Special Report Foreign Interference

National Security and Intelligence Committee of
Parliamentarians
Special Report on Foreign Interference in

Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions
Submitted to the Prime Minister on March 22, 2024 pursuant to subsection 21(2) of
the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act
(Revised version pursuant to subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act)
© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, 2024.
All rights reserved.
Ottawa, ON.
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and

Institutions (Revised version pursuant to subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act)
CP104-6/2024E-PDF
978-0-660-71872-9
CP104-6/2024E
978-0-660-71874-3
Special Report on Foreign Interference in
Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions
The National Security and Intelligence

Committee of Parliamentarians
The Honourable David McGuinty, P.C., M.P.

Chair
Submitted to the Prime Minister on March 22, 2024

Revised version tabled in Parliament in June 2024
Note
This report is composed of an introduction, four chapters, a conclusion, the Committee’s
findings and recommendations, and four annexes. The four chapters are almost exclusively
based upon classified documentation, mostly summary assessments intended for s enior
officials or ministers and classified briefings, but also specific reporting from various security and
intelligence organizations. This is especially true of Chapter 2 and parts of Chapter 3, where the
Committee summarizes trends or specific instances and issues of foreign interference. Readers
should note that the Committee has fully or partly redacted references to much of this source
material to avoid injury to Canada’s national security, national defence or international relations.
Moreover, readers should consider that examples given in the text may refer to any order of
government unless otherwise noted in this document.
Revisions
Consistent with subsection 21(2) of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of
Parliamentarians Act (NSICOP Act), the Committee may submit a special report to the Prime
Minister and the ministers concerned on any matter related to its mandate. Consistent with
subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act, the Prime Minister may, after consulting the Chair of the
Committee, direct the Committee to submit to him or her a revised version of the report that
does not contain information the Prime Minister believes the disclosure of which would be
injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is
protected by solicitor-client privilege.
This document is a revised version of the Special Report provided to the Prime Minister on
March 22, 2024. At the time, the document was classified as “Top Secret//Special
Intelligence//[Codewords and handling caveats]//Cabinet Confidence//Solicitor -Client
Privilege//Canadian Eyes Only.” Revisions were made to remove information the disclosure of
which the Prime Minister believed would be injurious to national security, national defence or
international relations or which constitutes solicitor-client privilege. Where information could
simply be removed without affecting the readability of the document, the Committee noted the
removal with three asterisks (***) in the text of this document. Wher e information could not
simply be removed without affecting the readability of the document, the Committee revised the
document to summarize the information that was removed. Those sections are marked with
three asterisks at the beginning and the end of the summary, and the summary is enclosed by
square brackets (see example below).
EXAMPLE: [*** Revised sections are marked with three asterisks at the beginning and the end
of the sentence, and the summary is enclosed by square brackets. ***]
The National Security and Intelligence
Committee of Parliamentarians
(Membership from the 44th Parliament)
The Honourable David J. McGuinty, P.C., M.P. (Chair)
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron, M.P.
Mr. Don Davies, M.P.
The Honourable Patricia Duncan, Senator
Ms. Iqra Khalid, M.P. (ceased being a member on September 17, 2023)
The Honourable Marty Klyne, Senator
The Honourable Frances Lankin, P.C., C.M., Senator
Ms. Patricia Lattanzio, M.P.
Mr. James Maloney, M.P. (ceased being a member on September 17,

2023)
Mr. Rob Morrison, M.P.
Mr. Alex Ruff, M.S.C., C.D., M.P.

Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
Scope.................................................................................................................................. 2
Methodology........................................................................................................................ 4
Chapter 1: Understanding foreign interference and its challenges ..................................... 5
Chapter 2: The threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and
institutions........................................................................................................................... 11
Key threat actors................................................................................................................ 11
Key tactics ......................................................................................................................... 16
Covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural communities and
parliamentarians............................................................................................................. 16
Leveraging relationships with influential Canadians ......................................................... 24
Exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration ......................... 30
Use of cyber tools to attain specific objectives ................................................................. 32
Chapter 3: The government’s response ............................................................................. 35
Policy initiatives ................................................................................................................. 35
The Plan to Protect Democracy (*** 2018)....................................................................... 35
Strategy to Counter Hostile Activities by State Actors (HASA) ......................................... 41
Intelligence priorities....................................................................................................... 45
Legislative changes........................................................................................................ 46
Operational responses.................................................................................................... 47
Briefing parliamentarians ................................................................................................ 54
Interdepartmental governance ........................................................................................ 56
Parliamentary ethics officers .............................................................................................. 57
Chapter 4: The Committee’s assessment of the response to foreign interference in
democratic processes and institutions .............................................................................. 59
The threat of foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions.......................... 60
A permissive environment: How systemic challenges in responding to foreign interference
provide opportunities for foreign actors ............................................................................... 61
Absence of a common threshold for action...................................................................... 62
Absence of robust tools .................................................................................................. 62
The distribution, assessment and use of intelligence ....................................................... 65
Engagement with Parliamentarians ................................................................................. 66
The role of Parliamentarians in addressing foreign interference .......................................... 67
Committee comments ........................................................................................................ 68
The Committee’s comment on unauthorized disclosure of intelligence (the leaks) ............ 68
The Committee’s comment on the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol and the
integrity of the 43 rd and 44th federal elections................................................................... 68
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 71
Findings............................................................................................................................... 73
Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 75
Annexes............................................................................................................................... 77
Annex A: List of witnesses............................................................................................ 77
Annex B: Terms of Reference....................................................................................... 79
Annex C: Timeline of the government’s response to foreign interference in democratic
processes and institutions, 2018 to 2024 ............................................................................ 81
Annex D: Foreign interference-related findings and recommendations from NSICOP’s
2019 annual report ............................................................................................................. 83
Introduction
1. Beginning in the fall of 2022, media reports allegedly based on leaked intelligence
brought the question of foreign interference squarely into the public discourse. They raised
questions about what the Prime Minister knew and when, and whether the Government ignored
intelligence for partisan advantage. The reports also prompted questions about what the
government had done more broadly to respond to interfer ence by the People’s Republic of
China and other countries in the federal elections of 2019 and 2021, including whether larger
systemic negligence was at play. Some parliamentarians and commentators called for a public
inquiry.
2. On November 1, 2022, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and

House Affairs initiated a study of foreign interference. The Standing Committee called on
Ministers and senior officials to explain how the government has responded to foreign
interference activities. It also heard from subject matter experts, interested organizations and
community groups about the threat from states conducting interference activities. 1 The House of
Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics launched a similar
study on December 7, 2022. Neither standing committee had access to classified information. 2
3. On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister requested or announced a number of independent

reviews. The Prime Minister asked the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
(NSIRA) to conduct a review of the flow of information from national security agencies to
decision-makers during the 43 rd and 44th general elections. 3 NSIRA’s review focused on the
production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference, including how it was
communicated across the government. 4 (NSIRA submitted its review to the Prime Minister on
March 5, 2024.)5 The Prime Minister also appointed an Independent Special Rapporteur to
determine, among other things, whether the government should call a public inquiry into
allegations of foreign interference. 6 (The Special Rapporteur concluded that a public inquiry
should not be pursued; 7 however, the government ultimately established a public inquiry on
1 On May 16, 2023, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs also launched a study on the Question
of Privilege Related to the Intimidation Campaign Against the Member for Wellington – Halton Hills and Other
Members.
2 The Committee notes that in October 2020 the Special Committee on the Canada – People’s Republic of China
Relationship commenced a study of the national security dimensions of the Canada – China relationship, including
foreign interference, and published a report in May 2023.
3
Prime Minister, “Taking further action on foreign interference and strengthening confidence in our democracy ,”
March 6, 2023.
4
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), “Terms of Reference for the NSIRA Review of the
Government of Canada’s production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference in the 43 rd and 44th
Canadian federal elections,” May 23, 2023.
5
NSIRA, Letter to the Chair of NSICOP, March 5, 2024.
6
Prime Minister, “Taking further action on foreign interference and strengthening confidence in our democracy ,”
March 6, 2023; Prime Minister, “Prime Minister announces mandate of Independent Special Rapporteur,” March 21,
2023.
7 David Johnston, First Report – The Right Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur , May 23,
2023.
1
September 7, 2023.) 8 Finally, the Prime Minister requested that the National Security and
Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (the Committee) “complete a review to assess the
state of foreign interference in federal election processes” with respect to “foreign interference
attempts that occurred in the 43 rd and 44th federal general elections, including potential effects
on Canada’s democracy and institutions.” 9
4. In response to the Prime Minister’s request, the Committee decided to conduct a broader
review, expanding its scope beyond the federal election process to Canada’s federal democratic
processes and institutions (defined at paragraph 7, below). 10 It did so for two reasons. First, the
Committee had already completed a review of foreign interference in 2019 and was well aware
of how states try to manipulate Canadian politics and society in support of their own national
interests. As such, the Committee understood that elections, while critical, are part of a broader
continuum of effort aimed at interfering with Canadian democratic processes and institutions.
Second, the Committee wanted to focus its efforts where it has greatest value: access to highly
classified information that cannot be discussed in public. The Committee relied in large part on
classified materials, briefings and appearances to inform its understanding of the state of foreign
interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions and the government’s response.
Scope
5. This report builds on the Committee’s 2019 review, which was a broader examination of
foreign interference in Canada. It included a detailed review of the main threat actors, their
motivations, and foreign interference tactics and targets, and an examination of the
government’s response to the threat, including cooperation and deconfliction, resourcing and
prioritization, and legislative frameworks. The 2019 review did not specifically examine foreign
interference activities directed at the 43rd federal election given the government’s nascent
efforts in this area at the time.
6. This review seeks to avoid duplicating the Committee’s previous work. It is clear to the
Committee that foreign actors continue to carry out interference activities in Canada. The key
threat actors, including their motivations, tactics and techniques, largely remain the same,
although this review describes what has evolved and what intelligence agencies reported in the
time period in question. Moreover, the mandates and legislative authorities of t he departments
and agencies responsible for responding to foreign interference are also largely unchanged; this
review will discuss where there are exceptions.
7. As a result, this review narrowly focuses on the specific threat to Canada’s democratic
processes and institutions as a subset of the larger foreign interference challenge (see Annex B,
8 Privy Council Office (PCO), “Government of Canada launches public inquiry into foreign interference,” September 7,
2023; and PCO, Terms of Reference: Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions, September 12, 2023.
9 Prime Minister, “Taking further action on foreign interference and strengthening confidence in our democracy ,”
March 6, 2023. The 43rd federal general election took place on October 21, 2019. The 44 th federal general election
took place on September 20, 2021.
10 The Committee conducted its review consistent with paragraph 8(1)(a) of the NSICOP Act.
2
Committee Terms of Reference). The Committee defines democratic processes and institutions
as those processes, actors and stakeholders with an integral role in influe ncing or determining
how Canada governs itself. In this respect, key actors and stakeholders include:
x voters;
x political parties, candidates and their staff;
x Parliamentarians and their staff;
x public servants;
x the media;
x lobbyists; and
x community groups.
Key processes include:
x the election itself; 11

x nomination processes, including leadership races;
x parliamentary business, including parliamentary motions and the legislative process;
x campaigns; and
x fundraising.
8. This review examined information from September 1, 2018 to March 15, 2024, and
included the following organizations:
x Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS);

x Communications Security Establishment (CSE);
x Department of Justice (DoJ);
x Elections Canada;
x Global Affairs Canada (GAC);
x The Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections;
x Privy Council Office (PCO);
x Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC);
x Public Safety Canada (PS); and
x Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
9. This review does not examine the impact of foreign interference on democratic principles
writ large.12 This concept was covered in the Committee’s previous report, which concluded that
the consequences of foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions were clear : it
undermines the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians; the fairness and
openness of Canada’s public institutions; the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions
11 Defined as the processes involved when Canadians vote for their member of Parliament: registering voters, casting
ballots, counting ballots and disseminating results.

12 Democratic principles include freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of
the press, freedom of association, democratic rights, mobility rights, security of the person, and the rule of law.
3
and participate in civic discourse; the integrity and credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process;
and public trust in the policy decisions made by the government. 13 The Committee deliberated
at length about this distinction, but ultimately decided that given its previous work and the
ongoing efforts by other parliamentary committees to study foreign interference, its value lay in
a more focused review of democratic processes and institutions drawing on highly classified
materials.
Methodology
10. In support of the review, the Committee requested material fro m CSIS, CSE, the RCMP,
PS, GAC and PCO, examining approximately 4000 documents totalling over 33,000 pages. It
also relied on secretarial briefings and departmental responses to written questions. Senior
officials appeared before the Committee, sometimes more than once, from CSIS, CSE, the
RCMP, PS, GAC and PCO. Given their important roles in addressing aspects of foreign
interference, senior officials from the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Elections Canada
and the Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections also briefed the Committee. In the
final stage of its review, the Committee held appearances with the Minister of Justice; the
Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs; the M inister of
Foreign Affairs; and the Prime Minister. The Committee extends its gratitude to Ministers and
officials for their time, candour and expertise.
11. In considering information received for this review and conclusions from its previous
review of foreign interference, the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent
assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing
interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests. 14 This
assessment has informed the Committee’s analysis of review appearances and materials,
raising several key questions:
x Has the government’s response to this threat contributed toward the perception by
foreign states that Canada’s democratic processes and institutions are an easy target?
x If effective threat mitigation seeks to counter a hostile actor’s intent, capability and
opportunity to act, how and where are Canada’s democratic processes and institutions
most vulnerable?
The Committee used this analytical lens to develop its assessment, findings and
recommendations, which are intended to provide the government clarity on where gaps persist
and where action must be taken.
13
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), Annual Report 2019, 2020.
14
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *** 2022; and CSIS, Email response to question from NSICOP
Secretariat, December 11, 2023.
4
Chapter 1: Understanding foreign interference and its
challenges
12. The term “foreign interference” is not codified in Canadian law, but is generally
understood to mirror the CSIS Act definition of foreign influenced activities “within or relating to
Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or
involve a threat to any person.” 15 Since the Committee’s last review, the definition of foreign
interference has evolved as the threat has gained prominence in the security and intelligence
community. In its 2021 report on threats to Canada’s democratic process, CSIS stated:
Broadly speaking, foreign interference includes attempts to covertly influence, intimidate,

manipulate, interfere, corrupt or discredit individuals, organizations and governments to
further the interests of a foreign country. These activities, carried out by both state and
non-state actors, are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada,
and directly threaten national security.
Foreign interference involves foreign states, or persons/entities operating on their behalf,

attempting to covertly influence decisions, events or outcomes to better suit their
strategic interests. In many cases, clandestine influence operations are meant to
deceptively influence Government of Canada policies, officials or democratic processes
in support of foreign political agendas.16
13. In the context of democratic processes and institutions, foreign interference can be a
single act or a series of activities or behaviours over a period of time, throughout which a foreign
state conceals its efforts to influence decision-making.17 States engage in foreign interference in
pursuit of a number of objectives, ranging on a spectrum from strategic to tactical. Strategic
objectives include building or maintaining a positive or uncritical view of the state and its
activities in Canada, and creating a disincentive to criticize a state’s domestic policies or
practices. Tactical objectives serve the strategic goal, such as impeding, blocking or altering
Parliamentary studies, motions or law-making that the state perceives as detrimental to its
interests, or instructing individuals to undermine or support the efforts or aspirations of
ethnocultural groups within Canada.
14. As will be described in Chapter 3, foreign interference activities in Canada in the period
under review were conducted predominantly through person-to-person interaction, which the
Committee referred to in its previous report as “traditional” foreign interference. 18 Foreign actors
seek to cultivate long-term relationships with Canadians who they believe may be useful in
15
CSIS Act, section 2.
16 CSIS, Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process , July 2021.
17
CSIS, *** 2022.
18 As opposed to cyber-driven foreign interference methods such as hack -and-leak operations and disinformation
campaigns. NSICOP, Annual Report 2019, 2020.
5
advancing their interests, with a view to having the Canadian act in favour of the foreign actor
and against Canada’s interests.
15. In this respect, foreign interference should be under stood as a long-term effort, akin to
espionage, using inducements or threats. Both dynamics enable the manipulation of targets
when required, for example, through requests for inappropriate or special favours. Inducement
typically involves two steps. First, a foreign actor offers the influential Canadian money or other
favours. This may include direct payments, cash, in-kind campaign contributions, investment in
their region, all-expenses-paid trips to the foreign country, or promises of an employment
opportunity or a paid position requiring little to no work after leaving public offic e. This is
intended to build a sense of debt or reciprocity. Second, once the Canadian accepts the foreign
government’s money or another favour, the foreign actor uses it as a “bargaining chip” to gain
leverage over their target. 19
16. The process may go on for years, and may develop at a slow enough pace that allows
some Canadian targets to avoid, at least for a while, having to confront head -on that they are
engaged in or assisting foreign interference. Some influential Canadians may self -censor on
issues considered by a foreign country to be contentious, while others may internalize foreign
messages and align themselves with the positions of these countries. Others may take action in
the interest of the foreign state regardless of Canada’s position, and may e ven act in ways
detrimental to Canada’s interests. 20
17. Foreign actors also employ coercive techniques to discourage efforts to counter the
foreign state’s interest. These include denying visas, ordering the withdrawal of community
support through votes or f unds, or threatening the livelihood or benefits of family members living
in the foreign state.
18. Foreign interference activities are distinct from acceptable diplomatic advocacy and
lobbying. The latter activities are known to the host state and occur through recognized
channels to achieve specific policy outcomes or objectives. It is normal for foreign diplomats in
Canada, for example, to reach out to elected officials across the political spectrum, to pressure
policymakers, to use local media to promote their national interests or to engage with and
support domestic organizations. Canadian diplomats do the same abroad, advocating for
Canadian strategic interests, seeking out influential state actors, and supporting initiatives that a
host country may not fully welcome, such as pro-democracy projects. Whether employed in
Canada or in another country, these activities are overt, declared to the host state, and
consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Foreign interference activities
are not.
19
Alliance Canada Hong Kong, In Plain Sight: Beijing’s unrestricted network of foreign influence in Canada, May
2021.
20 CSIS, *** 2022.
6
19. The Committee heard repeatedly from officials that identifying the line between foreign
influence and foreign interference is not a straightforward exercise. Sophisticated foreign actors
use a mix of both overt and covert activities. For this reason, significant amounts of foreign
interference fall into a legal and normative “grey zone” (see Figure 1 below). 21 For example, it is
not illegal for a foreign state to coordinate with a private or non -state entity to pressure
policymakers. This activity becomes interference when the foreign state seeks to hide its
involvement, direction or funding. Similarly, it is not illegal to pay Canadian media to produce
coverage that portrays a foreign state in a positive light or to amplify the official pol icy of a
foreign state. When that state conceals its involvement, however, this activity is no longer within
the bounds of acceptable diplomacy and lobbying: it is foreign interference.
21 CSIS, *** 2021.
7
Figure 1: Foreign Interference
20. Another challenge is determining whether an activity is state-directed given efforts by the
state to conceal its work. For this reason, it can be difficult to identify whether an individual is a
target of foreign interference (e.g., unaware that a foreign state is acting on their behalf to
support their candidacy), an unwilling accomplice (e.g., due to threats of sanctions), or a witting
participant (e.g., knowingly taking direction from a foreign diplomatic mission).22 Hostile states
are aware of this grey zone and take advantage of it. 23
22
CSIS, *** 2022.
23 CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, May 9, 2023.
8
21. For example, a common tactic used to advance foreign interference is the use of proxies.
A proxy is a Canadian or a person residing in Canada with a formalized relationship with the
foreign state who wittingly and knowingly conducts activities on behalf of the foreign state’s
interests. This tactic distances the threat activity from the foreign actor, giving the latter plausible
deniability for their actions. A similar tactic uses co-optees. CSIS considers a co-optee as an
individual who does not have a formal relationship with the foreign state, but is, to varying
degrees of awareness, used by the state to further its interests. 24
22. Foreign interference activities ebb and flow according to foreign states’ strategic
considerations. Historically, the shape and scope of foreign interference in Canada have been
determined by factors such as a state actor’s ability and willingness to deploy resources for
foreign interference activities; whether a state actor believes its actions will be met with
meaningful consequences; and, whether a state’s homeland-related conflict has extended into
Canada.25 Foreign interference can also increase or decrease around major events: most
notably for the purposes of this review, intensifying during election periods, which represent
unique windows of opportunity for foreign actors to exert influence on all orders of
government.26 CSIS notes,
…for some foreign states, the decisions and policy stances of the federal, provincial, and
municipal governments may negatively affect their core interests. As the world has
become ever smaller and more competitive, foreign states seek to leverage all elements
of state power to advance their national interests and position themselves in a rapidly
evolving geopolitical environment. 27
24 CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat, November 20, 2023.

25
CSIS, *** 2018.
26 CSIS,
*** 2022.
27 CSIS, Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process, July 2021.
9
10
Chapter 2: The threat of foreign interference in Canada’s
democratic processes and institutions
23. This chapter describes the primary threat actors and outlines the fo ur main tactics that
these states have used since 2018, specifically:
x covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural communities and
parliamentarians;
x leveraging relationships with influential Canadians;
x exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration; and
x deploying a variety of cyber tools to attain specific objectives.
Throughout this chapter, the Committee includes examples and case st udies to illustrate the
threat.
24. Foreign interference activities in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions in the
period under review were conducted predominantly through person-to-person interaction. 28
Foreign states also used mainstream and social media, and other digital means, to conduct
interference activities. Interference activities in democratic processes and institutions were
conducted by foreign diplomats, intelligence officers, state proxies and co-optees, and targeted
all orders of government, civil society groups, ethnocultural communities, community
organizations, businesspersons and journalists.
Key threat actors
25. In its 2019 review of the Government Response to Foreign Interference, the Committee
noted that the most significant perpetrators of foreign interference in Canada were the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation, with the PRC representing the greatest
foreign interference threat. The Committee also noted that other states, including India, ***,
Pakistan and Iran engaged in foreign interference activities. The Committee found that these
activities posed a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada’s
fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of people in Canada. 29
26. Between September 1, 2018 and November 7, 2023, foreign interference targeting
democratic institutions and processes remained largely consistent with the broader trends the
Committee identified in its previous review. Most notably, the PRC remained the largest foreign
interference threat to Canada, including to its democratic institutions and processes. 30 The
PRC’s foreign interference efforts continue to be sophisticated, persistent and multi -
28
NSICOP, Annual Report 2019, 2020.
29
30 CSIS, *** 2018; CSIS, *** 2021; PCO, *** 2022; CSIS, *** 2022; and CSIS, *** 2022.
11
dimensional, targeting all orders of Canadian government and various facets of society and
relying upon a number of methods. 31
27. However, contrary to its assessment in 2019, which noted that Russia was the second
most significant foreign interference threat, the Committee observed that Russia did not engage
in foreign interference activities within the more narrow context of Canadian democratic
institutions and processes. In this period of review, Canada was a lower -level priority for Russia,
which focused its efforts instead on other strategic priorities and its adversarial competition with
the United States. 32 In short, while Russia maintained the capability to engage in foreign
interference generally against Canada, it lacked the intent to do so. 33
28. Instead, India emerged as the second-most significant foreign interference threat to
Canada’s democratic institutions and processes. While India’s foreign interference efforts have
slowly increased ***,34 it became clear during the period of this review that its efforts had
extended beyond countering what it perceived as pro-Khalistani efforts in Canada to include
interfering in Canadian democratic processes and institutions, including through the targeting of
Canadian politicians, ethnic media and Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities. 35 The
Committee notes that Pakistan also targeted democratic institutions and processes in the early
phase of the period under review, ***.36
29. A number of states conducted activities that undermined the democratic rights and
freedoms of Canadians during the time under review. In addition to the foreign states mentioned
above, *** and Iran continued to monitor and repress respective ethnocultural communities in
Canada (see textbox on transnational repression below). 37 However, the Committee did not
observe any intelligence reporting about these three states engaging in foreign interference
activities targeting Canadian democratic processes and institutions.38
31
CSIS, *** 2021.
32
CSIS, *** 2020.
33 SITE, Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), July
2020; and SITE, “Key Observations from GE44: Review of Principal Threat Actors and Elections Security,” “Update to
the Panel,” after action report for the 2021 election, Deck, November 5, 2021.
34
CSIS, *** 2021.
35 CSIS, *** 2021.
36
CSIS, *** 2023.
37 CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
38 CSIS, *** 2020; CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
12
Transnational repression
Transnational repression refers to the exertion of control of an ethnocultural community by a

foreign state through monitoring, coercion, harassment, intimidation or violence. States
deploy a wide range of tradecraft to carry out repression, including human intelligence
collection, online monitoring, cyber attacks, coercion by proxy, controlling mobility by
selectively providing consular services (such as visas), harassment and threats of violence ,
threats and harm to family members, forced repatriation and, in some cases, physical
violence.39
These states target ethnocultural communities primarily to maintain their grip on power and
control global narratives about their own domestic regimes. Central to this tactic is the
targeting of overseas dissidents, exiled communities and critics, including journalists and
human rights activists. The message that state-sponsored repression aims to send to
ethnocultural communities is clear: regime opposition will not be tolerated anywhere in the
world and Western democracies cannot offer protection from the regime or guarantee
fundamental rights. 40
During the period under review, the primary perpetrators of repression against ethnocultural
communities in Canada were the PRC, India, ***, Iran, *** and ***.41 Observed transnational
repression focused on fundamental rights and freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression), but did
not directly target democratic institutions and processes.
One means by which the PRC has engaged in transnational repression received attention by
the media in late 2022. In September 2022, a report published by the non-governmental
organization (NGO) Safeguard Defenders alleged that the PRC had established a series of
“Overseas Police Stations” in countries around the world, including Canada. (“Overseas
Police Station” is derived from the term “Police-Overseas Chinese Liaison Stations,” which
itself is a direct translation from the Chinese term used by the PRC. 42) Subsequent
investigation *** confirmed these reports. 43
As of March 2023, there were at least seven stations in Canada: thr ee in Toronto, two in
Vancouver and two in Montreal. 44 The stations were housed in various locations, including a
residence and a convenience store, and reportedly provided PRC-related administrative
services, such as renewing PRC driver’s licences. 45 According to PCO, Canadian community
39
CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023; and CSIS, *** 2022.
40
CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
41 CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
42 Safeguard Defenders, 110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild, September 2022. As described in
the following paragraphs, these PRC ‘police stations’ have no equivalent to Canadian police functions.
43
CSIS, CSIS Security Alert: ‘Police Stations’ in Canada a Part of O ngoing PRC Interference,” December 5, 2022.
44 House of Commons’ Special Committee on the Canada – People’s Republic of China Relationship, The Chinese
Communist Party’s Overseas Police Service Stations , Interim Report, November 2023.
45 CSIS, *** 2022; PCO, *** 2022; and PCO, “People’s Republic of China (PRC) Overseas Police Stations,”
Memorandum for the Prime Minister, undated (written on or after November 4, 2022).
13
leaders ran the stations under the broad direction of PRC-based Ministry of Public Safety
police officers.46
The PRC established these stations without Canada’s permission and in contravention of the
Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act. CSIS assessed that a key purpose of
these stations was “to collect intelligence and monitor former PRC residents living in Canada
as part of the PRC’s broader transnational anticorruption, repression, and repatriation
campaign.” 47 PCO similarly assessed that the stations represented the “institutionalization
and intensification of [the PRC’s] pre-existing extraterritorial law enforcement efforts,” which it
assessed were likely to continue, albeit with more emphasis on covert tactics. 48
The United States (U.S.) has taken steps to respond to these Overseas Police Stations. In
April 2023, the Federal Bureau of Investigation charged two Chinese -Americans, both U.S.
citizens, with conspiring to act as PRC agents by establishing one of these stations in New
York, under an offence that does not exist in Canada because Canada does not have a
foreign agent registry.49
[*** Two paragraphs were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
paragraphs described CSE’s response, including to provide intelligence to CSIS an d the
RCMP, and GAC’s use of diplomatic tools with respect to the PRC. ***]50 51
In late October 2022, the RCMP announced that it was investigating. 52 In March 2023 the
RCMP informed the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House
Affairs (PROC) that uniformed RCMP officers had attended four stations, which reportedly
ceased their operations afterwards.53 In April 2023, the Minister of Public Safety informed
PROC that the RCMP had “taken decisive action to shut down the so-called police stations,” 54
and in June 2023 the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) informed PROC that
the RCMP’s investigations were ongoing. 55 As of November 2023, no charges had been
laid.56
46
PCO, CHINA: Overseas Police Stations Expanding ‘Law Enforcement without Borders ’, November 7, 2022.
47 CSIS, “CSIS Security Alert: ‘Police Stations’ in Canada a Part of Ongoing PRC Interference,” December 5, 2022.
48
PCO, CHINA: Overseas Police Stations Expanding ‘Law Enforcement without Borders,’ November 7, 2022.
49 U.S. Attorney’s Office, “Two Individuals Arrested for Operating Undeclared Police Station of the Chinese
Government in Chinatown in Manhattan,” April 17, 2023.

50
CSE, NSICOP appearance, May 18, 2023.
51
PCO, “People’s Republic of China (PRC) Overseas Police Stations,” Memorandum for the Prime Minister, undated
(written on or after November 4, 2022).
52 RCMP, “Reports of criminal activity in relation to foreign ‘police’ stations in Canada,” media statement, October 27,
2022.
53
RCMP Deputy Commissioner, PROC Evidence, March 2, 2023.
54 Hon. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, PROC Evidence, April 27, 2023.
55
NSIA, PROC Evidence, June 1, 2023.
Communist Party’s Overseas Police Service Stations, Interim Report, November 2023.
14
The House of Commons’ Special Committee on the Canada – People’s Republic of China
Relationship has also studied this issue and in November 2023 released an interim report. 57
Communist Party’s Overseas Police Service Stations , Interim Report, November 2023.
15
Key tactics
Covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural

communities and parliamentarians
30. Foreign states relied on a range of tactics to covertly influence opinions and positions.
They sought to manipulate public opinion through traditional and social media, including through
disinformation campaigns; sought to covertly exploit ethnocultural communities, most notably to
influence their voting preference; and targeted and attempted to intimidate parliamentarians.
The Committee describes each of these methods below, focusing on federal democratic
processes and institutions while also providing several examples from other orders of
government.
Exploiting traditional and social media

31. During the period under review, the Disinformation refers to false or misleading
intelligence community observed states information that is spread deliberately, as
manipulating traditional media to opposed to misinformation, which is spread
disseminate propaganda in what unwittingly. It is a term often employed as
otherwise appeared to be independent shorthand for the broader challenge of
news publications. 58 Foreign states also information manipulation. In addition to false
spread disinformation to promote their information, disinformation includes:
agendas and consequently challenge
Canadian interests, 59 which posed the x The omission of facts;
greatest cyber threat activity to voters x Inauthentic amplification of narratives;
during the time under review. 60 These x Doctored audio/visual content;
tactics attempt to influence public x Trolling; and
discourse and policymakers’ choices, x Efforts to censor or coerce self -
compromise the reputations of politicians,
censorship of information.
delegitimize democracy or exacerbate
existing frictions in society. 61
All aim to distort the public’s perception of
reality.
32. According to the intelligence
community, the PRC was the most Source: Global Affairs Canada, “Rapid
capable actor in this context, interfering
Response Mechanism Canada,” October 2023.
with Canadian media content via direct
engagement with Canadian media
executives and journalists. 62 [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged
information. The sentences described examples of the PRC paying to publish media articles
58
PCO, China's Foreign Interference Activities, Special Report, January 2022.
59 CSE, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process , July 2021.
60
CSE, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process , July 2021.
61 CSE, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic
Process , July 2021.
62 CSIS, *** 2019; and CSIS, *** 2021.
16
without attribution, sponsoring media travel to the PRC, pressuring journalists to withdraw
articles and creating false accounts on social media to spread disinformation. ***]63 64 65
33. Online influence and information operations were some of the more difficult tactics for
Canadian intelligence agencies to link to the PRC, or indeed any foreign state. 66 Intelligence
agencies refer to this as the attribution problem. 67 For example, during the 2021 federal election,
the government’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE), an
intelligence coordination mechanism created in 2018 to support implementation of the Critical
Elections Incident Public Protocol (both SITE and the Protocol are described in Chapter 3),
observed online and media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians, particularly of Chinese
heritage, from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada.68 The Conservative Party flagged
related concerns to SITE about these developments. 69 While SITE was unable to f ind clear
evidence that linked this activity to specific direction from the PRC government,70 it did observe
indicators of a coordinated campaign. 71 Specifically, different Chinese-language media outlets in
Canada adopted the language of a PRC state media article, without specifically attributing it.
Most of these media outlets were linked to the PRC via partnership agreements with the China
News Service, the Chinese Communist Party’s primary media entity servicing Chinese
ethnocultural communities, which reports directly to the United Front Work Department, the
Chinese Communist Party’s central coordinating body for foreign interference activities (se e
textbox below).72 Moreover, Chinese social media, notably WeChat, is heavily censored by the
PRC. CSIS assesses that messages which appear and remain on WeChat have at least tacit
support from the government. 73
34. The SITE Task Force briefed the Panel for the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol
on these developments. The Protocol sets out the process by which Canadians would be
notified of a threat to the integrity of a general election. 74 The Task Force advised the Panel that
it could not definitively determine a link to the PRC nor measure the impact of such foreign
63 CSIS, “Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference: Director’s Notes,” February 9, 2021.
64
CSIS, *** 2022.
65 CSIS, *** 2021.
66 According to CSE, online influence operations (such as hack-and-leak) are usually part of broader online foreign
influence activities (OFIA), which are a common tool for adversaries to further their strategic interests, including
national security, economic prosperity and ideological goals. Online in fluence campaigns try to impact civil discourse,
influence policy makers choices, exacerbate friction in democratic societies and damage the reputation of public
figures, such as politicians. OFIA often exploit misinformation and disinformation. An online information operation
utilizes and affects various types and flows of online information to create a desired impact, which can include cyber
compromise of systems. Information operations are considered to be a type of influence operation. CSE, Email
response to questions from NSICOP Secretariat, February 19, 2024.
67
SITE, “SITE TF Briefing to Secret Cleared Federal Political Parties: Canada’s Foreign Interference Threat
Landscape,” July 2021.
68
SITE, “Key Observations from GE44: Review of Principal Threat Actors and Elections Security,” “Update to the
Panel,” after action report for the 2021 election, Deck, November 5, 2021.
69 Mr. Fred DeLorey, Evidence to PROC, April 25, 2023.
70
SITE, “Key Observations from GE44: Review of Principal Threat Actors and Elections Security,” “Update to the
Panel,” after action report for the 2021 election, Deck, November 5, 2021.
71 SITE, Threats to the Canadian Federal Election 2021, January 21, 2022.
72
CSIS, *** 2022.
73 CSIS, ***.
74 Government of Canada, “Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” August 20 21.
17
interference attempts on the election, and noted the difficulty in definitively concluding whether
foreign interference took place, given that third parties can proactively further PRC interests with
little-to-no tasking.75 The five deputy ministers on the Panel determined that the threshold for a
public announcement was not met as the incident did not threaten Canada’s ability to have a
free and fair election. 76
35. More recently, the government identified an information operation targeting the Member
of Parliament for Wellington-Halton Hills, Michael Chong. While monitoring digital platforms for
the June 2023 federal by-elections, GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), established in
2018 as part of a G7 initiative to counter threats to democracy, observed that the operation
involved a coordinated network on WeChat, which shared and amplified a large volume of false
or misleading narratives about Mr. Chong’s identity, background, political stances and family
heritage. GAC publicly stated that “…while China’s role in the information operation is highly
probable, unequivocal proof that China ordered and directed the operation is not possible to
determine due to the covert nature of how social media networks are leveraged in this type of
information campaign.” 77
36. During the period under review, India also demonstrated the intent and capability to
engage in this type of foreign interference through media manipulation. 78 [*** Three sentences
were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an
example of efforts to discredit a political party leader using materials drafted by Indian
intelligence organizations. ***] 79
Exploiting ethnocultural communities

37. In the period under review, foreign states sought to exploit cultural and linguistic ties with
ethnocultural communities and groups in Canada to interfere in Canada’s democratic processes
and institutions. The PRC was the most prolific actor, supported by its United Front Work
Department (see following text box). 80 According to CSIS, members of Chinese ethnocultural
communities are primary targets for influence work, relating to the Chinese Communist Party’s
efforts to control overseas Chinese diaspora populations and co-opt Canadian civil society for
its own benefit. [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
sentence described an example. ***] 81
75
SITE, Threats to the Canadian Federal Election 2021, December 17, 2021.
76
Morris Rosenberg, “Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” February 20,
2023; and threshold for informing the public as defined by the Government of Canada, “Cabinet Directive on the
Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” August 2021.
77 GAC, “Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects information operation targeting member of Parliament,”
August 9, 2023.
78
CSIS, ***.
79
***.
80 CSIS, “Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference,” Director’s Notes, February 9, 2021; CSIS, *** 2021;
CSIS, *** 2021; and U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China Overseas United Front Work,
Background and Implications for the United States,” August 24, 2018.
81 CSIS, *** 2023.
18
The United Front Work Department
The United Front Work Department (UFWD), a department of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the organization primarily responsible for strengthening
the PRC’s influence and interests abroad. 82 The individual responsible for the United Front
Work Department is the f ourth highest ranking member of the PRC’s seven-person
Politburo.83
United front work refers to the PRC government’s strategy of influencing, through both overt
and covert methods, overseas Chinese communities, foreign governments, and other actors
to take actions and positions supportive of Beijing’s preferred global narrative. While the PRC
employs a large network to carry out united front work, the UFWD is responsible for its
conception, implementation and oversight.
The CCP is assessed to have spent over USD $2.6 billion on united front work in 2019 –
more than it spent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twenty-three percent of the budget
(approximately $600 million) was allocated to influencing foreigners and overseas Chinese, in
particular.84
United front work has been successful in co-opting or subverting political opponents of the
CCP and incentivizing public displays of support for the Party. The UFWD has produced
propaganda, suppressed critical narratives, and engaged academics, media, businesses and
politicians to influence them to adopt pro-China positions or avoid adopting what the PRC
considers anti-China positions.85
The United Front Work Department works with the PRC’s intelligence agencies. 86 [*** One
sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described
UFWD methods.***]87
There is no Western equivalent to united front work. 88 [*** Two sentences were deleted to
remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described CSIS analysis that
indicated the PRC is aware of the increased scrutiny of united front work in Western countries
82 CSIS Director, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023; and PCO, China's Foreign Interference Activities, Special
Report, January 2022.

83
Alex Joske, The Party Speaks for You: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front
System, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020.
84 Ryan Fedasiuk, “Puttin g Money in the Party’s Mouth: How China Mobilizes Funding for United Front Work,” The
Jamestown Foundation, Volume 20, Issue 16, September 16, 2020.

85
CSIS, *** 2021.
86
Alex Joske, The Party Speaks for You: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front
System, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020; and PCO, China's Foreign Interference Activities, Special Report,
January 2022.
87 Alex Joske, Spies and Lies: How China’s Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World, Hardie Grant Bo oks, 2022.
88 CSIS, *** 2023.
19
and the importance of acting lawfully. The pretence of acting lawfully explains the CCP’s
opposition to legislation that would make united front work more difficult. ***]89
38. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The
UFWD operates through a large network that includes front organizations which do not declare
their affiliation to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and have an additional overt and legal
function. These front organizations tasked state-owned enterprises, Chinese-registered private
companies, Chinese student organizations, foreign cultural organizations, foreign media,
members of Chinese ethnocultural communities, and prominent businesspersons and political
figures to engage in democratic institutions and processes in a way that supports the goals of
the CCP.90 During the period under review, a security and intelligence organization took
measures to counter these efforts. 91
39. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***]
According to CSIS, the PRC views community associations in particular as an important means
through which PRC-linked officials can approach the Canadian government and elected
officials. CSIS assesses that the UFWD has established community organizations to facilitate
influence operations against specific members of Parliament and infiltrated existing community
associations to reorient them towards supporting CCP policies and narratives.92
40. Not all entities targeted by the UFWD were aware that they were being used or that what
they were doing was problematic. 93 Indeed, CSIS emphasized *** that only a small number of
people within community associations are witting co-optees or proxies. 94 These organizations
often have close relationships with the PRC Embassy and consulates and may rely on financial
support for their activities, may benefit from reciprocal favours, including financial and economic
incentives or other honours and awards to cooperate with PRC authorities, or may simply
support the PRC because of a sense of national pride. 95
41. That said, there are clear examples of witting and co-opted community organizations
engaging in foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes. [*** Six sentences
were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an
example of the PRC creating an organization to conduct foreign interference, its work in a
specific federal riding, and an unsuccessful effort by a security and intelligence organization to
counter these activities. ***]96
89
CSIS, *** 2023.
90
PCO, China's Foreign Interference Activities, Special Report, January 2022.
91
*** 2023.
92
CSIS, *** 2023.
93 PCO, China's Foreign Interference Activities, Special Report, January 2022.
94
CSIS, *** 2023.
95 RCMP, United Front Work in Canada *** 2020.
96 *** 2019.
20
42. Community organizations and events can be valuable sources of fundraising and help
build community support for candidates for political office. [*** Three sentences were deleted to
remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of how the PRC
used community organizations to support or undermine candidates in specific electoral districts
and at different levels of government. ***]97 98
43. Community organizations can also be used in a practice known as “ astro-turfing,” by

which a foreign state can conceal its involvement and instead have it appear that influential
Canadians or grass-roots organizations are expressing their own opinions on the issues. 99 For
example, CSIS stated, “[b]y co-opting major community associations and leaders, the [Chinese
Communist Party] is able to give the impression that the overseas Chinese community, much
like the citizens of the PRC, speak with one voice – a voice that supports CCP policies.” 100
[*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged in formation. The sentence
described an example of PRC efforts to interfere with Parliament’s 2021 motion to declare the
PRC’s treatment of its Uyghur population as a genocide and to express concern about the
deterioration of Canada-PRC relations. ***]101
Targeting parliamentarians for coercion or suppression

44. CSIS and CSE have produced a body of intelligence that demonstrates that foreign
actors have targeted federal parliamentarians to collect information to support potential future
efforts to coerce them. Foreign actors have also intimidated or pressured parliamentarians who
they perceived as having taken political positions counter to theirs. 102
PRC in particular employs this strategy. According to CSIS, the PRC is committed to a wide-
scale influence campaign against Canadian federal actors, which is coordinated and executed
by PRC officials (see Case Study #1). 103 The PRC’s goal is to cultivate and increase the impact
of pro-PRC voices in Canada and to marginalize individuals viewed as anti-PRC. CSIS
assesses that the PRC categorizes its targets into groups based on their perceived level of
support for the PRC. 104 105 106
97
CSIS, *** 2022.
98
CSIS, *** 2022.
99
“Astro-turfing” is a covert tactic that seeks to create “a misleading impression of representing monolithic grassroots
communities.” Alliance Canada Hong Kong, Murky Waters: Beijing’s Influence in Canadian Democratic and Electoral
Processes, May 2023.
100 CSIS, *** 2023.
101
CSIS, *** 2021.
102
CSIS, *** 2021; and CSIS, *** 2021.
103 CSIS, *** 2023.
104
CSIS, *** 2023.
105 CSIS, *** 2023.
106 CSIS, *** 2023.
21
Case Study #1: *** Intelligence reporting on the PRC and its distribution within
the government ***
[*** Three paragraphs were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
paragraphs noted reported efforts by the PRC to tailor its targeted influence operations
against federal parliamentarians, centered around supporting pro-PRC legislators and
punishing their anti-PRC colleagues, including for their position on what the PRC considers
the ‘Five Poisons.’ The paragraphs also described the limited distribution of this information
within government, including, but not limited to, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor
(NSIA), the Director of CSIS, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defence,
and the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister. The paragraphs also noted a potential risk to
some Canadian parliamentarians, notably in the context of their travel to the PRC. ***]107 108
[*** This paragraphs was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In June
2021, CSIS drafted a paper drawing on a range of intelligence reporting to provide a more
comprehensive and reliable picture of PRC interference. While the paper circulated
unofficially, including to at least one senior GAC official, CSIS did not formally issue the paper
until February 13, 2023, because of pandemic-related challenges and delays in obtaining
approvals for dissemination.109 The NSIA subsequently requested that the paper be
withdrawn, indicating that the distribution list was too large.110
On February 24, 2023, the NSIA held a meeting with the Clerk of the Privy Council and
Deputy Ministers from CSIS, CSE, Public Safety and GAC. According to PCO, the NSIA
asked CSIS what actions could be taken about the intelligence contained in the report. 111
According to CSIS, Deputy Ministers agreed that the Prime Minister should read the report
and requested that CSIS draft a condensed version for the Prime Minister. The Director of
CSIS approved the new version on March 9, 2023. 112
The Prime Minister was not provided the report. In a later response to Committee questions,
PCO stated that it was the NSIA’s view that “the activity indicated in the report did not qualify
as foreign interference, but was rather part of regular diplomatic practice.” 113 Indeed, the
Director of CSIS only became aware that PCO had not provided the report to the Prime
Minister in October 2023. 114 As of February 2024, this report had not been given to the Prime
Minister.115
107
CSIS, *** 2023.
108
*** 2024.
109
CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat questions, October 2023; and CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP
Report, January 19, 2024.
110 CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat questions, October 2023; and PCO, Written response to NSICOP
Secretariat questions, October 2023.

111
PCO, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat ques tions, October 2023.
112 CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat questions, October 2023.
113
PCO, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat questions, October 2023.
114 CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat questions, October 2023.
115 PCO, Letter to the Executive Director of the NSICOP Secretariat, March 2024.
22
46. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
paragraph described PRC efforts to collect information, including compromising information, on
numerous federal actors, including from all political parties and both houses of Parliament.
***]116 117 118 119
47. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged info rmation. ***]
According to some intelligence reporting, the PRC collected detailed information to produce
profiles on some Chinese-Canadian members of Parliament in order to exert influence on them
through various people and groups, in Canada and abroad. 120
48. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Federal
actors of Chinese descent are a particular target of the PRC, due to the expectation that these
individuals are or should be more sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) goals
and perspectives. 121 According to CSIS, the PRC could punish Chinese-Canadian legislators
who had behaved in ways deemed unacceptable by PRC officials to deter such behaviour in
others. Conversely, the PRC could reward Chinese-Canadian legislators for behaviour deemed
appropriate by PRC officials by providing benefits both in Canada and the PRC, directly or
indirectly (e.g., via family members). In short, the use of rewards and punishments is a routine
part of the CCP’s coercive approach to manage dissent and influe nce, within the PRC and
abroad.122
49. One of the key examples of this practice was the PRC’s targeting of Conservative Party
of Canada Member of Parliament Michael Chong. In February 2021, Mr. Chong sponsored a
vote in the House of Commons to identify the PRC’s treatment of its Uyghur population as
genocide.123 [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
sentence described efforts by the PRC to collect information on Mr. Chong and his family. ***]124
According to CSIS, at no time did the intelligence reporting indicate a threat to life, physical
harm, or detention of Mr. Chong or his family members. 125 The PRC’s objective was to make an
example of Mr. Chong in order to deter other parliamentarians from taking “anti-China”
positions.126
50. Mr. Chong was provided with increasingly detailed information on the PRC’s efforts over
time. In June 2021, CSIS briefed Mr. Chong on foreign interference threat activities, 127 but could
116 CSIS, *** 2023.

117
CSIS, *** 2023.
118 CSIS, *** 2023.
119
CSIS, *** 2023.
120
*** 2023.
121
CSIS, *** 2023.
122 CSIS, *** 2023.
123 CSIS, *** 2021.
124
CSIS, Memorandum to the Minister re Threat Reduction Measure: PRC Targeting Specific Members of
Parliament, signed by the Minister of Public Safety on May 18, 2023.
125 CSIS, Memorandum to the Minister re Threat Reduction Measure: PRC Targeting Specific Members of

126 CSIS, *** 2021.
127 Michael Chong, PROC Evidence, May 16, 2023.
23
not in its briefing provide classified information owing to the restrictions of s. 19 (1) of the CSIS
Act, which limits the sharing of classified information to the federal government. In other words,
CSIS was unable to share intelligence with Mr. Chong about the research by the PRC ***.
Mr. Chong first became aware of the reported threats to his family on May 1, 2023, in the
media.128 On May 2, at the direction of the Prime Minister, the Director of CSIS provided Mr.
Chong with a classified briefing by way of a Threat Reduction Measure under “exigent
circumstances.” 129 On May 16, 2023, the Minister of Public Safety issued the Ministerial
Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians ,
which directed CSIS to inform parliamentarians of such threats without delay. 130
51. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. Th e
paragraph described PRC efforts to collect and use compromising material on federal politicians
to intimidate or silence them. ***] 131 132 133 134
Leveraging relationships with influential Canadians
52. This section explores four means by which threat actors employ “traditional” foreign
interference through human-to-human relationships. This primarily involves establishing
reciprocal relationships with influential Canadians, using clandestine networks, employing
proxies, and covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials. In the period under
review, threat actors used all of these levers, often at the same time.
Establishing reciprocal relationships

53. In the period under review, CSIS and CSE produced a body of intelligence that showed
that foreign actors used deceptive or clandestine methods to cultivate relationships with
Canadians who they believed would be useful in advancing their interests – particularly
members of Parliament and senators – with a view to having the Canadian act in f avour of the
foreign actor and against Canada’s interests. In this respect, their efforts extended beyond
normal diplomatic activities.
54. In some cases, parliamentarians were unaware they were the target of foreign
interference. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The
sentences described an example of India’s financial support to some candidates from two
128
Michael Chong, PROC Evidence, May 16, 2023.
129
CSIS, Memorandum to the Minister re Threat Reduction Measure: PRC T argeting Specific Members of
130
Minister of Public Safety, Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and
Parliamentarians, May 16, 2023.
131 ***.
132
***.
133 ***.
134 ***.
24
political parties, and CSIS’s assessment that the candidates were unaware of the source of the
funds. ***]135 136
55. Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after
their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information.
The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their
colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.
***]137 138 139
paragraph described a textbook example of foreign interference that saw a foreign state support
a witting politician. CSIS provided specific intelligence to the secret-cleared representatives of
the party shortly before the election and to the Prime Minister shortly after. The Prime Minister
discussed this incident with the Committee and the steps he took in response to intelligence
reporting. ***]140 141 142 143
57. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In this
context, CSIS assessed that the PRC believes that its relationship with some members of
Parliament rests on a quid pro quo that any member’s engagement with the PRC will result in
the PRC mobilizing its network in the member’s favour. The PRC would show support for
lawmakers in ridings with large numbers of ethnic Chinese voters and who maintain close
relationships with the Chinese ethnocultural community, including through Chinese leaders and
business people. 144 145
135
***.
136
CSIS, Briefing to NSICOP Secretariat, August 2023.
137
CSIS, ***.
138
CSIS, *** report for the CSIS director, *** 2020.
139
CSIS, 2022-2023 Annual s. 6(4) Report to the Minister on CSIS Operational Activities , August 2023.
140 CSIS, “PM Briefing: ***.
141 In response to this intelligence, the Director of CSIS briefed the Panel for the Critical Elections Incident Public
Protocol on *** and ***. CSIS, accompanied by PCO, informed Secret-cleared *** representatives on *** and CSIS
briefed the Prime Minister on ***. CSIS, “PM Briefing: ***.
142 CSIS, “PM Briefing: ***.
143
Prime Minister, NSICOP appearance, November 7, 2023.
144 CSIS, *** 2023.
145 CSIS, *** 2023.
25
Member of Parliament wittingly provided information *** to a foreign state
[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The
Committee notes a particularly concerning case of a then-member of Parliament maintaining
a relationship with a foreign intelligence officer. According to CSIS, the member of Parliament
sought to arrange a meeting in a foreign state with a senior intelligence official and also
proactively provided the intelligence officer with information provided in confidence.146 147 148
Clandestine networks
58. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In the
period under review, foreign states developed clandestine networks surrounding candidates and
elected officials to gain undisclosed influence and leverage over nomin ation processes,
elections, parliamentary business and government decision-making. Run by foreign states’
officials, these informal networks consisted of Canadian ethnocultural community leaders and
prominent businesspersons, political staffers, candidates and elected officials. Foreign officials
conveyed their candidate preferences to their networks, after which co -optees or proxies
promoted the chosen slate to targeted groups of voters. 149
59. For example, *** the PRC had established an informal foreign interference network in ***,
understood in this context to describe complex, overlapping and extensive personal and
professional connections.150 The *** network worked in loose coordination with one another and
with guidance from the consulate *** to covertly support or oppose candidates in the 2019
federal election. The *** network had some contact with at least 11 candidates and 13 campaign
staffers, some of whom appeared to be wittingly working for the PRC. 151 [*** Two sentences
were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described the
network’s efforts to keep federal political candidates away from events that the PRC considered
to be “anti-China,” such as a pro-Hong Kong rally; noted similar activities by another network in
the riding of Don Valley North; and identified specific individuals involved. ***] 152 153
60. Officials from the PRC also used clandestine networks to conduct foreign interference in
Greater Vancouver. [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged
information. The sentences described the PRC’s efforts to leverage its network to support a
specific political candidate, noted the work of certain organizations and individuals within the
146
CSIS, ***.
147
CSIS, ***.
148 CSIS, ***.
149 CSIS, *** 2022.
150
CSIS, *** 2020; and CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
151
Contrary to the media article ***, the *** network did not count eleven candidates in its membership (it had ***
central members), but it did have contact with at least 11 candidates. Gl obal News, “Canadian intelligence warned
PM Trudeau that China covertly funded 2019 election candidates: Sources,” November 7, 2022; CSIS, *** 2020.
152 CSIS, *** 2020; and PCO, China’s Foreign Interference Activities, Special Report, January 2022.
153 CSIS, *** 2019.
26
network, and noted an effort by a security and intelligence organization to counter the work of
one of the individuals. ***]154 155
paragraph described how India also takes advantage of networks and developed and built a
network of contacts through whom it conducts interference activities, including journalists,
members of ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***] 156
paragraph described how Pakistan has engaged in foreign interference in provincial and federal
politics. The paragraph described how Pakistan interfered in candidate nominations, worked to
support a preferred candidate’s election, including to mobilize voters and to fundraise, and
efforts by a security and intelligence organization to counter these activities. ***]157 158 159
The use of proxies

63. As noted in Chapter 1, foreign states use Canadians as proxies who act at their behest,
creating a separation between the threat activity and the foreign actor. As reported elsewhere in
this chapter, the PRC also relies on a network of proxies, including prominent businesspeop le
and community leaders, in major urban centres like Greater Vancouver (see paragraph 60),
Greater Toronto (see ***) and ***. The PRC proxy considered by the security and intelligence
community to be the most egregious case of foreign interference *** (see Case Study #2).
64. For its part, India has an active proxy, who has proactively looked for ways to further
India’s interests by monitoring and attempting to influence politicians, ***.160 [*** Two sentences
were deleted to remove injurious or privileged inf ormation. The sentences described the
importance India ascribes to the proxy, how Indian officials developed and built a network of
contacts through whom India conducts interference activities, including journalists, members of
ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***] (***)161 162
65. Political staffers in particular are a sought-after proxy for foreign actors. Staffers can
influence or exert some measure of control over a politician by influencing messaging and
controlling the calendar of the elected official for whom they work to covertly support the
interests of the foreign state. 163 They have also been used to monitor their employers and report
back to foreign state actors. 164 [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged
154
CSIS, *** 2021.
155
CSIS, *** 2022; *** 2022.
156
CSIS, *** 2019; and CSIS, *** report for the CSIS Director, *** 2020.
157 CSIS,
*** 2019; and SITE, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), August 2020.
158 ***.
159
***.
160
CSIS, *** 2021.
161 CSIS, *** 2020.
162
CSIS, *** 2021.
163 CSIS,
*** 2022.
164 CSIS, ***.
27
information. The sentence described an example of a political staffer passing confidential
information to a contact of a foreign state about a politician’s activities and donors. ***] 165
Case Study #2 : *** A proxy’s activities pose a threat to national security
[*** Twelve paragraphs were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The case
study described the activities of a PRC proxy. It noted CSIS’s assessment that the proxy
represented a threat to Canada in every sense of the CSIS Act’s s. 2 definition of foreign
influence in that their actions over time have been detrimental to the interest of Canada and
are clandestine, deceptive and threatening. CSIS further assessed that one aspect of the
proxy’s behaviour was a high-risk, high-harm threat to some Canadians and permanent
residents. CSIS has shared information on the proxy with the RCMP. ***]166 167 168 169 170 171 172
173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188
Covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials

66. In the period under review, intelligence reporting from CSIS and CSE showed that foreign
states attempted to covertly buy influence with candidates and elected officials. [*** Five
sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described
an example of the PRC using intermediaries to provide funds likely to support candidates in the
2019 federal election, including two transfers of funds approximating $250,000 through a
165
CSIS, ***.
166 CSIS, *** 2022.
167 *** 2022.
168
*** 2022.
169 *** 2023.
170 *** 2019.
171 *** 2021.
172 *** 2022. ***.
173 *** 2023.
174 *** 2021.
175 *** 2022.
176
*** 2023.
177 *** 2023.
178
CSIS, *** 2023, bold emphasis in original.
179
*** 2021.
180
*** 2019.
181 *** 2021.
182 *** 2023.
183
*** 2021.
184
*** 2023.
185 *** 2022.
186
*** 2022.
187 *** 2022.
188 NSICOP Secretariat meeting with CSIS officials, August 30, 2023.
28
prominent community leader, a political staffer and then an Ontario member of Provincial
Parliament. CSIS could not confirm that the funds reached any candidate . ***]189 190 191 192
67. In another example, *** Canadians believed to be proxies for the PRC covertly
encouraged individuals to donate money to the campaigns of candidates that the PRC favoured
and promised to pay them back, which is an offence under the Canada Elections Act.193 [***
Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences noted
that the RCMP and the Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections were apprised of this
intelligence. ***]194 195
paragraph described CSIS information that an Indian proxy claims to have repeatedly
transferred funds from India to politicians at all levels of government in return for pol itical
favours, including raising issues in Parliament at the proxy’s request. CSIS did not share this
information with the RCMP or with the Commissioner of Canada Elections. ***] 196 197 198
Case Study #3: India *** funneled funds to some federal candidates ***
[*** Four paragraphs were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. This case
study described an example of India likely reimbursing a proxy who had provided funds to
candidates of two federal parties. It noted CSIS’s assessment that none of t he candidates
were aware the funds were from India, and that meetings between newly elected members of
Parliament who had received funding and Indian officials were to take place. ***] 199 200 201 202
203 204 205 206
189 *** 2019.

190
*** 2019.
191 *** CSIS, *** 2023.
192 CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
193 CSIS, ***.
194 According to CSIS, RCMP provided feedback to CSIS on this intelligence reporting. CSIS, Factual Review of
NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.

195
CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
196 CSIS, *** 2022.
197
*** CSIS, *** 2020.
198
CSIS, ***.
199
These activities were part of a wider campaign of foreign interference *** 2023.
200 ***.
201 ***.
202
***.
203
CSIS, Briefing to NSICOP Secretariat, August 2023.
204 *** 2023.
205
NSICOP, Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in
February 2018, October 12, 2018.
206 CSIS, Meeting with NSICOP Secretariat, August 2023.
29
Exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration
69. In the period under review, foreign actors covertly supported or opposed candidates by
exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration. This included
interfering with nomination processes or attempting to influence or control electoral district
associations. CSIS considers the nomination process to be a particularly soft target for several
reasons.207 First, many ridings are considered ‘safe seats,’ so winning the nomination is akin t o
winning the subsequent election without having to interfere in the election itself. Second,
nomination processes are not directly regulated or safeguarded by federal, provincial, or
territorial legislation or enforcement bodies, such as the Commissioner of Canada Elections. As
a result, the likelihood and consequences of the detection of such activities are low. Unlike
Australia and the United Kingdom, Canada does not criminalize interfering in nominations,
leadership races, or any other political party process.208
70. Third, nomination processes are governed by the different rules of each political party:
breaking these rules is not illegal. Each political party has its own rules and requirements for
participating in a nomination, such as a minimum age or residency requirement, or whether a
membership fee is required to join the party and vote. For example, some parties allow non -
citizens to register as party members and vote in a nomination, as long as they live in the riding.
*** CSIS assesses that it is relatively easy to fraudulently add voters who live outside a riding to
a nomination process’s voter list with inaccurate addresses. It is also reportedly relatively easy
to show an altered phone bill with the wrong address, or a fraudulent letter from a scho ol, in
order to vote in a nomination. 209
71. *** PRC-linked proxies involved in provincial politics engaged in efforts to control the
federal Electoral District Association in ***. In addition to trying to influence the riding’s
nomination processes (***), they also sought to control the riding’s finances. *** Their actions
demonstrate how threat actors work across multiple orders of government: the proxies here
worked at the provincial and federal levels, and the riding association they targeted was
federal.210
207
CSIS, *** 2022.
208
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign
Interference) Act 2018, section 92.2(1)(c)(i), and paragraph 866 of the law’s Revised Explanatory Memorandum,
2018; and UK Parliament, National Security Act 2023, section 14, 2023.
209 CSIS, *** 2023; and CSIS *** 2019.
210 CSIS, *** 2022.
30
Case Study #4: PRC interference in the Liberal nomination contest in Don
Valley North
According to CSIS, the PRC *** had a significant impact in getting Han Dong nominated as
the Liberal Party of Canada’s 2019 federal candidate in Don Valley North. [*** Three
sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences
described the PRC’s objectives and the work of its proxy. ***] 211
The nomination vote occurred on September 12, 2019. Many of Mr. Dong’s supporters
arrived in buses *** supported by the PRC: between 175 and 200 international Chinese
students arrived in several buses. The Consulate reportedly told the students that they must
vote for Mr. Dong if they want to maintain their student visas. 212
The Consulate knowingly broke the Liberal Party of Canada’s rule that voters in a nomination
process must live in the riding. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or
privileged information. The sentences noted that the students reportedly: lived outside of the
riding; were provided with fraudulent residency paper work; and sought to physically
intimidate voters and distribute pro-Dong materials, contrary to Party rules. ***]213 214
CSIS assessed that the PRC’s foreign interference activities played a *** significant role in
Mr. Dong’s nomination, which he won *** by a small margin.215 By successfully interfering in
the nomination process of what can be considered a safe riding for the Liberal Party of
Canada, the PRC was well-positioned to ensure its preferred candidate was elected to
Parliament.216 [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information.
The sentences described a CSIS assessment on the degree to which an individual was
implicated in these activities. ***]217
On September 28, 2019, CSIS briefed the Liberal Party of Canada’s Secret-cleared
representatives on its assessment, who in turn briefed the PM alone the following day. 218 The
Liberal Party of Canada allowed Mr. Dong to run in both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.
[*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. T he sentences
described the Prime Minister’s discussion with the Committee about Mr. Dong and the steps
he took in response to intelligence reporting. ***] 219
211
CSIS, *** 2021.
212
CSIS, *** 2022.
213 CSIS Director, “Notes for DIR PM Brief: Don Valley North in the 2019 Election,” February 8, 2020.
214 CSIS, *** 2020.
215
CSIS, *** 2019.
216
Mr. Dong was elected to Parliament by a wide margin: 22,998 votes versus 16,307 for the runner -up. Elections
Canada, Results of the 43rd General Election, 2019.
217
CSIS, *** 2019.
218 Jeremy Broadhurst, Evidence to PROC, April 25, 2023.
219 Prime Minister, NSICOP appearance, November 7, 2023.
31
72. Foreign actors also targeted party leadership campaigns. [*** Three sentences were
deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described two specific
instances where PRC officials allegedly interfered in the leadership races of the Conservative
Party of Canada. ***] 220 221
paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership
race. ***]222
74. Foreign actors did not limit their activities to the federal level. [*** Two sentences were
deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described PRC offers of
support to a provincial politician, and its subsequent signalling of that support to trusted
contacts, who took specific measures to support the politician. ***]223
Use of cyber tools to attain specific objectives
75. Threat actors deploy a variety of cyber tools to interfere in democratic processes and
institutions. They do so for three main reasons: to undermine the integrity of an election, either
directly by corrupting the digital infrastructure on which it depends or indirectly by sowing doubt
in the minds of voters; to embarrass political parties and elected officials through the leak of
information; and to manipulate voters through disinformation to exploit political fissures. (Online
foreign influence posed the greatest cyber threat activity to voters during the time under review,
as discussed earlier in paragraph 31).
Cyber attacks on electoral infrastructure

76. Cyber threat activity against electoral infrastructure is largely conducted by state-
sponsored actors. These activities include targeting information technology systems that
support the election process, owners and operators of elections systems, individuals
accountable for elections (e.g., election officials), and vendors of election system hardware and
software.224 States and their proxies engage in this activity to undermine democratic institutions
or sabotage election results. This may take the form of targeting electoral processes and
infrastructure, altering content on websites and social media accounts of election management
bodies, stealing information such as voter registration databases, or compromising the systems
or communications underlying the election. 225
77. Under CSE’s Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorization, CSE planned a
defensive cyber operation in anticipation of the 2019 federal election, and again for the 2021
election. In both 2019 and 2021, the threat that the operations would have countered ultimately
220
CSIS, *** 2020.
221
CSIS, *** 2022.
222 CSIS, *** 2022.
223
CSIS, *** 2022.
224 SITE, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), August 2020.
32
failed to materialize and CSE did not need to conduct the operations. CSE also advised the
Committee that for both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, there was no indication that any
foreign cyber threat activity targeted electoral infrastructure. 226
Cyber attacks on political parties and parliamentarians

78. Foreign states and their proxies also attempt to engage in cyber threat activity to breach
the information systems of political parties, candidates and their staff. 227 They do this to disrupt
engagement with the public for financial gain, to harm the political party or candidate, or for
publicity; to steal sensitive or proprietary information; or to interfere with political party
procedures undertaken online. 228 The Canadian intelligence community observed cyber threat
activity during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. However, there was no indication that any
threat activity specifically targeted Canadian political parties or elected officials in relation to the
federal election. Instead, this activity was likely part of broader, ongoing cyber espionage
campaigns.229
79. That said, CSE detected state-directed cyber threat activity targeting democratic
institutions and processes outside of the election period. For example, a PRC state-directed
cyber group started targeting eight members of Parliament and one senator in early 2021. All
targeted Parliamentarians were members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an
international multi-party group of legislators focused on how democracies should collectively
approach issues related to the PRC. The cyber group’s reconnaissance activity against
Canadian politicians was most likely carried out in an attempt to obtain information on their
personal and work devices; however, this cyber activity was unsuccessful. This type of activity is
consistent with that in 19 European countries, which have reported similar cyber activity against
their legislatures since early 2020. 230
226
CSE, “Foreign Interference Review: NSICOP Committee Hearing”, May 18, 2023.
227
SITE, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), August 2020.
229
SITE, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), August 2020; SITE, Key Observations from GE44, November
5, 2021; and SITE, Threats to the Canadian Federal Election 2021, December 17, 2021.
230 CSIS, ***, *** 2021.
33
34
Chapter 3: The government’s response
80. This chapter outlines the government’s response to the threat of foreign interference in
democratic processes and institutions (see Annex C). In this context, the Committee considers
the government’s response to include two broad policy initiatives: first, initiatives to protect
Canada’s democratic processes and institutions *** adopted by the government between 2018
and 2023 and the implementation of those initiatives; and second, efforts to amend the
legislative frameworks for investigating, prohibiting, preventing or countering t his threat. This
chapter also examines the government’s efforts to brief parliamentarians on the threat of foreign
interference, its operational response to threat of foreign interference using existing mandates
and authorities, and interdepartmental governance of the file.
Policy initiatives
The Plan to Protect Democracy (*** 2018)
81. Canada’s strategic response to foreign interference in democratic processes and

institutions must be understood in the context that brought the issue to the fore. As noted
earlier, Russia carried out an influence campaign aimed at the United States (U.S.) in the 2016
presidential election with the goal of undermining public faith in the U.S. democratic process and
discrediting the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. 231 It did so by leveraging social media to provoke
and amplify political and social discord in the U.S., including by purchasing political
advertisements and staging local political rallies. This influence effort was complemented by
targeted cyber hacks and the release of materials damaging to the Clinton campaign. 232 The
U.S. intelligence community was aware of Russian efforts during the presidential campaign, but
the central challenge for the U.S. government during those events was how to inform the
American public of Russia’s interference without appearing to unduly influence the course of the
election. Russia would go on to employ similar “hack-and-leak” and disinformation campaigns in
the United Kingdom in 2016, France in 2017, and Germany in 2017. 233
82. These events shaped Canada’s early efforts to counter foreign interference in its
elections. In February 2017, the Prime Minister tasked the Minister of Democratic Institutions to
work in collaboration with the Ministers of Public Safety and National Defen ce to lead the
government’s efforts to defend the Canadian electoral process from cyber threats. 234 The
Minister of Democratic Institutions developed a four-pillar framework, intended to serve as the
architecture for Canada’s efforts to combat foreign electoral interference. The four pillars were:
231
United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
US Elections,” January 6, 2017.
232
United States Government, Mueller Report, 2019.
233 PCO, “Case Studies for Panel - Summaries of AUS, FR, GER, IRE, UK, US,” September 12, 2019.
234 Prime Minister’s Office, “Minister of Democratic Institutions Mandate Letter,” February 1, 2017.
35
x Combating foreign interference through increased threat awareness and international
coordination;
x Promoting institutional resilience by supporting key stakeholders (e.g., government
institutions, political parties, media, etc.) to effectively plan for, respond to, and mitigate
electoral interference;
x Building citizen resilience by promoting informed and critical thinking about democracy
and democratic issues in the digital space; and
x Establishing rules for digital platforms to act with appropriate responsibility in an
elections context. 235
83. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In 2018,
the Government recognized that additional measures were required to bolster Canada’s
electorate and electoral infrastructure, and more comprehensively mitigate cyber and non -cyber
threats.236 In January 2019, the Government announced the Plan to Protect Canada’s
Democracy, which sought to address what the government assessed to be the ke y
vulnerabilities at the time, including by:
x Formalizing government responses to foreign interference during an election campaign,

and how Canadians would be informed;
x Increasing media literacy programming to help inform and inoculate Canadians against
disinformation campaigns;
x Expanding outreach efforts to political parties and diaspora communities to help them
protect themselves from foreign human interference and cyber operations;
x Better understanding the spread of disinformation on digital platforms and identifying key
foreign perpetrators. 237
84. The Plan established or formalized several mechanisms and initiatives, specifically:
x The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, including the Panel and the Security and
Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force;
x The Digital Citizen Initiative at Canadian Heritage;
x Increased public engagement by intelligence agencies on the threat of electoral
interference;
x Direction for the RCMP to form a team dedicated to investigating foreign interf erence
activities;
x The creation of the Protecting Democracy Unit at PCO; and
x Direction for CSIS, CSE and the RCMP to provide a classified threat briefing to key
political party leaders. 238
The Committee will describe these initiatives and their implementation below.
235 PCO, “Protecting Canada’s Democracy: Overview,” February 18, 2020.

236
*** 2018.
237 Public Safety Canada, “HASA File Timeline,” October 28, 2019; and *** 2018.
238 PCO, “Protecting Canada’s Democracy: Overview,” February 18, 2020.
36
85. The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol) : Announced by the
government on January 30, 2019, the Protocol set out how the government would publicly
inform Canadians during the writ period about incidents that threatened Canada’s ability to have
a free and fair election. In 2021, the government updated the Protocol after the 43 rd general
election to align the Protocol’s application period with the caretaker convention,239 which refers
to the period between the dissolution of Parliament or when the Government loses a vote of no-
confidence and the swearing-in of a new government or when an election result returning an
incumbent government is clear.240 Implementation of the Protocol is supported by two key
mechanisms: the Panel and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task
Force.
86. The Panel: Five deputy heads (the Panel) administer the Protocol. Its members are the
Clerk of the Privy Council, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, and the deputy
ministers of the Departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Public Safety. 241 The Panel is
supported and informed by SITE.
87. SITE: Consisting of CSIS, GAC, the RCMP, and CSE, SITE is an operational task force
that “aims to improve awareness, collection, coordination and action in countering Foreign
Interference in Canada’s federal election[s].” 242 SITE focuses its efforts on covert, clandestine,
or criminal activities interfering with or influencing electoral processes in Can ada.243 SITE also
offered briefings to Secret-cleared representatives of each political party represented in the
House of Commons during the election period (discussed below).244 In the period under review,
SITE operated throughout the phases of the electoral process. In the pre-writ periods, SITE met
frequently, including with Elections Canada (EC) and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada
Elections, and provided threat briefings to the Panel, EC and the Office of the Commissioner,
and to those Secret-cleared representatives of federal political parties. 245 During the writ period
and on election day, SITE met daily and produced a daily situation report for the Panel, was on
call 24/7, and provided threat briefings to political party representatives (see paragraph 96
below). After election day, SITE remained on call 24/7 for one week and then prepared an after
action report.246 Since the 2019 election, SITE has remained a standing task force. 247
239 Government of Canada, “Strengthening Canada’s electoral system,” December 7, 2023.

240
PCO, “Guidelines on the conduct of Ministers, Ministers of State, exempt staff and public servants during an
election,” August 2021.
241 PCO, “Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force – Partner Roles,” August 11, 2021.
242
National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA), “Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Creation of the Security
and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE),” submitted October 16, 2018, returned from the PM January
24, 2019, hand written file number 2018-NSIA-00181.
243
PCO, “Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force – Partner Roles,” August 11, 2021.
244
In 2019, SITE briefed Secret-cleared members from the Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic and Green
Parties. In 2021, only the Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic and Green Parties accepted the government’s offer
to receive Secret-level briefings. Morris Rosenberg, “Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident
Public Protocol,” February 20, 2023; and CSE, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
245
2023.
246
SITE, “Summary of SITE TF Activities: Pre-, During and Post-Federal Election,” July 2, 2021.
247 Meeting monthly. Morris Rosenberg, “Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public
Protocol,” February 20, 2023.
37
88. The Protocol requires preparation of an independent report after each election to assess
the Protocol’s implementation and effectiveness in addressing threats. Two reports have been
released to date: the Judd Report released in May 2020 and the Rosenberg Report released in
February 2023.248 The Judd report concluded that the Protocol was implemented successfully
and suggested recommendations for improvement to resolve challenges that had been
encountered, which were addressed by *** the Government in 2021, as noted earlier. 249 (The
Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol requires that the independent
report on the Protocol’s implementation be shared with the Committee. The Committee
supported the author’s key recommendations and flagged several considerations in a letter t o
the Prime Minister in December 2020).250 The Rosenberg report found that while there had been
foreign interference efforts, they did not meet the Protocol’s threshold for the Panel to advise the
public. The Rosenberg report also stressed that “the government’s plan and public
communications should acknowledge that the problem of interference occurs both before the
election is called and during the caretaker period.” 251
89. Digital Citizen Initiative: Based at Canadian Heritage, the initiative aims to build citizen
resilience against online disinformation and build partnerships to support a healthy information
ecosystem, by supporting projects to promote critical thinking and digital media literacy. 252 The
government reports that the initiative has spent over $15 million on 96 projects by civil society
and academic organizations “to build citizen resilience against disinformation.” 253 For example,
in 2019-2020, the government contributed $7 million to bolster civic, news and digital media
literacy, ranging from awareness sessions and workshops to the development of learning
materials. According to the Digital Citizen Initiative, these projects reached more than 12 million
Canadians.254
90. G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM): Announced at the June 2018 G7 Summit in
Charlevoix, this Canada-led initiative works to strengthen coordination across G7 countries to
respond to foreign interference by sharing information and identifying opportunities for
coordinated responses in response to disinformation campaigns. 255 Housed within GAC, RRM
Canada, which is the permanent secretariat to the RRM, also monitors the digital information
248
See James Judd, “Report on the Assessment of the 2019 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” May 2020;
and Morris Rosenberg, “Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” February
20, 2023. There are classified and redacted versions of each report.
249 James Judd, “Report on the Assessment of the 2019 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” May 2020.
250 NSICOP, 2020 Annual Report, March 2021.
251
2023.
252
The Digital Citizen Initiative’s programming focused on countering misinformation and disinformation in the context
of democratic pro cesses and institutions appears to have largely occurred in 2019 and 2020. Since then, the initiative
has also supported activities to help Canadians identify other forms of misinformation and disinformation, such as
about COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Canadian Heritage, “Digital Citizen Initiative – Online
disinformation and other online harms and threats,” March 20, 2023; and “Government of Canada reinforces support
to organizations to help counter harmful disinformation,” March 16, 2022.
253
PCO, Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s
Democratic Institutions, April 6, 2023.
254
Canadian Heritage, “Digital Citizen Initiative – Online disinformation and other online harms and threats,” March
20, 2023.
255 PCO, “G7 Rapid Response Mechanism”, January 30, 2019.
38
environment for foreign state-sponsored disinformation, including during general elections. 256
RRM Canada leads GAC’s participation in SITE, and began evaluating the Canadian digital
information ecosystem in the year prior to the 2019 Election. RRM Canada regularly informed
SITE of online and media activities, including disinformation, aimed at discouraging Canadians
from supporting certain political parties, and discrediting Canadian politicians and institutions.
An example of RRM Canada’s contribution is described in paragraph 35.
91. Increased Public Engagement by Intelligence Agencies: *** The Plan to Protect Canada’s
Democracy also provided the authority for Canada’s intelligence agencies to increase
engagement with Canadians on the threat of electoral interference. For CSIS, this meant the
authorization to make sustained investments in its capacity to investigate, analyse and provide
advice on foreign influenced activity targeting Canada’s democratic institutions, and to raise
awareness of threats to key stakeholders involved in the democratic process. Similarly, the Plan
enabled CSE to provide technical advice, guidance and services to Canadian political parties
and elections administrators, and enhance public engagement efforts on cyber threats to
Canada’s democratic processes. 257 In July 2021, CSIS publicly released its report, “Foreign
Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process,” which lays out foreign state motivations
and techniques, key targets in Canada and government efforts to address the threat. 258 For its
part, CSE built on a 2017 report to publish a report in 2019 on cyber threats to Canada’s
democratic processes, detailing key targets and trends and an assessment of the Canadian
context.259 CSE released an updated version of this report in July 2021.
92. RCMP: Under the *** Plan to Protect Democracy, *** the Government directed the RCMP
to form a temporary team dedicated to investigating f oreign interference activities in order to
investigate and disrupt any criminal acts that may be conducted as a part of interference,
including hacking, intimidation, and the bribery of public officials.260 Initially based in the Ottawa
Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, its activities were “informally” transferred to the
Foreign Actor Interference Team (FAIT) within the Federal Policing National Security Program
at National Headquarters (NHQ) in 2020.261 According to the RCMP, the “informal establishment
of the FAIT at NHQ was a short-term solution to address the most immediate foreign
interference-related needs identified at the time.” 262 The team consists of seven police officers
who provide oversight of the RCMP’s foreign interference investigations across Canada, but
who do not directly conduct these investigations. 263
256
Global Affairs Canada, “Rapid Response Mechanism Canada: Global Affairs Canada,” August 9, 2023.
257
*** 2018.
258
CSIS, Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process , July 2021.
259
CSE, Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process: July 2021 Update, July 2021; see also the 2017 and 2019
reports.
260 *** 2018.
261
RCMP, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024; and RCMP, “RCMP Document Production FRI8 –
FP FAIT and ETRU,” RCMP document produced for NSICOP’s review of the RCMP Federal Policing mandate, June
2022.
262
RCMP, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
263 RCMP, “RCMP Document Production FRI8 – FP FAIT and ETRU,” RCMP document produced for NSICOP’s
review of the RCMP Federal Policing mandate, June 2022.
39
93. PCO Protecting Democracy Unit: In 2018, the government established the Protecting
Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement
“government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and to protect Canada’s
democratic institutions.” 264 The Unit was established to act as the central hub to lead and to
coordinate all work across the Government with regards to strengthening and protecting
Canada’s democratic institutions from emergent threats, working with other government
departments and agencies, and other domestic and international stakeholders, as
appropriate.265 Funding for the unit was not provided until Budget 2022. 266
94. Briefing political parties: *** The Government authorized CSIS, CSE and the RCMP to
provide leaders from the political parties represented in the House of Commons with in-depth,
classified threat briefings to encourage them to strengthen their internal security practices and
behaviours and build their awareness of foreign-influenced activities in Canada. To facilitate
these briefings, PCO sponsored security clearances for individuals from each of the political
parties represented in the House of Commons. 267 Ultimately, these briefings were provided
under SITE’s remit to SECRET-cleared party representatives from July 2019 to September
2019 for the 43 rd general election, and from July 2021 to September 2021 for the 44 th general
election.268
95. In February 2023, the Rosenberg report concluded that the “political party representatives
were generally pleased with the information sharing with government.” 269 However, in April and
May 2023, Conservative Party of Canada and Liberal Party of Canada representatives testified
at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs that they
received very little threat information from the government, and what they did receive was
“vague” and lacked specificity. The Conservative Party of Canada also testified that SITE did
not take seriously its concerns about foreign interference in 13 ridings in the 2 021 election
(noted in paragraph 33). Both parties’ representatives testified that they thought that SITE would
provide them with actionable threat information, such as about their own party’s candidates or
volunteers, so that they could keep an eye on issues or conduct their own investigations. Party
representatives also testified that SITE members repeatedly cited legislative challenges as a
reason the task force could not share more information, although they reportedly did not specify
what those challenges were. 270 Party representatives also noted other challenges of working
with SITE. On the one hand, party representatives testified that SITE members’ knowledge of
political parties and how campaigns are conducted was low. On the other hand, party
representatives acknowledged that their intelligence literacy was low, but noted that SITE did
little to explain intelligence concepts to them. 271 In its capacity as former Chair of SITE, CSE
264
PCO, “Countering an Evolving Threat: Update of Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s
Democratic Institutions,” April 6, 2023.
265 *** 2018.
266 PCO, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
267
*** 2018.
268
CSE, “Foreign Interference Review: NSICOP Committee Hearing,” May 18, 2023.
269 Morris Rosenberg, “Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol,” February 20,
2023.
270 The PROC hearings of April 25 and May 18, 2023.
271 The PROC hearings of April 25 and May 18, 2023.
40
advised the Committee that it “had no recollection of specific discussions with political parties
where SITE discussed political parties and campaigns or conversations on the finer points of
intelligence collection/concepts.” 272
Strategy to Counter Hostile Activities by State Actors (HASA)
security and intelligence community recognized that work to counter foreign interference in
democratic processes and institutions needed to extend beyond securing elect ions.273 Indeed, in
2018 the Government acknowledged that the threat of foreign interference was multi-pronged
so Canada requires a multi-faceted, nimble approach, acknowledging that traditional human
interference activity, long-tracked by intelligence agencies, continues to be perpetrated in
Canada.274
97. In March 2018, Public Safety first briefed Deputy Ministers on the threat of hostile
activities by state actors (HASA), defined as “actions by hostile states or their proxies that are
deceptive, coercive, corruptive, covert, threatening or illegal, yet fall below the threshold of
armed conflict, and which undermine Canada’s national interests.” 275 In July 2018, Public Safety
subsequently began efforts to develop a strategy ***, which was discussed and debated over
the ensuing four years. 276 By the fall of 2019, departments and agencies had identified areas for
reform across the security and intelligence community. 277
98. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] It would
take the Government over two and a half years to put in place a plan of reform. The plan
included a classified, internal-to-government countering HASA strategy; the creation of a HASA
coordinator; an unclassified, public-facing strategy; consultations on legislative amendments;
and new resources and activities for the RCMP. These initiatives are described below.278 279 280
99. A classified internal-to-government Countering HASA Strategy: The Strategy prioritized

defending the following five sectors: democratic processes and institutions, Canadian
communities vulnerable to harassment and intimidation, economic prosperity and research
security, international affairs and defence, and critical infr astructure. These sectors are
underpinned by three pillars of action:
272
CSE, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
273
Public Safety, “HASA File Timeline, October 28, 2019.
274
*** 2018.
275
*** 2022.
276 *** 2018.
277The Deputy Minister National Security Committee met on HASA in September 2018, March 2019, June 2020,
September 2020, and September 2021. The Assistant Deputy Minister National Security Policy Committee discussed
HASA in March 2019, September 2019, December 2019, May 2020. HASA was also discussed by the Deputy
Ministers and Clerk Committee in October 2019. Public Safety, “HASA File Timeline”, October 28, 2019.
278
*** 2022.
279 *** 2022.
280 *** 2018.
41
x DETECT: Understanding the threat environment and establishing a common operating
picture as a prerequisite for an effective whole-of-government response;
x STRENGTHEN: Building resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and the perception of
Canada being a permissive environment, making Canada a harder target;
x ACT: Deploying coordinated mechanisms to respond to HASA, based on evidence
gathered through threat detection and in accordance with all applicable laws. 281
100. The creation of a new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator : [*** This
paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The Government
endorsed the creation of a coordination role to implement the Strategy and to convene federal
departments and agencies to address emerging HASA issues through the creation of a
“Counter-HASA Coordinator,” beginning in the 2023-24 fiscal year. The Coordinator’s role would
not alter the mandates of national security agencies and departments, nor would it grant Public
Safety the authority to operationally direct others. Rather, its mandate would be limited to better
leveraging PS’s existing coordination role to ensure that HASA threats are jointly examined and
addressed.282 This coordination role is also distinct from PCO’s Protecting Democracy Unit,
which focuses almost exclusively on implementing the Plan to Protect Democracy, notably on
countering disinformation.
101. The Prime Minister announced the creation of the renamed National Counter Foreign
Interference Coordinator on March 6, 2023. 283 This brought Canada partially in line with
Australia, which appointed a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator in 2018 to
administer a national, whole-of-government strategy with objectives similar to the HASA
Strategy.284 (Australia also has a Counter-Foreign Interference Taskforce, which includes the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, which is
responsible for detecting, disrupting and investigating foreign interference activit ies.) 285 Since
the Coordinator was named, his efforts have primarily focused on establishing governance
mechanisms, including a new ad hoc Deputy Minister Committee on Foreign Interference for
urgent decisions.286
281
*** 2022.
282 *** 2022.
283
Prime Minister’s Office, “Taking Further Action on Foreign Interference and Strengthening Confidence in Our
Democracy”, March 6, 2023. *** In the lead to up the announcement of the position, the Coordinator’s first efforts
were to establish his office, including financial and spending authorities.
284
Australia’s Coordinator is supported by the Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre (CFICC), housed
within the Department of Home Affairs. The CFICC coordinates Australia’s whole-of-government effort to respond to
FI by administering Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Strategy, coordinating outreach and advice to vulnerable
sectors and systems, and engaging with culturally diverse communities to strengthen them against foreign
interference. In addition, the NCFIC is responsible for engaging with international partners, and developing
approaches to deter and prevent foreign interference in Australia, including making t he public more resilient and
better informed. Australian Department of Home Affairs, “Countering Foreign Interference,” June 5, 2023
285
Australian Department of Home Affairs, “Countering Foreign Interference,” June 5, 2023.
286 Public Safety, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023; and PS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19,
2024.
42
102. An unclassified public-facing Countering HASA Strategy: [*** This paragraph was revised
to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The Government considered a whole-of-
government strategic communications and engagement strategy, intended to help coordinate
government communications with the public and key stakeholders (e.g., industry, ethnocultural
communities, historically marginalized groups and other orders of government, etc.) regarding
HASA threats. This approach was aligned with counter-disinformation efforts led by the Privy
Council Office Democratic Institutions Secretariat. 287 Public Safety subsequently noted that
while the principles underpinning the public strategy remain valid, it has been challenging to find
the right timing for its release in light of the media reports of leake d intelligence and the ensuing
public debate about foreign interference, and is now considering whether to substitute this
strategy with an educational approach. 288
103. Mandate to conduct consultations on proposed legislative amendments: *** In 2023, the
Government launched consultations on a potential foreign influence transparency registry and
potential amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act), the
Criminal Code, and the Security of Information Act (SOIA). 289 The following section provides an
update on these efforts.
104. CSIS Act Amendments: Enacted in 1984, the CSIS Act has not been comprehensively
reviewed since its initial five-year review completed in 1990. *** Despite amendments like the
introduction of threat reduction measures in 2015 and the dataset regime in 2019, significant
deficiencies in CSIS’s authorities remain, which have an impact on its ability to respond to
foreign interference. Specific shortcomings include CSIS’s ability to collect foreign intel ligence
and to share classified information (i.e., with elected officials or other orders of government). 290
On November 24, 2023, the government launched public consultations on legislative
amendments to the CSIS Act, including whether to amend the Act to enable CSIS to disclose
classified intelligence outside the federal government. 291
105. Criminal Code and SOIA Amendments: [*** This paragraph was revised to remove
injurious or privileged information. ***] These are two statutes that address a broad range of
conduct related to HASA. The Criminal Code criminalizes, among other things, treason,
sabotage, trading in influence and the unauthorized use of a computer, while SOIA focuses on
information-related conduct harmful to, or likely to harm, Canada. The Government believed that
these provisions could benefit from modernization, such as the Criminal Code’s dated
prohibition against treason, and the SOIA’s provision regarding unauthorized disclosure of
official information in section 4, which was struck down by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
in 2006.292 In April 2023, the government committed “to explore if further amendments to
existing provisions are needed and whether to create new offences … to facilitate prosecution of
287
*** 2022.
288
Public Safety NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
289
Public Safety, “Countering Hostile Activities by State Actors: Deck for DMNS”, September 2021.
290 *** 2022.
291
Government of Canada, “Enhancing measures to counter foreign interference: Whether to amend the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act,” Public consultation paper, November 24, 2023.
292 *** 2022.
43
foreign interference activities.” 293 Public Safety also informed the Committee that the Canada
Evidence Act would now be part of this consultation exercise. 294
106. On November 24, 2023, the government launched public consultations on legislative
amendments to the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence
Act.295 The consultations sought input on whether to define foreign interference in criminal law
and create related offences to protect democratic processes at all orders of government and at
all times, including outside an election period. Of relevance to foreign interference in democratic
processes and institutions specifically, the consultations also sought views on whether to
increase the maximum penalties (from two to five years imprisonment) for anyone convicted of
preparing, conspiring, or attempting to commit an existing or new foreign interference offence.
Additionally, the consultations sought input on whether to implement a single regime for
safeguarding sensitive information in judicial reviews and statutory appeals, and reforms to how
national security information is protected and used in criminal proceedings. The Committee
understands this as an attempt to address the “intelligence and evidence” challenge. This
challenge refers to the risk of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive collection techniques,
confidential sources or intelligence shared from allies in a criminal trial.
107. Foreign Influence Transparency Registry: As outlined in the previous chapter, some
foreign governments or their proxies use individuals or entities to influence government policies
or public discourse covertly or in a non-transparent manner. Three of Canada’s closest allies
have adopted foreign agents’ registries, which prescribe the registration of persons acting as
agents of foreign principals and requires public disclosure of one’s status as a foreign agent, to
respond to this activity: notably the U.S. (1938), 296 Australia (2018),297 and the United Kingdom
(U.K.) (2023).298 Registries serve two purposes: they promote transparency (similar to lobbying
registries) and they enable criminal investigations into foreign interference. Under U.S. law, a
person who works for or on behalf of a foreign government but has not registered with the U.S.
Attorney General is liable to criminal prosecution, and this has enabled the FBI to investigate
and lay charges in relation to election interference and transnational repression. 299 This is also
the case in Australia (since 2018) and the U.K. (legislation creating a registry received royal
assent in 2023).
293 PCO, Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s
294 Public Safety, NSICOP appearance, June 26, 2023.
295
Government of Canada, “Addressing foreign interference: Whether to Amend the Security of Information Act and
Modernize certain Criminal Code offences, and to Introduce a review mechanism in the Canada Evidence Act to
manage sensitive information,” Public consultation paper, November 24, 2023. These consultations concluded after
the completion of this review.
296 United States Congress, Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938.
297
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and
Foreign Interference) Act 2018, section 92.2(1)(c)(i), and paragraph 866 of the law’s Revised Explanatory
Memorandum, 2018.
298
UK Parliament, National Security Act 2023, section 14, 2023.
299 A recent example: United States Department of Justice, United States v. Ionov and others, press release and
indictment, April 18, 2023.
44
108. On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced the launch of public consultations on
the potential scope and configuration of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, intended to
“ensure transparency and accountability from people who advocate on behalf of a foreign
government.” 300 Public Safety held these consultations between March 10, 2023 and May 9,
2023.301 In November 2023, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety advised
the Committee that they expected to introduce legislation imminently. 302
Intelligence priorities
109. Cabinet approves national intelligence priorities every two years through the Intelligence
Priorities Memorandum to Cabinet, the primary mechanism available to the Prime Minister,
Cabinet, and senior security and intelligence officials for control, accountability, and oversight of
Canada’s intelligence collection and assessment priorities.303 Once approved by Cabinet, the
Ministers of Public Safety, Foreign Affairs and National Defence issue Ministerial Directives to
the relevant organizations in their portfolios to guide intelligence collection and assessment over
the ensuing two years. 304 Officials then use the intelligence priorities to inform the creation of
intelligence requirements outlining specific issues or entities of interest to intelligence
consumers.305
110. In the period under review, Cabinet set intelligence priorities for the years 2017 -2019,
2019-2021 and 2021-2023. During this period, foreign interference in democratic processes and
institutions featured regularly and prominently in Canada’s intelligence requirements:
x 2017-2019: The government sought intelligence on how foreign states and their non-
state proxies are using espionage, interference or sabotage to undermine the effective
functioning and integrity of Canada’s democratic institutions, governance and associated
processes.306 More specifically, of ficials sought intelligence on covert or malign efforts to
influence or compromise Canadian (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal) politicians,
elections, governance, policy, political institutions or infrastructure (including the
media).307 Officials cited specific concerns relating to social media platforms; agents of
influence (journalists, academics, businesspersons, government officials); interference
300 Prime Minister’s Office, “Taking Further Action on Foreign Interference and Strengthening Confidence in Our
Democracy”, March 6, 2023.
301 Public Safety, “Government of Canada launches public consultations on a Foreign Influence Transparency
Registry in Canada”, March 10, 2023.

302
Minister of Public Safety, NSICOP appearance, October 31, 2023; and Prime Minister, NSICOP appearance,
November 7, 2023.
303 NSICOP, 2018 Annual Report, 2019.
305
PCO, “Canadian Intelligen ce Requirements Pursuant to the 2021-2023 Canadian Intelligence Priorities and
Outcomes” September 29, 2022.
306 PCO, Standing Intelligence Requirement Chart on Espionage, Foreign Interference and Sabotage Coverage
Review,” April 2019.

307 PCO, Standing Intelligence Requirement Chart on Espionage, Foreign Interference and Sabotage Coverage
45
or malign pressure on Canadian media or public policy figures; and any other covert,
deceptive or malign use of Canadian proxies.308
x 2019-2021 and 2021-2023: Cabinet approved intelligence priorities for 2019-2021 and
2021-2023 that specifically included foreign interference, which in turn informed
intelligence requirements related to the plans, intentions, and capabilities of hostile state
actors (or their proxies) to conduct interference activities against Canadian strategic
interests.309 Clients specifically sought intelligence on:
o Influence of Canadian officials, and threats to Canadian elections, democracy

and civil society;
o Intimidation and influence of diaspora and dissidents in Canada; and
o Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and cyber-enabled interference.310
PCO updates Cabinet annually on how each organization of the security and inte lligence
community has supported the intelligence priorities using the National Intelligence Expenditure
Review (NIER). The NIER informs Cabinet Ministers of variances in annual expenditures over
time.311 Between 2019-2020 and 2021-2022, organizations increased their expenditures on
intelligence collection and assessment for espionage, foreign interference and sabotage, the
priority which includes foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions, by
approximately $***, bringing it closer to expenditures for terrorism and extremism, the
community’s top priority. 312 Although the NIER methodology changed for the next year, this
trend stayed steady in fiscal year 2021-2022.313
Legislative changes
111. Elections Modernization Act: The government enacted legislative changes through the
Elections Modernization Act, which received royal assent in December 2018. The Act made
amendments to the Canada Elections Act, which governs elections to the House of Commons
and protects the rights of Canadian citizens to participate in Canada’s democratic processes.
The Elections Modernization Act added three offences: undue influence of electors to vote or
refrain from voting by a foreigner; intimidation of voters to vote for or refrain from voting for a
particular candidate or party; and prohibitions on the use of foreign contributions for partisan
activities, advertising, elections advertising and election surveys. The Act also gave the
308
PCO, Standing Intelligence Requirement Chart on Espionage, Foreign Interference and Sabotage Coverage
309
PCO, “Canadian Intelligence Requirements Pursuant to the 2021-2023 Canadian Intelligence Priorities and
Outcomes,” September 29, 2022.
310
PCO, “Canadian Intelligence Requirements Pursuant to the 2021-2023 Canadian Intelligence Priorities and
Outcomes,” September 29, 2022.
311 PCO, “Canadian National Intelligence Expenditure Review For the 2020-2021 Fiscal Year,” March 2022.
312
PCO, “Canadian National Intelligence Expenditure Review For the 2020-2021 Fiscal Year,” March 2022. In FY
2019-2020, the expenditures for espionage, foreign interference and sabotage and terrorism and extremism were
approximately *** and ***, respectively, a difference of approximately ***; by FY 2021-2022, the expenditures were
approximately *** and ***, respectively, a difference of approximately *** with the foreign interference -related category
now higher. The dollar figures here include Internal Servi ces.
313 PCO, “Canadian National Intelligence Expenditure Review For the 2020-2021 Fiscal Year,” June 2023.
46
Commissioner of Canada Elections the power to seek a court order to compel testimony to
address serious instances of alleged non-compliance with the Canada Elections Act.314
112. Communications Security Establishment Act: The government enacted further legislative
change with the passage of the National Security Act, which received royal assent in June 2019.
The act made a number of changes, notably the creation of the Communications Security
Establishment Act, which provided CSE the authorities to conduct defensive and active cyber
operations to protect Canadians and Canadian interests and critical infrastructure, including
electoral infrastructure. These authorities permitted CSE to respond operationally to foreign
interference threats (*** examined further in paragraph 116 below).
Operational responses
113. The following section outlines how departments and agencies used their existing
authorities to investigate, disrupt and deter foreign interference in Canada’s democratic
processes and institutions in the period under review. This section does not provide an
exhaustive account of all operational activity; rather, it illustrates the various lines of effort that
contributed toward the government’s overall operational response to the threat. These inclu de
disruption operations; efforts by law enforcement bodies; and diplomatic activities.
Disruption operations
114. While the primary role of CSIS and CSE is to collect and report intelligence to the
government, both organizations have the authority to disrupt or counter threats to Canada’s
national security. The following section outlines how those tools were used to respond to foreign
interference in democratic processes and institutions.
115. CSE Active and Defensive Cyber Operations: Under the CSE Act, CSE may conduct
defensive cyber operations to protect federal systems and non-federal systems designated of
importance to the Government of Canada, including critical infrastructure, as well as active
cyber operations to protect and pursue Canadian international affairs, defence and security
interests. Under these authorities, CSE uses a variety of techniques, such as ***.315 As noted in
Chapter 2, under the period of review the Minister of Defence authorized two Defensive Cyber
Operations to allow CSE to conduct activities that could disrupt malicious cyber operations
targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, including the development of
defensive measures to protect Elections Canada’s infrastructure. 316 [*** Two sentences were
deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described how CSE
selected its targets, and described a Ministerial Authorization for a CSE Active Cyber Operation
to counter foreign interference. ***]317 318
314
Elections Modernization Act, assented to December 13, 2018.
315 CSE, *** 2022.
316
CSE, NSICOP appearance, May 2023.
317 CSE, *** ACO_DCO MA Quarterly Up date Summary, undated.
318 CSE, NSICOP Appearance, May 2023.
47
116. CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs): Under the CSIS Act, CSIS may take
measures to reduce a threat to the security of Canada if the measures are reasonable and
proportional to the severity of the threat, among other requirements. 319 Between September
2018 and September 2023, CSIS conducted seven TRMs responding to foreign interference in
Canada’s democratic institutions and processes by the PRC, Russia, India, and Pakistan (see
Table 1 below). 320 The TRMs sought to either disrupt foreign interference networks in
Canada,321 diminish the influence of a threat actor, 322 or brief individuals who were the victims of
foreign interference. 323
Table 1: CSIS Threat Reduction Measures against foreign interference in democratic

institutions and processes, September 1, 2018 to September 30, 2023
Year Country Primary objective

1 ***324 *** Disrupt foreign interference networks
2 ***325 *** Diminish the influence of a threat actor
4 ***327 *** Disrupt foreign interference networks
7 ***330 *** Brief individuals who were the victims of
foreign interference
117. *** TRMs were developed in anticipation of the federal elections in 2019 and 2021. [***
Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences
described Threat Reduction Measures taken to address the foreign interference activities of
specific countries and the success of those measures. ***] 331 332 333
319 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23, ss. 12.1 and 12.2. CSIS must have reasonable
grounds to believe the threat constitutes a threat to the security of Canada.

320 To put this number in context, in a typical year CSIS conducts between 16 and 19 TRMs, and conducted a total of
77 TRMs between 2018 and 2022: 17 TRMs in 2018, 19 in 2019, 8 in 2020, 17 in 2021, and 12 in 2022. NSIRA, 2022
Annual Report, September 2023.
321 CSIS, ***; CSIS, ***; CSIS, ***; CSIS, ***.
322 CSIS, ***.
323 CSIS, “FW Questions stemming from DIRs 2023 05 09 appearance before NSICOP,” email from CSIS to NSICOP
Secretariat about CSIS’s briefing of Mr. Chong (on May 2, 2023), May 31, 2023; CSIS, “Delivered Form of Words –
Briefing to Erin O’TOOLE,” May 26, 2023; and CSIS, “Delivered Form of Words – Briefing to MP Jenny KWAN,” May
26, 2023.
324
*** CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024. ***.
325
CSIS, ***.
326
CSIS, ***.
327 CSIS, ***.
328 CSIS, ***.
329
CSIS, ***.
330
CSIS, “Memorandum to the Minister: Threat Reduction Measure: PRC Targeting Specific Members of Parliament,”
signed by the Minister of Public Safety on May 18, 2023.
331
CSIS, ***.
332 CSIS, ***.
333 CSIS, ***.
48
118. On May 18, 2023, CSIS carried out a TRM under exigent circumstances to brief Member
of Parliament Michael Chong (see paragraph 50). Later that month, CSIS used its TRM
authority to provide threat briefings to two other members of Parliament, and one former
member of Parliament in September 2023.334 This TRM was notable in that CSIS described in
its briefing to the Minister that the *** overall operational, reputational, legal and foreign policy
risk for this TRM was high ***.335 CSIS also noted that it had limited ability to prevent later
disclosure of the classified information by the members of Parliament, and underlined the legal,
policy and procedural implications of disclosing classified information to individuals who did not
hold the requisite security clearance and were not bound by the Security of Information Act.336
Efforts by law enforcement

119. Canada has two federal organizations responsible f or investigating criminal offences
related to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions: the Office of the
Commissioner for Canada Elections and the RCMP. Section 14 (d) of the NSICOP Act limits the
Committee’s access to information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a
law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution. For this reason, the Committee was
unable to discern a clear picture of the investigations that may have been underway in the time
period under review. However, it was able to learn the following information.
120. Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections: The Office of the Commissioner of
Canada Elections (OCCE) is mandated to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the
Canada Elections Act.337 While the Act does not define “foreign interference,” it does prohibit the
involvement of foreigners in specific ways, such as prohibiting foreigners from making political
contributions.338 The OCCE is a relatively small organization and its 20 investigators work
almost entirely based on complaints received. 339 The maximum penalties for those committed of
an offence under the Act are five years imprisonment, a fine of $50,000 for an individual and
$100,000 for an entity, or a prohibition from sitting or being elected to Parliament for s even
years.340 The Commissioner of Canada Elections advised the Committee that her office was
reviewing 174 foreign interference-related complaints it received about the 2019 and 2021
elections, almost all of which (148 or 85%) were received in 2023 after the leaks of classified
information.341 As of June 16, 2023, the OCCE had received 158 foreign interference -related
334
signed by the Minister of Public Safety on May 18, 2023; and CSIS, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19,
2024.
335
336
337
Elections Canada Act (2000, c. 9), s. 509.2.
338 Elections Canada, “Appearance of the Chief Electoral Officer before the National Security and Intelligence
Committee of Parliamentarians,” Deck, June 16, 2023.

339
Commissioner of Canada Elections, Evidence to PROC, November 1, 2022.
340
Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, “Annex 1 to the Presentation of the Commissioner of Canada
Elections to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP),” June 2023.
341
In November 2022, the Commissioner told PROC that the OCCE had received 10 foreign interference -related
complaints concerning the 2019 election, and 13 concerning the 2021 election. Commissioner of Canada Elections,
Evidence to PROC, November 1, 2022.
49
complaints concerning the 2019 election (out of a total of 8,00 0 complaints for that election),342
and 16 concerning the 2021 election. 343 The Commissioner noted that the key external
challenges faced by the OCCE included the intelligence-to-evidence dilemma, technological
limitations (e.g., encryption), information sharing within the federal government and the difficulty
in obtaining evidence located in other countries. 344
121. RCMP: In 2020, the RCMP established a Foreign Actor Interference Team to coordinate
and oversee its foreign interference investigations (paragraph 93). The unit was established
using resources from other national security priorities and the RCMP advised the Committee
that it will be unsustainable without new resources.345 Despite the creation of this unit, the
RCMP was unable to tell the Committee exactly how many foreign interference investigations it
had undertaken in the review period – it could only calculate the number of “occurrences,”
defined as a record of a call for service or self -generated work (according to the RCMP, an
investigation involves one or more occurrences, but “not all occurrences are investigations”).
Between 2018 and 2022, the RCMP had six occurrences linked to foreign interference in
democratic institutions and processes, all of which required the RCMP to determine whether
suspicious events or allegations of foreign interference were potential offences under existing
criminal law, such as breach of trust or intimidation. 346
122. The RCMP conducted no investigations into foreign interference -related activities in the
context of the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. 347 The SITE Task Force’s post-election reports
for the 2019 and 2021 elections noted that there was no information shared with SITE that could
have led to a criminal investigation. 348 Additionally, the RCMP stated that CSIS likely did not
provide it with any leads linked to foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes
between 2018 and 2023 (the RCMP does not track CSIS leads by threat type, e.g., foreign
interference, espionage).349
123. The RCMP has been taking other steps to respond to foreign interference. In 2020, the
RCMP added foreign interference to the duties of an “all source” intelligence unit to brief senior
RCMP officials for their situational awareness, but not for investigation. In 2021, the RCMP
342
Commissioner of Canada Elections, Evidence to PROC, March 2, 2023.
343 Commissioner of Canada Elections, NSICOP appearance, June 16, 2023. The OCCE subsequently advised
NSICOP that it had submitted updated statistics to the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral
Processes and Democratic Institutions on December 22, 2023, using a different methodology, which explains the
difference in numbers. OCCE, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
344
Commissioner of Canada Elections, NSICOP appearance, June 16, 2023.
345 RCMP, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
346
RCMP operational data provided to NSICOP on October 27, 2023.
347
RCMP, “Foreign Interference in Canada’s Federal Democratic Processes: R CMP Appearance to the National
Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians,” Deck, May 12, 2023.
348 RCMP, “Foreign Interference in Canada’s Federal Democratic Processes: RCMP Appearance to the National
Security and Intelligence Committee of Parl iamentarians,” Deck, May 12, 2023; SITE, Security and Intelligence
Threats to Elections Task Force, After Action Report (2019 Federal Election), July 2020 (TS//SI//CEO); and CSE,
Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
349 RCMP, “SASU SP2,” spread sheet received by NSICOP on September 22, 2023. This RCMP table shows that
between September 1, 2018 and July 31, 2023, CSIS provided the RCMP with 219 disclosures of information related
to national security, eight of which were related to foreign interfer ence (none between 2018 and 2020, one in 2021,
two in 2022, and five in 2023) but none of the eight were linked to democratic institutions and processes.
50
drafted a Foreign Actor Interference Strategy intended for the public; as of January 2024, the
document remained unpublished.350
Diplomatic efforts
124. GAC contributed to several government initiatives aimed at protecting the 2019 and 2021
federal elections. As noted earlier, GAC’s Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination Unit
participated in the SITE Task Force and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs sat on the Critical
Election Incident Public Protocol Panel. 351 In advance of the 2019 and 2021 federal elections,
GAC also sent a formal notice to all foreign diplomatic missions in Canada to remind heads of
mission of their obligation to ensure “diplomatic and consular representatives do not conduct
activities, which may either be perceived as inducing electors to vote for a particular candidate,
or prohibiting them from voting for a particular candidate in any way during an election period.
Furthermore, accredited foreign representatives should not – directly or indirectly – make any
financial contribution to a candidate, political party or political event.” 352
125. Outside of the context of the federal elections and, as noted in the Committee’s previous
report, GAC’s responsibility for managing Canada’s bilateral and multilateral relationships
renders it a key decision-maker in determining how to respond to a state’s attempts at
interfering in domestic affairs. GAC has a number of diplomatic tools at its disposal to induce
behavioural change in other states. These include bilateral measures, such as cancelling
important visits, denying admissibility to diplomatic officials, closing diplomatic missions, closing
cultural centres, public attribution of hostile activities by foreign actors, sanctions and declaring
a foreign diplomat persona non grata. GAC also employs multilateral approaches, such as
sharing best practices and lessons-learned with likeminded partners on how to counter foreign
interference, developing diplomatic responses with like-minded states or raising a country’s
behaviour for consideration by international organizations. 353 When considering possible
measures, GAC calibrates the government’s response against broader foreign policy
interests.354 A recent example of GAC’s use of one of its tools is provided in Case Study #5,
below.
350
RCMP, “RCMP Foreign Interference (FI) Strategy Draft – For Internal Consultation Only,” October 4, 2021.
351
GAC, “Countering Foreign Inference: Components of an Effective Response by GAC,” November 2023.
352
GAC, “Important Notice about Federal Elections from the Office of Protocol of Canada: August 20 2021 | Avis
important a propos des elections federales de la part du Bureau du protocole du Canada: le 20 août 2021,” August
2021.
353 GAC, “Countering Foreign Inference: Components of an Effective Response by GAC,” November 2023.
354 NSICOP, Annual Report 2019, 2020.
51
Case Study #5: The expulsion of Zhao Wei
On May 8, 2023, the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Canada had declared Zhao
Wei, a Toronto-based PRC diplomat, persona non grata.355 He was given five days to leave
Canada.
This action followed a May 1, 2023 media report of a leaked July 2021 CSIS assessment
which described the PRC’s foreign interference activities in Canada as a “critical national
security threat.” 356 The article discussed a number of examples, including that the PRC’s
Ministry of State Security (MSS) took specific actions to target members of Parliament,
notably to obtain information on relatives who may be located in the PRC “for further
sanctions.” It quoted the CSIS assessment as saying that these efforts were “almost certainly
meant to make an example of this member of Parliament and deter others from taking an
anti-PRC position.” According to the Globe and Mail source, the target was Michael Chong
and the PRC diplomat involved was Mr. Zhao.
[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Within the
review period, CSIS had provided GAC and other government organizations intelligence
reporting on officials conducting foreign interference activities. In addition to a July 2021
assessment, CSIS provided GAC several specific reports between 2019 and 2022, some of
which specifically mentioned Mr. Zhao. 357
The July 2021 report was an assessment product, and *** more than half of the reports had
limited distribution, meaning that only named recipients, such as the Deputy Minister or
specific officials, would have been able to read them. 358 One of these reports, *** was on the
*** PRC seeking information ***. In none of these instances did GAC officials seek further
information on these reports ***.359
During the same period (2019 – 2023), CSIS and GAC officials formally exchanged
information on *** several occasions about specific *** actors, including Mr. Zhao, conducting
foreign interference activities in Canada. ***
x In *** 2019, *** CSIS provided a document, at GAC’s request, which *** summarized
threat activities. In this document, CSIS *** identified Mr. Zhao as a *** candidate for
expulsion.360 GAC sought no further information from CSIS.
355
GAC, “Canada declares Zhao Wei persona non grata,” Statement, May 2023.
356
The Globe and Mail, “China views Canada as a ‘high priority’ for interference: CSIS report,” May 2023.
357
CSIS, *** undated.
358
It is important to note that these reports generally focused on specific instances of foreign interference. CSIS
noted to the Committee that its assessment products are meant to provide general context about foreign interference
in order to enable the reader to better understand more specific reports.
360 CSIS, “PRC Espionage and Foreign Influence Footprint: ***,” *** 2019.
52
x On *** 2022, CSIS briefed GAC officials on a Threat Reduction Measure it was
considering ***. [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged
information. The sentence described links between the subject of the Measure and the
PRC. ***] GAC officials noted that their Minister had expressed an interest in
countering PRC foreign interference and they had been looking for potential steps to
take in response. Officials discussed the possibility of declaring *** persona non grata,
and CSIS committed to provide more information. 361 Nothing came of this initiative.
x In February 2023, four months after the first leaks to the media of intelligence on PRC
interference activities in Canada, CSIS briefed an interdepartmental Counter Foreign
Interference Working Group on actions by allied states against Russian and PRC
officials engaged in foreign interference. The briefing concluded with a discussion of
*** what CSIS described as “egregious” foreign interference activities: ***.362 CSIS
noted that GAC considered the expulsion option as being too extreme (a “nuclear
option”).363
x On *** 2023, CSIS received an urgent request from GAC ***.364 CSIS provided GAC a
list *** the following day. This list was intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive
***.365 On April 1, GAC advised CSIS that it was considering options with respect to
the PRC and that information *** would be welcome. 366
[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] On May 1,
the day of the Globe and Mail story on Mr. Zhao, GAC sent an urgent request to C SIS. GAC
asked CSIS to provide analysis and asked specific questions. CSIS responded the following
day by providing previously released intelligence reports and recommending the review of
another.367 368
[*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph
described GAC’s evolving view of Mr. Zhao and its ultimate assessment that he was likely
involved in foreign interference activities in Canada. ***] 369
GAC stated that the decision to expel Mr. Zhao was made in response to his foreign
interference activities. GAC stated that once Mr. Zhao’s name was associated publicly with
Mr. Chong, Canada was going to force Mr. Zhao to leave Canada. [*** One sentence was
deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described diplomatic
361 CSIS email, *** GAC Briefing Summary,” *** 2022.

362 CSIS presentation, “*** Action_v.2,” February 2023.
363
NSICOP Secretariat meeting with CSIS officials, August 30, 2023.
364 CSIS email to GAC, “GAC Request ***,” ***, 2023.
365 CSIS email to GAC, “GAC Request ***,” ***, 2023.
367 CSIS email to GAC, “Urgent – Request from DM call this afternoon,” *** 2023; *** ***, “Follow up question from
factual accuracy check,” January 26, 2024.

368
***, “[Update & new question] Follow-up question from factual accuracy check,” January 26, 2024.
369 GAC, “PRC/Canada: PRC Consul Zhao Wei and allegation in Canadian media,” *** 2023; and GAC,
“PRC/Canada: An updated assessment on Zhao Wei,” *** 2023.
53
engagement with the PRC. ***]370 *** Canada declared Mr. Zhao persona non grata on May 8,
2023.371
Briefing parliamentarians
126. In its 2018 report on the Prime Minister’s visit to India, the Committee recommended that
“Members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and
regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.” 372 The
Committee repeated this recommendation in its 2019 report on foreign interference. 373 In
December 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister’s authorization to
implement the Committee’s recommendations by having CSIS brief parliamentarians in the
early weeks of the 43 rd Parliament.374 The Prime Minister’s Office never replied formally to the
recommendation. In December 2020, the NSIA returned to the Prime Minister to seek
authorization for CSIS to brief parliamentarians, including unclassified briefings to all members
of Parliament and Senators, and classified briefings to opposition party leaders. 375 The package
for the Prime Minister included draft instruction letters to the Ministers of Public Safety and
Defence to coordinate the briefings, as well as draft letters to the opposition leaders offering
classified briefings. The Prime Minister’s Office did not reply. In February 2022, the NSIA
revived the initiative in another memorandum to the Prime Minister, following December 2021
media articles about the Conservative Party of Canada’s concerns with 13 ridings in the most
recent federal election (*** this memorandum was ultimately not provided to the Prime
Minister).376 The memorandum noted a similar proposal had been submitted in December 2020,
but did not go forward as a result of the 2021 election and proposed the same steps as the 2020
proposal.377 When asked by the Committee why he had not proceeded with this initiative, the
Prime Minister responded that he thought that the Parliamentary Protective Service already
briefs new parliamentarians about foreign interference. 378
127. That said, CSIS conducted briefings for select parliamentarians on an ad hoc basis. In
2021 the Minister of Public Safety instructed CSIS to brief parliamentarians who CSIS believed
370
NSICOP Secretariat meeting with GAC officials, August 28, 2023.
371
GAC, “Foreign Interference by PRC ***,” Memorandum for Action, undated.
372 “Members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn -in and regularly thereafter
on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.” NSICOP, Special report into the allegations associated
with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018, 2018.
373
374
Clerk of the Privy Council, “Briefings to Parliamentarians on Foreign Interference and Extremism in Canada,”
Memorandum for the Prime Minister, December 16, 2019.
375 NSIA, “National Security Briefings to Parliamentarians,” “Decision Sought/Signature Required” Memorandum for
the Prime Minister, December 22, 2020 (S); and NSICOP, Special report into the allegations associated with Prime
Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018, 2018.
376
NSIA, “National Security Briefings to Parliamentarians,” “Decision Sought/Signature Required” Memorandum for
the Prime Minister, undated and unsigned.
377
NSIA, “National Security Briefings to Parliamentarians,” “Decision Sought/Signature Required” Memorandum for
the Prime Minister, undated and unsigned.
378 Prime Minister, NSICOP appearance, November 7, 2023.
54
had been the target of espionage, intimidation or foreign interference. 379 In the summer of 2021,
CSIS provided a series of classified and unclassified briefings to 25 members of Parliament
from the Conservative Party of Canada, New Democratic Party and Liberal Party of Canada.380
The unclassified briefings were about the PRC’s foreign interference activities against
parliamentarians. CSIS conducted these briefings using open source information, while the
classified briefings, which CSIS conducted under the authority of a Threat Reduction Measure,
specifically mentioned *** foreign interference activities against parliamentarians (see paragraph
118).381
128. The briefings covered three topics: CSIS’s mandate, the definition of foreign interference,
and how members of Parliament and their staff can protect themselves from specific tactics.
The information about tactics was general in the unclassified briefings and specific in the
classified ones. CSIS provided members of Parliament with two infographics and contact
information for who to contact at CSIS and the RCMP to report an act of foreign interference in
the upcoming election. 382 CSIS conducted all of the summer 2021 briefings before the issuance
of the writs on August 15, 2021. 383 CSIS did not provide briefings during the writ period in order
to adhere to the caretaker convention.384 Since the 2021 election, CSIS increased the number of
briefings provided to parliamentarians. In 2022, CSIS briefed 49 MPs and five Senators. 385
129. On April 6, 2023, the government responded to NSICOP’s recommendations on briefings

for parliamentarians. It noted:
x The Parliamentary Protective Service provides security briefings to incoming members

of Parliament.386
x The Security and Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (SITE) offers briefings to
political party representatives during the writ period.
x The Privy Council Office Security Operations Division briefs all incoming Ministers and
Parliamentary Secretaries on the spectrum of threats, including foreign interference.
CSIS also provides briefings to Parliamentarians upon request.
379
Hon. Bill Blair, Evidence to PROC, June 1, 2023.
380
Seventeen members of Parliamen t received unclassified briefings and ten received classified briefings (two
members of Parliament received both). CSIS, CSIS Engagement with Elected Officials on Foreign Interference: An
Initiative of National Significance, CSIS Analytical Brief *** November 3, 2021.
381 CSIS, *** 2021; and CSIS, CSIS Engagement with Elected Officials on Foreign Interference: An Initiative of
National Significance, CSIS Analytical Brief ***, November 3, 2021.

382
CSIS, CSIS Engagement with Elected Officials on Foreign Interference: An Initiative of National Significance,
CSIS Analytical Brief ***, November 3, 2021.
383 CSIS, CSIS Engagement with Elected Officials on Foreign Interference: An Initiative of National Significance,
CSIS Analytical Brief ***, November 3, 2021.

384
CSIS’s response to RFI #6, September 18, 2023.
385
CSIS, CSIS Public Report 2022, March 2023; and CSIS, “Briefing to the NSIA and Clerk of the Privy Council on
Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Institutions, Monday, September 12, 2022, 12:30 – 1:30 PM,”
Tab 3 “IMU Stats: CSIS defensive briefings since May 2021,” September 12, 2022.
386 The Committee notes the Parliamentary Protective Service provides physical security within the Parliamentary
precinct.
55
x Briefings for members of Parliament and the Senate will be provided upon their
swearing-in and on a regular basis. 387
As of February 2024, this approach appears to be unchanged, with no specific briefing program
for all parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference, per the Committee’ s
recommendations in 2018 and 2020.388
Interdepartmental governance
130. During the review period, the government created two deputy ministerial committees and
one Cabinet committee – the National Security Council – to improve its assessment of
intelligence and response to national security threats, including foreign interference.
131. The Deputy Minister Intelligence Committee (DMIC): In 2020, the NSIA created and
chaired DMIC, whose mandate was to flag important strategic intelligence assessments to
deputy ministers and ensure a coordinated response. 389 Its core membership includes PCO,
CSE, CSIS, GAC, Public Safety, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and
the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence (CAF/DND). 390 The
governance structure was designed for getting policy decisions to Cabinet instead of driving the
work of the national security community, and the intelligence discussed often lacked the level of
detail needed to understand a threat issue. 391 The Committee is only aware of one DMIC
meeting in which members discussed intelligence on foreign interference against democratic
institutions and processes. 392 DMIC ceased meeting in June 2021, but reconvened in March
2023.393
132. The Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR) : In summer 2023,
the NSIA created DMCIR. 394 DMCIR is mandated to review more operational and tactical
intelligence reporting that requires a timely response. 395 It also identifies intelligence that should
be briefed to Ministers, Cabinet or the Prime Minister and any intelligence already identified for
briefing via other means.396 Membership includes CSE, CSIS, GAC, Public Safety, RCMP and
PCO.397 According to its Terms of Reference, DMCIR began by focusing only on foreign
interference issues, but may broaden its scope to include other appropriate issues. 398 PCO
387 PCO, Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s
389
Vincent Rigby, PROC Evidence, June 8, 2023. Mr. Rigby was the NSIA from Januar y 2020 to June 2021.
390
PCO, DMIC Terms of Reference, February 2023.
391
Public Safety, “Governance in Canada’s National Security Community,” Deck, June 29, 2021.
392 PCO, “DMIC Agenda,” January 2021. This was the only DMIC agenda that PCO provided NSICOP.
394
Rob Stewart (Deputy Minister of Public Safety during the 2021 election), PROC Evidence, October 19, 2023.
395
PCO, Factual Review of NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.
396 PCO, “Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR) Terms of Reference,” June 2023; and

397 PCO, “Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR) Terms of Reference,” June 2023.
398 PCO, “Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR) Terms of Reference,” June 2023.
56
advised the Committee that DMCIR meets weekly, with formal tracking of discussions including
the production of meeting minutes.399
133. The National Security Council: On September 27, 2023, the Prime Minister announced
the creation of the National Security Council, a new committee of Cabinet. 400 The Council first
met in October 2023,401 and is mandated to serve “as a forum for strategic decision-making and
for sharing analysis of intelligence in its strategic context.” 402 Chaired by the Prime Minister, who
stated that he wished to convene it on a regular basis,403 the members of the Council are the
following:
1) Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance

2) Minister of Defence
3) Minister of Emergency Preparedness
4) Minister of Foreign Affairs
5) Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry
6) Minister of Justice and the Attorney General
7) Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs .404
Parliamentary ethics officers
134. In its review of the Prime Minister’s official visit to India in 2018, the Committee
recommended that “Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly
distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with
the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before
private interests.” 405 Two independent and non-partisan officers of Parliament support
compliance with the Act. The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner provides members of
the House of Commons and federal public office holders with direction and advice about ethics
and conflicts of interest with a view to avoid conflicts of interest before they occur. The Senate
Ethics Officer plays the same role for Senators. Both officers of Parliament also investigate
potential breaches of the Conflict of Interest Act and the conflict of interest codes of each
chamber.406
135. Currently, foreign interference is not defined in the Conflict of Interest Act or in the conflict
of interest code of either chamber. This being the case, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics
399
400
Prime Minister, “Prime Minister announces changes to Cabinet committees,” September 27, 2023.
401
Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, NSICOP
appearance, October 31, 2023.
402 Prime Minister, “Cabinet Committee Mandate and Membership,” September 27, 2023.
403
Prime Minister, NSICOP appearance, November 7, 2023.
404
Prime Minister, “Cabinet Committee Mandate and Membership,” September 27, 2023.
405 NSICOP, Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in
February 2018, 2018, Recommendation #1.

406 The Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code
for Senators. The Parliament of Canada Act is the enabling legislation for both officers.
57
Commissioner and the Senate Ethics Officer are not currently expressly empowered to provide
parliamentarians and federal public office holders with advice on how to avoid potential
exposure to foreign interference and to investigate conflicts of interest linked or potentially linked
to foreign interference as such.
58
Chapter 4: The Committee’s assessment of the response to
foreign interference in democratic processes and
institutions
136. Foreign interference is not new. For over thirty years, CSIS has been reporting to
successive governments on attempts by foreign actors to interfere in Canada’s democratic
processes and institutions. The Committee’s 2019 report on foreign interference marked the first
time the issue had been examined by a review body. The Committee was concerned by what it
found: Canada was the target of pervasive and sustained foreign interference activities, which
the Committee believed posed “a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to
the country’s sovereignty.” 407 This remains the case today.
137. The Committee’s previous review did not specifically examine the government’s response
to threats of foreign interference in the run-up to 43rd federal election, given the government’s
early efforts to address threats to the election process. These efforts would result in the Plan to
Protect Democracy, under which the government established the Critical Ele ctions Incident
Public Protocol, amended the Canada Elections Act, and implemented mechanisms and
initiatives to respond to misinformation and disinformation campaigns. The government later
took steps to address the threat of foreign interference more broadly, specifically by establishing
an internal, whole-of-government strategy to address this threat, including the creation of the
role of Foreign Interference Coordinator and consultations for a foreign influence transparency
registry act. The government also adapted its intelligence priorities to learn more about the
threat of foreign interference, which brought new information to light about how foreign actors
interfere in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions. In short, the government has
launched or implemented a number of strategic policy initiatives to address foreign interference
since our 2019 report, including in areas which specifically address foreign interference
targeting democratic processes and institutions.
138. Operational departments have also acted to different degrees. CSIS has conducted a
number of Threat Reduction Measures to counter specific instances of foreign interference in
democratic processes or institutions, collected and reported intelligence on states and
individuals involved in foreign interference in Canada to government, and briefed a number of
Parliamentarians on the threat. Under the Ministerial Authorization for Defensive Cyber
Operations issued by the Minister of Defence, CSE planned two defensive cyber operations to
protect election inf rastructure during the two most recent federal elections, which proved to be
unnecessary. Additionally, CSE conducted operations under a Ministerial Authorization for
Active Cyber Operations to counter *** foreign interference, and collected intelligence on
specific foreign actors. The RCMP created a small unit to coordinate investigations of foreign
interference and initiated a number of investigations, although it cannot determine exactly how
many, nor does it distinguish between those involving democratic processes and institutions and
407
NSICOP, 2019 Annual Report, 2020. The 2019 review covered the p eriod 2015 – 2018. This review covers the
period 2018 – 2023.
59
other investigations into foreign interference more generally. No charges have been laid in
respect of foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. For its part, GAC
identified a number of online threats through its Rapid Response Mechanism, and expelled one
mid-level diplomat for conducting foreign interference following significant media pressure.
139. Notwithstanding these efforts and the considerable intelligence reporting on specific
foreign interference activities targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, the
Committee notes that the intelligence community continues to assess that threat actors view
Canada as a permissive environment to pursue their strategic interests.408
140. The Committee’s assessment explores the persistent disconnect between the gravity of
the threat and the measures taken to counter it, a gap which the Committee believes is the
reason why threat actors continue to view Canada’s democratic processes and institutions as
easy targets for foreign interference. As noted in Chapter 1, effective threat mitigation seeks to
counter a hostile actor’s intent, capability and opportunity to act. While the government has
limited ability to address intent and capability, it is accountable for addressing vulnerabilities that
permit threat actors to interfere. The state of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic
processes and institutions cannot be understood without understanding how and why these
vulnerabilities persist. The following assessment is divided into three themes: the threat posed
to our democratic processes and institutions; the systemic challenges which contribute to
Canada being a permissive environment for foreign actors to in terfere; and the role that all
Parliamentarians must play in reducing the threat. The Committee also shares its views on the
leaks of sensitive material and the integrity of the 43 rd and 44th federal elections.
The threat of foreign interference in democratic processes and

institutions
141. Over the course of its review, the Committee heard from the Prime Minister, three
Ministers, and 34 officials from eight departments and agencies, and reviewed ove r 4,000
documents, including over 1,000 intelligence products. On the basis of this information, the
Committee believes there is ample intelligence to support the intelligence community’s assertion
that foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions constitutes a continuing,
significant threat to Canada’s national security.
142. The PRC is clearly the most prolific actor. In its efforts to protect and enhance the
legitimacy and stability of the Chinese Communist Party domestically and abroad, the PRC
employs a comprehensive approach to targeting and leveraging virtually all aspects of Canada’s
democratic processes and institutions to advance its strategic interests (see paragraph 7 for the
Committee’s definition of democratic processes and institutions). The Committee underlines the
scale and sophistication of the PRC’s efforts, which comprise a complex array of covert and
overt mechanisms, using PRC and non-PRC entities, ranging from community groups to private
enterprises, to accomplish foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and
408 CSIS, ***; and CSIS, Email response to question from NSICOP Secretariat, December 11, 2023.
60
institutions. While not as widespread as the PRC’s efforts, India’s activities are also of
significant concern. India seeks to cultivate relationships with a variety of witting and unwitting
individuals across Canadian society with the intent of inappropriately exerting India’s influence
across all orders of government, particularly to stifle or discredit criticism of the Government of
India. The Committee was already aware of India’s efforts to interfere in Canada’s democratic
processes and institutions through its review of the Prime Minister’s official visit to India in 2018
and its 2019 foreign interference review. This review reinforced the Committee’s understanding
of India’s activities.
143. In addition to interference against Canadian democratic processes and institutions by the
PRC, India and to a limited extent Pakistan, other countries, notably Iran *** engaged in
episodic foreign interference directed towards suppressing dissidents and critics in Canada.
Known as “transnational repression,” these activities represent one of the most egregious forms
of foreign interference. The Prime Minister’s announcement in Parliamen t on September 18,
2023 that Canada’s intelligence community had been actively pursuing credible allegations of
the Government of India’s involvement the murder of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar in
June 2023 is the latest example. 409 The Committee condemns this and all instances of
transnational repression and considers them a threat to Canadian values, human rights and
democratic freedoms. However, they are not the focus of this review.
144. In reflecting on the significant body of intelligence pointing to the PRC and India’s
targeting of democratic processes and institutions, the Committee observed that in almost all
cases, the activities could not be construed as regular diplomatic lobbying. Rather, they clearly
met the definition of foreign interference as described in Section 2 of the CSIS Act: contrary to
Canada’s national interest, and deceptive, clandestine or threatening. More worryingly from the
Committee’s perspective, these states could engage in such activities owing at le ast in part to
challenges and gaps which the Committee had previously identified to the government in 2019.
These challenges help to perpetuate a permissive environment fo r foreign actors to operate.
A permissive environment: How systemic challenges in responding to

foreign interference provide opportunities for foreign actors
145. There are four significant unaddressed challenges which help to create an environment
where foreign states may interfere in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions. These
are: differences in thresholds for response to foreign interference; an absence of robust tools to
counter the threat; limitations in the dissemination, assessment and use of intelligence; and the
lack of effective communication with federal parliamentarians. Each are discussed below.
409 CBC, “Trudeau accuses India’s government of involvement in killing of Canadian Sikh leader,” Se ptember 2023.
61
Absence of a common threshold for action
146. The first challenge is the absence of an agreed threshold for action. In its 2019 report, the
Committee observed that “[s]ecurity and intelligence organizations do not share a common
understanding of the threat, including its gravity in Canada and its most common
manifestations.” 410 In many ways, this situation continues. While departments and agencies
appear to have coalesced around a similar definition of what constitutes foreign interference,
differences still persist in measuring the gravity of the threat, recognizing interference in practice
and determining thresholds for action. This is particularly problematic in policy departments like
PCO and GAC, organizations which make decisions, including on whether to brief ministers on
intelligence and to recommend what actions to take in response.
147. Two examples from our review are particularly salient. The first is a decision not to brief
the Prime Minister on important intelligence. In February 2023, the Clerk of the Privy Council,
the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) to the Prime Minister, and deputy heads
from CSIS, CSE, GAC and PS met and agreed that a highly sensitive and comprehensive
intelligence assessment on foreign interference should be briefed to the Prime Minister.
However, the NSIA later concluded that the activities did not constitute foreign interference and
did not share the assessment with the Prime Minister.
148. The second example is the decision to expel PRC diplomat Zhao Wei. Until leaks forced
the government’s hand, GAC had frequently dismissed CSIS reporting on foreign interference
activities in democratic processes and institutions, including those conducted by Mr. Zhao. GAC
believed that CSIS had misunderstood regular diplomatic behaviour and that the behaviour “did
not reach the threshold.” We note, however, that GAC has no threshold, codified or customary,
to make such decisions, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is silent in this
regard.
149. Both examples illustrate the lack of a consistent understanding of a thresho ld above
which permissible diplomatic activities become foreign interference. They also illustrate the
difficulty in moving from identifying a problem to addressing it. While the Committee recognizes
that defining something as complicated as a threshold for action is difficult, and the absence of a
Criminal Code offence or other statutory definitions no doubt compounds the problem, decisions
as important as these should rest on firmer foundations.
Absence of robust tools
150. The Committee heard repeatedly over the course of its review that an outdated legal
framework is hampering the government’s response to foreign interference. There are a number
of areas for reform. Perhaps the most important are changes to the Criminal Code and the
Security of Information Act, for two reasons. First, amendments should provide clear and
modern definitions of foreign interference, helping to clarify what activities do and do not qualify
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as threats. That should ensure departments develop standardized definitions of what constit utes
thresholds for action. Second, changes to these statutes would provide more numerous and
specific offences for the RCMP to investigate, and signal to current and would -be offenders the
gravity of their behaviour. The same logic applies to the proposed legislation for a Foreign
Influence Transparency Registry. Crafted carefully to avoid the stigmatization of ethnocultural
communities and to protect Canadian rights and freedoms, the legislation should clarify what
behaviours qualify as interference, and act both as a deterrent to agents of foreign states and to
provide the RCMP with offences to investigate. Similar legislation in allied states has proven to
be a useful tool for police to respond to foreign interference.
151. Changes to the CSIS Act are similarly overdue. The CSIS Act is showing its age,
particularly with respect to countering foreign interference. Over the course of this review, the
Committee noted that CSIS was using its authority to conduct Threat Reduction Measures
(TRM) to brief some federal parliamentarians on foreign interference threats posed to them by
foreign actors. In this, we believe that CSIS acted in good faith: section 19 (1) of the CSIS Act
does not provide CSIS the authority to share classified information to individuals outsid e the
government, but CSIS needed to respond to specific threats and it used a novel authority to do
so. At the same time, the Committee believes this is far from ideal. The TRM authority exists to
permit CSIS to take measures to reduce a threat where ther e are reasonable grounds to believe
that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada. It was not intended to
address CSIS’s inability to share classified information outside the government.
152. The requirement for these changes was identified by government departments in 2018,
and highlighted by this Committee in 2019. Policy work to develop the Hostile Activities by State
Actors (HASA) strategy, which recommended these statutory changes, was well advanced by
fall 2019. It took *** the Government two more years to endorse the strategy, in June 2022,
another nine months to launch consultations on a foreign influence registry in March 2023, and
another eight months to launch public consultations on amendments to the Criminal Code, the
SOIA and the CSIS Act in November 2023. At the end of this review, the government assured
the Committee that it intended to table legislation for the Foreign I nfluence Transparency
Registry “imminently.” While the Committee welcomes that commitment and looks forward to
seeing the bill, the Committee believes that delays in launching public consultations and tabling
legislation were unnecessary, and represent a lost opportunity to build upon the changes the
government implemented in 2018 to address threats posed by foreign interference in Canada’s
democratic processes and institutions.
153. There are two other areas for statutory reform. The first is in the area of “intelligence and
evidence.” Intelligence agencies take great care in protecting their sensitive collection
techniques, confidential sources and intelligence shared from allies. The disclosure of such
information in a court could reduce the effectiveness of future operations, endanger sources and
damage relations with foreign partners. Consequently, if CSIS or CSE decides to share
intelligence with law enforcement, it does so knowing that it risks being disclosed in court if the
police investigation leads to a criminal trial. The Committee noted numerous instances over the
course of its review in which intelligence agencies did not share information with enforcement
63
bodies, including the RCMP and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for this
reason. The Committee believes this is a critical problem, where significant differences exist
between operational organizations and the Department of Justice. The creation of new criminal
offences for foreign interference activities will matter little if law enforcement bodies still cannot
rely on information derived from intelligence collection. This is a foundational, complex issue
which merits its own review. In the meantime, the government should review the legislative
options which have been developed that could start to address the problem.
154. The second area for legislative reform is the regulation of political nomination processes.
The Committee was disturbed to learn how easily foreign actors take advantage of loopholes
and vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration to support preferred
candidates or to gain access to other influential positions within the parties, most notably in the
context of candidate nomination processes. This is a critical gap, because a number of ridings in
Canada are considered “safe seats” for one party or another, so a succe ssful nomination may
amount to a candidate’s election. Because the number of votes required to sway riding
nominations is so small, they are a useful avenue for foreign states to engineer the election of
their preferred candidate. While the Canada Elections Act imposes administrative penalties on
fundraising by a foreign entity, Canada does not criminalize interfering in nominations or in any
other political party process. The government should do so. It should also engage all political
parties to determine whether party nomination processes should be included within the
framework of the Canada Elections Act, subject to monitoring by Elections Canada and the
Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections.
155. In the meantime, federal political parties themselves have a role to play. Parties need to
reduce or eliminate opportunities for foreign states to directly or indirectly interfere in a
foundational part of our democratic system – the nomination process – by identifying and
addressing vulnerabilities in their own systems and processes, including in areas such as age
and residency requirements and fundraising. More generally, the government should work with
all parties to establish the means to allow CSIS and other intelligence organizations to raise with
party leaders specific instances of foreign interference occurring prior to, during and after an
election, so that those instances may be addressed. The Committee further encourages the
government to give the same consideration to other orders of government.
156. The Committee does not call for legislative reform lightly. As legislators, Committee
members recognize the complexity and significance of statutory reform. However, it has
become clear that the initiatives implemented by the government in 2018 – the Critical Election
Incident Public Protocol, the Panel, SITE and the Rapid Response Mechanism – are insufficient
on their own to address the threat. While the Committee recognizes that CSIS’s Threat
Reduction Measures and CSE’s Active and Defensive Cyber Operations play important roles in
addressing interference in democratic processes and institutions, their use is limited by
circumstance (among other things) and their effects are hard to measure in terms of disruption
or deterrence. Addressing these limitations requires, at least in part, specific legislative reforms.
In short, the security and intelligence community needs more tools. The government should see
that it has them and be properly resourced to use them.
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The distribution, assessment and use of intelligence
157. It is clear that there are systemic problems in the distribution, assessment and use of
intelligence to inform decision-making on foreign interference. In the time period under review,
the government adapted its intelligence priorities to learn more about the threat of foreign
interference, causing intelligence organizations to increase their collection and assessment. It is
unclear whether this change made a material difference to the officials in departments
responsible for policymaking and decision-making.
158. The Committee wishes to underscore that decision-makers from policy departments
(Privy Council Office, Public Safety and Global Affairs Canada), not intelligence organizations
(CSIS, CSE), are ultimately responsible for providing policy advice and recommendations on
how to respond to intelligence about foreign interference. In that respect, the Committee is
concerned that, while intelligence organizations have increased their reporting on foreign
interference, policy departments lack the instinct to make responsive recommendations based
on that reporting. On the one hand, the Committee observed strong, if slow, engagement by the
three policy departments in the development of strategic policy proposals, like the Host ile
Activities by State Actors Strategy. On the other, the Committee saw little evidence that these
departments saw a role for themselves in responding to intelligence reporting by providing
separate policy advice to their respective ministers (although the Committee notes that in March
2023 GAC commenced briefing the Minister of Foreign Affairs on intelligence reporting relevant
to the security of Canada, whereas it had previously focused on international issues). In fact, the
Committee found few cases where these departments made any recommendations to their
respective ministers when provided intelligence on specific threats or summary assessments of
threat actors, except in reaction to the media. At the same time, it does not appear that the
Ministers responsible for those departments, who are ultimately accountable for protecting
Canada against foreign interference, requested policy advice in response to intelligence
reporting. If this context persists, it will not matter how much the intelligence community collects
and assesses if its reports are simply read by officials and then ignored.
159. That said, the intelligence community could make it easier for their reports to have an
impact. First, the dissemination of intelligence products across the government is uneven, with
the most important items marked for a very limited number of senior-level officials, who often
have little time to read and digest such information, and are not shared with the policy experts
who would be responsible for advising on a proposed response. Additionally, systems for
dissemination are inconsistent across the intelligence community: notably, CSE’s electronic
dissemination system permits clients (i.e., those that receive intelligence products) to track
readership and search for items, while CSIS’s distribution system lacks this function. This
inconsistency creates challenges for clients in developing strategic policy advice. Clients must
either develop their own summary of intelligence reporting over time, which is difficult because
they are not intelligence professionals, or they must rely on intelligence agencies to provide
summary products and assessments for use in decision-making, which is difficult because
intelligence organizations are not expert on the mandates and authorities of their clients.
65
160. Second, intelligence agencies often remove information that would be salient for officials
in the belief that the information is too sensitive or on the assumption that the sanitized
information would still be compelling. Conversely, in some cases, senior officials have
requested that intelligence agencies pull back published reports because they believed the
information was too politically sensitive. Not only does this behaviour create a chilling effect on
intelligence collection and assessment, depriving the government of the full context of its
decisions, it also undermines a core public service value of providing “fearless advice” and risks
politicizing the community’s own intelligence reporting to suit the inclinations of the government
of the day. This issue should be of concern for this and all future governments.
161. In short, intelligence must be both available and specific enough to be persuasive to
decision-makers. As such, the Committee believes there is space for closer collaboration
between intelligence producers and consumers in drafting intelligence assessments based on a
shared understanding of the threat and a common threshold for action, where each side can
bring to bear their expertise and understanding of their mandates. The Committee belie ves such
collaboration would strengthen the work of two new governance bodies. The first is the Deputy
Minister Committee on Intelligence Response, which the Committee understands as a forum for
senior public servants to consider intelligence reporting fro m a government-wide perspective,
weigh national security against other important considerations, including international relations,
and develop recommendations to support decision making by relevant Ministers or Cabinet. The
second and most important body is Cabinet itself. The Committee welcomes the creation of the
National Security Council (NSC) and the Prime Minister’s stated commitment to its success. The
Committee hopes that the Council will not only drive necessary reforms in the security and
intelligence community, especially as they pertain to foreign interference in democratic
processes and institutions, but also provide an effective forum to discuss specific threats and
take decisions to address them. More importantly, the Committee hopes that thes e bodies will
strengthen the accountability of government in addressing foreign interference threats.
Engagement with Parliamentarians
162. The final tool which the Committee emphasizes is important to address foreign
interference is engagement with Parliamentarians. In its 2018 report on the Prime Minister’s
official visit to India and its 2019 report on foreign interference, the Committee recommended
that all members of the House of Commons and the Senate receive briefings regarding foreign
interference upon being sworn in and regularly thereafter. It did so because Parliamentarians
are often at the center of interference activities by foreign states. While the Committee
recognizes that CSIS has provided briefings to some members of Parliament, a comprehensive
briefing strategy covering all Parliamentarians was not implemented despite PCO seeking the
Prime Minister’s approval on two occasions. The Committee considers the Prime Minister’s lack
of action on this recommendation to be a serious omission. This initiative was comparatively
simple to implement: PCO and CSIS were ready to act and could have done so quickly. That it
was not represents an unfortunate and potentially consequential missed opportuni ty.
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The role of Parliamentarians in addressing foreign interference
163. The Committee recognizes that the problem of foreign interference in democratic
institutions and processes is not the government’s alone to solve. Parliamentarians have a role
to play as well. The Committee has seen considerable evidence that Parliamentarians across all
parties and groups are potential targets for interference activities of foreign states and actors
because of the roles they play in Parliament, in Cabinet and within the communities they
represent. As such, Parliamentarians need to ensure ethical and lawful conduct in their
engagement and activities with foreign officials. The Conflict of Interest and Ethics
Commissioner and the Senate Ethics Officer could play a role, in this regard, if they were
respectively empowered to provide Parliamentarians with direction and advice on how to avoid
exposure to foreign interference, and to investigate allegations linked to foreign interference.
More broadly, Parliamentarians should also consider what vulnerabilities persist in areas that
they themselves control, such as their official business, including sponsored travel, party
nominations or engagements with foreign officials. In doing so, it would become it harder for
foreign states to target them and their parties.
164. Unfortunately, the Committee has also seen troubling intelligence that some
Parliamentarians are, in the words of the intelligence services, “semi-witting or witting”
participants in the efforts of foreign states to interfere in our politics. These examples in clude:
x Communicating frequently with foreign missions before or during a political campaign to

obtain support from community groups or businesses which the diplomatic missions
promise to quietly mobilize in a candidate’s favour;
x Accepting knowingly or through willful blindness funds or benefits from foreign missions
or their proxies which have been layered or otherwise disguised to conceal their source;
x Providing foreign diplomatic officials with privileged information on the work or opinions
of fellow Parliamentarians, knowing that such information will be used by those officials
to inappropriately pressure Parliamentarians to change their positions;
x Responding to the requests or direction of foreign officials to improperly influence
Parliamentary colleagues or Parliamentary business to the advantage of a foreign state;
and,
x Providing information learned in confidence from the government to a known intelligence
officer of a foreign state.
These are particularly concerning examples of behaviour by a few Parliamentarians. Some may
be illegal, but are unlikely to lead to criminal charges, owing to Canada’s failure to address the
long-standing issue of protecting classified information and methods in judicial processes.
Regardless, all the behaviours are deeply unethical and, the Committee would submit, contrary
to the oaths and affirmations Parliamentarians take to conduct themselves in the best interest of
Canada. While some of the Committee’s recommendations should help the government to
address instances of f oreign interference abetted by Parliamentarians, the Committee reminds
its colleagues that their duty as Parliamentarians is to the people of Canada.
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Committee comments
The Committee’s comment on unauthorized disclosure of intelligence (the leaks)
165. The genesis of this review was media reporting based on unauthorized leaks of highly
sensitive intelligence. It is not the Committee’s mandate to investigate the leaks, nor comment
on individual allegations reported in the media. That said, the Committee is deeply troubled by
both the leaks and the media’s decision to publish material derived from highly classified
intelligence. There are justifiable reasons why the government cannot share information with the
public, not least of which is to protect confidential sources and methods and the integrity of its
relationships with allies. The leaks may well have *** undermined specific aspects of Canada’s
national security. They certainly have provided hostile threat actors with critical information
about the government’s capabilities, vulnerabilities and plans, doing significant damage to
intelligence collection efforts and to Canada’s reputation as a trusted foreign partner. The
Committee rejects any notion that the individual or individuals responsible for the leaks acted as
patriots or whistleblowers.
166. On the other hand, the Committee acknowledges an uncomfortable truth. Prior to the
leaks, there was little sense of urgency between elected officials and senior decision-makers to
address outstanding gaps to this important and well-documented threat to national security.
Regrettably, the leaks were the principal catalyst for the government to start considering key
legislative reforms and to take meaningful actions against particular states. But the ends do not
justify the means and that is not how our system should work. Canada is a parliamentary
democracy. The illegal actions of one or more individuals should not drive policy and legislative
changes. The elected government, with the support of Parliament, must set the agenda. It is
unfortunate that it took leaks to do so.
The Committee’s comment on the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol and
the integrity of the 43rd and 44th federal elections
167. As the Canadian public has learned from the reports of the Critical Elections Incident
Public Protocol and the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, the
government was aware of foreign interference activities during the 43 rd and 44th general
elections. Often, these activities targeted specific political candidates and ridings. However, the
reports agreed that the overall integrity of the respective elections was maintained. While the
Committee did not focus exclusively on the 43 rd and 44th elections, it did not observe any
material in its review to suggest that the Protocol reports’ or the Independent Special
Rapporteur’s conclusions were incorrect. Nonetheless, it notes two concerns.
168. First, the Committee cautions future Panels about relying too heavily on a clear link to a
foreign state. In the case of the potential disinformation campaign about the Conservative
Party’s position on the PRC flagged by Kenny Chiu and the Honourable Erin O’Toole, the
Committee is concerned that the Protocol set too high a bar by relying on definitive state
attribution when the indicators of a coordinated campaign were evident. Direct state attribution
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will always be challenging, if not impossible, given states’ efforts to conceal disinformation
campaigns through proxies and other means. It appears that the Rapid Response M echanism is
successfully addressing this dynamic in its June 2023 public announcement of an information
campaign targeting Member of Parliament Michael Chong. Implementation of the Protocol
should evolve in a similar manner.
169. Second, the Committee joins the authors of those reports in noting the difficulty in
determining the effects of foreign interference in specific ridings. Foreign states and their
proxies clearly intended and attempted to interfere in the elections, but to the extent that can be
determined they were not successful in swaying the overall outcome of the election. This should
not give Canadians great comfort. By expanding its review of foreign interference activities
directed at democratic processes and institutions outside of the previous two elections, the
Committee saw concerning intelligence of foreign states interfering in, for example, specific
nomination processes and riding elections. The Committee was disturbed to learn that these
foreign states often believed their efforts had an impact, which would likely encourage similar
behaviour in the future.
170. In the Committee’s view, foreign interference in even one riding is too many. The threat is
persistent and pervasive. The government must ensure that foreign interference is not left
unchecked, lest it become determinative both in future elections at the party nomination and
riding levels and more broadly in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions.
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70
Conclusion
171. This report represents the third time the Committee has reviewed the government’s
response to threats of foreign interference. Its 2018 report introduced the Committee to the
threat in the specific context of the Prime Minister’s official visit to India. Its 2019 report was a
more thorough examination of foreign interference activities from 2015 to 2018. Although the
Committee opted not to study electoral interference in light of the government’s early efforts to
counter specific threats in this area, its recommendations to counter foreign interf erence were
sufficiently broad to address interference across a wide spectrum, including democr atic
processes and institutions (see Annex D). Given the risks posed by foreign interference to
Canada’s national security, the Committee expected the government to act. It was slow to do
so. Indeed, the Prime Minister has acknowledged publicly that the government needed to do a
better job of following up on the Committee’s recommendations. 411
172. In the Committee’s view, this delay contributed in part to the crisis in which the
government found itself in late 2022 and early 2023. A number of unauthorized leaks of
intelligence raised significant concerns about the state of foreign interference in Canada and in
our democratic processes and institutions. The Prime Minister requested three separate
reviews, one by the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, one by the
National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and one by this Committee. Specifically, he
asked the Committee to “assess the state of foreign interference in federal election processes”
with respect to “foreign interference attempts that occurred in the 43 rd and 44th federal general
elections, including potential effects on Canada’s democracy and institutions.” 412
173. The Committee accepted the Prime Minister’s request, expanding its scope in order to
conduct a review that captured the broader issues of foreign interference in our democratic
processes and institutions. This review revealed that the reforms implemented by the
government in 2018 were insufficient to address foreign interference in democratic processes
and institutions. While the government recognized this gap in 2018, it took four ye ars to develop
and approve its “Hostile Activities by State Actors” strategy. A key part of the strategy,
consultations on legislative reforms, was then delayed by over a year. The length of this process
did not, in the Committee’s view, demonstrate a sense of urgency commensurate wit h the
gravity of the threat.
174. The delay in these actions, many of which had been recommended by the Committee,
undermined the government’s operational responses to the threat. With no new tools, the
security and intelligence community was forced to rely upon existing authorities and legislation.
Gaps in these areas limited the ability of security and intelligence organizations to act,
particularly with respect to sharing information with law enforcement bodies to enable
investigations, lay charges or support prosecutions. Similarly, CSIS was largely unable to share
411 CBC News, “Prime Minister admits he hasn’t heeded intelligence watchdog’s recommendations in the past,”
March 2023.
412 Prime Minister, “Taking further action on foreign interference and strengthening confidence in our democracy ,”
March 6, 2023.
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salient information with key stakeholders outside of the federal g overnment, notably with
Parliamentarians and other orders of government. These gaps contribute to a situation in which
there are few meaningful deterrents to foreign states and their Canada-based proxies to
conduct interference activities.
175. The slow response to a known threat was a serious failure and one from which Canada
may feel the consequences for years to come. The implications of this inaction include the
undermining of the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians, the integrity and
credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process, and public trust in the policy decisions made by
the government. Canada is only now beginning to see the introduction of additional measures to
address foreign interference activities.
176. The threat of foreign interference is pervasive and persistent. It is imperative that the
government act now to address the vulnerabilities that make Canada’s democratic processes
and institutions an easy target. The government must ensure that legislation keeps pace with
this evolving threat so that the security and intelligence community has the tools it needs to
respond to the threat in a way that discourages future interference efforts. It must clearly define
thresholds for response and clarify the roles and mandates of governance bodies to support a
coherent and coordinated response to instances of foreign interference, and the accountabilities
of Ministers. The government must also address deficiencies in how intelligence is distributed,
assessed and used internally, and in doing so build a culture where officials and Ministers alike
are seized with and accountable for identifying challenges and taking decisions to address
them.
177. Bearing in mind its responsibility for ensuring Canada’s national security, the federal
government needs to act swiftly to remove the obstacles that prevent it from playing an effective
leadership role throughout the country in countering foreign interference. These include
outdated legislation governing the sharing of classified information, stalled initiatives to inform
the Canadian public and other key stakeholders, and the absence of mechanisms to engage
other orders of government. The Committee underscores that b riefing Parliamentarians on the
threat is imperative.
178. Finally, Parliamentarians have a role to play. They must recognize that as lawmakers,
they may be targets of f oreign interference because of the positions they occupy and the
decisions they take. The Committee calls on Parliamentarians to carefully consider all ethical
and legal ramifications of their engagement with foreign officials or their proxies, and act to
reduce their own vulnerabilities. Foreign interference is not “politics as usual.” Parliamentarians
must be part of the solution.
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Findings
179. The Committee makes the following findings:
F1 Foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference specifically

targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, occurring before, during
and after elections and in all orders of government. These activities continue to pose a
significant threat to national security, and to the overall integrity of Canada’s
democracy. The PRC and India are the most active perpetrators.
F2 The government was aware in 2018 that the reforms implemented under the Plan to
Protect Democracy were insufficient to address foreign interference in democratic
processes and institutions. It has yet to implement an effective response to foreign
interference in democratic processes and institutions. This is despite a significant body
of intelligence reporting, the completion of foundational policy work, public
consultations and having been called to do so by this Committee.
F3 Significant differences persist in how Ministers, departments and agencies interpret

the gravity and prevalence of the threat, including the threshold for response.
x The intelligence community increased its reporting to the government on the

threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and
institutions in response to Canada’s intelligence priorities.
x Policy departments (Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, and Public
Safety) did not adequately consider intelligence reporting or assessments, or
develop policy advice to address specific cases of foreign interference.
x Ministers accountable for national security did not request policy advice in
response to intelligence reporting and the government was slow to put in place
governance structures to consider intelligence and take decisions.
F4 The roles, mandates and accountabilities of the National Security Council and
supporting governance committees are unclear.
F5 Canada’s current legal framework does not enable the security and intelligence
community or law enforcement to respond effectively to foreign interference activities.
This impedes the federal government’s ability to engage other orders of government
and law enforcement with respect to sharing and use of classified intelligence,
respectively.
F6 While departments and agencies conducted operations to disrupt or deter foreign

interference, tangible results with respect to the level of actual threat reduction were
difficult to measure.
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F7 The government continues to lack an effective approach to engage with the Canadian
public and other orders of government. While it has increased engagement with some
Parliamentarians, political parties and electoral candidates, its efforts have been time-
bound (i.e., election-focused), narrowly targeted, often reactive and the information
provided too general. It has also repeatedly failed to implement a comprehensive
approach to engaging federal Parliamentarians.
F8 The government’s ability to address vulnerabilities in political party administration is

limited.
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Recommendations
180. The Committee makes the following recommendations:
R1 The government table legislation before the next federal election to address gaps in
Canada’s legal framework with respect to foreign interference, specifically to:
a) Create a foreign influence transparency registry;

b) Amend the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act to define foreign
interference and introduce relevant offences;
c) Modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, including to
facilitate wider sharing of classified information;
d) Address the intelligence and evidence challenge; and,
e) Reduce vulnerabilities in political nomination processes, including leadership
conventions.
R2 The government engage political parties to determine whether party nomination

processes and leadership conventions be included within the framework of the
Canada Elections Act, and work with Parliament to determine whether the statute
governing the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and the Senate Ethics
Officer be revised to include foreign interference.
R3 The government review and renew legislation, strategies and funding to ensure they
keep pace with the evolution of foreign interference activities and other national
security threats, and regularly include and respect legislative review provisions in
national security legislation.
R4 The government ensure that the roles, mandates and accountabilities of the National
Security Council and supporting governance committees are clear and publicly
communicated to improve transparency and performance.
R5 The security and intelligence community develop consistent definitions and thresholds
for action with respect to foreign interference, and organizations responsible for
intelligence collection and those responsible for providing policy advice, respectively,
regularly collaborate to provide the government timely and comprehensive
assessments of threats and advice for action.
R6 The government immediately implement and report annually on the briefings for
Parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference.
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76
Annexes
Annex A: List of witnesses
The Ministry
x The Right Honourable Justin P.J. Trudeau, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada
x The Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs
x The Honourable Dominic Leblanc, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety, Democratic
Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs
x The Honourable Arif Virani, P.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
x Director
x Deputy Chief, Foreign Interference
x Foreign Interference Coordinator
x Director General, ***
x Acting Director General, ***
x Deputy Chief, ***
x Senior Intelligence Analyst
Communications Security Establishment
x Deputy Chief, Authorities, Compliance and Transparency

x Director, ***
x Director, ***
Elections Canada
x Chief Electoral Officer of Canada

x Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Security and Digital Transformation
Global Affairs Canada
x Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

x Assistant Deputy Minister, Indo-Pacific
x Chief Intelligence Officer, Director General Intelligence Bureau
x Director General, Office of Human Rights, Freedoms, and Inclusion
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Justice Canada
x Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General

x Assistant Deputy Minister, Public Safety, Defence and Immigration
x Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Sector
Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
x Commissioner of Canada Elections

x Senior Director, Enforcement
Privy Council Office
x Deputy Clerk
x Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Governance
x National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister
x Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence
x Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government
x Executive Director, Task Force on Foreign Interference
Public Safety Canada
x Associate Deputy Minister

x National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator and Assistant Deputy Minister,
National and Cyber Security Branch
x Director, Counter-Foreign Interference
x Director, National Security Operations
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
x Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing

x Acting Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing National Security
x Acting Director General, Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing
x Senior Advisor, Federal Policing Strategic Management
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Annex B: Terms of Reference
Review: Foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes
Overview
On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister requested that the National Security and Intelligence
Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP, or the Committee) “complete a review to assess the
state of foreign interference in federal electoral processes” with respect to “foreign interference
attempts that occurred in the 43rd and 44th federal general elections, including potential effects
on Canada’s democracy and institutions.”
The Committee met on March 7, 2023 and considered the Prime Minister’s request. It decided
on a broader review under paragraph 8(1)(a) of the NSICOP Act of the state of foreign
interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes, from 2018 to the present, and may
examine other periods, where relevant. The Committee will consider the latest independent
assessment of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.
On March 8, 2023, the Committee announced its Review of Foreign interference in Canada’s
federal democratic processes, 2018 - present. The review will build on the Committee’s 2019
review of the government’s response to foreign interference, which focused on the period
January 1, 2015 to August 31, 2018.
Definitions
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act describes “foreign influenced activities” as
“activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Can ada and are
clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person.” The term “foreign influence” also
appears in the Security of Information Security Act.
That said, the term “foreign interference” has become common in Canada and among its allies
to better distinguish between acceptable diplomatic practices and hostile or unlawful practices.
The Committee uses “foreign interference,” but emphasizes that its definition is identical to that
of “foreign influenced activities,” as described in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.
Democratic processes and institutions include the candidate nomination process, fundraising
and donations, the campaign, and the election itself, and key actors such as voters, political
parties, lobby groups, community organizations and the media.
Foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions can include using deceptive
means to “cultivate relationships with elected officials and others perceived to possess influence
in the political process; seek to inf luence the reporting of Canadian media outlets; seek, in some
cases, to affect the outcome of elections; and coerce or induce diaspora communities to
79
advance foreign interests in Canada.” It can also include the spread of false narratives through
disinformation campaigns.
Objectives
This review has two primary objectives. The first is to examine the state of foreign interference
in Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions.
The second objective is to examine the federal government’s response t o the threat of foreign
interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions, including:
x Strategies, policies, and approaches to protecting Canada’s federal democratic

processes and institutions from this threat;
x The implementation and resourcing of the operational response to the threat;
x Interdepartmental coordination of the policy and operational response to the threat;
x The legislative frameworks for investigating, prohibiting, preventing or countering this
threat;
x The engagement by relevant organizations with ministers or their offices on related
threats, issues, or challenges, or in the use of organizational authorities to investigate,
disrupt, or collect information on such threats.
As with previous reviews, the Committee will arrive at findings and make recommendations.
Officials and others will be called, as required.
The review may provide an update about the government responses of the other countries to
foreign interference in national democratic processes and institutions.
Cooperation with NSIRA
Consistent with paragraph 9 of the NSICOP Act, the Committee will take all reasonable steps to
cooperate with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency to avoid unnecessary
duplication of work in relation to the fulfilment of their respective mandates. This will include
regular coordination meetings between Secretariats and may include shared document requests
and information briefings.
Appearances
Consistent with paragraph 18 of the NSICOP Act, government officials will be invited to appear
before the Committee in private. The Committee will publish a list of senior officials who appear.
80
Annex C: Timeline of the government’s response to foreign
interference in democratic processes and institutions, 2018 to 2024
81
82
Annex D: Foreign interference-related findings and
recommendations from NSICOP’s 2019 annual report
Findings:
83
Recommendations:
The Committee reiterated a recommendation from its Special report into the allegations
associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018 :
84

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National Security and Intelligence Committee of

Special Report on Foreign Interference in

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and

The National Security and Intelligence

The Honourable David McGuinty, P.C., M.P.

Submitted to the Prime Minister on March 22, 2024

The Honourable David J. McGuinty, P.C., M.P. (Chair)

Mr. Stéphane Bergeron, M.P.

Mr. Don Davies, M.P.

The Honourable Patricia Duncan, Senator

The Honourable Marty Klyne, Senator

The Honourable Frances Lankin, P.C., C.M., Senator

Ms. Patricia Lattanzio, M.P.

Mr. James Maloney, M.P. (ceased being a member on September 17,

Mr. Rob Morrison, M.P.

Mr. Alex Ruff, M.S.C., C.D., M.P.

2. On November 1, 2022, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and

3. On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister requested or announced a number of independent

Key processes include:

x the election itself; 11

x Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS);

ballots, counting ballots and disseminating results.

Broadly speaking, foreign interference includes attempts to covertly influence, intimidate,

Foreign interference involves foreign states, or persons/entities operating on their behalf,

campaigns. NSICOP, Annual Report 2019, 2020.

21 CSIS, *** 2021.

24 CSIS, Written response to NSICOP Secretariat, November 20, 2023.

Key threat actors

Transnational repression refers to the exertion of control of an ethnocultural community by a

Government in Chinatown in Manhattan,” April 17, 2023.

Covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural

Exploiting traditional and social media

Exploiting ethnocultural communities

Report, January 2022.

Jamestown Foundation, Volume 20, Issue 16, September 16, 2020.

43. Community organizations can also be used in a practice known as “ astro-turfing,” by

Targeting parliamentarians for coercion or suppression

Secretariat questions, October 2023.

116 CSIS, *** 2023.

Parliament, signed by the Minister of Public Safety on May 18, 2023.

Leveraging relationships with influential Canadians

Establishing reciprocal relationships

The use of proxies

Case Study #2 : *** A proxy’s activities pose a threat to national security

Covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials

189 *** 2019.

NSICOP Report, January 19, 2024.

Use of cyber tools to attain specific objectives

Cyber attacks on electoral infrastructure

Cyber attacks on political parties and parliamentarians

The Plan to Protect Democracy (*** 2018)

81. Canada’s strategic response to foreign interference in democratic processes and

x Formalizing government responses to foreign interference during an election campaign,

235 PCO, “Protecting Canada’s Democracy: Overview,” February 18, 2020.

239 Government of Canada, “Strengthening Canada’s electoral system,” December 7, 2023.

Protocol,” February 20, 2023.

review of the RCMP Federal Policing mandate, June 2022.

Strategy to Counter Hostile Activities by State Actors (HASA)

99. A classified internal-to-government Countering HASA Strategy: The Strategy prioritized

361 CSIS email, * GAC Briefing Summary,” * 2022.