UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.
Case No. 23-00257 (TSC)
DONALD JOHN TRUMP

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL INTERVENTION

Comes now John Doe, in propria persona, stating the following in this Memorandum

in Support of Motion for Conditional Intervention, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution:

INTRODUCTION

As a Jeffersonian originalist, Movant learned a long time ago that the Constitution “is a

mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which [judges] may twist and shape into any

form they please.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Spencer Roane) (Sept. 6, 1819) at 2. Movant

has yet to meet an honest jurist and, following Judge Silberman,1 despair at the prospect of

ever encountering one in the wild. The short tour of American jurisprudence in the decades

since Movant entered law school is judges “constitutionaliz[ing] our personal preferences.”

1
As your own learned colleagues—who are, presumably, in a position to know—openly admit, judges are
inveterate sociopaths. Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Court of Appeals confessed that he was “in des-
pair” about the United States Supreme Court, in asserting that every one of the Justices “is guilty, to one degree
or another, of violating the two most basic rules of restrained judicial behavior: ruling only on questions pre-
sented by the case at hand, and interpreting precedents honestly." Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, 296-2
Atlantic Monthly 39 (Sept. 2005). A seriatim list of concurrences would make War and Peace read like a novella
by comparison.

1
Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F. 3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial

of rehearing en banc).

Movant cannot hope to clean out our juridical Augean Stables in this forum; all that can

be done is to provide this Court a path from the Constitution—private criminal prosecution—

to action which may preserve it. And this requires review of the Article III “judicial Power.”

ARGUMENT

A. READING LAW: A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION2

We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the
first duty of intelligent men.
~George Orwell3

The Framers made no effort to define the “judicial Power” because they didn’t have to.

Lord Bacon observed that the office of the judge "is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret

law, and not to make law, or give law." Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620).

Lord Coke maintained that "[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law,

according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion." 1

E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 51 (1642). Blackstone adds that a judge is "sworn

to determine, not according to his own judgments, but according to the known laws.” 1 Wm.

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *69 (1765). “The judicial power to de-

termine law is a power only to determine what the law is, not to invent it.” Anastasoff v.

United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901, vacated as moot, 234 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). Further,

2
This is a conflation of the titles of two tomes authored by the late Antonin Scalia while he was busy not doing
his day job: Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West
2012), and Antonin Scalia, et al., A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Amy Gutmann, ed.)
(Princeton U. Pr. 1998).
3
George Orwell, The Taming of Power (book review), New Adelphi, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939), at 205.

2
as the legislative power is vested in Congress, U.S. Const. art. I, judges have no lawmaking

power. At all. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (court rulemaking authority lies with Congress).

Mindful that “the discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The

History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson, and

Co. 1856), Alexander Hamilton argued that to "avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it

is indispensable that [judges] should be bound by strict rules and precedents, which serve to

define and point out their duty in every particular case before them." The Federalist No. 78,

470 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987).4

Whereas statute and precedent told judges “what the law is,” canons of construction ex-

plained how to apply it. While testi-lying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Judge

Kavanaugh admitted that a judge “must interpret the Constitution as written, informed by

history and precedent” and “interpret the law, not make the law” (citing Federalist 83), add-

ing that “rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense.”5 At the appellate level,

judging is not rocket science.

First and foremost, the object of constitutional interpretation is to give effect to the ex-

pressed intent of its framers. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889). Legislators

are presumed to have said what they meant and meant what they said, Connecticut Nat’l

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (Thomas, J.; collecting 200 years’ worth of

4
Concurrences would fill a Brandeis brief. Jefferson envisioned the judge as “a mere machine,” expecting that
the law “be dispensed equally & impartially to every description of men.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Edmund
Pendleton), Aug. 26, 1776. Professor (Justice) Story adds that “A more alarming doctrine could not be prom-
ulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to
decide for itself [what the law is], without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.” 1 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 350 (1838). As in all but the most exotic cases, the
“law” is established, the judge was expected to be little more than an administrator, playing what Professor
Llewellyn called “the game of matching cases.” Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 49 (1960).
5
Brett Kavanaugh’s Opening Statement to Senate Judiciary Committee, CNN, Sept. 4, 2018 (unpaginated).

3
cases), and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language

must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980).6 Accordingly, the first step in interpretation of any

legislative provision “is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unam-

biguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,

519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (Thomas, J.).

“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect;

and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). Moreover, “where a technical word is used [in the Con-

stitution], all the incidents belonging to it necessarily attended it." 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the

Federal Constitution 531 (1836) (remarks of James Madison).7 Considered in pari materia,

these rules provide a coherent framework for resolving virtually any constitutional dispute.

The Constitution was a treaty between thirteen co-sovereigns; the pre-existing common law,

textual and substantive canons, and common language defined all terms.8

Residual ambiguities were resolved by resort to common sense. The office of the judge

is “to make such construction [of a law] as shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy,

6
There was no legislative history published for the United States Constitution and apparently, this was by
design. See, James Madison, The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of
the United States, May-September, 1787 G. Hunt, ed. (1837) (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908).
7
This understanding was also assumed by Judge Pendleton, John Marshall, and Edmund Randolph during that
and subsequent debate. 3 Elliot at 546, 558-59, 573; United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833).
8
According to Madison, there is one and only one correct way to interpret the Constitution:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation. In that sense alone is it the legitimate Constitution. And if that not be the guide
in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of
its powers.
James Madison, Writings of James Madison: 1819-1836 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added); accord,
e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Wilson Nicholas), Sept. 7, 1803 at 2; Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours,
First Things 17 (May, 2002).

4
and to suppress subtle invention and evasions for continuance of the mischief ... according

to the true intent of the makers of the act." Heydon's Case [1584] 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.).

Pacta sunt servanda. Every word had a meaning and purpose, and in those rare instances

where the letter of the law was not sufficiently pellucid, We Citizens expected You Judges

to give life to the ultimate intent of the drafters of legislation. We expect judges to be repos-

itories of common sense, and to exercise it liberally. As the Constitution would never pre-

cipitate an absurd and unjust result where any plausible alternative is available, see e.g.,

United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); Haggar Co.

v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940), we expect judicial decisions to make sense.

But judging is a little like going to the loo: “The job ain’t over ‘til the paperwork is done.”

Justice Breyer observes:

Judges do not simply announce a legal conclusion. They reason their way to that con-
clusion in an opinion written for all to see. The obligation to provide legally defensible
reasoning in a publicly accessible format prevents a judge from escaping accountability.
Indeed, a good judicial opinion is transparent and informative. It shows that the decision
is principled and reasoned. The strength of this reasoning matters.

Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 83 (2010). Former Chief

Justice Hughes adds, "there is no better precaution against judicial mistakes than setting out

accurately and adequately the material facts as well as the points to be decided." Charles E.

Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 64 (1928).

The Breyer standard is not just a statement of best practices, but what we have a consti-

tutional right to demand. Every American—from the lowliest serf to the mightiest prince—

has a right to “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to federal court.9 Judges have a

9
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). More directly, we have a constitutional right to "equal and impar-
tial justice under the law," Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 468 (1891), and where “there is a legal right, there

5
corresponding duty to provide it," Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58

(1912), and a willful failure to do so is potentially a federal crime. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3 (aiding

and abetting); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (conspiracy against rights).

1. The Original Judicial Sin: Boni Judicis est Ampliare Jurisdictionem.

The “genius document”10 we call our Constitution—as opposed to the bastardized ver-

sion illicitly imposed upon us by our corrupt, power-besotted judiciary—was replete with

effective internal controls intended to forestall abuses of the judicial power. But as Jefferson

correctly predicted, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Charles Hammond), Aug. 18, 1821 at

1, self-serving judges would “interpret” these sensible internal controls out of existence. As

your colleague Justice Thomas states, “the structure of the government that was supposed to

protect our liberty. And what has happened through the years is that the protections afforded

by that structure have been dissipated.” A Conversation with Justice Clarence Thomas, 36-

10 Imprimis 6 (Oct. 2007).

One of the most persistent weaknesses in the English system of government was that

judges were accountable to the government, either in the person of the King or Parliament.

As English judges generally preferred to keep their lucrative sinecures, they faced the temp-

tation to place their fingers on the scales of justice to the benefit of the Crown. English law

developed an array of effective remedies to ameliorate this problem.

is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 163 (1803), for to “take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.”
Poindexter v Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884).
10
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, United States Senate
Cmte. on the Judiciary, Jun. 29, 2010 (statement of Elena Kagan), at 96, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/KAGANHEARINGSDAY2.pdf.

6
 The crown jewel of the English legal system was the right to have a trial by jury, under

which, the judge was reduced to little more than father-confessor. It "is the most transcend-

ent privilege which any subject can enjoy, of wish for, that he cannot be affected either in

his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neigh-

bours and equals." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries at *379; see, Bushel’s Case [1670] 124 Eng.

Rep. 1006 (C.C.P). It “is a fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot

be legislated away." Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (D.Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J,

riding circuit). According to Framer (and signatory to the Declaration of Independence) El-

bridge Gerry, its purpose was to “guard agst. corrupt Judges.” 2 Farrand, The Records of the

Federal Convention of 1787 587 (1909)—a sentiment unanimously echoed by his contem-

poraries.11 This venerable institution, revered by the Founding Fathers,12 was even at one

time respected by You Judges:

It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule that on ques-
tions of fact, it is the province of the jury; on questions of law it is the province of the
court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon
yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in contro-
versy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay
that respect which is due to the opinion of the court: for, as on the one hand, it is pre-
sumed, that juries are the best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that

11
See also, 1 J. Elliot, Debates at 504 (remarks of Mr. Lee, of Virginia); accord, e.g., The Federalist No. 83 at
465 (Alexander Hamilton); Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to William C. Jarvis), Sept. 28, 1820, at 1; 2 John Adams,
The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States 253 (Charles F. Adams ed., Little, Brown &
Co. 1850). See also, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
There is no contrary authority.
12
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. Quoting Blackstone and Matthew Hale, Elbridge Gerry observed
“that property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by jury,” and
that it “is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce.” Elbridge Gerry, Ob-
servations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions (1788), as reprinted in, Pam-
phlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published During its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 10
(P. Ford ed. 1888). John Dickenson viewed it as a "Heaven-taught institution," Fabius, Letter (to the editor),
Delaware Gazette (1788), as reprinted in, John Dickinson, The Letters of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal
Constitution; and in 1797 on the Present Situation of Public Affairs 32 (1797), and one of "the corner stones
of liberty." Id. at 34. Criticism of the institution is notable only by its absence.

7
 the court is the best judge of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your
power of decision."

Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 at 4 (emphasis added).

The Seventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "the right to trial by jury shall

be preserved," U.S. Const. amend. VII—"the right which existed under the English common

law when the Amendment was adopted," Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295

U.S. 654, 657 (1935)—and an unbroken two-century line of Supreme Court decisions, holds

that if a court procedure alters the substance of the English common law jury trial as it existed

back in 1791, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("common law" refers to

the English common law, in 1791), it is unconstitutional. But if Movant tried to enforce that

right to the jury trial our Framers intended to “preserve” in this Court, you would look at me

as if I just arrived from the planet Neptune.13 But again, Movant is not here to fix that.

2. The Ninth Amendment: Madison’s Rosetta Stone

While the Framers did not provide us a legislative history for the Constitution, they did

for the Bill of Rights, and that fact is of paramount importance, as the Ninth Amendment

provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to

deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX. On its face, it is a

mandatory canon of judicial construction, guaranteeing that enumerated and unenumerated

rights were treated as being equal in dignity and force. And were there any doubt on this

13
The singular virtue of the jury trial was that it ensured that the claims would be heard by a fair and independ-
ent tribunal. It was a “security against corruption,” as “it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury” to
subvert justice. The Federalist No. 83 at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton); see Sir John Hawles, The Englishman's
Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at Law and a Juryman 71-2 & fn. (1844) (1680). What today’s courts
are doing is spectacularly unconstitutional. See e.g, Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional,
93 U.Va. L. Rev. 139, 144 (2007).

8
score, it was extinguished by author James Madison. In introducing his draft of our Bill of

Rights to the House of Representatives, he explained that he consciously avoided attempting

to enumerate all the rights retained by the people, arguing that

“….by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication,
that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands
of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into
this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gen-
tlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.”

1 Annals of Congress 456 (1789) (remarks of Rep. Madison).

The clause in question provides:

"The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights,
shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.”

Id. at 452 (emphasis added).

To a man, the Framers believed that all men were “endowed by their Creator with certain

unalienable Rights.” Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). All that government

could do is take them away and then, only where specified in the federal and various State

constitutions. Whether profound or trivial, every natural right you can think of is protected

from infringement by the mob. Including, and not incidentally, the right to not have to re-

move your hat in a courtroom in deference to the judge.14 As such, government can only

infringe upon those rights that were willingly relinquished by the people, and only when

needed to discharge its legitimate duties as our authorized agents. Professor Barnett refers

14
The People’s {Ancient and Just} Liberties Assrted in the Tryal of William Penn and William Mead (Sept.
1670) (trial of Pennsylvania founder William Penn). In a land where “all men are created equal,” the right not
to genuflect to a superior authority is necessarily implicit, irrespective of whether that refusal was borne of
religious conviction. As such, Penn’s was not a “religious” right protected by the First Amendment. But it
would seem, on its face, to be so trivial a matter that it could easily be found to be “non-fundamental.”

9
to this foundational concept as "the presumption of liberty." See Randy Barnett, Restoring

the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004). Distilled to essentials, we agree

to relinquish some of our natural rights and assume certain obligations in exchange for a

portfolio of procedural remedies (“civil rights”) which preserve the rights we retain. E.g.,

Mass. Const. (1780), part 1, art. X-XI.15

A fair summation of English jurisprudence is the development of effective legal remedies

for those whose rights have been wrongfully invaded, so that the subject would never be put

in a position where s/he is forced to resort to self-help. As Jefferson explained, the purpose

of a written constitution is to “bind up the several branches of government ... to render un-

necessary an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion, on every infraction of their

rights.” Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 255 (Query 13) (1783). This also

includes a toolbox of writs used to force our servants in government to discharge the duties

imposed by their agency. The most familiar of these remedies is the writ of habeas corpus.

Sometimes referred to as the “Great Writ,” it is not granted by government but rather, a pre-

existing natural remedy recognized in Britain for centuries. The Constitution can only re-

strict it and then, only at need. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Another is the right to remove a

judge from office for malfeasance, enshrined in the Article III Good Behaviour Clause. As

long as these prerogatives were respected, revolution became unnecessary.

15
As former Judge Michael McConnell of the Tenth Circuit explained,
“the essence of the social contract is that we relinquish certain of our natural rights—most fundamentally,
the right to be a judge in our own case and to do violence—use violence against others, and we receive
in return more effectual protection for certain of our rights, plus the enjoyment of certain positive rights:
that is, rights that are created by the creation of political society. Civil rights are the rights we enjoy after
entering the state of civil society....”
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights, Enumerated Rights, and the Ninth Amendment, Sumner Canary Lec-
ture (Case Western U., Wednesday, Oct. 28, 2008) (transcribed by author; emphasis added), video available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLANRrZPm-k (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).

10
 Under this paradigm, “government” was a simple contract, dissolved via breach by one

of the parties.16 Sovereignty—the jura summa imperii—was retained by the people, holding

it as tenants-in-common. Governments are our authorized agents, with powers enumerated

in constitutions. Our national Constitution (and its predecessor) is a treaty between thirteen

co-sovereigns, expressly delegating a portion of their delegated sovereignty. See e.g., N.H.

Const. part 1, art. 7. The people retain the right to revolution, Declaration of Independence,

para. 2 (U.S. 1776), N.H. Const. part 1, art. 10, which is unenumerated and protected by the

Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The “right” to keep and bear arms and organize into militias

is not a separate right, so much as it is a remedy.

3. Private Criminal Prosecution: A Non-Defeasible Prerogative of Citizenship

Assume for a moment that you were the father of Jaycee Dugard, the Nevada girl kid-

napped and held for two decades, forced to bear two children sired by her kidnapper.17 Now

assume that the local prosecutor, invoking "prosecutorial discretion," refused to prosecute

16
Whenever agents of the government “endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are
thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided
for all men, against force and violence.” John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690), ch. XIX, §
222.
17
'She's A Survivor': Jaycee Dugard 30 Years Later And Why Investigators Recently Questioned Kidnapper
Again, CBS News Sacramento, Jun. 11, 2021, at https://www.cbsnews.com/gooddaysacramento/news/jaycee-
dugard-30-years-later-garrido/

11
her kidnapper. As a father, what would you do? The rest of us can make an educated guess.

To prevent that, every civilised society built on the rule of law has devised a mechanism for

private prosecution of criminals.

From time immemorial, it has been the common duty of every Englishman—including

the King—to keep the King’s peace, and one of the tools handed down was the right of any

subject—now, citizen—to enforce the law by prosecuting criminals. As Canada’s Depart-

ment of Justice observes, the right (and duty) to initiate a private criminal prosecution is one

of those common law safeguards—"a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or

partiality on the part of authority," Gouriet v. Union of Post Ofc. Workers [1978] A.C. 435,

477 (H.L.) (Canada)—flourishing a pedigree as old as the common law itself:

A private citizen's right to initiate and conduct a private prosecution originates in the
early common law. From the early Middle Ages to the 17th century, private prosecu-
tions were the main way to enforce the criminal law. Indeed, private citizens were re-
sponsible for preserving the peace and maintaining the law.18

In 1789, private criminal prosecution was a practical necessity. The world’s first bona

fide police force would form decades into the future,19 and essentially by default, the re-

sponsibility of enforcing public order fell upon the populace.20 The federal government re-

lied on qui tam actions for enforcement of the law,21 and for centuries, “it was not only the

privilege but the duty of the private citizen to preserve the King's Peace and bring offenders

to justice.”22

18
Canada Dept. of Justice, The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Part IV, ch. 26 (undated and unpagi-
nated; copy on file).
19
Charles P. Nemeth, Private Security and the Law 6 (3d ed. 2004).
20
See e.g., People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837 (mandamus); People ex rel.
Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 Denio. 617, 618 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (general rule unless statute provides otherwise).
21
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371,
1406-08 (Jul. 1988).
22
Note 18, supra.

12
 As our society and law became more complex, we delegated this task to professionals.

But “one of the ultimate sanctions [of the common law] is the right of private persons to lay

informations and bring prosecutions,” Lund v Thompson [1958] 3 All E.R. 356, 358; accord,

Gouriet, supra. at 498, and it was a well-established principle of statutory construction that

"[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute

be clear and explicit for this purpose." Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603,

623 (1813). "Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption

favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory

purpose to the contrary is evident [and] to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must

‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” United States v. Texas, 507

US 529, 534 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted). This, in turn, begs two questions:

(1) Has Congress ever attempted to repeal this right, and if so, (2) does it even have the raw

power to do so? As it is a fundamental right essential to preservation of our liberty not

relinquished in the Constitution, the answer must be no.

The power to either force officials to prosecute a crime or prosecute it yourself is ubiqui-

tous in democratic countries—and even in countries that are not exactly staunch redoubts of

human rights, such as Zimbabwe. Even in Harare, a victim of a crime has the legal right to

prosecute if their Attorney-General declines:

In all cases where the Attorney-General declines to prosecute for an alleged offence,
any private party, who can show some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of
the trial arising out of some injury which he individually has suffered by the commission
of the offence, may prosecute, in any court competent to try the offence, the person
alleged to have committed it.

Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 2004, [Chapter 9:07], Part 13 (Zimbabwe).

13
 The salutary purpose of such a rule, according to Justice Holmes, was to accommodate a

natural desire for revenge within the law by avoiding "the greater evil of private retribution."

Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 41-42 (1881). Accordingly, in all common-law coun-

tries, the idea that the State can be trusted with the exclusive, uncontrolled franchise in pros-

ecution of crimes is simply unthinkable, as Professor Nreseko of the University of Botswana

notes, relating comments in an unpublished case of Tanzania’s Court of Appeals:

We are surprised because we did not think anyone in our country could be vested with
such absolute and total powers. It would be terrible to think that any individual or group
of individuals could be empowered by law to act even mala fide. As it turned out to our
great relief the exercise of the powers by the DPP under the Criminal Procedure Act is
limited by the Act. Although the powers of the DPP appear to be wide, the exercise is
limited by three considerations. That wherever he exercises the wide powers he must do
so only in the public interest, in the interest of justice and in the need to prevent abuse
of the legal process.

D. N. Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Trials and Int'l Tribunals, Int'l Soc'y

for the Reform of Criminal Law (undated), at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Nsereko.pdf,

quoting Director of Public Prosecutions v. Mehboob Akbar Haji & Another, Cr, App. No.

28 of 1992 (unreported).

No other country in the civilised world—and not even Zimbabwe!—thinks it is a good

idea to grant the State an exclusive franchise to decide which crimes it will prosecute, and

which it will ignore, without any external control whatever. The right exists throughout the

Commonwealth, even if invoked only rarely. E.g., Barrymore Facing Pool Death Case, BBC

News, Jan. 16, 2006 (Great Britain); Plans for Private Prosecution Against Winnie, BBC

News, Nov. 26, 1997 (South Africa: prosecution of Winnie Mandela proposed). Malaysia

allows private criminal prosecution by the aggrieved party, Criminal Procedure Code, Act

593, Sec. 380 (Malaysia) and even citizen's arrests. Id., Sec. 27(1). While this appears to be

a relatively new development, India limits the citizen's standing to initiate a criminal

14
prosecution of public servants to those directly impacted by their alleged acts. Private com-

plaint can't be based to prosecute public servant: Court, DNAIndia.com (Press Trust India),

Oct. 16, 2010, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1453552/reportprivate-complaint-can-t-

be-used-to-prosecutepublic-servant-court. The procedure is robust in Jamaica, Private citi-

zens can initiate criminal prosecutions without fiat from DPP - AG's Chambers, The Gleaner

(Jamaica), Nov. 30, 2015, https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20151202/pri-

vate-citizens-can-initiate-criminal-prosecutions-without-fiat-dpp, and perhaps unsettled in

Kenya, Kenya: DPP Urges Court to Drop Private Prosecution Case, The Star (Nairobi), Aug.

5, 2013, reprinted at http://allafrica.com/stories/201308052173.html (the right itself appears

to be intact, but the procedure is uncertain), but for the most part, Commonwealth nations

tend to follow the example of Mother England.

Pretty much every other reasonably civilized country on the face of this earth has devised

some formal mechanism for controlling reluctant prosecutors. A brief survey of established

Western democracies reveals that, in most instances, prosecutors have little or no discretion

as to whether to prosecute a crime. Italy includes an express duty to prosecute in its consti-

tution. Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution] art. 112 (Italy 1947). As anyone

who has been following the news already knows, Martin Sieff, Spain Wants Torture Charges

Against Bush Six Dropped, UPI, Apr. 16, 2009, Spain trusts her citizens with wide latitude

to initiate criminal proceedings. Constitución Espanola de 1978 [1978 Constitution] art. 125

(Spain). Prosecutorial discretion in most states is governed by statute and often, quite lim-

ited. See e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attor-

ney in West Germany, 18 Amer. J. Comp. L. 508 (1970). In the Netherlands, whereas public

prosecutors have sole prosecuting authority and statutory discretion as to whether to forego

15
prosecution in the "public interest," an aggrieved victim can take her prosecutors to court to

force a prosecution. Openbaar Ministerie, The Principle of Expediency in the Netherlands

(Power Point presentation), Oct. 27, 2006, at http://eulec.org/Downloads/intstrafrecht/expe-

diency-china.pps. The Phillippines has a separate court—the Sandiganbayan—quite literally

dedicated to prosecuting public corruption, where private prosecutors may intervene in spec-

ified circumstances. See, Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2011) (discussing

limits on intervention). And unlike the United States, our former protectorate still has the

writ of certiorari. Id.

In our own hemisphere, most countries have robust private prosecution systems, see gen-

erally, Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Chang-

ing World Politics (Norton, 2001), and of course, our nice neighbours to the North are light-

years ahead of us on the human rights front. See Gouriet, supra.

What we can say for certain is that there is nothing in the Framers’ Constitution extin-

guishing the right. The constitutional charge to the President that “he shall take Care that

the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, did not do so, as both the New

York, N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XIX (1822), and Pennsylvania constitutions, Pa. Const. of

1776, § 20 (1820), had virtually identical clauses, and were not interpreted as banning it; in

Philadelphia, it had devolved into a sort of “blood sport.” Allen Steinberg, "The Spirit of

Litigation:" Private Prosecution and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia,

20 J. Social History 231 (1986). Nor can vestment of the executive power in the President,

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, for the same reason.

Even as late as 1875, there was never any doubt that in America, a victim of a crime had

the clear legal right to prosecute it. See, Winter, Metaphor of Standing at 1403 (however, a

16
minority of states required the relator to allege a private right). In that year, the Supreme

Court found "a decided preponderance of American authority in favor of the doctrine that

private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce a public duty, not due to the govern-

ment as such, without the intervention of the government law officer." Union Pacific R. Co.

v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355 (1875). The Court drew a "reasonable implication" that by virtue

of its silence, Congress "did not contemplate the intervention of the Attorney General [to

compel compliance with the law] in all cases." Id. at 356.

If the Framers ever intended to deprive citizens of that right, one is left to search in vain

for evidence of that intent. And as the prosecution of crime was not seen as an executive

function in 1791 but rather, one of the well-established prerogatives of the people, it is un-

likely that they would have even perceived the threat that it could be divested by congres-

sional fiat. The question has never been resolved, see, Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton

et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816 and n. 2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), but it is hard

to imagine that the “inestimable right ... of invoking the penalties of the law upon those who

criminally or feloniously attack our persons or our property,” Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S.

581, 598 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting), would be willingly yielded by an informed popu-

lace, or identify the constitutional mechanism by which it was divested.

In a functional judicial system, a warrant already would have been issued for Defendant

Trump’s arrest. This Court agreed to his pre-trial release, expressly conditioned on his not

violating “federal, state, or local law while on release.” ECF # 13. This Court could take

judicial notice of his conviction on nine counts of criminal contempt in the Supreme Court

of New York, Decision and Order, People v. Trump, No. SMZ 71762-24 and SMZ 71764-

24, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Part 59 (Apr. 30, 2024). And if this were still “a government of laws, not

17
men,” where "[a]ll men are equal before the law," Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332

(1921), Citizen Trump would be remanded to custody, like so many of those who partici-

pated in the insurrection of January 6, 2021, pending trial on the merits. But this is America

in 2024, where “ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE

EQUAL THAN OTHERS.” George Orwell, Animal Farm, Ch. 10 (1941) (emphasis in orig-

inal). Like Hitler in Nazi Germany, Defendant Trump commands an army of berserkers;

using that horde, he has cowed judges, prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, and craven politicians

into acceding to his will. He is engineering a slow-moving coup ďêtat, with the aid of pliant

politicians, prosecutors, and even judges. If there was ever a “break glass in case of emer-

gency” moment, it is today.

If I had standing to do so, I would respectfully ask this Court to revoke his bail. It is of

no moment that he is running for the Presidency, as Eugene Debs literally ran for the office

from prison. Terence McArdle, The socialist who ran for president from prison—and won

nearly a million votes, Wash. Post (Sept. 22, 2019). In addition, I would request access to a

grand jury, as seven Article III judges appear to be aiding and abetting the crimes Defendant

Trump stands accused of.23 But all I can do at this point is ask this Court to appoint me as a

substitute prosecutor ex relatione,24 to stand in the breach if Defendant Trump again becomes

President Trump and orders his Attorney General to drop the case.

23
To wit, Judge Cannon, and Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and
Barrett (“the Conspiring Justices”). Whereas the Department of Justice may have a policy prohibiting the pros-
ecution of a sitting President, it does not appear to foreclose indictments, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Amenability of
the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution while in Office, Dept.
of Justice Ofc. of Legal Counsel (Sept. 24, 1973), and Movant could pursue crimes committed by other parties,
which would almost certainly involve that of being accessories after the fact. 18 U.S.C. § 3.
24
State courts that have prohibited private prosecution consistently bemoan a postulated "parade of horribles,"
citing the danger that unconstitutional prosecutions will take place. Federal statutory law solves this problem
by empowering the United States Attorney to supervise prosecutions, 28 U.S.C. § 519, and file a nolle prosequi
where appropriate. See, Stretton and Taylors Case [1588] 74 Eng. Rep. 111 (K.B.).

18
B. JANUARY 6TH WAS A DRESS REHEARSAL.

“Mussolini was a clown. Hitler was very lazy. It’s not as if they are always paragons of

self-discipline and organization.”25 But they both eventually succeeded, and it can happen

here.26 History might not repeat itself, but it has a disturbing tendency to rhyme. As Harvard

political scientist Steven Levitsky observes, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was the “dress

rehearsal” for the October Revolution of 1917.27 January 6th was Trump’s Beer Hall Putsch,

with tactics reportedly purloined from the storming of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.28

This Court will be holding the equivalent of the Treason Trial,29 provided it ever occurs.

While Trump might find planning a birthday party challenging, his entourage has a plan

for evading accountability for the array of crimes for which he was indicted and for weapon-

izing the Department of Justice. Moreover, they brazenly published their nefarious scheme

in black-and-white:

Promptly and Properly Eliminating Lawless Policies, Investigations, and Cases,

Including All Existing Consent Decrees. Few things undermine the DOJ’s credibility
more than brazenly partisan and ideologically driven prosecution of an Administration’s
perceived political enemies, yet the department has readily indulged in such misadven-
tures during the Biden Administration. Before even entering the Robert F. Kennedy
building on January 20, 2025, the next Administration should …
• In a manner consistent with applicable law, prepare a plan to end imme-
diately any policies, investigations, or cases that run contrary to law or
Administration policies.

25
Ben Jacobs, Is Trump’s Coup a ‘Dress Rehearsal?’, N.Y. Magazine, Dec. 27, 2020, https://nymag.com/intel-
ligencer/2020/12/historians-fear-trumps-failed-coup-is-a-dress-rehearsal.html.
26
Alex Henderson, "Every failed coup is just practice": Domestic extremism is going to get worse, intel expert
warns, Salon, Oct. 4, 2021, https://www.salon.com/2021/10/04/every-failed-coup-is-just-practice-domestic-
extremism-is-going-to-get-worse-intel-expert-warns_partner/.
27
Note 25, supra. [Jacobs].
28
Alan Feuer, et al., Proud Boys Charged With Sedition in Capitol Attack, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/us/politics/proud-boys-charged-sedition-capitol-attack.html
29
See The Failed Coup That Led To Hitler's 'Mein Kampf' (audio interview) Fresh Air, NPR, Jan. 14, 2016, at
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/14/463028807/the-failed-coup-that-led-to-hitlers-mein-kampf

19
Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 557 (Heritage Fdn. 2023) (emphasis in

original).

The Don has already pledged to pardon his fellow co-conspirators, Hannah Rabinowitz

and Katelyn Polantz, Trump’s January 6 pardon pledge baffles some attorneys, CNN, Feb.

5, 2022, and “[i]f he took office again, Trump could indeed order his attorney general to

simply drop any federal charges he still faces even if the cases were in progress.” Mag-

gie Haberman and Alan Feuer, Blame Shifting, Attacks and Legal Gaslighting, N.Y. Times,

Nov. 26, 2023 (emphasis added). The only catch, of course, is that he has to get elected.

“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed … as-

sists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his … trial or punishment… is an acces-

sory after the fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). In the matter styled United States v.

Trump, No. 9:23-cr-80101 (S.D. Fl. 2023), Judge Aileen Cannon has displayed a breathtak-

ing level of tyrannical partiality30 and willful disregard for her judicial obligations, interfer-

ing in an investigation without colorable jurisdiction, Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005

(11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022), slip op. at 2-3, and slow-walking the prosecution by failing to sched-

ule crucial hearings in a timely manner. See e.g., Hugo Lowell, Trump classified documents

trial running about four months behind schedule, The Guardian (U.K.), Nov. 17, 2023.

And she has accomplices.

30
Article III judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. English law
sourced in Coke and Blackstone defines this seemingly abstruse term of legal art with remarkable precision.
By making a public official subject to removal for violating it, the condition of “good behavior” defined the
powers of any given office. Coke and Blackstone listed four separate grounds for the violation of good behavior
tenure relevant to judges: abuse of office, nonuse of office, willful refusal to exercise an office, and oppression
and tyrannical partiality. See generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure,
79 Yale L.J. 1475 (1970). When an Article III judge is elevated to the federal bench, s/he swears an oath to
"administer justice without respect to persons [and] ... faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon" him or her, 28 U.S.C. § 453, defining the scope of his duties and obligations. “Tyran-
nical partiality … in the administration and under the colour of their office," 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *140,
is grounds for removal from office.

20
 1. Anderson: The Essential Predicate

On December 19, 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Anderson v.

Griswold, 2023 CO 63 (Colo. 2023), holding that Defendant Trump “was disqualified from

holding the office of President31 under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” Id., slip op. at 1.32 The controlling question was whether the

Amendment was self-executing; the answer was provided by Chief Justice Marshall, in the

first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the consti-
tution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Consistent with Marbury, there is no support in precedent or logic for the proposition that

any constitutional provision must be activated by Congressional legislation to become

31
In concluding that the Amendment covered the President, the Anderson majority wrote:
“Senator Reverdy Johnson worried that the final version of Section Three did not include the office of the
Presidency. He stated, “[T]his amendment does not go far enough” because past rebels “may be elected
President or Vice President of the United States.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2899 (1866). So, he
asked, “why did you omit to exclude them? I do not understand them to be excluded from the privilege
of holding the two highest offices in the gift of the nation.” Id. Senator Lot Morrill fielded this objection.
He replied, “Let me call the Senator’s attention to the words ‘or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States.’” Id. This answer satisfied Senator Johnson, who stated, “Perhaps I am wrong as to the
exclusion from the Presidency; no doubt I am; but I was misled by noticing the specific exclusion in the
case of Senators and Representatives.” Id. This colloquy further supports the view that the drafters of this
Amendment intended the phrase “any office” to be broadly inclusive, and certainly to include the Presi-
dency.”
Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23-SA-300 ¶ 140 (Colo. 2023) (slip op.)
32
It provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall … hold any office, civil or military, under the United States
… who, having previously taken an oath … to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 3.

21
effective. E.g., United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the

Thirteenth amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any

ancillary legislation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth);

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth).33 Moreover, according

to the Senator who introduced said Amendment to that body, Section Five was remedial in

scope, “enabl[ing] Congress, in case the State shall enact laws in conflict with the principles

of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment.” Cong.

Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868) (statement of Sen. Jacob M. Howard (R-MI) (em-

phasis added)). In the Conspiring Justices’ majority opinion, they quoted from the paragraph

quoted above and as such, were on notice as to the Amendment framers’ expressed intent.

Trump v. Anderson, No. 23–719, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), slip op. at 5.

At the risk of stating the obvious, the purpose of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

is to disqualify public officials who “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United

States” from ever again serving in elected office, subject to a congressional pardon provision.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. And when it served his purposes, the bribe-engorged34 Justice

33
While there is no enforceability provision in the original Bill of Rights, that is a function of the fact that they
were not enforceable as against the States. Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Enforceability provisions were added to every subsequent Amendment.
34
Though our Justices appear to be for sale, they don’t come cheap. The steady stream of thinly-disguised
bribes—developer Harlan Crow is this generous with all of his friends, right?— aimed at Justice Thomas in-
cludes a $500,000 cash payment to his wife, an undisclosed number of trips on Crow’s yacht and private jet, a
$175,000 library wing named in his honor, several million to turn the cannery his mother worked for into a
museum—a project reportedly initiated by Thomas himself—and the Bible of firebrand Black abolitionist
Frederick Douglass, valued at $19,000. Mike McIntire, The Justice and the Magnate, N.Y. Times, Jun. 19, 2011,
at A-1. Whether it involves attending secretive junkets offered by the Federalist Society, Brian Ross, Supreme
Ethics Problem, ABC News, Jan. 23, 2006, or duck hunting with a litigant during the pendency of a case,
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., in cham-
bers) (the value of a bribe is its value to the recipient, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1983) (business loan to Senator)), see generally,
Justin Elliott, et al., A “Delicate Matter”: Clarence Thomas’ Private Complaints About Money Sparked Fears

22
Clarence Thomas pompously declared that a court “must presume that a legislature says in

a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat’l. Bank

v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). The language of the Amendment has a plain and

unambiguous meaning, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (Thomas, J.),

and “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must

ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylva-

nia, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980). “When the words of a statute are unambiguous,” sol-

emnly intones Thomas, “this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete,’” Ger-

main, 503 U.S. at 255, … unless, of course, we don’t like the outcome.35

Trump v. Anderson was outcome-driven ‘jurisprudence’ in its most grotesque form. “In a

stunning disfigurement of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Conspiring Justices “impressed

upon it an ahistorical misinterpretation that defies both its plain text and its original mean-

ing.” J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14,

2024. There is no rational way to get from the text and the “strict rules and precedents,

which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case before them," The

Federalist No. 78, at 470, to the conclusion that “States have no power under the Constitu-

tion to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency,” Trump

v. Anderson, slip op. at 6, given that there is no such thing as a federal election.36

He Would Resign, ProPublica, Dec. 18, 2023, https://www.propublica.org/article/clarence-thomas-money-

complaints-sparked-resignation-fears-scotus, our Supreme Court is as compromised as Congress.
35
The Sotomayor “concurrence” in Trump v. Anderson, No. 23-719, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) at was in substance a dissent.
36
As a matter of definition, there is no such thing as a national election in the United States. Individual States
appoint slates of Electors, chosen “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. Accordingly, there is no compelling reason why the federal government should ever get involved.
The choice of Electors has always been a matter for each State, and the Electors were free to vote for anyone

23
 “Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.

The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise ‘neither force nor will

but merely judgment.’" Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015)

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting; citation omitted). The rewriting of the Constitution under the false

pretense of interpreting it is “a flagrant perversion of the judicial power,” Heiner v. Donnan,

285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932), intolerable at any time. “This practice of constitutional revision

by an unelected committee of nine robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted

in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to gov-

ern themselves.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).37

they cared to, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952), though States may enforce “pledge laws” restricting their
freedom of action. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 2316 (2020).
As state courts of general jurisdiction are perfectly capable of applying federal law, Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876), there is no reason why a State cannot answer the question of whether a candidate for high
office has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. And
as state courts generally follow persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions, see e.g., Evans v. Bd. of County
Com'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971) (abolishing state sovereign immunity; collecting cases), and the Supreme
Court could fashion a uniform rule where a conflict existed, there was never a compelling need for Congress
to provide guidance on this question. However, if the final resolution by the courts was intolerable, Congress
is empowered to enact remedial legislation. Of course, they presupposed existence of a functional Congress.
37
As Justice Scalia observed, “Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are nothing more than ‘parchment
barriers.’ Both depend on a judicial culture that understands its constitutionally assigned role ... [and] the mod-
esty to persist when it produces results that go against the judges' policy preferences.” Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). “The Court's temptation is in the quite
opposite and more natural direction—towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it
succumbs.” Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In two
brief passages, Scalia summarized two centuries’ worth of judicial misconduct. E.g., United States v. Callen-
der, 25 F.Cas. 239, 257 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit) (eviscerating the Seventh Amendment).
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. Judge Bork describes the Court as a “band of outlaws.” Robert H.
Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 24 (Nov. 1996). Justice Kagan writes that they “forget that
they are judges and that their Court is a court,” Elena Kagan, The Development and Erosion of the American
Exclusionary Rule: A Study in Judicial Method (unpublished Master’s thesis; Apr. 20, 1983).
The academy is no kinder. Professor Karl Llewellyn writes that judges routinely
manhandl[e] ... the facts of the pending case, or of the precedent, so as to make it falsely appear that the
case in hand falls under a rule which in fact it does not fit, or especially that it falls outside of a rule which
would lead in the instant case to a conclusion the court cannot stomach.
Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 133 (1960); accord, Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think 144 (Harv. U. Press 2008). Alan Dershowitz adds. “[S]ome justices actually cheat. … Trust no

24
2. United States v. Trump (Mar-A-Lago): The Scheme

In isolation, Trump v. Anderson is illegitimate. Problematic. Lawfare. Every member of

the Supreme Court knows better.38 But it gets worse. In context, it creates a constitutional

crisis of Brobdignagian proportion.

In 2020, Defendant Trump appointed Aileen Cannon to a seat on the federal bench; she

was about 40 years of age at the time. “Aileen Cannon,” Wikipedia (accessed Jun. 7., 2024).

Importantly, she was assigned to the West Palm Beach Division of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida. And Defendant Trump lives within the confines

of that Division.39 If Defendant Trump were to ascend again to the Presidency, he would be

able to nominate Cannon for a lifetime appointment to the Supreme Court, and she would

be of “prime age” for ascension to the Court. Moreover, Cannon either knew or was able to

one in power, including—especially—judges. … You will be amazed at how often you will find judges “fi-
nessing” the facts and the law.” Alan Dershowitz, Letters To a Young Lawyer 11 (Basic Books 2001).
38
E.g., Justice Sotomayor notes that the “intent of the founders was set forth in the Constitution. They created
the words; they created the document. It is their words that is the most important aspect of judging.” Confir-
mation Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia A. Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 245 (1991) (statement of Judge Sotomayor).
Justice Thomas asserted that his job as a judge is “to interpret [lawmakers’] intent, not to second-guess” it.
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 102nd Cong., 144 (1991) (statement of Judge Thomas). Chief Justice Roberts adds
that “the Framers were willing to have the judges decide cases that required them to interpret the Constitution,
because they were going to decide it according to the rule of law.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 161 (2005)
(statement of Judge Roberts). Justice Gorsuch observed that “my job is not to write the law, Senator. It is to
apply the law … Our founders were brilliant. They did not give me all the power. I do not wear a crown; I wear
a robe.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 121, 138 (1991) (statement of
Judge Gorsuch).
When it serves their purposes, the Justices dutifully parrot these limits. E.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,
575 U.S. 433, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting, with Alito and Thomas). And as the empirical evidence proves beyond cavil, their testimony in
those farcical hearings was demonstrably false and misleading.
39
Alison Durkee, Trump Can Legally Live at Mar-A-Lago Palm Beach Says, Forbes, May 7, 2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/05/07/trump-can-legally-live-at-mar-a-lago-palm-beach-
says/

25
discover via reasonable inquiry that Trump prized loyalty and would be likely to reward her

with a spot on the Court if she were to “do him a solid.”40 Convenient.

On or about August 22, 2022, Cannon intervened in a federal investigation into alleged

criminal activity by Mr. Trump and co-conspirators, pursuant to a Motion, styled “In the

Matter of the Search of Mar-a-Lago.” Trump v. United States, 9:22-cv-81294 (S.D. Fla.). In

said Motion, Trump averred: “President[sic] Donald J. Trump is the clear frontrunner in the

2024 Republican Presidential Primary and in the 2024 General Election, should he decide to

run.” Id., Dkt. 1 at 1.

Acts of obstruction by Defendant Cannon in the resolution of that matter, see generally,

18 U.S.C. § 1503, included issuance of an Order to the United States Department of Justice

(DOJ) to release the previously sealed detailed property list of materials seized as the result

of a valid search warrant, to halt its review of all seized materials, and the appointment of

Raymond J. Dearie, senior judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New

York, as a special master. On or about December 1, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the

case to be dismissed because Cannon improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over it,

writing: “This appeal requires us to consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to

block the United States from using lawfully seized records in a criminal investigation. The

answer is no.” Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (slip op. at 2).

40
See, Michael S. Schmidt, Obstruction Inquiry Shows Trump’s Struggle to Keep Grip on Russia Investiga-
tion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2018 (“Mr. Trump then asked, “Where’s my Roy Cohn?”). He found his Roy Cohn in
“Coverup General” William Barr. See e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 442 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49
(D.D.C. 2020) (“[A] review of the redacted version of the Mueller Report by the Court results in the Court’s
concurrence with Special Counsel Mueller’s assessment that Attorney General Barr distorted the findings in
the Mueller Report.”). “Trump sought three things in his judicial appointees, or as he sometimes called them,
“my judges.” First, he wanted justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade. Second, he wanted “jurists in the
mold of Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.” Third, he wanted judges who would
be loyal to him.” David Lat and Zachary B. Shemtob, Trump’s Supreme Court Picks Are Not Quite What You
Think, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2023 (emphasis added).

26
 The Eleventh Circuit further observed that "The law is clear,” reasoning that:

“We cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government
investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can we write a rule that allows
only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of our
caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both
would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations.”

Id., slip op. at 20-21.

On information and belief, any reasonably competent federal district court judge would

know that Mr. Trump’s request was objectively frivolous and thus, Cannon was charged with

the knowledge it was frivolous, and that her Orders had no possible chance of surviving

appellate review. By inference, her intent was to assist Plaintiff Trump to “hinder or prevent

his apprehension, trial or punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. The delay in the eventual indictment

of Trump occasioned by Defendant Cannon’s obstruction exceeded four months.

On or about June 8, 2023, Defendant Cannon was assigned a criminal case with former

President Trump as a defendant, styled United States v. Trump, 9:23-cr-80101 (S.D. Fla. Jun.

8, 2023) (“Trump-FL”). On information and belief, the probability of her being assigned the

case approached 100% which again, appears to be according to plan.

Section 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides: “Any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The impartiality of a judge who was (1) ap-

pointed by a defendant and (2) improperly interfered in a criminal investigation (3) in a

matter where the outcome would have a substantial likelihood of affecting her career pro-

spects and (4) who failed to disclose lavish ‘gifts’ from known allies of the defendant41 might

41
Lucian K. Truscott IV, Judge Cannon's secret right-wing getaway: Why didn't we know about this?, Salon
(May 7, 2024), at https://www.salon.com/2024/05/07/cannons-secret-right-wing-getaway-why-didnt-we-
know-about-this/

27
reasonably be questioned. Moreover, a reasonably competent federal judge—or, any judge

who could read newspapers42—would be aware of the appearance of a conflict.

“There may be circumstances in which the ties between the judge and the public official

are so close, and the consequences of a ruling adverse to the official are so dire, that disqual-

ification is appropriate regardless of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued.”

Charles C. Geyh, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, 3d. ed. (Federal

Judicial Center, 2020) at 27. The closest analogue Professor Geyh references is a case in-

volving Alabama Governor Don Siegelman, wherein a federal district judge recused sua

sponte on the grounds that his “‘distant relationship’ to [Siegelman’s political rival] Gover-

nor Riley [not a party to the action], plus mere attendance at private political functions for

Bob Riley two years ago, "could raise some public confidence issues.” United States v. Bobo,

323 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (N.D.Ala. 2004). Under the Bobo standard, Cannon’s failure to

recuse is so far beyond the pale as to constitute strong evidence of scienter.

Having retained jurisdiction over Trump-FL in open defiance of federal law, Judge Can-

non has engaging in a catch-and-kill scheme with the purpose of delaying trial until after the

2024 Presidential election by issuing a stream of inscrutable rulings, paperless orders, rulings

without prejudice, and postponing statutory obligations, with the self-evident purpose of

preventing prosecutors from being able to remove her from the case.43 And in essence, this

42
E.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Appointee Will Remain Judge in Documents Case, Clerk Says, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 10, 2023, at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/judge-aileen-cannon-trump-docu-
ments.html; Jay Weaver, Some want judge to recuse herself in Trump case. Can and should that still happen?,
Miami Herald, (Jun. 23, 2023), at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle276631871.html (Calls for recusal “came largely from the political left but also from some legal experts, all
citing Cannon’s controversial decisions favoring Trump in a civil dispute last year over the FBI’s seizure of
government records from his Palm Beach estate”).
43
E.g., Brandi Buchman, ‘This conclusion was wrong’: Jack Smith cites ‘clear error,’ witness intimidation
while schooling Cannon on discovery restrictions in Mar-a-Lago documents case, Law & Crime, Feb 9, 2024,
https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/this-conclusion-was-wrong-jack-smith-cites-clear-error-witness-intimi-
dation-while-schooling-cannon-on-discovery-restrictions-in-mar-a-lago-documents-case/

28
is what the Conspiring Justices have done with respect to the matter now before you, with

facially criminal intent.

3. United States v. Trump (Insurrection): The Grift

To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.

~Magna Carta, c. 40 (1215).

In a flagrant break with precedent, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the

Supreme Court refused to decide the question of the scope of the President’s immunity from

criminal prosecution in certiorari prior to judgment. Order, Trump v. United States, No. 23-

939 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2023). Failing that, they could have decided the matter in a matter of

hours, cf., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (argued Dec. 11, 2000; decided Dec. 12, 2000),

or at least, lifted the stay on the prosecution in this Court to allow trial preparations to ensue.

But instead, they chose to hear it on the last possible day of oral argument; if the Conspiring

Justices succeed in delaying Trump's coup trial beyond Election Day by slow-walking their

opinion and ordering an unnecessary remand, it will have granted him de facto immunity,

increasing his odds of being re-elected. The Conspiring Justices’ criminal intent could not

be more plain. But don’t take Movant’s word for it. Take that of conservative icon Judge J.

Michael Luttig. Judge Luttig CALLS OUT Supreme Court Over Trump DELAY Tactic,

MeidasTouch (podcast), May 1, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPKkjR_QQw4.

29
 Trump’s actual argument—that a President can be immune from criminal prosecution

for ordering the assassination of a political rival, selling our nuclear secrets, or orchestrating

a coup ďêtat—blazed a new trail in the wilderness of juridical absurdity.44 And the response

of Justice Kagan--the only first-rate intellect left on that “Court”— was priceless: “That an-

swer sounds to me as though it's like, yeah, under my test, it's an official act, but that sure

sounds bad, doesn't it?”45 Worse yet, the larger conspiracy to ‘protect Trump’ appears to be

an all-hands-on-deck criminal enterprise among Trump appointees.46 The only question that

is begged is why Justice Thomas, who quoted Justice Iredell for the utterly sensible propo-

sition that "[i]f [the President] commits any crime, he is punishable by the laws of his coun-

try," Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2435 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting),

would ever think that Presidential criminal immunity was a thing.

We all know why it was a thing. It was all about the grift.

When it comes to bold, in-your-face judicial bribery, Clarence Thomas is the G.O.A.T.

Movant complained about this over a decade ago, to no avail. But now, it is back in our

44
At the risk of stating the painfully obvious, if everyone understood that a President enjoyed blanket immunity
for his conduct in office, the infamous pardon of President Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Presidential Statement,
Sept. 8, 1974, would have been both redundant and superfluous.

45
Trump v. United States, supra., Transcript of Oral Arg. at 43 (Apr. 25, 2024). Counsel for Trump hemmed
and hawed frantically in his effort to evade having to state that position with clarity before the Court, for rea-
sons which should be abundantly apparent.
46
The larger conspiracy to protect Trump appears to be an all-hands-on-deck enterprise among Trump appoin-
tees. Commentators have expressed grave concern that the right-wing of the “Court” intends to use Fischer v.
United States, Dkt. # 23-5572 (U.S. filed Sept. 11, 2023) as a vehicle for decriminalizing the January 6 insur-
rection. E.g., Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court will weigh in on the January 6 insurrection. What could possi-
bly go wrong?, Vox, Mar. 25, 2024; Amy Howe, Justices divided over Jan. 6 participant’s call to throw out
obstruction charge, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 16, 2024, 4:34 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/04/justices-di-
vided-over-jan-6-participants-call-to-throw-out-obstruction-charge/. Judges Walker and Rao of the District of
Columbia Circuit tried to shelter Trump’s tax returns from statutorily authorized congressional discovery,
Trump v. Mazars U.S.A., LLP, No. 19-5142 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 2019) (dissent from pet. for hearing en banc),
Katsas wrote a dissent in Fischer v. United States, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023). No one else even consid-
eredthese aberrations.

30
faces. At least one of these trips was with billionaire Harlan Crow to the legendary Bohe-

mian Grove.47 “Thomas said he was advised he didn't have to disclose private jet flights and

luxury vacations paid for by billionaire Harlan Crow because, although a close friend, Crow

‘did not have business before the Court’” … because, well, of course, he did.48 And even if

he didn’t, the notion that no one who can afford to do Bohemian Grove would want to corner

him about a case boggles the imagination.

To not put too fine a spin on it, Thomas is a career criminal, taking bribes on a wholesale

basis and not reporting them for decades. And the last time he was caught, he invoked the

“I am incredibly stupid” defense, which is not only unbecoming of an Associate Justice of

the United States Supreme Court, but never seems to work unless you are a Supreme Court

Justice. Cf., United States v. Thomas, No. 91-4061, 1993.C10.41489, ¶¶ 97-98 (10th Cir.

Feb. 23, 1993) (Versuslaw). And while it is a tough sale for a common criminal to make, it

was a particularly daunting one for Justice Thomas to attempt, as he has had countless trees

murdered in his attempt to establish his towering intellect:

“As much as it stung to be told that I’d done well in the seminary despite my race, it
was far worse to feel that I was at Yale because of it. I sought to vanquish the perception
that I was somehow inferior to my white classmates by obtaining special permission to
carry more than the maximum number of credit hours and by taking a rigorous curricu-
lum of courses in such traditional areas as corporate law, bankruptcy, and commercial
transactions. How could anyone dare to doubt my abilities if I excelled in such de-
manding classes? I even went out of my way to take a course in taxation....’

Clarence Thomas, My Grandfather’s Son 203 (HarperCollins 2007) (italics in original; bold

type added) (hereinafter, “MGS”).

47
E.g., Abbie VanSickle, Clarence Thomas, in Financial Disclosure, Acknowledges 2019 Trips Paid by Harlan
Crow, N.Y. Times, Jun. 7, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/07/us/supreme-court-disclosures-
gifts.html, Mike Wendling, Clarence Thomas and Bohemian Grove: What goes on at the all-male club? BBC
News, Apr. 7, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65217165
48
Zoe Tillman, Thomas’s Billionaire Friend Had Business Before Supreme Court, Bloomberg Law, Apr. 24,
2023, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/thomass-billionaire-friend-had-business-before-supreme-
court.

31
 Unfortunately for Justice Thomas, Justice Thomas makes a devastating point: You can’t pro-

claim that you are a worthy successor to the great Thurgood Marshall on one hand and then, almost

in the same breath, pretend that you are an imbecile who just fell off the turnip truck. As any

seminarian knows, “Even a fool is thought wise if he keeps silent, and discerning if he holds his

tongue.” Prov. 17:28 (NIV).

Specifically, Thomas proclaimed that he “inadvertently omitted” the source of his wife’s earned

income as required by the Ethics in Government Act, “due to a misunderstanding of the filing

instructions.” Ariane de Vogue and Devin Dwyer, Justice Clarence Thomas Amends 20 Years of

Disclosure Forms With Wife's Employers, ABCNews.com, Jan. 24, 2011. This becomes especially

problematic in light of Politico’s revelation that Justice Thomas was filling out said forms properly

until 1997—ostensibly, about the time that she joined the ultra-right-wing Heritage Foundation.

And to not put too fine a spin on it, the reports themselves are almost as incriminating as a pubic

hair on a Coke can:

Clarence Thomas, Form AO-10 (Financial Disclosure Rept. for Calendar Year 2007) 2 (May

15, 2008).

Through his conduct, Justice Thomas clearly demonstrated knowledge of the difference

between earned and investment income, correctly treating the advances on his autobiography

32
as non-investment income. The instructions are pellucid and require him to disclose the

source of wife Virginia’s non-investment income, but not the amount. Moreover, every

American taxpayer is charged with the ability to distinguish between investment and non-

investment income. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 163(d), 212. It is a simple concept, explained thor-

oughly in any law school survey course on income taxation. Reading the damned form can’t

be that hard.

It would be one thing if Thomas were a day laborer, used to spending his days out in the

fields or on construction sites, but Thomas is an Associate Justice of the United States Su-

preme Court, who has even bragged about his familiarity with tax law. In his autobiography,

he boasts that he had earned an honors grade in his class on taxation at Yale Law School,

MGS at 75, confessed that he was “interested in tax and corporate law,” Id. at 99, and “had

bench trials in a number of tax cases.” Id. at 108. Yet, despite his admission of competence

in the area of tax law, see, Mo. Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.1, and his admission by conduct

that he understood the difference between investment and non-investment income is, he

claimed that this serial oversight was “inadvertent?” Maybe he just thought he was Charlie

Rangel. See e.g., Isabel Vincent and Melissa Klein, The Case Against Charlie Rangel, N.Y.

Post, Oct. 4, 2009 (Chairman of Ways and Means caught committing tax fraud).

Let’s be honest: If any other son of Pinpoint, South Carolina had committed this suppos-

edly “inadvertent” serial error, he would have been prosecuted to the fullest extent of the

law. In fact, it has happened often; just ask Martha Stewart. But as Michael Tomasky [then

of] The Guardian cynically observes, in America, the demigods of our Supreme Court are

above the law:

“Obviously, Thomas is not going to be indicted over this. But how could a man - a
member of the Supreme Court! - just openly lie on such a form? Lie? Yes, rather

33
 obviously. Let's put it this way. If you or I were filling out a form, and we came to a
question about our spouse's income, and we knew very well that our spouse had income,
we would check the appropriate income category. And here is one of the nine leading
legal people in the United States. On what conceivable honest basis could he have
thought his wife, who got up every morning and went to work every day at one of
Washington's most richly endowed think tanks, had no income? For six years?

I wish we had a satirist, a Balzac, chronicling this age. It is beyond believability.”

Michael Tomasky, Clarence Thomas, What?, The Guardian (U.K.), Jan. 27, 2011 (emphasis

added).

This wasn’t a mere failure to disclose. When Justice Thomas ticked off the box that said

“none,” he made a materially false representation not just once, but for at least thirteen years

running. A pattern of (mis)conduct. And were he a lesser Thomas, like Judge Thomas Por-

teous, it would have been included in his articles of impeachment:

“Beginning in or about March 2001 and continuing through about July 2004, while a
Federal judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., engaged in a pattern of conduct inconsistent with the trust
and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge by knowingly and intentionally
making material false statements and representations under penalty of perjury ...

In doing so, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal and disrepute, preju-
diced public respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary, and demonstrated that
he is unfit for the office of Federal judge.

Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors
and should be removed from office.”49

Whether it involves attending secretive junkets offered by the Federalist Society, taking

a bribe from a litigant, or duck hunting with a litigant during the pendency of a case, our

Supreme Court is as compromised as the average Congressman, and it is no longer even

49
Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, H. Res. 1031, 111 Cong. Rec. S1645 (Mar. 17, 2010) (emphasis
added).

34
subtle.50 Through a relentless campaign of bribery, our Supreme Court "Justices" have per-

mitted their once-august body to become an unelected and unaccountable wholly owned

subsidiary of the Republican Party. See e.g., Sheldon Whitehouse, The Scheme: How the

Right Wing Used Dark Money to Capture the Supreme Court (2022).

When it comes to judicial grift, “Clarence Sale” Thomas is the undisputed G.O.A.T., but

it seems that everybody who is anybody in conservative judicial circles is on the gravy train.

And they don’t even have the decency to tell us about conflicts, much less recuse. E.g., Kate

Aronoff, Billionaire Poised to See Return on Investment in Neil Gorsuch, The New Republic,

Jan. 16, 2024. Unsurprisingly, Gorsuch did not recuse.51

50
BribeFest has been underway in earnest for twenty-five years. Clarence Thomas’ Private Complaints About
Money Sparked Fears He Would Resign, ProPublica, Dec. 18, 2023, https://www.propublica.org/article/clar-
ence-thomas-money-complaints-sparked-resignation-fears-scotus. Clarence and Ginni Thomas just couldn’t
make it on a measly $500,000/year in today’s dollars, and needed some folding cash (“The month before, the
justice had borrowed $267,000 from a friend to buy a high-end RV.”). Desperate to retain their ideological
majority on the Court, conservative oligarchs devised schemes designed to fatten Justices’ bank accounts. E.g.,
Frank Rich, Nobody Knows the Lynchings He’s Seen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2007 ($1.5M advance for Justice
Thomas autobiography, “My Grandfather’s Son”); Antonin Justin Elliot, et al., A “Delicate Matter”: Scalia,
Form AO-10 (for Calendar Year 2004) at 4 (lavish vacation in Auckland, NZ from Oct. 19- 27, 2004).
51
Robert El-Jaouhari, Highlights from Oral Argument in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Cranfill Sum-
ner LLP, Jan. 18, 2024, at https://www.cshlaw.com/resources/highlights-from-oral-argument-in-loper-bright-
enterprises-v-raimondo/. See also, the serendipitous purchase of Gorsuch’s hunting lodge by the law firm of
famed legal felon Jack Abramoff: “The Supreme Court justice did not report the identity of the purchaser,
whose firm has had numerous cases before the court.” Heidi Przyblya, Law firm head bought Gorsuch-owned
property, Politico, Apr. 25, 2023, at https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/25/neil-gorsuch-colorado-prop-
erty-sale-00093579

35
 Brett Kavanaugh (mysterious debt repayments).52 Amy Coney Barrett (record book ad-

vance).53 Samuel Alito (hedge fund manager Paul Singer, with frequent business before the

Court).54 John Roberts (via BigLaw headhunter wife Jane).55 Quite literally, if you want to

get your foot in the door at One First Street, YOU HAVE TO PAY THE LADY!

At the end of the day, these people are all about the grift. “Elton John Justice” (“Rich

man can ride, but the hobo, he can drown,” Elton John, Mona Lisas and Mad Hatters (MCA

1972)). They sell their offices because they can, and the re-election of Donald Trump means

that the Conspiring Justices can continue to live lives bordering on the dissolute. And you

don’t need slides to figure out why they will do just about anything to make it so.

52
“Who made the down payment on his house? How did he come up with $92,000 in country club fees?”
Stephanie Mencimer, The Many Mysteries of Brett Kavanaugh’s Finances, Mother Jones, Sept. 13, 2018, at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/09/the-many-mysteries-of-brett-kavanaughs-finances/
53
Who would pay the newest Supreme Court justice $2M to tell us “how judges compartmentalize their per-
sonal feelings” in rulings? Jake Lahut, Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett gets $2 million advance for
a book deal, according to new report, Business Insider, Apr 19, 2021, at https://www.businessinsider.com/amy-
coney-barreett-book-advance-2-million-supreme-court-2021-4.
54
“In the years after the undisclosed trip to Alaska, Republican mega-donor Paul Singer’s hedge fund has
repeatedly had business before the Supreme Court. Alito has never recused himself.” Justin Elliot, Justice
Samuel Alito Took Luxury Fishing Vacation With GOP Billionaire Who Later Had Cases Before the Court,
ProPublica, Jun. 20, 2023.
55
E.g., Mattathias Schwartz, Jane Roberts, who is married to Chief Justice John Roberts, made $10.3 million
in commissions from elite law firms, whistleblower documents show, Business Insider, Apr 28, 2023, at
https://www.businessinsider.com/jane-roberts-chief-justice-wife-10-million-commissions-2023-4.

36
 If you think you’ve seen this rodeo before, you’re probably right:

At one point during the December 27th call in which Donoghue refuted President
Trump’s fraud allegations, Donoghue recorded in handwritten notes a request President
Trump made specifically to him and Acting Attorney General Rosen: “Just say the elec-
tion was corrupt and leave the rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.” Donoghue
explained: “[T]he Department had zero involvement in anyone’s political strategy,” and
“he wanted us to say that it was corrupt.” “We told him we were not going to do that.”

Final Report, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States

Capitol 49 (Dec. 2022). Plausible deniability. The co-conspirators don’t have to come out

and declare embarrassingly bad law to do The Don a solid. All they will have to do is “pull

a Pecker.” Kayla Epstein, et al., Deal to bury Trump stories was 'agreement between friends',

BBC, Apr. 23, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-us-canada-68848464. The Don

and his unhinged chorus of allies in the MAGAsphere will take care of the rest.

C. ….AND BECAUSE I HAVE TO ‘GO THERE’

Exactly. And that is the point.

A long time ago, in a galaxy, far, far away, there once was a Republic called the United

States of America, where “[t]he law [was] no respecter of persons,” Trist v. Child, 88 U.S.

441, 453 (1875), and "[e]veryone [stood] alike as equals under the law.” Wilson v. Vermont

Castings, 977 F. Supp. 691, 699 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (jury instructions). Where “the kind of trial

a man [got did not depend] on the amount of money he has," Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,

19 (1956) or his station in life.

37
 But as the incomparable constitutional scholars George Carlin and Charles Schulz note,

in truth, that magic land never really existed.

Just when these American citizens needed their rights the most, their government
took ‘em away. And rights aren’t rights if someone can take ‘em away. They‘re
privileges.
~George Carlin56

As Suetonius records, the Roman emperor Caligula imposed taxes on food, lawsuits, and

wages, but did not publish his tax laws; as a result, "great grievances were experienced from

the want of sufficient knowledge of the law. At length, on the urgent demands of the Roman

people, he published a law, but it was written in a very small hand, so that no one could

make a copy of it.” Suetonius, The Lives of the Twelve Caesars 280 (trans. A. Thomson;

Bell, 1893), Ch. 4, § LXI. If anything, Americans’ predicament is even worse: We can read

the published “law” until we go blind, but we cannot rely on it.

By way of illustration, the United States is a signatory to the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by

the United States Sept. 8, 1992) (hereinafter, "the ICCPR"). As it is substantially cotermi-

nous with the earlier Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217A (III), U. N.

Doc. A/810 (1948), its self-evident purpose was to abolish official immunity in tort for

56
George Carlin, YouTube video at ~7:45 (undated), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWiBt-pqp0E (in
re: internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II).

38
violations of human rights guaranteed therein, ICCPR, art. 2, which are essentially cotermi-

nous with our own Bill of Rights.57 Article VI of our Constitution provides that “all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99.

(1884). In turn, this is consistent with 250 years’ worth of Anglo-American law concluding

that a right cannot exist without a remedy for its breach. Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng. Rep.

126, 136 (H.C.); accord, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) ("To take away

all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.").

An especially grotesque example of judicial lawmaking is the irrational expansion of

the concept of official immunity. Judges gave their guild an absolute immunity against civil

suits,58 later extending it to prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), States,

e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), and even the federal government. E.g., United

States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 133 S.Ct. 12, 16 (2012). Never mind that at “the time of Mar-

bury v. Madison there was no doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity, as there never had

been in English law.” Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, Year-

book (Supreme Court Historical Society) 103, 104 (1985).59

57
See generally, United Nations Human Rights Committee, Background to the ICCPR and Optional Protocols
(website, undated), https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr/background-international-covenant-civil-
and-political-rights-and-optional-protocols (visited Jun. 10, 2024) (listing rights protected, including the right
to a fair trial).
58
Cf., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (a judge must possess jurisdiction over a dispute to claim immun-
ity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (immunity is virtually unlimited); see also, e.g., Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967), (holding that "any person" means “any person but us judges”). The Bradley rationale for
judicial immunity ended with the advent of the oxymoronic notion of discretionary certiorari and non-prece-
dential opinions. See Anastasoff, supra.
59
Professor Chemerinsky piles on, explaining that it places a common-law principle above the Constitution
itself, obliterating the Supremacy Clause and extinguishing "the right of every individual to claim the protec-
tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Erwin Chemerinsky, "SEE NO EVIL: Sovereign Immunity
Puts States Above the Law, Implying They Can Do No Wrong," Mar. 21, 2001, L. A. Daily J. at 6 (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 163).

39
 The judge-made law of immunity exists nowhere in the plain text of the Constitution,

the spaces between the text, or even emanations from its penumbrae. See, Griswold v. Con-

necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). Rather by definition, it defeats any opportunity for chal-

lenging government action as contrary to law or securing a fair remedy for wrongful injury,

thereby eviscerating the Bill of Rights.60 And back when judges still colored inside the lines,

our law still reflected this. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (Fifth Amendment

waived immunity). But any spark of incipience it had left was eradicated by the ICCPR.61

60
To even state the case is to refute it, and many have. “Representative democracy ceases to exist the moment
that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to their constituents,” 1 St.
George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 297 (1803) (editor's app’x.).” and as Ronald Reagan put it, some
governments “make elaborate claims that citizens under their rule enjoy human rights,” ... but “[e]ven if words
look good on paper, the absence of structural safeguards against abuse of power means they can be taken away
as easily as they are allowed.” Ronald Reagan, Speech (Proclamation of Human Rights Day), Dec. 10, 1987.
61
Congress expressed its intent that provisions of the ICCPR "will become binding international obligations of
the United States," 138 Cong. Rec. S4,783 (1992) (stmt. of Sen. Moynihan (D-MA)). Our State Department
has warranted to the international community that whenever conforming legislation is required to comply with
treaty obligations, it is our consistent practice to withhold an instrument of ratification until appropriate legis-
lation is enacted. United States Dept. of State, Core Doc. Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties, United
Nations Doc. No. HRI/CORE/USA/2005 (Jan. 16, 2005) at ¶ 157.
In considering ratification, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that it wanted to defeat the claim
that it was an international hypocrite. Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 3 (102d Sess. 1992) (“In view of the leading role that the
United States plays in the international struggle for human rights, the absence of U.S. ratification of the cove-
nant is conspicuous and, in the view of many, hypocritical”). If the ICCPR were not pellucid on its face, this
speaks directly to congressional intent.
Based on the foregoing, it is not logically possible to find the ICCPR to be a non-self-executing treaty. Chief
Justice Marshall said, "where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating
in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress."
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1801). And when the United States declares to the world
that its law is in full compliance with the treaty, the Foster v. Nielson (27 U.S. 253 (1829)) “contract” exception
cannot apply by definition, because there is literally nothing left for Congress to do to fulfill its end of the
bargain. As such, it is the law of the land, and enforceable in our courts. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599
(2008). Besides, even if judges could claim that the ICCPR was a non-self-executing treaty and that United
States of America lied to the rest of the world in declaring its compliance, unilateral reservations fundamentally
incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty are void as a matter of international law. Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980). Thus, to find that
it is not the law of the land, you must also admit that Lady Liberty is AN ADULTERER.

40
 However, as Affirmative Action’s latest “gift” to the Supreme Court proves, the entire

United States Reports is no match for a headstrong judge. Despite the foregoing, now-Jus-

tice Ketanji Brown Jackson actually wrote this breathtaking sentence:

The Bill of Rights clearly does not contain any congressional mandate expressly
waiving sovereign immunity.
Smith v. Scalia, 44 F.Supp.3d 28, 40 (D.C. Dist. 2014). But in finding that no one could be

sued, Ms. Jackson effectively ruled that

...the Bill of Rights can literally be voided by Congress because the Framers failed
to enact an Eleventh Amendment declaring, “We really, really, really, REALLY
DO mean it!”

Although Movant cannot vouch for what they teach at Harvard between symposia on Crit-

ical Race Theory and Animal Law, it seems self-evident that students would know that “[i]t

is a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy,

although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.” Kendall v. United States,

37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838).

Still, the most shameful act of judicial sodomy of the Constitution Ms. Jackson indulges

in is her invocation of the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity–a medieval common-law

doctrine, tracing its origin to the notorious Tudor Star Chamber. Floyd and Barker [1607]

77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber). Created by judges for the benefit of judges, it is predi-

cated upon a sophistry even Lewis Carroll would find impenetrable. Professor Olowofoyeku

of London’s Brunel University deftly ridicules it: “You have been injured by the misconduct

of a judge. We have to deny you redress. This is necessary because we have to protect your

interests by protecting the judges, so that they in turn can protect your interests without fear

of apprehension.” Abimbola Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity 197

(Oxford U. Pr. 1993).

41
 No sane human would ever willingly strike such a bargain, and the very notion of the rule

of law necessarily precludes it.62 But when an unelected and unaccountable judge is forced

to choose between fealty to the Constitution and personal self-interest, she will pick the latter

every time.

In a properly functioning court system, a decision this bizarre would have been over-

turned on appeal. But in this case, the Supreme Court’s most infamous raging alcoholic,

Brett “Beerman” Kavanaugh, was obviously too drunk to read appellate briefs.63 And the

Supreme Court, redefining the word “certiorari,”64 willfully abandoned its constitutionally

assigned duty to superintend lower courts. Cf., United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. 121, 126

(1795).65 The existence of jurisdiction "creates an implication of duty to exercise it. Mondou

v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912). The Court literally cannot function as

a supreme court without exercising its superintending authority, for when it shirks this duty,

it cedes the raw ability to declare “what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 177.

62
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the doctrine of immunity, finding it irreconcilable with the very
concept of rights under law, Nelles v. Ontario, 2 S.C.R. 170 (1989) (Canada), and were followed by the rest of
the civilised world. E.g., Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent’s case), 3 NZLR 667 (CA 1994) (New Zea-
land), Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad & Tobago (No. 2) [1979] AC 385; Case C-224/01, Köbler v
Austrian Republic [2003] 3 CMLR 28) (European Union). But those countries are all ICCPR signatories, and
respect treaty obligations.
63
Brett Kavanaugh: Adventures in Perjury, https://www.scribd.com/document/388429610/Kavanaugh-
090918
64
“Certiorari” means “To be informed of.” Black’s Law Dictionary 228 (6th ed. 1990). A writ of certiorari sets
aside a decision made contrary to the law. “The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have
only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This is the concern of the Crown,
for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion.”
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 (India). Mandamus is the Court’s Swiss Army Knife;
certiorari is the mechanism pulling it out of its pocket.
65
"This superintending authority has been deposited in the Supreme Court, by the Federal Constitution; and it
becomes a duty to exercise it upon every proper occasion." This understanding is confirmed by the author of
Article III, James Wilson, 2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (J. D. Andrews ed., 1896), and learned com-
mentators of the day such as Justice Story, 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§§ 377-78 (1833), and Chancellor Kent, 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 298 (1826).

42
 The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

Movant is no longer certain what is left of the Constitution anymore. This exercise can

be repeated thousands of times, but it can be said for certain that the Seventh Amendment,

United States v. Callender, 25 F.Cas. 239, 257 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit), the

protections for unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's

Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), the Eleventh Amendment as written, Alden v.

Maine, supra; see John Paul Stevens, “Two Questions About Justice,” 2003 Ill.L.Rev. 821,

the right of access to the courts, see Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitu-

tional, 93 U.Va. L. Rev. 139 (2007), to equal justice under law, to prosecute criminals who

injure you, to honest judges, to the protection of treaties, and most importantly, the right to

rely on published Court decisions as authoritative statements of the law we can use to plan

our affairs. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); Williams v. Dallas

Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., dissenting from den. of

reh. en banc) (gobsmacking example).

While Justice Scalia enjoyed being our Ruler so much that he was happy to “work for

free,”66 when the Court’s most petulant toddler didn’t get his way, he threw tantrums any

three-year-old would be proud of. And in his anger, he inadvertently uttered the truth: that

our Supreme Court is no longer a court, but an unelected super-legislature, no longer con-

strained by even the Constitution itself. “This practice of constitutional revision ... has

rob[bed] the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Inde-

pendence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” Obergefell

66
“I’ve been working for free, which probably means I’m too stupid to be on the Supreme Court.” Scalia on
the Record, Both Online and Off (CBS television broadcast Apr. 27, 2008) (http://perma.cc/A64CQNBB).

43
v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 576 U.S. __ (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting; slip op. at 2). As Abraham

Lincoln declared, "no man is good enough to govern another man, without the other’s con-

sent," Abraham Lincoln, Speech (on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16,

1854, and the Framers’ Constitution—and not the SCOTUStitution, illicitly rewritten by

our judges—marks the outer limit of our consent.

You Judges can only rule by consent, and Movant does not consent.

To a man, our Founding Fathers maintained that the right to kill a tyrant was absolute.67

This view is elegantly conveyed by Thomas Paine:

Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support
an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and
destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind
me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it? What signifies it to
me, whether he who does it is a king or a common man?

Thomas Paine, The American Crisis, No. 1 (Dec. 19, 1776), as reprinted in Paine: Collected

Writings 97 (E. Foner, ed.) (Putnam, 1984). And to Pope Samuel of Alito and his fellow

prelates on the Court, Movant would cordially remind them that the Constitution does not

grant you (or anyone else) squatters’ rights over the uterus down the street.

67
Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin both recommended that the Great Seal of the United States be
encircled by the phrase, "Rebellion against Tyrants Is Obedience to God." David Hall, Genevan Reform and
the American Founding 8 (Lexington Books 2003). Concurrences resemble a Brandeis brief. Judge Roger
Sherman—the only man to sign all four of our nation’s founding documents—observed in the halls of Congress
that it is "the privilege of every citizen, and one of his most essential rights, to bear arms, and to resist every
attack upon his liberty or property, by whomsoever made." Don B. Kates, The Right To Arms: The Criminology
of Guns, 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. 86, 98 & n. 41 (internal citation omitted); see also, e.g., Thomas Jefferson,
Letter (to Isaac Tiffany), Apr. 4, 1819, at 1, 3 Elliot, Debates at 45 (Speech of Patrick Henry, Virginia Con-
vention, Jun. 5, 1788).

44
 CONCLUSION

There are two available remedies. While the use of lethal force against wayward judges

is certainly permissible,68 it is not desirable. The Constitution exists to obviate the need to

resort to violence, and Movant has the right to demand that it be so used.

To that end, two remedies are sought. First, Movant seeks to be named conditional sub-

stitute counsel, to be effective in the case that Defendant Trump is elected as President, and

asks that this criminal case be dismissed and federal resources be withdrawn from the pros-

ecution. Second, Movant seeks access to a grand jury for purposes of presenting evidence

of felonious acts by the Conspiring Justices, conditioned on Special Counsel Smith’s refusal

to do so.

Respectfully submitted this __th day of June, 2024,

/s/ Signature under seal

ericx.blair.84@gmail.com

68
Before Magna Carta, Bishop John of Salisbury wrote that "[t]o kill a tyrant is not merely lawful, but right
and just ... the law rightly takes arms against him who disarms the laws, and the public power rages in fury
against him who strives to bring to nought the public force.” John of Salisbury, Policraticus, Bk. iii, ch. 15,
reprinted in, The Statesman’s Book of John of Salisbury lxxiii (John Dickenson trans., Russell & Russell, 1963)
(1159). Aquinas concurred, in observing that a violent response to tyranny is not merely permissible, but pre-
dictable: “[M]en remove themselves from a tyrant as from cruel beasts, and to be subject to a tyrant seems the
same as to be mauled by a cruel animal.” St. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, in St. Thomas Aquinas:
Political Writings 15 (R.W. Dyson trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1267). Blackstone weighs in as well,
observing that that Englishmen have a “natural right of resistance and self-preservation [which may lawfully
be exercised] when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of op-
pression.” 1 Blackstone, Commentaries at *144.
This view has reached the status of jus cogens law. St. Pope John Paul II observed that any violent result of
a struggle against an oppressive government is morally "attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it
about." Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, Sec. 55, Encyclical Letter on the Value and Inviolability of
Human Life, Mar. 25, 1995. Concurrences throughout history would read like a Brandeis brief. See e.g., Paul
Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
721 (2003) (invoking international law principle of "just war" to justify targeted assassinations of American
public officials, including judges).

45
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June _, 2024, I sent a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL INTERVENTION to:

Jack Smith, Esq., Special Counsel

Office of the United States Attorney
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Rm. B-206
Washington, D.C. 20530

John F. Lauro, Esq.

Lauro & Singer
400 N. Tampa St., 15th Floor
Tampa, FL 33602
Counsel for former President Donald J. Trump

The last known address, by way of certified United States Mail:

46