Consciousness is an integral part of the human experience, yet its origins and nature are more diffi-

cult to ascertain than most other phenomena within our world. It is at the same time integral to our
understanding of the outside world, yet the implications for its existence may lock out of knowing,
or even experiencing this same outside world. Out of the myriad of ways one could explain con-
sciousness, two categories have emerged, namely: physicalism and dualism (including other forms
of non-physicalism). The modern consensus, coupled with a myriad of scientific achievements seem
to promote the view that physicalist accounts of consciousness are sufficiently exhaustive. How-
ever, I will make the argument the physicalist account cannot adequately explain consciousness,
specifically phenomenal consciousness. The physicalist answers to three integral questions about
consciousness are incomplete, and leave out important details about consciousness we regularly ex-
perience.

The first question is on precisely what consciousness is. Though consciousness is a singular thing, it
seems to have two functions which can be understood separately (Block, 1995). The first of these is
‘access consciousness’. Access consciousness relates to general awareness of a living thing and its
ability to interact with direct senses which allows it to access the outside world. For example, if I
were to look upon a glass of water, access consciousness would allow me to be aware of the glass of
water, and understand its experiential function, namely that I can drink it. This information is ob-
ject-focused, and requires only a base processing of information. In neuroscience, we see that there
are parts of the brain which specialise in processing certain senses, i.e. the occipital lobe which pro -
cesses sight. The hemispheres of the brain also work together to integrate information from one an-
other to perform specific sensorimotor actions (Idris et al, 2017) which lends credence to the idea
that there is a physical effect produced by mental states. However, there is another kind of con-
sciousness, called phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995) which relates to the experience of the
aware being, or a ‘what-it-is-likeness’ (Nagel, 1974) inherent to being a conscious thing. With a
physicalist framework, one would assert that this experience is too fundamentally physical in na-
ture. One way to explain this is through a form of reductive physicalism, which is espoused by iden-
tity theorists. According to identity theorists, mental states are equivalent to certain brain states
(Smart, 1959). Taking this view, whenever one has the experience of being in a given mental state,
there is an identical brain state which is occurring that generates the mental state. However, the is -
sue with that view comes when explaining qualia, or how an experience ‘feels’. With a reductive
physicalist view, we cannot explain other features of phenomenal consciousness, like its subjectiv-
ity. As Nagel (1974) argues: we could have all the brain information without being able to explain
the actual experience of this information. For instance, one could have the knowledge that pain is
caused by c-fibres activating without knowing anything about the experience of that pain (Putnam,
1975), or how it feels. Because of this, we could never know what it is like to be something other
than ourselves, and we are left with a best guess. Some physicalists would bite the bullet and deny
that there is any such thing (Smart, 1959), however, when doing so, it leaves the phenomenal expe-
rience we do have inexplicable by physical terms, thereby denying the existence of phenomenal
consciousness in any physical way. Also, there is a potential problem when a mental state has no
specific brain state underpinning it. It seems possible that different brain states can produce a simi -
lar mental state, which would mean that the mental state is not dependent on a 1:1 correspondence.
For instance, things other than humans could experience similar mental states, but would not have
the same brain state as they are not human (Nagel, 1974).

A second question follows from the first, which centres on the problem of subjectivity. The phe-
nomenal conscious experience is unique to each individual, and cannot be known just by having the
physical information alone. If phenomenal consciousness is indeed physical, then it would follow
that by possessing all the physical knowledge about a certain brain state would allow us to know ev-
erything about the mental state which it produces, however, we don’t seem to have this. Physicalists
offer a few explanations to combat this and maintain the physical nature of phenomenal conscious-
ness. One of these is functionalism. Functionalism holds that the mental states need not be under-
stood in relation to a corresponding brain state, but a specific function, which itself has a physical
source, even if not immediately reducible (Block, 1978). So, if one were in pain, it would be a func -
tion created by the sensory inputs and inherent beliefs, both of which are processed and stored in the
brain (Putnam, 1975). However, an issue with this view of functionalism is that there are many
things which have the function of a mental state without actually possessing phenomenal conscious-
ness. A calculator, for instance is able to perform calculations in the same way a mind does without
possessing the phenomenal consciousness. If functionalism is merely a product of inputs and out-
puts, then, as Block (1978, p. 96) says, ‘the government of China…could be functionally equivalent
to you for an hour.’ Yet you would have phenomenal consciousness, and the government of China
would not. This means that functionalism is inadequate in its explanation of phenomenal conscious-
ness, as it misattributes actions which function like mental states with the state itself. Another po-
tential explanation for this comes from anomalous monism, which argues that the mental states are
derivative of physical states, but act in an anomalous way, which is inexplicable by referring back
to the physical cause alone (Davidson, 1970). In this way, mental events would be causally effica-
cious since they are caused by the physical, but not subject to pure determinism like other physical
objects are. In this way, it would seem that one could understand the subjectivity of phenomenal
consciousness as physical yet not determined or correspondent to any specific physical process.
This would adequately explain how qualia and subjective experience could exist, however a poten-
tial problem is that the mental cause would either be excluded by the causal exclusion problem or
be overdetermined, which will be expounded upon in the counter argument. Another view is that of
phenomenal concept strategy, which holds that the phenomenal experiences we have can be under-
stood in terms of concepts, or ways of thinking about conscious experience in an inner way (Sund-
ström, 2011). This means that our subjective experiences could potentially be understood in a physi-
calist way using this strategy of converting phenomenal ‘subjective’ experiences to non-phenome-
nal ‘objective’ experiences. While this tool seems to work, it is not by itself sufficient to under-
standing the nature of consciousness and is an auxiliary to the physicalist conceptions we have al -
ready tackled.

The third problem is the question of how consciousness comes about. In Chalmer’s (2013) paper on
panpsychism, he argues that the conceivability argument against materialism (physicalism) would
cause problems for physicalist views like identity theory and functionalism, since it is conceivable
that beings like ours could exist without consciousness whilst remaining physically identical. This
would mean that the brain could operate exactly as it does in a physical sense whilst being without
consciousness and nothing physical would be missing. His argument for constitutive panpsychism
claims that consciousness is a fundamental physical phenomenon and can be found as micro-physi-
cal blocks which together constitute the consciousness we all possess. However, a problem with this
argument is how micro-experiences from micro-physical objects could possibly create one macro-
experience (Chalmers, 2013), as well as the lack of scientific evidence that would support such a
hypothesis. Many micro-physical entities like quarks and bosons have been discovered and inte-
grated into our physical theories of the universe, yet none of these say anything about a fundamen-
tally physical substance which could be termed consciousness. If this physical thing cannot be
picked up by any physical sensors yet comprises a fundamental part of our universe, then it is either
not there at all, or it is not physical. The first choice would lead to the conclusion that there is no
such thing as consciousness, namely that it is illusory (Block & Dennett, 1993) or that it is not phys-
ical and dualism is instead true. If phenomenal consciousness is illusory, then there is the question
of how the brain creates it, and why it exists, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Though physicalism has all of these problems, it doesn’t mean that dualism is not without its own
set. Given the fact that dualism asserts that the mind and body are distinct (Descartes & Williams,
1996), there is the question of how they interact. Princess Elisabeth, in her reply to Descartes, out-
lines that the mind and body cannot interact with one another if they are wholly distinct (McWeeny,
2011) given that there is no way to understand the mind in any material terms according to
Descartes. Even if we don’t hold this view and instead subscribe to the notion that the mind inhabits
the body, we are still stuck with the problem of how the mind can be causally efficacious (Church-
land, 1984). Some would bite the bullet and see the mind as epiphenomenal (Jackson, 1982) while
not doing anything of use. While this might grant a form of dualism, it is insufficient for most dual -
ists who want to hold to the notion that the mind does cause physical effects. The problem with this
is we cannot do this while holding onto the empirically a posteriori understanding that every physi-
cal event has a sufficient physical cause, also known as causal closure. This is problematic for
anomalous monism as the mental cause which arises from a physical cause can be understood in a
physical way (Davidson, 1970) which leads to overdetermination, where multiple sufficient cases
can produce one effect (Kim, 1998). If this holds, then Davidson has no justification for holding
onto the mental cause due to mental exclusion, since he would hold to causal closure. For dualists,
this can be solved by letting go of causal closure (Bennett, 2007). However, this would either mean
that our current understanding of causation is potentially wrong as postulated by Hume (Bennett,
2007) or we have the mind become a ‘nomological dangler’, making the mind and phenomenal con-
sciousness an inexplicable thing by our current physical laws (Smart, 1959). For this reason, some
see the physicalist view as more viable since it adheres to Occam’s razor, assuming fewer things
about the nature of reality in its explanation (Smart, 1959). However, despite these problems and
lack of empirical evidence, it does seem to hold that dualist explanations are possible and coherent
within frameworks like idealism, whereas physicalism fails by its own empiricist metrics.

With all the arguments I have made, I believe it reasonable to conclude that the physicalist account
for phenomenal consciousness is severely lacking. It fails to adequately justify the definition of phe-
nomenal consciousness in its explanations for it, struggles to know the subjectivity of our con-
sciousness and cannot fully explain how consciousness comes about without major problems.
Though dualism has its own problems, namely the issue of causal interaction and the lack of empiri-
cal evidence to substantiate the claim, it is better able to provide an exhaustive account for the exis -
tence of the mind and phenomenal consciousness without leaving out any key details about its na-
ture.

References

- Bennett, K. (2007). Mental causation. Philosophy Compass, 2(2), 316–337.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x
- Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Perception and Cognition, 261-325. Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press.
- Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 18(2), 227–247. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188
- Block, N., & Dennett, D. C. (1993). Consciousness explained. The Journal of Philosophy/the
Journal of Philosophy, 90(4), 181. https://doi.org/10.2307/2940970
- Chalmers, D. (2013). Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism. The Amherst Lecture in Philoso-
phy, 8. https://philpapers.org/rec/CHAPAP-17
- Churchland, Paul M. (1984). Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the
Philosophy of Mind. (ed.) MIT Press.
- Davidson, D. (1970) Mental Events. In Essays on Actions and Events, 207-229. Oxford.
- Idris, J et al. (2017). Human Brain Anatomy: Prospective, Microgravity, Hemispheric
Brain Specialisation and the Death of a person. Human Anatomy: Reviews and Medical Ad-
vances, 61-88.
- Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2960077
- Kim, J. (1998) The many problems of mental causation. In The MIT Press eBooks.
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4629.003.0003
- McWeely, J. (2011). Princess Elisabeth and the Mind-Body Problem. Just the Arguments.
- Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
- Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality. In Cambridge University Press eBooks.
https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo978051162525
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. The Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141-
156.
- Sundström, P. (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Concepts, 6(4), 267-281.