IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[DAVID DENNISON],

Plaintiff,

v.

AILEEN MERCEDES CANNON,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

Comes now Plaintiff ‘DAVID DENNISON,” in propria persona, stating the following

in support of this Complaint and Jury Demand:

INTRODUCTION

1. In a manner eerily reminiscent of National Enquirer chairman David Pecker’s crim-

inal scheme to “catch and kill” salacious stories about Donald Trump to aid him in his 2016

run for the Presidency, on information and belief, the Defendants are attempting to “catch

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and kill” the Government’s case against criminal defendant and former President Donald J.

Trump (“Mr. Trump”) for stealing sensitive documents, styled United States v. Trump, Case

No. 9:23-cr-80101-AMC (S.D.Fla. filed 2023) (“The Florida Case”), and for leading an in-

surrection, styled United States v. Trump, Case No. 1:23-cr-00257-TSC (D.D.C. filed 2023)

(“the D.C. Case”) for the express purpose of aiding him in his 2024 run for the Presidency.

2. Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides: Any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (emphasis added).

3. On or about May 13, 2024, during an impromptu ‘press conference’ conducted at the

close of the day of another of his many trials, Mr. Trump questioned the impartiality of New

York Supreme Court Justice Juan Merchan:

“But we have a corrupt judge. We have a judge who’s highly conflicted, keeping me
from campaigning. He’s an appointed judge. You know who appointed him? Democrat
politicians. He’s appointed. He’s a corrupt judge, and he’s a conflicted judge, and he
ought to let us go out and campaign, and get rid of this scam….”

Trump Posts Videos of Himself FREAKING OUT after Trial (video), Meidas Touch, May

14, 2024 at 1:00, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjKag8tI404 (repost of Fox News

broadcast, aired at 4:28 P.M. EDT).

4. On or about May 14, 2024, with a time stamp of 7:03 A.M. local time, Mr. Trump

posted another tweet on his Truth Social platform, whining that “The problem with this

Judge, Merchan, is TOTALLY COMPROMISED, CONFLICTED, AND CORRUPT, MAK-

ING BIG MONEY OFF THIS SCAM AND ITS OUTCOME. He can’t render a fair deci-

sion, too much is at stake for him and the Democrats.” Donald J. Trump, Tweet, Truth Social,

May 14, 2024 (time stamp at 5:03 A.M. MDT; copy retained, emphasis in original).

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 5. On information and belief, Defendant Cannon accepted at least two all-expenses-paid

vacations at a luxury hunting lodge and failed to file the required Privately Funded Seminar

Disclosure Reports in a timely manner, creating a self-evident appearance of conflict:

“Cannon, however, somehow forgot to [file the report], so anyone who might be
interested in learning who was paying for Cannon’s vacations and the nature of her ju-
dicial education would have been out of luck.

So why do we suppose Judge Cannon was so shy about who’s paying for her luxury
trips and what she might have learned there? Oh, I don’t know … might it be because
she didn’t want anyone to know about her links to the Leonard Leo wing of legal theory?
Could it have been that she didn’t want it known that she had taken money from an
organization that was in large part funded by billionaires friendly to the man whose case
she was presiding over?

I mean, 10 grand or so in first-class air travel and luxury accommodations and bot-
tomless trips to the luxo-resort’s “local produce” salad bar and steak pit might start to
look like a bribe when you pay attention to what was actually being discussed between
float trips down the Yellowstone and hikes through the mountains, don’t you think?

Wouldn’t you love to see the thank-you notes Cannon sent to Leonard Leo and his
pals? I would. But until NPR called up Judge Cannon and asked her about her journeys
out to the Montana luxury resort, nobody knew a thing about who had tried to curry
favor with her. That was when she hurriedly filled out the forms and posted the disclo-
sure she had actually been required to post within 30 days of returning from her trip. So
now we know what she was concealing, but we didn’t know where she had been or who
she had been listening to when she first got the Trump case and made the rulings —
later overturned by judges of the 11th Circuit — that many legal experts had said were
ridiculously favorable to Trump.”

Lucian K. Truscott IV, Judge Cannon's secret right-wing getaway: Why didn't we know about

this?, Salon (May 7, 2024), at https://www.salon.com/2024/05/07/cannons-secret-right-

wing-getaway-why-didnt-we-know-about-this/

6. Even Mr. Trump would be forced to concede that a judge who was (1) appointed by a

defendant and (2) improperly interfered in a criminal investigation (3) in a matter where the

outcome would have a substantial likelihood of affecting her career prospects and (4) failed

to disclose lavish partisan ‘gifts’, see Overview of Privately Funded Seminars Disclosure

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System, United States Federal Courts (website), at https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judge-

ships/privately-funded-seminars-disclosure/overview-privately-funded-seminars-disclosure

(accessed May 14, 2024), is one in whose “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

7. 18 U.S.C. § 3 provides: “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States

has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or

prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.” There is no

known exception for the official acts of federal judges.

8. The Framers’ Constitution contained an array of effective remedies for abuse of gov-

ernmental power in general, and judicial power in particular. Where a judge acts corruptly,

an ordinary citizen can remove him or her from the bench under the Article III Good Behav-

iour Clause. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.1

9. English law sourced in Coke, Blackstone, and the Year Books defines this seemingly

abstruse term of legal art with remarkable precision. By making a public official subject to

removal for violating it, the condition of “good behavior” defined the powers of any given

office. Coke and Blackstone listed four separate grounds for the violation of good behavior

tenure relevant to judges: abuse of office, nonuse of office, willful refusal to exercise an

office, and oppression and tyrannical partiality.2

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Article III judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. “It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
2
Coke listed three grounds for forfeiture of good behavior tenure: abuse of office, nonuse of office, and willful
refusal to exercise an office. R. v. Bailiffs of Ipswich [1706] 91 Eng. Rep. 378 (K.B.) (corporate recorder for-
feited office for failure to attend corporate meetings); Henry v. Barkley [1596] 79 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224 (K.B.);
see generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 Yale L.J. 1475 (1970);
Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72, 88-128 (2006).
Blackstone adds "oppression and tyrannical partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the admin-
istration and under the colour of their office." 4 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *140
(1765). When an Article III judge is elevated to the federal bench, s/he swears an oath to "administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and ... faithfully and impartially

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 10. The oath of judicial office, 28 U.S.C. § 453—which has not changed since 1791,

Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789)—provides federal judges with fair notice

of their constitutional obligations.3

11. “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without

effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Mar-

bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).

12. "When an office held ‘during good behavior’ is terminated by the grantee’s misbe-

havior, there must be an ‘incident’ power to ‘carry the law into execution’ if ‘good behavior’

is not to be an impotent formula." Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Prob-

lems, 2d ed., 132 (Harvard U. Pr. 1999).

13. Congress previously concluded that neither it nor the President has power to enforce

good behavior tenure.4

discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon" him or her, 28 U.S.C. § 453, thereby defining the scope
of his duties and obligations.
3
As Coke and Blackstone was the Colonial lawyer’s Bible, this understanding was common currency among
the Framers. In the Federalist, in arguing against judicial removal by the legislature via the power of address,
Alexander Hamilton observed that “the standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy, ... [is] the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and
impartial administration of the laws.” The Federalist No. 87, 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987).
“Brutus,” though expressing his misgivings, agreed that “judges holding their commissions during good be-
havior [was] a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible.” “Brutus,” The Power of the
Judiciary, New-York Journal, Mar. 20, 1788.
4
During debate over the Chase impeachment, Congress acknowledged its inability to enforce good behavior
tenure. Senator Hemphill recounted the Framers’ intent that "the words in the Constitution rendered the judges
independent of both the other branches of government." 5 Elliot’s Debates 444 (remarks of Sen. Hemphill (F-
PA). As the right to decide what is or is not "good behavior" sua sponte is a de facto power of address, it does
not appear to have been the intent of the Framers to entrust that power to Congress. This view was reinforced
a established a century ago in the investigation of Judge Emory Speer of the District of Georgia, who was
charged with "despotism, tyranny, oppression, and maladministration" in the course of his judicial decision-
making. Charles Geyh, When Courts and Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Courts 160
(U. Mich. Press 2008). Specifically, the congressional committee concluded that "a series of legal oppressions
[constituting] an abuse of judicial discretion" did not constitute an impeachable offense, id. at 160-61 (quota-
tions omitted), despite their being self-evident serial violations of his good behavior tenure. Moreover, had the
Framers intended to foreclose enforcement of good behavior tenure, they would have retained the power of
address, and not imposed the condition.

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 14. The United States Supreme Court’s inherent power and duty of superintendence of

all lower courts extends only to ensuring uniformity of decisions and that judges observe the

limits of their lawful jurisdiction.5

15. “Citizen” is the highest office in the land; the citizenry retains ultimate sovereignty

as tenants-in-common, retaining the common-law duty to “keep the King’s peace.”6

At common law, good behavior tenure was originally enforced by the King. But as the power concerned
only the interests of his subjects, and as the King exercised it only in parens patriae, he was bound by law to
allow the use of it to any subject interested. Blackstone explains:
“WHERE the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent, which ought not to be granted,
or where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal
the patent is by writ of scire facias in chancery. This may be brought either on the part of the king, in
order to resume the thing granted; or, if the grant be injurious to a subject, the king is bound of right to
permit him (upon his petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in a scire facias.”
3 Blackstone, Commentaries at 260-61 (1765) (emphasis added); see, United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
28 U.S. 315, 360 (1888) (explaining the process).
5
In a lecture on the nature of courts, Justice (Professor) James Wilson—the principal author of Article III—
explains why a supreme court is an essential feature of any rational system of jurisprudence:
“In every judicial department, well arranged and well organized, there should be a regular, progressive,
gradation of jurisdiction; and one supreme tribunal should superintend and govern all the others.
An arrangement in this manner is proper for two reasons. 1. The supreme tribunal produces and
preserves a uniformity of decision through the whole judicial system. 2. It confines and supports
every inferior court within the limits of its just jurisdiction.
If no superintending tribunal of this nature were established, different courts might adopt different and
even contradictory rules of decision; and the distractions, springing from these different and contradic-
tory rules, would be without remedy and without end. Opposite determinations of the same question, in
different courts, would be equally final and irreversible.”
2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896) (emphasis added).
A survey of state constitutions of the era reveals that most of the larger states bestowed judicial sinecures
subject to the condition of good behavior. E.g., Pa. Constitution of 1776, Ch. 2, § 23 (removable by address);
Pa. Constitution of 1790, art. V. § 2 (1790) (good behavior tenure), N.Y. Const. of 1777, § 25 (good behavior),
Constitution of Georgia of 1777 (jury trials), Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. III, art. I (good behavior and removal
by address). It should be noted that in the Northwest Territory, the only way to remove a judge was for violating
good behavior tenure, as the Continental Congress did not have a provision for impeaching officers. An Ordi-
nance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51,
51 n.a (1787).
6
Under the Lockean paradigm, “government” was a contract between the people, which can be dissolved via
breach. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), ch. XIX, § 222. Sovereignty—the jura summa
imperii—was retained by the people, holding it as tenants-in-common. Governments are our authorized agents,
with powers enumerated in and limited by constitutions. Our national Constitution (and its predecessor) is a
treaty between thirteen co-sovereigns, expressly delegating a portion of their delegated sovereignty. See e.g.,
N.H. Const. part 1, art. 7. The citizen retains the ultimate duty to ensure that the rule of law (a/k/a, “the King’s
peace”) be observed, as had been the case in England since Magna Carta [1215].

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 PARTIES

16. Plaintiff Kenneth L. Smith is a citizen of the United States of America, acting pur-

suant to the common obligation of all citizens “to support and defend the Constitution and

laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” 8 C.F.R. §

337.1. Plaintiff has been uniquely and irreparably injured by the willful failure of several of

the Defendants to honor their oaths; as the only persons who would possess a superior inter-

est in enforcing Article III good behavior tenure are Mr. Trump (who wouldn’t) and the

United States Government (which can’t), Plaintiff must have standing, or the Good Behavior

Clause would otherwise be rendered nugatory for impossibility of enforcement.

17. Defendants Aileen Mercedes Cannon, John G. Roberts Jr., Samuel A. Alito Jr., and

Clarence Thomas are Article III judges, holding their sinecures “during good behaviour.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

18. Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Article III and the Tenth Amendment.

19. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13617 to compel Defendant Cannon to

recuse herself in the Florida Case, as "literally, the language of § 1361 would allow a district

court to issue mandamus directly against [even] the Justices of the Supreme Court them-

selves." Panko v. Rodak, 606 F.2d 168, 171 & n. 6 (7th Cir. 1979).

20. As significant actions taken pertinent to this matter occurred within this District, and

on information and belief, at least one Defendant currently resides in this District, venue is

appropriate.

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The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.