REHVA COVID-19 Guidance Document - V4 - 17112020

REHVA COVID-19 guidance document, November 17, 2020
(this document updates all previous versions, i.e.: August 3, April 3 and March
17. Further updates will follow as necessary)
How to operate HVAC and other building service systems to prevent the spread
of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) disease (COVID-19) in workplaces
1 Introduction
In this document, REHVA summarises advice on the operation and use of building service systems
during an epidemic of a coronavirus disease (COVID-19), to reduce the risk of transmission of COVID-
19 depending on HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) systems related factors. The
advice below should be treated as interim guidance; the document may be complemented with new
evidence and information when it becomes available.
The suggestions below are meant as an addition to the general guidance for employers and building
owners that are presented in the WHO document ‘Getting workplaces ready for COVID-19’. The text
below is intended primarily for HVAC professionals and facility managers. It may be useful for
occupational and public health specialists and other professionals involved in decisions on how to use
buildings.
In this document, building services related precautions are covered. The scope is limited to
commercial and public buildings (e.g., offices, schools, shopping areas, sports premises, etc.) where
only occasional occupancy of infected persons is expected, and some advice is given for temporary
hospital and healthcare settings. Residential buildings are out of the scope of this document.
The guidance is focused on temporary, easy-to-organise measures that can be implemented in
existing buildings that are in use during or after epidemic with normal or reduced occupancy rates.
Some long-term recommendations are also presented.
Disclaimer:
This document expresses REHVA expert advice and views based on the available scientific knowledge
of COVID-19 available at the time of publication. In many aspects, SARS-CoV-2 information is not
complete and some evidence1 from previous airborne viruses may have been used for best practice
recommendations. REHVA, the contributors and all those involved in the publication exclude all and
any liability for any direct, indirect, incidental damages or any other damages that could result from,
or be connected with, the use of the information presented in this document.
1
In the last two decades we have been confronted with three coronavirus disease outbreaks: (i)
SARS in 2002-2003 (SARS-CoV-1), (ii) MERS in 2012 (MERS-CoV) and COVID-19 in 2019-2020 (SARS-
CoV-2).
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Summary
New evidence on SARS-CoV-2 airborne transmission and general recognition of long-range aerosol-
based transmission have developed recently. This has made ventilation measures the most important
engineering controls in the infection control. While physical distancing is important to avoid a close
contact, the risk of an airborne transmission and cross-infection over distances more than 1.5 m from
an infected person can be reduced with adequate ventilation and effective air distribution solutions.
In such a situation at least three levels of guidance are required: (1) how to operate HVAC and other
building services in existing buildings right now during an epidemic; (2) how to conduct a risk
assessment and assess the safety of different buildings and rooms; and (3) what would be more far-
reaching actions to further reduce the spread of viral diseases in future in buildings with improved
ventilation systems. Every space and operation of building is unique and requires specific assessment.
We make 15 recommendations that can be applied in existing buildings at a relatively low cost to
reduce the number of cross-infections indoors. Regarding airflow rates, more ventilation is always
better, but is not the only consideration. Large spaces such as classrooms which are ventilated
according to current standards tend to be reasonably safe, but small rooms occupied by a couple of
persons show the highest probability of infection even if well ventilated. While there are many
possibilities to improve ventilation solutions in future, it is important to recognise that current
technology and knowledge already allows the use of many rooms in buildings during a COVID-19 type
of outbreak if ventilation meets existing standards and a risk assessment is conducted as described
in this document.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 1
2 Transmission routes ................................................................................ 3
3 Heating, ventilation & air-conditioning systems in the context of COVID-19 ........... 7
4 Practical recommendations for building services operation during an epidemic for
infection risk reduction .............................................................................. 9
5 Summary of practical measures for building services operation during an epidemic 15
Appendix 1 - ...........................................................................................16
Airborne transmission risk assessment and far-reaching actions to reduce the spread of
viral diseases in future buildings with improved ventilation systems ......................16
Appendix 2 - ...........................................................................................26
Inspection of rotary heat exchangers to limit internal leakages ............................26
Appendix 3 - ...........................................................................................29
Ventilation in patient rooms .......................................................................29
Appendix 4 - ...........................................................................................31
COVID-19 ventilation and building services guidance for school personnel ...............31
Feedback ...............................................................................................35
Literature ..............................................................................................36
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2 Transmission routes
It is important for every epidemic to understand the transmission routes of the infectious agent. For
COVID-19 and for many other respiratory viruses three transmission routes are dominant: (1)
combined droplet and airborne transmission in 1-2 m close contact region arising from droplets and
aerosols emitted when sneezing, coughing, singing, shouting, talking and breathing; (2) long-range
airborne (aerosol-based) transmission; and (3) surface (fomite) contact through hand-hand, hand-
surface, etc. contacts. The means to deal with these routes are physical distance to avoid the close
contact, ventilation to avoid airborne transmission and hand hygiene to avoid surface contact. This
document mainly focuses on reduction measures of airborne transmission while personal protective
equipment such as wearing masks is out of the scope of the document. Additional transmission routes
that have gained some attention are the faecal-oral route and resuspension of SARS-CoV-2, which are
also addressed in this document.
The size of a coronavirus particle is 80-160 nanometre2,i and it remains active on surfaces for many
hours or a couple of days unless there is specific cleaning ii,iii,iv. In indoor air SARS-CoV-2 can remain
active up to 3 hours and up to 2-3 days on room surfaces at common indoor conditions v. An airborne
virus is not naked but is contained inside expelled respiratory fluid droplets. Large droplets fall down,
but small droplets stay airborne and can travel long distances carried by airflows in the rooms and in
extract air ducts of ventilation systems, as well as in the supply ducts when air is recirculated.
Evidence suggests that airborne transmission has caused, among others, well known infections of
SARS-CoV-1 in the pastvi,vii.
Expelled respiratory droplets that are suspended in air (which means airborne), range from less than
1 m (micrometre = micron) to more than 100 m in diameter, which is the largest particle size that
can be inhaled. They are also referred to as aerosols, i.e. particles suspended in air, since droplets
are liquid particles. The main airborne transmission mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 1.
Close contact: combined exposure from droplets Long range: exposure from droplet nuclei (aerosols)
and droplet nuclei (aerosols) can be controlled with sufficient ventilation
Figure 1. The distinction between close contact combined droplet and aerosol transmission (left) and long-
range aerosol transmission (right) which can be controlled with ventilation diluting the virus concentration to
a low level. (Figure: courtesy L. Liu, Y. Li, P. V. Nielsen et al.xii)
Airborne transmission depends on the droplet sizeviii,ixx and is usually divided into close contact and
long-range regions as follows:
1. Short-range droplet transmission region for close contact events can be defined through the
distance travelled before the drops and large droplets (up to 2000 m = 2 mm) fall down to
surfaces. At an initial droplet velocity of 10 m/s larger droplets fall down within 1.5 m.
2
1 nanometer = 0.001 micron
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Respiratory activities correspond to a droplet velocity of 1 m/s for normal breathing, 5 m/s for
talking, 10 m/s for coughing and 20-50 m/s for sneezing. Expelled droplets evaporate and
desiccate in the air so that the final droplet nuclei shrink to roughly a half or one-third of the
initial diameterxi. Droplets with initial diameter smaller than 60 m do not reach the ground
before they desiccate entirely and may be carried further than 1.5 m by airflows.
2. Long-range airborne transmission applies beyond 1.5 m distance for droplets <60 m. Droplet
desiccation is a fast process; for instance, 50 m droplets desiccate in about two seconds and 10
m droplets in 0.1 s to droplet nuclei with roughly a half of the initial diameter 3. Droplet nuclei
<10 m may be carried by airflows for long distances since the settling speeds for 10 m, and 5
m particles (equilibrium diameter of droplet nuclei) are only 0.3 cm/s and 0.08 cm/s, so it takes
about 8.3 and 33 minutes respectively to fall 1.5 m. Because of instant desiccation, the term
"droplet" is often used for desiccated droplet nuclei which still include some fluid explaining why
viruses can survive. Droplet nuclei form a suspension of particles in the air, i.e. an aerosol. With
effective mixing ventilation, the aerosol concentration is almost constant from 1-1.5 m distance
onward. This concentration is most dominantly affected by air change rates in adequately
ventilated rooms but is also reduced by deposition and decay of virus-laden particles.
The distance of 1.5 m for large droplets to fall, shown in Figure 2, left, applies if there is no air
movement in the room. Usually, air distribution of ventilation and convection air flows of heat gains
cause air velocities between 0.05 – 0.2 m/s in typical rooms with human occupancy. Using these
velocities as lower and upper bounds together with particle settling velocities allows an estimate of
how far droplets can travel before falling 1.5 m under the influence of gravity. These estimates
illustrate that even larger than 30 m droplets can travel much more than 1-2 meters.
1.8 1.8
50 µm 50 µm
Air velocity 0.05 m/s Air velocity 0.2 m/s
30 µm 30 µm
1.5 1.5
20 µm 20 µm
10 µm 10 µm
1.2 1.2
5 µm 5 µm
Height, m
Height, m
0.9 0.9
0.6 0.6
0.3 0.3
0 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Distance travelled, m Distance travelled, m
Figure 2. Traveling distance estimates for different sizes of droplets to be carried by room air velocities of
0.05 and 0.2 m/s before settling 1.5 m under the influence of gravity. The travelled distance accounts for
movement after the initial jet has relaxed and is calculated with the equilibrium diameter of completely
desiccated respiratory droplets (m values in the figure refer to equilibrium diameters). With turbulence
distance travelled is less, but settling time is longer.
More important than how far different size droplets travel, is the distance from the source or infected
person at which a low, an almost constant aerosol concentration will be reached. As shown in Figure
3
Physics of suspended respiratory droplets in air shows that a droplet with initial diameter of 20 m will
evaporate within 0.24 seconds in room air with 50% RH shrinking at the same time to a droplet nuclei with
equilibrium diameter of about 10 m. For this droplet nuclei of 10 m, including still some fluid, it takes 8.3
minutes to fall down 1.5 m in still air.
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1, right, the concentration of droplet nuclei will decrease rapidly within the first 1-1.5 meter from a
person's exhalationxii. This effect is due to the aerodynamics of the exhalation flow and the flow in
the microenvironment around people (plume). The droplet nuclei distribution depends on the position
of people, air change rate, the type of air distribution system (e.g., mixing, displacement, or personal
ventilation), and other air currents in the spacexiii. Therefore, close contact within the first 1.5-meter
creates high exposure to both large droplets and droplet nuclei that is supported by experimental
and numerical studiesxii. Aerosol concentrations and cross-infection from 1.5 m or more from an
infected person can be controlled with adequate ventilation and air distribution solutions. The effect
of ventilation is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Illustration of how an infected person (speaking woman on the right) leads to aerosol exposure (red
spikes) in the breathing zone of another person (man on the left in this case). Large droplet exhalation is
marked with purple spikes. When the room is ventilated with mixing ventilation system, the number of virus-
laden particles in the breathing zone is much lower than when the ventilation system is off. Left figure:
ventilation system on, right figure: ventilation system off.
For SARS-CoV-2, the long-range aerosol-based route with infection through exposure to droplet nuclei
particles was first acknowledged by the WHO for hospital aerosol-generating procedures and was
addressed in the guidance to increase ventilationxiv. Japanese authorities were one of the first to
address the possibility of aerosol transmission under certain circumstances, such as when talking to
many people at a short distance in an enclosed space, and associated risk of spreading the infection
even without coughing or sneezing xv. After that, many other authorities have followed including the
US CDC, UK Government, Italian Government and the China National Health Commission. Important
evidence came from a studyv concluding that aerosol transmission is plausible, as the virus can remain
viable in aerosols for multiple hours. Analyses of superspreading events have shown that closed
environments with minimal ventilation strongly contributed to a characteristically high number of
secondary infectionsxvi. Well known superspreading events reporting aerosol transmission are from a
Guangzhou restaurantxvii and Skagit Valley Chorale eventxviii where outdoor air ventilation rate was as
low as 1–2 L/s per person. The fact that substantial evidence has quickly emerged indicating that
SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted via aerosols has been required to be generally recognised by many
scientistsxixxx. To date, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) review on
HVAC-systems in the context of COVID-19 as well as the German Robert-Koch-Institut have recognised
aerosol transportxxixxii. Finally, after an open letter by 239 scientistsxxiii,the WHO in June 2020 added
aerosol transmission to their transmission mode scientific brief xxiv. Generally, a long-range aerosol-
based transmission mechanism implies that keeping 1-2 m distance from an infected person is not
enough, and concentration control with ventilation is needed for effective removal of particles in
indoor spaces.
Surface (fomite) contact transmission may occur when expelled large droplets fall on nearby surfaces
and objects such as desks and tables. A person may be infected with COVID-19 by touching a surface
or object that has the virus on it and then touching their mouth, nose, or possibly their eyes, but US
CDC and other have concluded that this route is not thought to be the main way this virus spreads xxv.
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The WHO recognises the faecal-oral, i.e. aerosol/sewage transmission route for SARS-CoV-2
infectionsxxvi. The WHO proposes as a precautionary measure to flush toilets with a closed lid. In this
context, it is essential to avoid dried-out drains and U-traps in floors and other sanitary devices by
regularly adding water (every three weeks depending on the climate) so that the water seal works
appropriately. This prevents aerosol transmission through the sewage system and is in line with
observations during the SARS 2002-2003 outbreak: open connections with sewage systems appeared
to be a transmission route in an apartment building in Hong Kong (Amoy Garden) xxvii. It is known that
flushing toilets are creating rising air flows containing droplets and droplet residue when toilets are
flushed with open lids. SARS-CoV-2 viruses have been detected in stool samples (reported in recent
scientific papers and by the Chinese authorities)xxviii,xxix,xxx.
Conclusion about the aerosol (airborne) transmission route:

New evidence and general recognition of the aerosol-based transmission route have been developed
recently. When the first version of this document was published on March 17, 2020, REHVA proposed
following the ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) to apply a set of HVAC measures
that help to control the aerosol route in buildings. To date, there is evidence on SARS-CoV-2 aerosol-
based transmission, and this route is now recognised worldwide. The relative contribution of different
transmission routes in the spread of COVID-19 is still under discussion. It also very much situation-
dependent whether one transmission route or the other is dominant. For instance in hospitals with
an excellent 12 air changes per hour (ACH) ventilation rate, aerosol transmission is mostly eliminated,
but in poorly ventilated spaces, it may be dominant. Transmission routes remain an important
research subject, and it has already been reported that the short-range aerosol-based route
dominates exposure to respiratory infection during close contact xxxi. Medical literature has started to
talk about a new paradigm of infectious aerosols. It is concluded that there is no evidence to support
the concept that most respiratory infections are primarily associated with large droplet transmission,
and that small particle aerosols are the rule, rather than the exception, contrary to current
guidelinesxxxii. In the context of buildings and indoor spaces there is no doubt that cross-infection risk
may be controlled up to 1.5 m from a person with physical distancing and beyond that distance with
ventilation solutions.
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3 Heating, ventilation & air-conditioning systems in the context of COVID-19
There are many possible measures that may be taken to mitigate COVID-19 transmission risks in
buildings. This document covers recommendations for ventilation solutions as the main ‘engineering
controls’, as described in the traditional infection control hierarchy (Figure 4.) to reduce the
environmental risks of airborne transmission. According to the hierarchy, ventilation and other HVAC
& plumbing related measures are at a higher level than the application of administrative controls and
personal protective equipment (including masks). It is therefore very important to consider
ventilation and other building services system measures to protect against airborne transmission.
These may be applied in existing buildings at a relatively low cost to reduce indoor infection risk.
Figure 4.Traditional infection control pyramid adapted from the US Centers for Disease Controlxxxiii.
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has prepared guidance for public
health authorities in EU/EEA countries and the UK on the ventilation of indoor spaces in the context
of COVID-19xxi. This guidance is targeted at public health professionals and serves as a basis for REHVA
to provide technical and system-specific guidance for HVAC professionals. The main evidence and
conclusions by ECDC can be summarised as follows:
• The transmission of COVID-19 commonly occurs in enclosed indoor spaces.
• There is currently no evidence of human infection with SARS-CoV-2 caused by infectious aerosols
distributed through the ventilation system air ducts. The risk is rated as very low.
• Well-maintained HVAC systems, including air-conditioning units, securely filter large droplets
containing SARS-CoV-2. COVID-19 aerosols (small droplets and droplet nuclei) can spread through
HVAC systems within a building or vehicle and stand-alone air-conditioning units if the air is
recirculated.
• The airflow generated by air-conditioning units may facilitate the spread of droplets excreted
by infected people longer distances within indoor spaces.
• HVAC systems may have a complementary role in decreasing transmission in indoor spaces by
increasing the rate of air change, decreasing the recirculation of air, and increasing the use of
outdoor air.
• Building administrators should maintain heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems

according to the manufacturer's current instructions, particularly concerning the cleaning and
changing of filters. There is no benefit or need for additional maintenance cycles in connection
with COVID-19.
• Energy-saving settings, such as demand-controlled ventilation controlled by a timer or CO 2
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detectors, should be avoided.
• Consideration should be given to extending the operating times of HVAC systems before and
after the regular period.
• Direct air flow should be diverted away from groups of individuals to avoid pathogen dispersion
from infected subjects and transmission.
• Organizers and administrators responsible for gatherings and critical infrastructure settings
should explore options with the assistance of their technical/maintenance teams to avoid the
use of air recirculation as much as possible. They should consider reviewing their procedures for
the use of recirculation in HVAC systems based on information provided by the manufacturer or,
if unavailable, seeking advice from the manufacturer.
• The minimum number of air exchanges per hour, following the applicable building regulations,
should be ensured at all times. Increasing the number of air exchanges per hour will reduce the
risk of transmission in closed spaces. This may be achieved by natural or mechanical ventilation,
depending on the setting.
In the guidelinexxxiv ECDC stresses the importance of ventilation by concluding that ensuring the
implementation of optimal ventilation adapted to each particular indoor setting could be critical in
preventing outbreaks and transmission amplification events. In the guideline the minimum number
of air exchanges per hour, in accordance with the applicable building regulations, is required to be
ensured at all times. It is stated that increasing the number of air exchanges per hour, by means of
natural or mechanical ventilation, will reduce the risk of transmission in closed spaces. Ventilation
has seen as a major method because there is no evidence on the effectiveness of methods for
decontamination of air (e.g. UV light irradiation) for use in community settings.
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4 Practical recommendations for building services operation during an
epidemic for infection risk reduction
This REHVA guidance on building services operation covers 15 main items, as illustrated in Figure 5:
1. Ventilation rates
2. Ventilation operation times
3. Overrule of demand control settings
4. Window opening
5. Toilet ventilation
6. Windows in toilets
7. Flushing toilets
8. Recirculation
9. Heat recovery equipment
10. Fan coils and split units
11. Heating, cooling and possible humidification setpoints
12. Duct cleaning
13. Outdoor air and extract air filters
14. Maintenance works
15. Indoor air quality (IAQ) monitoring
Figure 5. Main items of REHVA guidance for building services operation.
4.1 Increase air supply and exhaust ventilation

In buildings with mechanical ventilation systems, extended operation times are recommended for
these systems. Adjust the clock times of system timers to start ventilation at the nominal speed at
least 2 hours before the building opening time and switch off or to a lower speed 2 hours after the
building usage time. In demand-controlled ventilation systems, change the CO2 setpoint to 400 ppm
in order to maintain the operation at nominal speed. In buildings that have been vacated due to the
pandemic (some offices or educational buildings), it is not recommended to switch ventilation off,
but to operate continuously at reduced speed during normal operation hours. Extended operation
time helps to remove virus particles from the building and to remove released virus particles from
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surfaces. In winter and summer, increased energy use has to be accepted, because ventilation
systems have enough heating and cooling capacity to fulfil these recommendations without
compromising thermal comfort.
The general advice is to supply as much outside air as reasonably possible. The key aspect is the total
outdoor air flow rate, typically sized as supply air flow rate per square meter of floor area or per
person. Clean air delivery rate from an air cleaner adds on to the supply air flow rate (see Appendix
1 for details).
If the number of occupants is reduced, do not concentrate the remaining occupants in smaller areas
but maintain or enlarge the physical distance (min 2-3 m between persons) between them to improve
the dilution effect of ventilation. More information about ventilation rates and risks in different
rooms is provided in Appendix 1.
Exhaust ventilation systems for toilets should be operated in similar mode to the main ventilation
system. It should be switched to the nominal speed at least 2 hours before the building opening time
and may be switched off or to a lower speed 2 hours after the building usage time.
Additional ventilation guidance for patient rooms is provided in Appendix 3 and for school personnel
in Appendix 4.
4.2 Use openable windows more

The general recommendation is to stay away from crowded and poorly ventilated spaces. In buildings
without mechanical ventilation systems, it is recommended to actively use openable windows (much
more than normal, even when this causes some thermal discomfort). Window opening is then the
only way to boost air exchange rates. Windows should be opened for approximately 15 min when
entering the room (especially when the room was occupied by others beforehand). Also, in buildings
with mechanical ventilation, window opening can be used to boost ventilation further.
Open windows in toilets with a passive stack or mechanical exhaust systems may cause a
contaminated airflow from the toilet to other rooms, implying that ventilation begins to work in the
reverse direction. Open toilet windows should be avoided to maintain negative pressure in the toilets
and the right direction of mechanical ventilation. If there is no adequate exhaust ventilation from
toilets and window opening in toilets cannot be avoided, it is important to keep windows open also
in other spaces to achieve cross flows throughout the building.
4.3 Humidification and air-conditioning have no practical effect

Relative humidity (RH) and temperature contribute to virus viability, droplet nuclei forming, and
susceptibility of occupants' mucous membranes. The transmission of some viruses in buildings can be
altered by changing air temperatures and humidity levels to reduce the viability of the virus. In the
case of SARS-CoV-2, this is unfortunately not an option as coronaviruses are quite resistant to
environmental changes and are susceptible only to a very high relative humidity above 80% and a
temperature above 30 ˚Cii,iii,iv, which are not attainable and acceptable in buildings for reasons of
thermal comfort and avoiding microbial growth. SARS-CoV-2 has been found viable for 14 days at 4℃;
for a day at 37℃ and for 30 minutes at 56℃xxxv.
SARS-CoV-2 stability (viability) has been tested at a typical indoor temperature of 21-23 ℃ and RH of
65% with very high virus stability at this temperature and RHxxxvi. Together with previous evidence on
MERS-CoV, it is well documented that humidification up to 65% may have very limited or no effect
on the stability of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The current evidence does not support the view that
moderate humidity (RH 40-60%) will be beneficial in reducing the viability of SARS-CoV-2 and so
humidification is NOT a method to reduce the viability of SARS-CoV-2.
Small droplets (0.5 – 50 m) will evaporate faster at any relative humidity (RH) levelxxxvii. Nasal
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systems and mucous membranes are more sensitive to infections at very low RH of 10-20 %xxxviii,xxxix,
and for this reason some humidification in winter is sometimes suggested (to levels of 20-30%),
although the use of humidifiers has been associated with higher amounts of total and short-term sick
leavexl.
In buildings equipped with centralised humidification, there is no need to change humidification
systems' setpoints (usually 25 or 30%xli). Usually, any adjustment of setpoints for heating or cooling
systems is not needed, and systems can be operated normally, as there is no direct implication for
the risk of transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
4.4 Safe use of heat recovery sections

Virus particle transmission via heat recovery devices is not an issue when an HVAC system is equipped
with a twin coil unit or another heat recovery device that guarantees 100% air separation between
the return and supply sidexlii.
Some heat recovery devices may carry over particle and gas phase pollutants from the exhaust air
side to the supply air side via leaks. Rotary air to air heat exchangers (i.e., rotors, called also wheels)
may be liable to significant leakage in the case of poor design and maintenance. For properly
operating rotary heat exchangers, fitted with purging sectors and correctly set up, leakage rates are
very low, being in the range of 0-2% that is in practice insignificant. For existing systems, the leakage
should be below 5% and should be compensated with increased outdoor air ventilation, according to
EN 16798-3:2017. However, many rotary heat exchangers may not be properly installed. The most
common fault is that the fans have been mounted in such a way as to create a higher pressure on the
exhaust air side. This will cause leakage from the extract air into the supply air. The degree of
uncontrolled transfer of polluted extract air can in these cases be of the order of 20%xliii, which is not
acceptable.
It has been shown that rotary heat exchangers which are properly constructed, installed, and
maintained have almost zero transfer of particle-bound pollutants (including air-borne bacteria,
viruses, and fungi), and the transfer is limited to gaseous pollutants such as tobacco smoke and other
smellsxliv. There is no evidence that virus-laden particles larger than about 0.2 m would be
transferred across the wheel. Because the major part of the leakage is caused by the pressure
differences between supply and exhaust air, stopping the rotor will have only a minor impact of the
leakage. Therefore, its not necessary to switch the rotor off. The normal operation of rotors makes
it also easier to keep ventilation rates higher. It is known that the carry-over leakage is highest at
low airflow, so higher ventilation rates should be used as recommended in Section 4.1.
If critical leaks are detected in the heat recovery sections, pressure adjustment or bypassing (some
systems may be equipped with bypass) can be an option to avoid a situation where higher pressure
on the extract side will cause air leakage to the supply side. Pressure differences can be corrected
by dampers or by other reasonable arrangements. In conclusion, we recommend inspecting the heat
recovery equipment, including measuring the pressure difference and estimating leakage based on
temperature measurement, see Appendix 2.
4.5 No use of central recirculation

Viral material in extract (return) air ducts may re-enter a building when centralised air handling units
are equipped with recirculation sectors. The general recommendation is to avoid central recirculation
during SARS-CoV-2 episodes: close the recirculation dampers either using the Building Management
System or manually. This is especially important in buildings that are used by susceptible end-users4
(e.g. nursing homes).
4
In hospitals the use of recirculation is strictly forbidden in many countries.
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Sometimes, air handling units and recirculation sections are equipped with return air filters. This
should not be a reason to keep recirculation dampers open as these filters normally do not filter out
viral material effectively since they have coarse or medium filter efficiencies (G4/M5 or ISO
coarse/ePM10 filter class).
In air systems and air-and-water systems where central recirculation cannot be avoided because of
limited cooling or heating capacity, the outdoor air fraction has to be increased as much as possible
and additional measures are recommended for return air filtering. To completely remove particles
and viruses from the return air, HEPA filters would be needed. However, due to a higher pressure
drop and special required filter frames, HEPA filters are usually not easy to install in existing systems.
Alternatively, duct installation of disinfection devices, such as ultraviolet germicidal irradiation
(UVGI) also called germicidal ultraviolet (GUV), may be used. It is essential that this equipment is
correctly sized and installed. If technically possible, it is preferred to mount a higher-class filter in
existing frames and to increase exhaust fan pressure without reducing the airflow rate. A minimum
improvement is the replacement of existing low-efficiency return air filters with ePM1 80% (former
F8) filters. The filters of the former F8 class have a reasonable capture efficiency for virus-laden
particles (capture efficiency 65-90% for PM1).
4.6 Room level circulation: fan coil, split and induction units
In rooms with fan coils only or split units (all-water or direct expansion systems), the first priority is
to achieve adequate outdoor air ventilation. In such systems, the fan coils or split units are usually
independent of mechanical ventilation which in some cases even might not exist, and there are two
possible options to achieve ventilation:
1. Active operation of window opening together with the installation of CO2 monitors as indicators
of outdoor air ventilation;
2. Installation of a standalone mechanical ventilation system (either local or centralised without
recirculation, according to its technical feasibility). This is the only way to ensure a sufficient
outdoor air supply in the rooms at all times.
If option 1 is used, CO2 monitors are important, because fan coils and split units with both cooling or
heating functions improve thermal comfort, and it may take too long before occupants perceive poor
air quality and lack of ventilationxlv. During hours of occupation leave windows partially open (if
openable) to increase the level of ventilation. See an example of a CO2 monitor in Appendix 4, Figure
17.
Fan coil units have coarse filters that practically do not filter smaller particles but may still collect
potentially contaminated particles. Standard maintenance procedures are to be followed with
recommendations provided in Section 4.9.
Split units and sometimes fan coils may cause high air velocities. In common spaces (larger rooms
with fan coil or split units occupied by many persons), in the case of local air velocities of 0.3 m/s or
more, directed air flows from one person to another should be avoided with workplaces arrangements
or air jet adjustments.
4.7 Duct cleaning has no practical effect

There have been some overreactive statements recommending cleaning ventilation ducts to avoid
SARS-CoV-2 transmission via ventilation systems. Duct cleaning is not effective against room-to-room
infection because the ventilation system is not a contamination source if the above guidance about
heat recovery and recirculation is followed. Viruses attached to small particles will not deposit easily
in ventilation ducts and will normally be carried out by the airflow.xlvi. Therefore, no changes are
needed to normal duct cleaning and maintenance procedures. Much more important is to increase
the outside air supply and to avoid recirculation of air according to the recommendations above.
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4.8 Additional change of outdoor air filters is not necessary
In the COVID-19 context, questions have been asked about filter replacement and the protective
effect in very rare cases of outdoor virus contamination, for instance, if air exhausts are close to air
intakes. Modern ventilation systems (air handling units) are equipped with fine outdoor air filters
right after the outdoor air intake (filter class F7 or F85 or ISO ePM2.5 or ePM1), which filter particulate
matter from the outdoor air well. The size of the smallest viral particles in respiratory aerosols is
about 0.2 m (PM0.2), smaller than the capture area of F8 filters (capture efficiency 65-90% for PM1).
Still, the majority of viral material is already within the capture area of filters. This implies that in
rare cases of virus-contaminated outdoor air, standard fine outdoor air filters provide reasonable
protection for a low concentration and occasional occurrence of viral material in outdoor air.
Heat recovery and recirculation sections are equipped with less effective medium or coarse extract
air filters (G4/M5 or ISO coarse/ePM10) whose aim is to protect equipment against dust. These filters
have a very low capture efficiency for viral material (see Section 4.4 for heat recovery and 4.5 for
recirculation).
From the filter replacement perspective, normal maintenance procedures can be used. Clogged
filters are not a source of contamination in this context, but they reduce supply airflow, which has a
negative effect on reducing indoor contamination levels. Thus, filters must be replaced according to
the normal procedures when pressure or time limits are exceeded, or according to scheduled
maintenance. In conclusion, it is not recommended to change existing outdoor air filters and replace
them with other types of filters, nor it is recommended to change them sooner than usual.
4.9 Safety procedures for maintenance personnel

HVAC maintenance personnel may be at risk when conducting scheduled maintenance, inspection or
replacement of filters (especially extract air filters) if standard safety procedures are not followed.
To be safe, always assume that filters, extract air ducts, and heat recovery equipment may have
active microbiological material on them, including viable viruses. This is particularly important in
any building where there has recently been an infection. Filters should be changed with the system
turned off, while wearing gloves and respiratory protection and disposed of in a sealed bag.
4.10 Room air cleaners and UVGI can be useful in specific situations
Room air cleaners remove particles from the air, which provides a similar effect compared to the
outdoor air ventilation. To be effective, air cleaners need to have HEPA filter efficiency, i.e., to have
a HEPA filter as the last step. Unfortunately, most attractively priced room air cleaners are not
effective enough. Devices that use electrostatic filtration principles instead of HEPA filters (not the
same as room ionizers!) often work with similar efficiency. Because the airflow through air cleaners
is limited, the floor area they can serve is usually quite small. To select the right size air cleaner,
the airflow capacity of the unit (at an acceptable noise level) has to be at least 2 ACH and will have
positive effect until 5 ACHxlvii (calculate the airflow rate through the air cleaner in m 3/h by multiplying
the room volume by 2 or 5). If air cleaners are used in large spaces, they need to be placed close to
people in a space and should not be placed in the corner and out of sight. Special UVGI disinfection
equipment may be installed in return air ducts in systems with recirculation, or installed in room, to
inactivate viruses and bacteria. Such equipment, mostly used in health care facilities needs to be
correctly sized, installed and maintained. Therefore, air cleaners are an easy to apply short term
mitigation measure, but in the longer run, ventilation system improvements to achieve adequate
5An outdated filter classification of EN779:2012 which is replaced by EN ISO 16890-1:2016, Air filters for
general ventilation - Part 1: Technical specifications, requirements and classification system based upon
particulate matter efficiency (ePM).
Page | 13
outdoor air ventilation rates are needed.
4.11 Toilet lid use instructions

If toilet seats are equipped with lids, it is recommended to flush the toilets with lids closed to
minimize the release of droplets and droplet residues from air flowsxlviii,xxvi. Building occupants should
be clearly instructed to use the lids. Water seals must work at all timesxxvii. Regularly check the water
seals (drains and U-traps) and add water if required, at least every three weeks.
4.12 Risk of Legionellosis after shut-down

Throughout the duration of the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) epidemic, many buildings have been
experiencing reduced use or complete shut-down over extended periods of time. This includes, for
example, hotels/resorts, schools, sports facilities, gyms, swimming pools, bath houses and many
other types of buildings and facilities equipped with HVAC and water systems.
Depending on a variety of factors, including system layout and design, prolonged reduced (or no) use
can lead to water stagnation in parts of the HVAC and water systems, enhancing the risks of an
outbreak of Legionnaires' disease (Legionellosis) upon reassuming full operation.
Before restarting the system, a thorough risk analysis should be carried out to assess any Legionellosis
risks involved. Several relevant authorities provide information on related risk assessment and restart
procedures, includingxlixlliliiliii.
4.13 IAQ monitoring

The risk of indoor cross-contamination via aerosols is very high when rooms are not ventilated well.
If ventilation control needs actions by occupants (hybrid or natural ventilation systems) or there is
no dedicated ventilation system in the building, it is recommended to install CO2 sensors at the
occupied zone that warn against underventilation especially in spaces that are often used for one
hour or more by groups of people, such as classrooms, meeting rooms and restaurants. During an
epidemic it is recommended to temporarily change the default settings of the traffic light indicator
so that the yellow/orange light (or warning) is set to 800 ppm and the red light (or alarm) up to 1000
ppm in order trigger prompt action to achieve sufficient ventilation even in situations with reduced
occupancy. In some cases, standalone CO2 sensors or 'CO2 traffic lights' can be used, see an example
in Appendix 4. Sometimes it may work better to use CO2 sensors that are part of a web-based sensor
network. The signals from these sensors can be used to warn building occupants to use operable
windows and mechanical ventilation systems with multiple settings in the right way. One can also
store the data and provide facility managers with weekly or monthly data reports so that they know
what is going on in their building and in rooms with high concentration, helping them to identify the
infection risk.
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5 Summary of practical measures for building services operation during an
epidemic
1. Provide adequate ventilation of spaces with outdoor air
2. Switch ventilation on at nominal speed at least 2 hours before the building opening time and set
it off or to lower speed 2 hours after the building usage time
3. Overrule demand-controlled ventilation settings to force the ventilation system to operate at
nominal speed
4. Open windows regularly (even in mechanically ventilated buildings)
5. Keep toilet ventilation in operation at nominal speed in similar fashion to the main ventilation
system
6. Avoid opening windows in toilets to maintain negative pressure and the right direction of
mechanical ventilation air flows
7. Instruct building occupants to flush toilets with closed lid
8. Switch air handling units with recirculation to 100% outdoor air
9. Inspect heat recovery equipment to be sure that leakages are under control
10. Ensure adequate outdoor air ventilation in rooms with fan coils or split units
11. Do not change heating, cooling and possible humidification setpoints
12. Carry out scheduled duct cleaning as normal (additional cleaning is not required)
13. Replace central outdoor air and extract air filters as normal, according to the maintenance
schedule
14. Regular filter replacement and maintenance works shall be performed with common protective
measures including respiratory protection
15. Introduce an IAQ (CO2) sensor network that allows occupants and facility managers to monitor
that ventilation is operating adequately.
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Appendix 1 - Airborne transmission risk assessment and far-reaching actions
to reduce the spread of viral diseases in future buildings with improved
ventilation systems
1 Introduction
This appendix summarises available information on ventilation rates and provides a method for cross-
infection risks assessment which can be applied for typical rooms in non-residential buildings.
Available information on COVID-19 allows to argue that transmission of this disease has been
associated with close proximity (for which ventilation isn't the solution) and with spaces that are
simply inadequately ventilated. The latter is supported by evidence from superspreading events
where outdoor air ventilation has been as low as 1–2 L/s per personxvii,xviii, that is by factor 5–10 lower
than commonly recommended 10 L/s per person in existing standards. The question, how much
ventilation would be needed to substantially reduce airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and what
are other factors such as air distribution and room size that matter is discussed in the following
paragraphs. It is important to understand that this topic includes high uncertainties given the current
state of knowledge and scientific developments may provide new information quickly. The scope of
this appendix applies for long-range airborne transmission reduction only, so the ventilation solutions
discussed do not affect 1-2 m close contact and surface contact transmission modes.
2 Ventilation rate, room size and activity effects on infection risk

As discussed in Section 2, at a greater distance than 1.5 m from an infected person, control of virus-
containing aerosol concentrations depends on ventilation solutions. The overall dose when exposed
to a virus, (for example, when sharing a room with somebody infected) is equal to the product of
concentration and time. Thus, to reduce the dose and infection risk, ventilation has to be increased
and the occupancy time to be reduced. In existing ventilation systems, it is typically not possible to
increase the fan speed significantly, so the system can deliver the performance for which it is sized.
Sometimes, it may be possible to increase total airflow rates by 10-20% overall and by balancing
possibly more significantly in specific rooms. Other improvement measures are limited to those
discussed in Section 4.1.
From a legal point of view, the outdoor air ventilation rate must fulfil at least national minimum
requirements set in the local building code or other regulatory documents (which may also include
specific regulation for COVID-19). If a national ventilation regulation does not exist, then typically
local building laws will always contain a provision for "good building practice", referring to the use of
national, European or international standards and guidelines. Typical sizing according to ISO 17772-
1:2017 and EN 16798-1:2019 results in default Indoor Climate Category II to 1.5 – 2 L/s per floor m2
(10–15 L/s per person) outdoor airflow rates in offices and to about 4 L/s per floor m2 (8–10 L/s per
person) in meeting rooms and classrooms.
Ventilation improvement in existing or new buildings brings the question: Are the ventilation rates of
Category II enough, or more outdoor air ventilation is needed to reduce the risk of cross-infection?
Infection risk is currently not addressed in these standards as a design criterion. On the other hand,
cross-infection risk is well known and applied in the design of hospital buildings where it leads to
ventilation with a 6-12 ACH rate (see Appendix 3). Hospital ventilation systems have worked well in
COVID-19 conditions as cross-infections have been under control, illustrating that high capacity
ventilation is capable to keep aerosol concentration at low level. In non-hospital buildings, there are
evidently lower emission rates and smaller numbers of infected persons per floor area. So, a lower
ventilation rate than in hospitals, for instance Category I ventilation rate, could be considered as a
starting point for the risk reduction. It is also worth noting that 4 L/s per floor m2 in meeting rooms
and classrooms corresponds to 5 ACH and is not much below the air change rate of patient rooms
with precautions against airborne risks.
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Infection risk can be calculated for different activities and rooms using a standard airborne disease
transmission Wells-Riley model, calibrated to COVID-19 with correct source strength, i.e., quanta
emission rates. In this model, the viral load emitted is expressed in terms of quanta emission rate (E,
quanta/h). A quantum is defined as the dose of airborne droplet nuclei required to cause infection
in 63% of susceptible persons. With the Wells-Riley model, the probability of infection (p) is related
to the number of quanta inhaled (n) according to equation (1)xi:
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑒 −𝑛 (1)
The quanta inhaled (n, quanta) depends on the time-average quanta concentration (Cavg,
quanta/m3), the volumetric breathing rate of an occupant (Qb, m3/h) and the duration of the
occupancy (D, h):
𝑛 = 𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑄𝑏 D (2)
The airborne quanta concentration increases with time from an initial value of zero following a
"one minus exponential" form, which is the standard dynamic response of a fully mixed indoor
volume to a constant input source. A fully mixed material balance model for the room (equation
(3)) can be applied to calculate the concentration:
𝑑𝐶 𝐸
= 𝑉 − 𝜆𝐶 (3)
𝑑𝑡
where
E quanta emission rate (quanta/h);
V volume of the room (m3);
λ first-order loss rate coefficientliv for quanta/h due to the summed effects of ventilation (λv,
1/h), deposition onto surfaces (λdep, 1/h), virus decay (k, 1/h) and filtration by portable air
cleaner if applied (kfiltration, 1/h), λ = λv + λdep + k + kfiltration;
C time-dependent airborne concentration of infectious quanta (quanta/m3).
The surface deposition loss rate of 0.3 1/h may be estimated based on data from Thatcher lv and
Diapoulilvi. For virus decay Fearslvii shows no decay in virus-containing aerosol for 16 hours at 53% RH,
whereas Van Doremalenv estimated the half-life of airborne SARS-CoV-2 as 1.1 h, which equates to a
decay rate of 0.63 1/h. An average value of these two studies is 0.32 1/h.
For portable air cleaner, the filtration removal rate (kfiltration) depends on the rate of airflow
through the HVAC filter (Qfilter), and the removal efficiency of the filter (ηfilter):
𝑄𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝜂𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑘𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (4)
𝑉
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For portable cleaners with a High-Efficiency Particle Air (HEPA) filter, the Clean Air Delivery Rate
(CADR, m3/h) is provided and the filtration removal rate can be calculated as kfiltration = CADR/V. It
should be noted that the removal efficiency of filters and the CADR are particle-size dependent.
These parameters are to be estimated based on the size distribution of virus-containing particles.
Calculation examples provided in the following are conducted without air cleaners.
Assuming the quanta concentration is 0 at the beginning of the occupancy, equation (3) is solved
and the average concentration determined as follows:
𝐸
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑉 (1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑡 ) (5)
1 𝐷 𝐸 1
𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔 = ∫ 𝐶(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡 = 𝜆𝑉 [1 − 𝜆𝐷 (1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐷 )] (6)
𝐷 0
where
t time (h).
Calculation examples can be found from papers analysing the Skagit Valley Chorale event lviii and
quanta generation rates for SARS-CoV-2lix. Quanta emission rates vary over a large range of 3 – 300
quanta/h depending strongly on activities so that higher values apply for loud speaking, shouting and
singing and also for higher metabolism rates, as shown in Table 1. Volumetric breathing rates depend
on the activity being undertaken as shown in Table 2.
Activity Quanta emission rate, quanta/h

Resting, oral breathing 3.1
Heavy activity, oral breathing 21
Light activity, speaking 42
Light activity, singing (or loudly 270
speaking)
Table 1. 85th percentile quanta emission rates for different activitieslx.
Activity Breathing rate, m3/h

Standing (office, classroom) 0.54
Talking (meeting room, restaurant) 1.1
Light exercise (shopping) 1.38
Heavy exercise (sports) 3.3
Table 2. Volumetric breathing rateslxilxii.
Although SARS-CoV-2 quanta/h emission values include some uncertainties, it is already possible to
calculate infection risk estimates and conduct comparisons on the effect of ventilation and room
parameters. Results from such calculations are shown in Figure 6 for commonly used ventilation rates
and rooms. It is assumed that in all calculated rooms, there is one infected person. The following
time-averaged quanta emission rates calculated from activities shown in Table 1 were used: 5
quanta/h for office work and classroom occupancy, 15 quanta/h for a restaurant, 10 quanta/h for
shopping, 21 quanta/h for sports and 19 quanta/h for meeting rooms. While typical COVID-19
infection rates in the general population have been in the magnitude of 1:1000 or 1:10 000, the
Page | 18
assumption that only one infected person is in a room that is used by, e.g., 10 (office), 25 (school)
or 100 persons (restaurant) is highly valid.
A risk assessment as shown in Figure 6. helps to build a more comprehensive understanding of how
virus laden aerosols may be removed by ventilation. The results show that with Category II ventilation
rates according to ISO 17772-1:2017 and EN 16798-1:2019, the probability of infection is reasonably
low (below 5 %) for open-plan offices, classrooms, well-ventilated restaurants, and for short, no more
than 1.5-hour shopping trips or meetings in a large meeting room. Small office rooms occupied by 2-
3 persons and small meeting rooms show a greater probability of infection, because even in well
ventilated small rooms the airflow per infected person is much smaller than that in large rooms.
Therefore, in an epidemic situation small rooms could be safely occupied by one person only. In
normally ventilated rooms occupied by one person there is no infection risk at all because of no
emission source. There is also a very visible difference between 1 L/s m2 and 2 L/s m2 ventilation
rate in an open plan office (note that 1 L/s m 2 is below the standard). Speaking and singing activities
are associated with high quanta generation, but also physical exercises increase quanta generation
and breathing rate that directly affects the dose. Thus, many of indoor sports facilities (excluding
swimming pools and large halls) are spaces with higher probability of infection if they are not
specially designed for high outdoor ventilation rates.
Page | 19
0.2
Probability of infection, -
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Occupancy time, h
Open plan office 1 L/s m2 Open plan office 2 L/s m2

2 person office room 1.5 L/s m2 Classroom 4 L/s pers
Classroom 6 L/s pers Classroom 8 L/s pers
0.2
Probability of infection , -
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 1 2 3 4
Occupancy time, h
Meeting room 6 pers Meeting room 10 pers Meeting room 20 pers

Restaurant 4 L/s m2 Shopping 1.5 L/s m2 Sports facility 3 L/s m2
Figure 6. Infection risk assessment for some common non-residential rooms and ventilation rates calculated
with the REHVA COVID-19 ventilation calculator. 1.5 L/s per m2 ventilation rate is used in 2 person office
room of 16 m2, and 4 L/s per m2 in meeting rooms. Detailed input data is reported in Table 3.
Infection risk probability calculation workflow is illustrated in Table 3. The total airflow rate is
calculated as a product of L/s per floor area ventilation rate value and the floor area, therefore the
larger the room the larger the total airflow rate per infected person (1 infected person is assumed in
all rooms). It should be noted that the number of occupants has no effect because the calculation is
per infected person. The room height (volume) matters on the concentration development so that
the source E is switched on at time t = 0 and the concentration starts to build up. In the calculation,
8-hour occupancy was considered and the average concentration is quite close to the steady state as
the value in the parentheses is higher than 0.9 in all cases (1.0 will correspond to the steady state).
Page | 20
Case Specific Input Parameters
Floor Height Ventilation Qunta Breathing Occupancy Air Total first Room x steady Average Quanta Probability
area rate per emission rate time change order volume state concen- inhaled of
floor area rate rate loss rate concentration (dose) infection
tration
2 2 3 3
A (m ) h (m) L/(s m ) quanta/h m /h Δt (h)
-1 -1
kven (h ) ktot (h ) V (m ) [] quanta/m3 quanta -
2
Open plan office 1 L/s m 50 3 1 5 0.54 8 1.2 1.82 150 0.93 0.02 0.07 0.071
2
Open plan office 2 L/s m 50 3 2 5 0.54 8 2.4 3.02 150 0.96 0.01 0.05 0.045
2 person office 1.5 L/s m2 16 3 1.5 5 0.54 8 1.8 2.42 48 0.95 0.04 0.18 0.162
Meeting room 6 pers 18 3 4 19 1.1 8 4.8 5.42 54 0.98 0.06 0.56 0.428
Classroom 4 L/s pers 56 3 2 5 0.54 8 2.4 3.02 168 0.96 0.01 0.04 0.040
2
Restaurant 4 L/s m 50 3 4 15 1.1 8 4.8 5.42 150 0.98 0.02 0.16 0.147
2
Shopping 1.5 L/s m 50 3 1.5 11 1.38 8 1.8 2.42 150 0.95 0.03 0.32 0.272
Sports facility 3 L/s m2 50 3 3 21 3.3 8 3.6 4.22 150 0.97 0.03 0.85 0.573
Table 3. Infection risk probability calculation workflow for the cases reported in Figure 6.
It is important to understand the limitations of the probability calculation:
• Results are sensitive to quanta emission rates which can vary over a large range, as shown in
Table 1. The uncertainty of these values is high. Also, there are likely to be super spreaders that
are less frequent but may have higher emission rates (as in the choir caselviii). This makes absolute
probabilities of infection uncertain, and it is better to look at the order-of-magnitude (i.e. is the
risk of the order of 0.1% or 1% or 10% or approaching 100%). The relative effect of control
measures may be better understood from this calculation, given the current state of knowledge;
• Calculated probability of infection is a statistical value that applies for a large group of persons,
but differences in individual risk may be significant depending upon the individual’s personal
health situation and susceptibility;
• Assuming full mixing creates another uncertainty because, in large and high-ceiling rooms, the
virus concentration is not necessarily equal all over the room volume. In the calculation, a 50 m2
floor area is used for an open-plan office. Generally, up to 4 m high rooms with a maximum
volume of 300 m3 could be reasonably well mixed; however, it is more accurate to simulate
concentrations with CFD analyses. Sometimes, thermal plume effects from occupants may
provide some additional mixing in high spaces such as theatres or churches.
These limitations and uncertainties mean that rather than predicting an absolute infection risk, the
calculation is capable of comparing the relative effectiveness of solutions and ventilation strategies
to support the most appropriate choice. The calculation model can show which strategy offers the
lowest load for non-infected persons. The model can be applied to show low and high-risk rooms in
existing buildings that is highly useful in the risk assessment of how buildings should be used during
the outbreak. Calculation results are easy to convert to the form of relative risk. In Figure 7 this is
done for an open plan office where 2 L/s per person ventilation rate (0.2 L/s per m 2) with occupant
density of 10 m2 per person is considered as 100% relative risk level. This ventilation rate that is a
half of an absolute minimum of 4 L/s per person can be used to describe superspreading events.
Results in Figure 7 show that a common ventilation rate of 2 L/s per m 2 will reduce the relative risk
to 34% and doubling that value to 4 L/s per m 2 will provide relatively smaller further reduction to
19%.
Page | 21
100%
Relative risk of infection, %

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0 1 2 3 4
Ventilation rate, L/(s m 2)
Figure 7. Relative risk in open plan office of 50 m2 where 2 L/s per person (0.2 L/s per m2) ventilation rate is
considered as a reference level for a superspreading event with 100% relative risk.
Finally, Figure 7 allows to estimate what is the difference between Category II and I ventilation rates.
With 10 m2 per person occupant density, the airflow rates become 1.4 and 2.0 L/s per m2 in Category
II and I respectively when low polluting materials are considered. Thus, Category II ventilation results
in 43% relative risk and Category I in 34% that shows significant improvement as the curve has quite
deep slope at that range.
3 CO2 concentration as a ventilation indicator

An easy way to monitor the ventilation performance is to use CO2 sensors as recommended in Section
4.13. CO2 readings describe outdoor ventilation rate adequately under normal occupant density.
When persons enter a room, it takes some time before the concentration builds up and reaches the
steady state value. In well ventilated rooms, CO2 concentration builds up quickly, in meeting rooms
and classrooms within 30 minutes and in offices less than in one hour. More specifically, the speed
of the concentration build-up depends on the room time constant which is reciprocal of air change
rate (63% of concentration change happens within 1 time constant and 95% within 3 time constants).
Thus, CO2 readings provide reliable indication about the ventilation sufficiency after the time of
couple of the time constants.
At the same ventilation rate, the CO2 concentration is lower if occupancy is reduced for instance,
because of physical distancing or administrative measures. CO2 concentration dependency on
occupant density is illustrated in Figure 8 for an office with two ventilation rates. 2 L/s per m2
ventilation corresponds to good practice of indoor climate Category I which is capable to keep CO 2
concentration below 800 ppm if there is at least 7 m2 floor area per occupant. In the case of smaller
ventilation rate of 1 L/s per m2, at least 10 m2 per person is needed to keep CO2 concentration below
1000 ppm.
On the CO2, the bottom line is that high CO2 indicates poor ventilation without question. Low CO 2 is
good, but it’s not by its own a confirmation of a low risk of aerosol transmission; occupant density,
occupancy duration and room size are to be considered too.
Page | 22
CO2, ppm CO2 concentration limits in offices
1000
Not acceptable
800
Acceptable ventilation 1 L/(s m2)
600 2 L/(s m2)

Good ventilation
400
200
CO2 outdoor = 400 ppm

0
6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Floor area per person, m2/person
Figure 8. CO2 concentration (absolute values that include outdoor concentration) dependency on ventilation
rate and occupancy in offices.
4 Propagation and spread by air currents directed to a person

While air movement is commonly treated as a draught that is a local thermal discomfort issue, in
rooms with an infected person, this can take on a new meaning. Because of studies of a Guangzhou
restaurant and some previous airplane infections, this phenomenon of spread by air movement is well
known. A strong directed airflow toward an infected person may carry little-diluted viral material in
an aerosol towards a susceptible person in a very high concentration, which may propagate the virus
within a specific part of the room, as shown by Figure 9. The ECDC addresses this possibility (see
Section 3), concluding that “Air flow generated by air-conditioning units may facilitate the spread of
droplets excreted by infected people longer distances within indoor spaces.” However, in this specific
case, it is not known what were the relative contributions of the directed air flow of split unit and
the poor ventilation to the infections in the Guangzhou restaurant. Only the combined effect of these
two factors is known along with the fact that the ventilation was negligible, being only about 1 L/s
per person. This indicates that the very low level of ventilation was likely the main cause of the
outbreak in the restaurant.
Although the air conditioning unit was not likely to be the main contributor in this specific case, the
issue of directed air flow should be taken seriously in future air distribution design. Low velocity air
distribution solutions which do not provide either strong air currents or draughts are already widely
available and should now be applied more widely.
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Figure 9. CFD simulated air distribution by split unit in Guangzhou restaurantxvii. The index person is shown
with magenta-blue and nine infected persons with red. (Figure: courtesy Yuguo Li
Air distribution may have a crucial effect on the concentration of viral material in room air. It can
both locally reduce or increase concentrations remarkably. A number of papers show that assuming
well-mixed air in a space is in many cases an oversimplification that fails when it comes to particles
and aerosol concentrations. Increasing the ventilation rate may in some situations even increase the
concentration in the breathing zone because of unfavourable airflow patterns. Such evidence is
reported for some displacement and underfloor systems lxiiilxiv.
Generally, viral aerosol concentration control is a new consideration for room air distribution where
viral material from a point source (an infected person with unknown location) should be effectively
diluted and locally removed at the same time. Therefore, a fully mixing air distribution system,
capable of completely mixing contamination from a point source in a large room in one hand, and
vertical stratification and exhausts capable of removing the higher concentration before it is
completely mixed, would be beneficial. Additionally, personal ventilation solutions can be useful as
they help to reduce concentrations locally in workplaces. There is no obvious way to combine such
mutually contradictory features. Thus, dilution rates, effectiveness of contaminant removal and
efficiency of air changes for all possible types of air distribution including personal ventilation
solutions should be the subject for air distribution research. This should consider the situation of one
randomly located point source instead of a common situation with more or less equally distributed
emission sources distributed in rooms with no infected persons.
5 Cross-contamination aspects of ventilation and AC systems

High ventilation hygiene levels and strict avoidance of any cross-contamination are well known
aspects of hospital and industrial ventilation design. In other non-residential buildings the issue is
more speculative because of contaminants with lower risks and the more economical and energy-
efficient solutions used. The need for more widespread infection control, however, will raise new
questions for the use of recirculation and potential leakages in heat recovery equipment, as well as
about safe distances between exhaust and intake air openings. Recirculation is technically easy to
avoid in any climate, and there are available alternatives, such as more energy-efficient heat, cold,
Page | 24
and humidity recovery solutions. However, further research into pollutant transfer may be needed.
For instance, pollutant transfer studies of rotors (enthalpy wheels) are more than 20 years old, and
more studies about particle and gas-phase transfer and the effects of hygroscopic coatings may also
be needed. The same applies to air cleaning technologies for which research and standardization are
in the development phase.
6 Summary and the research agenda

While there are many possibilities to improve ventilation solutions in future, it is important to
recognise that current technology and knowledge already allows the use of many rooms in buildings
during a COVID-19 type of outbreak as long as ventilation rates correspond to or ideally exceed
existing standards and a cross-infection risk assessment is conducted (as shown in Section 2).
Regarding the airflow rates, more ventilation is always better, but to dilute the aerosol concentration
the total airflow rate in L/s per infected person matters. This makes large spaces ventilated according
to current standards reasonably safe, but smaller rooms occupied by fewer people and with relatively
low airflow rates pose a higher risk even if they are well ventilated. Limiting the number of occupants
in small rooms, reducing occupancy time and applying physical distancing will in most cases keep the
probability of cross-infection to a reasonable level. For future buildings and ventilation improvement,
Category I ventilation rates can be recommended as these provide significant risk reduction compared
to common Category II airflow rates.
Proposed research agenda:
• Future research should tackle cross-contamination, air distribution, and outdoor air ventilation
capacity aspects as the first priority;
• Quick and affordable retrofit solutions of improved ventilation efficiency resulting in reduction
of risk of infection should be a specific focus for existing buildings (that can be developed as a
part of energy efficient low carbon retrofit to meet 2030/2050 goals);
• Risk management may be improved by dedicated use of IAQ monitoring systems designed not just
to detect high CO2 concentration situations but designed to translate CO2 concentration trends
(depending upon room size, a normal number of persons present in the room, etc.) into an
evaluation of Wells-Riley infection risks;
• Research funding agencies and industry should invest in developing practical technical solutions
to protect against the aerosol transmission of infectious diseases in indoor environments,
buildings, and on public transport systems;
• Building codes, standards, and guidelines should be revised and updated to improve preparedness
for future epidemics;
• The proposed actions will provide concurrent benefits for reducing the risk of airborne
transmission of viral diseases and general health in times between epidemics.
Page | 25
Appendix 2 – Inspection of rotary heat exchangers to limit internal leakages
The main indicator of internal leakage of contaminated air leaving the room to supply air through
the exchanger is expressed by Exhaust Air Transfer Ratio (EATR) in %. EATR is a function of the
pressure difference between the supply air side downstream of the exchanger (p22) and the extract
air side upstream of the exchanger (p11), and its value depends on the type of sealing and conditions.
But also, the rotor speed and purge sector have an impact on EATR. The main target is to keep over
pressure on the supply air side, and in this way, maintain any possible leakage from supply to exhaust
air (i.e. EATR = 0%). In well-equipped air handling units (AHUs), pressure taps to measure p11 and p22
are normally available.
Figure 10. P22-11 in AHU
For a correctly designed, set-up and maintained rotary heat exchanger, the leakage of potentially
contaminated by pathogens extract air to supply air stream is typically very low and without practical
meaning. Nevertheless, in the case of incorrect layout of AHU fans or lack of a correct pressure
balance setting within the AHU, the leakage may be significantly higher.
Measures to keep the exhaust air leakage low

The air leakage across a rotary heat exchanger depends on a number of factors described below. The
facility management staff normally have no impact on the location of fans, but other measures to
eliminate or minimise leakage should be taken during commissioning, inspection and regular
maintenance.
Correct position of fans

A prerequisite for minimising internal leakages is the correct positioning of fans. The available fans
position configurations are shown on Figures 11-14. The most recommended configuration includes
both fans located downstream within the exchanger (see Figure 11), In this configuration, with
correctly balanced pressures (p22-11 > 0) and properly set-up purge sector, EATR is usually below 1%.
In contrast, the most adverse configuration in terms of leakage includes both fans on the building
side (see Figure 12) In the worst case, for this configuration EATR can amount to as much as 10–20%6.
6
Eurovent Recommendation 6-15. Estimation based on Eurovent Certified data.
Page | 26
Figure 11. Best configuration. Both fans after the Figure 12. Both fans on building side
rotor
Figure 13 Both fans on the outdoor side Figure 14 . Both fans upstream the exchanger.
Balancing pressure difference

The next step to minimise a leakage is to set the correct difference between pressures p22 and p11.
Pressure p11 should be at least 20 Pa less than the pressure p 22. Depending on the configuration of
fans, this can be done by throttling as follows:
- If both fans are placed after the rotor (Figure 11): adjust the throttle in the extract air so
p11 will become at least p22 – 20 Pa. If the throttling device (e.g. damper) is not available in
an AHU, it should be installed in the ductwork.
- Both fans on the building side (Figure 12): There is no possibility to use throttling in this case.
- Both fans on the outdoor side (Figure 13): There is no need to use throttling in this case.
- Both fans upstream of the rotor (Figure 14): adjust the throttle in the supply air so p 11 will
become at least p22 – 20 Pa. If the throttling device (e.g. damper) is not available in an AHU,
it should be installed in the ductwork.
Correct application of the purge sector, position and setting

The purge sector is a device that can practically eliminate the leakage resulting from the rotation of
the wheel (carry-over leakage). Its location and setting (angle) must be arranged according to the
AHU manufacturer’s guidance depending on the configuration of fans and pressure relations.
Effective sealing of the rotor

Perimeter and middle beam sealing prevent air leakage from the supply side to the exhaust side.
Seals are subject to wear and their performance deteriorates with time. The condition of the seals
should be checked during periodic inspection and, if necessary, the seal should be restored to its
original state in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
Method to estimate leakage (EATR) for on-site tests

The precise testing of internal air leakage must be carried out in the laboratory. However, a draft of
the new upcoming standard prEN308 provides a simple method for estimation of EATR in service using
temperature measurements that can be performed on-site. The test procedure includes
Page | 27
measurements of temperatures t11, t21 and t22 in steady-state conditions with the rotor stopped (heat
transfer deactivated). Next, EATR is calculated as:
𝑡22 − 𝑡21
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
𝑡11 − 𝑡21
Where,
t11 is temperature exhaust air inlet;
t21 is temperature supply air inlet;
t22 is temperature supply air outlet.
Leakage related to the rotation of the wheel (carry-over) cannot be determined by this method.
Page | 28
Appendix 3 - Ventilation in patient rooms
Ventilation systems for special patient rooms like airborne infectious isolation rooms (AIIR) have been
well developed for infection risk control7. These rooms apply two principles: by preventing the spread
of airborne microbes adjoining rooms and the surrounding area and by reducing the amount of
airborne microbes in patient room with efficient ventilation. To prevent the spread by airborne
transmission from a source patient to susceptible patients and other persons in a patient room, it is
important to keep the patient room with negative pressure comparing with adjacent rooms in
hospitals. Patient rooms with negative pressure are also known as 'Class N isolation room', 'airborne
infection isolation' and 'infectious isolation units'. A few recommendations are presented here
specifically for the operation of patient rooms during COVID-19 temporary hospital settings according
to several national regulations/standards89101112. Generally, hospital ventilation systems designed
according to these regulations/standards have provided adequate airborne infection risk control for
COVID-19 disease so that no cross-infections have been reported from modern hospitals.
For normal areas/patient rooms:

- Normal patient rooms that are not intended for patients with infectious diseases, need at least
4 air changes per hour (ACH).
- If used for airborne precaution, it should be updated to meet the requirement for isolation rooms,
where adequate ventilation is considered to be at least 6 ACH (equivalent to 40 L/s/patient for
a 4x2x3 m3 room).
For temporary areas/wards for patients with infectious diseases:

- Healthcare facilities without enough single isolation rooms in emergency departments should
designate a separate, well-ventilated areas/wards where patients with suspected COVID-19 can
wait.
- If feasible, ventilation system should be updated to meet the requirement for isolation rooms.
For isolation rooms with airborne infections:

- AIIR air shall be exhausted directly to the outdoors, using HEPA filter whenever it is possible to
avoid possible cross contamination if the exhaust air outlet are nearby windows or outdoor air
intakes.
- Ensure supply air ducts are independent of the common building supply air system.
- The supply airflow rate should be 6-12 ACH (e.g. equivalent to 40-80 L/s/patient for a 4x2x3 m3
room) for existing isolation rooms, ideally at least 12 ACH for new constructions. See Figure 15
for illustration of the effect of high airflow rates.
- Recommended negative pressure differential is ≥5 Pa to ensure that air flows from the corridor
7
Guidelines for the classification and design of isolation rooms in health care facilities, Victorian Advisory
Committee on Infection Control 2007.
http://docs2.health.vic.gov.au/docs/doc/4AAF777BF1B3C40BCA257D2400820414/$FILE/070303_DHS_ISO%20Ro
omGuide_web.pdf
8 ASHRAE Standard 170-2013
9 VDI 6022 https://www.vdi.de/richtlinien/unsere-richtlinien-highlights/vdi-6022
10 https://www.fhi.no/publ/eldre/isoleringsveilederen/
11 https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/environmental/appendix/air.html#tableb2
12 https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-IPC-2020.4
Page | 29
into the patient room.
- Exhaust air shall be located directly above the patient bed on the ceiling or on the wall.
- Ensure the room is as airtight as possible
- Extract air from the patient room and toilet should not be recirculated and returned to the room.
- Fit a local audible alarm or local visual means in case of fan failure and negative differential
pressure is not maintained.
- A separate exhaust system dedicated to each room that removes a quantity of air greater than
that of the supply system.
- If possible, anteroom or air lock should be used to prevent the transmission of infectious agent
from the door opening of the AIIR.
Figure 15. illustration of high airflow rates. Time to replace the air in the room as a function of airflow rate
and room volume.
If natural ventilation is used, higher ventilation rates are recommended because of unstable
operation of ventilation where sufficient ventilation cannot be guaranteed at all times. Natural
ventilation is suitable for the use only in favourable climate conditions. Comprehensive natural
ventilation guidance is provided by WHO 13.
13
Natural Ventilation for Infection Control in Health-Care Settings. WHO 2009.
https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/natural_ventilation.pdf
Page | 30
Appendix 4 - COVID-19 ventilation and building services guidance for school
personnel
In this document we summarise advice on the operation and use of building services in schools, in
order to prevent the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) virus (SARS-CoV-2). This guidance
is focussing on school principals, teachers and facility managers.
Before taking preventive measures, it requires some basic understanding of transmission of infectious
agents. In relation to COVID-19 four transmission routes can be distinguished:
1. in close contact of 1-2 m via large droplets and aerosols (when sneezing or coughing or talking);
2. via the air through aerosols (desiccated small droplets), which may stay airborne for hours and
can be transported long distances (released when breathing, talking, sneezing or coughing);
3. via surface contact (hand-hand, hand-surface etc.);
4. via the faecal-oral route.
More backgrounds on transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 can be found in Section 2 of this document.
Figure 16. Exposure mechanisms of COVID-19 SARS-CoV-2 droplets. (Figure: courtesy Francesco Franchimon)
General guidance for employers and building owners that is presented in e.g. the WHO document
‘Guidance for COVID-19 prevention and control in schools’ and national guidelines focus on monitoring
of symptoms, keeping distance and good hygiene practices (transmission routes via large droplets
and via surface contact). In order to keep the risk of infection as low as reasonably achievable, we
additionally recommend measures on ventilation (airborne transmission) and sanitary installations
(faecal-oral transmission).
Ventilation
In many European schools sufficient ventilation is a challenge. Today, many schools in Europe are
Page | 31
naturally ventilated (e.g. using windows). Natural ventilation significantly depends on the
temperature difference between the indoor and the ambient air and the current wind situation. As
a result, a sufficient natural ventilation cannot be guaranteed at all times. Mechanical ventilation
systems can ensure a continuous air exchange throughout the year.
Below some practical instructions are given to optimize ventilation in the short-term:
• Secure ventilation of spaces with outdoor air. Check whether the ventilation systems in
classrooms, either natural or mechanical, are functioning well:
✓ Check whether windows and grilles can be opened;
✓ Clean ventilations grilles so that the air supply is not obstructed;
✓ Have mechanical ventilation systems checked for their functioning by your maintenance
company;
• Install a CO2 monitor with traffic light indication (Figure 17) at least in the classrooms in which
ventilation depends on opening windows and/or outdoor grilles. This visualises the need for extra
ventilation by opening windows. Make sure that the CO 2 monitor is placed at a visible position in
the classroom, away from fresh air inlets (e.g. open windows), typically on the internal wall at
occupied zone height of about 1.5 m. In times of Corona, we suggest to temporarily change the
default settings of the traffic light indicator (yellow/orange light up to 800 ppm and red light up
to 1000 ppm) in order to promote as much ventilation as possible.
Figure 17. Examples of CO2 monitors with traffic light indicator showing the indoor air quality.
• Check operating hours of mechanical ventilation systems. Switch ventilation to nominal speed at
least 2 hours before the school starts and switch off or to lower speed 2 hours after occupancy.
Keep toilet ventilation in the nominal speed in similar fashion as the main ventilation system.14
• Switch air handling units with central recirculation to 100% outdoor air.
• Adjust the setpoints of CO2 controlled ventilation systems (if present). With these systems, the
amount of air exchange is automatically reduced with lower occupancy to save energy. In order
to reduce the risk of transmission of infectious diseases full ventilation is needed, even if only
part of the students is present. Ask your maintenance company if CO 2 controlled ventilation is
present in your building. Generally, they are also the ones to adjust the setpoints.
• Give teachers instructions on how to use the ventilation facilities:
✓ Open windows and ventilations’ grilles as much as possible during school hours. Opening
windows just underneath the ceiling reduces the draught risk. In rooms with mechanical
14
More detailed ventilation operation guidance is provided in Section 4.1.
Page | 32
air supply and exhaust this is usually not necessary, but extra ventilation is positive and
does not disrupt the ventilation system.
✓ Ensure regular airing with windows during breaks (also in mechanically ventilated
buildings).
✓ Make sure that ventilation facilities are not obstructed or blocked by curtains or
furniture.
✓ Keep an eye on any installed CO2 monitors (ask pupils to assist). Be aware that more
aerosols are released during activities such as singing or sport.
✓ Use local cooling systems, like fan coils or split units, as you usually do 15. Though, make
sure that there is always supply of fresh outdoor air by mechanical ventilation systems
or operable windows.
Figure 18. Open windows as much as possible during school hours and ensure airing during breaks.
In the long-term it obviously makes sense to structurally improve the ventilation, since poor indoor
air quality leads to, among others, headache, fatigue and reduced learning performance.
Some contractors and maintenance companies are now offering to replace filters, but this is NOT
necessary to reduce infection risks. Only replace filters when necessary or already planned. In
addition, one talks about cooling and humidification of air. Adjusting the setpoints of the climate
system to lower values is NOT necessary and useless in schools. The same goes for placing humidifiers,
because there is NO evidence that this is effective. Focus on things that really matter, such as proper
ventilation.
Sanitary
15
More detailed guidance on fan coils and split units is provided in Section 4.6.
Page | 33
Points of attention for the sanitary facilities (taps, toilets, sewers):
• Flush all toilets, water taps and showers before the school reopens. If water taps haven’t been
used for several weeks, the water that is still in the pipes may be of poor quality.
• Check if water taps in all toilets are in operating condition (with soap dispensers and paper
towels) or provide other facilities to disinfect hands after using the toilet.
• Replace frequently used water taps with taps with a sensor, so that they can be used without
touching them.
• Make sure that floor drains do not run dry to avoid an open connection to the sewer. Fill the
drains regularly with water. Add some oil to prevent the water seal from evaporating quickly.
• Give the instructions to flush toilets with closed lid and wash hands after toilet use.
More information
https://www.rehva.eu/activities/covid-19-guidance
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/guidance-
for-schools-workplaces-institutions
https://www.unicef.org/media/66216/file/Key%20Messages%20and%20Actions%20for%20COVID-
19%20Prevention%20and%20Control%20in%20Schools_March%202020.pdf?sfvrsn=baf81d52_4
Page | 34
Feedback
If you are specialist in the issues addressed in this document and you have remarks or suggestions for
improvements, feel free to contact us via info@rehva.eu. Please mention ‘COVID-19 interim
document’ as subject when you email us.
Colophon
This document was prepared by the COVID-19 Task Force of REHVA’s Technology and Research Committee, based
on the first version of the guidance developed in the period between March 6-15th 2020 by REHVA volunteers.
Members of the Task Force are:

Prof. Jarek Kurnitski, Chair of REHVA COVID-19 Task Force, Tallinn University of Technology, Chair of REHVA
Technology and Research Committee
Dr. Atze Boerstra, REHVA vice-president, managing director bba binnenmilieu
Dr. Francesco Franchimon, managing director Franchimon ICM
Igor Sikonczyk, Senior Technical and Regulatory Affairs Manager at Eurovent
Ir. Froukje van Dijken, healthy building specialist at bba binnenmilieu
Prof. Catalin Lungu, REHVA vice-president, vice-president of AIIR
Prof. Guangyu Cao, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
Dr. Hywel Davies, Technical Director of CIBSE
Prof. em. Olli Seppänen, Aalto University
Frank Hovorka, REHVA president, director technology and innovation FPI, Paris
Jaap Hogeling, manager International Projects at ISSO
Prof. Ivo Martinac, REHVA vice-president, KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Prof. Livio Mazzarella, Milan Polytechnic University
Prof. em. Francis Allard, La Rochelle University
Henk Kranenberg, vice-president of Eurovent, Senior Manager at Daikin Europe NV
Mikael Borjesson, Vice President of Eurovent Association, Competence Director Swegon Group
Francesco Scuderi, Deputy Secretary General at Eurovent Association
Prof. Dr. Marija S. Todorovic, University of Belgrade Serbia
Dr. Benoit Sicre, Lucerne School of Engineering and Architecture
Prof. Manuel Gameiro da Silva, REHVA vice-president, University of Coimbra
Kemal Gani Bayraktar, REHVA vice-president, Marketing Director at Izocam
Juan Travesi Cabetas, REHVA vice-president, vice-president of ATECYR
Prof. Manuel Ruiz de Adana, ATECYR Technical Committee. University of Cordoba
Prof. Pedro G. Vicente Quiles, Chair of ATECYR Technical Committee. Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche
Prof. Cristina Tanasa, Politehnica University Timisoara
Ioan Silviu Dobosi, AIIR - Romanian Association of Building Services Engineers
This document was reviewed by Prof. Yuguo Li from the University of Hongkong, Prof. Shelly Miller from the
University of Colorado Boulder, Prof. Pawel Wargocki from the Technical University of Denmark, Prof. Lidia
Morawska from the Queensland University of Technology and Dr. Jovan Pantelic from the University of California
Berkeley.
Page | 35
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REHVA COVID-19 guidance document, November 17, 2020

Conclusion about the aerosol (airborne) transmission route:

• The transmission of COVID-19 commonly occurs in enclosed indoor spaces.

• Building administrators should maintain heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems

• Energy-saving settings, such as demand-controlled ventilation controlled by a timer or CO 2

Figure 5. Main items of REHVA guidance for building services operation.

4.1 Increase air supply and exhaust ventilation

4.2 Use openable windows more

4.3 Humidification and air-conditioning have no practical effect

4.4 Safe use of heat recovery sections

4.5 No use of central recirculation

4.7 Duct cleaning has no practical effect

4.9 Safety procedures for maintenance personnel

4.11 Toilet lid use instructions

4.12 Risk of Legionellosis after shut-down

4.13 IAQ monitoring

2 Ventilation rate, room size and activity effects on infection risk

Activity Quanta emission rate, quanta/h

Activity Breathing rate, m3/h

Open plan office 1 L/s m2 Open plan office 2 L/s m2

Meeting room 6 pers Meeting room 10 pers Meeting room 20 pers

It is important to understand the limitations of the probability calculation:

Relative risk of infection, %

3 CO2 concentration as a ventilation indicator

600 2 L/(s m2)

CO2 outdoor = 400 ppm

4 Propagation and spread by air currents directed to a person

5 Cross-contamination aspects of ventilation and AC systems

6 Summary and the research agenda

Proposed research agenda:

Figure 10. P22-11 in AHU

Measures to keep the exhaust air leakage low

Correct position of fans

Balancing pressure difference

Correct application of the purge sector, position and setting

Effective sealing of the rotor

Method to estimate leakage (EATR) for on-site tests

For normal areas/patient rooms:

For temporary areas/wards for patients with infectious diseases:

For isolation rooms with airborne infections:

Members of the Task Force are:

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