadets and Mensheviks against the Bolshevik Party. Lenin
clarifies the essence of the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, which seeks to occupy the "middle
line" in the class struggle. Whatever the external forms, the essence lies in the relationship of classes .
During the events of July, Lenin clarifies the modification of the essence of the slogan “all power to
the Soviets”, as well as the essence of the conditions that in the previous period made possible the
peaceful way of the revolution. “The essence of the matter is that the power cannot be taken
peacefully now” [261] , power in fact passed into the hands of a military gang; one should not take the
deceptive appearance of the Kerensky government as an essence and not see its Bonapartist
essence. Lenin argues to Kautsky and Co. that "the economic essence of capitalist exploitation is not
at all affected by the replacement of monarchical forms of government with republican-democratic
ones" ... etc., etc.
With the same clarity finds Lenin class essence of Marx's theory of the state and the fundamental
difference between the proletarian state against bourgeois: "The essence of Marx's doctrine of the
state has been mastered only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a single class is
necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for of the proletariat , which overthrew
the bourgeoisie, but also for the whole historical period separating capitalism from "a society without
classes", from communism. The forms of bourgeois states are extremely diverse, but their essence is
the same: all these states are one way or another, but in the last analysis it is obligatory
the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but
give an enormous abundance and diversity of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the
same: the dictatorship of the proletariat ” [262] . Lenin also clearly characterizes the main essence of
the dictatorship of the proletariat: "Its main essence is in the organization and discipline of the
vanguard of the working people, its avant-garde, its sole leader, the proletariat" [263] .
We find a deep analysis of the essence of the October Revolution and the essence of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in Comrade Stalin. The essence of the October Revolution, Comrade
Stalin, sees in its two features: first, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born from power that
arose from the alliance of the proletarian and working masses of the peasantry under the leadership of
the proletariat; secondly, the dictatorship of the proletariat has become firmly established in us as a
result of the victory of socialism in one country that is capitalistically underdeveloped, while capitalism
is preserved in capitalistically more developed countries. There is a significant, the fundamental
difference between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, that is, the dictatorship of the exploiting
minority over the exploited majority, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the dictatorship of
the majority over the minority of exploiters. “The essence of Soviet power lies in the fact that the
most mass and most revolutionary organizations of those classes that were oppressed by capitalists
and landowners are now the“ permanent and only basis of all state power, of the entire state
apparatus ” [264] .
In connection with this, the criticism by Comrade Stalin of Comrade Zinoviev’s attempts to identify
the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the concept of the dictatorship of the party is
of great theoretical importance for the materialist dialectic . As Comrade Stalin points out,
Lenin understands only in a certain sense, by the dictatorship of the proletariat , essentially
the dictatorship of its organized and conscious minority, that is, the party, precisely in the sense of
the governing party roles. “To say,“ in essence, ”explains Lenin's thought, Comrade Stalin explains,
does not mean to say,“ entirely. ” We often say that the national question is essentially a peasant
question. And this is absolutely correct. But this does not mean that the national question is covered
by the peasant question ... The dictatorship of the proletariat in scope is wider and richer than the
leading role of the party ” [265] .
The party exercises its leadership through advice, through the intermediary of the masses,
listening keenly to their voice. Zinoviev did not see these intermediary links through which the party
leadership finds its implementation. According to Zinoviev, the party directly exercises the dictatorship
of the proletariat. Zinoviev, then, identified the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in a
certain sense (“leadership”) with a specific form of its implementation.
According to all these instructions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, the essence of the subject or
issue, its “core” we must not only reveal, “expel” from the “unimportant”, ie, random, single facts: we
must simultaneously consider the movement of this essence , its formation, the transition to the form
of its manifestation, its implementation. The essence of any thing is not a dead immovable
abstraction, a certain “self-identical” essence, not a “thing in itself”, but an internal regular connection
of phenomena, their basis for the correct understanding of which requires various specific moments of
its manifestation. Therefore, we must see in the very essence of the unity of opposites , a living unity
of identity and distinction between positive (positive) and negative (negative),
movement,transition from one to another.
In the process of historical practice of a social person, along with the concept of essence, another,
more specific, single-order category is developing, showinghow the essence is connected with the
form of its manifestation and development. This concept is the base , the base. “The smaller
philosophers,” Lenin explains, “argue about the essence or directly given (Kant, Hume, all
Machists). Hegel instead or puts and , explaining the specific content of this "and" " [266] .
“Essence” and “basis” are concepts of one order. The basis - the same essence, taken in the inner
necessity of its transition into its mediation, expresses not only the interpenetration of opposites, but
also their struggle. The base expresses the real connection of these opposites. Identity and difference,
necessity and chance, cause and action — both conflicting moments, considered separately, turn into
each other . “And then,” Engels notes, “we must come to the aid of the“ foundations ”” [267] .
In historical development, the different becomes identical, and in the identical, differences are
found, the need manifests itself in the form of diverse accidents, etc. In order not to get lost in this
eternal and continuous interaction of phenomena, in order not to become eclectic and sophistic, we
must discover the basis , the decisive beginning in this controversial process , we must reveal
the basis on which this interpenetration of opposites proceeds.
Mechanists usually ripped the foundation from the reasonable, did not see the transition of
the foundation into its effect. For philosopher-idealists like Leibniz, the “foundation” was a purely
logical concept, through which they tried to rationally explain the pattern of phenomena. The law of
"sufficient reason" as a more flexible and subjectivistic formulation was advanced by them against the
supposedly "mechanistic" study of the causal connection of phenomena. Everything that exists has its
“sufficient basis” ‚- this empty and vague formula stated. Hegel already distinguishes from the purely
logical "formal foundation" the "real foundation", which really gives rise to this effect, however,
understanding it as a certain stage of development of the spirit.
The practice of proletarian struggle poses the most difficult question to Marx and Engels — about
the foundations of social life. Overcoming and generalizing the achievements of contemporary
knowledge to him, Marx overcomes Hegelian idealism, putting into the concept of the real basis a
new, materialistic content. In the field of public life, we are dealing with an economic basis as a real
basis on which political forms and ideological superstructures grow. The historical practice of the
proletariat gives further development to the concept of the basis in the works of Lenin and
Stalin. Large-scale industry, we say, is the material basis of a socialist economy. It was impossible to
develop further on two different economic bases, on the basis of large-scale socialist industry and on
the basis of small-scale agriculture, Comrade Stalin pointed out, justifying the slogan of
collectivization of agriculture. We single out the main thing in that particular and new that Lenin
brought to the treasury of Marxism when he spoke about the fundamentals of Leninism.
In any thing and in any process, we find an internal connection of various external properties ,
“mediations”, manifestations, taken in unity with their inner essence, with the regularity that
manifests in them. The concept of external and internal - therefore, both are necessary to characterize
the process of development. To understand the nature of the development of any process, we must
proceed from its essence, hence from its internal connections and relations. This is the true basis of
development , and this is not understood by mechanists, who seek to reduce development to a
number of external provisions or look for its basis in an external push. But it would be wrong to forget
from the role that external conditions play for development, in which the internal properties of a thing
receive their concrete development; it is wrong, as the Menshevist idealists do, to limit development
by deducing it from the internal properties of the object, without taking into account the role
of external conditions for development. We proceed from the unity of the internal and external in the
development of nature and society, and the leading role is played by the internal regularity, say, the
internal regularity of the development of a certain formation.
The essence is not on the other side of phenomena. Phenomena , manifestations of essence are
not at all something lower than the very essence ofphenomena, as Kantian philosophy believed. On
the contrary, the world of phenomena is a richer, definite, concrete being than the essence taken from
itself , divorced from its manifestations, because the concrete manifestations of the essence imply
the presence of an inner connection in them. Development reveals the objective opposite of essence
and phenomena, since every single phenomenon does not fully reveal essence. But the development
of matter itself makes this opposition - the essence and phenomena, external and internal, the basis
and reasonable -relative ; it gives permission to their contradiction, development is carried out only
with the active role and internal and external conditions. The unity of the inner and the outer, the
unity of the essence and form of manifestation- this is the most important position that runs through
the whole Marxist dialectic.
This unity gets a vivid expression in the content . The content of any phenomenon is
simultaneously compared with its form and at the same time implies a certain form: the content both
generates the form and includes this form.
Cost is the economic content in which its essence crystallizes - social labor and which
simultaneously finds its “certainty of form” in exchange value. The material relations of production are
social content, each time adopting one or another “historically social definiteness,” that is, the form
of certain production relations, a certain economy: capitalist, socialist, etc.
Content and form are in a dialectical unity: they transform one into another, manifest themselves
in one another, determine the development of one in another . “Form,” says Hegel, “is content that
turns into form , content is form that turns into content” [268] . The form is therefore not passive in the
development process: as an essential moment of content, the form back actively influences the course
of development of the content and its changes. In contrast to all idealism, Marxism, speaking of the
unity of content and form, emphasizes the leading role of content - in contradictions and in
the struggle content and form. Content generates, conditions, predetermines its form. But at the same
time, it always assumes the presence of one form or another. There is no unformed content, as well
as no empty form. Form is the law of the structure of the content, its specific structure, representing
its essential moment, but due to the essence of this phenomenon. “Form is essential,” Lenin points
out. “The entity is formed in one way or another, depending on the entity” [269] .
The form is thus not alien to the essence, content, and at the same time opposes it as a special,
defining moment of essence, content. They interpenetrate each other in the unity of the subject and
the process of development. Nevertheless, the objective basis (essence) of this unity, we must always
look in the content, did not identify it with the form.
Historical development leads to the fact that the internal turns into the external and vice
versa. This leads to the fact that the form is separated from the content . It gets its own , relatively
independent development. The form is opposed to content as something external, hindering its
development; it sometimes lags behind the development of the content and contradicts its further
development. In the development process, therefore, there is a “struggle of content with form and
vice versa. Dumping the form, altering the content " [270]. The old form, which has become the external
content, is reset in its further development by overcoming the resistance of the form. A new form
matured with the content is finally approved and begins to actively contribute to its further
alteration. So it is with the productive forces and production relations with political and legal forms
and the economic content of modern capitalist society.
Historical materialism focuses on the contradictions and conflicts between the material foundations
of production and its social form . The contradiction of content and form occupies an important place
in Marx's analysis of capitalist society. Having identified the controversial essence of commodity
production, Marx further specifies it as a contradiction between the socially necessary content of value
and the form of value (exchange value). On the other hand, analyzing the external manifestations of
capitalist reality, Marx teaches to distinguish between the economic content of commodity transactions
and their legal forms.
The dialectic movement of the economic categories of goods ‚value, money, capital, surplus value,
rent, etc., analyzed by Marx in Capital, reflects the class relations of people. A thing, a product of
labor, takes the form of a commodity with its inherent contradiction, not because of the natural
natural properties of this product, but because of a certain attitude of people in the process of
production and distribution. So it is with all other economic phenomena. In a review of The Critique of
Political Economy, Engels says: "Political economy deals not with things, but with relations between
people and ultimately between classes, but these relations are always connected with things and
manifest as things " [271] .
Marx expressed the same thought as follows:
“The goods cannot go to the market and exchange among themselves ... In order for these things
to relate to each other as goods, commodity owners must treat each other as persons whose will
resides in these things” [272] .
Idealists such as Rubin and mechanists like Bukharin, Bessonov, A. Kohn, and others. They pervert
this basic dialectical materialistic position. The former have a Kantian separation of form from
content , the emasculation of all content. The mechanists, on the contrary, completely fail to
understand the role and significance of the social form., не видят своеобразия закономерностей
различных общественных формаций и тем самым также не понимают действительных процессов
общественного развития и классовой борьбы. Следовательно всюду, где Маркс раскрывает
диалектику товара, денег, капитала, стоимости, прибавочной стоимости и т. д., мы имеем дело по
существу с общественными отношениями, принявшими вещную форму. Экономический закон
движения капиталистического общества, вплоть до его последней стадии — империализма, —
представляет выражение и отражение развития и роста классовых противоречий между
буржуазией и пролетариатом.
Here lies the point that fundamentally distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois theories. To the
bourgeois, it seems that goods, money, value, capital have natural properties that determine the
attitude of people towards them and the attitude of people towards each other. “In the eyes of the
latter,” says Marx, “their own social movement takes the form of the movement of things, under
whose control they are, instead of controlling it” [273] . Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, which
constitutes one of the most brilliant, if not the most brilliant chapter in Capital, for the first time
disrupts the hazy veil from bourgeois economic relations. Marx’s dialectical method found itself here to
its full height, with all its sharpness and clarity. Marx’s dialectic has revealed the
public content . Marx's criticism of naturalism , a mechanistic approach to social phenomena, showed
the specificity of the quality of social relations. Thus, the solution to the mystery of ideology, and in
particular of bourgeois ideology, is given, consisting in the fact that every ideology reflects the social
relations of people.
The problem of form and content gets Marx a detailed exposition also when analyzing the issue of
productive forces and production relations. In the introduction of “Towards a Critique of Political
Economy”, Marx wrote: “The dialectic of concepts, the productive forces (means of production) and
production relations , the dialectic, the boundaries of which are to be determined and which does not
destroy the real difference” [274]. The dialectic of productive forces and production relations is the
dialectic of content and form. In Capital, Marx, without ignoring the real difference between the
productive forces and production relations, establishes their unity. In fact, the relations of small
commodity producers, which are reflected in the internally contradictory nature of labor and goods,
are determined by the scattered and limited nature of the means of production of small-scale farming
and handicrafts. Capitalist relations rest on the separation of the means of production from the direct
producer. Finally, the socialist socialization of the means of production is inevitably accompanied by
the socialization of production, distribution, the establishment of planning, etc. This mutual
penetration of productive forces (content) and production relations (form) is consistently shown in
Capital on such economic phenomena as cost, wages, crises, etc. The role of productive forces in the
formation of value (the problem of the average socially necessary time ); the role of productive forces
in the enrichment of capital and the impoverishment of the working class (exploitation of female and
child labor), the creation of a “reserve” army of labor, a fall in the wages of the worker below the cost
of labor, etc. due to the growth of the organic composition of capital; finally, crises - a vivid indicator
that production relations have already become fetters for the productive forces - on all this Marx
masterfully discovered the dialectical unity and difference of productive forces and production
relations.
Marx did not only establish this relationship between the productive forces and production
relations. He accurately indicated the basis of this connection. The content determines the form . In
turn, the form as a meaningful form does not remain external content, represents the form of the
development of content . The level of the productive forces determines the relations of production,
although the latter are the essence of the forms of development of the productive forces. This, for
example, was not understood by Proudhon, who believed that it was not the development of the
means of production that determined the corresponding division of labor, but, on the contrary, the
division of labor necessitates a certain kind of means of labor:
“For Proudhon, who, if he sees things, sees them differently, the division of labor, in the sense of
A. Smith, is born before the workshop, meanwhile, as it is, it determines its existence” [275] .
The concepts of form and content are of particular importance for the scientific and class analysis
of imperialism. Thus, criticizing the absurd opinion of the opportunists that the internationalization of
capital is a means of peace between nations, pointing out that international trusts and cartels are the
clearest expression of the internal struggle between capitalists, Lenin says: "The form of struggle may
change and changes constantly depending on different, relatively private and temporary reasons, but
the essence of the struggle, its class content can not change as long as there are classes ... Replacing
the content questionthe struggle and agreements between capitalist combines the question of the
form of the struggle and agreements (today - a peaceful, tomorrow - the warlike, the next day -
warlike again) - then sink to the role of a sophist ... " [276] As an example of the slogan of the United
States of Europe, put forward by Trotsky, Lenin shows as a slogan of the united states of the world, by
its economic content, it turns out to be identical with socialism after the victory of the proletarian
revolution, and as under capitalism this Trotskyist slogan is identical with the defense of imperialism
and leads to wrong the impossibility of the victory of socialism in one country.
In another case, in “Childhood Illness of“ Left-Wing ”,” pursuing a line of struggle on two fronts -
with right and “left” doctrinaire in understanding the struggle methods of international communism,
Lenin points out that the new powerful content of the work of the Communist Party ( proletariat) “can
and should prove itself in any form, both new and old, can and should regenerate, conquer, subjugate
all forms not only new, but also old” ... [277]
The dictatorship of the proletariat is the main content of the proletarian revolution. This
fundamental position of Lenin and Stalin finds its concrete manifestation when considering a number
of more specific issues. Such, for example, is the question of a new form of proletarian
democracy. “The forms of democracy inevitably changed over the course of millennia” [278] ‚notes
Lenin. It is absurd to suppose that the deepest revolution in the world will occur within the framework
of the old parliamentary, bourgeois democracy, “without creating new forms
of democracy” [279] . “Soviet power,” says t. Stalin, “is a new formstate organization, fundamentally
different from the old, bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary form, the new type of state ” [280] . The
real content of this new form of proletarian democracy, the real content of the tactics of the proletariat
are the abolition of classes and the construction of a socialist society. “The proletariat needs the
destruction of classes — this is the real content of proletarian democracy, proletarian freedom ...,
proletarian equality ... Whoever does not understand this content of the dictatorship of the proletariat
(or, equivalently, Soviet power or proletarian democracy) in vain accepts this word” [281] .
The dictatorship of the proletariat is the main content of the proletarian revolution and at the same
time a new form of state in which the struggle for the complete destruction of classes takes place. But
the new powerful content can use for its development and the old forms, exposing them to a radical
change. Such are the national forms of culture in which new, international, proletarian content
develops under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Sometimes a certain content may appear in a form that is outwardly opposite to it. Such, for
example, are the capitulatory, counter-revolutionary content and the "left" form of Trotskyist
phraseology. “Capitulism in practice, as content ,“ left-wing ”phrases and“ revolutionary ”-avantuyurist
habits, as a form covering up and advertising capitulary content — such is the essence of
Trotskyism [282] .
4.5. Law, reason, purpose
Materialistic knowledge of the phenomena of nature, society and thinking in their universal
connection , knowledge of the essence of each individual thing in its unity with the manifestations of
this essence leads us to consider the dominant laws in nature and society , to clarify the patterns
of development.
The concept of the law reflects the essential relation , i.e. the relation of the essence; the law acts
in relation to phenomena, is carried out in them not as an external force, but as an objective,
immanent, internal tendency of their development characteristic of the phenomena themselves. The
law acts as a universal form of their internal communication.
“The concept of law ,” Lenin notes, “is one of the stages of man’s knowledge
of unity and connection , interdependence and integrity of the world process” [283] .
Engels shows how our knowledge of the laws of nature has historically gradually developed - how
from more particular generalizations we gradually turn over the millennia to a “judgment of
universality”. The practice and technology of material production plays a decisive, definite role
here. Already in the prehistoric years they knew practically that friction generates heat, but thousands
of years passed before a judgment was created: friction in general is a source of heat. Only in the
epoch of industrial capitalism, in connection with the study of thermal sources of energy, Mayer and
Joule put forward a generalization: every mechanical movement is transformed into heat by
friction. Further generalization leads to a more universal law: any form of movement under certain
conditions turns into another form of movement. So historically develop knowledge of the general laws
of nature.
Man can not immediately embrace, reflect, reflect the whole, all of nature; according to Lenin, “he
can only forever approach this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world,
etc.” [284] .
 “There is a law,” Lenin stresses Hegel’s thought, “a reflection of the universe that is essential in the
movement” [285] . But the concept of law is a dialectically contradictory concept, reflecting the
development of objective laws in their internal contradictions. In the law we have something
repetitive, identical , “strong”,remaining , something unchanging and “calm” in comparison with
mutable phenomena. The law takes the essence of movement and the development of phenomena in
its abstract, "pure" form: the law is the "form of the universal" (Engels) . “The law takes calm,” Lenin
continues, “and therefore the law, every law is narrow, incomplete, approximate”; in this sense ...
"the phenomenon is richer than the law" [286] .
However, the law should not be considered only as an abstraction from a variety
of repetitive phenomena. The law also has a qualitative aspect: it is fixed to us every time as a special
necessary development trend in which the law, as it were, seeks to embrace its endless manifestations
and needs to be realized in them. In this respect, the abstraction of the law is deeperor rather, reflects
reality more fully than each individual phenomenon. The law of value, Lenin pointed out, is much truer
than its every single manifestation, than every act of exchange, than the law of supply and
demand. The law covers and expresses each individual phenomenon approximately, relatively, at one
stage of knowledge, on the one hand, in one respect; he does not give all the concrete fullness, the
whole integrity of the phenomenon, which can be fully known only through the knowledge of its
infinite number of sides. In this sense, the law is poorer than asingle concrete, holistic
phenomenon. And at the same time, covering the group of homogeneous phenomena, the law is
deeper, or rather, more constant than its every single manifestation. This is the peculiarity of the law,
of any scientific abstraction, reflecting the internal inconsistency any development.
Marx, Engels, Lenin constantly emphasize this internal contradiction of the law. They fight for the
only scientific, natural knowledge of reality — with all kinds of idealistic negation or idealistic distortion
of the meaning of the general laws of nature and society. And at the same time, they are fighting a
fetishistic, simplified, vulgar understanding of the law, as a certain unchanging “absolute”, which
directly and in its entirety, in its “pure form”, manifests itself in every single concrete
phenomenon. They emphasize the relative, historical nature of the laws, the variability of the laws
themselves.
“The ultimate goal of this work, Marx says about Capital, is to reveal the law of the economic
development of modern society” [287] . At the same time, Marx strongly emphasizes the relative,
historical, transient nature of the laws of capitalist society. He sharply criticizes the views of the
bourgeois economy, which sees in the laws of capitalism eternal "natural" laws. According to one of
the early reviewers of Capital, an essay which Marx himself recognized as successful, “for Marx only
one thing is important: to find the law of phenomena, of which he is studying. And while it is
important for him not only the law that governs them, as long as they have a known form and while
they are in the relationship that is observed at this time. For him, moreover, the law of their variability
is still important. , their development, i.e., the transition from one form to another, from one order of
relationship to another ” [288] . General, suitable for all times of economic laws for Marx does not
exist. “In his opinion, on the contrary, each historical period has its own laws ” [289] . His scientific goal
is “to clarify thoseparticular laws that govern the emergence, existence, development, death of a
given social organism and its replacement with another, higher” [290] .
Marx sharply contrasts the blind laws of capitalist elements with the laws of socialist society,
comprehended by the collective mind of people and directed by them to their good.
Engels emphasizes the historical, relative nature of the laws of nature — the seemingly universal,
eternal, and immutable laws. It shows that the physical laws - for example, the liquid state of water
from 0 to 100 ° C - that these laws are ultimately determined by the conditions of the earthly planet
and could be modified by the sun or the moon. The most general formulation of the theory of the
transformation of energy, according to Engels, in its application to the world system turns into the
history of the rule of various laws at different stages of its development.
Marx, Engels, Lenin are fighting with the abstract-fetishist understanding of the laws, which is
characteristic of both mechanics and idealism. They show that, expressing "in pure form" the essence
of phenomena, the laws cover only approximately the universal law of nature. Laws are carried out in
concrete capitalist reality only among constant deviations, only as a mainstream, overcoming
permanent violations of laws, that is, as some average of constant fluctuations and deviations from
the law. The law of value, the universal law of capitalist accumulation, the law of the tendency of the
rate of profit to fall, and so on - Marx considers all phenomena of capitalist reality in this natural
way. At the same time, Marx emphasizes not onlythe historical nature of the laws of capitalist
production, but also the fact that they are only approximately carried out in capitalist reality as
mainstream tendencies seeking to destroy, overcome fluctuations and deviations. “In general,” says
Marx, “in capitalist production, every general law is implemented only as the mainstream , in a very
confusing and approximate way, as some average of constant fluctuations that can never be
sufficiently established” [291] .
In another place, noting that the prices of goods deviate from their value, that goods are sold in
capitalist society in accordance with their market value only in those rare cases where supply and
demand cease to operate and cover each other, Marx explains: “The actual internal laws capitalist
production, obviously, can not be explained from the interaction of supply and demand ..., since these
laws are implemented in a pure form only when supply and demand cease to operate i.e. cover each
other. Supply and demand never really cover each other, or, if they cover, they
only accidentallytherefore, from a scientific point of view, this case should be equated to zero, should
be considered as non-existent. However, in political economy they are supposed to cover each
other. Why? This is done in order to consider the phenomena in their natural form, corresponding to
their concept , that is, to consider them regardless of what they seem to be due to fluctuations in
supply and demand. On the other hand, in order to find the real tendency of their movement, so to
speak, to fix it ” [292]. Marx shows that only by considering the result of the movement over a more or
less long period, we get a complete balance between demand and supply, that this result is obtained
only as an average of completed oscillations, only " as a constant movement of their
contradiction ." Here we have “ evasion of market prices from market values and, on the other hand,
a tendency seeking to eliminate these deviations ...” [293]
In the concrete reality of capitalism, the laws are never realized in their pure form. Each specific
phenomenon represents a certain deviation from the law manifested in it and the confirmation of
the law, since the dominant tendency of development of the entire given set of phenomena seeks to
eliminate this deviation, which takes place in individual phenomena. The law is always implemented
only as a development trend, often in intertwining with other trends. And only in this way we correctly
recognize the specific content of reality.
This is exactly how Lenin approaches the question of the regularity of phenomena, elucidating the
question of the relationship between general laws and the laws of the special stages of development of
capitalist society. The production of monopoly by the concentration of production, Lenin points out, is
in general the general and fundamental law of the modern stage of development of capitalism: “In its
economic essence, imperialism is monopoly capitalism” [294]. But with all this, imperialism remains a
special stage in the development of capitalism and is subordinated along with this special law and the
general laws and contradictions of capitalism - the contradiction between social production and private
appropriation, between the organization of production in individual enterprises and anarchy
throughout society. Therefore, the tales of bourgeois economists about the possibility of eliminating
crises under monopoly capitalism are wrong. No, capitalist contradictions are even more acute in the
period of imperialism. “On the contrary,” says Lenin, “the monopoly created
in some industries intensifies and sharpens the chaos inherent in all capitalist production as a whole.”
Monopolies tend to stagnate and rot. However, "it would be a mistake to think that this tendency
to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism ... On the whole, capitalism is immeasurably faster
than ever before, it is growing , but this growth is not only becoming even more uneven , but the
unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the most strong capital countries " [295] .
From this dialectical understanding of the law, Lenin and Stalin proceeded, substantiating the law
of uneven development under imperialism and the possibility of building socialism in one
country. Social-opportunists such as Kautsky, completely abstract approaching the laws of the
imperialist stage, argued from a purely "economic" point of view, that the contradictions of capitalism
unevenness weakened under the domination of finance capital, because the development of "talking"
to monopolies, hence towards a single world monopoly, to one world trust.
Trotsky and Zinoviev also argued that the unevenness in the development of imperialism was
less. Comrade Bukharin developed a point of view close to the theory of "ultra-imperialism", proving
that the laws of capitalist competition cease to operate, if only within individual states.
Development goes to monopolies. "This is indisputable," Lenin replied to the discourse on such
pure "abstractions" of development, "but this is completely empty ... The best answer to the dead
abstractions of ultra-imperialism ... is to contrast the concrete economic reality of the modern world
economy" [296] . Kautsky pulls through the idea that “the domination of finance capital weakens
the unevenness and contradictions within the world economy, whereas in fact
it strengthens them” [297] .
Lenin also conducts the same dialectical understanding of the historical regularity of development
in his famous rehearsal of Sukhanov on the issue of the "regularity" of the October Revolution. Lenin
shows that “with a general pattern of development in all of world history, they are not at all excluded,
but, on the contrary, separate development lines are assumed , representing the originality of either
the form or the order of this development” [298] . October not only did not violate the general line of
development of world history, passing from capitalism to socialism, but confirmed these general laws,
and nevertheless, in the October proletarian revolution we had the peculiarity of a separate line of
development, the peculiarity of transition.
Developing Lenin’s thought further, Comrade Stalin explains the features of the October
Revolution, which consist, firstly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in us as a power
that emerged from the union of the proletariat and the toiling masses of the peasantry under the
leadership of the proletariat that the dictatorship of the proletariat has become firmly established in us
as a result of the victory of socialism in one country, while preserving capitalism in other capitalist
countries.
At the same time, Comrade Stalin argues that the October Revolution has an international nature,
that it is a classic example of Lenin's theory, obligatory for all countries, that this peculiarity
of October, in the words of Lenin, also went "along the general line of world history." The breaking of
the chain of imperialism by the proletarian revolution in those of its links where imperialism
is weaker becomes the general law of the proletarian revolution in the epoch of imperialism.
In these provisions of Lenin and Comrade Stalin, we have an inseparable connection between the
natural knowledge of reality and revolutionary practice . The practice of the proletarian revolution
gives us a genuine criterion for verifying the significance of the general laws of capitalist development
and for combating their opportunistic fetishism. The practice of socialist construction brings a number
of new moments to our understanding of the law. She brings a conscious,reasonable,
planned beginning in the laws of the transition period (this conscious beginning is carried out by the
dictatorship of the proletariat). In contrast to the “law of primitive socialist accumulation” and the
“labor cost law” that the Trotskyists and the right to understand the new economy put forward, by
analogy with the elemental laws of capitalism, we see all the uniqueness of the laws of history after
the victory of the proletariat leading the masses of the working people and the building of socialism.
One of the most important steps towards the cognition of the universal, universal connection and
the laws of nature is the cognition of causal connections, causes and effects, the so-called causality .
The development of a causal, causal point of view is an absolutely necessary step in the
development and strengthening of the materialistic understanding of nature. Early materialists put
forward the concept of causality as opposed to idealists who deny the existence of causal connections
in nature and society. But early materialists tended to understand the causal connection of
phenomena primarily as mechanical causality. Modern mechanists, such as L. Axelrod, are even
inclined to see in mechanical causality the main difference between materialism and idealism.
Kantian philosophy pays a lot of attention and space to the category of causality, seeking to turn
causality into a subjective concept, into the category of our reason , which we bring from ourselves
into the external world.
Hegel from the standpoint of idealistic dialectics criticized the old mechanism and Kantianism on
the issue of causality, he showed that causality is only a small particle, only a moment in the
knowledge of universal world communication, which was understood by Hegel as the development of
absolute spirit.
Engels and Lenin give a deep dialectical materialist interpretation of the concept of causality . At
the same time, they clarify the whole meaning of this concept for materialism, its objective content
and at the same time emphasize its relativity, one-sidedness and incompleteness in the process of
cognition of universal law.
Even in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, harshly criticizing the denial of causation by the
Machists and Kantians and noting all the enormous significance of causality for materialism, Lenin at
the same time pointed out that in terms of cause and effect we have a certain simplification of the
objective connection of phenomena. Lenin emphasizes in his summary "the comprehensiveness and
comprehensiveness of the world connection, only one-sided, fragmentary and incompletely expressed
causality" [299] . “The formation of (abstract) concepts and operations with them,” says Lenin, “ already
includes the idea, conviction, and consciousness of the laws of the objective connection of the
world. To single out causality from this connection is ridiculous. ” [300]. “Cause and effect, érgo, are
only moments of world interdependence, connection (universal), interconnection of events, only links
in the chain of development of matter” [301] .
For Hegel, according to Lenin, “causality is only one of the definitions of the universal connection,
which he had already embraced much deeper and more comprehensive” [302] . Hegel “brings quite
a story under causality and understands causality a thousand times deeper and richer than the
darkness of the" scientists "now" [303] . “Causality, usually understood by us, is only a small part of the
world connection,” but — this is where the materialistic addition and correction of Lenin by
Lenin follows , “a part not of a subjective, but of an objectively real connection” [304] .
The relationship of cause and effect, understood by the mechanists as the relationship of some
external “substances”, we must study more deeply, proceeding from the movement of matter, from
the movement of history and their universal connection. The starting point of the Marxist-Leninist view
of the causal (causal) relationship between phenomena, said Engels, is the recognition of their mutual
conditionality, their interaction . “The first,” says Engels, “what strikes us when considering moving
matter, is the interconnection of separate movements, separate bodies between themselves,
their dependence with each other” [305] .
Our knowledge is not satisfied, however, by one such initial common point of view. We
therefore single out the conditions under which each individualphenomenon or combination of these
phenomena occurs , separate links of the process, considered separately from other links. In the
general flow of motion of matter, we distinguish between the movements that affect, which are
transferred to other bodies or phenomena, and those movements that arise as a result of this
influence or movement transfer. In order to understand individual phenomena, says Engels, “we must
remove them from their natural or historical connection and, examining each separately, examine its
properties, its particular causes of action, etc.” [306] . "If any movement ... is transferred from one
body to another, then since this movement is actively transferred , it can be considered the cause of
the movement, since it is transferred passively as a result ” [307] .
This dialectic view of the causal connection of phenomena is justified and confirmed in the practice
of the social man. The reason, as our practical activity proves it, must be turned into its “actions”; it
manifests itself in them as a movement active in relation to its effect, as a movement reproducing an
object in a certain way. Practice reveals this objective causal connection of phenomena, creates an
idea of causality.
Hegel also pointed out that in order for a necessary connection to occur between phenomena , not
only conditions and not only a subject arising from all these conditions are necessary, but also an
activity that “ translates a condition into a subject and a subject into a condition”. It is a different
matter, Engels notes, when we also find that we are able to reproduce a certain movement , creating
the conditions under which it occurs ... and that we can give this movement acertain direction and
dimensions in advance.
Due to this , thanks to human activity , the idea of causality is created , the idea that one
movement is the cause of another and “human activity gives the possibility
of proving causality” [308] . Lighting a match on the box, we each time confirm that it is friction that
generates heat and fire. True, even here a deviation from the rule may occur, the expected action
may not follow, the match will not suddenly light up. “But,” Engels adds, “that’s what proves causality
does not disprove it, because with each such deviation from the rule, it is possible, by making an
appropriate study, to find the reason for this (for example, the dampness of matches, etc. - Auth. ),
so here a double check of causality is actually performed ” [309] .
The causal point of view is thus not at all introduced by us into the cognitive process from our
consciousness, as skeptics and Kantian philosophers believe. It inevitably follows from the very
objective connection of things , it inevitably is generated by the social practice of man and is
confirmed in this practice. From this objective connection of things and confirming its practice it
follows the need for our knowledge to consider certain things and phenomena as separate links , as
moments of the overall process.
However, the separation of “causes” and “consequences” (actions) makes sense only if, distracting
from the unity of the world’s natural or historical process, we also have as a starting point their
interaction, their movement, their internally necessary natural connection . “Cause and effect,” Engels
sums up, “are the essence of a concept, having meaning only in application to a
separate phenomenon, but ... if we consider the same phenomenon in its general world connection,
then these two concepts are connected and turn into an idea of universal interaction, in which cause
and effect are constantly changing places , and what is now or here is a consequence, then it becomes
there or then a cause and vice versa " [310] .
“The human concept of cause and effect ,” according to Lenin, “ always somewhat simplifies the
objective connection of natural phenomena , only approximately reflecting it, artificially isolating
certain aspects of one single world process” [311] .
A correct dialectical understanding of the causal connection of phenomena is therefore
fundamentally opposed to the mechanistic point of view and idealistic relativism . The concept of
causality in itself cannot yet serve as a watershed between the materialistic and idealistic
worldview; still less, one can speak of the principle of mechanical causality as a distinctive feature of
dialectical materialism ‚- as L. Axelrod does, for example, forgetting the basic question of philosophy -
about the relation of being to consciousness. Under mechanical causality one should understand the
lower, simplest forms. causal relationships that take place within pure mechanics. Counter-motion of
solids is the cause of the impact, turning the tap causes a water jet, mechanical work is the cause of
heat, etc. Here we, at best, have a purely external transition from one form of mechanical movement
to another, just as simple; cause and effect remain external; they are not in the internal, necessary
connection between them. The cause of the blow may be not only the meeting of the bodies, but also
the fall of the body.
The situation is completely different when we turn to more complex physical, chemical, and
especially biological and social phenomena. Causes and effects are here in the internal, necessary,
connection between themselves, which can only be understood on the basis of the laws of
development. The reason not only produces its effect, not only turns into its action, but in turn the
presence of this particular combination of causes must be assumed to be the presence of these
effects. Cause and effect are interconnected by an internal, regular link. Therefore, it is erroneous to
say that one “recognition of the principle of mechanical causality is the soul of materialism” [312]. It is a
mistake to suppose, as K. Kautsky does, for example, that the concept of causality must be connected
with the concept of impulse, collision (der Anstoss) [313] . The “push”, as well as any previous action in
the socio-historical development, which is not connected with its effect by an internal connection, can
only be an external cause , and not at all a necessary cause of this phenomenon.
In every possible way Engels condemned the "ordinary, non-dialectical conception of cause and
effect as two permanently disconnected poles, absolutely not seeing interaction" [314] .
That is exactly the question of the causal relationship of Lenin, when he, for example, covers the
reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Supporters of the Second International, he
points out, cannot “even raise the most serious historical and political question about the reasons for
the victory of the Bolsheviks” [315] . Meanwhile, this question is “resolved indisputably” if we proceed
not from the external coupling of the event, but from the general “point of view of class struggle and
socialism” [316] .
And Lenin proves the historical inevitability, the necessity of the victory of Bolshevism. The
Bolsheviks won because they had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, and in it the most
conscious part, because they had a huge majority in the army, so that their forces were at crucial
points in the capitals and military fronts, so that the proletariat was able to lead the broad non-
proletarian working masses.
So it is precisely the question of causality, and so on. Stalin, when he explains, “what is the reason
that the USSR, despite its cultural backwardness, despite the lack of capital, despite the lack of
technically-forged economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic growth?” and is at the front of
economic construction decisive progress and the advanced capitalist countries, in spite of the
abundance of capital and an abundance of technical personnel and a higher level of culture, are in a
state of growing economic of the crisis and suffer in economic development defeat after defeat " [317] .
Tov. Stalin sees this reason not in external circumstances, but in the deep inner-necessary laws
of various economic systems. “The reason,” notes t. Stalin, “is in the difference between
the economic systems of the economy in our country and in the capitalists. The reason is the failure of
the capitalist economic system. The reason is the advantages of the Soviet economic system over the
capitalist system ” [318] .
But modern bourgeois idealistic philosophy prefers not to talk about the reasons at all . Machists
and other subjective idealists tend to use the abstract expression “functional connection” between
phenomena. In this case, the concept of a function denotes a general connection and interdependence
ofphenomena: each of the interrelated phenomena is a function of the other. In other words, the use
of the concept of a function in this case smears the fact that this phenomenon, being variously
connected with another, can be either an action (consequence) or another cause .
Such externally “scientific” claims of bourgeois idealistic methodology, its desire to completely
exorcise the concept of “causal relationship” have as its source an idealistic denial by it of objective
causal connections .
The dialectical understanding of the interaction of causes and effects has nothing to do with such
a relativistic view. All our ideas about the causal connection of phenomena develop in connection with
human practical activity : they are strengthened, confirmed hourly by our practice. For the last time
we have a particularly large growth of mysticism, the negation of causality in bourgeois science. A
number of discoveries in the field of the structure of matter are used by bourgeois scientists to deny
causality. These are the works of physicists: Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Planck, and others.
 The split into reason and action, with all their internal unity and connection, exists objectively,
regardless of our knowledge, in the things themselves. Causes and actions undoubtedly interact with
each other; each cause is already in the fetus and carries its action and back; nevertheless, in this
connection ofphenomena, it is precisely the reason that each time is the starting point of the
movement — its initial, defiant, generating, active moment. Since the effect of a cause stems from the
very essence of the regularity of this phenomenon, this effect of causes must be the
original, previous corollary and in time moment. However, Hume has already noticed that to say: “This
phenomenon occurs after that (post hoc)” does not mean yet: “It is due to that (propter
hoc)”. Speaking about the reason, it is important to emphasize that in it we have not only the starting
point of interaction, but also the defining condition causing, generating this effect, the given
object, reproducing it in a certain way .
To talk only about the functional connection of phenomena means essentially to confine ourselves
with stating their mutual connection, without trying to get to the objective basis of their interaction:
this position clearly leads to relativism , to sophistry! Replace the knowledge of the causes of the
knowledge of all conditions at all - mean to take the path of eclecticism , which can not be isolated
from the whole total weight of the possible conditions of the special , the most essential
conditions actually determine in this context the nature of the investigation. Meanwhile, in the process
of human activity, there is a continuous “release”, isolation of such determining, essential
conditions. (causes) of the whole mass of other conditions — more general, less significant, etc. The
close connection with practice allows the materialistic understanding of causality to overcome both the
relativism of “functional theory” and eclecticism, which replaces causality with “conditions”.
It is also extremely important to be able to distinguish the causes of events from the external
cause that led them: you need to remember the internalconnection that always exists between the
cause and the effect. Finally, in the process of concrete study of this phenomenon, among the causes
of the phenomenon, one must be able to find the root, main reasons that can later cause a repetition
of this phenomenon, distinguish these main reasons from the causes of special, specific, temporary,
which have only a passing value, also taken into account by us in order to recreate the entire specific
situation.
So, for example, Comrade Stalin raised the question of the reasons for our difficulties on the grain
front in 1928. The right-wing opposition sought these reasons only in planned miscalculations, losing
sight of the main reasons. Tov. Stalin revealed the main reasons, the essence of our difficulties, which
then consisted in the dispersion of small peasant farming at that stage and the need for its
collectivization. Tov. At the same time, Stalin also noted specific, temporary causes of difficulties —
the rapid growth of solvent demand from the peasantry, the unfavorable state of the price of bread,
mistakes of the planned leadership, etc.
It is easy to see that only such a deep understanding of the laws and causes of these phenomena
can help us correctly highlight our goals and objectives . This inextricable link between causes and
goals, however, is often ignored by bourgeois science, opposing expediency to causal knowledge . The
causal, or causal, point of view on the interdependence between phenomena for a long time has
opposed a completely different, frankly idealistic view - the teleological point of view . According to
teleology, any phenomenon, whether it has a place in nature or in public life, is the fulfillment of a
certain goal . Implementation of goals - all the same, the goals set by God, or the goals of the internal
characteristic of the subject, - leads this phenomenon to development, to perfection . Therefore, the
“teleologists” say, if we establish in the observed phenomena a connection of constancy, regularities,
then we should consider these relations not at all from the point of view of the causes generating
them, but from the point of view of how certain higher goals are realized in them.
Such a view leads its original origin from religious ideas about the "divine providence." Church
writers, beginning with the “father of the church,” Augustine, especially zealously attached teleology
to an understanding of social life; human life on earth was depicted by them as the path of sinful trials
leading to a higher goal, to a different “kingdom”, to the erection of the “city of God”, etc.
Together with the development of productive forces and the development of scientific knowledge,
the teleological point of view itself was modified. The “goal” was no longer sought beyond phenomena,
but within them : the expedient nature of a natural phenomenon is declared to be intrinsic to this
phenomenon, itsimmanent expediency.
The doctrine of the internal expediency of the structure of things was advanced by Aristotle. This
teleological view has received the highest development from Leibniz, in his theory that the world is
built from isolated entities (souls) - “monads”. Each monad, according to Leibniz, represents the
realization of some innergoal that drives its development. In idealistic philosophy, a distinction is
gradually created between the “active cause” (causa effeciens), that is, the cause in our usual
understanding, and the “final cause” (causa finalis) or goal.
The best example of internal expediency, which is most often indicated by "teleologists", is the
expedient structure of organisms in animals and plants; here the structure of each organ seems to
find its justification in the function it performs. On the perverted understanding of this internal
expediency of the structure of organisms, some modern bourgeois biological theories rest. Such, in
particular, is the background of all vitalistic theories that ascribe to living organisms the existence of
some special vital force (for the modern leader of vitalism, Drish, etc.). The study of intrinsic and
organic expediency is carried out by bourgeois idealistic science and, in the study of social life, by
representatives of the "organic school" and neo-Kantianism in the "subjective sociology" of the
Narodniks. All these areas of bourgeois science believe that causal study is unsuitable for history and
must be replaced or supplemented by the search for internal goals and higher values that are
supposedly carried out in the development of society.
The strongest blow of teleology in natural science was delivered by Darwin. He pointed out that the
very expediency of the structure of organisms must find and find for itself a causal and natural
explanation. This expediency is not at all explained by the rationality of their organization, but by the
death for many millennia of all unsuitable for the conditions of existence, the "inexpedient" of the
constructed species. It is obvious that nature does not set itself conscious goals. Most importantly,
however, the teleological point of view quite inconsistently contrasts causal explanation of phenomena
and their expedient nature of one another, that it arbitrarily divorces one side of the case from the
other. It is impossible to isolate the question “for what” certain actions of people flow, for which, for
example, ciliate cilia are needed, for example, this phenomenon takes place from the question
“ why ”. To do so means either to pre-suppose, outside the actual connection of phenomena, a
realization of their rational will, or at least to consider in advance that the “goal” does not depend on
the causes of thephenomenon.
Meanwhile, a thing in all respects, including in the “goal” it implements, must be understood from
the conditions causing it: every full definition of this phenomenon, every explanation, “why” it
proceeds in a certain way, contains in itself and an explanation of “for what”, for what purpose this
phenomenon is being performed. When we figured out why the eyes were arranged expediently, then
by this we established and “for what” they are so arranged. If we explain why, according to what laws,
these public actions of people are performed, and show that they can be accomplished only in the
direction of this and not another goal, then by this we will much more fully and correctly explain the
goal that these public actions. Communism Marx and Engels did not explain as an ideal condition that
must be established, but as a real historical movement that destroys the current state and, by
revealing the laws of capitalist development and class struggle, thereby clarified the historical mission
of the proletariat.
“The concept of a goal,” according to Hegel, “is equivalent to a simple definition of the object
itself.” “In fact,” Lenin comments on Hegel, “the goals of man are generated by the objective world
and suggest it,” they find him, as given, present. But it seems to man that his goals outside the world
are taken, they are independent of the world (“freedom”) ” [319] . Expediency should not be
mechanistically discarded in the course of our study of reality, but it should not be ideally opposed to
regularity and causality, it requires a special, but nonetheless causal and regular explanation of it. The
expediency of the phenomena of nature and social actions of man, we must therefore be considered
as a special, a specific expression, a special form of manifestation of their laws, their causal
relationship, the main tendency of their development.
The internal expediency of the structure of organisms is a special expression of the unity of
the whole and of the individual parts, the unity of the content of the functions of the body and their
forms.
The meaning of the concept of goal in public life is that it allows one to study phenomena in
continuous connection with practice — with the practical role of things, with social actions of a
person. “The idea, as truth , - Lenin notes, - Hegel approaches through practical expedient human
activity,” he goes “from a subjective concept and a subjective goal to objective truth” [320] .
Marxism-Leninism does not at all deny the meaning of goals in a person’s social life, in the practice
of class struggle, but, on the contrary, reveals their real historical significance. The pursuit of certain
goals, indicate Marx and Engels, a characteristic feature of social life, the socio-historical actions of
people, distinguishing them from elemental forces and the laws of nature. Already analyzing the
simple process of labor, Marx shows all the profound difference of expediently directed labor from the
labor of the most skillful bee. All the development of technology expresses these distinctive features of
the purposeful activity of man.
 Explaining certain provisions of Hegel and translating them into the language of materialist
dialectics, Lenin emphasizes the logical basis of our expedient activity, its objective character as a
form of an objective process. At the same time, Lenin explains that the opposition of human goals to
the laws of nature has its basis in the very process of cognition and in the peculiarities of human
cognition “not immediately and not just coinciding” with cognizable nature. "The laws of the external
world of nature ... the essence of the basis of expedient human activity" [321] . - “Two forms of
the objective process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and goal-setting human activity ... At first,
human goals seem alien (“other”) to nature. Human consciousness, science ... reflects the essence,
substance of nature, but at the same time, this consciousness is external in relation to nature (not
immediately, not just coinciding with it) " [322] .
The collision of goals pursued by various people and entire social classes has led so far to the fact
that social life developed according to spontaneous laws, not according to a predetermined plan, not in
accordance with the goals set.
Marx shows how a contradiction arises between the capitalist’s limited goal — the increase in
surplus value, and the means for this goal — an unlimited increase in production and the unconditional
development of social productive forces.
However, it would be erroneous to think that under capitalism the class goals of the bourgeois
classes and the proletariat, which are fighting among themselves, are not pursued and do not achieve
the class goals.
The bourgeoisie uses the state power as an instrument of forcible suppression of the proletariat
and all the working people. The task of the proletariat is to overthrow the bourgeoisie, deprive it of
state power, and use this weapon in the course of their class goals.
The implementation of these class goals by the dictatorship of the proletariat leads to the fact that
the contradiction between "means" and "goals" characteristic of capitalist production disappears, that
the ultimate goal of the proletarian struggle - "organizing socialism on the ruins of
capitalism" (Lenin) - is fully in line and in unity with its means — the growing economic and political
power of the Soviet country — on the basis of the planned, purposeful activities of the working class
and its party.
4.6. Necessity and chance
“Every single thing ,” says Lenin, “is connected in thousands of transitions with a different kind
of individual (things, phenomena, processes). And so on. Already here there are elements, rudiments,
concepts of necessity , objective connection of nature, etc. Random and necessary, the phenomenon
and the essence is already here, for saying: Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, it is a leaf of a tree, etc.,
we discard a number of signs, as random , we separate the essential from the being and oppose one
another ” [323] .
Recognition of the existence of an objective connection throughout the world, recognition of the
need for everything accomplished — or, as they say, its determinism (conditionality) —is one of the
most important starting prerequisites of our knowledge, only under the condition of the universal
connection does the materialistic dependence of the phenomena of consciousness become apparent .
However, one recognition of the dominant connection in the world, the recognition of determinism,
does not yet serve as a watershed between the two main lines in philosophy - between materialism
and idealism. The mere statement of need is far from predetermined by character. dependence
existing between being and consciousness. It is possible to recognize the necessity of all occurring
phenomena and at the same time look for the basis of this need for thinking, in objective "spirit", in
God, etc. On the basis of mere statement of need alone, it is easy to combine both mechanical
materialists and and even some idealists. The father of revisionism is Ed. Bernstein believed that in
order to be a materialist, it suffices only to assert the need for everything that is happening, to be a
determinist. F. Mehring, objecting to Bernstein, quite reasonably referred to such thinkers as Voltaire
and Schopenhauer, who were adamant determinists, which did not prevent them from remaining
ardent enemies of materialism. Determinism can be the starting premise of dialectical materialist
knowledge only in a strictly its materialistic understanding: the content of materialistic determinism
arises from the relationship between being and consciousness established by materialism. Equally
important is the form recognized by us need.
In the reality around us, at every step, in each individual case, something appears at first glance
just the opposite of this need — an accident appears . Marx states this, for example, in the entire
sphere of capitalist competition, “over which, if we consider each individual case, chance prevails , in
which consequently the internal law , which is enforced among these accidents and regulates them,
becomes noticeable only under the condition large masses " [324] .
 Necessity and contingency are usually contrasted with one another. Random events are those
events, facts, actions that apparently do not find an explanation for themselves in the necessary
course of things. Accidentally, a person was crushed by a car, we accidentally met a friend on the
street, accidentally won a government loan, and so on. Not knowing how to explain chance, bourgeois
science at first seeks either to limit our knowledge to the range of phenomena in which the need for
causality is most clearly manifested phenomena, or completely banish the concept of "chance" from
the field of scientific knowledge, declaring chance a purely subjective concept. Together with Spinoza,
the whole mechanistic philosophy asserts that “a random phenomenon is called solely because of the
lack of our knowledge". Everything has its reasons, and therefore, everything happens is
necessary. But we can not always accurately determine all the causes that caused this phenomenon. A
number of reasons led to the fact that the car was driving down the street, another row brought a
person there, and as a result of the mutual action of these two series of reasons, an event
happened. So, says the mechanist, everything that seems random happens in reality
is necessary . The notion of chance is, therefore, of relative importance - only in relation to the
unidentified causal connection of phenomena. The latter view is confirmed, as it were, by the laws of
statistics, which establish a certain regularity in the most “accidents”: the strict repetition of cases of
car victims, suicides, etc.
In Soviet literature, Comrade Bukharin expressed a mechanistic view of chance: identifying chance
with impartiality, Comrade Bukharin argues that we speak of contingency only because we do not
know all the causal causal series that intersect: . causeless no phenomena. Phenomena may appear to
us "random", since we do not know enough of their causes " [325] .
This point of view, however, speaks of a purely mechanical understanding of necessity. Accident is
not causelessness at all. Causality is one character of the links between processes in the objective
world. Accident and necessity are a different type of these connections. These types of relationships
involve each other. However, this does not at all imply that these types of relations should be
identified. The concept of necessity does not at all exclude accidents that also have
anobjective meaning. To recognize the objective nature of accidents does not mean at all to deny the
fact that they are caused by certain reasons. Every chance has its extremely complex reasons.. More
precisely, absolutely everything is causally caused - even the fact that a dry leaf of a tree fell on my
hand, and not on the ground, that I choked for food. But it is obvious that such an abstract declaration
of everything in the world is necessary , all sorts of arguments about the need for “in general” do not
explain anything to us. But the most important thing is to find out what each time the specific, special
nature of this particular manifestation of this need . Consistent materialism must give the phenomena
a concrete explanation . A dialectical materialist, therefore, speaks not only of causation, but always
studies concrete, definite forms of this necessity. Can't speak only about the necessity of this
phenomenon or event when it is a separateevent, entering as part of the general course of
events, does not significantly affect the basic pattern of development. The abstract recognition by us
of everything “necessary” will not differ from the old theological determinism, which explained
absolutely everything in the world by the predetermined will of “divine providence.”
As Engels points out, metaphysical thinking is therefore lost in this “impassable” opposition
between necessity and contingency, because it purely abstractlyimagines necessity,
certainly excluding chance from the general process . In this case, there are two types of metaphysical
worldview. Some believe that “some thing, some relation, some process
is either random or necessary, but it cannot be either ” [326]. For example, the old natural scientists
declared the main species signs of animals and plants necessary, and the rest signs random. Only the
necessary signs they declared the only worthy of scientific interest, and all the random - indifferent to
science. But with this view in relation to chance, any scientific explanation ceases , and therefore it
becomes possible to reduce the accidental to supernatural reasons.
So an abstract understanding of necessity leads to religious ideas.
Other representatives of mechanical materialism completely deny randomness, giving it a purely
subjective meaning. At the same point of view are the Soviet modern mechanists. In this case,
according to Engels, “the so-called necessity remains a simple phrase ... Accident is not
explained here out of necessity: rather the opposite.” Once everything is necessary, then the very
" need is reduced to something purely random " [327] .
A proper understanding of necessity therefore does not at all eliminate the concept of chance as an
objective category. Accident is not causelessness at all. Hegel rightly wrote on this subject that
science has as its subject matter the discovery of “the necessity hidden behind seeming accident; but
it should not imagine that chance is only the product of our subjective thought and that it is necessary
to reject it in order to reach the truth ” [328] . But for the idealist Hegel, the category of chance was a
step in the development of the objective spirit , world consciousness. The modern Menshevist
idealists, taking randomness under their "defense", turn the whole question into a scholastic
discussion of purely logical concepts.
Accidental is necessary , since every chance is included in the dominant connection between nature
and society; and at the same time, random is not necessary , because chance is not essential for the
development of a given pattern and does not have a significant effect on the course of its
development, since here, on the place of one chance with the same general pattern, another chance
due to others external causes, and not the most internal laws.
Accident is therefore the addition of necessity (its opposite) and the form of manifestation of the
same necessity. Due to the complexity of social development, chance often turns out to be
the historical concrete form in which social need is fulfilled . The aspirations of people "intersect," says
Engels, "and in all such societies, therefore, necessity prevails , the addition and form of which is
an accident " [329] . “Necessity,” according to Engels, “is composed entirely of purest accidents, and
these imaginary accidents constitute a form beyond which necessity is hidden” [330] .
The role and significance of each randomness is governed by necessity, and at the same time,
randomness forms this necessity. Each individual phenomenon bears the essential imprint of the
dominant pattern and at the same time has some features that are not essential for this pattern. Each
individual coincidence is balanced by other accidents and therefore may not affect the general course
of development, its main trends.
However, this does not mean that chance plays no role in the development of necessity. It must
play a certain role precisely because it represents a specialform of necessity . Darwin also pointed out
that small “random” changes in the organism, intensifying, can lead to changes in the very
“necessary” nature of a biological species. “History,” wrote Marx to Kugelman about the role of the
individual in history, “would have a very mystical character, if 'accidents' would not
play any role. These accidents are included , of course, itself an integral part in the overall
development, balancing the other accidents. But acceleration and deceleration strongly depends on
these accidents " [331] . Everything depends, of course, on how much a given chance is essential for a
given connection of phenomena . It cannot be said, as the previous bourgeois historians did, that the
course of history depended on the beauty of Cleopatra's nose or on the cold of Napoleon. But
undoubtedly, for example, the apparent dementia and short-sightedness of the last representatives of
the house of the Romanovs only accelerated the revolutionary explosion in Russia. There is no doubt
that the genius of Marx and Lenin had a tremendous accelerating effect on the development of the
revolutionary labor movement.
4.7. Opportunity and reality
The essence and the basis, the content and the form, the law, the need - all these basic concepts
of dialectical logic are the steps in the process of cognition of the material world, the essence of the
form of thinking in which the cognized reality finds its diverse reflection .
When we speak of reality, we mean something deeper than just the actual existence of individual
things or than their immediate, external existence . As Hegel pointed out, reality is a unity, an integral
totality of all internal and external moments that form it, the ratio of all sides; the process of
development of reality is anecessary , internally determined, natural process. “Separate being (object,
phenomenon, etc.),” Hegel develops his thought, “is (only) one side of the idea (truth). Truth still
needs other aspects of reality ... The totality of all aspects of the phenomenon, of reality and their
(inter)relationships are what make up the truth ” [332] .
The idealist Hegel, as already known, identified the necessity, the regularity of things with the laws
of the mind, with the development of absolute spirit. Hence his famous position: everything real
is rational , everything rational is valid . This provision Hegel applied to the course of socio-historical
development - due to the idealistic expression, which it received from Hegel - often led his followers to
the reactionary conclusions: the so-called "right-Hegelians" it served as a justification for existing in a
society of oppression and exploitation. Since everything is really rational, they interpreted, including,
for example, our famous critic Belinsky, who at one time was entirely under the spell of the
“philosophical cap of Egor Fedorovich” (i.e. Hegel), which means that Prussian semi-feudal monarchy
and autocracy are also necessary and necessary Nikolay Palkin, etc.: all this, they say, has its
justification in the laws of the development of the world spirit. Hegel himself, however, put into his
thought a different, essentially revolutionary, content. He distinguished between the simple external
existence of things, which may be unreasonable, and their reality, which must be reasonably
necessary.
“Reality as a unity of internal and external is so little opposed to reason that, on the contrary, it is
completely rational; and that which is unreasonable is precisely why it should not be regarded as
valid ” [333] . “The reality that does not correspond to the concept is simply a subjective, random ,
arbitrary phenomenon , not true” [334] .
Everything that is rational or, in the materialistic language, everything historically necessary should
become a reality: therefore, all unreasonable public institutions that still exist, but no longer have
internal foundations in the necessary, regular course of history, should sooner or later be destroyed by
the course of historical development. Hegel distinguishes reality from the temporal, random realities,
“corresponding to the idea,” that is, it regards it as something essential, internally necessary, and
natural.
Marxism reveals this materialistic content behind Hegel’s idealistic shell of thought. However, it
cannot be limited to a single translation of the Hegelian proposition on the rationality of the real into a
language of historical necessity, as for example Plekhanov does. It should not be forgotten that this
position itself led to the reactionary defense of the Prussian feudal order [335]. To confine ourselves to
the recognition that everything real is historically conditioned and in this sense necessary, it means
that one can easily slip into the path of objectivism, fatalism, contemplative materialism. The
bourgeois philosopher, Stammler, was once ironic, indicating that if socialism is historically inevitable,
then there is no need to fight to accelerate its offensive, as there is no need to create a party for the
onset of a lunar eclipse. Struve argued, on the other hand, that if capitalism in Russia is historically
necessary, then there is no need to fight with it. Kautsky later tried, with the same arguments, to
come out in defense of imperialism, which is also historically necessary! The Russian Mensheviks,
including Plekhanov, they abstractly argued the historical inevitability of the bourgeois revolution for
Russia and did not really seek our historical development for those forces that could change the whole
character of this revolution and lead the proletariat to victory. Meanwhile, the most important aspect,
the necessary moment in the development of reality is the human activity , our practice , which sets
forth certain goals and implements them by constantly transforming external reality in the process of
its cognition.
“Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but
also of immediate reality” [336] . A person’s will, divorced from external reality, suffers from
subjectivism and itself hinders the achievement of its goals.
Marxist-Leninist cognition implies not only strict consideration of the totality of all moments and
aspects of reality and its development , its development at each specific stage, it also implies taking
into account the real possibilities of the course of historical development, its conditions , its driving
forces, includingactivities of the revolutionary class in its development, its revolutionary practice,
taking into account the ways and means necessary to turn an opportunity into reality . “The
development of the totality of moments of reality NB = the essence of dialectical cognition” [337] , Lenin
points out.
In this regard, it should be pointed out that the Marxist-Leninist theory emphasizes the distinction
that exists between possibility and reality , and at the same time notes the essential significance that
real possibilities have for the development of reality.
When we speak of the possibility of anything, a strict distinction must be made between
an abstract , purely formal possibility and a real possibility. From the point of view of formal logic, it is
possible to absolutely everything that you can think of, what you can imagine (without formal logical
contradictions), everything that you can come up with any logical basis. Here the opportunity turns
into an abstract, subjective concept; the content of one or another conceivable possibility is pulled out
of a definite, objectively necessary connection of things. The dialectician Hegel, evil, mocked such talk
of empty, abstract possibilities: air; it is possible that the Turkish Sultan would become Pope, because
he - the person may itself apply to the Christian faith, to become a Catholic priest, and so on ... The
uneducated man, the less he knows. certain ratio of objects that he wants to be seen, the more it is
inclined to spread about every kind of empty Perhaps, as it happens for example in the political field
with the so-called policy of beer ... reasonable, practical people do not allow themselves to seduce
possible because it is possible, and hold for a valid " [338] .
The most profound substantiation of this difference between abstract and real possibilities was
given by the Marxist-Leninist theory. Lenin repeatedly underlines that possibility is not yet reality ,
that Marxists should proceed not from abstract possibility, etc., but from reality. Lenin argued the
entire fallacy of the views of R. Luxemburg, which, during the war, put forward such an empty,
abstract “opportunity” —the transformation of an imperialist war into a national defensive war. In his
notes on Bukharin's “Economy in Transition”, Lenin pointed out the complete fallacy of Comrade
Bukharin’s abstract discourse on the “possibility” or “impossibility” of restoring capitalist relations
during their disintegration outside of the examination of these discourses by practice: ““ Impossibility
”is provable only practically, said Lenin. “The author does not put the dialectical relation of theory to
practice” [339] .
At the same time, criticizing the Menshevik Sukhanov, Lenin pointed out that the uniqueness of the
situation in the era of imperialism opened up the possibility of a different transition to the creation of
basic premises of civilization than in all other Western European states, and that this possibility does
not violate the general pattern of world history, but lies along the general line of world development.
It is extremely important to identify the real possibilities of development and the conditions
for their transformation into reality. Real possibility has its own objective, necessary foundations in the
very content of a developing reality, in the laws of its development. The real possibility is already
something not only conceivable, but also objectively existing, it consists in a certain number of
conditions which are inherent in the objective reality itself and which therefore contribute to the
development of this latter. However, we must firmly remember that the real possibility is not yet
reality . One real opportunity can be countered by other real possibilities, also having known objective
bases in reality itself, although not laid down in this reality with absolute necessity. The process of the
development of reality is a process in which the range of possibilities is gradually more and more
determined and thus the range of possibilities is limited, in which all other possibilities gradually
disappear and finally one certain possibility turns into reality .
What is the reason for the victory of one opportunity over other possibilities? First of all, this
victory is due to the presence in the structure of the given object of objective, necessary grounds in
favor of the implementation of this particular definite opportunity and the absence of such necessary
grounds in favor of another opportunity. For example, Lenin pointed out at the beginning of NEP and
on the possibility of a split between the two cooperating classes, the workers and peasants. “If serious
class disagreements arise between these classes, then a split will be inevitable, but in our social
system it’s not necessary to establish such a split ” [340] .
To understand the conditions for the victory of any opportunity, when we talk about the socio-
historical reality, it is not enough to talk about its objective necessity: here our decisive activity also
plays a decisive role , turning possibilities into reality. Here a definite struggle of the social class
solves, aimed at maintaining and strengthening one real possibility and at weakening, preventing,
destroying all other possibilities.
Here, the important role is played by certain ways and means by which this activity and this
struggle are directed and used. The main task of our party, Lenin saw, was to closely monitor the
circumstances from which "a split can flow out and warn them " [341] .
It is extremely interesting to trace all the moments of the development of reality on the problem of
the possibility of building socialism in one country. Trotsky's position was characterized by
a subjective-idealistic, abstract understanding of the possibility, in fact leading to the opportunist, and
later leading him to counter-revolutionary conclusions. Trotsky denied that the working class in Russia
would be able to remain in power without the direct state support of the European proletariat. Denying
this real opportunity, the possibility for the working class to build socialism in one country, Trotsky at
the same time put forward such an abstract, empty opportunity as the “one-act” world revolution, in
which the working class of one country begins a revolution in full confidence that his initiative will
immediately give push revolution in other countries. “The genuine upsurge of the socialist economy,”
Menshevik Trotsky “argued”, “will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the most
important countries of Europe” [342]. Subjectivism in understanding the possibilities of the proletarian
revolution easily forced Trotsky to switch from these unreasonable views to the outwardly opposite
position of complete "hopelessness." “And if this had not happened, it would be hopeless to think ...
that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could resist in the face of a conservative Europe” [343] .
In complete opposition to Trotsky, in his understanding of the possibility of building socialism in
one country, Lenin proceeds from the law laid down in the historical reality itself, from the law of
uneven development of capitalism, which is especially strengthened and sharpened during the period
of imperialism. “The unevenness of economic and political development is the unconditional law of
capitalism. It follows that the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few or even in one capitalist
country taken separately ” [344] . Lenin accurately defined that range of conditions.which creates a real
opportunity for us to build a socialist society: the power of the proletarian state on all major means of
production, the power of the state in the hands of the proletariat, its alliance with millions of small and
tiny peasants and the leadership of these latter by the proletariat, the development of cooperation,
etc. Is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society? This is not yet a building of a
socialist society, but it is all necessary and sufficient for this building ” [345] .
At the same time, Lenin noted that "the free association of nations in socialism is impossible
without a more or less long, stubborn struggle of the socialist republics with backward
states" [346] . Lenin pointed out at the beginning of the recovery period, that although the imperialists
as a result of the intervention, and could not overthrow the new system created by the revolution, but
"they did not give him a chance to make right now a step forward, which would have justified the
forecasts of the socialists, who would give them the possibility of a huge to quickly develop the
productive forces, to develop all the possibilities that would have developed in socialism, to prove to
everyone and everyone clearly, with their own eyes, that socialism is fraught with gigantic powers and
that humanity has now passed to a new stage, which carries extraordinarily brilliant possibilities of
development ” [347] .
Tov. Stalin develops further the teaching of Lenin on the real possibility of building socialism in one
country. While fighting on two fronts, with Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, Comrade Stalin
found out the enormous significance that confidence in this possibility has for our practical action ,
which the Trotskyists denied, found ways and means of turning this possibility into reality that the
rightists did not see and pervert. .
"What is the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country?"
To this question, Comrade Stalin replies: "This is the possibility of resolving contradictions between
the proletariat and the peasantry by the internal forces of our country, the possibility of the seizure of
power by the proletariat and the use of this power to build a full socialist society in our
country" [348] . And, in contrast to the Trotskyists, this real possibility of building socialism in our
country differs from the question of the impossibility of the final victory of socialism in one country
without the victory of the revolution in other countries, Comrade Stalin says: “Without such an
opportunity, building socialism is building without perspective, building without confidence socialism ...
The denial of such an opportunity is disbelief in the construction of socialism, a departure from
Leninism ” [349] .
However, “ there is a big difference between the possibility of building socialism and its actual
construction . It is impossible to confuse opportunity with reality ” [350] . Along with this opportunity,
which the Trotskyists did not want to see, there was another possibility that the right opportunists had
forgotten — the possibility of the restoration of capitalism in our country. Only in the struggle against
this last opportunity, in its prevention and destruction, only under certain conditions does the
possibility of building socialism in our country come about and turns from possibility into reality. " We
can destroy the opportunity the restoration of capitalism, we can root out the roots of capitalism and
achieve a final victory over capitalism if we carry out the hard work of electrifying the country, if
we put together the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, industry, agriculture and
transport [351] .
Summing up at the XVI Party Congress the results of the struggle against Trotskyism and right-
wing opportunism, Comrade Stalin pointed out: “The Soviet system provides tremendous
opportunities for the complete victory of socialism. But the possibility is not yet reality . To turn an
opportunity into reality, a number of conditions are necessary, including the party line and the correct
implementation of this line play an important role ” [352] . These conditions were not understood by the
right deviationists, despite the fact that they abstractly recognized the possibility of building socialism
in our country. "The trouble of the right deviationists is that, recognizing formally the possibility of
building socialism in one country, they do not want to recognize those ways and means struggle,
without which it is impossible to build socialism " [353] . Thus, in practice, right-wing deviationists rolled
into the viewpoint of denying the possibility of building socialism in our country.
Speaking about the results of the first five-year plan, Comrade Stalin therefore emphasized
the need and real opportunity for us to implement the policy of the most accelerated rates in the first
five-year plan: Only in this way could the country be given the opportunity to quickly re-equip on the
basis of new technology and finally get out on a wide road. ” “But did the party have a real
opportunity implement the policy of the most accelerated pace. Yes, it did. She had this opportunity
not only because she managed to shake the country in time in the spirit of fast progress, but above all
because she could rely on widespread new construction on old or renovated factories and plants that
had already been mastered by workers and engineers. in view of this, the technical personnel have
been able to carry out the most accelerated rates of development ” [354] .
In the second five-year plan, especially in its first years, there is no longer any need to implement
the policy of the most accelerated rates, since a certain period is required to master and fully use the
new technology.
Mastering the new technology, organizational and economic strengthening of the collective farms -
these are the ways and means, those are the conditions that will make it possible to turn into reality
the real possibilities of the complete victory of socialism, already conquered by the proletariat, which
will lead to the destruction of classes and the construction of a complete socialist society.
 4.8. General nature of categories
Criticizing the theoretical eclecticism of Trotsky and Bukharin on the issue of trade unions, Lenin
established four basic requirements of materialist-dialectical logic. Here he makes, firstly, the
requirement to study the subject from all its sides, in all its connections and mediations, despite the
fact that we will never “fully achieve this”; secondly, the requirement to “take the object in
its development and self-movement,” in changing its connections; thirdly, according to Lenin, “all
human practice must be included in the full“ definition ”of the subject both as a criterion of truth and
as a practical determinant of the connection of the subject with what is necessary for man ”. Fourthly,
the requirement of concreteness of knowledge.
These concise, but deeply substantive provisions put forward by Lenin, we must bear in mind when
considering the categories of materialist dialectics.
Let us dwell on the most important features of the categories of dialectical logic.
The main and most important requirement of materialist dialectics, Lenin points out, is
“the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not deviations, but a thing in itself)” [355] . This is the
basic premise of the materialist theory of reflection. The categories of materialistic dialectics are
not empty concepts of formal logic, but meaningful forms reflecting the objective , material, concrete
content of the knowable world. These are “moments of man's knowledge of nature.” “The form of the
reflection of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is the concepts, laws, categories” [356]. In
logical concepts there is something subjective, since these are concepts of human thinking, since they
only reflect objective processes in our consciousness. While logical concepts remain “abstract”
concepts, as long as they remain divorced from the processes they reflect, they are
subjective. However, it is important for us to emphasize that in the process of knowledge, our
concepts more and more fully express the objective content of the world. “Human notions,” Lenin
summarizes, “are subjective in their abstractness, isolation, but objective in general, in the process,
as a result, in the trend, in the source” [357] .
But the subject, the thing, any question, as we already know, must be studied in all its connections
and mediations; must be taken, as Lenin formulates, "the whole aggregate of the many-
sided relations of this thing to others." The “development of this thing (of the phenomenon), its own
movement, its own life” [358]should be studied .
These requirements of dialectical logic primarily apply to the most general concepts. Each concept
is in a certain respect, in a certain connection with all theothers. This is because each concept, taken
separately, reflects any one side of a single objective reality. “ The totality of all aspects of the
phenomenon, reality and their (inter) relationship is what makes up the truth,” Lenin points
out. “Relations (= transitions = contradictions) of concepts = main content of logic” [359] .
The categories of logic, its basic concepts should be considered by us in their interrelations - in
those connections and relations that exist between essence and phenomenon, between content and
form, between possibility and reality. Each category is associated with all other categories. These
concepts do not “flow out” purely logically one from the other, as idealists believe, but reflect the
objective world, nature and society from various sides.
However, this circumstance does not mean that the categories of logic are fixed: in the fixed, dead
notions, the living life of nature and society, with all its changes, its connections and changes of these
connections, could not get the correct reflection ... "If everything develops," asks in one Lenin's place
- does this relate to the most general concepts and categories of thinking ? If not, then thinking is not
connected with being. If yes, then there is a dialectic of concepts and a dialectic of knowledge, which
has an objective meaning ” [360] . Therefore, along with the interdependence of the concepts
of all “without exception”, Lenin also emphasizes the “ transitions of concepts from one to another, all
without exception. “Human notions,” he notes, “are not immobile, but eternally move, transform into
each other, pour one into another, without this they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts,
the study of them, the "art of operating with them"(Engels) always requires studying the movement
of concepts, their connection, their mutual transitions " [361] .
This movement and development of concepts is not, however, a purely logical self-movement of
the concept itself; the process of human knowledge reflects the objective movement of nature and
society and human activity. Knowledge of the world, its reflection, the unity of the subject with the
object, with things, is a process . Only in the process of cognition, reflecting the process of changing
the objective world and therefore only gradually, side by side, step by step, covering the universal
connection and pattern of the real world, - in a number of relative truths, our knowledge of absolute
truth takes shape.
Therefore, Lenin compares the knowledge of a person reflecting this world with a river, and the
concepts with individual drops of a river reflecting particular aspects, positions and connections of
things. “Concepts as accounting for individual aspects of movement, individual drops (=“ things ”),
separate jets” [362] .
The development of the most common concepts, categories of logic is inextricably linked with the
entire history of human society, with the practice of material production and the process of production
development. It is connected with the history of thinking, with the history of philosophy.
Every process of development is a process proceeding as a result of the struggle of opposites. We
must study, Lenin continues to enumerate the elements of dialectics, the development of a thing,
“internal contradictory tendencies ( and sides) in this thing”, “a thing as a sum and unity of
opposites ”, “a struggle or development of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc.” [363] .
Accordingly, our concepts “must also be hewn, broken, flexible, mobile, relative, interconnected,
united in opposites in order to embrace the world” [364] . The reflection of nature in human thought,
Lenin says, must be understood “ not without movement , not without contradictions, but in the
eternal process of movement, the emergence of contradictions and their resolution” [365] . The
movement of our knowledge in its internal contradictions is a process in which a split of the forms of
logical knowledge occurs. . The world is embraced by our thinking in opposite concepts to one
another, in mutually exclusive and at the same time interpenetrating one other category: essence and
phenomenon, content and form, cause and effect, necessity and chance. These categories are
opposites, but these opposites become identical, mutually penetrate each other, they pass one into
another.
Distinctive features of the concepts and categories of materialistic dialectics are thus their
objectivity, their mutual connection, their movement and mutual transitions, their development on the
basis of the unity of opposites. But the concepts of dialectical logic are materialistic abstractions . They
reflect not individual objects or relations of individual things, but have a universal , universal
meaning. With the help of logical categories, we reveal a common in separate phenomena and
objects , we reveal the unity of the general and the particular in each separate subject.
Marx, Engels, Lenin, in contrast to the vulgar creeping empiricism of bourgeois science, with all
their strength emphasized the enormous scientific significance of materialistic abstractions. They
showed that the abstractions of matter, law, etc. , reflect reality more truly , or rather ,
more accurately than each individual case or individual of our ideas, because with the help of scientific
abstraction we understand the hidden essence of phenomena, their law , their necessary
connection with random signs .
At the same time, Marx, in his Introduction to the Criticism of Political Economy, pointed out that
the method of dialectical logic implies that we not only select from the directly given concrete
material, through analysis, some defining general relations, the simplest definitions, but also the
reverse — ascent, movement from the simplest and abstract to the more complex and more concrete ,
not only disassembly, analysis, but also summation, connection, synthesis.
Each concrete thing is an infinite set of sides and relations, each side separately is studied by us by
highlighting the general definitions of the essence, laws, and necessary connections. We do not fully
know, do not exhaust completely the given subject in its concreteness, studying its general
connections and separate sides. However, there is no other way and method to at least get closer to
the knowledge of the concrete, as through the general , as through the analysis (highlighting) of its
individual sides and synthesis, summing up the obtained general concepts, the simplest
definitions. This idea is also emphasized by Lenin: “The meaning of the general ,” he says, “is
contradictory, it is dead, it is unclean, incomplete, etc., etc., but it is only the degree to the knowledge
of the concrete, for we never know the concrete completely. The infinite sum of general concepts,
laws, etc., gives a concrete in its completeness ” [366] .
Our cognition reveals directly in being, in immediate phenomena, their essence, their law, their
causes, their identity, their difference. “Such,” says Lenin, “is truly the general course of all human
knowledge, of all science in general. Such is the course of natural science, political economy, and
history ” [367] . Using the example of Marx's Capital, Marx shows how analysis here takes "the simplest,
usual, basic, most massive, most ordinary, billions of times the meeting attitude of a bourgeois
(commodity) society: the exchange of goods" [368]. Marxist analysis reveals in this main cell of
bourgeois society the germs of all the contradictions of modern society. The further exposition of Marx
shows the development and growth, and the movement of these contradictions and this society in the
sum of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end. Lenin shows that in any simple sentence
connecting the individual and the common, for example, Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, is
dialectic. “ Already here ,” Lenin emphasizes, “there are elements, beginnings, concepts of necessity ,
objective connection of nature, etc. Random and necessary, phenomenon and essence are already
here, for saying: Ivan is a man, Bug is a dog, it is a leaf tree, etc., we discard a series of signs, as
random, we separate the essential from the being and oppose one to the other ” [369] . By any
example, Lenin argues, one can show "the transformation of the separate into the general, the
accidental into the necessary, transitions, play, interconnection of opposites" [370] .
The categories of logic are the moments of the movement of knowledge, in which there is an
ascent from visual contemplation to abstract thinking and a return to concrete reproduction of the
concrete by thinking. In scientific thinking, as in actual development, we are thus moving in a circle ,
returning, as it were, to the starting point, to a concrete, objective world, carrying out the unity of
analysis and synthesis in the dialectical method. In this same movement of our concepts, opening us
total in a separate entity for the phenomena we have the opposition of a part, the essence of the
phenomenon, the content of the form, the law of its forms, causes of action, etc. -.. All this movement
concepts in the Marxist method of investigation only reflects the real relationship of things
themselves. The contradictions of categories only reflect the unity of opposites, revealed by us in the
objective world that we are studying. This process of research and the movement of thought in
"circles" can be accomplished infinitely by us , for the sides and properties of things in their
development are inexhaustible, because, as things develop, each time even deeper knowledge of their
connections and interdependencies is possible, even more complete assimilation of the concrete by
thinking for each new abstraction gives us only a partial, relative truth about the subject.
Lenin vividly expressed this idea when he formulated the “circles” of our knowledge:
“The movement of knowledge to the object,” says Lenin, “can always go only dialectically: to step
back, or rather to get there, to retreat, to better jump (to know?). Lines converging and diverging:
circles touching each other. Key point = the practice of man and human history " [371] . Or in another
place: “The activity of a person who has compiled an objective picture of the world, changes
the external reality, destroys its certainty (= changes one or another of its sides, qualities), and thus
takes away her features of appearance, insignificance and insignificance, “in and of itself and for itself
for itself (= objective truth)” [372] .
Practice and even more specifically the technique - the technical practice of humanity, the process
of development of its productive forces, Lenin includes in the process of knowledge, inextricably
linking logic and history in this way , turning categories of dialectical logic into historical categories
into categories of revolutionary practice. The concepts and categories of dialectical logic - the essence,
law, content and form, necessity, possibility and reality - we must consider not only in their
connection, in their movement, in the unity of opposites, but also from the point of view of
revolutionary practice as a category not only of logical thinking but also revolutionary action .
4.9. Formal logic and dialectics
Dialectics in its historical development had to endure a serious struggle with the metaphysical
worldview, which, as we already know (see Chapter III), completely dominated in the XVII – XVIII
centuries. and which to this day is a characteristic feature of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science.
Describing metaphysics, Engels says: “For metaphysics, things and their mental images, that is,
concepts, are separate, unchanging, frozen, once and for all given objects, subject to study one after
the other and one independently of the other. Metaphysicist thinks in complete, direct
oppositions ; his speech consists of “yes, yes, no — no; what more than that, from the evil one ” [373] .
Both idealistic and materialistic metaphysics are suitable for this characteristic, despite the
fundamental difference in their starting points. A metaphysical materialist proceeds from the
recognition of an objectively real world that exists independently of our consciousness. The idealist
completely denies the existence of the material world, or in any case makes its existence dependent
on consciousness, thinking, and spirit. But both the first and second equally metaphysically approach
the subject of their research whether they are things and concepts, as in the first case, or only
concepts, as in the second case.
Metaphysics is distracted from the movement of a thing, from its internal processes, and takes a
thing or a concept as something completely finished , finished, frozen, given once and for all. Things
and concepts for metaphysics do not arisethey always exist in finished form or arise “suddenly”,
without any preparation, without a process of becoming. Cash things and concepts do not change in
the period of their existence, they are always equal to themselves, new signs do not appear in them,
existing ones do not disappear, they are internally fixed, there are no contradictions in them, there is
no internal source of movement, there is no self-movement. Therefore, for the world of things, the
metaphysician assumes or inevitably must allow some initial force, the first engine, an external
impulse that leads or has once set in motion things. The movement of concepts metaphysicist usually
puts in an exclusive dependence on the arbitrariness of the subject. He does not understand and does
not recognize movement, the inner connection and interdependence of concepts as a reflection of the
movement and interrelation of things of the objective, real world.
 The metaphysical viewpoint gets its rationale in formal logic . Formal logic is born and develops in
ancient Greece. The young Greek trading bourgeoisie, who led a cruel criticism of feudal principles and
feudal morality in the face of the sophists , as the victory of merchant capital is indicated, comes to
the need to give a positive justification to the logical methods and forms of thinking that can ensure
the stability of the new bourgeois order and the development of its productive forces. This task takes
on the logic of Aristotle, the brilliant thinker of antiquity, who first formulated the basic laws of logical
thinking. For Aristotle himself, his logic still did not bear the character of that logical scholasticism of
formal logic in the proper sense of the word, which later followers turned it into, which completely
failed to understand its inquiries and searches. According to Engels, Aristotle investigated all essential
forms of dialectical thinking. “The logic of Aristotle,” says Lenin, “is the inquiry, the quest, the
approach to the logic of Hegel,” and from it, from the logic of Aristotle (which everywhere at every
step poses the question of dialectics ) made the dead scholasticism, discarding all searches,
fluctuations, techniques posing questions " [374]. The main disadvantage of Aristotle is that he allows
helpless confusion around the main issue, the question of the general and the individual; This
confusion is created by the fact that, not doubting the reality of the external world and spontaneously
to materialism, Aristotle is inconsistent in resolving the issue of the relation of thinking to
being. Struggling against the vulgar empiricism, seeing only a single, separate, Aristotle admits the
existence of a general concept independently of individual objects.
According to Lenin, Aristotle is confused " in the dialectic of the general and the separate - the
concept and sense-perceptible reality of a separate object, thing, phenomenon" [375] . Lenin shows that
this gap between the general and individual, between concepts and sense-perceived reality is
characteristic of the entire further development of formal logic, has its gnoseological roots in
the idealistic formulation of the question of being and thinking, concepts and the things reflected in
them: “Primitive idealism: common (concept, idea) is a separate being . It seems wild, monstrous (or
rather, childishly) ridiculous. But is it not in the same way ( quite the same way) modern idealism,
Kant, Hegel, the idea of God? " [376]
Разрыв между общим и отдельным — обозначившийся уже у Аристотеля, получает своё
дальнейшее развитие, усиливается и обостряется сначала в средневековой схоластике (так
называемый «реализм»), затем в буржуазной логике, особенно по мере того как буржуазия
становится консервативной и реакционной силой. Если восходящая буржуазия стремилась
превратить логику в метод отыскания новых результатов, внося в неё новые приёмы
исследования (например метод индукции, введённый Беконом), то уже в логике Канта мы имеем
идеалистический разрыв между миром вещей и нашими понятиями: превращение логических
понятий в пустые, бессодержательные формы особенно характерно для логики неокантианства.
As already mentioned above, the categories of dialectical logic reflect objective laws and therefore
are meaningful forms of thinking. The development of categories of dialectical logic reflects in a
generalized form the real development of the objective world and human cognition. The profound
difference between formal logic and dialectics is that the concepts and laws of thinking established by
formal logic are only formal principles of thinking “as such”, taken regardless of what the content
of this thinking is. The author of a large course of formal logic, the bourgeois idealist-neo-Kantian
Siegwart, for example, considers logic as a collection of technical methods of thinking. and says:
"Compliance with its rules does not guarantee the necessary material truth of the results, but only the
formal correctness of the techniques " [377] . Formal logic reflects the external forms of things
considered by it as unchanging, frozen. The content of thinking does not interest her even if it is a
matter of sheer absurdity. “Formally correct, but essentially mockery,” this Leninist characteristic of
bureaucracy applies to formal logic.
Formal, metaphysical logic is inevitably subjective.in any case, even the materialist metaphysician,
thanks to the principles of his formal logic, is always on the verge of subjectivism and sophistry, not to
mention the metaphysical idealists. Not seeing in the concepts of reflection of the developing and
moving world, formal logic is naturally unable to embrace the world as a unity of opposites, does not
notice the internal movement and changes of objects, their comprehensive, often contradictory
connections and interactions. She metaphysically regards things and concepts as eternally immutable,
as completely separate, isolated, separated from each other, without internal relationships. Therefore,
the study of formal logic is not historically. Analysis in formal logic is dead, mechanistic; this is a
simple, crude division of things in space, the dissection of an object into its cash, separate parts, pure
quantitative disintegration of a thing, its fragmentation. Formal-logical synthesis is also dead,
mechanistic, non-historical - this is the simple addition of the presence of these things, bringing them
into a purely external spatial or temporal relationship. Analysis and synthesis are considered purely
subjectively as simple research techniques. Indeed, scientific analysis and synthesis should be
analogous, a reflection of analysis and synthesis, differentiation and connection, occurring in the
objectively real world. The forms of analysis and synthesis in dialectics are therefore qualitatively as
diverse as the ways and forms of separating and connecting things in the objective world. Formal logic
breaks analysis and synthesis into two completely opposite, completely external and alien to each
other actions, whereas in reality they do not exist one without the other,
Formal logic sees, of course, not only the identity of things, but also their opposite. But it does not
reach the unity (identity) of opposites. The identity is in one pocket, the difference is in the
other. Identity in formal logic is an abstract identity, the difference is an abstract difference. Stopping
at the unity of things or concepts, metaphysical logic overlooks their split, and passing into a split of
things, it misses their unity. In a word, formal logic recognizes both identity and opposite, not seeing
their unity. Therefore, the contradictions of formal logic are the contradictions of concepts, and not the
contradictions of the objective world. It is intractable contradictions, fixed, dead, these are not
dialectical contradictions, they are neither the source, nor the basis, nor the result of movement. At
the same time, formal logic does not tolerate any real contradictions, its logical "principles" are
entirely pointed against the materialist-dialectical law of the unity of opposites.
The three basic "principles" of the law of formal logic perfectly illustrate the foregoing.
The first "principle" of formal logic says: A is A, or A is equal to A. This is the principle of
abstract identity . All the things of the world and all concepts are once and for all defined by A, they
are always identical, equal to themselves, independently of any development, of any movement. The
world is one, not opposite, not split in itself, not contradictory, unchanging, without movement.
The second "principle" of formal logic , the principle of contradiction, reads as follows: But not is
not-A, but not equal to not-A. This position is a negative expression of the first principle, the principle
of identity: since A is A, it cannot be equal to non-A. But, on the other hand, it can also be viewed as
the absolute opposite of the first principle (which Hegel indicated for a long time and which Plekhanov
completely misunderstands when describing formal logic in his preface to Engels’s Ludwig
Feuerbach). If the first "principle" speaks of the absolute identity of the world, the second "principle",
on the contrary, comes from an absolute difference, from the inner tornness of the world, from its
absolute duality, as each A is opposed forever and always every absolutely opposite non-A. Therefore
there is an opposite in the world, but this world is not one, its opposite parts exist absolutely
independently of each other, they are external and alien to each other, there is no connection between
them, no movement, no movement, and there are no separate movements in each of them. They are
absolute opposites, but they do not lead a struggle between themselves because the struggle requires
one or another form of their unity. Therefore, the combination of opposites in formal logic is possible
only in a purely mechanical, external, eclectic way, and this connection inevitably depends on the
arbitrariness of the subject.
The third "law" of formal logic says: something is either A or not-A, something is either A or not-
A. This position of formal logic (the law of elimination of the third) is a synthesis of the first two
principles. Every existing "something" - every thing or concept is either A or its opposite, non-A, but
not the unity of opposites. Thus, this principle negates the unity of identity and
opposition. Consequently, this law is the core of formal logic, fundamentally opposite and hostile to
the core of dialectical logic, that is, the law of the unity of opposites.
In addition to the basic laws of formal logic, the subject of its research is usually the study of
concepts, judgments, and conclusions .
The empty formalism, the separation of the laws of thinking from all real content, characteristic of
metaphysical logic in the theory of the laws of thinking, is also manifested on the question of
concepts, judgments and conclusions. In his doctrine of the concept of formal logic comes from the
following position: "the volume and content of the concept are inversely proportional to each
other". The meaning of this law is that the more concrete content in a concept, the narrower its scope
and vice versa: the smaller the content, the wider the scope of the concept. The task of creating
concepts from the point of view of metaphysical logic is to arrive at concepts as wide as possible in
their scope ‚in other words, to increasingly dilute all content from the concept. Formally, a logical
abstraction consists in the fact that all separate, special features are distracting from things or
processes, until a general concept is obtained, in which everything separate, special, has already
disappeared. For example, the general concept of a tree is by its scope broader than the concept of an
oak, an apple tree, a linden; the concept of a plant is broader than the concepts of a tree, a bush, etc.
The general concept in its content is poorer than a more particular concept.
At first glance it may seem that the point of view of formal logic on the issue of the concept
correctly reflects reality. Meanwhile, it is easy to see the entire metaphysical nature of this position.
 The basis of the formal-logical doctrine of the concept lies in the perfect idealistic gap between the
single, the particular and the general , their opposition. Already Hegel seeks to bridge this gap: he put
forward the doctrine of the concept as the unity of the general, the particular and the singular. Hegel
gave a deep criticism of the emptiness of formalism and the metaphysical nature of the formal-logical
doctrine of the concept. However, his teaching on the unity of the individual, the particular, the
general is based on the fact that the concept, the idea , is the essence of the world. The gap between
the world of individual things and the general is thus preserved in Hegel, since the concept gives rise
to the objective world.
The only consistent to the end doctrine of a concrete, meaningful concept is given by materialistic
dialectics. This doctrine of a concrete concept fully and to the end overcomes the entire void of formal
logic, vulgar empiricism and idealism in the doctrine of the concept. Marx, in his Introduction to the
Critique of Political Economy, provides guidance on this issue. Considering the basic concepts that
political economy usually begins with, he points out: “It seems right to start with real and concrete,
from the real prerequisites, therefore, for example, in political economy from the population, which is
the basis and subject of the whole social process of production. Meanwhile, upon closer inspection,
this turns out to be erroneous. The population is an abstraction, if I, for example, leave aside the
classes of which it consists. These classes are, again, an empty sound, if I do not know the elements
on which they rest, for example, wage labor, capital, etc. ” [378] .
Criticizing such a method of presenting political economy, Marx further specifies what the method
of genuinely scientific knowledge of reality should be. Moving from directly concrete to more and more
simple concepts, to more and more lean abstractions is one way. This path was political economy in
its appearance in the XVII century. However, after some common basic definitions have been
extracted through analysis, it will be correct to go from the abstract to the concrete. “The latter
method is obviously scientifically correct. The concrete is concrete because it is a combination of
numerous definitions, being the unity of the diverse. In thinking, it is therefore presented as a process
of connection, as a result, and not as a starting point, although it represents the starting point in
reality, and as a result is also the starting point of contemplation and representation. On the first path,
the complete representation evaporates to the degree of an abstract definition, while in the second the
abstract definitions lead to the reproduction of the concrete by thinking. Hegel, therefore, fell into the
illusion that the real should be understood as the result of an ascending to inner unity ... of the
developing thinking deepening in and out of itself, while the method of ascent from the abstract to the
concrete is only a way by which thought absorbs the concrete, reproduces it spiritually as
concrete. However, this is by no means the process of the emergence of the most concrete ” [379] .
In these provisions, Marx is given the deepest interpretation of a specific concept from the point of
view of materialist dialectics. Marx, first of all, reveals Hegel’s idealism in his theory of a concrete
concept, which he considers the real world as the result of the development of thinking. The concrete
concept of materialist dialectics reflects directly this particular reality, but taken in its internal
connections and laws. It is the unity of the general, the particular, the individual. The concrete
concept of materialistic dialectics does not kill the individual, does not reject everything special, does
not give an empty and skinny abstraction. On the contrary, being a general concept, a concept that
revealed patterns, it includes the wealth of the individual and the particular. The concrete concept of
materialist dialectics reproduces in thought the actual, concrete in all its concreteness. Any category of
"Capital" of Marx, starting with the goods and ending with the rent of land, is an example of such a
concrete concept. The materialistic dialectic does not at all deny the role and meanings of abstract
thinking, analysis, the task of creating common concepts.
On the contrary, it raises this question to a higher level. However, there is a huge difference
between the abstractions of formal logic and the concepts of materialist dialectics. The concrete
concept of materialist dialectics is a meaningful concept, there is a concept that reflects all the wealth
of reality and at the same time the internal, general laws of the development of this reality.
The wider it is in its scope, the richer it is in its content. The concept of a commodity, the concept
of a class, is not empty empty abstractions: they do not belong only to thinking , as modern
mechanists believe. They reflect the real, objective connections of things. The working class is not an
empty abstraction from a multitude of individual workers, but their integral unity, a real social group
that occupies a certain place in a historically defined production system.
In contrast to the formal logic, which emasculates any concrete content from its empty forms of
thinking, dialectical logic highlights the concreteness of our scientific knowledge. There is no abstract
truth, truth is always concrete ‚- Lenin repeated this position repeatedly. Not only the concepts of
dialectical logic should be specific, include in themselves all the wealth of the particular and the
individual, but vice versa - the knowledge of the individual, individual subject must be concrete, it
must embrace this individual, as a unity of the general and the particular , as a special case of the
manifestation of the general regularity, to reveal its place and role in overall development.
This comprehensive, concrete knowledge of individual moments, sides, areas, etc. of development
in that particular , decisive meaning that they receive at special stages for the whole development as
a whole, for the development of general regularity, ensures the unity of theory and
revolutionary practice . In this particular cognition of the singular, Lenin's formulation of the question
of the decisive link lies in matters of strategy and tactics of the struggle of the proletariat. The link for
which at this stage you need to grasp to pull out the chain of development can only be determined on
the basis of the indissoluble unity of theoretical knowledge and revolutionary practice, only by a
concrete study of specific aspects of the process, their characteristics and their significance for the
whole development. Lenin’s and Stalin’s teachings on the possibility of the middle-weak links of the
imperialist chain for the proletarian revolution to break through; strengthening the dictatorship of the
proletariat and the Soviet government as a crucial link during the entire transition period; mastering
trade as the most important link in the recovery stage of NEP; development of new technology as a
crucial element of technical reconstruction; organizational strengthening of collective farms and
alignment of the artel form,
Formal logic has carefully developed a classification of various types of judgments and
conclusions. Staying true to her starting point, she analyzes only theform of judgment, the type of
connections between concepts, distracting from the real content of judgments.
Due to its antihistoricity and metaphysical character, formal logic cannot apply developmental
perspectives to the forms of judgment and reasoning that it studies. “Dialectical logic,” wrote Engels,
“in contrast to the old, purely formal logic, is not content to enumerate and compare without
connection the form of movement of thinking, that is, various forms of judgment and inference. It, on
the contrary, derives these forms from one another , establishes a relation of subordination between
them, and not coordination, it develops higher forms from the lower ones [380] .
It is the point of view of development , the historical point of view, applied to the study of the form
of thinking , the forms of judgment and inference, which turns logic into a science. This work was
mainly done by Hegel on an idealistic basis. True to the principles of all his logic , for the first time in
the history of philosophy and logic he gave a rational grouping of judgments as judgments of
singularity, judgments of particularity, judgments of universality. Using examples from the history of
the development of science, Engels shows the "inner truth and necessity" of the Hegel group,
simultaneously showing the dependence of their development on the social and historical practice of
man.
As we have already indicated, only a long historical development of practice and knowledge led to
a positive judgment: “ Friction is a source of heat ” [381] . This judgment can be considered as
a single . The further historical development of science led to a deeper generalization: “Any
mechanical movement is capable of being transformed by friction into heat” [382] . This is a judgment of
a peculiarity , for we are talking about a special form of motion — mechanical. Further historical
development led to the judgment of universality , to the universal law: “Any form of movement is
capable and forced under certain conditions for each case to turn directly or indirectly into any other
form of movement”[383] .
Thus, we see that only a historical approach, an approach to the problems of logic from the point
of view of the development of science and technology, provides a real basis for dialectical materialist,
genuinely scientific logic. Hence it is also clear that there is not and cannot be any particular science of
logic, separate from the theory of knowledge, from dialectics. Logic, dialectics, theory of knowledge is
one and the same philosophical science - materialistic dialectics.
The materialistic dialectic overcomes, "removes" the formal logic in the sense that it
gives its answer to all the problems of logic, based on the history of the development of technology
and science.
Formal logic as a whole does not reflect the real laws of the material world. But she is not just
nonsense, but, in the words of Lenin, a barren flower growing on a mighty tree of dialectical
knowledge. Formal logic is the result of one-sided, forced straightening in the process of knowing
curves, moving, flexible faces into ossified straight lines. If dialectical logic fights against the
vagueness of concepts, for their definiteness in the sense of concreteness and richness of living, real
content, then formal logic turns this definiteness into something absolutely stable, once and for all
given, limited to fixed frames, always identical to itself. Therefore, the social basis of formal logic has
historically been backward, inactive forms of social life, like the feudal system or such a
society, whose deep inner dialectics is hidden under the form of the gross external movement of
things (goods), like capitalism. To this we must add that the formal logic, distorting the picture of the
world, has always served as the surest tool in the hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing
classes, has always been a pillar of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of
dialectics and formal logic is becoming clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that
historically formal logic in the hands of progressive classes played a certain positive role both in
science and in social development. Learning formal logic always served as the most faithful tool in the
hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing classes, has always been the mainstay of religion and
obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of dialectics and formal logic is becoming clear. This
circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal logic in the hands of progressive classes
played a certain positive role both in science and in social development. Learning formal logic always
served as the most faithful tool in the hands of the ruling exploiting and oppressing classes, has
always been the mainstay of religion and obscurantism. The hostility and intransigence of dialectics
and formal logic is becoming clear. This circumstance does not exclude the fact that historically formal
logic in the hands of progressive classes played a certain positive role both in science and in social
development. Learning formal logic with known amendments, even now it will bring its own benefit, if
not to forget its root vices. Within certain limits, this lower level of knowledge allows one to struggle
with vulgar empiricism and relativism and prepares for the perception of a higher level of dialectical
knowledge.
But if formal, metaphysical logic prevailed in the history of cognition, if an individual becomes
dialectic only through practical experience and accumulation of knowledge, then it does not follow at
all that dialectics and formal logic are fundamentally related to each other, represent equivalent things
or differ only quantitatively, as a whole and part.
A very common point of view, according to which formal logic is declared to be a subordinate
moment and a special case, is an integral part of the dialectic . The author of this point of view is
Plekhanov. Plekhanov argues that the laws of dialectics act only where the subject is in a state of
visible change, transition; when it comes to individual objects as such, formal logic reigns
there. “ Thinking according to the rules of formal logic (according to the“ basic laws ”of thought) is a
special case of dialectical thinking, ” [384] says Plekhanov. Elsewhere, Plekhanov expresses himself in
the following way: “ Dialectical thinking does not exclude also metaphysical: it only gives him certain
limits beyond which the realm of the dialectic begins ” [385] .
Regarding this separation of the “two kingdoms” - dialectics and formal logic - we must
immediately note that it is closely connected, firstly, with Plekhanov’s general understanding of
dialectics as a sum of examples, and secondly, with his tactical opportunism. It justifies liberalism,
Plekhanov's opportunism in politics. Directly referring to Plekhanov, this viewpoint is developed by the
idealist Asmus, warmed by the Menshevist idealists. The latter comes to the anti-Leninist and
thoroughly idealistic conclusion that the dialectic is the sphere of only “wide” horizons, that is, the
general concepts of philosophy, and the formal logic is the sphere of “narrow” horizons, the sphere
of practice, ie, class struggle and socialist construction. So Asmus helps the mechanists and
Menshevist idealists to substantiate the metaphysics of opportunism and counter-revolutionary
Trotskyism. He has no idea that a truly revolutionary practice is impossible without dialectics and, in
turn, is its cradle and element.
To include formal logic as a moment in dialectical logic is as ridiculous as declaring alchemy a
moment of chemistry, astrology a moment of astronomy.
Scholastic defenders of “offended” formal logic like to refer to Lenin’s remark that formal logic
should be studied in the lower grades; they should answer with an exact quotation from Lenin: “The
logic of the formal, which is limited in schools (and should be limited - as amended - for the lower
classes), takes formal definitions, guided by what is most common or most often striking and ... The
dialectical logic requires that we move on ” [386] .
Consequently, it is not at all the case that Lenin recommends that the school should study not
formal dialectics, but formal logic. This "limitation" is the lowest level of knowledge, preparation for
the study of dialectics. In addition - and this is the main thing - Lenin adds: with known
“amendments”. Formal logic "with amendments" is no longer the old formal logic.
Lawyers of formal logic, allegedly proving "according to Engels" that formal logic is suitable in
everyday homely situations, must be answered: we are struggling with this home household situation,
for which formal logic is good, no less than with its logical product. We are fundamentally rebuilding
life, raising it to the level of the great tasks of socialist construction. The new socialist life will, along
with all the processes of struggle and socialist restructuring of life, produce a dialectical thinking.
The learned lackeys of the bourgeoisie use formal logic for their class interests; they are fighting
against the materialist dialectic - the basis of the revolutionary worldview of Marxism-
Leninism. Therefore, we need to study the formal logic not only from the point of view of using its
actual content, but also in order to study the weapons of our class enemy. Only materialistic dialectics
is the scientific method of research and the logical basis of the socialist practice and class struggle of
the proletariat.
As materialistic dialectics is the methodological basis of the general line of the party, so
metaphysics and formal logic in Soviet conditions are the methodological basis of both right and "left"
opportunism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. For example, NEP is the economic policy of the
proletariat, designed to allow capitalism within certain limits and to fight, oust and destroy capitalism
at the same time. "Whoever does not understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP, departs from
Leninism" [387]. - says Stalin. And the Trotskyists, as metaphysicians who do not understand the
dialectical contradictory nature of NEP, saw only one side - the assumption of capitalism - and
therefore called NEP state capitalism. Likewise, Bukharin saw only one side of NEP - the freedom of
market relations - and missed what NEP moreover suggests government regulation of trade: "Destroy
one of these parties - and you will not have NEP," [388]says Stalin. Our difficulties are the difficulties of
growth, the party says, and the opportunists do not understand this dialectic, consider the difficulty
" as such”, Identify our difficulties with the hopeless difficulties of capitalism and cry out about the
death of Soviet power. The nature of the middle peasant is dual: on the one hand, he is a hard
worker, and on the other - a small proprietor. The Trotskyists see only one small-ownership side of
the peasantry, while the right opportunists, on the contrary, forget this side of it. Every
purely formal implementation of the Party directive has a metaphysical methodological basis: they
fulfill the letter and not the meaning of the directive, beat off the “number”, perform unilaterally,
incorrectly. For example, if a party talks about eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis
of complete collectivizationthen the “leftist”, formally fulfilling the directive of the party, will carry out
the elimination of the kulaks, forgetting about its basis. The party proposes to increase the percentage
of collectivization, seeking to strengthen the organizational and economic work on collective farms,
and the "leftist" drives the percentage of collectivization, forgetting about the need to work to
strengthen the collective farms.
A one-sided view of the controversial process of socialist construction is typical for Trotskyists and
opportunists, and this is formal logic: a one-sided approach to a thing from the point of view of its
abstract identity .
The varieties of metaphysical thinking are eclecticism and sophistry .
Eclectic is any unprincipled combination of internally unrelated, fundamentally contradictory points
of view or teachings. Lenin called the eclectic Machist Bogdanov because he wanted to unite historical
materialism and Mach’s idealistic philosophy. Eclectics are also mechanists and Menshevist idealists
who, in their anti-Marxist philosophy, combine one — mechanical materialism, Kantianism, positivism,
etc., and others — Hegelianism with elements of Kantianism, mechanism, etc. Lenin’s brilliant
eclecticism was given in 1921 during trade union discussion [389] in connection with the eclectic position
in this discussion of Bukharin. The dispute was about what the trade unions are under the dictatorship
of the proletariat. Trotsky took a purely metaphysical position in this dispute: the trade unions, or the
school of communism, or the administrative apparatus — no third — was given to the point of view of
the nationalization of the trade unions. In opposition to Trotsky, Lenin pointed out that trade unions
should be taken as a dialectical unity of political education (trade unions - the school of communism)
and economic functions (participation in government, for example, in economic planning), but with the
latter being subordinated first, with economics being subordinated to politics. Lenin demanded to
indicate what is the main and decisive factor for trade unions, in which internal connection between
them are the various functions of the trade unions. This was mainly educational functions and in
accordance with this, the party decided: the trade unions are the school of communism. Bukharin took
a "buffer" position: trade unionsand the school of communism, and the management
apparatus, and politics, andeconomics. “The theoretical nature of that mistake,” says Lenin, “which
Comrade Bukharin makes here, is that he replaces eclecticism with the dialectical relationship between
politics and economics (which Marxism teaches us). "And the one and the other," "on the one hand,
and on the other," is Bukharin's theoretical position. This is eclecticism. ” [390]. At the same time, Lenin
gives a famous example with a glass. There is a glass and a faceted cylinder, and a butterfly cap, and
a device for prespaun, and a tool to strike, and a tool for drinking. All this must be taken into
account. But it is necessary to indicate the main thing in this particular connection and situation: what
is it for a speaker speaking on the podium? A tool for drinking.
“If (as Bukharin does. - Auth. ), Two or more different definitions are taken and connected
together quite by accident (both a glass cylinder and a drinking tool), then we get an
eclectic definition pointing to different sides of the subject and only” [ 391] .
 Sophistry is “flexibility, applied subjectively” (Lenin) , there is an identification of opposites, not
seeing their struggle, there is an erasure of the faces between opposites on the grounds that they can
turn one into another.
Once in antiquity Kratil, a pupil of Heraclitus, perverted the words of his teacher (who said that one
cannot enter the same river twice), adding Heraclitus in the formula that one cannot enter the same
river once. If Heraclitus claimed that the river (water) flows, and therefore, when we enter it the
second time, it will actually be another river (water), then from the point of view of Kratila the river
never happens by itself. This is a clear exaggeration. Plekhanov rightly points out that Kratyl replaces
the moment of existence with the moment of formation [392] .
It - sophistry, because a dialectic requires that every thing has been taken from the point of view
of the unity of the date of formation, development, ie, the changes that occur in the thing, and
now.. Determinate being , ie qualitative certain things.. In this its stage developmentin this regard and
setting. A living person is precisely a living person, not a corpse, since the process of life takes place
in it. Undoubtedly, a simultaneous process of the death of a part of the cells occurs in his body, but on
this basis it would be sophistry to call him a corpse. Materialistic dialectics requires precise and
definite answers at any given moment. Capitalism, until it is destroyed by the proletarian revolution, is
precisely capitalism, not socialism, although it contains in its depths its denial — the socialist
proletariat. It would be sophistry, however, on this basis to declare capitalism socialism. Lenin
explained to R. Luxemburg that sophistry is the blurring of the line between imperialist and national
war on the grounds that one can turn into another. The modern Mensheviks are social-fascists,
declaring the growth of state monopoly capitalism as an increase in socialism ‚they are thoroughly
burned by sophists, outspoken defenders of wage slavery.
From all this it follows that eclecticism and sophistry are the sworn enemies of materialist
dialectics. It is necessary to fight against them as against the methodology of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie, fascism and social fascism.
Chapter 5. Fighting on Two Fronts in Philosophy
5.1. Philosophy and politics
Marxism-Leninism develops in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movements that
oppose it or recognize it in words, but pervert it in essence. The struggle of these currents against
Marxism was carried out in a variety of forms and forms, from direct denial or silence of Marxism to
attempts to combine Marxism with the bourgeois worldview and blow it up from the inside by diluting
its revolutionary content. The struggle of Marxism for hegemony in the international labor movement
has been going on and on in various forms in all fields from the first days of the rise of Marxism until
the last time.
“When Marxism ousted all doctrinal exercises that were hostile to it, those tendencies expressed in
these teachings began to look for other ways for themselves. The forms and causes of the struggle
changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism, Lenin
says, began (the 90s of the last century) from the struggle of a current hostile to Marxism within
Marxism ” [393] .
Lenin and Stalin revealed the deep social roots of the various deviations from Marxism in the
development of the international labor movement. Alien and corrupting influences oppose the
proletariat not only in open struggle, they penetrate the ranks of the struggling army of the
proletariat, finding there elements of instability, vacillation, hesitation. The capitalist elements that
remain and revive on the basis of small-scale production “surround the proletariat from all sides with
petty-bourgeois elements, infiltrate it with it, corrupt it with it, and cause recurrence of petty-
bourgeois spinelessness, fragmentation, individualism, transitions from hobbies to despondency”
inside the proletariat [394] .
This pressure of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements , which often lend themselves to the
least stable sections of the proletariat and its party, is one of the sources of contradictions within the
proletarian party, a source that feeds various opportunist trends.
The second source, indicated by Comrade Stalin, is the heterogeneous composition of the working
class . The working class fights and comes to power, beingheterogeneous . The bulk of it is the "pure-
blooded" proletarians, who "have long broken ties with the capitalist class. This layer of the proletariat
is the most reliable pillar of Marxism " [395] . Another layer is people from the peasantry, from the petty
bourgeoisie, from the intelligentsia, who have recently joined the ranks of the proletariat and brought
with them old skills, habits, hesitations and vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie. “This layer represents
the most favorable soil for all kinds of anarchist, semi-anarchist and“ ultra-leftist ”groups. [396]. It was
this stratum that followed the “Left Communists” in the Brest period, then the “workers' opposition”
and the Trotskyists (until 1928–1929), when these groups formed the ideology of the “furious petty
bourgeois”, behind the left benders of recent times. The third layer, characteristic of the proletariat of
capitalist countries, is “the labor aristocracy, the upper class of the working class, the richest part of
the proletariat” [397] . This part has a strong desire for compromise, an agreement with the
bourgeoisie, from which it received certain handouts. “This stratum represents the most favorable
ground for outspoken reformists and opportunists” [398] .
This characteristic of Comrade Stalin, given to them at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, means
above all the proletariat of the capitalist countries. But essentially (taking into account the fact that in
Soviet conditions there can be no labor aristocracy and a professional bureaucracy associated with
monopoly capitalism, but only certain decomposed and bureaucratic elements of the working class and
the party are possible) this characteristic applies to the conditions of the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
In the development of Marxism, within it, in the international labor movement itself, two main
streams of deviations from the revolutionary Marxist line with theoretical and practical principles
opposed to Marxism were revealed . Lenin in 1910 revealed their features. Speaking about this, Lenin
wrote: “The main tactical differences in the modern working-class movement in Europe and America
are reduced to a struggle with two major trends, receding from Marxism, which actually became the
dominant theory in this movement. These two directions are revisionism (opportunism, reformism)
and anarchism (anarcho-syndicalism, anarcho-socialism). Both of these deviations from the dominant
Marxist theory and Marxist tactics in the labor movement have been observed in various forms and
with different shades in all civilized countries over the course of more than half a century of mass
labor movement. Already from this fact alone it is clear that these deviations cannot be explained
either by accidents or the mistakes of individuals or groups, or even by the influence of national
characteristics or traditions, etc. There must be root causes underlying the economic structure and
development pattern of all capitalist countries. and constantly generating these digressions ” [399] .
In this position, Lenin thus establishes two types of directions that depart from Marxism: frankly-
right direction and revisionism "from the left", retreating to anarchism. The roots of these revisionist
tendencies lie in the economic structure and character of the development of capitalism, both as a
whole and in individual countries. Among the reasons for these two directions, Lenin points not only to
the controversial, abrupt development of the labor movement, but also to its source — the uneven
development of capitalism and the dialectical nature of social development in general . Lenin explains
the latter in the following way: “The constant source of disagreement is the dialectical nature of social
development, which goes in contradictions and in the way of contradictions... Capitalism itself creates
its own grave-digger, creates the elements of the new system itself, and at the same time, without a
“leap”, these individual elements do not change anything in the general state of things, do not affect
the domination of capital. These contradictions of living life, the living history of capitalism and the
labor movement can embrace Marxism as a theory of dialectical materialism . But it goes without
saying that the masses learn from life, not from a book, and therefore individuals or groups are
constantly exaggerating, building into one-sided theory, into one-sided system of tactics, one or
another feature of capitalist development, then one or the other. “This development” [400] .
This extremely important position of Lenin is of tremendous importance for understanding the
dialectic of struggle on two fronts. It also indicates the class and theoretical roots of various kinds of
deviations from Marxism. Both the right and the “left” trends, both reformism and anarcho-
syndicalism, take one side or tendency of the labor movement, make it absolute, unilaterally develop
it and consider it the only correct and possible one. They do not understand the dialectical
contradictions of reality. “And real life, real history includes these various tendencies, just as life and
development in nature include both slow evolution and fast jumps, breaks, gradualness” [401] .
Reality also includes a gradual, slow development. But this development prepares jumps,
evolutionary development is replaced by a revolution, opening a new era, taking all development to a
new higher level. But reformists take one of these sides of reality, namely, gradual development .
In the reforms, in all kinds of partial changes and improvements, they see the realization of
socialism. Anarchists, syndicalists, on the contrary, deny the gradual development. They do not see
that “new content makes its way through all and all forms” (Lenin) , including through some old
forms. Metaphysical one-sidedness is peculiar to both the right and the "left", and reformism and
anarchism. Outwardly, these are the two extreme poles. Essentially, both inhibit the development of
the revolutionary movement, organization, rallying of the proletariat, litter its theory bourgeois trash,
interfering with his political education. Therefore, revisionism and anarcho-syndicalism are two types
of perversions of Marxism-Leninism, two types of deviations from Marxism, two types of revision of
Marxism. These two types - right and "left" - are observed in the labor movement in all civilized
countries, but in different forms and forms, with the most varied shades at different levels of
development of the labor movement. In the struggle against these two types of deviations from
Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary theory of the proletariat continued to develop.
These two types of perversions of Marxism also took place in our country, in the history of Russian
Social-Democracy, where their development took on special forms reflecting the peculiarities of the
class struggle in Russia. Bolshevism grew and was tempered in the struggle on two fronts with the
indicated two types of revision of Marxism, in the struggle against opportunism.
Already since the 1990s, a split has been taking place among the Social Democrats into “ Iskra-
ists ” and “ Economists .” The latter were the opportunistic current of Russian social democracy. In the
epoch of growth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, “economism” has changed into Menshevism,
which stands for a bloc with the bourgeoisie. Only the Bolsheviks consistently fight for the
revolutionary tactics of the proletariat. At the same time there was a struggle with the "left" direction
-sindikalistskim as " mahaevschina". The epoch of reaction (1908–1910) in a completely new form
again raised the question of the opportunist and revolutionary tactics of social democracy. The main
course of Menshevism gave rise to liquidationism, the renunciation of the struggle for a new revolution
in Russia, illegal organization and work, scornful mockery of the “underground”. The emergence
of otzovism , the “left” trend in Bolshevism, which preached the rejection of the use of legal forms of
struggle, from participation in the State Duma and the withdrawal of the party faction from there ,
dates to this time .
With both of these trends, representing two varieties of bourgeois influence on the proletariat,
Bolshevism led an irreconcilable and consistent struggle, a struggle on two fronts. On this occasion,
Lenin wrote that "the Bolsheviks in fact conducted a struggle on two fronts from August 1908 to
January 1910, that is, a struggle against the liquidators and otzovists" [402] .
The appearance of these trends, Lenin explains a number of deep objective historical reasons. Not
an accident, not a mistake, “but the inevitable result of the action of these objective reasons — and an
inseparable from the“ base ”superstructure over the entire working-class movement in modern Russia
— is the bourgeois influence on the proletariat that creates liquidationism (= semi-liberalism, wishing
to classify itself as .) and otzovism (= semi-anarchism, which wants to identify itself with the
community) " [403] .
Lenin in his work “Left-wing Children’s Disease in Communism,” listing all the main points in the
development of Bolshevism and examining the question: “In the struggle with which enemies within
the working-class movement did Bolshevism grow up and harden?” Reveals the essence of the
struggle against Menshevik opportunism “Which in 1914 finally turned into social-chauvinism, finally
went over to the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. This, according to Lenin, was naturally
the main enemy of Bolshevism within the labor movement. This enemy remains the main one on the
international scale ” [404] . At the same time, “Bolshevism grew, developed, and hardened in a long
struggle against petty-bourgeois revolutionism.”which looks like anarchism or something borrows from
it, which retreats in any way significant from the conditions and needs of the enduring proletarian
class struggle ” [405] .
Describing both of these deviations within Marxism, right and left doctrinal studies, Lenin wrote:
“Right-wing doctrinal studies rested on the recognition of old forms alone and went bankrupt to the
end without noticing a new content . Left doctrinaire rests on the unconditional denial of certain old
forms , not seeing that the new content makes its way through all and every form ” [406] .
This conclusion of Lenin also has great methodological significance. This basic characteristic covers
the essential side of each variety of hostile currents within Marxism. One of them, the right revision
form, does not see the new content, the new quality and does not go beyond the old forms, the other
revision - the left one , on the contrary, notices only the new content, the new quality, but does not
understand the ways and stages of development of this content, completely discarding the forms
struggles that still need to be used in a given environment.
For Lenin, we find a dialectical substantiation of the need to combat deviations within the
party . The very deviation from Marxism-Leninism, from the revolutionary path goes through various
stages of development. As Lenin says: “Bias is not yet a ready current. This bias is something that can
be corrected. People are somewhat strayed from the road or begin to stray, but you can still fix
it. This, in my opinion, is expressed by the Russian word "bias" " [407]. Hence the bias is a deviation
from the correct line, a departure from it. This is not yet a ready-made current, but such a deviation
that leads away from the correct line, and if we insist on this deviation consistently, then at a certain
level it may develop into a certain opportunistic current, completely alien and hostile to Marxism and
the party.
 In contrast to Lenin, Trotsky held an opportunistic position in this issue in the pre-revolutionary
era. Like Kautsky, he opposed to the correct Marxist-Leninist demand for struggle on two fronts his
own formula of "overcoming by expanding and deepening," which was reduced to centricism tactics ,
i.e., an attempt to occupy the "middle" line, to eclectic reconciliation of various trends, i.e. in fact
helped opportunism and covered it.
That is why "Trotsky's proposal to put instead of struggle on two fronts the " overcoming by
expanding and deepening "met with the ardent support of the Mensheviks and followers of the
war" [408] .
As early as the 1980s, Engels wrote to Bernstein: “As you can see, every working party of a large
country can develop only in the internal struggle, in full accordance with the laws of dialectical
development ” [409] .
Tov. Stalin pointed out at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, citing in particular these words of
Engels: "There is not and cannot be a" middle "line in matters of principle" [410] . “The policy of the“
middle ”principled line is not our policy. The policy of the “middle” principled line is the policy of
withering and reborn parties ” [411] . “The history of our party is the history of the struggle of
contradictions within this party, the history of overcoming these contradictions and the gradual
strengthening of our party on the basis of overcoming these contradictions” [412] . “ Overcoming
intraparty differences by means of struggle is the law of development of our party ” [413] .
The materialist dialectic is the methodological basis of the practice of the revolutionary proletariat,
the general line of its party. It is materialistic dialectics, its application in the knowledge of society,
makes it possible to correctly discover and understand the pattern of class struggle, to take into
account the class distribution at any given moment, to correctly determine the nature of social
contradictions, to outline trends and direction of development, to separate the essential, the
important, the unimportant, the minor and accidental, to understand their dialectical unity, to choose
the decisive link in the struggle of the proletariat, by grasping which one could pull out the whole
chain of development; ensure the success of the proletarian revolution and consolidate them as a
basis for further progress.
The Comintern also conducts its struggle on the basis of dialectical materialism, which is reflected
in the program of the Comintern. “By defending and propagating the dialectical materialism of Marx
and Engels , applying it as a revolutionary method of cognizing reality in order to revolutionize this
reality, the Communist International is actively fighting all types of bourgeois worldview and all types
of theoretical and practical opportunism” [414] .
The main thing in Marxism-Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat . As the
whole of Marxism as a whole, this teaching also has a materialistic dialectic as its philosophical
foundation. The misunderstanding and distortion of the philosophical basis of the policy of the
proletariat must inevitably affect the practical implementation of this policy. The theoretical
philosophical struggle is one of the forms of class struggle, and, like any form of class struggle, it is
filled with political content, it is subject to political struggle. The perversions of dialectical materialism
are always are closely linked with deviations from the general line of the party, non-proletarian
political trends, with a reflection of the class hostile ideology in the ranks of the proletariat and its
party. The philosophical development of Marxism-Leninism is always closely connected with the
political development of the working class, with its struggle against reformism, anarchism, right-wing
and “left-wing” opportunism. Lenin repeatedly pointed to this. “The debate about what philosophical
materialism is,” wrote Lenin in 1911, “why erroneous, what are dangerous and reactionary deviations
from it, is always connected” with a “lively real connection” with the “Marxist socio-political trend” it
would not be a Marxist, not a socio-political and not current. Only limited “real politics” of reformism
or anarchism can deny the “reality” of this connection. [415] .
Lenin, speaking of political deviations, does not detach them from the general philosophical
attitudes. He reveals their social roots, their political essence, determines which of these deviations
constitutes the main danger, the reasons for this, characterizes the role of conciliationism in the
struggle on two fronts, it also reveals the methodological aspect of deviations, etc., i.e. gives a
comprehensive , a specific analysis of the conditions, forces and forms of struggle, while applying and
developing the materialist dialectics.
The revolutionary effective role of the materialist dialectic has always been the cause of the most
acute hatred and rabid malice of the bourgeoisie throughout the revolutionary struggle of the
proletariat. There are thousands of tricks developed by the bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois agents
within the labor movement to somehow tear Marxist theory from revolutionary practice and to
emasculate the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism - the materialist dialectic. Marxism had to wage a
merciless struggle with both the root enemy - idealism, and petty-bourgeois agents inside Marxism
itself, that is, with various forms of philosophical revisionism, which under the specious pretext of
introducing amendments, "additions", clarifications, etc., were constantly trying to bourgeois Marxism,
Such is the class position of the petty bourgeoisie; vacillating between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, that in the ideological sphere it also shows its indecision, inconsistency, disregard for
serious theoretical work, limited to fragments of theories borrowed partly from the theoretical arsenal
of the proletariat, partly from the reactionary bourgeoisie and other classes. Trifling, snatching
individual pieces, fragments and their mechanical connection from everywhere, reconciliation,
eclecticism — in theory and cowardice, vacillation, wavering — in practice are those features that
Lenin repeatedly pointed out to the ideologues and “leaders” of petty-bourgeois parties: the
Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries etc. The petty bourgeoisie could never work out a coherent and
consistent materialistic worldview,
With philosophical revisionism, Marx and Engels, and then our party, also always waged an
implacable, merciless theoretical struggle on two fronts : both against the vulgarization of materialism
and the idealistic perversions of dialectical materialism (Marx, Engels and Lenin struck each time at
form of audit, which was the main danger for the practical-political movement of the proletariat). The
conditions of the political struggle, depending on the basic form of the struggle against the
bourgeoisie, also determined the main direction of the theoretical blows inflicted on philosophical
revisionism within the party. For example, after the 1905 revolution, the leader of our party, Lenin,
simultaneously had to wage a theoretical struggle on two fronts: against the Machism of Bogdanov,
Bazarov and others, and against the Menshevik, mechanistic and agnostic distortions of the materialist
dialectics Plekhanov, as well as his students Deborin and Axelrod. The main danger then was the
idealistic, Machist, revision of materialistic philosophy. This revision led straight to the rejection of
Marxism and the complete theoretical disarmament of the proletariat in front of the
bourgeoisie. “Increasingly subtle falsification of Marxism,” wrote Lenin about Machism and Machists,
“more and more subtle counterfeits of anti-materialist teachings for Marxism,” is what characterizes
modern revisionism in political economy, tactical matters, and philosophy in general, as in
epistemology and in sociology ” [416] .
This audit is for the time the main danger because it was the theoretical expression of the crisis,
wavering in the ranks of the Marxists after the defeat of the revolution of 1905 "Resolute resistance to
this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle for the basics of Marxism, was again placed on
the day of all" [417] , - Lenin wrote then. Machism theoretically harbored both the political
liquidationism of the Mensheviks (Valentinov, Yushkovich and others) and the ultra- "leftist" otzovism
of Bogdanov and others. This is why Lenin directed the main blow against the Machists, leading this
struggle together with Plekhanov and his students, but without stopping for one minute of the
struggle, neither with the Menshevik distortion of Plekhanov's materialist dialectics, nor with its
individual philosophical errors in matters of materialism. And then Lenin fought on two fronts.
During the period of the imperialist war and revolution (1914–1917), the theoreticians of the
Second International (it inflicted tremendous damage on the revolutionary movement of the
proletariat) —the Kautsky, Bauer, Plekhanov and the mechanistic and idealistic perversions of
dialectical materialism, Bauerom, Plekhanov and the revolutionaries of the Second International
flourished especially strongly on the front of the Marxist theory of theory .
These revisions were specifically expressed in the discourse on the "immaturity" of the
prerequisites of the proletarian revolution, in the separation of revolutionary theory from practice, in
the substitution of concrete for abstract dialectics with eclecticism and sophistry. 1914–1917 - this is
the period of the bitter struggle of Leninism against the prostitution of Marxism, the abdication of the
leaders of international Menshevism from the concrete and revolutionary dialectic of Marx. This is the
band of the most passionate, implacable war with Menshevik idealistic and mechanistic revision of the
foundations of dialectical materialism. At the same time, Lenin is waging a struggle against “leftist”
errors in the field of theory — with Bukharin’s anarchist mistakes on the state, etc. In the same way,
the theoretical struggle develops on two fronts and during the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The defense of the general line of the party necessarily includes the struggle for the purity of the
materialist dialectics — this most faithful and most acute weapon of the struggle of the
proletariat. The struggle against reformism and anarchism, the struggle on two fronts - against right
and "left" opportunism - necessarily implies a struggle on two fronts also in the field of philosophy.
The relationship between philosophy and politics, between philosophical deviations and political
trends always exists. But this connection between philosophy and politics does not act as a direct,
immediate and permanent correspondence between philosophical and political currents. Mechanism is
the philosophical base of the right deviation, Menshevik and Menshevist idealism - basically the
theoretical basis of the "left" deviation and Trotskyism. However, this does not at all imply that the
right has only mechanism and no elements of idealism, while counter-revolutionary Trotskyism and
the “left” have one idealism and no mechanism. Trotskyism, for example, will also penetrate right
through the most vulgar and vulgar mechanism. An abstract arrangement of slopes according to
contrived "schemes" would be completely wrong. The only consistent method and worldview is
dialectical materialism. Any deviation from it inevitably leads to bourgeois eclecticism with a
predominance of either vulgar mechanical materialism or more or less disguised idealism.
Philosophy and politics are always inextricably linked. This inherent link between them is due to
their specific social roots in a given society . But this connection of philosophy and politics does not
always get a direct and immediate expression. Here we see various transitions, overflows, zigzags and
deviations in determining the connection between various philosophical and political deviations. This
relationship can only be established by a specific analysis of all aspects of a particular philosophical
and political bias. The struggle against opportunist deviations in theory and in political practice cannot
be limited to the struggle against any of the parties - political or only theoretical - it must be
comprehensive.
The Menshevist idealists , exactly like the mechanists, do not understand the dialectical connection
of philosophy and politics, do not understand the Marxist-Leninist statement of the question of a
struggle on two fronts in politics and philosophy. They completely identified deviations in either area,
replacing the struggle against right-wing opportunism with the struggle against mechanism
alone. Moreover: the struggle of the party against the right, especially in the theoretical field, is
considered by Menshevist idealists to be a simple continuation of their “struggle” against the
mechanists! As one of the representatives of Menshevist idealism wrote: “the struggle against the
theoretical foundations of the right deviation is a direct continuation of our struggle against the
mechanists and the verification of the correctness of the theoretical philosophical positions that we
have taken in this struggle. This is a political test of our theoretical positions ” [418] .
The party waged and is fighting against any deviations from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism,
against opportunism in politics and all revisionism in theory and in philosophy. Struggling against
political opportunism, she digs up to the theoretical, philosophical foundations, based on Lenin’s
instructions that “you cannot completely understand any mistake for yourself, including political, if you
don’t get the theoretical roots of an error from someone who makes it, on the basis of certain,
consciously accepted by him provisions " [419] . In the struggle against deviations in the field of theory,
in the field of philosophy, including, the party reveals their political content, exposes the class essence
of theoretical opportunism and revisionism, no matter what mask they hide.
The struggle with only one bias while ignoring the second front shows that the fundamentals and
positions of this struggle are not Marxist-Leninist. Such a line leads to a distortion of the struggle on
two fronts, to one-sidedness, which creates the conditions for new perversions of a different order, the
accumulation of errors, going along the line of a different bias. In this way the ground is created for a
link with another front. This closure of various opportunist currents in practice occurs very often. Right
help the "left", "left" pour water on the mill right. The “struggle” against deviations while ignoring this
wrong side, the reverse side of each deviation, helps not the party, but opportunism, and only leads to
confusion and new forms of perversion of Marxism-Leninism.
5.2. The struggle on two fronts and the tasks of the theory under the dictatorship
of the proletariat
The dictatorship of the proletariat advanced new tasks before revolutionary theory and, moreover,
immeasurably wider and more difficult than they were before. The dictatorship of the proletariat does
not mean the cessation of class struggle, but the continuation of class struggle in new forms: in the
form of ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, in the form of a sharp and bitter civil
war, in the form of leading the main masses of the peasantry, the use of bourgeois specialists and
petty-bourgeois intellectuals, in the form of educating a new discipline to achieve a new,
immeasurably higher level of labor productivity.
A whole period of the proletariat’s struggle against the remnants of the exploiting classes, against
attempts to restore the capitalist system, the struggle for the rebuilding of small-scale commodity
economy, on the basis of which “is preserved and revived again in the bitter struggle against
communism”, is capitalism and the bourgeoisie. A struggle is needed to preserve and consolidate the
alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry, to lead the non-proletarian mass of working people, to
re-educate this mass in the spirit of organizing a new social discipline of labor. A whole period is
needed in order to create the material and technical basis and the economic basis of a socialist
society, and a certain amount of time is required to re-educate the workers themselves in the process
of "a long and difficult mass struggle with mass petty-bourgeois influences" (Lenin) .
 The victorious proletariat cannot immediately shrug off the shoulders and throw out the legacy of
capitalism. The habits of the past, the bourgeois tendencies among the backward layers of the
proletariat make themselves felt and will manifest themselves until the classes are completely
eliminated. The difference in attitudes, skills and attitudes among the different layers of the proletariat
at the turning points of the transition period, in the process of the development of the class struggle,
is manifested in the appearance of opportunistic biases in the party, manifestations of right and "left"
opportunism. Here it must be borne in mind that the party has not only representatives of different
layers of the proletariat, but also people from other classes who have not broken ties with them or
made their way into the party of the proletariat because it is the only party under the dictatorship of
the proletariat that penetrated it because it is the ruling party. "They,[420] .
Despite the apparent opposite of right-wing and “left-wing” opportunism, they very
often agree with their own assessments and requirements, since they are fed from the same class
roots. Both types of opportunism express the pressure of bourgeois ideology in the petty-bourgeois
element, with the only difference that frank right opportunism reflects mainly the ideology of the
kulaks, and the “left” opportunism mainly reflects the ideology of the urban capitalist classes, the
ruined urban petty bourgeoisie. This fact of the closure of both types of opportunism is not
surprising. Lenin said more than once that the "ultra-left" opposition is the wrong side of the right,
Menshevik, opportunistic opposition.
"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and
peaceful, military and economic, pedagogical and administrative against the forces and traditions of
the old society" [421] . Only the Communist Party, armed with the materialist dialectic, tempered in the
struggle, can successfully wage the class struggle of the proletariat in the era of its dictatorship.
Dialectical materialism has become the dominant world view in our country, the weapon of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in uprooting hostile ideologies, a weapon against religious obscurantism
and clericalism. The proletarian worldview became the most important means of revolutionary
education of the many millions of masses of the peasantry, a weapon for the liberation of the working
people from spiritual, centuries-old slavery, from political and national oppression by the exploiting
classes.
New forms of class struggle raised the demands placed on revolutionary theory. First, the
requirement of maximum flexibility of the theory so that it can not only keep up with practice during
the period of rapid revolutionary changes, but also be ahead of practice, correctly orienting
practitioners during the largest and sharp turns and transitions from one form of struggle to another,
indicating the direction during transitions from one stage of development to another. Secondly, that
the theory gives an accurate Marxist analysis of class relations in their originality at each stage of the
movement, helping to comprehend the movement as a whole. Thirdly, that the theory would help to
reveal the main contradictions and the main tendency of developmentso that each time at each new
turn the party can correctly grasp the main link, the main crucial task on which the success of the
whole movement depends.
Hence the important task that Lenin posed to Marxist-Leninists is to fully develop the theory of
materialist dialectics from all sides, at the same time fully subordinating this theoretical development
to the general interests of the proletariat’s class struggle and the political goals of the party . the
practice of socialist construction and the world revolution.
An incorrect and one-sided understanding of this task leads to two kinds of dangers: either to
the separation of theory from practice , that is, to empty scholasticism, or to an underestimation of
theory, to narrow division, tailism, empiricism. The latter also means in fact the opposite side of the
first danger - theseparation of practice from theory . The development of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic
can only be achieved in a decisive, merciless struggle on two fronts, only in the struggle against both
these dangers, which equally, although from different sides, lead to a Menshevik gap between theory
and practice.
The ingenious development of the materialist dialectic under the dictatorship of the proletariat was
given by Lenin on the specific problems put forward by the world revolution and socialist construction
in the USSR. This work was continued by Comrade Stalin on the basis of resolving key, fundamental
problems connected with the construction of the foundation of a socialist economy and the destruction
of classes. The decisions of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern are based on the consistent Marxist-
Leninist application of the theory of materialist dialectics to specific stages of the class struggle of the
proletariat. The party resolved and resolved all the fundamental tasks of the revolution, guided by the
Marxist-Leninist dialectic, at the same time developing and refining it on new concrete material that
revolutionary practice in practical and theoretical struggle gives on two fronts.
 The correct application of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic in the field of political leadership of
economic and cultural construction made it possible for the Leninist party to win world-historic values
- by successfully building the foundation of a socialist economy, carrying out a plan for complete
collectivization and on its basis eliminating the kulaks as a class.
Struggling on two fronts - with right and "left" opportunism, the party at each main stage
determines the main danger . At the same time, the party is guided in determining the nature of
biases by striving to reveal the class essence of these biases. For example, the "left" deviation of the
Trotskyists and the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition was the main danger in the transition to the
reconstructive period, at the beginning of it, before the XV Party Congress. With the unfolding of the
socialist offensive, the main danger for the party is the right deviation.
Any attempt at a double-dealing policy, an attempt to occupy a position of undermining the
dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, by representatives of the right-left bloc, always received a
crushing blow from our party.
The path of opportunism is the path of departure of unstable communists from the revolutionary
Marxist-Leninist line, from the general line of the party. The path of abandoning party ideology is the
process of shaping a hostile and alien ideology. The path of opportunism is a transition to the positions
of class forces hostile to the proletariat, a movement that objectively reflects the pressure of the
bourgeoisie and its ideology. The deviationists objectively become the channel through which the
party penetrates, into its unstable links, the influence of the petty-bourgeois element and the
capitalist elements emerging on its basis. The draft evaders become the mouthpiece of the anti-
proletarian class forces in our country. Such are the class roots of right and "left" opportunism in the
transitional period.
But the ideology, politically hostile to the proletariat, is also reflected in the field of theory, in
methodology : the indicated types of opportunism differ from each other not only in their social
nature, but also in their general theoretical roots, in their philosophical basis. And this is despite
some common features of their methodology, as indicated by Lenin: their perversion of materialistic
dialectics, eclecticism, etc. Modern right-wing opportunism is based mainly on mechanistic
methodology. It is characterized by the fact that it does not see the new content, the qualitative
uniqueness of the proletarian dictatorship, denies the inconsistency of development, stands for a
“peaceful” evolution, denies the class struggle, etc.
“Left” opportunism and “left” bends are sent from the methodological setting that is inclined to
deny certain old forms, does not see the paths and stages in development, does not take into account
the material foundations of progress, jumps over unfinished developmental stages, which leads to
adventurism in politics , replaces reality with what is desired, confuses possibility and reality, etc. The
main methodological basis for this kind of opportunism is Menshevist idealism .
The struggle for the general line of the party demands Bolshevik party definition, an irreconcilable
principled struggle against right opportunism — the main danger at this stage, against “left”
opportunism, against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. But this struggle for the general line of the
party requires a struggle on two fronts, both in theory and in philosophy : against the mechanists —
the main danger in this period, against Menshevist idealism, against reconciliation to both, as well as
against open bourgeois influences on the proletariat, requires struggle with consistent Marxist-Leninist
positions on the basis of the inseparable connection between theory and the practice of socialist
construction.
The Trotskyists and the “Left” Zagibiks could not understand the essence of the struggle on two
fronts . They called the struggle that our party fought "centrism". They slandered the party, believing
that two extreme wings are created in the party, and that the general line of the party is created as a
result of the “balance” of both currents. In the same vein, the Deborynites interpreted the problem of
struggle on two fronts in philosophy, when the party raised the question of turning the philosophical
front to the tasks of socialist construction and the development of self-criticism. Under the guise of
combating "centrism" and "eclecticism", and Trotskyism and Menshevist idealism rejected the task of
fighting on two fronts. In fact, the struggle of the party on two fronts includes, involves the struggle
with centrism - this concealed opportunism,conciliation to opportunism. The party’s consistent struggle
for the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory went through several stages during the transition
period. After the October Revolution, the overthrown exploiting classes were deprived of ideological
influence within the country, and the world bourgeoisie and its Social Democratic agents in the person
of Kautsky and Vandervelde - outside the country and in the face of the Russian Menshevism and
social emanation turned out to be the spokesmen for their bestial hatred of revolutionary Marxism-
Leninism outside and inside the country. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, especially
Menshevism, whose social characteristic, as Lenin repeatedly emphasized, is an amazing adaptability,
began to penetrate into Marxism under all sorts of signs of "Marxist science."
The frankly Menshevik theories of Sukhanov and Co. proved the "untimely" proletarian revolution
in Russia, which, de did not reach the necessary "height of the productive forces". Not understanding
the uniqueness of the situation in the epoch of imperialism and the peculiarities of Russia's historical
development, they mechanically transferred here the general forms of capitalist development. In the
early period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Machism again turned out to be a more veiled form
of bourgeois attack on dialectical materialism, which was originally combined with mechanism and was
expressed in a number of Bogdanov’s works during this period.
Bogdanov carefully disguised his idealism, speaking under the banner of "proletarian culture",
"socialism of science", "organizational science", etc. He allegedly "refused" any philosophy, but in fact,
under "Marxist" phrases he dragged idealism in political economy, in the theory of historical
materialism, in literary criticism. Bogdanov substituted the materialist dialectic with the idealistic
theory of the "organizational process" and the mechanistic "theory of equilibrium" - the theory of
reconciliation of contradictions. As the main form of the movement towards socialism, he advanced
"cultural" work, denoting his theories with the loud name of "proletarian culture", opposing them to a
revolutionary political struggle. Objectively reactionary philosophy of Bogdanov reflected the
deep defeatist and decadent moods of the cowardly petty bourgeoishiding from the revolution, trying
to escape from it by returning to peaceful "organizational" work in the "normal" framework of the
renowned bourgeois democracy.
The rotten philosophy of Bogdanov was reflected among a portion of the university youth, among
the workers of Proletkult, in the group of the so-called "workers' opposition", in the views of some
theorists - the "left" communists. She said in particular her influence on the theoretical views of
Comrade Bukharin. The idealistic "leftist" mistakes of Comrade Bukharin in his "Economy in Transition"
were "substantiated" by Bogdanov idealism and mechanism.
During this period, Lenin gave a sharp rebuff to the Menshevik ideology of the Sukhanovs. But
Lenin is also leading a decisive struggle against "left" communism and its methodological errors - its
subjectivism and abstractness. In particular, Lenin responded to Bogdanovism with the second edition
of "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" with the application of the article by V.I. Nevsky, where a
critical analysis of the latest Bogdanov's works was given. In the preface to this book, Lenin pointed
out that under the guise of "proletarian" culture, A. A. Bogdanov conducted bourgeois and reactionary
views.
With the introduction of NEP and the known growth of capitalist relations in the town and country,
the bourgeoisie began to count on a peaceful return to capitalism through the gradual rebirth of Soviet
power. Part of the bourgeois professorship, attracted to work in Soviet institutions, took an openly
hostile position in relation to Soviet power. From university departments, from the pages of journals,
she led counter-revolutionary work and acted as an open enemy of dialectical materialism along the
whole line of science, opposing it with idealism and reactionary views. Another part of the bourgeois
intelligentsia proclaimed “a change of milestones”, But“ Smenovekhovstvo ”also meant nothing more
than proclaiming the need for cooperation with the Soviet authorities in order to“ facilitate ”the latter a
peaceful return to capitalism.
In order to fight against idealism and religion, to fight against vulgar empiricism and mechanism,
to expose the scholars of feudalists and graduate lackeys of the priesthood, an organ “ militant of
materialism "- the magazine" Under the banner of Marxism ", the tasks of which were formulated by
Lenin in the famous article" On the Meaning of Militant Materialism. "
For a number of years, “leftist” opportunism continued to remain the main danger for the
party. Counter-revolutionary Trotskyism begins its subversive work, first as a faction of communism
‚as an inter-party opposition. In all areas of the theory, we have various forms of the Menshevik
theories of the Second International that have penetrated under every possible disguise: the
methodology of "left" opportunism, Trotskyism and the "bourgeois" groups conciliatory to it, which is
characterized by a combination of idealism and mechanism; the Menshevik-Kautsky idealist theory of
Rubin in political economy, the Menshevik "development" of the history of Marxism by
Ryazanov, pulling and further deepening of Plekhanov's mistakes in Marxist philosophy by his students
Axelrod and Deborin both through the positivist-Kantian and mechanistic revision of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy (Axelrod) and Menshevist idealism (Deborin, Karev, Sten); the revival of subjective-
idealistic and Kantian concepts in philosophy (in Sarabyanov and others), Menshevik-idealistic theories
in literary criticism (Pereverzev, Voronsky, etc.). In the field of party politics, the struggle of the party
led by comrade Stalin against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism is developing. The main danger in the
theory was the idealistic revision of Marxism, which, being smashed to pieces in politics as a
methodology of Trotskyism and “left” opportunism, was still not fully exposed in theory and
philosophy.
But in the recovery period, along with the idealistic danger, various forms of mechanism and
vulgar, vulgar empiricism also arose . The most vivid expression of creeping empiricism and the
bourgeois form of the revision of Marxism were Mininschina (1922) and Enchmenism (1923). Minin
threw out the slogan: “Philosophy overboard”, and Enchmen, following him, began to propagate
confused biological theory among young students, opposing it to the supposedly “outdated” Marxism.
The mechanistic danger was most vividly expressed in the revision of dialectical materialism by
Bukharin, precisely in the application and further development of Bogdanov scholasticism in the theory
of historical materialism and in political economy. Despite the warning of V. I. Lenin, Comrade
Bukharin and his students stubbornly continued to develop the Bogdanov theory of equilibrium ,
opposing it to the materialist dialectic. In addition to the Bukharin theoretical “school,” a significant
group of naturalists and partly anti-religious propagandists was outlined, trying to respond in this
vulgar-empirical form to the rising head of clericalism.
They replaced the open attack on Marxism with a struggle that was covered up — under the slogan
of defending science from “philosophical scholasticism”, identifying dialectical materialism with the
latest conclusions of natural science.
By the beginning of the reconstructive period, mechanism became a mouthpiece for various trends
hostile to Marxism-Leninism (Machism, Freudianism, Kantianism, positivism, etc.), he joined up with
the Menshevik-Kantian group Axelrod and the Bukharin-Bogdanovsky "sociological"
school. Mechanists-naturalists and anti-religious scholars (Timiryazev, Sarabyanov, Varyash, etc.)
became hawkers of the Bukharin-Bogdanov equilibrium theory. The transition from the reconstruction
period to the reconstructive was a transition to new forms of class struggle of the proletariat, to the
solution of the most difficult and supreme tasks of the proletarian dictatorship:
1) building the foundation of a socialist economy,
2) the complete transfer of small-scale peasant farming to the socialist rails of large-scale
machine-driven collective production,
3) on this basis to the task of destroying the kulaks as a class and then destroying classes in
general.
The world-historical task of building socialism could not be solved using Trotskyist or Bukharin-
Bogdanov, essentially bourgeois, formulas. The questions posed by the party about the ways of
further development required their resolution using the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, the class
struggle method of the proletariat.
“Development has been going on with us and continues to go beyond the formula of Comrade
Bukharin. The development went on and continued to go according to the formula of Lenin - “who is
whom.” Whether we will exploit them, exploiters, suppress them, or they will crush and crush us, the
workers and peasants of the USSR ‚so the question is ... Organization of the offensive of socialism
along the whole front - that’s what the task confronted us in developing the reconstruction of
the entire national economy . The party understood its mission in this way ” [422] .
The Party, starting with the XIV Congress, mobilized all the material resources of the state and the
strength of the proletariat to accelerate the pace of industrialization of the country in every way, and
from the XV Congress began to resolutely carry out a plan for state and collective farm
construction. By increasingly implementing the policy of restricting the kulaks and stepping on it
closely, by the summer of 1929 she had achieved a radical change in the development of agriculture
from small, individual to large, to collective.
At the same time, a decisive breakthrough in the area of labor productivity came: the development
of mass socialist competition and shock training. This moment was a “leap”, a transition to an
accelerated movement forward, a decisive and radical turn in our policy from restricting the kulaks to
a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, the transition to socialism’s onset of capitalism along the
whole front.
In the reconstructive period, the general line of the party develops under the sign of an organized
offensive against capitalism. Such is the course of the proletariat’s class struggle for the completion of
the foundation of a socialist economy. This is also the way of the development of the Marxist-Leninist
dialectic developed by the Central Committee of the Party and its leader, Comrade Stalin.
The forms of class struggle in the reconstructive period are different from the forms of class
struggle at the last stage. The transition of socialism into a general and unfolded offensive could not
but cause desperate resistance of the old world and the aggravation of class contradictions. Carefully
disguised "malicious sabotage of the tops of the bourgeois intelligentsia in all sectors of our industry,
the brutal struggle of the kulaks against collective forms of farming in the countryside, sabotage of the
measures of Soviet power by the bureaucratic elements of the apparatus , which are the agents of the
class enemy, are still the main forms of resistance of the outdated classes of our country " [423] .
The struggle against the wrecking bourgeois theories of Kondratieff, Chayanov, Grohman, with the
Menshevik ideology of Bazarov, Rubin, Sukhanov gained purely practical and political significance in
the conditions of the reconstructive period. “ Without an irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois
theories based on Marxist-Leninist theory, it is impossible to achieve complete victory over class
enemies ” [424] .
The aggravation of the class struggle and the revival of petty-bourgeois elements in the country
were reflected in the form of right and "left" deviations from the general line of the party, which
threatened the party with a breakdown of the socialist offensive policy. At the same time, the right
deviation (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) as a kulak agents within the party was the main and main
danger at this stage. Only in a merciless struggle with deviations the party could achieve the results
that we now have.
Marxist philosophy was faced with the task of theoretically crushing the philosophical foundations
of both these biases and the frankly hostile wrecking methodology. Meanwhile, the philosophical
leadership led by Deborin divorced philosophy from party politics, from the practice of socialist
construction, from concrete knowledge. Not only did it not cope with the exposure of hostile
methodologies, but it itself was captured by the wrecking concept of ruby; for a number of years it
peacefully coexisted with it, and at a crucial moment, during the economic discussion, it took up the
position of active defense of Rubin, placing his articles in the magazine “Under the banner of Marxism”
and praising him as a “deepener” of Marxist political economy.
The pressure of hostile ideologies reflected on the further intensification of the mechanistic and
idealistic dangers in various fields of Marxist-Leninist theory: in philosophy, science, political economy,
literary criticism, history, etc. This danger was revealed by the party in a number
of discussions held in various areas of theory.
The mechanistic revision of the Marxist dialectic in the field of historical materialism, political
economy, etc. in the new situation, in the drastically changed conditions of the class struggle in the
country, took on a particularly pressing, political character, becoming the theoretical banner of
the right-leaning party. In order to crush right-wing opportunism as the main danger in the party, it
was also necessary to crush Bukharin’s entire system of philosophical mechanistic views, with which
he substantiated his opportunism in politics. Under these conditions, the mechanism turned out to be
the main danger.
The revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of classes and class struggle and its underlying
Bukharin-Bogdanov mechanistic concept were taken up along with the Menshevik Grohman-Bazarov-
Sukhanov group, which fully shared the Bogdanov theory of "organizational process", that is,
equilibrium theory, and tried to carry it out in their practical work in the field of planning,
procurement, etc. Thus, at the new stage, mechanismism became not only the philosophical basis of
the right deviation, but also the theoretical knowledge mja Menshevik sabotage Bazarov-
gromanovskoy group banner of capitalist restoration.
Tov. In his speech at the conference of Marxist agrarians, Stalin pointed out the inadmissible
lagging of theoretical work from the practical successes of socialist construction and the need to
quickly eliminate this gap in certain areas of Marxist theory. “It must be admitted,” said Comrade
Stalin, “that theoretical thought has not kept pace with our practical successes, that we have a
certain gap between practical successes and the development of theoretical thought . Meanwhile, it is
necessary that theoretical work not only keep up with practical work, but also be ahead of it, arming
our practitioners in their struggle for the victory of socialism. ” [425]. Tov. Stalin severely criticized a
number of opportunist and bourgeois, sabotage theories that had circulated in our literature, and set
before the theoretical front the task of both uprooting these theories and developing new questions
put forward by practice.
But none of these tasks, the preborins philosophical leadership could not put in front of the
available philosophical cadres, failed to mobilize these cadres to help the party to overcome the
difficulties of the reconstructive period. The Deborinska group continued to ignore the task of
eliminating the separation of theory from practice and after the slogan put forward by Comrade Stalin
on the theoretical front.
The stubborn unwillingness of this group to understand the tasks of the party line in philosophy at
the new stage, the well-known political and theoretical blindness of this group had deep roots in the
class struggle in the country. Even during the struggle against the Trotsky opposition, the active part
of this group had a close connection with Trotskyism, sharing Trotsky anti-party attitudes in
politics. By systematically evading the theoretical criticism of Trotskyism and the “left” bends, while
continuing to defend a number of Trotskyist attitudes in theory, it thereby continued to feed the
Trotskyist sentiments in theory. At the same time, the group of Comrade Deborin did not render
timely assistance to the party in exposing the ideology of the rightist opportunism. Only after the right
deviation was shattered by the party, the Deborino group tried to link abstract criticism of mechanism
with criticism of right-wing opportunism in politics, but could not carry it out completely due to its
revisionist attitude to Marxism-Leninism. Nothing was done by the Deborinsky group to expose the
bourgeois and Menshevik sabotage methodologies of the Grohmans, the Kondratievs, the Chayanovs
and other ideologues of hostile classes. On the contrary, as we have already indicated, the Deborinsky
group itself found itself in captivity of the idealistic theory of the ruby in political economy.
The party organization of the IKP of Philosophy and Natural History correctly understood the
instructions of Comrade Stalin, managed to expand the discussion with the Böborin group and
correctly identify the main lines of disagreement: as a new stage in the development of dialectic
materialism, about the need for an expanded struggle on two fronts in philosophy and natural science,
about new tasks of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in connection with the socialist construction, etc.
” [426] .
As a result of the discussion under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and so on.
Stalin managed to expose the Menshevist idealistic anti-party essence of the views of the Deborinsky
group. The course and results of the philosophical discussion once again revealed the closest link that
exists between philosophy and politics, between science and the class struggle, and the inadmissibility
of any gap, especially in conditions of heightened class struggle, the elimination of the kulaks as a
class and the offensive the whole front. The discussion once again found that the slightest deviations
from the correct Marxist-Leninist positions, even in the most abstract questions of theory, now acquire
important political significance and express a certain class conditionality, ultimately directed against
the dictatorship of the proletariat .
The Central Committee of our Party, in its resolution on the journal Under the Banner of Marxism,
put forward in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy the slogan “to wage a steady struggle on two fronts:
with the mechanistic revision of Marxism, both the main danger of the modern period and
the idealistic distortion of Marxism by the group tt. Deborin, Karev, Stan and. et al. ” [427] set the task
of Marxist philosophy and the magazine Under the Marxism,“ to wage a resolute struggle for the
general line of the party, against any deviations from it, conducting consistently throughout his work
the Leninist principle of partisan philosophy ” [428] .
“Taking philosophy away from politics,” says the decision of the Central Committee, “not spending
the partisanship of philosophy and natural science in all of its work, which led the magazine“ Under
the banner of Marxism, ”the group resurrected one of the most harmful traditions and dogmas of the
Second International - the gap between theory and practice , rolling down in a number of critical
questions on the position of Menshevist idealism " [429] .
The party paid serious attention to the theoretical section, including it as an integral link in the
general chain of the socialism’s unfolding offensive against capitalism along the whole front.
Life put on the order of the day the task of carrying out the strictest conduct of the Leninist
principle of the partisanship of science, the subordination of science to the tasks of the party policy in
the building of socialism. The party demanded an implacable struggle on two fronts in theory and the
eradication of all hostile influences in science.
5.3. Mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism and right-wing opportunism
As we have already seen, modern mechanists represent an unprincipled bloc of revisionist groups:
here we have mechanistic naturalists (Timiryazev, Perov) and the Bogdanov-mechanistic group of
Bukharin, and Menshevik-Kantians (Axelrod), and mechanistic-Freudian (Varyash), and positivists,
sliding down to subjective idealism (Sarabyanov).
Despite the existing shades in philosophical views, despite all the differences in the political views
of N. I. Bukharin and L. Axelrod, they are all united in therevision of the foundations of dialectical
materialism , the replacement of materialistic dialectics by a mechanistic methodology. They are all
united in the lack of understanding of the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the class
roots of mechanism, all of which are characterized by the rejection of Marxist-Leninist dialectics as a
science.
A common feature for all mechanists, inextricably linked with their misunderstanding of the
revolutionary dialectics ‚is the lack of historicism , the lack of understanding of partisanship theory and
unity of theory with revolutionary practice. Borrowing from the old revisionists the worn-out, battered
“arguments” and sophisms against materialistic dialectics, the mechanists forget and revise the basic
position of dialectical materialism that every theory is determined by revolutionary
practice. Mechanists, like Menshevist idealists, having debated for a number of years, have never
asked themselves the question: what kind of socio-political trends, what ideology of classes did
mechanical materialism have in the historical past, what classes does it have in the present? If the
mechanists were able to ask themselves this question, they would immediately expose themselves as
ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie.
Until the proletariat entered the arena of the historical struggle, old mechanical materialism was
a revolutionary theory . Despite his shortcomings, he was the revolutionary weapon of the French
advanced bourgeoisie in the struggle against feudalism and religion as a stronghold of medieval
reaction; It was a revolutionary theoretical basis for the first socialist and communist doctrines, which
arose long before the independent movement of the proletariat. Feuerbach's materialism, opposed by
the radical German bourgeoisie to the former idealism, was also revolutionary at a certain historical
stage. But already with the rise of the dialectical the materialism of Marx and Engels, and with the
very first battles of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, the old, metaphysical materialism began to
turn its reactionary side against Marxism, turning more and more into a “refuge of indecisive cripples
and writing industrialists”. On the philosophical basis of Feuerbach’s limited materialism, grasping its
“idealism” above and its contemplative, metaphysical character, reactionary petty-bourgeois “true”
socialism of Grün in Germany flourished with which Marx and Engels made a decisive struggle before
the 1848 revolution. which reflected indecision, passivity, inconsistency of the petty bourgeoisie, Marx
and Engels had to wage a stubborn struggle for decades, because these forms of inconsistent
materialism served as the theoretical basis of numerous petty-bourgeois movements in
socialism. Only in a tireless struggle against the reactionary petty-bourgeois currents did Marxism
become the dominant teaching in the ranks of the proletariat.
The whole struggle of Marx and Engels with the inconsistent materialist Dühring, who at every step
stumbled into idealism, and his supporters - the left phrase "Most" and the opportunists Vollmar,
Bernstein, etc., also shows that inconsistent mechanical materialism is alien to Marxism ideology.
But mechanism was not only a bourgeois methodology in the past: mechanismism, combined with
idealism, continues to play a significant role in bourgeois theory. The mechanical theory of equilibrium
serves as a theoretical justification for the bourgeois evolutionary theory of slow and quiet progressive
development, the teachings on the need to maintain the capitalist system in the "equilibrium". Social
Fascism (Kautsky and others) also substantiates the theory of social equilibrium and the need to adapt
society in its development to the natural environment - its hatred for the proletarian revolution. The
reflection of this bourgeois ideology in Soviet conditions was the views of "our" mechanists.
Modern mechanists continue to call themselves dialectical materialists. In words, both Bukharin,
and Axelrod, and Sarabyanov, and Varyash, and others “recognized” and “defended” dialectics.
In fact, they "defended" mechanism from the materialistic dialectic, from revolutionary Marxism-
Leninism. Is this not a direct mockery of Marxism, when Bukharin asserted that the "general trend" of
his innovations in Marxist philosophy "goes along the line of the development of the orthodox,
revolutionary understanding of Marx"? In fact, NI Bukharin has been propagandizing bourgeois
equilibrium theory for more than a decade. Is it not strange that even now, when these theories have
been shattered by the practice of socialist construction, Comrade Bukharin does not abandon his
erroneous mechanistic philosophy! The same applies to the rest of the mechanists - Timiryazev,
Axelrod and others who had fought for a number of years with Marxist-Leninist philosophy, expelling it
from the field of theoretical natural science - again with an oath of loyalty to dialectical materialism.
What arguments have mechanists opposed to materialist dialectics and in favor of the mechanistic
world view?
First of all, following their revisionist predecessors — Bogdanov and other “fighters” of dialectical
materialism, modern mechanists again put forward as the main argument against dialectics
the identification of dialectical materialism with the “latest conclusions of modern natural science” and
positive science, which, ostensibly, require a revision of Marx's views , Engels and Lenin. As another
“argument,” they advanced a naked phrase about the presence of elements of mysticism and
teleology. in dialectics: at the same time, Hegel’s idealistic dialectics substituted them for Marxist
dialectics. This hackneyed, haggard technique, which the revisionists invariably enjoyed throughout
the whole history of Marxism, for some reason fell in love with N. I. Bukharin. In order to more easily
defeat the dialectic of Marx, he invariably fights with Hegel's triad, believing in this the essence of
Marxist dialectics and imitating Mikhailovsky, Bogdanov and other Machist-positivists, social fascists
Bower, Adler, etc. in this case. - they fought with the Marxist-Leninist dialectic under the flag of the
struggle against the “Deborinsky scholasticism”.
The third argument of the mechanists is an appeal to empiricism . In this respect, the mechanists
completely followed the old vulgar materialists, whom Engels had called pathetic, insignificant croffers,
who had not made a single step forward in the development of the theory. They considered it possible
to replace Marxist theory with narrow-mindedness, vulgar empiricism, revealing a complete lack of
understanding of the meaning of revolutionary theory. These are the main "arguments" of the
mechanists, who in general do not represent anything new for Marxism and the party.
And the mechanists' perceptions of the mechanistic perversion of Marxism remained the same as
those of all revisionists. Constant dodging of the subject matter, silence and detour of the main, basic
in the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, snatching of separate quotations, their deliberate distortion in
order to bring Marxism under the mechanism, and Marx, Engels and Lenin under the mechanists,
sophistry and eclecticism in all writings the mechanists are the old revisionist methods by which the
mechanists were engaged in systematically perverting Marxism-Leninism for a number of years.
This is also the attitude of Bukharin to the philosophical foundations of the theory of historical
materialism and Marxist political economy. The dialectical laws of historical development and the
capitalist economic formation Bukharin turns into metaphysical laws of equilibrium, replacing Marxism
with bourgeois sociology, dialectics with flat evolutionism. Timiryazev and other mechanists have the
same attitude towards Engels: they carry out the mechanistic perversion of Engels's “Dialectics of
Nature” and the rejection of Engels dialectics under the guise of the need to revise Engels’s
supposedly outdated form of materialism.
What is the attitude of mechanists to the philosophical legacy of Lenin ? On the part of the
mechanists, we had a complete disregard for Lenin's works on dialectics and on natural science. With
regard to Bukharin, the words of t. Stalin on the "hypertrophied pretentiousness of the under-learned
theorist" are fully justified. Leninism as a new stage in the development of dialectical materialism for
Comrade Bukharin did not exist. As for Axelrod, she has long led a systematic struggle against
Leninist revolutionary dialectics.
Other mechanics, such as Varyash, in their work try to turn Lenin into an apologist for mechanism
and Menshevism, in unscrupulous way try to slip Lenin’s mechanistic formulations, carefully avoiding
the question of the struggle of Lenin and our party with Menshevism and with Menshevik distortions of
materialistic dialectics, politics, tactics.
The blindness of our mechanists in relation to the Menshevik danger, the desire to gloss over this
danger reveals the petty-bourgeois nature of modern mechanism. This is even more confirmed by the
fact that the mechanists do not want to, do not wish to learn Leninist revolutionary dialectics, fight
with it, distort it, distort it. They ignore the task of developing the theory of dialectics, put forward by
Lenin, and the problem of studying the dialectic of Marx and Engels.
But mechanists in every possible way resurrect and deepen the theoretical errors of Plekhanov. In
confirmation of their mechanistic world view, and to refute Engels materialism, Axelrod, Timiryazev,
Perov, and others, and at one time, and so, Stepanov referred to Plekhanov, erecting his mistakes into
a whole system of anti-Marxist views.
In short, the revisionist attitudes of the mechanists are as follows:
1. Identification of dialectical materialism with the modern mechanistic worldview; the
identification of philosophical materialism as the worldview of the proletariat with modern natural
science and the "latest conclusions of positive science." Hence the elimination of materialistic dialectics
as a philosophical science. Hence, positivism, vulgar empiricism, the separation of practice from
theory, and disregard for the development of revolutionary theory.
2. Revision of the materialist theory of reflection and the slide to agnosticism, positivism,
Kantianism, idealism.
3. The denial of dialectics as a theory of knowledge. Contrasting theory of knowledge
dialectic. Revision of dialectics as the science of the universal laws of the development of nature,
society and thinking. Replacing dialectics with mechanics, flat evolutionism and equilibrium
theory. The mechanists did not understand the law of the unity of opposites and replace it with a
theory of reconciliation of contradictions, collisions of variously directed forces. Hence, the denial of
the objective nature of quality and thus the denial of qualitative, abrupt development. Reduction of
dialectical causality to mechanical. The denial of the dialectical unity of chance and necessity. Hence
the fatalism, the theory of gravity, tailism, the failure to understand the active revolutionary role of
the proletariat, the revolutionary practice. In the field of historical materialism - a revision of the
Marxist doctrine of class struggle,
4. Replacing dialectical logic with formal logic, eclecticism and scholasticism.
The result is an unprincipled surrender of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist positions and the
dissolution of Marxism in the petty-bourgeois ideology.
Such is the essence of modern mechanics. Undoubtedly, mechanism has nothing to do with the
revolutionary theory of the proletariat.
 The party has repeatedly fought off vicious assaults on Marxism-Leninism by petty-bourgeois
agents in its ranks, trying to replace consistent materialism with some old theoretical waste
paper. The same historical rubbish is the mechanistic methodology, which at the first practical test
turned out to be the weapon of kulak agents against the party, against socialist construction. The
mechanistic methodology of the Right has already been broken by the revolutionary practice of the
proletariat’s class struggle. In the fire of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the fire of living
practice, mechanism did not stand the critical test. The main point of the Marxist doctrine that the
revolutionary theory "finally develops only in close connection with practice a truly mass and truly
revolutionary movement ” [430] - the theorists of modern rotten mechanism cowardly bypassed this
point, they“ forgot ”it.
What kind of classically alien influences in the ranks of the party is a reflection of mechanism, with
which ideological and political currents is it associated with in the past, of which classes and class
groupings is it in our era? Without a comprehensive clarification of these issues, without clarifying the
political consequences of their theoretical mistakes, without this the criticism of the mechanists would
have been half-way, one-sided. The Deborinsky group criticized the mechanists in an abstract
“professorial manner,” criticized them from the standpoint of idealistic dialectics, without linking their
criticism with revolutionary practice and party politics. Therefore, their criticism, having some positive
significance, could not fully expose the mechanists, because it itself was conducted from anti-Leninist
positions. Moreover, in a number of issues, the Deborintsy converged with the mechanists.
Now let's take a closer look at the basic theoretical errors of the mechanists.
5.3.1. Positivism of mechanists and their rejection of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism
Without understanding the class character of revolutionary practice, the mechanists also do not
understand the role and significance of revolutionary theory. They slide to vulgar empiricism, to the
rejection of philosophy, to the rejection of the theory of materialist dialectics.
“Is there a dialectic as a special science or is it a method?”, Asked the truly “metaphysical heads”
from the mechanistic camp. They give a monstrously illiterate revisionist answer to this, that talking
about dialectics as a science and even less talking about some kind of dialectics, for example, in
natural science there is “scholasticism”, “logistics”, “mysticism”, “lack of thought”, etc. Science is a
philosophy to itself , ”the mechanists say, trailing behind the vulgar, vulgar empiricists. “For Marxists,
there is no area of some kind of“ philosophizing, ”separate and separate from science: materialistic
philosophy for Marxists is the last and most general conclusions of modern science [431]‚- wrote t.
Stepanov, having fallen for the bait of bourgeois professors who“ banish ”the dialectic from
science. Axelrod, Bukharin and other mechanists tried in one way or another to reduce the philosophy
of Marxism to "modern" science, "modern conclusions of natural science", eliminate Marxist dialectics
as a philosophical science, declared it "obsolete scholasticism." In this regard, the mechanists are
definitely following in the footsteps of the previous revisionists and are lagging behind the Menshevism
of the Second International. Marxism does not have its own philosophy, says the modern social-fascist
M. Adler. Marxism is compatible with any philosophy, the social fascist Kautsky is now
preaching. Marxism is fully compatible with Kantianism, ”Struve, Bernstein, Vorlander and other
bourgeois theorists said earlier. Now our mechanists have added to this gallery of the “fighters” of the
dialectic. Their slogan is: there is the liquidationism of Marxist philosophy. It means the rejection of
the revolutionary materialist dialectic, that is, of Marxism.
When in the early years of NEP Minin threw out the slogan: “ philosophy overboard ”, then his
performance in the ranks of the party was given a decisive rebuff as a hostile outing. Mininshchina
was a manifestation of petty-bourgeois vacillation on the part of theoretically unstable elements in the
party. The same empty petty-bourgeois claim to "overcome" Marxist philosophy, that is, to reject it,
which Minin sounded at one time, is heard in the slogan of modern mechanists. Minin openly proposed
to throw overboard the philosophy of Marxism, and our mechanists propose to "replace" it with the
conclusions of "modern science." But the essence remains the same - the desire to eliminate Marxist
philosophy as a science.
For naturalistic mechanists, this desire means a direct refusal to defend Marxism, to pursue a
consistently materialistic line in the natural sciences. The rejection of dialectics means the weakening
of the materialist front in the fight against idealism, the cession of materialist positions to the class
enemy.
Of course, mechanists can free themselves from philosophy only in imagination. In fact, no science
has ever managed and could not do without a philosophical basis, without a clear answer to
elementary questions about what to take as a starting point: matter or thinking — without a clear
answer to the question that we are learning: is it real? irrespective of consciousness, the existing
world and its objective laws, as materialism teaches, or the fantastic world of illusions, sensations and
its laws invented by people, is based on, as idealists think. No science is possible without the theory of
scientific thinking.. For without thinking, it is impossible to connect two simplest natural science facts,
not to mention studying the natural connections in nature and in society. In the same way, no science
can do without a clear answer to the question of the knowability of the world.
No matter how much the mechanists shout against philosophy, they still cannot do without it. And
since in a class society there are only two fundamental directions in philosophy — materialism and
idealism, they thereby take the side of some particular direction, for the despicable, cowardly “party of
an imaginary middle”, called positivism, agnosticism, etc. , there is also an expression of one of the
main directions, only littered, littered with garbage of petty-bourgeois prejudices.
“Naturalists,” says Engels, “imagine that they are freed from philosophy when they ignore it or
scold it. But since they cannot move even a step without thinking, logical definitions are necessary for
thinking ..., in the end, they are still captured by philosophy, but unfortunately for the most part - the
worst; and here people, especially diligently scolding philosophy, become slaves of the nastiest,
vulgarized remnants of the nastiest philosophical systems ” [432] .
Engels considers the transition from metaphysical to dialectical thinking to be the only way out of
the impasse to which flat naturalism and empiricism in the field of natural science leads. For vulgar
empiricism, Engels criticized the vulgar materialists — Buchner, Focht, and others — for the fact that
they, like our mechanists, arrogantly criticized the dialectic, neglected philosophy and, having no
vocation for the further development of the theory, step did not go beyond their teachers ", the
French materialists. Our mechanists, as if in mockery of Engels, are now trying again to drag us into
the vulgar empirical swamp of Büchners. “The names of Moleschott, Focht and Buchner,” sings Boris
Borichesky, the mechanist, “are still the embodiment of“ vulgar ”materialism. Meanwhile, after
actually studying these half-forgotten thinkers we come to a completely different conclusion : we have
very respectable scientists who stand at the level of the then positive knowledge, with all its virtues
and with some problems ” [433] . Such speeches, directed against Engels and Lenin, are commonplace
with other modern mechanists who have lost the remnants of the party-theoretical sense. They are
ready to raise from the graves of all the old mechanists, as well as creeping empiricists, if only to
"slay" the consistent dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin.
The mechanists completely ignore Lenin’s position, which is clear and obligatory for every party
member engaged in the natural sciences, that “without a solid philosophical foundation, no natural
sciences, no materialism can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the
restoration of bourgeois worldview. In order to withstand this struggle and to carry it through to the
end with complete success, Lenin says, the naturalist must be a modern materialist, a conscious
supporter of the materialism that is represented by Marx, that is, must be a dialectical materialist
” [434]. Lenin, like Engels, insists on the further development of materialist dialectics. Without the full
development of the theory of dialectics, Lenin says, “materialism cannot be militant materialism. He
remains, to use an expression of Shchedrin, not so much fighting , how to fight . Without this, the
major scientists as often as before will be helpless in their philosophical conclusions and
generalizations ” [435] .
With the Leninist instructions on the development of the theory of dialectics, which are now the
directive of the party, the mechanists are not at all considered. Speaking against Leninist philosophy,
they abandon the consistently materialistic theory of knowledge, slipping straight into bourgeois
positivism.
What is positivism , with which modern bourgeois science is now infected, and which is confessed
by the “certified” lackeys of clericalism, modern “learned” feudalists, reactionaries? Positivism (from
the word “positive” - positive) is evolved since the second half of the XIX century. the current in
bourgeois science, which in words does not want to know anything except positive (positive) science,
which in words rejects any philosophy as scholasticism. But in fact, under the mantle of scientific
"positivity", reactionary and idealistic views and clericalism are dragged in and out. Positivism believes
that the theory of knowledge is generally superfluous. The main question of any philosophy - the
question of the relationship between consciousness and matter - positivists consider "unscientific",
"scholastic", intractable. Consequentlyin fact, positivism is also a kind of philosophical doctrine,
dragging the philosophy of Kant, Hume, Mach, or another idealist under the banner of
"scientificness". Positivists are in fact either agnostic or outright idealists.
Positivism is especially dangerous now, when, under the influence of the deepest crisis and decay
of capitalism, on the one hand, the tremendous successes of the natural sciences, confirming
dialectical materialism, on the other, there is a stratification among modern bourgeois
scientists. Some of them are beginning to switch to the positions of dialectical materialism, while a
significant part of scientists, especially in capitalist countries, has swung toward open reaction, leaves
the positions of shy materialism (hidden by positivism, agnosticism) and goes into the camp of
reaction, hitting mysticism, clericalism (all under same flag positivism). The largest modern scholars,
Planck and others, who earlier under the flag of positivism to some degree shyly defended
materialism, now in their scientific works try to take the path of compromise with religion. Modern
largest physicists, Millikan and Eddington, are arguing about how the “god” could create the
world. Eddington preaches that the world was created by a single act, and Millikan uses all his
scientific erudition to "prove" that "the creator tirelessly at work. " Such is the modern scientific
positivism, which is the direct agent of fideism, mysticism, clericalism, modern imperialist
reaction. And all this shame is accomplished under the banner of a positive "positive" science!
From this it is clear that the rejection of philosophy and the preaching of positivism is a complete
rejection of Marxism. However, until now, mechanists continue to stand on the view that Marxist
philosophy does not exist as a science and that it is replaced by “modern science”, modern
mechanistic natural science.
5.3.2. Revision of the dialectic and the materialist theory of reflection
Modern mechanists did not understand the core of materialism , abandoning the materialist theory
of reflection in its form, which was developed by Marx and Engels and raised to a new level by Lenin.
Even in the controversy with the metaphysical materialist Dühring, Engels ridiculed Dühring’s
manner of throwing "eternal truths of last resort" and his lack of understanding of the relationship
between absolute and relative truths. In contrast to Dühring's metaphysics, Engels showed that
concepts, logical categories, all scientific, experimentally obtained knowledge are not frozen,
unchanging, but developing relative historical products, reflections objective laws of the historical
development of nature and society. For lack of understanding of dialectics, Marx Proudhon criticized in
his time “Poverty of Philosophy” and classics of bourgeois political economy and vulgar economists,
showing and proving the transitory and relative nature of economic categories, which are merely
reflective reflections of objective, historically transient material-production capitalist relations in
Capital public formation.
In their time Bogdanov, Bazarov, and other Machists could not understand the dialectical doctrine
of relative and absolute truth. Lenin wrote about the Machists that “they did not understand anything
about Engels’s application of dialectics to gnoseology (absolute and relative truth, for
example)” [436] . Acknowledging the relative nature of the concepts of physics, the Machists slid toward
relativism: they could not understand their objective values, refused to recognize them as reflections
of the objective, regardless of the humanity of the existing material world. As we have already pointed
out, Plekhanov, in his criticism of the Machists, did not pay enough attention to this side of the
matter. A characteristic feature of Plekhanov’s criticism of Kantians, agnostics, Machists, Lenin finds
that this criticism was conducted “more from a vulgar materialistic than from a dialectical, materialistic
point of view.”
In connection with this, Lenin’s words that “Plekhanov, in his remarks against Machism, did not
care much about the refutation of Mach, but about inflicting factional damage to Bolshevism” [437], have
a deep meaning . Criticizing the Machists, Plekhanov made a number of unacceptable concessions to
Machism, overlooking the need for a dialectical view of the nature of knowledge. He himself was of the
opinion that we would never know how our consciousness arises [438] . This was undoubtedly a tribute
to agnosticism.
Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory of knowledge was also in the hands of the Machists, because it
ultimately led to subjectivism, to the denial of objective reality and objective truth, that is, it led to the
Machist subjectivist swamp. With his hieroglyphic theory, Plekhanov "made a clear mistake in
presenting materialism"(Lenin) . Plekhanov made a concession to Machism with his incorrect theory of
"experience" and a number of other mistakes.
Lenin's criticism of Machism, and along the way of Plekhanov's mistakes, helps us to reveal
the epistemological roots of the modern positivism of the mechanists. The main gnoseological mistake
of the mechanists is that they incorrectly, non-dialectically raise and resolve the basic philosophical
question about the relation of thinking to being, the question of the relation of the subjective and
objective, relative and absolute. And they cannot be correctly scientifically understood without
recognizing the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection , without the doctrine of absolute and relative
truth, that is, without applying dialectics to the theory of reflection.
From a consistently materialistic position, Lenin reveals the epistemological roots of Comrade
Bukharin’s mistakes in his notes on “The Economy of the Transition Period” and in other works. "The
error of the" Bogdanovian "terminology" in Bukharin "stands out: subjectivism , solipsism. It is not the
case of who “considers”, to whom it is “interesting,” but that it is independent of human consciousness
” [439] . Where Bukharin speaks of the "cognitive value" of Marx's method, Lenin writes in the margins:
"Only" cognitive value "? and not the objective world reflecting? “Bashful” ... agnosticism! ” [440] In
another place, where Bukharin, instead of talking about the disclosure of the objective dialectic of the
transitional era, again subjectivistly argues only about the “dialectical-historical point of view ”, Lenin
writes: , the dialectical “point of view” is only one of many equal “points of view” ... " [441] And Lenin, in
the final review of the book of Bukharin, reproaches the latter for the fact that he uncritically borrows
the terminology of Machist Bogdanov, does not ponder its content: agnostic, Humevsky-Kantian,
according to philosophical foundations), into idealism (“logic”, “point of view”, etc.) outside
the consciousness of their production from matter , from objective reality, etc. ” [442] .
Unwillingness to correctly, dialectically understand the derivative character of sensations and
logical categories, their dependence on matter, on objective reality, the constant silence about the
objective content of concepts is generally characteristic of revisionists, both mechanists and
Menshevists idealists. Bukharin in words for philosophy, he even spoke in the "defense" of philosophy
- as for example in his criticism of Enchmen, but in this defense he does not have an understanding of
the dialectical theory of knowledge. Nowhere did Bukharin raise or examine the question of the
relation of subjective and objective, relative and absolute moments in the knowledge of objective
reality, of the dialectical character of the process of knowledge. There is nothing accidental about this
for Bukharin. He was never consistent, that is, a dialectical materialist. He hesitated before, in his
younger years, and after the revolution he continued to oscillate between materialism and
positivism. In his younger years, Bukharin eclectically “combined” Marxist views with the philosophy of
Mach-Avenarius;
It was not for nothing that V.I. Lenin, when he had to reveal these or other mistakes of Bukharin,
concentrates every time the fire of his criticism onBukharin’s epistemological untidiness, which points
to the unacceptable ignoring of the materialist theory of knowledge.
“ His theoretical views ,” Lenin wrote about him, “ can be very doubtfully attributed to quite
Marxist, because there is something scholastic in him (he never studied and, I think, never understood
completely dialectics) ” [443] .
As can be seen from this cited commentary on Bukharin, Lenin puts the anti-dialectic, scholastic
errors of the latter in direct connection with the lack of understanding of dialectics as a theory of
knowledge and the negation of the theory of reflection. Other mechanists (Stepanov, Varyash,
Timiryazev, Perov) philosophical materialism is openly replaced by vulgar materialism. The problem of
the relation of thinking to matter is solved metaphysically, not dialectically.
Mechanists Axelrod and Sarabyanov do not trust human knowledge at all. Their views are close to
Kantianism and Machism. In his polemic with the Machists, Lenin asked them the question: "Is a
person given when he sees red, feels solid, etc., is objective reality or not?" [444]
The Machists gave a negative answer to this question; they denied an objective source of
sensations. Axelrod and Sarabyanov gave the same approximate answer. In their opinion, the
sensations of red, solid, etc., i.e., in general, the sensations of man are devoid of objective content,
they do not reflect the objective world that is independent of sensation. In their opinion, sensations,
concepts are conventional signs, hieroglyphs, they do not reflect objective reality.
The philosophical mistakes of Plekhanov, following the line of the well-known departure from
consistent materialism to vulgar materialism and Kantian agnosticism, are now being repeated by LI
Axelrod (Orthodox), defending them and deepening them further. Axelrod aggressively defends
Plekhanov's agnosticism and hieroglyphism. It stands on that essentially Kantian point of view, that
“sensations caused by the action of various forms of motion of matter are not similar to the objective
processes that generate them” [445]. She especially emphasizes this "dissimilarity" of forms of
knowledge to the forms of the material world. Thus she has. like Kant, knowledge does not connect,
does not bring people closer to nature, but only separates. The hieroglyphism of LI Axelrod is in
glaring contradiction with the Marxist-Leninist consistent-materialist theory of reflection. At Axelrod,
we actually have a gap between knowledge and the material world.. Axelrod's dialectics turns into
subjectivism and sophistry and is not a reflection of the dialectics of the objective world. The agnostic
theory of Axelrod inevitably follows the denial of dialectics as a science and the transformation of
dialectics “into a system of formal principles,” which do not reflect anything objective, but serve only
as some purely subjective conventional cognitive means known as “point of view” for the approach to
the subject of knowledge.
Mechanical materialists of the 18th century they did not suffer from such an ugly one-sidedness as
modern mechanists, distinguished by exceptional “stiffness” and “ossification” of thought. The old
materialists and in sensations were able to understand and find the subjective image of the objective,
material world , they were able to reflect the objective in the subjective . And with modern
mechanists, the subjective is only subjective.
 Mechanists do not understand that the question of the objective content of sensations and
concepts is at the same time a question of recognizing their objective source , that is, matter as the
only and last objective reality independent of human consciousness. The knowledge that the material
world exists outside of us is given as a result of historical, social, sensual human practice. Nature is
reflected, that is, it makes itself known, is copied in the sensations and concepts of man, and this
existence of an objective reality independent of man and mankind, confirmed in life at every step, is
objective truth. “To regard our sensations as images of the external world — to recognize objective
truth — to standon the point of view of the materialistic theory of knowledge , they are the
same ” [446]. This is the truth for any consistent materialist, both for Marx and Lenin, and for Feuerbach
and the French materialists.
When Sarabyanov and Axelrod refuse to recognize the objectivity of the content of our sensations,
this suggests that they have completely abandoned materialism .
Mechanists agree with old materialists only in their inability to apply dialectics to the process of
cognition. Marxism-Leninism teaches that dialectics also includes “what is now called theory of
knowledge, gnoseology, which should consider its subject equally historically , studying and
generalizing the origin anddevelopment of knowledge , the transition from not knowledge to
knowledge” [447] .
This is absolutely not able to understand the mechanists. And yet it is impossible to correctly
understand the theory of reflection, if we consider it metaphysically, anti-dialectically, as Feuerbach
and the old materialists considered it. The Marxist theory of reflection considers knowledge as a
process, as a transition from ignorance to knowledge , as a historical process of more and more
profound reflection in the heads of people of the ever-evolving nature and society.
What kind of scholasticism LI Axelrod held, to what extent she has a vulgar idea of the theory of
reflection, can be seen at least from her polemic on this issue with Lenin. “If sensations were images
or copies of things,” she wrote, “what devil, one wonders, would we need things that in this case
would actually turn out to be things in themselves, in the absolute sense of the word?” To recognize
sensations as images or copies of objects means again to create an impassable dualistic gulf between
the object and the subject ” [448] .
As can be seen from the above quotation, Axelrod did not understand dialectics at all. She
was treading around Feuerbach’s extrahistorical man , abstract non-historic categories - “subject and
object”. Moreover, it goes back from Feuerbach, who recognized, in sensations, concepts, an image or
a copy of the objective material world, to Kant’s metaphysics and idealism, which, as we know, could
not link reflection with the reflected in itself, that is, tore the sensation from matter. Axelrod's
antihistoricism is Feuerbach and Kant's antihistory in the theory of knowledge, ugly folded together.
The metaphysical, anti-dialectical view of the relation of thinking to matter, inherent in general to
all mechanists, has nothing in common with Marxism.
Marx, Engels, and Lenin enriched the theory of reflection with dialectics, the doctrine of relative
and absolute truth. They were taught to consider the process of reflecting the material world in the
consciousness of man historically, in the course of the historical practice of work, in the course
of class battles of humanity. Just as consciousness reflects matter in general, and the concrete
historical social consciousness reflects the historical material process of the production of social life —
this is the basic premise of the theory of knowledge of Marxism. The revisionist, formal-logical views
of mechanists on knowledge have nothing in common with the Marxist dialectic.
Mechanists do not understand the objective meaning of dialectical materialist logic, do not
understand its derivatives from the material world, from the historical development of the world and
society. Therefore, they turn logical categories into empty abstractions ‚mystic, scholasticism, without
being able to specifically apply them in practice.
Mechanists, as we have seen, forget the role of a revolutionary, world-transforming practice,
confirming that objective truth, absolute content, reflecting objective reality, is in relative
truth. Therefore, they do not understand that “human thinking is by its nature capable of giving and
giving us absolute truth, which is made up of a sum of relative truths” [449] .
Modern mechanists, not understanding the doctrine of absolute and relative truth, are slipping into
Kant's agnosticism, Hume, subjectivism, relativism and sophistry.
The agnostic theory of hieroglyphs after Axelrod stubbornly defended himself and so.
Sarabyanov. He came to the recognition of truth only as something subjective and to the negation of
objective truth, that is, not only to the Kantian direct denial of the knowability of the objective world,
but also to the subjective-idealistic denial of the existence of the world outside of consciousness.
 With the denial of objective truth, Sarabyanov also agreed to the denial of objective qualities, etc.
Sarabyanov thus assumed the position of subjective idealism, he had only a materialistic phrase, one
appearance of materialism.
“Why,” says Sarabyanov, “I call all truth subjective?” Yes, because truth is not objective being,
that truth is our understanding of the world, things, processes ” [450] .
So comrade Sarabyanov signed in his subjectivism. “To put relativism into the basis of the theory
of knowledge,” wrote Lenin, “means inevitably to condemn oneself either to absolute skepticism,
agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivism” [451] . The relativism of Sarabyanov and the Kantian
skepticism of Axelrod have nothing in common with the Marxist theory of knowledge. “The difference
between subjectivism (skepticism and sophistry, etc.) from dialectics,” writes Lenin, “among other
things, that in (objective) dialectics is relatively (relative) and the difference between relative and
absolute. For objective dialectics and in the relative there is absolute. For subjectivism and sophistry,
the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute. ” [452]. The distinction between the ideal and the
material is also not unconditional, not excessive, and historical practice at every step confirms to us
how human concepts, thoughts, knowledge, being derived from matter, entirely conditioned by it, turn
back, mastering the masses, into practical action, into material force
For the vulgarizers of Marxism, these truths are incomprehensible, for they are trying to resolve
the relation of thinking to matter in an abstract-scholastic, contemplative, and not dialectical
way. Subjective - subjective, objective - objective, relative, not absolute, not objective, etc. The
mechanists have a whole series of other idealistic, Kantian and Humerian mistakes. Axelrod defends
the Menshevik-Kantian non-class theory of morality, merging with Kautsky in this matter. Sarabyanov,
for example, supported Berg’s idealist in biology and opposed Darwin. He considered, for example,
wrong that "we in the mass still stand unconditionally on the positions of Darwinism" [453] . Varyash
still has his Freudian, idealistic mistakes.
All these idealistic waverings of the mechanists are by no means accidental . They inevitably derive
from the false positivist position taken by the mechanists in relation to Marxist philosophy, from their
revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory of reflection, from the revision of materialist dialectics as a
philosophical science.
No matter how much the mechanists would like to be materialists, Marxists, a departure from the
position of inconsistent mechanical materialism against their will and desire leads to idealistic
vacillation, to open revisionism. The mechanical, inconsistent, vulgar materialism of the mechanists
could not withstand the onslaught of bourgeois ideas; a number of the most important combat points
of materialism, the mechanists surrendered to Kantianism, Humism, subjective idealism. In other
words, the mechanists did not withstand the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elements during the
period of heightened class struggle in the country, succumbed to the ideologies of bourgeois-
Menshevik positivism.
5.3.3. Contrasting the theory of knowledge dialectic
The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of dialectics as a theory of knowledge and logic is the only consistent
doctrine from which one cannot retreat a single step in order not to fall into the swamp of revisionism
and bourgeois reaction. For a number of years, the modern mechanistic camp has been systematically
combating dialectics as a theory of knowledge, developing positivistic empirical philosophy hostile to
revolutionary Marxism, or, as Axelrod calls it, “philosophy of scientific experience”, as opposed to
dialectics as a theory of knowledge . “The systematic development of the philosophy of dialectical
materialism still does not exist” [454] , says Axelrod; although she still believes that only Marxism "can
provide a genuinely scientific theory of knowledge, or a theory of experience, and the general
philosophical outlook, scientifically grounded " [455] . The materialistic dialectic of Marx and Engels and
its development by Lenin - is this really not a “genuinely scientific theory of knowledge”?
Obviously, Lenin and his party, on the one hand, and Axelrod, and behind it the whole mechanistic
camp, on the other, speak different languages. Following Marx and Engels, Lenin understood Marxist
theory as a materialistic dialectic, which sets the task of changing the world. Following Kant, Axelrod
understands philosophy, the theory of knowledge - the theory of experience, gnoseology, which deals
with questions about "conditions and prerequisites" of "experience", the possibility of justifying
"experience", the possibility of "justifying" causality, etc. Dialectics, in the opinion Axelrod cannot be a
theory of experience, gnoseology, because she understands dialectics metaphysically only as
a method or teaching about purely formal principles of thinking , and not as a philosophical science
about the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking.
What should be the theory of knowledge according to Axelrod? Following the revisionist and
bourgeois philosophers, Axelrod believes that "the theory of experience must be based on experience
data", that experience in turn "requires its justification" [456] . Her positivist philosophy of experience
should, in her opinion, address serious problems, including the “important problem of the primary
prerequisites of experience”: the problem of reality, as it manifests itself in experience, “the problem
of causality, the problem of the criterion of truth”, “the question in which ontological premises
necessary from the point of view of dialectical materialism are permissible ” [457] , etc.
What is experience? How is experience possible? What are the conditions and prerequisites of
experience? - this is what, in its opinion, revolutionary Marxism-Leninism should do under the
dictatorship of the proletariat In other words, the Bolsheviks should deal with the old chewing
problems of Kantianism. However, the party has to expose this old rot, as the mechanists stubbornly
continue to defend this theory of experience, directing it against Marxist-Leninist dialectics. None of
the mechanists spoke out against the Menshevik-Kantian prostitution of the Marxist dialectic, on the
contrary, they are doing the same thing in their "philosophical works".
Varyash, in his special book devoted to Lenin's dialectic, circumvented the central position of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy that dialectics is the theory of knowledge and the logic of Marxism. He
attributed to Lenin his own Axelrod-Plekhanov views on dialectics only as a “method,” and not as a
theory of knowledge and the logic of Marxism. Therefore, the first question in the section devoted to
Lenin's dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, Varyash has the question: “what is experience?”
Lenin’s criticism of the word “experience” as a cover for both the materialist and idealistic line in
philosophy, as well as a sharp Leninist criticism of the Plekhanov error on about experience - all this is
forgotten and circumvented by Varyas in favor of Menshevik positivism. The concept of experience on
Varyash, which he attributes to Lenin, there is a supposedly "important category" of the materialist
theory of knowledge. Analyzing the rationale of Kant’s experience, Varyash notes: “an explanation of
Kant’s experience ... comes down essentially if not to the complete abolition of experience, then in any
case to a radical reworking of this important concept,” and the trouble is that “Kant’s experience
means not that that for us. " To save the theory of experience, according to Varyash, is still possible
by introducing materialistic corrections, which he makes in his book in full agreement with the
program of developing the “theory of experience”, which is outlined in Axelrod.
None of the Marxists so harshly and mercilessly attacked "the uncritical borrowing of the notion of"
experience "alien to Marxism, worn out by the whole philosophical reaction of the notion of"
experience, "like Lenin. “At the present time,” wrote Lenin, “the professorial philosophy of all shades
puts its reactionary nature on the outfits of the recitation about“ experience ”” [458] . Idealists,
empiricists, all empirio-critics, all Machists, and the subjective idealist Fichte connected their
philosophy only with experience, were sent from experience. “I declare solemnly,” Fichte wrote, “the
inner meaning, the soul of my philosophy, is that man has nothing at all but experience; a person
comes to everything he comes to, only through experience ” [459] .
Under the same word "experience" mechanists revise the dialectic. “All our knowledge comes from
experience and rests on experience. Dialectic materialism is empirical from beginning to end, ”echoes
Axelrod, echoing the common choir of Marxist enemies. At the same time, Axelrod understands
experience in one case idealistically, in the other case materialistly. When she writes that “Kant’s
whole mistake was that he separated the form of experience from the content of experience, a priori
forms from sensuality,” she identifies experience here with consciousness, that is, interprets
“experience” idealistically. When she says that “experience” is a process of interaction between the
subject and independent from his object, she understands him materialistically. But even in this case,
it does not go beyond the Feuerbach contemplative understanding of "experience." In addition, she
later surrenders her materialistic position to Kantianism. The sensations arising in the course of this
interaction are, according to Axelrod, not images of the real world, but hieroglyphs, conventional
signs. In other words, the philosophy of "experience" Axelrod should serve as the basis for the theory
of hieroglyphs, a cover for the old Feuerbach contemplative materialism and Kantian
agnosticism. Such is the objective class-political content of the latest "Marxist theory of knowledge"
developed by the Menshevik empiricists in opposition to the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist
dialectic. The struggle of the mechanists against the dialectic as a theory of knowledge is clearly
essentiallythe struggle of Menshevism with Bolshevism in philosophy .
The theory of knowledge of Marxism has nothing in common with the Menshevik half-Kantian
declamation about "experimental", "empirical" knowledge. In materialist dialectics, the source of
knowledge is matter independent of consciousness, moving. Living, sensory knowledge, determined
by practical, revolutionary-critical activity, is the most important moment of a single dialectical
process of knowledge, which is only a reflection of the dialectics of the objective world.
What kind of "empiricism" the mechanists are talking about, it can be seen at least from the
following thesis of Sarabyanov: "not only the senses deceive us," wrote Sarabyanov, "but also nature
itself misleads us." According to the theory of Sarabyanov, all sensory knowledge turns into a
continuous deception, and therefore all actions of people should also turn into a complete mistake,
that is, some kind of eternal, fundamental discrepancy between perceptions and the material world is
legalized. It is impossible to build a scientific revolutionary theory on the "empiricism" of mechanists,
which would make it possible to foresee the course of concrete historical reality and put words into
action in a revolutionary way, that is, you cannot build bold, revolutionary, decisive Bolshevik
tactics. Against such a rotten "empiricism", the main position of Lenin is directed,
Our mechanists talk about empiricism not at all in order to seriously study the role and significance
of empirical, sensory cognition to substantiate revolutionary theory and successful practical action. On
the contrary, with cries about empiricism, they want to cover up their rejection of dialectics, of
revolutionary theory, in order to oppose empirical knowledge to theoretical, in order to oppose semi-
Canadian, agnostic epistemology to dialectics as theories of knowledge.
The Marxist dialectic is revolutionary and concrete; it is not divorced from sensual, lively historical
practice and sensual empirical knowledge. Mechanists are trying to isolate it. tear away from empirical
knowledge, expel the dialectic from its “positive” theory of knowledge, turn it into objectless,
reflecting nothing of the forms of thinking. By this they show only their complete ignorance about the
dialectical nature of the most empirical sensory knowledge, as well as a lack of understanding of the
connection between empirical and theoretical knowledge.
After science has proven the historical development of nature, the historical origin and
development of the organic world and human society, it is completely absurd to return to the
old metaphysical theories about nature, boundaries and abilities of knowledge and isolate the doctrine
of the method from gnoseology, logic, etc., as mechanists try to do. Metaphysical view on the essence
of knowledge is a long past historical stage. Meanwhile, the mechanists' arguments are thoroughly
metaphysical. They have absolutely no dialectical understanding of the relationship between sensual
and theoretical knowledge. They take a separate perception of an individual without a historical
approach to it, select individual cases of erroneous perceptions, whether damage to any sense organ,
incompleteness of conditions for correct perception, etc., are selected and, on the basis of this
“experience,” Sarabyanov: "because the feelings are deceiving us." Or, they argue, “the sensitivity of
the senses all the time changes depending on the training and the state of the body,” and therefore
“one cannot trust the senses”. One asks how can we still know the world, if feelings are deceiving and
nature leads us by the nose? “Only by means of an instrument and an experiment,” answers Comrade
Sarabyanov, “we can know things and their processes,” with the tools “we correct our senses.” A truly
miserable, miserable "theory of experience" of the mechanists. It turns out that the sense organs
deceive us only with respect to the subjects being studied, but they never deceive a person who
knows with the help of tools ...
Meanwhile, in reality, the situation is just the opposite: experiment, practice, technology - the
same tools prove that in the end , in sum, the human sensesfaithfully reflect objects and processes of
nature. If they were deceiving us, there would be no equipment or tools; effective historical practice
would be impossible. Of course, the senses of a single person, just like no single instrument, will give
us absolute accuracy and never able to completely and accurately reflect nature. But humanity in its
historical development can endlessly develop and refine its knowledge. It is impossible on the basis of
varying degrees of limitedness of our individual perceptions to draw conclusions that feelings generally
deceive us. The experiment does not refute, but confirms the ability of perceptions to reflect things
correctly. The experiment does not undermine confidence in sensory cognition, but expands, enriches
spheres of sensory cognition, transforming the forms of material movement that are not perceived or
difficult to be perceived by the senses into movements that are accessible to our perception. Artificial
instruments of knowledge do not oppose the senses, but complement them , helping to better
understand the phenomena and relationships of nature.
Engels, objecting to Helmholtz-type agnostics, provides detailed and detailed evidence that
perceptions correctly reflect nature. He developed a dialectic view of the nature of sensory cognition,
pointing to his active and historical character, to the dialectical connection of sensual thinking and
practice. In the article “On the role of labor in the process of humanizing the monkey,” Engels gave a
consistently materialistic, that is, dialectical substantiation of the origin and development of human
cognition - unlike modern mechanists, scholastics who still question Kant:
The origin and development of sensory knowledge and thinking according to Engels cannot be
understood apart from historical practice, apart from active labor activity and class struggle. Marx,
Engels and Lenin set before us the task of substantiating and developing further dialectics as a theory
of knowledge based on the development of technology, the history of all sciences and in particular the
development of the organic world, the history of the development of a child. Darwin’s theory of
development, Engels says, “was given not only an explanation of the existing representatives of
organic life, but also laid the foundation for the prehistory of the human spirit, for studying various
stages of its development, starting from simple, structureless, but experiencing irritation of the lower
organisms to the thinking human the brain. Without this prehistory, adds Engels,[460] . Thanks to the
theory of development, thinking is explained by naturalcauses. that is, scientifically grounded and
explained. Not to take into account, like the mechanists, the dialectic active character of human
knowledge as a whole and its direct dependence on practical activities aimed at changing the nature
and transformation of society, means engaging in empty scholasticism. Therefore, the mechanists'
attempt to isolate dialectics as a theory of thinking from sensual, empirical knowledge and from
objective dialectics is a reactionary venture that has nothing to do with Marxism, with Marxist science
in general.
5.3.4. Replacing the dialectic of mechanics. Equilibrium theory
The misunderstanding of materialistic dialectics as a theory of knowledge is combined among
mechanists with a one-sided mechanistic view of nature and society, with the restoration of old
mechanistic materialism.
“The materialism of the past (XVIII) century,” wrote Engels, “was mostly mechanical, because of
all natural sciences, by that time only mechanics had reached certain completeness, and it was only
mechanics of solid bodies (earthly and celestial), in short, gravity mechanics. Chemistry still had a
childlike appearance, it still adhered to the phlogiston theory. Biology was still in diapers: the plant
and animal organism was studied only in rough, it was explained by purely mechanical reasons. In the
eyes of the materialists of the eighteenth century, man was a machine, like animals — in the eyes of
Descartes. The exceptional application of the measure of mechanics to chemical and organic
processes, in the field of which the mechanical laws, although they continue to operate, but recede
into the background before other higher laws, is the first, peculiar, [461] .
The greatest merit of Marx and Engels is overcoming the shortcomings of the old, contemplative
anti-dialectical materialism, enriching materialism with dialectics. Materialistic dialectics - as a
comprehensive doctrine of the universal laws of the development of nature, society and thinking - is
the only consistent materialistic theory of knowledge and the method of revolutionary action.
The universal character of dialectics as the science of the laws of nature and society has been
repeatedly revised by bourgeois fellow travelers of Marxism. Lenin criticized the bourgeois apologist
Struve for "the primordial ignorance of dialectics." The most severe criticism has subjected Lenin to
contemporary naturalists for their inability to rise from elemental materialism to dialectical, for their
descent from materialism to Machism. Similarly, modern mechanism is associated with “primordial
ignorance” of dialectics among a number of comrades who are engaged in Marxist theory.
The universal character of the laws of materialist dialectics is subject to revision by the entire
modern mechanistic course. Naturalists are trying to replace the dialectic with the mechanics of the
natural sciences. A considerable part of the mechanistic camp, mainly in the person of Bukharin and
his "school", replaced the dialectics with the mechanistic theory of equilibrium in the field of history,
political economy, strategy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariati.e. in the field of social
cognition and action. Thus, the aspirations of the mechanistic camp are aimed at undermining the
dialectical materialist basis of revolutionary Marxism as an integral and unified worldview and
replacing it with a mechanistic worldview. True, expelling the dialectic from nature and society, the
mechanists continue to talk about the "dialectical" method of Marx. But this is only a phrase; in fact,
the dialectical method of thinking turns into a formal logic, eclecticism, sophistry, into a dead
scholasticism.
The mechanists consider Marxist dialectics insufficiently materialistic, they are trying to
“supplement”, “deepen”, “concretize” and, under the guise of development of “concretization”,
dialectics revise Marxism-Leninism along the whole line.
An attempt to replace the revolutionary dialectic with mechanics, an attempt to narrow down,
curse the Marxist dialectic and reduce it to an empty verbal trinket and characterizes the revisionist
essence of modern mechanism. This striving is expressed primarily by N. I. Bukharin.
Back in 1922, Bukharin wrote that Marx and Engels "freed the dialectic from its mystical husk
in action " [462] , but allegedly did not substantiate it theoretically and never gave a theoretical and
systematic presentation of it. Bukharin reproaches Marx and Engels for abandoning to the proletariat a
worldview that is not liberated "from the teleological taste, inevitably associated with the Hegelian
formulation, which rests on the self-development of the " Spirit " [463] . And therefore, instead of
“mystical” Marxist dialectics, he proposes to base Marxism on a mechanistic “equilibrium theory”,
which supposedly “is both more general and purified from idealistic elements formulation of the laws
of moving material systems " [464] . “We consider it quite possible,” says Bukharin, “to shift the
mystical, as Marx called it, the language of Hegelian dialectics into the language of modern
mechanics” [465] .
Following bourgeois professors, Bukharin does not hesitate to reproach the Marxist dialectic with
Hegelian mystic a thousand times for the first time, point out that in the Marxist worldview there is a
“teleological (mystical) flavor”, “idealistic elements” hint at the “narrowness” of Marxist dialectics and
look for “more common (!) formula of the laws of motion of matter. " But this also means - to lead a
new campaign against Marxism in favor of the “more general” bourgeois “point of view”! Bukharin
realizes that revision of the dialectic inevitably entails a revision of the whole of Marxism, and the
corresponding revision of the whole of Marxist science: the theory of historical materialism, political
economy, Marxist-Leninist politics and tactics must also be carried out with bringing the theory of
equilibrium to Marxism. "Theoretical work",
However, reproaching Marx and Engels for "mystification", Bukharin bypassed their main
statements about dialectics. Marx and Engels knew well that the bourgeoisie and its theoretical
minions would muddy their revolutionary doctrine, calling it "Hegelian sophistry." Marx replied to
bourgeois criticism with the following words: “I criticized the hemispheric side of Hegelian dialectics
almost 30 years ago, while it was still in fashion.” “My dialectical method,” Marx said, “is not only
radically different from Hegel's, but represents its direct opposite” [466] .
Bukharin did not understand the revolutionary significance of the materialist dialectic. And he said
nothing new. He repeated only the old Bogdanov-Machist slander of Marxism: “The basic concept of
dialectics in Marx, like in Hegel, did not reach full clarity and completeness; and because of this, the
very use of the dialectical method is made inaccurate and vague, arbitrariness is mixed in its schemes,
and not only the boundaries of the dialectic remain uncertain, but sometimes its very meaning is
distorted ” [467] .
Bukharin also repeated Bogdanov’s thought, word for word, on the narrowness and historical
limitations of dialectics and the need to move to a broader and “common point of
view.” “Organizational processes in nature,” wrote Bogdanov, “are accomplished not only through the
struggle of opposites, but also in other ways; the dialectic is therefore a special case, and its scheme
cannot become a universal method. The resulting new point of view is formulated by empirio-monism
" [468]. This point of view of Bogdanov's empirio-monism, about which Bukharin is silent, is Bogdanov's
mechanistic, “organizational science”, with its notorious equilibrium theory, for which Bukharin
grasped, ignoring Lenin’s warnings about the idealistic, reactionary basis of Bogdanov's
“organizational science,” his “tectology ".
“Bogdanov deceived you by changing ... and trying to move the old argument. And you give in!
” [469] - wrote Vladimir Ilyich to Bukharin. In response to this warning, Bukharin discovered a complete
unwillingness to understand Lenin. “But this is precisely what needs to be proved ,” he replied to
Lenin. - In my opinion,in essence, there really is no philosophy here, and tectology is something other
than empirio-monism. It’s not so easy to inflate me in such things ” [470] .
This pretentious response of Bukharin, the “unlearned theorist,” very vividly characterizes his
attitude towards Lenin as a theorist and towards the Lenin stage of development of Marxist philosophy
in particular.
To this day, Bukharin has not refused this Bogdanov-scholastic methodology, despite its clearly
idealistic, reactionary character, completely hostile to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, let us see how,
according to Bogdanov, his mechanistic, or as he calls it, “tectological” point of view from the Marxist
critical-revolutionary dialectics should differ.
First of all, the tectological "point of view" of Bogdanov, in accordance with his subjectivism, should
be a universally broad scheme, completely indifferent to its content . “Before tectology, as well as
before mathematics, all phenomena are equal, all elements are indifferent” ‚this is the basic principle
of Bogdanov’s methodological scholastics. The mechanistic methodology should drown all life, the
concrete in the abstract, give universal, empty, empty, formal "symbolic schemes" according to all the
rules of formal logic, separating the general from the particular and the individual. “Its
generalizations, like mathematical symbols, should be distracted from the concreteness of
the elements, the organizational link of which they express, should hide this concreteness under the
indifferent symbols” [471].
Thus, the concrete materialistic dialectic, for which there is no common outside the particular and
the singular, no abstract outside the concrete, Bogdanov contrasts idealistic abstract
scholastic, universal schematics , like the world schematics of the positivist Dühring. This dead
scholasticism, capable of killing everything revolutionary in empty abstraction, covering it up with an
empty phrase, lubricating everything, going around everything, is an invaluable methodology for
bourgeois agents in the labor movement. This universal Bogdanov's schematism of Bukharin was
adopted entirely.
The second subjective-idealistic principle of Bogdanov’s methodology, which was not noticed by
Marxist Bukharin, states that “for tectology” the unity of experience is not found, “but is created in an
active-organized way”. According to Bogdanov, we must proceed not from the conditions of a concrete
objective situation, not from the material external world and its unity, which for the idealist Bogdanov
does not exist, but from our own mind, from mental "elements" we must create, create, organize,
construct nature and society, create unity of experience. “How is experience possible , how are the
elements to add up their system, how to harmonize experience?” - this is the question that Kant
pursued; he pursues both Bogdanov and ... Bukharin. The fewer contradictions between the
“elements”, the easier it should flowthe organizational process , the higher the better the system
should be. Therefore, “the task of practice and theory is reduced to a tectological question: how
is it most expedient to organize a certain set of elements, real or ideal?”
Bukharin is trying to "materialize" this, essentially subjectively idealistic, method of a priori
designing systems from elements! “Any thing,” he says, “whether it be a stone, or a living object, or a
human society, or something else,” we can consider as a whole, consisting of parts (elements)
connected with each other; in other words, we can consider this whole as a system ” [472] . “Each
system consists of component parts (elements) interconnected one way or another. Human society is
made of people, the forest is made of trees and bushes, a heap of stones are made of these stones, a
herd of animals is made of individual animals, etc. ” [473]. .. All the wisdom of Bukharin's
"organizational", ie, mechanistic, "dialectic" is the formula: "if you are such and such elements,
then what should be the conditions under which it is possible to keep the balance of the system, which
includes, or should include its elements. "
Bukharin has not advanced one step from the Kantian question, “how is experience possible,” “how
is unity of experience possible,” how is equilibrium possible? Bukharin’s answers are made like this:
class societies exist, then there must be additional equilibrium conditions. There must be something
that plays the role of a hoop that stiffens classes, which prevents society from disintegrating, falling
apart, and finally breaking up. Such a hoop is the state, i.e. a condition for the unity of society,
according to Bukharin, must be reconciling, connecting classes, smoothing the contradictions of the
hoop - the state. This empty idealistic and reactionary scholasticism blurs the class essence of the
state and leads to bourgeois lies about the extra-class nature of the state. Here Bukharin’s classes are
reduced to empty abstractions, “elements”, society to an equally deadly abstraction — a system. The
state is reduced to an external hoop - an empty abstraction, which must bind elements, give "unity",
consistency, stability to the system.
This Kantian method of constructing a “system” of elements, the method of finding the conditions,
Bukharin tries to attribute to Marx and Engels. “The method of finding the necessary conditions on the
basis of the available (or assumed) facts was extremely often used by Marx and Engels, although so
far very little attention has been paid to this. Meanwhile, in essence, the whole "Capital" is built that
way " [474] .
The method of finding the necessary conditions has nothing to do with Marxism as a consistently
materialistic doctrine. This method is imbued withantihistoricism . Meanwhile, the Marxist method
consists in the historical approach, in the approach from the point of view of development to the
question of grounds and conditions. This is what the whole Capital of Marx is really saturated with. In
theoretical constructions, Bogdanov and Bukharin proceed not from the material world, as the
consecutive dialectical materialists Marx, Engels and Lenin proceed, but from the initial, scattered,
disconnected "elements", parts, from which they then mechanically construct a whole, unity, looking
for his "conditions". Therefore, their elements and the “systems” made of them remain dead
abstractions, and not reflections of the living, concrete, material world. The living material unity of the
world, developing through the struggle of opposites, itself produces its parts. But for Bukharin and our
other metaphysical mechanists, the parts exist before the whole , separately from the whole.
Third, Bogdanov demands that his idealistic organizational mechanistic scholasticism not be
confused with the "harmful" materialistic dialectics. Bogdanov is the sworn enemy of materialism, NI
Bukharin did not understand this, an ardent opponent of the basic law of materialist dialectics: the
unity of opposites. Materialism - the recognition of the external world, according to Bogdanov, is a
mystic. Therefore, he does not want to have anything in common with the "mystical", that is, the
materialistic, Marxist dialectic, and in every possible way is denouncing it. However, he leads the
attack on the dialectic of Marx not only by attacking materialism, but also uses another method,
accusing Marx of Hegelianism. He believes that the Marxist dialectic is "formal" because it makes the
concreteness of the study a prerequisite, takes the external material world as its starting
point, objective reality. Bogdanov lumps together the materialistic dialectic of Marx and the idealistic
dialectic of Hegel, on the grounds that both Marx and Hegel recognize development as a struggle of
opposites. In the materialist dialectic as a doctrine of the self-development of matter, Bogdanov sees
"logism", "mystic", and "teleology" in Marx and Marxists.
Instead of criticizing the reactionary essence of Bogdanov's theory, Bukharin reconciles it with
revolutionary Marxism. In the remarks on “The Economy of the Transition Period,” Lenin noted
Bukharin’s fascination with Bogdanovism. "The author gives valuable new facts , but worsens,
verballhornt Marx's theory of" sociological "scholasticism" [475] . The dialectic process - “the author puts
it next (and in 2nd place) with Begriffsscholastik Bogdanov. But it is impossible to put near: either - or
" [476] . Bukharin connects the "human language with the organizational gibberish of Bogdanov."
To what slavishly, blindly Bukharin follows Bogdanov, it can be seen from the fact that among
Bogdanov's identification of organic with mechanical is among the innovations that he "brings" to
Marxism.
Bukharin's entire argument is borrowed from Bogdanov, and he understands “organic” not in the
biological sense, but in the specifically Bogdanov sense, in the sense of the organizational
process. And for this purpose, Bukharin, following Bogdanov, refers to the electronic theory, which
allegedly represents the "organized system" of elements as opposed to the old, isolated, single and
now extinct element - the atom. There is nothing more shameful and disgraceful for a Marxist theorist
than this reference to electronic theory for refuting Marxist dialectics and justifying the mechanism
and Machist scholasticism!
So the whole point of Bukharin’s slogan of transcribing dialectics into the language of mechanics is
to try to “kill” dialectics, the revolutionary soul of Marxism, and turn Marxism into bourgeois theory, to
substitute Marxist theory for Machist, metaphysical scholasticism.
The rest of the mechanists also replace dialectic with mechanics, although they do so in a much
more hidden form. Tov. Stepanov, for example, considered the dialectical understanding of nature as
“too general a name” and tried to “concretize” dialectics as a mechanistic worldview. He believed that
“to understand any phenomenon of life for modern science means to reduce it to relatively simple
chemical and physical processes ” [477] .
The main starting point and with it the crown of the whole methodology of the mechanists - in their
striving to substitute dialectics for mechanics - is their perversion of the essence, the core of
dialectics, the law of the unity of opposites, its replacement by the theory of equilibrium . The
idealistic roots of this theory, in various forms appearing in the works of the bourgeois positivists and
especially developed in our country by Bogdanov and Bukharin, reveal Bogdanov's "organizational
science". According to Bogdanov, the "organizational process" (which Bogdanov, for catching
simpletons, is called organizational "dialectics") does not tolerate any internal contradictions in its
elements and systems. Bogdanov's organizational “dialectics” expelled every living contradiction of the
world. It is allowed only external inconsistency, external collision of “elements”, parts, which,
however, in every system must be fully coordinated, so that these elements themselves mechanically,
“organizationally” grow into the system. To do this, the system must be stable, be at rest, in
balance . But since there is no absolute equilibrium in nature, in his “organizational process” Bogdanov
is forced to allow an imbalance in order for the system to receive at least the appearance of
movement. This organizational process must take the form of the Hegelian triad: first equilibrium -
then its violation - then restoring equilibrium. This is the whole Bogdanov-Bukharin "dialectic" of the
"organizational process".
The normal state of the system is declared to be consistency and balance of parts, "elements". Any
internal contradiction is an imbalance of the system, which entails a crash, destruction, - as Bukharin
says, the links between the "elements" burst. Therefore, an imbalance in both Bogdanov and Bukharin
is an abnormal state in nature and society, and it cannot continue for a long time.
The theory of equilibrium is most pronounced in Bukharin’s The Theory of Historical Materialism.
“In the world,” says Comrade Bukharin, “there are differently acting forces directed against each
other. Only in exceptional cases do they balance each other for a moment. Then we have a state of
“peace”, i.e. their real “struggle” remains hidden. But one has only to change with one of the forces,
as now “internal contradictions” are found, an imbalance occurs, and if a new equilibrium is
established at the time, it will be established on a new basis, i.e., with a differentcombination of
forces, etc. this implies? And it follows from this that “struggle” is “contradictions,” that
is, antagonisms of variously directed forces and cause movement ” [478]. Bukharin, as can be seen from
the above extract, takes the state of equilibrium of forces directed against each other as the initial
position. From here it is sent in order to explain how and thanks to what reason the object moves ,
develops. It turns out, in the opinion of Comrade Bukharin, that when a subject comes into motion, a
phenomenon is derived from a state of equilibrium or, which is the same, from a state of rest, thanks
to a change in one of the forces (note, thanks to one of the forces. - Auth.) are in the
phenomenon. The question is, for what reason does a change in one of the forces occur, and therefore
- due to which the state of rest is disturbed? To this question, Bukharin answers definitely: “It is
absolutely clear that the internal structure of the system (internal equilibrium) should change
depending on the relationship that exists between the system and the environment . The relationship
between the system and the environment is crucial. For all the positions of the system, the main
forms of its movement (decay, development, stagnation) are determined precisely by this attitude
” [479] .
If so, since the state of the object (system) changes depending on the relationship between the
object ("system") and the external environment (that is, other objects surrounding it), then one
cannot speak of an internal contradiction inherent in the object itself. According to the materialist
dialectic, the struggle of opposites is the internal source of self-movement of each object or
phenomenon. Bukharin, like all mechanists, transfers the source of movement and development to the
outside , portraying the external environment as the cause of the imbalance.
Therefore, we can only talk about the contradiction between the system and the environment. As
for the internal contradiction within the “system”, about which Bukharin sometimes tries to talk, his
opposites peacefully coexist, forming a state of equilibrium and changing his position relative to each
other only depending on the environmental conditions.
For example, the relationship between classes in society is explained by the attitude of society to
nature. Nature is the cause of the direction in which one of the classes will change, and therefore the
class struggle will go. But if the development of society is explained by the impact on it from the side
of nature, then, one wonders, where does the cause of the movement and the change of nature itself
lie?
On this Comrade. Bukharin does not give a clear answer. And there can be no other answer, of
course, if only to observe a logical sequence, as soon as the one that this cause is supra-cosmic force,
which can be called whatever you like and which in the XVII – XVIII centuries was called the first
divine impulse, then just the creator! So equilibrium theory leads straight to the justification of religion
...
Equilibrium theory is primarily trying to eliminate self-movement, and therefore the self-
development of phenomena - this is one of the basic principles of materialist dialectics. In the very
concept of self-movement, Comrade Bukharin sees a bad, “teleological” aftertaste. Secondly, the
opposite sides of the object are understood by Comrade Bukharin as external to each other, which are
mechanically in contact with each other. And, thirdly, that follows from all the previous, the
contradiction is understood only as antagonism of forces . Bukharin states so directly: "The struggle
of" contradiction, "that is, antagonism."
But contradiction and antagonism are not the same thing. Antagonism is only a special case of
contradiction. The antagonistic form of contradiction alone is not obligatory. For example, the
antagonism of classes of capitalist society will disappear along with the classes, and the contradictions
that internally condition the movement and development of society will remain under socialism.
Thus, the mechanists reject the dialectical law of the unity of opposites, replacing it with a purely
mechanical law of equilibrium. To verify this, it suffices to compare Bukharin’s statement of the theory
of equilibrium with the basic formulations of the laws of mechanics.
The laws of mechanics:
According to the first law, "each body retains its state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion, if it is
not forced by the forces acting on it to change this state." The second law says: “the change in motion
is proportional to the impact of the driving force and occurs in the direction of the straight line in
which this force acts”. Finally, according to the third law, “action is always equal to opposition , or the
actions of two bodies against each other are always equal and directed in the opposite way.”
Equilibrium theory:
“ The relationship between the environment and the“ system ” (read: external cause and
phenomenon. - Aut. ) Is the value that ultimately determines the movement of any system! " [480]
“In the world there are differently acting forces directed against each other. Only in exceptional
cases do they balance each other for a moment. Then we have a state of “peace”, i.e. their real
“struggle” remains hidden. But one has only to change with one of the forces , as now “internal
contradictions” are found, an imbalance occurs , and if a new equilibrium is established at the time, it
will be established on a new basis, i.e., with another combination of power, etc. [ 481]
After this, it is not difficult to notice all the inconsistency of the theory of equilibrium. The theory of
equilibrium is distracted from the absolute, universal character of motion, without which, as we have
shown before, neither the existence of matter nor its knowledge is possible. This is the mechanistic
and metaphysical character of the theory of equilibrium. But the recognition that the movement of
objects does not occur due to internal contradictions, as materialistic dialectics teaches, but due
to external interaction of phenomena, things and the world around us, is essentially a denial of their
actual movement and development. It inevitably entails a denial of their historical development, i.e.,
changes in their quality .
It is not surprising that the mechanistic theory of equilibrium negates the objectivity of qualities
and the uniqueness of various forms of motion. It reduces all types and forms of movement to
movement. Mechanists consider it “quite possible to shift„ mystical “, as Marx called it, the language
of Hegelian dialectics into the language of modern mechanics” [482] .
It is known that mechanists reduce the whole essence of materialist dialectics to the theory
of evolution . The most outspoken of them, Comrade Stepanov, wrote: “The evolutionary point of
view, the point of view of development , is one of the characteristic features of modern
science” [483] . Moreover, under the "modern science" m. Stepanov implied dialectical materialism.
The mechanistic theory of equilibrium is therefore inextricably linked with the denial by the
mechanists of objectivity of qualities , with their return to Locke on the question of qualities: only the
“primary” qualities of things that are studied by mechanics are recognized by them as objectively
existing. Mechanism therefore requires the reduction of all other qualities to the mechanics under
study, the reduction of all higher forms of motion to its lower, mechanical forms. The mechanists
'perversion of the law of the unity of opposites entails their failure to understand the unity of the
internal and external, content and form, necessity and chance, in particular, the mechanists' denial of
randomness as a special form of manifestation of necessity (see previous chapters).
Equilibrium theory is a necessary component of the bourgeois worldview. It is inextricably linked
with bourgeois philosophy — with its positivism and empiricism, with their denial of the significance of
theory and philosophy. It is one of the whales of bourgeois science in the matter of "scattering" and
"overthrowing" Marxism with its dialectical materialism, revolutionary dialectics. Equilibrium theory is
inextricably linked with the political views of the bourgeoisie, which seeks to portray the existing
capitalist order as the "harmonious" cooperation of classes, with all its forces trying to maintain the
balance of capitalist society. The mechanistic theory of equilibrium helps bourgeois scientists to
“scientifically” substantiate class goals and tasks that are directly and frankly advanced by bourgeois
sociology. In the future, we will have the opportunity to show how the theory of equilibrium fully
reveals to us the goals and objectives of modern sociology as a bourgeois science of society. It is not
surprising that the theory of equilibrium enjoys great honor among the theorists of social fascism
(Kautsky and others).
Bogdanov is much more outspoken than Bukharin; he contrasted his theory of equilibrium with the
dialectic of Marx. He directly wrote that in the Marxist dialectic "the inevitably associated with its
Hegelian and Prehegelian terminology" remnants of "logism" can be harmful in an "organizational",
that is, mechanistic, analysis.
Tov. Bukharin, literally repeating Bogdanov’s slander against Marxism, entirely borrowing his
theory of equilibrium, however, is silent about the fact that Bogdanov openly calls materialist dialectics
“harmful” (!) To the theory of equilibrium.
Instead of understanding the bourgeois-class, reactionary essence of the theory of equilibrium,
Bukharin tries to give her a “Marxist”, “dialectical” rationale, tries to reconcile it with the revolutionary
dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.
An extremely flat understanding of dialectics, above which the mechanists in their theory of
equilibrium cannot rise in any way, is a direct result of the influence of bourgeois ideology. This direct
revision of the materialist dialectic served as the theoretical prerequisites for a right-wing agonist
understanding of the issues of transition and the world revolution.
5.4. Menshevist idealism
5.4.1. Misunderstanding of partisanship theory. Denial of Lenin's stage in philosophy
The Marxist-Leninist principle of partisan philosophy is the most important principle of materialist
dialectics. Marx, Engels, Lenin in all his activities were led by him, developing it on the most diverse
material of the natural and social sciences.
Lenin always emphasized that “materialism includes ... partisanship, obliged at any assessment of
an event to directly and openly take the point of view of a certain social group” [484] . Bourgeois
theorists and social fascists are trying to challenge the scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism precisely
because of its partisanship, which makes it truly scientific , "to the end of a revolutionary theory." All
revisionist groups and trends, and in the first place, seek to discredit the principle of partisanship that
pervades the theory of Marxism. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of
philosophy is also a characteristic feature in the activities of Menshevist idealists.
Menshevist idealists ignore the axiom of Marxism, which is that in a class society, the theory in all
its forms and forms is nothing more than a kind of weapon of the class struggle. It was not by chance
that the Menshevist idealists bypassed this Marx-Lenin doctrine, since all their theoretical work
proceeded along a different line, was conducted from other fundamental principles, and expressed an
ideology hostile to the proletariat. The Menshevist idealists ignored the Marxist-Leninist principle of
partisanship of philosophy, expressed primarily in the fact that they divorced philosophy from the
practice of socialist construction, from the core tasks of the proletarian revolution, from the tasks of
active struggle for the general line of the party.
In the works of Menshevist idealists one can find quite a few general declarative statements on the
topic that the theory is partisan. But there was absolutely no genuine scientific analysis and
substantiation of this position, much less holding partisanship in theoretical work. The practice of their
activities showed that these declarations served for them only as a cover for the idealistic revision of
materialistic dialectics. The social-fascist henchmen of the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the labor
movement, powerless to “throw the Marxist theory overboard,” strive to dogmatize it, emasculate its
revolutionary content and, tearing it away from the class struggle of the proletariat, into a set of
empty abstract categories and thereby discredit it value as an effective, essential weapon of the
revolutionary struggle. In the same direction, a revision of the philosophy of Marxism was conducted
by the Menshevist idealists. In contrast to the mechanists with their slogan "overboard philosophy",
the Menshevist idealists conducted a revision of Marxist philosophy under flag of its development . In
fact, instead of developing categories of materialist dialectics based on the material of the era of
imperialism and proletarian revolutions: materialistic processing of Hegelian philosophy based on
history, science and technology, they uncritically retell Hegelian philosophy, completely ignoring the
need to comprehend those fundamental, specific tasks that faced the party and the country for the
last period.
The general line of the party over the years has been subjected to revision by both the Trotskyists
and the right and "left" opportunists. The party mobilized all forces in order to defend Lenin’s work,
the ways outlined by him for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Menshevist idealists
have passed this struggle. Moreover, some of them actively came out with Trotskyist theoretical
principles: Karev, with his “theory” of one main class in the transition period; Stan, who taught the
Komsomol members to personally verify the correctness of the general line of the party, etc. Instead
of being guided by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy, put philosophy at
the service of the general line of the party to actively fight against its deviations, Menshevist idealists
themselves played the role of suppliers of methodology for various deviationist and counter-
revolutionary movements. Separating philosophy from the practice of socialist construction and the
class struggle of the proletariat, the Deborino group simultaneously audited almost all problems of
Marxist philosophy.
Ignoring Deborin's group of partisanship of the theory was vividly expressed in the fact that
Menshevist idealists did not recognize in Leninism a new, higher stage in the development of
Marxism . They denied the Leninist stage in philosophy, they considered Lenin only a practitioner, a
conductor of Marx’s teachings in the revolutionary movement.
Tov. Stalin classically illuminated and developed the main issues of Leninism, described Leninism
as Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, characterized and showed on
concrete material the role of Lenin as the most brilliant theorist who developed Marxism
comprehensively and raised it to a new, highest level. Menshevist idealists denied this role of
Lenin. Karev in the magazine "PZM" for 1924 made a description of Lenin, which is different from the
installations of the party. “Lenin,” Karev wrote, “stands entirely on the basis of Marxism, applying it to
our present situation — the period of decay of capitalism. He brings Marx's theory, cleared of the
debates of the Second International, into action. Leninism is Marxism of the epoch of the collapse of
capitalism, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. This is Marxism in the practice of the
proletarian revolution, for which there were not yet sufficient material prerequisites in the Marxist
International. Most of all, Lenin would have been surprised if he had been told that he was opening a
new era (?!) In Marxism. ”[485] . So the Menshevist idealists, contrary to the facts, tried to deny
Leninism - they fought against the characteristics of Leninism as a new, higher stage in the
development of Marxist theory and practice. Denying the Leninist stage in the development of the
theory of Marxism, they thereby revealed their misunderstanding of the main thing in Marxism, its
teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the revolutionary "soul" of Marxism - materialistic
dialectics, describing Marxism as a fixed dogma, objectively in common with similar theories of social-
fascist theorists.
The epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions with its enormous scope and intensification of
the class struggle, the greatest discoveries in all areas of science and technology, the complication of
old and the emergence of new forms of class struggle, sharp differentiation and exacerbation of the
class struggle in various forms of ideology - gave the richest material for further comprehensive
development of the theory of Marxism. Lenin, being at the head of the Bolshevik Party, in its
revolutionary experience of unparalleled in the world, based on the generalization of the practice of
the class struggle of the international proletariat and the achievements of world science,
comprehensively developed Marxism, raised it to the highest level. The revolutionary essence of
Marxism in the works of Lenin found its brilliant development. Naturally, the theorists of social
fascism, seeking to undermine the influence of Marxism among the masses,
Under the conditions of the USSR, the Menshevist idealists could not openly preach such views. But
in unison with the Trotskyists and the right, they also characterized Lenin as a "practice", only
successfully "applying" Marx's teachings in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. This touching
unity of the Menshevik idealists with the Right and the Trotskyists in assessing the greatest leader and
theorist of the world communist movement once again indicates that, in the person of Menshevist
idealists, we have peculiar suppliers of methodology for various counterrevolutionary and anti-party
groups and movements.
Denying Leninism as a new, highest stage in the development of Marxism, the Menshevist idealists
quite logically rejected the Leninist stage in philosophy . After the release of Lenin's abstracts of
philosophy, representing the richest treasury of thoughts and ideas, highlighting many of the most
important problems of philosophy in a new way, Deborin wrote in the preface to the IX Lenin
Collection: there is no doubt that if he were able to bring the work begun to the end, he would give a
serious impetus to the further development of dialectical materialism, raising it to a higher level
” [486]. Here the essence of the views of the Menshevist idealists on the question of the Lenin stage in
the philosophy of Marxism is formulated in a concise form. Deborin denies Lenin's greatest
achievements in the further development of materialist dialectics. This is entirely linked to his
assessment of Lenin only as a "practice." Deborin argues that Lenin " could " give a serious impetus to
the development of the philosophy of Marxism. What kind of Leninist stage in dialectical materialism
can be discussed from the standpoint of Menshevist idealists, if, in their opinion, Lenin could not , did
not even have time to give an impetus for the development of dialectical materialism? Thus, while
rejecting Lenin's role in the development of philosophy, Menshevist idealists objectively carried out the
social order of various camps hostile to Marxism, merged on a number of issues with the theorists of
the Second International.
The refusal by the Menshevist idealists of the Leninist stage in philosophy is accompanied by their
completely uncritical, apologetic attitude to the works of Plekhanov. In previous chapters we have
already dwelt in some detail on Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov’s philosophical errors. Now let us just
remind once again that Lenin, criticizing Plekhanov, emphasized Plekhanov’s misunderstanding that
dialectics is the theory of knowledge of Marxism, its vulgar interpretation of the laws of dialectics as
the sum of examples. Lenin noted that Plekhanov inconsistently criticizes Kantianism, he himself
makes a number of concessions to agnosticism, that he leads the struggle against Machism more from
the vulgar-materialist positions than from the dialectical-materialist. Plekhanov’s mistakes, as is
already known, exist on such issues as reassessing Feuerbach’s philosophy, incorrect characterization
of Marx’s philosophical development process, reappraisal and incorrect characterization of the role of
the geographical environment in the development of productive forces, wrong Feuerbachian
understanding of the problem of unity of subject and object, separation elements logical from the
historical in matters of the history of philosophy. The presence of such erroneous views indicates the
need for critical work on the works of Plekhanov, enjoying - and rightly - great popularity among the
wide circles of the proletariat of the USSR and foreign countries. It is necessary to clear the valuable
in Plekhanov's works from everything non-Marxist, opportunist, especially since at present these
mistakes (or similar) are used by social-fascists, and in the conditions of the USSR mechanists and
Menshevist idealists give these ideas the last word Marxist philosophy.
The question of the role of Lenin and Plekhanov in the development of philosophy did not
accidentally attract the attention of the party and the workers of the philosophical segment of the
theoretical front. In connection with the development of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the depth of
Plekhanov's philosophical errors, their connection with Plekhanov's Menshevik position in the
revolutionary movement, were particularly pronounced. The struggle against the mechanistic and
Menshevik-idealistic revision of Marxism personally showed that the mistakes and organic flaws in
Plekhanov’s works are used by them to revise the most important problems of the philosophy of
Marxism. With the stubbornness worthy of better application, the mechanists continue to uphold and
develop further the erroneous views of Plekhanov that follow the line of Kantian
agnosticism. apologetics of everything written by Plekhanov on philosophical problems, trying to
obscure his mistakes.
Contrary to the precise, brilliant characterization of Comrade Stalin's role of Lenin in the
development of philosophy, Menshevik idealists came forward with their theory of Plekhanov as
a theorist who supplemented Lenin's practice . In his pamphlet "Lenin as a Thinker", Deborin wrote:
"Both these thinkers (Plekhanov and Lenin. - Auth. ) Complement each other in a certain sense ...
Plekhanov is primarily a theorist, Lenin is primarily a practitioner, a politician, a leader ..." [487]Thus,
Plekhanov, the leader of Russian Menshevism, was transformed by the will of Deborin into a
theoretical mentor of Lenin.
It is characteristic that this completely false, non-Marxist theory Menshevist idealists still until very
recently sought to defend with the help of various sophisms. In the preface to the IX Lenin Collection,
Deborin attempted to lay the historical basis for this thoroughly false concept. “Between Plekhanov
and Lenin,” writes Deborin, “there is a distinction reflecting the peculiarities of the historical phases in
the development of the revolutionary movement and the class struggle of the proletariat” [488] . This
theory of Deborin is nothing more than an attempt to weaken the need to criticize Plekhanov's
mistakes, reduce the significance of these mistakes and obscure their connection with the Menshevik
line of Plekhanov in the revolutionary movement. Undoubtedly, as a Marxist, Plekhanov spoke on the
arena of political struggle several years before Lenin, and his first works were of great importance for
the propaganda of Marxism. But all the most important Leninist basic theoretical works refer to the
same period in which the works of Plekhanov-Marxist were published. Moreover, the Leninist Friends
of the People were written a little earlier than even the Monist View by Plekhanov. The political
activities of Plekhanov and Lenin mainly proceeded in the period of the imperialist stage of
development of capitalism. Methodological failures in the philosophical works of Plekhanov and his
mistakes in the interpretation of many of the problems of philosophy are connected with its
opportunistic, Menshevik, liberal stance in the revolutionary movement. Back in 1908 Lenin
emphasized in a letter to Gorky that "Plekhanov harm this (Marxist - Ed. ) Philosophy,
linking here struggle with factional strife, but because the present Plekhanov not a single Russian
Social-Democrat must not be confused with the old Plekhanov" [ 489] .
Lenin and Plekhanov are not representatives of different eras, but the spokesmen of the ideology
of various social classes. Plekhanov, who wrote brilliant pages in the history of the revolutionary
movement in general and of the proletariat in particular, in the first decades of its activity, since the
early 900s, has more and more become the spokesman for the petty-bourgeois ideology in the labor
movement and during the war is completely bourgeois. This Menshevik line in the revolutionary
movement explains the causes of theoretical errors and in its specifically philosophical
works. Deborin’s attempt to treat Lenin and Plekhanov as people of different periods (epochs) in the
development of the revolutionary movement is nothing but a means to belittle and conceal those
major fundamental methodological errors of Plekhanov that Lenin repeatedly criticized, revealing their
class and logical background.
It is characteristic that this installation of the Menshevist idealists, which was too crudely
formulated by Deborin, under the fire of unfolding criticism, was tried to "fix" by another prominent
representative of this group, Karev. In an article in the “PZM”, he writes that “in this respect,
Plekhanov and Lenin represented not different epochs in the labor movement, but different jets in
him , in Marxism, different depths of his understanding” [490] . Karev, faithful to his Menshevik-idealistic
methodology, ignores the simple truth for the Marxist that explaining the difference between
Plekhanov, the greatest theoretician of the Second International, and Lenin, the depth of
understanding - this means not explaining anything. The difference in depth of understanding itself
needs a classexplanation. No matter how personally talented any ideologue of the bourgeoisie is at
present, in the era of decay of capitalism, his creative activity, his ability to penetrate into the laws of
development are “constrained” by his class nature, conservatism of the class he represents. The
inability of the bourgeoisie to look into the future determines, narrows the boundaries and reduces the
depth of its understanding by theorists of the phenomena of social development. The ideologists of the
classes descending from the historical arena, despite all their talents, are not able to give truly
profound scientific generalizations and discoveries. This truth of Marxism is confirmed by the entire
history of the development of science and philosophy. As Plekhanov became clearer and more frank in
his position of Menshevism, the depth of his "understanding" of the problems of the philosophy of
Marxism decreased.
 Menshevist idealists ignore the simple truth that it is impossible to talk about the existence of
"various jets" in Marxism without changing the essence of the teachings of Marx - Lenin. Only from
the standpoint of Menshevism can Plekhanov's mistakes and his misunderstanding on a number of
critical issues of the essence of the materialist dialectics of a certain "stream" located "within" Marxism
be characterized. This means to identify with the social-fascist characterization of Marxism as a
conglomerate of various currents, jets and inclinations in the interpretation of theoretical issues. The
Menshevik idealists embarked on this path, wishing, by all means, to defend their typically revisionist
attitude.
The Menshevist idealists completely ignored Lenin's criticism of the theoretical mistakes of
Plekhanov.
On this issue, the revisionist groups in the USSR, the mechanists and the Menshevist idealists
largely converged. At least the Menshevist idealists, perverting themselves and not understanding the
theory of Lenin’s reflection, could not lead the struggle against the mechanistic revision of the Marxist-
Leninist theory of reflection. Contrary to Lenin, they characterized the questions of criticism of the
theory of hieroglyphs as unworthy. “There is such a theory of hieroglyphs,” said Deborin during the
discussion, “that she died a long time, does not care for anyone, who was finally criticized by
Lenin.” In this thesis of Deborin, not only is the lack of understanding of the danger posed by the
Machist and Kantian revisions at the present stage, especially in the conditions of the crisis of
capitalism, but also the desire to divert the attention of criticism from the Kantian jet, which takes
place in the works of Deborin himself. In such articles by Deborin as Dialectics in Kant, in the works of
Asmus, etc., Kant's agnosticism is obscured, his philosophy under their pen becomes for the present
time almost a dialectical and revolutionary philosophy. The linkage along this line with the social-
fascist views largely explains the solidarity of the Menshevik idealists with the neo-Kantian revision of
Marx's political economy, conducted by the Menshevik-pest Rubin.
5.4.2. Hegelian revision of the materialist dialectic
Until recently, the Menshevik revision of Marxism in capitalist countries proceeded mainly under
the slogan of “cantianizing” Marxist philosophy. The social-fascist theorists, trying to substantiate their
revision, tried to characterize Marxism as a “one-sided” teaching, which needs to be supplemented
by its theory of knowledge of Kant (Max Adler, Vorlönder, and others). Exfoliating the revolutionary
content of Marxism, they led the line on the "addition" of his KantianismBy bringing this reactionary
theoretical base under its counter-revolutionary practice in the ranks of the labor movement. At the
present stage, as the bourgeoisie is fascized and its attack on the working class increases, the
bourgeoisie is trying to use Hegel’s idealistic dialectic in a perversion and reactionary form for a
philosophical foundation of its activity. This new trend of bourgeois thought, as mentioned, is also
reflected in social-fascism (Kautsky, Kunov, Siegfried Mark).
In the USSR, where Marxism is the dominant ideology, taking advantage of the interest shown by
the broad masses to Hegel, a group of philosophers led by Deborin revised the philosophy of Marxism
under the guise of the need to “supplement” it with Hegelianism. “The fascination with Hegel, the
dialectician,” writes Karev, “was a completely legitimate and necessary reaction to the opportunist
disdain of the majority of theoreticians of the Second International. But at the same time as the
revolutionary Marxists headed by Lenin in Hegel were looking for additions (emphasized by us - Avt. )
To Marx ... the Mensheviks in Hegel were looking for an antidote to Marx's state theory (Coons), and
bourgeois apologists were an instrument against Marxism at its very foundation. ” [491]. In this thesis of
Karev, dating back to 1924, the essence of the Menshevist-idealistic revision of the philosophy of
Marxism by the Deborin group is formulated. Marxism is incomplete, “one-sided”, needs to be
supplemented, especially in its philosophical part — this is the attitude of the Menshevik
idealists. Therefore, in contrast to the empiricists, the mechanists who simply threw philosophy
overboard, the Menshevist idealists took the line to eliminate the philosophy of Marxism by separating
it from the practice of class struggle, by complementing it with Hegelian philosophy, ultimately
fulfilling the same task by using more subtle means. the elimination of the philosophy of Marxism, as
the mechanists. Karev is against the essence of Marxism-Leninism against Lenin's instructions that
"the doctrine of Marx is omnipotent because it is true, it is complete and harmonious, giving people
a whole a world view irreconcilable with no superstition, no reaction, no defense of bourgeois
oppression. " This doctrine does not need any addition from the bourgeois-idealistic teachings of the
dying capitalist world, just as the philosophy of Marxism does not need any additions like
“ complete philosophical materialism that gave humanity great tools of knowledge, and the working
class in particular” (Lenin) . The attempt to revise the philosophy of Marxism under the guise of its
“complement” is not new and represents one of the methods of covering up the revisionist activities of
various anti-Marxist groups, including the Menshevist idealists.
 Let us turn to a concrete consideration of those questions on which, "complementing Hegel," the
Menshevist idealists, who revisited the philosophy of Marxism, revisited. Lenin in 1922, set the task
of materialistic processing rational content of Hegel's philosophy, at the same time pointing out that
Hegel's method is radically opposed to Marx's method, as he thoroughly idealistic, that it can not be
used without processing or materialistic especially connected with materialism. Other views are held
by Menshevist idealists. In Hegel’s teaching, they see, on the one hand, idealism, personified in the
system, on the other hand, materialismexpressed in the method of Hegel. “According to the definition
of Engels and Lenin,” writes Karev, “Hegelian philosophy was put on the head by materialism. The
method was materialistic in it ” [492] . Thus, under the pen of Menshevist idealists, the method of the
classical idealist Hegel receives a characteristic as a materialistic method. The apologetic attitude of
the Menshevist idealists to Hegel's philosophy, its uncritical acceptance are expressed in this position
by Karev with exhaustive completeness.
Conducting their line on the hegelianization of Marxism, the Menshevist idealists, as a rule, sought
to back up their revelations with references to Marx, Engels, Lenin. Meanwhile, the classics of Marxism
never approached the consideration of Hegel's method in isolation from his whole teaching, from his
philosophical system. They always took them in unity, describing Hegel's philosophy as a philosophy in
its content, structure and idealistic method. “My dialectical method,” wrote Marx, “is not only radically
different from Hegel's, but represents its exact opposite. For Hegel, the process of thought, which he,
under the name of an idea, turns even into an independent subject, is a demiurge (creator) of reality,
representing only its external manifestation. For me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing
but[493] . Marx with exceptional clarity emphasizes here the opposite of his method to the method of
Hegel .
The Menshevist idealists ignored Engels' direct, completely clear statements that "a method which,
by its own admission (Hegel. - Avt. )" From nothing through nothing came to nothing "was ...
completely inappropriate", that "the Hegelian method in its existing The form was completely
unsuitable. He was essentially idealistic " [494] . Engels puts this systematic criticism of the Hegelian
method, the discovery and development by Marx of the method of materialist dialectics, on a par with
the discovery of the basic materialistic view of the world.
The classics of Marxism always emphasized that the most important task in overcoming Hegelian
philosophy, in its criticism, is the task of reworking its dialectical-idealistic method. The same task set
before the philosophy and Lenin. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about any "synthesis", about any
combination of Hegel's method with materialism, without changing Marxism, just as you cannot talk
about the combination or addition of Marxism with Kantianism.
Nevertheless, this theory of combination, "synthesis" of the Hegelian method with the materialism
of Marx and Lenin, is developed by Menshevist idealists on various issues of materialist dialectics and
the history of philosophy. Dialectical materialism, in their opinion, "is a synthesis of Hegel's dialectical
method with a materialistic understanding of nature and history" [495] . Following the methodological
attitudes of Deborin, his followers came out with the assertions that dialectical materialism is nothing
more than Feuerbach's materialism plus Hegel's method, etc. So in the most vulgar form, the most
complicated process of historical genesis and the formation of Marxism was presented.
Conducting the theory that dialectical materialism is nothing more than a materialistic view of the
world plus Hegel's method, Menshevist idealists confused this idealistic, eclectic confusion as a
materialistic reworking of Hegelian philosophy, while opposing and tearing apart not only Hegel’s
method and system, but also the proletarian world outlook, promoting the idea of the possibility of
synthesizing an idealistic method with a materialistic world view.
Leading the struggle against the Marxist-Leninist principle of partisan theory, tearing philosophy
away from the concrete tasks of the class struggle, the Menshevist idealists in their works gave a
theoretical non-Marxist interpretation of practice and theory . The Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the
specific socio-historical practice of transforming the world according to the role of theory as an
instrument of changing the world, Lenin's teaching about the unity of theory and practice - based on
practice, Lenin’s specific instructions that "the point of view of the life of practice should be the first
and main point view of the theory of knowledge, the Menshevik idealists, as a rule, replace Hegelian-
Feuerbach's understanding of practice. "The main idea of Hegel in criticizing them of criticism and any
theory of knowledge comes down to," writes Deborin, "that criticism thoughts, that is, the study of her
abilities, must go hand in hand with the activity ofthought. Hegel solves the problem of knowledge in
the light of the world-historical practice of mankind. The dualism of the subject and object, knowledge
and the subject is overcome not through contemplation , so to speak, of these opposites, but as a
result of the subject’s struggle with the object, their mutual comparison and comparison in the process
of the historical life of mankind ” [496]. Thus, Deborin interprets Kant's so extensive Hegelian criticism
that he almost identifies it with Marxist criticism. Deborin does not understand that Hegel in this
criticism of Kant does not go beyond the limits of his idealism and that therefore there is no question
of how Hegel resolves these problems, and even in the light of the actual world-historical practice of
mankind. And this is for the simple reason that the practice in the understanding of Hegel is by no
means a concrete historical, sensual practice of humanity, not the practice of discovering the laws of
the objective world and its transformation, but only a “practical idea”, a category that completely fits
into the Hegelian theory of the identity of being. and thinking. Thus, Deborin’s assertion that Hegel, in
his criticism of Kant, solves the problems of knowledge in the light of the world-historical practice of
mankind, contradicts the facts, is further proof of the completely uncritical understanding of Hegel’s
views by the Menshevist idealists and their identification with the Marxists. Ignoring the Marxist-
Leninist theory of practice takes place in Deborin’s interpretation of the understanding of practice and
theory by Feuerbach. “All the literary activity of Feuerbach,” writes Deborin, “... since the break with
Hegel, represents a relentless struggle against the“ theoretical, ”contemplative point of view of
previous philosophy and the defense of point of view and practical ” [497] . In this
thesis eclecticism once again affects Deborin and his misunderstanding of the essence of the Marxist-
Leninist interpretation of the problem of practice. In fact, neither Hegel nor Feuerbach reached the
true understanding of the essence of the social concrete historical practice of mankind, being the
spokesmen for the ideology of the bourgeoisie. The first is mainly due to its idealism, the second is
due to the metaphysical nature of its materialism and idealistic views in explaining social phenomena.
The philosophy of Feuerbach is a vivid example of philosophy, which sought only to explain the
world. “Nature and man,” writes Feuerbach, “both constitute something inseparable. Contemplate
nature, contemplate man. Here before your eyes you have all the secrets of nature " [498]. In this
thesis, Feuerbach most clearly formulated the essence of his philosophy and its passive, contemplative
nature. Feuerbach’s weak side is his lack of understanding of the revolutionary, transformative role of
practice and the role of theory as an instrument for changing the world. Through all his works, the
thought passes that "only contemplation of things and creatures in their objective reality frees a
person completely and completely from all prejudices." The philosophy of Feuerbach did not go
beyond the task of explaining the world, while the task of philosophy, according to Marx, was not only
to explain the world, but to change it. With all the great significance of his philosophy, Feuerbach was
and remained a preacher from a purely “theoretical”, contemplative point of view, and not a fighter
against it, as Deborin tries to present, contrary to the facts.
Hegelian-Feuerbachian, non-Marxist interpretation of practice and theory by Menshevist idealists is
entirely linked with the line of separation of theory from the practice of socialist construction, the
separation of the logical from the historical in explaining the problems of the history of
philosophy. Menshevist idealists ignored Lenin’s direct instructions that a revolutionary, truly scientific
theory can only be developed on the basis of practice., in the most immediate, closest connection with
her. They then recognized the theory of equal importance with practice (see Luppol’s book “Lenin in
Philosophy”), then in Hegelian they dissolved practice in theory. Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide
to action; losing sight of this, “we take out his living soul from it, we undermine its fundamental
theoretical foundations — dialectics — the study of comprehensive and complete contradictions of
historical development; we are undermining its connection with certain practical tasks of the era,
which may change with each new turn of history. " [499]. This gap in the connection of philosophy with
the practical tasks of socialist construction was carried out by the Menshevist idealists on the
philosophical part of the theoretical front, turning the development of the theory of materialist
dialectics into empty literature, into abstract arguments about the logical ordering of categories, not
even moving it forward.
Idealism in the interpretation of the major issues of materialist dialectics is not an accidental
phenomenon in the concept of Menshevist idealists, but an expression of the idealistic essence of their
revision. That this is so shows the nature of their interpretation of the main problem of philosophy. In
his book “Lenin as a Thinker”, Deborin, first giving the correct definition of matter, concludes: “In a
broader sense, matter is the entire infinite concrete set of“ mediations, ”that is, relationships and
connections” [500]. This is a typical idealistic definition, for that which characterizes matter has not been
reflected in it. Matter as an objective reality that exists independently of our consciousness, as the
source of our sensations, etc. — for some reason, all this has completely disappeared from the
characterization of Deborin of matter “in the broad sense”. Is this an idealistic interpretation of
matter in the works of Deborin and his group? Far from it. This definition stems from the entire
revisionist line of this group and is far from being single.
Idealism was especially strongly reflected in the interpretation of this fundamental, most important
issue in the works of Deborin's students, in particular, in Hessen’s book The Basic Principles of the
Theory of Relativity. In it, Hessen, following the general line of Menshevist idealists, declares that
“dialectical materialism considers matter as a synthesis of space and time” [501] . This characteristic is
basically identical with the above-mentioned deborin characteristic. It also left only one connection,
only the forms of existence of matter, without matter itself. Forms of existence of matter, time and
space are identified by Hesse with matter itself. This has nothing to do with the interpretation of
matter in the philosophy of Marxism and represents a kind of characteristic of matter by modern
philosophers and idealist physicists.
These views on matter, thanks to the widespread attitudes of the Deborinsky group, made
themselves felt in the most diverse areas of the theory, and in philosophy they led to frank idealism,
to the statement that such an attribute of matter as stretching is not an attribute in itself, is not
important for characterizing matter, etc. What then remains of matter from the interpretation of
Menshevist idealists and from their oaths of loyalty to Marxist-Leninist philosophy ?!
In this way, the Menshevist idealists revisited all the main problems of the philosophy of Marxism,
so under the guise of developing dialectical materialism and Hegel’s critics presented idealistic
scholasticism of the worst sense.
In his collection of articles "Dialectics and Natural Science", Deborin, describing the philosophy of
Marxism, wrote: "Materialistic dialectics as a universal methodology must penetrate all concrete and
empirical sciences, because it is, so to speak, an algebra of sciences, introducing
an internal connection to specific content " [ 502] . In this formulation of the essence of the materialist
dialectic, Deborin completely reproduced the following characteristic of idealistic dialectics by
Hegel. “The dialectic is, therefore, a living soul in the movement of science: this beginning alone
brings necessity and internal connection to the content of science ...” [503] Here is a sample of the
“materialistic processing” of Hegelian philosophy by Menshevist idealists! The idealistic definition of
dialectics is not an accident, but a kind of system in the work of Menshevist idealists.
Having characterized dialectic as an instrument for making connections , Deborin in other articles
continues to develop this idealistic concept. “It is necessary to be aware of the fact,” he writes, “that
the basis of all scientific knowledge lies in basic concepts that have the character of a category. They
are equally inherent in being, as well as thinking " [504] . According to the Marxist-Leninist theory of
reflection, concepts are nothing more than images. in human thinking patterns of the objective
world. The categories of logic are a conclusion from the history of man’s knowledge of the laws of the
development of nature and society. Marxism connects the development of science and certain
philosophical categories with the development of human society and human thinking, for they are the
product of practical human activity and the result of human knowledge of the laws of the
world. Deborin, arguing that concepts are inherent in being and thinking, gives them an ontological
meaning, the meaning of some primary entities, and in this interpretation makes a bias towards
Hegelianism.
This type of position is very often repeated in the works of Deborin. So he writes: “Each separate
area of reality - nature and society - is based on general laws and forms of movement, having their
own foundation, at the same time rests on specific specific categories specific to this area” [505] . Here,
Deborin carried out typical Hegelian installations.
As we already know, Hegel, guided by his teaching about the identity of being and thinking, builds
his own logic, starting with an empty identity - pure being, which goes into its opposite - “pure
nothing”, seeing their unity in becoming ‚passes to the concept of what has become, existing being -
quality - and then goes on to the categories of quantity and measure, and finally, in the second part of
logic, considering the categories of essence, reveals the concepts of identity, difference, opposites,
etc. Formation of these categories for Hegel becomes sie objective world. The process of knowledge
Hegel identifies with the process of the development of the world. The self-development of the
concept for him is identical with the self-development of reality. Contradictions in Hegel appear after
the concepts of differences and opposites, that is, in other words, they appear at the next stage of
development. From the point of view of materialistic dialectics, this does not hold water. Matter -
eternally existing, objective reality - is internally contradictory at all levels of its existence and
development. There can be no matter without motion, and the motion of matter is nothing but a
constantly ongoing contradiction.
To accept the Hegelian scheme of development of concepts and their interpretation of identity,
differences, opposites and contradictions as stages of the development of the world means to accept
his teaching on the identity of being and thinking, it means to propagate pure idealism. On this
idealistic way of interpreting the differences, opposites and contradictions, Deborin becomes. “ The
opposite ,” he writes, “goes further into contradiction , which constitutes a new step in the process of
knowledge and development of the world ” [506]. Here, Deborin describes the opposition and
contradiction as different stages not only in the development of knowledge, but also in the
development of the world, uncritically reproducing Hegelian views on this issue. Deborin objectively
opposes here Marx’s doctrine of internal contradictions of matter, as the basis of its self-movement,
against the doctrine that difference and opposition are only forms of expression of contradictions of
the material world. Deborin views the contradiction only as a later product of the development of the
objective world, the contradiction in his interpretation appears only at the end of
development. “When,” says Deborin, “all the necessary stages of development — from simple identity
through differences and opposites to exclusive contradiction — are passed, then the era of 'resolving
contradictions' comes” [507] . Here the stages of development of our knowledge of objective laws
Deborin identifies with the stages of development of the objective world itself.
A similar type of idealistic line is pursued by Menshevist idealists and throughout their
interpretation of the general problem of the relationship between the logical and the historical in
scientific knowledge. The classics of Marxism consider the logical as reproduced in thought, cleansed
of historical accidents. In Capital, Marx gave a brilliant model for solving this cognitive problem. In the
movement of concepts, he showed the historical process of development of capitalism, starting from
simple commodity economy and ending with developed capitalism, gave a logical analysis of forms of
exchange, ranging from a random form to a monetary form, and the course of Marx's logical analysis
only reflects the course of historical development. real public relations expressed by these
forms. Marx, Engels, Lenin never dissolved the historical process of the development of society in a
logical process, did not identify them, but always actively fought against the substitution of the
historical for the logical.
Meanwhile, in the works of Menshevist idealists, who readily refer to the classics of Marxism,
pervasive logicism is the red thread. So they are characterized by complete oblivion of the class
struggle in the study of the historical development of philosophical thought, the desire to present the
history of the development of philosophical systems as a purely immanent, logical process of
development. To explain the origin and essence of this or that philosophical system - for them it
means analyzing from the logical side the content of the previous philosophical system and, finding in
it similar elements with elements of the subsequent system, present them as causes and conditions
that gave rise to further development of philosophy. In other words, as a rule, they took only the
purely logical side, and the concrete historical basis for the development of philosophical systems was
completely ignored; class struggle, the fundamental driving force of historical development in a class
society completely fell out. At best, Deborin puts forward “the needs of society or the level of culture”
as the main reason for the emergence of new philosophical theories, i.e., Hegel does not go further in
solving this issue. “Thus,” writes Deborin, “two points that determine philosophy: the needs of society
in a given era or degree of culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is
built; here we have which defines philosophy: the needs of society in a given epoch or the degree of
culture form, as it were, the basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we have which
defines philosophy: the needs of society in a given epoch or the degree of culture form, as it were, the
basis on which the philosophical system is built; here we havehistorical continuity, which goes hand in
hand with the historical development of the various and diverse interests of society. The second point
is logical continuity, which consists in the fact that philosophical teachings logically develop from each
other and define each other logically ” [508] .
It is not by chance, therefore, that in our time, the development of materialist dialectics has been
attempting to conduct Menshevist idealists out of touch with the practice of class struggle and socialist
construction, without having developed any of the pressing problems of materialist dialectics.
5.4.3. Contrasting the dialectic of the theory of knowledge and the distortion of its
revolutionary essence
Menshevist - idealistic revision of philosophy in the USSR was carried out in a highly veiled form, in
subtle and complex forms, being basically an idealistic revision of the Hegelian type. But the
Menshevik essence of this revision, its kinship with international Menshevism, apart from the points
previously noted by us, found its expression also in the Kantian interpretation of a number of major
issues of materialist dialectics. In particular, on this line, Deborin inspected and such an important
question of the philosophy of Marxism as the question of dialectics as a theory of knowledge .
On this occasion, Lenin wrote that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge (Hegel and) of Marxism:
that was the“ side ”of the case (this is not the“ side ”of the case, but the essence of the matter) that
Plekhanov did not pay attention to, let alone other Marxists [509] . To these other "Marxists" we can
rightfully rank Menshevist idealists in our time. Contrary to the characterization of materialistic
dialectics as a theory of Marxist cognition given by Lenin, Deborin and his students absolutely
uncritically followed Plekhanov, deepening his mistakes in this question and opposing the theory of
knowledge to dialectics, as if only “methodology”. Deborin in the article "Marx and Hegel" writes that
"the significance of dialectics as a methodologyopposed to the theory of knowledge, was fully
recognized by the founders of Marxism and its largest representatives " [510] . Deborin argues that the
theory of knowledge is no longer needed, that "the theory of knowledge has fulfilled its historical
task," thus identifying the theory of knowledge of Marxism with the Kantian theory of knowledge. By
this, Deborin turns dialectics into some pure, abstract methodology.
Deborin does not understand that materialistic dialectics is a genuinely scientific, to the end
revolutionary theory of knowledge of Marxism, representing the unity of the scientific worldview and
method. Deborin's reference to the founders of Marxism does not hold water. Marx, Engels, Lenin in
their works never opposed, and could not oppose the materialist dialectic of the theory of
knowledge. Dialectics is the science of the universal laws of the development of nature, society and
thinking. The laws of being and thinking are identical in content and different in form. These
propositions of Engels give the key to understanding Lenin's instructions that dialectics is the theory of
knowledge of Marxism. Ways, methods of knowledge, therefore, can not be established outside the
specific, socio-historical practice of a person, outside the process of his cognitive activity. Dialectics,
The social-fascists oppose the theory of knowledge of Marxism to the dialectic. And this is entirely
linked to their disregard for the role of practice, their rejection of the partisanship of philosophy and
the understanding of Marxism as dogma, with their neo-Kantian “complement” and “correction” of
Marxism! In contrasting the dialectic of the theory of knowledge, the political Menshevism of
Plekhanov and the insufficiently one-sided understanding of dialectics by him undeniably affected the
political Menshevism. Menshevist idealists contrary to the doctrine of Marxism and Lenin's direct
guidance, in spite of Lenin's criticism of Plekhanov specifically on this issue continued to be carried out
in the conditions of the USSR to restore their revisionist installation Plekhanov, taking thus the theory
of knowledge of the dialectic, method from worldview, theory from practice. Denying the role of the
theory of knowledge behind dialectics, the Menshevist idealists thus bypass the basic question of
philosophy about the relationship between being and consciousness and turn the dialectic into some
kind of “pure”, not including worldview issues, but essentially an idealistic methodology.
Such attempts to oppose , break the dialectic and the theory of knowledge or dissolve the theory
of knowledge in some abstract methodology inevitably lead to agnosticism and idealism, to undermine
the scientific significance of materialistic dialectics as the only scientific methodology and theory of
knowledge.
Materialistic dialectics is essentially a revolutionary science, so revisionists of all kinds, striving to
undermine the effectiveness of Marxism, to blunt its revolutionary essence, first of all direct their
weapons against the essence, the core of materialistic dialectics - the law of the unity of
opposites. Some of the revisionists (Bernstein, etc.) simply reject the study of the contradictions of
the real world, calling the Marxian dialectic Hegelianism, others seek to replace it with the vulgar
mechanistic theory of equilibrium, others interpret the basic laws of dialectics in an idealistic, Kantian
understanding and try to discredit the laws of materialist dialectic dialectics in this way. their truly
materialistic and scientific revolutionary value.
The latter is characteristic of the revisionist activity of Menshevist idealists. In his description of the
law of the unity of opposites, Deborin essentially conducts social-fascist attitudes. Guided by the law
of the unity of opposites in our knowledge - it means to understand that internal contradictions are the
basis for development, that in every phenomenon we have to reveal internal, essential contradictions
behind external relations, reveal the causes leading to its self-denial, in the phenomenon itself,
remember that in each subject there are conflicting trends, the struggle which is the cause of its
development. Lenin, specifying the law of unity of opposites, developing it further on the material of
the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, describing this law, wrote: “The unity (coincidence,
identity, equal effect) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of
mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, as absolutely development, movement ” [511] . Contrary to
this classical characteristic of Lenin's law, Menshevistvuyushchie idealists give a fundamentally
opposite interpretation, describe it not as a law of struggle, not as a law of development, but as a law
of "synthesis", reconciliation of opposites. For example, one of Deborin’s typical interpretations of this
question. Speaking of the antinomies of Kant, Deborin writes: “... Kant contrasts the thesis with the
antithesis, wanting to prove that the thesis excludes the antithesis and that therefore they cannot be
reconciled, they cannot be resolved. The positive dialectic in the thesis and antithesis sees not
mutually exclusive, but mutually reconciling opposites " [512] .
Thus, the Leninist formulation of this law, a formulation that most fully and comprehensively
expresses the essence of the development of the world, the essence of the class struggle, Deborin
contrasts his Menshevik type with the interpretation of this law. This interpretation of the laws of
materialist dialectics, characteristic of revisionists in general, is essentially the theoretical expression
of their treacherous line in the ranks of the labor movement.
Tov. Speaking about the law of the unity of opposites, Kaganovich stressed that “to understand the
unity of opposites in reality means not to be afraid of difficulties. It means not being afraid of the
contradictions of life that arise on our way, but overcoming them with Bolshevik energy and
perseverance ” [513]. It is this understanding of the law that is truly scientific, Marxist-Leninist
understanding of it. Proceeding from this scientific revolutionary understanding of the laws of
dialectics, the laws of the development of class struggle and guided by them, our party has always led
the way not to reconciliation and to obscure fundamental differences, but to their opening and
revolutionary overcoming. On the contrary, the social fascists are characterized by a line of
reconciliation, the blunting of contradictions, the glossing over of fundamental differences, and they
are characterized by the desire to hide differences, blunt, reconcile them. Menshevist idealists also
followed this path.
5.4.4. Menshevik-Trotskyist understanding of the class struggle. Interlocking with
Mechanism
Historical materialism as a theory of the class struggle of the proletariat plays the largest role in
the modern revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, in the practice of socialist construction in
particular. The tasks of developing the problems of historical materialism, of studying new forms of
class struggle and of the laws of the transition period are now acquiring exceptional
importance. Historical materialism as the only scientific theory of knowledge and changes in the laws
of social development must be put at the service of the practice of socialist construction. Without the
closest connection with the practice of class struggle, without generalizing the experience of the
struggle of the proletariat for socialism, theory cannot fruitfully develop and fulfill the tasks assigned
to it to combat bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, to remake public consciousness, on the
elimination of class remnants in the minds of people. Meanwhile, a group of philosophers headed by
Deborin, divorcing theory from practice, philosophy from politics, is completely ignored the task of
developing questions of historical materialism , and if it concerned them, it interpreted them in a
Trotskyist or right-opportunist, Menshevik-idealistic or mechanistic sense.
In their works, not only is there no attempt to further elaborate and concretize historical
materialism on the new problems put forward by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but also problems
that at the time were sufficiently developed by the classics of Marxism were given, as a rule, non-
Marxist, Menshevik-idealistic characteristic. All very few statements by Deborin on the theory of
historical materialism are so abstract , in the worst sense of the word, that they are of absolutely no
value and are often formulated in such a way that the question arises: who is the author or materialist
or idealist?
Take, for example, the déborin characteristic of a class. He writes that “Marxism considers
the social class as a reality, as a real fact, on the basis of historical evolution” [514] . This characteristic
is not only general and empty, but it also clearly incorrectly depicts the true merit of Marx in the area
of the development of the problems of classes and the class struggle. In a letter to Weidemeier dated
March 5, 1852, Marx specifically noted that he showed the connection of the existence of classes with
certain historical forms of development of material production, revealed and substantiated that the
class struggle leads to thedictatorship of the proletariat and that the transition to destruction grades at
all. Deborin, striving to "prove" to the mechanists the reality of classes, true to his Menshevik-
idealistic methodology, bypasses the main, most important thing in Marxism. In his pamphlet Lenin as
a Thinker, Deborin, attempting to more specifically characterize classes and class struggle under the
dictatorship of the proletariat, wrote: “The dictatorship of the proletariat does not represent a kind of
heavenly“ state ”in which class contradictions are eliminated. On the contrary, the dictatorship of the
proletariat is a continuation of the class struggle and even civil war on a wider basis, in
the international arena, where two hostile classes stand against each other ” [515]. Here, under the
pretext of presenting and developing Leninist views, Deborin carried out the right-opportunist theory
of the attenuation of the class struggle, carried out the theory of the rejection of the class struggle in
the USSR and its recognition only in the international arena.
This brightly ultra-opportunistic characteristic of the class struggle is supplemented by him in the
same pamphlet with the Kautskyan characteristic of the essence of imperialism. “Politically,” writes
Deborin, “imperialism means reaction , but economically, progress ” [516] . So despite the clear Leninist
characterization of imperialism as the last stage in the development of capitalism, as a stage of
decaying capitalism in all respects, Deborin conducts the theory of economic progress of
capitalism, tearing politics away from economics in a Kautsky manner , objectively slipping into
solidarity with Kautsky’s doctrine of imperialism as capitalist politics.
 When trying to address issues relevant to the transition period, the Menshevist idealists turned out
to be the outspoken guides of the theoretical attitudes of the defeated Party of Trotskyism and the
Right deviation. Contrary to the teachings of Lenin about the proletariat and the peasantry as two
main classes in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Karev puts forward the thesis
about one main class in the transition period, Trotskyist denies the role of the peasantry as the second
main class, opposing Lenin's teaching that the preservation of the union of the working peasants
under the leadership of the working class.
Thus, the interpretation of the questions of the class struggle of Menshevist idealists shows that,
through them and the mechanists, we have spokesmen for the ideology of various petty-bourgeois
strata. Menshevist idealists attributed to themselves the role of almost the only, to the end consistent
fighters against the mechanistic revision of materialistic dialectics. Did they fight the mechanists? Yes,
they did, but they did not lead them from a dialectical materialist, not from a Marxist position, not in a
party way, without finishing their criticism, without revealing the class essence of
mechanismism. Moreover, on a number of issues, Menshevik idealists even identified themselves with
the mechanists .
So, for example, one of the first questions on which the struggle against the mechanists was
launched was the question of the latter’s denial of the philosophy of Marxism and its replacement with
the latest conclusions of natural science. The Menshevist idealists broke a lot of copies in the fight
against the mechanists on this issue, but formally fighting them, essentially idealistic emascurating
the content of materialistic dialectics, hegelizing the philosophy of Marxism, from the other end
pursued the same line as the mechanists - the line of eliminating materialistic dialectic as a
philosophical science. So Deborin wrote that “speculative elements are being supplanted more and
more by purely scientific ones, and the worldview as a whole acquires a more scientific
character. Philosophy reveals a tendency to merge with science. A large proportion of purely
philosophical questions are already being absorbed by positive sciences. ” Here, Deborin openly
associates himself with the mechanists, holds completely erroneous views that have nothing in
common with Marxist ones. Deborin, like the mechanists, talks about the destruction of philosophy,
about its dying away and its replacement by positive sciences, not understanding that the philosophy
of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There can be no
talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the destruction of this
philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-Leninist
philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more
significant. about its dying off and its replacement by positive sciences, not realizing that the very
philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There
can be no talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the
destruction of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-
Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more
significant. about its dying off and its replacement by positive sciences, not realizing that the very
philosophy of Marxism itself has a deeply scientific character and an independent field of study. There
can be no talk of any merging of the philosophy of Marxism with other sciences, nor about the
destruction of this philosophy as a science. Moreover, with the flourishing of positive sciences, Marxist-
Leninist philosophy will be raised even higher in its development, and its role will become even more
significant.
At present, after discussion and exposure of two varieties of the Menshevik revision of the
philosophy of Marxism in the USSR, the struggle must continue with both the mechanistic revision in
philosophy — the main danger on the theoretical front, and Menshevist idealism. This struggle is an
integral part of the development of the Leninist stage in philosophy, the specific problems of
materialist dialectics and historical materialism.
5.4.5. Criticism of the methodology of counterrevolutionary Trotskyism and "left"
opportunism
We have already said that in the history of the labor movement there are two types of perversions
of the revolutionary theory and practice of the proletariat. Along with social reformism, frankly right
opportunism, anarcho-syndicalists and similar revisionists "left" always existed and fought against
Marxism. Representatives of this type of revisionism, in practice pursuing an opportunistic line, in
words sought to be “to the left” of the party of the proletariat, putting forward hierarchical demands
and slogans.
A characteristic feature of the “left” opportunism is the crackling revolutionary phraseology that
covers the petty-bourgeois essence of their views. The theoretical basis of their views and their
political practice is idealism, objectivism, abstract dogmatism, a complete break with
dialectics. Revisionists "on the left" deny the need for flexible tactics, maneuvering, accounting for all
conditions of the situation on the basis of materialistic dialectics. They do not set themselves the task
of correctly considering all the specific stages of development and the difficulties to be overcome. They
always act dogmatically "straightforwardly", unilaterally, subjectively arbitrarily. As Lenin wrote in his
notes “On the Question of Dialectics” about idealism: “Straightness and one-sidedness, woodenness
and ossification, subjectivism and subjective blindness, voilà (here) are the epistemological roots of
idealism” [517] .
This assessment of Lenin is quite applicable to the Trotskyists, to anarcho-syndicalists and to all
kinds of “left” deviationists. It reveals the essence of the philosophical foundations of their political
views. On the question of "leftist" views, we find extremely important instructions from Marx and
Engels, since they also had to fight on two fronts. After the revolution of 1848, the Willich-Schaper
fraction of the minority arose in the workers' movement of Germany, which criticized Marx and Engels
for their alleged lack of consistency and "non-revolutionary" in matters of the revolutionary movement
in Germany.
Dogmatism, idealism, subjectivism and voluntarism - such is the philosophical characteristic of this
"left" trend, given by Marx. Such are the features, such is the methodological essence of the “left”
currents in the labor movement not only in the XIX century, but also in the XX century. This feature is
not outdated and still. On the contrary, it received even greater confirmation of its correctness in the
theory and politics of various “left” groups in the post-October period. This anti-Marxist methodology
received the clearest expression in Trotskyism, in this type of Menshevism, which was covered with a
left phrase at the previous stages and which has now become the vanguard of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie.
The attempt to bypass the question of the methodology of Trotskyism, as the Menshevist idealists
did, not to consider or criticize its general theoretical, philosophical foundations is fundamentally
wrong. The attempt to reduce the whole affair to Trotsky's “personal sentiments”, which from time to
time ... “ quite unexpectedly comes into conflict with the main governing core of our party, is
often unsuccessful, too, on the most unexpected or random issue that is not of significant
importance” [518] .
In fact, not only Trotsky himself, but all Trotskyists, we have some common methodological
attitudes characteristic of them. For the seemingly "random" and "unexpected" speeches of Trotsky,
we must reveal their class basis, their theoretical roots, their connection with the whole system of
views of Trotskyism.
The desire to detach the political practice of Trotskyism from its theoretical foundations, as we
have indicated, is extremely characteristic of Menshevist idealism, which bridges the gap between
theory and practice. But Trotsky himself is trying to give a “philosophical” justification for such a break
in theory and practice , which believes that theoretical activity should proceed independently of party
political practice. For example, in his report on Mendeleev, Trotsky explicitly states that individual
scientists may not think at all about the practical results of their research. The wider, the bolder, the
more independent of the practical need of the day his thought works, the better ” [519] .
This was said by Soviet scientists. It was Trotsky who urged them not to think about the practical
results of their work for socialist construction. It turns out that the less they know about the needs of
social construction, the better!
In this separation of theory from practice, science from party position, in
bourgeois objectivism, Trotsky sees "the essence of Marxism." “It is the essence of Marxism,” writes
Trotsky, “that he finally approached society as an object of objective research, considering human
history as a giant laboratory diary ... It is this objective approach that gives Marxism the unsurpassed
power of historical foresight.” Objectivism, divorced from revolutionary practice, is what Marxism looks
like in the image of Trotsky.
Following the position of Plekhanov that "party science, strictly speaking, is impossible," Trotsky
tried to substantiate this position in the future with the interests of the bourgeois reader. “But the
reader has the right to demand,” he wrote in his work, “for historical work to be not an apology for a
political position , but an internally based image of the real process of revolution. Historical work only
fully responds to its purpose when events unfold on its pages in all its natural coerciveness
” [520] . Here political position is opposed Trotsky's “real process”, as if the proletariat’s implementation
of their political position does not in itself constitute a real process. Denying in words the "perfidious
impartiality", Trotsky puts forward in his place ... "scientific conscientiousness."
Trotsky completely misunderstood the essence of Marxism, its fundamental difference from
bourgeois science, which is the consistent implementation of the principle of partisanship. “Marxism
differs from all other socialist theories,” wrote Lenin, “by a remarkable combination of complete
scientific sobriety in analyzing the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with
the most resolute recognition of the significance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity,
revolutionary initiative of the masses” [521] .
But Trotsky's "objectivism" is only a disguised cover for his true subjectivism, his sophistry, his
play with empty phrases. Trotsky repeatedly spoke out against clear revolutionary slogans with his
eclectic slogans covering his liberal political line. His slogans are a model of sophistry , the
replacement of revolutionary assessments by petty-bourgeois, opportunistic deviation
from certain answer to burning political questions. Sometimes, from the outside, his slogans look as if
“dialectically”, according to the formula that Plekhanov gave out as completely dialectical: “Neither yes
nor no.” In fact, this is a complete substitution of dialectics for sophistry. In the period of the Brest
Peace Trotsky throws an empty phrase: "Neither peace nor war", during the imperialist war: "Neither
victories nor defeats." The same Menshevik formula - “neither yes nor no” - was expressed in
Trotsky’s denial of Bolshevism and Menshevism in its eclectic attempt to rise above the “extremes”, in
an effort to create its own “special” trend. In fact, this sophistry of Trotsky led to political
opportunism, to the passivity and betrayal of the revolutionary proletariat at decisive moments in the
struggle.[522] . “This point of view of the matchmaker constitutes the whole“ ideological basis ”of
Trotsky’s conciliationism [523] . Unprincipled eclecticism and sophistry, opportunism, disguised with loud
empty phrases ‚such is Trotskyism in the past stages.
The formula “neither yes nor no” is an absolute negation of anything, an abstract movement in
words, but essentially a passive trampling on the spot. This is the “poverty of philosophy”, about
which Marx, describing Proudhon, wrote: “ Yes turns into no , no turns into yes , yes becomes
both yes and no , no becomes simultaneously and no and yes . In this way, opposites are mutually
balanced, neutralized and paralyzed ” [524] .
That is precisely the meaning of the "philosophy" of negation in Trotsky. This is the philosophy of a
liberal obscuring, blurring the actual contradictions of life, the class struggle, an attempt to circumvent
sharp corners, evade a direct answer. Such a "philosophy" leads Trotsky to the same results as
Proudhon did. “Despite the greatest efforts to climb to the height of the system of contradictions , Mr.
Proudhon could never rise above the first two steps: simple thesis and antithesis, and here he reached
only two times, and overturned and fell once” [525] . Like Proudhon, here Trotsky did not get the
dialectical logic of contradictions, but the formal logic of abstract negations.
Subjectivism, sophistry, and formal logic lead Trotsky away from concrete study,
to abstract reasoning from the point of view of “general principles” and therefore to politically incorrect
conclusions , when considering any issue . In the discussion on trade unions, Lenin says: “When I take
up the question of the production role of trade unions, I see the fundamental irregularity in Trotsky
that he speaks about it“ in principle ”, about the“ general principle ”. He speaks in all theses from the
point of view of the "general principle". The statement is already fundamentally wrong in this ” [526] .
On the issue of trade unions, Trotsky does not give a concrete analysis of the position and tasks of
the trade unions under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, Trotsky could not understand the
essence of the trade unions, and therefore the role that the trade unions should play during the
transition period. An abstract approach deprives Trotsky of the ability to correctly understand the
nature of the Soviet state, the elements of bureaucracy in the latter, the correct balance of economics
and politics, administrative bodies and trade unions.
The whole trade union platform of Trotsky, by Lenin’s definition, takes “a step back
from business theses ... setting concrete, practical, vital, living tasks ... to abstract, abstract,"
devastated ", theoretically incorrect, intellectually formulated general theses , with oblivion of
the most businesslike and practical " [527] . “In order to put this question correctly,” Lenin wrote, “one
must move from empty abstractions to a concrete, that is, to a given dispute” [528]. From general
reasoning, from the theses on "production atmospheres", "production dialectics", etc., it was
necessary to move on to studying the practical experience of production propaganda, the actual work
of trade unions as a school of association, a school of solidarity, a school of management, etc. Trotsky
violated This basic rule, the basic requirement of dialectics, is the requirement of concreteness "with
its tests, with its whole approach to the question." Trotsky has “the wholeapproach ... his whole
direction is wrong,” as he goes backwards, “from a living cause to a dead scholasticism of all sorts of“
production atmospheres ” [529] .
A characteristic feature of Trotskyist idealism is its voluntarism. (from the word "will"). For
Trotskyism, the will is the most important thing, everything else is subject to it. Marxism-Leninism, as
we know, never denied the role of the individual in history, much less the role and activity of the
whole class. On the contrary, he emphasized the necessity and enormous significance of the conscious
expression of the will of the working class. But at the same time, Marxism-Leninism believes that the
basis of this activity of the individual and class is not arbitrariness, but the economic interests of the
class, rooted in objective reality. Engels pointed out, “that free will means nothing more than decision-
making with knowledge of the matter.” Practical activity, volitional actions and aspirations, the policies
and tactics of the proletariat should be based on objective necessity. In Trotsky, volitional aspirations
are not an expression of this class conscious inner necessity, but imposed on them from
outside. “Overtaking”, premature demands, “idealistic leaps” through the necessary stages of the
development of reality, we can follow a number of examples of Trotskyism’s speeches: ignoring the
main stages of the revolution in his theory of permanent revolution, attitude to the Brest world, failure
to understand the Chinese revolution of 1925–1926 the program of "super-industrialization", the
slogan of expropriation in 1927, etc.
Idealism is especially vividly represented in Trotsky's "historical works": in "1905", "Lessons of
October", "History of the Russian Revolution"; in all these works, Trotsky develops his views entirely in
the spirit of Plekhanov’s Menshevik historical concept, deriving Russian despotism not from the
development of the Russian economy, not from the internal conditions for the development of class
struggle in Russia, but from external conditions - from the need to protect the country from external
attacks. Trotsky and the Mensheviks attributed these provisions to the bourgeois liberal historians —
Milyukov, Klyuchevsky, and others. It was not for nothing that Lenin as far back as 1911, taking into
account Trotsky’s early work and comparing it with Martov, wrote: “Trotsky’s philosophy of history is
the same . The “sectarian spirit”, intellectual idealism , and ideological fetishism are brought to the
fore .
Historical idealism is reflected in Trotsky and in his approach to the essence of the historical
process. In the work My Life, Trotsky wrote: “To put it bluntly, the whole historical process is a
refraction of the natural through the accidental. If we use the language of biology, we can say that
historical regularity is carried out through the natural selection of accidents ” [530]. According to
Trotsky, it turns out that the entire historical process is a natural selection of accidents. If the
mechanists deny the objective nature of chance, then Trotsky, in contrast to them, turns chance into
an absolute law of social development. Here we have a direct identification of chance with an objective
regularity, in which objective necessity is ignored as the basis on which chance can take place. Here
we have a transition to the point of view of bourgeois empiricism and idealism in the field of history.
Along with the basic idealistic features of Trotsky's views, we find in them a significant dose
of mechanism . Although Trotsky himself points out that the “liberal-Manchester attempts” of
mechanically transferring Darwinism to sociology led only to childish analogies, and considered that
“there is no need to dwell on these vulgarities,” he still contradicts himself, falls into the arms of
bourgeois naturalism and social Darwinism. Trotsky declares that Darwinism is the premise of
Marxism, that in his deep conviction “in the broad materialist and dialectical sense, Marxism is the
application of Darwinism to human society” [531] .
In a report on Mendeleev, Trotsky also stated that “we live in an era of sifting and selection” [532] .
In the same report on Mendeleev, we find in Trotsky a number of other mechanistic
interpretations, in particular, the notorious theory of the reduction of higher forms of the movement of
matter to lower forms. “Psychology,” he says, “is reduced for us in the last account to physiology, as
this last one is to chemistry, physics, and mechanics” [533] . "Chemistry reduces the essence of
chemical processes to the mechanical and physical properties of particles" [534] .
Consequently, the essence of these or those complex processes, according to Trotsky, can be
revealed only by reducing this higher to the simple, to the primary. For example, the phenomena of
consciousness - “the soul is - a complex system of conditioned reflexes, entirely rooted in primary
reflexes of physiology, which, in turn, passes its roots through the powerful layer of chemistry into the
subsoil of physics and mechanics” [535] .
Trotsky is inclined to extend this theory of the reducibility of all phenomena to mechanics to
society. “The same can be said about sociology. To explain social phenomena there is no need to
involve any eternal or otherworldly beginnings. Society is a product of the development of primary
matter, like the crust of the earth or amoeba. Thus, from the most complex phenomena of social
ideology, scientific thought gets to matter, to its constituent elements, to particles with their physical
and mechanical properties using the methods of their diamond drilling ” [536] .
Consequently, Trotsky also applies to his society a universal “law” of reducibility of all the most
complicated phenomena to the simplest. Instead of studying social phenomena in all their originality,
Trotsky proposes to study the physiological and mechanical properties of the simplest elements, to
approach social life, to the class struggle, just as the physiologist approaches the amoeba. Instead of
dialectical materialism, we have here the mechanism of the most vulgar variety, the most vulgar
metaphysics, flat evolutionism and eclecticism.
 Trotsky slavishly grabs every bourgeois fashion trend in the field of science and declares it a
materialistic, even a materialistic, dialectical movement. So the reflexology of Academician Pavlov,
who in the experimental works gave valuable data confirming materialism, but in general settings
allows for a number of mechanistic errors, this reflexology is recognized by Trotsky as the only
scientific psychology that goes “all the way through dialectical materialism” [537] .
We see the same thing in Trotsky's assessment of Freudianism. Freudianism is recommended by
Trotsky as “a working hypothesis that can and will undoubtedly give conclusions and conjectures going
along the lines of materialistic psychology” [538] . The same story with the characteristic of Mendeleev's
philosophical views. In the theory of knowledge, Mendeleev clearly stands on idealistic, precisely on
agnostic, Hume-Kantian positions — he denies the possibility of knowing the essence of things. If,
according to Lenin, agnosticism contradicts and is incompatible with dialectical materialism [539] , then,
according to Trotsky, agnosticism is only “verbal concessions” that do not affect the essence of
views. And Mendeleev "in his methods and in his highest achievements is none other than a dialectical
materialist" [540]. Trotsky could not give a correct analysis of the views of a scientist with the position
of dialectical materialism, since in his philosophical views he himself did not have and has nothing to
do with Marxism-Leninism.
We can find the same peculiar combination of idealism with mechanism in the analysis of views
and other Trotskyist theorists - Preobrazhensky, Voronsky, etc. If in T. Preobrazhensky in the "New
Economy" elements of mechanism were especially pronounced, then Voronovsky's critical literary
works were clearly worn idealistic character.
The same methodological guidelines are also characteristic of the "semi-Trotskyists of the
Zinoviev-Kamenev group." Here we also find a combination of subjectivism ‚- for example, in the
question of the“ dictatorship of the party ”, in their portrayal of the dictatorship of the proletariat as
the dictatorship of the party over the working class — with abstract dogmatism and mechanism — the
mechanistic transfer of capitalism to Soviet conditions and the interpretation of NEP as“ state
capitalism ” etc. Here we also find a scholastic approach to the new facts of life, the inability to
correctly understand and correctly apply Marxism-Leninism, its materialistic dialectics.
These methodological features of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition were revealed by comrade Stalin
at the seventh plenum of the ECCI, when he characterized the Zinoviev understanding of
"revisionism." “According to Zinoviev, it turns out that any improvement, any refinement of the old
formulas or individual provisions of Marx or Engels, and even more so their replacement by other
formulas corresponding to the new conditions, is revisionism. Why, one wonders? Is not Marxism a
science, and does science not develop, enriching itself with new experience and improving the old
formulas? ... If, for example, Marx said in the middle of the last century that with the ascending line
of development of capitalism, the victory of socialism within national borders is impossible, and Lenin
in 15th XX century said that when the descending line development of capitalism, with dying
capitalism, such a victory is possible - it turns out that Lenin fell into revisionism in relation to Marx ...
According to Zinoviev, it turns out in such a way ... that any improvement in individual provisions and
formulas of certain classics of Marxism is revisionism " [541] .
A common methodological framework unites the Trotskyists of the Soviet Union with various
Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist groups in Germany and in other countries (Korsch, Bordiga, etc.).
Trotskyism also has a number of common methodological features with all kinds of “left”
opportunism. “Left” opportunism and “left” bends at the present stage of socialist construction with
“administration” and “jumping over” the nearest specific tasks, such as speaking out against the
expansion of Soviet trade, for the dying off of councils in areas of complete collectivization, for the
dying off of the monetary system, for dying schools, etc., with their bureaucratic-administrative,
mechanistic "plans" - also sin with subjectivism, abstractness, etc.
The combination of subjectivism and voluntarism with mechanistic fatalism led the “left”
opportunists and the Trotskyists to unexpected flights from one extreme to another — from the policy
of administrative clamping to cries for “democracy”, from plans of “super industrialization” to the
camp of opponents of genuine industrialization.
However, it should be noted that, despite the peculiar combination of the subjective-idealistic
understanding with the mechanistic-fatalistic ‚the most important thing that characterizes their
philosophical essence in the philosophical foundations of Trotskyism and“ left ”opportunism, there is
a subjective-idealistic basis . This is the well-known dividing line between the "left" and the right
opportunism. The philosophy of “left-wing” opportunism reflects the social existence of the USSR, the
ruining urban petty bourgeoisie, and expresses their aspirations and interests in the field of
politics. Their political expression is petty-bourgeois radicalism, petty-bourgeois revolutionism with an
opportunist being and external revolutionary phraseology.
 As we have already seen, both common social roots and a whole series of general idealistic
provisions, and finally, often political practice itself, link Trotskyism with lesser idealism.. A number of
representatives of Menshevist idealism at one time fought against the party, being in the ranks of the
Trotskyist opposition (Karev, Stan, Gonikman, etc.). At a certain historical stage in the development of
Trotskyism and its existence as a faction of communism, Menshevist idealism supplied Trotskyism with
its main methodological weapon, acting as a philosophical conductor of Trotskyist
ideas. Molshevistvuyuschy idealism played the same role and continues to play in relation to the “left”
opportunism. It is not surprising that Menshevik idealists did not criticize the methodology of
Trotskyism. If they tried to “criticize” Trotskyism on this side, at best they found elements of
mechanism in it, that is, they could not reveal the very idealistic essence of the theoretical,
philosophical foundations of Trotskyism.
Chapter 6. The main questions of the Leninist stage in the development of
dialectical materialism
6.1. Lenin in the fight against international opportunism and revisionism in the
field of philosophy
The decision of the Central Committee of our Party dated January 25, 1931 on the journal PZM,
summing up the philosophical discussion, set before the philosophical section of the theoretical front
the most important task of actually developing the Leninist philosophical legacy, the task of widely
propagating the questions of the Marxist philosophy.
The question of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism is the central
problem of the whole struggle with Menshevik idealism and mechanists and the main point that
determines the path of all our further theoretical work in the field of dialectical and historical
materialism.
Can and should we even speak about Leninism in philosophy, can we even speak about a new and
higher stage in the development of Marx-Engels dialectical materialism. Does not such a statement of
the question represent the opposition of Lenin to Marx and Engels, does this not lead to an
underestimation of what Marx and Engels gave in the development of philosophy? Just on these issues
we have an exceptional distortion of Marxism. Ryazanov, this traitor and traitor to the party, spoke
out against the very legitimacy of raising this question. All this is not surprising, if we recall how
Ryazanov once wrote about Leninism. It is to him that famous words belong: “I am not a Bolshevik, I
am not a Menshevik and not a Leninist. I am only a Marxist, and as a Marxist I am a communist. ”
Ryazanov’s views on the question of Leninism in philosophy were by no means singular. On the
contrary. These views were a red thread in the works of Deborin, Karev and others.
However, in this matter they were not alone. Such “theorists” such as Trotsky, Zinoviev,
Preobrazhensky, Bukharin developed such views in their philosophy on the question of Leninism in
philosophy.
In the collection “Militant Materialist”, book. 2, in 1925, Preobrazhensky’s article “Lenin and Marx
as Theorists” was published, raising the question of Lenin’s theoretical legacy. In this article,
Preobrazhensky develops the following mechanistic scheme: in Marxism, he distinguishes various
elements “having different degrees of durability”. Firstly, such elements, which should remain entirely,
secondly, those that should be developed and supplemented, and, thirdly, those that should be
replaced by new constructions. And now, from the point of view of this scheme, Preobrazhensky
comes to the conclusion (and this is his main idea) that the methodology of Marxism, dialectical
materialism - this is precisely the element of Marx's doctrine that does not tolerate any
development. He writes: “As for the general philosophical method, [542] . Further, while continuing to
develop these thoughts, Preobrazhensky found that the unity of the method of Marx and Lenin lies in
the unity of the method of dialectical materialism .
We now turn to Bukharin. In his pamphlet "Lenin as a Marxist," Comrade Bukharin also raises the
question of dialectical materialism in Lenin's works. He approaches this problem in the following way:
in Marxism, he distinguishes two things: first, the sum of ideas, propositions, theoretical views, etc.,
second, theMarxist method , its methodology, with which this sum of ideas and views , theoretical
positions are extracted, with the help of which a certain historical epoch is analyzed , etc.
And in this regard, he writes: “But if by Marxism we mean not the sum of ideas, what Marx had,
but the tool, the methodology, which is incorporated in Marxism, then it goes without saying that
Leninism is not something that modifies or auditing methodology of Marxist teaching. On the contrary,
in this sense Leninism is a full return to the Marxism that was formulated by Marx and Engels himself
” [543] .
 So, from the point of view of Comrade Bukharin, Leninism, by its methodology, is a full return,
and only a return , to Marxism, formulated by Marx and Engels himself. In this regard, there is
no further development , no further deepening and concretization of Marx's doctrine. Thus, we see
that in this matter we have a touching unity of views in Ryazanov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Preobrazhensky,
Bukharin, Deborin, Karev, etc.
In contrast to all the wrong attitudes in this matter, we have an attitude and a solution to this
problem, given by t. Stalin as far back as 1924 in his "Fundamentals of Leninism." He wrote on the
question of interest to us: “What was given in Lenin’s method was already predominantly present in
Marx’s teaching, which, according to Marx,“ is essentially critical and revolutionary ”. It is this critical
and revolutionary spirit that penetrates Lenin's method from the beginning to the end. But it would be
wrong to think that Lenin's method is a simple restoration of what Marx gave. In fact, Lenin's method
is not only the restoration, but also the concretization and further development of Marx’s critical and
revolutionary method, his materialist dialectics ” [544] .
Here are given the only correct statements and the solution of the question of Leninism in
philosophy. Lenin's works on dialectical materialism, his brilliant use of materialistic dialectics are not
only a return (after all the perversions and deviations from dialectical materialism that we had in the
era of the Second International) to dialectical materialism. Leninism in philosophy represents not only
the return, but also the further development and concretization of dialectical materialism. Leninism in
philosophy represents a new, higher stage in the development of the philosophy of Marxism.
It should be clear and understandable to everyone that such a question can in no way mean any
kind of “opposition” of Leninism to Marxism or any misunderstanding or underestimation of the legacy
of Marx and Engels. On the contrary, if you truly be faithful to the spirit of Marxism, and not its letter,
if you correctly understand the relationship between method and worldview, between theory and
practice, if you understand that Marxism is not a frozen dogma, but a living, developing teaching, then
only that answer is possible. given by t. Stalin on the question of Lenin's stage in the development of
dialectical materialism. The question about the method of dialectical materialism, given by
Preobrazhensky, Bukharin, whose views proceed from the fact that in the content of Marxism, the
richness of his ideas there can be a major movement forward, but in the field of Marxist methodology
there can be no movement forward and deepening, based on a complete misunderstanding of the
correlation of the method of Marxism and its other constituent parts, on a misunderstanding in
essence, if you raise the question, the relationship between theory and practice, on the
misunderstanding of the very method of dialectical materialism. Indeed, can there be significant new
content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism,
on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without
development, specification, deepening the relationship between theory and practice, on the lack of
understanding of the method of dialectical materialism itself. Indeed, can there be significant new
content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism,
on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without
development, specification, deepening the relationship between theory and practice, on the lack of
understanding of the method of dialectical materialism itself. Indeed, can there be significant new
content in the very development of Marxism, such significant, such as Lenin's works on imperialism,
on the state and revolution, on the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc., etc., without
development, specification, deepening the very method of materialistic dialectics. The new epoch, and
precisely such a rich epoch as the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, gives new forms
of communication, new laws, new types of relations, extremely complex forms of class relations,
various forms of class struggle, the gigantic development of technology, natural sciences, and the
peculiar contradictions development, etc.
One can understand all this (not only describe it) only on the basis of deepening and concretization
of the Marxist methodology itself. Since dialectical materialism is a scientific methodology, to the
extent that its deepening and concretization cannot but be based on the totality of the knowledge of
the sciences of its time. And it is precisely in all these relations that Lenin is brilliant and great.
As you know, Comrade Stalin, in his letter On Some Issues in the History of Bolshevism,
emphasized the tremendous international significance of the theory and practice of Bolshevism. This
letter is a brilliant continuation and development of the basic principles of his "Questions of Leninism"
on questions of the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism. Just as in The Questions of Leninism,
Comrade Stalin remarkably deeply and fully consistently conducts here one of the most important
theses set forth by Lenin in his preparatory work for the famous book The State and the
Revolution. Lenin throws one extremely important remark there. He says: “The Bolsheviks are not“
casus ”, they grew out of the struggle against opportunism from 1894–1914.” [545]. And in Comrade
Stalin's "The Questions of Leninism" and in his last letter on the history of Bolshevism, all these
problems are posed and developed precisely in the spirit of the Leninist principle of Bolshevism’s
uncompromising struggle against opportunism in all its forms and forms.
It is clear that when we raise the question of the new thing that Lenin introduced into the
development of dialectical materialism, one cannot but depart from these most important points. It is
clear that one cannot consider the philosophy of Marxism without or outside the whole history of
Bolshevism , without or outside the whole history of the struggle of Bolshevism against opportunism,
from which Bolshevism grew.
On the other hand, it is clear that it is impossible to give a true scientific history of Bolshevism
without considering, studying Lenin’s theoretical struggle . This is precisely what the letter of Comrade
Stalin calls for. Starting from this basic position, we will be able to correctly approach the formulation
and resolution of issues related to understanding and highlighting the Leninist philosophical legacy,
the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism.
Tov. Stalin gave the classical definition of Leninism as Marxism of the era of imperialism and
proletarian revolutions . To understand the essence of the theoretical questions and problems that
inevitably had to arise and arose in connection with the practice of class struggle during this new
historical period, it is necessary to recall some of the main features that characterize it.
As pointed out by t. Stalin, this new historical era is determined by three main points:
1) the extreme intensification of the struggle between the working class and capitalists,
2) the extreme aggravation of the struggle between imperialist powers for the redivision of the
world, for the colonies, for the markets and raw materials,
3) the fundamental contradictions and the intensification of the struggle between oppressor and
oppressed nations.
All these contradictions are an expression of the fact that the productive forces cannot further
develop within the framework of the production relations created by capitalism at this stage, that this
is the last stage in the development of capitalism, that this is the eve of proletarian revolution. This
new epoch is characterized by an extreme aggravation of the class struggle, new forms of its
manifestation, and extreme complexity.
This is a period of extremely fierce struggle in the field of ideology. This is the crisis of the whole
system, the crisis of bourgeois ideology, bourgeois science, etc.
In the conditions of this new historical stage, new tasks arose and confront the proletariat and its
party — the tasks of directly overthrowing capitalism. In the same new historical period, the whole
bourgeois essence of the policy of the Second International was revealed. In "The Questions of
Leninism", t. Stalin gives a description of the entire work of the Second International. Only by
understanding the depth of this characteristic can one understand how Bolshevism grew on the basis
of the struggle against opportunism in the Second International. Tov. Stalin writes: “Above, I said that
between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, lies a whole lane of the
domination of opportunism of the Second International. In the interests of accuracy, I must add that
this is not about the formal domination of opportunism, but only about its actual domination. Formally,
the leaders of the Second International were "faithful" Marxists, "Orthodox" - Kautsky and others. In
fact, however, the main work of the Second International was carried out along the lines of
opportunism. The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie by virtue of their opportunistic,
petty-bourgeois nature, while the “orthodoxes”, in turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists in the
interests of “maintaining unity” with the opportunists, in the interests of “peace and party”. The result
was the dominance of opportunism, because the chain between the politics of the bourgeoisie and the
politics of the "orthodox" turned out to be closed "[546] .
An extremely profound description of the main line of the work of the Second International as
an opportunistic line is given here . Tov. Stalin also shows the role and importance of centrism in the
Second International, the role and significance of various forms of opportunism. It shows how the
chain between the policies of the bourgeoisie and the policies of the Second International was
closed. Further Comrade Stalin points out a number of characteristic features of the work of the
Second International: the domination of eclecticism, sophistry instead of revolutionary theory, closely
related to the living practice of the revolutionary struggle, the presence of fragments of Marxism,
which, being divorced from the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, turned into
emasculated dogmas.
Tov. Stalin points out that instead of a revolutionary struggle the epoch of the Second International
flourished flabby philistinism, politicking, etc. In connection with all this, the proletariat and its real
ideologues were faced with the task of forging, creating really militant, truly revolutionary parties. It
was necessary to make a complete revision of all that was created during the period of relatively
peaceful "organic" development of capitalism, during the period of the domination of the Second
International. It was necessary to clear the Augean stables of the theory and practice of the Second
International. And this part of the general verification of the theoretical and practical platform of the
Second International fell to the lot of Leninism.
It is clear that this indication of Comrade Stalin, where he gives a historical analysis of conditions
and outlines the historical tasks that befell Leninism, refers not to one of the sides of the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, but to all the constituent parts of Marxism - to the economic, political and his
philosophical side.
Lenin not only restored the revolutionary Marxist doctrine, having cleared it from the opportunism
of the Second International, but also developed it further in relation to the new conditions, the
conditions of imperialism, the conditions of the new forms of class struggle. Lenin gave further
specification of all aspects of the Marxist-Leninist teaching.
It is necessary to examine the essence of the philosophical "positions" of the Second International,
find out how the closure of the chain between the policies of the bourgeoisie and the policies of the
Second International affected the philosophical views of the latter, in order to show the whole role and
significance of the Leninist struggle against philosophical opportunism in all its manifestations .
Eclecticism, sophistry, the isolation of theory from practice, from revolutionary struggle are
characteristic of the entire set of views of the most prominent theorists of the Second International,
including their philosophical views, for their philosophical "line".
This "line" is mainly determined by the following points:
1) a complete separation of theory from practice,
2) rupture of economics and politics,
3) the separation of the economic and historical theory of Marxism, its constituent parts, from the
philosophical basis.
Hence, among the most prominent theorists of the Second International, there arises the need to
find some kind of "new" theoretical and cognitive rationale for the economic and historical theory of
Marxism. It is clear that when the philosophical basis of Marxism is disconnected from the historical
and economic theory of Marxism , one has to put some other philosophical foundation under
Marxism. Among the most prominent "pillars" of the Second International, we just have the binding of
the most terry-bourgeois points of view along the line of philosophy. In this regard, the
representatives of the Second International are whipping completely around the tail of the
bourgeoisie.
Finally, the moment characteristic of the general picture of their philosophical views is the refusal
of the most prominent theorists of the Second International in one form or another from materialist
dialectics. At one time, this found a clear expression in the position put forward by the “famous”
Bernstein that dialectics is nothing more than a trap on the way to genuine knowledge, that dialectics
must be abandoned. Other representatives of the Second International, the hidden opportunists,
centrists, etc., expressed essentially the same thing, but only in a more subtle, veiled way.
Such is the general characteristic of the philosophical "line" (if it is even possible to use the word
line at all) of the Second International. As for the theoretical-cognitive foundations that were brought
under Marxism in connection with the elimination of the Marxist philosophical foundations by the
representatives of the Second International, the following tendencies are typical for the latter: the
essentially official jet is neo-Kantianism , then Machism , then the recently developingneo-
Hegelianism . It is known that the Second International put forward quite prominent representatives
of the neo-Kantian current, who linked Kant and Marx differently in questions of philosophy, ethics,
etc. We find among them “theorists” such as Bernstein, Max Adler, Vorlander, Kautsky, Hilferding, etc.
The Machist stream is also strong (Friedrich Adler, Otto Bauer, and others) and the neo-Hegelian
current that has developed in recent years in the ranks of Social Democracy, which is finally
developing. One of his prominent spokesmen for the time being is Breslavl professor Siegfried
Mark. An extremely curious process takes place, in which the closeness of the chain between politics,
theory, the ideology of the bourgeoisie and politics, theory, the ideology of the Second International,
is reflected. In recent years, bourgeois philosophy is increasingly turning to Hegel, trying to modernize
it, adapt it in its own way. Fascist bourgeois philosophy puts Neo-Hegelianism in its service. This
process, which takes place in the ranks of bourgeois philosophers, immediately receives its response
in the ranks of social fascism. Social-fascist theorists, following the bourgeoisie’s motive, are trying to
move from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism,
We now turn to a more detailed account of the attitude of the theorists of the Second International
to these philosophical schools of the bourgeoisie. Let us first consider Kautsky’s position on neo-
Kantianism .
 In his famous article “Marxism and Revisionism”, Lenin described the neo-Kantianism that
developed in the ranks of Social Democracy as follows: “In the field of philosophy,” he wrote,
“revisionism went at the tail of bourgeois professorial science. The professors went "back to Kant" ‚and
revisionism dragged on for neo-Kantians, the professors repeated thousands of times the cadres'
vulgarity against philosophical materialism, - and the revisionists, condescendingly smiling, mumbled
(word for word on the last handbook) that materialism had long been" refuted "; professors blamed
Hegel like a "dead dog", and, preaching idealism themselves, only a thousand times smaller and more
vulgar than Hegel's, scornfully shrugged their shoulders about the dialectic, and the revisionists
climbed behind them into the morass of the philosophical debacle of science, replacing the “cunning”
(and revolutionary) dialectic with the “simple” (and calm) “evolution”; professors practiced their state
salary, driving both their idealistic and “critical” systems to the prevailing medieval “philosophy” (i.e.
to theology) ‚and the revisionists moved towards them, trying to make religion a“ private matter ”not
in relation to the modern state , and in relation to the party of the advanced class. What kind of real
class significance such “amendments” to Marx had, one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of
itself ” trying to make religion a “private matter” not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to
the party of the advanced class. What kind of real class significance such “amendments” to Marx had,
one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of itself ” trying to make religion a “private matter” not
in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class. What kind of real
class significance such “amendments” to Marx had, one cannot speak of this - the matter is clear of
itself ”[547] .
This scathing criticism, directed against revisionists such as Bernstein, against Conrad Schmidt,
against Struve, and others, was directly related to the centrists and Kautsky, who in these matters
essentially gave up the position to Bernstein. The Neo-Kantian revision of Marxism, exposed by Lenin,
shown from its social roots, the theory advocated by social democratic "philosophers", in essence, did
not differ from the idealistic reaction of the bourgeois neo-Kantians.
Previously, professors, honestly fulfilling the social order of the bourgeoisie, were dragged back to
Kant. Now, in fulfilling the social order of the capitalists, they are striving to adapt the Hegelian theory
of the state, even the Hegelian dialectic, to the need of black-shirts, to justify the terrorist rule of the
bourgeoisie. Previously, the social democratic "theorists", lagging behind these bourgeois professors,
"connected" Marx with Kant. Now the modern social-fascists, trailing behind the reactionary scholars,
preach the neo-Hegelian views and try to somehow “connect” them with Marx.
Kautsky’s position on the attitude towards the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism very well expresses
in general that attitude to philosophical problems that prevailed in the ranks of social democracy. In
his correspondence with Plekhanov, when the latter came out with very sharp criticism of Bernstein,
Kautsky wrote: “In any case, I must openly declare that neo-Kantianism confuses me the least. I have
never been strong in philosophy, and although I stand on the point of view of dialectical materialism, I
still think that the economic historical point of view of Marx and Engels is at least compatible with neo-
Kantianism; after all, Darwinism also gets along well with Büchner materialism, as with the monism of
Haeckel and Kantianism of Lange. If Bernstein shed only in this direction, it wouldn't bother me in the
least. ”
Kautsky, as you see, is not at all embarrassed by the combination of Kant and Marx, the separation
of the philosophical foundations of Marxism from the economic and historical theory of Marxism. True,
he declares that he is entirely at the point of view of dialectical materialism, but this declaration is in
fact replaced by a complete surrender of his positions. It must be said that Kautsky conducts this
same point of view in his last work, The Materialistic Understanding of History, which is a theoretical
generalization of all the opportunistic practices of social democracy. In this two-volume work, Kautsky
speaks on the question of the relationship between the various sides of Marxism. He says:
“The recognition of a materialistic understanding of history should not be a prerequisite for
membership in a Social Democratic party. This party should provide everyone who wants to
participate in the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat, in the struggle against all oppression,
exploitation, theoretically justify this desire, as it can - materialistically, Kantian, Christian, or in any
other way. ”
In essence, this point of view provides complete freedom to combine Marxism with religion, with
Kant, Mach, etc. Kautsky’s general position on the relation to neo-Kantianism, expressed in 1898 in
correspondence with Plekhanov, found its theoretical expression here. If we take his interpretation of
the questions of the theory of knowledge, things in themselves, problems of ethics, the neo-Kantian
point of view of the author is felt everywhere.
Let us turn to the question of the general attitude of Kautsky to Machism . During the philosophical
discussion of 1908-1910. with Bogdanovism, one of the workers, Bendianidze, appealed to Kautsky to
speak on the question of Machism. Kautsky answered him with a letter: “You ask me,” he wrote,
“whether Mach is a Marxist. It depends on what is meant by Marxism. I consider Marxism not as a
philosophical doctrine, but as an empirical science, as a special understanding of society. This view,
however, is incompatible with idealistic philosophy, but it does not contradict Mach's theory of
knowledge. I personally do not see a significant difference between the views of Mach and
Dietzgen. Marx is very close to Dietzgen ”(1909).
This answer is extremely characteristic not only in its terry-opportunist essence, it also defines
Kautsky’s understanding of Marxism, its opportunistic attitude to Machism.
So Kautsky views Marxism not as a philosophical doctrine, but only as an empirical
science. Secondly, Marxism is only a theory of society. And third, Marxism is incompatible with the
idealistic revision of Marxism, but at the same time it does not contradict Mach's theory of knowledge,
which, after all, is idealism. Such is Kautsky’s “dialectic”. This is the bawdy caricature of Marxism
drawn by the "venerable" Kautsky worker Bendianidze. This small place from Kautsky’s answer
perfectly describes his views. It fully confirms the general description of the positions of the Second
International, which was given above.
This is Kautsky’s attitude to Machism, which was developed in the West, and we have
Bogdanovism, etc. But we should take Kautsky’s last work, “The Materialistic Understanding of
History,” we can say the same about neo-Hegelianism. Kautsky turns in order to prove that Marxism
can be compatible with neo-Hegelianism, etc. The general process of fascization of social democracy
gets its quite clear expression in the book in the field of philosophy. Such is the philosophical "line" of
this shameless eclecticism, this hardened sophist, reconciling, connecting everything and continuing to
give such a "mess" for Marxism.
It is necessary to dwell a bit on the characterization of the philosophical positions of the left-wing
Social Democrats — Mehring and R. Luxemburg, as well as Plekhanov, the leader of Russian
Menshevism, in order to imagine with all clarity what the Second International gave in the field of
philosophy in order to understand the significance of the struggle against opportunism which was
conducted by Lenin.
Mehring has written quite a few articles on philosophical questions, and paid quite a lot of attention
to philosophical problems. A number of Mehring's articles devoted directly to the criticism of a literary
work contain valuable, accurate characteristics from the point of view of dialectical materialism. But
still, basically, Mehring does not go beyond the positions we have characterized above. First of all,
dialectical materialism is not for Mehring a coherent outlook and the method of Marxism. He believes
that you can set the view into the nature of the mechanical materialism and that this kind of
materialism is combined with historical materialism. This view runs like a thread through all the works
of Mehring. We also find statements on his attitude towards neo-Kantianism, Machism, etc. In a
number of his articles he wrote that neo-Kantians did not at all encroach upon the existence of
Marxism, but only wanted to “elevate” it or “supplement” it; that they do not find "fundamental"
errors in historical materialism; that "Mach for natural science did the same thing that Marx did for the
social sciences"; that “Mach does not want to be a philosopher at all ... he is confident enough in order
to confine himself to the sphere in which he scientifically feels himself the master. In this respect,
Mach is quite in agreement with Marx,[548] . These are some of Mering’s statements in a number of his
philosophical articles.
On the question of mechanical materialism and historical materialism, Mehring wrote: “Historical
materialism includes natural science in itself, but natural science does not include historical in
itself” [549] .
“In the field of natural science, mechanical materialism is a principle of scientific research, which
historical materialism is in the social sciences. To assert that Marx and Engels, who rejected the right
of mechanical materialism to the sphere of history, would also deny him his right to the sphere of
natural science, would mean to send these people from the field of scientific thinking to the area of
superstition, in which devils of Australian blacks manage, philosophy of the unconscious and " the
psychism of the "neo-Marmarists" [550] .
Mehring is not an idealist and does not combine Marx with Kant, Marx with Mach. However, he is
not, as we see, a consistent dialectical materialist; on the contrary, in his outlook, in his views on
nature, Mehring sticks to mechanical materialism.
What are the philosophical positions of R. Luxemburg ? It is absolutely clear that she is not a
representative of consistent, that is, dialectical materialism. In the economic works of R. Luxemburg,
in her “theory of automatic collapse of capitalism,” in raising the question of the relationship between
internal and external contradictions, we find a detailed mechanistic concept applied to the analysis of
capitalism.
 Also known is the assessment which Lenin gave to the views of R. Luxemburg on the national
question. Touching on the philosophical side of the question, Lenin shows how R.
Luxemburg substitutes dialectics with sophistry and completely abstract propositions. Lenin especially
scourges her for not understanding a concrete historical approach to the national question. In the
question of spontaneity and consciousness, R. Luxemburg combines idealistic moments with individual
moments of mechanism, but consistently conducted dialectical materialism is absent in its theoretical
statements and applied to this or that political particular-practical question.
The philosophical positions of the left social democrats, the left radicals in the Second
International, as we see, did not differ significantly from the theoretical and philosophical views of the
revisionists and centrists.
6.2. Lenin and Plekhanov
Plekhanov undoubtedly occupies a special place among the theorists of the Second
International. The question of Lenin and Plekhanov was one of the most important questions of the
entire philosophical discussion, one of the most important questions of the struggle against Menshevik
idealism and mechanism. In his philosophical views, Plekhanov undoubtedly represents the best
among the theorists of the Second International. Undoubtedly, along with the internal organic unity
that exists between Plekhanov’s political opportunism and his philosophical deviations from Marx and
Engels, he has a certain contradiction, which is that he nevertheless, better than all the other theorists
of the Second International, defended materialism from subjective idealism and positivism of the
populists and from open Bernstein revisionism, led the struggle against Machism and Bogdanovism
and at the same time turned the dialectic into sophistry, scholasticism. The difficulty lies in the fact
that Plekhanov represents, as Lenin noted in his statements and characterization of Plekhanov, the
figure
Truly historic the approach is to reveal a truly objective place and significance that Plekhanov
occupies in the development of the labor movement. A genuinely historical assessment consists in
giving, in recognition of the role played by Plekhanov, at the same time revealing all the mistakes that
exist in his philosophical views. It is necessary to give a Bolshevik assessment of the role and
significance of the struggle that Lenin led with Plekhanov on all major philosophical
problems. Beforehand, one extremely important remark must be made to show that there is much in
common between Deborin and Axelrod on the question of attitude towards Plekhanov. Despite all the
struggles that Deborin and Axelrod fought between themselves, in the main question, on the question
of Lenin and Plekhanov, on the question of Lenin's philosophical inheritance, there are many
similarities in their views, and this general is extremely important to analyze and show here. For
example, in the magazine “Under the banner of Marxism” was printed without comments, it should be
like some kind of official material about Plekhanov, the letter of Axelrod-Orthodox and Deutsch, under
the heading “G. V. Plekhanov never ceased to be a Marxist. ”
The content of this letter is as follows:
"The number 110/1519" Izvestia All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets ", as well as in other organs of the press put the ECCI appeal" To the workers of
all countries, "in which among other things in the first paragraph is printed:"
More late Plekhanov, when he was a Marxist“, And so on. We consider the words
underlined as incorrect and offensive both for the memory of the founder of the Marxist
trend in Russia, and for us, his friends, and like-minded people personally. We find it all
the more necessary to protest against this insinuation, because it has been abandoned
by an entire institution, moreover in its appeal "to the workers of all countries." The
latter, not knowing the exact views of the late Plekhanov and relying on the statement of
such an authoritative body as the Comintern Executive Committee, will undoubtedly
believe that the founder of Marxism in Russia later changed him, which of course is
absolutely wrong. We, persons close to Plekhanov, know what his views were until his
death, we assert that up to the grave he remained faithful to the views of the founders of
scientific socialism, which he had learned in his youth and invariably preached for forty
years.
PS We ask all the bodies that printed the appeal of the Executive Committee of the
Comintern to reprint our present letter. ”
For the “Committee on the perpetuation of the memory of G. V. Plekhanov”
Lyubov Axelrod-Orthodox, Leo Deutsch, May 20, 1922, Moscow.
Here is a direct Menshevik attack, a direct Menshevik appeal against the appeal of the Comintern,
who is accused by Axelrod of insinuations, etc. And this was placed at the time on the pages "Under
the Marxist banner" This is an extremely characteristic fact that needs to be clarified in order to
understand how important the struggle with Comoria, as with the mechanists, was around the
problem "Lenin and Plekhanov."
In essence, both Deborin and Axelrod for a number of years before the last philosophical discussion
and during it defended and carried out this point of view, did not abandon it essentially even after
discussion.
It does not make sense to dwell on the already well-debunked Deborin formulation of the question
of Plekhanov as a theorist, who supplements Lenin as a practice. You can take another installation -
"student" Karev. In his “Instead of an article for the fifth anniversary of the journal,” he wrote the
following:
“Nowadays, attempts are being made repeatedly to oppose Plekhanov to Lenin or Lenin to
Plekhanov. Attempts are no good. Everyone knows the political mistakes of Plekhanov. It is known
that in the twilight of his days during the war and in 1917, many of the political mistakes of such a
consistent mind as Plekhanov was turned into theoretical mistakes. And before the war, Plekhanov
had several inaccurate formulations and unsuccessfully set accents in the field of theory: the famous
story with hieroglyphs and the concept of experience, the insufficient emphasis on Marx's inclusion of
the theory of knowledge in dialectics, the loss of classes in the scheme of the public whole — that
prepared Plekhanov's mistakes in the Russian History public thought ”, etc. But all
these privatemistakes cannot eliminate the general thing that Lenin repeatedly stressed - the
philosophical works of Plekhanov still remain the best of what is written on these topics in the world
literature of Marxism ” [551] .
Here Karev expounded the whole concept in the understanding of Plekhanov. There is not a grain
of Bolshevism in this concept. Here that no line, then gross errors. The general meaning of these
errors: an apologetic attitude towards the whole .... Plekhanov, Plekhanov Menshevik, Plekhanov-
author of the "History of Russian Social Thought," and so on and so forth Karev unaware that Lenin's
Bolshevik necessary to oppose Plekhanov-Menshevik that Lenin's theory of reflection must
be contrasted with Plekhanov's hieroglyphic theory, and so on and so forth.
Karev thinks that “falling out of classes in the scheme of a public whole” is “an unsuccessful
emphasis”! This place is a bright spotlight reveals and illuminates the entire Menshevikovuyuschuyu,
and even simply the liberal essence of the views of Karev and the entire boarding group.
This place magnificently reveals the anti-Marxist essence of Menshevist idealism.
These are the attitudes that the group from the group on the question of the relationship between
Lenin and Plekhanov had.
Let us turn to Zinoviev. In his book “Leninism” there is a special chapter “Leninism and
Dialectics”. This chapter, being a vivid example of the “quotational” Marxism, shows how far Comrade
Zinoviev understood neither Leninism nor dialectics, how he perverts the genuine Leninist dialectics,
its revolutionary-effective character. Zinoviev completely misunderstood the partisanship of
philosophy, so deeply and fully unfolded by Lenin. Not understanding this aspect of the matter,
Zinoviev slides into a struvistic objectivist interpretation of materialist dialectics. This is how he
perverts the creature of Lenin's views: “Lenin knew how to be the most active, passionate,“ rabid
”(Lenin's favorite word) participant in events and at the same time knew how, as if going off to the
sidelines, completely objectively observe, events with philosophical calm, [552] . Continuing to develop
this installation, if I may say so, Zinoviev tries to prove with a number of examples how “in the midst
of topical and political arguments Lenin“ suddenly “turns to dialectics” [553] .
Nothing more than a complete perversion of the essence of the matter, such “characteristics” of
Lenin should be called. Zinoviev, quite outwardly, mechanically imagines the connection between
theory and practice, between "rabid, passionate" activity in political events and the supposedly
"objective", "philosophically calm" observation of them in Lenin, between "current political
argumentation" and argumentation from the point of view materialistic dialectic. Zinoviev does not
understand at all that the power of Lenin as the greatest materialist-dialectic who developed the
teachings of Marxism in the new historical epoch is that he provides examples of the revolutionary
unity of theory and practice, of scientific analysis with deep partisanship. Zinoviev does not
understand that Lenin has the organic internal unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary politics,
It is clear that, having distorted the Menshevik theory of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice,
Zinoviev completely misinterprets the question of Lenin and Plekhanov. In essence, he poses this
question in the spirit of Menshevist idealism, or, rather, is one of the authors of this position. Here is
what he writes about Plekhanov and Lenin: “As long as it is a matter of purely philosophical problems,
Plekhanov understands dialectics as well as Lenin. As an enlightener, as a writer, as a propagandist,
as a popularizer of the philosophical views of Marx, Plekhanov is strong. Academic presentation of the
dialectical method Plekhanov gives us brilliantly. But to reduce all these issues from the academic sky
to the sinful land, to apply the dialectic to the revolutionary struggle ‚to the movement of the masses,
to social development, to the liberation struggle of the working class - in this area Plekhanov turned
out to be completely powerless. And Lenin in this particular area was a real giant ” [554]. Doesn't
Zinoviev here co-author Deborin’s famous Menshevik thesis that “Plekhanov is a theorist and Lenin is
a practitioner”? Did Zinoviev not break the theory and practice here? Zinoviev obscures the fact that,
in the general understanding of materialist dialectics, we have in Plekhanov, despite the "brilliant"
presentation, a number of gross, fundamental errors, a well-known system of deviations from
dialectical materialism. Zinoviev completely blurs the fact that Plekhanov’s political opportunism could
not fail to get its expression in his theoretical views on the philosophy of Marxism, and vice versa - his
deviations from dialectical materialism could not help but have an effect on his political
views. Zinoviev, like Karev, like Deborin, does not understandthe connection that Lenin repeatedly
revealed in his works.
What is the real historical place of Plekhanov and how should one raise the question of the
relationship between Lenin and Plekhanov in the development of the philosophy of
Marxism? Undoubtedly, Plekhanov, who was at the head of the Emancipation of Labor group, is one of
the representatives of Marxism in Russia. We know Lenin's statements about this. Undoubtedly, much
of what Plekhanov wrote on dialectical materialism was of great positive importance for the
strengthening and development of Marxist ideas in Russia. The works of Plekhanov were and are of
considerable value in the struggle against philosophical revisionism. Taking these historical merits of
PlekhanovAt the same time, we must not forget the struggle that Lenin waged against the distortions
of the materialist dialectics by Plekhanov, against the Plekhanov-Menshevik scholastics, sophistry and
vulgarization of Marxist philosophy, especially in its application to political and strategic-tactical
issues. We must know from the history of the entire revolutionary movement in Russia and in the
West over the past four decades, know from the history of the struggle of our party that it is the only
consistent follower of Marxism in the entire international labor movement who has raised Marxism in
all its constituent parts, including the theory of dialectics , on a new level, is Lenin. There were
repeated attempts to present Plekhanov as an intermediate link between Marx and Engels, on the one
hand, and Lenin, on the other, attempts to portray Lenin as a disciple of Plekhanov (Deborin and
others). It is necessary to repel this apparent falsification of historical facts in favor of
Menshevism. We must also give a decisive rebuff to the claims that Plekhanov in the theoretical sense,
in the academic presentation of Marxism gives "brilliant pages", that Plekhanov has no flaws in this
respect and that only in practice he turned out to be non-dialectic. This is a totally wrong point of
view.
Since, however, Marxism of the Second International epoch represents a step backwards, a retreat
from orthodox Marxism, and since Plekhanov in his entirety of his works basically does not go beyond
the limits of Marxism of this era, we should consider his own philosophical works as a series of
deviations from consistent Marxism .
It is an erroneous opinion that in Plekhanov we have in the field of philosophy only a series of
separate, random, erroneous formulations. There are a lot of individual mistakes from the point of
view of Lenin’s understanding of the problems of Marxist philosophy. The task of understanding these
mistakes, the task of critical overcoming them is that it is necessary to search for and disclose
the internal logic of these mistakes, as well as the organic link that exists between them and the
political, mainly Menshevik, line of Plekhanov.
Approaching the assessment of the entire set of theoretical works of Plekhanov, it is necessary first
of all to note that "the main tradition and dogma of the Second International" - the gap between
theory and practice, the gap between theoretical writings on dialectical materialism and the inability to
apply it - received a very vivid expression . One need only recall Lenin's characteristics of this
Plekhanov "dialectic" ("dogmatics", "most harmful sophistry", "perversion", "mockery of the spirit of
Marxism", etc., etc.) in order to understand what is strong, as described above. the gap exists in
Plekhanov.
If we take Plekhanov's own philosophical works and analyze the totality of the mistakes that he has
and which were criticized by Lenin, then in general we can outline about four rods around which these
mistakes are concentrated:
1) the lack of understanding of “dialectics as a theory of knowledge,” the lack of understanding of
materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, the reduction of dialectics to the sum of examples;
2) commitment to formalism and logistics;
3) significant elements of agnosticism, Kantianism;
4) significant influence of vulgar, contemplative materialism.
 Lenin’s struggle against Plekhanov’s opportunism and its perversions of dialectics has been going
on throughout the history of our party. Here we will cite only some facts from this struggle, while
noting a characteristic feature: the struggle that Lenin waged against Plekhanov on political issues all
the time touches on the cardinal problems of materialist dialectics.
Let us point out here at Lenin’s criticism of Plekhanov in connection with his adherence to
formalism and logistics. We are referring to Lenin's remarks on the Plekhanov draft program of the
party. Lenin in his remarks about Plekhanov's “second project” wrote the following:
"one. According to the method of formulating the most important department related to the
characterization of capitalism, this project does not give a program of the proletariat fighting against
very real manifestations of very definite capitalism, but a program of an economic textbook devoted to
capitalism in general.
2. In particular, the program is not suitable for the party of the Russian proletariat, because the
evolution of Russian capitalism, the contradictions and social disasters generated by Russian
capitalism are almost completely bypassed and obscured by the same system to characterize
capitalism in general ...
To get rid of the fact that capitalism "in its developed form" is generally distinguished by such
properties, - and in Russia capitalism "becomes predominant," means to evade that particular
accusation and declaration of war, which is more important for a practically fighting party ” [555 ] .
These Leninist remarks, full of deep meaning, cast a bright light on all the difference between
Lenin's materialist dialectics and Plekhanov formalism, its logistics in solving major issues.
Lenin has the requirement of concrete analysis of concrete capitalism in Russia and setting specific
tasks for the party, the proletariat, and Plekhanov - a general characteristic of capitalism, abstractness
and deducing the “properties” of Russian capitalism from the definition of the concept of capitalism in
general. This “system to characterize capitalism in general” is extremely characteristic, as Lenin notes,
for the entire program. Instead of concrete analysis on the basis of dialectical materialism, in
Plekhanov we have a deduction from concepts, a logical definition of concepts. But this is a
characteristic feature of formalism and logistics.
In July 1907, in the preface to the second edition of The Development of Capitalism in Russia,
Lenin returned to the same characteristic of the Plekhanov methodology, but on other issues. He
wrote: “A concrete analysis of the position and interests of various classes should serve to determine
the exact meaning of this truth in its application to a particular issue. The opposite way of reasoning,
often encountered by right-wing social democrats with Plekhanov at the head of them - that is, the
desire to seek answers to specific questions in a simple logical development of common truth about
the main character of our revolution, is a debasement of Marxism and continuous mockery of
dialectical materialism ” [556] .
Lenin’s struggle with Plekhanov’s theoretical and tactical views, especially during the revolution of
1905–1906, was of great importance for the victory of the Bolshevik strategy and tactics in the labor
movement and its implementation in the revolution. Along with directly political content, this struggle
provides extremely rich material for studying and understanding Lenin’s philosophical positions in
opposition to Plekhanov’s positions. It should be noted that Plekhanov conducts his entire “argument”
on tactical issues allegedly from the point of view of dialectical materialism. All the time, he criticizes
Lenin for "a complete lack of understanding of dialectical materialism," for deviating from him. In his
article “Something about“ Economism ”and“ Economists ”,” he throws the Bolsheviks accusation of
being careless about theory. "In the" economist "practice, he wrote - The theory in general was not
acquired in the worst way. But the current practice of the "political" tone (i.e. the Bolsheviks. - Auth. )
also not god knows how prilezhit to theory. If we really get to the truth, then we will say that our
current practices, “politicians,” are just as careless about the theory as the practices, “economists of
the recent past,” [557] .
With a zeal worthy of a better use, Plekhanov repeats this same slander on Lenin infinitely many
times. Blaming Lenin in the absence of dialectics, he even states the "fourth period" in the labor
movement. He writes: “And this is why the“ liquidation of the fourth period ”of our movement,
characterized by the influence of Lenin's metaphysics, just as the“ third period ”of its movement is
characterized by the influence of“ economism ”must, among other things, be to rise finally to the
theoretical point of view this group (i.e. the group “Liberation of Labor”). Even very short-sighted
people will soon see it. ”
Plekhanov does not stop at these vile attacks against Lenin, he deepens them, spreading slander,
then supported by Deborin and other Mensheviks at that time, regarding Machian philosophy, which is
supposedly the official philosophy of Bolshevism. Here is what he wrote in his Letters on Tactics and
Tactlessness.
 “When I say that we, in words, actually hold on to Marx and his dialectic, I, of course, do not mean
theorists of our present Blanquism. In the field of philosophy, these people even in words do not
follow Marx. They act as his "critics"; for them, who stand on the point of view of empirio-monism, the
dialectic is “a long-surpassed level” [558] .
This was written by Plekhanov in the spring of 1906.
The accusations of Lenin and the Bolsheviks of idealism are repeated by Plekhanov an infinite
number of times. So he writes: “The tactics defended by our Bolsheviks bears obvious traces of petty-
bourgeois idealism and petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism” [559] . He further writes: “... Lenin
lowers the level of revolutionary thought ... he introduces a utopian element into our views ...
Blankism or Marxism - this is the question we are tackling today. Tov. Lenin himself admitted that his
agrarian project was closely connected with his idea of seizing power. " [560]. In Letters on Tactics and
Tactlessness, he addresses the Bolsheviks in the following way: “You are precisely dogmatists who
have lost all ability to practice. You take your own will for the main revolutionary engine, and when we
point you to a real relationship, you scream about our supposed opportunism. You think that a
revolutionary who wants to reckon with these real relationships is "nothing left to do." Your faction,
like two peas in a pod, is similar to the Willich-Schaper faction, and this faction was only a German
form of Blanquism, which adopted Marx’s terminology and some completely undigested scraps of his
ideas ... Naturally being idealists in tactics, you naturally use idealistic criterion for evaluating all other
parties; you try to define them more or less goodwill" [561] . “Your arguments about the" criticism of
weapons "arenothing more than a simple transfer to the domain of tactical reasoning of the
Dühringian theory of violence, which Frederick Engels once so mocked at mockingly " [562] .
In the article we have quoted above, “The working class and the social democratic intelligentsia,”
Plekhanov accuses Lenin of both narodlism, socialism and Bauerism. So he writes: “In Lenin’s view,
we see not Marxism , but, I apologize for the ugly sounding word, Bauerism , a new edition of the
theory of heroes and the crowd , corrected and supplemented in accordance with the market
requirements of the most modern time” [563] .
Such is the bouquet of lies, slander against Lenin, which Plekhanov puts forward in the process of
the Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks for carrying out revolutionary tactics in the 1905
revolution, for the slogans of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry, for exposing the Menshevik opportunism, their tailism to the Cadet liberal bourgeoisie
It would be possible to show that Plekhanov fought Lenin throughout almost the entire history of
the party, with the exception of those periods when he himself showed fluctuations in the direction of
Bolshevism. Here it is only necessary to cite the Plekhanov assessment of the April theses of Lenin in
1917, which are the greatest document of international socialism, the clearest example of the method
of materialist dialectics, the deepest concrete analysis of the class struggle and the correlation of class
forces in the February revolution. How does Plekhanov evaluate these theses? He wrote: “I compare
him (ie, Lenin. - Auth. ) Theses with the speeches of the abnormal heroes of these great artists
(Plekhanov means Chekhov and Gogol. - Aut.) and in some way enjoy them. And it seems that these
theses were written just under the circumstances in which Avkenty Poprishin sketched one of his
pages. This situation is characterized by the following note: “I do not remember the numbers. There
was no month either. It was the devil knows what “is.” We will see that it was under this situation,
that is, with full distraction from the circumstances of time and place, Lenin’s theses were written. This
means that the reporter of Unity, who called Lenin's speech “delusional,” was absolutely right ” [564] .
That is how evil, frenzied insinuation Plekhanov comes to in the struggle against Bolshevism during
the war and in the period after the February revolution. Plekhanov "criticizes" Bolshevism, dwelling on
the philosophical, methodological side of the issue, in every way perverting, in every way juggling his
views.
Disclosing and overcoming Plekhanov's mistakes in the field of philosophy means overcoming
Menshevism in such an important theoretical area as is the philosophy of Marxism. It was along this
line that the struggle against Menshevist idealism was, and has great party significance.
6.3. Lenin's struggle against philosophical opportunism in the history of our party
Let us turn to the question of the falsification of the history of Lenin’s philosophical struggle with
opportunism, which we have in the works of representatives of mechanism and Menshevist
idealism. It is necessary to note a number of characteristic features of the approach taken by
Menshevist idealism to Lenin’s philosophical struggle with opportunism. First of all, and this is in close
connection with the general concept of Menshevist idealism, for the Deborintsy there is a
characteristic separation of Lenin’s “purely philosophical works” from all his other works.. Such works
of Lenin, such as “What is the“ Friends of the People ”,” “Development of Capitalism in Russia”, etc.,
completely fell out of the attention of these philosophers when approaching the path of Lenin’s
philosophical development, since these works are not “purely philosophical works. The second
characteristic feature of Lenin’s approach of Menshevist idealism to the philosophical struggle is the
well-known theory that “ Lenin is a disciple of Plekhanov ” and therefore his philosophical works do not
have independent meaning, but are important insofar as they complement Plekhanov’s views. The
third characteristic feature of their approach to the struggle of Lenin against philosophical opportunism
is the denial of the international significance of Lenin's works. against neo-Kantianism, against
Machism, the denial of the international significance of Lenin’s struggle for materialist
dialectics. Finally, the fourth moment is the intensified dragging of the Menshevik Plekhanov's little
idea about the organic connection that supposedly exists between Bolshevism and Machism . Here are
four important points that are a common thread in a number of articles, materials, works written by
representatives of Menshevist idealism. Will we take the book “Lenin as a Thinker” by Deborin, the
book “Lenin and Philosophy” by Luppol, Karev's works and articles — all these moments have been
developed in one degree or another.
Let us recall first of all what Deborin wrote in his article "Mach's Philosophy and the Russian
Revolution" as early as 1908, being a Menshevik, regarding the connection that supposedly exists
between the philosophy of Machism and Bolshevism as a political movement.
“The seal of subjectivism, of“ voluntarism, ”he says there, rests on all the tactics of so-called
Bolshevism, whose philosophical expression is Machism. Machism is a worldview without a world; as a
philosophy of subjectivism and individualism, it forms, in combination with Nietzsche's immoralism,
which gives justification for evil, exploitation, etc., an ideological fog covering the practical aspirations
of the bourgeoisie. Bolshevik philosophers and "ideologists" do not go beyond the limits of the petty-
bourgeois outlook. Bolshevik strategists and tactics with their romantic revolutionism and petty-
bourgeois radicalism put into practice the theoretical principles of philosophical nihilism , based
on which is the denial of objective truth and the recognition of the right for each person to determine
the nature of what is permitted and unauthorized, true and false, good and evil, fair and unjust . Our
maximized Marxists are conscious Bolsheviks, comprehending the practices and tactics of the
latter. Bolshevik practices and tactics are unconscious Machists and idealists. Objectively, Machism is
thus in Russian ideology of the revolutionary, radical stratum of the bourgeoisie, and within these
limits, marks a progressive phenomenon. In relation to Marxism — the worldview of the proletariat —
Machism plays a reactionary role. The powerlessness and political backwardness of the petty
bourgeoisie force it to seek temporary allies among other classes of the population. But the most
reliable revolutionary-consistent ally is the proletariat. But in order to “grasp” the latter for the sake of
at least the “dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”, one has to resort to Marxist
phraseology, which makes it possible to cover the petty-bourgeois “essence”. After all, our Social
Revolutionaries are „Marxists too”. ”
Special comments to this Menshevik slander on Bolshevism are hardly required. It is important to
note that such views in a highly veiled form were reflected even in the work “Lenin as a Thinker”,
written by Deborin in 1924, published until 1928 without any corrections.
It must be said that in this question we can state that there was a touching unity between then
Deborin and Axelrod-Orthodox. Axelrod-Orthodox has a number of malicious Menshevik articles on
philosophical questions.
Here is what she wrote, for example, in the article “Two Trends”.
“If the link between philosophy and social trends is hidden in most, if it has to be discovered only
by analyzing the internal content of this social trend, then the link between Bolshevism and Machism
is striking from the vulgar empirical point of view or, to put it in terms of empirical critics , - from a
purely descriptive point of view. In fact, most theorists of Bolshevism profess empirio-critical
teaching. Philosophy for these theorists is not a serious subject, but a method of thinking, which also
determines the methods of their practical activity. It is clear, therefore, that their theoretical and
practical activity also influenced this circle of Social Democrats, which has no direct relation to
philosophy ” [565] .
Further in the same article, she continues in the most slanderous way to depict "the psychology
and logic of Bolshevism," as she puts it, striving to prove the kinship, the identity of Bolshevism with
Machism.
Plekhanov's thesis about the relationship of Bolshevism with Machism, which was so zealously
developed and promoted by Deborin and Axelrod, was exposed by Lenin. In his work Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism, Lenin wrote:
“In his remarks against Machism, Plekhanov did not so much care about the refutation of Mach as
about inflicting factional damage to Bolshevism. For this petty and meager use of fundamental
theoretical disagreements, he has already been punished by the right - two books of Menshevik-
Machists ” [566] .
Let us now turn to the work of Comrade Luppol "Lenin and Philosophy."
In it we find:
“In his book he did not develop in a positive form the principles of dialectical materialism, but he
expounded them in the form of negative criticism of the philosophical revisionists of Marxism. The
polemical task determined the method and nature of the construction of the book of Lenin. For each of
the main provisions of the revisionists, he finds them rooted in the idealistic philosophical literature of
the West and, thus revealing their idealistic, anti-Marxist character, contrasts briefly materialistic
theses, drawing them not only from Marx and Engels, but also from such materialists like Diderot,
Feuerbach , Iosif Ditsgen, Plekhanov ” [567] .
Here is an example of the falsification of the philosophical path of Lenin. It is especially strange to
read such lines about the Lenin book, written in 1925–1926. and printed in 1929, after that
remarkable, deep posing of the question, which Comrade Stalin gave in his works in 1924
Exposing such falsification, it must be said that Lenin from his very first works gives us samples of
the effective understanding of Marxism, which was mentioned at the beginning. Lenin from his very
first works connects philosophy with politics, gives samples of the partisanship of philosophy. When he
criticizes the economic, political views of the populists, he does not stop there, but also gives
extensive criticism of their philosophical and sociological views. Let's compare at least two works: “On
the development of the monistic view” of Plekhanov and “What is the“ Friends of the People ”” of Lenin
and we will immediately see the enormous difference that exists between Lenin and Plekhanov,
between the understanding of Marxism and Lenin and Plekhanov. What does Plekhanov give in his
book? It is known that this book by Plekhanov is one of his best books on the philosophy of Marxism,
that a number of generations of Marxists grew and grew on it. It is clear to us that this book must be
studied, that without this it is impossible to become a genuine Marxist, a genuine Communist, but it is
not necessary to study it in the way of Jordan. It needs to be studied critically, figuring out
Plekhanov’s mistakes and what in which Lenin surpasses Plekhanov. Plekhanov we find
extremely academic presentation of Marxism, Marxist philosophy and historical preparation of
Marxism. We already have in this book significant elements of mechanism, errors on the question of
the role of the geographic environment; "Geographic bias", lack of understanding of the relationship
between nature and society. We have in Plekhanov a completely insufficient formulation and
development of the question of the role and significance of the theory of class struggle in Marxism, in
the materialist understanding of history. From Lenin, from the very beginning, we are confronted with
party militancy in the struggle against the Narodniks. Lenin establishes the connection between the
philosophical, sociological, economic and political views of the populists. If we take Lenin’s analysis of
handicraft in the domestic production system, if we take the specific nature of the criticism of the
populists, going from criticism of the general philosophical and sociological views of the populists, to
questions about the community, about handicrafts, if we compare all the theoretical wealth that Lenin
gives, and recall that it is in this work that sharpens the most important problem of historical
materialism - the question of the socio-economic formation, we will see what difference there is
between these works of Lenin and Plekhanov. Finally, it must be said that Lenin is essentially the first
and independently , and not in the way that Deborin and Luppol depict, gives in Russia a detailed
exposition of the Marxist world outlook in the struggle with the subjective sociology of the
Narodniks. Plekhanov wrote his book in the autumn of 1894 , and Lenin wrote his Friends of the
People in April 1894 , and wrote independently, regardless of the work that Plekhanov did. Comparing
these works, revealing how much higher Lenin's work is, we can say that Lenin was the first in Russia
to give an extensive exposition of dialectical materialism in the struggle against the Narodniks in his
book with subjective sociology .
Lenin was the first to lead the struggle against neo-Kantianism in the most consistent way. As far
back as the end of 1894, Lenin read in the Petersburg circle of Social Democrats a report on the
reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature, which he published in a revised form, as a book aimed at
two fronts simultaneously - against Struve and against populists. We have in mind Lenin's work "The
Economic Content of Populism and His Criticism in the Book of Mr. Struve," written in. end of 1894
and published in 1895
This work provides an exceptional example of the irreconcilability of theoretical controversy, a
sample of the struggle on two fronts. In it, Lenin also criticizes Struve’s philosophical views, criticizes
in a number of places and remarks the neo-Kantian revision of Marxism, which was outlined by
Struve. Concreteness criticism characteristic generally for Lenin's works. Further, in his works against
Bulgakov on the theory of implementation, etc. Lenin throws a number of remarks against the neo-
Kantians. At the same time, Plekhanov did not yet speak either against the Bernstein revision or
against Struve. Much later, in a letter to Potresov of September 2, 1898, Lenin points out that
Plekhanov still does not speak out strongly against neo-Kantianism, giving Struve and Bulgakov
polemics about the main issues of this philosophy, as if it had become an integral part of Marxist
philosophy.
The first version of Plekhanov’s article “On the economic factor” published in PZM sheds bright light
on Plekhanov’s interpretation of a number of philosophical questions, in particular, describing his
attitude to neo-Kantian revisionism of Struve, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, etc. Leninist criticism of Struve. In
this version of the article, Plekhanov writes: “The philosophical views of the“ students ”who are
opposed to the German“ critical ”philosophy are not similar to the philosophical views of the authors
of“ Capital ”. They know this very well and do not consider themselves consistent with his
philosophy. But this does not prevent them from recognizing the justice of his economic and
philosophical-historical theory ... They are his students to the same extent as those who share not
only his economic and philosophical-historical, but also philosophical views. Neo-Kantian within these
limits can be the same loyal and consistent student of this famous thinker, like any of the modern
materialists, that is, those who follow the author of "Capital" in philosophy as well.
But is it possible to share the philosophical and historical views of a writer, without at the same
time sharing his philosophical views? This question can not be answered unconditionally, Sa depend,
as the French say. But as for the neo-Kantians, it must be said in the affirmative that they can,
without changing their philosophical point of view, recognize the validity of Marx’s economic and
philosophical-historical views ” [568] .
This version of the article was written by Plekhanov at the end of 1897 or at the beginning of 1898.
Here, for a number of tactical considerations, Plekhanov comes, as we see, to the theoretical
protection of revisionism, allowing the possibility of combining Marxism with neo-Kantianism .
As a matter of fact, in these lines there is no difference in the statement of this question between
him and Kautsky, who, just in a letter of May 22, 1898, wrote to Plekhanov about the same thing.
In contrast to this position, Lenin from the very beginning of his literary activity, from his first
major work “What is the“ Friends of the People ”and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats”
takes a clear, consistent, revolutionary position, defending the solidity and integrity of the Marxist
doctrine, categorically speaking against any attempts or even hints of the possibility of combining
Marxism with some “fashionable” philosophical theory. Lenin is essentially the first in the international
arena to criticize the Russian neo-Kantians, with concrete criticism and analysis of their economic
views, and so on. This is how it is in reality, and this reality completely contradicts what Deborin
wrote.
It must further be said that Lenin is in essence also the initiator of the struggle against Machism ,
and this, again, is completely distorted by Deborin in the book Lenin as a Thinker. Deborin portrays
the case as if the Plekhanov school, which included Plekhanov, Axelrod and himself, Deborin, came out
in the struggle against Machism, and Lenin only joined them and wrote his Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism.
Lenin was the first to initiate the struggle against Machism. In 1904, Axelrod, at the insistence of
Lenin, wrote an article directed against Bogdanovism. Around 1901, after reading Bogdanov’s book “A
Historical Look at Nature” and seeing that it is an idealistic revision of Marxism, Lenin insisted that
Plekhanov and Axelrod criticize Bogdanov, since he himself was then directly engaged in party
affairs. At the same time, Axelrod wrote her article, and she herself pointed out that she was
criticizing Bogdanov at the insistence of Lenin.
The Deborintsy, like the mechanists, completely covered the international significance which
Lenin's struggle against Machism had. Meanwhile, Lenin himself wrote that this “philosophical dispute”
was of international importance, that dialectical materialism needed to be “tackled” with new
discoveries in the field of natural science, that Plekhanov did not raise this question at all, ignored
questions of natural science.
Here are a number of points that should be specially theoretically developed to show the role and
importance that Lenin’s struggle against opportunism has in the field of philosophy in order to show
the consistency and intransigence with which Vladimir Ilyich waged this fight throughout the entire
history of the party.
One does not have to dwell on the meaning that the questions of the struggle against neo-
Hegelianism. “Materialism and empirio-criticism”, Lenin's works on Hegel, his article “On the meaning
of militant materialism” provide a detailed theory of materialist dialectics, a deep appreciation of the
role and significance of Hegel in preparing Marxism, an excellent weapon for really critical approach to
Hegel, for exposing his idealism. In the struggle of Bolshevism unfolding in the international arena
against fascism, social fascism, the struggle against the fascism of science, which leads the fascists to
try to portray every major bourgeois thinker as the ancestor and father of fascism, whether Hegel,
Goethe, Spinoza, etc. D., - protection of the foundations of dialectical materialism is of particular
importance. Lenin's teaching, his philosophical works are the most acute weapon of the struggle
against modern neo-Hegelianism, weapons
6.4. Lenin and the further development of materialistic dialectics
We now turn to the question of what is new introduced by Lenin in the development of dialectical
materialism.
The starting point for understanding the Leninist stage in the development of the philosophy of
Marxism, for understanding that Lenin introduced the new to the development of Marxism as a whole,
is the classic characteristic of Leninism given by Comrade Stalin. We must proceed from the fact that
the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In developing these or other aspects of the Marxist-Leninist theory, one must proceed from the
fact that the Marxist-Leninist teaching is a harmonious, coherent, consistent teaching that the three
constituent parts of Marxism are not mechanically glued parts, one of which can be accepted and the
other half accepted. one can not be realized, and the other can be realized in a few years, etc. We
must proceed from the fact that Marxism is a consistent, harmonious, monolithic teaching, from which
nothing can be pulled out, in order not to distort, not to debase it ... We must understand also that
the main thing in Leninism, namely the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, defines and
defines the tasks and direction of work, the development of individual aspects of Leninism as Marxism
of the new era. We must proceed from this in order to understand the new that Lenin introduced into
one or another component of Marxism. However, from these undisputed provisions, sometimes wrong
conclusions are drawn, essentially meaning a liquidationist point of view in relation to the philosophy
of Marxism.. We have in mind vulgar-simplistic statements about this order: based on the correct idea
that the main thing in Leninism is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, they believe that
one should not look for anything new that was introduced by Lenin into Marxist philosophy, proletarian
revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is believed that the essence of the Leninist stage
in the development of the philosophy of Marxism is that Lenin developed the philosophy of Marxism as
a theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, they are trying to dissolve all the
constituent parts of Leninism, including Leninist philosophy, in the doctrine of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. To take on this point of view means to take on the liquidationist point of view with respect
to the philosophy of Marxism, which, hiding behind phrases about the dictatorship of the proletariat, is
essentially engaged in the destruction of the philosophy of Marxism. original and new, which brings
Lenin in one direction or another of Marxism.
We must proceed from the exceptional in depth thoughts that Comrade Stalin unleashed in his
conversation with the first American workers' delegation on September 9, 1927. He said:
“I think that Lenin did not add any“ new principles ”to Marxism, just as Lenin did not abolish any of
the“ old ”principles of Marxism. Lenin was and remains the most loyal and consistent student of Marx
and Engels, fully and fully based on the principles of Marxism. But Lenin was not only the executor of
the teachings of Marx - Engels. He was at the same time the follower of the teachings of Marx and
Engels. What does it mean? This means that he developed further the teachings of Marx-Engels in
relation to the new conditions of development, in relation to the new phase of capitalism, in relation to
imperialism. This means that, by developing further the teachings of Marx in the new conditions of
class struggle, Lenin introduced to the common treasury of Marxism something new in comparison
with what was given by Marx and Engels, in comparison with what could be given in the period of pre-
imperialist capitalism, and this new, introduced by Lenin in the treasury of Marxism, is based entirely
on the principles given by Marx and Engels. In this sense, we speak about Leninism as Marxism of the
epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. ” [569] .
There is not a single question of Marxist philosophy, there is not a single problem of materialist
dialectics, historical materialism that Lenin would not develop, specify in accordance with the
conditions of the class struggle of the proletariat in the new historical era. It is clear that in matters of
dialectical materialism,Lenin does not abolish any of the “old principles” of Marxist philosophy and
does not add “new principles” .
Lenin's greatness as a theoretician of the proletariat, as a person who has analyzed and revealed
the laws of a new historical epoch, the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, is that it is
based on the principles of Marxism, without changing any of them, and without introducing new
principles developed all the constituent parts of Marxism as applied to the conditions and tasks of the
class struggle of the proletariat .
 If we turn to the characteristics of the conditions, the peculiarities of the new era and the tasks
that confronted the working class in working out the problems of the philosophy of Marxism, the
following should be noted:
First, the domination of idealism among wide circles of intelligentsia and bourgeois scholars . In
this regard, there is a big difference between the era of pre-monopoly capitalism and the era of the
domination of monopolies. The political feature of imperialism, as Lenin repeatedly notes, is
“the reaction along the". This reaction along the whole line gets its bright reflection in science, in
philosophy. With the entry of capitalism into the new phase, the turn of broad circles of the bourgeois
and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia has intensified in the direction of idealism, mysticism,
clericalism. Broad scientific circles began to turn away from materialism more and more. In this
respect, the fate of Haeckel's World Mysteries and the idealistic orgy and whistle that has risen in the
bourgeois press in connection with its publication are very characteristic.
Secondly, a deep crisis of physics and the whole of natural science, which received great
development already at the beginning of the 20th century. All science, especially physics, has
undergone tremendous development, leading to a change in the basic old ideas about the structure of
matter, about space and time, about matter and motion, about the principle of causality, etc. The
discovery of an electron, quantum processes, etc. created a whole revolution in the old views. On this
basis, many bourgeois scholars began to draw reactionary idealistic conclusions. Lenin points to the
development of "physical idealism", "physiological idealism", etc. Lenin emphasizes that here "we are
confronted with some international ideological trend that does not depend on any one philosophical
system, but arises from some general reasons beyond philosophy " [570].
Lenin emphasizes that “the essence of the crisis of modern physics consists in breaking the old
laws and basic principles, in rejecting objective reality out of consciousness, that is, replacing
materialism with idealism and agnosticism. “Matter has disappeared” - this is how one can express the
basic and typical difficulty in relation to many particular issues that created this crisis ” [571] .
Thirdly, the specialization of all bourgeois philosophy on all sorts of gnoseological questions, on all
sorts of epistemological subtleties in order to bring philosophical justification under the turn towards
clericalism in wide circles of intellectuals, under this crisis of bourgeois science .
The widespread development of neo-Kantian idealism, the "mathematical rationale" of modern
natural science, the flourishing of empirio-critical literature, immanentists, intuitionists,
phenomenologists, etc., etc., inventing thousands of epistemological subtleties and details with the
goal of refuting the hated materialism a thousand first time, that's picture of the philosophical
development of the beginning of XX century.
Fourthly, the reflection of all this idealistic reaction among the socialist parties and the
development of philosophical revisionism, opportunism, starting with the neo-Kantian revision of
Marxist philosophy and ending with Bogdanov's empirio-monism. The cries about the absence in
Marxism of a “theoretical-cognitive” justification, about the need to bring a “new gnoseological
foundation” under Marxism, about the need for Marxism to take into account the newest
“achievements” of philosophy in the field of the theory of knowledge, the writings that materialism has
long been outdated - are getting wide Spread. “The ever more subtle falsification of Marxism, the ever
more subtle counterfeits of anti-materialist doctrines under Marxism - this is what characterizes
modern revisionism in political economy, tactical issues, and philosophy in general, both in
epistemology and sociology” [572] , - wrote Lenin.
Finally, fifthly, the need on the part of representatives of Marxist philosophy to give its answer to
the questions posed in connection with the revolution in natural science ; the need to "cope" with the
latest discoveries; from the point of view of dialectical materialism, the need to break up all the latest
tricks and subtleties in the field of bourgeois, professorial philosophy, relying on all the real
achievements of science; finally, the need to give the most resolute rebuff to this anti-materialist
reaction in the workers' parties. That is why Lenin so insisted on the need to consider the struggle
against idealistic philosophy in the light of the real scientific discoveries of the new era, which is why
Lenin wrote:
“The connection of a new physics, or rather, a certain school in a new physics with Machism and
other varieties of modern idealistic philosophy, is not subject to the slightest doubt. To dismantle
Machism, ignoring this connection — as Plekhanov does — is to mock the spirit of dialectical
materialism, that is, to sacrifice Engels’s method for one letter or another at Engels ” [573] .
All this historical situation, these conditions, needs and tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat
on the front of philosophy and science required the further development of the theory of
knowledge dialectical materialism, demanded the further development of materialist dialectics. In this
situation, it was impossible to confine ourselves only to the protection of general principles, and it was
necessary to give a detailed theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, which answers all
questions of the revolution of natural science, based on the deepest study and synthesis of the newest
stage in the development of science and, first of all, social development. Lenin points out that "the
revision of the" form "of Engels' materialism, the revision of his natural-philosophical propositions not
only does not contain anything" revisionist "in the established sense of the word, but, on the contrary,
is necessarily required by Marxism" [574] .
In Fundamentals of Leninism, Comrade Stalin wrote:
“No one else, like Lenin, took up the most serious task of generalizing according to materialistic
philosophy the most important of what science has given for the period from Engels to Lenin, and the
comprehensive criticism of anti-materialist movements among Marxists. Engels said that "materialism
has to take a new look with every great new discovery." It is known that this task was fulfilled for its
time by none other than Lenin in his remarkable book “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism” [575] .
Lenin received further theoretical substantiation and development of the materialist theory of
knowledge. It was Lenin who, in accordance with the needs of the new epoch, paid particular attention
to the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism , developing the teachings of Marx and Engels in
this regard. This explains why Lenin interpreted so deeply the questions of Marxist philosophy,
understanding the materialist dialectic as the philosophical science of Marxism, giving a very deep
understanding of the unity of dialectics and the theory of knowledge. In all these problems, Lenin does
not introduce "new principles" into Marxist philosophy and does not cancel any old ones, but proceeds
from the principles of Marx and Engels.
The next point that needs to be noted when we are talking about the Lenin stage in the
development of dialectical materialism is that it was Lenin, from all the Marxists of the modern era,
who gave the most complete, detailed criticism of the latest anti-materialistic trends.with which you
have to fight to the present. The newest forms of Hegelianism, Kantianism, neo-Kantianism, Machism,
subjective idealism, Bogdanovism, and finally, physical idealism — all of this has been subjected to
Lenin's merciless criticism and exposure. The Leninist criticism and the exposure of these
antimaterialistic, anti-dialectical currents are the strongest, for this is not their criticism from the
standpoint of vulgar materialism, to which even Plekhanov sometimes stumbled. Lenin, in his criticism
of these teachings, dialectically combines logical criticism with a historical-class approach, a
consideration of the connection of these trends with the state of modern science.
Another important question on which we can and should note the new and unique, connected with
the name of Lenin, is the question of the relation of Marxism to Hegel.. In general, it must be said that
the question of the relation of Marx to Hegel and the Hegelian dialectic is of tremendous theoretical
significance. The entire pleiad of revisionists, beginning with Bernstein, Kunov, Kautsky and ending
with our mechanists and Comrade Bukharin, who does not understand the revolutionary materialist
dialectics, deny or pervert it, proceeds from the position that the works of Marx and Engels contain the
stain of Hegelian idealism. Even Comrade Bukharin, in his book The Theory of Historical Materialism,
in the chapter entitled “On the Statement of the Problem of Historical Materialism,” believes that Marx
is infected to some extent with Hegelianism. This is connected with the mechanistic concept of
Bukharin, with his lack of understanding of the real relationship that exists between Marxism and
Hegel. For Lenin on this question, we have, above all, a restoration, a return to a correct
understanding of this problem after all the distortions in this matter in the era of the Second
International. If, however, we were limited to only this, we would not fully express the essence of the
Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and
concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and
systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development
of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example,
in his philosophical tetradas) gives brilliant examples we would not fully express the essence of the
Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and
concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and
systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development
of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example,
in his philosophical tetradas) gives brilliant examples we would not fully express the essence of the
Leninist solution of this problem. Lenin has not only a return, but a further development and
concretization of this problem - since Lenin has a completely developed concept of a consistently and
systematically developed theory of dialectical materialism. The concretization and further development
of the teachings of Marx and Engels in this matter with Lenin consists in the fact that he (for example,
in his philosophical tetradas) gives brilliant examples Hegel’s materialist processing of dialectics in all
the most important basic categories.
 The next most important question to dwell on is the question of the theory of reflection in Lenin's
works. In general, it should be said that the questions of dialectics as a theory of knowledge, the law
of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics, the theory of reflection are not at all some separate,
isolated questions from each other. These are all the most important problems of the theory of
materialist dialectics, brilliantly developed by Lenin. These are questions that are in organic connection
with each other. None of them can be understood without the others. Tear off the materialist theory of
reflection from Lenin’s statement of the question that “dialectics is the theory of knowledge ", and
from this position, or rather to say from its Leninist content, nothing remains. But is dialectics as a
theory of knowledge, can the theory of reflection be understood without the law of the unity of
opposites as the core of dialectics? Is the Leninist doctrine of the unity of theory and practice, is the
Leninist principle of the partisanship of philosophy and science not the constituent parts of this single
concept? Only by understanding this can one dwell on each of these parties separately.
The theory of reflection is of exceptional importance for the most consistent justification of
materialism. It is not at all accidental that it is precisely at this point that the notorious enemy of
dialectical materialism, the social-fascist Max Adler, concentrates his attack against Leninism.
In his work, which is called the “textbook of the materialist understanding of history” and which is
so far from materialism as heaven from earth, which is a work specifically aimed against Lenin,
slanderous, malicious, anti-Bolshevik from beginning to end document, Max Adler specifically devotes
two chapters the analysis of Lenin's theory of reflection in order to refute this theory, which is really
the banner of the true materialist point of view.
This is what Max Adler writes about Lenin's theory of reflection: “Lenin very much loves, as we
already know, to call critical idealism“ old rubbish ”. This not quite polite word should, however, be
rightfully applicable to what Lenin in his book “Materialism and Empiric Criticism” repeatedly calls the
materialist theory of knowledge. This is in fact nothing more than the old rubbish, the so-called,
actually long ago buried under the noise and laughter of a critical philosophy — thetheory of
reflection ... "
Let us see what conclusions Adler himself draws after the “burial under the noise and laughter” of
the theory of reflection. He develops a typically idealistic theory based on the findings of "modern
natural science" about "the disappearance of matter", "theory" ‚ really buried by Lenin in" Materialism
and Empirio-criticism ". “Modern natural science,” says Adler, “does not need as a hypothesis not only
God, but also Matter, and the great English physicist Pearson could exclaim rightly: Matter
disappeared.” I hardly need any comments here ...
The theory of reflection in the Leninist sense takes the whole process of knowledge , starting from
sensation and ending with the concept, and considers it historically. And the one who limits this theory
of reflection, separates the theory of reflection from practice, from the whole historical path of
knowledge, he certainly does not understand Lenin, he certainly cannot understand that Lenin
introduced a new understanding of these issues.
The next question to dwell upon in the presentation of the Leninist stage is the question of the law
of the unity of opposites .
We often have the opinion that supposedly only Lenin has an understanding of this law as the core
of dialectics. This is of course a wrong opinion. One has only to point out Marx’s analysis of Capital in
the dual nature of labor, the exchange process, the process of creating surplus value, turning money
into capital, crises in Capital, in order to understand that this law runs like a red thread all over
Capital, is the real core of the dialectic in the works of Marx and Engels. Everyone knows the
statements of Engels on this issue in the "Anti-Dühring" and in "L. Feuerbach. It is known that this law
was developed in the works of Marx and Engels as the central issue of materialist dialectics. However,
one should not at all conclude from this that Lenin does not contribute anything new to this question,
does not develop Marxism.
In order to understand what the essence of this new, what Lenin brings to understanding of the
law of the unity of opposites, it is necessary first of all to understand why this law, as the most
important law of the development of the objective world, and how the law of knowledge took on
special significance in the new historical era. If we take “Imperialism”, “State and Revolution”, these
are the greatest works of Lenin, which analyze the relationship of state and revolution, the problems
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the analysis of the new era, then we will see that they are built
from the point of view of applying all categories of materialist dialectics to these phenomena. But the
law of the unity of opposites is of particular importance for understanding this whole Leninist analysis
of the new era and its fundamental problems. Lenin points out that the problem of the contradictions
of capitalism in the monopoly stage of its development is the crown task of the critique of
imperialism. Lenin writes: “Questions about whether a reformist change in the foundations of
imperialism is possible, whether to go forward to further aggravate and deepen the contradictions
engendered by it, or back to blunt them, are fundamental questions of the criticism of
imperialism. Since the political features of imperialism are the reaction along the line and the
strengthening of national oppression in connection with the oppression of the financial oligarchy and
the elimination of free competition, the petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism appears
in almost all imperialist countries at the beginning of the 20th century. And the break with Marxism on
the part of Kautsky and the broad international trend of Kautskyism lies precisely in the fact that
Kautsky not only did not care,[576] .
It is clear that the question of how to understand the theory of contradictions, how to apply the
laws of materialist dialectics to the analysis of imperialism, are the fundamental questions of the
criticism of imperialism. This is the line between Bolshevism and opportunism of any order. This is the
line between the true revolutionary understanding of the materialist dialectic and those who tried to
reduce the materialist dialectic to the theory of blunting contradictions. Lenin points out: “Kautsky’s
theoretical criticism of imperialism therefore has nothing to do with Marxism, and therefore it is
suitable only as an approach to preaching peace and unity with opportunists and social-chauvinists,
because this criticism bypasses and obscures just the most deep and fundamental contradictions of
imperialism : the contradiction between monopolies and the free competition existing next to them,
[577]
.
Opportunists of any kind, departing from Marxian dialectics, also cover up the main contradictions
between the working class and the bourgeoisie, contradictions between imperialist states,
contradictions between colonial imperialist countries, etc., etc. All these questions are fundamental
questions of analysis and criticism of imperialism . It is clear now that in this epoch the question of the
law of the unity of opposites could not but get an extremely large sharpening.
Naturally, this question should have received further theoretical development from Lenin. In his
remarks and preparatory work for "Imperialism" Lenin repeatedly on the margin points out the
importance of precisely the theoretical, that is, the philosophical, development of the law of the unity
of opposites.
If we take Lenin’s work “The State and the Revolution”, then undoubtedly, the main line on which
this work is built is to clarify the development of the Marxist view of the state as a product of the
intransigence of the class struggle, as opposed to the social democratic teachings about the state as a
product reconciliation classes. Thus, here the main question of the methodological order is the
question of the unity of opposites.
Lenin develops and specifies the question of the relationship between the moments of unity and
the struggle of opposites. Let us recall the well-known Leninist position concerning the absoluteness of
struggle and relativity of unity, identity, coincidence of contradictions.
Lenin emphasizes the need for a concrete analysis of contradictions and
various types. contradictions. In fact, in the epoch of imperialism we have contradictions in the most
extreme terms between the working class and capitalists, between the imperialist states, between the
metropolises and the colonial countries. It's all a different type of contradiction. It is also necessary to
point out the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry: the contradictions between
the working class and the peasantry in the era before the victory of the proletarian revolution, the
contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry in the era of the proletarian
revolution. Finally, we have an exceptionally brilliant formulation of the question of the relationship
between the proletarian and bourgeois-democratic revolution, when the solution of the tasks of the
bourgeois-democratic revolution becomes a by-product of the proletarian revolution, etc. The entire
set of these problems that have arisen in the field of social science,
In developing further the materialist dialectics as a philosophical science, Lenin did not confine
himself to working out the law of the unity of opposites as the core of dialectics. He gave further
theoretical development of all other categories of materialist dialectics, their connection with each
other and with the law of the unity of opposites. Above, when setting forth the laws of materialist
dialectics, we have seen how these questions were developed by Lenin on the basis of the practice of
the revolutionary struggle of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, on the basis of his
study of the state of modern natural science.
Finally, the question of the partisanship of philosophy and science .
The doctrine of the partisanship of philosophy and science in general is the most important link in
Lenin’s development of dialectical materialism. It is no coincidence that the fact that it was Lenin who
gave such a brilliant further development of this most important issue and in this direction. The new
era, the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, is an era of gigantic class clashes, powerful
proletarian uprisings, an era of unprecedented intensification of the class struggle. The struggle of
classes acquires an exceptional degree of aggravation in this epoch, the main classes of capitalist
society come forward fully armed in the historical arena, this struggle is rising to a new level
compared to the period of industrial capitalism. In this era, political parties get a very big
development. Not only the proletariat forges its communist party in every country, thereby reinforcing
to a very large extent their own consciousness, their cohesion and organization. The bourgeoisie is
also hard forging their parties. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in Russia,
taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the
bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined,
militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of
capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp
antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class
differentiation runs with great clarity. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in
Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the
bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined,
militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of
capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp
antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class
differentiation runs with great clarity. Taking into account the lessons of the proletarian revolution in
Russia, taking into account the experience of the first round of proletarian revolutions in the West, the
bourgeoisie is intensively organized, strengthening its parties, creating powerful and disciplined,
militarily built party organizations, such as the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The antagonism of
capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics, this sharp
antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class
differentiation runs with great clarity. like for example the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The
antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics,
this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class
differentiation runs with great clarity. like for example the fascist party in Italy and Germany. The
antagonism of capitalism receives its profound expression not only in the field of politics, economics,
this sharp antagonism is also reflected in all areas of science, in the field of ideology. And here class
differentiation runs with great clarity.
In his article “The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionaryness” in December 1905, Lenin gave
excellent characteristics of partisanship and non-partyism. So he writes: “Strict partisanship is a
satellite and the result of a highly developed class struggle. And, on the contrary, in the interests of
open and wide class struggle, the development of strict partisanship is necessary ” [578] .
He goes on to say: “The most consistent, complete and well-formed expression of the political
struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. Non-partisanship is indifference to the struggle of
parties. But this indifference does not equal neutrality, refraining from the struggle, because in the
class struggle there can be no neutrals, it is impossible to “refrain” in capitalist society from
participating in the exchange of products or labor. And exchange inevitably gives rise to an economic
struggle, and after it, a political struggle. Indifference in the struggle is not, therefore, in fact, a
suspension from the struggle, abstention or neutrality. Indifference is the tacit support of the one who
is strong, of the one who dominates ” [579] .
So that there is no ambiguity in the sense that Lenin's provisions relate not only to political issues,
but also to the ideological struggle, we present one place from the same Lenin article. He further
writes: “Non-partisanship is a bourgeois idea. Partyness is a socialist idea. This provision is by and
large applicable to all bourgeois society. Of course, one must be able to apply this general truth to
individual particular questions and particular cases ” [580] .
These places with remarkable clarity formulate the problem of partisanship. True, the application of
these provisions, these truths to the field of ideology, to the field of science requires consideration of
the uniqueness, specificity of the subject, the special nature of this area, the special forms in which
the struggle is expressed. However, there is no doubt that these provisions reveal much to us for
understanding the Leninist principle of partisanship of philosophy and science.
From what has been said it becomes quite clear why it is precisely in this direction that, in
connection with and in accordance with the new epoch, the theoretical development of the Marxist
provisions on the party character of science and philosophy is proceeding. Between the quoted lines of
Lenin, written by him in 1905, the brilliant pages about the partisanship of philosophy and the
struggle of parties in science in “Materialism and empirio-criticism” in 1908, Lenin's notes on
philosophy in the IX – XII “Lenin collections” in 1914 and Finally, Lenin's article “On the Meaning of
Militant Materialism” - there is a deep internal connection, giving us the opportunity to fully clarify the
essence of his teaching on the partisanship of philosophy.
Lenin's development of the principle of partisanship of science consists in the fact that he showed
all the limitations of objectivism , which falls into the apologetics of the ruling classes, and all the
limitations of subjectivism , which turns social science into a series of edifications of philistine
morality. He showed all the limitations, objectivism, welcoming the spontaneous course of the
historical process and not understanding the active, effective role of the revolutionary class in
changing reality, as well as all the limitations of subjectivism , which reduces the historical process to
the actions of an abstract far-fetched personality, endowed with the same reactionary morality and
"modern moral ideas.
Lenin showed that the partisanship of dialectical materialism is not at all in the synthesis (in the
sense of reconciliation) of subjectivism and objectivism, as Deborin presented this case in his book
Lenin as a Thinker. Lenin showed that the point of view of dialectical materialism is the highest point
of view, overcoming and removing both objectivism and subjectivism; he overcomes objectivism
because he proceeds from the active, effective position of the revolutionary class — the proletariat,
which is changing the world; he overcomes subjectivism because he firmly holds on to the objective
reality of biased facts.
The party spirit of philosophy is the most important link, the central point, which is characteristic of
Lenin's approach to the problems of philosophical theory. This is due to the fact that none other than
Lenin gave the most profound, tested on the facts of the new era after Marx and Engels, the
theoretical and practical resolution of the question of the relationship between theory and practice. It
was Lenin who tirelessly emphasized in his works, in contrast to the theory and practice of the Second
International, in contrast to Plekhanov, the position of the founders of materialism that "our theory is
not a dogma, but a guide for revolutionary action." The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of
philosophy and theory is generally associated with deep inner roots with the whole concept of
Leninism in general. It is connected with the fact that it was Leninism that gave and gives examples of
the unity of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. The doctrine of partisanship, as if in
focus, collects, reflects a number of the most important aspects of Marxism-Leninism. This doctrine
expresses most fully, most consistently, most specifically for our era, the thesis of Marx that
philosophers should not only explain the world, but change it. The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship
of philosophy, the resolution of the question of subjectivism and objectivism, theory and practice is an
excellent development and concretization of Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach.
The essence of the Leninist development of the principle of partisanship of philosophy and science
can be reduced to the following five points:
First of all. The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of science and philosophy is the best
expression of the tasks of the proletariat in the field of science and philosophy, when all bourgeois
science experiences the most severe internal crisis and decay, when "nonpartisan philosophy is only a
contemptible conceit behind idealism and fideism" [581] . The Leninist doctrine of the partisanship of
philosophy represents the best revelation in the era of acute class struggle in science of the class and
party character of bourgeois philosophy and theory, as well as all sorts of similar social fascist
theories.
Secondly. The principle of partisanship of the theory means the most complete and comprehensive
interpretation of the Marxist thesis about the effectiveness of our theory. According to the teachings of
Leninism, his party is the most advanced, most active, most effective part of the working
class. Therefore, who really and consistently wants to hold the point of view of the class of science, he
must extend this understanding to an understanding of the partisanship of science.
Thirdly. In Lenin's doctrine of partisan philosophy, the most complete and detailed resolution of the
question of theory and practice, the primacy of practice, is given. Lenin's resolution of this issue
provides a pattern of struggle with both the idealistic interpretation of this problem, when theoretical
activity is considered a primate, and with a creeping-empirical point of view, which eliminates the role
and significance of theory in general and theoretical work in particular. None other than Lenin in all his
works emphasized the tremendous importance of revolutionary theory. Recognizing that without a
revolutionary theory there is not and cannot be a revolutionary working-class movement, Lenin at the
same time wrote: “With this emphasis on the necessity, importance and enormity of the theoretical
work of the Social Democrats, I don’t want to say that this work comes first practical , the less that
the second was postponed until the end of the first. So only fans of the "subjective method in
sociology" or followers of utopian socialism "could conclude" [582] . The doctrine of the partisanship of
materialism expresses precisely the whole depth of the Leninist resolution of the question of theory
and practice.
 Fourth. The principle of partisanship of philosophy and science gives the classical resolution of the
most important question about the relationship between philosophy, science and politics. We have
seen above what absurdities piled up by bourgeois science on this issue and how Social Democratic
theorists are trying their best to break all ties between politics and science. Meanwhile, in this
question Lenin gave an extremely large amount of new things. It is worth remembering the discussion
about the trade unions and the accusation of Lenin, then advanced by Comrade Bukharin, for his
supposedly too "political" approach. It was then about the relationship between economics and
politics. How did Lenin respond? He wrote: “Politics is a concentrated expression of economics,” I
repeated in my speech, because I had already heard this incomparable in the mouth of a Marxist
completely unacceptable reproach for my “political” approach.Politics can not have primacy over the
economy. To argue otherwise - is to forget the ABC of Marxism " [583] .
Here the Lenin understanding of Marxism and its dialectic, its concrete approach, have the most
profound effect. He further explains: “For the question is (and in Marxist it can stand) only this way:
without a correct political approach to the matter, this class will not retain its domination,
and therefore will not be able to solve its production task ” [584] .
Lenin here explains in what sense he puts in the forefront a political approach . Although the
economy decides in the last analysis, however, without the right political approach, without the right
political line, the proletariat cannot win its victory, and after its victory the solution of economic
problems. It may seem that Lenin was given here the formulation of a question concerning only
economics and politics. This is not true. These statements by Lenin have a much wider meaning, in
particular, they are also extremely important for understanding our approach to the problems of
theory. And here, in matters of theory and theoretical struggle, the political approach cannot but have
the primacy. During the struggle with Menshevist idealism, some of its representatives zealously
defended the primacy, the primacy of philosophy over politics, on the grounds that philosophy is a
universal methodology, completely without understanding the point of view of our party on this issue.
Fifth. The doctrine of partisanship philosophy notes as its most important moment an active
struggle for the general line of the party.
Even in his struggle with Struve, as we have seen, Lenin wrote that "materialism includes, so to
speak, partisanship, obliging with any assessment of the event directly and openly to take on the
point of view of a certain social group" [585] . Under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
when the communist party is the one and only party of the proletariat, when hostile, class ideological
processes are reflected within the party in the form of various deviations from the party’s general line,
it can only mean openly and openly : active defense and struggle for the general line of the party. In
connection with all this, it is possible to specify the Leninist position for the present epoch as follows:
in the struggle against any open or disguised opportunism, dialectical materialism includes
partisanship, i.e. obliges it directly and openly, actively and consistently to fight for the general line
party. Representatives of Menshevist idealism, trying to define the partisanship of philosophy, gave an
extremely abstract, extremely academic, non-partisan definition of the partisanship of philosophy,
which supposedly boiled down to the fact that the philosophical section of the theoretical front should
look for the "methodological" keys of each era. The anti-Party nature of such a definition is that the
Deborin group "forgot" that the only guiding theoretical and practical the center in the era of the
dictatorship of the proletariat is the party and its central committee. The most important feature of
Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Party is that the leading headquarters is not only the politically
organizational center of the revolutionary movement, but also its ideological and theoretical
center. The peculiarity of Bolshevism as opposed to the parties of the Second International consists
precisely in the fact that it forges such a leadership of the Communist Party, which is a genuine
theoretical synthesis of theory and practice, theory and politics, theory and organization, theory and
tactics. It is precisely because the leading headquarters of Leninism gives such a synthesis that it is
the center of truly creative Marxism .
6.5. Tov. Stalin and materialistic dialectics
The further development of Marxist-Leninist theory in all its constituent parts, including the
philosophy of Marxism, is associated with the name of Comrade Stalin. In all practical work, in all
theoretical works of Comrade Stalin, all the experience of the world struggle of the proletariat, all the
wealth of the content of Marxist-Leninist theory is embodied. Tov. Stalin develops and specifies the
doctrine of Leninism decisively in all areas. Comrade Stalin devotes special attention in all his works to
the problem of the unity of theory and practice, the question of the martial creative character of the
Marxist doctrine.
The combat character of the Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of the Marxist doctrine as a
revolutionary-critical weapon of changing the world, theunity of theory and practice — all this is
further developed in the works of Comrade Stalin. It was he who conducted a huge struggle with all
sorts of dogmatic, scholastic distortions of Marxian dialectics. In the struggle against voluntarism, with
Trotsky's eclecticism, with Zinoviev’s “Quotation Marxism”, with Bukharin’s scholastics, with
equilibrium theory, with Menshevik idealism — in the struggle with these theorists, Comrade Stalin
lifts the development of our military theory to a new level.
With particular force, Comrade Stalin exposes the dogmatism of international Menshevism, social-
fascism, their emasculation of all revolutionary content from Marxism.
Even at the VI Party Congress, Comrade Stalin, objecting to the statements of Preobrazhensky
about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in your country, pointed out:
“The possibility is not ruled out that it is Russia that will be a country paving the way to
socialism ... We must cast aside the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is a
Marxism dogmatic and Marxism creative. I stand on the basis of the latter ” [586] .
The whole subsequent struggle: against Trotskyism, against the Zinoviev-Kamenev variety shows
it, with what ingenious foresight the materialistic dialectic was applied by Comrade Stalin to the most
important issue, the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country. Conducting a fundamental
distinction between dogmatic "Marxism" and Marxism is genuine is the leitmotif of a number of further
speeches by Comrade Stalin, in which he deals with these problems. Particular attention should be
paid to the article by t. Stalin dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, published in Pravda in
April 1920. There, t. Stalin wrote:
“There are two groups of Marxists. Both of them work under the flag of Marxism, consider
themselves "truly" Marxist. And yet they are far from identical. Moreover, there is a whole gulf
between them, for the methods of their work are diametrically opposite.
The first group is usually limited to external recognition of Marxism, its solemn declaration. Without
being able or willing to grasp the essence of Marxism, not being able or unwilling to translate it into
reality, it transforms the living and revolutionary positions of Marxism into dead, non-speaking
formulas. She bases her activity not on experience, not on practical work, but on quotations from
Marx. It draws instructions and directives not from an analysis of living reality, but from analogies and
historical parallels. The discrepancy between the word and the deed is the main illness of this group ...
The second group, on the contrary, transfers the center of gravity of the question from the
external recognition of Marxism to its holding, to its implementation. The purpose of the ways and
means of implementing Marxism corresponding to the situation, the change of these ways and means
when the situation changes is what this group mainly draws its attention to ... Marx's words are quite
appropriate to this group, by virtue of which Marxists cannot dwell on to explain the world, but must
go further in order to change it. The name of this group is Bolshevism, communism " [587]. Do I need a
clearer, clearer description of the works of Comrade Stalin himself? Speech at the conference of
Marxist agricultural workers, where the task was to eliminate the kulaks as a class, a speech at a
meeting of business executives — six historical conditions, recent speeches on collective farm issues,
etc. — all are examples of the “implementation” of Marxist-Leninist teachings, everything these are
examples of “outlining the ways and means of implementing Marxism, appropriate to the situation,
changing these ways and means when the situation changes.”
Comrade Stalin returns many times to the question of the effective character of the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine of combating all and all opportunistic perversions. Here is another place:
“What is Marxism? Marxism is science. Can Marxism be preserved and developed as a science if it
is not enriched by the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, if it does not digest this
experience from the point of view of Marxism, from the point of view of the Marxist method? It is clear
that can not.
Is it not clear after this that Marxism requires the improvement and enrichment of the old formulas
on the basis of taking into account the new experience while maintaining the point of view of Marxism,
while preserving its method, and Zinoviev does the opposite, retaining the letter and replacing the
letter of Marxism with the individual provisions of Marxism, his method.
What can be common between real Marxism and the substitution of the main line of Marxism with
a letter of separate formulas and quotations from individual provisions of Marxism? ” [588] .
This characteristic of the Marxist method, the materialist dialectic as a science, which must be
constantly enriched by the new experience of the proletariat’s class struggle, which should
theoretically generalize and digest this experience, is very important for understanding the essence of
Marxist theory. Thus we see that the fundamental principle of the creative character of the powerful
Marxist doctrine, of the unity of revolutionary theory and practice, of materialistic dialectics, the
greatest tool of knowledge and changes in the world, is a common thread in all the works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin.
 And precisely because Comrade Stalin gives us a sample of such an effective understanding and
application of Marxism, that is why he also gives us examples of further theoretical development of
the questions of materialist dialectics. Indeed, it is worth recalling the statements of comrade Stalin
on the issue of the link, the subjective and objective factors of historical development, the categories
of possibility and reality, his criticism of the theory of equilibrium and the theory of gravity so that it
becomes clear what profound theoretical development of the materialistic questions dialectics he gives
us. It is precisely t. Stalin truly, in the spirit of Lenin's testament “On the Meaning of Militant
Materialism”, develops this dialectic from all sides, using “those examples of dialectics in the field of
economic, political relations, such as modern history, [589] .
Dialectics is the soul of Marxism, Comrade Stalin follows Lenin. . At the XVI Congress of the Party,
Comrade Stalin follows characterized Lenin's formulation of the question of the right of nations to self-
determination up to secession "this" contradictory "formula reflects that living truth of Marx's dialectic,
which gives the Bolsheviks able to take the most impregnable fortress on the national
question" [ 590] . Criticizing further opportunism, he said: “Whoever did not understand this dialectic of
historical processes, he died for Marxism. The trouble with our draft dodgers is that they do not
understand and do not want to understand Marxian dialectics ” [591] .
We give here two or three samples of the dialectic of Comrade Stalin, which enabled and enables
the Bolsheviks to take the most impregnable fortresses. Take the analysis of the nature of the
collective farms given by Comrade Stalin in his speech at the conference of Marxist agrarians. Defining
the type of collective farm economy as one of the forms of socialist economy ‚t. Stalin approaches this
definition from the point of view of analyzing people's relations in the production process, that is, from
the point of view of the only consistent Marxist criterion for determining the social nature of the
economy. And from this single correct point of view, “doesn’t the collective farm represent the
socialization of the main instruments of production on land belonging to the same state? What is the
basis for asserting that collective farms as a type of economy do not represent a form of socialist
economy? ”[592] . Establishing the socialist nature of collective farms as a type of economy, Comrade
Stalin turns to an analysis of the internal contradictions of the collective farm, distinguishing it from
the consistently socialist type of economy and enterprises. Of particular interest is the analysis of the
elements of class struggle on collective farms. He writes: “This is exactly the mistake of our“ left
”phrase phrase that they do not see this difference. What does the class struggle outside the collective
farms, before the formation of collective farms? This means fighting the kulaks who own the tools and
means of production and enslaving themselves to the poor with the help of these tools and means of
production. This struggle is a struggle not for life, but for death. And what does the class struggle on
the base collective farms? This means, first of all, that the fist is broken and devoid of tools and
means of production ... This means, finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective farms,
of which some have not yet freed themselves from individualistic and kulak remnants and are trying to
use some inequality in collective farms to their advantage, while others want to banish these
remnants and this inequality from the collective farms ” [593] .
We see in this way how Comrade Stalin reveals the qualitative difference that exists between the
class struggle in the countryside outside the collective farm and the elements of the class struggle on
the collective farm. Only by proficiently using the materialist dialectic method, the method of truly
concrete analysis of complex concrete reality, only by being able to apply the most important laws of
dialectics, the laws of quality, quantity, measure, the unity of opposites in Leninist way, such a clear
analysis of the collective nature of collective farms can be given. One thing - the contradictions in the
village outside the collective farms on a qualitatively different basis, another thing is the existing
contradictions in collective farms already on a different qualitative basis, in a different type of farm. It
is one thing - the struggle with the fist, the owner of tools and means of production, the struggle for
life and death, and the other thing is the struggle against kulak, individualistic remnants on the basis
of collective farms. One thing is the first type of contradictions, another thing is second-order
contradictions.
All the works of Comrade Stalin are an inexhaustible number of such samples of materialistic
dialectics. We will only mention the next question here - this is a question about national and socialist
culture. Everyone is familiar with the Stalinist analysis of the nature and slogans of national culture
under the rule of the bourgeoisie and under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here are two types of
resolution of the unity of form and content, which gives us a living reality and which were opened with
such skill by Comrade Stalin. This is what Comrade Stalin said at the XVI Party Congress: “What is
national culture under the rule of the national bourgeoisie? Bourgeois in its content and national in its
form culture, which aims to poison the masses with the poison of nationalism and strengthen the rule
of the bourgeoisie. What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? Socialist in its
content and national in form culture, which aims to educate the masses in the spirit of
internationalism and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. How can these two fundamentally
different phenomena be mixed without breaking with Marxism ” [594] .
The main point in the analysis of these phenomena by comrade Stalin is the difference in class
structure and class nature of the dual type of domination - the domination of the national bourgeoisie
and the domination of the socialist proletariat and its dictatorship. Extremely characteristic in this
analysis is the materialistic primacy of content in the dialectical unity of form and content. Tov. Stalin
does not recognize once and for all the given unity of form and content — he analyzes the historical,
class background of this unity. The application of the theory of development to the question of culture
is extremely characteristic. We give this classic place from the work of t. Stalin. He wrote: “It may
seem strange that we, the supporters of the merger In the future, national cultures in one common
(both in form and content) culture with one common language, are at the same time supporters of
the flourishing of national cultures at the moment, in the period of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. But there is nothing strange about it. It is necessary to let national cultures develop and
unfold, revealing all their potencies in order to create conditions for their merging into one common
culture with one common language. The flourishing of national in form and socialist in content cultures
under the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country for merging them into one common socialist
(both in form and content) culture with one common language, when the proletariat wins all over the
world and socialism enters everyday life - this is precisely the dialectical nature of Lenin’s raising the
question of national culture [595] .
Here are vivid examples of materialistic dialectics. The one who would consider that we have here
only the application of dialectics, and not its development, not the development of the theory of
materialist dialectics, would be deeply mistaken . It must be understood that the actual creative
application of the method of materialist dialectics is at the same time its actual theoretical
development . In this case, the example of the unity of form and content shows what theoretical
wealth we get here. In addition to the two types of unity of form and content, the theory of
development applied to the national question provides a new type of unity of opposites: a uniform and
in the form and content of the culture of a communist society.
We have given here two examples of the application and development of materialist dialectics in
order to show how the party and Comrade Stalin, fulfilling Lenin’s directives and instructions, develop
from all sides materialistic dialectics, without which Marxism is, according to Lenin, not fighting, but
fighting . In the light of the creative understanding of Marxism, the effective understanding of
dialectical materialism, the scholastic nature of the development of dialectics, which was “conducted”
by Menshevist idealism in isolation from the practice of socialist construction, becomes completely
clear.
Our party attaches exceptional importance to revolutionary theory, without which revolutionary
practice is unthinkable. The materialistic dialectic is the revolutionary soul of Marxism-Leninism.
Notes
one
V. Lenin, The Three Sources and the Three Components of Marxism, Vol., Vol. XVI, p. 349. Here,
as everywhere else, Lenin is quoted in the third edition of the Collected Works.
( back )
2
V. Lenin, Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism, Vol., Vol. XVI, p. 349. We
underlined. - Auth.
( back )
3
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 28.
( back )
four
V. Lenin, Marx's correspondence with Engels, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVII, p. 30. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
five
V. Lenin, Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism, Vol., Vol. XVI, p. 353.
( back )
6
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Works, Vol. XIII, p. 117.
( back )
7
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 56.
( back )
eight
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 195. Cited hereinafter according to the 1933 edition.
( back )
9
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 145.
( back )
ten
K. Marx and F. Engels, On the Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Vol., Vol. I, p. 412.
( back )
eleven
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 55.
( back )
12
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 12.
( back )
13
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 144.
( back )
14
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 201.
( back )
15
K. Marx and F. Engels, International Reviews, Vol., Vol. VIII, pp. 238–239.
( back )
sixteen
K. Marx and F. Engels, Articles from New Moral World, Vol. II, pp. 405–406.
( back )
17
G. Hegel, Science of Logic, 1929, p. 71.
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18
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 59.
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nineteen
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 214. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
20
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 42.
( back )
21
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 42.
( back )
22
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 43.
( back )
23
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 42.
( back )
24
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 59.
( back )
 25
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 147.
( back )
26
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 6.
( back )
27
K. Marx and F. Engels, On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Soch., Vol. I, p. 400.
( back )
28
K. Marx and F. Engels, Holy Family, Works, vol. III, p. 56.
( back )
29
K. Marx and F. Engels, German Ideology, Coll., Vol IV, p. 28.
( back )
thirty
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 61.
( back )
31
K. Marx and F. Engels, Preparatory Works for the “Holy Family,” Vol. III, p. 628.
( back )
32
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. XXIII. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
33
V. Lenin, Against the boycott, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. XII, p. 32.
( back )
34
K. Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1933, p. 26.
( back )
35
K. Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1933, p. 38.
( back )
36
K. Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1933, p. 28.
( back )
37
K. Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1933, p. 28.
( back )
38
K. Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1933, p. 28.
( back )
39
K. Marx and F. Engels, German-French Chronicles, Vol., Vol. I, p. 366.
( back )
40
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 7. In the future, everywhere will be quoted on the 9th
edition.
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41
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 7. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
42
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 8. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
 43
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 8. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
44
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 6. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
45
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 16. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
46
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 274.
( back )
47
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 326.
( back )
48
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 326.
( back )
49
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 277.
( back )
50
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 276.
( back )
51
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 443.
( back )
52
P. Holbach, The System of Nature, 1924, p. 31.
( back )
53
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 17.
( back )
54
F. Mehring, Sat. “On philosophical and literary themes”, D. Locke, 1923, p. 3.
( back )
55
J. Berkeley, Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 62–63.
( back )
56
J. Berkeley, A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 84–85.
( back )
57
D. Diridre, Selected Works, Vol. I, 1926, p. 150.
( back )
58
M. Planck, Positivismus und reale Aussenweit, S. 1.
( back )
59
A. Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6.
( back )
60
E. Husserl, Philosophy as a strict science. "Logos", Prince. 1, 1911, p. 56.
( back )
61
 V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 162. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
62
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1907, pp. 24–25. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
63
I. Kant, The Range to any future metaphysics, 1905, p. 54.
( back )
64
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1907, p. 99, Note. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
65
I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1907, p. 244, Note.
( back )
66
G. Hegel, Philosophical Propedeutics, 1927, pp. 163–164.
( back )
67
G. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, 1913, p. 11.
( back )
68
G. Hegel, Philosophical Propedeutics, 1927, p. 11.
( back )
69
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1932, p. 16.
( back )
70
R. Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Bd. II, pp. 271-272.
( back )
71
Th. Litt, Die Philosophie der Gegenswart, II Aufl., S. 74–75.
( back )
72
D. Manuilsky, Report at the XI Plenum of the ECCI. - “The Communist Party and the Crisis of
Capitalism”, Partisdat, 1932, p. 35. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
73
D. Manuilsky, Report at the XI Plenum of the ECCI. - “The Communist Party and the Crisis of
Capitalism”, Partisdat, 1932, p. 37.
( back )
74
D. Manuilsky, Report at the XI Plenum of the ECCI. - “The Communist Party and the Crisis of
Capitalism”, Partisdat, 1932, p. 37. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
75
D. Manuilsky, Report at the XI Plenum of the ECCI. - “The Communist Party and the Crisis of
Capitalism”, Partisdat, 1932, pp. 606–608. Underlined by us. -Auth.
( back )
76
G. Gentile, Sistema di Logica, v. II, p. 144
( back )
77
G. Gentile, Lʼesprit acte pur, p. 144
( back )
78
 G. Gentile, Lʼesprit acte pur, p. 217.
( back )
79
G. Gentile, Sistema di Logica, v. II, p. 188.
( back )
80
V. Lenin, On the Meaning of Militant Materialism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVII, p. 187. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
81
L. Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, Vol. III, p. 353.
( back )
82
K. Marx and F. Engels, German Ideology, Op., Vol IV, p. 35.
( back )
83
G. Plekhanov, From Idealism to Materialism, Vol. Vol. XVIII, p. 176.
( back )
84
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 213.
( back )
85
M. Stirner, The Only and His Property, 1907, p. 203.
( back )
86
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 213.
( back )
87
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 214.
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88
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 214.
( back )
89
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., Vol. I, pp. 200–201.
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90
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., Vol. I, p. 206–207.
( back )
91
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 171.
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92
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 181.
( back )
93
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 180.
( back )
94
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., Vol. I, p. 233.
( back )
95
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., Vol. I, p. 236.
( back )
96
 K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 231.
( back )
97
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 365.
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98
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 532.
( back )
99
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., Vol. I, p. 406.
( back )
100
K. Marx and F. Engels, Op., T. I, p. 412.
( back )
101
C. Marx and F. Engels, On the Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Soch., Vol. I, p. 411.
( back )
102
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 216.
( back )
103
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 215.
( back )
104
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 215.
( back )
105
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 216.
( back )
106
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 216.
( back )
107
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 218.
( back )
108
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 215.
( back )
109
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 220.
( back )
110
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 221.
( back )
111
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 221.
( back )
112
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 223.
( back )
113
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 224.
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114
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 222.
( back )
115
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 241.
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116
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 227. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
117
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, t. I ‚p. 223. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
118
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 139.
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119
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 216. We emphasize. - Auth.
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120
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 17.
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121
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 98.
( back )
122
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 100. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
123
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 10.
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124
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 10.
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125
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 75. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
126
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 35. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
127
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 70.
( back )
128
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 30.
( back )
129
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 119. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
130
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 213. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
131
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 213.
( back )
132
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 41. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
 133
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 41.
( back )
134
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 221.
( back )
135
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 13.
( back )
136
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XIII, p. 220.
( back )
137
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 219.
( back )
138
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 97. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
139
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 85. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
140
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 143.
( back )
141
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 36.
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142
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 143. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
143
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 145.
( back )
144
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 146.
( back )
145
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 144. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
146
See for example the work of Zeitlin.
( back )
147
B. Hessen, Basic Ideas of the Theory of Relativity, p. 64.
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148
“The Archive of Marx and Engels,” Vol. I, p. 220. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
149
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. XXIII.
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150
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 111.
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151
 "Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 227.
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152
“Lenin's Collection” IX, p. 203. We emphasize. - Auth.
( back )
153
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XIII, pp. 44–45. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
154
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 46.
( back )
155
G. Plekhanov, Notes to the 1st ed. "L. Feuerbach ", 1931, p. 117.
( back )
156
G. Plekhanov, Notes to the 1st ed. "L. Feuerbach ", 1931, p. 118.
( back )
157
G. Plekhanov, Once again materialism, that is, XI, p. 141.
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158
G. Plekhanov, Materialism again, v. XI, p. 142.
( back )
159
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XIII, Appendices, p. 330. We are
underlined. - Auth.
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160
V. Sarabyanov, article in “Under the banner of Marxism” No. 6, 1926, p. 64.
( back )
161
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 193.
( back )
162
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 59.
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163
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 37.
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164
V. Sarabyanov, article in “Under the banner of Marxism” No. 6, 1926, p. 66.
( back )
165
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 108. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
166
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 84.
( back )
167
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 100. Underlined by us. - Auth.
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168
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 203.
( back )
 169
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 110. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
170
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 7.
( back )
171
S. Gonikman, Lenin as a Philosopher, ed. 2 nd., P. 40.
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172
A. Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, ed. 3rd, 1929, p. 27.
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173
V. Sarabyanov, article in “Under the banner of Marxism” No. 6, 1926, p. 67.
( back )
174
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 261.
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175
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 257. We emphasize. - Auth.
( back )
176
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, pp. 134–135. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
177
"Leninsky collection" XI, p. 362.
( back )
178
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 442.
( back )
179
“Archive of Marx and Engels,” Vol. III, p. 253.
( back )
180
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 116. It is underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
181
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 289.
( back )
182
“Lenin's Collection” IX, pp. 183–185.
( back )
183
V. Lenin, What to do, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. IV, p. 380. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
184
"Lenin's collection" I, p. 145.
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185
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 61.
( back )
186
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., Pp. 16–17. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
187
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 6.
( back )
188
V. Lenin, The Three Sources and the Three Components of Marxism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XVI, p. 349.
Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
189
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 292.
( back )
190
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 325.
( back )
191
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 11.
( back )
192
K. Marx, Unpublished Manuscripts, Bolshevik, No. 6, 1932, p. 80.
( back )
193
I. Rubin, Essays on the theory of value, ed. 4th., P. 217.
( back )
194
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 208.
( back )
195
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1931, p. 18. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
196
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, pp. 14–15.
( back )
197
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 125.
( back )
198
"Lenin's collection" XII, p. 185.
( back )
199
“Lenin's Collection” IX, pp. 127–129.
( back )
200
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 183.
( back )
201
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 85. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
202
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 193.
( back )
203
"Lenin's collection" XII, p. 191. We emphasize. - Auth.
( back )
204
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 133.
( back )
205
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 321. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
206
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 321.
( back )
207
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 323.
( back )
208
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 323.
( back )
209
“Lenin's Collection” XII, pp. 323–324.
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210
This view is most fully formulated by F. Engels in The Dialectic of Nature.
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211
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 275.
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212
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 277.
( back )
213
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 131.
( back )
214
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 69.
( back )
215
K. Marx, Criticizing Political Economy, p. 16.
( back )
216
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 324. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
217
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. 9. Underlined by us. - Auth.
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218
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, pp. 43–44.
( back )
219
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. 85.
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220
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. 57. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
221
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. 100.
( back )
222
K. Marx and Engels, Letters, p. 198.
( back )
 223
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 227.
( back )
224
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 23.
( back )
225
V. Lenin, The Attitude of Social Democracy to the Peasant Movement, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. VIII, p. 186.
( back )
226
V. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIII, p. 394.
( back )
227
V. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIII, p. 394.
( back )
228
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 234. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
229
G. Hegel, Science of Logic, 1929, p. 54.
( back )
230
G. Hegel, Op., Vol. I, 1930, p. 157.
( back )
231
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 125.
( back )
232
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 127.
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233
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 127.
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234
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 81.
( back )
235
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 81.
( back )
236
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 11. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
237
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 277. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
238
“Lenin's Collection” IX, p. 285. The latter is underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
239
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 301. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
240
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 100. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
241
 V. Lenin, What is the "Friends of the People" and how are they fighting against the Social
Democrats ?, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. I, p. 80. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
242
V. Lenin, What is the "Friends of the People" and how are they fighting against the Social
Democrats ?, Op., Ed. 3rd, vol. I, p. 84.
( back )
243
"Leninsky collection" XI, p. 378.
( back )
244
V. Lenin, Step forward, two steps back, Op., Ed. 3rd, T. VI, p. 326.
( back )
245
V. Lenin, Step forward, two steps back, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. VI, p. 326. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
246
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, pp. 57–58.
( back )
247
V. Marks, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, p. 589.
( back )
248
V. Lenin, The Collapse of the Second International, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, pp. 347-348. Underlined
by us. - Auth.
( back )
249
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 183. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
250
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, Theses on Feuerbach, 1933, p. 60. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
251
K. Marx, Theories of surplus value, vol. III, 1932, p. 107. We underline. - Auth.
( back )
252
K. Marx, Theories of surplus value, vol. III, 1932, pp. 98–99.
( back )
253
K. Marx, Theories of surplus value, vol. III, 1932, p. 356.
( back )
254
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, p. 15.
( back )
255
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, p. 18.
( back )
256
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, pp. 638–639.
( back )
257
K. Marx, Theories of surplus value, vol. II, 1932, pp. 198–199. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
258
K. Marx, Theories of surplus value, vol. II, 1932, p. 200.
( back )
259
V. Lenin, Party Crisis, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 87.
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260
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 107.
( back )
261
V. Lenin, To the slogans, Op., Ed. 3rd, T. XXI, p. 35.
( back )
262
V. Lenin, State and Revolution, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXI, p. 393.
( back )
263
V. Lenin, Hello to the Hungarian workers, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, p. 314.
( back )
264
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 34.
( back )
265
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 206.
( back )
266
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 115.
( back )
267
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 112. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
268
G. Hegel, Science of Logic, Vol. II, 1929, Part 1.
( back )
269
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 135.
( back )
270
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 277.
( back )
271
K. Marx, Toward a Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 209.
( back )
272
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. 41.
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273
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, pp. 33–34.
( back )
274
K. Marx, Toward a Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 35.
( back )
275
K. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, 1930, p. 128.
( back )
276
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIX, pp. 130–131.
( back )
 277
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 238.
( back )
278
V. Lenin, I Congress of the Communist International, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, p. 12.
( back )
279
V. Lenin, I Congress of the Communist International, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, p. 12. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
280
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 35.
( back )
281
V. Lenin, On the Problems of the Third International, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, pp. 398–399.
( back )
282
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 559.
( back )
283
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 145.
( back )
284
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 203.
( back )
285
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 149. Cf. In Marx: "The constant trend and law of the development of the
capitalist mode of production."
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286
“Lenin's Collection” IX, pp. 147–149.
( back )
287
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, Preface to the 1st ed., P. XV.
( back )
288
K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, 1932, Epilogue, p. XXI. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
289
K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, 1932, Afterword, p. XXII. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
290
K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, 1932, Afterword, p. XXII. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
291
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, Part 1, p. 105. We underlined. - Auth.
( back )
292
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, Part 1, p. 126. We underlined. - Auth.
( back )
293
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, Part 1, p. 127.
( back )
294
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIX, p. 170.
( back )
295
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XIX, p. 172. Underlined
by us. - Auth.
( back )
296
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XIX, p. 147.
( back )
297
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XIX, p. 147.
( back )
298
V. Lenin, On our revolution, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVII, p. 399. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
299
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 161. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
300
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 197.
( back )
301
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 161.
( back )
302
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 167.
( back )
303
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 163.
( back )
304
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 163. We underlined. - Auth.
( back )
305
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 14.
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306
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 14.
( back )
307
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, pp. 10–11.
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308
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 14. Underlined, except for the last, by us. - Auth.
( back )
309
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 14.
( back )
310
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, p. 15. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
311
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 128. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
312
L. Axelrod, Philosophical Essays.
( back )
313
K. Kautsky, A Materialistic Understanding of History, vol. I.
( back )
314
K. Marx and F. Engels, Letters, p. 405.
( back )
315
V. Lenin, Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the dictatorship of the proletariat, Vol.,
Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, pp. 633–634.
( back )
316
V. Lenin, Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the dictatorship of the proletariat, Vol.,
Ed. 3rd, T. XXIV, p. 634.
( back )
317
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 537.
( back )
318
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 537.
( back )
319
“Lenin's Collection” IX, pp. 215–217.
( back )
320
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 219.
( back )
321
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 213.
( back )
322
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 215.
( back )
323
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 325.
( back )
324
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, 1932, Part 2, p. 597. We underlined. - Auth.
( back )
325
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 42.
( back )
326
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 107. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
327
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 108. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
328
G. Hegel, Science of Logic, Vol. III, 1929, Part 1.
( back )
329
K. Marx and Engels, Letters, Letter from Engels to Starkenberg dated January 25, 1894, p. 408.
( back )
330
 F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1931, p. 41. “Economic movement as necessary makes its way
through an endless crowd of accidents (that is, things and events, the internal interrelationship of
which is so remote or so difficult to determine that we can forget about it, assume that it does not
exist ”) (Marx and Engels, Letters, Letter from Engels to Flea, September 21, 1890, p. 375).
( back )
331
K. Marx and Engels, Letters, Letter from Marx to Kuggelman dated April 17, 1871, pp. 209–
291. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
332
“Lenin's Collection” IX, pp. 227–229.
( back )
333
G. Hegel, Op., T. I p. 239. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
334
G. Hegel, Logic, Vol., V. I, 1930, p. 142.
( back )
335
See, for example, the early work of K. Marx “Criticism of the State Law of Hegel”, “The Archive of
Marx and Engels”, vol. III.
( back )
336
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 261. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
337
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 159.
( back )
338
G. Hegel, Op., T. I, p. 241. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
339
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 362.
( back )
340
V. Lenin, How do we reorganize Rabkrin, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVII, p. 405. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
341
V. Lenin, How do we reorganize Rabkrin, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVII, p. 405. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
342
L. Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 93.
( back )
343
L. Trotsky, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90.
( back )
344
V. Lenin, On the Slogan of the United States of Europe, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 232.
( back )
345
V. Lenin, On Cooperation, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVII, p. 392. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
346
V. Lenin, On the Slogan of the United States of Europe, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 233.
( back )
 347
V. Lenin, Better less, yes better, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVII, p. 415. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
348
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 222.
( back )
349
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 222.
( back )
350
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 351.
( back )
351
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., Pp. 350–351.
( back )
352
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 548.
( back )
353
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 560. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
354
I. Stalin, Results of the First Five-Year Plan, Partisat, 1933, pp. 24–25.
( back )
355
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 275.
( back )
356
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 203.
( back )
357
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 249. We emphasize. - Auth.
( back )
358
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 275.
( back )
359
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 229.
( back )
360
"Lenin's collection" XII, p. 185.
( back )
361
“Lenin's Collection” XII, pp. 181–183.
( back )
362
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 139.
( back )
363
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 275.
( back )
364
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 139.
( back )
365
 "Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 227.
( back )
366
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 229.
( back )
367
“Lenin's Collection” XII, pp. 290–291.
( back )
368
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 324.
( back )
369
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 325.
( back )
370
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 325.
( back )
371
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 229.
( back )
372
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 269.
( back )
373
F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1933, pp. 14–15. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
374
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 331.
( back )
375
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 337.
( back )
376
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 337.
( back )
377
H. Siegwart, Logic, Vol. I, p. 10.
( back )
378
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, pp. 25–26. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
379
K. Marx, On the Criticism of Political Economy, 1933, p. 26. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
380
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 100. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
381
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 101.
( back )
382
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 101.
( back )
383
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 102.
( back )
384
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1931, Preface by Plekhanov, p. 22.
( back )
385
G. Plekhanov, Thunder is not out of the cloud, Sat. “Labor Liberation Group” No. 6, p. 22.
( back )
386
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVI, p. 134.
( back )
387
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 211.
( back )
388
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 405.
( back )
389
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. XXVI, p. 132.
( back )
390
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. XXVI, p. 132.
( back )
391
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVI, p. 134. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
392
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1931, Preface by Plekhanov, p. 22.
( back )
393
V. Lenin, Marxism and Revisionism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XII, p. 184.
( back )
394
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 190.
( back )
395
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 444.
( back )
396
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 444.
( back )
397
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 444.
( back )
398
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 444.
( back )
399
V. Lenin, Disagreements in the European Labor Movement, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 5. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
400
V. Lenin, Disagreements in the European Labor Movement, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 6. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
401
 V. Lenin, Disagreements in the European Labor Movement, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 7.
( back )
402
V. Lenin, Notes journalist, Soch., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XIV, pp. 305–306.
( back )
403
V. Lenin, Notes journalist, Soch., Ed. 3rd, t. XIV, p. 304. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
404
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XXV, p. 179. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
405
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 180.
( back )
406
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 238. It is
underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
407
V. Lenin, X Congress of the RCP (B.), Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 267.
( back )
408
V. Lenin, Notes journalist, Soch., Ed. 3rd, t. XIV, p. 306. It is underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
409
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 324–325. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
410
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 439.
( back )
411
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 440.
( back )
412
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 439.
( back )
413
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 442. We emphasize it. - Auth.
( back )
414
Comintern Program, Introduction, p. 12.
( back )
415
V. Lenin, Our liquidators, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 88.
( back )
416
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 270.
( back )
417
V. Lenin, On Some Features of the Historical Development of Marxism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 74.
( back )
418
“Bulletin of the Communist Academy” No. 35–36, 1929, p. 280. Speech by Vol. I. Podvolotsky.
( back )
 419
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XXVI, p. 131. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
420
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 381.
( back )
421
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 191.
( back )
422
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 528.
( back )
423
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 526.
( back )
424
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 443. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
425
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 442. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
426
From the resolution of the party cell of the IKP F. and E. “Pravda” of January 26, 1931
( back )
427
Pravda, January 26, 1931
( back )
428
Pravda, January 26, 1931
( back )
429
"Pravda" dated January 26, 1931. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
430
V. Lenin, Children's disease of "leftism" in communism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXV, p. 174. Underlined
by us. - Auth.
( back )
431
I. Stepanov, Historical Materialism and Modern Natural Science, 1925, p. 57.
( back )
432
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, pp. 21–22.
( back )
433
Collection "Mechanistic Natural Science and Dialectical Materialism".
( back )
434
V. Lenin, On the Meaning of Militant Materialism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVII, p. 187.
( back )
435
V. Lenin, On the Meaning of Militant Materialism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVII, p. 188. We are
underlined. - Auth.
( back )
436
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 197.
( back )
437
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 290. Note.
( back )
438
G. Plekhanov, vol. XI, p. 46.
( back )
439
"Lenin's collection" XI, p. 385.
( back )
440
"Leninsky collection" XI, p. 348.
( back )
441
"Lenin's Collection" XI, p. 387.
( back )
442
"Lenin's Collection" XI, pp. 400-401.
( back )
443
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 416.
( back )
444
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 105.
( back )
445
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, Review (Orthodox) Axelrod on
the book "Materialism and empirio-criticism", p. 331.
( back )
446
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 106. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
447
V. Lenin, Karl Marx, Op., Ed. 3rd, v. XVIII, p. 11. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
448
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, Review (Orthodox) Axelrod on
the book "Materialism and empirio-criticism", p. 330.
( back )
449
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 110.
( back )
450
Magazine "Under the banner of Marxism" № 6, p. 66.
( back )
451
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 111.
( back )
452
V. Lenin, On the Question of Dialectics, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 302.
( back )
453
V. Sarabyanov, Historical Materialism, p. 147.
( back )
454
 L. Axelrod, In Defense of Dialectical Materialism, p. 224.
( back )
455
L. Axelrod, In Defense of Dialectical Materialism, p. 224.
( back )
456
L. Axelrod, In Defense of Dialectical Materialism, p. 226.
( back )
457
L. Axelrod, In Defense of Dialectical Materialism, p. 223.
( back )
458
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 122.
( back )
459
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 122.
( back )
460
F. Engels, The Dialectic of Nature, p. 216.
( back )
461
F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1931, p. 23.
( back )
462
N. Bukharin, The Attack Collection, p. 118.
( back )
463
N. Bukharin, The Attack Collection, p. 118.
( back )
464
N. Bukharin, The Attack Collection, p. 118.
( back )
465
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 76.
( back )
466
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. XXIII.
( back )
467
A. Bogdanov, The Philosophy of Living Experience, 1920, p. 189.
( back )
468
A. Bogdanov, The Philosophy of Living Experience, 1920, p. 208.
( back )
469
"Lenin's collection" XII, p. 385.
( back )
470
"Lenin's collection" XII, p. 385.
( back )
471
A. Bogdanov, Tectology, p. 105.
( back )
472
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 77.
( back )
473
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 793.
( back )
474
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, pp. 46–47.
( back )
475
"Leninsky collection" XI, p. 356.
( back )
476
"Lenin's collection" XI, p. 361.
( back )
477
I. Stepanov, Historical Materialism and Modern Natural Science, 1925, p. 26.
( back )
478
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 75.
( back )
479
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 80.
( back )
480
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 364.
( back )
481
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 75. Emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
482
N. Bukharin, The Theory of Historical Materialism, p. 76.
( back )
483
I. Stepanov, Historical Materialism and Modern Natural Science, 1925, p. 25.
( back )
484
V. Lenin, The Economic Content of Populism, Op., Ed. 3rd, vol. I, p. 276.
( back )
485
N. Karev, On the Real and Invalid Study of Hegel, Article in “Under the Banner of Marxism” No. 4–
5, 1924, p. 241.
( back )
486
A. Deborin, Preface to the IX Lenin Collection, p. 3, ed. 1st
( back )
487
A. Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, ed. 3rd, 1929, p. 26.
( back )
488
"Lenin's Collection" IX, p. 3.
( back )
489
V. Lenin, Letter to Gorky dated February 13, 1908, Op., Ed. 3rd, T. XXVIII, p. 524.
( back )
490
"Under the banner of Marxism" No. 6, 1930, p. 35. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
491
"Under the banner of Marxism" № 1 for 1924
( back )
492
N. Karev, Article in the Journal “Under the Banner of Marxism” No. 8–9 for 1925, p. 9. Underlined
by us. - Auth.
( back )
493
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1932, p. XXIII. Afterword to the second edition.
( back )
494
K. Marx, To the criticism of political economy. Review of Engels, p. 206.
( back )
495
A. Deborin, Dialectics in Kant, “Archive”, Vol. I, p. 14.
( back )
496
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 238.
( back )
497
A. Deborin, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1923, p. 134.
( back )
498
L. Feuerbach, Vol. I, p. 77.
( back )
499
V. Lenin, On Some Features of the Historical Development of Marxism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XV, p. 71.
( back )
500
A. Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, ed. 3rd, 1929, p. 42.
( back )
501
B. Hessen, Basic Ideas of the Theory of Relativity, p. 69, Moscow Worker.
( back )
502
A. Deborin, Dialectics and Natural Science, 1930, p. 31. We underline. - Auth.
( back )
503
G. Hegel, Op., T. I p. 135.
( back )
504
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 259.
( back )
505
A. Deborin, Dialectics and Natural Science, 1930, p. 27.
( back )
506
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 232. The latter is emphasized by us. - Auth.
( back )
507
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 234.
( back )
508
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 11.
( back )
509
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 325.
( back )
510
A. Deborin, Philosophy and Marxism, 1930, p. 234.
( back )
511
"Leninsky collection" XII, p. 324.
( back )
512
“Archive of Marx and Engels”, vol. I, p. 64.
( back )
513
L. Kaganovich, For a Bolshevik study of party history, Partisdat, 1932, p. 12.
( back )
514
A. Deborin, Dialectics and Natural Science, 1930, p. 246.
( back )
515
A. Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, ed. 3rd, 1929, p. 120.
( back )
516
A. Deborin, Lenin as a Thinker, ed. 3rd, 1929, p. 87.
( back )
517
"Lenin's Collection" XII, p. 326.
( back )
518
S. Kanatchikov, History of one bias.
( back )
519
L. Trotsky, Mendeleev and Marxism, Guise, 1925, p. 6. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
520
L. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol. I, ed. "Pomegranate", 1931, p. 15. Underlined by
us. - Auth.
( back )
521
V. Lenin, Against the boycott, Op., Ed. 3rd, t. XII, p. 32.
( back )
522
V. Lenin, Notes journalist, Soch., Ed. 3rd, T. XIV, p. 302.
( back )
523
V. Lenin, Notes journalist, Soch., Ed. 3rd, T. XIV, p. 303.
( back )
524
K. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, 1930, p. 102.
( back )
525
K. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, 1930, p. 102.
( back )
526
V. Lenin, On Trade Unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 65.
( back )
527
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 127.
( back )
528
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 136.
( back )
529
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, pp. 131, 136, 129.
( back )
530
L. Trotsky, My Life, vol. II, p. 234.
( back )
531
L. Trotsky, October Generation, p. 56.
( back )
532
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 268.
( back )
533
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 273.
( back )
534
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 274.
( back )
535
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 275.
( back )
536
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 275.
( back )
537
L. Trotsky, Culture and Socialism, Vol. XXI, p. 430.
( back )
538
L. Trotsky, Culture and Socialism, Vol. XXI, p. 430.
( back )
539
V. Lenin, Remarks on Bukharin's book "The Economy of the Transition Period".
( back )
540
L. Trotsky, DI Mendeleev and Marxism, Vol., Vol. XXI, p. 17.
( back )
541
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, pp. 507–510.
( back )
542
"Militant materialist", Prince. 2, 1925, p. 44.
( back )
543
N. Bukharin, The Attack Collection, p. 255.
( back )
544
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 16. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
 545
V. Lenin, Marxism on the State, 1931, p. 62.
( back )
546
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 11.
( back )
547
V. Lenin, Marxism and Revisionism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XII, pp. 184–185.
( back )
548
F. Mehring, Guarding Marxism, 1927, p. 136.
( back )
549
F. Mehring, Guarding Marxism, 1927, p. 31.
( back )
550
F. Mehring, Guarding Marxism, 1927, p. 94.
( back )
551
“Under the banner of Marxism” No. 12, 1926, p. 25.
( back )
552
G. Zinoviev, Leninism, 1926, p. 342.
( back )
553
G. Zinoviev, Leninism, 1926, p. 355.
( back )
554
G. Zinoviev, Leninism, 1926, p. 346. Underlined by us. - Auth.
( back )
555
“Lenin's Collection” II, pp. 88–89.
( back )
556
V. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. III, p. 12.
( back )
557
G. Plekhanov, vol. XIII, p. 17.
( back )
558
G. Plekhanov, Vol. XV, p. 125. Note.
( back )
559
G. Plekhanov, Vol. XV, p. 62. Note.
( back )
560
G. Plekhanov, Vol. XV, p. 72.
( back )
561
G. Plekhanov, Vol. XV, pp. 108–109.
( back )
562
G. Plekhanov, Vol. XV, p. 115.
( back )
563
 G. Plekhanov, vol. XIII, p. 133.
( back )
564
G. Plekhanov, On the theses of Lenin and why nonsense is sometimes interesting, Sat. “Year at
home”, Paris.
( back )
565
The collection “At the Turn” of 1909, in which F. Dan, A. Deborin, D. Koltsov, V. Lvov, L. Maslov,
Martynov, Nevedomsky, L. Orthodox, A. Potresov participated.
( back )
566
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 290. Note.
( back )
567
I. Luppol, Lenin and Philosophy, pp. 21–22.
( back )
568
The magazine "Under the banner of Marxism" № 4-5 for 1931, pp. 15-16.
( back )
569
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 263.
( back )
570
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 247.
( back )
571
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 211.
( back )
572
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 270.
( back )
573
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 206.
( back )
574
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 206.
( back )
575
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 17.
( back )
576
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XIX, pp. 160–161.
( back )
577
V. Lenin, Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, v. XIX, p. 166.
( back )
578
V. Lenin, Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. VIII, p. 412.
( back )
579
V. Lenin, Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. VIII, p. 415.
( back )
580
V. Lenin, Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, T. VIII, p. 416. It is underlined
by us. - Auth.
 ( back )
581
V. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, t. XIII, p. 290.
( back )
582
V. Lenin, What is the "Friends of the People" and how are they fighting against the Social
Democrats ?, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. I, pp. 197–198.
( back )
583
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 126.
( back )
584
V. Lenin, Once again on the trade unions, Op., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVI, p. 126.
( back )
585
V. Lenin, The Economic Content of Populism, Op., Ed. 3rd, vol. I, p. 288.
( back )
586
Sat “On the Paths to October”, 1925, p. 138. We emphasized. - Auth.
( back )
587
I. Stalin, About Lenin, Partisat, 1932, pp. 5–6.
( back )
588
I. Stalin, On the Opposition, p. 510.
( back )
589
V. Lenin, On the Meaning of Militant Materialism, Vol., Ed. 3rd, Vol. XXVII, p. 187.
( back )
590
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 566.
( back )
591
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 567.
( back )
592
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 454.
( back )
593
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 455.
( back )
594
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 565.
( back )
595
I. Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 9th., P. 566.
( back )

Table of contents
 Foreword
 Chapter 1. Marxism-Leninism - the worldview of the proletariat
 1.1. Three sources and three components of Marxism
 1.2. Historical roots of Marxism
 1.3. Marxism-Leninism as a unity of theory and practice
 1.4. Leninism - a new and higher stage in the development of Marxism
 Chapter 2. Materialism and Idealism
 2.1. Two lines in philosophy
 2.2. Mechanistic materialism
 2.3. Subjective idealism, Machism, intuitivism
 2.4. Kant's dualism and modern Kantianism
 2.5. Absolute, objective idealism of Hegel and modern neo-Hegelianism
 2.6. The materialistic philosophy of L. Feuerbach
 2.7. The development of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels and the transition to dialectical
materialism
 Chapter 3. Dialectical Materialism
 3.1. Materialistic dialectics as a philosophical science
 3.2. The materiality of the world and the form of existence of matter
 3.3. Matter and consciousness. Dialectically-materialist theory of reflection
 3.4. Objective, absolute, relative truth
 3.5. Social practice as a criterion of knowledge. Party philosophy
 3.6. Dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge
 Chapter 4. The laws of materialistic dialectics
 4.1. The law of the unity of opposites
 4.2. The law of the transition of quantity to quality and back
 4.3. Denial of Denial
 4.4. Essence, phenomenon, content, form
 4.5. Law, reason, purpose
 4.6. Necessity and chance
 4.7. Opportunity and reality
 4.8. General nature of categories
 4.9. Formal logic and dialectics
 Chapter 5. Fighting on Two Fronts in Philosophy
 5.1. Philosophy and politics
 5.2. The struggle on two fronts and the tasks of the theory under the dictatorship of the proletariat
 5.3. Mechanistic revision of dialectical materialism and right-wing opportunism
 5.4. Menshevist idealism
 Chapter 6. The main questions of the Leninist stage in the development of dialectical materialism
 6.1. Lenin in the fight against international opportunism and revisionism in the field of philosophy
 6.2. Lenin and Plekhanov
 6.3. Lenin's struggle against philosophical opportunism in the history of our party
 6.4. Lenin and the further development of materialistic dialectics
 6.5. Tov. Stalin and materialistic dialectics