(Loeb Classical Library No. 164) Harold North Fowler, W. R. M. Lamb - Plato - Statesman. Philebus. Ion.-Harvard University Press (1925)

NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE
TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation
https://archive.org/details/statesmanphilebuOOOOplat
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.
EDITED BY
t T. E. PAGE, c.n., litt.d.
t E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. f W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d.
L. A. POST, l.h.d. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.iiist.soo.
PLATO
THE STATESMAN
PHILEBUS
ION
PLATO
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
THE STATESMAN · PHILEBUS

BY
HAROLD N. FOWLER, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF GREEK, WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
ION
BY
W. R. M. LAMB, M.A.
SOMETIME FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

MCMLXII
First printed 1925
Reprinted 1939, 1942, 1952, 1962
Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE.Vli
GENERAL INTRODUCTION. IX
TI1E STATESMAN. 1
PHTLE15US . .. 1<)7
ion... 401
INDEX , , . . I.448
40602
PREFACE
The Greek text of the Statesman and the Philebus is

based upon the Codex Clarkianus (B) and the Codex
Venetus (T). Deviations from the text as given in
one or other of these mss. are noted in the margin at
the foot of the page. In most instances disagreement
between these two mss. and occasionally readings
found in inferior mss. or in ancient quotations, as
well as emendations olfered by modern scholars, are
noted, even when they have not affected the text
chosen. The following abbreviations are employed :—
B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written a.d.

895.
T = Codex Venetus, Append, class. 4, cod. 1 ;
twelfth century.
W = Codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. graec. 7.
D = Codex Venetus 185.
G = Codex Venetus, Append, class. 4, cod. 54.
btw = later hands of BTW.
vii
PREFACE
The brief introductions aim merely at supplying

such information as may in some measure aid the
reader to appreciate these particular dialogues.
Harold N. Fowler.
The text here given of the Ion is based on the

recension of Schanz. Two modern corrections are
adopted and noted at 533 d and 539 e. The intro¬
duction and notes are intended to give only
immediate help in understanding the dialogue.
W. R. M. Lamb.
viii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Plato was born in 427 b.c. of Athenian parents who

could provide him with the best education of the
day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life.
He came to manhood in the dismal close of the
Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the
height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides
had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless
heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other
sophists, and his early bent seems to have been
towards poetry. But his intelligence was too pro¬
gressive to rest in the agnostic position on which
the sophistic culture was based. A century before,
Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible,
because the objects of sense are continually changing ;
yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a
theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by
developing some hints let fall by its oracular author
about the truth contained in names. From this
influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates,
whose character and gifts have left a singular impress
on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost
wholly due to Plato’s applications and extensions of
a 2 IX
his master’s thought; since, fortunately for us, the

pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but
brought his artistic genius into play, and composed
the memorials of philosophic talk which we know
as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and
Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew
similar sketches of his teaching : the suggestion
came from the “ mimes ” of the Syracusan Sophron,
—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary
types of character. As Plato became more engrossed
in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse
was strengthened by the desire of recording each
definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion
and advance.
When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was
over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens
for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he
tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific
explanations of the universe, and found them full of
puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anax¬
agoras,—that the cause of everything is “ mind.”
This was more promising : but it led nowhere after
all, since it failed to rise above the conception of
physical energy ; this “ mind ” showed no intelligent
aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe
works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the
plan of making definitions of “ beautiful,” “ good,”
large,” and so on, as qualities observed in the several
classes of beautiful, good and large material things,
and then employing these propositions, if they
x
appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher

hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science
out of a recognized theory of “ ideas ” or “ forms,”
which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated
when we say “ this man is good,” and which postu¬
lates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects
of sense. His “ hypothetical ” method, familiar to
mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance
in the Republic.
The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate
scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory
of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest
reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and
the soul. For some years before the master’s death
(399 b.c.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was
often a spell-bound hearer of the “ satyr.” But
ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which
varied according to their age and the extent of their
acquaintance with him. Aristophanes’ burlesque in
the Clouds (423 b.c.) had left a common impression
not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet
the young men who had any frequent speech with
him in his later years, while they felt there was
something uncanny about him, found an irresistible
attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight
into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent elo¬
quence on the principles of their actions and careers.
He kept no school, and took no fees ; he distrusted
the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom
he was carelessly confounded ; moreover, he professed
xi
to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to

know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues,
such as the Apology, Crito, Euihyphro, Charmides,
Laches, and Lysis, show the manner in which lie
performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially
those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing
themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect,
the law of definite individual knowledge, above all
reason of state or tie of party ; and it is not sur¬
prising that his city, in the effort of recovering her
political strength, decided to hush such an in¬
convenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate,
but he continued his work undeterred.
Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have
professed no positive doctrine, there were one or
two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue,
he said, is knowledge ; for each man’s good is his
happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs
must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge
is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it
awakened and exercised by “ dialectic,” or a system¬
atic course of question and answer. He also be¬
lieved his mission to be divinely ordained, and
asserted that his own actions were guided at times
by the prohibitions of a “ spiritual sign.” He was
capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in
rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and
once for as long as twenty-four hours.
It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive
theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance
xii
on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in

a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and
mystical suggestions must have led his favourite
pupils a good way towards a new system of meta¬
physics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped
their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique
affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that
happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings
with the material world, and that the mind has
prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic
life.
After the death of Socrates in 399> Plato spent
some twelve years in study and travel. For the
first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara,
where Eucieides, his fellow-student and friend, was
forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have
composed some of the six Dialogues already men¬
tioned as recording Socrates’ activity in Athens.
Towards and probably beyond the end of this period,
in order to present the Socratic method in bolder
conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the
Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias. These
works show a much greater command of dramatic
and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The
last of them may well be later than 387, the year in
which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better
the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to
Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the
Academy ; where the memory of his master was to
be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the
xiii
Socratic discussions among the elect of the new

generation. The rivalry of this private college with
the professional school of Isocrates is discernible
in the subject and tone of the Gorgias. Plato
carried on the direction of the Academy till his
death, at eighty-one, in 346 ; save that half-way
through this period (367) he accepted the invitation
of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the
younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant
had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato’s
talk : now it was a wayward youth who refused the
yoke of a systematic training. What that training
was like we see in the Republic, where true political
wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through
mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned,
with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make
wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.
The Meno and Gorgias set forth the doctrine that
knowledge of right is latent in our minds : dialectic,
not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of
eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived,
must be long and difficult : but he felt a mystical
rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture
the immutable “ forms ” as existing in a w'orld of
their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence
it springs—that know'ledge is somehow possible, had
come to the front of his mind when he began to
know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the
Cratylus and Symposium, display the strength of the
conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the
xiv
feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest

powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are
summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute
beauty. The Phaedo turns the logical theory upon
the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from
the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types
of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the
Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an
inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of
death.
With increasing confidence in himself as the
successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the
Republic, to show the master meeting his own un¬
satisfied queries on education and politics. We read
now of a “ form ” of good to which all thought and
action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will
explain not merely why justice is better than in¬
justice, but the meaning and aim of everything.
In order that man may be fully understood, we are
to view him “ writ large ” in the organization of an
ideal state. The scheme of description opens out
into many subsidiary topics, including three great
proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of
private property, the community of women and
children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But
the central subject is the preparation of the philo¬
sopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for
dialectic ; so that, once possessed of the supreme
truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men.
As in the Phaedo, the spell of mythical revelation is
xv
brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The

Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us
allegorically into the realm of “ ideas,” and thence to
point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained
dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philo¬
sopher’s duty of investigating the mutual relations
of the “ forms ” to which his study of particular
things has led him.
A closer interest in logical method, appearing
through his delight in imaginative construction, is
one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato’s
teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues,
the Theaetelus and Parmenides, he puts off the
aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as cate¬
gories of thought which require co-ordination. The
discussion of knowledge in the former makes it
evident that the Academy was now the meeting-
place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager
to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had
learnt from other schools of thought ; while the
arguments are conducted with a critical caution
very different from the brilliant and often hasty
zeal of Socrates. The Parmenides corrects an actual
or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in
the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle,
now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with
the theory as he understood it. The forms are
viewed in the light of the necessities of thought:
knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice
which will raise our minds to the vision of all parti-
xvi
culars in their rightly distinguished and connected

classes.
Plato is here at work on his own great problem :—
If what we know is a single permanent law under
which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the
link between the one and the many ? The Sophist
contains some of his ripest thought on this increas¬
ingly urgent question : his confident advance beyond
Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form,
which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of
a lecture. We observe an attention to physical
science, the association of soul, motion, and existence,
and the comparative study of being and not-being.
The Politicus returns to the topic of state-government,
and carries on the process of acquiring perfect
notions of reality by the classification of things.
Perhaps we should see in the absolute “ mean ”
which is posited as the standard of all arts, business,
and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The
Philebus, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge,
dwells further on the correct division and classifica¬
tion required if our reason, as it surely must, is to
apprehend truth. The method is becoming more
thorough and more complex, and Plato’s hope of
bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is
gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity
and plurality.
The magnificent myth of the Tirnaeus, related
by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the
universe, so as to show how the One manifests
xvii
itself as the Many. We have here the latest

reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many
physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the
Laws he addresses himself to the final duty of the
philosopher as announced in the Republic : a long
habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather
than disqualify him for the practical regulation of
public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once
more on soul, as the energy of the world and the
vehicle of our sovereign reason.
Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of
knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge
the compass of Socrates’ teaching till it embraces
enough material for complete systems of logic and
metaphysics. How far these systems Avere actually
w'orked out in the discussions of the Academy we can
only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and
a careful comparison of Aristotle ; whose writings,
however, have come down to us in a much less
perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the
end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content
with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may
be able to detect in the Timaeus a tendency to
view numbers as the real principles of things ; and
we may conjecture a late-found interest in the
physical complexion of the world. As a true artist,
with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life,
Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, through¬
out ; but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science
we must regard him rather as a great inventor of
xviii
sciences than as what ~we should now call a scientist.

This is giving him a splendid name, which few men
have earned. Some of his inventions may be un¬
realizable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly
futile. There are flaws in his arguments : to state
them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of
taking part in a discussion at the Academy.
W. R. M. Lamb.
[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole.

The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduc¬
tion is that which agrees best in the main with modern views
of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some
instances is uncertain.]
SIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following give useful accounts of Socratic and

Platonic thought:—·
T. Gomperz : The Greek Thinkers, vols. ii. and iii. Murray,
1901-5.
W. Lutoslawski: The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic.
Longmans, 1897.
R. L. Nettleship : Philosophic Lectures and Remains. 2 vols.
Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1901.
D. G. Ritchie : Plato. T. and T. Clark, 1902.
J. A. Stewart: The Myths of Plato. Macmillan, 1905.
» )! Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. Clarendon Press,
1909.
A. E. Taylor: Plato. Constable, 1911.
A. M. Adam : Plato : Moral and Political Ideals. Camb.
Univ. Press, 1913.
H. Jackson : Presocratics, Socrates and the Minor Socratics,
Plato and the Old Academy (Cambridge Companion to
Greek Studies). Camb. Univ. Press, 1905.
The following are important editions :—

J. Adam: The Republic. 2 vols. Camb. Univ. Press, 1902.
W. H. Thompson : The Phaedrus. Bell, 1868.
>» »» The Gorgias. Bell, 1871.
R. D. Archer-Hind : The Phaedo. Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1894.
" » The Timaeus. Macmillan, 1888.
J. Burnet: The Phaedo. Clarendon Press, 1911.
L. Campbell: The Theaetetus. Clarendon Press, 1883.
»« i. The Sophistes and Politicus. Clarendon Press
1867.
E. S. Thompson : The Meno. Macmillan, 1901.
xx
THE STATESMAN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN
The Statesman or Politicus is in form a continuation

of The Sophist. Socrates, Theodorus, the Eleatic
Stranger, and Theaetetus meet again, and the Stranger
is ready to proceed to discuss the Statesman as he
had discussed the Sophist on the previous day.
As in the Theaetetus and The Sophist, other hearers
are supposed to be present, and one of them, the
young Socrates, now takes the place of Theaetetus
as interlocutor. But in this dialogue, as in The
Sophist, the dramatic form is hardly more than a
convention. The Stranger delivers a thinly disguised
lecture.
The process of acquiring knowledge of reality by
classification of things by means of division is carried
on here, as in The Sophist, and the importance of the
dialectic method is emphasized. The doctrine that
virtue and art find their standard in the absolute
mean appears here for the first time, foreshadowing
the teachings of Aristotle.
The subject of the dialogue, apart from its insist¬
ence upon method, is the State, quite as much as
the Statesman. Plato maintains that the King or
the Statesman may do good to the citizens against
their will, even by violence, at least in theory; but
INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN
in the world as it is, he finds three chief kinds of

government,—by one ruler, by the few, and by the
many. A divine and perfect ruler might rule without
laws, but human governments can be only imitations
of the divine ; in them, therefore, laws are necessary.
The best government is found to be a monarchy
with laws ; the government of the few is inter¬
mediate ; but democracy has little power for good
or ill; it is therefore the least good of lawful
governments and the least bad of governments
without law.
The long mythical tale of the reversed motion of
the world and the consequent reversal of the processes
of life contains serious teachings concerning the
relations of God to the universe and to man, but is
not an attempt to solve all the difficulties that arise
in connexion therewith. The division of property,
as it appears in the state, into classes is original
and illuminating. This dialogue, like The Sophist,
is rather hard reading, but is an important part
the body of Platonic doctrine.
3
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ
[η ΠΕΡΙ ΒΑ2ΙΛΕΙΑ2, ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]
π ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
u 2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2, 0ΕΟΔΩΡΟ2, ΞΕΝ02, 2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2 Ο ΝΕΩΤΕΡ02
I. 2Ω. ΤΗ πολλήν χάριν οφείλω σοι τής θεαιτή-

του γνωρίσεως, ώ Θεόδωρε, άμα καί τής τοΰ ξένου.
» θεο. Τάχα δε', ώ Σιώκρατες, όφειλήσεις ταντης
τριπλασίαν, επειδάν τόν τε πολιτικόν άπεργάσωνταί
σοι και τον φιλόσοφον.
2Ω. Ειερ· ουτω τούτο, ώ φίλε Θεόδωρε, φήσομεν
άκηκοότες είναι τοΰ περί λογισμούς και τα γεωμε¬
τρικά κρατίστου ;
Β ΘΕΟ. ΓΙώ?, ώ Ίόώκρατες;
2Ω. Τώρ άνδρών έκαστον θεντός1 τής ίσης αξίας,
οι τή τιμή πλέον άλλήλων άφεστασιν ή κατά την
αναλογίαν την τής ύμετερας τέχνης.
ΘΕΟ. Ευ νε νή τον ήμετερον θεόν, ώ 'Σιώκρατες,
τόν ’Άμμωνα και δικαίως, και πάνυ μεν ούν
1 θέντο$ Heindorf: θέντεs ΒΤ.
4
THE STATESMAN
[or ON KINGSHIP; logical]
CHARACTERS
SoCRATLS, TlIEODORUS, THE STRANGER, THE YOUNGER
Socrates
soc. Really I am greatly indebted to you, Theo¬

doras, for my acquaintance with Theaetetus and with
the Stranger, too.
theo. Presently, Socrates, you will be three times
as much indebted, when they have worked out the
statesman and the philosopher for you.
soc. Indeed ! My dear Theodoras, can I believe
my ears ? Were those really the words of the great
calculator and geometrician?
theo. Why, what do you mean, Socrates ?
soc. When you rated sophist, statesman, and
philosopher at the same value, though they are
farther apart in worth than your mathematical
proportion can express.
theo. By Amnion, our special divinity,1 that is a
good hit, Socrates; evidently you haven’t forgotten
1 Theodoras was from Cyreue, not far from the oasis of
Ammon.
5
PLATO
μνημονικώς επεπληξάς μοι το περί τούς λογισμούς

αμάρτημα, και σε μεν άντι τούτων εις αύθις
μετειμι· σύ δ’ ημΐν, ώ ξενε, μη8αμώς άποκάμης
χαριζόμ,ενος, αλλ’ έξης, ε’ιτε τον πολιτικόν ανδρα
C ττρότερον ε’ιτε τον φιλόσοφον προαιρεΐ, προ-
ελόμενος διεξελθε.
ΞΕ. Ταστ’, ώ Θεόδωρε, ποιητόον, επείπερ άπαξ
γε1 εγκεχειρηκαμεν, και ούκ άποστατόον πριν αν
αυτών προς τό τύλος ελθωμεν. άλλα γάρ περ'ι
θεαιτητου τοΰδε τί χρη δράν με;
ΘΕΟ. Τοΰ περί;
ΕΕ. Αιαναπαύσωμεν αυτόν μεταλαβόντες αυτού
τον συγγυμναστην τόνδε Σωκράτη; η πώς συμ¬
βουλεύεις;
ΘΕΟ. Κ,αθάπερ είπες, μεταλάμβανε· νεω γαρ
οντε ραον οΐσετον πάντα πόνον άναπαυομενω.
D 2Ω. Και μην κινδυνεύετον, ώ ξενε, άμφω ποθεν
εμοι ξυγγενειαν όχειν τινά. τον μεν γε ούν υμείς
κατά την τού προσώπου φύσιν όμοιον εμοι φαίνεσθαί
φάτε, τού δ’ ημιν η κλησις ομώνυμος ούσα και η
258 7τρόσρησις παρέχεται τινα οικειότητα, δει δη τούς
γε ξνγγενεΐς ημάς άει προθύμως διά λόγων άναγνω-
ρίζειν. θεαιτητω μεν ούν αυτός τε σννεμιξα χθες
διά λόγων και νΰν άκηκοα άποκρινομενου, Σ^ωκρά-
τους δε ουδέτερα· δει δε σκεφασθαι και τούτον,
εμοι μεν ούν εις αύθις, σοι δε νύν άποκρινεσθω.
ΞΕ. Ταυτ’ εσται. ώ Σώκρατες, ακούεις δη Σω-
κράτους;
ΝΕΟ 2 2Ω. Ηβί.
ΞΕ. Συγχωρεΐς ούν οΐς λεγει;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Γίάνυ μεν ούν.
1 7ε] τε ΒΤ.
6
THE STATESMAN
your mathematics, and you are quite right in finding

fault with my bad arithmetic. I will get even with
you at some other time; but now, Stranger, I turn
to you. Do not grow tired of being kind to us, but
go on and tell us about the statesman or the
philosopher, whichever you prefer to take first.
str. That is the thing to do, Theodoras, since we
have once begun, and we must not stop until we
have finished with them. But what shall I do about
Theaetetus here ?
theo. In what respect ?
str. Shall we give him a rest and take his school¬
mate here, the young Socrates, in his place ? What
is your advice ?
theo. Make the change as you suggest. They
are young, and if they have a chance to rest by turns,
they will bear any labour better.
soc. And besides, Stranger, it seems to me that
they are both related to me after a fashion ; one of
them anyhow, as you say, looks like me in his cast of
countenance, and the other has the same name and
appellation, which implies some sort of kinship. Of
course we ought always to be eager to get acquainted
with our relatives by debating with them. Now I
myself had an argument with Theaetetus yesterday
and have been listening to his answers just now, but
I do not know Socrates in either way and must
examine him, too. But let him reply to you now ;
my turn will come by and by.
str. Very well; Socrates, do you hear what
Socrates says ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And do you agree ?
Y. soc. Certainly.
7
PLATO
B ΞΕ. Ου τα σά κοΛυειν φαίνεται, δει δε ίσως

ετι ηττον τάμα διακωλυειν. αλλά δη μετά τον
σοφιστήν άναγκαΐον, ώς εμοί φαίνεται, τον πολιτι¬
κόν άνδρα1 διαζητεΐν νών καί μοι λεγε πότερον
των επιστημόνων τιν’ ημΐν καί τούτον θετε'ον, η
πώς;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Οντως.
2. he. Τά? επιστημας άρα διαληπτεον, ώσπερ
ηνίκα τον πρότερον εσκοποϋμεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΤΤγ’ αν.
ΞΕ. Οό μεν δη κατά ταντόν γε, ω Άιάκρατες,
φαίνεται μοι τμήμα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι μην;
C ΞΕ. Κατ’ άλλο.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Έοι/ce γε.
ΞΕ. Ύην ούν πολιτικήν ατραπόν πη τις άνευρη-
σει2; δει γάρ αυτήν ά,νευρεΐν, καί χωρίς άφελόντας
από των άλλων ιδέαν αυτή μίαν επισφραγίσασθαι,
καί ταΐς άλλαις εκτροπαΐς εν άλλο είδος επισημηνα-
μενους πάσας τάς επιστημας ώς ου σας δυο είδη
διανοηθηναι την φυγήν ημών ποιησαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύοΰτ’ ηδη σόν, οΐμαι, το εργον, ώ
ζενε, αλλ’ ουκ εμόν γίγνεται.
D ΞΕ. Αεί γε μην, ώ Ίόώκρατες, αυτό είναι καί
σόν, όταν εμφανες ημΐν γενηται.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κσ.Αώ? είπες.
ΞΕ. ’ Αρ’ οΰν ουκ αριθμητική μεν καί τινες ετεραι
ταυτη συγγενείς τε'χναι φιλαί τών πράξεων είσι, το
δε γνώναι παρεσχοντο μόνον;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έστιν ούτως.
1 τον ττοΧιτικδν Ανδρα. W : ττοΧιτικδν τον Ανδρα ΒΤ.
2 άνευρήσει] &;/ εύρηστ/ Β : &ν εΰρήσει Τ.
8
THE STATESMAN
str. There seems to be no objection on your part,

and I suppose there should be still less on mine.
Well, then, after the sophist, I think it is our next
duty to seek for the statesman ; so please tell me :
should we rank him also among those who have a
science, or not ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. Must the sciences, then, be divided as when
we were examining the sophist ?
y. soc. Perhaps.
str. In that case, Socrates, I think the division
will not be along the same lines.
y. soc. How will it be ?
str. Along other lines.
y. soc. Very likely.
str. Where, then, shall we find the statesman’s
path ? For we must find it, separate it from the
rest, and imprint upon it the seal of a single class;
then we must set the mark of another single class
upon all the other paths that lead away from this,
and make our soul conceive of all sciences as of two
classes.1
y. soc. This, Stranger, is now your affair, I think,
not mine.
str. And yet, Socrates, it must be your affair, too,
when we have found the path.

Y. soc. Quite true.
str. Are not arithmetic and certain other kindred
arts pure sciences, without regard to practical
application, which merely furnish knowledge ?
y. soc. Yes, they are.
1 i.e. one class is to be separated and then all the rest
are to be marked as one other class—the familiar division
into two parts.
9
PLATO
ΞΕ. At δε ye περ'ι τεκτονικήν αν και συμπασαν

χειρουργίαν ώσπερ εν ταΐς πράζεσιν ενοΰσαν
Ε ουμφυτον την επιστήμην κεκτηνται, και συναπο-
τελοΰσι τα γιγνόμενα ύπ’ αυτών σώματα πρότε-
ρον ούκ όντα.
ΞΕ. Ταάττ^ τοίνυν συμπάσας επιστημας διαιρεί,
την μεν πρακτικήν προσειπών, την δε μόνον γνω¬
στικήν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Εστω σοι ταΰθ’ ώς μιας επιστήμης της
όλης €iorj ουο.
ΞΕ. Πότερον ούν τον πολιτικόν και βασιλέα και
δεσπότην και ετ οικονόμον θησομεν ώς εν πάντα
ταΰτα προσαγορεύοντες, η τοσαυτας τεχνας αύτας
είναι φώμεν, όσαπερ ονόματα ερρηθη; μάλλον δε
μοι δεΰρο επου.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐΐη;
259 «Ε. Τ?]δε· εΐ τω τις των δημοσιευόντων ιατρών
ικανός ξυμβουλενειν ίδιωτενων αυτός, άρ’ ουκ
αναγκαΐον αύτώ π ροσαγο ρευεσθαι τοϋνομα της
τέχνης ταύτόν όπερ ω συμβουλεύει ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
ξε. π δ’ ; δστις βασιλευοντι χώρας άνδρι παρ-
αινεΐν δεινός ιδιώτης ών αυτός, αρ’ ου φησομεν
όχειν αυτόν την επιστήμην ην εδει τον άρχοντα αυτόν
κεκτησθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φησομεν.
Β ΞΕ. ’Αλλά μην η γε αληθινού βασιλεως βασιλική;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
ΞΕ. Ταυτήν δε ο κεκτημενος ουκ, άντε άρχων
άντε ιδιώτης ών τυγχάνη, πάντως κατά γε την
τέχνην αυτήν βασιλικός όρθώς προσρηθησεται;
10
THE STATESMAN
str. But the science possessed by the arts relating

to carpentering and to handicraft in general is
inherent in their application, and with its aid they
create objects which did not previously exist.
y. soc. To be sure.
str. In this way, then, divide all science into two
parts, calling the one practical, and the other purely
intellectual.
Y. soc. Let us assume that all science is one and

that these are its two forms.
str. Shall we then assume that the statesman,
king, master, and householder too, for that matter,
are all one, to be grouped under one title, or shall
we say that there are as many arts as names ? But
let me rather help you to understand in this way.
Y. soc. In what way ?
str. By this example : If anyone, though himself
in private station, is able to advise one of the public
physicians, must not his art be called by the same
name as that of the man whom he advises ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. Well, then, if a man who is himself in private
station is wise enough to advise him who is king
of a country, shall we not say that he has the science
which the ruler himself ought to possess ?
Y. soc. We shall.
str. But certainly the science of a true king is
kingly science ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And will not he who possesses this science,
whether he happen to be a ruler or a private citizen,
rightly be called “kingly,” when considered purely
with reference to his art ?
11
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Δίκαιον γοΰν.

3E. Καί μην οικονόμος γε και δεσπότης
ταυτόν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τί μην;
3Ε. Τι δε; μεγάλης σχήμα οίκησεως η σμικράς
αΰ πόλεως όγκος μών τι προς αρχήν διοισετον;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ολδεν.
0 HE. 0ύκοΰν, ό νυν δη διεσκοπουμεθα, φανερόν
ώς επιστήμη μία περί πάντ5 εστι ταΰτα· ταυτην
δε ε’ιτε βασιλικήν είτε πολιτικήν είτε οικονομικήν
τις ονομάζει, μηδέν αύτω διαφερώμεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι γάρ;
3· ΞΕ. ’Αλλά μην τάδε γε δηλον, ώς βασιλεύς
άπας χερσι καί ζυμπαντι τω σώματι σμίκρ’ άττα
εις τό κατεχειν την άρχην δυναται προς την της
φυχης συνεσιν καί ρώμην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δηλον.
HE. Τ·)]? δη γνωστικής μάλλον η της χειρο-
D τεχνικής καί όλως πρακτικής βουλει τον βασιλέα
φώμεν οίκειότερον είναι;
HE. Ύην άρα πολιτικήν καί πολιτικόν καί βασι¬
λικήν καί βασιλικόν εις ταντόν ώς εν πάντα ταΰτα
ζυνθησομεν ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δηλον.
ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν πορενοίμεθ' αν εζης, ει μετά, ταΰτα
την γνωστικήν διοριζοίμεθα;
νε. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ γε.
HE. Πρόσεχε δη τον νοΰν, αν άρα εν αύτη τινα
διο.φνην1 κατανοήσωμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φράζε ποιαν.
1 δίαφυην D : διαφυ-γήν ΒΤ (y erased in Τ).
12
THE STATESMAN
y. soc. At least he has a right to be.

str. And surely the householder and the master
of a family are the same.
y. soc. Yes, of course.
str. Well, so far as government is concerned, is
there any difference between the grandeur of a large
house and the majesty of a small state ?
y. soc. No.
str. Then as for the point we were just discussing,
it is clear that all these are the objects of one
science, and whether a man calls this the art of
kingship or statesmanship or householding, let us
not quarrel with him.
Y. soc. By no means.
str. But this is plain, that any king can do little
with his hands or his whole body toward holding his
position, compared with what he can do with the
sagacity and strength of his soul.
Y. soc. Yes, that is plain.
str. Shall we say, then, that the king is more
akin to the intellectual than to the manual or the
practical in general ?
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. Shall we, therefore, put all these together as
one—the political art and the statesman, the royal
art and the king ?
y. soc. Obviously.
str. Then we should be proceeding in due order
if we should next divide intellectual science ?
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. Now pay attention to see if we can perceive
any natural line of cleavage in it.
y. soc. Tell us of what sort it is.
B 13
PLATO
E EE. Τοιάνδε. λογιστική που τις ήμΐν ήν

τέχνη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
HE. Των γνωστικών γε, οΐμαι, πανταπασι τεχ¬
νών.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ου;
ΞΕ. Τνονση δε λογιστική τήν εν τοΐς άριθμοΐς
διαφοράν μών τι πλέον εργον δώσομεν ή τα γνω-
σθεντα κρΐναι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύί μην;
ΞΕ. Και γαρ άρχιτεκτων γε πας ούκ αυτός εργα¬
τικός άλλα εργατών αρχών.
νε. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. ΤΙαρεχόμενός γε που γνώσιν άλλ* ου χείρ¬
ονργίαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Οντως.
260 ΕΕ. Δικαίως δη μετεχειν αν λε'γοιτο τής γνω¬
στικής επιστήμης.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τουτω δε γε, οΐμαι, προσήκει κρίναντι μη
τέλος εχειν μηδ’ άπηλλάχθαι, καθάπερ 6 λογιστής
άπήλλακτο, προστάττειν δε εκάστοις τών εργατών
τό γε πρόσφορον, εως αν άπεργάσωνται τό προσ-
ταχθεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Όρθώς.
ΞΕ. 0υκοϋν γνωστικαι μεν αΐ τε τοιαΰται ξυμ-
πασαι και όπόσαι ξυνεπονται τή λογιστική, κρίσει
Βδέ και επιτάξει διαφερετον άλλήλοιν τουτω τώ
γένη;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φαίνεσθον.
ΞΕ. *Αρ' οΰν συμπάσης τής γνωστικής εί
τό μεν επιτακτικόν μέρος, τό δε κριτικόν δι-
14
THE STATESMAN
str. Of this sort. We recognized a sort of art of

calculation.
y. soc. Yes.
str. It is, I suppose, most certainly one of the
intellectual arts.
y. soc. Of course.
str. And shall we grant to the art of calculation,
when it has found out the difference between
numbers, any further function than that of passing
judgement on them when found out?
Y. soc. No, certainly not.
str. Every architect, too, is a ruler of workmen,
not a workman himself.
y. soc. Yes.
str. As supplying knowledge, not manual labour,
y. soc. True.
str. So he may fairly be said to participate in
intellectual science.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. But it is his business, I suppose, not to pass
judgement and be done with it and go away, as the
calculator did, but to give each of the workmen the
proper orders, until they have finished their appointed
task.
y. soc. You are right.
str. Then all such sciences, and all those that
are in the class with calculating, are alike intellectual
sciences, but these two classes differ from one another
in the matter of judging and commanding. Am
I right ?
y. soc. I think so.
str. Then if we bisected intellectual science as a
whole and called one part the commanding and the
15
PLATO
αιροΰμενοι προσείποιμεν, εμμελώς άν φαΐμεν δι·

ηρησθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κατά γε την εμην δόξαν.
ΞΕ. ’Αλλά μην τοΐς ye κοινή τι -πράττουσιν
αγαπητόν όμονοεΐν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ου;
HE. Τούτου τοίνυν μεχριπερ αν αυτοί κοινωνωμεν,
εατεον τά ye των άλλων δοξάσματα χαίρειν.
C 4· 3Ε· Φάρε δη, τουτοιν τ οΐν1 τεχναιν ημΐν
τον βασιλικόν εν ποτερα θετεον; άρ’ εν τη κριτική,
καθάπερ τινά θεατήν, η μάλλον της επιτακτικής
ώς όντα αυτόν τέχνης θησομεν, δεσπόζοντα γε;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ού μάλλον;
HE. Ύην επιτακτικήν δη τέχνην πάλιν άν ειη
θεατεον εΐ πη διεστηκεν. καί μοι δοκέΐ τηδε πη,
καθάπερ η των καπήλων τέχνη της των αύτοπωλών
D διώρισται τέχνης, καί τό βασιλικόν γένος εοικεν
από του των κηρνκων γένους άφωρίσθαι.
νε. 2Ω. Πcos·;
HE. Πωληθεντα που πρότερον έργα άλλότρια
παραδεχόμενοι δεύτερον πωλονσι πάλιν οί κάπηλοι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
ΞΕ. Ούκοΰν και τό κηρυκικόν φΰλον επιταχθεντ’
άλλότρια2 νοήματα παραδεχόμενον αυτό δεύτερον
επιτάττει πάλιν ετεροις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αληθέστατα.
HE. Τί οΰν; εις ταύτόν μίξομεν βασιλικήν ερμη-
Ε νευτικη, κελευστικη, μαντική, κηρυκικη, καί πολ-
λαΐς ετεραις τούτων τεχναις συγγενεσιν, αι σΰμ-
1 τούτοιν τοΓγ] ταύταιν ταίν ΒΤ.
2 έπιταχθεν τ άλλότρια ΒΤ.
16
THE STATESMAN
other the judging part, might we say we had made

a iitting division ?
v. soc. Yes, in my opinion.
str. And surely when men are doing anything in
common it is desirable for them to agree.
y. soc. Of course it is.
str. On this point, then, so long as we ourselves
are in agreement, we need not bother about the
opinions of others.
y. soc. Of course not.
str. Now to which of these two classes is the
kingly man to be assigned ? Shall we assign him to
the art of judging, as a kind of spectator, or rather
to the art of commanding, inasmuch as he is a ruler ?
y. soc. Rather to the latter, of course.
str. Then once more we must see whether the
art of command falls into two divisions. It seems
to me that it does, and I think there is much the
same distinction between the kingly class and the
class of heralds as between the art of men who sell
what they themselves produce and that of retail
dealers.
y. soc. How so ?
str. Retail dealers receive and sell over again the
productions of others, which have generally been
sold before.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. And in like manner heralds receive the
purposes of others in the form oi orders, and then
<nve the orders a second time to others.
O
Y. soc. Very true.

str. Shall we, then, join the art of the king in
the same class with the art of the interpreter, the
boatswain, the prophet, the herald, and many other
17
PLATO
7τασαι τό γ’ επιτάττειν εχουσιν ; ή βούλει, καθάπερ

ήκάζομεν νυν δη, καί τοϋνομα παρεικασωμεν,
επειδή καί σχεδόν ανώνυμον ον τυγχάνει τό των
αυτεπιτακτών γένος, καί ταύτη ταΰτα διελώμεθα,
τό μεν των βασιλέων γένος εις τήν αύτεπιτακτικήν
θεντες, τοΰ δε άλλου παντός άμελήσαντες, όνομα
ετερον αύτοΐς παραχωρήσαντες θεσθαι τινα; τοΰ
γάρ άρχοντος ενεκα ήμΐν ή μέθοδος ήν άλλ ουχι
261 τοΰ εναντίου.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πάνυ μεν οΰν.
5· ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν επειδή τοΰτο μετρίως άφεστηκεν
απ' εκείνων, άλλοτριότητι διορισθέν προς οικειότητα,
τοΰτο αυτό πάλιν αΰ διαιρεΐν άναγκαΐον, εϊ τινα
τομήν ετι εχομεν ύπείκουσαν εν τουτω;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Υίάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Και μήν φαινόμεθα εχειν ° άλλ’ επακο¬
λούθων σνντεμνε.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πή;
ΞΕ. ΐΐά,ντας 6ιτόσους άν άρχοντας διανοηθώμεν
επιτάξει προσχρωμενους άρ’ ούχ ευρήσομεν γενε-
Β σεώς τίνος ενεκα προστάττοντας;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ οΰ;
ΞΕ. Καί μήν τά γε1 γιγνόμενα πάντα δίχα δια-
λαβεΐν ου παντάπασι χαλεπόν.
νε. 2Ω. Π^;
ΞΕ. Τά μεν άφυχα αυτών εστί που ξυμπάντων,
τά δ’ εμφυχα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τοάτοι? δε γε αύτοΐς τό τοΰ γνωστικού μέρος
επιτακτικόν όν, είπερ βουλόμεθα τεμνειν, τεμοΰμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κατά τί;
1 ye Stephanus : re ΒΤ.
18
THE STATESMAN
kindred arts, all of which involve giving orders ? Or,

as we just now made a comparison of functions, shall
we now by comparison make a name also—since the
class of those who issue orders of their own is virtu¬
ally nameless — and assign kings to the science
of giving orders of one’s own, disregarding all the
rest and leaving to someone else the task of naming
them ? For the object of our present quest is the
ruler, not his opposite.
y. soc. Quite right.
str. Then since a reasonable distinction between
this class and the rest has been made, by distinguish¬
ing the commands given as one’s own or another’s,
shall we again divide this class, if there is in it any
further line of section ?
y. soc. Certainly.
str. I think there is one; please help me in
making the section.
y. soc. On what line ?
str. Take the case of all those whom we conceive
of as rulers who give commands : shall we not find
that they all issue commands for the sake of producing
something ?
y. soc. Of course.
str. Furthermore it is not at all difficult to divide
all that is produced into two classes.

y. soc. How ?
str. Of the whole class, some have life and others
have no life.
y. soc. Yes.
str. And on these same lines we may, if we like,
make a division of the part of intellectual science
which commands.
y. soc. In what way ?
19
PLATO
EE. To μεν επι rat? των άψυχων γενεσεσιν αυ¬

τόν τάττοντες,1 to δ’ άπΐ ταΐς των2 έμψυχων
C και παν ούτως ηδη διαιρησεται δίχα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Παντάττασι' γε.
ΕΕ. Τδ μεν τοίνυν αυτών παρα.λίπωμεν, τδ δ
άναλάβωμεν, άναλαβόντες δε μερισώμεθα εις δυο το
σάμπαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Α,εγεις δ’ αυτοΐν άναληπτεον είναι πό¬
τερον;
ΞΕ. Πάντω? που τδ περί τα ζώα επιτακτικόν,
ου γάρ δη τό γε της βασιλικής επιστήμης εστ'ι ποτέ
των άψυχων επιστατούν, οίον άρχιτεκτονικόν, άλλα
γενναιότερου εν τοΐς ζωοις και περί αυτά ταΰτα
D την δυναμιν άει κεκτημενον.
ΞΕ. Ύην γε μην των ζωων γενεσιν και τροφήν
την μεν τις αν ΐδοι μονοτροφίαν ουσαν, την δε
κοινήν των εν ταΐς άγελαις θρεμμάτων επιμέλειαν.
ΕΕ. ΆΛΑ’ ου μην τόν γε πολιτικόν ενρησομεν
ίδιοτρόφον,3 ώσπερ βοηλάτην η τινα ιπποκόμον,
άλλ’ ιπποφορβώ τε και βουφορβώ μάλλον προσ-
εοικότα.
νε. 2Ω. Φαίνεται γε δη ρηθεν νυν.
Ε ΕΕ. Τίότερον οΰν της ζωοτροφίας την των ζυμ-
πόλλων κοινήν τροφήν άγελαιοτροφίαν η κοινο-
τροφικην τινα όνομάζομεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Όπότερον αν e’v τω λό^ω ζυμθαίνη.
6. ΞΕ. Καλώ? γ€, ώ Σώκρατες· καν διαφυλά-
1 τάσσοντε$ ΒΤ.
* έπΐ reus των D, Stephanas : ότι των ΒΤ.
3 ιδιοτρόφον D : Ιδιύτροττον ΒΤ.
20
THE STATESMAN
str. By assigning one part of it to the production

of lifeless, the other to that of living objects; and
in this way the whole will be divided into two
parts.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. Let us then leave one half and take up the
other, and then let us divide that entire half into
two parts.
y. soc. Which half shall we take up ?
str. That
β
which issues commands relatinc σ
to
living objects, assuredly. For certainly the science
of the king is not, like that of the architect, one
which supervises lifeless objects; it is a nobler
science, since it exercises its power among living
beings and in relation to them alone.
y. soc. True.
str. Now you may notice that the breeding and
nurture of living beings is sometimes the nurture of
a single animal and sometimes the common care of
creatures in droves.
y. soc. True.
str. But we shall find that the statesman is not
one who tends a single creature, like the driver of a
single ox or the groom who tends a horse; he has
more resemblance to a man who tends a hei’d of
cattle or a drove of horses.
y. soc. That seems to be true, now that you
mention it.
str. Shall we call the art of caring for many living
creatures the art of tending a herd or something like
community management ?
y. soc. Whichever we happen to say.
str. Good, Socrates! If you preserve this attitude
b 2 21
PLATO
ξης τδ μη σπουδάζειν επι τοΐς όνόμασι, πλουσιώτε·

ρος εις το γήρας άναφανήσει φρονήσεως. νΰν δε
τοΰτο μεν, καθάπερ δια κελεύει,, ποιητεον την δέ
άγελαιοτροφικήν άρ’ εννοείς πή τις δίδυμον άπο-
262 φήνας τδ ζητουμενον εν διπλασίοισι1 τά νυν εν
τοΐς ήμίσεσιν εις τότε ποιήσει ζητεΐσθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐΐροθυμήσομαι. καί μοι δοκεΐ των
μεν ανθρώπων ετερα τις είναι, των δε αΰ θηρίων
άλλη τροφή.
ΞΕ. Π,αντάπασί γε προθυμότατα και άνδρειότατα
διήρησαι· μη μεντοι τοΰτό γε εις αύθις κατά
δύναμιν πάσχωμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ ποιον;
ΕΕ. Μη σμικρόν μόριον εν προς μεγάλα και
Β πολλά άφαιρώμεν, μηδέ είδους χωρίς· άλλα τδ
μέρος άμα είδος εχετω. κάλλιστον μεν γάρ από
των άλλων ευθύς διαχωρίζειν τδ ζητουμενον, άν
όρθώς εχη, καθάπερ ολίγον συ πρότερον οίηθείς
εχειν την διαίρεσιν επεσπευσας τον λόγον, ίδών
επ’ ανθρώπους πορευόμενον αλλά γάρ, ώ φίλε,
λεπτουργεΐν ούκ ασφαλές, διά μέσων δε άσφαλε-
στερον ίεναι τεμνοντας, και μάλλον ίδεαις άν τις
προστυγχάνοι. τοΰτο δε διαφέρει το παν προς
C τάς ζητήσεις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?, ώ ζενε, λεγεις τοΰτο;
ΞΕ. Πειρατε'ον ετι σαφεστερον φράζειν εύνοια
τής σής φύσεως, ώ λύώκρατες. εν τω μεν οΰν
παρεστηκοτι τα νΰν δηλώσαι μηδέν ενδεώς αδύνατον
επιχειρητεον δε τι και σμικρω πλέον αύτό προαγα-
γεΐν εις τδ πρόσθεν σαφήνειας ενεκα.
διτλασ/οισί] δίπλασίοα ή ΒΤ.

22
THE STATESMAN
of indifference to mere names, you will turn out

richer in wisdom when you are old. But now we
will, as you suggest, not trouble ourselves about
the name ; but do you see a way in which a man may
show that the art of herding is twofold, and may
thereby cause that which is now sought among a
double number of things to be sought among half
as many ?
y. soc. I am quite willing to try. I think one
kind is the care of men, the other that of beasts.
str. You made the division with perfect willingness
and courage. However, let us do our best not to
fall again into your error.
Y. soc. What error ?
str. We must not take a single small part, and
set it off against many large ones, nor disregard
species in making our division. On the contrary,
the part must be also a species. It is a very fine
thing to separate the object of our search at once
from everything else, if the separation can be made
correctly, and so, just now, you thought you had the
right division and you hurried our discussion along,
because you saw that it was leading towards man.
But, my friend, it is not safe to whittle off shavings ;
it is safer to proceed by cutting through the middle,
and in that way one is more likely to find classes.
This makes all the difference in the conduct of
research.
y. soc. What do you mean by that. Stranger ?
str. I must try to speak still more clearly,

Socrates, out of regard for your capacity. Just at
present it is impossible to make the matter entirely
plain, but I will try to lay it before you a little more
fully for the sake of clearness.
23
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Ποιον ούν δη φράζεις διαιρούμενους

ημάς ούι< ορθώς άρτι δράν;
ΞΕ. Τοιόνδε, οίον ε'ί τις τάνθρώπινον επιχει-
I) ρησας δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροΐ καθάπερ οί
πολλοί των ενθάδε διανέμ,ουσι, το μεν Ελληνικόν
ώς εν από πάντων άφαιροϋντες χωρίς, συμπασι δε
τοΐς άλλοις γένεσιν, απειροις ούσι και άμίκτοις και
άσυμφώνοις προς άλληλα, βάρβαρον μια κλησει
προσειπόντες αυτό διά ταυτην την μίαν κλησιν καί
γένος εν αυτό είναι προσδοκώσιν η τον αριθμόν
τις αΰ νομίζοι κατ’ είδη δυο διαιρεΐν μυριάδα
άποτεμνόμενος από πάντων, ώς εν είδος άποχω-
Ε ριζών, καί τω λοιπω δη παντί θεμενος εν όνομα
διά την κλησιν αΰ καί τοΰτ' άξιοι γένος εκείνου
χωρίς ετερον εν γίγνεσθαι.1 κάλλιον δε που καί
μάλλον κατ' είδη καί δίχα διαιροΐτ' αν, εί τον μεν
αριθμόν άρτίω καί περιττω τις τέμνοι, τδ δε αΰ
των ανθρώπων γένος άρρενι καί θηλει, Αυδούς δε
η Φρόγας η τινας ετέρους προς άπαντας τάττων
άποσχίζοι τότε, ηνίκα άποροι γένος άμα καί μέρος
63 ενρίσκειν έκάτερον των σχισθέντων.
7. ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Ορθότατα· άλλα γάρ τοΰτο αυτό,
ώ ξένε, πώς αν τις γένος καί μέρος εναργέστερου
γνοίη, ώς ου ταύτόν έστον αλλ’ έτερον άλληλοιν;
ΞΕ. βέλτιστε άνδρών, οΰ φαΰλον προστάττεις,
"Σιώκρατες. ημείς μεν καί νυν μακροτέραν τ οΰ
δέοντος άπό του προτεθέντος λόγου πεπλανημεθα,
συ δε έτι πλέον ημάς κελεύεις πλανηθηναι. νυν
μέν οΰν, ώσπερ είκός, επανίωμεν πάλιν ταϋτα δε
ι et- yi-yveadai Stallbaum : eyyiyνισθεα BT.
24
THE STATESMAN
y. soc. What is it, then, that you say we did

wrongly in making our division just now?
str. It was very much as if, in undertaking to
divide the human race into two parts, one should
make the division as most people in this country do;
they separate the Hellenic race from all the rest as
one, and to all the other races, which are countless in
number and have no relation in blood or language to
one another, they give the single name “ barbarian ” ;
then, because of this single name, they think it is a
single species. Or it was as if a man should think
he was dividing number into two classes by cutting
off a myriad from all the other numbers, with the
notion that he was making one separate class, and
then should give one name to all the rest, and
because of that name should think that this also
formed one class distinct from the other. A better
division, more truly classified and more equal, would
be made by dividing number into odd and even, and
the human race into male and female ; as for the
Lydians and Phrygians and various others they could
be opposed to the rest and split off from them when
it wras impossible to find and separate two parts, each
of which formed a class.
y. soc. Very true; but that’s just the trouble.
Stranger: how can we get a clearer knowledge of
class and part, and see that they are not the same
thing, but different ?
str. Socrates, you most excellent young man, it is
no small task you impose upon me. We have already
strayed away from our subject more than we ought,
and you wish us to wander still farther afield. So
for the present let us return to our subject, as is
proper; then we will go on the trail of this other
25
PLATO
B εις αΰθις κατα σχολήν καθάπερ ίχνευοντες μετιμεν.

ού μην άλλα τοΰτό γε αΰ παντάπασι φΰλαζαι, μη
ποτέ παρ’ if.ιοΰ δόζης αυτό εναργώς διωρισμενον
άκηκοεναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τό ποΐον;
HE. Εΐδός τ€ καί μέρος ετερον άλλήλων είναι.
ΞΕ. Ώ? εΐδος μεν όταν η τον, καί μέρος αυτό
άναγκαΐον είναι του πράγματος ότουπερ αν είδος
λεγηται· μέρος δε είδος1 ουδεμία ανάγκη, ταυτη
με η ’κείνη μάλλον, ώ Σώκρατες, αεί φάθι λεγειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ταΰτ' εσται.
C ΞΕ. Φράσον δη μοι το μετά τούτο.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποιον;
HE. Τό της άποπλανήσεως όπόθεν ημάς δεΰρ'
ηγαγεν. οίμαι μεν γάρ μάλ.ιστα, δθεν ερωτηθείς
σύ την άγελαιοτροφίαν όπη διαιρετεον είπες μάλα
προθυμως δυ' είναι ζώων γένη, τό μεν ανθρώπινον,
ετερον δε των άλλων ζυμπάντων θηρίων εν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 'Αληθή.
ΞΕ. Και εμοιγε δη τότ' εφάνης μέρος άφαιρών
ήγεΐσθαι καταλιπεΐν τό λοιπόν αΰ πάντων γένος εν,
D ότι πάσι ταύτόν επονομάζειν εσχες όνομα, θηρία
καλέ σας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΗΙν καί ταΰτα ούτως.
ΞΕ. Τό δε' γε, ω πάντων άνδρειότατε, τάχ αν,
ει που φρόνιμόν εστί τι ζωον ετερον, οίον δοκεΐ τό
των γεράνων, ή τι τοιοΰτον άλλο, δ κατά ταότα.
ίσως διονομάζει καθάπερ καί συ, γεράνους μεν εν
γένος άντιτιθεν τοΐς άλλοις ζώοις καί σεμνΰνον
αυτό εαυτό, τα. δε αλλα μετά των ανθρώπων ζυλλα-
1 dSos] dSous ΒΤ.
26
THE STATESMAN
matter by and by, when we have time. Only take

very good care not to imagine that you ever heard
me declare flatly—
y. soc. What?
str. That class and part are separate from one
another.
y. soc. But what did you say ?
str. That when there is a class of anything, it
must necessarily be a part of the thing of which it is
said to be a class; but there is no necessity that a
part be also a class. Please always give this, rather
than the other, as my doctrine.
Y. soc. 1 will do so.
str. Then please go on to the next point.
y. soc. What is it ?
str. That from which our present digression
started. For I think it started when you were asked
how the art of herding should be divided and said
with great readiness that there were two kinds of
living beings, the human race and a second one, a
single class, comprising all the beasts.
y. soc. True.
str. And it was clear to me at the time that you
removed a part and then thought that the remainder
was one class because you were able to call them
all by the same name of beasts.
y. soc. That is true, too.
str. But indeed, my most courageous young
friend, perhaps, if there is any other animal capable
of thought, such as the crane appears to be, or any
other like creature, and it perchance gives names,
just as you do, it might in its pride of self oppose
cranes to all other animals, and group the rest, men
included, under one head, calling them by one name,
27
PLATO
βόν εις ταύτό ουδεν άλλο πλήν 'ίσως θηρία προσείποι.

7τειραθώμεν ουν -ημείς εζευλαβεΐσθαι πάνθ' όπόσα
τοιαΰτα.
Ε νε. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΕΕ. Μή παν το των ζωων γένος διαιρούμενοι,
ΐνα ήττον αύτα πάσχω μεν.
νε. 2Ω. Ουδεν γάρ δει.
ΞΕ. Και γάρ ουν και τότε ήμαρτάνετο ταύτη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύί δή,
ΕΕ. Ύής γνωστικής όσον επιτακτικόν ήμΐν μέρος
ήν που του ζωοτροφικοΰ γένους, αγελαίων μην
ζωων. η γάρ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Αιήρητό τοίνυν ήδη και τότε ζυμπαν τό ζωον
264 τω τιθασω και άγρίω. τά μεν γάρ εχοντα
τιθασευεσθαι φυσιν ήμερα προσείρηται, τά δε μη
εχοντα άγρια.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Καλώ?.
ΞΕ. "Ην δε γε θηρευομεν επιστήμην, εν τοΐς
ήμεροις ην τε καί εστιν, επί τοΐς άγελαίοις μην
ζητητεα θρεμμασιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Μη τοίνυν διαιρώμεθα ώσπερ τότε προς
άπαντα άποβλεφαντες, μηδε σπευσαντες, Ϊνα δη
Β ταχύ γενο^μεθα προς τη πολίτικη, πεποίηκε γάρ
ημάς καί νυν παθεϊν το κατά την παροιμίαν πάθος.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποίον;
ΞΕ. Ούχ ήσυχους ευ διαιρούντας ήνυκεναι βρα¬
δύτερου.
28
THE STATESMAN
which might very well be that of beasts. Now let

us try to be on our guard against all that sort of
thing.
y. soc. How can we guard against it ?
str. By not dividing the whole class of living
beings, that so we may avoid such errors.
y. soc. Well, there is no need of dividing the
whole.
str. No, certainly not, for it was in that way that
we fell into our former error.
y. soc. What do you mean ?
str. That part of intellectual science which
involves giving commands was a part of our animal¬
tending class, with especial reference to animals in
herds, was it not ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. Well, even at that stage of our discussion all
animals had already been divided into tame and wild.
For if their nature admits of domestication they are
called tame ; if it does not, they are called wild.
y. soc. Excellent.
str. But the science we are hunting for was, and
is, to be sought among tame creatures, more specifically
creatures in herds.
y. soc. Yes.
str. Let us, then, not make our division as we did
before, with a view to all, nor in a hurry, with the
idea that we may thus reach political science quickly,
for that has already brought upon us the proverbial
penalty.
y. soc. What penalty ?
str. The penalty of having made less speed,
because we made too much haste and did not make
our division right.
29
PLATO
NE. 2n. Και καλώς γε, ώ ξένε, πεποίηκεν.

8. HE. Ύαΰτ’ έστω, πάλιν δ’ οΰν εξ άρχής
την κοινοτροφικην πειρώ/ιεθα διαιρεΐν ’ίσως γαρ
και τοΰτο δ σύ προθυμεΐ διαπεραινόμενος 6 λόγος
αυτός σοι κάλλιον μηνύσει, καί μ.οι φράζε.
ΝΕ. 2η. Ποΐον δη;
HE. To8e, εί τινων πολλάκις άρα διακήκοας· ον
C γάρ δη πρόστυχης γε αυτός οΐδ’ ότι γεγονας ταΐς
εν τώ Κείλω τιθασείαις των ιχθύων και των εν ταΐς
βασιλικαΐς λίμναις. εν μεν γάρ κρηναις τάχ αν
ίσως εΐης ήσθημένος.
νε. 2η. Πάνο μεν οΰν και ταΰτα τεθεαμαι
κάκεΐνα πολλών άκηκοα.
ΞΕ. Και μην χηνοβωτίας γε καί γερανοβωτίας, εί
και μη πεπλάνησαι περί τα Θετταλικά πεδία,
πεπυσαι γοΰν καί πιστεύεις είναι.
ΝΕ. 2η. Τί μην;
D ΕΕ. Τοοδ’ ενεκά τοι πάντα ηρώτησα ταΰτα,
διότι τής τών αγελαίων τροφής εστι μην εννδρον,
εστι δε καί ξηροβατικόν.
ΝΕ. 2η. ”Έστι γάρ οΰν.
ΞΕ. Άρ’ οΰν καί σοί ξυνδοκεΐ ταΰτη δεΐν διχά-
ζειν την κοινοτροφικην επιστήμην, εφ’ εκατό ρω
τούτων τό μέρος αυτής επινεμοντας εκάτερον, τό
μεν ετερον ύγροτροφικόν ονομάζοντας, τό δ’ ετερον
ξηροτροφικόν;
ΝΕ. 2η. "Έ,μοιγε.
HE. Καί μην καί τό βασιλικόν ούτως ον ζη-
Ε τήσομεν όποτερας εστι τής τέχνης' δήλον γάρ1
παντί.
ΝΕ. 2η. Πώ? δ5 οΰ;
1 yap Burnet : δη yap ΒΤ.
30
THE STATESMAN
y. soc. And it was a good thing for us, Stranger.

str. I do not deny it. So let us begin again
and try to divide the art of tending animals in
common ; for perhaps the information you desire so
much will come to you in the ordinary course of our
conversation better than by other means. Tell me—
y. soc. What ?
str. Whether, as I suppose, you have often heard
people speak of this,—for 1 know you never actually
saw the preserves of fish in the Nile and in the ponds
of the Persian king. But perhaps you have noticed
the like in fountain-pools.
y. soc. Yes, I have often seen the fish in fountain-
pools and have heard many tales of those foreign
preserves.
str. And surely, even if you have not wandered
over the plains of Thessaly, you have heard of goose-
farms and crane-farms there and you believe that
they exist.
str. The reason why I asked you all these questions
is that the rearing of docks is in part aquatic and in
part an affair of the dry land.
y. soc. Yes, that is true.
str. Then do you agree that we ought to divide
the art of tending animals in common into corre¬
sponding parts, assigning one part of it to each of
these two, and calling one the art of aquatic-herding
and the other the art of land-herding ?
y. soc. Yes, I agree.
str. And surely we shall not have to ask to which
of these two arts kingship belongs, for that is clear
to everyone.
y. soc. Of course.
31
PLATO
HE. Πα? μεν δη τό γε ζηροτροφικόν της άγελαιο-

τροφίας διέλοιτ' αν φΰλον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΞΕ. Ύω πτηνω τε και πεζω διορισάμενος.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 'Αληθέστατα.
ΞΕ. Τι δε; τό πολιτικόν η περί1 τό πεζόν
ζητητέον; η ουκ ο'ίει και τον άφρονέστατον ώς
έπος είπεΐν δοζάζειν ούτως;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. “Eya>ye.
HE. Τήν δε 7τεζονομικην, καθάπερ άρτιον σ.ριθμον,
δει τεμνομένην δίχα άποφαίνειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αηλον.
265 ΕΕ. Καί μην έφ’ δ γε μέρος ωρμηκεν ημΐν δ
λόγος, επ' εκείνο δυο τινέ καθοράν όδώ τεταμένα
φαίνεται, την μεν θάττω, προς μέγα μέρος σμικρόν
διαιρουμένην, την δέ, όπερ εν τω πρόσθεν ελέγομεν
ότι δει μεσοτομεϊν ώς μάλιστα, τοΰτ’ έχουσαν
μάλλον, μακροτέραν γε μην. έζεστιν οΰν όποτέραν
αν βουληθώμεν, ταυτην πορευθηναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι δέ; άμφοτέρας αδύνατον;
ΞΕ. "Αμα γ', ώ θαυμαστέ· εν μέρει γε μην
δηλον ότι δυνατόν.
Β νε. 2Ω. Έν μέρει τοίνυν έγωγε άμφοτέρας
αίροΰμαι.
ΞΕ. ’Ρόδιον, επειδή τό λοιπόν βραχύ, κατ'
άρχάς μην καί μεσοΰσιν άμα της πορείας χαλεπόν
αν ην ημΐν τό πρόσταγμα· νυν δ’, επειδή δοκεΐ
ταυτη, την μακροτέραν πρότερον2 ΐωμεν νεαλέ-
στεροι γάρ όντες ράον αυτήν πορευσόμεθα. την δε
δη διαίρεσιν όρα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Λ eye.
1 η περί Heindorf: ώσπερ ΒΤ. 2 πρότερον] προτέραν ΒΤ.
32
THE STATESMAN
str. Anybody could doubtless make a division of

the art of tending herds on land.
y. soc. What would the division be ?
str. Into the tending of Hying and walking
animals.
y. soc. Very true.
str. And statesmanship is to be sought in con¬
nexion with walking animals, is it not ? Any fool,
so to speak, would believe that, don’t you think?
y. soc. Of course.
str. And the art of tending animals that walk
must, like an even number, be divided in half.
y. soc. Evidently.
str. And now I think I see two paths leading in
that direction in which our argument has stai'ted :
the quicker way, by separating a relative!)^ small
part and a larger, and the other way, which is more
in accord with what we said a while ago about the
need of making the division as nearly in the middle
as we can, but is longer. So we can proceed by
whichever of the two we wish.
y. soc. Can we not go by both ?
str. Not by both at once, silly boy; hut obviously
we can take them in turn.
Y. soc. Then I choose both in turn.
str. That is easy enough, since we have but a
short distance to go. At the beginning, certainly,
or middle of our journey it would have been hard to
comply with your demand. But now, since this is
your wish, let us go first by the longer way, for we
are fresher now and shall get along on it more easily.
So attend to the division.
y. soc. Go on.
S3
PLATO
9. ΞΕ. Τδ πεζά ημΐν των ήμερων, δσαπερ αγε¬

λαία, διηρημενα εστί φύσει δίχα.
ΝΕ. 2Π. Τινι;
ΞΕ. Τω των μεν την γενεσιν άκερων είναι, των
δε κερασφόρον.
C νε. 2η. Φαίνεται.
ΞΕ. Την 8η 7τεζονομικήν 8ιελών άποδος εκατερω
τω μερει λόγω χρώμενος· αν γάρ όνομάζειν αυτά
βουληθής, εσται σοι ττερητεττλεγμόνον μάλλον του
δέοντος.
ΝΕ. 2η. Πώ? οΰν χρή λεγειν;
ΞΕ. 7Ωδε · της πεζονομικής επιστήμης 8ίχα δι -
αιρεθείσης τό μόριον θάτερον επί τω κερασφόρω1
μερει τω της αγέλης επιτετάχθαι, τό δε 'έτερον επί
τω τής άκεράτου.
ΝΕ. 2η. Ταΰτ’ έστω ταύτη λεχθεντα· πάντως
D γάρ ίκανώς δεδήλωται.
ΞΕ. Και μην ό γε βασιλεύς ημΐν αΰ καταφανής
ότι κολοβόν αγέλην τινά κεράτων νομενει.
ΝΕ. 2η. Πώ? γάρ ού δήλος;
ΞΕ. Ταύτην τοίνυν καταθραύσαντες τό γιγνό-
μενον2 αύτω πειρώμεθα άποδοΰναι.
ΝΕ. 2η. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Πότερον οΰν βούλει τω σχιστώ τε και τώ
καλουμένω μωνυχι διαιρεΐν αυτήν ή τή κοινογονία
τε καί ίδιογονία; μανθάνεις γάρ που.
νε. 2η. Τδ ποιον;
Ε HE. "Οτι τδ μεν των ίππων καί όνων πεφυκεν
εξ άλλήλων γεννάν.
νε. 2η. Ναι.
1 κερασφόρφ Τ : κεροφόρφ Β.
2 yiyvopevov Cornarius : κινούμενον BTW.
34,
THE STATESMAN
str. The tame walking animals which live in herds

are divided by nature into two classes,
v. soc. How by nature ?
str. Because one class is naturally without horns,
and the other has horns.
y. soc. That is obvious.
str. Now divide the art of tending herds of
walking animals into two parts, assigning one to each
class of animals; and define the parts, for if you try
to give them names, the matter will become need¬
lessly complicated.
y. soc. How shall I speak of them then ?
str. In this way: say that the science which
tends herds of walking animals is divided into two
parts, one of which is assigned to the horned portion
of the herd, the other to the hornless portion.
y. soc. Assume that I have said that; for you
have made it perfectly clear.
str. And furthermore our “ king ” is very clearly
the herdsman of a herd devoid of horns.
y. soc. Of course ; that is evident.
str. Let us then try to break up this herd and
give the king the part that belongs to him.
y. soc. Very well.
str. Shall we make our division on the basis oi
having or not having cloven hoofs, or on that of
mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what
I mean.
y. soc. No. What is it ?
str. Why, I mean that horses and asses can breed
from each other.
y. soc. Oh yes.
35
PLATO
HE. To δέ γε λοιπόν έτι της λείας αγέλης tow

ημέρων αμιγές γένει προς άλληλα.
NE. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ου;
ΞΕ. Ύί δ’; δ πολιτικός αρ’ επιμέλειαν έχειν φαί¬
νεται πάτερα κοινογενοϋς φυσεως η τίνος ίδιο-
γενοΰς;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δηλον οτι της άμίκτου.
ΞΕ. Ύαυτήν δη δει καθάπερ τα έμπροσθεν, ως
έοικεν, ημάς δίχα διαστέλλειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δει γό,ρ οΰν.
266 HE. Και μην τό γε ζωον, όσον ήμερον και
άγελαϊον, σχεδόν πλην γενοΐν δυοΐν παν ηδη κατα-
κεκερμάτισται. τδ γαρ των κυνών ουκ έπάζιον
καταριθμεΐν γένος ώς εν άγελαίοις 0ρέμμασιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ου γαρ ουν. άλλα, τίνι δη τώ δυο δι-
αιροϋμεν ;
ΞΕ. τΩ.πτερ και δίκαιόν γε Θεαίτητόν τε και σέ
διανέμειν, επειδή και γεωμετρίας άπτεσθον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τω,·
ΞΕ. Ύη διαμέτρου δηπου και πάλιν τη της δια¬
μέτρου διαμέτρου.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? είπες;
Β ΞΕ. Ή φυσις ην τό γένος ήμουν των ανθρώπων
κέκτηται, μών άλλως πως εις την πορείαν πέφυκεν
η καθάπερ η διάμετρος ή δυνάμει δίπους;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ουκ άλλως.
1 The word “diameter” here denotes the diagonal of a
square. The early Greek mathematicians worked out
their arithmetical problems largely by geometrical methods
(cf. Theaetetus 147 d if.). The diagonal of the unit square
[\β) was naturally of especial interest. It was called some¬
times, as here, simply ή διάμετρος, sometimes, as just below,
ή δίάμτοροί ή δυνάμα δίτους, or, more briefly, ή διάμετροί
36
THE STATESMAN
str. But the rest of the herd of hornless tame

animals cannot cross the breed.
y. soc. That is true, of course.
str. Well then, does the statesman appear to
have charge of a kind that mixes or of one that docs
not mix the breed ?
y. soc. Evidently of one that is unmixed.
str. So I suppose we must proceed as we have
done heretofore and divide this into two parts.
y. soc. Yes, wTe must.
str. And yet tame gregarious animals have all,
with the exception of about two species, been already
divided ; for dogs are not properly to be counted
among gregarious creatures.
y. soc. No, they are not. But how shall we divide
the two species ?
str. As you and Theaetetus ought by rights to
divide them, since you are interested in geometry.
y. soc. How do you mean ?
str. By the diameter, of course, and again by the
diameter of the square of the diameter.1
y. soc. What do you mean by that ?
str. Is the nature which our human race possesses
related to walking in any other way than as the
diameter which is the square root of two feet ? 2
y. soc. No.
δίπους. Given a square the side of which is the unit (i.e.
one square foot), the length of the diagonal will be and
the square constructed with that diagonal as its side will
contain two square feet. The length of the diagonal of this
square will be v/4 = 2 feet, and its area will be four square
feet.
2 There is here a play upon words. Man, being a two-
footed (δίττονή animal, is compared to the diagonal of the
unit square (,J2, δίάμβτρος δί-η-ουs).
37
PLATO
EE. Kcu μην η γε του λοιπού γένους πάλιν εστι

κατά δυναμιν αν της ημετέρας δυνάμεως διάμετρος,
ε'ίπερ δυοΐν γέ εστι ποδοΐν δίς πεφυκυΐα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ουκ έστι; και δη και σχεδόν
δ βοΰλει δηλοΰν μανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Προ? δη τουτοις έτερον αΰ τι των προς
γέλωτα εύδοκιμησάντων αν, ω Σιώκρατες, άρα καθ-
C ορώμεν ημΐν γεγονός εν τοΐς διηρημένοις;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ ποΐον;
ΕΕ. Ύάνθρωπινον ημών άμα γένος ξυνειληχός
και ξυνδεδραμηκός γένει τω των ον των γενναιότατα)
κα'ι άμα εύχερεστάτω.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΚαΤορώ και μάΧ άτόπως1 ξυμβαΐνον.
ΞΕ. Ύί δ’; ουκ εικός ύστατα άφικνεΐσθαι τά
βραδύτατα;
νε. 2Ω. Ncu, τοΰτό γε.
ΞΕ. Τδδε δε ουκ έννοοΰμεν, ώς ετι γελοιότερος
6 βασιλεύς φαίνεται μετά της αγέλης ζυνδιαθέων
καί ζύνδρομα πεπορευμένος τω των άνδρών αΰ προς
D τον ευχερή βίον άριστα γεγυμνασμένω;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Υίαντάπασι μεν ούν.
ΕΕ. Νΰν γάρ, ω Ίόώκρατες, εκείνο εστι κατα¬
φανές μάλλον τδ ρηθέν τότ εν τη περί τον σοφιστήν
ζητησει.
νε. 2Ω. Τδ ποΐον;
ΞΕ. "Οτι τη τοιαδε μεθόδω των λόγων ούτε
σεμνοτέρου μάλλον έμέλησεν η μη, τόν τε σμικρό-
1 μά\' άτόπως] μ,άλα τό πως ΒΤ.
1 i.e. the remaining species is four-footed. Our diameter

is v/2, and four is the area of the square constructed on
the diagonal of the square which has as its side. All
38
THE STATESMAN
str. And the nature of the remaining species,

again, considered from the point of view of the
square root, is the diameter of the square of our root,
if it is the nature of twice two feet.1
y. soc. Of course; and now I think I almost
understand what you wish to make plain.
str. Socrates, do we see that besides this some¬
thing else has turned up in these divisions of ours
which would be a famous joke ?
y. soc. No. What is it?
str. Our human race shares the same lot and
runs in the same heat as the most excellent and at
the same time most easy-going race of creatures.2
y. soc. Yes, I see that; it is a very queer result.
str. Indeed ? But is it not reasonable that they
arrive last, who are the slowest ?
y. soc. Yes, that is true.
str. And do we fail to notice this further
point, that the king appears in a still more ridiculous
light, running along with the herd and paired in the
race with the man of all others who is most in
training for a life of cai’eless ease ? 3
y. soc. Certainly he does.
str. For now, Socrates, we have shown more
clearly the truth of that which we said yesterday in
our search for the sophist.4
y. soc. What was it ?
str. That this method of argument pays no more
heed to the noble than to the ignoble, and no less
this satirizes the tendency of contemporary thinkers to play
with numbers.
2 The animal referred to is the pig. See P. Shorey,
Classical Philology, 1917, July, p. 308.
3 i.e. the swineherd, the pig belonging to yevei εύχερεστάτψ.
4 See Sophist 227 a.
39
PLATO
τερον ούδεν ητίμακε προ του μείζονος, αεί δε καθ’

αυτήν περαίνει, τάληθεστατον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Εοικεν.
HE. Ούκοΰν μετά τούτο, "να μη με φθης1 ερω-
τηοας, την βραχυτεραν οδόν ητις τότε ην επί τον
Ε του βασιλεως όρον, αυτός σοι πρότερον έλθω;
νε. 2Ω. "Σφοδρά γε.
HE. Λε^ω δη δεΐν τότε ευθύς τό πεζόν τω δίποδι
προς τό2 τετράπουν γένος διανεΐμαι, κατιδόντα
δε τάνθρώπινον ετι μόνω τω πτηνω ξύνειληχός την
δίποδα αγέλην πάλιν τω φιλώ καί τω πτεροφυει
τεμνειν, τμηθείσης δε αυτής καί τότ ηδη της
ανθρωπονομικης δηλωθείσης τέχνης, φεροντα τον
πολιτικόν καί βασιλικόν οίον ηνίοχον εις αυτήν εν-
στησαντα, παραδοΰναι τας της πόλ.εως ηνίας ώς
οικείας καί αύτω ταύτης οϋσης της επιστήμης.
267 νε. 2Ω. Καλώ? καί καθαπερεί χρέος άπεδω-
κας μοι τον λόγον, προσθείς την εκτροπήν οιον
τοκον και αναπληρωσας αυτόν.
10. ΞΕ. Φερε δη καί ξυνείρωμεν επανελθόντες
επι την αρχήν μέχρι της τελευτής τον λόγον τοΰ
ονοματος της τοΰ πολίτικου τέχνης.
νε. 2Ω. ΤΙάνυ μεν ούν.
ΞΕ. Γης γνωστικής τοίνυν επιστήμης ημΐν ην
κατ αρχας μέρος επιτακτικόν τούτου δε άπεικα-
σθεν τό μόριον αύτεπιτακτικόν3 ερρηθη. ζωοτρο¬
ύλ φικη δε πάλιν αύτεπιτακτικης ου τό σμικρότατον
των γενών άπεσχίζετο· καί ζωοτροφικης είδος
αγελαιοτροφικόν, άγελαιοτροφικοΰ δ’ αΰ πεζονομι-
1 με φθαS Stephanus e Ficino : μ ίφθηs Β : μεμφθφ Τ.
2 τό D, Stallbaum : om. ΒΤ.
8 αΰτβπιτακτικύν] αϋτβπίτακτον ΒΤ.
40
THE STATESMAN
honour to the small than to the great, but always

goes on its own way to the most perfect truth.
y. soc. So it seems.
str. Then shall I now, without waiting for you to
ask me, guide you of my own accord along that
shorter way referred to a moment ago that leads to
the definition of the king ?
y. soc. By all means.
str. I say, then, that we ought at that time to have
divided walking animals immediately into biped and
quadruped, then seeing that the human race falls
into the same division with the feathered creatures
and no others, we must again divide the biped class
into featherless and feathered, and when that division
is made and the art of herding human beings is made
plain, we ought to take the statesmanlike and kingly
man and place him as a sort of charioteer therein,
handing over to him the reins of the state, because
that is his own proper science.
y. soc. You have cleared up the argument finely,
and as if it were a debt you were paying, you threw
in the digression as interest and for good measure.
str. Now let us go back to the beginning and
join together the definition of the name of the
statesman’s art link by link to the end.
str. In the first place we said that intellectual
science had a part that gives commands; and a
portion of this was called by a comparison the part
that gives its own commands; and again the art of
rearing living beings was singled out, which is by
no means the smallest part of the art which gives its
own commands; and a class of rearing living beings
was herd-tending, and a part of this again the herding
41
PLATO
κόν του δε πεζονομικοΰ μάλιστα άπετεμνετο

τέχνη της άκεράτου φύσεως θρεπτική, ταύτης
δ’ αυ το μέρος ούκ ελαττον τριπλοϋν συμπλεκειν
άναγκαΐον, άν εις εν τις αυτό όνομα ζυναγαγεϊν
βουληθη, γενεσεως άμίκτου1 νομευτικην2 επιστή¬
μην προσαγορεύων. τό δ’ από τούτου τμήμα, επί
C ποίμνη δίττοδι μέρος άνθρωπονομικόν ετι λειφθεν
μόνον, τοΰτ αυτό εστιν ηδη τό ζητηθεν, άμα
βασιλικόν ταύτόν κληθεν καί πολιτικόν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐΐαντάπασι μεν ούν.
HE. ^Αρά γ', ω Σιώκρατες, αληθώς ημιν τοΰτο
καθάπερ συ νυν ειρηκας ούτως εστί καί πεπραγμε-
νον ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ ποιον δη;
HE. Τδ παντάπασιν ίκανώς είρησθαι τό προτεθεν
η τοΰτ’ αυτό καί μάλιστα ή ζητησις ελλείπει, τό
τον λόγον είρησθαι μεν πως, ού μην παντάπασί
D γε τελεως άπειργάσθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? είπες;
HE. ’Eya> νών πειράσομαι tout’ αυτό ο δια-
νοοΰμαι νυν ετι μάλλον δηλώσαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Λεγοις άν.
ΞΕ, 0 ύκοΰν των νομευτικών ημιν πολλών φάνε ί¬
σων άρτι τεχνών μία τις ην η πολίτικη καί μιας
τίνος αγέλης επιμελεια;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
HE. Ταύτην δε γε διώριζεν ό λόγος ούχ ίππων
είναι τροφόν οδδ’ άλλων θηρίων, αλλ’ ανθρώπων
κοινοτροφικην επιστήμην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούτως.
1 άμίκτου Boeckh : μικτού ΒΤ.
2 νομευτικην Heindorf: νομευτικην ΒΤ.
42
THE STATESMAN
of walking animals ; and from the herding of walking

animals the art of rearing those without horns was
divided. And of this in turn one part will have to
be treated as no less than threefold, if it is to be
called by one comprehensive name, and it will be
called (l) the science (2) of tending herds (3) which
do not cross breeds. But the only possible further
subdivision of this is the art of herding· human
beings, and this is at last what we are looking for,
the single art called both kingly and statesmanlike.
y. soc. That is perfectly true.
str. And yet, Socrates, have we truly accomplished
this, exactly as you have said ?
y. soc. Accomplished what ?
str. The perfectly satisfactory discussion of our
subject. Or is our investigation incomplete in just
this detail, that we have given a definition after a
fashion, but have not perfectly completed it ?
Y. soc. What do you mean ?
str. I will try to make still plainer to us both the
thought which I now have in mind.
y. soc. Please do so.
str. We found just now that there were many
arts of herding, and one of them was the art of
statesmanship, which was the care of one particular
kind of herd, did we not ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And our argument defined this, not as the
tending of horses or other beasts, but as the science
of tending men in common.
y. soc. Yes, it did.
43
PLATO
E II. EE. To δη τών νομεών πάντων διάφορον

και το των βασιλέων θεασώμεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Το ποιον;
EE. Ει τις των άλλων τω1 τέχνης άλλης όνομα
εχων κοινή της αγέλης ζύντροφος είναι φησι και
προσποιείται.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΙΊώ? φης;
ΞΕ. 0Ιον οι έμποροι και γεωργοί και σιτουργοι
πάντες, και προς τουτοις γυμνασται και τό των
ιατρών γένος, οίσθ’ οτι τοΐς περί τα ανθρώπινα
νομεΰσιν, οΰς πολιτικούς εκαλεσαμεν, παντάπασι
68 τω λόγω διαμάχοιντ αν ούτοι σύμπαντες, ώς
σφεΐς της τροφής επιμελούνται τής ανθρώπινης,
ού μόνον αγελαίων ανθρώπων, άλλα και τής των
αρχόντων αυτών;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκοΰν όρθώς αν λεγοιεν;
ΞΕ. ’Ίσα)?, και τούτο μεν επισκεφόμεθα, τάδε
δύ ίσμεν, ότι βουκόλου γε ούδείς αμφισβητήσει
περί τούτων ούδενός, άλλ’ αυτός τής αγέλης τροφός
ο βουφορβός, αυτός ιατρός, αυτός οΐον νυμφευτής
Β και περ'ι τούς τών γιγνομενων τόκους και λοχείας
μόνος επιστήμων τής μαιευτικής· ετι τοίνυν παι-
διας και μουσικής εφ’ όσον αυτού τα θρέμματα
φύσει μετείληφεν, ούκ άλλος κρείττων παραμυθει-
σθαι και κηλών πραύνειν, μετά τε οργάνων καί φιλώ
τω στόμα τι την τής αυτού ποίμνης άριστα μετα-
χειριζόμενος μουσικήν καί δη καί τών άλλων
περί νομεών ό αυτός τρόπος, ή γάρ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Πώ? ούν ήμΐν 6 λόγος ορθός φανεΐται καί
ακέραιος 6 περί τού βασιλεως, όταν αυτόν νομέα καί
1 τφ G : τφ Τ: τό Β.
THE STATESMAN
str. Let us, then, observe the point of difference
between kings and all other herdsmen.

Y. soc. What point of difference ?
str. Let us see whether anyone who is designated
by the name of another art says and claims that he
is fellow manager of the herd in common with any
of the other kinds of herdsmen.
str. For instance, merchants, husbandmen, and
all who prepare grain for use, and also gymnastic
trainers and physicians would certainly all dispute
with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we have called
statesmen, and would assert that they themselves
take care of the tending of humanity, and not the
tending of the common herd only, but even that of
the rulers themselves, would they not ?
y. soc. And would they be right ?
str. Perhaps. We will examine that matter; but
this we know, that no one will ever raise such a
contention against any neatherd, but the herdsman
himself tends the herd, he is their physician, he is
their matchmaker, and he alone knows the midwife’s
science of aiding at the birth of their offspring.
Moreover, so far as the nature of the creatures allows
them to enjoy sport or music, no one can enliven or
soothe them better than he; whether with instru¬
ments or merely with his voice he performs the
music best suited to his own herd ; and the same
applies to the other herdsmen. Is not that the case ?
y. soc. You are quite right.
str. Then how can our discourse about the king
be right and free from error, when we pick him out
c 45
PLATO
C τροφόν αγέλης ανθρώπινης θώμεν μόνον εκκρί-

νοντες μυρίων άλλων αμφισβητούν των;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Οί'Βαμώς.
HE. Ούκοΰν όρθώς ολίγον έμπροσθεν εφοβηθη-
μεν ύποπτευσαντες μη λεγοντες μεν τι τυγχάνοιμεν
σχήμα βασιλικόν, ου μην άπειργασμενοι γε είμεν πω
δι' ακρίβειας τον πολιτικόν, εως άν τούς περικεχυ-
μενους αύτω και της σύννομης αύτω αντιποιού¬
μενους περιελόντες και χωρίσαντες απ’ εκείνων
καθαρόν μόνον αυτόν άποφηνωμεν;
D ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Ορθότατα μεν οΰν.
HE. Τοΰτο τοίνυν, ώ Σώκρατες, ημΐν ποιητεον,
εί μη μελλομεν1 επί τω τελεί καταισχΰναι τον
λόγον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Αλλά μην ούδαμώς τοΰτό γε δραστεον.
12. ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν εξ άλλης άρχης δει καθ'
ετεραν όδδν πορευθηναί τινα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποιαν δη;
ΞΕ. Σχεδόν παιδιάν εγκερασαμενους· συχνω γάρ
μερει δει μεγάλου μύθου προσχρησασθαι, καί τό
λοιπόν δη, καθάπερ εν τοΐς πρόσθεν, μέρος αεί
Ε μέρους άφαιρουμενους επ' άκρον άφικνεΐσθαι τό
ζητούμενου. ούκοΰν χρη;
νε. 2Ω. Πάνυ μεν οΰν.
ΞΕ. Άλλα δη τω μύθω μου πάνυ πρόσεχε τον
νουν, καθάπερ οί παΐδες· πάντως ού πολλά εκ-
φεύγεις παιδιάς2 ετη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Λεγοις άν.
ΞΕ. ^Ην τοίνυν καί ετι εσται των πάλαι λεχθεν-
1 μέΧΚομεν Ast : μέΧΚοιμεν ΒΤ.

8 παιδιας Campbell: τταιδias ΒΤ: παιδιού Stephanus :
παιδεία! al.
46
THE STATESMAN
alone as herdsman and tender of the human herd,

while countless others dispute his claim ?
v. soc. It cannot possibly be right.
str. We suspected a little while ago that although
we might be outlining a sort of kingly shape we had not
Jret perfected an accurate portrait of the statesman,
and could not do so until, by removing those who
crowd about him and contend writh him for a share
in his herdsmanship, we separated him from them
and made him stand forth alone and uncontaminated.
Was our fear justified ?
y. soc. It certainly was.
str. Then w^e must attend to that, Socrates, if
we are not to end our argument in disgrace.
y. soc. But we certainly must not do that.
str. Then we must begin again from a new
starting-point and travel by a different road.
y. soc. By what road ?
str. By one which offers us some amusement;
for there is a famous story a great part of which it
is really our duty to insert into our discussion; and
then after that we can proceed as before, by elimin¬
ating part after part, and in that way reach the
ultimate object of our search. Shall we do that ?
str. Then please pay careful attention to my
story, just as if you were a child; and anyway you
are not much too old for children’s tales.
y. soc. Please tell the story.
str. Of the portents recorded in ancient tales
47
PLATO
των πολλά τε αλλα καί δη καί το περί την Άτρεως

τε καί Θυεστου λεχθεΐσαν εριν φάσμα, άκήκοας
γάρ που καί άπομνημονευεις ο φασι γενεσθαι τότε.
Ν£. 2Ω. Το περί της χρυσής άρνός 'ίσως σημεΐον
φράζεις.
269 HE. Ούδαμώς, άλλα το περί της μεταβολής
δύσεώς τε καί ανατολής ήλιου καί των άλλων
άστρων, ώς άρα δθεν μεν ανατέλλει νΰν, εις τούτον
τότε τον τόπον εδυετο, άνετελλε δ’ εκ τοΰ εναντίου,
τότε δε δη μαρτυρήσας άρα ό θεός Άτρει μετε-
βαλεν αυτό επί τό νΰν σχήμα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αεγεται γάρ ουν δη καί τούτο.
HE. Και μην αΰ καί την γε βασιλείαν ήν ήρξε
ΚρόΐΌ? πολλών άκηκόαμεν.
Β ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐίλείστων μεν ουν.
ΞΕ. Τι δε; τό τούς έμπροσθεν φυεσθαι γηγενείς
καί μη εξ άλλήλων γεννάσθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και τούτο εν των πάλαι λεχθεντων.
ΕΕ. Ύαΰτα τοίνυν εστι μεν ξυμπαντα εκ ταύτοΰ
πάθους, καί προς τουτοις ετερα μύρια καί τούτων
ετι θαυμαστότερα, διά δε χρόνου πλήθος τά μεν
αυτών άπεσβηκε, τά δε διεσπαρμένα είρηται χωρίς
εκαστα άπ’ άλλήλων. ο δ’ εστί πάσι τουτοις
C αίτιον τδ πάθος ούδείς είρηκεν, νΰν δε δη λεκτεον
εις γάρ την τοΰ βασιλεως άπόδειξιν πρεφει ρηθεν.
1 Hermes revenged upon the Pelopidae the death of his

son Myrtilus by causing a lamb with golden fleece to be
born among the flocks of Atreus. When his claim to the
succession was disputed, Atreus promised to show this
prodigy to prove that the gods were on his side. Thyestes
persuaded Aerope, the wife of Atreus, to give him the lamb,
and Atreus was in danger of losing his kingdom, had not
Zeus, who favoured his claim, made the sun and the Pleiades
48
THE STATESMAN
many did happen and will happen again. Sucli an

one is the portent connected with the tale of the
quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes. You have
doubtless heard of it and remember what is said
to have taken place.
y. soc. You refer, I suppose, to the token of the
golden lamb.1
str. Oh no; I mean the change in the rising and
setting of the sun and the other heavenly bodies,
how in those times they used to set in the quarter
where they now rise, and used to rise where they
now set, but the god at the time of the quarrel, you
recall, changed all that to the present system as a
testimony in favour of Atreus.
Y. soc. Yes, I’ve heard that, too.
str. And again we have often heard the tale of
the reign of Cronus.
y. soc. Yes, very often.
str. And how about the story that the ancient
folk were earthborn and not begotten of one another?
y. soc. That is one of the old tales, too.
str. Well, all these stories and others still more
remarkable have their source in one and the same
event, but in the lapse of ages some of them
have been lost and others are told in fragmentary
and disconnected fashion. But no one has told
the event which is the cause of them all, and so
I must tell it now; for that will help us to make
clear the nature of the king.
return from their setting towards their rising. This is the
form of the story given in a scholium on Euripides, Orestes,
9S8, and Plato seems to have this form in mind, though
variants existed. The lamb was a token (σημεΊον) of the
favour of the gods, and the changed course of the sun and
stars was a testimony (μαρτύρησαs) to the right of Atreus.
49
PLATO
Ι3· NE. 2Ω. Κάλλιστ’ είπες, καί λεγε μηδέν

ελλείπων.
ΞΕ. Άκούοις αν. τό γάρ παν τάδε τότε μεν αυ¬
τός ό θεός ζυμποδηγεΐ πορευόμενον καί συγκυκλεΐ,
τότε δ’ άνηκεν, όταν αι περίοδοι του προσήκοντος
αυτω μετρον ειληφωσιν ηδη χρόνου, τό δε πάλιν
D αυτόματον εις τάναντία περιάγεται, ζωον ον και
φρόνησιν είληχός εκ του συναρμόσαντος αυτό κατ
άρχάς. τούτο 8e αυτω τό άνάπαλιν ίεναι διά τόδ’
εζ ανάγκης έμφυτον γεγονεν.
νε. 2Ω. Διά τδ ποιον δη;
HE. Τό κατά ταυτά και ωσαύτως εχειν αεί καί
ταύτόν είναι τοΐς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσηκει
μόνοις, σώματος δε φυσις ου ταύτης της τάζεως.
δν δε ουρανόν καί κόσμον επωνομάκαμεν, πολλών
μεν καί μακαρίων παρά, τοΰ γεννησαντος μετείλη-
φεν, άτάρ ούν δη κεκοινώνηκε γε καί σώματος·
Ε όθεν αυτω μεταβολής άμοίρω γίγνεσθαι διά παν¬
τός αδύνατον, κατά δύναμίν γε μην ότι μάλιστα εν
τω αυτω κατα ταύτα μίαν φοράν κινείται· διό την
άνακύκλησιν εΐληχεν, ότι σμικροτάτην της αύτοΰ
κινησεως παράλλαζιν. αυτό δε εαυτό στρεφειν
αεί σ^δοΕ οάδε^ι δυνατόν πλην τω των κινούμενων
αΰ πάντων ηγουμενω· κινεΐν δέ τούτω τότε μεν
άλλως, αύθις δε εναντίως ου θεμις. εκ πάν¬
των δη τούτων τον κόσμον μήτε αυτόν χρη φάναι
στρεφειν εαυτόν αεί, μητ αΰ όλον αεί υπό θεοΰ
στρεφεσθαι διττά? καί εναντίας περιαγωγάς, μητ’
270 αΰ δύο τινε θεώ φρονοΰντε εαυτοΐς εναντία στρε-
φειν αυτόν, άλλ’ όπερ άρτι ερρηθη καί μόνον λοιπόν,
50
THE STATESMAN
v. soc. Very good; just tell your tale and omit

nothing.
str. Listen then. During a certain period God
himself goes with the universe as guide in its revolv¬
ing course, but at another epoch, when the cycles
have at length reached the measure of his allotted
time, he lets it go, and of its own accord it turns
backward in the opposite direction, since it is a living
creature and is endowed with intelligence by him
who fashioned it in the beginning. Now this reversal
of its motion is an inevitable part of its nature for
the following reason.
y. soc. What reason ?
str. Absolute and perpetual immutability is a
property of only the most divine things of all, and
body does not belong to this class. Now that which
we call heaven and the universe has received from
its creator many blessed qualities, but then, too, it
partakes also of a bodily nature; therefore it is
impossible for it to be entirely free from change ; it
moves, however, so far as it is able to do so, with a
single motion in the same place and the same
manner, and therefore it has acquired the reverse
motion in a circle, because that involves the least
deviation from its own motion. But to turn itself
for ever is hardly possible except for the power that
guides all moving things; and that this should turn
now in one direction and now in the opposite
direction is contrary to divine law. As the result of
all this, we must not say either that the universe
turns itself always, or that it is always turned by God
in twro opposite courses, or again that two divinities
opposed to one another turn it. Ί he only remaining
alternative is what I suggested a little while ago, that
51
PLATO
τότε μεν ύπ’ άλλης συμποδηγεΐσθαι θείας αίτιας,

το ζην πάλιν επικτώμενον και λαμβάνοντα αθανασίαν
επισκευαστην παρά του δημιουργού, τότε δ
όταν άνεθη, δά εαυτού1 αυτόν ιεναι, κατά καιρόν
άφεθεντα τοιοΰτον, ώστε άνάπαλιν πορεύεσθαι
πολλάς περιόδων μυριάδας διά δη2 τδ μεγιστον
ον καί ίσορροπώτατον επί σμικροτάτου βαΐνον
ποδός ιεναι.
Β νε. 2Ω. Φαίνεται γοΰν δη καί μάλα εικότως
ειρησθαι πάνθ’ όσα διελήλυθας.
Ι4· HE. Αογισάμενοι δη ξυννοησωμεν τό πά¬
θος εκ των νΰν λεχθεντων, δ πάντων εφαμεν είναι
των θαυμαστών αίτιον, εστι γάρ ουν δη τού τ’ αυτό.
SE. Τδ την τού παντός φοράν τότε μεν εφλ ά
νΰν κυκλεΐται φερεσθαι, τότε δ’ επί τάναντία.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δτ^;
ΞΕ. Ύαυτην την μεταβολήν ηγεΐσθαι δει των περί
τον ουρανόν γιγνομεναιν τροπών πασών είναι μεγί-
C στην καί τελεωτάτην τροπήν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’'Κοικε γοΰν.
ΞΕ. Μεγίστας τοίνυν καί μεταβολάς χρη νομίζειν
γίγνεσθαι τότε τοΐς εντός ημΐν οίκοΰσιν αυτοΰ.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και τούτο εικός.
ΞΕ. Μεταβολάς δε μεγάλας καί πολλάς καί παν-
τοιας συμφερομενας αγά ούκ ΐσμεν την τών ζώων
φυσιν ότι χαλεπώς ανέχεται;
ΞΕ. Φθοραί τοίνυν εξ ανάγκης τότε μεγισται
ξυμβαίνουσι τών τε άλλων ζώων, καί δη καί τδ τών
1 εαυτόν Eusebius : ιαυτ'ον ΒΤ.
2 δη Stallbaum : δέ ΒΤ.
52
THE STATESMAN
the universe is guided at one time by an extrinsic

divine cause, acquiring the power of living again and
receiving renewed immortality from the Creator,
and at another time it is left to itself and then
moves by its own motion, being left to itself at
such a moment that it moves backwards through
countless ages, because it is immensely large and
most evenly balanced, and turns upon the smallest
pivot.
y. soc. All that account of yours appears, at any
rate, very reasonable.
str. Then, in the light of what has been said, let
us consider and gain understanding of the event
which we said was the cause of all those wonderful
portents ; for it is really just this.
y. soc. Just what ?
str. The fact that at certain periods the universe
has its present circular motion, and at other periods
it revolves in the reverse direction.
Y. soc. How was this the cause ?
str. We cannot help believing that of all the
changes which take place in the heavens this reversal
is the greatest and most complete.
y. soc. It certainly seems to be so.
str. Therefore we must also believe that at the
same time the greatest changes come upon us who
dwell within the heavens.
y. soc. That is likely too.
str. And animals cannot well endure many great
and various changes at once. 1 hat is a familiar fact,
is it not ?
y. soc. Of course.
str. Inevitably, then, there is at that time great
destruction of animals in general, and only a small
c 2 53
PLATO
D ανθρώπων γένος ολίγον τι περιλείπεται· περί δε

τούτου? αλλα τε παθήματα πολλά καί θανμαστα και
καινά ξυμπίπτει, μέγιστον δε τόδε και ξυνεπόμενον
τη τού παντός άνειλίξει τότε, όταν η της νΰν καθ-
eστηκνιας εναντία γίγνηται τροπή.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τό ποιον;
ΞΕ. "Ην ηλικίαν έκαστον είχε των ζώων, αυτή
πρώτον μεν εστη πάντων, καί επαυσατο παν όσον
ην θνητόν επί το γεραίτερον ίδεΐν πορευόμενον,
Ε μεταβάλλον δε πάλιν επί τουναντίον οίον νεώτερον
καί άπαλώτερον εφυετο· καί των μεν πρεσβυτερών
αί λευκάί τρίχες εμελαίνοντο, των δ αΰ γενειώντων
αί παρειαί λεαινόμεναι πάλιν επί την παρελθοΰσαν
ώραν έκαστον καθίστασαν, των δε ηβώντων τα
σώματα λεαινόμενα καί σμικρότερα καθ' ημέραν
καί νύκτα εκάστην γιγνόμενα πάλιν εις την τού
νεογενούς παιδός φΰσιν άπηει, κατά τε την φυχην
καί κατά το σώμα άφομοιουμενα· το δ’ εντεύθεν
ηδη μαραινόμενα κομιδη τό πάμπαν έζηφανίζετο.
τών δ’ αΰ βιαίως τελευτώντων εν τώ τότε χρόνω τό
τού νεκρού σώμα τά αυτά ταΰτα πάσχον παθήματα
271 διά τάχους άδηλον εν όλίγαις ήμέραις διεφθείρετο.
ΐ5· ΝΕ. 5Ω. Γε'νεσι? δε δη τις τότ ην, ώ ζένε,
ζώων; καί τι'να τρόπον έζ άλληλων εγεννώντο;
ΞΕ. Δηλον, ώ Σιώκρατες, ότι τό μεν εζ άλληλων
ούκ ην εν τη τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, τό δε γηγενές
1 The tale of Atreus introduces the fanciful theory of the

reversal of the revolution of the heavenly bodies, and this,
especially in an age when the stars were believed to exercise
a direct influence upon mankind and other creatures, natur¬
ally brings with it the reversal of all processes of growth.
This leads to a new birth of mankind, and the Stranger then
54
THE STATESMAN
part of the human race survives ; and the survivors

have many experiences wonderful and strange, the
greatest of which, a consequence of the reversal of
everything at the time when the world begins to
turn in the direction opposed to that of its present
revolution, is this.1
Y. soc. What is that experience ?
str. First the age of all animals, whatever it was
at the moment, stood still, and every mortal creature
stopped growing older in appearance and then
reversed its growth and became, as it were, younger
and more tender; the- hoary locks of the old men
grew dark, and bearded cheeks grew smooth again
as their possessors reverted to their earlier ages, and
the bodies of young men grew smoother and smaller
day by day and night by night, until they became
as new-born babes, to which they were likened in
mind and body; and then at last they wasted away
entirely and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of
those who died by violence in those times quickly
underwent the same changes, were destroyed, and
disappeared in a few days.
y. soc. But then. Stranger, how did animals come
into existence in those days ? How were they
begotten of one another?
str. It is clear, Socrates, that being begotten of
one another was no part of the natural order of that
briefly describes the age of innocence, the fall of man and
the barbarism that follows, and the partial restoration of man
through divine interposition and the gift of the various arts
of civilization. Plato does not offer this as a real explanation
of the existing condition of the world, but it serves, like the
myths introduced in other dialogues, to present, in connexion
with accepted mythology, a theory which may account for
some of the facts of life.
55
PLATO
είναι ποτέ γένος λεχθεν tout’ ην το κατ’ εκείνον

τον χρόνον εκ γης πάλιν άναστρεφόμενον, άπεμνημο-
νεΰετο δε υπό των ημετερων προγόνων των πρώτων,
οΐ τελευτώση μεν τη προτερα περιφορά τον ε$ης
J5 χρόνον εγειτόνουν, τησδε δε κατ' άρχάς εφύοντο·
τούτων γάρ οΰτοι κηρυκες εγενονθ ημΐν των λόγων,
οι! νυν υπό πολλών ούκ όρθώς άπιστοΰνται. το γαρ
εντεύθεν, οΐμαι, χρη ζυννοεΐν. επόμενον1 γάρ
εστι τώ τούς πρεσβυτας επί την του παιδός ίεναι
φύσιν, εκ των τελευτηκότων αΰ, κείμενων δε εν γη,
πάλιν εκεΐ ξυνισταμενους και άναβιωσκομενους,
τη τροπή2 συνανακυκλουμόνης εις τάναντία της
γενεσεως, και γηγενείς δη κατά τούτον τον λόγον
C όξ ανάγκης φυόμενους, ούτως εχειν τοϋνομα και
τον λόγον, όσους μη θεός αυτών εις άλλην μοίραν
εκόμισεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κομιδη μεν οΰν τούτο γε επεται τοΐς
έμπροσθεν, άλλα δη τον βί'.ον ον επι της Κρόνου
φης είναι δυνάμεως, πότερον εν εκείναις ην ταΐς
τροπαΐς η εν ταΐσδε; την μεν γάρ τών άστρων τε
και ήλιου μεταβολήν δηλον ώς εν εκατερα ις
ζυμπίπτει ταΐς τροπαΐς γίγνεσθαι.
ΞΕ. Καλώ? τώ λόγω ξυμπαρηκολούθηκας. ο δ*
D ηρου περί τού παντα αυτόματα γίγνεσθαι τοΐς άν-
θρώποις, ήκιστα της νυν εστι καθεστηκυίας φοράς,
άλλ’ ην και τούτο της έμπροσθεν, τότε γάρ αυτής
1 έπύμινον Stallbaum: έχύμενον ΒΤ.

2 τη τροπτ) Β: 'έπεσθαι ry τροπή Τ.
1 This may refer to philosophers (cf. Phaedo 82 c) or,

more probably, to those who, like Menelaus, were transferred
56
THE STATESMAN
time, but the earth-born race which, according to

tradition, once existed, was the race which returned
at that time out of the earth ; and the memory of
it was preserved by our earliest ancestors, who were
born in the beginning of our period and therefore
were next neighbours to the end of the previous
period of the world’s revolution, with no interval
between. For they were to us the heralds of these
stories which are nowadays unduly disbelieved by
many people. For you must, I think, consider what
would result. It is a natural consequence of the
return of the old to childhood that those who are
dead and lying in the earth take shape and come
to life again, since the process of birth is reversed
along with the reversal of the world’s revolution;
for this reason they are inevitably earth-born, and
hence arises their name and the tradition about
them, except those of them whom God removed to
some other fate.1
y. soc. Certainly that follows from what preceded.
But was the life in the reign of Cronus, which you
mentioned, in that previous period of revolution or
in ours ? For evidently the change in the course
of the stars and the sun takes place in both
periods.
str. You have followed my account very well.
No, the life about which you ask, when all the fruits
of the earth sprang up of their own accord for men,
did not belong at all to the present period of
revolution, but this also belonged to the previous
one. For then, in the beginning, God ruled and
to the abode of the blessed, or, like Heracles, became gods.

Such individuals would be exempt from the consequences of
any subsequent reversal of the world’s revolution.
57
PLATO
πρώτον της κυκλήσεως ηρχεν επιμελούμενος όλης 6

θεός, ώ? δ’ αν1 κατά, τόπους ταύτόν τούτο υπό θεών
αρχόντων πάντ’ ην2 τά τού κόσμου μέρη διειλημμε-
να· καί δη καί τά ζώα κατά γένη καί άγελας οΐον
νομής θείοι, διειληφεσαν δαίμονες, αυτάρκης είς
πάντα έκαστος εκάστοις ών οίς αυτός ενεμεν, ώστε
Ε ούτ' άγριον ην ούδεν ούτε άλληλων εδωδαί, πόλε¬
μός τε ούκ ενην ουδέ στάσις τό παράπαν· άλλα θ'
οσα της τοιαύτης εστ'ι κατακοσμησεως επόμενα,
μύρια άν είη λεγειν. τό δ’ οΰν τών ανθρώπων
λεχθεν αυτομάτου περί βίου διά τό τοιόνδε είρηται.
θεός ενεμεν αυτούς αυτός επιστατών, καθάπερ νϋν
άνθρωποι, ζώον ον ετερον θειότερον, άλλα γένη
φαυλότερα αυτών νομεύουσι· νεμοντος δε εκείνου
272 πολιτεΐαί τε ούκ ησαν ούδε κτήσεις γυναικών
καί παίδων· εκ γης γάρ άνεβιώσκοντο πάντες, ούδεν
μεμνημενοι τών πρόσθεν αλλά τά μεν τοιαΰτα
άπην πάντα, καρπούς δε άφθονους ειχον από τε δέν¬
δρων καί πολλής ύλης άλλης, ούχ υπό γεωργίας φυό¬
μενους, άλλ’ αύτομάτης άνα διδούσης της γης.
γυμνοί δε καί άστρωτοι θυραυλοΰντες τά πολλά
ειώμοντο· τό γάρ τών ωρών αύτοΐς άλυπον εκεκρα-
το, μαλακάς δε εύνάς ειχον άναφυομενης εκ γης
Β πόας άφθονου, τον δη βίον,ώ Ίόώκρατες, ακούεις
μεν τον τών επί 1\ρόνου· τόνδε δ’ δν3 λόγος επί
Αιός είναι, τον νυνί, παρών αύτός ησθησαι· κρΐναι
δ’ αύτοιν τον εύδαιμονεστερον άρ’ αν δύναιό τε καί
εθελήσειας ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούδαμώς.
1ώ; δ’ αδ Burnet: ώ? 'νυν ΒΤ.

2 πάντ’ ήν Stallbaum: πάντ]j ΒΤ.
3 δν W : ώ$ ΒΤ : δν cits al.
58
THE STATESMAN
supervised the whole revolution, and so again, in

the same way, all the parts of the universe were
divided by regions among gods who ruled them,
and, moreover, the animals were distributed by species
and flocks among inferior deities as divine shepherds,
each of whom was in all respects the independent
guardian of the creatures under his own care, so
that no creature was wild, nor did they eat one
another, and there was no war among them, nor any
strife whatsoever. To tell all the other consequences
of such an order of the world would be an endless
task. But the reason for the story of the spontaneous
life of mankind is as follows : God himself was their
shepherd, watching over them, just as man, being
an animal of different and more divine nature than
the rest, now tends the lower species of animals. And
under his care there were no states, nor did men
possess wives or children; for they all came to life
again out of the earth, with no recollection of their
former lives. So there were no states or families,
but they had fruits in plenty from the trees and
other plants, which the earth furnished them of its
own accord, without help from agriculture. And
they lived for the most part in the open air, without
clothing or bedding; for the climate was tempered
for their comfort, and the abundant grass that grew
up out of the earth furnished them soft couches.
That, Socrates, was the life of men in the reign of
Cronus ; but the life of the present age, which is
said to be the age of Zeus, you know by your own
experience. Would you be able and willing to
decide which of them is the more blessed ?
Y. soc. Certainly not.
59
PLATO
HE. BouAet δήτα εγώ σοι τρόπον τινά διακρίνω;

ΝΕ. 2Ω. Haw μεν οΰν.
ΐό. ΞΕ. Εϊ μεν fyivvv οι τρόφιμοι τοΰ Κρόνου,
παροΰσης αύτοίς οϋτω πολλής σχολής και δυνάμεως
προς τό μή μόνον άνθρώποις άλλα και θηρίοις διά
C λόγων δυνασθαι ξυγγίγνεσθαι, κατεχρώντο του-
τοις ξόμπασιν επί φιλοσοφίαν, μετά τε θηρίων καί
μετ’ άλλήλων όμιλοϋντες, καί πννθανόμενοι παρά
πάσης φυσεως ε’ί τινά τις ιδίαν δυναμιν εχουσα
ήσθετό τι διάφορον των άλλων εις συναγυρμόν
φρονήσεως, ευκριτον ότι των νΰν οί τότε μυρίω προς
ευδαιμονίαν διεφερον εί δε εμπιμπλάμενοι σίτων
άδην καί ποτών διελεγοντο προς άλλήλους καί τά
θηρία μύθους, οίοι δή καί τά νΰν περί αυτών λέγονται,
D καί τοΰτο, ώ? γε1 κατά την εμήν δόξαν άποφή-
νασθαι, καί μάλ> ευκριτον. όμως δ’ ούν ταΰτα ρ.εν
άφώμεν, εως αν ήμιν μηνυτής τις ικανός φανή,
ποτερως οί τότε τάς επιθυμίας εΐχον περί τε
επιστημών καί τής τών λόγων χρείας· ου δ’ ενεκα
τον μΰθον ήγείραμεν, τοΰτο λεκτεον, ίνα τό μετά
τοΰ το εις τό πρόσθεν π εραίνωμεν. επειδή γάρ
πάντων τούτων χρόνος ετελεώθη καί μεταβολήν
εδει γίγνεσθαι καί δή καί τό γήινον ήδη παν άνήλωτο
Ε γένος, πάσας εκάστης τής φυχής τάς γενεσεις
άποδεδωκυίας,όσαήν εκάστη προσταχθεν τοσαΰτα2
εις γήν σπέρματα πεσοόσης, τότε δή τοΰ παντός ό
μεν κυβερνήτης, οΐον πηδαλίων οίακος άφεμενος,
εις την αύτοΰ περιωπήν άπεστη, τον δβ δή κόσμον
πάλιν άνεστ ρεφεν ειμαρμένη τε καί ξύμφυτος
επιθυμία, πάντες οΰν οί κατά τούς τόπους συν
1 us ye G: &στε ΒΤ (in Τ 7 is written above the r).

2 προσταχθίν τοσαντα Eusebius : προσταχθέντα$ αύτά ΒΤ.
6ο
THE STATESMAN
str. Shall I, then, make some sort of a judgement

for you ?
y. soc. Do so, by all means.
str. Well, then, if the fostei children of Cronus,

having all this leisure and the ability to converse not
only with human beings but also with beasts, made
full use of all these opportunities with a view to
philosophy, talking with the animals and with one
another and learning from every creature that,
through possession of some peculiar power he may
have had in any respect beyond his fellows percep¬
tions tending towards an increase of wisdom, it would
be easy to decide that the people of those old times
were immeasurably happier than those of our epoch.
Or if they merely ate and drank till they were full
and gossiped with each other and the animals,
telling such stories as are even now told about
them, in that case, too, it would, in my opinion,
be very easy to reach a decision. However, let us
pass those matters by, so long as there is no one
capable of reporting to us what the desires of the
people in those days were in regard to knowledge
and the employment of speech. The reason why we
revived this legend must be told, in order that we
may get ahead afterwards. For when the time of
all those conditions was accomplished and the change
was to take place and all the earth-born race had at
length been used up, since every soul had fulfilled
all its births by falling into the earth as seed its
prescribed number of times, then the helmsman of
the universe dropped the tiller and withdrew to his
place of outlook, and fate and innate desire made
the earth turn backwards. So, too, all the gods
who share, each in his own sphere, the rule of the
61
PLATO
άρχοντας τώ μεγίστω δαίμονι θεοί, γνόντες ήδη

τό γι,γνόμενον, άφίεσαν αν τα μέρη τοΰ κοσμου
273 της αυτών επιμελείας· δ δε μεταστρεφόμενος και
ξυμβάλλων, αρχής τε καί τελευτής εναντίαν άρμην
δρμηθείς, σεισμόν ττολύν εν εαυτώ ποιων άλλην αΰ
φθοράν ζώων παντοίων άπηργάσατο. μετά δε
ταΰτα προελθόντος ικανού χρόνον, θορύβων τε και
ταραχής ήδη παυόμενος και των σεισμών γαλήνης
επιλα βόμενος εις τε τον είωθότα δρόμον τον
εαυτόν κατακοσμουμενος ήει, επιμέλειαν καί κράτος
Β όχων αυτός τών εν αύτώ τε καί εαυτόν, την τοΰ
δημιουργού καί πατρός άπομνημονενων διδαχήν εις
δύναμιν. κατ’ άρχάς μεν ουν άκριβεστερον άπετε-
λει, τελευτών δε άμβλυτερον τούτων δε αύτώ τό
σωματοειδες τής συγκράσεως αίτιον, τό τής πάλαι
ποτέ φυσεως ζΰντροφον, ότι πολλής ήν μετεχον
αταξίας πριν εις τον νυν κόσμον άφικεσθαι. παρά
μεν γάρ τοΰ συνθεντός πάντα καλά κεκτηται·
παρά δε τής έμπροσθεν εξεως, όσα χαλεπά καί
C άδικα εν ουρανώ γιγνεται, ταΰτα εξ εκείνης αυτός
τε εχει καί τοΐς ζωοις εν απεργάζεται, μετά μεν
ουν τοΰ κυβερνήτου τά ζώα τρεφων εν αύτώ σμικρά
μεν φλαΰρα, μεγάλα δε ενετικτεν αγαθά· χωριζό-
μενός δε εκείνου τον εγγύτατα χρόνον αεί τής
άφεσεως κάλλιστα πάντα διάγει, προϊόντος δε τοΰ
χρόνου καί λήθης εγγιγνομενης εν αύτώ μάλλον καί
δυναστεύει τό τής παλαιάς άναρμοστίας πάθος,
D τε λευτώντος δε εξ ανθεί τοΰ χρόνου καί σμικρά μεν
τάγαθά, πολλήν δε την τών εναντίων κράσιν
επεγκεραννύμένος επί διαφθοράς κίνδυνον αύτοΰ τε
62
THE STATESMAN
Supreme Spirit, promptly perceiving what was taking

place, let go the parts of the world which were under
their care. And as the universe wras turned back
and there came the shock of collision, as the be¬
ginning and the end rushed in opposite directions,
it produced a great earthquake within itself and
caused a new destruction of all sorts of living creatures.
But after that, when a sufficient time had elapsed,
there was rest now from disturbance and confusion,
calm followed the earthquakes, and the world went
on its own accustomed course in orderly fashion,
exercising care and rule over itself and all within
itself, and remembering and practising the teachings
of the Creator and Father to the extent of its power,
at first more accurately and at last more carelessly ;
and the reason for this was the material element in
its composition, because this element, which was
inherent in the primeval nature, was infected with
great disorder before the attainment of the exist¬
ing orderly universe. For from its Composer the
universe has received only good things; but from its
previous condition it retains in itself and creates in
the animals all the elements of harshness and in¬
justice which have their origin in the heavens. Now
as long as the world was nurturing the animals
within itself under the guidance of the Pilot, it
produced little evil and great good ; but in becoming
separated from him it always got on most excellently
during the time immediately after it was let go, but
as time went on and it grew forgetful, the ancient
condition of disorder prevailed more and more and
towards the end of the time reached its height, and
the universe, mingling but little good with much of
the opposite sort, was in danger of destruction for
63
PLATO
άφικνεΐται καί τών iv αύτώ. διδ δη καί τότ ήδη

θεός ό κοσμήσας αυτόν, καθορών iv άποριαις οντα,
κηδόμενος ϊνα μή χειμασθείς υπό ταραχής διαλυθείς
εις τον τής άνομοιότητος άπειρον όντα ποντον1
Ε δυη, πάλιν εφεδρος αύτοΰ των πηδαλίων γιγνο-
μενος, τα νόσησαν τα και λυθεντα εν τή καθ’ εαυτόν
προτερα περιόδω στρεφας, κοσμεί τε και επαν-
ορθών αθάνατον αυτόν καί άγήρων απεργάζεται.
Τούτο μεν οΰν τέλος απάντων ε’ίρηται· τό δ’ επι
την του βασιλεως άπόδειξιν ικανόν εκ του πρόσθεν
άπτομενοις του λόγου· στρεφθεντος γάρ αυ του
κόσμου την επί την νυν γενεσιν οδόν τό τής ηλικίας
αυ πάλιν ΐστατο καί καινά τάναντία άπεδίδου τοΐς
τότε, τά μεν γάρ υπό σμικρότητος ολίγου δέοντα
ήφανίσθαι των ζωων ηυζάνετο, τά δ’ εκ γής νεογενή
σώματα πολιά2 φόντα πάλιν άποθνήσκόντα εις γήν
κατήει. καί τάλλά τε πάντα μετεβαλλεν, άπομιμοό-
74 μένα καί ζυνακολουθοΰντα τω του παντός παθήμα-
τι, καί δη καί τό τής κυήσεως καί γεννήσεως καί
τροφής μίμημα συνείπετο τοΐς πάσιν ύπ’ ανάγκης·
ου γάρ εζήν ετ' εν γή δι' ετερων συνιστάντων
φνεσθαι ζωον, αλλά καθάπερ τω κόσμω προσ-
ετετακτο αυτοκράτορα είναι τής αύτοΰ πορείας,
ουτω δη κατά ταύτά καί τοΐς μερεσιν αύτοΐς δι’
αυτών, καθ όσον οίόν τ’ ήν, φυειν τε καί γεννάν
και τρεφειν προσετάττετο υπό τής όμοιας αγωγής.
Β Οΰ δό ενεκα ό λόγος ώρμηκε πας, επ’ αύτώ νυν
εσμεν ήδη. περί μεν γάρ τών άλλων θηρίων πολλά
άν καί μακρά διεξελθεΐν γίγνοιτο, εξ ων εκαστα
καί δι’ άς αιτίας μεταβεβληκε· περί δέ ανθρώπων
1 ττίντον Simplicius, Proclus : τόπον mss.
* πολιά W2t: 7ro\iai Β : 7τολλά Τ : om. pr. W,
64
THE STATESMAN
itself and those within it. Therefore at that moment

God, who made the order of the universe, perceived
that it was in dire trouble, and fearing that it might
founder in the tempest of confusion and sink in the
boundless sea of diversity, he took again his place as
its helmsman, reversed whatever had become unsound
and unsettled in the previous period when the world
was left to itself, set the world in order, restored it
and made it immortal and ageless.
So now the whole tale is told ; but for our purpose
of exhibiting the nature of the king it will be enough
to revert to the earlier part of the story. For when
the universe was turned again into the present path
of generation, the age of individuals came again to
a stop, and that led to new processes, the reverse of
those which had gone before. For the animals which
had grown so small as almost to disappear grew
larger, and those newly born from the earth with
hoary hair died and passed below the earth again.
And all other things changed, imitating the condition
of the universe and conforming to it, and so too
pregnancy and birth and nurture necessarily imitated
and conformed to the rest; for no living creature
could any longer come into being by the union of
other elements, but just as the universe was ordered
to be the ruler of its own course, so in the same
way the parts were ordered, so far as they could, to
grow and beget and give nourishment of themselves
under the same guidance.
And now we have come at last to the point for the
sake of which this whole discourse was begun. For
much might be said, and at great length, about the
other animals, their previous forms and the causes of
their several changes; but about mankind there is
65
PLATO
βραχύτερα καί μάλλον προσήκοντα, της γάρ του

κεκτημενού καί νέμοντος ημάς δαίμονος άπερημιο-
θέντες έπιμελείας, των πολλών αυ θηρίων, δσα
χαλεπά τάς φάσεις ην, άπαγριωθέντων, αυτοί δε
ασθενείς άνθρωποι και αφύλακτοι γεγονότες διηρπά-
C ζοντο ύπ' αυτών, και έτ' αμήχανοι και άτεχνοι
κατά τούς πρώτους ησαν χρόνους, άτε της μεν
αυτόματης τροφής έπιλελοιπυίας, πορίζεσθαι δε
ούκ έπιστάμενοί πω διά τό μηδεμίαν αυτούς χρείαν
πρότερον άναγκάζειν. εκ τούτων πάντων εν μεγά-
λαις άπορίαις ησαν. όθεν δη τά πάλαι λεχθέντα
παρά θεών δώρα ημΐν δεδώρηται μετ' αναγκαίας
διδαχής και παιδεύσεως, πυρ μεν παρά ΐΐρομηθέως,
τέχναι δε παρ' 'Άφαίστου και της συντέχνου,
D σπέρματα δε αΰ και φυτά παρ' άλλων1 και πάνθ'
όπόσα τον ανθρώπινον βίον συγκατεσκευακεν εκ
τούτων γέγονεν, επειδή τό μεν εκ θεών, όπερ
ερρηθη νυν δη, της επιμελείας έπελιπεν ανθρώπους,
δι' εαυτών δε εδει την τε διαγωγήν καί την επι¬
μέλειαν αυτούς αυτών εχειν καθάπερ όλος ό κόσμος,
ω ζυμμιμουμενοι καί ζυνεπόμενοι τον αεί χρόνον
νυν μεν ούτως, τότε δε εκείνως ζώμέν τε καί
Ε φυομεθα. καί τό μέν δη τοΰ μύθου τέλος εχέτω,
χρήσιμον δε αυτόν ποιησόμεθα προς τό κατιδεΐν
όσον ημάρτομεν άποφηνάαενοι τον βασιλικόν τε
κολ πολιτικόν εν τω πρόσθε λόγω.
ΐ7· ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? οΰν καί πόσον αμάρτημα
φης είναι γεγονός ημΐν;
ΞΕ. μέν βραχύτερον, τη δε μάλα γενναίον καί
πολλέρ μεΐζον καί πλέον η τότε.
1 ϋλλων Stephan us e Ficino : άλλήλων ΒΤ.
66
THE STATESMAN
less to say and it is more to our purpose. For men,

deprived of the care of the deity who had possessed
and tended us., since most of the beasts who were
by nature unfriendly had grown fierce, and they
themselves were feeble and unprotected, were ravaged
by the beasts and were in the first ages still without
resources or skill; the food which had formerly offered
itself freely had failed them, and they did not yet
know how to provide for themselves, because no
necessity had hitherto compelled them. On all these
accounts they were in great straits; and that is the
reason why the gifts of the gods that are told of in the
old traditions wrere given us with the needful informa¬
tion and instruction,—fire by Prometheus, the arts by
Hephaestus and the goddess who is his fellow-artisan,
seeds and plants by other deities.1 And from these
has arisen all that constitutes human life, since, as I
said a moment ago, the care of the gods had failed
men and they had to direct their own lives and take
care of themselves, like the whole universe, which
we imitate and follow through all time, being born
and living now in our present manner and in that
other epoch in the other manner. So, then, let our
tale be finished; but wTe will turn it to account for
opening our eyes to the great error we made in the
exposition of the king and the statesman in our
earlier discussion.
y. soc. How, then, did we err, and what is the
great error you say we have committed ?
str. In one way we made a comparatively slight
error, in another a very important one, much greater
and more far-reaching than the first.
1 The fellow-artisan of Hephaestus is Athena; seeds and
plants are the gifts of Demeter and Dionysus.
67
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Πω?;

ΞΕ. Ότι μέν έρωτώμενοι τον εκ της νϋν περι¬
φοράς καί γενέσεως βασιλέα και πολιτικόν τον εκ
τής εναντίας περιόδου ποιμένα τής τότε ανθρώπινης
275 αγέλης εΐπομεν, και ταΰτα θεόν αντί θνητού,
ταύτη μεν πάμπολυ παρηνέχθημεν ότι δε ζυμπά-
σης τής πόλεως άρχοντα αυτόν άπεφήναμεν, δντινα
δε τρόπον ου διείπομεν, ταύτη δε αΰ τό μέν λεχθέν
αληθές, ου μην όλον γε ουδέ σαφές έρρήθη, διό και
βραχύτερου ή κατ' εκείνο ή μα ρτήκαμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Αληθή.
HE. Δει τοίνυν τον τρόπον, ώς έοικε, διορίσαντας
τής αρχής τής πόλεως ουτω τελέως τον πολιτικόν
ήμΐν είρήσθαι προσδοκάν.
Β HE. Διά ταΰτα μην καί τον μύθον παρεθέμεθα,
ινα ενδείξαιτο περί τής άγελαιοτροφίας μη μόνον ώς
πάντες αυτής άμφισβητοΰσι τώ ζητουμένω τα νυν,
αλλά κάκεΐνον αυτόν εναργέστερου ΐδοιμεν, ον
προσήκει μόνον κατά τό παράδειγμα ποιμένων τε
καί βουκόλων τής1 ανθρώπινης επιμέλειαν έχοντα
τροφής τούτου μόνον άζιωθήναι του προσρήματος.
ΞΕ. Οΐμαι δ’ έγωγε, ώ Σώκρατες, τούτο μέν έτι
Q μεΐζον ή κατά βασιλέα είναι τό σχήμα τό του
θείου νομέως, τούς δ’ ενθάδε νυν όντας πολιτικούς
τοΐς άρχομένοις όμοιους τε είναι μάλλον πολύ τάς
φύσεις καί παραπλησιαίτερον παιδείας μετειλη-
φέναι καί τροφής.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ'τω? που.
1 Τ77ϊ] TOP ΒΤ.
68
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. How did we do that ?

str. When we were asked about the king and the
statesman of the present movement of the world and
mode of generation, we told of the shepherd of the
human flock in the time of the reverse movement,
and he was a god, not a man, besides. That was a
very great error. Then when we declared that he
was ruler of the whole state, but did not fully tell in
what manner he ruled, what we said was true, though
it was not complete nor clear, and therefore our error
was less in this case than in the other.
y. soc. True.
str. Apparently, then, we must expect a complete
description of the statesman only when we have
defined the manner of his rule over the state.
y. soc. Very good.
str. And this is why I introduced the myth, not
only in order to show that all men compete for the
care of the flock with him whom we are now seeking,
but also that we may more clearly see him who alone
ought to have the care of human beings as shepherds
and neatherds care for their flocks and herds, and
therefore alone deserves to be honoured with that
appellation.
str. I think, Socrates, that the form of the divine
shepherd is greater than that of the king, whereas
the statesmen who now exist here are by nature
much more like their subjects, with whom they share
much more nearly the same breeding and education.
y. soc. Certainly.
69
PLATO
HE. Ύ^ητητεοι1 γε μην ούδεν αν εϊησαν οϋθ’ ήττον

ούτε μάλλον, είθ’ ούτως εΐτ’ εκείνως πεφυκασιν.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ? yap οι»;
ΞΕ. Ττ^δε2 δη πάλιν επανελθωμεν. ην γάρ εφα-
μεν αύτεπιτακτικήν μεν είναι τέχνην επί ζωοις,
D ού μην ιδία γε αλλά κοινή την επιμέλειαν εχονσαν,
καί προσείπομεν δη τότε ευθύς άγελαιοτροφικην—
μεμνησαι γάρ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
ΞΕ. Ύαότης τοίνυν πη διημαρτάνομεν. τον γάρ
πολιτικόν ούδαμοΰ συνελάβομεν οάδ’ ώνομάσαμεν,
άλλ’ ημάς ελαθε κατά την ονομασίαν εκφυγών.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΞΕ. Too τα? ayeAa? εκάστας τρεφειν τοΐς μεν
άλλοις που πάσι μετεστι νομεΰσι, τω πολιτικω δε
ού μετόν επηνεγκαμεν τοϋνομα, δέον των κοινών
Ε επενεγκεΐν τι ζόμπασιν.
νε. 2Ω. Άληθη λεγεις, είπερ ετυγχανε γε όν.
ΞΕ. Πώ? δ’ ούκ ην τό γε θεραπενειν που πάσι
κοινόν, μηδέν διορισθείσης τροφής μηδε τίνος άλλης
πραγματείας; άλλ’ η3 τινα αγελαίο κομικην η
θεραπευτικήν η καί τινα επιμελητικην αυτήν
όνομάσασιν ώς κατά πάντων εζην περικαλυπτειν
καί τον πολιτικόν άμα τοΐς άλλοι?, επειδή δεΐν
τοΰτ’ εσημαινεν 6 λόγος.
ΐ8. ΝΕ. 2Ω. Όρθώς. άλλ’ ή μετά τούτο δι-
76 αίρεσις αύ τινα τρόπον εγίγνετ' αν;
ΞΕ. Κατά ταύτά καθ’ άπερ έμπροσθεν διηρουμεθα
την άγελαιοτροφικην πεζοΐς τε καί άπτησι, καί
άμίκτοις τε καί άκεράτοις, τοΐς αύτοΐς άν που
1 ζητητέοi Coislin.; ζητητέον ΒΤ.
2 Trjoe Stephanus : τί δέ ΒΤ.
70
THE STATESMAN
str. And yet they would have to be investigated

with precisely the same care, whether their nature
be like that of their subjects or like that of the
divine shepherd.
y. soc. Of course.
str. Then let us go back to this point: the art
which we said gave its own orders and had to do with
living beings, but had charge of them not singly but
in common, and which we at once called the art of
the herdsman,—do you remember ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. Well, it was in connexion with that, some¬
where, that we made our mistake; for we never
included or named the statesman; unobserved by us
he slipped out of our nomenclature.
y. soc. How so ?
str. All the other herdsmen have this in common
that they feed their respective herds; but the
statesman does not, yet we gave him the name of
herdsman, when we ought to have given him one
which is common to them all.
y. soc. True, if there were such a name.
str. Is not caring for herds common to them all,
with no especial mention of feeding or any other
activity ? If we called it an art of tending herds or
caring for them or managing them, as all herdsmen
do, we could wrap up the statesman with the rest,
since the argument showed that we ought to do so.
y. soc. Quite right; but how would the next
division be made ?
str. Just as we divided the art of feeding herds
before by distinguishing between those that go on foot
and the winged, and the unmixed breeds and the
3 άλλ’ Αλλην T.
71
PLATO
τούτοις διαιρούμενοι και την αγελαίο κομικήν την

τε νύν και την επί Υρόνου βασιλείαν περιειληφότες
άν η μεν ομοίως εν τω λόγω.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φαίνεται· ζητώ δε αΰ τί τό μετά τούτο.
ΞΕ. Αηλον οτι λεχθεντός οϋτω τού της αγελαίο -
Β κομικής ονόματος ούκ άν ττοτ’ εγένεθ’ ημίν το
τινας άμφισβητείν ώς οάδ’ επιμέλεια το παραπαν
έστίν, ώσπερ τότε δικαίως ημφισβητήθη μηδεμιαν
είναι τέχνην εν ημιν αξίαν τούτον τού θρεπτικού
προσρήματος, εΐ δ’ οΰν τις είη, πολλοΐς πρότερον
αυτής και μάλλον προσηκειν η τινι των βασιλέων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Ορθώς.
ΞΕ. Επιμέλεια δέ γε ανθρώπινης συμπάσης
κοινωνίας ούδεμία άν εθελησειεν έτέρα μάλλον και
προτέρα1 της βασιλικής φάναι καί καπά πάντων
C ανθρώπων αρχής είναι τέχνη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αέγεις όρθώς.
HE. Μετά ταύτα δέ γε, ώ Ίόώκρατες, άρ* εννοοΰμεν
οτι προς αύτώ δη τω τέλει συχνόν αΰ διημαρτά-
νετο ;
sE. 1 006, ως αρ et και Οίβνοηυημβν οτι μαλιστα
τής δίποδος αγέλης είναι τινα θρεπτικήν τέχνην,
ούδέν τι μάλλον ημάς έδει βασιλικήν αυτήν ευθύς
καί πολιτικήν ώς άποτετελεσμένην προσαγορεύειν.
ΞΕ. Πρώτον μεν, ο έλέγομεν, τοΰνομα μετα-
D σκευωρήσασθαι, προς τήν επιμέλειαν μάλώον προσ-
αγαγόντας ή τήν τροφήν, ’έπειτα ταύτην τέμνειν
ου γάρ σμικράς άν έχοι τμήσεις έτι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποιας;
1 προτέρα Stallbaum : πραότερα Β : πραοτέρα Τ.
72
THE STATESMAN
hornless, we might divide the art of tending herds

by these same distinctions, embracing in the word
both the kingship of the present time and that of
the time of Cronus.
y. soc. Evidently; but again I wonder what the
next step is.
str. It is clear that if we had used the word
“ tending ” herds, we should never have met with
the contention that there is no caring for them at all
in statesmanship, though the earlier contention was
justified that there is no art in the case of human
beings that deserves the name of feeding, and if
there be such an art, it belongs much more to many
others than to the king.
str. But no other art would advance a stronger
claim than that of kingship to be the art of caring
for the whole human community and ruling all
mankind.
y. soc. You are right.
str. And after all this, Socrates, do we see that
another great error was committed at the very end ?
Y. soc. What was it ?
str. Why, it was this: No matter how strong our
belief that there was an art of feeding the biped
herd, we ought not to have called it kingship and
statecraft on the spot, as if it were all quite settled.
y. soc. What ought we to have done, then ?
str. In the first place, as we said, we ought to
have remodelled the name, making it denote care,
rather than feeding, and then we ought to have
divided the art, for it may still admit of not un¬
important divisions.
Y. soc. What are they ?
73
PLATO
EE. τΗι τ€ τον θειον αν που διειλόμεθα νομέα

χωρίς καί τον ανθρώπινον επιμελητήν.
νε. 2Ω. Όρθώς.
ΞΕ. Αΰθις 8ε γε την άπονεμηθεΐσαν επιμελητικήν
8ίχα τέμνειν άναγκαΐον ήν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τίνι;
ΞΕ. Τώ βιαίω τε καί εκουσίω.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι 8ή;
ΞΕ. Και ταύτη που το πρότερον αμαρτανοντες
Ε εύηθέστερα του δέοντος εις ταύτόν βασιλέα καί
τύραννον ζυνέθεμεν, άνομοιοτάτους όντας αυτούς
τε καί τον τής αρχής εκατέρου τρόπον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Αληθή.
ΞΕ. Νυν 8έ γε πάλιν επανορθούμενοι, καθάπερ
ei7τον, την άνθρω πίνην επιμελητ ικήν 8ίχα διαιρώ-
μεθα, τω βιαίω τε καί εκουσίω;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΪΙάνυ μεν οΰν.
ΞΕ. Και την μεν γέ που των βίαιων τυραννικήν,
την δε εκούσιον καί εκουσίων δίποδων αγελαίοκο-
μικήν ζώων προσειπόντες πολιτικήν, τον έχοντα αύ
τέχνην ταύτην καί επιμέλειαν όντως όντα βασιλέα
καί πολιτικόν άποφαινώμεθα;
77 Ι9· νε. 2Ω. Και κινδυνεύει γε, ώ ζένε, τελέως
αν ήμΐν ούτως εχειν ή περί τον πολιτικόν άπόδειξις.
ΞΕ. Καλώ? αν, ώ Σιώκρατες, ήμΐν έχοι. δει δε μη
σοί μόνω ταΰτα, άλλα κάμοί μετά σου κοινή ζυν-
δοκεΐν. νΰν δε κατά γε την έμήν ουπω φαίνεται
τέλεον ό βασιλεύς ήμΐν σχήμα έχειν, άλλα καθάπερ
ανδριαντοποιοί παρά καιρόν ενίοτε σπεύδοντες
πλείω καί μείζω του δέοντος έκαστα των έργων
Β έπεμβαλλόμενοι βραδύνουσι, καί νΰν ήμεΐς, ινα
THE STATESMAN
sth. There is one by which we might have divided

the divine shepherd from the human caretaker.
Y. soc. Quite right.
str. And again it was essential that the art of
caretaking thus isolated and assigned to man be
divided into two parts.
y. soc. On what line of division ?
str. On that of compulsory and voluntary.
y. soc. Why is that ?
str. Because this was about the point at which
we made our mistake before ; we were more simple-
minded than we should have been, and we put the
king and the tyrant together, whereas they and
their respective modes of ruling are quite unlike.
y. soc. True.
str. But now shall we, as I said, correct ourselves
and divide the care of humanity into two parts, by
the criterion of the compulsory and the voluntary ?
str. And if we call the art of those who use com¬
pulsion tyrannical or something of the sort and the
voluntary care of voluntary bipeds political, may we
not declare that he who possesses this latter art of
caretaking is really the true king and statesman ?
Y. soc. Well, Stranger, it looks as though our
account of the statesman were complete now.
str. That would be a fine thing for us, Socrates.
But not you alone must think so; I must think so,
too, in agreement with you. As a matter of fact,
however, in my opinion our figure of the king is
not yet perfect, but like statue-makers who some¬
times in their misapplied enthusiasm make too
numerous and too large additions and thus delay the
completion of their several works, we too, at this
75
PLATO
δή προς τώ ταχύ καί μεγαλοπρεπώς δηλώσαιμεν

το τής έμπροσθεν αμάρτημα διεξόδου, τω βασιλει
νομίσαντες πρεπειν μεγάλα παραδείγματα ποιεΐ-
σθαι, θαυμαστόν όγκον άράμενοι του μύθου, μείζονι
του δέοντος ήναγκάσθημεν αύτοϋ μερει προσ-
χρήσασθαι· διό μακροτεραν την άπόδειξιν πεποιή-
καμεν και πάντως τω μύθω τέλος ούκ επεθεμεν,
C άΛΛ’ άτεχνώς ό λόγος ήμΐν ώσπερ ζωον την
εξωθεν μεν περιγραφήν εοικεν ίκανώς εχειν, την
δε οΐον τοΐς φαρμάκοις καί τή συγκράσει των
χρωμάτων ενάργειαν ούκ άπειληφεναι πω. γραφής
δε καί συμπάσης χειρουργίας λεξει καί λόγω
δηλοΰν παν ζωον μάλλον πρεπει τοΐς δυναμενοις
επεσθαι’ τοΐς δ’ άλλοις διά χειρουργιων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τοάτο μεν όρθώς· όπη δε ήμΐν ουπω
φής ίκανώς είρήσθαι δήλωσον.
D ΞΕ. Χαλεπόν, ώ δαιμόνιε, μή παραδείγμασι
χρώμενον ίκανώς ενδείκνυσθαί τι τών μειζόνων.
κινδυνεύει γαρ ημών έκαστος οΐον όναρ είδώς
άπαντα πάντ αΰ πάλιν ώσπερ ύπαρ άγνοεΐν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώϊ· tout’ είπες;
HE. Και μάΧ άτόπως εοικά γε εν τω παρόντι
κινήσας το περί τής επιστήμης πάθος εν ήμΐν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι δη;
ΞΕ. Παραδείγματος·, ώ μακάριε, αΰ μοι καί το
παράδειγμα αυτό δεδεηκεν.
Ε νε. 2Ω. Τι οΰν; λεγε μηδέν εμού γε ενεκα
άποκνών.
1 i.e. the nature of example is to be explained below

by means of an example. The example of the letters of
the alphabet is employed also in the Theaetetus 202 ff.,
but the Stranger cannot properly refer to that, as he was
76
THE STATESMAN
time, wishing to make quick progress, and also tc

make clear in a grand style the error of our previous
course, and, moreover, fancying that the use of great
illustrations was proper in the case of a king, have
taken up a marvellous mass of myth and have con¬
sequently been obliged to use a greater part of it
than we should. So we have made our discourse
too long and after all have never made an end of
the tale, but our talk, just like a picture of a living
creature, seems to have a good enough outline, but
not yet to have received the clearness that comes
from pigments and the blending of colours. And
yet it is more fitting to portray any living being
by speech and argument than by painting or any
handicraft whatsoever to persons who are able to
follow argument; but to others it is better to do it
by means of works of craftsmanship.
y. soc. That is true; but explain wherein you
think our exposition is still deficient.
str. It is difficult, my dear fellow, to set forth any
of the greater ideas, except by the use of examples;
for it would seem that each of us knows everything
that he knows as if in a dream and then again,
when he is as it were awake, knows nothing of it all.
y. soc. What do you mean by that ?
str. I seem at present in absurd fashion to have
touched upon our experience in regard to knowledge.
Y. soc. In what respect ?
str. Why, my friend, the very example I employ
requires another example.1
y. soc. Indeed ? What is it ? Don’t hesitate
to tell on my account.
not present at the time. Or is this a dramatic slip on
Plato’s part ?
n 77
PLATO
20. HE. Αεκτεον, επειδή καί συ γε έτοιμος

άκολουθεΐν. τούς γάρ που παΐδας ΐσμεν, όταν άρτι
γραμμάτων έμπειροι γίγνωνται —
ΞΕ. Ότι των στοιχείων έκαστον εν ταΐς βραχυτά-
ταις καί ράσταις των συλλαβών ικανώς διαισθά¬
νονται, καί τάληθή φράζειν περί εκείνα δυνατοί
γίγνονται.
78 νε. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
HE. Ταΰτά δε γε ταΰτα εν άλλαις άμφιγνοοΰντες
πάλιν δόξη τε φευδονται καί λόγω.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ μεν ούν.
ΞΕ. νΑρ' ούν ούχ ώδε ραστον καί κάλλιστον επ-
άγειν αυτούς επί τα μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΞΕ. Άνάγειν πρώτον επ’ εκείνα, εν οΐς ταύτά
ταΰτα όρθώς εδόξαζον, άναγαγόντας δε τιθεναι
Β παρά τά μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα, καί παραβάλλοντας
ενδεικνυναι τήν αυτήν ομοιότητα καί φύσιν εν
άμφοτεραις ούσαν ταΐς συμπλοκαΐς, μεχριπερ αν
7τάσι τοΐς άγνοουμενοις τά δοξαζόμενα αληθώς
παρατιθέμενα δειχθή, δειχθεντα δε, παραδείγματα
οϋτω γιγνόμενα, ποίηση τών στοιχείων πάντων
έκαστον εν πά.σαις ταΐς συλλαβαΐς τό μεν
ετερον ώς τών άλλων ετερον όν, τό δε
C ταύτόν ώς ταύτόν αεί κατά ταύτά εαυτώ προσ-
αγορεΰεσθαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΥΙαντάπασι μεν ούν.
ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν τοΰτο μεν ικανώς συνειλήφαμεν, ότι
1 There is here a play on the words -καρα-τιθέμενα δειχθή,

δειχθέντα δέ, παρα-δεί·γματα. Placed beside, they are shown,
78
THE STATESMAN
str. I will tell; since you on your part are

prepared to listen. We know that children, when
they are just getting some knowledge of letters—
y. soc. Well?
str. Recognize the several letters well enough in
the short and easy syllables, and can make correct
statements about them,
str. And then again in other syllables they are
in doubt about those same letters, and err in opinion
and speech about them,
y. soc. Yes, certainly.
str. Would not the easiest and best way to lead
them to the letters which they do not yet know
be this ?
y. soc. What ?
str. To lead them first to those cases in which
they had correct opinions about these same letters
and then to lead them and set them beside the
groups which they did not yet recognize and by
comparing them to show that their nature is the
same in both combinations alike, and to continue
until the letters about which their opinions are
correct have been shown in juxtaposition with all
those of which they are ignorant. Being shown in
this way they become examples 1 and bring it about
that every letter is in all syllables always called by
the same name, either by differentiation from the
other letters, in case it is different, or because it is
the same.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. Is this, then, a satisfactory definition, that
and being shown, they become paradigms, i.e. objects of

comparison, i.e. examples.
79
PLATO
■παραδείγματος γ* έστί τότε γένεσις, όπόταν ον

ταύτόν εν έτέρω διεσπασμένω δοξαζόμενον όρθώς
καί συναχθέν περί έκάτερον ώς συνάμφω μίαν
αληθή δόξαν άποτελή;
ΝΕ. 5Ω. Φαίνεται.
ΞΕ. Θαυμάζοιμεν αν οΰν, εί ταύτόν τούτο ημών ή
φυχή φύσει περί τα των πάντων στοιχεία πεπονθυια
D τότε μεν ύπ’ αλήθειας περί εν έκαστον εν τισι συν-
ίσταται, τότε δε περί άπαντα εν ετεροις αν φέρεται,
καί τα μεν αυτών άμή γέ πη τών συγκράσεων
όρθώς δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δ’ εις τάς τών πραγ¬
μάτων μακράς καί μή ραδίους σύλλαβός ταύτα
ταΰτα πάλιν αγνοεί;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και θαυμαστόν γε ούδέν.
HE. Πώ? γάρ, ώ φίλε, δύναιτο άν τις άρχόμενος
από δόξης φευδοΰς επί τι τής αλήθειας καί μικρόν
Ε μέρος άφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν;
ΝΕ. 5Ω. Σχεδόν ούδαμώς.
ΞΕ. Ούκοΰν ταΰτα εί ταύτη πέφυκεν, ούδέν δή
πλημμελοΐμεν άν εγώ τε καί σύ πρώτον μέν έπιχει-
ρήσαντες όλου παραδείγματος ίδεΐν την φύσιν εν
σμικρώ κατά μέρος άλλω παραδείγματι, μετά δε
ταΰτα μέλλοντες, επί το τοΰ βασιλέως μέγιστον ον
ταύτόν είδος απ’ ελαττόνων φέροντές ποθεν, δια
παραδείγματος έπιχειρεΐν αυ την τών κατά πόλιν
θεραπείαν τέχνη γνωρίζειν, ΐνα νπαρ άντ’ όνείρατος
ήμΐν γίγνηται;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΤΙάνυ μέν οΰν όρθώς.
279 ΞΕ. Πάλιν δή τον έμπροσθεν λόγον άναληπτέον,
ώς επειδή τώ βασιλικώ γένει τής περί τας πόλεις
επιμελείας άμφισβητοΰσι μυρίοι, δει δή πάντας
άποχωρίζειν τούτους καί μόνον εκείνον λείπειν, καί
80
THE STATESMAN
an example is formed when that which is the same

in some second unconnected thing is rightly con¬
ceived and compared with the first, so that the two
together form one true idea ?
y. soc. Evidently.
str. Can we wonder, then, that our soul, whose
nature involves it in the same uncertainty about the
letters or elements of all things, is sometimes in
some cases firmly grounded in the truth about every
detail, and again in other cases is all at sea about
everything, and somehow or other has correct
opinions about some combinations, and then again is
ignorant of the same things when they are trans¬
ferred to the long and difficult syllables of life ?
y. soc. Surely we need not wonder at that.
str. No; for could anyone, my friend, who
begins with false opinion, ever attain to even a small
part of truth and acquire wisdom ?
y. soc. No ; it is hardly possible.
str. Then if this is the case, would it be a bad
thing if you and I first tried to see in another small
and partial example the nature of example in general,
with the intention of transferring afterwards the same
figurative method from lesser things to the most
exalted eminence of the king, and trying by means
of an example to become acquainted in a scientific
way with the management of states, in order that
this may be waking knowledge for us, not dream
knowledge ?
y. soc. That is a very good idea.
str. Then we must take up our former argument
again, and since there are countless others who con¬
tend that they, rather than the royal class, have the
care of states, we must accordingly remove all these
81
PLATO
προς τούτο δη παραδείγματος εφαμεν δεΐν Τίνος

ημΐν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και μάλα.
21. ΞΕ. Τι δητα παράδειγμά τις αν, οχον την
αυτήν πολίτικη1 πραγματείαν, σμικρότατον παρα-
Β θεμένος ίκανώς αν ευρόι το ζητονμενον; βοΰλει
προς Αιός, ώ Έώκρατες, εί μη τι πρόχειρον ετερον
εχομεν, άλλ’ οΰν την γε υφαντικήν προελώμεθα;
καί ταυτην, εί δοκεΐ, μη πάσαν; άποχρησει γάρ
ίσως η περί τά εκ των ερίων υφάσματα· τάχα γάρ
άν ημΐν καί τοΰτο το μέρος αυτής μαρτυρησειε
προαιρεθεν ο βουλόμεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι γάρ ου;
ΞΕ. Τι δητα ου, καθάπερ εν τοΐς έμπροσθεν
τεμνοντες μέρη μερών έκαστον διηρουμεθα, καί
C νυν περί υφαντικήν ταυτάν τοΰτο εδράσαμεν, καί
κατα δυναμιν δτι μάλιστα διά βραχέων ταχύ πάντ
επελθόντες πάλιν ηλθομεν επί το νυν χρήσιμον;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? λεγεις;
ΞΕ. Αυτήν την διέξοδον άπόκρισίν σοι ποιησομαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΚάΑΑιστ’ εΐπες.
HE. Έστι τοίνυν πάντα ημΐν όπόσα δημιουργοΰ-
μεν καί κτώμεθα, τά μεν ενεκα τοΰ ποιεΐν τι, τά δε
τοΰ μη πάσχειν άμυντηρια2· καί των άμυντηρίων3
τα μεν άλεζιφάρμακα καί θεία καί ανθρώπινα, τά
Τ> δε προβλήματα· των δε προβλημάτων τά μεν προς
τον πόλεμόν οπλίσματα, τά δε φράγματα· καί των
φραγμάτων τά μεν παραπετάσματα, τά δε πράς
χειμώνας καί καύματα άλεζητηρια· τών δε άλεβη-
1 ττολιτίκΐι Ast: 7Γ6\lTIK7)V ΒΤ.

2 άμυντήρια] άλεξίτήρια ΒΤ.
8 άμυντηρίων] άλεξιτηρίων ΒΤ.
82
THE STATESMAN
and isolate the king; and, as we said, to accom¬

plish this we need an example.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. What example could we apply which is very
small, but has the same kind of activity as statesman¬
ship and would enable us satisfactorily to discover
that which we seek ? What do you say, Socrates, if
we have nothing else at hand, to taking at random
the art of weaving, and, if you please, not the
whole of that ? For I fancy the art of weaving wool
will be enough ; if we choose that part only it will
probably furnish us with the illustration we desire.
y. soc. Agreed.
str. Then just as we divided each subject before
by cutting off parts from parts, why not now apply
the same process to the art of weaving and, by
going through all the steps as briefly as we possibly
can, arrive quickly at that which serves our present
purpose ?
str. I will answer you by actually going through
the process.
y. soc. Excellent!
str. Well, then, all things which we make or
acquire are for the sake of doing something or else

they are for defence against suffering; and of the
defensive class some are spells and antidotes, both
divine and human, and some are material defences;
and of the material defences some are equipment
for war and some are protections ; and of protections
some are screens and some are defences against heat
83
PLATO
τηρίων τα μεν στεγάσματα, τα δε σκεπάσματα· καί

των σκεπασμάτων ύποπετάσματα μεν άλλα, περι¬
καλύμματα δε ετερα· περικαλυμμάτων δε τα μεν
E όλόσχιστα, σύνθετα δε ετερα· των δε συνθέτων τα
μεν τρητά, τα δε άνευ τρήσεως συνδετά· καί των
άτρητων τα μεν νευρώνα φυτών εκ γης, τα δε τρίχινα·
των δε τρίχινων τα μεν ϋδασι και γη κολλητά, τα
δέ αυτά αύτοις συνδετά. τουτοισί δη τοΐς εκ
των εαυτοΐς συνδουμενών1 εργασθεΐσιν άμυντηρίοις
και σκεπάσμασι το μεν όνομα ίμάτια εκαλεσαμεν
την δε των ίματίων μάλιστα επιμελουμενην τέχνην,
280 ώσπερ τότε την της πόλεως πολιτικήν είπομεν,
ουτω και νυν ταυτην προσείπωμεν απ’ αύτοΰ τοΰ
πράγματος ίματιουργικην; φωμεν δε και υφαντι¬
κήν, όσον επι τη των ίματίων εργασία μεγιστόν ην
μοριον, μηδέν διαφερειν πλην όνόματι ταυτης της
ιματιουργικής, καθάπερ κάκεΐ τότε την βασιλικήν
της πολίτικης;
νε. 2Ω. 'Ορθότατά γε.
ΞΕ. Τδ μετά τούτο δη συλλογισώμεθα, ότι την
ίματίων υφαντικήν οϋτω ρηθεΐσάν τις τάχ άν ίκανώς
B ιρήσθαι δόζειε, μη δυνάμενος ζυννοεΐν ότι των
μεν εγγύς ζυνεργών ουπω διώρισται, πολλών δε
ετεροον ζυγγενών άπεμερίσθη.
νε. 2Ω. Ποιων, είπε, ζυγγενών;
22. he. Οόχ εσπου τοΐς λεχθεΐσιν, ώς φαίνει·
παλιν ούν εοικεν επανιτεον άρχόμενον από τελευτής,
ει γάρ ζυννοεΐς την οικειότητα, την μεν διετεμομεν
1 eavTois συνδονμένων] αυτών (αυτών Β) συνδουμένοπ ΒΤ.

84
THE STATESMAN
and cold; and such defences are either shelters or

coverings; and coverings are either rugs to spread
under us or wrappings to wrap round us ; and
wrappings are either all of one piece or composed of
several pieces; and of the composite garments some
are stitched and others put together without stitch¬
ing ; and of the unstitched some are made of the
fibres of plants and some are of hair; and of those
made with hair some are stuck together with liquids
and cement and others are fastened without any
such extraneous matter. Now to these protective
coverings made of materials fastened without ex¬
traneous matter we give the name of clothes; and
just as we called the art statecraft which was con¬
cerned with the state, so we shall call the art con¬
cerned with clothes, from the nature of its activity,
clothes-making, shall we not ? And may we say
further that weaving, in so far as the greatest part
of it is, as we saw, concerned with the making of
clothes, differs in name only from this art of clothes-
making, just as in the other case the royal art
differed from statecraft ?
y. soc. That is perfectly correct.
str. Let us next reflect that a person might
think that this description of the art of weaving was
satisfactory, because he cannot understand that it
has not yet been distinguished from the closely
co-operative arts, though it has been separated from
many other kindred arts.
y. soc. What kindred arts ?
str. You do not seem to have followed what I
have been saying; so I think I had better go back
again and begin at the end. For if you under¬
stand what I mean by kinship, we distinguished
d 2 85
PLATO
απ’ αυτής νυν δη, την των στρωμάτων συνθεσιν

περιβολή χωρίζοντες καί υποβολή.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Μανθάνω.
C ΞΕ. Καί μην την εκ των λινών καί σπάρτων
καί πάντων όπόσα φυτών άρτι νεΰρα κατά λόγον εί-
πομ,εν, δημιουργίαν πάσαν άφείλομεν την τ’ αΰ
πιλητικήν άφωρισάμεθα καί την τρήσει καί ραφή
χρωμενην συνθεσιν, ής η πλείστη σκυτοτομική.
ΞΕ. Καί τοίνυν την των όλοσχίστων σκεπασμά¬
των θεραπείαν δερματουργικήν καί τάς των στεγα¬
σμάτων, όσαι τε εν οικοδομική καί όλη τεκτονική
D καί εν άλλαις τεχναις ρευμάτων στεκτικαί γίγ-
νονται, συμπάσας αφειλομεν, όσαι τε1 περί τάς
κλοπάς2 καί τάς βία πράξεις διακωλυτικά έργα
παρέχονται τεχναι φραγμάτων, περί τε γενεσιν
επιθηματουργίας ουσαι καί τάς των θυρωμάτων
πήξεις, γομφωτικης απονεμηθεΐσαι μόρια τέχνης·
την τε όπλοποιικην απετεμόμεθα, μεγάλης καί
παντοίας της προβληματουργικης τμήμα οΰσαν
δυνάμεως· καί δη και την μαγευτικήν την περί τα
Ε ιλεξιφάρμακα κατ’ αρχάς ευθύς διωρισάμεθα ξυμ-
πασαν, καί λελοίπαμεν, ως δόξαιμεν αν, αυτήν την
ζητηθεΐσαν αμυντικήν χειμώνων, ερεοΰ προβλήμα¬
τος εργαστικήν, όνομα δε υφαντικήν λεχθεΐσαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έοι/εε γάρ οΰν.
ΞΕ. Άλλ’ ούκ εστι πω τελεον, ώ παι, τούτο λε-
λεγμενον. ό γάρ εν αρχή τής των Iματ ίων εργασίας
281 ιπτάμενος τουναντίον ύφή δράν φαίνεται.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ?;
1 re D : om. ΒΤ.
κλοπ-ά?] πλοκας ΒΤ.
86
THE STATESMAN
from clothing something akin to it a moment ago

when we separated rugs from it by the distinction
between spreading under and wrapping round.
y. soc. I understand.
str. And we removed the entire manufacture of

cloth made from flax and broom-cords and all that we
just now called vegetable fibres; and then, too, we
separated off the process of felting and the kind of
joining that employs piercing and sewing, most
important of which is the shoemaker’s art.
y. soc. Yes, to be sure.
str. And we separated off the art of making
coverings of leather in single pieces and all the arts
of making shelters, which we find in house-building
and carpentering in general and in other methods
of protection against water, and all the arts which
furnish protection against theft and acts of violence,
the arts, that is to say, of making lids and constructing
doors, which are regarded as parts of the joiner’s
art; and we cut off the armourer’s art, which is a
section of the great and various function of making
defences; and at the very beginning we cut off the
whole art of magic which is concerned with antidotes
and spells, and we have left, as it would seem, just
the art we were seeking, which furnishes protection
from the weather, manufactures a defence of wool,
and is called the art of weaving.
y. soc. That seems to be the case.
str. But, my boy, this is not yet completely
stated; for the man who is engaged in the first
part of the making of clothes appears to do some¬
thing the opposite of weaving.
y. soc. How so ?
87
PLATO
EE. To μεν της υφής συμπλοκή τις Ιστΐ που.

ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
SE. Το δε γε των συνεστώτων καί συμπεπιλη-
μενών διαλυτικη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ ποιον δη;
SE. Τδ της τοΰ ξαίνοντος τέχνης εργον. η την
ξαντικήν τολμησομεν υφαντικήν και τον ξάντην ώς
όντα ΰφάντην καλέΐν;
νε. 2Ω. Ούδαμώς.
ΕΕ. Και μην την γε αΰ στημονος εργαστικην και
κρόκης εί τις υφαντικήν προσαγορεύει, παράδοξόν
Β τε και φεΰδος δνομα λεγει.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
ΞΕ. Τι δε'; κναφευτικην σύμπασαν και την άκε-
στικην πάτερα μηδεμίαν επιμέλειαν μηδε τινα
θεραπείαν εσθήτος θώμεν, η καί ταυτας πάσας ώς
υφαντικός λεξομεν;
ΕΕ. Άλλα, μην της γε θεραπείας άμφισβητή-
σουσιν αΰται ξύμπασαι καί της γενεσεως της των
ίματ ίων τη της υφαντικής δυνάμει, μεγ ιστόν μεν
μέρος εκείνη διδοΰσαι, μεγάλα δε καί σφίσιν
αύταΐς άπονεμουσαι.
C ΝΕ. 2Ω. Π,άνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Πρδ? τοίνυν ταύταις ετι τάς των εργαλείων
δημιουργούς τεχνας, δι’ ών άποτελεϊται τά της ύφης
έργα, δοκεΐν χρη τό γε1 συναιτίας είναι προσποιή-
σασθαι παντός υφάσματος.
νε. 2Ω. ’Ορθότατα.
ΞΕ. Πότερον ούν ημΐν δ περί της υφαντικής
λόγος, ου προειλόμεθα μέρους, ίκανώς εσται διωρι-
σμόνος, εαν αρ’ αύτην των επιμελειών όπόσαι περί
88
THE STATESMAN
str. The process of weaving is, I take it, a kind

of joining together.
y. soc. Yes.
str. But the first part 1 refer to is a separation of

what is combined and matted together.
Y. soc. What do you mean?
str. The work of the carder’s art. Or shall we
have the face to say that carding is weaving and
the carder is a weaver ?
y. soc. No, certainly not.
str. And surely if we say the art of making the
warp or the woof is the art of weaving, we are
employing an irrational and false designation.
y. soc. Of course.
str. Well then, shall we say that the whole arts
of fulling and mending are no part of the care and
treatment of clothes, or shall we declare that these
also are entirely included in the art of weaving ?
y. soc. By no means.
str. But surely all these will contest the claim of
the art of weaving in the matter of the treatment and
the production of clothes; they will grant that the
part of weaving is the most important, but will claim
that their own parts are of some importance, too.
Y. soc. Yes, certainly.
str. Then we must believe that besides these the
arts which produce the tools by means of which the
works of weaving are accomplished will claim to be
collaborators in every work of weaving.
str. Will our definition of the art of weaving (I
mean the part of it we selected) be satisfactory if
we say that of all the activities connected with
1 γ«] re BT.
89
PLATO
τήν ερεάν εσθήτα, εις την καλλίστην καί μεγίστην

D πασών τιθώμεν η λεγοιμεν μεν αν τι αληθές, ον
μην σαφές γε ουδέ τελεον, πριν αν1 και ταυτας
αυτής πάσας περιελωμεν ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Όρθιος.
23· HE. 0ύκοΰν μετά ταντα ποιητεον ο Λεγο-
μεν, tv’ εφεξής ήμΐν 6 λόγος ϊη;
ΞΕ. Πρώτοι μεν τοίνυν δυο τεχνας ουσας περί
πάντα τα δρώμενα θεασώμεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύίνας;
HE. Ύήν μεν γενεσεως οΰσαν ξυναίτιον, την δ
αυτήν αιτίαν.
νε. 2Ω. riais;
HE. "Οσαι μεν το πράγμα αυτό μη δημιουργοΰσι,
Ε Tats δε δήμιουργουσαις όργανα παρασκευάζουσιν,
ών μη παραγενομενων ουκ αν ποτέ εργασθείη τό
προστεταγμενον εκάστη των τεχνών, ταυτας μεν
ξυναιτίους, Tas δε αυτό τό πράγμα άπεργαζομενας
αιτίας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έχει γοΰν λόγον.
ΞΕ. Μετά τοΰτο δη τάς μεν περί τε ατράκτους
και κερκίδας καί όπόσα άλλα όργανα τής περί τα
άμφιεσματα γενεσεως κοινωνεΐ, πάσας ξυναιτίονς
είπωμεν, τάς δε αυτά θεραπευουσας καί δήμιονρ-
γούσας αιτίας;
32 ΞΕ. Των αιτιών δη πλυντικήν μεν καί άκεστι-
κήν καί πάσαν τήν περί ταΰτα θεραπευτικήν, πολλής
ουσης τής κοσμητικής, τοννταΰθα αυτής μόριον
είκός μάλιστα περιλαμβάνειν ονομάζοντας πάν τή
τέχνη τή κναφευτική.
90
THE STATESMAN
woollen clothing it is the noblest and the greatest?

Or would that, although it contains some truth, yet
lack clearness and completeness until we separate
from weaving all these other arts ?
Y. soc. You are right.
str. I hen shall our next move be to do this, that

our discussion may proceed in due order ?
y. soc. Certainly.
str. First, then, let us observe that there are two

arts involved in all production.
y. soc. What are they ?
str. The one is a contingent cause, the other

is the actual cause.
str. Those arts which do not produce the actual

thing in question, but which supply to the arts
which do produce it the tools without which no art
could ever perform its prescribed work, may be
called contingent causes, and those which produce
the actual thing are causes.
y. soc. At any rate, that is reasonable.
str. Next, then, shall we designate all the arts
which produce spindles, shuttles, and the various
other tools that partake in the production of clothing
as contingent causes, and those which treat and
manufacture the clothing itself as causes ?
str. And among the causal arts w'e may properly
include washing and mending and all the care of
clothing in such ways; and, since the art of adorn¬
ment is a wide one, we may classify them as a part
of it under the name of fulling.
1 αΰ BT.
91
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Καλώ?.

HE. Και μην ξαντική γε καί νηστική1 καί παντα
αν τα περί την ποίησήν αυτήν της εσθήτος ής λεγομεν
μέρη, μία τις εστι τέχνη των ύπό πάντων λεγομένων
η ταλασιουργική.
Β ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
HE. Τη? δη ταλασιουργικής δυο τμήματα εστον,
καί τουτοιν έκάτερον άμα δυοϊν πεφυκατον τεχναιν
μέρη.
νε. 2Ω.Πώ?;
ΞΕ. Τδ μεν ξαντικόν καί τό της κερκιστικης
ήμισυ καί όσα τά ζυγκείμενα απ’ άλλήλων άφίστησι,
παν τούτο ώς εν φράζειν της τε ταλασιουργίας
αυτής έστί που, καί μεγάλα τινέ κατά πάντα ήμΐν
ήστην τέχνα, ή συγκριτική τε καί διακριτική.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
HE. Τη? τοίνυν διακριτικής η τε ξαντική καί τα
C νυν δη ρηθέντα άπαντά έστιν η γάρ εν ερίοις τε
καί στήμοσι διακριτική, κερκίδι μεν άλλον τρόπον
γιγνομένη, χερσί δε έτερον, έσχεν οσα αρτιως
ονόματα ερρήθη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πάνυ μεν ουν.
ΕΕ. Αΰθις δη πάλιν συγκριτικής μόριον άμα και
ταλασιουργίας εν αυτή γιγνόμενον λάβωμεν όσα
δε της διακριτικής ήν, αυτόθι μεθιώμεν2 ξυμπαντα,
δίχα τέμνοντες την ταλασιουργίαν διακριτικά) τε
και συγκριτικά) τμήματι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΔιΎίρησθω.
ΕΕ. Τδ συγκριτικόν τοίνυν αΰ σοι καί ταλα-
1 ξαντική . . . νηστική Stephanus : ξαντικήν . . . νηστικήν

ΒΤ.
2 μεθιώμεν Hermann : μετίωμεν ΒΤ.
92
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. Good.
str. And, again, carding and spinning and all the
processes concerned with the actual fabrication of the
clothing under consideration, form collectively one
art familiar to every one—the art of wool-working.
y. soc. Of course.
str. And wool-working comprises two divisions,
and each of these is a part of two arts at once.
y. soc. How is that ?
str. Carding,and one half of theuse of the weaver’s
rod,1 and the other crafts which separate things that
are joined—all this collectively is a part of the art
of wool-working; and in all things we found two
great arts, that of composition and that of division.
y. soc. Yes.
str. Now carding and all the other processes just
mentioned are parts of the art of division; for the
art of division in wool and threads, exercised in one
way with the rod and in another with the hands, has
all the names just mentioned.
str Then let us again take up something which
is at once a part of the arts of composition and of
wool-working. Let us put aside all that belongs to
division, making two parts of wool-working, by apply¬
ing the principles of division and of composition.
y. soc. Let us make that distinction.
str. The part which belongs at once to com·
1 The weaver’s rod (for the Greeks appear to have used a

rod, not a comb) was used to drive the threads of the woof
close together, and also to keep the threads of the warp and
woof distinct (cf. Cratylus 388 a). All the processes here
described, familiar as they were to the ancients, have been
done away with, or, at least, greatly modified, in Europe
and America by the modern methods of industry
93
PLATO
D σιουργικόν άμα μόρων, ώ ΊΙώκρατες, διαιρετεον,

είπερ Ικανώς μελλομεν την προρρηθεΐσαν υφαντικήν
αίρησειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 0ύκοΰν χρη.
ΞΕ. Χρή μεν ουν και λόγω μεν γε αυτής το μεν
εΐναι στρεπτικόν, τό δε συμπλεκτικόν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. *Αρ’ ουν μανθάνω; δοκεΐς γάρ μοι το
περί την του στημονος εργασίαν λεγειν στρεπτικόν.
ΞΕ. Ου μόνον γε, άλλα καί κρόκης· η γενεσιν
άστροφόν τινα αυτής ευ ρησομεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 0υδαμως.
ΞΕ. Αιόρισαι δη και τουτοιν εκάτερον ΐσως γαρ
Ε ό διορισμός έγκαιρος αν σοι γενοιτο.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐΐη;
ΞΕ. Ύηδε· των περί ξαντικήν έργων μηκυνθεν
τε καί σχόν πλάτος λεγομεν είναι κάταγμά τι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
ΞΕ. Ύοΰτου δη τό μεν άτράκτω τε στραφεν καί
στερεόν νήμα γενόμενον στήμονα μεν φάθι τό νήμα,
την δε άπευθυνουσαν αυτό τέχνην είναι στημονονη-
τικην.
νε. 2Ω. Όρθως.
ΞΕ. 'Όσα δε γε αυ την μεν συστροφην χαυνην
λαμβάνει, τη δε του στημονος εμπλεξει προς την
της γνάφεως ολκήν εμμετρως την μαλακότητα
ίσχει, ταΰτ’ άρα κρόκην μεν τα νηθεντα, την δε
επιτεταγμενην αυτοΐς είναι τέχνην την κροκονητικην
283 φωμεν.
1 i.e. the pull (ολκή) of the carder’s comb was less strong
in the preparation of the threads of the woof than in that of
the threads of the warp.
94
THE STATESMAN
position and to wool-working, Socrates, you must

allow us to divide again, if we are to get a satisfactory
concept of the aforesaid art of weaving.
y. soc. Then we must divide it.
str. Yes, we must; and let us call one part of it
the art of twisting threads, and the other the art of
intertwining them.
Y. soc. I am not sure I understand. By the art
of twisting I think you mean the making of the
warp.
str. Not that only, but also the making of the
woof. We shall not find that the woof is made
without twisting, shall we ?
y. soc. No, of course not.
str. Well, just define warp and woof; perhaps
the definition would serve jmu well at this junction.
y. soc. How shall I do it ?
str. In this way : A piece of carded wool, which is
lengthened out and is wide, is said to be a lap of
wool, is it not ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And if any such lap of wool is twisted
with a spindle and made into a hard thread, we call
the thread warp, and the art which governs this
process is the art of spinning the warp.
y. soc. Right.
str. And the threads, in turn, which are more
loosely twisted and have in respect to the force used
in the carding a softness adapted to the interweaving
with the warp we will call the woof, and the art
devoted to these we will call the art of preparing
the woof.1
95
PLATO
ΞΕ. Καί μην τό γε της υφαντικής μέρος ο προύθέ-

μεθα, π αντί που δήλον ήδη. το γάρ συγκριτικής
τής εν ταλασιουργία μόριον δταν εύθυπλοκία κρόκης
και στήμονος άπεργάζηται πλέγμα, το μεν πλεχθέν
ξυμπαν έσθήτα έρεαν, την δε επί τούτω τέχνην
ουσαν προσαγορευομεν υφαντικήν.
24. ΞΕ. Είεν τι δη ποτέ οΰν ουκ ευθύς απ-
Β εκρινάμεθα πλεκτικήν είναι κρόκης καί στήμονος
υφαντικήν, άλλα περιήλθομεν εν κύκλω πάμπολλα
διοριζόμενοι μάτην;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκουν έμοιγε, ώ ζένε, μάτην ούδέν
των ρηθέντων εδοζε ρηθήναι.
ΞΕ. Καί θαυμαστόν γε ούδέν άΑΛά τάχ αν, ω
μακάριε, δόξειε. προς δη τό νόσημα τό τοιοΰτον,
άν άρα πολλάκις ύστερον έπίη — θαυμαστόν γάρ
ούδέν—, λόγον άκουσόν τινα προσήκοντα περί
C πάντων των τοιούτων ρηθήναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ae'ye μόνον.
ΞΕ. Πρώτον τοίνυν ’ίδωμεν1 πάσαν τήν τε υπερ¬
βολήν καί τήν έλλειφιν, ινα κατά λόγον επαινώ μεν
καί φέγωμεν τα μακρότερα τοΰ δέοντος έκάστοτε
λεγάμενα καί τάναντία περί τάς τοιάσδε διατριβάς.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκουν χρή.
ΞΕ. Περί δή τούτων αυτών 6 λόγος ήμίν, οΐμαι,
γιγνόμενος ορθώς άν γίγνοιτο.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τίνων;
ΞΕ. Μηκου? τε πέρι καί βραχύτητος καί πόσης
D υπεροχής2 τε καί ελλείφεως· ή γάρ που μετρη¬
τική περί πάντ’ έστί ταΰτα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
1 ίδωμεν] είδωμεν ΒΤ.
96
THE STATESMAN
str. So now the part of the art of weaving which

we chose for our discussion is clear to pretty much
every understanding ; for when that part of the art of
composition which is included in the art of weaving
forms a web by the right intertwining of woof and
warp, we call the entire web a woollen garment, and
the art which directs this process we call weaving.
str. Very good. Then why in the world did we
not say at once that weaving is the intertwining of
woof and warp ? Why did we beat about the bush
and make a host of futile distinctions ?
y. soc. For my part, I thought nothing that was
said was futile. Stranger.
str. And no wonder; but perhaps you might
change your mind. Now to avoid any such malady,
in case it should, as is not unlikely, attack you
frequently hereafter, I will propose a principle of
procedure which is applicable to all cases of this sort.
y. soc. Do so.
str. First, then, let us scrutinize the general
nature of excess and deficiency, for the sake of
obtaining a rational basis for any praise or blame we
may bestow upon excessive length or brevity in
discussions of this kind.
y. soc. Yes, that is a good thing to do.
str. Then the proper subjects for our considera¬
tion would, I fancy, be these.

y. soc. What?
str. Length and shortness and excess and
deficiency in general; for all of them may be
regarded as the subjects of the art of measurement.
y. soc. Yes.
2 υπέροχης] ύπερβολψ BTW (υπέροχης in marg. W).
97
PLATO
ΞΕ. Αιέλωμεν τοίνυν αυτήν δυο μέρη' δει γάρ

δη προς ο νυν σπεΰδοαεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αέγοις άν την διαίρεσιν δπη.
ΞΕ. T?]8e· το μέν κατά την προς άλληλα μεγέ¬
θους καί σμικρότητος κοινώνιαν, το δε κατά την
της γενέσεως άναγκαίαν ουσίαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? λέγεις;
ΞΕ. ?Αρ’ ου κατά φΰσιν δοκεΐ σοt το μεΐζον μη-
δευο? ετέρου δεΐν μεΐζον λέγειν η τοΰ έλάττονος, και
Ε τοϋλαττον αΰ τοΰ μείζονος ελαττον, άλλου δέ
μηδενός;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Έμοιγε.
ΞΕ. Τι δε; τδ την τοΰ μέτριου φΰσιν ύπερβάλλον
και ύπερβαλλόμενον ύπ’ αυτής εν λόγοις είτε και εν
έργοις άρ’ ούκ αΰ λέζομεν ώς όντως γιγνόμενον, εν
ω και διαφέρουσι μάλιστα ημών οί τε κακοί καί οί
αγαθοί;
ΞΕ. Διττά? άρα ταΰτας ουσίας καί κρίσεις τοΰ
μεγάλου καί τοΰ σμικροΰ θετέον, άλλ’ ούχ ώς
έφαμεν άρτι προς άλληλα μόνον δεΐν, άλλ’ ώσπερ
νΰν εΐρηται μάλλον την μεν προς άλληλα λεκτέον,
την δ’ αΰ προς το μέτριον οΰ δέ ένεκα, μαθεΐν
άρ’ άν βουλοίμεθα;
2S4 he. Ει προς μηδέν έτερον την τοΰ μείζονος εάσει
τις φΰσιν η προς τοϋλαττον, ούκ έσται ποτέ προς το
μέτριον ή γάρ;
ΕΕ. Ούκοΰν τάς τέχνας τε αυτά? καί τάργα αυτών
ζΰμπαντα διολοΰμεν1 τοΰτω τώ λόγω, καί δη καί
1 διολοΰμεν Bekker : διελοΰμεν ΒΤ.
98
THE STATESMAN
str. Let us, then, divide that art into two parts;
that is essential for our present purpose.
v. soc. Please tell how to make the division.
str. In this way: one part is concerned with
relative greatness or smallness, the other with the
something without which production would not be
possible.
str. Do you not think that, by the nature of the
case, we must say that the greater is greater than
the less and than nothing else, and that the less is
less than the greater and than nothing else ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. But must we not also assert the real existence

of excess beyond the standard of the mean, and of
inferiority to the mean, whether in words or deeds,
and is not the chief difference between good men
and bad found in such excess or deficiency ?
y. soc. That is clear.
str. Then we must assume that there are these
two kinds of great and small, and these two ways of
distinguishing between them; we must not, as we
did a little while ago, say that they are relative to
one another only, but rather, as we have just said,
that one kind is relative in that way, and the other
is relative to the standard of the mean. Should we
care to learn the reason for this?
y. soc. Of course.
str. If we assert that the greater has no relation
to anything except the less, it will never have any
relation to the standard of the mean, will it ?
y. soc.No.
str. Will not this doctrine destroy the arts and
their works one and all, and do away also with
99
PLATO
την ζητου μόνην νΰν πολιτικήν και την ρηθεΐσαν

υφαντικήν άφανιοΰμεν ; άπασαι γάρ αί τοιαντα'ι
που το του μέτριου πλέον και ελαττον ούχ ώς ούκ
ον άλλ’ ώς ον χαλεπόν περί τάς πράξεις παραφυλάτ-
Β τουσι, και τουτω δη τω τρόπω τδ μέτρον σωζουσαι
πάντα αγαθά και καλά απεργάζονται.
ΞΕ. Ουκοΰν άν την πολιτικήν άφανίσωμεν, άπορος
ημΐν η μετά τοΰτο εσται ζητησις της βασιλικής
επιστήμης;
ΝΕ. 5Ω. Και μάλα.
ΞΕ. Πότερον οΰν, καθάπερ εν τω σοφιστή προσ-
ηναγκάσαμεν είναι το μη ον, επειδή κατά τοΰτο1
διεφυγεν ημάς 6 λόγος, ουτω και νΰν τό πλέον αΰ
καί ελαττον μετρητά προσαναγκαστεον γίγνεσθαι
C μη προς άλληλα μόνον αλλά και προς την τοΰ
μέτριου γενεσιν; ου γάρ δη δυνατόν γε ούτε πολι¬
τικόν οΰτ άλλον τινά των περί τάς πράξεις επι¬
στήμονα άναμφισβητητως γεγονεναι τούτου μη
ξυνομολογηθ εντός.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ουκοΰν και νΰν ότι μάλιστα χρη ταύτόν
ποιεΐν.
25· ΞΕ. ΠΑβον, ώ Έώκρατες, ετι τοΰτο τό εργον
η ’κείνο· καίτοι κάκείνου γε μεμνημεθα τό μήκος
όσον ήν άλλ’ ύποτίθεσθαι μεν τό τοιόνδε περί
αυτών καί μάλα δίκαιον.
D ΞΕ. "Ω? ποτέ δεησει τοΰ νΰν λεχθεντος προς την
περί αυτό τακριρες αποοειςιν. οτι οε προς τα νυν
1 τοΟτο] τούτον ΒΤ.
1 Sophist 235.
100
THE STATESMAN
statesmanship, which we are now trying to define,

and with weaving, which we did define ? For all
these are doubtless careful about excess and
deficiency in relation to the standard of the mean;
they regard them not as non-existent, but as real
difficulties in actual practice, and it is in this way,
when they preserve the standard of the mean, that
ail their works are good and beautiful.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. And if we do away with the art of statesman¬
ship, our subsequent search for the kingly art will be
hopeless, will it not ?
y. soc. Certainly.
str. Then just as in the case of the sophist1
we forced the conclusion that not-being exists, since
that was the point at which we had lost our hold of
the argument, so now we must force this second
conclusion, that the greater and the less are to be
measured in relation, not only to one another, but
also to the establishment of the standard of the mean,
must we not ? For if this is not admitted, neither
the statesman nor any other man who has knowledge
of practical affairs can be said without any doubt to
exist.
y. soc. Then we must by all means do now the
same that we did then.
str. This, Socrates, is a still greater task than
that was; and yet we remember how long that took
us ; but it is perfectly fair to make about them some
such assumption as this.
y. soc. As what ?
str. That sometime we shall need this principle
of the mean for the demonstration of absolute
precise truth. But our belief that the demonstration
101
PLATO
καλώς καί ίκανώς δείκνυται, δοκ€Ϊ μοι βοηθεΐν

μεγαλοπρεπώς ήμΐν οΰτος ό λόγος, ώς άρα ήγητεον
ομοίως τάς τεχνας πάσας είναι, μεΐζόν τε άμα καί
ελαττον μετρεΐσθαι μη προς άλληλα μόνον, άλλά
καί προς την τοΰ μέτριου γενεσιν. τούτον τε γάρ
δντος εκείνα εστι, κάκείνων ούσών εστι καί τοΰτο,1
μη δε οντος ποτέρου τούτων ουδέτερον αυτών έσται
ποτό.
Ε ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τοΰτο μεν ορθώς· άλλά τί δη τό μετά
τοΰτο;
ΞΕ. Αήλον ότι διαιροΐμεν αν την μετρητικήν,
καθάπερ έρρήθη, τούτη δίχα τέμνοντες, εν μεν
τιθέντες αυτής μόριον ξυμπάσας τέχνας όπόσαι τον
αριθμόν καί μήκη καί βάθη καί πλάτη καί παχύτη¬
τας2 προς τουναντίον μετροΰσι· τό δε έτερον,
όπόσαι προς τό μετριον καί τό πρεπον καί τον
καιρόν καί τό δέον καί πάνθ’ όπόσα εις τό μέσον
άπωκίσθη τών εσχάτων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και μεγα γ* εκάτερον τμήμα είπες, καί
πολύ διαφερον άλλήλοιν.
ΞΕ. "0 γάρ ενίοτε, ώ Ίόώκρατες, οιόμενοι δή τι
285 σοφόν φράζειν πολλοί τών κομφών λεγουσιν, ώς
άρα μετρητική περί πάντ’ εστί τα γιγνόμενα, τοϋτ’
αυτό τό νυν λεχθεν δν τυγχάνει, μετρήσεως μεν
γάρ δή τινα τρόπον πάνθ’ όπόσα ’έντεχνα μετείληφε·
διά δε τδ μη κατ’ είδη συνειθίσθαι σκοπεΐν διαιρού¬
μενους ταΰτά τε τοσοΰτον διαφεροντα ζυμβάλλουσιν
ευθύς εις ταύτόν όμοια νομίσαντες, καί τουναντίον
αύ τούτου δρώσιν ετερα ού κατά μέρη διαιροΰντες,
1 τοΟγο] ταΰτα ΒΤ.

8 παχύτητας Β : ταχύτητας Τ et al„
102
THE STATESMAN
is for our present purpose good and sufficient is, in

my opinion, magnificently supported by this argu¬
ment that we must believe that all the arts alike
exist and that the greater and the less are measured
in relation not only to one another but also to the
establishment of the standard of the mean. For if
this exists, they exist also, and if they exist, it exists
also, but neither can ever exist if the other does not.
y. soc. 1 hat is quite right. But what comes next ?
str. We should evidently divide the science of
measurement into two parts in accordance with what
has been said. One part comprises all the arts which
measure number, length, depth, breadth, and thick¬
ness in relation to their opposites; the other
comprises those which measure them in relation to
the moderate, the fitting, the opportune, the needful,
and all the other standards that are situated in the
mean between the extremes.
y. soc. Both of your divisions are extensive, and
there is a great difference between them.
str. Yes, for what many clever persons occasion¬
ally say, Socrates, fancying that it is a wise remark,
namely, that the science of measurement has to do
with everything, is precisely the same as what we
have just said. For in a certain way all things which
are in the province of art do partake of measurement;
but because people are notin the habit of considering
things by dividing them into classes, they hastily put
these widely different relations1 into the same
category, thinking they are alike ; and again they do
the opposite of this when they fail to divide other
things into parts. What they ought to do is this:
1 i.e. relations to each other and relations to the standard

of the mean.
103
PLATO
δέον, όταν μεν την των πολλών τι? πρότερον αΐσθη-

Β ται κοινωνίαν, μη προαφίστασθαι πριν αν iv αυτή
τάς διαφοράς ΐδη πάσας όπόσαιπερ iv είδεσι κεΐνται,
τάς δε αν παντοδαπάς άνομοιότητας, δταν iv πλή-
θεσιν δφθώσι, μη δυνατόν είναι δυσωπούμενον
7ταύεσθαι, πριν αν ζυμπαντα τα οικεία εντός μιας
όμοιότητος ερζας γένους τίνος ουσία περιβάληται.
ταϋτα μεν ουν ίκανώς περί τε τούτων καί περί
των ελλείφεων καί υπερβολών είρησθω· φνλάτ-
τωμεν δε μόνον ότι δυο γένη περί αυτά
C εζεύρηται της μετρητικής, καί ά φαμεν αυτ* είναι
μεμνώμεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Μεμνησόμεθα.
20. ΞΕ. Μετά τούτον δη τον λόγον ετερον

προσδεζώμεθα περί αυτών τε τών ζητούμενων καί
περί πάσης της εν τοΐς τοιοΐσδε λόγοις διατριβής.
ΞΕ. Ει τις άνεροιτο ημάς την περί γράμματα συν¬

ουσίαν τών μανθανόντων, όπόταν τις ότιοΰν όνομα
ερωτηθη τίνων εστί γραμμάτων, πότερον αυτώ τότε
D φώμεν γίγνεσθαι την ζητησιν ενός ενεκα μάλλον
του προβληθεντός η του περί πάντα τά προ¬
βαλλόμενα γραμματικωτερω γίγνεσθαι;
νε. 2Ω. Αηλον ότι του περί άπαντα.
ΞΕ. Τι'δ’ αΰ νυν ημΐν η περί τοΰ πολίτικου ζητη-

σις; ενεκα αύτοΰ τούτου προβεβληται μάλλον η
τοΰ περί πάντα διαλεκτικωτεροις γίγνεσθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Καί τοΰτο δήλον ότι τοΰ περί πάντα.
104
THE STATESMAN
when a person at first sees only the unity or common

quality of many things, he must not give up until he
sees all the differences in them, so far as they exist in
classes; and conversely, when all sorts of dissimilar¬
ities are seen in a large number of objects he must
find it impossible to be discouraged or to stop until
he has gathered into one circle of similarity all the
things which are related to each other and has in¬
cluded them in some sort of class on the basis of
their essential nature. No more need be said, then,
about this or about deficiency and excess; let us
only bear carefully in mind that two kinds of measure¬
ment which apply to them have been found, and
let us remember what those kinds are.
y. soc. We will remember.
str. Now that we have finished this discussion,
let us take up another which concerns the actual
objects of our inquiry and the conduct of such
discussions in general.
str. Suppose we were asked the following question
about a group of pupils learning their letters: “ When
a pupil is asked of what letters some word or other
is composed, is the question asked for the sake of
the one particular word before him or rather to make
him more learned about all words in the lesson ? ”
y. soc. Clearly to make him more learned about
them all.
str. And how about our own investigation of the
statesman ? Has it been undertaken for the sake of
this particular subject or rather to make us better
thinkers about all subjects?
y. soc. Clearly this also is done with a view to
them all.
105
PLATO
HE. TII που τον της υφαντικής γε λόγον αυτής

ταύτης ενεκα θήρευαν ούδείς αν εθελήσειε νουν εχων
άλλ’, οΐμαι, τούς πλείστους λεληθεν ότι τοΐς μεν των
Ε όντων ραδίως καταμαθεΐν αισθητοί1 τινες ομοιό¬
τητες πεφυκασιν, ας ούδεν χαλεπόν δηλοΰν, όταν
αυτών τις βουληθή τώ λόγον αίτοΰντι περί του μη
μετά πραγμάτων άλλα χωρίς λόγου ραδίως ενδεί-
ζασθαι· τοΐς δ’ αΰ μεγίστοις οΰσι και τιμιωτάτοις
286 ούκ εστιν εϊδωλον ούδεν προς τούς ανθρώπους
ειργασμενον εναργώς, ού δειχθεντός την του πυνθα-
νομενου φυχην ό βουλόμενος άποπληρώσαι, προς
των αισθήσεων τινα προσαρμόττων, ικανώς πληρώ¬
σει. διό δει μελετάν λόγον έκαστου δυνατόν είναι
δούναι και δεξασθαι· τά γαρ άσώματα, κάλλιστα
όντα καί μέγιστα, λόγω μόνον, άλλω δε ούδενί
σαφώς δείκνυται, τούτων δε ενεκα πάντ’ εστί τά
νυν λεγάμενα, ράων δ’ εν τοΐς ελάττοσιν η μελετη
Β παντός περί μάλλον η περί τά μείζω.
νε. 2Ω. ΚάλΛιστ’ είπες.
ΞΕ. τοίνυν χάριν σπανά' ημΐν ταΰτ’ ερρηθη
περί τούτων, μνησθώμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύίνων;
ΞΕ. Ύαυτης τε ούχ ήκιστα αυτής ενεκα τής δυσ-
χερείας ήν περί την μακρολογίαν την περί την
υφαντικήν άπεδεζάμεθα δυσχερώς, καί την περί
την τού παντός άνείλιζιν καί την2 τού σοφιστοΰ
περί τής τού μη όντος ουσίας, εννοοΰντες ώς εσχε
μήκος πλέον, καί επί τουτοις δη πάσιν επεπλήζαμεν
C ημΐν αύτοΐς, δείσαντες μη περίεργα άμα καί
μακρά λεγοιμεν. ΐν’ ούν εις αΰθις μηδέν πάσχωμεν
1 αίσθηταί Cornarius : αίσθητικαί ΒΤ.
2 τήν om. ΒΤ.
106
THE STATESMAN
str. Of course no man of sense would wish to

pursue the discussion of weaving for its own sake;
but most people, it seems to me, fail to notice that
some things have sensible resemblances which are
easily perceived ; and it is not at all difficult to show
them when anyone wishes, in response to a request
for an explanation of some one of them, to exhibit
them easily without trouble and really without
explanation. But, on the other hand, the greatest
and noblest conceptions have no image wrought
plainly for human vision, which he who wishes to
satisfy the mind of the inquirer can apply to some
one of his senses and by mere exhibition satisfy
the mind. We must therefore endeavour by practice
to acquire the power of giving and understanding a
rational definition of each one of them ; for immaterial
things, which are the noblest and greatest, can be
exhibited by reason only, and it is for their sake
that all we are saying is said. But it is always
easier to practise in small matters than in greater
ones.
y. soc. Excellent.
str. Let us, then, remember the reason for all
that we have said about these matters.
Y. soc. What is the reason ?
str. The reason is chiefly just that irritating
impatience which we exhibited in relation to the long
talk about weaving and the revolution of the universe
and the sophist’s long talk about the existence of
not-being.1 We felt that they were too long, and
we reproached ourselves for all of them, fearing that
our talk was not only long, but irrelevant. Consider,
therefore, that the reason for what has just been said
1 See 283 b, 277, Sophist 261.
107
PLATO
τοιοΰτον, τούτων ενεκα πάντων τά πρόσθεν νών

ειρήσθαι φάθι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύαΰτ' εσται. Aeye εζής μόνον.
ΞΕ. Aeyai τοίνυν ότι χρή δη μεμνημενους εμε
καί σε των νυν ειρημενων τόν τε φόγον εκάστοτε
καί επαυνον ποιεισθαι βραχύτητος άμα καί μήκους
ών άν αεί περί λεγωμεν, μη προς άλληλα τά μήκη
κρίνοντες, άλλα κατά το τής μετρητικής μέρος ο
D τότε εφαμεν δεΐν μεμνήσθαι, προς το πρεπον.
νε. 2Ω. Όρθώς.
ΞΕ. Ου τοίνυν ουδέ προς τούτο πάντα, ούτε γάρ
προς την ηδονήν μήκους άρμόττοντος ούδεν προσδεη-
σόμεθα, πλήν εΐ πάρεργόν τί· τό τε αύ προς την του
προβληθεντος ζήτησίν, ώς άν ραστα καί τάχιστα
ευροίμεν, δεύτερον άΑΑ’ ου πρώτον 6 λόγος αγαπάν
παραγγελλεί, πολύ δε μάλιστα και πρώτον την
μέθοδον αυτήν τιμάν του κατ' είδη δυνατόν είναι
Ε διαιρεΐν, και δή και λόγον, άντε παμμήκης λεχθείς
τόν άκουσαντα εύρετικώτερον άπεργάζηται, τούτον
σπουδάζειν και τώ μήκει μηδέν άγανακτεΐν, άντ'
αΰ βραχύτερος, ωσαύτως· ετι δ' αΰ προς τούτοις
τόν περί τάς τοιάσδε συνουσίας φεγοντα λόγων
μήκη καί τάς εν κύκλω περιόδους ούκ αποδεχό¬
μενου, οτι χρή τόν τοιοΰτον μη πάνυ ταχύ μηδ'
ευθύς ούτω μεθιεναι φεζαντα μόνον ώς μακρά
287 τά λεχθεντα, αλλά καί προσαποφαίνειν οίεσθαι δεΐν
ώς βραχύτερα άν γενόμενα τούς συνόντας άπηργά-
ζετο διαλεκτικωτερους καί τής τών όντων λόγω
δηλώσεως εύρετικωτερους, τών δε άλλων καί προς
108
THE STATESMAN
is my wish to avoid any such impatience in the
future.
y. soc. Very well. Please go on with what you
have to say.
str. What I have to say, then, is that you and I,
remembering what has just been said, must praise
or blame the brevity or length of our several dis¬
cussions, not by comparing their various lengths with
one another, but with reference to that part of the
science of measurement which we said before must
be borne in mind ; I mean the standard of fitness.
str. But we must not always judge of length by
fitness, either. For we shall not in the least want
a length that is fitted to give pleasure, except,
perhaps, as a secondary consideration; and again
reason counsels us to accept fitness for the easiest
and quickest completion of the inquiry in which we
are engaged, not as the first, but as the second thing
to be desired. By far our first and most important
object should be to exalt the method itself of ability
to divide by classes, and therefore, if a discourse, even
though it be very long, makes the hearer better able
to discover the truth, we should accept it eagerly and
should not be offended by its length, or if it is short,
we should judge it in the same way. And, moreover,
anyone who finds fault with the length of discourses
in our discussions, or objects to roundabout methods,
must not merely find fault with the speeches for
their length and then pass them quickly and hastily
by, but he must also show that there is ground for the
belief that if they had been briefer they would have
made their hearers better dialecticians and quicker
to discover through reason the truth of realities.
E 109
PLATO
αλλ’ άττα ψόγων καί επαίνων μηδέν φροντίζει

μηδε το παράπαν άκούειν δοκεΐν των τοιούτων
λόγων, καί τούτων μεν άλις, εί καί σοί ταύτη
ζυνδοκεΐ· προς δε δη τον πολιτικόν ίωμεν πάλιν,
Β της 7τρορρηθείσης υφαντικής αύτώ φεροντες το
παράδειγμα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Καλώ? είπες, καί ποιώμεν ά λεγεις.
27· ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν από γε των πολλών ό βασι¬
λεύς όσαι ζύννομοι, μάλλον δέ από πασών τών περί
τάς άγελας διακεχώρισται· λοιπαί δε, φαμεν, αι
κατά πόλιν αυτήν τών τε ζυναιτίων και τών αιτίων,
ας πρώτας απ’ άλληλων διαιρετεον.
ΕΕ. Oΐσθ, οΰν ότι χαλεπόν αύτάς τεμεΐν δίχα;
C τό δ’ αίτιον, ώς οιμαι, προϊοΰσιν ούχ ηττον εσται
καταφανές.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 0ύκοΰν χρη δράν ούτως.
ΕΕ. Κατά μέλη τοίνυν αύτάς οΐον ιερείον διαι-
ρώμεθα, επειδή δίχα άδυνατονμεν. δει γάρ εις
τον εγγύτατα ότι μάλιστα τεμνειν αριθμόν αεί.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? ουν ποιώμεν τά νυν;
ΕΕ. 'Ώσπερ έμπροσθεν, όπόσαι παρείχοντο όρ¬
γανα περί την υφαντικήν, πάσας δήπου1 τότε
ετίθεμεν ώς συναιτίους.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΕΕ. Και νυν δη ταύτόν μεν τούτο, ετι 8e μάλλον
D η τόθ’ ημΐν ποιητεον. όσαι γάρ σμικρόν η μεγα τι
δημιουργοΰσι κατά πόλιν όργανον, θετεον άπάσας
ταυτας ώς ούσας συναιτίους. άνευ γάρ τούτων ούκ
αν ποτέ γενοιτο πόλις ούδε πολίτικη, τούτων δ’
αΰ βασιλικής εργον τέχνης ουδόν που θήσομεν.
1 δήτου] δέ που Β: που Τ,
110
THE STATESMAN
About other people and the praise or blame they direct

towards other qualities in discourse, we need not
be concerned; we need not even appear to hear
them. But enough of this, if you feel about it as I do ;
so let us go back to the statesman and apply to him
the example of weaving that we spoke of a while ago.
y. soc. Very well; let us do so.
str. The art of the king, then, has been separated
from most of the kindred arts, or rather from all the
arts that have to do with herds. There remain,
however, the arts that have to do with the state itself.
These are both causes and contingent causes, and
our first duty is to separate them from one another.
str. It is not easy to divide them into halves, you
know. But I think the reason will nevertheless be
clear as we go on.
y. soc. Then we had better divide in another way.
str. Let us divide them, then, like an animal
that is sacrificed, by joints, since we cannot bisect
them ; for we must always divide into a number of
parts as near two as possible
Y. soc. How shall we do it in the present instance ?
str. Just as in the previous case, you know, we
classed all the arts which furnished tools for weaving
as contingent causes.
y. soc. Yes.
str. So now we must do the same thing, but it
is even more imperative. For all the arts which
furnish any implement, great or small, for the state,
must be classed as contingent causes; for without
them neither state nor statesmanship could ever exist,
and yet I do not suppose we shall reckon any of them
as the work of the kingly art.
Ill
PLATO
NE. 2Ω.Οδ γάρ.

ΞΕ. Και μεν δη χαλεπόν επιχειρονμεν δράίν άπο-
χωρίζοντες τοΰτο από των άλλων τδ γένος· ο τι
γάρ οΰν των οντων εστιν ώς1 ενός γε τίνος όργανον
είπόντα δοκεΐν είρηκεναι τι πιθανόν, όμως δε έτε-
Ε ρον αΰ των εν πόλει κτημάτων εΐπωμεν τάδε.
HE. Ώ? ούκ εστι ταυτην την δυναμιν εχον. ον
γάρ επί γενεσεως αιτία πήγνυται,2 καθάπερ όργα¬
νον, άλλ’ ενεκα τον δήμιουργηθεντός σωτηρίας.
HE. Τούτο δ δη ξηροΐς και ύγροΐς καί εμπυροις
καί άπυροις παντοδαπόν είδος εργασθεν άγγεΐον3
μια κλησει προσφθεγγόμεθα, καί μάλα γε συχνόν
είδος καί τη ζητούμενη γε, ώς οΐμαι, προσηκον
288 ούδεν άτεχνώς επιστήμη.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ οϋ;
ΞΕ. Τούτων δη τρίτον ετερον είδος κτημάτων
πάμπολυ κατοπτεον πεζόν καί ενυδρον καί πολυ-
πλανες καί απλανές καί τίμιον καί άτιμον, εν δε
όνομα εχον, διότι παν ενεκά τίνος εφεδρας εστί,
θάκος αεί τινι γιγνόμενον.
ΞΕ. ”Οχημα αυτό που λεγομεν, ον πάνυ πολιτικής
εργον, άλλα μάλλον πολύ τεκτονικής καί κεραμικής
καί χαλκοτυπικής.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Μανθάνω.
Β 28. ΞΕ. Τί δε τέταρτον; άρ' ετερον είναι
1 ίστιν Campbell: ώ$ έσtip Β : ώί δατιν Τ: ΐστιν Her¬

mann.
2 αΐτίφ πή-γνυται Bekker : αίτίαι ττή-γνυνται ΒΤ.
3 ayyeiov Hermann : ayyeiov δ δη ΒΤ.
112
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. No.
str. We shall certainly be undertaking a hard task
in separating this class from the rest; for it might be
said that everything that exists is the instrument of
something or other, and the statement seems plausible.
But there are possessions of another kind in the
state, about which I wish to say something.
y. soc. What do you wish to say ?
str. That they do not possess this instrumental
function. For they are not, like tools or instruments,
made for the purpose of being causes of production,
but exist for the preservation of that which has been
produced.
Y. soc. What is this class of possessions ?
str. That very various class which is made with
dry and wet materials and such as are wrought by
fire and without fire; it is called collectively the
class of receptacles; it is a very large class and has,
so far as I can see, nothing at all to do with the art
we are studying.
y. soc. No, of course not.
str. And there is a third very large class of
possessions to be noticed, differing from these ; it is
found on land and on water, it wanders about and
is stationary, it is honourable and without honour,
but it has one name, because the whole class is
always a seat for some one and exists to be sat upon.
str. We call it a vehicle, and it certainly is not
at all the work of statesmanship, but much rather
that of the arts of carpentry, pottery and bronze-
working.
Y. soc. I understand.
str. And is there a fourth class ? Shall we say
113
PLATO
τούτων λεκτεον, εν ώ τα πλειστά εστι των παλαι

ρηθεντων, εσθης τε ξυμπασα και των οπλών το πολύ
και τείχη πάντα θ’1 δσα γήινα περιβλήματα και
λίθινα, και μύρια ετερα; προβολής δε ενεκα ξυμ-
πάντων αυτών είργασμενων δίκαιότατ’ αν όλον
προσαγορευοιτο πρόβλημ,α, και πολλώ μάλλον τέχ¬
νης οικοδομικής εργον και υφαντικής το πλεΐστον
νομίζοιτ’ άν όρθότερον η πολίτικης.
C ΞΕ. Π εμπτον δε άρ> άν εθελοιμεν τό περί τον
κόσμον και γραφικήν θεΐναι καί όσα ταυτη προσ-
χρώμενα καί μουσική μιμηματα τελείται, προς τας
ηδονάς μόνον ημών άπειργασμενα, δικαίως δ’ άν
όνόματι περιληφθεντα ενί;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποίω;
ΞΕ. Παίγνιόν που τι λεγεται.
ΞΕ. Τούτο τοίνυν τουτοις εν όνομα άπασι πρεφει
προσαγορευθεν· ου γάρ σπουδής ουδεν αυτών χάριν,
άλλα παιδιάς ενεκα πάντα δράται.
D νε. 2Ω. Και τοΰτο σχεδόν ετι μανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Τδ δδ πάσι τουτοις σώματα παρεχον, εξ ών
καί εν οΐς δημιουργοΰσιν όπόσαι τών τεχνών νυν
εΐρηνται, παντοδαπόν είδος πολλών ετερων τεχνών
εκγονον όν, άρ' ούχ εκτον θησομεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ ποιον δη λεγεις;
ΞΕ. Χρυσόν τε καί άργυρον καί πάνθ’ όπόσα
μεταλλεόεται καί όσα δρυοτομικη καί κουρά ξΰμ-
πασα τεμνουσα παρεχει τεκτονική καί πλεκτικη·
καί ετι φλοιστικη φυτών τε καί εμφυχων δέρματα
Ε σωμάτων περιαιροΰσα σκυτοτομικη, καί όσαι
1 θ'] δ’ ΒΤ.
114
THE STATESMAN
that there is one, differing from those three, one to

which most of the things we have mentioned belong
—all clothing, most arms, all circuit walls of earth
or of stone, and countless other things ? And since
they are all made for defence, they may most rightly
be called by the collective name of defence, and this
may much more properly be considered for the most
part the work of the art of building or of weaving
than of statesmanship.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. And should we care to make a fifth class, of
ornamentation and painting and all the imitations
created by the use of painting and music solely for
our pleasure and properly included under one name ?
Y. soc. What is its name ?
str. It is called by some such name as plaything.
Y. soc. To be sure.
str. So this one name will properly be applied to
all the members of this class; for none of them is
practised for any serious purpose, but all of them
merely for play.
Y. soc. I understand that pretty well, too.
str. And shall we not make a sixth class of that
which furnishes to all these the materials of which
and in which all the arts we have mentioned fashion
their works, a very various class, the offspring of
many other arts ?
str. Gold and silver and all the products of the
mines and all the materials which tree-felling and
wood-cutting in general cut and provide for carpentry
and basket-weaving; and then, too, the art of
stripping the bark from plants and the leather-
worker’s art which takes off the skins of animals, and
115
PLATO
περί τά τοιαϋτα είσιν τεχναι, καί φελλών καί βυ~

βλων καί δεσμών εργαστικαί παρεσχον δημιουργεΐν
σύνθετα εκ μη συντιθέμενων είδη γενών, εν δε
αυτό προσαγορεύομεν πάν τό πρωτογενές άνθρώποις
κτήμα καί άξύνθετον και βασιλικής επιστήμης
ούδαμώς εργον ον.
ΞΕ. Την δη της τροφής κτησιν, και όσα εις το
σώμα ζυγκαταμιγνύμενα εαυτών μερεσι μέρη
σώματος εις τό θεραπεΰσαί τινα δύναμιν είληχε,
289 λεκτεον έβδομον όνομάσαντας αυτό ζύμπαν ημών
είναι τροφόν, ει μη τι κάλλιον εχομεν άλλο θεσθαι·
γεωργική δε και θηρευτική και γυμναστική και
ιατρική και μαγειρική πάν ύποτιθέντες όρθότερον
άποδώσομεν η τη πολίτικη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώς γάρ ου;
29· ΞΕ. Σχεδόν τοίνυν όσα εχεται κτήσεως,
πλην τών ήμερων ζώων, εν τούτοις επτά οΐμαι
γενεσιν ειρησθαι. σκοπεί δε· ην γάρ δικαιότατα
μεν αν τεθεν κατ άρχάς τό πρωτογενές είδος, μετά
Β δε τούτο όργανον, άγγειον, όχημα, πρόβλημα,
παίγνιον, θρέμμα, ά1 παραλείπομεν δε, εί τι μη
μεγα λεληθεν, εις τι τούτων δυνατόν άρμόττειν, οΐον
η τού νομίσματος ίδεα και σφραγίδων και παντός
χαρακτηρος. γένος τε γαρ εν αύτοΐς ταΰτα ούδέν
εχει μεγα ζύννομον, αλλά τά μεν εις κόσμον, τά
δε εις όργανα βία μεν, όμως δε πάντως ελκόμενα
συμφωνήσει, τά δε περί ζώων κτησιν τών ήμερων,
C πλην δούλων, η πρότερον άγελαιοτροφικη διαμερι-
σθεΐσα πά.ντα ειληφυΐα αναφαίνεται.
νε. 2Ω. Πανυ μεν οΰν.
1 Λ add. Madvig.
116
THE STATESMAN
all the other arts which have to do with such matters,

and those that make corks and paper and cords and
enable us to manufacture composite classes of tilings
from kinds that are not composite. We call all this,
as one class, the primary and simple possession of man,
and it is in no way the work of the kingly science.
y. soc. Good.
str. And property in food and all the things

which, mingling parts of themselves with parts of
the body, have any function of keeping it in health,
we may say is the seventh class, and we will call it
collectively our nourishment, unless we have some
better name to give it. All this we can assign to
the arts of husbandry, hunting, gymnastics, medicine,
and cooking more properly than to that of states¬
manship.
y. soc. Of course.
str. Now I think I have in these seven classes
mentioned nearly all kinds of property except tame
animals. See: there was the primary possession,
which ought in justice to have been placed first, and
after this the instrument, receptacle, vehicle, defence,
plaything, nourishment. Whatever we have omitted,
if some unimportant thing has been overlooked, can
find its place in one of those classes; for instance,
the group of coins, seals, and stamps, for there is not
among these any kinship such as to form a large
class, but some of them can be made to fit into the
class of ornaments, others into that of instruments,
though the classification is somewhat forced. All
property in tame animals, except slaves, is included
in the art of herding, which has already been divided
into parts.
y. soc. Yes; quite true.
E 2 117
PLATO
EE. To δε δή δουλών καί πάντων υπηρετών λοι¬

πόν, iv οΐς που και μαντεύομαι τους περί αυτό το
πλέγμα άμφισβητοΰντας τώ βασιλεΐ καταφανείς
γενήσεσθαι, καθάπερ τοΐς ΰφάνταις τότε τούς περ'ι
το νήθειν τε καί ζαίνειν καί όσα άλλα εΐπομεν. οι
δε άλλοι πάντες, ώς συν αίτιοι λεχθεντες, άμα τοΐς
εργοις τοΐς νυν δη ρηθεΐσιν άνήλωνται καί άπεχωρί-
D σθησαν από βασιλικής τε καί πολίτικης πράζεως.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έοίκασι γοΰν.
ΞΕ. ’Ίθι δη σκεφώμεθα τούς λοιπούς προσελθόν-
τες εγγύθεν, ιν’ αυτούς εΙδωμεν βεβαιότερον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκοΰν χρή.
ΕΕ. Τούς μύν δη μεγίστους ύιτη ρότας, ώς ενθενδε
ίδεΐν, τουναντίον έχοντας εύρίσκομεν οΐς ύπωπτευ-
σαμεν επιτήδευμα καί πάθος.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τίνα?;
ΕΕ. Του? ώνητους τε καί τω τρόπω τουτω κτη-
τούς· οΰς άναμφισβητητως δούλους εχομεν είπεΐν,
Ε ήκιστα βασιλικής μεταποιούμενους τέχνης.
ΞΕ. Τι' δε' ; των ελεύθερων οσοι τοΐς νυν δη ρη-
θεΐσιν εις υπηρετικήν εκόντες αυτούς τάττουσι, τά
τε γεωργίας καί τά των άλλων τεχνών έργα διακομί-
ζοντες επ’ άλληλους καί άνισοΰντες, οί μεν κατ’
αγοράς, οί δε πάλιν εκ πόλεως άλλάττοντες κατά
θάλατταν καί πεζή, νόμισμά τε προς τά άλλα καί
αύτό προς αυτό διαμείβοντες, οΰς αργυραμοιβούς
290 τε καί εμπόρους καί ναύκληρους καί καπηλους επ-
ωνομά καμεν, μών της πολίτικης άμφισβητησουσί τι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τάχ’ αν ίσως τής γε των εμπορευτικών.
118
THE STATESMAN
str. There remains the class of slaves and servants

in general, and here I prophesy that we shall find
those who set up claims against the king for the very
fabric of his art, just as the spinners and carders
and the rest of whom we spoke advanced claims
against the weavers a while ago. All the others,
whom we called contingent causes, have been
removed along with the works we just mentioned
and have been separated from the activity of the
king and the statesman.
y.soc. That seems to be the case, at least.
str. Come then, let us step up and look from
close at hand at those who are left, that so we may
know them more surely.
y. soc. Yes, that is what we should do.
str. We shall find, then, that the greatest servants,
when seen from near at hand, are in conduct and
condition the opposite of that which we suspected.
Y. soc. Who are they ?
str. The bought servants, acquired by purchase,

whom we can without question call slaves. They
make no claim to any share in the kingly art.
y. soc. Certainly not.
str. How about those free men who put them¬
selves voluntarily in the position of servants of those
whom we mentioned before ? I mean the men who
carry about and distribute among one another the
productions of husbandry and the other arts, whether
in the domestic market-places or by travelling from
city to city by land or sea, exchanging money for
wares or money for money, the men whom we call
brokers, merchants, shipmasters, and peddlers; do
they lay any claim to statesmanship ?
y. soc. Possibly to commercial statesmanship.
119
PLATO
ΞΕ. ΆΛΑ’ ού μην, ούς γε όρώαεν μισθωτούς και

θήτας πάσιν ετοιμότατα υπηρετούντας, μη ποτέ
βασιλικής μεταποιούμενους εύρωμεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ;
ΞΕ. Τι δε άρα τούς τα τοιάδε 8ιακονοΰντας ημΐν
εκάστοτε ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τά ποια είπες και τίνας;
Β ΞΕ. *Ών το κηρυκικόν έθνος, όσοι τε περί γράμ¬
ματα σοφοί γίγνονται πολλάκις ύπηρετησαντες,
και πόλλ, άττα έτερα περί τάς άρχάς διαπονεΐσθαί
τινες έτεροι πάνδεινοι, τί τούτους αύ λεξομεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Οπερ είπες νΰν, ύπηρέτας, άλλ’ ούκ
αυτούς εν ταΐς πόλεσιν άρχοντας.
HE. ΆΛΑ’ ού μην, οΐμαί γε, ένύπνιον ίδών εΐπον
ταύτη πη φανησεσθαι τούς διαφερόντως άμφισβη-
τοΰντας της πολίτικης, καίτοι σφοδρά γε άτοπον
C αν είναι δόξειε το ζητεΐν τούτους εν υπηρετική
μοίρα τινί.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κομιδη μεν ούν.
ΞΕ. Έτι δη προσμίξωμεν εγγύτερον επι τούς
μηπω βεβασανισμένους. εισ'ι δε οι τε περί μαντικήν
έχοντές τίνος επιστήμης διακόνου μόριον ερμηνευ-
ται γάρ που νομίζονται παρά θεών άνθρώποις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Και μην και το των ιερέων αύ γένος, ώς το
νόμιμόν φησι, παρά μεν ημών δωρεάς θεοϊς διά θυ-
σιών επιστημόν έστι κατά νοΰν έκείνοις δωρεΐσθαι,
D παρά δε εκείνων ημΐν εύχαΐς κτησιν αγαθών αίτη-
σασθαι· ταΰτα δε διακόνου τέχνης έστί που μόρια
άμφότερα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φαίνεται γοΰν.
30. ΕΕ. ’Ήδτ^ τοίνυν μοι δοκοΰμεν οΐόν γέ τίνος
120
THE STATESMAN
str. But certainly we shall never find labourers,

whom we see only too glad to serve anybody for hire,
claiming a share in the kingly art.
y. soc. Certainly not.
str. But there are people who perform services

of another kind. How about them ?
Y. soc. What services and what men do you mean ?
str. The class of heralds and those who become
by long practice skilled as clerks and other clever
men who perform various services in connexion with
public offices. What shall we call them ?
Y. soc. What you called the others, servants;
they are not themselves rulers in the states.
str. But surely it was no dream that made me
say we should find somewhere in this region those

who more than others lay claim to the art of states¬
manship ; and yet it would be utterly absurd to
look for them in any servile position.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. But let us draw a little closer still to those
whom we have not yet examined. There are men
who have to do with divination and possess a portion
of a certain menial science; for they are supposed
to be interpreters of the gods to men.
y.soc. Yes.
str. And then, too, the priests, according to law
and custom, know how to give the gods, by means of

sacrifices, the gifts that please them from us and by
prayers to ask for us the gain of good things from
them ; now these are both part of a servant’s art.
y. soc. At least they seem to be so.
str. At last, then, I think we are, as it were.
121
PLATO
ΐχνους έφ' ο πορευόμεθα προσάπτεσθαι. το γάρ

δη των ιερέων σχήμα και τό των μάντεων εΰ μάλα
φρονήματος πληροΰται και δόξαν σεμνήν λαμβάνει
διά το μέγεθος των εγχειρημάτων, ώστε περί μεν
Αίγυπτον ουδ’ εξεστι βασιλέα χωρίς Ιερατικής
Ε άρχειν, άλλ’ εάν άρα και τύχη πρότερον εξ άλλου
γένους βιασάμενος, ύστερον άναγκαΐον εις τούτο
ειστελεισθαι αυτόν τό γένος· έτι δε καί των
'Ελλήνων πολλαχοϋ ταΐς μεγίσταις άρχαΐς τα μέ¬
γιστα των περί τα τοιαΰτα θύματα ευροι τις αν
προσταττόμενα θυειν. και δη και παρ’ ύμΐν ούχ
ήκιστα δήλον δ λέγω· τώ γάρ λαχόντι βασιλεΐ
φασι τήδε τά σεμνότατα και μάλιστα πάτρια των
αρχαίων θυσιών άποδεδόσθαι.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Και πάνυ γε.
291 ΞΕ. Τούτου? τε τοίνυν τούς κληρωτούς βασιλέας
άμα και ιερέας, και ύπηρέτας αυτών καί τινα έτερον
πάμπολυν δχλον σκεπτέον, δς άρτι κατάδηλος νυν
ήμΐν γέγονεν άποχωρισθέντων τών έμπροσθεν.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Tim? δ’ αυτούς καί Ae'yei?;
ΞΕ. Καί μάλα τινάς άτοπους.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί δη;
ΞΕ. ΪΙάμφυλόν τι γένος αύτο>ν, ώς γε άρτι σκο-
πουμένω φαίνεται, πολλοί μεν γάρ λέουσι τών
άνδρών εΐξασι και Κένταυροι? καί τοιουτοισιν έτέ-
Β ροις, πάμπολλοι δε Σατυροις καί τοΐς άσθενέσι
καί πολυτρόποις θηρίοις· ταχύ δε μεταλλάττουσι
τα? τε ιδέας καί την δυναμιν εις άλλήλους. καί
μέντοι μοι νυν, ώ Σώκρατες, άρτι δοκώ κατανενοη-
κέναι τούς άνδρας.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Αέγοις αν έοικας γάρ άτοπόν τι καθ·
οράν.
122
THE STATESMAN
on the track of our quarry. For the bearing of

the priests and prophets is indeed full of pride,,
and they win high esteem because of the magnitude
of their undertakings. In Egypt, for example, no
king can rule without being a priest, and if he
happens to have forced his way to the throne from
some other class, he must enroll himself in the class
of priests afterwards; and among the Greeks, too,
you would find that in many states the performance
of the greatest public sacrifices is a duty imposed
upon the highest officials. Yes, among you Athenians
this is very plain, for they say the holiest and most
national of the ancient sacrifices are performed by
the man whom the lot has chosen to be the
King.1
str. We must, then, examine these elected kings
and priests and their assistants, and also another very
large crowd of people which has just come in sight
now that the others are out of the way.
y. soc. Who are these people ?
str. A very queer lot.
y. soc. How so ?
str. They are of very mixed race, at least they
seem so now, when I can just see them. For many
of them are like lions and centaurs and other fierce
creatures, and very many are like satyrs and the
weak and cunning beasts; and they make quick
exchanges of forms and qualities with one another.
Ah, but now, Socrates, I think I have just made out
who they are.
y. soc. Tell me; for you seem to have caught
sight of something strange.
1 The second in order of the nine annual archons.
123
PLATO
ΞΕ. Nat- τό γάρ άτοπον έζ άγνοιας πάσι συμβαί¬

νει. καί γάρ δη καί νυν αυτός τοΰτο έπαθον
έζαίφνης ήμφεγνόησα κατιδών τον περί τά των
C πόλεων πράγματα χορόν.
HE. Τον 7τάντων των σοφιστών μέγιστον γόητα
καί ταύτης της τέχνης έμπειρότατον δν από των
όντως όντων πολιτικών και βασιλικών καίπερ
παγχάλεπον ον τα άφαιρειν άφαιρετέον, ει μέλλομεν
ίδεΐν έναργώς τό ζητούμενον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Αλλά μην τοΰτό γε ούκ άνετεον.
ΞΕ. Ουκουν δη κατά γε την έμήν. καί μοι φράζε
τόδε.
νε. 2Ω. Το ποιον;
31. HE. Άρ’ ον μοναρχία τών πολιτικών ημΐν
D αρχών εστι μία;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
HE. Και μετά μοναρχίαν εΐποι τις αν, οΐμαι, την
υπό τών ολίγων δυναστείαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ' ου;
ΞΕ. Τρίτον δε σχήμα πολιτείας ονχ η του πλή¬
θους αρχή, δημοκρατία τοϋνομα κληθεΐσα;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και1 πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τρεις δ’ οΰσαι μών ου πέντε τρόπον τινά
γίγνονται, δυο έζ εαυτών άλλα προς αύταΐς ονόματα
τίκτονσαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποια δη;
Ε 3Ε. Προ? τδ βίαιόν που και εκούσιον άποσκο-
ποΰντες νϋν και πενίαν και πλούτον καί νόμον και
ανομίαν εν αύταΐς γιγνόμενα διπλήν εκατόραν τοϊν
δυοΐν διαιροΰντες μοναρχίαν μεν προσαγορεύουσιν
1 και om. Β.
124
THE STATESMAN
str. Yes, for ignorance makes tilings seem strange

to everybody. That was what happened to me just
now; when I suddenly caught sight of them I did
not recognize the troop of those who busy themselves
with the affairs of the state.
y. soc. What troop ?
str. That which of all the sophists is the greatest

charlatan and most practised in charlatanry. This,
although it is a hard thing to do, must be separated
from the band of really statesmanlike and kingly
men, if we are to get a clear view of the object of
our search.
y. soc. But we certainly cannot give that up.
str. No, of course not. I agree to that. And
now please answer a question.
str. We agree that monarchy is one of the forms
of government, do we not ?
Y. soc. Yes.
str. And after monarchy one might, I should say,
mention the rule of the few.

str. And a third form of government is the rule
of the multitude, called democracy, is it not ?
str. Do not these three become after a fashion
five, producing out of themselves two additional
names ?
y. soc. What names ?
str. People nowadays are likely to take into
consideration enforced subjection and voluntary
obedience, poverty and wealth, law and lawlessness
as they occur in governments, and so they divide
two of the forms we mentioned, giving to the two
125
PLATO
ώς δυο παρεχόμενων είδη δυοΐν όνόμασι, τυραννίδι,

το δε βασιλικη.
ΕΕ. Την δε υπό ολίγων γε εκάστοτε κρατηθεΐσαν
πόλίν αριστοκρατία καί ολιγαρχία.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Δημοκρατίας γε μην, εάντ* ουν βιαίως εάντε
292 εκουσίως των τάς ουσίας εχόντων τδ πλήθος
αρχή, καί εάντε τούς νόμους ακριβώς φυλάττον
εάντε μη, πάντως τοϋνομα ούδείς αυτής εΐωθε
μεταλλάττ ειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. *Αληθή.
ΞΕ. Τι οΰν; οίόμεθά τινα τούτων των πολιτειών
ορθήν είναι τουτοις τοΐς οροις όρισθεΐσαν, ενί καί
δλίγοις καί πολλοΐς, καί πλουτω καί πενία, καί τω
βιαίω καί εκουσίω, καί μετά γραμμάτων καί άνευ
νόμων ζυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τί γάρ δη καί κωλύει;
Β ΞΕ. Σκοπεί δη σαφεστερον τηδε επόμενος.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πη;
ΞΕ. Τω ρηθεντι κατά π ρωτάς πότερον εμμενοΰμεν
η διαφωνησομεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τω δη ποίω λεγεις;
ΞΕ. Την βασιλικήν αρχήν των επιστημών είναι
τινα εφαμεν, οΐμαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Και τούτων γε ούχ άπασών, αλλά κριτικήν
δηπου τινα καί επιστατικην εκ των άλλων προειλό-
μεθα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Κάκ της επιστατικης την μεν επ' άφυχοις
C εργοις, την δε επί ζωοις· καί κατά τοΰτον δη τον
126
THE STATESMAN
aspects of monarchy the two names tyranny and

royalty.
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. And the state that is ruled by the few is
called, as the case may be, aristocracy or oligarchy.
y. soc. To be sure.
str. In the case of democracy, however, whether
the multitude rule those who have property by
violence or with their willing consent, and whether
the laws are carefully observed or not, no one ever
habitually changes the name.
y. soc. True.
str. Now then, do we believe that any of these
forms of government which are defined by the dis¬
tinctions between the one, the few, and the many,
or wealth and poverty, or violence and willingness, or
written constitution and absence of laws, is a
right one ?
y. soc. I don’t see why not.
str. Look a bit more closely along the line I am
going to point out.
str. Shall we abide by what we said in the
beginning, or dissent from it ?
y. soc. To what do you refer ?
str. We said, I believe, that royal power was one
of the sciences.
y. soc. Yes.
str. And not only a science, but we selected it
from the rest as a science of judgement and command.
y. soc. Yes.
str. And from the science of command we dis¬
tinguished one part which rules inanimate works, and
one which rules living beings; and so we have gone
127
PLATO
τρόπον μερίζοντες δεΰρ' a εί προεληλυθαμεν, επιστή¬

μης ούκ έπιλανθανόμενοι, το δ’ ήτις1 ούχ ίκανώς
πω2 δυνάμενοι διακριβώσασθαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αεγεις όρθώς.
ΞΕ. Τοοτ’ αυτό τοίννν άρ* εννοουμεν, ότι τον
όρον ούκ ολίγους ουδέ πολλούς, ουδέ τό εκούσιον,
ουδέ τδ ακούσιον, ουδέ πενίαν ουδέ πλούτον γίγνε¬
σθαι περί αυτών χρεών, αλλά τινα επιστήμην, εϊπερ
άκολουθήσομεν τοΐς πρόσθεν;
D 32. ΝΕ. 2Ω. Άλλα μην τοΰτό γε αδύνατον
μη ποιείν.
ΞΕ. Έ£ ανάγκης δη νυν τούτο ουτω σκεπτεον,
εν τίνι ποτέ τούτων επιστήμη ζυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι
περί ανθρώπων αρχής, σχεδόν τής χαλεπωτάτης καί
μεγίστης κτήσασθαι. δει γάρ ίδεΐν αυτήν, ΐνα
θεασώμεθα τίνας άφαιρετεον από του φρονίμου
βασιλεως, οι προσποιούνται μεν είναι πολιτικοί καί
πείθουσι πολλούς, εισί δε ούδαμώς.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αεΐ γάρ δη ποιείν τοΰτο, ώς ό λόγος
ήμΐν προείρηκεν.
Ε ΞΕ. Μώ)' οΰν δοκεΐ πλήθος γε εν πόλει ταυτην
την επιστήμην δυνατόν είναι κτήσασθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και πώς;
ξε. ΆΛΑ’ αρα εν χιλιάνδρω πόλει δυνατόν
εκατόν τινας ή καί πεντήκοντα αυτήν ίκανώς
κτήσασθαι;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ραστη μεντ’ άν ουτω γ' εΐη πασών τών
τεχνών ΐσμεν γάρ ότι χιλίων άνδρών άκροι
πεττευται τοσοΰτοι προς τους εν τοΐς άλλοις
*Έιλλησιν ουκ άν γενοιντό ποτέ, μή τι δη
βασιλείς γε. δει γάρ δη τόν γε την βασιλικήν
1 t}tis] ήν Tis Β: ην tls Τ. 2 πω] πω% ΒΤ : που vulg.
128
THE STATESMAN
on dividing in this manner to the present moment,

never forgetting that it is a science, but as yet unable
to state with sufficient accuracy what science it is.
Y. soc. You are right.
str. Then is this our understanding, that the
distinction between forms of government ought not
to be found in the words few or many, or voluntary
or unwilling, or wealth or poverty, but some science
must be the distinguishing feature, if we are to be
consistent with our previous statement?
y. soc. Yes, indeed; it cannot be otherwise.
str. Necessarily, then, our present duty is to
inquire in which, if any, of these forms of govern¬
ment is engendered the science of ruling men, which
is about the greatest of sciences and the most difficult
to acquire. We must discover that in order to see
what men are to be distinguished from the wise
king—men, I mean, who pretend to be, and make
many believe that they are, statesmen, but are
really not such at all.
y. soc. Yes, we must do this; that is implied in
what w'as said before.
str. Does it seem at all possible that a multitude
in a state could acquire this science ?
y. soc. By no means.
str. But in a state of one thousand men could
perhaps a hundred or as many as fifty acquire it
adequately ?
y. soc. No, in that case this would be the easiest
of all the arts ; for we know that a city of a thousand
men could never produce that number of finished
draught-players in comparison with those in other
Greek cities, still less so many kings. For the man
129
PLATO
εχοντα επιστήμην, αν τ’ αρχή καί εάν μή,

293 κατά τον έμπροσθεν λόγον όμως βασιλικόν προσ-
αγορευεσθαι.
ΞΕ. Καλώ? άπεμνημόνευα ας. επόμενον 8ε', οΐμαι,
τουτω την μεν ορθήν αρχήν περί ενα τινά κολ δυο
και παντάπασιν ολίγους δεΐ ζητεΐν, όταν ορθή γίγνη-
ται.
ΞΕ. Τούτου? δε γε, εάντε εκόντων εάντε άκόντων
άρχωσιν, εάντε κατά γράμματα εάντε άνευ γραμμά¬
των, και εάν πλουτοΰντες ή πενόμενοι, νομιστεον,
ώσπερ νυν ήγουμεθα, κατά τέχνην ήντινοΰν αρχήν
Β άρχοντας, τούς ιατρούς δε ούχ ήκιστα νενομίκα-
μεν, εάντε εκόντας εάντε άκοντας ημάς ίώνται,
τεμνοντες ή καίοντες ή τινα άλλην άλγηδόνα
προσάπτοντες, και εάν κατά γράμματα ή χωρίς
γραμμάτων, και εάν πενητες οντες ή πλούσιοι,
πάντως ούδεν ήττον ιατρούς φαμεν, εωσπερ αν επι-
στατοΰντες τέχνη, καθαίροντες είτε άλλως ίσχναί-
νοντες ε’ίτε και αύζάνοντες, αν μόνον επ’ άγαθω
τω των σωμάτων, βελτίω ποιοΰντες εκ χειρόνων,
C σωζωσιν οι θεραπευοντες έκαστοι τα θεραπευό¬
μενα· ταυτη θήσομεν, ώς οΐμαι, και ούκ άλλη,
τούτον όρον ορθόν είναι μόνον ιατρικής και άλλης
ήστινοσοΰν αρχής.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κομιδή μεν ούν.
33· He. Άναγκαΐον δή και πολιτειών, ώς
εοικε, ταυτήν διαφερόντως ορθήν είναι και μόνην
πολιτείαν, εν ή τις αν εύρίσκοι τούς άρχοντας αληθώς
130
THE STATESMAN
who possesses the kingly science, whether he rule or

not, must be called kingly, as our previous argument
showed.
str. You did well to remind me. And in agree¬
ment with this, we must, I suppose, look for the
right kind of rule in one or two or very few men,
whenever such right rule occurs.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. And these men, whether they rule over
willing or unwilling subjects, with or without written
laws, and whether they are rich or poor, must,
according to our present opinion, be supposed to
exercise their rule in accordance with some art or
science. And physicians offer a particularly good
example of this point of view. Whether they cure
us against our will or with our will, by cutting us or
burning us or causing us pain in any other way, and
whether they do it by written rules or without them,
and whether they are rich or poor, we call them
physicians just the same, so long as they exercise
authority by art or science, purging us or reducing
us in some other way, or even adding to our weight,
provided only that they who treat their patients
treat them for the benefit of their health and
preserve them by making them better than they
were. In this way and no other, in my opinion, shall
we determine this to be the only right definition
of the rule of the physician or of any other rule
whatsoever.
y. soc. Very true.
str. It is, then, a necessary consequence that
among forms of government that one is pre¬
eminently right and is the only real government, in
which the rulers are found to be truly possessed
131
PLATO
επιστήμονας καί ού δοκοΰντας μόνον, εάντε κατά

νόμους εάντε civ ευ νόμων άρχωσι, καί εκόντων η
D ικόντων, καί πενόμενοι η πλουτούντες, τούτων
ύπολογιστεον ούδεν ούδαμώς εΐναι κατ' ούδεμίαν
ορθότητα.
νε. 2Ω. Καλώ?.
HE. Και εάντε γε άποκτιννύντες τινάς η και εκ~
βάλλοντες καθαίρωσιν επ' άγαθω την πόλιν, ε’ίτε και
αποικίας οΐον σμηνη μελιττων εκπόμποντός ττοι
σμικροτόραν ποιώσιν, η τινας επεισαγόμενοί ποθεν
άλλους εζωθεν πολίτας ποιοΰντες αυτήν αυξωσιν,
εωσπερ αν επιστήμη και τω δικαίω προσχρώμενοι
σωζοντες εκ χείρονος βελτίω ποιώσι κατά δύναμιν,
Ε ταυτην τότε καί κατά τούς τοιουτους όρους ημΐν
μόνην ορθήν πολιτείαν εΐναι ρητεον δσας δε άλλα?
λόγο μεν, ού γνήσιας ούδ’ όντως ούσας λεκτεον, αλλά
μεμιμημενας ταυτην, ας μεν ώς1 εύνόμους λόγο μεν,
επί τα καλλίω, τάς δε άλλας επί τά αίσχίονα μεμιμη-
σθαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τά μεν άλλα, ώ ζενε, μετρίως εοικεν
είρησθαι· το δε καί άνεν νόμων δεΐν άρχειν χαλε-
πώτερον άκονειν ερρηθη.
HE. Έμικρον γε εφθης με ερόμενος, ώ Σώκρατες.
94 εμελλον γάρ σε διερωτησειν ταΰτα πότερον άπο-
δεχει πάντα, η τι καί δυσχεραίνεις τόυν λεχθόντων·
νΰν δε ηδη φανερόν, ότι τούτο βουλησόμεθα το
περί της των άνευ νόμων αρχόντων όρθότητος
διελθεΐν ημάς.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ού;
ΞΕ. Τρόπον μόντοι τινά δήλον ότι της βασιλικής
εστιν η νομοθετική· το δ’ άριστον ού τούς νόμους
1 άί μέν ώ? Stallbaum : ασμένως Β: ασμένως Τ.
132
THE STATESMAN
of science, not merely to seem to possess it, whether

they rule by law or without law, whether their
subjects are willing or unwilling, and whether they
themselves are rich or poor—none of these things
can be at all taken into account on any right method.
y. soc. Excellent.
str. And whether they purge the state for its
good by killing or banishing some of the citizens,
or make it smaller by sending out colonies some¬
where, as bees swarm from the hive, or bring in
citizens from elsewhere to make it larger, so long as
they act in accordance with science and justice and
preserve and benefit it by making it better than it was,
so far as is possible, that must at that time and by
such characteristics be declared to be the only right
form of government. All other forms must be con¬
sidered not as legitimate or really existent, but as
imitating this ; those states which are said to be well
governed imitate it better, and the others worse.
Y. soc. Everything else that you have said seems
reasonable; but that government should be carried
on without laws is a hard saying.
str. You got ahead of me a little with your
question, Socrates; for I was just going to ask
whether you accepted all I have said, or were dis¬
pleased with anything. But now it is clear that we
shall have to discuss the question of the propriety
of government without laws.
y. soc. Of course we shall.
str. In a sense, however, it is clear that law¬
making belongs to the science of kingship; but the
best thing is not that the laws be in power, but that
133
PLATO
ε’στιν ισχύει, αλλά άνδρα τον μετά φρονήσεως

βασιλικόν, οΐσθ' όπη;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Π 77 8η λεγεις;
ΞΕ. "Οτι νόμος ουκ αν ποτέ δύναιτο τό τε άρι-
Β στον και τό δικαιότατον ακριβώς άμα πάσιν περι-
λαβών τό βέλτιστον επιτάττειν αί γάρ άνομοιο-
τ-ητες των τε ανθρώπων και των πράξεων και τό1
μηδέποτε μηδέν, ώς έπος είπεΐν, ησυχίαν άγειν
των ανθρωπίνων ούδεν εώσιν άπλοΰν εν ούδενι περ'ι
απάντων καί επί πάντα τον χρόνον άποφαίνεσθαι
τέχνην ούδ' ηντινοΰν. ταΰτα δη συγχωρονμεν που;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύί μην;
ΞΕ. Ύόν δε γε νόμον όρώμεν σχεδόν επ' αυτό
τούτο ξυντείνοντα, ώσπερ τινά άνθρωπον αυθάδη
C καί αμαθή καί μηδενα μηδέν εώντα ποιεΐν παρά την
εαυτοΰ τάξιν, μηδ’ επερωτάν μηδενα, μηδ’ αν τι
νεον άρα τω ξυμβαίνη βελτιον παρά τον λόγον δν
αυτός επεταξεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Άληθη- ποιεί γάρ άτεχνώς, καθάπερ
είρηκας νυν, ό νόμος ημΐν εκάστοις.
ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν αδύνατον ευ όχειν προς τά μηδέποτε
απλά τδ διά παντός γιγνόμενον άπλοΰν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κινδυνεύει.
34· he. Διά τί δη ποτ ουν άναγκαΐον νομοθετειν,
επειδηπερ ουκ όρθότατον 6 νόμος; άνευρετεον
D τούτου την αιτίαν.
ΞΕ. Ουκοΰν καί παρ' ΰμίν είσί τινες οΐαι καί
εν άλλαις πόλεσιν άθρόων ανθρώπων ασκήσεις, είτε
προς δρόμον είτε προς άλλο τι, φιλονεικίας ενεκα;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και πάνυ γε πολλαί.
1 τό] τοΰ ΒΤ.
134
THE STATESMAN
the man who is wise and of kingly nature be ruler.

Do you see why ?
y. soc. Why is it ?
str. Because law could never, by determining
exactly what is noblest and most just for one and
all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the
differences of men and of actions and the fact that
nothing, I may say, in human life is ever at rest,
forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any
simple rule for everything and for all time. We
agree to that, I suppose ?
str. But we see that law aims at pretty nearly
this very thing, like a stubborn and ignorant man
who allows no one to do anything contrary to his
command, or even to ask a question, not even if
something new occurs to some one, which is better
than the rule he has himself ordained.
y. soc. True ; the law treats each and all of us
exactly as you describe.
str. So that which is persistently simple is in¬
applicable to things which are never simple ?
y. soc. I suppose so.
str. Why in the world, then, is it necessary to
make laws, since law is not the most perfect right ?
We must ask the reason for this.
str. Well, there are here at Athens, as in other
cities, classes for practice in athletics to prepare for
contests in running or the like, are there not ?
γ. soc. Yes, a great many of them.
135
PLATO
ΞΕ. Φόρε νυν άναλάβωμεν πάλιν μνήμη τάς των

τίχντ) γυμναζόντων επιτάζεις iv ταΐς τοιαυταις
άρχαΐς.
ΞΕ. 'Ότι λεπτού ργεΐν ούκ εγχωρεΐν ηγούνται καθ
ένα 'έκαστον, τώ σώματι τό προσηκον εκάστω
Ε προστάττοντες, άλλα. παχυτερον οιονται δεΐν ώς
επί τό πολύ και επί πολλούς την του λυσιτελοΰντος
τοΐς σώμασι ποιεΐσθαι τάζιν.
ΞΕ. Διό δ-^ γε και 'ίσους πόνους νΰν διδόντες άθρό-
οις άμα μεν έζορμώσιν, άμα δε καί καταπαυουσι
δρόμου καί πάλης καί πάντων των κατά τα σώματα
πόνων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έστι ταΰτα.
ΞΕ. Και τον νομοθετην τοίνυν ήγώμεθα, τον
ταΐσιν άγελαις έπιστατήσοντα του δίκαιου περί καί.
295 των προς άλλήλους ζυμβολαίων, μη ποθ’ ικανόν
γενήσεσθαι πασιν άθρόοις προστάττοντα ακριβώς
ένί εκάστω τό προσηκον άποδιδόναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τό γοΰν εΐκός.
ΞΕ. Άλλα τό τοΐς πολλοΐς γε, οΐμαι, καί ώς επί
τό πολύ καί πως ούτωσί παχυτερως έκάστοις τον
νόμον θήσει,1 καί εν γράμμασιν άποδιδούς καί εν
άγραμμάτοις, πατρίοις δε έθεσι νομοθετών.
ΞΕ. Όρθώς μεντοι. πώς γάρ αν τις ικανός
γόνοιτ’ αν ποτέ, ώ Σώκρατες, ώστε διά βίου αεί
Β παρακαθημενος εκάστω δι’ ακρίβειας προστάττειν
τό προσηκον; επεί τουτ αν δυνατό? ών, ώς οΐμαι,
τών την βασιλικήν όστισοϋν όντως επιστήμην
1 θησει] θήσειν ΒΤ.
136
THE STATESMAN
str. Now let us recall to mind the orders given

by the professional trainers when they are in charge
of such classes.
Y. soc. What do you mean?
str. They think they cannot go into details in
individual cases and order what is best for each
person’s physique; they think they must employ
a rougher method and give a general rule which
will be good for the physique of the majority.
y. soc. Good.
str. And therefore they nowadays assign equal
exercise to whole classes; they make them begin at
the same time and stop at the same time, whether
they run or wrestle or practise any other kind of
bodily exercise.
y. soc. That is true.
str. And so we must believe that the law-maker
who is to watch over the herds and maintain justice
and the obligation of contracts, will never be able
by making laws for all collectively, to provide exactly
that which is proper for each individual.
y. soc. Probably not, at any rate.
str. But he will, I fancy, legislate for the majority
and in a general way only roughly for individuals,
whether he issues written laws or his enactments
follow the unwritten traditional customs.
str. Yes, quite right. For how could anyone,
Socrates, sit beside each person all his life and tell
him exactly what is proper for him to do ? Certainly
anyone who really possessed the kingly science, if
he were able to do this, would hardly, I imagine.
137
PLATO
είληφότων σχολή ποτ' αν έαυτώ θειτ' εμποδίσματα

γράφων τούς λεχθέντας τούτους νόμους.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έκ των νυν γοΰν, ώ ξένε, είρημένων.
ΞΕ. Μάλλον δε ye, ώ βέλτιστε, εκ των μελλόντων
ρηθήσεσθαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ύίνων δη;
ΞΕ. Των τοιώνδε. εΐπωμεν γάρ δη πρός γε ημάς
C αυτούς. Ιατρόν μέλλοντα ή καί τινα γυμναστικόν άπο-
δημεΐν και άπέσεσθαι των θεραπευόμενων συχνόν,
ώς οίοιτο,χρόνον,μή μνημονεύσειν οίηθέντατά προσ-
ταχθεντα τούς γυμναζόμενους ή τούς κάμνοντας,
υπομνήματα γράφειν αν έθέλειν αύτοις, ή πώς;
t ο €ί τταρα όοςαν ζλαττω χρονον αποοη-
μήσας ελθοι πάλιν; άρ’ ούκ αν παρ’ εκείνα τα. γράμ¬
ματα τολμησειεν άλλα ύποθεσθαι, ζυμβαινόντων
D άλλων βελτιόνων τοΐς κάμνουσι διά πνεύματα η
τι καί άλλο παρά την ελπίδα των εκ /λιός ετερως
πως των είωθότων γενόμενα, καρτερών δ’ αν ηγοιτο
δεΐν μη εκβαίνειν τά άρχαΐά ποτέ νομοθετηθεντα
μήτε αυτόν προστάττοντα άλλα μήτε τον κάμνοντα
ετερα τολμώντα παρά τά γραφεντα δράν, ώς ταϋτα
όντα ιατρικά καί υγιεινά, τά δε ετερως γιγνόμενα
νοσώδη τε καί ούκ εντεχνα· ή παν τό τοιοΰτον εν
γε επιστήμη ζυμβαΐνον καί άληθεΐ τέχνη περί
Ε άπαντα παντάπασι γέλως αν δ μέγιστος γίγνοιτο
των τοιούτων νομοθετημάτων;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Παντάπασι μεν ούν.
HE. 1 ω 06 τα οικαια οη και αοικα και καλα και
αισχρά καί αγαθά καί κακά γράφαντι καί άγραφα
νομοθετήσαντι τάίς των ανθρώπων άγέλαις, όπόσαι
1 δ’ ei] δαί el Τ: δή Β.
138
THE STATESMAN
ever put obstacles in his own way by writing what

we call laws.
y. soc. No, at least not according to what has
just been said.
str. Or rather, ray friend, not according to what
is going to be said.
y. soc. What is that ?
str. Something of this sort: Let us suppose that
a physician or a gymnastic trainer is going away
and expects to be a long time absent from his
patients or pupils; if he thinks they will not
remember his instructions, he would want to write
them down, would he not ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. What if he should come back again after a
briefer absence than be expected? Would he not
venture to substitute other rules for those written
instructions if others happened to be better for his
patients, because the winds or something else had,
by act of God, changed unexpectedly from their usual
course ? Would he persist in the opinion that no
one must transgress the old laws, neither he himself
by enacting new ones nor his patient by venturing
to do anything contrary to the written rules, under
the conviction that these laws were medicinal and
healthful and anything else was unhealthful and
unscientific ? If anything of that sort occurred in
the realm of science and true art, would not any
such regulations on any subject assuredly arouse the
greatest ridicule ?
y. soc. Most assuredly.
str. But he who has made written or unwritten
laws about the just and unjust, the honourable and
disgraceful, the good and the bad for the herds
139
PLATO
κατά, πάλιν iv εκάσταις νομεύονται κατά τούς των

γραφάντων νόμους, αν 6 μετά τέχνης γράφας η τις
ετερος όμοιος άφίκηται, μη εζεστω δη παρά ταΰτα
296 ετερα προστάττειν ; η και τούτο το άπόρρημα
ούδεν ηττον αν εκείνου τη αλήθεια γελοΐον φαίνοιτο;
35· ΞΕ. Οΐσθ' ούν επί τω τοιουτω λόγον τον
παρά των πολλών λεγόμενον;
νε. 2Ω. 0ύκ εννοώ νυν γ' ούτως.
ΞΕ. Και μην ευπρεπής, φασι γάρ δη δεΐν, ει τις
γιγνώσκει παρά τούς τών έμπροσθεν βελτίους
νόμους, νομοθετεΐν την εαυτού πόλιν έκαστον πεί-
σαντα, άλλως δε μη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι ούν; ούκ όρθώς;
Β ΞΕ. ”\σως. αν δ’ ούν μη πείθων τις βιάζηται το
βελτιον, άπόκριναι, τι τούνομα της βίας εσται; μη
μεντοι πω, περί δε τών έμπροσθεν πρότερον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποΐον δη λεγεις;
ΞΕ. "Αν τις άρα μη πείθων τον ίατρευόμενον,
εχων δε όρθώς την τέχνην, παρά τά γεγραμμενα το
βελτιον άναγκάζη δραν παΐδα η τινα άνδρα η καί
γυναίκα, τί τούνομα της βίας εσται ταύτης; άρ’ ού
παν μάλλον η το παρά την τέχνην λεγόμενον άμάρ-
C τημα το νοσώδες; καί πάντα όρθώς είπεΐν εστι
πρότερον τω βιασθεντι περί το τοιοϋτον, πλην ότι
νοσώδη καί άτεχνα πεπονθεν υπό τών βιασαμενων
ιατρών;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. 'Αληθέστατα λεγεις.
ΞΕ. Τί δε ημΐν δη τό παρά την πολιτικήν τέχνην
140
THE STATESMAN
of men that are tended in their several cities in

accordance with the laws of the law-makers, is not
to be permitted to give other laws contrary to those,
it the scientific law-maker, or another like him,
should come ! Would not such a prohibition appear
in truth as ridiculous as the other ?
y. soc. It certainly would.
str. Do you know what people in general say
about such a case ?
Y. soc. I don’t recall it just now off-hand.
str. Yes, it is very plausible; for they say that if
anyone has anything better than the old laws to
offer, he must first persuade the state, and then he
may make his laws, but not otherwise.
y. soc. And is that not right ?
str. Perhaps. But suppose a man does not use
persuasion, but makes an improvement by force.
What is this force to be called ? Answer me—or,
no, not yet ; first answer in reference to what we were
talking of before.
str. Suppose a physician who has right knowledge
of his profession does not persuade, but forces, his
patient, whether man, woman, or child, to do the
better thing, though it be contrary to the wrritten
precepts, what will such violence be called ? The last
name in the world to call it would be “ unscientific
and baneful error,” as the phrase is, would it not ?
And the patient so forced might rightly say anything
else rather than that he had been treated in a
baneful or unscientific way by the physicians who
used force upon him.
y. soc. Very true.
str. But what can we call the unscientific error
f 141
PLATO
αμάρτημα λεγόμενόν εστιν; dp’ ον τό αισχρόν και

κακόν και άδικον;
νε. 2Ω. Παντάπασί γε.
HE. Των δη βιασθεντων παρά τα γεγραμμένα και
πάτρια δράν ετερα δικαιότερα και αμεινω και
D καλλίω των έμπροσθεν, φόρε, τον των τοιούτων
αν φόγον περί της τοιαύτης βίας, άρ’, ει μελλει μη
καταγελαστότατος είναι πάντων, πάντα αύτω μάλ¬
λον λεκτεον εκάστοτε, πλην ώς αισχρά και άδικα
καί κακά πεπόνθα σιν οι βιασθεντες νπο των
βιασαμενων ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αληθέστατα λεγεις.
HE. ’ΑΛΑ’ άρα εάν μεν πλούσιος 6 βιασάμενος η,
8/ικαια, ·>\
αν ο
c>» ν / 3/ο \ η
αρα πβνης, αοικα τα piaauevra εσπν;
Ω ' 5 /
η καν πείσας καν μη πείσας τις, πλούσιος η πενης,

Ε η κατά γράμματα η παρά γράμματα, δρα ζύμφορα,1
τούτον δει καί περί ταΰτα τον όρον είναι τόν γε άλη-
θινωτατον ορθής πόλεως διοικησεως, ον ο σοφός καί
αγαθός άνηρ διοικήσει τό των άρχομενων ; ώσπερ ό
κυβερνητης τό της νεώς καί ναντών αεί ζνμφερον
297 παραφνλάττων, ον γράμματα τιθείς αλλά την τέχ¬
νην νόμον παρεχόμενος, σώζει τούς σννναύτας, ούτω
καί κατά τόν αυτόν τρόπον τούτον παρά, των ούτως
άρχειν δυναμενων ορθή γίγνοιτ' αν πολιτεία, την
της τέχνης ρώμην των νόμων παρεχόμενων κρείττω;
καί πάντα ποιοΰσι τοΐς εμφροσιν αρχουσιν ούκ εστιν
αμάρτημα, μεχριπερ αν εν μεγα φυλάττωσι, τό
Β μετά νοΰ καί τέχνης δικαιότατον αεί διανεμοντες
τοΐς εν τη πόλει σώζειν τε αυτούς οΐοί τε ώσι
και αμεινους εκ χειρόνων άποτελεΐν κατά τό
δυνατόν;
1 δρςι ξύμφορα Cornarius : δρ$ μή ξύμφορα ^ ξύμφορα MS3.
142
THE STATESMAN
in the field of statesmanship ? Is it not baseness

and evil and injustice?
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. Now if people are forced, contrary to the
written laws and inherited traditions, to do what is
juster and nobler and better than what they did
before, tell me, will not anyone who blames such
use of force, unless he is to be most utterly ridiculous,
always say anything or everything rather than that
those who have been so forced have suffered base
and unjust and evil treatment at the hands of those
who forced them ?
y. soc. Very true.
str. But would the violence be just if he who
uses it is rich, and unjust if he is poor? Or if a
man, whether rich or poor, by persuasion or by other
means, in accordance with written laws or contrary
to them, does what is for the good of the people,
must not this be the truest criterion of right govern¬
ment, in accordance with which the wise and good
man will govern the affairs of his subjects? Just
as the captain of a ship keeps watch for what is at
any moment for the good of the vessel and the sailors,
not by writing rules, but by making his science his
law, and thus preserves his fellow voyagers, so may
not a right government be established in the same
way by men who could rule by this principle, making
science more powerful than the laws ? And whatever
the wise rulers do, they can commit no error, so long
as they maintain one great principle and by always
dispensing absolute justice to them with wisdom and
science are able to preserve the citizens and make
them better than they were, so far as that is possible.
Is not this true ?
143
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Ούκ εστ άντειπεΐν παρά γε a νΰν εΐ-

ρηται.
HE. Καί μην προς εκείνα ούδε άντιρρητεον.
30. νε. 2Ω. Τά ποια είπες;
HE. Ώ? ούκ άν ποτέ πλήθος ούδ' ώντινωνοΰν
την τοιαυτην λαβόν επιστήμην οΐόν τ άν γενοιτο
C μετά νοΰ διοικεΐν πόλιν, άλλα περί σμικρόν τι και
ολίγον και το εν εστι ζητητεον την μίαν εκείνην
πολιτείαν την ορθήν, τάς δ’ άλλας μιμήματα θετεον,
ώσπερ και ολίγον πρότερον ερρηθη, τάς μεν επί
τά καλλίονα, τάς δε επί τά αισχίω μιμούμενος
ταύτην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? τί τοΰτ’ εΐρηκας; ούδε γάρ άρτι
δήθεν κατεμαθον τδ περί των μιμημάτων.
HE. Και μην ού φαΰλόν γε, άν κινησας τις τούτον
τον λόγον αυτού καταβάλη καί μη διελθών ενδείζηται
D το νΰν γιγνόμενον αμάρτημα περί αυτό.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐΐοΐον δη;
ΞΕ. Τοιόυδε τι δει γε ζητεΐν, ού πάνυ ζννηθες
ούδε ρόδιον ίδεΐν όμως μην πειρώμεθα λαβειν
αυτό, φόρε γάρ· ορθής ημΐν μόνης οΰσης ταυ της
της πολιτείας, ην ειρηκαμεν, οΐσθ’ ότι τά? άλλας
δει τοΐς τ αυτής συγγράμμασι χρωμενας ούτω
σωζεσθαι, δρώσας το νΰν επαινούμενον, καίπερ
ούκ όρθότατον ον;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Το ποΐον;
ΞΕ. Το παρά τούς νόμους μηδέν μηδενα τολμάν
ποιεΐν των εν τη πόλει, τον τολμώντα δε θανάτω
Ε ζημιοΰσθαι καί πάσι τοΐς εσχάτοις. καί τοΰτ'
εστιν ορθότατα καί κάλλιστ’ όχον ώς δεύτερον,
επειδάν το πρώτον τις μεταθη το νΰν δη ρηθεν
144
THE STATESMAN
Y. soc. There is no denying the truth of what you

have just said.
str. And those other statements cannot be denied,
either.
y. soc. What statements ?
str. That no great number of men, whoever they
may be, could ever acquire political science and be
able to administer a state with wisdom, but our one
right form of government must be sought in some
small number or one person, and all other forms are
merely, as we said before, more or less successful
imitations of that.
y. soc. What do you mean by that ? I did not
understand about the imitations a little while ago,
either.
str. And yet it is quite a serious matter if after
stirring up this question we drop it and do not go on
and show the error which is committed in relation
to it nowadays.
y. soc. What is the error?
str. I will tell you what we must investigate; it
is not at all familiar or easy to see, but let us try to
grasp it nevertheless. Tell me this : Assuming that
the form of government we have described is the
only right form, don’t you see that the other forms
must employ its written laws if they are to be pre¬
served by doing that which is approved of nowadays,
although it is not perfectly right ?
y. soc. What is not perfectly right ?
str. That no citizen shall dare to do anything
contrary to the laws, and that he who does shall be
punished by death and the most extreme penalties.
And this is perfectly right and good as a second
choice, as soon as you depart from the first form of
145
PLATO
ώ Se τρόπω γεγονός εστι τούτο δ δη δεύτερον

εφησαμεν, διαπερανώμεθα. η γαρ;
νε. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
37· HE. Et? δη τάς εικόνας επανίωμεν παλιν,
αΐς άναγκαΐον άπεικάζειν αεί τούς βασιλικούς
άρχοντας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποια?;
ΞΕ. Τον γενναΐον κυβερνήτην και τον ετερων
πολλών αντάξιον ιατρόν, κατίδωμεν γάρ δη τι
σχήμα εν τοντοις αύτοΐς πλασάμενοι.
νε. 2Ω. Ποιον τι;
298 ξε. Τοιδνδε οΓον ει πάντες περί αυτών διανοη-
θειμεν, ότι δεινότατα απ' αυτών πάσχομεν. ον μεν
γάρ αν εθελησωσιν ημών τούτων εκάτεροι σωζειν,
ομοίως δη σωζουσιν, ον δ’ αν λωβάσθαι βουληθώσι,
λωβώνται τεμνοντες καί καίοντες καί προστάττον-
τες άναλώματα φερειν παρ' εαυτούς οΐον φόρους,
ών σμικρά μεν εις τον κάμνοντα καί ούδεν άναλί-
σκουσι,τοις δ’ άλλοις αυτοίτε καί οι οίκεται χρώνται·
Τ καί δη καί τελευτώντες η παρά ξυγγενών η παρά
τινων εχθρών του κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθόν
λαμβάνοντες άποκτιννύασιν. οι τ’ αυ κυβερνηται
μυρίο. ετερα τοιαΰτα εργάζονται, καταλείποντες1 τε
εκ τίνος επίβουλης εν ταΐς άναγωγαΐς έρημους,
καί σφάλματα ποιούντες εν τοΐς πελάγεσιν εκβάλ-
λουσιν εις την θάλατταν, καί ετερα κακουργοΰσιν.
εί δη ταΰτα διανοηθεντες βουλευσαίμεθα περί αυτών
1 καταλείποντες codd. Paris. BCH : κα,ταλιπόντες ΒΤ.
1 Cf. Plomer, Iliad, xii. 514 Ιητρίis yap άνήρ πολλών Αντάξιος
Αλλων. The image of the physician was used above, 293.
The image of the captain (for the Greek κυβερνήτης had an
146
THE STATESMAN
which we were just speaking. Now let us tell in

some detail how this which we called the second
choice comes about. Shall we do so ?
str. Let us return once more to the images
which we always have to use in portraying kingly
rulers.
y. soc. What images ?
str. The noble captain of a ship and the “physician
who is worth as much as many others.1 ” Let us
make a simile of them and use it to help us to
discover something.
y. soc. What is your simile ?
str. Something of this sort: Imagine that we all
thought in regard to captains and physicians : “We
are most abominably treated by them. For whomso¬
ever of us either of them wishes to save, he saves,
one of them just like the other, and whomsoever
he wishes to maltreat, he maltreats. They cut us
up and burn us and order us to bring them payments
of money, as if they were exacting tribute, of which
they spend little or nothing for their patients; they
themselves and their servants use the rest. And
finally they are bribed by the patient’s relatives or
enemies and actually bring about his death. And
as for the captains, they commit countless other
misdeeds; they make plots and leave us deserted
ashore when they put out to sea, they bring on
mishaps at sea and so cast us into the water, and are
guilty of other wrong-doings.”
Now suppose, with these thoughts in mind, we
importance commensurate with that of the captain, rather

than of the pilot, in modern times) has just been used. See
also Republic, vi. 488 a ; Laics xii. 963 b.
147
PLATO
C βουλήν τινα, τούτων των τεχνών μηκέτι επίτρεπαν

άρχειν αύτοκράτορι μηδετέρα μητ’ ουν δουλών μητ’
ελεύθερων, ζυλλέζαι δε εκκλησίαν ημών αυτών,
η ζύμπαντα τον δήμον η τούς πλουσίους μόνον,
εζεΐναι δε καί ιδιωτών και τών άλλων δημιουργών
περί τε πλοΰ και περί νόσων γνώμην ζυμβαλέσθαι,
καθ’ δ τι χρη τοΐς φαρμάκοις ημάς και τοΐς ιατρικούς
όργάνοις προς τούς κάμνοντας χρησθαι, και δη και
D τοΐς πλοίοις τε αύτοΐς και τοΐς ναυτικούς όργάνοις
εις την τών πλοίων χρείαν και περί τούς κινδύνους
τούς τε προς αυτόν τον πλοΰν άνεμων και θαλάττης
περί και προς τάς τοΐς λησταΐς εντεύζεις, και εάν
ναυμαχεΐν άρα δέη που μακροΐς πλοίοις προς ετερα
τοιαΰτα· τα δε τώ πληθει δόξαντα περί τούτων,
είτε τινών ιατρών καί κυβερνητών είτ’ άλλων
ιδιωτών ξυμβουλευόντων, γράφαντας εν κύρβεσί
Ε τισι και στηλαις, τα δε καί άγραφα πάτρια θεμε-
νους εθη, κατά ταΰτ’ ηδη πάντα τον επειτα χρόνον
ναυτίλλεσθαι καί τάς τών καμνόντων θεραπείας
ποιεΐσθαι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κ.ομιδη γε εϊρηκας άτοπα.
HE. Κατ’ ενιαυτόν δε γε άρχοντας καθίστασθαι
του πλήθους, είτε εκ τών πλουσίων είτε εκ τοΰ
δήμου παντός, δς αν κληρούμενος λαγχάνη· τούς
δε καταστάντας άρχοντας άρχειν κατά τα γράμματα
κυβερνώντας τάς ναΰς καί τούς κάμνοντας ίωμένους.
νε. 5Ω. Ταΰτ’ έτι χαλεπώτερα.
38. ΞΕ. Θεώ δη καί τό μετά ταΰτα επόμενον,
επειδάν γάρ δη τών αρχόντων εκάστοις δ ενιαυ-
148
THE STATESMAN
deliberated about them and decided that we would

no longer allow either of these arts to rule without
control over slaves or free men, but that we would
call an assembly either of all the people or of the
rich only, and that anyone, whether he were engaged
in some other form of skilled labour or were without
any special qualifications, should be free to offer an
opinion about navigation and diseases, how drugs
and surgical or medical instruments should be applied
to the patients, and how ships and nautical instru¬
ments should be used for navigation and in meeting
dangers, not only those of winds and sea that affect
the voyage itself, but also those met in encounters
with pirates, and if battles have to be fought between
ships of war; and that whatever the majority
decided about these matters, whether any physicians
or ship captains or merely unskilled persons took
part in the deliberations, should be inscribed upon
tablets and slabs or in some instances should be
adopted as unwritten ancestral customs, and that
henceforth forever navigation and the care of the
sick should be conducted in accordance with these
provisions.
y. soc. That is a most absurd state of things that
you have described.
str. And suppose that rulers of the people are set
up annually, whether from the rich or from the whole
people, on the principle that whoever is chosen by
lot should rule, and that these rulers exercise their
authority in commanding the ships or treating the
sick in accordance with the written rules.
Y. soc. That is still harder to imagine.
str. Now consider what comes next. When the
year of office has passed for each set of rulers, there
r 2 149 ·
PLATO
τός εξελθη, δεήσει δικαστήρια καθίσαντας1 άνδρών,

99 ή των πλουσίων εκ προκρίσεως ή ξύμπαντος αΰ
του δήμου τούς λαχόντας, εις τούτους είσάγειν τούς
άρξαντας καί εύθύνειν, κατηγορεϊν δε τον βουλό-
μενον ώς ου κατά τά γράμματα τον ενιαυτόν εκυ-
βερνησε τάς ναΰς ουδέ κατά τά παλαιά των προ¬
γόνων εθη· τά αυτά δε ταΰτα καί περί των τούς
κάμνοντας ίωμενων ών δ’ άν καταφηφισθή τιμάν
ο τι χρή παθεΐν αυτών τινας ή άποτίνειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκοΰν ο γ’ εθελων καί εκών εν τοΐς
Β τοιούτοις άρχειν δίκαιότατ’ άν ότιοΰν πάσχοι καί
άποτίνοι.
ΞΕ. Και τοίνυν ετι δεήσει θεσθαι νόμον επί πάσι
τούτοις, άν τις κυβερνητικήν καί το ναυτικόν ή τό
υγιεινόν καί ιατρικής αλήθειαν περί πνεύματά τε καί
θερμά καί φυχρά ζητών φαίνηται παρά τά γράμματα
καί σοφιζόμενος ότιοΰν περί τά τοιαΰτα, πρώτον
μεν μήτε ιατρικόν αυτόν μήτε κυβερνητικόν όνομά-
ζειν άλλα μετεωρολόγον, άδολεσχην τινά σοφιστήν,
εΐθ’ ώς διαφθείροντα άλλους νεωτόρους καί άνα-
C πείθοντα επιτίθεοθαι κυβερνητική καί ιατρική μή
κατά νόμους, άλλ’ αύτοκράτορας άρχειν των πλοίων
καί των νοσοάντων, γραφάμενον είσάγειν τον βου-
λόμενον οΐς εξεστιν εις δή τι δικαστήριον άν δε
παρά τούς νόμους καί τά γεγραμμενα δόβη πείθειν
είτε νέους είτε πρεσβύτας, κολάζειν τοΐς έσχάτοις.
1 καθίσαντας D : καθήσαντας Β : καθίστάντας Τ.
1 This passage obviously refers to the trial of Socrates.
The word μετέωρα was used by those who made all sorts of
general accusations against Socrates (see Apology, 18 b,
19 b, with its reference to the Clouds of Aristophanes), and
the reference of the words διαφθείροντα Άλλους νεωτέρους to
the accusation brought against him by Miletus, Anytus,
150
THE STATESMAN
will have to be sessions of courts in which the judges

are chosen by lot either from a selected list of the
rich or from the whole people, and the rulers will
have to be brought before these courts and examined
as to their conduct in office, and anyone who pleases
can bring against the captains an accusation for
failure to command the ships during the year in
accordance with the written laws or the ancestral
customs, and similarly against the physicians for
their treatment of the sick ; and if any of them is
found guilty, the court shall decide what his punish¬
ment or his fine shall be.
y. soc. Surely anyone who consents voluntarily
to hold office under such conditions would richly
deserve any penalty or fine that might be imposed.
str. And then, in addition to all this, there will
have to be a law that if anyone is found to be
investigating the art of pilotage or navigation or the
subject of health and true medical doctrine about
winds and things hot and cold, contrary to the
written rules, or to be indulging in any specula¬
tion whatsoever on such matters, he shall in the
first place not be called a physician or a ship captain,
but a star-gazer,1 a kind of loquacious sophist,
and secondly anyone who is properly qualified may
bring an accusation against him and hale him into
court for corrupting the young and persuading them
to essay the arts of navigation and medicine in
opposition to the laws and to govern the ships and
the sick according to their own will; and if he is
found to be so pex-suading either young or old
contrary to the laws and written rules, he shall suffer
and Lycon (Apology 24 c φησϊ yap δτ] τούs veows άδικΐύν μβ
διαφθείροντα) is perfectly plain.
151
PLATO
οίιδεν γάρ δεΐν των νόμων είναι σοφώτερον οι'δόνα

γάρ άγνοεΐν τό τε ιατρικόν και τό υγιεινόν ουδέ
τό κυβερνητικόν και ναυτικόν εζείναι γαρ τώ
D βουλομενω μανθάνειν γεγραμμενα και πάτρια εθη
κείμενα, ταΰτα δη περί τε ταυτας τάς επιστημας
εί γίγνοιτο ούτως ώς λεγομεν, ώ Έώκρατες, και
στρατηγικής και ξυμπάσης ηστινοσοΰν θηρευτικής
και γραφικής η ξυμ.πάσης μέρος ότιοΰν μιμητικής
και τεκτονικής και ζυνόλης όποιασοΰν σκευουργίας
η και γεωργίας και της περί τα φυτά ξυνόλης τέχνης,
η και τινα ίπποφορβίαν αΰ κατά συγγράμματα
θεασαίμεθα γιγνομενην η ζυμπασαν αγελαίοκομικην
η μαντικήν η παν δ τι μέρος διακονική περιείληφεν,
Ε η πεττείαν η ξιιμπασαν αριθμητικήν φίλην είτε
επίπεδον είτε εν βάθεσιν είτε εν τάχεσιν1 οΰσάν
που,—περί άπαντα ταΰτα ουτω πραττόμενα τί
ποτ’ φανείη, κατά συγγράμματα γιγνόμενα και
μη κατά τέχνην;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Αηλον δτι πάσαί τε2 αίτεχναι παντελώς
αν αττολοίνο ήμιν, και ovoe €ίς αυσις γβνοιντ αν
ποτέ διά τον άποκωλυοντα τούτον ζητεΐν νόμον
ώστε ό βίος, ών καί νυν χαλεπός, εις τον χρόνον
300 εκείνον αβίωτος γίγνοιτ’ αν το παράπαν.
39· ΞΕ. Τι δε τόδε; εί κατά συγγράμματα
μεν άναγκάζοιμεν έκαστον γίγνεσθαι των είρημενων
καί τοΐς συγγράμμασιν ημών επι στατεΐν τον
χειροτονηθεντα η λαχόντα εκ τύχης, οΰτος δε μηδέν
φροντίζων τών γραμμάτων η κέρδους ενεκά3 τίνος
η χάριτος ιδίας παρά ταΰτα επιχειροΐ δράν ετερα,
μηδέν γιγνώσκων, άρα ου τοΰ κακοΰ τοΰ πρόσθεν
μεΐζον αν ετι τούτο γίγνοιτο κακόν;
1 τάχεσιν] τάχεσιν al. 2 τε om. Β. 3 £νεκεν ΒΤ.
152
THE STATESMAN
the most extreme penalties. Nothing, they say,

ought to be wiser than the laws; for no one
is ignorant of medicine and the laws of health or
of the pilot’s art and navigation, since anyone who
pleases can learn the existing written rules and
ancestral customs. Now if these regulations which
I speak of were to be applied to these sciences,
Socrates, and to strategy and every part of the entire
art of hunting and to painting or every kind of
imitation and to carpentry including every kind of
utensil-making, or even to husbandry and all the
art that is concerned with plants, or if we were to
see an art of horse-breeding conducted by written
rules, or herdsmanship in general or prophecy or
everything that is included in the art of serving, or
draught-playing or the whole science of number,
whether arithmetic or plane geometry or solid
geometry or problems of motion—what would you
think of carrying on all these in such a way, by
written rules and not by knowledge ?
y. soc. Clearly all the arts would be utterly
ruined, nor could they ever rise again, through the
operation of the law prohibiting investigation; and
so life, which is hard enough now, would then
become absolutely unendurable.
str. Here is a further point. If we ordained that
each of the aforesaid arts must be carried on by
written rules and that the observance of our written
rules be under the charge of the man who is elected
or chosen by lot, but he should disregard the written
rules and for the sake of some gain or to do a favour
to some one should try to act contrary to them,
without possessing any knowledge, would not this
be a greater evil than the former ?
153
PLATO
ME. 2Ω. ’Αληθέστατα γε.

B HE. Παρά yap οΐμαι τούς νόμους τους εκ πείρας
πολλής κείμενους καί τινων ζυμβουλων εκαστα
χαριεντως ζυμβουλ.ευσάντων καί πεισάντων θεσθαι
το πλήθος, ό παρά ταΰτα τολμών δράν, αμαρτήμα¬
τος αμάρτημα πολλαπλάσιον άπεργαζόμένος, άνα-
τρεποι πάσαν άν πράζιν ετι μειζόνως των Συγγραμ¬
μάτων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ου μέλλει;
ΕΕ. Διά ταΰτα δη τοΐς περί ότουοΰν νόμ,ους και
0 Συγγράμματα τιθεμενοις δεύτερος πλους το παρά
ταΰτα μήτε ένα μήτε πλήθος μηδέν μηδέποτε εάν
δράν μηδ’ ότιοΰν.
ΞΕ. Ούκοΰν μιμηματα μεν άν έκαστων ταΰτα εΐη
της αλήθειας, τά παρά των είδότων εις δυναμιν είναι
γεγραμμένα ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώς- δ’ ου;
ΕΕ. Και μην τόν γε είδότα έφο.μεν, τον όντως
πολιτικόν, εί μεμνημεθα, ποιησειν τη τέχνη πολλά
εις την αύτοΰ πράΣιν των γραμμάτων ούδεν φροντί-
ζοντα, όπόταν άλλ’ αύτω βελτίω δόΣη παρά τά
D γεγραμμενα ύφ’ αύτοΰ καί επεσταλμενα άποΰσί
τισιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Έιφαμεν γάρ.
ΕΕ. Ούκοΰν άνηρ όστισοΰν εις η πλήθος ότιοΰν,
οΐς άν νόμοι κείμενοι τυγχάνωσι, παρά ταΰτα ο τι άν
επιχειρησωσι ποιεΐν ώς βελτιον ετερον ον, ταύτόν
δρώσι κατά δυναμιν όπερ 6 αληθινός εκείνος;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
ΞΕ. *Αρ’ ούν ει μεν άνεπιστημονες δντες το τοιοΰ-
1 See 295 ε.
154
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. Most assuredly.
str. Since the laws are made after long experience
and after commissioners of some kind have carefully
considered each detail with delicate skill and have
persuaded the people to pass them, anyone, I fancy,
who ventured to violate them would be involved in
error many times greater than the first, and would
cause even greater ruin than the written laws to
all kinds of transactions.
y. soc. Of course he would.
str. Therefore the next best course for those who
make laws or written rules about anything whatsoever
is to prohibit any violation of them whatsoever,
either by one person or by a greater number.
y. soc. Right.
str. These laws, then, written by men who know
in so far as knowledge is possible, are imitations in
each instance of some part of truth ?
Y. soc. Of course.
str. And yet we said, if we remember, that the
man of knowledge, the real statesman, would by his
art make many changes in his practice without
regard to his writings, when he thought another
course was better though it violated the rules he
had written and sent to his absent subjects.1
y. soc. Yes, we did say that.
str. But is it not true that any man or any
number of men whatsoever who have written laws,
if they undertake to make any change in those laws,
thinking it is an improvement, are doing, to the best
of their ability, the same thing which our true
statesman does ?
y. soc. Certainly.
str. If, then, they were to do this without science,
155
PLATO
τον δρώεν, μιμεΐσθαι μεν αν έπιχειροΐεν το αληθές,

Ε μιμοίντ’ άν μέντοι παν κακώς1· εί δ’ έντεχνοι,
τοΰτο ούκ έστιν έτι μίμημα, άλλ' αύτό το άληθέ-
στατον εκείνο;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Παντού? που.
ΕΕ. Και μην έμπροσθεν γε ώ μολογη μόνον ημΐν
κεΐται μηδέν πλήθος μη8’ ηντινοΰν δυνατόν είναι
λαβεΐν τέχνην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κεΐται γαρ ουν.
ΕΕ. Ούκοΰν εί μέν έστι βασιλική τις τέχνη, τό
των πλουσίων πλήθος και 6 ζύμπας δήμος ούκ αν
ποτέ λάβοι την πολιτικήν ταύτην επιστήμην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γαρ αν;
ΕΕ. Δει δη τά? τοιαύτας γε, ώς έοικε, πολιτείας,
εί μέλλουσι καλώς την άληθινην εκείνην την του
301 ενός μετά τέχνης αρχοντος πολιτείαν εις δνναμιν
μιμησεσθαι, μηδέποτε κειμένων αύτοΐς των νόμων
μηδέν ποιεΐν παρά, τά γεγραμμένα καί πάτρια έθη.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κάλλιστ’ είρηκας.
ΕΕ. "Οταν άρα οι πλούσιοι ταύτην μιμώνται, τότε
αριστοκρατίαν καλού μεν την τοιαύτην πολιτείαν
όπόταν δε των νόμων μη φροντίζωσιν, ολιγαρχίαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κινδυνεύει.
ΕΕ. Και μην όπόταν αύθις εις άρχη κατά νόμους,
Β μιμούμενος τον επιστήμονα, βασιλέα καλουμεν, ού
διορίζοντες όνόματι τον μετ' επιστήμης η δόξης
κατά, νόμους μοναρχοΰντα.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κινδυνεύομεν.
ΕΕ. Ο ύκοΰν καν τις άρα επιστήμων οντω? ών
εί? άρχη, πάντως τό γε άνομα ταύτόν βασιλεύς καί
ούδέν έτερον προσρηθησεται· δι ά2 δη τά πέντε
1 παν κα/ιώϊ] πανκακώς Β : παν ■ κακώς Τ: πανκάκως Burnet.
156
THE STATESMAN
they would be trying to imitate reality, they would,

however, imitate badly in every case; but if they
were scientific, then it would no longer be imitation,
but the actual perfect reality of which we spoke ?
y. soc. Yes, assuredly.
str. And yet we agreed definitely a while ago
that no multitude is able to acquire any art
whatsoever.
y. soc. Yes, that is definitely agreed.
str. Then if there is a kingly1 art, neither the
collective body of the wealthy nor the whole people
could ever acquire this science of statesmanship.
Y. soc. No ; certainly not.
str. Such states, then, it seems, if they are to
imitate well, so far as possible, that true form of
government—by a single ruler who rules with science
-—must never do anything in contravention of their
existing written laws and ancestral customs.
y. soc. You are quite right.
str. Then whenever the rich imitate this govern¬
ment, we call such a state an aristocracy; and when
they disregard the laws, we call it an oligarchy.
y. soc. Yes, I think we do.
str. And again, when one man rules according to
laws and imitates the scientific ruler, we call him a
king, making no distinction in name between the
single ruler who rules by science and him who rules
by opinion if they both rule in accordance with laws.
y. soc. Yes, I think we do.
str. Accordingly, if one man who is really scientific
rules, he will assuredly be called by the same name,
king, and by no other; and so the five names of what
1 See 292 e.
2 δι’ ά] διά BT.
157
PLATO
ονόματα των νυν λεγομενων πολιτειών εν μόνον

γεγονεν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έοικε γουν.
ΞΕ. Τι δ’, όταν μήτε κατά νόμους μήτε κατά εθη
πράττη τις εις αρχών, προσποιήται δέ ώσπερ ο επι-
C στήμων ώς άρα παρά τά γεγραμμενα τό γε βελτι-
στον ποιητεον, ή δε τις επιθυμία και άγνοια τουτου
του μιμήματος ηγούμενη, μών ου τότε τον τοιοΰτον
έκαστον τύραννον κλητεον;
νε. 5Ω. Τι μήν;
40. ΞΕ. Ουτω δή τύραννός τε γεγονε, φαμεν,
και βασιλεύς και ολιγαρχία και αριστοκρατία και
δημοκρατία, δυσχερανάντων των ανθρώπων τον
ενα εκείνον μόναρχον, και άπιστησάντων μηδέν a
τής τοιαυτης αρχής άζιον αν γενεσθαι ποτέ, ώστε
D εθελειν και δυνατόν είναι μετά αρετής και επιστήμης
άρχοντα τά δίκαια καί όσια διανεμειν όρθώς πάσι,
λωβάσθαι δε καί άποκτιννυναι καί κακοΰν δν άν
βουληθή έκαστο τε ημών επεί γενόμενόν y’ αν οΐον
λίγο μεν άγαπάσθαί τε άν καί οικειν διακυβερνώντα
εύδαιμόνως ορθήν ακριβώς μόνον πολιτείαν
νε. 2Π. Πώ? δ’ ού;
ΞΕ. Nw δε γε οπότε ούκ εστι γιγνόμενος, ώς
δή φαμεν, εν ταΐς πόλεσι βασιλεύς οΐος εν σμήνεσιν
Ε εμφόεται, τό τε σώμα ευθύς καί την φυχήν
διαφόρων εις, δει δή συνελθόντας ζυγγράμματα
γράφειν, ώς εοικε, μεταθεοντας τά τής αληθέστατης
πολιτείας ίχνη.
1 What are called five distinct forms of government are
resolved into one—the one right form of which all others are
imitations (291 c). This is to be sought in some small
number or one person (ibid.). We have found it in the
really scientific monarchy, and the other so-called forms of
158
THE STATESMAN
are now called the forms of government have become

only one.1
y. soc. So it seems, at least.
str. But when a single ruler acts in accordance
with neither laws nor customs, but claims, in
imitation of the scientific ruler, that whatever is best
must be done, even though it be contrary to the
written laws, and this imitation is inspired by desire
and ignorance, is not such a ruler to be called in
every instance a tyrant ?
Y. soc. Certainly.
str. Thus, we say, the tyrant has arisen, and the
king and oligarchy and aristocracy and democracy,
because men are not contented with that one perfect
ruler, and do not believe that there could ever be
any one worthy of such power or willing and able by
ruling with virtue and knowledge to dispense justice
and equity rightly to all, but that he will harm and
kill and injure any one of us whom he chooses on any
occasion, since they admit that if such a man as we
describe should really arise, he would be welcomed
and would continue to dwell among them, directing
to their weal as sole ruler a perfectly right form of
government.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. But, as the case now stands, since, as we
claim, no king is produced in our states who is,
like the ruler of the bees in their hives, by birth
pre-eminently fitted from the beginning in body and
mind, we are obliged, as it seems, to follow in the
track of the perfect and true form of government by
coming together and making written laws.
government, being merely imitations of this, require no

names of their own.
159
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Κινδυνεύει.

ΞΕ. Θαυμάζομεν δητα, ω Σ,ώκρατες, εν ταΐς τοι-
αΰταις ττολιτείαις δσα ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι κακα και
δσα ξυμβησεται, τοιαύτης της κρηπΐδος υποκείμε¬
νης αύταΐς, της κατά γράμματα και εθη μη μετά
επιστήμης πραττουσης τάς πράξεις, η1 ετερα
302 προσχρωμενη παντί κατάδηλος ώς πάντ’ αν δι.-
ολεσειε τα ταυτη γιγνόμενα; η εκείνο ημΐν θαυμα-
στέον μάλλον, ώς ισχυρόν τι πόλις εστι φύσει;
πάσχουσαι γάρ δη τοιαΰτα αί πόλεις νυν χρόνον
άπεραντον, όμως ενιαί τινες αυτών μόνιμοί τε είσι
καί ούκ άνατρεπονται· πολλαι μην ενίοτε και καθ-
άπερ πλοία καταδυόμενοι διόλλυνται και διολώλασι
καί ετι διολουνται διά την των κυβερνητών καί
ναυτών μοχθηρίαν τών περί τα μέγιστα μεγίστην
Β άγνοιαν είληφότων, οι περί τά πολιτικά κατ’
ούδεν γιγνώσκοντες ηγούνται κατά πάντα σαφέ¬
στατα πασών επιστημών ταυτην είληφεναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ’Αληθέστατα.
41. ΞΕ. Tt? οΰν δη τών ούκ ορθών πολιτειών
τούτων ήκιστα χαλεπή συζην, πασών χαλεπών
ούσών, καί τις βαρυτάτη, δει τι κατιδεϊν ημάς,
κοαπερ πρός γε το νΰν προτεθεν ημΐν πάρεργον
λεγόμενόν; ου μην άλλ’ εις γε το δλον ίσως άπανθ’
ενεκα τοΰ τοιούτου πάντες δρώμεν χάριν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δει4 πώς δ’ ού;
C ΞΕ. Ύην αυτήν τοίνυν φάθι τριών ούσών χαλε¬
πήν διαφερόντως γίγνεσθαι καί ράστην.2
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώς- φης;
ΞΕ. Ούκ άλλως, πλην μοναρχίαν φημί καί ολίγων
1 y add. Stephanus e Ficino.

s δίαφερόντως &μα καί ράστην -γίγνεσθαι Τ.
ΐ6θ
THE STATESMAN
y. soc. Yes, I suppose we are.

str. Can we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the
evils that arise and are destined to arise in such
kinds of government, when they are based upon
such a foundation, and must conduct their affairs in
accordance with written laws and with customs,
without knowledge ? For every one can see that any
other art built upon such a foundation would ruin all
its works that are so produced. Ought we not rather
to wonder at the stability that inheres in the state ?
For states have laboured under such conditions for
countless ages, nevertheless some of them are
lasting and are not overthrown. Many, to be sure,
like ships that founder at sea, are destroyed, have
been destroyed, and will be destroyed hereafter,
through the worthlessness of their captains and
crews who have the greatest ignorance of the greatest
things, men who have no knowledge of statesman¬
ship, but think they have in every respect most
perfect knowledge of this above all other sciences.
y. soc. Very true.
str. Is it, then, our duty to see which of these
not right forms of government is the least difficult to
live with, though all are difficult, and which is the
most oppressive, although this is somewhat aside from
the subject we had proposed for ourselves? On the
whole, however, perhaps all of us have some such
motive in mind in all that we are doing.
y. soc. Yes, it is our duty, of course.
str. Well then, you may say that of the three
forms, the same is both the hardest and the easiest,
γ. soc. What do you mean ?
str. Just this: I mean that there are three forms
of government, as we said at the beginning of the
l6l
PLATO
αργήν και πολλών, είναι τρεΐς ταυτας ημΐν λεγομε-

' Λ ' „ „ 5 / Λ / >5/
να? του νυν επικεχυ μενού Λογου κατ αρχας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΜΙσαν yap ουν.
ΞΕ. Ταυτα? τοινυν διχα τεμνοντες μίαν εκάστην
εξ ποιώμεν, την ορθήν χωρίς άποκρίναντες τούτων
εβδόμην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώς;
D ΞΕ. Έκ μεν της μοναρχίας βασιλικήν και τυραν¬
νικήν, εκ δ’ αυ των μη πολλών την τε εύώνυμον
εφαμεν είναι αριστοκρατίαν και ολιγαρχίαν εκ δ’
αυ των πολλών τότε μεν απλήν επονομάζοντες
ετίθεμεν δημοκρατίαν, νυν δε αυ και ταυτήν ημΐν
θετεον εστι διπλήν.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ? δή; και τινι διαιροΰντες ταυτην;
ΞΕ. Ουδέν διαφεροντι των άλλων, ουδ’ εϊ του-
νομα ηδη διπλοΰν εστι ταυτής- αλλά τό }/ε κατά
Ε νόμους άρχειν και παρανόμως εστι και ταυτη και
ταΐς άλλαις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έστι γάρ ουν.
ΞΕ. Τότε μεν τοινυν την ορθήν ζητοΰσι τοΰτο το
τμήμα ουκ ην χρήσιμον, ώς εν τοΐς πρόσθεν άπεδεί-
ξαμζν €7Τ66θτ) 06 €ζ€ίλομ€.v βκ€ίνην, τας ο αλλας
εθεμεν αναγκαίας, εν ταυταις δη το παράνομον και
εννομον εκάστην διχοτομεί τούτων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έοικε τουτου νυν ρηθεντος τοΰ λόγου.
ΞΕ. Μοναρχία τοινυν ζευχθεΐσα μεν εν γράμμασιν
άγαθοΐς, οΰς νόμους λεγομεν, άρίστη πασών των εξ-
άνομος δε χαλεπή καί βαρύτατη ξυνοικησαι.
1 The name is said to be twofold in meaning, probably

because it was applied in cases in which there was a
regularly constituted popular government and also in cases
of mob rule.
162
THE STATESMAN
discussion which has now flowed in upon us—

monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the
many.
y. soc. Yes, there were those three.
str. Let us, then, by dividing each of these into
two parts, make six, and by distinguishing the right
government from these, a seventh.
y. soc. How shall we make the division ?
str. We said that monarchy comprised royalty
and tyranny, and the rule of the few comprised
aristocracy, which has a name of good omen, and
oligarchy ; but to the rule of the many we gave then
only a single name, democracy; now, however, that
also must be divided.
y. soc. How ? On what principle shall we divide
that ?
str. On the same that we used for the others,
though the name of this form is already twofold in
meaning.1 At any rate, the distinction between
ruling according to law and without law applies alike
to this and the rest.
y. soc. Yes, it does.
str. Before, when we were in search of the right
government, this division was of no use, as we showed
at the time ; but now that we have set that apart
and have decided that the others are the only
available forms of government, the principle of
lawfulness and lawlessness bisects each of them.
Y. soc. So it seems, from what has been said.
str. Monarchy, then, when bound by good written
rules, which we call laws, is the best of all the six;

but without law it is hard and most oppressive to
live with.
163
PLATO
03 ne. 2Ω. Kινδυνεύει.

HE. Ύην δε γε tow μη πολλών, ώσπερ ενός και
πλήθους το ολίγον μ ίσον, ούτως ηγησώμεθα μεσην
επ’ άμφότερα· την δ’ αν τον πλήθους κατα παντα
ασθενή καί μηδέν μήτε αγαθόν μήτε κακόν μεγα
δυναμενην ώς προς τάς άλλας διά τδ τάς άρχας εν
ταύτη διανενεμησθαι κατά σμικρά είς πολλούς,
διό γεγονε πασών μεν νομίμων των πολιτειών
ούσών τούτων χειριστή, παρανόμων δ’ ούσώ>ν
Β ξυμπασών βέλτιστη · καί ακολάστων μεν πασών
ούσών εν δημοκρατία νίκα1 ζην, κοσμίων δ’ ούσών
ήκιστα εν ταυτη βιωτεον, εν τη πρώτη δε πολύ
πρώτον τε καί άριστον, πλην της έβδομης· πασών
γάρ εκείνην γε εκκριτεον, οιον θεόν εξ ανθρώπων,
εκ τών άλλων πολιτειών.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΦαΑεται τοΰθ’ οϋτω γίγνεσθαι τε καί
ξυμβαίνειν, καί ποιητεον ηπερ λεγεις.
HE. Ούκοΰν δη καί τούς κοινωνούς τούτων τών
πολιτειών πασών πλην της επιστημονος άφαιρετεον
C ώς ούκ όντας πολιτικούς αλλά στασιαστικούς,
καί ειδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας όντας καί αύτούς
είναι τοιούτους, μεγίστους δε όντας μιμητάς καί
γόητας μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τών σοφιστών σοφι-
στάς.
1 vi/cj] νικαη Β : νικάν Τ.
1 The concentration of power in the hands of one man

makes monarchy most efficient, but, since no human
monarch is perfect, monarchy must be regulated by laws.
Its efficiency makes it under such conditions the best
government to live under. But without restraint of law
monarchy becomes tyranny—the worst kind of oppression.
Oligarchy occupies a position intermediate between
164
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. I fancy it is.

str. But just as few is intermediate between one
and a multitude, so the government of the few must
be considered intermediate, both in good and in
evil. But the government of the multitude is weak
in all respects and able to do nothing great, either
good or bad, when compared with the other forms
of government, because in this the powers of govern¬
ment are distributed in small shares among many
men ; therefore of all these governments when they
are lawful, this is the worst, and when they are
all lawless it is the best; and if they are all without
restraint, life is most desirable in a democracy, but
if they are orderly, that is the worst to live in; but
life in the first kind of state is by far the first and
best, with the exception of the seventh, for that
must be set apart from all the others, as God is set
apart from men.1
y. soc. That statement appears to be true to the
facts, and we must do as you say.

str. Then those who participate in all those
governments—with the exception of the scientific
one—are to be eliminated as not being statesmen,
but partisans ; and since they preside over the
greatest counterfeits, they are themselves counter¬
feits, and since they are the greatest of imitators
and cheats, they are the greatest of all sophists.
monarchy and democracy—less efficient than the one and

more efficient than the other, because power is distributed
among a small number of persons—and is, therefore, when
lawful less good, and when lawless less bad, than monarchy.
Democracy, in turn, since power is too greatly subdivided,
is inefficient, either for good or evil, and is, therefore, when
lawful less good, and when lawless less bad, than either of
the others.
16’5
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Κινδυνευει τούτο εις τους πολιτικούς

λεγομένους περιεστράφθαι1 το ρήμα ορθότατα.
HE. ΈΧεν τοΰτο μεν άτεχνώς ημΐν ώσπερ όραμα,
καθάπερ ερρηθη νυν δη Κενταυρικόν όράσθαι και
Σατυρικόν τινα θίασον, όν δη χωριστέον απο
D πολίτικης εϊη τέχνης· νυν δ’ οΰτω πάνυ μόγις
έχωρίσθη.
HE. Τοΰτου δέ γ’ έτερον ετι χαλεπώτερον λει-
πεται τω ζνγγενές θ' όμοΰ τ’ είναι μάλλον τω βα¬
σιλίκια γένει και δυσκαταμαθητότερον καί μοι
φαινόμεθα τοΐς τον χρυσόν καθαίρουσι πάθος
όμοιον πεπονθέναι.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ?;
HE. Την που καί λίθους καί πόλλ' άττα έτερα
άποκρίνουσι κάκεΐνοι πρώτον2 οί δημιουργοί·
Ε μετά δέ ταΰτα λείπεται ζυμμεμιγμένα τα ζυγγενη
του χρυσού τίμια καί πυρί μόνον αφαιρετά, χαλκός
καί άργυρος, έστι δ’ δτε καί άδάμας, α3 μετά, βασά¬
νων ταΐς έφησεσι μόγις άφαιρεθέντα τον λεγόμενον
άκηρατον χρυσόν είασεν ημάς ίδεΐν αυτόν μόνον
εφ εαυτόν.
νε. 2Ω. Αεγεται γάρ οΰν δη ταΰτα ούτω γί¬
γνεσθαι.
42. HE. Κατά τον αυτόν τοίνυν λόγον εοικε
καί νϋν ημΐν τά μεν έτερο, καί όπόσα άλλότρια καί
τα μη φίλα πολίτικης επιστήμης άποκεχωρίσθαι,
λείπεσθο.1 δε τά τίμια καί ζυγγενη. τούτων δ’ εστί
304 που στρατηγία καί δικαστική καί όση βασιλική
κοινωνοΰσα ρητορεία πείθουσα το δίκαιον ζυν-
1 περιεστρέφθια ΒΤ.
2 ττρότερον Β. 3 ά add. Stephanus e Ficino.
166
THE STATESMAN
y. soc. This term “ sophist ” seems to have come

round quite rightly to the so-called statesmen.
str. Well, this part has been exactly like a play.
Just as we remarked a moment ago,1 a festive troop
of centaurs or satyrs was coming into view, which
we had to separate from the art of statesmanship;
and now we have succeeded in doing this, though
it has been very difficult.
y. soc. So it seems.
str. But another group remains, which is still
more difficult to separate, because it is more closely
akin to the kingly class and is also harder to recognize.
I think we are in somewhat the same position as
refiners of gold.
y. soc. How so ?
str. Why, the refiners first remove earth and
stones and all that sort of thing; and after that
there remain the precious substances which are
mixed with the gold and akin to it and can be
removed only by fire—copper and silver and some¬
times adamant.2 These are removed by the difficult
processes of smelting and tests, leaving before our
eyes what is called unalloyed gold in all its purity.
y. soc. Yes, that is said, at least, to be the process.
str. By the same method I think all that is
different and alien and incompatible has now been
eliminated by us from the science of statesmanship,
and what is precious and akin to it is left. Herein
are included the arts of the general and of the
judge and that kind of oratory which partakes of the
kingly art because it persuades men to justice and
1 291a.
2 Plato, Timaeus 59 b, defines adamant as χρυσοΰ 3fos, “ a
branch of gold.” It was, then, a substance akin to gold.
Platinum has been suggested.
PLATO
Siακυβερνά τάς εν ταΐς πόλεσι πράξεις· ά δη τίνι

τρόπου ραστά τις άπομερίζων δείξει γυμνόν και
μόνον εκείνον καθ' αυτόν τον ζητούμενον ύφ' ημών;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δ^Αον ότι τοΰτό πη δράν πειρατεον.
HE. ΐΐείρας μεν τοίνυν ενεκα φανερός εσταί' διά
δε μουσικής αυτόν εγχειρητεον δηλώσαι. καί μοι
λεγε.
νε. 2Ω. Το ποιον;
Β ΞΕ. Μουσικής εστι πού τις ημιν μάθησις, και
δλως τών περί χειροτεχνίας επιστημών;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έστιν.
l be τοό αν ; τούτων ηντινουν €ΐτβ oei
μανθάνειν ημάς είτε μη, πάτερα φησομεν επιστήμην
αΰ καί ταύτην είναι τινα περί αυτά ταΰτα,η πώς ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούτως, είναι φησομεν.
ΞΕ. 0ύκοΰν ετεραν όμολογησομεν εκείνων είναι
ταύτην ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Πότβρα δ’ αυτών ούδεμίαν άρχειν δεΐν άλλην
άλλης, η εκείνας ταύτης, η ταύτην δεΐν επιτρο-
πεύουσαν άρχειν ξυμπασών τών άλλων;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ταύτην εκείνων.
ΞΕ. Την2 εί δεΐ μανθάνειν η μη της μανθανομενης
και διδασκούσης άρα σύ γ* άποφαίνει δεΐν ημΐν
άρχειν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Έφόδρα γε.
ΞΕ. Και την ει δεΐ πείθειν άρα η μη της δυνα-
μενης πείθειν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Π cos' δ’ ου;
1 δδ τόδ’ αΰ Ast: δδ τδ δ’ αΰ ΒΤ.

2 την om. ΒΤ (and give el ... μη to young Socrates):
corr. Stallbaum.
168
THE STATESMAN
thereby helps to steer the ship of state. Now in

what way shall we most easily eliminate these and
show him whom we seek alone by himself and
undisguised ?
y. soc. Clearly we must do this somehow.
STn. Then if it is a question of trying, he will be
shown. But I think we had better try to disclose
him by means of music. Please answer my question.
str. Shall we agree that there is such a thing as
learning music and the sciences of handicraft in
general ?
y. soc. There is.
str. And how about this ? Shall we say that
there is another science connected with those, which
tells whether we ought or ought not to learn any
one of them ?
y. soc. Yes, we shall say that there is.
str. And shall we agree that this is different
from those ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And shall we say that none of them ought
to have control of any other, or that those sciences
should control this one, or that this should control
and rule all the others ?
y. soc. This should control those others.
str. You mean that the science which decides
whether we ought to learn or not should control the
science which is learnt or teaches ?
Y. soc. Emphatically.
str. And the science which decides whether to
persuade or not should control that which can
persuade ?
y. soc. Certainly.
169
PLATO
HE. ΈΧζν τίνι τό 7τειστικόν οΰν άποδώσομεν

επιστήμη πλήθους re καί οχλου διά μυθολογίας
D άλλα μή διά διδαχής;
ΝΕ. 2X1. Φανερόν, οιμαι, και τοΰτο ρητορική
ς> / >/
οοτβον OV.
ΞΕ. Το δ’ εΐτε διά ττειθοΰς εΐτε και διά τίνος
βίας δει ττράττειν ττρός τινας ότιοΰν ή και τό τταρά-
τταν ησυχίαν1 εχειν, τοΰτ’ αΰ ποια ττροσθήσομεν επι-
στήμη;
ΝΕ. 2X1. Ύή τής πειστικής άρχούση και λεκτικής.
HE. xUtj be αν ουκ aAArj πς, ως οιμαι, ττΑην η
του πολίτικου δυναμις.
ΝΕ. 2X1. Κάλλιστ’ εΐρηκας.
ΞΕ. Και τούτο μεν εοικε ταχύ κεχωρίσθαι πολι-
Ε τικής τό ρητορικόν, ώς ετερον είδος ον, υπηρετούν
μην ταύτη.
ΝΕ. 2X1. Ναί.
43· ΞΕ. Τι δβ περί τής τοιάσδ’ αΰ δυνάμεως
διανοητεον;
νε. 2X1. Ποία?;
ΞΕ. Τής ώς πολεμητεον εκάστοις οις αν προελώ-
μεθα πολεμεΐν, ε'ίτε αυτήν άτεχνον εΐτε έντεχνον
εροΰμεν;
ΝΕ. 2X1. Και πώς άν άτεχνον διανοηθεΐμεν, ήν
γε ή στρατηγική και πάσα ή πολεμική πράβις
πράττει;
ΞΕ. Τήν δ’ εΐτε πολεμητεον εΐτε διά φιλίας άπαλ-
λακτεον οΐαν τε και επιστήμονα διαβουλεύσασθαι,
ταυτής ετεραν ύπολάβωμεν ή τήν αυτήν ταύτη;
ΝΕ. 2X1. Ιοί? πρόσθεν άναγκαΐον επομενοισιν
ετεραν.
1 ησυχίαν add. Hermann.
170
THE STATESMAN
str. Well, then, to what science shall we assign

the power of persuading a multitude or a mob by
telling edifying stories, not by teaching ?
y. soc. It is, I think, clear that this must be
added to rhetoric.
str. But the power of deciding whether some
action, no matter what, should be taken, either by
persuasion or by some exercise of force, in relation
to any person, or whether to take no action at all—
to what science is that to be assigned?
y. soc. To the science which controls the sciences
of persuasion and speech.
str. And that would, I think, be no other than
the function of the statesman.
y. soc. A most excellent conclusion.
str. So rhetoric also seems to have been quickly
separated from statesmanship 1 as a different species,
subservient to the other.
y. soc. Yes.
str. Here is another function or power; what
are we to think about it ?

str. The power of determining how war shall be
waged against those upon whom we have declared war,
whether we are to call this a science or not a science ?
y. soc. How could we think it is not a science,
when generalship and all military activity practise it ?
str. And the power which is able and knows
how to deliberate and decide whether to make war
or peace, shall we assume that it is the same as this
or different ?
y. soc. If we are consistent, we must assume that
it is different.
1 Cf. 303 c.
171
PLATO
305 HE. Οΰκοΰν άρχουσαν ταυτης αυτήν άποφανού-

μεθα, εΐπερ τοΐς έμπροσθεν γε ύποληφόμεθα ομοίως;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Φημί.
HE. Tty’ οΰν ποτέ καί επ ιχειρησομεν οϋτω δεινής
καί μεγάλης τέχνης ξυμπάσης της πολεμικής δεσπο-
τιν άποφαίνεσθαι πλην γε δη την όντως ονσαν
βασιλικήν ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούδεμίαν άλλην.
ΞΕ. Ούκ άρα πολιτικήν γε θησομεν, υπηρετικήν
οΰσαν, την των στρατηγών επιστήμην.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ο ύκ εικός.
Β HE. ’Ίθι δη, καί την τών δικαστών τών ορθώς
δικαζόντων θεασώμεθα δυναμιν.
νε. 2Ω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
ΞΕ. *Αρ’ οΰν επί πλέον τι δΰναται τοΰ περί τά
ζυμβόλαια, πάνθ' οπόσα κεΐται νόμιμα παρά νομο-
θετου βασιλεως παραλαβοΰσα, κρίνειν εις εκείνα
σκοπούσα τά τε δίκαια ταχθεντα είναι καί άδικα,
την αυτής ιδίαν αρετήν παρεχόμενη τοΰ μηθ’ υπό
τινων δώρων μηθ’ υπό φόβων μήτε οίκτων μηθ'
C υπό τίνος άλλης εχθρας μηδε φιλίας ηττηθεΐσα
παρά την τοΰ νομοθετου τάζιν εθελειν άν τά ά/\λήλων
εγκλήματα διαιρεΐν ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Οϋκ, αλλά σχεδόν όσον είρηκας ταυτης
εστί της δυνάμεως εργον.
ΞΕ. Και την τών δικαστών άρα ρώμην άνευρίσκο-
μεν ου βασιλικήν ουσαν άλλα νόμων φύλακα καί
ύπηρετιν εκείνης.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. "Ένοικε γε.
ΞΕ. Ί όδε δη κατανοητεον ίδόντι συναπάσας τάς
επιστημας at είρηνται, ότι πολίτικη γε αυτών
οΰδεμία άνεφάνη. την γάρ όντως ουσαν βασιλικήν
172
THE STATESMAN
str. Shall we, then, assume that it controls the

other, if we are to agree with our views in the
former examples ?
y. soc. Yes.
str. And what other art shall we make bold to
declare is mistress of that great and terrible art, the

art of war as a whole, except the truly kingly art ?
y. soc. No other.
str. We shall, then, not call the art of the
generals statesmanship, since it is subservient.
Y. soc. No ; that would not be reasonable.

str. Now let us examine the function of the
righteous judges.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. Has it any power beyond that of judging
men’s contracts with one another, pronouncing them
right or wrong by the standard of the existing laws
which it has received from the king and law-giver,
showing its own peculiar virtue in that it is not
so perverted by any bribes, or fears, or pity, or
enmity, or friendship, as ever to consent to decide
the lawsuits of men with each other contrary to the
enactments of the law-giver?
y. soc. No; the business of this power is about
as you have described it.
str. Then we find that the strength of judges is
not kingly, but is guardian of laws and a servant of
the kingly power.
Y. soc. So it appears.
str. The consideration of all these arts which
have been mentioned leads to the conclusion that

none of them is the art of the statesman. For the
G 173
PLATO
D ουκ αντήν δει πράττειν, άλλ* αρχειν των δυνα-

μενων πράττειν, γιγνώσκουσαν την αρχήν τε και
ορμήν των μεγίστων εν ταΐς πόλεσιν εγ καίριας τε
περί και άκαιρίας, τάς δ* άλλα? τα προσταχθεντα
δράν.
HE. Διά ταΰτα αρα ας μεν άρτι διεληλυθαμεν
ούτε άλλήλων οϋθ’ αυτών άρχουσαι, περί δε τινα
ιδίαν αυτής οΰσα έκαστη πράξιν κατά την ιδιότητα
των πράξεων τουνομα δικαίως εΐληφεν ίδιον.
Ε ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΕΓ^ασι γοΰν.
ΞΕ. Ύήν δε πασών τε τούτων άρχουσαν και τών
νόμων καί ξυμπάντων τών κατά πόλιν επιμελουμε-
νην καί πάντα ξυνυφαίνουσαν ορθότατα, τοΰ κοινού
τη κλήσει περιλαβόντες την δυναμιν αυτής, προσ-
αγορευοιμεν δικαιότατ* αν, ώς εοικε, πολιτικήν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Παντάπασι μεν οΰν.
44· ΕΕ. Ουκοΰν δη καί κατά το της υφαντι¬
κής παράδειγμα βουλοίμεθ’ άν επεξελθεΐν αυτήν
νυν, ότε καί πάντα τά γένη τά κατά πόλιν δήλα
ήμΐν γεγονεν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και σφόδρα γε.
ΞΕ. Ύην δη βασιλικήν συμπλοκήν, ώς εοικε,
306 λεκτεον, ποία τ’ εστί καί τίνι τρόπω συμπλεκουσα
ποιον ήμΐν ύφασμα άποδίδωσιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δήλον.
ΞΕ. ΤΗ χαλεπόν ενδείξασθαι πράγμα άναγκαΐον
άρα γεγονεν, ώς φαίνεται.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Π όντως γε μήν ρητεον.
ΞΕ. Το γάρ αρετής μέρος αρετής εϊδει διάφορον
1 See 287-290, 303-305.

174
THE STATESMAN
art that is truly kingly ought not to act itself, but

should rule over the arts that have the power of
action ; it should decide upon the right or wrong
time for the initiation of the most important measures
in the state, and the other arts should perform its
behests.
y. soc. Right.
str. Therefore those arts which we have just

described, as they control neither one another nor
themselves, but have each its own peculiar sphere
of action, are quite properly called by special names
corresponding to those special actions.
y. soc. That appears, at least, to be the case.
str. But the art which holds sway over them all
and watches over the laws and all things in the
state, weaving them all most perfectly together, we
may, I think, by giving to its function a designation
which indicates its power over the community, with
full propriety call “statecraft.”
y. soc. Most assuredly.
str. Shall we then proceed to discuss it after the
model supplied by weaving,1 now that all the classes
in the state have been made plain to us ?
str. Then the kingly process of weaving must be
described, its nature, the manner in which it com¬
bines the threads, and the kind of web it produces.
y. soc. Evidently.
str. It has, apparently, become necessary, after
all, to explain a difficult matter.
y. soc. But certainly the explanation must be
made.
str. It is difficult, for the assertion that one part
of virtue is in a way at variance with another sort
175
PLATO
είναι τινα τρόπον τοΐς περί λόγους άμφισβητικοΐς

καί μάλ’ εΰεπίθετον προς τάς των πολλών δόξας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούκ εμαθον.
ΞΕ. Άλλ’ ώδε πάλιν, ανδρείαν γάρ οΐμαι σε
Β ήγεΐσθαι μόρος εν ape της ημΐν είναι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΪΙάνυ γ€.
ΞΕ. Καί μην σωφροσύνην ye ανδρείας μεν ετερον,
εν δ’ οΰν καί τοΰτο μόρων ης κακεΐνο.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τουταιν δη περί θαυμαστόν τινα Aoyov απο-
φαίνεσθαι τολμητεον.
ΞΕ. 'Ω? εστόν κατά δη τινα τρόπον ευ μάλα προς
άλληλας εχθραν καί στάσίν εναντίαν εχοντε1 * εν
πολλοΐς των όντων.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? λεγεις;
ΞΕ. Ουκ ειωθότα λόγον ούδαμώς· πάντα γαρ
C οΰν δη άλληλοις τά γε της αρετής μόρια λεγεται
που φίλια.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Σικοπώμεν δη προσσχόντες τον νουν εΰ μάλα,
πότερον ούτως άπλοΰν εστι τοΰτο, η παντός μάλλον
αυτών εχον διαφοράν τοΐς ξυγγενεσιν ες τι3;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ναί, λεγοις αν πη σκεπτεον.
ΞΕ. Έν τοΐς ξυμπασι χρη ζητεΐν όσα καλά μεν
λόγο μεν, εις δυο δ’ αυτά τίθεμεν εναντία άλληλων
είδη.
1 έχο^τε] 'έχετον ΒΤ : corr. Stallbaum.

2 es τι Campbell: έστι. Τ : έστίν Β : ϋστι tl Heindorf.
1 The word άνδρβία has a much wider meaning than the

English “courage.” Like the Latin virtus it embraces all
176
THE STATESMAN
of virtue may vei-y easily be assailed by those who

appeal to popular opinion in contentious arguments.
y. soc. I do not understaixd.
str. I will say it again in another way. I suppose
37ou believe that coui-age 1 is one part of virtue.
y. soc. Certainly.
str. And, of course, that self-restraint is different
fiOm coui'age, but is also a part of virtue of which
courage is a part.
y. soc. Yes.
str. Now I must venture to utter a strange
docti'ine about them.
str. That, in a way, they are in a condition of
great hostility and opposition to each other in many
beings.
str. Something quite unusual; for, you know, all
the parts of virtue ai’e usually said to be friendly to
one another.
y. soc. Yes.
str. Now shall we pay careful attention and see
whether this is so simple, or, quite the contraiy, there
is in some respects a variance between them and
their kin ?
y. soc. Yes ; please tell how we shall investigate
the question.
str. Among all the parts we must look for those
which we call excellent but place in two opposite
classes.
qualities which are desirable in a perfect man, especially the
more active and positive virtues. When applied to one
particular kind of virtue it is applied to courage, but
throughout this discussion it is used in the wider sense, for
which there is no single English equivalent.
177
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Aey’ ετι σαφεστερον.

HE. ΌξΰτΎ/τα καί τάχος, είτε κατά σώματα είτε
D εν φυχαΐς είτε κατά φωνής φοράν, είτε αυτών
τούτων είτ iv είδώλοις οντων, όπόσα μουσική
μιμούμενη και ετι γραφική μιμηματα -παρέχεται,
τούτων τίνος επαινετής είτε αυτός πώποτε γέγονας
είτε άλλου παρών επαινοΰντος ησθησαι;
HE. ΤΗ και μνημην εχεις όντινα τρόπον αυτό δρώ-
σιν εν εκάστοις τούτων;
ΞΕ. ΤΑρ' οΰν δυνατός αυτό αν γενοίμην, ώσπερ
και διανοούμαι, διά λόγων ενδείξασθαί σοι;
Ε νε. 2Ω. Τι δ’ ου;
ΞΕ. 'Ραδιον εοικας ηγεΐσθαι τό τοιοΰτον σκο¬
πώ μέθα δ’ οΰν αυτό εν τοΐς ύπεναντίοις γενεσι.
των γάρ δη πράξεων εν πολλά?? καί πολλάκις
εκάστοτε τάχος και σφοδρότητα και οξύτητα δια-
νοήσεώς τε και σώματος, ετι δε και φωνής, όταν
αγασθώμεν, λεγομεν αυτό επαινοΰντες μια χρώμενοι
προσρησει τη της ανδρείας.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?;
HE. Ό£λ και άνδρεΐον πρώτον που φαμεν, και
ταχύ και ανδρικόν, καί σφοδρόν ωσαύτως· καί
πάντως επιφεροντες τοΰνομα ο λέγω κοινόν πάσαις
ταΐς φυσεσι ταυταις επαινοϋμεν αύτάς.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Nat.
ΞΕ. Τι δε'; τό της ηρεμαίας αΰ γενεσεως εΐδος άρ'
307 ου πολλάκις επηνεκαμεν εν πολλαΐς των πράξεων;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Και σφόδρα γε.
ΞΕ. Μών οΰν ου τάναντία λεγοντες η περί εκεί¬
νων τούτο φθεγγόμεθα;
178
THE STATESMAN
Y. soc. Say more clearly what you mean.

str. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body
or soul or vocal utterance, whether they are real or
exist in such likenesses as music and graphic art
produce in imitation of them—have you never your¬
self praised one of them or heard them praised by
others ?
str. And do you remember in what way they
praise them as occasion offers ?
y. soc. Not in the least.
str. I wonder if I can express to you in words
what I have in mind.
y. soc. Why not ?
str. You seem to think that is an easy thing to
do. However, let us consider the matter as it appears
in the opposite classes. For example, when we
admire, as we frequently do in many actions, quick¬
ness and energy and acuteness of mind or body or
even of voice, we express our praise of them by one
word, courage.
y. soc. How so ?
str. We say acute and courageous in the first
instance, also quick and courageous, and energetic
and courageous ; and when we apply this word as a
common term applicable to all persons and actions
of this class, we praise them.
y. soc. Yes, we do.
str. But do we not also praise the gentle type of
movement in many actions ?
y. soc. We do, decidedly.
str. And in doing so, do we not say the opposite
of what we said about the other class ?
179
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. Πώς;

ΞΕ. Ώς ησυχαΐά που φαμεν εκάστοτε καί σωφρο-
νικά, περί τε διάνοιαν πραττόμενα άγασθεντες και
κατά τάς πράξεις αν βραδέα και μαλακά, και ετι
περί φωνάς γιγνόμενα λεία και βαρέα, και πάσαν
ρυθμικήν κίνησιν και ολην μούσαν εν καιρώ βραδυ-
Β τητι προσχρωμενην, ου το της ανδρείας άλλα το
της κοσμιότητος άνομα επιφερομεν αύτοΐς ξυμπασιν.
ΞΕ. Και μην όπόταν αΰ γε άμφότερα γίγνηται
ταΰτα ημΐν άκαιρα,1 μεταβάλλοντες εκάτερα αυτών
φεγομεν επί τάναντία πάλιν άπονεμοντες τοΐς
όνόμασιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΞΕ. Όξυτερα μεν αυτά γιγνόμενα του καιροΰ καί
θάττω καί σκληρότερα φαινόμενα2 υβριστικά καί
μάνικά λ άγοντες, τά δε βαρύτερα καί βραδύτερα
C καί μαλακώτερα δειλά καί βλακικά· καί σχεδόν
ώς το πολύ ταΰτά τε καί την σώφρονα φνσιν καί
την ανδρείαν την των εναντίων, οΐον πόλε μίαν3
διαλαχουσας στάσιν ιδέας, οϋτ’ άλλήλαις μιγνυμενας
εφευρίσκομεν εν ταις περί τά τοιαΰτα πράξεσιν, ετι
τε τούς εν ταΐς φυχαΐς αύτάς ϊσχοντας διαφερομε-
νους άλληλοις όφόμεθα εάν μεταδιώκωμεν.
45· νε. 2Ω. Ποΰ δη4 λεγεις;
ΞΕ. Έν πάσί τε δη τοΰτοις οΐς νυν εΐπομεν, ώς
D είκός τε εν ετεροις πολλοΐς. κατά γάρ οΐμαι την
αυτών εκατεροις ξυγγενειαν τά μεν επαινοΰντες ώς
1 Άκαιρα Stephanus e Ficino: ακέραια ΒΤ.

2 και after φαινόμενα add. ΒΤ.
3 πολβμίαν Campbell : πολέμιας ΒΤ.
4 ποΰ δή] σπουδηι Β : σπουδή Τ.
180
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. How is that ?

str. We are always saying “ How quiet! ” and
“ How restrained! ” when we are admiring the
workings of the mind, and again we speak of actions
as slow and gentle, of the voice as smooth and deep,
and of every rhythmic motion and of music in
general as having appropriate slowness; and we
apply to them all the term which signifies, not
courage, but decorum.
y. soc. Very true.
str. And again, on the other hand, when these
two classes seem to us out of place, we change our
attitude and blame them each in turn; then we use
the terms in the opposite sense.
str. Why, whatsoever is sharper than the occasion
warrants, or seems to be too quick or too hard, is
called violent or mad, and whatever is too heavy or
slow or gentle, is called cowardly and sluggish;
and almost always we find that the restraint of one
class of qualities and the courage of the opposite class,
like two parties arrayed in hostility to each other,
do not mix with each other in the actions that are
concerned with such qualities. Moreover, if we
pursue the inquiry, we shall see that the men who
have these qualities in their souls are at variance
with one another.
y. soc. In what do you mean that they are at
variance ?
str. In all those points which we just mentioned,
and probably in many others. For men who are
akin to each class, I imagine, praise some qualities as
g 2 181
PLATO
οικεία σφέτερα,1 τα δε των διαφόρων φέγοντες ώς

άλλότρια, πολλήν εις έχθραν άλληλοις καί πολλών
πέρι καθίστανται,.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κ LvSweVOVaLV.
ΞΕ. Παιδιά2 τοίννν αυτή ye τις η διάφορά τούτων
εστί των ειδών περί δε τα μέγιστα, νόσος Συμβαίνει
πασών εχθίστη γίγνεσθαι ταΐς πόλεσιν.
ΝΕ. 2Π. Περί δη ποια φης;
Ε ΞΕ. Περί δλην, ώ? ye είκός, την του ζην παρα¬
σκευήν. οι μεν γάρ δη διαφερόντως όντες κόσμιοι
τον ησυχον άε'ι βίον έτοιμοι ζην, αυτοί καθ' αυτούς
μόνοι τα σφέτερα αυτών πράττοντες, οίκοι τε αΰ
προς άπαντας ούτως όμιλοΰντες, και προς τάς
εζωθεν πόλεις ωσαύτως ετοιμ,οι πάντα οντες τρόπον
τινά άγειν ειρηνην και διά τον έρωτα δη τούτον
άκαιρότερον οντα η χρη, όταν ά βούλονται3 πράττω-
σιν. ελαθον αυτοί τε άπολεμως ΐσγοντες και τούς
/ < / O'
νεονς ωσαύτως οιατίυβντες, οντες τε αει των
επιτιθεμένων, εζ ών ούκ εν πολλοΐς έτεσιν αυτοί
308 και παΐδες καί ζύμπασα η πόλις άντ’ ελευθέρων
πολλάκις ελαθον αυτούς γενόμενοι δούλοι.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Χαλεπόν είπες καί δεινόν πάθος.
ΞΕ. Τι δ’ οί προς την ανδρείαν μάλλον ρέποντες;
άρ’ ούκ επί πόλεμον αεί τινα τάς αυτών ζυντείνοντες
πόλεις διά την τού τοιούτου βίου σφοδροτέραν τού
δέοντος επιθυμίαν εις έχθραν πολλοΐς καί δυνατοΐς
καταστάντες η πάμπαν διώλεσαν η δούλας αΰ καί
υποχειρίους τοΐς εχθροΐς υπέθεσαν τάς αυτών πατρί¬
δας;
Β ΝΕ. 2Ω. “Εστι καί ταΰτα.
1 σφέτερα] έφ’ 'έτερα ΒΤ. 2 παιδιά] παιδεία ΒΤ.
3 βού\ωνται ΒΤ.
182
THE STATESMAN
their own and find fault with those of their opposites

as alien to themselves, and thus great enmity arises
between them on many grounds.
y. soc. Yes, that is likely to be the case.
str. Now this opposition of these two classes is
mere child’s - play; but when it affects the most
important matters it becomes a most detestable
disease in the state.
y. soc. What matters does it affect ?
str.The whole course of life, in all probability.
For those who are especially decorous are ready to
live always a quiet and retired life and to mind their
own business ; this is the manner of their intercourse
with every one at home, and they are equally ready
at all times to keep peace in some way or other with
foreign states. And because of this desire of theirs,
which is often inopportune and excessive, when they
have their own way they quite unconsciously become
unwarlike, and they make the young men unwarlike
also ; they are at the mercy of aggressors ; and thus
in a few years they and their children and the whole
state often pass by imperceptible degrees from
freedom to slavery.
y. soc. That is a hard and terrible experience.
str. But how about those who incline towards
courage ? Do they not constantly urge their

countries to war, because of their excessive desire for
a warlike life ? Do they not involve them in
hostilities with many powerful opponents and either
utterly destroy their native lands or enslave and
subject them to their foes ?
y. soc. Yes, that is true, too.
183
PLATO
HE. Πώ? οΰν μη φώμεν εν τούτοι? άμφότερα

ταΰτα τα γένη πολλήν προς άλληλα άεί καί την
μεγίστην ΐσχειν εχθραν καί στάσίν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούδαμως ώς ού φήσομεν.
HE. Ούκοΰν όπερ επεσκοποΰμεν κατ' άρχάς άν-
ηυρήκαμεν, ότι μόρια αρετής ού σμικρά άλλήλοις
διαφερεσθον φύσει καί δη καί τους ΐσχοντας δράτον
τδ αυτό τούτο;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Κινδυνεύετον.
ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν αυ λάβωμεν.
νε. 2Ω. Τδ ποιον;
C 4-6· ΞΕ. Ει τις που των συνθετικών επιστη¬
μών πράγμα ότι οΰν τών αυτής έργων, καν εί τδ
φαυλότατον, εκοΰσα εκ μοχθηρών καί χρηστών
τινων ζυνίστησιν, η πάσα επιστήμη πανταχού τα
μεν μοχθηρά εις δυναμιν αποβάλλει, τα δ’ επιτήδεια
καί τα χρηστά ελαβεν, εκ τούτων δε καί όμοιων καί
άνομοίων οντων, πάντα εις εν αυτά ζυνάγουσα,
μίαν τινά δύναμιν καί ιδέαν δημιουργεί.
ΞΕ. Οόδ’ άρα η κατά φύσιν αληθώς οΰσα ημΐν
D πολίτικη μη ποτέ εκ χρηστών καί κακών ανθρώπων
εκοΰσα είναι συστήσηται πόλιν τινά, άλλ’ εύδηλον
ότι παιδιά πρώτον βασανιεΐ, μετά δε την βάσανον
αύ τοίς δυναμενοις παιδεύειν καί ύπηρετειν προς
τοΰτο αυτό παραδώσει, προστάττουσα καί επιστα¬
τούσα αυτή, καθάπερ υφαντική τοΐς τε ζαίνουσι
καί τοΐς τάλλα προπαρασκευάζουσιν όσα προς την
πλεξιν αυτής ξυμπαρακολουθοΰσα προστάττει καί
Ε επιστατεί, τοιαΰτα έκαστοι? ενδεικνΰσα τα. έργα
άποτελεΐν, οία αν επιτήδεια ήγήται προς την αυτής
είναι ξυμπλοκήν.
184
THE STATESMAN
str. Then in these examples how can we deny

that these two classes are always filled with the
greatest hostility and opposition to one another ?
y. soc. We certainly cannot deny it.
str. Have we not, then, found just what we had
in view in the beginning, that important parts of
virtue are by nature at variance with one another
and also that the persons who possess them exhibit
the same opposition ?
y. soc. Yes, I suppose that is true.
str. Let us then take up another question.
y. soc. What question ?
str. Whether any constructive science voluntarily
composes any, even the most worthless, of its works
out of good and bad materials, or every science
invariably rejects the bad, so far as possible, taking
only the materials which are good and fitting, out of
which, whether they be like or unlike, it gathers all
elements together and produces one form or value.
y. soc. The latter, of course.
str. Then neither will the true natural art of
statecraft ever voluntarily compose a state of good
and bad men ; but obviously it will first test them
in play, and after the test will entrust them in turn
to those who are able to teach and help them to
attain the end in view; it will itself give orders
and exercise supervision, just as the art of weaving
constantly commands and supervises the carders and
others who prepare the materials for its web, direct¬
ing each person to do the tasks which it thinks are
requisite for its fabric.
185
PLATO
NE. 2Ω. ΥΙάνυ μεν οΰν.

HE. Ταυτόν δη μοι τοΰθ’ η βασιλική φαίνεται
πάσι τοϊς κατά νόμον παιδευταΐς και τροφεΰσι, την
της επιστατικής αυτή δύναμιν εχουσα, ούκ επιτρε-
φειν ασκειν 6 τι μη τις προς την αυτής ξυγκρασιν
άπεργαζόμενος ήθος τι πρεπον αποτελεί, ταΰτα δε
μόνα παρακελεύεσθαι παιδευειν και τούς μεν μη
δυναμενονς κοινωνεΐν ήθους ανδρείου κα'ι σώφρονος
όσα τε άλλα εστί τείνοντα προς αρετήν, άλλ’ εις
309 άθεότητα και ύβριν και αδικίαν υπό κακής βία
φυσεως άπωθουμενους,1 θανάτοις τε εκβάλλει και
φυγαΐς και ταΐς μεγίσταις κολάζουσα άτιμίαις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Α,εγεται γοΰν πως ούτως.
ΞΕ. 1 ονς ο ev αμαυι,α τ αν καί ταπβίνοτητι
πολλή κυλινδουμενους εις τό δουλικόν ύποζεύγνυσι
γένος.
ΞΕ. Τού? λοιπούς τοίνυν, όσων αί φύσεις επι τό
γενναΐον ίκαναί παιδείας τυγχάνουσαι καθίστασθαι
Β και δεξασθαι μετά τέχνης ξόμμιζιν προς άλλήλας,
τούτων τάς μεν επι την ανδρείαν μάλλον ξυντεινού-
σας, οιον στημονοφυες νομίσασ’2 αυτών είναι τό
στερεόν ήθος, τάς δε επί τό κόσμιον πίονί τε καί
μαλακω καί κατά την εικόνα κροκώδει διανήματι3
77 ροσχρωμενας, εναντία δε τεινουσας άλλήλαις,
πειράται τοιόνδε τινά τρόπον ξυνδεΐν καί ζυμ-
πλεκειν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ποιον δη;
0 ΞΕ. Πρώτον μεν κατά τό ξυγγενες τό άειγενες
ον τής φυχής αυτών μέρος θείω ξυναρμοσαμενη
1 άπωθουμένονί Stallbaum : απωθούμενα ΒΤ.
2 νόμισα,·* ΒΤ : corr. Heusde.
186
THE STATESMAN
γ. soc. Certainly.
str. In the same way I think the kingly art,
keeping for itself the function of supervision, will
not allow the duly appointed teachers and foster
fathers to give any training, unless they can thereby
produce characters suitable to the constitution it is
creating, but in these things only it exhorts them
to give instruction. And those men who have no
capacity for courage and self-restraint and the other
qualities which tend towards virtue, but by the force
of an evil nature are carried away into godlessness,
violence, and injustice, it removes by inflicting
upon them the punishments of death and exile and
deprivation of the most important civic rights.
Y. soc. That is about what people say, at any rate.
str. And those in turn who wallow in ignorance
and craven humility it places under the yoke of
slavery.
str. As for the rest of the people, those whose
natures are capable, if they get education, of being
made into something fine and noble and of uniting
with each other as art requires, the kingly art takes
those natures which tend more towards courage,
considering that their character is sturdier, like the
warp in weaving, and those which incline towards
decorum, for these, to continue the simile, are spun
thick and soft like the threads of the woof, and tries
to combine these natures of opposite tendencies and
weave them together in the following manner.
Y. soc. In what manner ?
str. First it binds the eternal part of their souls
with a divine bond, to which that part is akin, and
3 διανήματι Cornarius : δια,νθήματι BT.

187
PLATO
δεσμώ, μετά δε τδ θειον τδ ζωογόνες αυτών αΰθις

ανθρωπίνους.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώς· τούτ’ εΐπες αν;
47· ΞΕ. Τήν των καλών καί δικαίων περί καί
αγαθών καί των τούτους εναντίων όντως ου σαν άληθη
δόξαν μετά βεβαυώσεως, όπόταν εν ταΐς ψυχαΐς
εγγίγνηται, θείαν φημί εν δαυμονίω γίγνεσθαυ γε'νευ.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πρεπει γοΰν όντως.
HE. Τδν δη πολυτυκόν καί τον αγαθόν νομοθετην
D dp’ ΐσμεν δτυ προσηκει μόνον δυνατόν είναι τη της
βασιλικής μονση τούτο αυτό εμποιειν τους όρθώς
μεταλαβοΰσυ παυδεύας, οΰς ελεγομεν νυν δη;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τδ γοΰν εικός.
ΞΕ. "0? δ’ αν δράν γε, ώ Έώκρατες, αδύνατη τδ
τουοΰτον, μηδέποτε τους νυν ζητούμενους όνόμασυν
αυτόν προσαγορεύωμεν.
ΞΕ. Τί οΰν; ανδρεία ψυχή λαμβανομενη της
τουαΰτης αλήθειας άρ’ ούχ ημεροΰται καί των δι-
Ε καίων μάλυστα οϋτω κουνωνεΐν αν εθελησειεν, μη
μεταλαβοΰσα δε αποκλίνει μάλλον προς θηριώδη
τινά φύουν;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? δ’ ον;
ΞΕ. Τι'δε'; τδ της κοσμίας φύσεως dp’ ου τούτων
μεν μεταλαβόν των δοξών όντως σώφρον καί
φρόνιμον, ώς γε εν πολιτεία, γίγνεται, μη κοινωνη-
σαν δε ών λεγομεν επονείδιστόν τινα εύηθείας δικαιό¬
τατα λαμβάνει φημην;
ΞΕ. Ούκοΰν ξυμπλοκην καί δεσμόν τούτον τοΐς
μεν κακοΐς προς σφάς αυτούς καί τους αγαθούς προς
τούς κακούς μηδέποτε μόνιμον φώμεν γίγνεσθαι,
188
THE STATESMAN
after the divine it binds the animal part of them with

human bonds.
y. soc. Again I ask What do you mean ?
str. I mean that really true and assured opinion
about honour, justice, goodness and their opposites
is divine, and when it arises in men’s souls, it arises
in a godlike race.
y. soc. That would be fitting, at any rate.
str. Do we not know, then, that the statesman
and good law-giver is the only one to whom the
power properly belongs, by the inspiration of the
kingly art, to implant this true opinion in those who
have rightly received education, those of whom we
were just now speaking ?
y. soc. Well, probably.
str. And let us never, Socrates, call him who
has not such power by the names we are now
examining.
str. Now is not a courageous soul, when it lays
hold upon such truth, made gentle, and would it not
then be most ready to partake of justice ? And
without it, does it not incline more towards
brutality ?
str. And again if the decorous nature partakes of
these opinions, does it not become truly self-restrained
and wise, so far as the state is concerned, and if it
lacks participation in such qualities, does it not very
justly receive the shameful epithet of simpleton?
y. soc. Certainly.
str. Then can we say that such interweaving and
binding together of the bad with the bad or of the
good with the bad ever becomes enduring, or that
189
PLATO
μηδε τινα επιστήμην αύτώ σπονδή προς τούς τοιού-

τους αν χρήσθαί ποτέ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ;
310 ΕΕ. Τοΐς δ’ εύγενεσι γενομενοις re1 εξ αρχής
ήθεσι θρεφθεΐσί τε κατά φύσιν μόνοις διά νόμων
εμφύεσθαι, καί επί τούτοις δή τοΰτ’ είναι τέχνη
φάρμακον, καί καθάπερ εϊπομεν τούτον θειότερον
είναι τον ξύνδεσμον αρετής μερών φύσε ως ανομοίων
καί επί τάναντία φερομενων.
ΕΕ. Τοά$ μήν λοιπούς, όντας ανθρωπίνους δε¬
σμούς, νπάρχοντος τούτου τοΰ θείου σχεδόν ούδεν
χαλεπόν ούτε εννοεΐν ούτε εννοήσαντα άποτελεϊν.
Β ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ^ δή, καί τίνας;
ΕΕ, Τοά? των επιγαμιών καί παίδων κοινωνήσεων
καί τών περί τας ίδιας εκδόσεις καί γάμους. οί γάρ
πολλοί τα περί ταΰτα ονκ όρθώς ξυνδοϋνται προς
την τών παίδων γεννησιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Τι δή;
ΕΕ. Τά μεν πλούτου καί δυνάμεων εν τοΐς τοι-
ούτοις διώγματα τι καί τις αν ώς άξια λόγου σπου-
δάζοι μεμφόμένος ;
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Ούδεν.
48. ΕΕ. Μάλλον δε γε δίκαιον τών περί τά
C γένη ποιούμενων επιμέλειαν τούτων περί λεγειν, εί
τι μη κατά τρόπον πράττουσιν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Eikos γάρ οΰν.
1 re] 7’ Β : ye (and yevovivoa after άρχψ) T.
1 More or less equivalent to naturalization. It apparently

means the adoption into one state of children bom to
190
THE STATESMAN
any science would ever seriously make use of it in

uniting such persons ?
y. soc. Of course not.
str. But we may say that in those only who were
of noble nature from their birth and have been
nurtured as befits such natures it is implanted by the
laws, and for them this is the medicine prescribed
by science, and, as we said before, this bond which
unites unlike and divergent parts of virtue is more
divine.
y. soc. Very true.
str. The remaining bonds, moreover, being human,
are not very difficult to devise or, after one has
devised them, to create, when once this divine bond
exists.
y. soc. How so ? And what are the bonds ?
str. Those made between states concerning
intermarriages and the sharing of children by
adoption,1 and those relating to portionings and
marriages within the state. For most people make
such bonds without proper regard to the procreation
of children.
str. The pursuit of wealth or power in connexion
with matrimony—but why should anyone ever take
the trouble to blame it, as though it were worth
arguing about ?
y. soc. There is no reason for doing so.
str. We have better cause, however, to speak our
minds about those whose chief care is the family, in
case their conduct is not what it should be.
y. soc. Yes; very likely.
citizens of another. This was not, as a rule, practised in the

Greek city states, but Plato here seems to recommend it.
191
PLATO
=E. Πράττοοσι μεν δη ούδε εξ ενός δρθοϋ λόγου,

την εν τω παραχρημα διώκοντες ραστώνην και τω
τούς μεν προσομοίους αυτοί? άσπάζεσθαι, τούς δ
άνομοίους μη στεργειν, πλεΐστον τη δυσχερειa
μέρος άπονεμοντες.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. ΓΙώ?;
ΕΕ. Οί μεν που κόσμιοι το σφετερον αυτών ήθος
ζητοΰσι, καί κατά δύναμιν γαμοΰσί τε παρά τούτων
καί τάς εκδιδομενας παρ' αυτών εις τούτους
D εκπεμπουσι πάλίν ώς δ' αύτως το περί την
ανδρείαν γένος δρα, την αύτοΰ μεταδίώκον φύσι,ν,
δέον ποιεΐν άμφότερα το·. γένη τούτων τουναντίον
άπαν.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ?, καί διά τί;
ΞΕ. Διότι πεφυκεν ανδρεία τε εν πολλαΐς γενε-
σεσιν άμικτος γεννωμενη σώφρονι φύσει κατά μεν
άρχάς άκμαζειν ρώμη, τελευτώσα δε εξανθειν παν-
τάπασι μανίαις.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Είκός.
ΕΕ. Ή δε αίδοΰς γε αύ λίαν πληρης φυχη καί
Ε ακέραστος τόλμης ανδρείας, επί δε γενεάς πολλάς
ουτω γεννηθεΐσα, νωθεστερα φύεσθαι τού καιρού
καί άποτελευτώσα δη παντάπασιν άναπηροΰσθαι.
νε. 2Ω. Και τούτο εικος ούτω ξυμβαίνειν.
ΞΕ. Τούτοι»? δη τούς δεσμούς ελεγον ότι χαλε¬
πόν ούδεν ξυνδεΐν ύπάρξαντος τού περί τά καλά καί
αγαθά μίαν εχειν άμφότερα τά γένη δόξαν, τούτο
γάρ εν καί δλον εστί βασιλικής ξυνυφάνσεως εργον,
μηδέποτε εάν άφίστασθαι σώφρονα άπό τών άνδρεί-
ων ηθη, ξυγκερκίζοντα δε όμοδοξίαις καί τιμάΐς καί
άτιμίαις καί δόξαις καί όμηρειών έκδόσεσιν εις
άλληλους, λεΐον καί τό λεγόμενον εύητριον ύφασμα
192
THE STATESMAN
str. The fact is, they act on no right theory at

all; they seek their ease for the moment; welcoming
gladly those who are like themselves, and finding
those who are unlike them unendurable, they give
the greatest weight to their feeling of dislike.
y. soc. How so ?
str. The decorous people seek for characters like

their own; so far as they can they marry wives of
that sort and in turn give their daughters in marriage
to men of that sort; and the courageous do the same,
eagerly seeking natures of their own kind, whereas
both classes ought to do quite the opposite.
y. soc. How so, and why ?
str. Because in the nature of things courage, if
propagated through many generations with no admix¬
ture of a self-restrained nature, though at first it is
strong and flourishing, in the end blossoms forth in
utter madness.
y. soc. That is likely.
str. But the soul, on the other hand, that is too
full of modesty and contains no alloy of courage or
boldness, after many generations of the same kind
becomes too sluggish and finally is utterly crippled.
y. soc. That also is likely to happen.
str. It was these bonds, then, that I said there
was no difficulty in creating, provided that both
classes have one and the same opinion about the
honourable and the good. For indeed the whole
business of the kingly weaving is comprised in this
and this alone,—in never allowing the self-restrained
characters to be separated from the courageous, but
in weaving them together by common beliefs and
honours and dishonours and opinions and interchanges
of pledges, thus making of them a smooth and, as
193
PLATO
311 ξυνάγοντα εξ αυτών, τάς εν ταΐς πόλεσιν άρχάς

αεί κοινή τούτοις επιτρεπειν.
νε. 2Ω. Πώ?;
ΕΕ. Ου μεν αν ενός άρχοντος χρεία ξυμβαίνη,
τον ταΰτα άμφότερα εχοντα αίρούμενον επιστάτην
ου δ’ αν πλειόνων, τούτων μέρος εκατερων ξυμμιγ-
νυντα. τα μεν γάρ σωφρόνων αρχόντων ήθη
σφόδρα μεν ευλαβή καί δίκαια καί σωτήρια,
δριμύτητος δε καί τίνος ίταμότητος οξείας καί
πρακτικής ενδεΐται.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Δοκεί γοΰν δη καί τάδε.
HE. Ια ο avopeta ye αυ προς μζν το όίκαιον
καί εύλαβες εκείνων επιδεεστερα, τό δ’ εν ταΐς
πράξεσι ιταμόν1 διαφερόντως ΐσχει. πάντα δέ
καλώς γίγνεσθαι τα περί τάς πόλεις ιδία καί δημοσία
τοΰτοιν μή παραγενομενοιν άμφοΐν αδύνατον.
ΝΕ. 2Ω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
ΞΕ. Τούτο δη τέλος υφάσματος εύθυπλοκία συμ-
πλακεν2 γίγνεσθαι φώμεν πολιτικής πράξεως τό
των ανδρείων καί σωφρόνων ανθρώπων ήθος,
C όπόταν όμονοία καί φιλία κοινόν ξυναγαγοΰσα
αυτών τον βίον ή βασιλική τέχνη, πάντωνμεγαλο-
πρεπεστατον υφασμάτων καί άριστον άποτελεσασα3
τους τ’ άλλους εν ταΐς πόλεσι πάντας δούλους καί
ελεύθερους άμπίσχουσα, συνεχή τουτω τώ πλεγματι,
καί καθ' όσον εύδαίμονι προσήκει γίγνεσθαι πόλει
τούτου μηδαμή μηδέν ελλείπουσα αρχή τε καί
επιστάτη.
νε. 2Ω. Κάλλιστα αύ τον βασιλικόν άπετελεσας
άνδρα ήμΐν, ώ ξενε, καί τον πολιτικόν.
1 ιταμόν Ast: τό μεν ΒΤ. 2 συμιτΧέκειν Β : ζυμττλεκεν Τ.

3 άττοτελέσασα Ast: άποτεΧέσασα ωστ’ είναι κοινόν mss.
194
THE STATESMAN
we say, well-woven fabric, and then entrusting to

them in common for ever the offices of the state.
y. soc. How is that to be done ?
str. When one official is needed, by choosing a
president who possesses both qualities; and when a
board is desired, by combining men of each class.
For the characters of self-restrained officials are
exceedingly careful and just and conservative, but
they lack keenness and a certain quick and active
boldness.
y. soc. That also seems, at least, to be true.
str. The courageous natures, on the other hand,
are deficient in justice and caution in comparison
with the former, but excel in boldness of action;
and unless both these qualities are present it is
impossible for a state to be entirely prosperous in
public and private matters.
Y. soc. Yes, certainly.
str. This, then, is the end, let us declare, of the
web of the statesman’s activity, the direct inter¬
weaving of the characters of restrained and courageous
men, when the kingly science has drawn them
together by friendship and community of sentiment
into a common life, and having perfected the most
glorious and the best of all textures, clothes with it
all the inhabitants of the state, both slaves and
freemen, holds them together by this fabric, and
omitting nothing which ought to belong to a happy
state, rules and watches over them.
Y. soc. You have given us, Stranger, a most com¬
plete and admirable treatment of the king and the
statesman.
195
PHILEBUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILEBUS
The object of the Philebus is the determination of

“the good.” Philebus, a totally unknown person
whose name serves as the title of the dialogue, is
represented as a thinker of the hedonistic school.
He has, apparently, been lectux-ing or taking part
in a discussion, but has withdrawn on account of
weariness. He speaks only a few short sentences
in the whole dialogue. Protarchus, son of the
wealthy Callias, serves to give the form of dialogue
to the discourse, but his personality is not even
outlined, and his remarks are as colourless as are
those of the younger Socrates in The Statesman.
Even Socrates himself, as in The Sophist, The
Statesman, and other dialogues of approximately the
same date, shows little personality: he is merely
the mouthpiece of the doctrine.
This dialogue, like The Sophist and The Statesman,
contains a preliminary illustration of method; for
the discussion of sounds in speech (17 IF.) serves the
same purpose as the “angler” in The Sophist and
the “ art of weaving ” in The Statesman. The
Philebus seems to be slightly later in date than the
other two dialogues.
In opposition to the assertion ascribed to Philebus,
that pleasure is the good, Socrates seems at first
prepared to maintain (with Eucleides and the Cynics)
199
that knowledge is the good, but presently announces

his suspicion that some third competitor will be
awarded the first place, and that even the second
place will not be held by pleasure. It is soon agreed
that a mixture of knowledge and pleasure is necessary
for the most desirable life. The discussion is carried
on in great measure by means of classification or
division, which is here founded on the principles (de¬
rived from Pythagorean sources) of the Limited and
the Unlimited. Pleasure and pain, and everything
which is capable of degrees of intensity, belong to
the class of the Unlimited, whereas number, measure,
and knowledge belong to that of the Limited, which
is regarded as essentially superior.
The composition of the mixture which is necessary
for the most perfect life is discussed in detail. This
involves a description and condemnation of excess in
the most intense pleasures and an interesting analysis
of the mixture of pain and pleasure in anger, pity,
revenge, and other emotions as they affect us in
theatrical representations or in real life. The
pleasures of scientific knowledge are said to be
absolutely pure and unmixed, therefore truer than
all mixed pleasures and preferable to them. Again,
pleasure being, according to certain hedonists, a
process or Becoming, is found to be on that account
inferior to knowledge, which is a state or Being.
The discussion of kinds of knowledge (55 c ff.) in¬
cludes (55 e) the distinction between scientific know¬
ledge, based on arithmetic, measuring, and weighing,
and such knowledge as rests upon the mere schooling
of the senses.
In the end the order in which possessions may be
called good is established as follows: (1) measure,
200
moderation, fitness, and the like; (2) proportion,

beauty, perfection, and their kin; (3) mind and
wisdom ; (4) sciences, arts, and true opinions; (5)
pure pleasures.
This dialogue, though it lacks the dramatic
qualities which make many of Plato’s works take
rank among the most charming products of all
literature, and in spite of certain inconsistencies and
even defects of reasoning—for instance, the confusion
between goodness and a good thing (55 b) or the
insistence upon the existence of false pleasures,
though the epithet “ false ” belongs really to opinion,
not to the pleasures themselves—is an interesting
and instructive presentation of an important subject.
It also exhibits clearly one side, at least, of Plato’s
development at a time which must be somewhat
after the middle of his career.
Annotated editions of the Philebus are by Charles

Badham (London, 1855 and 1878) and E. Poste
(Oxford University Press, i860).
201
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ
[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΗΔ0ΝΗ2, ΗΘΙΚ02]
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

St, ΤΙ
Γ· Π 2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧ02, ΦΙΛΗΒ02
1. 2Ω. 'Όρα 8η, ΐΐρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις

παρά Φιληβου δέχεσθαι νυνί καί προς τίνα τον1
παρ’ ημΐν άμφισβητεΐν, εάν μη σοι κατά νουν
Β η λεγόμενος, βονλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα εκά-
τερον;
πρω. Haw μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Φίληβος μεν τοίνυν αγαθόν είναι φησι το
χαίρειν πάσι ζωοις καί την ηδονην καί τέρφιν,
καί όσα τοΰ γένους έστί τουτου σύμφωνα· τό δε
77αρ ημών άμφισβήτημά έστι μη ταΰτα, αλλά
το φρονεΐν καί τό νοεΐν καί τό μεμνησθαι καί τά
τούτων αΰ ξυγγενη, δόξαν τε ορθήν καί αληθείς
C λογισμούς, της γε ήδονης άμείνω καί λωω γίγνε¬
σθαι ξΰμπασιν όσαπερ αυτών δυνατά μεταλαβεΐν
δυνατοΐς δέ μετασχεΐν ώφελιμώτατον απάντων
είναι πάσι τοΐς οΰσί τε καί εσομένοις. μών
ουχ ουτω πως λέγομεν, ώ Φίληβε, έκάτεροι;
ΦΙ. ΐίάντων μέν οΰν μάλιστα, ώ Ίόώκρατες.
1 τύν Schleiermacher: των ΒΤ.
202
PHILEBUS
[oh ON PLEASURE, ethical]
CHARACTERS
Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus
soc. Observe, then, Protarchus, what the doctrine

is which you are now to accept from Philebus, and
what our doctrine is, against which you are to argue,
if you do not agree with it. Shall we make a brief
statement of each of them ?
pro. By all means.
soc. Very well : Philebus says that to all living
beings enjoyment and pleasure and gaiety and what¬
ever accords with that sort of thing are a good ;
whereas our contention is that not these, but
wisdom and thought and memory and their kindred,
right opinion and true reasonings, are better and
more excellent than pleasure for all who are capable
of taking part in them, and that for all those now
existing or to come who can partake of them they
are the most advantageous of all things. Those are
pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they
not, Philebus ?
phi. Yes, Socrates, exactly.
W3
PLATO
2Ω. Αεχει 8ή τούτον τον νυν 8ι8όμ ενον, ώ

ΐΐρώταρχε, λόγον;
πρω. Ανάγκη όεχεσθαι- Φίληβος γάρ ήμΐν ο
καλός άπείρηκεν.
2Ω. Αεί 8η περί αυτών τρόπω παντί τάληθες
πη περανθήναι;
D ΠΡΩ. Αεΐ γάρ οΰν.
2. 2Ω. ”1θι 8η, προς τουτοις 8 ιο μολογη ao'jμέθα
καί τό8ε.
πρω. Τδ ποιον;
2Ω. Ώ? νυν ημών εκάτερος εξιν ψυχής καί
8ιάθεσιν άποφαίνειν τινά επιχειρήσει την 8υνα-
μενην άνθρώποις 7τάσι τον βίον εύ8αίμονα παρ-
εχειν. αρ’ ούχ ούτως;
ΠΡΩ. Οϋτω μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν υμείς μεν την τοΰ χαίρειν, ημείς δ’
αΰ την τοΰ φρονεΐν;
πρω. Έστι ταΰτα.
2Ω. Τι δ’, αν άλλη τις κρείττων τουταιν φα,νή;
Ε μών ούκ, αν μεν ή8ονή1 μάλλον φαίνηται ζυγγενής,
ήττώμεθα μεν άμφότεροι τοΰ ταΰτα εχοντος
12 βεβαίως βίου, κρατεί δε δ τής ή8ονής τον τής
φρονήσεως ;
πρω. Ναι.
2Ω. "Αρ δε γε φρονήσει, νικά μεν φρόνησις την
ή8ονήν, ή δε ήττάται; ταΰθ' ούτως όμολογοΰμενά
φάτε, ή πώς;
πρω. Έμοί γοΰν 8οκεΐ.
2Ω. Τί δε Φιλήβω; τί φής;
ΦΙ. Εμοι μεν πάντως νικάν ή8ονή 8οκεΐ καί
8όξει* σύ δε, Πρώταρχε, αυτός γνώσει.
1 ijdovy] ήδονη ΒΤ.
204
PHILEBUS
soc. And do you, Protarchus, accept this doctrine
which is now committed to you ?
pro. I must accept it ; for our handsome Philebus
has withdrawn.
soc. And must the truth about these doctrines be
attained by every possible means ?
pro. Yes, it must.
soc. Then let us further agree to this:
pro. To what ?
soc. That each of us will next try to prove clearly
that it is a condition and disposition of the soul
which can make life happy for all human beings. Is
not that what we are going to do ?
pro. It is.
soc. Then you will show that it is the condition
of pleasure, and I that it is that of wisdom ?
pro. True.
soc. What if some other life be found superior to
these two ? Then if that life is found to be more
akin to pleasure, both of us are defeated, are we
not, by the life which has firm possession of this
superiority, but the life of pleasure is victor over
the life of wisdom.
pro. Yes.
soc. But if it is more akin to wisdom, then wisdom
is victorious and pleasure is vanquished ? Do you
agree to that ? Or what do you say ?
pro. Yes, I at least am satisfied with that,
soc. But how about you, Philebus ? What do you
say ?
phi. I think and always shall think that pleasure
is the victor. But you, Protarchus, will make your
own decision.
H 205
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Παραδοο?, ω Φίληβε, ήμΐν τον λόγον

ούκ αν έτι κύριος ε’ίης της προς Σωκράτη ομο¬
λογίας η καί τουναντίον.
Β ΦΙ. ’Αληθή λέγεις· αλλά γαρ άφοσιοΰμαι καί
μαρτύρο μαι νυν αυτήν την θεόν.
πρω. Και ήμεΐς σοι τούτων γε αυτών συμμαρ-
τυρες αν ειμεν,1 ώς ταυτα ελεγες α λέγεις. άλλα
δή τά μετά ταυτα εξής, ώ Σώκρατες, όμως και
μετά Φιλήβου έκόντος ή όπως αν εθέλη, πειρώ-
μεθα περαίνειν.
3. 2Ω. ΐίειροπέον, απ’ αυτής δε τής θεοΰ, ην
όδε Άφροδίτην μεν λέγεσθαί φησι, το δ’ άληθέ-
στατον αυτής όνομα 'Ηδονήν είναι.
ΠΡΩ. ’Ορθότατα.
C 2Ω. Τό δ’ έμόν δέος, ω Πρώταρχε, αεί προς
τά των θεών ονόματα ούκ έστι κατ’ άνθρωπον,
αλλά πέρα τοΰ μεγίστου φόβον. καί νΰν την
μεν Άφροδίτην, όπη εκείνη φίλον, ταυτη προσ¬
αγορεύω· την δε ηδονήν οΐδα ώς έστι ποικίλον,
καί όπερ εΐπον, απ’ εκείνης ημάς άρχομένους
ένθυμεΐσθαι δει καί σκοπειν ήντινα φύσιν έχει,
έστι γάρ, ακούειν μεν ούτως άπλώς, έν τι, μορφάς
δε δήπου παντοίας είληφε καί τινα τρόπον αν¬
όμοιους άλλήλαις. ιδέ γάρ· ήδεσθαι μέν φαμεν
D τον άκολασταίνοντα άνθρωπον, ήδεσθαι δε καί
τον σωφρονοΰντα αντίο τώ σωφρονειν ήδεσθαι
δ’ αν καί τον άνοηταίνοντα καί ανόητων δοξών
καί ελπίδων μεστόν, ήδεσθαι δ’ αΰ καί τον φρο-
νοΰντα αντώ τώ φρονεΐν2 καί τούτων τών
ηδονών έκατέρας πώς άν τις όμοιας άλλήλαις
είναι λέγων ούκ άνόητος φαίνοιτο ένδίκως;
1 ιϊμιν corr. Ven. 189: ήμτν ΒΤ.
206
PHILEBUS
pro. Since you entrusted the argument to me,

Pliilebus, you can no longer dictate whether to make
the agreement with Socrates or not.
phi. True ; and for that reason I wash my hands
of it and now call upon the goddess 1 herself to witness
that I do so.
pro. And we also will bear witness to these words
of yours. But all the same, Socrates, Pliilebus may
agree or do as he likes, let us try to finish our argu¬
ment in due order.
soc. We must try, and let us begin with the very
goddess who Philebus says is spoken of as Aphrodite
but is most truly named Pleasure.
pro. Quite right.
soc. My awe, Protarchus, in respect to the names
of the gods is always beyond the greatest human
fear. And now I call Aphrodite by that name which
is agreeable to her ; but pleasure I know has various
aspects, and since, as I said, we are to begin with her,
we must consider and examine what her nature is.
For, when you just simply hear her name, she is
only one thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of
shapes which are even, in a way, unlike each other.
For instance, we say that the man who lives without
restraint has pleasure, and that the self-restrained
man takes pleasure in his very self-restraint; and
again that the fool who is full of foolish opinions and
hopes is pleased, and also that the wise man takes
pleasure in his very wisdom. And would not any
person who said these two kinds of pleasure were
like each other be rightly regarded as a fool ?
1 The goddess of Pleasure, Ηδονή personified.
2 ψρονοΰντα . . (ppoveiv T: σωφρονουντα . . σωφρονέίν B.

207
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Εισι μεν γάρ απ’ εναντίων, ώ Έώκρατες,

αΰται πραγμάτων, ού μην αύταί γε άλληλαις εναν-
Ε τίαι. πώς γάρ ηδονη γε ηδονη ούχ1 ομοιοτατον
άν εϊη, τούτο αυτό εαυτώ, πάντων χρημάτων;
2Ω. Και γάρ χρώμα, 5 δαιμόνιε, χρώματι·
κατά γε αυτό τούτο ούδέν διοίσει το χρώμα είναι
παν, τό γε μην μέλαν τώ λευκώ πάντες γιγνώ-
σκομεν ώς προς τώ διάφορον είναι και εναντιώ-
τατον ον τυγχάνει· και δη και σχήμα σχηματι
κατά ταύτόν γενει μεν εστι παν εν, τά δε μέρη
τοΐς μέρεσιν αυτού τά μεν έναντιώτατα άλληλοις,
13 τά δε διαφορότητα έχοντα μνρ'ιαν που τυγχάνει·
και πόλλ’ έτερα ούτως έχονθ’ ευ ρήσομεν · ώστε
τουτω γε τώ λόγω μη πίστευε, τώ πάντα τά
έναντιώτατα εν ποιουντι. φοβοΰμαι δε μη τινας
ήδονάς ηδοναΐς εύρησομεν εναντίας.
πρω. ’Ίσα)?' άΛΛά τί τοΰθ’ ημών βλάφει τον
λόγον;
2Ω. "Οτι προσαγορεύεις αυτά ανόμοια ον τα
ετέρω, φησομεν, ονόματι. λέγεις γάρ αγαθά
πάντα είναι τά ηδέα. το μεν ουν μη ούχ ηδέα
Β είναι τά ηδέα λόγος ούδεις αμφισβητεί· κακά
οντα αυτών τα ττοΑΑα και αγαοα oe, cos*
φαμέν, δμως πάντα συ προσαγορεύεις αγαθά
αυτά, όμολογών ανόμοια είναι, τώ λόγω εΐ τίς
σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί ουν δη ταύτον εν ταΐς
κακαΐς ομοίως καί εν άγαθαΐς ενόν πάσας ηδονάς
αγαθόν είναι προσαγορεύεις;
πρω. Πώ? λέγεις, ώ Σιώκρατες; οίει γάρ τινα
συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ηδονην εΐναι τάγαθόν,
1 ούχ Badham: μή ούχ ΒΤ.
208
PHILEBUS
pro. No, Socrates, for though they spring from
opposite sources, they are not in themselves opposed

to one another ; for how can pleasure help being
of all things most like pleasure, that is, like itself ?
soc. Yes, my friend, and colour is like colour ; in
so far as every one of them is a colour they will all be
the same, yet we all recognize that black is not only
different from white, but is its exact opposite. And
so, too, figure is like figure ; they are all one in
kind ; but the parts of the kind are in some instances
absolutely opposed to each other, and in other cases
there is endless variety of difference ; and we can
find many other examples of such relations. Do
not, therefore, rely upon this argument, which makes
all the most absolute opposites identical. I am
afraid we shall find some pleasures the opposites of
other pleasures.
pro. Perhaps; but why will that injure my con¬
tention ?
soc. Because I shall say that, although they are
unlike, you apply to them a different designation.
For you say that all pleasant things are good.
Now no argument contends that pleasant things are
not pleasant ; but whereas most of them are bad
and only some are good, as we assert, nevertheless
you call them all good, though you confess, if forced
to it by argument, that they are unlike. Now what
is the identical element which exists in the good and
bad pleasures alike and makes you call them all a
good ?
pro. What do you mean, Socrates ? Do you
suppose anyone who asserts that the good is pleasure
209
PLATO
εΐτα άνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τάς μου είναι τινας

C άγαθάς ήδονάς, τάς δε τινας έτέρας αυτών κακός;
2Ω. ΆΑΛ’ ουν άνομοίους γε φήσεις αυτάς άλλή-
λαις είναι καί τινας εναντίας.
ΠΡΩ. Οστι καθ' δσον ye ήδοναί.
2Ω. Πάλιν εις τον αυτόν φερόμεθα λόγον, ώ
ΐΐρώταρχε, ουδ’ άρα ηδονήν ηδονής διάφορον,
άλλα πάσας όμοιας είναι φήσομεν, καί τα παρα¬
δείγματα ημάς τα νυν δη λεχθέντα ονδεν τιτρώσκει,
πεισόμεθα1 δε και εροΰμεν άπερ οί πάντων φαν-
D λότατοί τε και περί λόγους άμα νέοι.
ΠΡΩ. Τά ποια δη λέγεις;
2Ω. "Οτι σε μιμούμενος εγώ και αμυνόμενος
εάν τολμώ λέγειν ώς το άνομοιότατόν έστι τώ
άνομοιοτάτω πάντων όμοιότατον, έξω τά αυτά
σοί λέγειν, και φανουμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοΰ δέοντος,
καί ό λόγος ημΐν έκπεσών οίχήσεται. πάλιν ουν
αυτόν ανακρούω μέθα, καί τάγ’ αν ίόντες2 εις τάς
ομοιας ίσως αν πως αΛΛηΛοίς συγχωρησαιμζν.
Ε πρω. Λέγε πώς;
4. 2Ω. Έμε θες υπό σοΰ πάλιν έρωτώμενον,
ώ Πρώταρχε.
πρω. Το ποιον δη;
2Ω. Φρονησίς τε καί επιστήμη καί νους καί
πανθ όπόσα δη κατ' άρχάς εγώ θέμενος εΐπον
αγαθά, διερωταψενος ο τι ποτ έστίν αγαθόν,
άρ ου ταύτόν πείσονται τοΰτο όπερ ό σάς λόγος;
πρω . Π ώς ;
2Ω. Πολλαί τε αί ξυνάπασαι επιστήμαι δόξουσιν
είναι καί ανόμοιοι τινες αυτών άλλήλαις· εί δε
14 καί ενάντιοι πη γίγνονταί τινες, άρα άξιος άν
1 7τεισ&μεθα Badham : πα,ρύμεθα Β : πσρασόμΐθα Τ.
210
PHILEBUS
will concede, or will endure to hear you say, that

some pleasures are good and others bad ?
soc. But you will concede that they are unlike
and in some instances opposed to each other.
pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures,
soc. Here we are again at the same old argument,
Protarchus, and we shall presently assert that one
pleasure is not different from another, but all pleas¬
ures are alike, and the examples just cited do not
affect us at all, but we shall behave and talk just
like the most worthless and inexperienced reasoners.
pro. In what way do you mean ?
soc Why, if I have the face to imitate you and
to defend myself by saying that the utterly unlike
is most completely like that which is most utterly
unlike it, I can say the same things you said, and
we shall prove ourselves to be excessively inexperi¬
enced, and our argument will be shipwrecked and
lost. Let us, then, back her out, and perhaps if we
start fair again we may come to an agreement.
pro. Plow ? Tell me.
soc. Assume, Protarchus, that I am questioned in
turn by you.
pro. What question do I ask ?
soc. Whether wisdom and knowledge and intellect
and all the things which I said at first were good,
when you asked me what is good, will not have the
same fate as this argument of yours.
pro. How is that ?
soc. It will appear that the forms of knowledge
collectively are many and some of them are unlike
each other ; but if some of them turn out to be
actually opposites, should I be fit to engage in
2 cli* ioyres Ven. 189: tmorres BT.
211
PLATO
ε’ίην τοΰ διαλεγεσθαι νυν, ει φοβηθείς τούτο

αυτό μηδεμίαν άνόμοιον φαίην επιστήμην επι¬
στήμη γίγνεσθαι, κάπειθ’ ήμΐν ούτως 6 λόγος
ώσπερ μΰθος άπολόμενος οίχοιτο, αυτοί δε σωζοι-
μεθα επί τίνος άλογίας;
πρω. ΆΛΑ’ ου μην δει τοΰτο γενεσθαι, πλήν
τοΰ σωθήναι. τό γε μήν μοι ίσον τοΰ σοΰ τε
και εμοΰ λόγου άρεσκεΐ' πολλαι μεν ήδοναι και
ανόμοιοι γιγνεσθων,1 πολλαι δε επιστήμαι και
διάφοροι.
Β 2Ω. Τήν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε,
τοΰ άγαθοΰ τοΰ τ’ εμοΰ και τοΰ σοΰ μη άπο-
κρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθεντες δε εις τό μέσον, τολ-
μώμεν, αν πη ελεγχόμενοι μηνυσωσι, πότερον
ηδονήν τάγαθόν δει λεγειν ή φρόνησιν ή τι τρίτον
άλλο είναι. νΰν γάρ ου δήπου πρός γε αυτό
τοΰτο2 φιλονεικοΰμεν, όπως aya>3 τίθεμαι, ταΰτ’
εσται τα νικών τα, ή ταΰθ’ ά συ, τω δ’ άληθεστ άτω
δει που συμμαχεΐν ημάς άμφω.
πρω. Δεΐ γάρ ούν.
5. 2Ω. Τούτον τοίνυν
τον λόγον ετι μάλλον
C δι’ ομολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. Τον ποΐον δή;
2 Ω. Τον πάσι παρεχοντα άνθρώποις πράγματα
εκοΰσι τε και άκουσιν ενίοις και ενίοτε.
πρω. ΐ\όγε σαφεστερον.
2Ω. Τον νΰν δή παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως
πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. εν γάρ δή τά πολλά
είναι και τό εν πολλά θαυμαστόν λεχθεν, και
ραδιον αμφισβητήσαι τω τούτων όποτερονοΰν
τιθεμενω.
1 yi-γνέσθωΐ'] -γί~γνεσθον ΒΤ,
212
PHILEBUS
dialectics now if, through fear of just that, I should

say that no form of knowledge is unlike any other,
and then, as a consequence, our argument should
vanish and be lost, like a tale that is told, and we
ourselves should be saved by clinging to some irra¬
tional notion ?
pro. No, that must never be, except the part
about our being saved. However, I like the equal
treatment of your doctrine and mine. Let us grant
that pleasures are many and unlike and that the
forms of knowledge are many and different.
soc. With no concealment, then, Protarchus, of
the difference between my good and yours, but with
fair and open acknowledgement of it, let us be bold
and see if perchance on examination they will tell
us whether we should say that pleasure is the good,
or wisdom, or some other third principle. For surely
the object of our present controversy is not to gain
the victory for my assertions or yours, but both of
us must fight for the most perfect truth.
pro. Yes, we must.
soc. Then let us establish this principle still more
firmly by means of an agreement.
pro. What principle ?
soc. The principle which gives trouble to all men,
to some of them sometimes against their will.
pro. Speak more plainly.
soc. I mean the principle which came in our way
just now ; its nature is quite marvellous. For the
assertions that one is many and many are one are
marvellous, and it is easy to dispute with anyone
who makes either of them.
2 τοΰτο corr. Coisl.: τοϋτο δ BT.

a άγω] άγω B: 4 ’γώ T.
Η 2 213
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. *Ap> ouv λύγεις, όταν τι? ύμε φη ΐΐρώτ-

D ο.ρχον eva γεγονότα φύσει, πολλούς είναι πάλιν
τούς εμε και εναντίους άλλήλοις, μύγαν καί σμι¬
κρόν τιθέμενος καί βαρύν καί κοΰφον τον αυτόν
καί αλλα μύρια;
2Ω. Συ μεν, ώ ΙΙρώταρχε, εΐρηκας τα δε-
δημευμύνα των θαυμαστών περί τό εν καί πολλά,
συγκεχωρημύνα δε ώς έπος είπεΐν υπό πάντυιν
ηδη μη δεΐν των τοιούτων άπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη
καί ράδια καί σφόδρα τοΐς λόγοις εμπόδια ύπο-
λαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, επεί μηδε τα τοιάδε,
Ε όταν τις εκάστου τα μύλη τε καί άμα μύρη διελών
τώ λόγω, πάντα ταϋτα τό εν εκείνο είναι δι-
ομολογησάμενος, ελύγχη καταγελών δτι τέρατα
διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε εν ώς πολλά εστι
καί άπειρα, καί τα πολλά ώς εν μόνον.
πρω. Συ δε δη ποια, ώ Σιώκρατες, ετερα λύγεις,
α μηπω συγκεχωρημύνα δεδήμευται περί τον
αυτόν τούτον λόγον;
15 2Ω. (Οπόταν, ώ παΐ, τό εν μη των γιγνομύνων
τε καί άπολλυμύνων τις τιθηται, καθάπερ άρτίως
ημείς εΐπομεν. ενταυθοΐ μεν γαρ καί τό τοιουτον
εν, δπερ εΐπομεν νυν δη, συγκεχώρηται τό μη
δεΐν ελύγχειν όταν δύ τις ένα άνθρωπον επιχειρη
τίθεσθαι καί βοΰν ένα καί τό καλόν εν καί τό
αγαθόν εν, περί τούτων των ενάδων καί των
τοιούτων η πολλή σπουδή μετά διαιρύσεως άμφι-
σβητησις γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. II ώς;
Β 2Ω. Πρώτον μεν εΐ τινας δει τοιαύτας είναι
μονάδας ύπολαμβάνειν αληθώς οϋσας· είτα πώς
αΰ ταύτας, μίαν εκάστην ούσαν αεί την αυτήν
214
PHILEBUS
pro. You mean when a person says that I, Prot-

archus, am by nature one and that there are also
many of me which are opposites of eacli other, assert¬
ing that I, the same Protarchus, am great and small
and heavy and light and countless other things ?
soc. Those wonders concerning the one and the
many which you have mentioned, Protarchus, are
common property, and almost everybody is agreed
that they ought to be disregarded because they are
childish and easy and great hindrances to specula¬
tion ; and this sort of thing also should be disregarded,
\vhen a man in his discussion divides the members
and likewise the parts of anything, acknowledges
that they all collectively are that one thing, and
then mockingly refutes himself because he has been
compelled to declare miracles—that the one is many
and infinite and the many only one.
pro. But what other wonders do you mean,
Socrates, in relation to this same principle, which
are not yet common property and generally acknow¬
ledged ?
soc. I mean, my boy, when a person postulates
unity which is not the unity of one of the things
which come into being and perish, as in the examples
we had just now. For in cases of a unity of that
sort, as I just said, it is agreed that refutation is
needless. But when the assertion is made that man
is one, or ox is one, or beauty is one, or the good is
one, the intense interest in these and similar unities
becomes disagreement and controversy.
pro. How is that ?
soc. The first question is whether we should be¬
lieve that such unities really exist; the second, how
these unities, each of which is one, always the same,
215
PLATO
καί μήτε γενεσιν μήτε όλεθρόν προσδεχομενην,

όμως είναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταυτην μετά δε
τοΰτ’ εν τοΐς γιγνομενοις a5 και απειροις είτε
διεσπασμενην καί πολλά γεγονΰίαν θετεον, ειθ
ολην αυτήν αυτής χωρίς, δ δη πάντων άδυνα-
τωτατον φαίνοιτ αν, ταυτον και εν αμα εν ενι
τε καί πολλοΐς γίγνεσθαι. ταΰτ εστι τα περί
C τα τοιαΰτα εν καί πολλά, άλλ’ ούκ εκείνα, ώ
ΪΙρώταρχε, άπάσης απορίας αίτια μη καλώς
όμολογηθεντα καί ευπορίας αΰ1 καλώς.
ΠΡΩ. Ο ύκοΰν χρη τοΰθ’ ημάς, ώ Σώκρατες,
εν τώ νυν πρώτον διαπονησασθαι;
2Ω. 'Ω? γοΰν εγώ φαίην αν.
πρω. Kat πάντας τοίνυν ημάς ύπόλαβε συγχω-
ρεΐν σοι τουσδε τα τοιαΰτα· Φίληβον δ’ ίσως
κράτιστον εν τώ νυν επερωτώντα μη κινεΐν ευ
κείμενον.
D 6· 2Ω. Etep· πόθεν οΰν τις ταυτης άρξηται
πολλής οΰσης καί παντοίας περί τά αμφισβη¬
τούμενα μάχης; άρ’ ενθενδε;
πρω. Πο'θεν;2
2Ω. Φαμεν που τ αυτόν εν καί πολλά υπό λόγων
γιγνόμενα περιτρεχειν πάντη καθ' έκαστον τών
λεγομένων αεί καί πάλαι καί νυν. καί τούτο
ούτε μη παυσηταί ποτέ ούτε ηρξατο νυν, άλλ’
εστι τό τοιοΰτον, ώς εμοί φαίνεται, τών λόγων
αυτών αθάνατόν τι καί άγηρών πάθος εν ημΐν
6 δε πρώτον αύτοΰ γευσάμενος εκάστοτε τών
Ε νέων, ησθείς ώς τινα σοφίας εύρηκώς θησαυρόν,
ύφ’ ηδονης ενθουσια τε καί πάντα κινεί λόγον
1 &ν αδ ΒΤ: &ν bracketed by Badham.

2 ένθένδα πόθεν assigned to Socrates ΒΤ.
216
PHILEBUS
and admitting neither generation nor destruction,

can nevertheless be permanently this one unity ; and
the third, how in the infinite number of things which
come into being this unity, whether we are to assume
that it is dispersed and has become many, or that
it is entirely separated from itself—which would seem
to be the most impossible notion of all—being the
same and one, is to be at the same time in one and
in many. These are the questions, Protarchus, about
this kind of one and many, not those others, which
cause the utmost perplexity, if ill solved, and are, if
well solved, of the greatest assistance.
pro. Then is it now, Socrates, our first duty to
thresh this matter out ?
soc. Yes, that is what I should say.
pro. You may assume, then, that we are all
willing to agree with you about that ; and perhaps
it is best not to ask Philebus any questions ; let
sleeping dogs he.
soc. Very well ; then where shall we begin this
great and vastly complicated battle about the matters
at issue ? Shall we start at this point ?
pro. At what point ?
soc. We say that one and many are identified by
reason, and always, both now and in the past, circulate
everywhere in every thought that is uttered. This
is no new thing and will never cease ; it is, in my
opinion, a quality within us which will never die or
grow old, and which belongs to reason itself as such.
And any young man, when he first has an inkling
of this, is delighted, thinking he has found a treasure
of wisdom ; his joy fills him with enthusiasm ; he joy¬
ously sets every possible argument in motion, some-
217
PLATO
άσμενος, τοτέ μεν επί θάτερα κύκλων καί συμφυρων

εις εν, τότε δέ πάλιν άνειλίττων καί διαμερίζων,
εις απορίαν αυτόν μεν πρώτον καί μάλιστα κατα-
βάλλων, δεύτερον δ’ αεί τον εχόμενον, άντε νεώ-
τερος άντε πρεσβυτέρας άντε ήλιξ ών τυγχάνη,
10 φειδόμενος ούτε πατρός οϋτε μητρός ούτε άλλου
των άκουόντων ούδενός, ολίγου δε καί των άλλων
ζώων, ου μόνον των ανθρώπων, επεί βαρβάρων
γε ούδενός άν φείσαιτο, εΐπερ μόνον έρμη νέα
ποθέν έχοι.
πρω. ρ', ώ Σιώκρατες, ούχ όράς ημών τό
πλήθος, ότι νέοι πάντες εσμεν, καί ου φοβεΐ μη
σοι μετά Φιληβου ξυνεπιθώμεθα, εάν ημάς λοι-
δορης; όμως δέ—μανθάνομεν γάρ ο λέγεις—εί
τις τρόπος έστι καί μηχανή την μεν τοιαυτην
ταραχήν ημΐν έξω τοΰ λόγου εύμενώς πως άπ-
Ρ ελθεΐν, οδόν δέ τινα καλλίω ταυτής επί τον λόγον
άνευρειν, συ τε προθύμου τοΰτο καί ημείς συν-
ακολουθησομεν εις δυναμιν ού γάρ σμικρός 6
παρών λόγος, ώ Σώκρατες.
2Ω. Ου γάρ οΰν, ώ παΐδες, ώς φησιν υμάς
προσαγορεΰων Φίληβος. ού μην εστι καλλιών
οδός ουδ’ άν γένοιτο, ής εγώ εραστής μέν είμι
αεί, πολλακις δέ με ήδη διαφυγοΰσα έρημ.ον καί
άπορον κατέστησεν.
πρω. ΤΟ αυτή; λεγέσθω μόνον.
C 2Ω. °Ηυ δηλώσαι μέν ού πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρή-
σθαι δέ παγχάλεπον πάντα γάρ όσα τέχνης
εχομενα ανηυρέθη1 πώποτε, διά ταυτης φανερά
γέγονε. σκόπει δέ ήν λέγω.
πρω. Λε^ε μόνον.
2Ω. Θεών μέν εις ανθρώπους δόσις, ώ? γε
218
PHILEBUS
times in one direction, rolling things up and kneading

them into one, and sometimes again unrolling and
dividing them ; he gets himself into a muddle first
and foremost, then anyone who happens to be near
him, whether he be younger or older or of his own
age ; he spares neither father nor mother nor any
other human being who can hear, and hardly even
the lower animals, for he would certainly not spare
a foreigner,1 if he could get an interpreter anywhere.
pro. Socrates, do you not see how many we are
and that we are all young men ? Are you not
afraid that we shall join with Philebus and attack
you, if you revile us ? However—for we understand
your meaning—if there is any way or means of
removing this confusion gently from our discussion
and finding some better road than this to bring us
towards the goal of our argument, kindly lead on,
and we will do our best to follow ; for our present
discussion, Socrates, is no trifling matter.
soc. No, it is not, boys, as Philebus calls you ;
and there certainly is no better road, nor can there
ever be, than that which I have always loved,
though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely
and forlorn.
pro. What is the road ? Only tell us.
soc. One which is easy to point out, but very
difficult to follow ; for through it all the inventions
of art have been brought to light. See ; this is
the road I mean.
pro. Go on ; what is it ?
soc. A gift of gods to men, as I believe, was
1 Apparently foreigners are considered among the lower
animals.
1 άνηυρέθη] avevpedy B: &v ΐΰρεθτ} T.

219
PLATO
καταφαίνεται εμοί, ποθεν εκ θεών ερρίφη διά τίνος

ΐΐρομηθεως άμα φανοτάτω τινί 7τυρί· και οί μεν
παλαιοί, κρείττονες ημών και εγγυτερω θεών
οικοΰντες, ταντην φήμην παρεδοσαν, ώς εξ ενός
μεν και1 πολλών όντων τών αεί λεγομένων
είναι, πέρας δε και απειρίαν εν αύτοΐς ξύμφυτον
εχόντων. δεΐν οΰν ημάς τούτων οϋτω διακε-
X) κοσμημένων αεί μίαν ιδέαν περί παντός εκάστοτε
θεμενους ζητεΐν—ευ ρήσε ιν γαρ ενονσαν—εάν οΰν
μεταλάβωμεν, μετά, μίαν δυο, εί πως είσί, σκο-
πειν, εί δε μη, τρεις ή τινα άλλον αριθμόν, καί
τών εν εκείνων έκαστον πάλιν ωσαύτως, μεχριπερ
άν τό κατ’ άρχάς εν μη ότι εν καί πολλά καί
άπειρά εστι μόνον ίδη τις, άλλα καί όπόσα· την
δε του απείρου ιδέαν προς το πλήθος μή προσ-
φερειν πριν άν τις τον αριθμόν αύτοΰ πάντα κατίδη
Ε τον μεταξύ τοΰ απείρου τε καί τοΰ ενός· τότε δ’
ήδη τό εν έκαστον τών πάντων εις τό άπειρον
μεθεντα χαίρειν εάν. οί μεν ούν θεοί, όπερ εΐπον,
ούτως ήμϊν παρεδοσαν σκοπεΐν καί μανθάνειν
καί διδάσκειν αδήλους· οί δε νΰν τών ανθρώπων
17 σοφοί εν μεν, όπως αν τΰχωσι, καί πολλά θάττον
καί βραδύτερου ποιοΰσι τοΰ δέοντος, μετά δε τό
εν άπειρα ευθύς· τά δέ μέσα αυτούς εκφεύγε ι,
οΐς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικώς πάλιν καί
το εριστικώς ημάς ποιεΐσθαι προς άλλήλους τούς
λόγους.
7. πρπ. Τά μεν πως, ώ Ίίώκρατες, δοκώ σου
μανθάνειν, τά δε ετι σαφεστερον δέομαι ά λεγεις
ακοϋσαι.
2Ω. Σαφές μην, ώ ΥΙρώταρχε, εστίν εν τοΐς
1 και Τ: καί έκ Β.
220
PHILEBUS
tossed down from some divine source through the

agency of a Prometheus together with a gleaming
fire ; and the ancients, who were better than we
and lived nearer the gods, handed down the tradition
that all the things which are ever said to exist are
sprung from one and many and have inherent in
them the finite and the infinite. This being the way
in which these things are arranged, we must always
assume that there is in every case one idea of
everything and must look for it—for we shall find
that it is there—and if we get a grasp of this, we
must look next for two, if there be two, and if not,
for three or some other number ; and again we must
treat each of those units in the same way, until we
can see not only that the original unit is one and
many and infinite, but just how many it is. And
we must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality
until we have a view of its whole number between
infinity and one ; then, and not before, we may let
each unit of everything pass on unhindered into
infinity. The gods, then, as I said, handed down to
us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching
one another ; but the wise men of the present day
make the one and the many too quickly or too
slowly, in haphazard fashion, and they put infinity
immediately after unity ; they disregard all that lies
between them, and this it is which distinguishes
between the dialectic and the disputatious methods
of discussion.
pro. I think I understand you in part, Socrates,
but I need a clearer statement of some things.

soc. Surely my meaning, Protarchus, is made clear
221
PLATO
γράμμασιν ο λέγω, καί λάμβανε αυτό εν το ντο is

Β οΐσπερ καί πεπαίδευσαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ?;
2Ω. Φωνή μεν ημιν εστί που μία διά τοΰ στό¬
ματός ίοϋσα, καί άπειρος αΰ πληθει, πάντων τε και
έκαστου.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μην;
2Ω. Και ούδεν ετερω γε τούτων εσμεν πω
σοφοί, οϋτε ότι το άπειρον αυτής ΐσμεν οϋθ δτι
τό εν άλλ’ οτι πόσα τ’ εστι καί όποια, τούτο εστι
το γραμματικόν έκαστον ποιούν ημών.
ΠΡΩ. ’Αληθέστατα.
2Ω. Καί μην καί τό μουσικόν δ τυγχάνει ποιούν,
τοϋτ εστι ταυτόν.
πρω. Πώ?;
C 2Ω. Φωνή μεν που καί τό κατ* εκείνην την
τέχνην εστί μία εν αυτή.
ΠΡΩ. Γίώ? δ’ ου;
2Ω. Δυο δε θώμεν βαρύ καί οξύ, καί τρίτον
ομοτονον. η πως;
πρω. Ούτως.
2Ω. ΆΛΑ’ ούπω σοφός άν ε’ίης την μουσικήν
είδώς ταΰτα μόνα, μη δε είδώς ώς γ* έπος είπειν
εις ταΰτα ούδενός άξιος εσει.
πρω. Ου γάρ οΰν.
2ω. ΆΛΑ’ , ώ φίλε, επείδαν λάβης τα διαστήματα
οποσα εστι τον αριθμόν της φωνής οξύτητάς τε
περί καί βαρύτητος, καί όποια, καί τούς ορούς
D των διαστημάτων, καί τα εκ τούτων όσα συ¬
στήματα γεγονεν, ά κατιδόντες οι πρόσθεν παρ-
εδοσαν ημΐν τοΐς επομενοις εκείνοις καλεΐν αυτά
222
PHILEBUS
in the letters of the alphabet, which you were taught

as a child ; so learn it from them.
pro. How ?
soc. Sound, which passes out through the mouth

of each and all of us, is one, and yet again it is
infinite in number.
pro. Yes, to be sure.
soc. And one of us is no wiser than the other

merely for knowing that it is infinite or that it is
one ; but that which makes each of us a grammarian
is the knowledge of the number and nature of
sounds.
pro. Very true.
soc. And it is this same knowledge which makes
the musician.
pro. How is that ?
soc. Sound is one in the art of music also, so far as
that art is concerned.
pro. Of course.
soc. And we may say that there are two sounds,
low and high, and a third, which is the intermediate,
may we not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. But knowledge of these facts would not suffice
to make you a musician, although ignorance of them
would make you, if I may say so, quite worthless in
respect to music.
pro. Certainly.
soc. But, my friend, when you have grasped the
number and quality of the intervals of the voice in
respect to high and low pitch, and the limits of the
intervals, and all the combinations derived from them,
which the men of former times discovered and handed
down to us, their successors, with the traditional
223
PLATO
αρμονίας, εν τε ταΐς κινησεσιν αν τον σώματος

ετερα τοιαΰτα ενόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα, ά δη δι
αριθμών μετρηθεντα δεΐν αΰ φασι ρυθμούς και
μέτρα επονομάζειν, και άμα εννοεΐν ώς ου τω
δει περί παντός ενός και πολλών σκοπειν' όταν
γάρ αυτά1 τε λάβης ουτω, τότε εγενου σοφός,
Ε όταν τε άλλο τών όντων εν2 ότιοΰν ταντη σκοπον-
μενος ελης, όντως εμφρων περί τοΰτο γεγονας·
τό δ’ άπειρόν σε έκάστων και εν εκάστοις πλήθος
άπειρον εκάστοτε ποιεί του φρονεΐν και ουκ
ελλόγιμον ουδ’ ευάριθμον, άτ ουκ εις αριθμόν
ούδενα εν ούδενί πώποτε άπιδόντα.
8. πρω. ΚάΛΑιστα, ώ Φίληβε, εμοιγε τα νΰν
λεγάμενα είρηκεναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.
ΦΙ. Και εμοί ταΰτά γε αυτά· άλλα τί δη ποτέ
18 προς ημάς ό λόγος οΰτος νΰν εϊρηται και τί ποτέ
βουλόμενος;
2Ω. Όρθώς μεντοι τανθ’ ημάς, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε,
ηρώτηκε Φίληβος.
ΠΡΩ. ΤΙάνυ μεν οΰν, και άποκρίνου γε αυτώ.
2Ω. Δράσω ταΰτα διελθών σμικρόν ετι περί
αυτών τούτων. ώσπερ γάρ εν ότιοΰν εί τις
ποτέ λάβοι, τούτον, ώ? φαμεν, ουκ επ’ απείρου
φυσιν δει βλεπειν ευθύς άλλ’ επί τινα αριθμόν,
ουτω και το εναντίον όταν τις τό άπειρον άναγκα-
Β ( θη ποώτον λαμβάνειν, μη επι τό εν ευθύς άλλ’3
c ριθμο ’ αύ τινα. πλήθος έκαστον εγοντά τι κατα¬
νοεί. , τελευτάν tc εκ πάντων εις εν. πάλιν δε εν
τοΐς γράμμασι τό νΰν λεγόμενον λάβω μεν.
1 αι’τ TG: ταΰτά ΒΤ.

3 Άντων Wohlrab: £ν Β: όντων Τ.
3 άλλ’ Liebhold: άλλ’ έπ' ΒΤ.
224
PHILEBUS
name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects

in the movements of the body, which they say are
measured by numbers and must be called rhythms
and measures—and they say that we must also
understand that every one and many should be
considered in this way—when you have thus grasped
the facts, you have become a musician, and when by
considering it in this way you have obtained a grasp
of any other unity of all those which exist, you have
become wise in respect to that unity. But the
infinite number of individuals and the infinite number
in each of them makes you in every instance indefinite
in thought and of no account and not to be considered
among the wise, so long as you have never fixed your
eye upon any definite number in anything.
pro. I think, Philebus, that what Socrates has said
is excellent.
phi. So do I ; it is excellent in itself, but why
has he said it now to us, and what purpose is there
in it ?
soc. Protarchus, that is a very proper question
which Philebus has asked us.
pro. Certainly it is, so please answer it.
soc. I will, when I have said a little more on just
this subject. For if a person begins with some
unity or other, he must, as I was saying, not turn
immediately to infinity, but to some definite number ;
now just so, conversely, when he has to take the
infinite first, he must not turn immediately to the
one, but must think of some number which possesses
in each case some plurality, and must end by passing
from all to one. Let us revert to the letters of the
alphabet to illustrate this.
22 5
PLATO
πρω. Π ως·;
2Ω. Επειδή φωνήν άπειρον κατενόησεν ε’ίτε
τις θεός ε’ίτε καί θείος άνθρωπος, ώς λόγος εν
Αιγύπτιο Θευθ τινα τούτον γενεσθαι λόγων, ος
πρώτος τά φωνήεντα εν τώ άπείρω κατενόησεν
ουχ εν όντα άλλα πλείω, και πάλιν ετερα φωνής
C /-ιόν ον, φθόγγου δε μετεχοντά τίνος, αριθμόν
δε τινα και τούτων είναι· τρίτον δε είδος γραμ¬
μάτων διεστησατο τα νυν λεγάμενα άφωνα ημΐν
τό μετά τούτο διηρει τά τε άφθογγα και άφωνα
μόχρι ενός έκαστον, και τά φωνήεντα καί τά
μέσα κατά τον αυτόν τρόπον, εως αριθμόν αυτών
λαβών ενί τε εκάστω και ξυμπασι στοιχεΐον
επωνόμασε· καθορών δε ώς ούδείς ημών ουδ' αν
εν αυτό καθ' αυτό άνευ πάντων αυτών μάθοι,
τούτον τον δεσμόν αν λογισάμενος ώς όντα ενα καί
D πάντα ταΰτα1 εν πως ποιοϋντα μίαν επ' αυτοΐς ώς
οΰσαν γραμματικήν τέχνην επεφθεγξατο προσειπών.
φι. Ταυτ’ ετι σαφεστερον εκείνων αυτά γε
προς άλληλα, ώ Τίρώταρχε, εμαθον· τό δ’ αυτό
μοι του λόγου νυν τε καί σμικρόν έμπροσθεν
ελλείπεται.
2Ω. λίών, ώ Φίληβε, τό τί προς έπος αΰ ταυτ’
εστίν;
ΦΙ. Nat, tout’ εστιν ο πάλαι ζητοΰμεν εγώ τε
καί ΐίρεοταρχος.
2Ω. Ή μην επ' αυτώ γε ηδη γεγονότες ζητείτε,
Ε ώς φης, πάλαι;
ΦΙ. Πω?;
9. 2Ω. ’Αρ' ου περί φρονησεως ην καί ηδονης
ημΐν εξ άρχης ό λόγος, όπότερον αυτοΐν αίρετεον;
1 πάντα ταΟτα] πάντα τά ταΰτα Β : ταΰτα πάντα Τ.
226
PHILEBUS
PRO. How ?
soc. When some one, wliethei· god or godlike man,
—there is an Egyptian story that his name was
Theuth—observed that sound was infinite, he was
the first to notice that the vowel sounds in that
infinity were not one, but many, and again that
there were other elements which were not vowels
but did have a sonant quality, and that these also
had a definite number ; and he distinguished a third
kind of letters which we now call mutes. Then he
divided the mutes until he distinguished each in¬
dividual one, and he treated the vowels and semi¬
vowels in the same way, until he knew the number
of them and gave to each and all the name of letters.
Perceiving, however, that none of us could learn
any one of them alone by itself without learning
them all, and considering that this was a common
bond which made them in a way all one, he assigned
to them all a single science and called it grammar.
phi. I understand that more clearly than the
earlier statement, Protarchus, so far as the reciprocal
relations of the one and the many are concerned,
but I still feel the same lack as a little while ago.
soc. Do you mean, Philebus, that you do not see
what this has to do with the question ?
phi. Yes ; that is what Protarchus and I have
been trying to discover for a long time.
soc. Really, have you been trying, as you say, for
a long time to discover it, when it was close to you
all the while ?
phi. How is that ?
soc. Was not our discussion from the beginning
about wisdom and pleasure and which of them is
preferable ?
227
PLATO
φι. Πώ? γάρ οΰ;

2Ω. Και μην εν γε εκάτερον αύτοΐν είναι φαμεν.
Φΐ. Πάυυ μεν ούν.
2Ω. Tour’ αυτό τοίνυν ημάς ό πρόσθεν λόγος
απαιτεί, πώς εστιν εν και πολλά, αυτών εκάτερον,
και πώς μη άπειρα ευθυς, αλλά τινά ποτέ αριθμόν
εκάτερον έμπροσθεν κεκτηται του άπειρα αυτών1
εκαστα γεγονεναι;
19 πρω. 0υκ εις φαΰλόν γε ερώτημα, ώ Φίληβε,
ούκ οιδ’ δντινα τρόπον κύκλιο πως περιαγαγών
ημάς εμβεβληκε Σωκράτης. και σκόπει 8ή,
πότερος ημών άποκρινειται τό νυν ερωτώμενον.
ίσως 8η γελοΐον τό εμε του λόγου διάδοχου παν¬
τελώς ύποστάντα διά τό μη 8υνασθαι τό νυν
ερωτηθεν άποκρίνασθαι σοι πάλιν τούτο προσ-
τάττειν γελοιότερον δ’ οίμαι πολύ τό μηόετερον
Β ημών 8υνασθαι. σκόπει 8η, τι 8ράσομεν. εΐ8η
γάρ μοι 8οκεΐ νΰν έρωταν η8ονής ημάς Σωκρά¬
της, είτ εστιν είτε μη, και όπόσα εστι και όποια·
της τ’ αΰ φρονησεως περί κατά ταύτά ωσαύτως.
2Ω. ’Αληθέστατα λεγεις, ώ παΐ Καλλιοιτ μη
γάρ 8υνάμενοι τούτο κατά παντός ενός και όμοιου
και ταυτοΰ 8ράν καί τοΰ εναντίου, ώς ό παρελθών
λόγος εμηνυσεν, ού8ε ίς εις ού8εν ούόενός αν
ημών ούόεποτε γενοιτο άξιος.
C πρω. Σχβδόυ εοικεν ούτως, ώ Σώκρατες, εχειν.
αλλά καλόν μεν τό ξόμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τώ
σώφρονι, 8ευτερος δ’ είναι πλους 8οκεΐ μη λαν-
θάνειν αυτόν αυτόν, τι 8η μοι τοΰτο εΐρηται τά
νΰν, εγω σοι φρασω. συ την8ε ημϊν την συν¬
ουσίαν, ώ Σώκρατες, επεόωκας πάσι καί σεαυτόν
1 αύτονΤ: αυτόν Β.
228
PHILEBUS
phi. Yes, of course.
soc. And surely we say that each of them is one.

phi. Certainly.
soc. This, then, is precisely the question which

the previous discussion puts to us : How is each of
them one and many, and how is it that they are not
immediately infinite, but each possesses a definite
number, before the individual phenomena become
infinite ?
pro. Philebus, somehow or other Socrates has led
us round and plunged us into a serious question.

Consider which of us shall answer it. Perhaps it is
ridiculous that I, after taking your place in entire
charge of the argument, should ask you to come back
and answer this question because I cannot do so,
but I think it would be still more ridiculous if neither
of us could answer. Consider, then, what we are to
do. For I think Socrates is asking us whether there
are or are not kinds of pleasure, how many kinds
there are, and what their nature is, and the same of
wisdom.
soc. You are quite right, son of Callias ; for, as
our previous discussion showed, unless we can do
this in the case of every unity, every like, every
same, and their opposites, none of us can ever be of
any use in anything.
pro. That, Socrates, seems pretty likely to be true.
However, it is splendid for the wise man to know
everything, but the next best thing, it seems, is not
to be ignorant of himself. I will tell you why I say
that at this moment. You, Socrates, have granted
to all of us this conversation and your co-operation
22.9
PLATO
προς το διελεσθαι τί των ανθρωπίνων κτημάτων

άριστον. Φιληβου γάρ είπόντος ήδονην καί τερ-
φιν καί χαράν καί πάνθ’ όπόσα τοιαΰτ’ εστι, σύ
προς αυτά αντείπες ώς ου ταΰτα άλλ’ εκεΐνά
D εστιν, ά πολλάκις ημάς αυτούς άναμιμνησκομεν
εκόντες, όρθώς δρώντες, ΐν’ εν μνημη παρακείμενα
εκάτερα βασανίζηται. φης δ’, ώς εοικε, σύ
τό προσρηθησόμενον όρθώς άμεινον ηδονης γε
αγαθόν είναι, νοΰν, επιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην
καί πάντα αΰ τά τούτων ξυγγενη, ά1 κτάσθαι
δεΐν, αλλ’ ούχί εκείνα. τούτων δη μετ' άμφι-
σβητησεως εκατερων λεχθεντων ημείς σοι μετά
παιδιάς ηπειλήσαμεν ώς ούκ άφησομεν οίκαδε σε
Ε πριν αν τούτων των λόγων πέρας ικανόν γενηταί
τι διορισθέντων. σύ δε συνεχώρησας καί εδωκας
εις ταΰθ’ ημϊν σαυτόν, ημείς δε δη λεγομεν,
καθάπερ οι παΐδες, ότι των όρθώς δοθεντων
άφαίρεσις ούκ εστι· παΰσαι δη τον τρόπον ημΐν
άπαντών τούτον επί τά νυν λεγάμενα.
2Ω. Ύίνα λεγεις;
20 πρω. Et? απορίαν εμβάλλων καί ανέρωτων ών
μη δνναίμεθ’ αν ικανήν άπόκρισιν εν τω παρόντι
διδόναι σοι. μη γάρ οίώμεθα τέλος ημΐν είναι
των νυν την πάντων ημών απορίαν, άλΧ εί δράν
τούθ’ ημείς άδυνατοΰμεν, σοι δραστεον· ύπεσχου
γαρ. βουλεύου δη προς ταΰτα αύτός πότερον
ηδονης είδη σοι καί επιστήμης διαιρετεον η καί
εατεον, εΐ πη καθ' ετερόν τινα τρόπον ο ιός τ’
εί καί βούλει δηλώσαί πως άλλκως τά νυν αμφισβη¬
τούμενα παρ’ ημΐν.
Β 5Ω. Δεινόν μεν τοίνυν ετι προσδοκάν ούδεν
δει τον2 εμε, επειδή τούθ’ ούτως είπες· τό γάρ
230
rHILEBUS
for the purpose of determining what is the best of

human possessions. For when Philebus said it was
pleasure and gaiety and enjoyment and all that sort
of thing, you objected and said it was not those
things, but another sort, and we very properly keep
reminding ourselves voluntarily of this, in order that
both claims may be present in our memory for ex¬
amination. You, as it appears, assert that the good
which is rightly to be called better than pleasure is
mind, knowledge, intelligence, art, and all their kin ;
you say we ought to acquire these, not that other
sort. When those two claims were made and an
argument arose, we playfully threatened that we
would not let you go home until the discussion was
brought to some satisfactory conclusion. You agreed
and put yourself at our disposal for that purpose.
Now, we say that, as children put it, you cannot take
back a gift once fairly given. So cease this way of
meeting all that we say.
soc. What way do you mean ?
pro. I mean puzzling us and asking questions to
which we cannot at the moment give a satisfactory
answer. Let us not imagine that the end of our
present discussion is a mere puzzling of us all, but
if we cannot answer, you must do so ; for you gave
us a promise. Consider, therefore, whether you
yourself must distinguish the kinds of pleasure and
knowledge or will let that go, in case you are able
and willing to make clear in some other way the
matters now at issue among us.
soc. I need no longer anticipate anything terrible,
since you put it in that way ; for the words “ in
1 ά Ven. 189: om. BT. 2 δεΐ τί>ν] δείτον BT.

231
PLATO
ει βουλει ρηθεν λύει πάντα φόβον έκαστων περί,

προς 8ε αν τουτοις1 μνημην τινά 8οκεΐ τις μοι
δεδωκεναι θεών ημΐν.
πρω. ΓΙώ? 8η καί τίνων;
10. 2Ω. Αόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι άκουσας
οναρ η και εγρηγορώς νυν εννοώ περί τε ηδονης
και φρονησεως, ώς ουδέτερον αύτοΐν εστ'ι τάγαθόν,
άλλ’ άλλο τι τρίτον, ετερον μεν τούτων, άμεινον
C δέ άμφοΐν. καίτοι τοϋτό γε αν2 εναργώς ημΐν
φανη νυν, άπηλλακται μεν ηδονη του νικάν το
γάρ αγαθόν ούκ αν ετι ταυ τον αύτη γίγνοιτο. η
πώς;
πρω. Ούτως.
2Ω. Των δε γε εις την διαίρεσιν ειδών ηδονης
ούδεν ετι προσδεησόμεθα κατ’ εμην δόξαν, προϊόν
δ’ ετι σαφέστερου δείξει.
πρω. ΚάΑλιστ’ είπών οϋτω και διαπεραινε.
2Ω. Σμίκρ’ αττα τοίνυν έμπροσθεν ετι διομολο-
γησώμεθα.
πρω. Τά ποια;
2Ω. Την ταγαθού μοίραν πότερον ανάγκη τε-
D Αεον η μη τελεον είναι,
ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δηπου τελεώτατον, ώ Έιώκρατες.
2Ω. Τί δε ; ικανόν τάγαθόν;
πρω. Πω? γάρ ου; και πάντων γε εις τούτο
διαφερειν των οντων.
2Ω. Τοδε γε μην, ώς οΐμαι, περί αύτοΰ αναγ¬
καιότατου είναι λεγειν, ώς παν τό γιγνώσκον αυτό
θηρεύει και εφίεται βουλόμενον ελεΐν και περί
1 αΰ τούτοσ t: α5 τοσ Β : αύτοΐς Τ.

2 καίτοι τοΰτύ ye &ι> Badham: και τοιοΰτό ye Β: καί
τοι οϋτω ye &ι> in margin Β2: καίτοι τοΰτο έάν Τ.
232
PHILEBUS
case you are willing ” relieve me of all fear. And

besides, I think some god has given me a vague
recollection.
pro. How is that, and what is the recollection
about ?
soc. I remember now having heard long ago in a
dream, or perhaps when I was awake, some talk
about pleasure and wisdom to the effect that neither
of the two is the good, but some third thing, different
from them and better than both. However, if this
be now clearly proved to us, pleasure is deprived of
victory; for the good would no longer be identical
with it. Is not that true ?
pro.It is.
soc. And we shall have, in my opinion, no longer
any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasure.
But the progress of the discussion will make that still
clearer.
pro. Excellent ! Just go on as you have begun.
soc. First, then, let us agree on some further small
points.
pro. What are they ?
soc. Is the nature of the good necessarily perfect
or imperfect ?
pro. The most perfect of all things, surely,
Socrates.
soc. Well, and is the good sufficient ?
pro. Of course ; so that it surpasses all other
things in sufficiency.
soc. And nothing, I should say, is more certain
about it than that every intelligent being pursues it,
desires it, wishes to catch and get possession of it,
233
PLATO
αυτό1 κτησασθαι, και τών άλλων ούδεν φροντίζει

πλην των άποτελουμενών άμα άγαθοις.
πρω. 0ύκ εστι τουτοις αντείπεΐν.
Ε 2Ω. Σκοπώμεν δη και κρίνοο μεν τόν τε ι)δονης
καί τόν φρονησεως βίον ίδόντες χωρίς.
πρω. ΓΙώ? είπες;
2Ω. Μήτε εν τω της ηδονης ενεστω φρονησις
μητ εν τω της φρονησεως ηδονη. δει γαρ,
εϊπερ πότερον αυτών εστι τάγαθόν, μηδέν μηδενός
ετι προσδεΐσθαι· δεόμενον δ’ αν φανη πότερον,
21 ούκ εστι που tout’ ετι τό όντως ημΐν αγαθόν.
πρω. Πώ? γα ρ αν;

2Ω. 0 υκοΰν εν σοί πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες
ταντα;
πρω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Άπο κρίνου δη.
πρω. Αεγε.
2Ω. Αεζαι 2 αν, ΤΙρώταρχε, συ ζην τόν βίον
άπαντα ηδόμενός ήδονόις τόις μεγίστας;
Ί / > ν
ου; ιο
·\
2Ω. Άρ’ οΰν ετι τίνος αν σοι προσδεΐν ηγοιο,

ει tout’ εχεις παντελώς;
ΠΡΩ. Ούδαμώς.
2Ω. "Ορα δη, του φρονεΐν και τοΰ νοεΐν και
Β λογίζεσθαι τα δέοντα, και όσα τούτων αδελφό,
\ £ ' 5 ν 3
μων μη oeoi αν τι;
~
πρω. Καί, πάντα

yap εχοιμ' αν που τό
τι;
χαίρειν εχων.
2Ω. Ο υκοΰν οΰτω ζών αεί μεν διά βίου ταΐς
μεγίσταις ηδοναΐς χαίροις αν;
1 αυτό] αύτδ ΒΤ. 2 5^£tu’] δίξαι ΒΤ: δέξαιο vulg.

3 μη δέοι &ν Klitsch: μηδδ δραν ΒΤ.
234
PHILEBUS
and has no interest in anything in which the good is

not included.
pro. There is no denying that.
soc. Let us, then, look at the life of pleasure and
the life of wisdom separately and consider and judge
them.
pro. How do you mean ?
soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure
and no pleasure in the life of wisdom. For if either
of them is the good, it cannot have need of anything
else, and if either be found to need anything, we can
no longer regard it as our true good.
pro. No, of course not.
soc. Shall we then undertake to test them through
you ?
pro. By all means.
soc. Then answer.
pro. Ask.
soc. Would you, Protarchus, be walling to live
your whole life in the enjoyment of the greatest
pleasures ?
pro. Of course I should.
soc. Would you think you needed anything
further, if you were in complete possession of that
enjoyment ?
pro. Certainly not.
soc. But consider whether you would not have
some need of wisdom and intelligence and power of
calculating your wants and the like.
pro. Why should I ? If I have enjoyment, I have
everything.
soc. Then living thus you would enjoy the greatest
pleasures all your life ?
235
PLATO
πρη. π ο
ΓΤ-ι / o.> V
ου;
2Ω. Now δε ye και μνήμην και επιστήμην καί
δόξαν μή κεκτη μόνος αληθή, πρώτον μεν τοΰτο
αυτό, ει χαίρεις ή μή χαίρεις, ανάγκη δήπου σε
άγνοειν, κενόν γε όντα πάσης φρονήσεως;
ΠΡΩ. Ανάγκη.
C 2Ω. Και μην ωσαύτως μνήμην μή κεκτημενον
ανάγκη δή που μηδ’ ότι ποτέ εχαιρες μεμνήσθαι,
τής τ’ εν τώ παραχρήμα ηδονής προσπιπτονσης
μηδ’ ήντινοΰν μνήμην ύπομενειν δόξαν δ’ αΰ
μή κεκτημενον αληθή μή δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαί-
ροντα, λογισμού δε στερόμενον μηδ’ εις τον
επειτα χρόνον ώς χαιρήσεις δυνατόν είναι λογί-
ζεσθαι, ζήν δε ούκ ανθρώπου βίον, αλλά τίνος
πλευμονος ή των όσα θαλάττια μετ’ όστρέίνων
D εμφυχά εστι σωμάτων. εστι ταΰτα, ή παρά
ταΰτα εχομεν άλλως πως διανοηθήναι;
πρω. Kat πώς;
2Ω. Άρ’ οΰν αιρετός ήμΐν βίος 6 τοιοΰτος;
πρω. Et? αφασίαν παντάπασί με, ώ Ίίώκρατες,
οΰτος ό Aoyos· εμβεβληκε τα νυν.
2Ω. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τον δε του
νοΰ μεταλαβόντες αυ βίον ίδωμεν.
11. πρω. Top1 ποιον δή λεγεις;
2Ω. Εί, τις δεξαιτ’ αν αΰ ζήν ημών φρόνησιν
μεν καί νοΰν και επιστήμην και μνήμην πάσαν
Ε πάντων κεκτημενος, ηδονής δε μετόχων μήτε
μεγα μήτε σμικρόν, μη δ' αΰ λύπης, άλλα τό
παραπαν απαθής πάντων τών τοιοΰτων.
πρω. Ουδέτερος δ βίος, ώ Σώκρατες, εμοιγε τού¬
των αιρετός, ούδ’ άλλω μή ποτέ, ώς εγωμαι, φανή,
1 τύν Τ: om. Β.
236
PHILEBUS
pro. Yes ; why not ?

soc. But if you did not possess mind or memory
or knowledge or true opinion, in the first place, you
would not know whether you were enjoying your
pleasures or not. That must be true, since you are
utterly devoid of intellect, must it not ?
pro. Yes, it must.
soc. And likewise, if you had no memory you
could not even remember that you ever did enjoy
pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present
pleasure could remain with you ; if you had no true
opinion you could not think you were enjoying
pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it,
and if you were without power of calculation you
would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy
it in the future ; your life would not be that of a
man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like
the oyster. Is that true, or can we imagine any other
result ?
pro. We certainly cannot,
soc. And can we choose such a life ?
pro. This argument, Socrates, has made me
utterly speechless for the present.
soc. Well, let us not give in yet. Let us take up
the life of mind and scrutinize that in turn.
pro. What sort of life do you mean ?
soc. I ask whether anyone would be willing to
live possessing wisdom and mind and knowledge and
perfect memory of all things, but having no share,
great or small, in pleasure, or in pain, for that matter,
but being utterly unaffected by everything of that sort.
pro. Neither of the two lives can ever appear
desirable to me, Socrates, or, I think, to anyone else.
i 237
PLATO
22 2Ω. Tt δ’ ό ξυναμφότερος, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, εξ

άμφοΐν συμμιχθεϊς κοινός γενόμενος ;
ΠΡΩ. 'Ηδορτ]? λεγείζ καί νοΰ και φρονησεως;
2Ω. Οντω καί τών τοιοΰτων λέγω εγωγε.1
ΠΡΩ. Πα? δηπου τοΰτόν γε αίρησεται προτε-
ρον η ’κείνων όποτερονοΰν, καί προς τοΰτοις ουχ
( / ί Ο5 3/
ο μεν, ο ο ον. ^
2Ω. Μανθάνομεν οΰν ο τι νυν ημΐν εστι το
ξυμβαΐνον εν τοΐς παροΰσι λογοις;
πρω. ΤΙάνν μεν ούν, δτί γε τρεις μεν βίοι πρου-
Β τεθησαν, τοΐν δυοΐν δ’ ουδέτερος ικανός ουδέ
αίρετδς ούτε ανθρώπων ούτε ζώων ούδενί.
2Ω. Μών οΰν ούκ ηδη τούτων γε περί δηλον
ώς ουδέτερος αυτών ώιχε ταγαθόν; ην γαρ αν
ικανός καί τελεος καί πάσι φυτοΐς καί ζώοις
αιρετός, οίσπερ δυνατόν ην ούτως αεί δια βι,ου
ζην εί δέ τίς άλλα ηρεΐθ' ημών, παρά φνσιν άν
την του αληθώς αίρετοΰ ελάμβανεν άκων εξ
άγνοιας η τίνος ανάγκης οΰκ εύδαίμονος.
γιρω. ’Έοι/ce γοΰν ταΰθ’ ούτως εχειν.
C 2Ω. Ώ? μεν τοινυν την γε Φιληβου θεόν ου
δεΐ διανοεΐσθαί ταυ τον καί ταγαθόν, ικανώς
ειρησθαι μοί δοκεΐ.
Φΐ. Οδδε γάρ 6 σός νους, ώ Σώκρατες, εστι
ταγαθόν, άλλ’ εξει που ταύτά εγκλήματα.
2Ω. Τάχ’ άν, ώ Φίληβε, δ γ’ εμάς· ου μεντοι
τόν γε άληθίνόν άμα καί θειον οΐμαί νουν,
άλλ’ άλλω? πως εχείν. τών μεν οΰν νικητηοιων
ιτροζ τον κοινον ριον ουκ αμφισβητώ ττω υπέρ
νοΰ, τών δε δη δευτερείων όρον καί σκοπεΐν χρη
D περί τί δράσομεν. τάχα γάρ αν του κοίνοΰ τουτου
1 Hyu-ye om. ΒΤ: add. in marg. Τ.
238
PHILEBUS
soc. How about the combined life, Protarchus,

made up by a union of the two ?
pro. You mean a union of pleasure with mind or
wisdom ?
soc. Yes, I mean a union of such elements.
pro. Every one will prefer this life to either of
the two others—yes, every single person without
exception.
soc. Then do we understand the consequences of
what we are now saying ?
pro. Certainly. Three lives have been proposed,
and of two of them neither is sufficient or desirable
for man or any other living being.
soc. Then is it not already clear that neither of
these two contained the good ? For if it did contain
the good, it would be sufficient and perfect, and
such as to be chosen by all living creatures which
would be able to live thus all their lives ; and if any
of us chose anything else, he wrould be choosing
contrary to the nature of the truly desirable, not of
his own free will, but from ignorance or some un¬
fortunate necessity.
pro. That seems at any rate to be true,
soc. And so I think we have sufficiently proved
that Philebus’s divinity is not to be considered
identical with the good.
phi. But neither is your “ mind ” the good,
Socrates ; it will be open to the same objections.
soc. My mind, perhaps, Philebus ; but not so, I
believe, the true mind, which is also divine ; that
is different. I do not as yet claim for mind the
victory over the combined life, but we must look
and see what is to be done about the second
place ; for each of us might perhaps put forward a
239
PLATO
βίου αίτιώμεθ' άν εκάτερος ό μ.εν τον νουν αίτιον,

ο δ’ ηδονην είναι, καί ούτω τδ μεν αγαθόν τούτων
άμφοτερων ουδέτερον αν ε’ίη, τάχα δ’ αν αίτιον
τις ύπολάβοι πότερον αυτών είναι. τούτου δη
περί καί μάλλον ετι προς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην
άν ώς εν τώ μικτώ τούτου βίω, ο τι ποτ εστι
τούτο δ λαβών 6 βίος οΰτος γεγονεν αιρετός άμα
καί αγαθός, ούχ ηδονη άλλα νους τούτω ζυγ-
γενεστερον καί ομοιότερόν εστι, καί κατά τούτον
Ε τον λόγον ούτ άν των πρωτείων ούδ' αύ των
δευτερείων ηδονη μετόν αληθώς άν ποτέ λεγοιτο·
πορρωτέρω δε εστι τών τριτείων, εΐ τι τώ εμώ
νώ δει πιστεύειν ημάς τα νΰν.
πρω. ’Αλλά μην, ώ Σώκρατες, εμοιγε δοκεΖ
νΰν μεν ηδονη σοι πεπτωκεναι καθαπερεί πλη-
γεϊσα υπό τών νΰν δη λόγων τών γάρ νικητήριων
23 περί μαχομεν η κεΐται. τον δε νοΰν, ώς εοικε,
λεκτεον ώς εμφρόνως ούκ άντεποιειτο τών νικη¬
τήριων τα γάρ αυτά επαθεν άν. τών δε δη
δευτερείων στερηθείσα ηδονη παντάπασιν άν τινα
καί ατιμίαν σχοίη προς τών αυτής εραστών ούδε
γάρ εκείνοις ετ άν ομοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.
2Ω. Τι οΰν; ούκ άμεινον αυτήν εάν ηδη καί
μη την άκριβεστάτην αυτή προσφεροντα βάσανον
καί εξελεγχοντα λυπεΐν;
ΠΡΩ. Ουδερ λε^ει?, ώ Σώκρατες.
Β 2Ω. Άρ’ δτι τδ αδύνατον εΐπον, λυπεΐν ηδονην;
πρω. Ον μόνον γε, άλλ’ δτι καί αγνοείς ώς
ούδείς πώ σε ημών μεθησει πριν άν εις τέλος
επεξελθης τούτων τώ λόγω.
2Ω. Βαβαί άρα, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, συχνού μεν
240
PHILEBUS
claim, one that mind is the cause of this combined

life, the other that pleasure is the cause ; and thus
neither of these two would be the good, but one or
the other of them might be regarded as the cause
of the good. On this point I might keep up the
fight all the more against Philebus and contend that
in this mixed life it is mind that is more akin and
more similar than pleasure to that, whatever it may
be, which makes it both desirable and good ; and
from this point of view pleasure could advance no
true claim to the first or even the second place. It
is farther behind than the third place, if my mind is
at all to be trusted at present.
pro. Certainly, Socrates, it seems to me that
pleasure has fought for the victory and has fallen

in this bout, knocked down by your words. And
we can only say, as it seems, that mind was wise
in not laying claim to the victory ; for it would
have met with the same fate. Now pleasure, if she
were to lose the second prize, would be deeply
humiliated in the eyes of her lovers ; for she would
no longer appear even to them so lovely as before.
soc. Well, then, is it not better to leave her now
and not to pain her by testing her to the utmost and
proving her in the wrong ?
pro. Nonsense, Socrates !
soc. Nonsense because I spoke of paining pleasure,
and that is impossible ?
pro. Not only that, but because you do not un¬
derstand that not one of us will let you go yet until

you have finished the argument about these matters,
soc. Whew, Protarchus ! Then we have a long
241
PLATO
λόγου -του λοιπού, σχεδόν δε ουδέ ραδίου πάνυ

τι νυν. και γάρ δη φαίνεται δεΐν άλλης μηχανης
επί τα δευτερεΐα υπέρ νοϋ πορευόμενον, οΐον
βέλη εχειν ετερα των έμπροσθεν λόγων' εστι δε
ίσως ενια και ταύτά.1 ούκοΰν χρη;
πρω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
12. 2Ω. Ύην δε γε αρχήν αύτοΰ διευλαβεΐσθαι
C πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.
πρω. Ποίαν δη λέγεις;
2Ω. Πάντα τά νυν όντα εν τω π αντί διχη δια-
λάβωμεν, μάλλον δ’, εί βοόλει, τριχη.
ΠΡΩ. Κα0’ ο τι, φράζοις αν.
2Ω. Αάβωμεν άττα των νΰν δη λόγων.
πρω. Ποια;
2Ω. Τον θεόν ελέγομέν που τό μεν άπειρον
δεΐζαι των ον των, τό δε πέρας;
πρω. Πάνυ μέν οΰν.
2Ω. Τουτω2 δη των ειδών τά δυο τιθωμεθα,
το δε τρίτον εζ αμφοΐν τουτοιν εν τι συμμισγό-
Π μεν ον. ειμι δ , ως εοικεν, έγω γελοίος τις
άνθρωπος3 κατ είδη διιστάς καί συναριθμουμενος.
πρω. Τι φης, ώγαθέ;
2Ω. 1 ετάρτου μοι γένους αΰ προσδεΐν φαίνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Αέγε τίνος.
^2Ω. Ύης ζυμμιζεως τούτων προς άλληλα την
αιτίαν ορα, και τιθει μοι προς τρισίν εκείνοις
τέταρτον τούτο.
ΠΡΩ. Μών οΰν σοι καί πέμπτου προσδεησει
διάκρισίν τίνος δυναμέν ου ;
2Ω. Τ'αχ αν’ ου μην οίμαί γε εν τω νυν' εάν
1 ταΰτα ΒΤ. 2 τούτω Stallbaum : τούτων ΒΤ.
3 Tts άνθρωποί Badham: tis ίκανόί Β : ns Ικανως Τ.
212
PHILEBUS
discussion before us, and not an easy one, either,

this time. For in going ahead to fight mind’s battle
for the second place, I think I need a new con¬
trivance—other weapons, as it were, than those of
our previous discussion, though perhaps some of the
old ones will serve. Must I then go on ?
pro. Of course you must.
soc. Then let us try to be careful in making our
beginning.
pro. What kind of a beginning do you mean ?
soc. Let us divide all things that now exist in the
universe into two, or rather, if you please, three
classes.
pro. Please tell us on what principle you would
divide them.
soc. Let us take some of the subjects of our
present discussion.
pro. What subjects ?
soc. We said that God revealed in the universe
two elements, the infinite and the finite, did we not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Let us, then, assume these as two of our
classes, and a third, made by combining these two.
But I cut a ridiculous figure, it seems, when I
attempt a division into classes and an enumeration.
pro. What do you mean, my friend ?
soc. I think we need a fourth class besides.
pro. Tell us what it is.
soc. Note the cause of the combination of those
two and assume that as the fourth in addition to the
previous three.
pro. And then will you not need a fifth, which has
the power of separation ?
soc. Perhaps ; but not at present, I think. How-
243
PLATO
E δε τι δεη, συγγνώσει πού μοι σύ μεταδιώκοντι

πεμπτον.1
ΠΡΩ. Τί μην;
2Ω. Πρώτον μεν δη των τεττάρων τα τρία
διελόμενοι, τά δύο τούτων π ειρώμεθα, πολλά
εκάτερον εσχι σμενον καί δίεσπα σμενον ίδόντες,
εις εν πάλα’ έκά.τερον συναγαγόντες, νοησαι πη
ποτέ ην αυτών εν καί πολλά εκάτερον.
πρω. Εϊ μοι σαφεστερον ετι περί αυτών είποις,
τάχ’ αν εποίμην.
24 2Ω. Αεγω τοίνυν τά δύο ά προτίθεμαι, ταΰτ
είναι άπερ νυν δη, το μεν άπειρον, το δε πέρας
εχον οτι δε τρόπον τινά τό άπειρον πολλά εστι,
πειράσομαι φράζειν το δε πέρας ύχον ημάς
π εριμενετω.
πρω. Με'νει.
2Ω. Σκεφαι δη. χαλεπόν μεν γάρ και άμφισβη-
τησιμον ο κελεύω σε σκοπεΐν, όμως δε σκοπεί,
θερμότερου και φυχροτερου περί πρώτον όρα
πέρας εί ποτέ τι νόησαις άν, η τό μάλλον τε και
ηττον εν αύτοΐς οικοΰντε2 τοΐς γενεσιν, εωσπερ
Β άν ενοικητον, τέλος ούκ άν επιτρεφαίτην γίγνε¬
σθαι· γενομενης γάρ τελευτής και αύτώ τετελευ-
τηκατον.
ΠΡΩ. ’Αληθέστατα λεγεις.
2Ω. Αεί. δε γε, φαμεν, εν τε τώ θερμοτερω καί
φυχροτερω τό μάλλον τε καί ηττον ενι.
πρω. Και μάλα.
2Ω. Αεί τοίνυν ο λόγος ημΐν σημαίνει τούτω
μη τέλος εχειν ατελή δ’ όντε δηπου παντάπασιν
απείρω γίγνεσθον.
πρω. Καί σφοδρά γε, ώ Σώκρατες.
244
PHILEBUS
ever, if we do need a fifth, you will pardon me for

going after it.
pro. Of course.
soc. First, then, let us take three of the four and,

as we see that two of these are split up and scattered
each one into many, let us try, by collecting each
of them again into one, to learn how each of them
was both one and many.
pro. If you could tell me more clearly about
them, I might be able to follow you.
soc. I mean, then, that the two which I select
are the same which I mentioned before, the infinite
and the finite. I will try to show that the infinite
is, in a certain sense, many ; the finite can wait.
pro. Yes.
soc. Consider then. What I ask you to consider
is difficult and debatable ; but consider it all the
same. In the first place, take hotter and colder
and see whether you can conceive any limit of them,
or whether the more and less which dwell in their
very nature do not, so long as they continue to
dwell therein, preclude the possibility of any end ;
for if there were any end of them, the more and less
would themselves be ended.
pro. Very true.
soc. But always, we affirm, in the hotter and colder
there is the more and less.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Always, then, the argument shows that these
two have no end ; and being endless, they are of
course infinite.
pro. Most emphatically, Socrates.
1 πέμπτοι’ βίον BT: βίον bracketed by Schanz.

2 οίκοΰντε sec. Coisl.: οίκονν BT.
i 2 24.5
PLATO
2Ω. ’AAA’ ευ ye, ώ φίAe Τίρώταρχε, ΰπελαβες

C καί άνεμνησας ότι καί τό σφοδρά τοϋτο, ο συ νυν
εφθεγξω, καί τό ye ήρεμα την αυτήν δΰναμιν
εχετον τώ μάλλον τε καί ηττον. δττου γάρ αν
ενητον, ούκ εάτον είναι ποσόν έκαστον, άλλ
αεί σφοδρότερον ήσυχαιτερου καί τουναντίον εκα-
σταις πράζεσιν εμποιοΰντε το πλέον καί τό ελαττον
άπεργάζεσθον, τό δε ποσόν αφανίζετον. 6 γαρ
ελεχθη νΰν δη, μη αφανίσαντε τό ποσόν, άλλ’
εάσαντε αυτό τε καί τό μετριον εν τη του μάλλον
D καί ηττον καί σφόδρα καί ήρεμα έδρα εγγενεσθαι,
αυτό, ερρει ταΰτα εκ της αυτών χώρας εν η ενήν.
ου γαρ ετι θερμότερου ουδέ φυχρότερον ε’ίτην1
αν λαβόντε το ποσόν προχωρεί γαρ καί ου
μενει τό τε θερμότερου αεί καί τό φυχρότερον
ωσαύτως, το δε ποσόν εστη καί προϊόν επαυσατο·
κατα δη τούτον τον λόγον άπειρον γίγνοιτ αν τό
θερμότερου καί τουναντίον αμα.
ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοΰν, ώ Έώκρατες· εστι δ’,
077ερ είπες, ου ράδια ταΰτα συνεπεσθαι· τό δέ
Ε ώις αΰθίς τε καί αύθις ίσως λεχθεντα τόν τε ερω-
τώντα καί τόν ερωτώμενον ίκανώς αν ζυμφω-
νοΰντας άποφήναιεν.
5Ω. Άλλ’ ευ μεν λεγεις, καί πειρατεον οϋτω
ποιειν. νΰν μεντοι αθρει της τοΰ απείρου φυσειυς
εί τοΰτο δεζόμεθα σημείου, ΐνα μη πάντ επεζ-
ιόντες μηκΰνωμεν.
πρω. Τδ ποιον δη λεγεις;
2Ω. Όττοσ’ αν ημΐν φαίνηται μάλλον τε καί
ηττον γιγνόμενα καί τό σφόδρα καί ήρεμα δεχό-
25 μένα καί τό λίαν καί δσα τοιαΰτα πάντα, εις τό
1 είτην Τ: ίστψ Β: Ί}την vulg.
246
PHILEBUS
soc. I am glad you responded, my dear Protarchus,

and reminded me that the word “ emphatically ”
which you have just used, and the word “ gently ”
have the same force as “ more ” and “ less.” For
wherever they are present, they do not allow any
definite quantity to exist ; they always introduce in
every instance a comparison—more emphatic than
that which is quieter, or vice versa—and thus they
create the relation of more and less, thereby doing
away with fixed quantity. For, as I said just now,
if they did not abolish quantity, but allowed it and
measure to make their appearance in the abode of
the more and less, the emphatically and gently,
those latter would be banished from their own proper
place. When once they had accepted definite
quantity, they would no longer be hotter or colder ;
for hotter and colder are always progressing and
never stationary ; but quantity is at rest and does
not progress. By this reasoning hotter and its
opposite are shown to be infinite.
pro. That appears to be the case, Socrates ; but,
as you said, these subjects are not easy to follow.
Perhaps, however, continued repetition might lead
to a satisfactory agreement between the questioner
and him who is questioned.
soc. That is a good suggestion, and I must try to
carry it out. However, to avoid waste of time in
discussing all the individual examples, see if we can
accept this as a designation of the infinite.
pro. Accept what ?
soc. All things which appear to us to become more
or less, or to admit of emphatic and gentle and
excessive and the like, are to be put in the class of
247
PLATO
του απείρου γένος ώς εις ευ δει πάντα ταΰτα

τιθέναι, κατά τον ’έμπροσθεν λόγον ον έφαμεν
όσα διέσπασται καί διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρη-
ναί κατά δυναμιν μίαν επισημαίνεσθαί τινα φΰσιν,
el μέμνησαι.
πρω. Μέμνημαι.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τά μη δεχόμενα ταΰτα, τούτων
δε τά εναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρώτον μεν τό
’ίσον καί Ισότητα, μετά δε το 'ίσον το διπλάσιου
καί παν ότιπερ άν προς αριθμόν αριθμός η μέτρον
Β η προς μέτρον, ταΰτα ξυμπαντα εις τό πέρας
άπολογιζόμενοι καλώς άν δοκοΐμεν δράν τοΰτο.
η πώς σύ φης;
πρω. Κάλλιστά γε, ώ Σώκρατες.
13. 2Ω. Είευ· τό δε τρίτον τό μικτόν εκ τοΰ-
τοιν άμφοΐν τίνα ιδέαν φησομεν έχειν;
πρω. Σοί και εμοι φράσεις, ώς οΐμαι.
2Ω. Θεό? μεν ονν, άνπερ γε εμαΐς εύχαΐς επη-
κοος γίγνηταί τις θεών.
πρω. Ενχου δη και σκόπει.
2Ω. Σκοπώ· καί μοι δοκεΐ τις, ώ ΤΙραιταρχε,
αυτών φίλος ημΐν νΰν δη γεγονέναι.
C πρω. Πώ? λέγεις τοΰτο και τίνι τεκμηρίω χρη;
2Ω. Φράσω δηλον ότι. σύ δέ μοι συνακο-
λούθησον τέρ λόγω.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.
2Ω. Θερμότερου έφθεγγόμεθα νΰν δη πού τι
και φυχρότερον. η γάρ;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
2Ω. Πρόσ@ε? δη ξηρότερου και ύγρότερον αύτοΐς
και πλέον και έλαττον και θάττον και βραδύτερου
και μεΐζον και σμικρότερον και όπόσα εν τώ
248
PHILEBUS
the infinite as their unity, in accordance with what

we said a while ago, if you remember, that we ought
to collect all things that are scattered and split up
and impress upon them to the best of our ability the
seal of some single nature.
pro. I remember.
soc. And the things which do not admit of more

and less and the like, but do admit of all that is
opposed to them—first equality and the equal, then
the double, and anything which is a definite number
or measure in relation to such a number or measure
—all these might properly be assigned to the class
of the finite. What do you say to that ?
pro. Excellent, Socrates.
soc. Well, what shall we say is the nature of the
third class, made by combining these two ?
pro. You will tell me, I fancy, by answering your
own question.
soc. Nay, a god will do so, if any god will give
ear to my prayers.
pro. Pray, then, and watch.
soc. I am watching ; and I think, Protarchus, one
of the gods has this moment been gracious unto me.
pro. What do you mean, and what evidence have
you ?
soc. I will tell you, of course. Just follow what
Isay.
pro. say on.
soc. We spoke just now of hotter and colder, did
we not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. Add to them drier and wetter, more and less,
quicker and slower, greater and smaller, and all that
PLATO
7τρόσθεν της το μάλλον τε καί ηττον δεχόμενης

ετίθεμεν εις εν φύσεως.
D πρω. Ττ^ τοΰ απείρου λέγεις;
2Ω. Ναι. συμμίγνυ δε γε εις αυτήν το μετά
ταΰτα την αΰ τοΰ1 7τέρατος γένναν.
πρω. Ποιαν;
2Ω. ηΗν καί νυν δη, δέον ημάς καθάπερ την
τοΰ απείρου συνηγάγομεν είς εν, οΰτω καί την
τοΰ περατοειδοΰς συναγαγεΐν, ου συνηγάγομεν.
άλλ’ ίσως καί νΰν ταύτον δράσει, εΡ τούτων
άμφοτέρων συναγόμενων καταφανής κάκείνη γέ¬
νη σεται.
πρω. Ποιαν καί πώς Aeyei?;
2Ω. Την τοΰ ίσου καί διπλάσιου, καί όπόση
Ε παύει προς άλληλα τάναντία διαφόρως έχοντα,
σύμμετρα δέ καί σύμφωνα ενθεΐσα αριθμόν απ¬
εργάζεται.
πρω. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνύς
ταΰτα γενέσεις τινάς έφ' εκάστων αυτών συμβαί-
νειν.
2Ω. Όρθώς γάρ φαίνομαι.
ΠΡΩ. Αέγε τοίνυν.
2Ω. Άρ’ ούκ εν μεν νόσοις η τούτων ορθή
κοινωνία την ύγιείας φύσιν έγέννησεν;
26 πρω. Παντάττασι μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Έν δέ όζει καί βαρει καί ταχεΐ καί βραδεΐ,
άπείροις οΰσιν, άρ’ ου ταύτά έγγιγνόμενα ταΰτα
άμα πέρας τε άπειργάσατο καί μουσικήν ζύμπασαν
τελεώτατα ζυνεστησατο;
πρω. Κάλλιστά γε.
2Ω. Και μην εν γε χειμώσι καί πνίγεσιν έγ-
γενομεν α3 το μέν πολύ λίαν καί άπειρον άφ-
250
PHILEBUS
we assigned before to the class which unites more

and less.
pro. You mean the class of the infinite ?
soc. Yes. Mix with that the second class, the
offspring of the limit.
pro. What class do you mean ?
soc. The class of the finite, which we ought just
now to have reduced to unity, as we did that of the
infinite. We have not done that, but perhaps we
shall even now accomplish the same end, if these
two are both unified and then the third class is
revealed.
pro. What third class, and what do you mean ?
soc. The class of the equal and double and every¬
thing which puts an end to the differences between
opposites and makes them commensurable and
harmonious by the introduction of number.
pro. I understand. I think you mean that by
mixture of these elements certain results are pro¬
duced in each instance,
soc. Yes, you are right.
pro. Go on.
soc. In cases of illness, does not the proper com¬
bination of these elements produce health ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And in the acute and the grave, the quick and
the slow, which are unlimited, the addition of these
same elements creates a limit and establishes the
whole art of music in all its perfection, does it not ?
pro. Excellent.
soc. And again in the case of cold and hot weather,
the introduction of these elements removes the excess
1 αΰ τοΰ Coisl.: αύτοΰ BT. 2 δράσει d Vahlen: δράσει BT.
3 έγγενόμενα B: iyyei/ομένη TG.
251
PLATO
είλετο, το δε 'έμμετρον καί άμα σύμμετρον

άπειργάσατο.
ΠΡΠ. Τι μην;
2Ω. Ούκοΰν εκ τούτων ώραί τε καί δσα καλά.
Β πάντα ημΐν γέγονε, των τε απείρων και, των
πέρας εχόντων συμμιχθεντων ;
πρω.Πώ? δ’ οϋ;
2Ω.Και άλλα γε 8η μύρια επιλείπω λίγων,
οΐον μεθ’ ύγιείας κάλλος καί ίσχύν, καί εν φυχαις
αΰ πάμπολλα ετερα και πάγκαλα, ύβριν γάρ που
καί ζύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίσΊ αυτή κατιδοΰσα
ή θεός, ώ καλέ Φίληβε, τέρας ούτε ηδονών
ούδεν ούτε πλησμονών ενόν εν αύτοΐς, νομον και
τάζιν πέρας εχοντη εθετο' και σύ μεν απο-
C κναισαι φης1 2 αυτήν, εγώ 8ε τουναντίον απόσωσαι
Aeyoj. σοΙ 8ε, ώ ΪΙρώταρχε, πώς φαίνεται;
πρω. Και μάλα, ώ Σώκρατες, εμοιγε κατά νουν.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν τα μεν 8η τρία ταΰτα ε’ίρηκα, εί
ξυννοεΐς.
πρω. Άλλ’ οΐμαι κατανοεΐν εν μεν γάρ μοι
8οκεΐς τό άπειρον λεγειν, εν δέ και δεύτερον το
πέρας εν τοΐς οΰσι· τρίτον δε ου σφοδρά κατέχω
τί βούλει φράζειν.
2Ω.Τδ γάρ πλήθος σε, ώ θαυμάσιε, εζεπληζε
της τοΰ τρίτου γενεσεως· καιτοι πολλά γε και το
D άπειρον παρεσχετο γένη, όμως 8’ επισφραγισθεντα
τώ τοΰ μάλλον και εναντίου γίνει εν εφάνη.
1 έχοντ' Τ: έχόντων Β.
3 άποκναΐσαι </>t;s Kidd. misc. Porson, p. 265; άποκναΐς ΐφηί BT.
1 This goddess may be Moucri/oj (in which case iyyet/ομένη,

the reading of T and G, would be preferable to iyyevb/j.eva
above), not music in the restricted modern sense, but the
252
PHILEBUS
and indefiniteness and creates moderation and har-

monjr.
pro. Assuredly.
soc. And thence arise the seasons and all the
beauties of our world, by mixture of the infinite
with the finite ?
pro. Of course.
soc. There are countless other things which I
pass over, such as health, beauty, and strength of
the body and the many glorious beauties of the
soul. For this goddess,1 my fair Philebus, beholding
the violence and universal wickedness which pre¬
vailed, since there was no limit of pleasures or of
indulgence in them, established law and order, which
contain a limit. You say she did harm ; I say, on
the contrary, she brought salvation. What do you
think, Protarchus ?
pro. What you say, Socrates, pleases me greatly.
soc. I have spoken of these three classes, you
observe.
pro. Yes, I believe I understand ; I think you
mean that the infinite is one class and the finite is
another class among existing things ; but what you
wish to designate as the third class, I do not com¬
prehend very well.
soc. No, because the multitude which springs up
in the third class overpowers you ; and yet the
infinite also comprised many classes, nevertheless,
since they were sealed with the seal of the more
and less, they were seen to be of one class.
spirit of numbers and measure which underlies all music,
and all the beauties of the world ; or the goddess may be
mentioned here in reference (and opposition) to the goddess
Pleasure (12 b) ; she is the nameless deity who makes
Pleasure and all others conform to her rules.
253
PLATO
ΠΡΩ.’Αληθή.
2Ω.Και μην το γε πέρας ούτε πολλά άιχεν,
ούτ εδυσκολαίνομεν ώς ούκ ήν εν φύσει.
ΠΡΩ. Π cos' γάρ άν;
2Ω. Ούδαμώς. άλλα τρίτον φάθι με λεγειν,
εν τούτο τιθεντα το τούτων εκγονον άπαν, γενεσιν
εις ουσίαν εκ των μετά του περατος άπειργα-
σμενών μέτρων.
πρω. ’Έμαθον.
E 14. 2Ω. Αλλά δη προς τρισί τέταρτόν tl
τότε εφαμεν είναι γένος σκεπτεον κοινή δ’ ή
σκεφις. όρα γάρ, εί σοι δοκεΐ άναγκαΐον είναι
πάντα τά γιγνόμενα διά τινα αιτίαν γίγνεσθαι.
πρω. Έ μοιγε· πώς γάρ άν χωρίς τούτου
γίγνοιτο;
2Ω. Ουκοΰν ή του ποιοΰντος φυσις ούδεν πλήν
ουο/χατι τής αιτίας διαφέρει, το δε ποιούν καί το
αίτιον όρθώς άν είη λεγόμενον εν;
πρω. Όρθώς.
27 2Ω. Και μην τό γε ποιουμενον αΰ καί το γιγνό-
μενον ούδεν πλήν όνόματι, καθάπερ το νυν δή,
διαφερον εύρήσομεν. ή πώς;
ΠΡΩ. Ούτως.
2Ω. Άρ’ οΰν ηγείται μεν τό ποιούν άει κατά
φύσιν, τό δε ποιουμενον επακολουθεί γιγνόμενον
εκείνω ;
ι *
πρω. ΐίάνυ γε.

__ »λ η ν \ 5/ »
2Ω. ΆΛΛο αρα και ου ταυτον αίτια τ εστί καί
τό δουλεΰον εις γενεσιν αίτίφ.
πρω. Τί μην;
£54
PHILEBUS
pro. True.
soc. And the finite, again, did not contain many
classes, nor were we disturbed about its natural unity.
pro. Of course not.
soc. No, not at all. And as to the third class,
understand that I mean every offspring of these
two which comes into being as a result of the measures
created by the co-operation of the finite.
pro. I understand.
soc. But we said there was, in addition to three
classes, a fourth to be investigated. Let us do that
together. See whether you think that everything
which comes into being must necessarily come into
being through a cause.
pro. Yes, I do ; for how could it come into being
apart from a cause ?
soc. Does not the nature of that which makes or
creates differ only in name from the cause, and may
not the creative agent and the cause be properly
considered one ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And, again, we shall find that, on the same
principle, that which is made or created differs in
name only from that which comes into being, shall
we not ?
pro. We shall.
soc. And the creative agent always naturally leads,
and that which is created follows after it as it comes
into being ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Then the cause and that which is the servant
of the cause for the purpose of generation are not
the same.
pro. Of course not.
255
PLATO
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τα μεν γιγνόμενα καί εξ ών γίγνεται

•πάντα τά τρία παρεσχετο ήμΐν γένη;
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα.
Β 2Ω. Το δε δή πάντα ταΰτα δημιουργούν λε-
γομεν τέταρτον, την αιτίαν, ώς ίκανώς ετερον
εκείνων δεδηλωμενον ;
πρω. "Ετερον γάρ οΰν.
2Ω. Όρθώς μην εχει, διωρισμενων των τετ-
τάρων ενός έκαστου μνήμης ενεκα εφεξής αυτά
καταριθμήσασθαι.
2Ω. Πρώτον μεν τοίνυν άπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δε
πέρας, επειτ’ εκ τούτων τρίτον μικτήν και γεγενη-
μενην ουσίαν’ την δε τής μίξεως αιτίαν και γενεσεως
0 Τετάρτην λε'γων άρα μη πλημμελοίην αν τι;
πρω. Και πώς;
2Ω. Φερε δή, τό μετά τοΰθ’ ήμΐν τις ό λόγος,
και τι ποτέ βουληθεντες εις ταΰτα άφικόμεθα;
αρ’ ου τάδε ήν; δευτερεΐα εζητοΰμεν πότερον
ηδονής γίγνοιτ’ αν ή φρονήσεως. ούχ ούτως ήν;
ΠΡΩ. Οϋτω μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Άρ’ οΰν ίσως1 νΰν, επειδή ταΰτα οϋτω
διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον αν και τήν κρίσιν επιτελε-
σαίμεθα πρώτου περί καί δευτέρου, περί ών δή
το πρώτον ήμφισβητήσαμεν;
ΠΡΩ. ’Τσω?.
D 2Ω. ’Ίθι δή· νικώντα μεν εθεμεν που τον μι¬
κτόν βίον ηδονής τε καί φρονήσεως. ήν ούτως;
ΠΡΩ. ΤΗν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τοΰτον μεν τον βίον όρώμεν που
τις τε εστι και οποίου γένους;
1 i'cros Stallbaum: ώι ΒΤ.
256
PHILEBUS
soc. Did not the things which come into being

and the things out of which they come into being
furnish us all the three classes ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And that which produces all these, the cause,

we call the fourth, as it has been satisfactorily shown
to be distinct from the others ?
pro. Yes, it is distinct.
soc. It is, then, proper, now that we have dis¬
tinguished the four, to make sure that we remember
them separately by enumerating them in order.
pro. Yes, certainly.
soc. The first, then, I call infinite, the second
limit or finite, and the third something generated
by a mixture of these two. And should I be making
any mistake if I called the cause of this mixture and
creation the fourth ?
pro. Certainly not.
soc. Now what is the next step in our argument,
and what was our purpose in coming to the point
we have reached ? Was it not this ? We were
trying to find out whether the second place belonged
to pleasure or to wisdom, were we not ?
pro. Yes, we were.
soc. And may we not, perhaps, now that we have
finished with these points, be better able to come to
a decision about the first and second places, which
was the original subject of our discussion ?
pro. Perhaps.
soc. Well then; we decided that the mixed life
of pleasure and wisdom was the victor, did we not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And do we not see what kind of life this is,
and to what class it belongs ?
257
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Πώ$ γαρ ου;

2Ω. Και μέρος y αυτόν φήσομεν είναι τοΰ
τρίτου, οιμαι, γένους· ου γαρ δυοΐν τινοΐν εστι
μικτόν εκείνο,1 άλλα ξυμπάντων των άπειρων
υπό τοΰ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ώστε όρθιος 6 νικη¬
φόρος ουτος βίος μέρος εκείνου γίγνοιτ αν.
πρω. ’Ορθότατα μεν ούν.
Ε 15. 2Ω. Ειον τί δε 6 σός, ώ Φίληβε, ήδύς
και άμικτος ιόν; εν τίνι γένει των είρημένων
λεγόμενος όρθιος αν ποτέ λέγοιτο; ώδε δ’ από-
κριναί μ οι πριν άποφήνασθαι.
ΦΙ. Αέγε μόνον.
2Ω. Ηδονή και λύπη πέρας έχετον, η των τό
μάλλον τε και ηττον δεχομένων έστόν;
Φΐ. Ναι, των τό μάλλον, ώ Σώκρατες· ου γαρ
αν ηδονή πάν αγαθόν ην, εί μη άπειρον ετυγχανε
πεφυκός και πληθει καί τω μάλλον.
28 5Ω. Οαδο y’ αν, ω Φίληβε, λύπη πάν κακόν
ωστ άλλο τι νέρν σκεπτέον η την τοΰ απείρου
φυσιν, ώς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταΐς ηδοναΐς άγαθοΰ.
τουτω2 δη σοι των απέραντων γε γένους οστών3
φρόνησιν δέ καί επιστήμην καί νοΰν εις τί ποτέ
των προειρημένων, ίο ΐΐρώταρχέ τε καί Φίληβε,
νΰν θέντες ούκ αν άσεβοΐμεν; ου γάρ μοι δοκεΐ
σμικρός ήμΐν είναι 6 κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καί
μη περί τό νΰν ερωτωμενον.
Β φι. Σεμνυνεις γάρ, ώ Σώκρατες, τον σεαυτοΰ
θεόν.
2Ω. Και γαρ συ, ω εταίρε, την σαυτοΰ· τό δ'
ερωτωμενον όμως ήμΐν λεκτέον.
1 μικτόν έκιΐνο Schiitz: μικτός έκιΐνος ΒΤ: om. Jackson.

2 τούτω Burnet: τούτων ΒΤ: τούτο Ven. 189.
258
PHILEBUS
pro. Of course we do.

soc. We shall say that it belongs to the third class ;
for that class is not formed by mixture of any two
things, but of all the things which belong to the
infinite, bound by the finite ; and therefore this
victorious life would rightly be considered a part of
this class.
pro. Quite rightly.
soc. Well then, what of your life, Philebus, of

unmixed pleasure ? In which of the aforesaid classes
may it properly be said to belong ? But before you
tell me, please answer this question.
phi. Ask your question.
soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or are they
among the things which admit of more and less ?
phi. Yes, they are among those which admit of
the more, Socrates ; for pleasure would not be
absolute good if it were not infinite in number and
degree.
soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be absolute evil ;
so it is not the infinite which supplies any element
of good in pleasure ; we must look for something
else. Well, I grant you that pleasure and pain are
in the class of the infinite ; but to which of the
aforesaid classes, Protarchus and Philebus, can we
now without irreverence assign wisdom, knowledge,
and mind ? I think we must find the right answer
to this question, for our danger is great if we
fail.
phi. Oh Socrates, you exalt your own god.
soc. And you your goddess, my friend. But the
question calls for an answer, all the same.
3 ye ytvovs έστων Burnet: yeyevbs ’έστω BT.

259
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Όρθώς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ώ Φίληβε,

και αύτώ πειστέον.
φι. 0ύκοΰν υπέρ εμού συ, ΐΐρώταρχε, προήρησαι
λέγειν;
πρω. ΪΙάνυ γε· νυν μέντοι σχεδόν απορώ, και
δέομαι γε, ώ Σώκρατες, αυτόν σε ήμΐν γενέσθαι
προφήτην, ΐνα μηδέν ημείς σοι περί τον αγωνι¬
στήν έξαμαρτάνοντες παρά μέλος φθεγζώμεθά τι.
C 2Ω. ΥΙειστέον, ώ Πρώταρχε· ουδέ γάρ χαλεπόν
ούδέν επιτάττεις· άλλ’ όντως σε εγώ, καΟάπερ
είπε Φίληβος, σεμνυνων εν τω παίζειν έθορυβησα,
νουν και επιστήμην έρόμενος όποιου γένους εΐεν;
πρω. ΐΐαντάπασί γε, ώ Σώκρατες.
2Ω. ’Αλλά μην ρόδιον. πάντες γάρ συμφω-
νοΰσιν οι σοφοί, εαυτούς όντως σεμνύνοντες, ώς
νους εστ'ι βασιλεύς ήμΐν ουρανού τε και γης. και
ΐσως ευ λέγουσι. διά μακροτέρων δ\ εί βούλει,
την σκέφιν αυτού τού γένους ποιησώμεθα.
D ΠΡΩ. Aey’ όπως βούλει, μηδέν μήκος ήμΐν
υπολογιζόμενος, ιό Σώκρατες, ώς ούκ άπεχθησό-
μενος.
16. 2Ω. Καλώ? είπες. άρξώμεθα δέ πως ώδε
επα νερωτώντες.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ?;
2Ω. ΤΙότερον, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, τά ξύμπαντα και
τόδε το καλούμενον όλον επιτροπεύειν φώμεν
τήν τού αλόγου και είκή δύναμιν και το όπη
έτυχεν, ή τάναντία, καθάπερ οι πρόσθεν ημών
ελεγον, νούν και φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστήν συν-
τάττουσαν διακυβερνάν;
Ε ΠΡΩ. Ούδέν τών αυτών, ώ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες.
ο μέν γάρ σύ νυν λέγεις, ουδ’ όσιον είναι μοι
260
PHILEBUS
pro. Socrates is right, Philebus ; you ought to do

as he asks.
phi. Did you not, Protarchus, elect to reply in my
place ?
pro. Yes ; but now I am somewhat at a loss, and
I ask you, Socrates, to be our spokesman yourself,
that we may not select the wrong representative and
so say something improper.
soc. I must do as you ask, Protarchus ; and it is
not difficult. But did I really, as Philebus said,
embarrass you by playfully exalting my god, when
I asked to what class mind and knowledge should
be assigned ?
pro. You certainly did, Socrates.
soc. Yet the answer is easy ; for all philosophers
agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that
mind is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are
right. But let us, if you please, investigate the
question of its class more at length.
pro. Speak just as you like, Socrates. Do not
consider length, so far as we are concerned ; you
cannot bore us.
soc. Good. Then let us begin by asking a ques¬
tion.
pro. What is the question ?
soc. Shall we say, Protarchus, that all things and
this which is called the universe are governed by
an irrational and fortuitous power and mere chance,
or, on the contrary, as our forefathers said, are
ordered and directed by mind and a marvellous
wisdom ?
pro. The two points of view have nothing in
common, my wonderful Socrates. For what you
are now saying seems to me actually impious. But
261
PLATO
φαίνεται· το δε νουν πάντα διακοσμεΐν αυτά

φάναι και της όφεως τοΰ κόσμου και ήλιου και
σελήνής και αστέρων καί πάσης της περιφοράς
άζιον, καί ούκ άλλως εγωγ* αν ποτέ περί αυτών
V 905 ·>\ Ο > /
ζιποιμι ονο αν οοςασαιμι.
2Ω. Βοιίλβι δητά τι καί ημείς τοΐς έμπροσθεν
όμολογούμενον ζυμφησωμεν, ώς ταΰθ ούτως έχει,
29 καί μη μόνον οίώμεθα δεΐν τάλλότρια άνευ κίνδυ¬
νου λε'γειν, άλλα καί συγ κινδυνεύω μεν καί μετ¬
έχω μεν τοΰ φόγου, όταν άνηρ δεινός φη ταΰτα
μη ούτως άλλ’ άτάκτως εχειν;
πρω. Πώ? γάρ ούκ αν βουλοίμην;
2Ω. ’Ίθι δη, τον επιόντα περί τούτων νυν ημΐν
λόγον άθρει.
ΠΡΩ. Κεγε μόνον.
2Ω. Τά περί την των σωμάτων φύσιν απάντων
των ζώων, πυρ καί ύδωρ καί ττνεϋμα καθορώμεν
που καί γην, καθάπερ οί χειμαζόμενοι φασιν,
Β ενόντα εν τη συστάσει.
πρω. Και μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γάρ όντως ύπ’
απορίας εν τοΐς νυν λόγοις.
2Ω. Φόρε δη, περί εκάστου των παρ' ημΐν
λαβε το τοιόνδε.
ΠΡΩ. Ποιον;
2Ω. 'Ότι σμικρόν τε τούτων έκαστον παρ’ ημΐν
ένεστι καί φαΰλον καί ούδαμη ούδαμώς ειλικρινές
ον καί την δύναμιν ούκ άζίαν της φύσεως εχον
εν ενί δε λαβών περί πάντων νόει τ αυτόν. οιον
πυρ εστι μεν που παρ ημΐν, εστι δ’ εν τω παντί.
C 0ύκοΰν σμικρόν μεν τι τδ παρ’ ημΐν καί
2Ω.
ασθενές καί φαΰλον, τδ δ’ εν τω παντί πληθει τε
262
PHILEBUS
the assertion that mind orders all things is worthy

of the aspect of the world, of sun, moon, stars, and
the whole revolving universe ; I can never say or
think anything else about it.
soc. Do you, then, think we should assent to this
and agree in the doctrine of our predecessors, not
merely intending to repeat the words of others, with
no risk to ourselves, but ready to share with them in
the risk and the blame, if any clever man declares
that this world is not thus ordered, but is without
order ?
pro. Yes, of course I do.
soc. Then observe the argument that now comes

against us.
pro. Go on.
soc. We see the elements which belong to the

natures of all living beings, fire, water, air, and
earth—or, as the storm-tossed mariners say, land
in sight—in the constitution of the universe.
pro. Certainly ; and we are truly storm-tossed
in the puzzling cross-currents of this discussion.
soc. Well, here is a point for you to consider in
relation to each of these elements as it exists in us.
pro. What is the point ?
soc. Each element in us is small and poor and in

no way pure at all or endowed with the power which
is worthy of its nature. Take one example and
apply it to all. Fire, for instance, exists in us and
also in the universe.
pro. Of course.
soc. And that which is in us is small, weak, and
poor, but that which is in the universe is marvellous
263
PLATO
θαυμαστόν καί κάλλει καί πάση δυνάμει rfj περί

το πυρ οΰση.
πρω. Και μάλα αληθές ο λέγεις.
2Ω. Τι δε; τρέφεται καί γίγνεται εκ τούτου
καί άρχεται το του παντός πυρ υπό του παρ
ημΐν πυράς, η τουναντίον ύπ* εκείνου τό τ εμόν καί
τό σόν καί τό των άλλων ζώων άπαντ ίσχει ταΰτα;
πρω. Ύοΰτο μεν ούδ’ άποκρίσεως άξιον έρωτας.
D 2Ω. Όρθώς· ταύτά γάρ ερεΐς, οίμαι, περί τε
της εν τοΐς ζώοις γης της ενθάδε καί της εν τώ
π αντί, καί των άλλων δη πάντων όσων ηρά) τησα
ολίγον έμπροσθεν ούτως άποκρινεΐ.
ΠΡΩ. Τι? yap άποκρινόμενος άλλως υγιαίνων
άν ποτέ φανείη;
2Ω. 'Σχεδόν ουδ’ δστισοΰν αλλά τό μετά τοΰτο
έξης €7του. πάντα γάρ ημείς ταΰτα τά νΰν δη
λεχθεντα αρ’ ούκ εις εν συγκείμενα ίδόντες επωνο-
μάσαμεν σώμα;
Ε 2Ω. Τ αυτόν δη λαβε καί περί τοΰδε ον κόσμον
λεγομεν τον1 αυτόν γάρ τρόπον άν ε’ίη που
σώμα, σύνθετον ον εκ τών αυτών.
πρω. ’Ορθότατα λεγεις.
2Ω. Πδτερον ουν εκ τουτου του σώματος ολως
τό παρ' ημΐν σώμα η εκ τοΰ παρ’ ημΐν τοΰτο
τρέφεται τε καί όσα νΰν δη περί αυτών είπομεν
>/\ / / \ V '
€LATj(p€ Τ€ καί €χ€ί;
ΠΡΩ. Και τ οΰθ’ έτερον, ώ Σώκρατες, ούκ
άξιον έρωτησεως.
30 2Ω. Τί δε'; τδδε άρα άξιον; η πώς ερεΐς;
ΠΡΩ. Αέγε τό ποΐον.
1 τον Badham: διά τόν Βϊ.
PHILEBUS
in quantity, beauty, and every power which belongs

to fire.
pro. What you say is very true.
soc. Well, is the fire of the universe nourished,
originated, and ruled by the fire within us, or, on
the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of
all living beings derive nourishment and all that
from the universal fire ?
pro. That question does not even deserve an
answer.
soc. True ; and you will, I fancy, say the same
of the earth which is in us living creatures and that
which is in the universe, and concerning all the
other elements about which I asked a moment ago
your answer will be the same.
pro. Yes. Who could answer otherwise without
being called a lunatic ?
soc. Nobody, I fancy. Now follow the next step.
When we see that all the aforesaid elements are
gathered together into a unit, do we not call
them a body ?
pro. Of course.
soc. Apply the same line of thought to that which
we call the universe. It w'ould likewise be a body,
being composed of the same elements.
pro. Quite right.
soc. Does our body derive, obtain, and possess
from that body, or that body from ours, nourishment
and everything else that we mentioned just now ?
pro. That, Socrates, is another question not worth
asking.
soc. Well, is this next one worth asking ? What
will you say to it ?
pro. What is it ?
265
PLATO
2Ω. To παρ’ ήμΐν σώμα dp* ου ψυχήν φήσομ€ν

εχειν;
ΠΡΩ. Αήλον ότι φήσομεν.
2Ω. Π όθεν,ώ φίλε Πρώιταρχε, λαβόν, είπερ
μή τό γε του παντός σώμα 'έμψυχον ον έτύγχανε,
ταύτά ye έχον τούτω καί, έτι πάντη καλλίονα;
ΠΡΩ. Αήλον ώς ού8αμόθεν άλλοθεν, ώ Σώκρατες.
2Ω. Ού γάρ που Sokov μεν γε, ώ ΓΙρώταρχε,
τα τέτταρα εκείνα, πέρας καί άπειρον καί κοινόν
Β καί τό τής αιτίας γένος εν άπασι τέταρτον ένόν,
τοΰτο εν μεν τοΐς παρ' ήμΐν ψυχήν τε παρέχον
καί σωμασκίαν1 εμποιούν καί πταίσαντος σώ¬
ματος ιατρικήν καί εν άλλοι? άλλα συντιθέν καί
άκουμενον πάσαν καί παντοίαν σοφίαν έπικαλεί-
σθαι, τών δ’ αυτών τούτων οντων εν όλω τε
ούρανώ καί κατά μεγάλα μέρη, καί προσέτι καλών
καί ειλικρινών, εν τούτοις δ’ ούκ άρα μεμηχανήσθαι
τήν τών καλλίστων καί τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.
0 ΠΡΩ. ΆΛΑ’ ούόαμώς τούτο y’ αν λόγον έχοι.
2Ω. 0 ύκοΰν εί μή τούτο, μετ’ εκείνου τού
λόγου αν επόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν ώς έστιν,
ά πολλάκις ειρήκαμεν, άπειρόν τε εν τώ παντί
πολύ, καί πέρας ικανόν, καί τις επ' αύτοΐς αιτία
ού φαύλη, κοσμούσα τε καί συντάττουσα ενιαυ¬
τούς τε καί ώρας καί μήνας, σοφία καί νοΰς λεγο-
μένη όικαιότατ αν.
ΠΡΩ. Δικαιότατα 8ήτα.
2Ω. "Σοφία μήν καί νοΰς άνευ ψυχής ούκ άν
ποτέ γενοίσθην.
πρω. Οό γαρ ούν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν εν μέν τή τού Διό? ερεΐς φύσει
D βασιλικήν μέν ψυχήν, βασιλικόν 8έ νοΰν έγγί-
2 66
PHILEBUS
soc. Shall we not say that our body has a soul ?

pro. Cleai-ly we shall.
soc. Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the
body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the
same elements as ours, only in every way superior ?
pro. Clearly it could get it from no other source,
soc. No ; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus,
that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite,
the combination, and the element of cause which
exists in all things, this last, which gives to our
bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and
medical treatment wThen the body is ill, and which
is in general a composing and healing power, is called
the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same
elements exist in the entire heaven and in great
parts thereof, and are, moreover, fair and pure, there
is no means of including among them that nature
which is the fairest and most precious of all.
pro. Certainly there would be no sense in that,
soc. Then if that is not the case, it would be
better to follow the other line of thought and say,
as we have often said, that there is in the universe
a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in
addition a by no means feeble cause which orders
and arranges years and seasons and months, and may
most justly be called wisdom and mind.
pro. Yes, most justly.
soc. Surely reason and mind could never come
into being without soul.
pro. No, never.
soc. Then in the nature of Zeus you would say
that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted
1 σωμασκίαν Eustathius: σώμα σκιάν BT.

267
PLATO
γνεσθαι διά την της αίτιας δυναμιν, iv δε άλλοι?

άλλα καλά, καθ’ 6 τι φίλον όκάστοις λόγεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Μ άλα γε.
2Ω. Τοατον δη τον λόγον ημάς μη τι μάτην
δόξης, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, είρηκόναι, άλλ’ εστι τοΐς
μεν πάλαι άποφηναμόνοις ώς αεί του παντός νους
άρχει ζυμμαχος εκείνοις.
ΠΡΩ. ’Έστι γάρ ουν.
2Ω. Ύή δε γε εμή ζητήσει πεπορικώς άπό-
Ε κρισιν, ότι νοΰς εστί γόνους1 τοΰ πάντων αιτίου
λεχθεντός των τεττάρων ών2 ην ημΐν εν τοοτο.3
όχεις γάρ δηπου νυν ημών ήδη την άπόκρισιν.
πρω. ’Έχω καί μάλα ικανώς· καίτοι με άπο-
κρινάμενος ελαθες.
2Ω. 'Ανάπαυλα γάρ, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, της σπουδής
γίγνεται ενίοτε ή παιδιά.
ΓΙΡΩ. Καλώ?4 είπες.
2Ω. Νοο? δηπου,5 ώ εταίρε, ου μεν γόνους
31 εστί και τίνα ποτέ δυναμιν κόκτηται, σχεδόν
επιεικώς ημΐν τα. νυν δεδήλωται.
πρω. Πάνυ μεν ουν.
2Ω. Καί μην ηδονής γε ωσαύτως πάλαι το
γένος εφάνη.
ΠΡΩ. Καί μάλα.
2Ω. λάεμνώμεθα δη και ταΰτα περί άμφοΐν,
οτι νοΰς μεν αιτίας ήν ξυγγενής καί τούτου σχεδόν
τοΰ γόνους, ηδονή δε άπειρός τε αυτή καί τοΰ
μήτε αρχήν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος εν αύτώ άφ'
εαυτοΰ εχοντος μηδε όζοντος ποτέ γόνους.
1 ytvovs Bekker: ytvom τηs ΒΤ.

2 om, ΒΤ: add. in marg. T.
3 των τίττά,ρων . . τοΰτο bracketed by Badliam.
268
PHILEBUS
through the power of the cause, and in other deities

other noble qualities from which they derive their
favourite epithets.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is

mere idle talk of mine ; it confirms the utterances
of those who declared of old1 that mind always rules
the universe.
soc. And to my question it has furnished the reply

that mind belongs to that one of our four classes
which was called the cause of all. Now, you see, you
have at last my answer.
pro. Yes, and a very sufficient one ; and yet you
answered without my knowing it.
soc. Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a
restful change from serious talk.
pro. You are right.
soc. We have now, then, my friend, pretty clearly
shown to what class mind belongs and what power
it possesses.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And likewise the class of pleasure was made

clear some time ago.
pro. Yes, it was.
soc. Let us, then, remember concerning both of
them that mind was akin to cause and belonged
more or less to that class, and that pleasure was
itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in
and by itself, has not and never will have either
beginning or middle or end.
1 Anaxagoras and probably some now unknown precursors.
4 καλώς T: και καλώς B.
6 νους δήπου Bekker: νΰν δήπου Τ: νΰν δη νους Β.
κ 2 69
PLATO
B ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· πώς γάρ ου;

17. 2Ω. Δε? δη το μετά τούτο, εν ω τε εστιν
έκάτερον αύτοΐν και διά τι πάθος γίγνεσθον όπόταν
γίγνησθον ίδειν ημάς· πρώτον την ηδονήν ώσπερ
τδ γένος αυτής πρότερον έβασανίσαμεν, ουτω
καί ταΰτα πρότερα. λύπης δ’ αυ χωρίς την
ηδονήν ούκ άν ποτέ δυναίμεθα ίκανώς βασανίσαι.
ΠΡΩ. ΆΛΑ’ ει ταυτη χρή πορευεσθαι, ταυτη
π ορευώμεθα.
2Ω. rAρ’ οΰν σοΙ καθάπερ έμοί φαίνεται τής
γενεσεως αυτών περί;
C πρω. Το ποιον;
2Ω. Έν τω κοινώ μοι γένει άμα φαίνεσθον
λύπη τε και ηδονή γίγνεσθαι κατά φυσιν.
πρω. Κοινδν δε/ ·)/ε, ώ φίλε Έώκρατες, υπο¬
μίμνησκε ήμάς τί ποτέ τών προειρημενών βονλει
δηλοΰν.
2Ω. ’Έσται ταΰτ’ εις δυναμιν, ώ θαυμάσιε.
πρω. Καλώ? είπες.
2Ω. Κοινδν τοίνυν ύπακουωμεν δ δή τών τετ-
τάρων τρίτον ελεγομεν.
πρω. "0 μετά το άπειρον και πέρας ελεγες, εν
ω καί υγίειαν, οίμαι δε καί αρμονίαν, ετίθεσο;
D 2Ω. Κάλλιστ’ είπες. τον νουν δε δτι μάλιστ’
ήδη πρόσεχε.
ΠΡΩ. Αέγε μόνον.
2Ω. Αέγω τοίνυν τής αρμονίας μεν λυόμενης
ημΐν εν τοΐς ζωοις άμα λυσιν τής φυσεως καί
γένεσιν αλγηδόνων έν τω τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνω.
πρω. ΓΙάνυ λέγεις είκός.
2Ω. Πάλιν δε άρμοττομένης τε καί εις τήν
αυτής φυσ ιν άπιουσης ήδονήν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον,
270
PHILEBUS
pro. We will remember that, of course,

soc. Our next task is to see in what and by means
of what feeling each of them comes into being when¬
ever they do come into being. We will take pleasure
first and discuss these questions in relation to
pleasure, as we examined its class first. But wye
cannot examine pleasure successfully apart from pain.
pro. If that is our proper path, let us follow it.
soc. Do you agree with us about the origin of
pleasure ?
pro. What do you think it is ?
soc. I think pain and pleasure naturally originate
in the combined class.
pro. Please, my dear Socrates, remind us which
of the aforesaid classes you mean by the combined
class.
soc. I will do so, as well as I can, my brilliant
friend.
pro. Thank you.
soc. By combined class, then, let us understand
that which we said was the third of the four.
pro. The one you mentioned after the infinite
and the finite, and in which you put health and also,
I believe, harmony ?
soc. You are quite right. Now please pay very
close attention.
pro. I will. Say on.
soc. I say, then, that when, in us living beings,
harmony is broken up, a disruj)tion of nature and a
generation of pain also take place at the same
moment.
pro. What you say is very likely,
soc. But if harmony is recomposed and returns to
its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated,
271
PLATO
el Sd δι ολίγων περί μεγίστων ότι τάχιστα

ρηθηναι.
Ε ΠΡΩ. Οΐμαι μεν σε όρθώς λεγειν, ω Σώκρατες,
εμφανεστερον δε ετι τ αυτά ταΰτα πειρώμεθα
λεγειν.
2Ω. 0 ύκοΰν τα δημόσιά που καί περιφανή
ραστον συννοεϊν;
πρω. Ποια;
2Ω. ΧΙείνη μεν που λύσις και λύπη;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
2Ω. Έδωδη δε, πληρωσις γι γνομενη πάλιν,
ηδονη;
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
2Ω. Δΐφος δ* αΰ φθορά και λύπη,1 η 8e του
32 ύγροΰ πάλιν το ξηρανθέν πληρούσα δύναμις ηδονη'
διάκρισις δε γ' αΰ και διάλυσις η παρά φΰσιν,
του πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, κατά φύσιν δε2 πάλιν
άπόδοσίς τε και φΰζις ηδονη.
Πάνυ μεν οΰν.
πρω.
Και ρίγους η μεν παρά φυσιν του ζώου
2Ω.
της ΰγρότητος πηζις λΰπη· πάλιν δ’ εις ταύτον
άπιόντων και διακρινομενων η κατά φυσιν οδό?
ηδονη. και ενι λόγω σκό πει εΐ σοι μέτριος
ό Λόγο? δς αν φη το εκ τοΰ3 απείρου και περατος
Β κατά φΰσιν εμφυχον γεγονός είδος, όπερ ελεγον
εν τω πρόσθεν, όταν μεν τούτο φθείρηται, την
μεν φθοράν λύπην είναι, την δ’ εις την αυτών
ουσίαν οδόν, ταύτην δ’ αΰ πάλιν την άναχώρησιν
πάντων ηδονην.
ΠΡΩ. ’Έστω· δοκέΐ γάρ μοι τύπον γε τινα εχειν.
1 \ύπη καί \ύσσ (λΟσσ Β) ΒΤ Stobaeus: bracketed by
Schleiermacher.
272
PHILEBUS
if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words

about matters of the highest import.
pro. I think you are right, Socrates ; but let us
try to be more explicit.
soc. It is easiest to understand common and
obvious examples, is it not ?
pro. What examples ?
soc. Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And eating, which is a filling up again, is a

pleasure ?
pro. Yes.
soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but

the filling with moisture of that which was dried up
is a pleasure. Then, too, the unnatural dissolution
and disintegration we experience through heat are
a pain, but the natural restoration and cooling are
a pleasure.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And the unnatural hardening of the moisture
in an animal through cold is pain ; but the natural
course of the elements returning to their place and
separating is a pleasure. See, in short, if you think
it is a reasonable statement that whenever in the
class of living beings, which, as I said before, arises
out of the natural union of the infinite and the finite,
that union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and
the passage and return of all things to their own
nature is pleasure.
pro. Let us accept that ; for it seems to me to
be true in its general lines.
2 8e Stobaeus: δή BT: δ’ ή Heusde.

3 τοΰ Stallbaum: rrjs BT.
273
PLATO
2Ω. Touro μεν τοίνυν εν ειδο? τιθώμεθα λύπης

re και ηδονης εν τούτο ις τοΐς πάθεσιν εκατεροις ;
πρω. Κείσθω.
18. 2Ω. Ύίθει τοίνυν αυτής της φυχης κατα
0 τδ τούτων των παθημάτων προσδόκημα το μεν
προ των ηδεων ελπιζόμενον ηδύ καί θαρραλεον,
τδ δε προ των λυπηρών φοβερόν και αλγεινόν.
πρω. Έστι γάρ οΰν τοΰθ’ ηδονης καί λύπης
έτερον είδος, τδ χωρίς του σώματος αυτής της
φυχης διά προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.
2Ω. Όρθώς ύπελαβες. εν γάρ τουτοις οΐμαι,
κατά γε την εμην δόζαν, είλικρινεσι τε εκατεροις
γιγνομενοις, ώς δοκεΐ, καί άμίκτοις λύπης τε καί
ηδονης, εμφανες εσεσθαι τδ περί την ηδονην,
D πότερον όλον εστί τδ γένος άσπαστόν, η τούτο
μεν ετερω τινί των προειρημενών δοτεον ημΐν
γενών, ήδονη δε καί λύπη, καθάπερ θερμώ καί
φυχρώ καί πάσι τοΐς τοιουτοις, τότε μεν άσπα-
στεον αυτά, τότε δε ούκ άσπαστεον, ώς αγαθά
μεν ουκ όντα, ενίοτε δε καί ενια δεχόμενα την
τών αγαθών εστιν δτε φυσιν.
πρω. ’Ορθότατα λεγεις, ότι ταύτη πη δει δια-
θηρευθηναι1 τδ νυν μεταδιωκόμενον.
2Ω. Πρώτον μεν τοίνυν τόδε ζυνίδωμεν ώς
^ είπερ όντως εστι τδ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομενών
μεν αυτών άλγηδών, άνασωζομενων δε ηδονη,
τών μήτε διαφθειρομενων μήτε άνασωζομενων
εννοησωμεν περί, τίνα ποτέ εξιν δει τότε εν
εκαστοις είναι τοΐς ζωοις, όταν ούτως ’ίσχη.
σφόδρα δε προσεχών τον νοΰν είπε· άρα ου πάσα
1 διαθηρευθψαι Stephanus : διαπορενθηναί ΒΤ: διαπορηθήναι

Solomon.
274
PHILEBUS
soc. Then we may assume this as one kind of

pain and pleasure arising severally under the con¬
ditions I have described ?
pro. Let that be assumed.
soc. Now assume within the soul itself the anticipa¬

tion of these conditions, the sweet and cheering hope
of pleasant things to come, the fearful and woful
expectation of painful things to come.
pro. Yes, indeed, this is another kind of pleasure
and pain, which belongs to the soul itself, apart
from the body, and arises through expectation.
soc. You are right. I think that in these two

kinds, both of which are, in my opinion, pure, and
not formed by mixture of pain and pleasure, the
truth about pleasure will be made manifest, whether
the entire class is to be desired or such desirability
is rather to be attributed to some other class among
those we have mentioned, whereas pleasure and
pain, like heat, cold, and other such things, are
sometimes desirable and sometimes undesirable, be¬
cause they are not good in themselves, though some
of them sometimes admit on occasion the nature of
the good.
pro. You are quite right in saying that we must
track our quarry on this trail.

soc. First, then, let us agree on this point : If it
is true, as we said, that destruction is pain and
restoration is pleasure, let us consider the case of
living beings in which neither destruction nor restora¬
tion is going on, and what their state is under such
conditions. Fix your mind on my question: Must
275
PLATO
ανάγκη παν iv τώ τότε χρόνιο ζώον μήτε τι

λυπεϊσθαι μήτε ηδεσθαι μήτε μεγα μήτε σμικρον;
ΠΡΩ. Ανάγκη μεν οΰν.
£Ω. Ούκοΰν earι τις τρίτη ημών η τοιαυτη
33 διάθεσις παρά τε την τοΰ χαίροντος και παρά την
τοΰ λυπουμενου ;
2Ω. "Aye δη τοίνυν, ταυτής πρόθυμόν μεμνη-
σθαι. προς γάρ την της ηδονης κρίσιν ον σμικρον
μεμνησθαι τ αυτήν εσθ’ ημΐν η μη. βραχύ δε
τι περί αυτής, εί βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.
πρω. Α,έγε ποιον.
2Ω. Του1 τοΰ φρονεΐν βίον2 οίσθ' ώς τοΰτον
τον τρόπον ούδεν άποκωλύει ζην.
Β πρω. Ύόν τοΰ μη χαίρειν μηδε λυπεΐσθαι λεγεις;
2Ω. Έρρηθη γάρ που τότε εν τη παραβολή των
βίων μηδέν δεΐν μήτε μεγα μήτε σμικρον χαίρειν
τώ τον τοΰ νοεΐν και φρονεΐν βίον ελομενω.
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα ούτως ερρηθη.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν ούτως άν εκείνω γε ύπάρχοι· και
ίσως ούδεν άτοπον, εί πάντων των βίων εστι
θειότατος.
πρω. Ούκουν είκός γε ούτε χαίρειν θεούς ούτε
το εναντίον.
2Ω. Πανυ μεν οΰν ούκ είκός· άσχημον γοΰν
αυτών εκάτερον γιγνόμενόν εστιν. αλλά δη τοΰτο
C μεν ετι καί εις αύθις επισκεφώμεθα, εάν προς
λόγον τι η, καί τώ νώ προς τά δευτερεΐα, εάν
μη προς τά πρωτεία δυνώμεθα προσθεϊνο.ι, προσ-
θησομεν.
1 τί>ν Badham: τφ τόν ΒΤ.
276
PHILEBUS
not every living being under those conditions neces¬

sarily be devoid of any feeling of pain or pleasure,
great or small ?
pro. Yes, necessarily.
soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides
those of feeling pleasure and pain ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind ;

for remembering or forgetting it will make a great
difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I
should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly
about it.
pro. Pray do so.
soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a

man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.
pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain ?
soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our com¬
parison of the lives that he who chose the life of
mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure,
great or small.
pro. Yes, surely, that was said,
soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life ;
and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the
most divine of lives.
pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either
joy or its opposite.
soc. No, it is very unlikely ; for either is unseemly
for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that
point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we
will give mind credit for it in contending for the
second place, if we cannot count it for the first.
pro. Quite right.
2 βίon Badham: έλομένφ βίον BT. Probably inserted

here from the passage just below.
κ 2 277
PLATO
19. 2Ω. Και μήν τό γε έτερον είδος των

ηδονών, δ της φυγής αυτής έφαμεν είναι, δια
μνήμης παν εστι γεγονός.
πρω. Πω?;
2Ω. Μνήμην, ώς εοικεν, ο τι ποτ εστι προτερον
άναληπτ έον, και κινδυνεύει πάλιν ετι προτερον
αίσθησιν μνήμης, εί μέλλει τα περί ταΰθ ημΐν
κατά τρόπον φανερά πη γενήσεσθαι.
D πρω. Πώ? φής;
2Ω. 0e? των περί τό σώμα ημών εκαστοτε
παθημάτων τά μέν εν τώ σώματι κατασβεν-
νυμενα πριν επί την φυγήν διεξελθεΐν απαθή
εκείνην εάσαντα, τά δέ δά άμφοΐν ιόντα καί τινα
ώσπερ σεισμόν εντιθέντα ίδιον τε καί κοινόν
εκατέρω.
πρω. ¥>.είσθω.
2Π. Ια μζν δη μη οι αμψοιν covra eav την
φυγήν ημών φώμεν λανθάνειν, τά δέ δι’ άμφοΐν
μή λανθάνειν, άρ’ ορθότατα εροΰμεν;
Ε πρω. Πώ? γάρ ου;
2Ω. Τό τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμώς ύπολάβης
ώς λέγω λήθης ένταΰθά που γένεσιν εστι γάρ
λήθη μνήμης έξοδος, ή δ’ εν τώ λεγομένου νυν
ουπω γέγονε· του δή μήτε όντος μήτε γεγονότος
πω1 γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινά αποβολήν άτοπον. ή γάρ;
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;
2Ω. Τά τοίνυν ονόματα μετάβαλε μόνον,
πρω. Πώ?;
2Ω. ’Αντί μέν του λεληθέναι τήν φυγήν, όταν
απαθής αυτή γίγνηται τών σεισμών τών τοΰ
34 σώματος, ήν νυν λήθην καλεΐς, αναισθησίαν επ¬
ονομάσου.
278
PHILEBUS
soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we

said was an affair of the soul alone, originates
entirely in memory.
pro. How is that ?
soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory,

and perception even before memory, if these matters
are to be made clear to us properly.
pro. What do you mean ?
soc. Assume that some of the affections of our

body are extinguished in the body before they reach
the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other
affections permeate both body and soul and cause
a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.
pro. Let us assume that.
soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul
forgets those which do not permeate both, and does
not forget those which do ?
soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I
speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises
in this case ; for forgetfulness is the departure of
memory, and in the case under consideration memory
has not yet come into being ; now it is absurd to
speak of the loss of that which does not exist and
has not yet come into being, is it not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Then just change the terms.
pro. How ?
soc. Instead of saying that the soul forgets, when
it is unaffected by the vibrations of the body, apply
the term want of perception to that which you are
now calling forgetfulness.
1 πω Stobaeus: πω? B: irus T.

279
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. "Εμαθον.
2Ω. To δ’ eV ενί πάθει την φνχήν καί τδ σώμα
κοινή γιγνόμενον κοινή καί κινεισθαι, ταυτην δ
αν την κίνησιν όνομάζων αίσθησιν ούκ οττο τροπου
φθόγγοι αν.
ΠΡΩ. ’Αληθέστατα λέγεις.
2Ω. 0υκοΰν ήδη μανθάνομεν ο βονλόμεθα κα-
λεΐν την αίσθησιν ;
2Ω. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αίσθησεως την μνημην
λίγων δρθώς αν τις λέγοι κατά γε την εμην δόξαν.
Β πρω. Όρθώς γάρ ουν.
2Ω. Μνήμης δε άνάμνησιν άρ' ού διαφέρονσαν
λόγο μεν;
πρω. Ταω?.
2Ω. *Αρ" ουν ον τόδε;
2Ω. "Οτα,ρ α μετά του σώματος επασχόν ποθ’
η1 φυγή, ταϋτ άνευ του σώματος αυτή εν εαντή
ότι μάλιστα άναλαμβάνη, τότε άναμιμνήσκεσθαί
που λόγο μεν. η γάρ;
πρω. Είάνυ μεν ουν.
2Ω. Και μην καί όταν άπολόσασα μνημην είτε
αίσθησεως είτ αΰ μαθήματος αΰθις ταυτην άν-
C αποληση πάλιν αυτή εν εαντη, καί ταΰτα ξυμπαντα
αναμνήσεις2 που λόγο μεν.
πρω. Όρθώς λόγεις.
2Ω. 05 δη χάριν άπαντ εΐρηται ταΰτα, εστι
τόδε.
2Ω. "Ινα ηδη3 την της φυγής ηδονήν χωρίς
σώματος ότι μάλιστα καί εναργέστατα λάβοιμεν,
280
PHILEBUS
pro. I understand.
soc. And the union of soul and body in one
common affection and one common motion you may
properly call perception.
pro. Very true.
soc. Then do we now understand what we mean
by perception ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. I think, then, that memory may rightly be
defined as the preservation of perception.
pro. Quite rightly.
soc. But do we not say that memory differs from
recollection ?
pro. Perhaps.
soc. And is this the difference ?
pro. What ?
soc. When the soul alone by itself, apart from the
body, recalls completely any experience it has had
in company with the body, we say that it recollects,
do we not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And again when the soul has lost the memory
of a perception or of something it has learned and
then alone by itself regains this, we call everything
of that kind recollection.
pro. You are right.
soc. Now my reason for saying all this is-
pro. What ?
soc. That henceforth we may comprehend as
completely and clearly as possible the pleasure of
1 τγ6Θ’ η T : πάθη B.
2 αναμι'ήσβις καί μνήμαί ΒΤ : καί μνήμας bracketed by Gloel,
3 -ήδη Hermann: μη ΒΤ: πη Schiitz.
281
PLATO
καί άμα επιθυμίαν" διά γάρ τούτων πως ταΰτα

άμφότερα εοικε δηλοΰσθαι.
20. ΠΡΩ. Αέγωμεν τοίνυν, ώ Σώκρατες, ήδη
το μετά ταΰτα.
2Ω. Πολλά γε περί γενεσιν ηδονής καί πάσαν
Ο την μορφήν αυτής άναγκαΐον, ώς εοικε, λέγοντας
σκοπεΐν. καί γάρ νΰν πρότερον ετι φαίνεται
ληπτεον επιθυμίαν είναι, τί ποτ εστι καί ποΰ
γίγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σκοπώμεν τοίνυν ούδεν γάρ άπολοΰμεν.
2Ω. Άπολοΰμεν μεν οΰν, καί ταΰτά γε, ώ
ΐΐρώταρχε, ευ ράντες ο νΰν ζητοΰμεν, άπολοΰμεν1
την περί αυτά ταΰτα απορίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Όρθώς ήμυνω· το δ’ εφεξής τουτοις
πειρώμεθα λεγειν.
2Ω. Ο ύκοΰν νΰν δη πείνην τε καί δίφος καί
Ε πόλλ’ ετερα τοιαΰτα εφαμεν είναι τινας επιθυμίας ;
πρω. Σφόδρα γε.
2Ω. Προ? τί ποτέ άρα ταύτον βλεφαντες οϋτω
πολύ διαφεροντα ταΰθ' ενί προσαγορεύομεν ονό-
ματι;
πρω. Μά ΔΓ ου ρόδιον ίσως είπεΐν, ω Σώ~
κρατες, άλλ’ όμως λεκτεον.
5Ω. ’Κκεΐθεν δη εκ των αυτών πάλιν άναλά-
βωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Χίόθεν δη;
2Ω. Αιφή που λεγομεν εκάστοτε τι;
πρω. Πώ? δ’ ου;
2Ω. Τοάτο δε γ* εστί κενοΰται;
2Ω. Άρ’ οΰν το δίφος εστίν επιθυμία;
πρω. Ναι, πώματός γε.
282
PHILEBUS
the soul, and likewise its desire, apart from the

body ; for both of these appear to be made plain by
what has been said about memory and recollection.
pro. Let us, then, Socrates, discuss the next point,
soc. We must, it seems, consider many things in
relation to the origin and general aspect of pleasure ;
but now I think our first task is to take up the nature
and origin of desire.
pro. Then let us examine that; for we shall not
lose anything.
soc. Oh yes, Protarchus, we shall lose a great deal!
When we find what we are seeking we shall lose our
perplexity about these very questions.
pro. That is a fair counter ; but let us try to
take up the next point.
soc. Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst,
and the like were desires ?
pro. They are, decidedly.
soc. What sort of identity have we in view when
we call these, which are so different, by one name ?
pro. By Zeus, Socrates, that question may not be
easy to answer, yet it must be answered.
soc. Let us, then, begin again at that point with
the same examples.
pro. At what point ?
soc. We say of a thing on any particular occasion,
“ it’s thirsty,” do we not ?
pro. Of course.
soc. And that means being empty ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And is thirst, then, a desire ?
pro. Yes, of drink.
1 άποΚοΰμεν B: om. T.
£83
PLATO
35 2Ω. ΤΙώματος, η πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οΐμαι μεν πληρώσεως.
2Ω. '0 κενούμενος ημών άρα, ώς εοικεν, επι¬
θυμεί των εναντίων η πάσχει· κενού μένος γάρ
ερα πληροΰσθαι.
πρω. Σαφεστατά γε.
2 Ω. Ίί ούν; 6 το πρώτον κενού μένος εστιν
οπόθεν είτ αισθησει πληρώσεως εφάπτοιτ άν
είτε μνημη, τούτου ο μητ’ εν τώ νΰν χρόνω πάσχει
μητ εν τώ πρόσθε πώποτ επαθεν;
ΠΡΩ. Και πώς;
Β 2Ω. ’Αλλά μην ο γ' επιθυμών τίνος επιθυμεί,
φαμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? γάρ ον;
2Ω. Ou/c άρα ο γε πάσχει, τούτου επιθυμεί. διφη
γαρ, τοΰτο δε κενωσις· 6 δε επιθυμεί πληρώσεως.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
2Ω. ΐίληρώσεώς ν’ άρα πη τι τών του διφώντος
αν βφατττοίτο.
ΠΡΩ. ’ Αναγκαίου.
2Ω. Το μεν δη σώμα αδύνατον κενοΰται γάρ που.
ΠΡΩ. Nat.
2Ω. Την φυχην άρα της πληρώσεως εφάπτεσθαι
C λοιπον, τη μνημη δήλον ότι· τώ γάρ άν ετ άλλω
εφάφαιτο;
πρω. Σχεδόν ούδενί.
21. 2Ω. Μ,ανθανομεν ούν ο συμβεβηχ’ ημΐν
εκ τούτων τών λόγων;
πρω. Τδ ποιον ;
2Ω. Σώματος επιθυμίαν ου φησιν ημΐν οΰτος ό
λόγος γίγνεσθαι.
πρω. Πώ?;
284
PHILEBUS
soc. Of drink, or of being filled with drink ?

pro. Of being filled, I suppose,
soc. The man, then, who is empty desires, as it
appears, the opposite of what he feels ; for, being
empty, he longs to be filled.
pro. That is very plain.
soc. Well then, is there any source from which a
man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension,
whether by perception or by memory, of fulness,
a thing which he does not feel at the time and has
never felt before ?
pro. It cannot be done.
soc. And yet he who desires, desires something,
we say.
pro. Of course.
soc. And he does not desire that which he feels ;
for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires
fulness.
pro. Yes.
soc. Then somehow some part of him who is
thirsty can apprehend fulness.
pro. Yes, obviously.
soc. But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.
pro. True.
soc. The only remaining possibility is that the
soul apprehends it, which it must do by means of
memory ; for what other means could it employ ?
pro. No other, I should say.
soc. And do we understand the consequences of
this argument ?
pro. What are the consequences ?
soc. This argument declares that we have no
bodily desire.
pro. How so ?
285
PLATO
2Ω. "Οτι τοΐς εκείνου παθήμασιν Εναντίαν άει

παντός ζώου μηνύει την επιχείρησιν.
2Ω. 'II δ’ άρμη γε επί τουναντίον άγουσα η τα
παθήματα δηλοΐ που μνήμην οΰσαν των τοΐς παθη-
μασιν εναντίων.
D 5Ω. Ύην άρα επάγουσαν επί τα επιθυμούμενα
άποδείζας μνημην ό λόγος ψυχής ζνμπασαν την τε
ορμήν και επιθυμίαν και την αρχήν τοΰ ζώου παντός
άπεφηνεν.
πρω. ’Ορθότατα.
2Ω. Αιψήν αρα ημών τό σώμα η πεινην η τι
τών τοιουτων πάσχειν ούδαμη d Aoyo? αίρει.
2Ω. Έη δη και τοδε περί ταύτα. ταΰτα κατα-
νοησωμεν. βίου γαρ είδος τί μ οι φαίνεται βουλε-
σθαι δηλοΰν ό λόγος ημΐν εν τουτοις αύτοΐς.
Ε ΠΡΩ. Έρ τίσι και ποιου περί βίου φράζεις;
2Ω. Έν τώ πληροΰσθαι και κενοΰσθαι και πάσιν
όσα περί σωτηρίαν τε εστι τών ζοροον και την φθοράν,
και ε’ί τις τούτων εν εκατερω γιγνόμενος ημών
άλγεΐ, τότε1 δε χαίρει κατά τάς μεταβολάς.
πρω. Έστι ταΰτα.
2Ω. Ύί δ’ όταν εν μεσορ τούτων γίγνηται;
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? εν μεσορ;
2Ω. Δια μεν το πάθος άλγη, μεμνηται δε τών
ηδεων, ών2 γενομενων παΰοιτ αν τής άλγτ]δόνος,
1 τοτέ Stallbaum: τότε ΒΤ.

3 Sin add. corr. Ven. 189: om. BT.
286
PHILEBUS
soc. Because it shows that the endeavour of every

living being is always towards the opposite of the
actual conditions of the body.
soc. And the impulse which leads towards the
opposite of those conditions shows that there is a
memory of the opposite of the conditions.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And the argument, by showing that memory
is that which leads us towards the objects of desire,
has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and
the ruling principle in every living being are of
the soul.
pro. Quite right.
soc. So the argument denies utterly that the body
hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.
pro. Very true.
soc. Let us consider a further point in connexion
with those very affections. For I think the purpose
of the argument is to point out to us a state of life
existing in them.
pro. Of what sort of life are you speaking, and
in what affections does it exist ?
soc. In the affections of fulness and emptiness and
all which pertain to the preservation and destruction
of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall
into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by
joy when we change to the other.
pro. That is true.
soc. And what if a man is between the two ?
pro. How between them ?
soc. Because of his condition, he is suffering, but
he remembers the pleasures the coming of which
would bring him an end of his pain ; as yet, however,
287
PLATO
πληρώται δε μηπω’ τι τότβ; φώμεν η μη φώμεν

36 αυτόν iv μέσω των παθημάτων eivat;
πρω. Φώμεν μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Πότερον άλγοΰνθ’ όλως η χαίροντα;
ΠΡΩ. Μά Δί’, άΛΛά διπλή τινι λύπη λυπου-
μενον, κατά μεν το σώμα εν τώ παθηματι, κατά δε
την φυχην προσδοκίας tlvl πόθω.
2Ω. Πώ?, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, το δLπλoΰv της λύπης
είπες; άρ’ ονκ έστι μεν δτε τLς ημών κενού μένος
Β εν έλπίδι φανερά του πληpωθήσεσθaL καθέστηκε,
τότε τουναντίον άνελπίστως έχει;
πρω. Και μάλα γε.
2Ω. Μών οΰν ούχί ελπίζων μεν πληρωθησεσθαι
τώ μεμνησθαι δοκεΐ ool χαίρειν, άμα δε κενοΰμενος
εν τοΰτοις τοΐς χρόνο ις άλγεΐν;
πρω. Ανάγκη.
2Ω. Τδτ’ άρα άνθρωπος και τάΛΑα ζώα λυπεΐταί
τε άμα και χαίρει.
πρω. Κινδυνεύει.
2Ω. Τι' δ’ όταν άνελπίστως έχη κενοΰμενος
τευξεσθαι πληρώσεως; άρ’ ου τότε το διπλοΰν
γιγνοιτ άν περί τόις λΰπας πάθος, δ σύ νυν δη
C κατιδών ωηθης απλώς είναι διπλοΰν;
ΠΡΩ. Αληθέστατα, ώ Έώκρατες.
2Ω. Ύαΰτη δη τη σκεφει τούτων τών παθημάτων
τοδε χρησώμεθα.
πρω. Το ποιον;
2Ω. Πότερον αληθείς ταΰτας τάς λΰπας τε καί
ηδονάς η φευδεΐς είναι λεξομεν; η τάς μεν τινας
αληθείς, τάς δ’ ου;
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? δ’, ώ Σιώκρατες, άν εΐεν φευδεΐς
ηδοναί η λΰπαι;
288
PHILEBUS
he does not possess them. Well then, shall we say

that he is between the affections, or not ?
pro. Let us say so.
soc. Shall we say that he is wholly pained or
wholly pleased ?
pro. No, by Zeus, but he is afflicted with a twofold
pain ; he suffers in body from his sensation, and in
soul from expectation and longing.
soc. How could you, Protarchus, speak of twofold
pain ? Is not an empty man sometimes possessed
of a sure hope of being filled, and sometimes, on the
contrary, quite hopeless ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And do you not think that when he has a
hope of being filled he takes pleasure in his memory,
and yet at the same time, since he is at the moment
empty, suffers pain ?
pro. It cannot be otherwise.
soc. At such a time, then, a man, or any other
animal, has both pain and pleasure at once.
pro. Yes, I suppose so.
soc. And when an empty man is without hope of
being filled, what then ? Is not that the time when
the twofold feeling of pain would arise, which you
just now observed and thought the pain simply was
twofold ?
pro. Very true, Socrates.
soc. Let us make use of our examination of those
affections for a particular purpose.
pro. For what purpose ?
soc. Shall we say that those pleasures and pains are
true or false, or that some are true and others not so ?
pro. But, Socrates, how can there be false plea¬
sures or pains ?
289
PLATO
2Ω. Πώ? δέ, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, φόβοι, αν αληθείς η

φευδεΐς, η προσδοκίαι αληθείς η μη, η δόζαι αληθείς
η φευδεΐς;
I) ΠΡΩ. Δό^α? μεν έγωγ’ αν που συγχωροίην, τα
δ> tf A
erepa ταυτ ονκ αν.
) > >/
2Ω. Πώς- φης; λόγον μέντοι τινά κινδυνευομεν

ου πάνυ σμικρόν έπεγείρειν.
ΠΡΩ. Άληθη λέγεις.
2Ω. ΆΛΑ’ ει προς τα παρεληλυθότα, ώ παΐ
’κείνου τάνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοϋτο σκεπτέον.
’Ίσως τοΰτό γε.
πρω.
Χαίροιν τοίνυν δει λέγειν τοΐς άλλοι? μηκεσιν
2Ω.
η και ότωοΰν των παρά το προσηκον λεγομένων.
ΠΡΩ. Όρθώς.
Ε 2Ω. Αέγε δη μοι· θαύμα γάρ εμέ γ* εχει δια
τέλους άει περί τα αυτά ά νυν δη προυθέμεθα άπο¬
ρη ματα.
πρω. Πώ? δη φης;
2Ω. xFeu8ei?, αί δ’ αληθείς ούκ εισίν ηδοναί;
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? γάρ αν;
2Ω. Ούτε δη όναρ ουθ' ϋπαρ, ώς φης,1 οΰτ’ εν
μανίαις ουτ έν παραφροσυναις2 ούδεις έσθ' δστις
ποτέ δοκέΐ μέν χαίρειν, χαίρει δε ούδαμώς, οάδ’
αύ δοκεΐ μέν λυπεΐσθαι, λυπεΐται δ* ου.
πρω. Πάνθ’ ουτω ταυτ’, ώ Σώκρατες, 'έχειν
παντες ύπειληφαμεν.
2Ω. Άρ’ ουν όρθώς; η σκεπτέον εΐτ’ όρθώς είτε
μη ταΰτα λέγεται;
31 22. πρω. Σκεπτέον, ώ? γ* εγώ φαίην άν,
1 φχι$ Stallbaum: φχι$, 'έστιν ΒΤ.

2 παραφροσύναι* Β, from ττάσαυ άφροσiWts: πάσασ άφρο-
σύναα Τ.
290
PHILEBUS
soc. But, Protarchus, how can there be true and

false fears, or true and false expectations, or true
and false opinions ?
pro. Opinions I would grant you, but not the rest,
soc. What ? I am afraid we are starting a very
considerable discussion.
pro. You are right.
soc. And yet we must consider, thou son of that
man,1 whether the discussion is relevant to what has
gone before.
pro. Yes, no doubt.
soc. We must dismiss everything else, tedious or
otherwise, that is irrelevant.
pro. Right.
soc. Now tell me ; for I am always utterly amazed
by the same questions we were just proposing.
soc. Are not some pleasures false and others true ?
pro. How could that be ?
soc. Then, as you maintain, nobody, either sleep¬
ing or waking or insane or deranged, ever thinks he
feels pleasure when he does not feel it, and never,
on the other hand, thinks he suffers pain when he
does not suffer it ?
pro. We have, Socrates, always believed that all
this is as you suggest.
soc. But is the belief correct ? Shall we consider
whether it is so or not ?
pro. I should say we ought to consider that.
1 “ Son of that man ” may mean “ son of Philebus,”

in so far as Protarchus is a pupil of Philebus, or (so Bury)
“ son of Gorgias,” the orator and teacher (c/. 58 b), or the
father of Protarchus may be referred to by the pronoun,
possibly because Socrates does not at the moment recall his
name or because he wishes to imply that he was a man of mark.
291
PLATO
2Ω. Διορισώμεθα δή σαφέστερου έτι τό νυν δη

λεγόμενον ηδονής τε περί, καί δόξης. εστι γάρ
που τι δοξάζειν ήμιν ;
ΠΡΩ. Nat.
2Ω. Kat ήδεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. Nat.
2Ω. Kat μην /cat το δοξαζόμενου εστί τι;
2Ω. Kat τό γε ω τό ήδόμενον ήδεται;
πρω. Kat πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τό δοξάζον, άντε όρθώς άντε μη
όρθώς δοξάζη, τό γε δοξάζειν όντως ούδέποτ’ άπόλ-
λυσιν.
Β πρω. Πώ? γάρ άν;
2Ω. Ο ύκοΰν καί το ήδόμενον, άντε όρθώς άντε
μη όρθώς ήδηται, τό γε όντως ήδεσθαι δήλον ώς
ουδέποτε άπολεΐ.
πρω. Nat, /cat τοΰθ’ ούτως έχει.
2Ω. 'Ότω1 ποτέ ούν δη τρόπω δόξα ψευδής τε /cat
αληθής ήμΐν φιλεΐ γίγνεσθαι, τό δ'ε τής ηδονής
μονον αληοες, οοςαί,βιν ο όντως και χαipew αμφο-
τέρα ομοίως είληχεν2 σκεπτέον.3
πρω. Σκεπτέον.
2Ω. ΓΑρ’ ότι δόξη μεν έπιγίγνεσθον ψευδός τε
C και αληθές, και εγενετο ου μόνον δόξα διά ταΰτα
αλλά και ποιά τις έκατέρα, σκεπτέον φής τοΰτ*
είναι;
πρω. Nat.
2Ω. Προ? δε γε τουτοις, εί και το παράπαν
1 'ότι3 ΒΤ : Tip t vulg.

2 ιΐΚηχε Stallbaum : εΐληφεν ΒΤ.
3 σκεπτίον add. Baiter.
292
PHILEBUS
soc. Then let us analyse still more clearly what

we were just now saying about pleasure and opinion.
There is a faculty of having an opinion, is there not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And of feeling pleasure ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And there is an object of opinion ?
pro. Of course.
soc. And something by which that which feels
pleasure is pleased ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And that which has opinion, whether right
or wrong, never loses its function of really having
opinion ?
pro. Of course not.
soc. And that which feels pleasure, whether
rightly or wrongly, will clearly never lose its function
of really feeling pleasure ?
pro. Yes, that is true, too.
soc. Then we must consider how it is that opinion
is both true and false and pleasure only true, though
the holding of opinion and the feeling of pleasure are
equally real.
pro. Yes, so we must.
soc. You mean that we must consider this ques¬
tion because falsehood and truth are added as
attributes to opinion, and thereby it becomes not
merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality in
each instance ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And furthermore, we must reach an agree¬
ment on the question whether, even if some things
293
PLATO
ήμΐν τα μεν εστι π οι άττα, ήδονή δε καί λύπη μόνον

άπερ εστί, ποιώ τινε1 δε ού γίγνεσθον, καί ταΰθ’ ήμΐν
διομολογητεον.
ΠΡΩ. Αήλον.
2Ω. ΆΛΑ’ ούδέν τοΰτό γε χαλεπόν ίδεΐν, ότι
και ποιώ τινε. πάλαι γάρ εΐπομεν ότι μεγάλαι τε
και σμικραί καί σφόδρα εκάτεραι γίγνονται, λνπαί
D τε και ήδοναί.
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μεν ούν.
2Ω. "Αν δε γε πονηριά τούτων, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε,
προσγίγνηταί τινι, πονηρόν μεν φήσομεν ούτω γίγνε¬
σθαι δόξαν, πονηρόν δε και ηδονην;
πρω. Άλλα τί μην, ώ Σώκρατες ;
2Ω. Ύί δ’, αν όρθότης η τουναντίον όρθότητι
τινι τούτων προσγίγνηται; μών ούκ ορθήν μεν
δόξαν εροΰμεν, αν ορθότητα ίσχη, ταύτόν δε ηδονην;
πρω. Άναγκαΐον.
Ε 2Ω. "Αν δε' γε άμαρτανόμενον τό δοξαζόμενου
η, την δόξαν τότε όμαρτάνουσάν γε ούκ ορθήν
όμολογητεον oύδ, όρθώς δοξάζουσαν;
πρω. Πώ? γαρ αν;
2Ω. 11 Ο , αν αυ Λύπην η τινα ηοονην περί το
εφύ ώ λυπεΐται η τουναντίον αμαρτάνουσαν εφ-
ορώμεν, ορθήν η χρηστήν η τι των καλών ονομάτων
αυτή προσθησομεν;
πρω. ΆΛΑ’ ούχ οίόν τε, εΐπερ άμαρτησεταί γε
ηδονή.
2Ω. Και μην εοικε γε ηδονή πολλάκις ού μετά
δόξης ορθής άλλα μετά φεύδους ημΐν γίγνεσθαι.
πρω. Πώ? γαρ ου; καί την μεν δόξαν γε, ώ
38 Σώκρατες, εν τω τοιούτω καί τότε λόγο μεν2 φευδή,
την δ’ ηδονήν αύτήν ούδείς αν ποτέ προσείποι φευδή.
294
PHILEBUS
have qualities, pleasure and pain are not merely

what they are, without qualities or attributes.
pro. Evidently we must.
soc. But it is easy enough to see that they have
qualities. For we said a long time ago that both
pains and pleasures are great and small and intense.
soc. And if badness becomes an attribute of any
of these, Protarchus, shall we say that the opinion
or the pleasure thereby becomes bad ?
pro. Why certainly, Socrates,
soc. And what if rightness or its opposite becomes
an attribute of one of them ? Shall we not say that
the opinion is right, if it has rightness, and the
pleasure likewise ?
pro. Obviously.
soc. And if that which is opined is mistaken,
must we not agree that the opinion, since it is at
the moment maldng a mistake, is not right or rightly
opining ?
pro. Of course.
soc. And what if we see a pain or a pleasure
making a mistake in respect of that by which the
pain or pleasure is caused ? Shall we give it the
attribute of right or good or any of the words which
denote excellence ?
pro. That is impossible if the pleasure is mistaken,
soc. And certainly pleasure often seems to come
to us in connexion with false, not true, opinion.
pro. Of course it does ; and in such a case,
Socrates, we call the opinion false ; but nobody
would ever call the actual pleasure false.
1 ποιώ rive t: ποιων rive T: ποιων rive B.
3 \έ'yoμev Stallbaum: έλέγομεν BT.
295
PLATO
2Ω. Άλλα 7τροθύμως άμύνεις τώ τής ήδονής, ώ

ΤΙρώταρχε, λόγω τα νΰν.
ΠΡΩ. Ουδόν γε, άλλ’ άπερ ακούω λόγω.
2Ω. Δια φόρεί δ’ ήμΐν ουδόν, ώ εταίρε, η μετά
δόξης re ορθής καί μετ ότηστήμης ηδονή τής μετά
τού ψεύδους καί άγνοιας1 πολλάκις εκάστοις ημών
εγγι γνομόνης;
Β ΠΡΩ. Εΐκδ? γοΰν μη σμικρόν δLaφόρεLV.
23. 2Ω. Τη? δη διαφοράς αύτοΐν επί θεωρίαν
ελθωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. “Aye οπη σοι φαίνεται.
2Ω. Τήδε δη άγω.
πρω. Π 77;
2Ω. Αοξα, φαμόν, ήμΐν εστι μεν ψευδής, εστι
δε καί αληθής;
πρω. Έστιρ.
2Ω. E-fl-erai μην ταύταις, ο νΰν δη ελόγομεν,
ηδονή καί λύπη πολλάκις, άληθεΐ καί ψευδεΐ δόξη
λόγω.
πρω. ΐϊάνυ γε.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν εκ μνήμης τε καί αίσθήσεως δόξα
C ημΐν καί τδ διαδοξάζειν εγχειρεΐν γίγνεθ’2 όκάστοτε;
2Ω. Άρ> ούν ημάς ώδε περί ταΰτα άναγκαΐον
ήγούμεθα ΐσχειν;
πρω. Πώ?;
2Ω. Πολλά/α? ίδόντι τινί πόρρωθεν μή πάνυ
σαφώς τα καθορώμενα ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρί-
νειν φαίης αν τανθ’ άπερ όρα;
ΠΡΩ. Φαίην αν.
2Ω. 0υκοΰν τδ μετά τούτο αύτδς αύτδν ούτος
ανόροιτ αν ώδε;
296
PHILEBUS
soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of

pleasure just now, Protarchus.
pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear,
soc. Is there no difference, my friend, between
the pleasure which is connected with right opinion
and knowledge and that which often comes to each
of us with falsehood and ignorance ?
pro. There is likely to be a great difference,
soc. Then let us proceed to the contemplation of
the difference between them.
pro. Lead on as you think best,
soc. Then this is the way I lead.
pro. What way ?
soc. Do we agree that there is such a thing as
false opinion and also as true opinion ?
pro. There is.
soc. And, as we were saying just now, pleasure
and pain often follow them—I mean true and false
opinion.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And do not opinion and the power of forming
an opinion always come to us from memory and
perception ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Do we, then, believe that our relation to these
faculties is somewhat as follows ?
pro. How ?
soc. Would you say that often when a man sees
things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes
to distinguish between the things which he sees ?
pro. Yes, I shou-ld say so.
soc. Next, then, would he not ask himself-
1 ayvoias Cornarius: dpoias BT.
2 yiyved’ Vat.: yLyνβσθ' B : ylyverai T.
297
PLATO
πρω. Πώ?;
2Ω. Τί ποτέ αρα έστι τό παρά την πέτραν τοΰθ
D έστάναι φανταζόμενον υπό τινι δένδρω; ταΰτ
ειπεϊν αν τις προς εαυτόν δοκ€Ϊ σοι,1 τοιαΰτα άττα
κατιδών φαντασθόντα αύτω ποτέ;
2Ω. ?Αρ’ οΰν μετά ταΰτα 6 τοιοΰτος ώς απο-
κρινόμενος αν προς αυτόν ε'ίποι τοΰτο, ώς ’έστιν
άνθρωπος, έπίτυχώς είπών ;
πρω. Και πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Καί. παρενεχθείς γ* αΰ τάχ αν ώς εστι τινών
ποιμένων έργον τό καθορώμενον άγαλμα προσείποι.
πρω. Μάλα γε.
Ε 2Ω. Καν μέν τις y αύτω παρη, τά τε προς
αυτόν ρηθέντα έντείνας είς φωνήν προς τον παρόντα
αυτά ταΰτ αν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, και Aoyo? δη
γέγονεν ούτως ο τότε δόξαν εκαλοΰμεν;
2Ω. "Αν δ, άρα μόνος η τοΰτο ταύτόν προς
αυτόν2 διανοούμενος, ενίοτε καί πλείω χρόνον
εχων εν αύτω πορεύεται.
ΠΡΩ. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Τί οΰν;
άρα σοί φαίνεται τό περί τούτων
γιγνόμενον όπερ εμοί;
ΠΡΩ. Το ποιον;
2Ω. Αοκεϊ μοι τότε ημών η φυχη βιβλίω τινί
προσεοικέναι.
πρω. Πώ?;
39 2Ω. Ή μνήμη ταΐς αίσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτουσα είς
ταυτον κακεΐνα ά περί ταΰτά εστι τά παθήματα φαί¬
νονται μοι σχεδόν οίον γράφειν ημών εν ταΐς φυχαΐς
τότε λόγους· καί όταν μέν άληθη γράφη τοΰτο τό
298
PHILEBUS
pro. What ?
soc. “ What is that which is visible standing beside
the rock under a tree ? ” Do you not think a man
might ask himself such a question if he saw such
objects presented to his view ?
pro. To be sure.
soc. And after that our gazer might reply to
himself correctly “ It is a man ” ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into
the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and
then he would call the thing which he saw an image.
pro. Yes, indeed.
soc. And if some one is with him, he might
repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to
himself, and thus that which we called an opinion
now becomes a statement ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. But if he is alone when he has this thought,
he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long
time.
pro. Undoubtedly.
soc. Well, is your view about what takes place in
such cases the same as mine ?
pro. What is yours ?
soc. I think the soul at such a time is like a book.
pro. How is that ?
soc. Memory unites with the senses, and they and
the feelings which are connected with them seem to
me almost to write words in our souls ; and when
the feeling in question writes the truth, true opinions
1 δοκει σοι Coisl.: δοκ-fj σοι T: δοκήσοι Β.

a αΰτόν] αυτόν Τ: αυτό Β.
2 99
PLATO
πάθημα, δόξα τε αληθής καί λόγου απ' αυτόν ξυμ-

βαίνουσυν αληθείς εν ήμΐν γυγνόμενου" ψευδή δ
όταν 6 τοιούτος παρ' ήμΐν γραμματέας γράψη,
τάναντία τοΐς άληθεσυν άπεβη.
Β πρω. ΐίάνυ μεν οΰν δοκεΐ μου, κα ίάποδεχομαυ
τα ρηθεντα όντως.
2Ω. Άποδεχον δή καί ετερον δημυονργόν ημών
εν ταυς ψυχαΐς εν τώ τότε χρόνω γυγνόμενον.
πρω. Ύίνα;
2Ω. Ζωγράφον, δς μετά τον γραμματυστην των
λεγομένων εικόνας εν τή φνχή τούτων γράφευ.
πρω. Πώ? δή τούτον αΰ καυ πότε λεγομεν;
2Ω. 'Όταν απ' όφεως ή τυνος άλλης αυσθησεως
τα τότε δοξαζόμενα καυ λεγάμενα άπαγαγών τυς τάς
των δοξασθεντων καυ λεχθεντων ευκόνας εν αντω
C όρα πως. ή τούτο ούκ εστυ γυγνόμενον παρ' ήμΐν;
πρω. Σφόδρα μεν οΰν.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν αί μεν των αληθών δοξών καυ λό¬
γων ευκόνες αληθείς, αί δε τών φενδών ψευδείς;
ΠΡΩ. ΐΐαντάπασυν.
2Ω. Ει δή ταΰτ όρθώς είρήκαμεν, ετυ καυ τόδε
επί τούτους σκεφώμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. Τό ποιον;
2Ω. Ε£ περί μεν τών όντων καί τών γεγονότων
ταϋτα ήμΐν οΰτω πάσχευν άναγκαυον, περί δε τών
μελλόντων ον;
ΠΡΩ. Π ερί απάντων μεν οΰν τών χρόνων ωσαύτως.
D 2Ω. Ο ύκοΰν αυ γε δυά τής ψυχής αυτής ήδοναί
καυ λΰπαυ ελεχθησαν εν τοΐς πρόσθεν ώς προ τών
δυά τού σώματος ηδονών καί λυπών προγίγνουντ'1 αν,
ώσθ' ήμΐν ξυμβαύνευ το προχαίρευν τε καί προλν-
πεΐσθαυ περί τον μέλλοντα χρόνον ευναυ γυγνόμενον;
300
PHILEBUS
and true statements are produced in us ; but when

the writer within us writes falsehoods, the resulting
opinions and statements are the opposite of true.
pro. That is my view completely, and I accept it
as stated.
soc. Then accept also the presence of another
workman in our souls at such a time.
pro. What workman ?
soc. A painter, who paints in our souls pictures to
illustrate the words which the writer has written.
pro. But how do we say he does this, and when ?
soc. When a man receives from sight or some
other sense the opinions and utterances of the
moment and afterwards beholds in his own mind the
images of those opinions and utterances. That
happens to us often enough, does it not ?
pro. It certainly does.
soc. And the images of the true opinions are
true, and those of the false are false ?
pro. Assuredly.
soc. Then if we are right about that, let us con¬
sider a further question.
pro. What is it ?
soc. Whether this is an inevitable experience in
relation to the present and the past, but not in
relation to the future.
pro. It is in the same relation to all kinds of time,
soc. Was it not said a while ago that the pleasures
and pains which belong to the soul alone might come
before the pleasures and pains of the body, so that
we have the pleasure and pain of anticipation, which
relate to the future ?
1 irpoylyvoLVT recc.: irpoyLyi/oir' BT.

L 301
PLATO
π ρω. Αληθέστατα.
2Ω. Πότερον οΰν τα γράμματά τε και ζωγραφη-
ματα, ά σμικρω πρότερον έτίθεμεν εν ημϊν γί¬
γνεσθαι, περί μεν τον γεγονότα και τον παρόντα
Ε χρόνον εστί, περί δε τον μέλλοντα ουκ εστιν;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
2Ω. *Αρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ότι πάντ έστι ταΰτα
ελπίδες εις τον έπειτα χρόνον οΰσαι, ημείς δ’ αυ
διά παντός του βίου αεί γέμομεν ελπίδων;
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μεν οΰν.
24. 2Ω. "Aye δή, προς τοΐς νυν ειρημένοις
και τόδε άπόκριναι.
2Ω. Δίκαιος άνηρ καί ευσεβής και αγαθός πάν¬
τως άρ’ ου θεοφιλής εστιν;
2Ω. Τί δε; άδικός τε καί παντάπασι κακός άρ’
40 ου τουναντίον έκείνω;
2Ω. Πολλών μην ελπίδων, ώς έλέγομεν άρτι,
πας άνθρωπος γέμει;
πρπ. It ο ου;
2Ω. Αόγοι μην είσιν εν έκάστοις ημών, άς ελ¬
πίδας όνομά ζομεν;
ΠΡΩ. Ναί.
2Ω. Και δη καί τα φαντάσματα εζωγραφημένα·
και τις ορα πολλάκις έαυτω χρυσόν γιγνόμενον
άφθονον καί επ’ αΰτω πολλάς ηδονάς’ καί δη καί
ενεζωγραφημένον αυτόν έφέ αΰτω χαίροντα σφόδρα
καθορα.
Β πρω. Τί δ’ ου;
2Ω. Τούτων οΰν πάτερα φώμεν τοΐς μεν άγαθοις
302
PHILEBUS
pro. Very true.

soc. Do the writings and pictures, then, which we
imagined a little while ago to exist within us, relate
to the past and present, but not to the future ?
pro. To the future especially,
soc. Do you say “ to the future especially ” be¬
cause they are all hopes relating to the future and
we are always filled with hopes all our lives ?
pro. Precisely.
soc. Well, here is a further question for you to
answer.
pro. What is it ?
soc. A just, pious, and good man is surely a friend
of the gods, is he not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And an unjust and thoroughly bad man is the
reverse ?
pro. Of course.
soc. But, as we were just now saying, every man
is full of many hopes ?
soc. And there are in all of us written words
which we call hopes ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And also the images painted there ; and
often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into
his possession, and in its train many pleasures ; and
he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself
immensely.
soc. Shall we or shall we not say that of these
303
PLATO
ώς πολύ τα γεγραμμενα παρατίθεσθαι αληθή διά

το
το θεοφιλείς είναι,, τοΐς δε κακοΐς ώς αΰ το1 πολύ
τουναντίον, ή μή φώμεν;
πρω. Και μάλα φατεον.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν καί τοΐς κακοΐς ήδοναί γε ούδεν
ήττον πάρεισιν εζωγραφημεναι, φευδεΐς δε αύταί
που.
πρω. Τι μην;
2Ω. vFet’δεσιν αρα ήδοναΐς τα πολλά οί πονη¬
ροί χαίρουσιν, οί δ’ αγαθοί των ανθρώπων άληθεσιν.
ΠΡΩ. ’Αναγκαιότατα λεγεις.
2Ω. Εισί. δη κατα τούς νΰν λόγους φευδεΐς εν
ταΐς των ανθρώπων φυχαΐς ήδοναί, μεμιμημεναι
μεντοι τας αληθείς επί τα γελοιότερα* καί λΰπαι
δε ώσαυτως.
πρω. Είσίν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν ήν δοξάζειν μεν όντως αεί τω το
παραπαν οοςαί,ονη, μη βπ ουσι be μηόβ €τη
γεγονόσι2 μηδ’ επ’ εσομενοις2 ενίοτε.
πρω. Πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Και ταΰτά γε ήν, οΐμαι, τα άπεργαζόμενα
δόξαν φευδή τότε καί το φευδώς δοξάζειν. ή γάρ;
πρω. Ναι.
2Ω. Τι ούν; ούκ άνταποδοτεον ταΐς λυπαις
τε καί ήδοναΐς την τούτων αντίστροφον εξιν εν
εκείνους;
πρω. Πώ?;
Ώς ήν μεν χαίρειν όντως αεί τω το παρά-
2Ω.
παν οπωσοΰν καί είκή χαίροντι, μή μεντοι επί τοΐς
ουσι μηδ’ επί τοΐς γεγονόσιν ενίοτε, πολλάκις δε
1 αΰ <τό> Stallbaum: αΰ ΒΤ.
ΒΤ read έττοΰσι, έπιγεγονόαι, and έπεσομένοσ.
304
PHILEBUS
pictures those are for the most part true which are
presented to the good, because they are friends of
the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for
the most part false ?
pro. Surely we must say that,
soc. Then the bad also, no less than the good,
have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are
false pleasures.
pro. Yes, surely.
soc. Then the bad rejoice for the most part in
the false, and the good in true pleasures.
pro. That is inevitably true.
soc. According to our present view, then, there
are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or
caricatures of the true pleasures ; and pains likewise.
pro. There are.
soc. We saw, you remember, that he who had an
opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it
was sometimes not based upon realities, whether
present, past, or future.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And this it was, I believe, which created false
opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. Very well, must we not also grant that
pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to
realities ?
soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in
any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but
it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether
present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently,
305
PLATO
καί ίσως πλειστάκις επί τοΐς μηδε μελλουσί π ore

γενήσεσθαι.
Ε πρω. Και ταΰθ’ ούτως άναγκαΐον, ώ Σ,ώκρα-
τες, εχειν.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν 6 αυτός λόγος αν εΐη περί φόβων
τε καί θυμών καί πάντων των τοιουτων, ώς εστι
καί ψευδή πάντα τα τοιαΰτα ενίοτε;
ΠΡΩ. ΤΙάνυ μεν ουν.
2Ω. Ύί δε'; πονηράς δόξας και χρηστάς1 άλλως
ή φευδεΐς γιγνομενας εχομεν είπεΐν;
πρω. Ουκ άλλως.
2Ω. Οόδ’ ήδονάς γ , οΐμαί, κατανοοΰμεν ώς άλλον
41 τίνά τρόπον είσΐ πονηραί πλήν τω φευδεΐς εΐναο.
ΠΡΩ. ΐίάνυ μεν ουν τουναντίον, ώ Σιώκρατες,
είρηκας. σχεδόν γάρ τω φεΰδει μεν ου πάνυ
πονηράς άν τις λυπας τε καί ήδονάς θείη, μεγάλη
δε άλλη και πολλή συμπιπτοΰσας πονηριά.
2Ω. Τά? μεν τοίνυν πονηράς ήδονάς καί διά
πονηριάν ουσας τοιαυτας ολίγον ύστερον εροΰμεν,
άν ετί δοκή νων τάς δε φευδεΐς κατ’ άλλον τρόπον
εν ημΐν πολλάς καί πολλάκι,ς εν ου σας τε καί εγγιγνο-
Β μενας λεκτεον. τουτω γάρ ίσως χρησόμεθα προς
τάς κρίσεις.
πρω. Πώ? γάρ οϋκ; ε’ίπερ γε είσίν.
2Ω. ΆΛΑ’, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, είσί κατά γε τήν εμήν.
τοΰτο δε τό δόγμα εως άν κεηται παρ' ήμΐν, αδύνα¬
τον ανέλεγκτον δήπου γίγνεσθαι.
πρω. Καλώ?.
25. 2Ω. ΪΙεραστώμεθα2 δή καθάπερ άθληταί
προς τούτον αυ τον λόγον.
1 και χρηστάς ΒΤ: formerly bracketed by Stallbaum s

κάχρήστους Apelt.
306
PHILEBUS
upon things which will never even be realities in the

future.
pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the
case.
soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger
and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes
false ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad

or good except as they become false ?
pro. No.
soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures

also are not bad except by being false.
pro. No ; you have said quite the reverse of the
truth, Socrates ; for no one would be at all likely
to call pains and pleasures bad because they are
false, but because they are involved in another great
and manifold evil.
soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such
because of evil we will speak a little later, if we
still care to do so ; but of the false pleasures we
must prove in another way that they exist and come
into existence in us often and in great numbers ;
for this may help us to reach our decisions.
pro. Yes, of course ; that is, if such pleasures
exist.
soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion ;
however, until we have established the truth of this
opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.
pro. Good.
soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and
grapple with this new argument.
2 πβραστώμεθα B: προσιστώμεθα T.
307
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. "Ιωμεν.
2Ω. ΆΑΑά μην είπομεν, είπερ μεμνημεθα, ολίγον
C εν τοΐς πρόσθεν, ώς όταν αί λεγόμενοι επιθυμίαι
εν ημΐν ώσι, δίχα άρα τότε το σώμα καί χωρίς της
φυγής τοΐς παθημασι διείληπται.
ΠΡΩ. Μεμνημεθα, και προερρηθη ταΰτα.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν το μεν επιθυμούν ήν η φυχη των
τοΰ σώματος εναντίων εζεων, το δε την άλγηδονα η
τινα δια πάθος ηδονην τό σώμα ην τό παρεχόμενου;
πρω. ?Ηρ γάρ οΰν.
2Ω. Έυλλογίζου δη τό γιγνόμενον εν τοντοις.
πρω. Αεγε.
D 2Ω. Υίγνεται τοίνυν, όπόταν η ταΰτα, αμα
παρακεΐσθαι λυπας τε και ηδονάς, και τούτων
αισθήσεις άμα παρ’ άλληλας εναντίων ούσών
γίγνεσθαι, δ καί νυν δη εφάνη.
πρω. Φαίνεται γοΰν.
2Ω. Ουκοΰν καί τάδε είρηται καί σννωμολογη-
μενον ημΐν έμπροσθεν κεΐται;
ΠΡΩ. Το ποιον;
2Ω. Ώς τό μάλλον τε καί ηττον άμφω τουτω
δεχεσθον, λύπη τε καί ηδονη, καί ότι τών απεί¬
ρων ε’ίτην.
πρω. Είρηται. τί μην;
2Ω. Τι? ονν μηχανη ταΰτ όρθώς κρίνεσθαι;
Ε ΠΡΩ. Πτ^ δη καί πώς;
2Ω. Ει το βουλή μα ημΐν της κρίσεως τουτουν
εν τοιουτοις τισί διαγνώναι βούλεται εκάστοτε τίς
τούτων προς άλληλας μείζων καί τίς ελάττων καί
τις μάλλον καί τίς σφοδρότερα, λύπη τε προς
ηδονην καί λύπη προς λύπην καί ηδονη προς
ηδονην.
308
PHILEBUS
pro. Let us do so.

soc. We said, you may remember, a little while
ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in
us, the body is apart from and separate from the soul
in that it has feelings.
pro. I remember ; that was said,
soc. And was not the soul that which desired the
opposites of the conditions of the body and the body
that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling ?
pro. Yes, that was the case.
soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes
place in these circumstances.
pro. Go on.
soc. What takes place is this : in these circum¬
stances pleasures and pains exist at the same time
and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains
are present side by side simultaneously, as was made
clear just now.
pro. Yes, that is clear.
soc. And have we not also said and agreed and
settled something further ?
pro. What ?
soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the
more and less and are of the class of the infinite.
pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly,
soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly
of this ?
pro. How and in what way do you mean ?
soc. 1 mean to ask whether the purpose of our
judgement of these matters in such circumstances is
to recognize in each instance which of these elements
is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain
with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with
pleasure.
l 2 309
PLATO
πρω. ΆΛΑ’ εστι ταΰτά τε τοιαΰτα καί ή βου-

λησις τής κρίσεως αϋτη.
2Ω. Τι οΰν; έν μέν οψει τό ιτόρρωθεν καί
42 έγγΰθεν όραν τα μεγέθη την αλήθειαν αφανίζει καί
ψευδή ποιεί δοξάζειν, εν λΰπαις δ’ αρα καί ήδοναίς
ονκ έστι ταύτόν τούτο γιγνόμενον;
ΠΡΩ. Πολύ μεν οΰν μάλλον, ώ Σώκρατες.
2Ω. ’Ενάντιον δη τό νυν τω σμικρόν έμπροσθεν
γε'γονεν.
ΠΡΩ. Τδ ποιον λέγεις;
2Ω. ToVe μεν αί δόξαι ψευδείς τε καί αληθείς
αΰται γιγνόμεναι τας λΰπας τε καί ήδονάς άμα του
παρ' αΰταΐς1 παθήματος άνεπίμπλασαν.
Β ΠΡΩ. ’Αληθέστατα.
2Ω. Νυν δε γε αύταί2 διά το πόρρωθέν τε καί
έγγΰθεν έκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμενοι θεωρεΐσθαι, καί
άμα τιθέμενοι παρ’ άλλήλας, αί μεν ήδοναί παρά τό
λυπηρόν μείζους φαίνονται καί σφοδρότεραι, λΰπαι
δ’ αΰ διά τό παρ' ήδονάς τουναντίον έκείναις.
πρω. ’Ανάγκη γίγνεσθαι τά τοιαϋτα διά ταΰτα.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν όσω μείζους τέον ούσέυν έκάτεραι
καί ελάττους φαίνονται, τοΰτο άποτεμόμένος εκατέ-
ρων3 τό φαινόμενον άλλ’ ουκ όν, ούτε αυτό όρθιος
C φαινόμενον ερεΐς, ουδ’ αυ ποτέ τό επί τοΰτιμλ μέρος
τής ηδονής καί λύπης γιγνόμενον ορθόν τε καί
αληθές τολμήσεις λέγειν.
πρω. Ου γάρ οΰν.
2Ω. Τούτων τοινυν εξής όψόμεθα εάν τήδε
1 αύταΐς ΒΤ: αυτούς Coisl.

2 αύταί] αδται ΒΤ.
3 έκατέρων Schleiermacher: ίκάτορον ΒΤ.
J τούτω ΒΤ: τοΰτο vulg.
310
PHILEBUS
pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that

is the purpose of our judgement.
soc. Well then, in the case of sight, seeing things
from too near at hand or from too great a distance
obscures their real sizes and causes us to have false
opinions ; and does not this same thing happen in
the case of pains and pleasures ?
pro. Yes, Socrates, even much more than in the
case of sight.
soc. Then our present conclusion is the opposite
of what we said a little while ago.
pro. To what do you refer ?
soc. A while ago these opinions, being false or
true, imbued the pains and pleasures with their own
condition of truth or falsehood.
pro. Very true.
soc. But now, because they are seen at various
and changing distances and are compared with one
another, the pleasures themselves appear greater
and more intense by comparison with the pains, and
the pains in turn, through comparison with the
pleasures, vary inversely as they.
pro. That is inevitable for the reasons you have
given.
soc. They both, then, appear greater and less
than the reality. Now if you abstract from both of
them this apparent, but unreal, excess or inferiority,
you cannot say that its appearance is true, nor again
can you have the face to affirm that the part of
pleasure or pain which corresponds to this is true or
real.
pro. No, I cannot.
soc. Next, then, we will see whether we may not
311
PLATO
άπαντώμεν ηδονάς καί λύπας φευδεΐς έτι μάλλον η

ταύτας φαινομενας τε καί ούσας iv τοΐς ζώοις.
ΠΡΩ. Ποια? δη καί πώς λέγεις;
26. 2Ω. ΕΓρηται που πολλάκις ότι της φύ-
σεως έκαστων διαφθειρομένης μέν συγκρίσεσι καί
D διακρίσεσι καί πληρώσεσι καί κενώσεσι καί τισιν
αύξαις καί φθίσεσι λϋπαί τε καί άλγηδόνες καί όδύ-
ναι καί πάνθ’ δπόσα τοιαϋτ δνόματ εχει ζυμβαίνει
γιγνόμενα.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι, ταΰτα εΐρηται πολλάκις.
2Ω. Ει? δε γε την αύτών φύσιν όταν καθιστη-
ται, ταύτην αυ την κατάστασήν ηδονην άπεδεξάμεθα
παρ’ ημών αύτών.
ΠΡΩ. Όρθώς.
2Ω. Τι δ’, δταν περί το σώμα μηδέν τούτων
γινόμενον ημών η;
ΠΡΩ. Πότε δε τοΰτ αν γένοιτο, ώ Σώκρατες ;
Ε 2Ω. Οόδεν προς λόγον εστίν, ώ Πρώταρχε, ό
σύ νυν ηρου τό ερώτημα.
ΠΡΩ. Τι δρ;
2Ω. Διότι την εμην ερώτησήν ον κωλύεις με1
διερέσθαι σε πάλιν.
πρω. Ποιαν;
2Ω. Εϊ δ’ ουν μη γίγνοιτο, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, φησω,
τό τοιοϋτον, τι ποτέ άναγκαΐον εζ αυτού συμβαί-
νειν ήμΐν;
ΠΡΩ. Μη κινούμενου τού σώματος εφ’ εκά-
τερα φης;
2Ω. Ού'τίυ?.
πρω. Δηλον δη τούτο γε, ώ Σώκρατες, ώς
ούτε ηδονη γίγνοιτ αν εν τώ τοιούτω ποτέ οϋτ’ αν
τις λύπη.
312
PHILEBUS
in another direction come upon pleasures and pains

still more false than these appearing and existing in
living beings.
pro. What pleasures and what method do you
mean ?
soc. It has been said many times that pains and
woes and aches and everything that is called by
names of that sort are caused when nature in any
instance is corrupted through combinations and dis¬
solutions, fillings and emptyings, increases and
diminutions.
pro. Yes, that has been said many times,
soc. And we agreed that when things are restored
to their natural condition, that restoration is pleasure.
pro. Right.
soc. But when neither of these changes takes place
in the body, what then ?
pro. When could that be the case, Socrates ?
soc. That question of yours is not to the point,
Protarchus.
pro. Why not ?
soc. Because you do not prevent my asking my
own question again.
pro. What question ?
soc. Why, Protarchus, I may say, granting that
such a condition does not arise, what would be the
necessary result if it did ?
pro. You mean if the body is not changed in
either direction ?
soc. Yes.
pro. It is clear, Socrates, that in that case there
would never be either pleasure or pain.
1 κωλύει: με Burnet: κωλύει έμϊ B : κωλνσειs με T.

313
PLATO
43 2Ω. Κάλλιστ’ είπες. άλλα γάρ, οΐμαι, τόδε

λέγεις, ώς αεί τι τούτων άναγκαΐον ημιν ξυμβαι-
νειν, ώς οΐ σοφοί φασιν αεί yap άπαντα ανω re και
κάτω pel.
πρω. Αέγουσι γάρ οΰν, και δοκοΰσί ye ου φαύ¬
λοι? λέγειν.
2Ω. Π cos' yap αν /.ιρ φαΰλοί ye οντες; αλλα yap
υπεκστηναι τον λόγον επιφερόμενον τούτον βού¬
λομαι. ττ^δ’ ούν διανοούμαι, φευγειν, και συ μοι
ξυμφευγε.
Λ eye δπη.
ΠΡΩ.
2Ω. Ταΰτα μεν τοίνυν ούτως έστω, φώμεν προς
Β τούτου?. συ δ’ άπόκριναι· πότερον αεί πάντα,
όπόσα πάσχα τι των εμφυχων, ταντ αισθάνεται τό
πάσχον, και ουτ’ αυξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ημάς
αυτού? ούτε τι των τοιούτων ούδέν πάσχοντες, η
παν τουναντίον;
πρω. 'Άπαν δηπου τουναντίον.1 ολίγου γάρ τά
γε τοιαΰτα λέληθε πάνθ’ ημάς?
2Ω. Ου τοίνυν καλώς ημίν είρηται τδ νυν δή
ρηθέν, ώς αί μεταβολαί κάτω τε και ανω γιγνό-
μεναι λυπας τε καί ηδονάς απεργάζονται.
πρω. Τι μην;
C 2Ω. Ώδ’ εσται κάλλιον καί άνεπιληπτότερον
το λεγόμενον.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ?;
2Ω. Ώ? αί μεν μεγάλαι μεταβολαί λυπας τε καί
ηδονάς ποιοΰσιν ημιν, αί δ’ αύ μετριαί τε καί
σμικραί το παράπαν ουδέτερα τούτων.
πρω. ’Ορθότερου ούτω? η ’κείνως, ώ Σ,ώκρατες.
1 Ατταν δήττοιι τουναντίον add. in marg. Τ: om. ΒΤ.
a T//xas add. vulg.
314
PHILEBUS
soc. Excellent. But you believe, I fancy, that

some such change must always be taking place in
us, as the philosophers1 say ; for all things are always
flowing and shifting.
pro. Yes, that is what they say, and I think their
theory is important.
soc. Of course it is, in view of their own import¬
ance. But I should like to avoid this argument
which is rushing at us. I am going to run away ;
come along and escape with me.
pro. What is your way of escape ?
soc. “ We grant you all this ” let us say to them.

But answer me this, Protarchus, are we and all
other living beings always conscious of everything
that happens to us—of our growth and all that sort
of thing—or is the truth quite the reverse of that ?
pro. Quite the reverse, surely ; for we are almost
entirely unconscious of everything of that sort.

soc. Then we were not right in saying just now
that the fluctuations and changes cause pains and
pleasures.
pro. No, certainly not.
soc. A better and more unassailable statement

would be this.
pro. What ?
soc. That the great changes cause pains and

pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones
cause no pains or pleasures at all.
pro. That is more correct than the other state¬
ment, Socrates.
1 Heracleitus and his followers.
315
PLATO
2Ω. 0υκοΰν εί ταΰτα ούτω, πάλιν ο νυν δη

ρηθείς βίος άν ηκοι.
πρω. Ποιο?;
2Ω. "Ον άλυπόν τε καί άνευ χαρμονών εφαμεν
είναι.
πρω. *Αληθέστατα λεγεις.
2Ω. Έκ δη τούτων τιθώμεν τριττούς ημΐν βίους,
*va μ,εν ηουν, τον ο αν Λυπηρόν, τον ο eva μηο-
ετερα. η πώς άν φαίης συ περί τούτων;
πρω. Ούκ άλλως εγωγε η ταυτη, τρεις είναι
τούς βίους.
2 Ω. Ο υκοΰν ούκ άν εΐη το μη λυπεΐσθαί ποτ€
ταύτόν τώ χαίρειν;
πρω. ΓΤώ? yap άν;
2Ω. Όπόταν ούν άκουσης ώς ηδ ιστόν πάντων
εστίν άλυπως διατελεΐν τον βίον άπαντα, τί τόθ' υπο¬
λαμβάνεις λεγειν τον τοιοΰτον;
πρω. ' [Ιδύ Aeyeiv φαίνεται εμοιγε οΰτος το μη
λυπεΐσθαι.
2Ω. Τριών οντων ούν ημΐν, ώντινων βούλει,
Κ τιθει, καλλίοσιν "να ονόμασι χρώμεθα, το μεν χρυ¬
σόν, το δ’ άργυρον, τρίτον δε τδ1 μηδετερα τούτων.
πρω. Κεΐται.
2Ω. Τδ δη μηδετερα τούτων εσθ' ημΐν δπως
θάτερα γενοιτ' άν, χρυσός η άργυρος;
ΠΡΩ. Και πώς αν;
2Ω. Οδδ’ αρα δ μέσος βίος ηδύς η λυπηρός
λεγόμενος όρθώς άν ποτέ οϋτ' εί δοζάζοι τις, δο^ά-
ζοιτο, ουτ εί λόγοι, λεχθείη, κατά γε τον ορθόν
λόγον.
πρω. Πώ? γάρ άν;
1 τό Τ s om. Β.
316
PHILEBUS
soc. But if that is the case, the life of which we

spoke just now would come back again.
pro. What life ?
soc. The life which we said was painless and

without joys.
pro. Very true.
soc. Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one

pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two ;
or do you disagree ?
pro. No, I agree to this, that there are the three
lives.
soc. Then freedom from pain would not be iden¬
tical with pleasure ?
pro. Certainly not.
soc. When you hear anyone say that the pleas¬

antest of all things is to live all one’s life without
pain, what do you understand him to mean ?
pro. I think he means that freedom from pain is
pleasure.
soc. Now let us assume that we have three things ;

no matter what they are, but let us use fine names
and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither
of the two.
pro. Agreed.
soc. Now can that which is neither become either

gold or silver ?
pro. Certainly not.
soc. Neither can that middle life of which we

spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called
in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those
who reason correctly.
pro. No, certainly not.
317
PLATO
2Ω. Άλλα μην, ώ εταίρε, λεγόντων γε ταΰτα

44 και δοζαζόντων αισθανόμεθα.
2Ω. ΐΐότερον οΰν και χαίρειν οϊονται τότε όταν
μη λυπώνται;
πρω. Φασΐ γοΰν.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν οϊονται τότε χαίρειν■ ού γαρ αν
ελεγόν που.
πρω. Κινδυνεύει.
2Ω. ^Υευδη γε μην δοζάζουσι περί τοΰ χαίρειν,
ε'ίπερ χωρίς τοΰ μη λυπεΐσθαι και τοΰ χαίρειν ή
φυσις εκατερου.
ΠΡΩ. Και μην χωρίς γε ην.
2Ω. ΤΙότερον
οΰν αιρώμεθα παρ* ημΐν ταΰτ
Β είναι, καθάπερ άρτι, τρία, η δυο μόνα, λύπην μεν
κακόν τοΐς άνθρώποις, την δ’ απαλλαγήν των λυπών,
αυτό τοΰτο αγαθόν όν, ηδύ προσαγορευεσθαι ;
27. ΠΡΩ. Πώ? δη νΰν τοΰτο, ώ Ίόώκρατες,
ερωτώμεθα ΰφ' ημών αυτών; ού γαρ μανθάνω.
2Ω. "Οντως γάρ τούς πολεμίους Φιληβου τοΰδε,
ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, ού μανθάνεις.
πρω. Αεγεις δε αύτούς τίνας;
2Ω. Και μάλα δεινούς λεγομένους τα περί φυσιν,
οΐ τό παράπαν ήδονάς ού φασιν είναι.
C 2Ω. Αυπών ταύτας είναι πάσας άποφυγάς, άς
νΰν οι περ'ι Φίληβον ηδονάς επονομάζουσιν.
πρω. Τούτοι? οΰν ημάς πάτερα πείθεσθαι ζυμ-
βουλεύεις, η πώς, ώ Σώκρατες;
2Ω. Ούκ, άλλ’ ώσπερ μάντεσι προσχρησθαί τισι,
μαντευομενοις ού τέχνη αλλά τινι δυσχερεία φυσεως
ούκ αγεννοΰς λίαν μεμισηκότων την της ηδονης δυ-
318
PHILEBUS
soc. But surely, my friend, we are aware of persons

who call it and consider it so.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Do they, then, think they feel pleasure when¬

ever they are not in pain ?
pro. That is what they say.
soc. Then they do think they feel pleasure at
such times ; for otherwise they would not say so.
pro. Most likely.
soc. Certainly, then, they have a false opinion
about pleasure, if there is an essential difference
between feeling pleasure and not feeling pain.
pro. And we certainly found that difference,
soc. Then shall we adopt the view that there are,
as we said just now. three states, or that there are
only two—pain, which is an evil to mankind, and
freedom from pain, which is of itself a good and is
called pleasure ?
pro. Why do we ask ourselves that question now,
Socrates ? I do not understand.

soc. No, Protarchus, for you certainly do not
understand about the enemies of our friend Philebus.
pro. Whom do you mean ?
soc. Certain men who are said to be master
thinkers about nature, and who deny the existence
of pleasures altogether.
pro. Is it possible ?
soc. They say that what Philebus and his school
call pleasures are all merely refuges from pain.
pro. Do you recommend that we adopt their
view, Socrates ?
soc. No, but that we make use of them as seers
who divine the truth, not by acquired skill, but by
some innate and not ignoble repugnance which makes
319
PLATO
ναμιν καί νενομικότων ούδέν υγιές, ώστε και αυτό

τούτο αυτής το επαγωγόν γοητευμα, άλλ’ ούχ ηδο-
D ντην,1 είναι, τούτοις μεν οΰν ταΰτα αν προσχρησαιο,
σκεφάμενος ετι καί τα άλλα αυτών δυσχεράσματα·
μετά δε ταΰτα αί γέ μοι δοκοΰσιν ηδοναί αληθείς
είναι πεύσει, ΐνα εξ άμφοΐν τοΐν λόγοιν σκεφάμενοι
την δΰναμιν αυτής παραθώμεθα προς την κρίσιν.
ΠΡΠ. Όρθώς λέγεις.
2Ω. λίεταδιώκωμεν δη τούτους, ώσπερ ξυμμά-
χους, κατά το της δυσχερείας αυτών ίχνος. οίμαι
γάρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αυτούς, άρχομένους ποθεν
Ε άνωθεν, ώς εί βουληθεΐμεν ότουοΰν είδους την
φύσιν ιδεΐν, οίον την του σκληρού, πότερον εις τα
σκληρότατα άποβλέποντες ούτως αν μάλλον συννοη-
σαιμεν η προς τα πολλοστά σκληρότητι; δει δη
σε, ώ Υίρώταρχε, καθάπερ έμοί, και τούτοις τοΐς
δυσχερέσιν άποκρίνεσθαι.
πρω. Υίάνυ μεν οΰν, και λέγω γε αύτοΐς οτι
προς τά πρώτα μεγέθει.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν εί και το της ηδονης γένος ιδεΐν
ηντινα ποτέ έχει φύσιν βουληθεΐμεν, ούκ εις τάς
45 πολλοστάς ηδονάς άποβλεπτέον, άλλ’ εις τά.ς άκρο-
τατας και σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Πά? άν σοι ταύτη συγχωροίη τά νυν.
2Ω. νΑρ> οΰν, αί πρόχειροί γε αΐπερ και μέγι-
σται τών ηδονών, ο λέγομεν πολλάκις, αί περί το
σώμά εισιν αυται;
ΠΡΩ. Πγάρ ου;
2Ω. Πότερον οΰν καί2 μείζους είσί καί γίγνονται
περί τούς κάμνοντας εν ταΐς νόσοις η περί τούς
1 ηδονήν recc. : ηδονή ΒΤ.

2 καί Τ: ora. Β.
320
PHILEBUS
them hate the power of pleasure and think it so

utterly unsound that its very attractiveness is mere
trickery, not pleasure. You may make use of them
in this way, considering also their other expressions
of dislike ; and after that you shall learn of the
pleasures which seem to me to be true, in order that
we may consider the power of pleasure from both
points of view and form our judgement by comparing
them.
pro. You are right.
soc. Let us, then, consider these men as allies

and follow them in the track of their dislike. I
fancy their method would be to begin somewhere
further back and ask whether, if we wished to
discover the nature of any class—take the hard, for
instance—we should be more likely to learn it by
looking at the hardest things or at the least hard.
Now you, Protarchus, must reply to them as you
have been replying to me.
pro. By all means, and I say to them that we
should look at the greatest things.

soc. Then if we wished to discover what the
nature of pleasure is, we should look, not at the
smallest pleasures, but at those which are considered
most extreme and intense.
pro. Every one would agree to that now.
soc. And the commonest and greatest pleasures

are, as we have often said, those connected with the
body, are they not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Are they greater, then, and do they become

greater in those who are ill or in those who are in
321
PLATO
νγιαίνοντας ; ευλαβήθώμεν δε, μη προπετώς άπο-

κρινόμενοι πταίσωμέν 7τη. τάχα γάρ Ισως φαΐμεν
Β άν περί νγιαίνοντας.
πρω. EIk6s ye.
2Ω. Τι δ’; ούχ αύται των ηδονών ύπερβάλλου-
σιν, ών άν καί έπιθυμίαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται1;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο μεν αληθές.
2Ω. Άλλ’ ούχ οί πυρέττοντες και εν τοιουτοις
νοσημασιν έχόμενοι μάλλον διφώσι καί ριγοΰσι καί
πάντα, όπόσα διά τοΰ σώματος εΐώθασι πασχειν,
μάλλον τ’ ένδεια ζυγγίγνονται καί άπ οπλή ρ ου μενών
μείζους ηδονάς ’ίσχουσιν ; η τοΰτο ου φησομεν
αληθές είναι;
C πρω. ΤΙάνυ μεν ούν νυν ρηθέν φαίνεται.
2Ω. Τι οΰν; όρθώς άν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ώς
ε’ί τις τάς μεγίστας ηδονάς ίδεΐν βονλοιτο, ούκ εις
ύγίειαν άλλ’ εις νόσον ίόντας δει σκοπείν; όρα δε,
μη με ηγη2 διανοούμενον έρωτάν σε εί πλείω
χαίρουσιν οί σφοδρά νοσοΰντες των ύγιαινόντων,
άλλ’ οΐου μέγεθος με ζητεΐν ηδονης, και το σφοδρά
περί τοΰ τοιοότου ποΰ ποτέ γίγνεται έκάστοτε.
νοησαι γάρ δεΐν φαμέν ηντινα φυσιν έχει και τίνα
D λεγονσιν οί φάσκοντες μηδ’ είναι το παράπαν αυτήν.
πρω. ’Αλλά σχεδόν έπομαι τω λόγω σου.
28. 2Ω. Τάχα, ώ ΪΙρώταρχε, ούχ ηττον δείξεις.
άπόκριναι3 γάρ· εν ύβρει μείζους ηδονάς—ού
πλείους λέγω, τω σφόδρα δέ καί τω μάλλον ύπερ-
εχ^υσας—οράς η εν τω σώφρονι βίω; λέγε δε
προσέχων τον νοΰν.
1 TpoyLyvojvrcu Stephanus : irpovyiyvovTai ΒΤ.

2 vyy\ vytt ΒΤ.
8 άττόκρσαι Schleiermacher : άποκρινά ΒΤ.
322
PHILEBUS
health ? Let us take care not to answer hastily and

fall into error. Perhaps we might say they are
greater in those who are in health.
pro. That is reasonable.
soc. Yes, but are not those pleasures the greatest

which gratify the greatest desires ?
pro. That is true.
soc. But do not people who are in a fever, or in
similar diseases, feel more intensely thirst and cold and
other bodily sufferings which they usually have; and do
they not feel greater want, followed by greater pleasure
when their want is satisfied ? Is this true, or not ?
pro. Now that you have said it, it certainly appears
to be true.
soc. Then should we appear to be right in saying
that if we wished to discover the greatest pleasures
we should have to look, not at health, but at disease ?
Now do not imagine that I mean to ask you whether
those who are very ill have more pleasures than those
who are well, but assume that I am asking about
the greatness of pleasure, and where the greatest
intensity of such feeling normally occurs. For we
say that it is our task to discover the nature of
pleasure and what those who deny its existence
altogether say that it is.1
pro. I think I understand you.
soc. Presently, Protarchus, you will show that
more clearly, for I want you to answer a question.
Do you see greater pleasures—I do not mean greater
in number, but greater in intensity and degree—in
riotous living or in a life of self-restraint ? Be careful
about your reply.
1 This paradox means “ what those say it is who deny
that it is really pleasure.”
323
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. ΆΛΑ’ έμαθον δ λέγεις, καί πολύ το δια-

φέρον δρω. τούς μεν γαρ σώφρονά.ς που και δ
παροιμιαζόμενος έπίσχει λόγος έκάστοτε, δ τδ
Ε ‘μηδέν άγαν” παρακελευόμένος, ω πείθονται’ τδ
δε των αφρόνων τε καί υβριστών μέχρι μανίας η
σφοδρά ηδονη κατέχουσα περιβόητους απεργάζεται.
2Ω. Καλώ?' και εΐ γε ταΰθ’ ούτως έχει, δηλον
ώς εν τινι πονηριά φυχης καί τού σώματος, άλΧ ούκ
εν άρετη μεγισται μεν ηδοναί, μεγισται δε καί λΰπαι
γίγνονται.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνα μεν ούν.
2Ω. 0ύκοΰν τούτων τινάς προελόμενον δει σκο-
πεΐσθαι τίνα ποτέ τρόπον εχούσας ελέγομεν αύτάς
είναι μεγίστας.
46 ΠΡΩ. ’Ανάγκη.
2Ω. Σκοπεί δη τάς των τοιώνδε νοσημάτων ηδο-
νάς, τίνα ποτέ εχουσι τρόπον.
πρω. Ποιων;
2Ω. Τά? των άσχημόνων, άς οΰς εΐπομεν δυσ¬
χερείς μισοΰσι παντελώς.
ΠΡΩ. Ποια?;
2Ω. Οιον τάς της φώρας ιάσεις τώ τρίβειν, καί
δσα τοιαΰτα, ούκ άλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως· τούτο
γάρ δη τδ πάθος ημίν, ώ πρδς θεών, τι ποτέ φώμεν
εγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ηδονην η λύπην;
ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τούτο γ’ άρ\ ώ Σώκρατες, εοικε
γίγνεσθαι τι κακόν.
Β 2Ω. Ου μεν δη ΦιΑήβου γε ενεκα παρεθεμην
τον λογον άλλ’ άνευ τούτων, ώ ΥΥρώταρχε, των
ηδονών καί τών ταύταις επομένων, αν μη κατ-
οφθώσι, σχεδδν ούκ αν ποτέ δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι
τδ νυν ζητούμενον.
324
PIITLEBUS
pro. I understand you, and I see that there is a

great difference. For the self-restrained are always
held in check by the advice of the proverbial ex¬
pression “ nothing too much,” which guides their
actions ; but intense pleasure holds sway over the
foolish and dissolute even to the point of madness
and makes them notorious.
soc. Good ; and if that is true, it is clear that the
greatest pleasures and the greatest pains originate
in some depravity of soul and body, not in virtue.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Then we must select some of these pleasures

and see what there is about them which made us
say that they are the greatest.
pro. Yes, we must.
soc. Now see what there is about the pleasures

which are related to certain diseases.
pro. What diseases ?
soc. Repulsive diseases which the philosophers of

dislike whom we mentioned utterly abominate.
pro. What are the pleasures ?
soc. For instance, the relief of the itch and the

like by scratching, no other treatment being required.
For in Heaven’s name what shall we say the feeling
is which we have in this case ? Is it pleasure or
pain ?
pro. I think, Socrates, it is a mixed evil,
soc. I did not introduce this question on Philebus’

account ; but unless we consider these pleasures and
those that follow in their train, Protarchus, we can
probably never settle the point at issue.
325
PLATO
πρω. Ούκοΰν ίτεον επί τάς τούτων ξυγγενεΐς.

2Ω. Τά? ev Tfj μίξει κοινωνουσας λεγεις;
2Ω. Εισι τοίνυν μίξεις αί μεν κατα το σώμα εν
αύτοΐς τοις σώμασιν, αί δ’ αυτής της φυχης εν τη
C φυχη’ τάς δ’ αΰ της φνχης καί τοΰ σώματος αν-
ευρησομεν λυπας ηδοναΐς μιχθείσας τότε μεν ηδονάς
τά ξυναμφότερα, τότε δε λυπας επ ι καλούμεν ας.
πρω. II ώ?;
2Ω. 'Οπόταν εν τη καταστάσει τις η τη διαφθορά
τάναντία άμα πάθη πάσχη, ποτέ ριγών θερηται και
θερμαινόμενος ενίοτε φυχηται, ζητών, οίμαι, το μεν
εχειν, τοΰ δ’ άπαλλάττεσθαι, το δη λεγόμενον
πικρώ γλυκύ μεμιγμενον, μετά δυσαπαλλακτίας
D παρόν, άγανάκτησιν και ύστερον συντασιν άγρίαν
ποιεί.
πρω. Καί. μάΧ αληθές τό νΰν λεγόμενον.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν αί τοιαΰται μίξεις αί μεν εξ ίσων
είσι λυπών τε καί ηδονών, αί δ’ εκ τών ετερων
πλειόνων;
πρω. Πώ? γάρ ού;
2Ω. Αεγε δη τάς μεν, όταν πλείους λΰπαι τών
ηδονών γίγνωνται—τάς της φώρας λεγομενας νΰν
δη ταΰτας είναι καί τάς τών γαργαλισμών—οπόταν
εντός τό ζέον η καί το φλεγμαΐνον, τη τρίφει δε καί
Ε τη κνησει1 μη εφικνηταί τις, τά δ’ επιπολης μόνον
διαχεη, τότε φεροντες εις πΰρ αυτά καί εις τουναν¬
τίον, άπορίαις μεταβάλλοντες ενίοτε αμήχανους
ηδονάς, τότε δε τουναντίον τοις εντός προς τά τών2
εξω λυπας ηδοναΐς ξυγκερασθείσας, εις όπότερ αν
1 κνήσει Heusde: klνήσει ΒΤ.
2 7rpos τά των Wohlrab : προστάττων Β : irpos τάϊ τώΐ' Τ.
326
PHILEBUS
pro. Then we must attack this family of pleasures,

soc. You mean those which are mixed ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. Some mixtures are concerned with the body
and are in the body only, and some belong only to
the soul and are in the soul ; and we shall also find
some mingled pains and pleasures belonging both to
the soul and to the body, and these are sometimes
called pleasures, sometimes pains.
pro. How so ?
soc. Whenever, in the process of restoration or
destruction, anyone has two opposite feelings, as
we sometimes are cold, but are growing warm, or
are hot, but are growing cold, the desire of having
the one and being free from the other, the mixture
of bitter and sweet, as they say, joined with the
difficulty in getting rid of the bitter, produces im¬
patience and, later, wild excitement.
pro. What you say is perfectly true,
soc. And such mixtures sometimes consist of equal
pains and pleasures and sometimes contain more of
one or the other, do they not ?
pro. Of course.
soc. In the case of the mixtures in which the pains
are more than the pleasures—say the itch, which
we mentioned just now, or tickling—when the burn¬
ing inflammation is within and is not reached by the
rubbing and scratching, which separate only such
mixtures as are on the surface, sometimes by bringing
the affected parts to the fire or to something cold
we change from wretchedness to inexpressible
pleasures, and sometimes the opposition between the
internal and the external produces a mixture of pains
and pleasures, whichever happens to preponderate;
327
PLATO
ρεφη, παρεσχοντο τω τα συγκεκριμένα βια διαχεΐν

47 ή τα διακεκριμένα σνγχεΐν και δμοΰ λΰπας ηδοναΐς
παρατιθεναι.
πρω. ’Αληθέστατα.
2Ω. 0ύκονν όπόταν αΰ πλείων ηδονή κατά τα1
τοιαΰτα πάντα ξυμμιχθή, το μεν υπομεμιγμενον τής
λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καί ήρεμα άγανακτειν ποιεί, το
δ’ αΰ τής ηδονής πολύ πλέον εγκεχυμενον συντείνει
τε και ενίοτε πηδάν ποιεί, καί παντοΐα μεν χρώ¬
ματα, παντοΐα δε σχήματα, παντοΐα δε πνεύματα
άπεργαζόμενον2 πάσαν εκπληξιν καί βοάς μετ
αφροσύνης ενεργάζεται;
Β πρω. Μάλα γε.
2Ω. Και λεγειν τε, ώ εταίρε, αυτόν τε περί
εαυτού ποιεί καί άλλον ώς ταΰταις ταΐς ηδοναΐς
τερπόμενος οΐον αποθνήσκει· καί ταΰτας γε δη
παντάπασιν αεί μεταδιώκει τοσοΰτιρ μάλλον οσω
αν άκολαστότερός τε καί άφρονεστερος ών τυγχανη,
καί καλεΐ δή μεγίστας ταΰτας, καί τον εν αύταΐς
ότι /χάλι, στ’ ό.εί3 ζωντα εύδαιμονεστατον κατ¬
αριθμείται.
πρω. Πάρτα, ω Σώκρατες, τα συμβαίνοντα προς
C των πολλών ανθρώπων εις δόζαν διεπερανας.
2Ω. ΐίερί γε των ηδονών, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, τών εν
τοΐς κοινοΐς παθήμασιν αυτού τού σώματος τών
επιπολής τε καί εντός κερασθεντων περί δε γ ών4
φυχή& σώματι τάναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην τε
άμα προς ηδονήν καί ηδονήν προς λύπην, ωστ’ εις
μίαν άμφότερα κράσιν ιεναι, ταΰτα έμπροσθεν μεν
διήλθομεν, ώς, όπότανβ κενώται, πληρώσεως
1 τα add. Par. 1809: om. ΒΤ.

2 άπερ-γαζόμενον Buttmann : απερ-/αγόμενα ΒΤ.
328
PHILEBUS
this is the result of the forcible separation of com¬

bined elements, or the combination of those that
were separate, and the concomitant juxtaposition of
pains and pleasures.
pro. Very true.
soc. And when the pleasure is the predominant
element in the mixture, the slight tincture of pain
tickles a man and makes him mildly impatient, or
again an excessive proportion of pleasure excites
him and sometimes even makes him leap for joy ;
it produces in him all sorts of colours, attitudes, and
pantings, and even causes great amazement and
foolish shouting, does it not ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And it makes him say of himself, and others
say of him, that he is pleased to death with these
delights, and the more unrestrained and foolish he
is, the more he always gives himself up to the pursuit
of these pleasures ; he calls them the greatest of all
things and counts that man the happiest who lives
most entirely in the enjoyment of them.
pro. Socrates, you have described admirably what
happens in the case of most people.
soc. That may be, Protarchus, so far as concerns
purely bodily pleasures in which internal and external
sensations unite ; but concerning the pleasures in
which the soul and the body contribute opposite
elements, each adding pain or pleasure to the other’s
pleasure or pain, so that both unite in a single
mixture—concerning these I said before that when
a man is empty he desires to be filled, and rejoices
3 μάλιστ' aid T: μάλιστα el B.

* 7’ Sjv Badham ; των BT. 6 ψυχή Burnet: έν ψυχή BT.
β όπόταν Wohll'ab: όπόταν αύ BT.
329
PLATO
επιθυμεί, καί ελπίζων μεν χαίρει, κενουμενος Se

άλγεΐ, ταΰτα δε τότε μεν ουκ εμαρτυράμεθα, νυν δε
D λεγομεν ώς φυχης προς σώμα διαφερομενης εν
πασι τουτοις πληθει αμηχάνοις ούσι μΐξις μία
λύπης τε και ηδονης ζυμπίπτει γεν ο μόνη.
πρω. Ku'SweJeiS' ορθότατα λεγειν.
29. 2Ω. Έτι τοίνυν ημΐν των μίξεων λύπης
τε και ηδονης λοιπή μία.
ΠΡΩ. Ποια, φης;
2Ω. °Ηρ αυτήν την φυχην αύτη πολλάκις λαμβά-
νειν συγκρασιν εφαμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? οΰν δη τοΰτ αυτό λεγομεν;
Ε 2Ω. ’Οργήν και φόβον και πόθον καί θρήνον
καί έρωτα καί ζήλον καί φθόνον καί όσα τοιαΰτα,
dp’ ουκ αυτής της ψυχής τίθεσαι ταυτας λυπας
τινάς;
πρω. "Εγωγε.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν αύτας ηδονών μεστας εύρησομεν
αμήχανων; η δεόμεθα ύπομιμνησκεσθαι το
ος τ’1 εφεηκε πολυφρονά περ χαλεπηναιβ

δς τε3 πολύ γλυκίων μελιτος καταλειβομενοιο,
48 καί τας εν τοΐς θρηνοις καί πόθοις* ηδονας εν

λυπαις ούσας άναμεμιγμενας;
πρω. Ουκ, άλλ’ ουτω ταΰτά γε καί ουκ άλλως
αν ξυμβαίνοι γιγνόμενα.
2Ω. Και μην καί τάς γε τραγικός θεωρήσεις,
όταν αμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μεμνησαι;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ’ οϋ;
2Ω. Την δ, εν ταΐς κωμωδίαις διάθεσιν ημών
της φυχής, αρ’ οΐσθ’ ώς εστι καν τουτοις μΐξις
λύπης τε καί ηδονης;
330
PHILEBUS
in his expectation, but is pained by his emptiness,

and now I add, what I did not say at that time,
that in all these cases, which are innumerable, of
opposition between soul and body, there is one single
mixture of pain and pleasure.
pro. I believe you are quite right.
soc. One further mixture of pain and pleasure is left.
pro. What is it ?
soc. That mixture of its own feelings which we
said the soul often experiences.
pro. And what do we call this ?
soc. Do you not regard anger, fear, yearning,
mourning, love, jealousy, envy, and the like as pains
of the soul and the soul only ?
pro. I do.
soc. And shall we not find them full of ineffable
pleasures ? Or must I remind you of the anger
Which stirs a man, though very wise, to wrath.
And sweeter is than honey from the comb,
and of the pleasures mixed with pains, which we find

in mournings and longings ?
pro. No, you need not remind me ; those things
occur just as you suggest.
soc. And you remember, too, how people enjoy
weeping at tragedies ?
soc. And are you aware of the condition of the
soul at comedies, how there also we have a mixture
of pain and pleasure ?
1 0’s r Homer (Iliad xviii. 109): ώστε BT.

2 το ωστ έφέηκβν rots θυμοίs καί rais dpycus τό ποΧύφρονά
περ χαλεπηναί BT: το?s . . τό del. Fischer.
3 Ss re Homer (Iliad, xviii. 110): ώστε BT.
4 πόθοις Par. 1812 in marg.: πύτοί! BT.
331
PLATO
πρω. Ου πάνυ κατανοώ.

Β 2Ω.ΐΐαντάπασυ γάρ ον ράδυον, ώ ΤΙρώταρχο,
iv τούτα» ζυννοεΐν το τουοΰτον εκάστοτε πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Ουκουν ώς γ' εουκεν εμού.
2Ω. Αάβωμεν γε μην αυτό τοσουτω μάλλον,
οσω σκοτευνότερόν εστυν, ΐνα καί εν άλλους ραον
καταμαθεΐν τυς οίός τ’ ή μΐζυν λύπης τε καί ηδονής.
πρω. Αεγοις αν.
2Ω. Τό τοι νυν δη ρηθεν όνομα φθόνου πάτερα
λύπην τινά ψυχής θήσευς, ή πώς;
ΠΡΩ. Οντως.
2 Ω. ’Αλλά μην 6 φθονών γε επί κακούς τοΐς
τών πελας ήδόμενος άναφανήσεται.
C ΠΡΩ. Σκόδρα γε.
2Ω. Κακόν μην άγνοια1 καί ήν δή λεγομεν
άβελτεραν εζυν.
2Ω. Εκ δή τούτων ίδε το γελοΐον ήντινα φύ¬
ουν εχευ.
ΠΡΩ. Αεγε μόνον.
2Ω. ’ Εστι δή πονηριά μεν τυς τό κεφάλαυον,
εζεως τυνος επίκλην λεγομενη · τής δ’ αύ πόσης
πονηρυας εστυ τουναντίον πάθος εχον ή τό λεγό¬
μενον υπο τών εν Αελφοΐς γραμμάτων.
ΠΡΩ. To ‘ γνώθυ σαντόν” λεγευς, ώ Έώκρατες;
D 2Ω. Eya»ye. τουναντίον μήν εκείνω δήλον ότι
το μηδαμή γυγνώσκευν αυτόν λεγόμενον υπό του
γράμματος άν είη.
ΠΡΩ. Ύί μήν;
2Ω. Ω Τίρωταρχε, πευρώ δε αάτο τούτο τρυχή
τεμνευν.
1 dyvoua Cornarius: άνοία ΒΤ.
332
PHILEBUS
pro. I do not quite understand,

soc. Indeed it is by no means easy, Protarcbus,
to understand such a condition under those circum¬
stances.
pro. No ; at least I do not find it so.
soc. Well, then, let us take this under considera¬
tion, all the more because of its obscurity ; then
we can more readily understand the mixture of pain
and pleasure in other cases.
pro. Please go on.
soc. Would you say that envy, which was men¬
tioned just now, was a pain of the soul, or not ?
pro. I say it is.
soc. But certainly we see the envious man re¬
joicing in the misfortunes of his neighbours.
pro. Yes, very much so.
soc. Surely ignorance is an evil, as is also what
we call stupidity.
pro. Surely.
soc. Next, then, consider the nature of the ridicu¬
lous.
pro. Please proceed.
soc. The ridiculous is in its main aspect a kind of
vice which gives its name to a condition ; and it is
that part of vice in general which involves the
opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription
at Delphi.
pro. You mean “ Know thyself,” Socrates ?
soc. Yes ; and the opposite of that, in the lan¬
guage of the inscription, would evidently be not to
know oneself at all.
pro. Of course.
soc. Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
M 333
PLATO
πρω. Πτ? φής; ου γάρ μη δυνατό? ώ.

2Ω. Αεγεις δ ή δεΐν εμε τούτο διελεσθαι τα νυν;
ΠΡΩ. καί δέομαι γε προς τώ λεγειν.
Λέγω,
2Ω. τΑρ’ ουν ου των άγνοούντων αυτούς κατά,
τρία ανάγκη τούτο τό πάθος πάσχειν έκαστον;
ιιΡΩ. Πώ?;
2Ω. Πρώτον μεν κατά χρήματα, δοξάζειν είναι
Ε πλουσιώτερον η κατά την αυτών ουσίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Πολλοί γοΰν είσί τό τοιοϋτον πάθος εχοντες.
2Ω. Πλειου? δε γε οΐ μείζους καί καλλίους
αυτούς δοξάζουσι, και πάντα όσα κατά τό σώμα
είναι διαφερόντως της οϋσης αύτοΐς αλήθειας.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Πολύ δε πλεΐστοί γε, οιμαι, περί τό τρίτον
είδος τό τών εν ταΐς φυχαΐς1 διημαρτηκασιν, αρετήν2
δοξάζοντες βελτίους εαυτούς, ούκ οντες.
ΠΡΩ. Σφοδρά μεν οΰν.
49 2Ω. Τών αρετών δ’ αρ’ ου σοφίας περί τό
πλήθος πάντως άντεχόμενον μεστόν ερίδων καί
δοξοσοφίας εστί φευδοΰς3;
2Ω. Κακόν μεν δη παν αν τις τό τοιοΰτον
είπών όρθώς αν ε'ίποι πάθος.
2Ω. Τούτο τοίνυν ετι διαιρετεον, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε,
δίχα, εί μελλομεν τον παιδικόν ίδόντες φθόνον άτο-
7τον ηδονής καί λύπης δφεσθαι μΐξιν. πώς ουν
1 τό των έν rats ψυχαΐς Badhara: τούτων εν ταΐς ψυχαΐς Β
Stobaeus : iv ταΐς ψυχα.ΐς τούτων Τ.
2 αρετήν various sources: άρετη$ ΒΤ: άρετφ Stobaeus.
3 ι/κυδοΟί] ψεύδους ΒΤ.
334
PHILEBUS
pro. How do you mean ? I am afraid I can never

do it.
soc. Then you say that I must now make the
division ?
pro. Yes, I say so, and I beg you to do so, besides.
soc. Must not all those who do not know them¬
selves be affected by their condition in one of three
ways ?
pro. How is that ?
soc. First in regard to wealth ; such a man thinks
he is richer than he is.
pro. Certainly a good many are affected in that
way.
soc. And there are still more who think they are
taller and handsomer than they are and that they
possess better physical qualities in general than is
the case.
pro. Certainly.
soc. But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err
in the third way, about the qualities of the soul,
thinking that they excel in virtue when they do not.
pro. Yes, most decidedly.
soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one
to which people in general lay claim, thereby filling
themselves with strife and false conceit of wisdom ?
soc. And we should surely be right in calling all
that an evil condition.
pro. Very much so.
soc. Then this must further be divided into two
parts, if we are to gain insight into childish envy
with its absurd mixture of pleasure and pain. “ How
335
PLATO
τεμνομεν δίχα, Aeyet?;1 πά.ντες2 όπόσοι ταυτήν

Β την φευδή δόζαν περί εαυτών άνοητως δοζάζουσι,
καθάπερ απάντων ανθρώπων, καί τούτων αναγκαίο -
τατον επεσθαι τοΐς μεν ρώμην αυτών καί δύναμιν,
τοΐς δε, οιμαι, τουναντίον.
ΠΡΩ. ’Ανάγκη.
2Ω. Ύαυτη τοίνυν δίελε, καί όσοι μεν αυτών
είσί μετ’ ασθένειας τοιοΰτοι καί αδύνατοί καταγελώ -
μενοί τίμωρεΐσθαί, γελοίους τοΰτους φάσκων είναι
τάληθη φθεγξει· τούς δε δυνατούς τίμωρεΐσθαί καί
ισχυρούς φοβερούς3 καί εχθρούς προσαγορεύων
C ορθότατου τούτων σαυτώ λόγον αποδώσεις, άγνοια4
γαρ η μεν τών ισχυρών εχθρό τε καί αισχρά—-
βλαβερά γάρ καί τοΐς πελας αύττβ τε καί δσαι
εικόνες αυτής είσίν—ή δ’ ασθενής ημΐν την τών
γελοίων ε’ίληχε τάζιν τεβ καί7 φύσιν.
ΠΡΩ. ’Ορθότατα λεγεις. άλλα γάρ η τών ηδο¬
νών καί λυπών μΐζις εν τούτοις οϋπω μοι καταφανής.
2Ω. Την τοίνυν τοΰ φθόνου λαβε δύναμιν
πρώτον.
ΠΡΩ. Αεγε μόνον.
D 2Ω. Αύπη τις άδικός εστί που καί ηδονή;
πρω. Τούτο μεν ανάγκη.
2Ω. 0ύκοϋν επί μεν τοΐς τών εχθρών κακοΐς
ουτ άδικον ούτε φθονερόν εστι το χαίρειν;
2Ω. Τά δε γε τών φίλων όρώντας εστιν δτε
κακά μη λυπεΐσθαι, χαίρειν δε, άρ’ ούκ άδικόν εστιν;
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? δ’ ου;
1 7τως . . λέγεις; given to Socrates Τ (after λέγεις t adds val
above the line): to Protarchus B.
2 ττάντες κέ. to Socrates Stallbaum: to Protarchus BT.
3 Οχυρούς φοβερούς Vahlen: φοβερούς καί Ισχυρούς BT,
336
PHILEBUS
shall we divide it,” do you say ? All who have this

false and foolish conceit of themselves fall, like the
rest of mankind, into two classes : some necessarily
have strength and power, others, as I believe, the
reverse.
pro. Yes, necessarily.
soc. Make the division, then, on that principle ;
those of them who have this false conceit and are
weak and unable to revenge themselves when they
are laughed at you may truly call ridiculous, but
those who are strong and able to revenge them¬
selves you will define most correctly to yourself by
calling them powerful, terrible, and hateful, for
ignorance in the powerful is hateful and infamous—
since whether real or feigned it injures their neigh¬
bours—but ignorance in the weak appears to us as
naturally ridiculous.
pro. Quite right. But the mixture of pleasure
and pain in all this is not yet clear to me.
soc. First, then, take up the nature of envy.
pro. Go on.
soc. Is envy a kind of unrighteous pain and also
a pleasure ?
pro. Undoubtedly.
soc. But it is neither wrong nor envious to rejoice
in the misfortunes of our enemies, is it ?
soc. But when people sometimes see the mis¬
fortunes of their friends and rejoice instead of
grieving, is not that wrong ?
pro. Of course it is.
4 &yvoia Cornarius : άνοια BT.

5 αυτή Heusde: αϋτη BT.
6 re] ye B. 7 τάξιν . . κα'ι om. T.
PLATO
2Ω. Ουκοΰν την αγνό Lav1 είπομεν ότι κακόν

πάσιν ;
πρω. Ό ρθώς.
5Ω. Τήν οΰν των φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καί δοξο-
Ε καλLav και δσα νυν δη διηλθομεν, εν τρισί λεγοντες
εϊδεσι γίγνεσθαι, γελοία μεν δπόσα ασθενή, μισητά
δ’ δπόσα ερρωμενα, φωμεν2 η μη φωμεν δπερ εΐπον
άρτι, την των φίλων εξιν ταυτήν δταν εχη τις την
άβλαβη τοΐς άλλοις γελοίαν είναι;
πρω. ΤΙάνυ γε.
2Ω. Κακόν δ’ ούχ δμολογοΰμεν αυτήν άγνοιαν1
γε ουσαν είναι;
πρω. Σφοδρά γε.
2Ω. Χαίρομεν δε η λυπουμεθα, δταν επ' αύτη
γελώμεν;
50 πρω. Δηλον δτι χαίρομεν.
2Ω. 'Ηδονήν δε επί τοΐς των φίλων κακοΐς, ού
φθόνον εφαμεν είναι τον τούτο άπεργαζόμενον;
πρω. *Ανάγκη.
2Ω. Γελώντας άρα ημάς επί τοΐς των φίλων
γελοίοις φησίν δ λόγος, κεραννυντας ηδονην αυ
φθάνω, λύπη την ηδονην ξυγκεραννυναι· τον γάρ
φθόνον ώμολογησθαι λύπην της φυχης ημΐν πάλαι,
τδ δε γελάν ηδονην, άμα γίγνεσθαι δε τουτω3 εν
τουτοις τοΐς χρόνοις.
πρω. Άληθη.
Β 2Ω. λίηνυει δη νΰν ό λόγο? ημΐν εν θρηνοις
τε καί εν τραγωδίαις καί κωμωδίαις,* μη τοΐς
1 Άγνοιαν Comarius: Άνοιαν ΒΤ.

2 φωμεν corr. Ven. 189: om. ΒΤ.
3 τούτω Badham: τούτο ΒΤ.
* και κωμφδίασ add. Hermann.
338
PHILEBUS
soc. And we said that ignorance was an evil to

every one, did we not ?
pro. True.
soc. Then the false conceits of our friends con¬

cerning their wisdom, their beauty, and their other
qualities which we mentioned just now, saying that
they belong to three classes, are ridiculous when they
are weak, but hateful when they are powerful.
Shall we, or shall we not, affirm that, as I said just
now, this state of mind when possessed in its harmless
form by any of our friends, is ridiculous in the eyes
of others ?
pro. Certainly it is ridiculous,
soc. And do we not agree that ignorance is in

itself a misfortune ?
pro. Yes, a great one.
soc. And do we feel pleasure or pain when we

laugh at it ?
pro. Pleasure, evidently.
soc. Did we not say that pleasure in the mis¬

fortunes of friends was caused by envy ?
pro. There can be no other cause,
soc. Then our argument declares that when we

laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we
mix pleasure with pain, since we mix it with envy;
for we have agreed all along that envy is a pain of
the soul, and that laughter is a pleasure, yet these
two are present at the same time on such occasions.
pro. True.
soc. So now our argument shows that in mourn¬

ings and tragedies and comedies, not merely on the
339
PLATO
δράμασι μόνον άλλα καί τη του βίου ζυμπάση

τραγωδία καί κωμωδία, λυπας ηδοναΐς άμα κε-
ράννυσθαι, καί iv άλλοις δη μυρίοις.
πρω. ’Αδύνατον μη όμολογειν ταΰτα, ω Έώκρα-
τες, el καί τις φιλονεικοΐ πάνυ προς τάναντία.
30. 2Ω. ’Οργήν μην καί πόθον καί θρήνον
καί φόβον καί έρωτα καί ζήλον καί φθόνον προυθε-
C μέθα καί όπόσα τοιαυτα, iv οΐς εφαμεν εύρησειν
μιγνυμενα τά νυν πολλάκις λεγάμενα. η γάρ;
πρω. Ναι.
2Ω. Μανθάνομεν οΰν ότι θρήνου περί καί φθό¬
νου καί οργής πάντα εστί τά νυν δη διαπερανθεντα;
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? γάρ ου μανθάνομεν;
2Ω. Ούκοΰν πολλά ετι τά λοιπά;
ΠΡΩ. Και πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Δια δη τί μάλισθ’ υπολαμβάνεις με δεΐζαί
σοι την εν τη κωμωδία μΐζιν ; άρ’ ου πίστεως γάριν,
D οτι την γε εν τοΐς φοβοις καί ερωσι καί τοΐς άλλοις
ραδιον κράσιν επιδεΐζαι· λαβόντα δέ τούτο παρά
σαυτω αφεΐναι με μηκετι επ' εκείνα ιόντα δεϊν μη-
κόνειν τους λόγους, άλλ’ απλώς λαβεΐν τούτο, δτι
και σώμα ανευ φυγής καί φυχη άνευ σώματος καί
κοινή μετ αλληλων εν τοΐς παθημασι μεστά εστι
συγκεκραμενης ηδονης λνπαις; νυν ούν λεγε, πάτερα
άφίης με η μεσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; είπών δε
σμικρα οιμαι σου τευζεσθαι μεθεΐναι με' τούτων
Ε γάρ απάντων αυριον εθελησω σοι λόγον δοΰναι, τά
340
PHILEBUS
stage, but in all the tragedy and comedy of life,

and in countless other ways, pain is mixed with
pleasure.
pro. It is impossible not to agree with that,
Socrates, even though one be most eager to main¬
tain the opposite opinion.
soc. Again we mentioned anger, yearning, mourn¬
ing, love, jealousy, envy, and the like, as conditions
in which we should find a mixture of the two elements
we have now often named, did we not ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And we understand that all the details I
have been describing just now are concerned only
with sorrow and envy and anger ?
pro. Of course we understand that,
soc. Then there are still many others of those
conditions left for us to discuss.
pro. Yes, very many.
soc. Now why do you particularly suppose I
pointed out to you the mixture of pain and pleasure
in comedy ? Was it not for the sake of convincing
you, because it is easy to show the mixture in love
and fear and the rest, and because I thought that
when you had made this example your own, you would
relieve me from the necessity of discussing those
other conditions in detail, and would simply accept
the fact that in the affections of the body apart
from the soul, of the soul apart from the body, and
of the two in common, there are plentiful mixtures
of pain and pleasure ? So tell me ; will you let me
off, or will you keep on till midnight ? But I think
I need say only a few words to induce you to let
me off. I will agree to give you an account of all
these matters to-morrow, but now I wish to steer
m 2 341
PLATO
νυν δε επί τά λοιπά βούλομαι στελλεσθαι προς την

κρίσιν ην Φίληβος επιτάττει.
ΠΡΩ. Καλώ? elves, ώ Σώκρατε?· άλλ’ οσ α
λοιπά ημΐν διεζελθε δνη σου φίλον.
31. 2Ω. Κατά φνσιν τοίννν μετά, τά? μιχθείσας
ηδονάς ύπο δη τίνος ανάγκης επί τά? άμίκτονς
πορευοίμεθ’ άν εν τώ μερει.
51 ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ’ είπες·
2Ω. ’Εγώ δή πειράσομαι μεταβολών σημαίνειν
ημΐν αύτάς. τοϊς γάρ φάσκουσι λυπών είναι
παύλαν πάσας τά? ηδονάς ού πάνυ πως πείθομαι,,
άλλ’ οπερ εϊπον, μάρτυσι καταχρώμαι προς το
τινά? ηδονάς είναι δοκονσας, ον'σας δ’ ούδαμώς,
καί μεγάλας ετερας τινά? άμα και πολλά? φαντα-
σθείσας, είναι δ’ αυτά? σνμπεφυρμενας όμοΰ λυπαις
τε καί άναπανσεσιν οδυνών τών μεγίστων περί τε
σώματος καί φυχης άπορίας.
Β πρω. ’Αληθείς δ’ αυ τίνας, ώ Σώκρατε?, υπο¬
λαμβάνουν ορθώς τις διανοοΐτ’ άν;
2Ω. Τά? περί τε τά καλά λεγάμενα χρώματα
καί περί τά σχήματα καί τών οσμών τά? πλείστας
καί τά? τών φθόγγων καί οσα τά? ενδείας άναισθη-
τους εχοντα καί άλυπους τά? πληρώσεις αίσθητάς
καί ηδείας καθαράς λυπών παραδίδωσιν.
πρω. ΙΙώ? δη ταΰτα, ώ Σώκρατες, αυ λεγομεν
ούτως;
2Ω. Πάνυ μεν οΰν ούκ ευθύς δηλά ε’στιν ά
C λέγω, πειρατεον μην δηλοΰν. σχημάτων τε γάρ
κάλλος1 ούχ οπερ άν υπολάβοιεν οί πολλοί πειρώμαι
νΰν λεγειν, οίον2 ζώων η τινων ζωγραφημάτων, άλλ’
3 κάλλοϊ Τ: κα\ω$ Β: κάλλονϊ vulg.

2 olov Τ: τ) Β.
342
PHILEBUS
my bark towards the remaining points that are

needful for the judgement which Philebus demands.
pro. Good, Socrates ; just finish what remains in
any way you please.

soc. Then after the mixed pleasures we should
naturally and almost of necessity proceed in turn to
the unmixed.
pro. Very good.
soc. So I will turn to them and try to explain

them ; for I do not in the least agree with those
who say that all pleasures are merely surcease from
pain, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses to prove
that some pleasures are apparent, but not in any
way real, and that there are others which appear
to be both great and numerous, but are really mixed
up with pains and with cessations of the greatest
pains and distresses of body and soul.
pro. But what pleasures, Socrates, may rightly
be considered true ?
soc. Those arising from what are called beautiful
colours, or from forms, most of those that arise from
odours and sounds, in short all those the want of
which is unfelt and painless, whereas the satisfaction
furnished by them is felt by the senses, pleasant,
and unmixed with pain.
pro. Once more, Socrates, what do you mean by
this ?
soc. My meaning is certainly not clear at the
first glance, and I must try to make it so. For
when I say beauty of form, I am trying to express,
not what most people would understand by the
words, such as the beauty of animals or of paintings,
343
PLATO
εΰθΰ τι λέγω, φησίν 6 λόγο?, καί περιφερές καί από

τούτων 8η τά το τοΐς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα επίπεδά το
καί στερεά καί τα τοΐς κανόσι καί γωνίαις, εί μου
μανθάνεις. ταΰτα γαρ ούκ είναι πρός τι καλά
ω, καθάπερ άλλα, άλλ’ αεί καλά καθ’ αυτά
D πεφυκεναι καί τινας ήδονάς οικείας έχειν, ούδέν
ταΐς των κνήσεων1 προσφέρεις· καί χρώματα 8η
τούτον τον τύπον εχοντα καλά καί ήδονάς. άλλ’
άρα μανθάνομεν, η πώς;
πρω. ΐίειρώμαι μεν, ώ Έώκρατες· πειράθητι 8ε
καί συ σαφέστερου έτι λέγειν.
2Ω. Αέγω 8η ήχάς2 των φθόγγων τάς λείας καί
λαμπράς τάς έν τι καθαρόν ίείσας3 μέλος, ου πρός
έτερον καλάς άλλ’ αυτά? καθ’ αυτά? είναι, καί τού¬
των ξυμφυτους ήδονάς επομένας.
ΠΡΩ. Έστι γάρ ουν καί τούτο.
Ε 2Ω. τά δέ περί τάς όσμάς ήττον μέν τούτων
θειον γένος ήδονών το δε μη συμμεμΐχθαι έν
αύταΐς αναγκαίους λυπας, καί οπη τούτο καί εν
οτω τυγχάνει γεγονός ημΐν, τοΰτ’ έκείνοις τίθημι
αντίστροφον άπαν. άλλ’, εί κατανοείς, ταΰτα
είδη δυο ών λέγομεν4 ήδονών.
ΠΡΩ. Καταυοώ.
52 2Ω. Έτι 8η τοίνυν τούτοι? προσθώμεν τάς
περί τά μαθήματα ή8ονάς, εί άρα 8οκοΰσιν ημΐν
αΰται πείνας μέν μή εχειν του μανθάνειν μη8έ διά
μαθημάτων πείνην άλγηδόνας εξ αρχής γιγνομένας.
ΠΡΩ. ΆΛΑ’ οϋτω ξυνδοκεΐ.
1 κνήσεων Heusde : κινήσεων ΒΤ.

2 ήχάϊ Bury: τas ΒΤ.
3 ίείσα,ς (sic) Τ : Ιούσας (sic) Β.
4 ών λέγομεν Jackson: λεγομένων ΒΤ.
344
PHILEBUS
but I mean, says the argument, the straight line

and the circle and the plane and solid figures formed
from these by turning-lathes and rulers and patterns
of angles ; perhaps you understand. For I assert
that the beauty of these is not relative, like that of
other things, but they are always absolutely beautiful
by nature and have peculiar pleasures in no way
subject to comparison with the pleasures of scratch¬
ing ; and there are colours which possess beauty
and pleasures of this character. Do you understand ?
pro. I am trying to do so, Socrates ; and I hope
you also will try to make your meaning still clearer.
soc. I mean that those sounds which are smooth
and clear and send forth a single pure note are
beautiful, not relatively, but absolutely, and that
there are pleasures wrhich pertain to these by nature
and result from them.
pro. Yes, that also is true.
soc. The pleasures of smell are a less divine class ;
but they have no necessary pains mixed with them,
and wherever and in whatever we find this freedom
from pain, I regard it always as a mark of similarity
to those other pleasures. These, then, are two
classes of the pleasures of which I am speaking. Do
you understand me ?
pro. I understand.
soc. And further let us add to these the pleasures
of knowledge, if they appear to us not to have
hunger for knowledge or pangs of such hunger as
their source.
pro. I agree to that.
345
PLATO
2Ω. Τι δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεΐσιν1 εάν ύστερον

άποβολαί διά της λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορας τινάς εν
αύταΐς άλγηδόνας;
πρπ. Ου τι φύσει γε, άλλ’ εν τισι λογισμοίς του
Β παθήματος,2 όταν τι? στερηθείς λυπηθή διά την
χρείαν.
2Ω. Και μ^ν, ώ μακάριε, νυν γε ημείς αυτά τά
τής φύσε ως μόνον παθήματα χωρίς τοΰ λογισμού
διαπεραίνομεν.
πρω. ’Αληθή τοίνυν λέγεις οτι χωρίς λύπης
ήμΐν λήθη γίγνεται έκάστοτε εν τοΐς μαθήμασιν.
2Ω. Ύαντας τοίνυν τάς των μαθημάτων ήδονάς
άμίκτους τε είναι λυπαις ρητέον καί ούδαμώς των
πολλών ανθρώπων άλλα των σφόδρα ολίγων.
πρω. Πώ? γάρ ου ρητέον;
Ο 32. 2Ω. Ουκοΰν οτε μετρίως ήδη διακεκρίμεθα
χωρίς τάς τε καθαράς ήδονάς καί τάς σχεδόν
ακαθάρτους όρθώς αν λεχθείσας, προσθώμεν τώ
λόγω ταΐς μέν σφοδραΐς ήδοναΐς άμετρίαν, ταΐς δέ
μη τουναντίον έμμετρίαν καί τάς3 τό μέγα καί το
σφοδρόν αΰ δεχομένας* καί πολλάκις καί όλιγάκις
γιγνομένας τοιαυτας5 του άπειρου γε εκείνου καί
ήττον καί μάλλον διά τε σώματος καί φυχής φερο-
D μένου θώμεν6 αυτά?7 είναι γένους, τάς δέ μή των
εμμέτρων.
ΠΡΩ. ’Ορθότατα λέγεις, ώ Ίόώκρατες.
2Ω. Έτι τοίνυν προς τούτοι? μετά ταΰτα τόδε
αυτών διαθεατέον 3
πρω. Τό ποιον;
1 πληρωθβΐσιν Schiitz: π\ηρωθει.σων ΒΤ.

2 -παθήματος Gt: μαθήματος ΒΤ.
3 τάς add. Stallbaum.
346
PHILEBUS
soc. Well, if men are full of knowledge and then

lose it through forgetfulness, do you see any pains
in the losses ?
pro. Not by their inherent nature, but sometimes
there is pain in reflecting on the event, when a man
who has lost knowledge is pained by the lack of it.
soc. True, my dear fellow, but just at present we
are recounting natural feelings only, not reflection.
pro. Then you are right in saying that we feel
no pain in the loss of knowledge.
soc. Then we may say that these pleasures of
knowledge are unmixed with pain and are felt not
by the many but only by very few.
soc. And now that we have fairly well separated
the pure pleasures and those which may be pretty
correctly called impure, let us add the further state¬
ment that the intense pleasures are without measure
and those of the opposite sort have measure ; those
which admit of greatness and intensity and are often
or seldom great or intense we shall assign to the
class of the infinite, which circulates more or less
freely through the body and soul alike, and the others
we shall assign to the class of the limited.
pro. Quite right, Socrates.
soc. There is still another question about them to
be considered.
pro. What is it ?
1 δ(χομένα$ add. Stallbaum (Ficinus).

5 rotat/ras τής BT: τηs bracketed by Stallbaum (Ste-
phanus).
8 θώμεν Stallbaum : προσθωμΐν BT.
7 αύτά,ϊ corr. Ven. 189: αΰταΐί BT.
8 διαθΐατέον corr. Ven. 159: διαθΐτέον BT.
347
PLATO
2Ω. Τι 77ore χρη φάναι προς αλήθειαν είναι; το

καθαρόν τε καί ειλικρινές η το σφοδρά τε καί τό
πολύ καί τό μέγα καί τό ικανόν;
ΠΡΩ. Τι ποτ άρα, ώ Σ,ώκρατες, έρωτας βουλό-
μενός;
2Ω. Μηδδρ, ώ Υϊρώταρχε, έπιλείπειν ελέγχων
Ε ηδονης τε καί επιστήμης, εί το μεν άρ αυτών έκα-
τέρου καθαρόν εστι, τό δ’ ού καθαρόν, ΐνα καθαρόν
εκάτερον ιόν εις την κρίσιν εμοί καί σοί καί ζυνάπασι
τοΐσδε ράω παρέχη την κρίσιν,
ΠΡΩ. ’Ορθότατα.
2Ω. “Ι0ι δη, περί πάντων όσα καθαρό, γένη
λέγομεν, ούτωσί διανοηθώμεν προελόμενοι πρώτον
αυτών εν τι σκοπώμεν.
53 ΠΡΩ. Τι ούν προελώμεθα;
2Ω. Τδ λευκόν εν τοΐς πρώτον, εί βο _λει, θεα-
σώμεθα γένος.
ΠΡΩ. Πάρο μεν ούν.
2Ω. Πώ? ούν αν λευκού και τίς καθαρότης ημΐν
είη; πάτερα τό μέγιστόν τε καί πλεΐστον η τό άκρα-
τέστατον, εν ω χρώματος μηδεμία μοίρα άλλη μηδε¬
νός ένείη;
ΠΡΩ. Αηλον ότι τό μάλιστα ειλικρινές όν.
2Ω. Όρθώς. άρ’ ούν ού τούτο αληθέστατου, ώ
ΤΙρώταρχε, καί άμα δη κάλλιστον τών λευκών
Β πάντων θησομεν, άλλ’ ού τό πλεΐστον ουδέ τό
μέγιστόν;
ΠΡΩ. Όρθότατά γε.
2Ω. Σιμικρόν άρα καθαρόν λευκόν μεμιγμένου
πολλοΰ λευκού λευκότερου άμα καί κάλλιον καί αλη¬
θέστερου εαν φώμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν έρούμεν
όρθώς.
348
PHILEBUS
soc. What kind of thing is most closely related to

truth ? The pure and unadulterated, or the violent,
the widespread, the great, and the sufficient ?
pro. What is your object, Socrates, in asking that
question ?
soc. My object, Protarchus, is to leave no gap in
my test of pleasure and knowledge, if some part of
each of them is pure and some part impure, in order
that each of them may offer itself for judgement in
a condition of purity, and thus make the judgement
easier for you and me and all our audience.
pro. Quite right.
soc. Very well, let us adopt that point of view
towards all the classes which we call pure. First let
us select one of them and examine it.
pro. Which shall we select ?
soc. Let us first, if agreeable to you, consider
whiteness.
pro. By all means.
soc. How can we have purity in whiteness, and
what purity ? Is it the greatest and most wide¬
spread, or the most unmixed, that in which there is
no trace of any other colour ?
pro. Clearly it is the most unadulterated,
soc. Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus, de¬
clare that this, and not the most numerous or the
greatest, is both the truest and the most beautiful
of all whitenesses ?
pro. Quite right.
soc. Then we shall be perfectly right in saying
that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful
and truer than a great deal of mixed white.
349
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. ’Ορθότατα μεν οΰν.

2Ω. Τι οΰν ; ον δη που πολλών δεησόμεθα παρα¬
δειγμάτων τοιοΰτων επί τον της ηδονης περί λόγον,
άλλ’ αρκεί νοεΐν ημΐν αντόθεν ώς άρα καί ζΰμπασα
Q ηδονη σμικρά μεγάλης καί ολίγη πολλής, καθαρά
λύπης, ήδίων καί αληθέστερα καί καλλιών γίγνοιτ'
αν.
πρω. Σφόδρα μεν οΰν, καί τό γε παράδειγμα
ικανόν.
2Ω. Τι δε τό τοιόνδε; άρα περί ηδονης ούκ
άκηκόαμεν ώς αεί γενεσίς εστιν, ουσία δε οΰκ εστι
τό παράπαν ηδονης; κομφοί γάρ δη τινες αΰ τούτον
τον λόγον επιχειροΰσι μηνΰειν ήμΐν, οΐς δει χάριν
εχειν.
ΠΡΩ. Τι δη;
2Ω. Διαπερανοΰμαί σοι τοΰτ αυτό επανερωτών,
D ώ ΐΐρώταρχε φίλε.
πρω. Αεγε καί έρωτα μόνον.
33. 2Ω. Έστδρ δη τινε δυο, τό μεν αυτό
καθ’ αυτό, τό δε αεί εφιεμενον άλλου.
πρω. Πευ? τοΰτω καί τίνε λεγεις;
2Ω. Τδ μεν σεμνότατου αεί πεφυκός, τό δ’
ελλιπες εκείνου.
ΠΡΩ. Αεγ' ετι σαφεστερον.
2Ω. Παιδικά που καλά καί αγαθά τεθεωρηκαμεν
αμα και εραστάς ανδρείους αυτών.
2Ω. Τούτοι? τοίνυν εοικότα δυοΐν οΰσι δ if άλλα
Ε ζητεί κατά πάνθ’ όσα λόγο μεν είναι.
ΠΡΩ. Τδ τρίτον ετ ερώ;1 λεγε σαφεστερον, ώ
Σώκρατες, 6 τι λεγεις.
350
PHILEBUS
pro. Perfectly right.

soc. Well then, we shall have no need of many
such examples in our discussion of pleasure ; we
see well enough from this one that any pleasure,
however small or infrequent, if uncontaminated with
pain, is pleasanter and more beautiful than a great or
often repeated pleasure without purity.
pro. Most certainly ; and the example is sufficient,
soc. Here is another point. Have we not often
heard it said of pleasure that it is always a process
or generation and that there is no state or existence
of pleasure ? There are some clever people who try
to prove this theory to us, and we ought to be grateful
to them.
pro. Well, what then ?
soc. I will explain this whole matter, Protarchus,
by asking questions.
pro. Go on ; ask your questions,
soc. There are two parts of existence, the one
self-existent, the other always desiring something
else.
pro. What do you mean ? What are these two ?
soc. The one is by nature more imposing, the
other inferior.
pro. Speak still more plainly,
soc. We have seen beloved boys who are fair and
good, and brave lovers of them.
pro. Yes, no doubt of it.
soc. Try to find another pair like these in all the
relations we are speaking of.
pro. Must I say it a third time ? Please tell your
meaning more plainly, Socrates.
1 rb τρίτον e'r’ έρω; Badham: τό τρίτον έτέρφ BT, giving

the words to Socrates.
351
PLATO
2Ω. Ουδεν τι ποικίλον, ώ ΪΙ ρώταρχε· άλλ’ 6

λόγος ερεσχηλεϊ νων, λέγει δ’ ότι τό μεν ένεκά του
των όντων έστ αεί, τό δ’ οΰ χάριν εκάστοτε τδ τίνος
ένεκα γιγνόμενον aei γιγνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Moyis εμαθον δια τό πολλάκις λεχθηναι.
2Ω. Taya δ’ ίσοι?, ώ παΐ, μάλλον μαθησόμεθα
54 προελθόντος του λόγου.
πρλ. It yap ου;
2Ω. Δυο δη τάδε ετερα λάβω μεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ποια;
2Ω. Έν μεν τι γενεσιν πάντων, την δε ουσίαν
ff ff
erepov ev.
πρω. Αυο αποδέχομαι σου ταΰτα, ουσίαν καί
γενεσιν.
2Ω. ’Ορθότατα. πότερον ουν τούτων ένεκα
ποτέρου, την γενεσιν ουσίας ενεκα φώμεν η την
ουσίαν είναι γενεσεως ενεκα;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο δ προσαγορεύεται ουσία ε’ι γενεσεως
ενεκα τουτ’ εστιν όπερ εστί, νυν πυνθάνει;
2Ω. Φαίνομαι.
Β πρω. Προ? θεών άρ’1 επανερωτας με τοιόνδε2
τι; λε'γ , ώ3 Πρώταρχε, μοί, πάτερα πλοίων ναυ¬
πηγίαν ενεκα φης γίγνεσθαι μάλλον η πλοία ενεκα
ναυπηγίας, καί πάνθ’ όπόσα τοιαΰτ εστί;2
2Ω. Λέγω τουτ’ αυτό, ώ Π ρώταρχε.
πρω. Τι ουν ουκ αυτός άπεκρίνω σαυτω, ώ Σώ-
κρατες;
2Ω. Οαδεν δ τι ου· συ με ντο ι τοΰ λόγου συ μ -
μότεχε.
1 &ρ' Badham: Up cb ΒΤ.

2 τοίύνδε . . έστίν; given to Protarchus Badham: to
Socrates BT.
352
PHILEBUS
soc. It is no riddle, Protarchus ; the talk is merely

jesting with us and means that one part of existences
always exists for the sake of something, and the
other part is that for the sake of which the former
is always coming into being.
pro. I can hardly understand after all your re¬
petition.
soc. Perhaps, my boy, you will understand better
as the discussion proceeds.
pro. I hope so.
soc. Let us take another pair.
pro. What are they ?
soc. One is the generation of all things (the
process of coming into being), the other is existence
or being.
pro. I accept your tw'o, generation and being,
soc. Quite right. Now which of these shall we
say is for the sake of the other, generation for the
sake of being, or being for the sake of generation ?
pro. You are now asking whether that which is
called being is what it is for the sake of generation ?
soc. Yes, plainly.
pro. For Heaven’s sake, is this the kind of ques¬
tion you keep asking me, “ Tell me, Protarchus,
whether you think shipbuilding is for the sake of
ships, or ships for the sake of shipbuilding,” and all
that sort of thing ?
soc. Yes, that is just what I mean, Protarchus.
pro. Then why did you not answer it yourself,
Socrates ?
soc. There is no reason why I should not ; but I
want you to take part in the discussion.
3 λέγ’ & Badham : λέγω & BT.

353
PLATO

2Ω. Φημί δή γενέσεως μέν ένεκα φαρμακα τε
C καί πάντα όργανα καί πάσαν ύλην παρατίθεσθαι
πάσιν, εκάστην δε γένεσιν άλλην άλλης ουσίας τίνος
εκάστης ένεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δε γενεσιν ουσίας
ενεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.
πρω. Σαφέστατα μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Οΰκοΰν ηδονή γε, είπερ γένεσις εστιν,
ένεκα τίνος ουσίας εξ ανάγκης γίγνοιτ αν.
5Ω. Τό γε μην οΰ ένεκα το ένεκά του γιγνο-
μενον αεί γίγνοιτ’ αν, εν τη του αγαθού μοίρα εκείνο
έστι· τό δε τίνος ένεκα γιγνόμενον εις άλλην, ώ
άριστε, μοίραν θετέον.
D ΠΡΩ. ’ Αναγκαιότατου.
2Ω. ?Αρ’ οΰν ηδονή γε είπερ γένεσις εστιν, εις
άλλην ή την του αγαθού μοίραν αυτήν τιθέντες
όρθώς θήσομεν;
5Ω. Οΰκοΰν δπερ άρχόμενος εΐπον τούτου του
λόγου, τω μηνύσαντι τής ηδονής πέρι τό γένεσιν μέν,
ουσίαν δε μηδ’ ήντινοΰν αυτής είναι, χάριν έχειν δεΐ·
δήλον γάρ ότι οΰτος των φασκόντων ηδονήν αγαθόν
είναι καταγελά.
πρω. Σφοδρά γε.
2Ω. Και μήν ό1 αυτός οΰτος έκάστοτε καί των
Ε εν ταΐς γενέσεσιν άποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? δή καί ποιων λέγεις;
2Ω. Ύών δσοι έξιώμενοι ή πείνην ή δίφαν ή τι
των τοιούτων, όσα γένεσις εξιάται, χαίρουσι διά τήν
1 ό add. Bekker.
354
PHILEBUS
pro. Certainly.
soc. I say that drugs and all sorts of instruments
and materials are always employed for the sake of
production or generation, but that every instance of
generation is for the sake of some being or other,
and generation in general is for the sake of being in
general.
pro. That is very clear.
soc. Then pleasure, if it is a form of generation,
would be generated for the sake of some form of
being.
pro. Of course.
soc. Now surely that for the sake of which any¬
thing is generated is in the class of the good, and
that which is generated for the sake of something
else, my friend, must be placed in another class.
pro. Most undeniably.
soc. Then if pleasure is a form of generation, we
shall be right in placing it in a class other than that
of the good, shall we not ?
pro. Quite right.
soc. Then, as I said when we began to discuss
this point, we ought to be grateful to him who
pointed out that there is only a generation, but no
existence, of pleasure ; for he is clearly making a
laughing-stock of those who assert that pleasure is
a good.
pro. Yes, most emphatically.
soc. And he will also surely make a laughing¬
stock of all those who find their highest end in forms
of generation.
pro. How is that, and to whom do you refer ?
soc. To those who, when cured of hunger or thirst
or any of the troubles which are cured by generation,
355
PLATO
γένεσιν άτε ηδονής ουσης αυτής, καί φασι ζήν ούκ

αν δέξασθαι μή διφώντές re καί πεινώντες καί τάλλα
α τις αν ε'ίποι πάντα τά επόμενα τοΐς τοιουτοις
παθήμασι μή πάσχοντες.
55 πρω. Έοίκασι γοΰν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τω γίγνεσθαι γε τουναντίον άπαντες
το φθείρεσθαι φαΐμεν αν;
πρω . ’ Αναγκαΐον.
2Ω. Την δη φθοράν και γένεσιν αίροΐτ’ αν τις
τοΰθ’ αίρουμενος, άλλ’ ον τον τρίτον εκείνον βίον,
τον εν ω μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεΐσθαι, φρονεΐν δ’ ήν
δυνατόν ώς οίόν τε καθαρώτατα.
ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τι?, ώ? εοικεν, ώ Ίόώκρατες, άλογία
συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, εάν τι? τήν ηδονήν ώς αγαθόν
ήμΐν τιθήται.
2Ω. Πολλή, επεί καί τήδε ετι λέγωμεν.
πρω. ΓΙη;
Β 2Ω. Πώ? ουκ άλογόν εστι μηδέν αγαθόν είναι
μηδε καλόν μήτε εν σώμασι μήτ εν πολλοΐς άλλοι?
πλήν εν φυχή, και ενταύθα ηδονήν μόνον, ανδρείαν
δε ή σωφροσύνην ή νοΰν ή τι των άλλων όσα αγαθά
εϊληχε φυχή, μηδέν τοιοΰτον είναι; προς τούτοις δε
ετι τον μή χαίροντα, άλγοΰντα δε, άναγκάζεσθαι
φάναι κακόν είναι τότε όταν άλγη, καν ή άριστος
πάντων, και τον χαίροντα αΰ, όσω μάλλον χαίρει,
C τότε όταν χαίρη, τοσουτω διαφέρειν προς αρετήν;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντ’ εστι ταΰτα, ώ Ίόώκρατες, ώς δυνα¬
τόν άλογώτατα.
34. 2Ω. Μη τοίνυν ήδονής μεν πάντως εζετασιν
πάσαν επιχειρώμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοϋ δε και επι¬
στήμης οΐον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανώμεν γενναίως
δε, εί πή τι σαθρόν έχει, πάν περικρουωμεν, ώς1 ότι
356
PHILEBUS
are pleased because of the generation, as if it were

pleasure, and say that they would not wish to live
without thirst and hunger and the like, if they could
not experience the feelings which follow after them.
pro. That seems to be their view,
soc. We should all agree that the opposite of
generation is destruction, should we not ?
pro. Inevitably.
soc. And he who chooses as they do would be
choosing destruction and generation, not that third
life in which there was neither pleasure nor pain,
but only the purest possible thought.
pro. It is a great absurdity, as it appears, Socrates,
to tell us that pleasure is a good.
soc. Yes, a great absurdity, and let us go still
further.
pro. How ?
soc. Is it not absurd to say that there is nothing
good in the body or many other things, but only in
the soul, and that in the soul the only good is
pleasure, and that courage and self-restraint and
understanding and all the other good things of the
soul are nothing of the sort ; and beyond all this
to be obliged to say that he who is not feeling
pleasure, and is feeling pain, is bad when he feels
pain, though he be the best of men, and that he who
feels pleasure is, when he feels pleasure, the more
excellent in virtue the greater the pleasure he feels ?
pro. All that, Socrates, is the height of absurdity,
soc. Now let us not undertake to subject pleasure
to every possible test and then be found to give
mind and knowledge very gentle treatment. Let
us rather strike them boldly everywhere to see if
1 its Apelt: ecos BT.

357
PLATO
καθαρώτατόν ear* αυτών φυσά, τούτο κατιδόντες

εις την κρίσιν χρώμεθα την κοινήν τοΐς τε1 τούτων
καί τοΐς της ηδονής μερεσιν άληθεστάτοις.
πρω. Όρθώς.
D 2Ω. 0ύκοϋν ήμΐν τδ μεν, οΐμαι, δημιουργικόν
εστι τής περί τα μαθήματα επιστήμης, τδ δέ περί
παιδείαν και τροφήν. ή πώς;
πρω. Ούτως.
2Ω. Έρ δη ταΐς χειροτεχνικαΐς διανοηθώμεν
πρώτα ει τδ μεν επιστήμης αυτών μάλλον εχομε-
νον, τό δε ήττον ενι, και δει τα μεν ώς καθαρώτατα
νόμιζειν, τα δ’ ώς άκαθαρτότερα.
ΠΡΩ. Ούκοΰν χρή.
5Ω. Τα? τοίνυν ηγεμονικός διαληπτεον έκαστων
αυτών χωρίς;
πρω. Ποια? και πώς;
Ε 2Ω. Οίον πασών που τεχνών αν τις αριθμη¬
τικήν χωρίζη καί μετρητικήν καί στατικήν, ώς έπος
ειπεΐν, φαΰλ,ον τδ καταλειπόμενον εκάστης αν
γ ι^ο ιτο.
πρω. Φαυλόν μεν δή.
2Ω. Τδ γοΰν μετά ταΰτ’ εΐκάζειν λείποιτ’ αν
και τας αισθήσεις καταμελετάν εμπειρία καί τινι
τριβή, ταΐς τής στοχαστικής προσχρωμενους δυνά-
56 μεσιν ας πολλοί τεχνας επονομάζουσι, μελετη καί
πονώ την ρώμην άπειργασμενας.
πρω. Αναγκαιότατα λεγεις.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν μεστή μεν που μουσική πρώτον, τδ
ζυμφωνον άρμόττουσα ου μετρώ άλλα μελετης
στοχασμώ· καί ξυμπασα αυτής αύλητική, τδ μετρον
εκαστης χορδής τώ στοχάζεσθαι φερομενης θη-
1 τοσ re t: ttjs re BT.
358
PHILEBUS
their metal rings unsound at any point ; so we shall

find out what is by nature purest in them, and then
we can make use of the truest elements of these and
of pleasure to form our judgement of both.
pro. Right.
soc. Well, then, one part of knowledge is pro¬
ductive, the other has to do with education and
support. Is that true ?
pro. It is.
soc. Let us first consider whether in the manual
arts one part is more allied to knowledge, and the
other less, and the one should be regarded as purest,
the other as less pure.
pro. Yes, we ought to consider that,
soc. And should the ruling elements of each of
them be separated and distinguished from the
rest ?
pro. What are they, and how can they be separ¬
ated ?
soc. For example, if arithmetic and the sciences
of measurement and weighing were taken away
from all arts, what was left of any of them would
be, so to speak, pretty worthless.
pro. Yes, pretty worthless.
soc. All that would be left for us would be to
conjecture and to drill the perceptions by practice
and experience, with the additional use of the powers
of guessing, which are commonly called arts and
acquire their efficacy by practice and toil.
pro. That is undeniable.
soc. Take music first ; it is full of this ; it attains
harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by
measurement ; and flute music throughout tries to
find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess,
359
PLATO
ρεύουσα, ώστε πολύ μεμιγμενον εχειν το μη σαφές,

σμικρον δε το βέβαιον.
Β 2Ω. Και μην ιατρικήν τε και γεωργίαν καί
κυβερνητικήν καί στρατηγικήν ωσαύτως εύρήσομεν
εχούσας.
ΠΡΩ. Και πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Τεκτονικήν δε' γε, οΐμαι, πλείστοις μετροις
τε καί όργάνοις χρωμενην τα πολλήν ακρίβειαν αύτη
πορίζοντα τεχνικωτεραν των πολλών επιστημών
παρέχεται.
πρω. Π??;
2Ω. Κατά τε ναυπηγίαν καί κατ' οικοδομίαν καί
εν πολλοΐς άλλοις της ξυλουργικής. κανόνι γάρ,
οΐμαι, καί τόρνω χρήται καί διαβήτη καί στάθμη
C καί τινι προσαγωγίω1 κεκομφευμενω.
πρω. Και πάνυ γε, ώ ΊΙώκρατες, όρθώς λεγεις.
2Ω. θώμεν τοίνυν διχή τάς λεγομενας τεχνας,
τας μεν μουσική ξυνεπ ομενας εν τοΐς εργοις
ελαττονος ακρίβειας μετισχούσας, τάς δε τεκτονική
πλείονος.
πρω. Κ,είσθω.
2Ω. Τούτων δε ταύτας άκριβεστάτας είναι τεχνας,
ας νυν δη πρώτας είπομεν.
πρω. ’Αριθμητικήν φαίνει μοι λεγειν καί δσας
μετά ταύτης τεχνας εφθεγξω νυν δή.
D 2Ω. Τίανυ μεν οΰν. άλλ’, ώ ΥΙρώταρχε, άρ’
ου διττας αύ καί ταύτας λεκτεον; ή πώς;
ΠΡΩ. Ποιας· δή λεγεις;
2Ω. Αριθμητικήν πρώτον άρ’ ούκ άλλην μεν
τινα την τών πολλών φατεον, άλλην δ’ αύ τήν τών
φιλοσοφούντων ;
360
PHILEBUS
so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is

great, and the amount of certainty small.
pro. Very true.
soc. And we shall find that medicine and agri¬

culture and piloting and generalship are all in the
same case.
pro. Certainly.
soc. But the art of building, I believe, employs

the greatest number of measures and instruments
which give it great accuracy and make it more
scientific than most arts.
pro. In what way ?
soc. In shipbuilding and house-building, and
many other branches of wood-working. For the
artisan uses a rule, I imagine, a lathe, compasses,
a chalk-line, and an ingenious instrument called a
vice.
pro. Certainly, Socrates ; you are right,
soc. Let us, then, divide the arts, as they are
called, into two kinds, those which resemble music,
and have less accuracy in their works, and those
which, like building, are more exact.
pro. Agreed.
soc. And of these the most exact are the arts
which I just now mentioned first
pro. I think you mean arithmetic and the other
arts you mentioned with it just now.
soc. Certainly. But, Protarchus, ought not these
to be divided into two kinds ? What do you say ?
pro. What kinds ?
soc. Are there not two kinds of arithmetic, that
of the people and that of philosophers ?
1 Trpoaayuyiip rec. t Hesychius Suidas: irpoaayuyeLtp B:
irpoayuy'np T.
361
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Π77 ποτέ διορισάμενος οΰν άλλην, την δε

άλλην θείη τις άν αριθμητικήν;
2Ω. Ου σμικρός όρος, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε. οι μεν
γάρ που μονάδας άνίσους καταριθμούνται των περί
Ε αριθμόν, οιον στρατόπεδα δυο καί βοΰς δυο και δυο
τά σμικρότατα η καί τα πάντων μέγιστα· οι δ’ ούκ
άν ποτέ αύτοΐς συνακολουθησειαν, ει μη μονάδα
μονάδος εκάστης των μυρίων μηδεμίαν άλλην άλλης
διαφερουσάν τις θήσει.
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα ευ λεγεις ου σμικράν δια¬
φοράν των περί αριθμόν τευταζόντων, ώστε λόγον
εχειν δυο αυτά? είναι.
2Ω. Τι δε; λογιστική και μετρητική η1 κατα
τεκτονικήν και κατ’ εμπορικήν της κατά φιλο-
57 σοφίαν γειομετρίας τε καί λογισμών καταμελετω-
μενων—πότερον ώς μία εκατερα λεκτεον η δυο
τιθώμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Τη πρόσθεν επόμενος εγωγ' άν δυο κατά
την εμην φηφον τιθείην εκατεραν τούτων.
2Ω. Όρθως. ου δ’ ενεκα ταΰτα προηνεγκάμεθα
εις το μέσον, άρα εννοείς;
ΠΡΩ. ’Τσω?, άλλα σε βουλοίμην άν άποφηνασθαι
το νΰν ερωτώμενον.
2Ω. Αοκεΐ τοίνυν εμοιγε ουτος ό λόγος, ούχ
ήττον η ότε λεγειν αυτόν ηρχόμεθα, ταΐς ήδοναΐς
Β ζητών αντίστροφον ενταύθα προβεβληκεναι, σκο¬
πών άρά εστί τις ετερας άλλη καθαρωτερα επιστή -
μηS' επιστήμη, καθάπερ ηδονης ηδονη.
ΠΡΩ. Και μάλα σαφές τουτό γε, ότι ταΰθ’
ενεκα τούτων επικεχείρηκεν.
35. 2Λ. Τί οΰν; άρ’ ούκ εν μεν τοΐς εμπρο-
1 ή add. corr. Ven. 189 : om. BT.
362
PHILEBUS
pro. How can one kind of arithmetic be distin¬

guished from the other ?
soc. The distinction is no small one, Protarchus.
For some arithmeticians reckon unequal units, for
instance, two armies and two oxen and two very
small or incomparably large units ; whereas others
refuse to agree with them unless each of countless
units is declared to differ not at all from each and
every other unit.
pro. You are certainly quite right in saying that
there is a great difference between the devotees of
arithmetic, so it is reasonable to assume that it is
of two kinds.
soc. And how about the arts of reckoning and
measuring as they are used in building and in trade
when compared with philosophical geometry and
elaborate computations—shall we speak of each of
these as one or as two ?
pro. On the analogy of the previous example, I
should say that each of them was two.
soc. Right. But do you understand why I intro¬
duced this subject ?
pro. Perhaps ; but I wish you would give the
answer to your question.
soc. This discussion of ours is now, I think, no
less than when we began it, seeking a counterpart
of pleasure, and therefore it has introduced the
present subject and is considering whether there is
one kind of knowledge purer than another, as one
pleasure is purer than another.
pro. That is very clear ; it was evidently intro¬
duced with that object.

soc. Well, had not the discussion already found
363
PLATO
σθεν επ' άλλοι? άλλην τέχνην οΰσαν άνηυρηκειν1

σαφεστέραν και άσαφεστέραν άλλην άλλης;
ΠΡΩ. ΤΙάνυ μεν ουν.
2Ω. Έη τούτοι? δε dp’ ου τινα τέχνην ώς ομώ¬
νυμον φθεγξάμενος, εις δόξαν καταστησας ώς μιας,
C πάλιν ώς δυοΐν επανερωτα τούτο ιν αύτοΐν τό σαφές
καί τό καθαρόν περί ταΰτα πότερον η των φιλο¬
σοφούν των η μη φιλοσοφούντων άκρφέστερον έχει;
πρω. Και μάλα δοκεΐ μοι τοΰτο διερωτάν.
2Ω. Ίίν ουν, ώ ΤΙρώταρχε, αύτώ δίδομεν από¬
κρισήν;
πρω. Ώ Σώκρατε?, εις θαυμαστόν διαφοράς
μέγεθος εις σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν επιστήμων.
2Ω. Ουκοΰν άποκρινουμεθα ραον;
πρω. Τι μην; και ειρησθω γε ότι πολύ μεν
αύται των άλλων τεχνών διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ’
D αυτών αι περί την τών όντως φιλοσοφούντων
άρμην άμηχανον ακρίβεια τε καί αλήθεια περί μέτρα
τε και αριθμούς διαφέρουσιν.
2Ω. ’Έστω ταΰτα κατά σέ, και σοι δη πιστεύοντες
θαρροΰντες άποκρινόμεθα τοΐς δεινοΐς περί λόγων
ολκήν—
ΠΡΩ. Τδ ποιον;
2Ω. Ω? εισι δύο αριθμητικοί και δύο μετρητικάI
και ταυταις2 αλλαι τοιαΰται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, την
διδυμότητα εχουσαι ταύτην, ονόματος δέ ενός κεκοι-
νωμέναι.
Ε πρω. Αιδώμεν τύχη αγαθή τούτοις οΰς φης δει¬
νούς είναι ταύτην την άπόκρισιν, ώ Σώκρατες.
^ °-V7ivpi)Keiv Burnet (άνηυρήκει corr. Ven. 189): άνευρίσκειν
2 καί δύο μετρητικαί ταύτασ Β : καί ταύτασ Τ.

3 64
PHILEBUS
in what preceded that the various arts had various

purposes and various degrees of exactness ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And after having given an art a single name

in what has preceded, thereby making us think that
it was a single art, does not the discussion now assume
that the same art is two and ask whether the art of
the philosophers or that of the non-philosophers
possesses the higher degree of clearness and purity ?
pro. Yes, I think that is just the question it asks,
soc. Then what reply shall we make, Protarchus ?
pro. Socrates, we have found a marvellously great
difference in the clearness of different kinds of
knowledge.
soc. That will make the reply easier, will it not ?
pro. Yes, to be sure ; and let our reply be this,
that the arithmetical and metrical arts far surpass the
others and that of these the arts which are stirred by
the impulse of the true philosophers are immeasurably
superior in accuracy and truth about measures and
numbers.
soc. We accept that as our judgement, and relying
upon you we make this confident reply to those who
are clever in straining arguments-
pro. What reply ?
soc. That there are two arts of arithmetic and two
of measuring, and many other arts which, like these,
are twofold in this way, but possess a single name
in common.
pro. Let us give this answer, Socrates, to those
who you say are clever ; I hope we shall have luck

with it.
N 365
PLATO
2Ω. Ύαντας οΰν λέγομεν επιστημας ακριβείς μά¬

λιστα είναι;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνα μεν οΰν.
2Ω. ΆΛΑ’ ημάς, ώ ΐίρωταρχε, άναίνοιτ* αν η
τον διαλεγεσθαι δύναμις, ε’ί τινα προ αυτής άλλην
κρίνα ιμεν.
58 ΠΡΩ. Τινα δε ταύτην αν δει λεγειν;
2Ω. Αηλον δτιη1 πας αν2 την γε νυν λεγομενην
γνοίη. την γάρ περί το ον καί το όντως και το
κατά ταύτόν αεί πεφυκός πάντως εγωγε οίμαι
ηγεΐσθαι ξυμπαντας δσοις νοΰ καί σμικρον προσ-
ηρτηται μακρω άληθεστάτην είναι γνώσιν σύ δε
τι; πως τοΰτο, ώ ΐίρωταρχε, διακρίνοις αν;
ΠΡΩ. ’Ήκουον μεν εγωγε, ώ Σώκρατες, εκά-
στοτε Υοργίου πολλάκις ώς η τοΰ πείθειν πολύ
διαφεροι πασών τεχνα>ν πάντα γάρ ύφ’ αύτη
Β δούλα δι’ εκόντων άΑΑ’ ού διά βίας ποιοΐτο, καί
μακρω αρίστη πασών εΐη τών τεχνών νυν δ’
ούτε σοί ούτε δη εκείνω βουλοίμην αν εναντία
τίθεσθαι.
2Ω. Τα όπλα μοι δοκεΐς βουληθείς ειπεΐν αισχυν-
θείς άπολιπεΐν.
ΠΡΩ. ’Έστω νυν ταΰτα ταύτη οπη σοι δοκεΐ.
2Ω. *Αρ’ ονν αίτιος εγώ τοΰ μη καλώς ύπο-
λαβεΐν σε;
2Ω. Ου/ε, ώ φίλε ΐίρωταρχε, τοΰτο εγωγε εζη-
τονν πω, τις τέχνη η τίς επιστήμη πασών διαφέρει
C τώ μεγίστη καί αρίστη καί πλεΐστα ώφελοΰσα ημάς,
αλλά τίς ποτέ το σαφές καί τάκριβες καί τδ άληθε-
στατον επισκοπεί, καν ει σμικρά καί σμικρά όνι-
νάσαβ τοΰτ’ εστιν δ νΰν δη ζητοϋμεν. άλλ’ δρα’ ούδε
3 66
PHILEBUS
soc. These, then, we say, are the most exact arts

or sciences ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. But the art of dialectic would spurn us,

Protarchus, if we should judge that any other art is
preferable to her.
pro. But what is the art to which this name
belongs ?
soc. Clearly anybody can recognize the art I
mean ; for I am confident that all men who have
any intellect whatsoever believe that the knowledge
which has to do with being, reality, and eternal
immutability is the truest kind of knowledge. What
do you think, Protarchus ?
pro. I have often heard Gorgias constantly main¬
tain that the art of persuasion surpasses all others ;
for this, he said, makes all things subject to itself,
not by force, but by their free will, and is by far the
best of all arts ; so now I hardly like to oppose either
him or you.
soc. It seems to me that you wanted to speak
and threw down your arms out of modesty.
pro. Very well ; have it as you like,
soc. Is it my fault that you have misunderstood ?
pro. Misunderstood what ?
soc. My question, dear Protarchus, was not as yet
what art or science surpasses all others by being the
greatest and best and most useful to us : what I am
trying to find out at present is which art, however
little and of little use, has the greatest regard for
clearness, exactness, and truth. See ; you will not
1 0tlt] Thompson: ό'πή B: Utl t) T.

2 iras &v Madvig·: ττασαν BT.
8 όνινασa Bekkers όνήνασα B: όνίνασα, T.
367
PLATO
γαρ άπεχθήσει Γοργιά, τή μεν εκείνου ΰπάρχειν

τέχνη 8ι8οΰς ττρος χρείαν τοΐς άνθρώποις κρατεΐν,
ή δ’ εΐττον εγώ νΰν πραγματεία, καθάπερ του λευκόν
περί τότε ελεγον, καν εί σμικρόν, καθαρόν 8’ ε’ίη, του
D πολλοΰ καί μη τοιουτου 8ιαφερειν τουτω γ αυτώ
τώ άληθεστάτω, καί νΰν 8η σφό8ρα διανοηθεντες
και ίκανώς 8ιαλογισάμενοι, μητ’ εις τινας ωφελεί ας
επιστημών βλεφαντες μήτε τινας εύόοκιμίας, άλλ’
εί τις πεφυκε της φυχης ημών 8υναμις εραν τε τοΰ
αληθούς και πάντα ενεκα τοντου πράττειν, ταυτην
είπωμεν 8ιεξερευνησάμενοι, τό καθαρόν νοΰ τε και
φρονησεως, εί ταυτην μάλιστα εκ τών είκότων
εκτησθαι φαί μεν αν η τινα ετεραν ταυτης κυριω-
Ε τέραν ημιν ζητητεον.
πρω. ΆΛΛά σκοπώ, καί χαλεπόν, οΐμαι, συγχω-
ρησαί τινα άλλην επιστήμην ή τέχνην τής αλήθειας
άντεχεσθαι μάλλον ή ταυτην.
2Ω. τΑρ’ οΰν εννοήσας τό τοιόνόε εΐρηκας ο
λε'γεις νΰν, ώς αί πολλαί τεχναι, καί δσοι1 περί
59 ταΰτα πεπόνηνται, πρώτον μεν 8όξαις χρώνται καί
τα περί 8όξας ζητοΰσι συντεταμενως2; εί τε καί περί
φνσεως ηγείται τις ζητεΐν, οΐσθ" δτι τά περί τον
κόσμον τόν8ε, δπη τε γεγονεν καί δπη πάσχει τι
καί οπη ποιεί, ταΰτα ζητεί διά βίου; φαίμεν αν
ταΰτα, ή πώς;
πρω. Ούτως.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν ου περί τά όντα αεί, περί 8ε τά
γιγνόμενα καί γενησόμενα καί γεγονότα ημών ό
τοιοΰτος άνήρηται τον πόνον;
1 Άσοι Ast: 'όσαι ΒΤ.

8 συντεταμένωί corr. Ven. 189: συντεταγμένως Β: ^υ^τεταγ-
μένως Τ.
368
PHILEBUS
make Gorgias angry if you grant that his art is

superior for the practical needs of men, but say that
the study of which I spoke is superior in the matter
of the most perfect truth, just as I said in speaking
about the white that if it was small and pure it was
superior to that which was great but impure. Now,
therefore, with careful thought and due consideration,
paying attention neither to the usefulness nor to the
reputation of any arts or sciences, but to that faculty
of our souls, if such there be, which by its nature
loves the truth and does all things for the sake of
the truth, let us examine this faculty and say whether
it is most likely to possess mind and intelligence in
the greatest purity, or we must look for some other
faculty which has more valid claims.
pro. I am considering, and I think it is difficult
to concede that any other science or art cleaves
more closely to truth than this.
soc. In saying that, did you bear in mind that the
arts in general, and the men who devote themselves
to them, make use of opinion and persistently in¬
vestigate things which have to do with opinion ?
And even if they think they are studying nature,
they are spending their lives in the study of the
things of this wrorld, the manner of their production,
their action, and the forces to which they are sub¬
jected. Is not that true ?
pro. Yes, it is.
soc. Such thinkers, then, toil to discover, not
eternal verities, but transient productions of the
present, the future, or the past ?
369
PLATO
2Ω. Τούτων ουν τι σαφές αν φαΐμεν τη άκριβε-
Β στάτη αλήθεια γίγνεσθαι, ών μήτε έσχε μηδέν
πώποτε κατα ταύτά μηθ’ έξει μήτε εις το νυν παρόν
έχει;
πρω. Και πώς;
2Ω. Τίερι ουν τά μη κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ’
ηντινοΰν πώς αν ποτέ βέβαιον γίγνοιθ’ ημΐν και
ότιοϋν;
πρω. Οΐμαι μέν ούδαμώς.
2Ω. Ουδ’ άρα νοΰς ουδέ τις επιστήμη περί αυτά
έστι τό άληθέστατον εχουσα.
πρω. Ουκουν εικός γε.
36. 2Ω. Τον μέν δή σέ καί εμέ καί Υοργιάν
καί Φίληβον χρή συχνά χαίρειν εάν, τάδε δέ δια-
C μαρτνρασθαι τώ λόγω.
2Ω. 'Ω? ή1 2 * περί εκείνα έσθ’ ημΐν τό τε βέβαιον
καί τό καθαρόν καί τό αληθές καί δ δή λέγομεν
ειλικρινές, περί τά αεί κατά τά αυτά ωσαύτως
άμικτότατα έχοντα, rf εκείνων δτι μάλιστα
έστι ζυγγενές4 τά δ’ άλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καί
υστέρα λεκτέον.
πρω. ’Αληθέστατα λέγεις.
2Ω. Τά δή των ονομάτων περί τά τοιαΰτα κάλ-
λιστα άρ’ ου τοΐς καλλίστοις δικαιότατου άπονέμειν;
πρω. Et/co? γε.
D 2Ω. 0ύκοΰν νοΰς έστι καί φρόνησις, ά γ’ αν τις
τίμησειε μάλιστα ονόματα;
1 ή Stephanus: ν ΒΤ.
2 τ) δεύτεροί ΒΤ (δευτέρωί corr. Ven. 189): δεύτεροί bracketed
by Hermann.
370
PHILEBUS
pro. Perfectly true.

soc. And can we say that any of these things
becomes certain, if tested by the touchstone of
strictest truth, since none of them ever was, will be,
or is in the same state ?
pro. Of course not.
soc. How can we gain anything fixed whatsoever
about things which have no fixedness whatsoever ?
pro. In no way, as it seems to me.
soc. Then no mind or science which is occupied
with them possesses the most pei-fect truth.
pro. No, it naturally does not.
soc. Then we must dismiss the thought of you
and me and Gorgias and Philebus, and make this
solemn declaration on the part of our argument.
pro. What is the solemn declaration ?
soc. That fixed and pure and true and what we
call unalloyed knowledge has to do with the things
which are eternally the same without change or
mixture, or with that which is most akin to them ;
and all other things are to be regarded as secondary
and inferior.
pro. Very true.
soc. And of the names applied to such matters,
it would be fairest to give the finest names to the
finest things, would it not ?
pro. That is reasonable.
soc. Are not mind, then, and wisdom the names
which we should honour most ?
371
PLATO
πρω. Nat.
2Ω. Ταΰτ’ apa εν ταΖς περ'ι τό ον όντως ivvotats
εστιν άπηκριβωμενα ορθώς κείμενα καλεΖσθαι.
πρω. Πάνα μεν οΰν.
Και μην ά γε εις την κρίσιν εγώ τότε παρ-
2Ω.
εσχόμην, ούκ αλλ’ εστίν η ταΰτα τα ονόματα.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μην, ώ Έώκρατες;
2Ω. Etev. το μεν 8η φρονησεώς τε καί η8ονης
Ε περί προς την άλληλων μΖξιν εΐ τι? φαίη καθαπερεί
8ημιουργοΖς ήμΐν εξ ών η εν οΐς 8εΐ 8ημιουργεΖν
τι, παρακεΖσθαι, καλώς αν τω λόγω άπεικάζοι.
πρω. Και μάλα.
2Ω. Τό 8η μετά ταΰτα αρ’ ού μιγνύναι επιχει-
ρητεον;
ΠΡΩ. Tt μην;
2Ω. Ούκοΰν τά8ε προειποΰσι και άναμνησασιν
ημάς αυτούς όρθότερον αν εχοι;
πρω. Τά ποΖα;
2Ω. "A /cat πρότερον εμνησθημεν εν 8’ η παρ¬
οιμία 8οκεΖ εχειν, τό και 8ις και τρις τό γε καλώς
60 εχον επαναπολεΖν τω λόγω 8εΖν.
2Ω. Φόρε 8η προς Διό?· οΐμαι γαρ ούτωσί πως
τα τότε λεχθεντα ρηθηναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ?;
2Ω. Φιληβος φησι την η8ονην σκοπόν ορθόν
πασι ζωοι? γεγονεναι και 8εΖν πάντας τούτου στο-
χαζεσθαι, και 8η και ταγαθόν τοΰτ’ αυτό είναι
ξνμπασι, και 8υο ονόματα, αγαθόν και η8ύ, ενί τινι
και φύσει μια τούτω ορθώς Te0eVrn εχειν Σωκρά-
1 τούτω δρθώs τεθέντ Heindorf: τούτο δρθως τιθέν ΒΤ.
372
PHILEBUS
pro. Yes.
soc. Then these names are applied most accu¬
rately and correctly to cases of contemplation of
true being.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And these are precisely the names which I
brought forward in the first place as parties to our
suit.
pro. Yes, of course they are, Socrates,
soc. Very well. As to the mixture of wisdom and

pleasure, if anyone were to say that we are like
artisans, with the materials before us from which to
create our work, the simile would be a good one.
pro. Certainly.
soc. And is it, then, our next task to try to make

the mixture ?
pro. Surely.
soc. Would it not be better first to repeat certain

things and recall them to our minds ?
pro. What things ?
soc. Those which we mentioned before. I think

the proverb “ we ought to repeat twice and even
three times that which is good ” is an excellent one.
pro. Surely.
soc. Well then, in God’s name ; I think this is

the gist of our discussion.
pro. What is it ?
soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal
of every living being and that all ought to aim at
it, and that therefore this is also the good for all,
and the two designations “ good ” and “ pleasant ”
are properly and essentially one ; Socrates, however,
n 2 373
PLATO
B της δ’ ev1 μεν ου φησι τοΰτ’ είναι, δυο δε καθάπερ

τα ονόματα, καί τό τε αγαθόν καί τό ήδύ διάφορον
άλλήλων φυσιν έχειν, μάλλον δε μέτοχον είναι
της του αγαθού μοίρας την φρόνησιν η την ηδονήν,
ου ταΰτ εστιν τε και ήν τα τότε λεγάμενα, ώ
ΐΐρώταρχε;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Ούκοϋν και τόδε και τότε και νΰν ημΐν αν
ξυνομολογοΐτο;
ΠΡΩ. Τδ ποιον;
2Ω. Τήν τάγαθοΰ διαφερειν φυσιν τωδε των
άλλων.
0 ΠΡΩ. ΤΐΡ6;
2Ω. τΩ.ι παρείη τοΰτ αεί των ζώων διά τέλους
πάντως καί πάντη, μηδενός ετέρου ποτέ έτι προσ-
δεϊσθαι, τό δε ικανόν τελεώτατον έχειν. ούχ
ούτως;
ΠΡΩ. Ουτω μεν οΰν.
2Ω. Ουκοΰν τω λόγω επειράθημεν χωρίς έκά-
τερον εκατέρου θέντες εις τον βίον εκάστων,
άμικτον μεν ηδονην φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δε ωσαύτως
ηδονής μηδέ τό σμικρότατον έχουσαν;
πρω. ’’Ήν ταΰτα.
D 2Ω. Μών οΰν ημΐν αυτών τότε πότερον ικανόν
έδοξεν είναι τω;
ΠΡΩ. Και πώς;
37. 2Ω. Et δε γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νΰν
όστισοΰν έπαναλαβών όρθότερον είπάτω, μνημην
καί φρόνησιν καί επιστήμην καί αληθή δόξαν τής
αυτής ιδέας τιθέμενος καί σκοπών εί τις άνευ
τούτων δέξαιτ’ αν οί καί ότιοΰν είναι ή καί γίγνεσθαι,
1 έν Badham: τρωτόν ΒΤ.
374
PHILEBUS
says that they are not one, but two in fact as in

name, that the good and the pleasant differ from
one another in nature, and that wisdom’s share in
the good is greater than pleasure’s. Is not and was
not that what was said, Protarchus ?
soc. And furthermore, is not and was not this a
point of agreement among us ?
pro. What ?
soc. That the nature of the good differs from all
else in this respect.
pro. In what respect ?
soc. That whatever living being possesses the good
always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further
need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient. We
agreed to that ?
pro. We did.
soc. And then we tried in thought to separate

each from the other and apply them to individual
lives, pleasure unmixed with wisdom and likewise
wisdom which had not the slightest alloy of pleasure ?
pro. Yes.
soc. And did we think then that either of them
would be sufficient for any one ?
pro. By no means.
soc. And if we made any mistake at that time,
let any one now take up the question again. Assum¬
ing that memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true
opinion belong to the same class, let him ask whether
anyone w'ould wish to have or acquire anything
whatsoever without these not to speak of pleasure,
375
PLATO
μη ότι δη γε ηδονην εΐθ' ώς κλειστήν είθ' ώς σφο ■

8ροτάτην, ην μήτε αληθώς δοξάζοι χαίρειν μήτε το
Ε 7ταράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτέ πεπονθε πάθος μητ’
αν μνημην τον πάθονς μηό' όντινονν χρόνον εχοι.
ταύτά δε λεγετω1 καί περί ψρονησεως, εΐ τις άνεν
πάσης ηδονης καί της βραχντάτης δέξαιτ αν
φρόνησιν εχειν μάλλον η μετά τινων ηδονών η
πάσας ηδονάς χωρίς φρονήσεως μάλλον η μετά
φρονησεως αν τινός.
πρη. Uvk ear tv y ω λωκρατες, αλλ ovoev bet
ταΰτά γε πολλάκις επερωτάν.
61 2Ω. Ονκοΰν τό γε τελεον καί πάσιν αιρετόν
καί τό παντάπασιν αγαθόν ονδετερον αν τοντων εΐη;
πρω. Πώ? γάρ άν;
2Ω. Τό τοίννν αγαθόν ήτοι σαφώς η καί τινα
τύπον αντον ληπτεον, ίν\ οπερ ελεγομεν, δεντερεΐα
ότω δώσομεν εχωμεν.
2Ω. Ονκοΰν οδόν μεν τινα επί τάγαθόν είληφαμεν;
ΠΡΩ. TiVa;
2Ω. Υάαθάπερ εΐ τις τινα άνθρωπον ζητών την
Β οΐκησιν πρώτον όρθώς ΐν’ οίκεΐ πνθοιτο αντον,
μεγα τι δη 7τον προς την εΰρεσιν αν εχοι τον ζητον·
μενον.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς· δ’ ον;
2Ω. Και νυν δη τις λόγος εμηννσεν ημΐν, ώσπερ
καί κατ' άρχάς, μη ζητεΐν εν τώ άμίκτω βίω τάγαθόν
αλλ’ εν τώ μικτώ.
2Ω. ’EA77is· μην π λείων εν τώ μιχθεντι καλώς
τό ζητονμενον εσεσθαι φανερώτερον η εν τώ μη;
1 λεγετω Vahlen: λέγω Β: λέγε Τ.
376
PHILEBUS
be it never so abundant or intense, if he could have

no true opinion that he is pleased, no knowledge
whatsoever of what he has felt, and not even the
slightest memory of the feeling. And let him ask
in the same way about wisdom, whether anyone
would wish to have wisdom without any, even the
slightest, pleasure rather than with some pleasures,
or all pleasures without wisdom rather than with
some wisdom.
pro. That is impossible, Socrates ; it is useless to
ask the same question over and over again.
soc. Then the perfect, that which is to be desired
by all and is altogether good, is neither of these ?
pro. Certainly not.
soc. We must, then, gain a clear conception of
the good, or at least an outline of it, that we may, as
we said, know to what the second place is to be
assigned.
pro. Quite right.
soc. And have we not found a road which leads
to the good ?
pro. What road ?
soc. If you were looking for a particular man and
first found out correctly where he lived, you would
have made great progress towards finding him whom
you sought.
soc. And just now we received an indication, as
we did in the beginning, that we must seek the good,
not in the unmixed, but in the mixed life.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Surely there is greater hope that the object
of our search will be clearly present in the well
mixed life than in the life which is not well mixed ?
377
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. ΓΙολυ γε.

2Ω. Tot? δη θεοΐς, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, ευχόμενοι
C κεραννύωμεν, είτε Διόνυσό? etre "Ηφαιστο? et0’
ο art? θεών τ αυτήν την τιμήν εϊληχε της συγκράσεως.
πρω. Πάνυ μεν ούν.
2Ω. Kat μην καθάπερ ημιν οίνοχόοις τισί παρ-
εστάσι κρηνα ι· μέλι το? μεν αν άπ εικάζοι τις την
της ηδονης, την δε της φρονησεως νηφαντικην
και άοινον αυστηρόν και υγιεινόν τίνος ϋδατος, ας
πρυθυμητέον ώς κάλλιστα συμμιγνυναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? γάρ ου;
D 2Ω. Φέρε δη πρότερον άρα πάσαν ηδονην
πάση φρονήσει μιγνυντες του καλώς αν μάλιστα έπι-
τύχοιμεν;
ΠΡΩ. ’Ίσω?.
2Ω. Άλλ’ ούκ ασφαλές. η δε άκινδυνότερον αν
μιγνυοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκώ τινά άποφηνασθαι αν.
ΠΡΩ. Αέγε τίνα.
2Ω. ’Ην ημιν ηδονη τε αληθώς, ώς οίόμεθα,
μάλλον έτέρας άλλη καί δη καί τέχνη τέχνης ακρι¬
βέ στέρα;
2Ω. Kat επιστήμη δη επιστήμης διάφορος, η
μεν επί τα γιγνόμενα καί άπολλνμενα άποβλέπουσα,
Ε η δε επί τα μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε άπολλνμενα,
κατά ταντά δε καί ωσαύτως οντα αεί. ταυτην
εις το αληθές επισκοπονμενοι ηγησάμεθα εκείνης
άληθεστέραν είναι.
πρω. Πάνυ μεν ούν όρθώς.
2Ω. Ούκονν εί τάληθέστατα τμήματα έκατέρας
ίδοιμεν πρώτον συμμίξαντες, άρα ικανά ταΰτα
συγκεκραμένα τον αγαπητότατου βίον άπεργα-
378
PHILEBUS
pro. Far greater.

soc. Let us make the mixture, Protarchus, with
a prayer to the gods, to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or
whoever he be who presides over the mixing.
pro. By all means.
soc. We are like wine-pourers, and beside us are
fountains—that of pleasure may be likened to a
fount of honey, and the sober, wineless fount of
wisdom to one of pure, health-giving water—of which
we must do our best to mix as well as possible.
pro. Certainly we must.
soc. Before we make the mixture, tell me : should
wre be most likely to succeed by mixing all pleasure
with all wisdom ?
pro. Perhaps.
soc. But that is not safe ; and I think I can offer
a plan by which we can make our mixture with less
risk.
pro. What is it ?
soc. We found, I believe, that one pleasure was
greater than another and one art more exact than
another ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. And knowledge was of twO kinds, one turning
its eyes towards transitory things, the other towards
things which neither come into being nor pass awray,
but are the same and immutable for ever. Consider¬
ing them with a view to truth, we judged that the
latter was truer than the former.
pro. That is quite right.
soc. Then what if we first mix the truest sections
of each and see whether, when mixed together, they
are capable of giving us the most adorable life,
379
PLATO
σάμενα παρεχειν ήμΐν, ή πνος ετι προσδεόμεθα καϊ

των μη τοιούτων ;
62 πρω. Έμοί γοΰν δοκέ δράν ούτως.
38. 2Ω. "Εστω δη τις ήμΐν φρονών άνθρωπος
αυτής περί δικαιοσύνης, ο τι εστιν, και λόγον εχων
επόμενον τώ νοεΐν, καί δη καί περί των άλλων
απάντων των ον των ωσαύτως διανοούμενος.
ΠΡΩ. "Εστω γάρ οΰν.
2Ω. τΑρ’ οΰν ούτος ικανώς επιστήμης εξει,
κύκλον μεν καί σφαίρας αυτής τής θείας τον λόγον
εχων, την δε άνθρωπίνην ταυτήν σφαίραν καί τους
κύκλους τούτους άγνοών, καί χρωμενος εν οίκοδομία
Β καί τοΐς άλλοις ομοίως κανόσι καί τοΐς κύκλοις ;
ΠΡΩ. TcAotav διάθεσιν ημών, ώ Έώκρατες, εν
ταΐς θείαις οΰσαν μόνον επιστήμαις λεγομεν.
2Ω. Πώ? φήζ; η τοΰ φευδοΰς κανόνος άμα καί
τοΰ κύκλου την ού βέβαιον ουδέ καθαράν τέχνην
εμβλητεον κοινή καί συγκρατεον;
πρω. Άναγκαΐον γάρ, εί μελλει τις ημών καί
την οδόν εκάστοτε εζευρήσειν ο'ίκαδε.
2Ω. ΤΗ καί μουσικήν, ήν ολίγον έμπροσθεν
C εφαμεν στοχάσεώς τε καί μιμήσεως μεστήν οΰσαν
καθαρότητος ενδεΐν;
πρω. Άναγκαΐον φαίνεται εμοιγε, εΐπερ γε ήμών
ο βίος εσται καί όπωσοΰν ποτέ βίος.
2Ω. BoiiAet δήτα, ώσπερ θυρωρός ΰπ’ όχλου
τις ωθούμενος καί βιαζόμενος, ήττηθείς άναπετάσας
τάς θύρας άφώ πάσας τάς επιστήμας είσρεΐν καί
μίγνυσθαι όμοΰ καθαρά τήν ενδεεστεραν;
D ΠΡΩ. 0ύκουν εγωγε οίδα, ώ Σώκρατες, ο τι τις
αν βλάπτοιτο πάσας λαβών τάς άλλας επιστήμας,
εχων τάς π ρωτάς.
380
PHILEBUS
or whether we still need something more and

different ?
pro. I think that is what we should do.
soc. Let us assume, then, a man who possesses
wisdom about the nature of justice itself, and reason
in accordance with his wisdom, and has the same
kind of knowledge of all other things.
pro. Agreed.
soc. Now will this man have sufficient knowledge,
if he is master of the theory of the divine circle and
sphere, but is ignorant of our human sphere and
human circles, even when he uses these and other
kinds of rules or patterns in building houses ?
pro. We call that a ridiculous state of intellect in
a man, Socrates, which is concerned only with divine
knowledge.
soc. What ? Do you mean to say that the un¬
certain and impure art of the false rule and circle is
to be put into our mixture ?
pro. Yes, that is inevitable, if any man is ever to
find his own way home.
soc. And must we add music, which we said a
little while ago was full of guesswork and imitation
and lacked purity ?
pro. Yes, I think we must, if our life is to be life
at all.
soc. Shall I, then, like a doorkeeper who is pushed
and hustled by a mob, give up, open the door, and
let all the kinds of knowledge stream in, the impure
mingling with the pure ?
pro. I do not know, Socrates, what harm it can do
a man to take in all the other kinds of knowledge if
he has the first.
381
PLATO
2Ω. Με#ιώ δη τάς ζυμπάσας ρεΐν els την της

Όμηρου και μάλα ποιητικής μισγαγκείας υποδοχήν;
πρω. ΪΙάνυ μεν ουν.
39. 2Ω. Με^εινται* και πάλιν επι την των
ηδονών πηγην Ιτεον. ώς γάρ διενοηθημεν αύτας
μιγνύναι, τά των αληθών μόρια πρώτον, ούκ
εζεγενεθη ημΐν, άλλα διά το πάσαν αγαπάν άπιστη -
Ε μην εις ταύτόν μ€θ€Ϊμ€ν άθρόας και πρόσθεν τών
ηδονών.
πρω. Αληθέστατα λεγεις.
2Ω. "Ωρα δη βουλεύεσθαι νών και περί τών
ηδονών, πάτερα και ταυτας πάσας άθρόας άφετεον
η και τούτων πρώτας μεθετεον ημΐν οσαι αληθείς.
πρω. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρός γε ασφάλειαν πρώ¬
τας τάς αληθείς άφεΐναι.
2Ω. Μεθείσθων δη. τι δε μετά ταυτα; άρ* ούκ
ει μεν τινες άναγκαΐαι, καθάπερ εκεί, ξυμμικτεον
και ταυτας;
ΠΡΩ. Τι δ’ οΰ; τάς γε αναγκαίας δηπουθεν.
63 2Ω. Ει δε' γε καί, καθάπερ τάς τάχνας πάσας
άβλαβες τε και ωφέλιμον ήν άπίστασθαι διά βίου,
και νυν δη ταύτά λεγομεν1 23 περί τών ηδονών, ε’ίπερ
πασας ηδονάς ηδεσθαι διά βίου συμφέρον τε ημΐν
εστι και άβλαβες άπασι, πάσας συγκρατεον.
πρω. Πώ? ουν δη περί αυτών τούτων λέγω μεν9;
και πώς ποιώμεν;
2Ω. Ούχ ημάς, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, διερωτάν χρη, τάς
ηδονάς δε αύτάς και τάς φρονήσεις διαπυνθανομενονς
Β το τοιόνδε άλΧηλων περί.
1 έξεγένεθ’ Stallbaum: έξεγενήθη ΒΤ.

s λεγομεν corr. Ven. 189: λέγωμεν ΒΤ.
3 λέγωμεν Ven. 189: λέγομεν ΒΤ.
382
PHILEBUS
soc. Shall I, then, let them all flow into what

Homer1 very poetically calls the mingling of the
vales ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. They are let in ; and now we must turn again

to the spring of pleasure. For our original plan for
making the mixture, by taking first the true parts,
did not succeed ; because of our love of knowledge,
we let all kinds of knowledge in together before
pleasure.
pro. Verv true.
·/
soc. So now it is time for us to consider about

pleasures also, whether these, too, shall be all let
loose together, or we shall let only the true ones
loose at first.
pro. It is much safer to let loose the true first.
soc. We will let them loose, then. But what
next ? If there are any necessary pleasures, as there
were kinds of knowledge, must we not mix them with
the true ?
pro. Of course ; the necessary pleasures must
certainly be added.
soc. And as we said it was harmless and useful
to know all the arts throughout our life, if we now
say the same of pleasures—that is, if it is advan¬
tageous and harmless for us to enjoy all pleasures
throughout life—they must all form part of the
mixture.
pro. What shall we say about these pleasures,
and what shall we do ?
soc. There is no use in asking us, Protarchus ;
we must ask the pleasures and the arts and sciences
themselves about one another.
1 Iliad, iv. 453.
383
PLATO
πρω. To ποιον;
2Ω. “ *Ω φίλαι,1 είτε ηδονάς υμάς2 χρη προσ-
αγορευειν είτε άλλω ότωοΰν όνόματι, μών ουκ αν
δέζαισθε3 οίκεΐν μετά φρονησεως πόσης η χωρίς
του φρονεΐν;” οΐμαι μεν προς ταΰτα τόδ’ αύτας
άναγκαιότατον είναι λέγειν.
πρω. Τό ποιον;
2Ω. "Οτι καθάπερ έμπροσθεν ερρηθη, “ τό μόνον
καί έρημον ειλικρινές είναι τι γένος ούτε πανυ τι
δυνατόν οϋτ ωφέλιμον· πάντων γε μην ηγουμεθα
C γενών άριστον εν άνθ’ ενός συνοικεΐν ημΐν τό
του γιγνώσκειν τάλλά τε πάντα και αυτήν4, ημών
τελεως εις δυναμιν εκάστην.”
ΠΡΩ. “ Και καλώς γε ειρηκατε τα νυν,” φησομεν.
5Ω. Όρθώς. πάλιν τοίνυν μετά τούτο την φρό-
νησιν και τον νουν άνερωτητεον “ άρ1 ηδονών τι
προσδεΐσθε3 εν τη συγκράσει; ” φαΐμεν αν αΰ τον
νουν τε και την φρόνησιν άνερωτώντες. “ ποιων,”
acev αν ίσως, ηδονών;
ΠΡΩ. Εικό?.
D 2Ω. Ό δε γ' ημετερος Aoyo? μετά τοΰτ’ εστιν
δδε. “προς ταΐς άληθεσιν εκείναις ηδοναΐς,”
φησομεν, “ άρ' ετι προσδεΐσθ’ ύμΐν τάς μεγίστας
ηδονάς συνοίκους είναι και τάς σφοδροτάτας; ”
ν η ϊ
και πώς, ώ Έώκρατες,” ίσως ψαιεν αν,
/ ~
αι γ
a
εμποδίσματά τε μύρια ημΐν έχουσι , τά? φυχάς εν αΐς

οικοϋμεν ταράττουσαι διά μάνικάς ηδονάς, και
γίγνεσθαι τε ημάς την αρχήν ουκ εώσι, τά τε
Ε γιγνόμενα ημών τέκνα ώς τό πολύ, δι’ αμέλειαν
1 φίλαι corr. Ven. 189: φίλε ΒΤ.

2 ύ/xas recc. t: ή/xas ΒΤ.
3 δέζαισθε corr. Vat.: δέζασθαι Τ: δέζεσθαι Β.
384
PHILEBUS
pro. What shall we ask them ?

soc. “ Dear ones—whether you should be called
pleasures or by any other name—would you choose
to dwell with all wisdom, or with none at all ? ” I
think only one reply is possible.
pro. What is it r
soc. What we said before : “ For any class to be

alone, solitary, and unalloyed is neither altogether
possible nor is it profitable ; but of all classes, com¬
paring them one with another, we think the best to
live with is the knowledge of all other things and,
so far as is possible, the perfect knowledge of our
individual selves.”
pro. “ Your reply is excellent,” we shall tell them,
soc. Right. And next we must turn to wisdom

and mind, and question them. We shall ask them,
“ Do you want any further pleasures in the mixture ? ”
And they might reply, “ What pleasures ? ”
pro. Quite likely.
soc. Then we should go on to say : “ In addition

to those true pleasures, do you want the greatest
and most intense pleasures also to dwell with you ? ”
“ How can we want them, Socrates,” they might
perhaps say, “ since they contain countless hind¬
rances for us, inasmuch as they disturb with madden¬
ing pleasures the souls of men in which we dwell,
thereby preventing us from being born at all, and
utterly destroying for the most part, through the
carelessness and forgetfulness which they engender.
* αΰ την (την B) before αύτην bracketed by Wohlrab.

5 προσδεΐσθε] ττροσδεισθαί BT.
3 85
PLATO
λήθην έμποιοϋσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν ; άλλ’

α?1 τε ήδονας αληθείς καί καθαρός2 είπες, σχεδόν
οικείας ήμΐν νόμιζε, καί προς ταύταις τας μεθ
υγιείας καί του σωφρονεΐν, καί δή καί ζνμπάσης
αρετής όπόσαι καθάπερ θεοϋ οπαδοί γιγνόμεναι
αυτή συνακολουθοΰσι πάντη, ταυτας μίγνν τάς3 δ’
αεί μετ' αφροσύνης καί τής άλλης κακίας έπομένας
πολλή που άλογία τω νώ μιγνύναι τον βουλόμενον
δτι. καλλίστην ίδόντα καί αστασιαστοτάτην μΐζιν καί
κρασιν, εν τούτη μαθεΐν πειράσθαι τί ποτέ εν τε
64 ανθρώπου καί τω παντί πέφυκεν αγαθόν καί τίνα
ιδέαν αυτήν είναι ποτέ μαντευτεον.” άρ’ ούκ
έμφρόνως ταΰτα καί έχόντως εαυτόν τον νοΰν φή-
σομεν υπέρ τε αύτοΰ καί μνήμης καί δόζης ορθής
άποκρίνασθαι τα νυν ρηθέντα;
πρω. ΐΐαντάπασι μεν ούν.
2Ω. Άλλα μην καί τάδε γε άναγκαΐον, καί ούκ
άλλως αν ττοτβ γενοιτο ουο αν ev.
Β ΠΡΩ. Τδ ποιον;
2Ω. ' Οι μή μίζομεν αλήθειαν, ούκ αν ποτέ τούτο
αληθώς γίγνοιτο ούδ’ αν γενόμενον είη.
πρω. Πώς· γαρ αν;
40. 2Ω. Ουδαμώς. αλλ5 ε’ί τίνος ετι προσδεΐ
τη συγκράσει ταύτη, λέγετε συ τε καί Φίληβος.
εμοι μεν γαρ καθαπερεί κόσμος τις άσώματος
αρξων καλώς έμφύχου σώματος ό νΰν λόγος άπ-
ειργάσθαι φαίνεται.
πρω. Και εμοί τοίνυν, ώ Σώκρατες, ουτω λέγε
δεδόχθαι.
1 άλλ’ &s Hermann: άλλα? Β: άλλα? Τ.

3 καθαρας Hermann: καθαρας &s ΒΤ.
3 μίγνυ· τάς Heusde: μι-γνύντας ΒΤ.
SS6
PHILEBUS
those of our children which are born ? But the true

and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, you must
consider almost our own by nature, and also those
which are united with health and self-restraint, and
furthermore all those which are handmaids of virtue
in general and follow everywhere in its train as if
it were a god,—add these to the mixture ; but as
for the pleasures which follow after folly and all
baseness, it would be very senseless for anyone who
desires to discover the most beautiful and most
restful mixture or compound, and to try to learn
which of its elements is good in man and the universe,
and what we should divine its nature to be, to mix
these with mind.” Shall we not say that this reply
which mind has now made for itself and memory and
right opinion is wise and reasonable ?
pro. Certainly.
soc. But another addition is surely necessary,

without which nothing whatsoever can ever come
into being.
pro. What is it ?
soc. That in which there is no admixture of truth

can never truly come into being or exist.
soc. No. But if anything is still wanting in our

mixture, you and Philebus must speak of it. For to
me it seems that our argument is now completed, as
it were an incorporeal order which shall rule nobly a
living body.
pro. And you may say, Socrates, that I am of the
same opinion.
387
PLATO
C 2Ω. *Ap* ovv επί μεν τοΐς τον άγαθοΰ νυν ηδη
ττροθυροις καί της οίκησεως εφεσταναι της του
τοιούτου λεγοντες ’ίσως όρθώς άν τινα τροπον
φαϊμεν ;
πρω. Έμ,οι γοΰν δοκεΐ.
2Ω. Τί δητα εν τη ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον αμα
καί μάλιστ αίτιον είναι δόξειεν αν ημΐν τοΰ πάσι
γεγονεναι προσφιλή την τοιαυτην διάθεσιν; τοΰτο
γάρ ιδόντες μετά τοΰτ’ επισκεφόμεθα είθ' ηδονη
είτε τω νώ προσφυέστερου1 κα'ι οίκειότερον εν τω
π αντί ξυνεστηκεν.
D πρω. Όρθώς· τοΰτο γάρ εις την κρίσιν ημΐν
εστ'ι συμφορώτατον.
2Ω. Και μην και ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως ού χαλε¬
πόν ίδεΐν την αιτίαν δι ην η παντός αξία γίγνεται
ητισοΰν η το παράπαν ούδενός.
ΠΡΩ. Πώ? λεγεις;
2Ω. Ούδείς που τοΰτο ανθρώπων αγνοεί.
ΠΡΩ. Τό ποιον;
2Ω. "Οτι μέτρου καί της συμμέτρου φΰσεως μη
τυχοΰσα ητισοΰν καί όπωσοΰν συγκρασις πάσα εξ
ανάγκης άπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννυμενα καί πρώτην
Ε αυτήν. ουδέ γάρ κράσις, αλλά τις άκρατος
σνμπεφορημενη αληθώς η τοιαυτη γίγνεται εκά-
στοτε όντως τοΐς κεκτημενοις ξυμφορά.
5Ω. Nw δη καταπεφευγεν ημΐν η τοΰ άγαθοΰ
δυναμις εις την τοΰ καλοΰ φυσιν. μετριότης γάρ
και συμμετρία κά.λλος δηπου καί αρετή πανταχοΰ
ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.
πρω. ΥΙάνυ μεν οΰν.
1 προσφυέστεροι* Heusde: προσφυές τε ΒΤ.
388
PHILEBUS
soc. And if we were to say that we are now in

the vestibule of the good and of the dwelling of the
good, should we not be speaking the truth after a
fashion ?
pro. I certainly think so.
soc. What element, then, of the mixture would
appear to us to be the most precious and also the
chief cause why such a state is beloved of all ?
When we have discovered this, we will then consider
whether it is more closely attached and more akin
to pleasure or to mind in the universe.
pro. Right ; for that is most serviceable to us in
forming our judgement.

soc. And it is quite easy to see the cause which
makes any mixture whatsoever either of the highest
value or of none at all.
soc. Why, everybody knows that.

pro. Knows what ?
soc. That any compound, however made, which
lacks measure and proportion, must necessarily de¬
stroy its components and first of all itself; for it is
in truth no compound, but an uncompounded jumble,
and is always a misfortune to those who possess it.
pro. Perfectly true.
soc. So now the power of the good has taken

refuge in the nature of the beautiful ; for measure
and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty
and virtue.
pro. Certainly.
389
PLATO
2Ω. Καί μην αλήθειαν γε εφαμεν αυτοί? εν τη

κράσει μεμΐχθαι.
πρω. Πάνυ γε.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν ει μη μια δυνάμεθα ιδέα το άγα-
65 θόν θηρεΰσαι, συν τρισί λαβόντες, κάλλει και Συμ¬
μετρία και αλήθεια, λεγωμεν ώς τούτο οΐον εν
όρθότατ’ αν αΐτιασαίμεθ' αν των εν τη συμμίξει,
και διά τούτο ώς αγαθόν ον τοιαΰτην αυτήν γε-
γονεναι.
41. 2Ω. ”Ηδτ] τοίνυν, ώ ΪΙρώταρχε, ικανός
ημΐν γενοιτ’ αν όστισοΰν κριτής ηδονης τε περί
Β και φρονησεως, όπότερον αύτοΐν του άρίστου ζυγ-
γενεστερόν τε καί τιμιώτερον εν άνθρωπο ις τε
εστι καί θεοΐς.
πρω. Δηλον μεν, όμως δ’ οΰν τώ λόγω επεξελ-
θεΐν βελτιον.
2Ω. Καθ’ εν έκαστον τοίνυν των τριών προς
την ηδονην καί τον νοΰν κρίνωμεν. Βει γάρ ίδεΐν,
ποτερω ώς1 μάλλον Συγγενές έκαστον αυτών άπο-
νεμοΰμεν.
πρω. Κάλλου? καί αλήθειας καί μετριότητος
περί λεγεις;
2Ω. Ναι. πρώτον δε γε αλήθειας λαβοΰ, ώ
ΪΙρώταρχε· καί λαβόμενος, βλεφας είς τρία, νοΰν
C και αλήθειαν καί ηΒονην, πολΰν επισχών χρόνον
αποκριναι σαυτώ πότερον ηδονη ΣυΥΥζνόατερον η
νους αλήθεια.
πρω. Τί δβ χρόνου δει; πολΰ γάρ, οΐμαι, δια-
φερετον. ηδονη μεν γάρ απάντων άλαζονίστατον,
ώς δε λόγος, καί εν ταΐς ηδοναΐς ταις περί τά-
1 ώ$ add. Burnet after Badham.
390
PHILEBUS
soc. We said that truth also was mingled with

them in the compound.
pro. Certainly.
soc. Then if we cannot catch the good with the

aid of one idea, let us run it down with three—beauty,
proportion, and truth, and let us say that these,
considered as one, may more properly than all other
components of the mixture be regarded as the cause,
and that through the goodness of these the mixture
itself has been made good.
pro. Quite right.
soc. So now, Protarchus, any one would be able

to judge about pleasure and wisdom, and to decide
which of them is more akin to the highest good and
of greater value among men and gods.
pro. That is clear ; but still it is better to carry
on the discussion to the end.

soc. Let us, then, judge each of the three sep¬
arately in its relation to pleasure and mind ; for it is
our duty to see to which of the two we shall assign
each of them as more akin.
pro. You refer to beauty, truth, and measure ?
soc. Yes. Take truth first, Protarchus ; take it

and look at the three—mind, truth, and pleasure ;
take plenty of time, and answer to yourself whether
pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.
pro. Why take time ? For the difference, to my
mind, is great. For pleasure is the greatest of im¬
postors, and the story goes that in the pleasures of
391
PLATO
φροδίσια, at δη μεγισται δοκοΰσιν είναι,, και το

επιορκεΐν συγγνώμην εΐληφε παρά θεών, ώς καθ-
άπερ παίδων των ηδονών νοΰν ουδέ τον όλίγιστον
D κεκτημενων· νους δε ήτοι ταυτον και αλήθεια
εστιν η πάντων όμοιότατόν τε και αληθέστατου.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν το μετά τοοτο την μετριότητα ωσ¬
αύτως σκεφαι, πότερον ηδονη φρονησεως η φρό-
νησις ηδονης πλειω κεκτηται.
ΠΡΩ. Εΰσκεπτόν γε και ταυτήν σκεφιν προβε-
βληκας. οΐμαι γάρ ηδονης μεν και περιχαρείας
ουδεν τών οντων πεφυκός άμετρώτερον εύρεΐν αν
τινα, νοΰ δε και επιστήμης εμμετρώτερον οοδ’ αν εν
ποτέ.
Ε 2Ω. Καλώ? εΐρηκας. όμως δ’ ετι λέγε το
τρίτον. νοΰς ημΐν κάλλους μετείληφε πλεΐον η
το της ηδονης γένος, ώστε είναι καλλίω νοΰν ηδονης,
η τουναντίον ;
πρω. ΆΛΑ’1 οΰν φρόνησιν μεν καί νοΰν, ώ
Σ ωκρατες,
' >
ουοεις
\ /
πωποτε ουσ
«/
υπαρ
V
ουτ
ί »/
οναρ
αισχρόν ούτε είδεν ούτε επενόησεν ουδαμη ούδαμώς
ούτε γιγνόμενον ούτε οντα ούτε εσόμενον.
2Ω. Όρθώς.
πρω. 'Ηδονά? δε γε που, καί ταΰτα σχεδόν τάς
μεγιστας, όταν ίδωμεν ηδόμενον όντινοΰν, η τό γε¬
λοίου επ’ αύταΐς η τό πάντων α’ίσχιστον επόμενον
66 ορώντες αυτοί τε αίσχυνόμεθα καί άφανίζοντες
κρυπτομεν ότι μάλιστα, νυκτί πάντα τά τοιαΰτα
διδόντες, ώς φώς ου δέον όράν αυτά.
2Ω. Πάντη δη φησεις, ώ ΐΐρώταρχε, υπό τε
αγγέλων πεμπων καί παροΰσι φράζων, ώς ηδονη
κτήμα ουκ εστι πρώτον οοδ’ αΰ δεύτερον, αλλά
1 άλλ’ Stallbaum: δ,ρ Τ Stobaeus: &ρ Β.
392
PHILEBUS
love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury is

even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasure? were
like children, utterly devoid of all sense. But mind
is either identical with truth or of all things most
like it and truest.
soc. Next, then, consider measure in the same
way, and see whether pleasure possesses more of it
than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure.
pro. That also is an easy thing to consider. For
I think nothing in the world could be found more
immoderate than pleasure and its transports, and
nothing more in harmony with measure than mind
and knowledge.
soc. You are right. However, go on and tell about
the third. Has mind or pleasure the greater share
in beauty, so that mind is fairer than pleasure, or the
other way round ?
pro. But Socrates, no one, either asleep or awake,
ever saw or knew wisdom or mind to be or become
unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever, now
or in the future.
soc. Right.
pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures at
that, when we see any one enjoying them and ob¬
serve the ridiculous or utterly disgraceful element
which accompanies them, fill us with a sense of
shame ; we put them out of sight and hide them, so
far as possible ; we confine everything of that sort
to the night time, as unfit for the sight of day.
soc. Then you will proclaim everywhere, Prot-
archus, by messengers to the absent and by speech
to those present, that pleasure is not the first of
possessions, nor even the second, but first the eternal
393
PLATO
πρώτον μέν πη περί μέτρον καί το μετριον καί

καιρών καί πάντα όπόσα χρή τοιαΰτα νομίζειν,
την άΐδιον ήρήσθαι φυσιν.1
ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοΰν εκ των νΰν λεγομένων.
Β 2Ω. Δεύτερον μην περί το σύμμετρον καί καλόν
καί το τελεον καί Ικανόν καί πάνθ’ όπόσα της γενεάς
αΰ ταντης έστίν.
πρω. Έοικε γοΰν.
2Ω. Τό τοίνυν τρίτον, ώς η έμή μαντεία, νουν
καί φρόνησήν τιθείς ονκ άν μεγα τι της αλήθειας
παρεζέλθοις.
πρω. ’Ίσως.
2Ω. *Αρ οΰν ου τέταρτα, ά της φυχής αυτής
εθεμεν, έπιστήμας τε καί τέχνας καί δόζας όρθάς
C λεχθείσας, ταΰτ είναι τα προς τοΐς τρισί τέταρτα,
είπερ του άγαθοΰ γε εστι μάλλον της2 ηδονής
ξυγγενή;
πρη. 1 αχ αν.
2Ω. ΪΙεμπτας τοίνυν, ας ήδονας εθεμεν άλυπους
όρισάμενοι, καθαρός επονομάσαντες τής φυχής
αυτής, επιστήμαις,3 τάς4 δε αίσθήσεσιν επομενας;
ΠΡΩ. "Ισω?.
2Ω. “ 'Έκτη δ’ εν γενεά,” φησίν Όρφευς, “ κατα¬
παυσατε κόσμον άοιδής'” άταρ κινδυνεύει καί ό
ήμετερος λόγος εν έκτη καταπεπαυ μένος είναι
D κρίσει. τό δή μετά ταΰθ’ ήμΐν ούδέν λοιπόν πλήν
ώσπερ κεφαλήν άποδοΰναι τοΐς ειρημένοις.
πρω. Ουκοΰν χρή.
42. 2Ω. ’Ί0ι δή, τό τρίτον τω σωτήρι τον
αυτόν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον έπεζέλθωμεν. .
1 "ΟΡν^θαι Stobaeus: ήρησθαι Β: ιίρησθαι φάσιν Τ: είρησθαι

φύσιν vulg.: ηύρησθat φύσιν Badham.
394
PHILEBUS
nature has chosen measure, moderation, fitness, and

all which is to be considered similar to these.
pro. That appears to result from what has now
been said.
soc. Second, then, comes proportion, beauty, per¬
fection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that class.
pro. Yes, so it appears.
soc. And if you count mind andwdsdomas the third,
you will, I prophesy, not wander far from the truth.
pro. That may be.
soc. And will you not put those properties fourth
which we said belonged especially to the soul—-
sciences, arts, and true opinions they are called—-
and say that these come after the first three, and
are fourth, since they are more akin than pleasure
to the good ?
pro. Perhaps.
soc. And fifth, those pleasures which we separated
and classed as painless, which we called pure pleasures
of the soul itself, those which accompany knowledge
and, sometimes, perceptions ?
pro. May be.
soc. “ But with the sixth generation,” says
Orpheus, “ cease the rhythmic song.” It seems
that our discussion, too, is likely to cease with the
sixth decision. So after this nothing remains for us
but to give our discussion a sort of head.
pro. Yes, that should be done,
soc. Come then, let us for the third time call the
same argument to witness before Zeus the saviour,
and proceed.
2 τηs Stallbaum: r) rrjs BT.

8 έπιστήμο.^ corr. Ven. 189: έτηστήμas BT.
4 τά$ Badham: τα« BT.
395
PLATO
ΠΡΩ. Ποιον δη;

2Ω. Φίληβος τάγαθόν ετίθετο ημ,ΐν ηδονην είναι
πάσαν καί παντελή.
ΠΡΩ. Τό τρίτον, ώ Έώκρατες, ώς έοικας,
έλεγες άρτίως τον εξ άρχης έπαναλαβεΐν δεΐν
λόγον.
Ε 2Ω. Ναι, τό δε γε μετά τοΰτο άκουωμεν. εγώ
γάρ δη κατιδών άπερ νυν δη διεληλυθα, και δυσ-
χεράνας τον Φιληβου λόγον ου μόνον άλλα καί
άλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, είπον ώς ηδονης γε
νους ε’ίη μακρω βέλτιόν τε καί άμεινον τω των
ανθρώπων βίω.
ΠΡΩ. ^Ην ταΰτα.
2Ω. 'Υποπτευων δε γε καί άλλα είναι πολλά
είπον ώς ει φανείη τι τούτοιν άμφοΐν βέλτιον, υπέρ
των δευτερείων νω προς ηδονην ξυνδιαμαχοίμην,
ηδονη δε καί δευτερείων στερησοιτο.
67 πρω. Είπε? γάρ οΰν.
2Ω. Καί μετά ταΰτά γε πάντων ίκανώτατα τού¬
το ιν ουδέτερον ικανόν εφάνη.
πρω. Αληθέστατα.
2Ω. Ουκοΰν παντάπασιν εν τουτω τω λόγω καί
νους άπηλλακτο καί ηδονη μη τοι τάγαθόν γε αυτό
μηδ’ έτερον αύτοΐν είναι, στερομένοιν1 αύταρκείας
καί της του ίκανοΰ καί τελέου δυνάμεως;
πρω. ’Ορθότατα.
2Ω. Φανεντο? δέ γε άλλου τρίτου κρείττονος
τουτοιν εκατέρου, μυρίω y’ αΰ νους ηδονης οίκειό-
τερον καί προσφυέστερον πέφανται νυν τη του
νικώντος ιδέα.
1 στερομένοιν corr. Yen. 189: στιρομένον ΒΤ.
396
PHILEBUS
pro. What argument ?
soc. Philebus declared that pleasure was entirely

and in all respects the good.
pro. Apparently, Socrates, when you said “ the
third time ” just now, you meant that we must
take up our argument again from the beginning.
soc. Yes; but let us hear what follows. For I,
perceiving the truths which I have now been detail¬
ing, and annoyed by the theory held not only by
Philebus but by many thousands of others, said that
mind was a far better and more excellent thing for
human life than pleasure.
pro. True.
soc. But suspecting that there were many other
things to be considered, I said that if anything should
be found better than these two, I should support
mind against pleasure in the struggle for the second
place, and even the second place would be lost by
pleasure.
pro. Yes, that is what you said,
soc. And next it was most sufficiently proved that
each of these two was insufficient.
pro. Very true.
soc. In this argument, then, both mind and
pleasure were set aside ; neither of them is the
absolute good, since they are devoid of self-suffi¬
ciency, adequacy, and perfection ?
pro. Quite right.
soc. And on the appearance of a third competitor,
better than either of these, mind is now found to be
ten thousand times more akin than pleasure to the
victor.
pro. Certainly.
o 397
PLATO
2Ω. Ούκοΰν πεμπτον κατά, την κρίσιν, ην νυν 6

λόγος άπεφηνατο, γίγνοιτ άν η της ηδονης δύναμις.
ΠΡΩ. Έοικεν.
Β 2Ω. Πρώτον δε ye ουδ’ άν οί πάντες βόες τε
καί ?77770ΐ καί τάλλα ξάμπαντα θηρία φώσι τω το
χαίρειν διώκειν οΐς πιστεύοντες, ώσπερ μάντεις
ορνισιν, οί πολλοί κρίνουσι τάς ηδονάς εις το ζην
ημΐν ευ κρατίστας είναι, καί τούς θηρίων έρωτας1
οίονται κυρίους είναι μάρτυρας μάλλον η τούς των
εν μούση φιλοσοφώ μεμαντευμενών εκάστοτε λόγων.
πρω. ’Αληθέστατα, ώ Σιώκρατες, είρησθαί σοι
νυν ηδη φαμεν άπαντες.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν καί άφίετε με;
πρω. Σμικρόν ετι τό λοιπόν, ώ Έώκρατες· ου
γάρ δηπου συ γε άπερεΐς πρότερος ημών ύπο-
μνησω δε' σε τα λειπόμενα.
1 Ζρωτοσ t: έρωντ/xs ΒΤ.
398
PHILEBUS
soc. Then, according to the judgement which has

now been given by our discussion, the power of
pleasure would be fifth.
pro. So it seems.
soc. But not first, even if all the cattle and horses
and other beasts in the world, in their pursuit of
enjoyment, so assert. Trusting in them, as augurs
trust in birds, the many judge that pleasures are the
greatest blessings in life, and they imagine that the
lusts of beasts are better witnesses than are the
aspirations and thoughts inspired by the philosophic
muse.
pro. Socrates, we all now declare that what you
have said is perfectly true.
soc. Then you will let me go ?
pro. There is still a little left, Socrates. I am
sure you will not give up before we do, and I will
remind you of what remains.
S99
ION
INTRODUCTION TO THE ION
This graceful little piece is remarkable not only for

the evidence it affords of the popularity and pro¬
cedure of Homeric recitals in the fifth and fourth
centuries, or again, for its brilliant witness to Plato’s
skill in characterization, but also for its insistence—
implied rather than expressed—on the doctrine that
no art, however warmly accepted and encouraged
by the multitude, can be of real worth unless it is
based on some systematic knowledge ; and that the
common claim of successful artists to be useful
servants of the public is probably a dangerous de¬
lusion. The “ rhapsode,” Ion of Ephesus, appears
before us in the two capacities of reciter and ex¬
positor of Homer. His profession, which bore in
its name the suggestion of “ song-stitching,” was
probably developed from extempore performances
of epic poets in their own person, when they strung
verses or groups of verses together in a continuous
chant : the rhapsode was able to recite from memory
the most interesting or moving narratives in the
great epics, and this practice came to be known by
the general name of “ rhapsody.” The rhapsode’s
profession was distinguished and lucrative. We read
here of the golden crowns he wore, his audience of
more than twenty thousand persons (535 d), and his
pecuniary reward for successfully stirring their
403
emotions (535 e). Isocrates (Paneg. 74 A, b) speaks

of the importance of such recitals for keeping alive
the national feeling of valour against the barbarians ;
and we read (Xenophon, Sympos. 3. 6) of one
person at least who used to hear rhapsodes almost
every day, and thus preserved his memory of the
whole of the Iliad and the Odyssey, which he had
learnt by heart as a boy. These solemn recitals of
the rhapsodes at great national festivals were both
a sign and a support of the immense popularity of
the Homeric poems ; the rhapsodes’ art corresponded
to that of the actors in dramatic and to that of
the minstrels in lyric performances. But besides
these public recitals they gave lectures on the sub¬
ject matter of the poems to classes of those who
hoped to acquire some practical knowledge from
their interpretations and disquisitions ; and on this
side of their profession they closely resembled the
sophists. It is this educative work of the rhapsode
which interests Plato. He is bent on criticizing the
whole system—or rather, the unsystematic tradition
—of Greek education ; and he seeks to show that the
rhapsode’s pretensions to any particular knowledge
of human affairs are absurd, and further, that even
his great success in impassioned recitation is a matter
not of studied art, but of divine “ possession ”—
something divorced from reason, and a possible
danger to the truth. The irrational nature of Ion’s
skill is illustrated by the striking comparison of the
magnet, which transmits an attractive force through
a series of iron rings. In the same way, the divine
inspiration, originating from the Muse, passes to the
poet, from him to the rhapsode, and from him again
to the audience. Performer and hearer alike are
404
held and swayed, like any frenzied bacchanal, by

something unreasonable, unaccountable, and over¬
mastering. Ion does not like this theory—that he
must be out of his mind when he exercises his famous
fascination—but he is eventually trapped into a
reluctant acceptance of it. For he cannot stand the
Socratic testing of his scientific knowledge, and
prefers to rest on his mysterious “ afflatus.” What
he would like best would be to give a regular lecture
on the beauties of Homer (536 d) ; but Socrates puts
him off with a few questions which expose the
scantiness of his kno\vledge, and only allows him to
show off his wonderful memory by quoting a few
passages of the poet. Yet Socrates’ tone towards
him throughout is friendly and restrained. Plato
was ever aware of the mighty influence of the poets
upon himself as well as upon the mass of his country¬
men, and there is regret no less than respect in his
voice when he bids them depart from his ideal state
{Rep. iii. 393).
The supposed time of the conversation with Ion is
the last year or two of the Peloponnesian War {cf.
541 d, note). There is a useful edition of the dialogue
by St. George Stock (Clarendon Press, 1909)·
ΙΩΝ
[η ΠΕΡΙ ΙΛΙΑΔ02, ΠΕΙΡΑ2ΤΙΚ02]
ΤΑ ΤΟΪ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΪ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2, ΙΩΝ
St. I
ρ. 530 2Ω. Τον ’Ίωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τα νυν ημΐν επι-
δεδήμηκας; ή οϊκοθεν εξ ’Έφεσον;
ΙΩΝ. Ουδαμώς, ώ Ίόώκρατες, άλλ’ εξ Έ7τιδαύρου
εκ των Ασκληπιείων.
2Ω. Μών καί ραψωδών αγώνα τιθεασι τώ θεώ
οί Έπιδαυριοι;
ΙΩΝ. Πάνυ γε, καί της άλλης γε μουσικής.
2Ω. Τί ουν; ηγωνίζου τι ημΐν; καί πώς τι
ηγωνίσω;
ΙΩΝ. Τα πρώτα των άθλων ήνεγκάμεθα, ώ
Σιώκρατες.
Β 2Ω. Ευ λεγεις· άγε δη όπως καί τα Παν-
αθηναια νικησομεν.
ΙΩΝ. Άλλ’ εσται ταΰτα, εάν θεός εθελη.
2Ω. Καί μην πολλάκις γε εζηλωσα υμάς τούς
ραψωδούς, ώ ’Ίων, τής τέχνης· το γαρ άμα μεν
το σώμα κεκοσμήσθαι αεί πρεπον υμών είναι τή
1 “ Music ” with the Greeks included poetry.

406
ION
[or ON THE ILIAD : tentative!
CHARACTERS
Socrates, Ion
soc. Welcome, Ion. Where have you come from

ηολν, to pay us this visit ? From your home in
Ephesus ?
ion. No, no, Socrates ; from Epidaurus and the
festival there of Asclepius.
soc. Do you mean to say that the Epidaurians
honour the god with a contest of rhapsodes also ?
ion. Certainly, and of music 1 in general,
soc. Why then, you were competing in some con¬
test, were you ? And how went your competition ?
ion. We carried off the first prize, Socrates,
soc. Well done : so now, mind that we win too at
the Panathenaea.2
ion. Why, so we shall, God willing,
soc. I must say I have often envied you rhapsodes,
Ion, for your art : for besides that it is fitting to
your art that your person should be adorned and that
2 The Athenian festival of the Great Panathenaea was

held every fourth year, and the Small Panathenaea probably
every year, about July.
407
PLATO
τβχνγι καί ώς καλλίστοις φαίνεσθαι, άμα δε αναγ¬

καίοι; είναι εν τε άλλοι? ποιηταΐς διατριβειν
πολλοί? και άγαθοΐς καί δη καί μάλιστα ε’ν Όμήρω,
τα> άρίστω καί decοτάτω των ποιητών, καί την
C τούτον διάνοιαν εκμανθάνειν, μη μόνον τα έπη,
ζηλωτόν εστιν. ου γάρ αν γενοιτό ποτέ αγαθός
ραφωδός, εί μη συνείη τα λεγάμενα υπό τοΰ
ποιητοΰ. τον γάρ ραφωδόν έρμηνέα δει τοΰ
ποιητοϋ της διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοΐς άκονονσι·
τοΰτο δε καλώς ποιεΐν μη γιγνώσκοντα ο τι λέγει
6 ποιητής αδύνατον. ταΰτα ονν πάντα άξια
ζηλοΰσθαι.
ΙΩΝ. Αληθή λέγεις, ώ Σώκρατε?· έμοί γοΰν
τοΰτο πλεΐστον έργον παρέσχε τής τέχνης, καί
οιμαι κάλλιστα ανθρώπων λέγειν περί Όμηρου,
D ώς οΰτε Μητρόδωρος 6 Ααμφακηνός οϋτε Έτησίμ-
βροτος ό Θάσιο? οϋτε Γλαυκών ούτε άλλο? ουδει?
των πώποτε γενομένων έσχεν ειπειν οϋτω πολλάς
καί καλάς διανοίας περί Όμηρου, οσας εγώ.
2Ω. Ευ λέγεις, ώ ’Ίων δήλον γάρ οτι ου φθο¬
νήσεις μοι έπιδεϊξαι.
ΙΩΝ. Και μην άξιόν γε ακόυσαι, ώ Σώκρατε?, ώς
εν κεκόσμηκα τον 'Όμηρον ώστε οιμαι υπό
Όμηριδών άξιος είναι χρυσίο στεφάνιο στεφανω-
θήναι.
2Ω. Και μην εγώ ετι ποιήσομαι σχολήν άκροά-
1 A friend of the philosopher Anaxagoras who wrote

allegorical interpretations of Homer in the first part of the
fifth century b.c.
408
ION
you should look as handsome as possible, the necessity

of being conversant with a number of good poets, and
especially with Homer, the best and divinest poet of
all, and of apprehending his thought and not merely
learning off his words, is a matter for envy ; since
a man can never be a good rhapsode without under¬
standing what the poet says. For the rhapsode
ought to make himself an interpreter of the poet’s
thought to his audience ; and to do this properly
without knowing what the poet means is impossible.
So one cannot but envy all this.
ion. What you say is true, Socrates : I at any
rate have found this the most laborious part of my
art ; and I consider I speak about Homer better than
anybody, for neither Metrodorus1 of Lampsacus,
nor Stesimbrotus2 of Thasos, nor Glaucon,3 nor any
one that the world has ever seen, had so many and
such fine comments to offer on Homer as I have.
soc. That is good news, Ion ; for obviously you
will not grudge me an exhibition of them.
ion. And indeed it is worth hearing, Socrates,
how well I have embellished Homer ; so that I think

I deserve to be crowned with a golden crown by the
Homeridae.4
soc. Yes, and I must find myself leisure some time
2 A rhapsode, interpreter of Homer, and historian who
lived in the time of Cimon and Pericles.
3 Perhaps the Homeric commentator mentioned by
Aristotle, Poet. 25. 16.
4 There was a society or clan in Chios called Homeridae
(“ sons of Homer ”), but the name seems to be used here
and elsewhere in Plato for any persons specially devoted to
Homer’s poetry. See Jebb, Homer, p. 78.
409
PLATO
531 σασθαί σου· νυν δέ μ.οι τοσόνδε άπόκριναι· πότερον

περί *Ομηρου μόνον δεινό? εί 7} και περί 'Ησιόδου
καί. ’Αρχίλοχου;
ΙΩΝ. Ούδαμώς, άλλα περί Όμηρον μόνον· ικανόν
γάρ μοι δοκεΐ είναι.
2Ω. Έστι δε 7τερί ότου "Ομηρός τε καί 'Ησίοδο?
ταυτά Αε'γετον;
ΙΩΝ. Οΐμαι εγωγε καί πολλά.
2Ω. Πότερον ουν 7τερί τούτων κάλλιον αν έζηγη-
σαιο α νμηρος Aeyet η a tiaiooos*;
ΙΩΝ. Όμοίως αν περί γε τούτων, ώ Σώκρα,τε?,
περί ών ταυτά λέγουσιν.
Β 2Ω. Τί δε, ών 7τερι ρ,τ) ταυτά λέγουσιν; οΐον
περί μαντικής λέγει τι "Ομηρός τε καί 'Ησίοδο?.
ΙΩΝ. ΓΙάνυ )/ε.
2Ω. Τί ουν; όσα τε όμοίως καί όσα διαφόρως
περί μαντικής λέγετον τώ ποιητά τούτω, πότερον
συ κάΛΛιον άν εξηγησαιο η των μάντεών τι? των
αγαθών;
ΙΩΝ. Των μάντεων.
2Ω. Εί δε συ ησθα μάντις, ούκ, ε’ίπερ περί των
όμοίως λεγομένων οίός τ’ ησθα εζηγησασθαι, καί
περί των δι αφόρως λεγομένων ηπίστω άν εζ-
ηγεισθαι;
ιων. Αήλον ότι.
2Ω. Τί ουν ποτέ περί μεν Όμηρου δεινό? εί,
C περί δε 'Ησιόδου ου, ουδέ των άλλων ποιητών;
η "Ομηρος περί άλλων τινών λέγει η ώνπερ
σύμπαντες οί άλλοι ποιηταί; ου περί πολέμου
τε τα πολλά διεληλυθε καί περί ομιλιών προς
άλληλονς ανθρώπων αγαθών τε καί κακών καί
ιδιωτών καί δημιουργών, καί περί θεών προς
410
ION
to listen to you ; but for the moment, please answer

this little question : are you skilled in Homer only,
or in Hesiod and Archilochus as well ?
ion. No, no, only in Homer ; for that seems to
me quite enough.
soc. And is there anything on which Homer and
Hesiod both say the same ?
ion. Yes, I think there are many such cases,
soc. Then in those cases would you expound better

what Homer says than what Hesiod says ?
ion. I should do it equally well in those cases,
Socrates, where they say the same.

soc. But what of those where they do not say the
same ? For example, about the seer’s art, on which
both Homer and Hesiod say something.
ion. Quite so.
soc. Well then, would you, or one of the good

seers, expound better what these two poets say, not
only alike but differently, about the seer’s art ?
ion. One of the seers.
soc. And if you were a seer, would you not, with

an ability to expound what they say in agreement,
know also how to expound the points on which they
differ ?
ion. Of course.
soc. Then how is it that you are skilled in Homer,

and not in Hesiod or the other poets ? Does Homer
speak of any other than the very things that all the
other poets speak of ? Has he not described war for
the most part, and the mutual intercourse of men,
good and bad, lay and professional, and the ways of
411
PLATO
άλληλους καί προς ανθρώπους ομιλούν των, ώς

όμιλοΰσι, και πepl των ουρανίων παθημάτων και
περί των εν "Αώου, και γενέσεις και θεών και
D ηρώων; ου ταΰτά εστι περί ών "Ομηρος την
ποίησιν πεποιηκεν;
ΙΩΝ. ’Αληθη λέγεις, ώ Σώκρατες.
2Ω. Τι δε οί άλλοι ποιηταί; ου περί των αυ¬
τών τούτων;
ΙΩΝ. Nat, άλλ’, ώ Σώκρατες, ούχ ομοίως
πεποιηκασι καί "Ομηρος.
2Ω . Tt μην; κάκιον;
ΙΩΝ. Πολό γε.
2Ω. "Ομηρος δε άμεινον;
ΙΩΝ. ’Άμεινον μεντοι νη Δία.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν, ώ φίλη κεφαλή ’Ίων, όταν περί
αριθμού πολλών λεγόντων εις τις άριστα λέγη,
γνώσεται δηπου τις τον ευ λεγοντα;
Ε ΙΩΝ. Φημί.
2Ω. Πότερον οΰν 6 αυτός, όσπερ και τούς
κακώς λέγοντας, η άλλος;
ΙΩΝ. Ό αυτός δηπου.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν ό την αριθμητικήν τέχνην εχων
ούτός εστιν;
ΙΩΝ. Nat.
2Ω. Tt δ’; όταν πολλών λεγόντων περί υγιεινών
σιτίων, όποια εστιν, εις τις άριστα λεγη, πότερον
ετερος μεν τις τον άριστα λεγοντα γνώσεται ότι
άριστα λέγει, έτερος δε τον κάκιον ότι κάκιον, η
ό αυτός;
ΙΩΝ. Δήλον δηπου, ό αυτός.
2Ω. Tt? ούτος; τί όνομα αύτώ;
ΙΩΝ. ’Ιατρό?.
412
ION
the gods in their intercourse with each other and

with men, and happenings in the heavens and in the
underworld, and origins of gods and heroes ? Are
not these the subjects of Homer’s poetry ?
ion. What you say is true, Socrates,
soc. And what of the other poets ? Do they not

treat of the same things ?
ion. Yes ; but, Socrates, not on Homer’s level,
soc. What, in a worse way ?

ion. Far worse,
soc. And Homer in a better ?

ion. Better indeed, I assure you.
soc. Well now, Ion, dear soul; when several people

are talking about number, and one of them speaks
better than the rest, I suppose there is some one who
will distinguish the good speaker ?
ion. I agree.
soc. And will this some one be the same as he

who can distinguish the bad speakers, or different ?
ion. The same, I suppose.
soc. And he will be the man who has the art of

numeration ?
ion. Yes.
soc. And again, when several are talking about

what kinds of foods are wholesome, and one of them
speaks better than the rest, will it be for two different
persons to distinguish the superiority of the best
speaker and the inferiority of a worse one, or for the
same ?
ion. Obviously, I should say, for the same,
soc. Who is he ? What is his name ?

ion. A doctor.
413
PLATO
2Ω. Ούκοΰν εν κεφαλαίω λέγωμεν, ώς 6 αυτός

γνώσεται αεί περί των αυτών πολλών λεγόντων,
532 οστις τε ευ λέγει καί δστις κακώς· η εί μη γνώσεται
τον κακώς λέγοντα, δηλον δτι ουδέ τον ευ, περί,
γε τοΰ αύτοϋ.
ιων. Ουτω?.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν 6 αύτδς γίγνεται δεινό? περί, αμφο-
τέρων;
ΙΩΝ. Ναι.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν σύ φης καί "Ομηρον καί τούς
άλλους ποιητάς, εν οΐς καί 'Ησίοδο? καί ’Αρχίλοχός
εστι, περί γε τών αυτών Aeyetv, άλλ’ ούχ ομοίως,
άλλα, τον μεν ευ, τούς δε χείρον;
ΙΩΝ. Καί άληθη λέγω.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν, είπερ τον ευ λεγοντα γιγνώσκεις,
Β καί τούς χείρον λέγοντας γι,γνώσκοι,ς αν δτι
χείρον λεγουσω.
ιων. 'Όοικε γε.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν, ώ βέλτιστε, ομοίως τον "Ιωνά
λέγοντες περί Όμηρου τε δεινόν είναι καί περί
τών άλλων ποιητών ούχ άμαρτησόμεθα, επειδή
γε αύτός ομολογη τον αυτόν εσεσθαι κριτήν ικανόν
πάντων, όσοι αν περί τών αυτών λέγωσι, τούς δε
ποιητάς σχεδόν άπαντας τά αυτά ποιεΐν.
ΙΩΝ. Τί ουν ποτέ τό αίτιον, ώ Σιώκρατες, δτι
εγώ, δταν μεν τις περί άλλου του ποιητοΰ δια-
λέγηται, ούτε προσέχω τον νουν αδυνατώ τε καί
C ότιοΰν συμβαλέσθαι λόγου άζιον, άλλ' άτεχνώς
νυστάζω, έπειδάν δε τις περί Όμηρου μνησθη,
εύθύς τε εγρηγορα καί προσέχω τον νουν καί
εύπορώ δ τι λέγω;
2Ω. Ου χαλεπόν τοΰτό γε εικάσαι, ώ εταίρε,
414
ION
soc. And so we may state, in general terms, that

the same person will always distinguish, given the
same subject and several persons talking about it,
both who speaks well and who badly : otherwise, if
he is not going to distinguish the bad speaker,
clearly he will not distinguish the good one either,
where the subject is the same.
ion. That is so.
soc. And the same man is found to be skilled in
both ?
ion. Yes.
soc. And you say that Homer and the other poets,
among whom are Hesiod and Archilochus, all speak
about the same things, only not similarly ; but the
one does it well, and the rest worse ?
ion. Yes, and what I say is true,
soc. And since you distinguish the good speaker,
you could distinguish also the inferiority of the worse
speakers.
ion. So it would seem.
soc. Then, my excellent friend, we shall not be
wrong in saying that our Ion is equally skilled in
Homer and in the other poets, seeing that you your¬
self admit that the same man will be a competent
judge of all who speak on the same things, and that
practically all the poets treat of the same things.
ion. Then what can be the reason, Socrates, why
I pay no attention when somebody discusses any
other poet, and am unable to offer any remark at ail
of any value, but simply drop into a doze, whereas
if anyone mentions something connected with Homer
I wake up at once and attend and have plenty to
say?
soc. That is not difficult to guess, my good friend ;
415
PLATO
άλλα παντί δήλον δτι τέχνη καί επιστήμη περί

'0μηρού λεγειν αδύνατος εΐ· εί γάρ τέχνη οίος τ€
ησθα, καί περί των άλλων ποιητών απαντων
λεγειν ο ιός τ’ αν ησθα· ποιητική γάρ που εστι
το ολον. η ου;
ιπν. Ναι.
D 2Ω. Ούκονν επειδάν λάβη τις και άλλην τέχνην
ηντινονν ολην, ά αυτός τρόπος της σκεφεώς εστι
περί άπασών των τεχνών; πώς τούτο λέγω, δεη
τί μου άκοΰσαι, ώ "Ιων;
ΙΩΝ. ΪΝαι μά τον Δ”, ώ Σ,ώκρατες, εγωγε·
χαίρω γάρ άκουων υμών τών σοφών.
2Ω. Βουλοίμην άν σε αληθή λεγειν, ώ ’Ίων'
άλλα σοφοί μεν που εστε ύμεΐς οί ραφωδοι και
ύποκριται και ών ύμεΐς άδετε τα ποιήματα, εγώ
e ουοεν άλλο η ταληυη λέγω, οιον βίκος ιοιωτην
Ε άνθρωπον, επε'ι και περ'ι τούτου ου νυν ήρόμην
σε, θεασαι ώς φαΰλον και Ιδιωτικόν εστι και
παντός άνδρός γνώναι ο ελεγον, την αυτήν είναι
σκεφιν, επειδάν τις ολην τέχνην λάβη. λάβωμεν
γάρ τώ λόγω· γραφική γάρ τις εστι τέχνη τό
δλον;
ΙΩΝ. Ναι.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν
και γραφής πολλοί κα'ι είσι και
γεγόνασιν αγαθοί και φαύλοι;
ΙΩΝ. Πάνα γε.
2Ω. ’Ήδη οΰν τινά είδες, οστις περί μεν Πολυ-
γνώ του τού ’AyA αοφώντος δεινός εστιν άπο-
φαίνειν, ά ευ τε γράφει και ά μη, περί δε τών
533 άλλων γραφεων αδύνατος; και επειδάν μεν τις
τά τών άλλων ζωγράφων έργα επιδεικνύη, νυστάζει
416
ION
anyone can see that you are unable to speak on

Homer with art and knowledge. For if you could
do it with art, you could speak on all the other poets
as well ; since there is an art of poetry, I take it, as
a whole, is there not ?
ion. Yes.
soc. And when one has acquired any other art

whatever as a whole, the same principle of inquiry
holds through all the arts ? Do you require some
explanation from me, Ion, of what I mean by this ?
ion. Yes, upon my word, Socrates, I do ; for I
enjoy listening to you wise men.
soc. I only wish you were right there, Ion : but
surely it is you rhapsodes and actors, and the men
whose poems you chant, who are wise ; whereas I
speak but the plain truth, as a simple layman might.
For in regard to this question I asked you just
now, observe what a trifling commonplace it was that
I uttered—-a thing that any man might know—
namely, that when one has acquired a whole art the
inquiry is the same. Let us just think it out thus :
there is an art of painting as a whole ?
ion. Yes.
soc. And there are and have been many painters,
good and bad ?
ion. Certainly.
soc. Now have you ever found anybody who is
skilled in pointing out the successes and failures
among the works of Polygnotus 1 son of Aglaophon,
but unable to do so with the works of the other
painters ; and who, when the works of the other
painters are exhibited, drops into a doze, and is at a
1 A celebrated painter who came from Thasos and adorned
public buildings in Athens about 470 b.c. Of. Gorg. 448 b.
417
PLATO
τε καί απορεί καί ούκ έχει ο τι συμβαλητα.,

έπειδάν δε περί Πολυγνώτου η άλλου οτου βουλει
των γραφεων ενός μόνου δέη άποφηνασθαι γνωμών,
εγρήγορε τε καί προσέχει τον νοΰν καί ευπορεί
f/ >/
ο π €ίπη;
ΙΩΝ. Ου μα τον Δία, ου δητα..
2Ω. Τι δε'; εν ανδριαντοποιία ηδη τιν’ είδες,
δστις περί μεν Δαιδάλου τοΰ λϊητίονος η Έπειου
Β του Πανοπεως η θεοδώρου του Σαμίου η άλλου
τίνος άνδριαντοποιοΰ ενός περί δεινό? εστιν εζ-
ηγεΐσθαι ά ευ πεποίηκεν, εν δε τοΐς των άλλων
άνδριαντοποιών εργοις απορεί τε καί νυστάζει,
ούκ εχων δ τι ε'ίπη;
ΙΩΝ. Ου μά τον Δία, ουδέ τούτον εώρακα.
2Ω. ΆΛΑά μην, ώς γ’ εγώ οιμαι, ουδ’ ε’ν αύλησει
γε ουδέ εν κιθαρίσει ουδέ εν κιθαρωδία ουδέ ε’ν

ραφωδία ούδεπώποτ είδες άνδρα, δστις περί μέν
C Όλυμπου δεινός εστιν εζηγεΐσθαι η περί θαμύρου
η περί Όρφέως η περί Φημίου τοΰ ’Ιθακήσιου
ραφωδοΰ, περί δε ’Ίωνο? τοΰ Έφεσίου απορεί
καί ούκ έχει συμβαλέσθαι, ά τε ευ ραφωδεΐ καί
<\ /
α μη.
ιων. Ούκ έχω σοι περί τούτου άντιλέγειν, ώ
Σώκρατες· άλλ’ εκείνο εμαυτω σύνοιδα, ότι περί
Όμηρου κάλλ ιστ ανθρώπων λέγω καί εύπορώ
καί οι άλλοι πάντες με φασιν εύ λέγειν, περί δε
των άλλων ου. καίτοι δρα τοΰτο τι εστιν.
1 According to legend, the first sculptor : cf. Eutliyphro

11, Mena 97 d.
418
ION
loss, and has no remark to offer ; but when he has to

pronounce upon Polygnotus or any other painter
you please, and on that one only, wakes up and
attends and has plenty to say ?
ion. No, on my honour, I certainly have not.
soc. Or again, in sculpture, have you ever found

anyone who is skilled in expounding the successes
of Daedalus1 son of Metion, or Epeius2 son of
Panopeus, or Theodorus3 of Samos, or any other
single sculptor, but in face of the works of the other
sculptors is at a loss and dozes, having nothing to say ?
ion. No, on my honour, I have not found such a
man as that either.

soc. But further, I expect you have also failed to
find one in fluting or harping or minstrelsy or
rhapsodizing who is skilled in expounding the art of
Olympus 4 or Thamyras,5 or Orpheus,5 or Phemius,6
the rhapsode of Ithaca, but is at a loss and has no
remark to offer on the successes or failures in
rhapsody of Ion of Ephesus.
ion. I cannot gainsay you on that, Socrates : but
of one thing I am conscious in myself—that I excel

all men in speaking on Homer and have plenty to
say, and everyone else says that I do it well ; but
on the others I am not a good speaker. Yet now,
observe what that means.
2 The maker of the wooden horse at Troy (Homer,
Od. viii. 493).
3 A metal-worker (Herodot. i. 51, iii. 41).
4 One of the mythical inventors of music : cf. Symp.
215 e.
6 A Thracian bard.
6 The minstrel who was forced to sing to the suitors of
Penelope (Od. i. 154, xxii. 330).
419
PLATO
2Ω. Και δρω, ω ’Ίων, καί έρχομαι γέ σοι άπο-

D φανούμενος,1 δ μοι δοκεΐ τούτο είναι., εστι γαρ
τοΰτο τέχνη μεν ουκ δν παρα σοι περί Όμηρου εύ
λέγειν, ο νυν 8η έλεγον, θεία δε δύναμις, η σε
κινεί, ώσπερ εν τη λίθω, ην Ευριπίδης μεν Μαγνητιν
ώνόμασεν, οι δε πολλοί 'Ερακλείαν. και γαρ
αυτή η λίθος ου μόνον αυτούς τούς δακτυλίους
άγει τούς σίδηρους, άλλα καί δύναμιν εντίθησι
τοΐς δακτυλίοις, ώστ αύ δύνασθαι ταύτδν τοΰτο
Ε ποιεΐν δπερ η λίθος, άλλους άγειν δακτυλίους,
ωστ ενίοτε ορμαθός μάκρος πάνυ σιδηρίων καί
δακτυλίων εζ άλληλων ηρτηται· πάσι δε τούτοις
εζ εκείνης της λίθου η δύναμις άνηρτηται. οΰτω
δε καί η Μούσα ενθέους μεν ποιεί αύτη, διά δε
των ενθεων τούτων άλλων ενθουσιαζόντων ορμα¬
θός εζαρτάται. πάντες γαρ οί τε των επών
ποιηταί οί αγαθοί ουκ εκ τέχνης άλλ' 'ένθεοι όντες
καί κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταΰτα τα καλά λέγουσι
ποιήματα, καί οί μελοποιοί οί αγαθοί ωσαύτως,
534 ώσπερ οί κορυβαντιώντες ουκ εμφρονες όντες
άρχουνται, ούτω καί οί μελοποιοί ουκ εμφρονες
όντες τα καλά μέλη ταΰτα ποιοΰσιν, άλλ’ έπειδάν
έμβώσιν εις την αρμονίαν καί εις τον ρυθμόν,
βακχεύουσι καί κατεχόμενοι, ώσπερ αί βάκχαι
άρύονται εκ των ποταμών μέλι καί γάλα κατ-
εχόμεναι, εμφρονες δε ούσαι ου, καί των μελοποιών
η φυχη τοΰτο εργάζεται, όπερ αυτοί λέγουσι.
λέγουσι γάρ δηπουθεν προς ημάς οί ποιηταί, ότι
1 άποφανούμενος Cobet: άποφαινόμενος MSS.
1 Probably referring to Magnesia in Caria, south of which

was one of the many places called Heraclea. Μαγνί/τυ λίθοι
occurs in a fragment of Euripides’ Oeneus.
420
ION
soc. I do observe it, Ion, and I am going to point

out to you what I take it to mean. For, as I was
saying just now, this is not an art in you, whereby
you speak well on Homer, but a divine power, which
moves you like that in the stone which Euripides
named a magnet,1 but most people call “ Heraclea
stone.” For this stone not only attracts iron rings,
but also imparts to them a power whereby they in
turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone,
and attract other rings ; so that sometimes there is
formed quite a long chain of bits of iron and rings,
suspended one from another ; and they all depend
for this power on that one stone. In the same
manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then
by means of these inspired persons the inspiration
spreads to others, and holds them in a connected
chain. For all the good epic poets utter all those
fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed,
and the good lyric poets likewise ; just as the
Corybantian2 worshippers do not dance when in their
senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine
songs in their senses, but when they have started on
the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and
it is under possession—as the bacchants are possessed,
and not in their senses, when they draw honey and
milk from the rivers—that the soul of the lyric
poets does the same thing, by their own report.
For the poets tell us, I believe, that the songs they
2 The Corybantes were priests of Cybele or Rhea, mother

of Zeus and other Olympian gods, and she was worshipped
with wild music and frenzied dancing which, like the bacchic
revels or orgies of women in honour of Dionysus, carried
away the participants despite and beyond themselves. Cf.
Eurip. Bacchae.
421
PLATO
B άπο κρηνών μελίρρυτων εκ Μουσών κήπων τινων

καί ναπών δρεπόμενοί τά μελρ ήμΐν φερουσίν
ώσπερ αί μέλίτταί, καί αυτοί ουτω πετάμενοί·
καί άληθη λεγονσι. κοΰφον γαρ χρήμα ποίητης
εστι καί πτηνόν καί ιερόν, καί ον πρότερον οίος
τε ποίεΐν, πριν αν ενθεός τε γενηταί καί εκφρων
καί ό νοΰς μηκετί εν αύτώ ivfj· εως δ’ αν τουτί
εχη τδ κτήμα, αδύνατο? πας ποίεΐν έστίν άνθρωπος
καί χρησμωδεΐν. ατε ουν ου τέχνη ποίοϋντες
καί πολλά λεγοντες καί καλά περί των πραγμάτων,
C ο'ισπερ συ περί Όμηρου, αλλά θεία μοίρα, τοΰτο
μόνον οΐός τε έκαστος ποίεΐν καλώς, ο η εφλ
Μούσα αυτόν ώρμησεν, ό μεν διθυράμβους, ό δε
εγκώμια, ό δε ύπορχηματα, ό δ’ επη, ό δ’ ιάμβους·
τά δ’ αλλα φαΰλος αυτών έκαστος εστιν. ον γαρ
τέχνη ταΰτα λεγουσίν, αλλά θεία δυνάμει, επεί,
εΐ περί ενός τέχνη καλώς ηπίσταντο λεγείν, καν
περί των άλλων απάντων διά ταΰτα δε ο θεός
εξαιρούμενος τούτων τον νουν τούτοι? χρητα ι
νπηρεταίς καί τοΐς χρησμωδοΐς καί τοΐς μάντεσί
D τοΐς θείοίς, Γνα ημείς οί άκοΰοντες είδώμεν, ότι
ούχ ουτοί εισιν οί ταΰτα λεγοντες ουτω πολλοΰ
άξια, οι? νοΰς μη πάρεστίν, άλλ’ ό θεός αυτός
εστιν ό λεγων, διά τούτων δε φθέγγεται προς
ημάς, μεγιστον δε τεκμηριον τω λόγω Τυννιχος
ίΛ7·\0> / Λ V\ \ \ * /
ο Λ^αλκίοευς, ος αΛΛο μεν ονοεν ττωποτ εποιησε
ποίημα, δτου τι? άν άξίώσείε μνησθηναι, τόν δό
παίωνα ον πάντες άδουσ ί, σχεδόν τι πάντων
1 A beginning of this comparison appears in Aristophanes’

422
ION
bring us are the sweets they cull from honey-dropping

founts in certain gardens and glades of the Muses-
like the bees, and winging the air as these do.1 And
what they tell is true. For a poet is a light and
winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to indite
until he has been inspired and put out of his senses,
and his mind is no longer in him : every man, whilst
he retains possession of that, is powerless to indite
a verse or chant an oracle. Seeing then that it is
not by art that they compose and utter so many fine
things about the deeds of men—as you do about
Homer—but by a divine dispensation, each is able
only to compose that to which the Muse has stirred
him, this man dithyrambs, another laudatory odes,
another dance-songs, another epic or else iambic
verse ; but each is at fault in any other kind. For
not by art do they utter these things, but by
divine influence ; since, if they had fully learnt by art
to speak on one kind of theme, they would know
how to speak on all. And for this reason God takes
away the mind of these men and uses them as his
ministers, just as he does soothsayers and godly seers,
in order that we who hear them may know that it is
not they who utter these words of great price, when
they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself
who speaks and addresses us through them. A con¬
vincing proof of what I say is the case of Tynnichus,3
the Chalcidian, who had never composed a single
poem in his life that could deserve any mention, and
then produced the paean3 which is in everyone’s
praise of the early tragedian Phrynichus (Birds 750)—“ he
sipped the fruits of ambrosial lays, ever bringing away sweet
song.-’
2 Nothing else is known of this poet.
8 A hymn in honour of a god, usually Apollo.
423
PLATO
μελών κάλλιστον, άτεχνώς, δπερ αυτός λέγει,

“ εύρημά τι Μοισάν.” εν τοντω γάρ δη μάλιστα
Ε μοι δοκεΐ ό θεδς ενδείξασθαι ημΐν, ΐνα μη δι-
στάζωμεν, δτι ούκ άνθρώπινά εστι τα καλά ταΰτα
ποιήματα ουδέ ανθρώπων, άλλα θεία και θεών, οι
δε ποιητα,ί ούδέν άλλ’ η έρμηνης είσι των θεών,
κατεχόμενοι εξ δτου αν έκαστος κατέχηται.
ταΰτα ενδεικνυμενος 6 θεδς εξεπίτηδες διά τοΰ
φαυλοτάτου ποιητοΰ τδ κάλλιστον μέλος ησεν
535 η ου δοκώ σοι άληθη λέγειν, ώ ’Ίων;
ΙΩΝ. Ναι μά τδν Αία, εμοιγε· άπτει γάρ πώς
μου τοΐς λόγοις της φυγής, ώ Ίδώκρατες, καί μοι
δοκοΰσι θεία μοίρα ημΐν παρά τών θεών ταΰτα οί
αγαθοί ποιηταί έρμηνευειν.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν υμείς αΰ οί ραφωδοί τά τών ποιη¬
τών ερμηνεύετε ;
ΙΩΝ. Και τούτο αληθές λέγεις.
2Ω. Οΰκοΰν έρμηνέων έρμηνης γίγνεσθε;
ΙΩΝ. ΤΙαντάπασί γε.
Β 2Ω. "Έχε δη μοι τάδε ειπέ, ώ "Ιων, καί μη από¬
κρυφη ο τι άν σε έρωμαι· όταν ευ ε’ίπης ’έπη καί
έκπληξης μάλιστα τούς θεωμένους, η τδν Όδυσσέα
όταν επί τδν ούδδν εφαλλόμενον αδης, εκφανη
γιγνόμενον τοΐς μνηστηρσι καί έκχέοντα τούς
οίστούς πρδ τών ποδών, η Άχιλλέα επί τδν "Έκτορα
δρμώντα, η καί τών περί Άνδρο μάχην ελεινών
τι η περί 'Έκάβην η περί Πρίαμον, τότε πότερον
έμφρων εΐ, η έξω σαυτοΰ γίγνη καί παρά τοΐς
1 Od. χχϋ. 2 foil.

2II. χχϋ. 312 foil.
424
ION
mouth, almost the finest song we have, simply—as

he says himself—“ an invention of the Muses.” For
the god, as it seems to me, intended him to be a
sign to us that we should not waver or doubt that
these fine poems are not human or the work of men,
but divine and the work of gods ; and that the poets
are merely the interpreters of the gods, according as
each is possessed by one of the heavenly powers.
To show this forth, the god of set purpose sang the
finest of songs through the meanest of poets : or do
you not think my statement true, Ion ?
ion. Yes, upon my word, I do : for you somehow
touch my soul with your words, Socrates, and I be¬

lieve it is by divine dispensation that good poets
interpret to us these utterances of the gods.
soc. And you rhapsodes, for your part, interpret
the utterances of the poets ?
ion. Again your words are true.
soc. And so you act as interpreters of interpreters ?
ion. Precisely.
soc. Stop now and tell me, Ion, without reserve

what I may choose to ask you : when you give a good
recitation and specially thrill your audience, either
with the lay of Odysseus 1 leaping forth on to the
threshold, revealing himself to the suitors and pouring
out the arrows before his feet, or of Achilles 2 dashing
at Hector, or some part of the sad story of Andro¬
mache 3 or of Hecuba,4 or of Priam,5 are you then in
your senses, or are you carried out of yourself, and
does your soul in an ecstasy suppose herself to be
3 II. vi. 370-502 ; xxii. 437-515.
4 II. xxii. 430-36 ; xxiv. 747-59.
6 II. xxii. 408-28 ; xxiv. 144-717.
425
PLATO
0 πράγμασιν ο’ίεταί σου είναι ή ψυχή οΐς λεγεις

ενθουσιάζουσα, ή iv 'Ιθάκη οΰσιν ή εν Τροία η
όπως αν καί τά επη εχη;
ΙΩΝ. Ώ? εναργες μοι τούτο, ώ Ίόώκρατες, το
τεκμηρίου είπες· ου γάρ σε άποκρυψάμενος ερω.
εγώ γάρ όταν ελεεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων εμπίπλαν-
ταί μου οί οφθαλμοί· όταν τε φοβερόν η δεινόν,
όρθαΐ αί τρίχες ΐστανται υπό φόβου και η καρδια
πήδα.
L 2Ω. Τι οΰν; φώμεν, ώ ’Ίων, εμφρονα είναι
τότε τοΰτον τον άνθρωπον, δς αν κεκοσμημενος
εσθήτι ποικίλη και χρυσοΐς στεφάνοις κλα.ίη τ
εν θυσίαις και εορταΐς, μηδέν άπολωλεκώς τούτων,
η φοβηται πλέον η εν δισμυρίοις άνθρώποις εστηκώς
φιλίοις, μηδενός άποδύοντος η άδικοΰντος;
ΙΩΝ. Ου μά τον Δια, οΰ πάνυ, ω Έιώκρατες, ώς
γε τάληθες ειρησθαι.
2Ω. Οίσθα οΰν ότι και των θεατών τούς πολλούς
τ αυτά ταΰτα υμείς εργάζεσθε;
Ε ΙΩΝ. Και μάλα καλώς οΐδα· καθορώ γάρ εκάστοτε
αυτούς άνωθεν από του βήματος κλαίοντάς τε και
δεινόν εμβλεποντας καί συνθαμβοΰντας τοΐς λεγο-
μενοις. δει γάρ με καί σφόδρ' αύτοΐς τον νοΰν
προσεχειν ώς εάν μεν κλαίοντας αύτούς καθίσω,
αυτός γελάσομαι αργύρων λαμβάνων, εάν δε γε¬
λώντας, αυτός κλαύσομαι αργύρων άπολλύς.
2Ω. Οίσθα οΰν οτι οΰτός εστιν ό θεατής των
δακτυλίων 6 έσχατος, ών εγώ ελεγον υπό της
Ίάρακλειώτιδος λίθου απ' άλληλων την δύναμιν
536 λαμβάνειν; ό δε μέσος σύ ό ραψωδός καί υποκριτής,
ό δε πρώτος αυτός ό ποιητής· ό δε θεός διά πάντων
τούτων ελκει τήν ψυχήν οποί αν βούληται των
426
ION
among the scenes you are describing, whether they

be in Ithaca, or in Troy, or as the poems may chance
to place them ?
ion. How vivid to me, Socrates, is this part of
your proof! For I will tell you without reserve :
when I relate a tale of woe, my eyes are filled
with tears ; and when it is of fear or awe, my hair
stands on end with terror, and my heart leaps.
soc. Well now, are we to say, Ion, that such a
person is in his senses at that moment,—when in all
the adornment of elegant attire and golden crowns
he weeps at sacrifice or festival, having been despoiled
of none of his finery ; or shows fear as he stands
before more than twenty thousand friendly people,
none of whom is stripping or injuring him ?
ion. No, on my word, not at all, Socrates, to tell
the strict truth.
soc. And are you aware that you rhapsodes pro¬
duce these same effects on most of the spectators
also ?
ion. Yes, very fully aware : for I look down upon
them from the platform and see them at such mo¬
ments crying and turning awestruck eyes upon me
and yielding to the amazement of my tale. For I
have to pay the closest attention to them ; since, if
I set them crying, I shall laugh myself because of
the money I take, but if they laugh, I myself shall
cry because of the money I lose.
soc. And are you aware that your spectator is the
last of the rings which I spoke of as receiving from
each other the power transmitted from the Heraclean
lodestone ? You, the rhapsode and actor, are the
middle ring ; the poet himself is the first ; but it is
the god who through the whole series draws the
427
PLATO
ανθρώπων, άνακρεμαννύς εξ άλληλίον την δυναμιν.

καί ώσπερ εκ της λίθου εκείνης ορμαθός πάμπολυς
εξη ρτηται χορευτών τε καί διδασκάλων καί ύπο-
διδασκάλων, εκ πλαγίου εξηρτημενων των της
λίουσης εκκρεμαμενων δακτυλίων. καί 6 μεν
των ποιητών εξ άλλης Μούσης, 6 δε εξ άλλης
Β ϊξηρτηται· όνομάζομεν δε αυτό κατεχεται· τδ δε
ε’στι παραπλήσιον· εχεται γάρ· εκ δε τούτων των
πρώτων δακτυλίων, των ποιητών, άλλοι εξ άλλου
αΰ ηρτημενοι είσί καί ενθουσιάζουσιν, οί μεν εξ
Όρφεως, οί δε εκ Μουσαίου· οί δε πολλοί εξ
Όμηρου κατεχονταί τε καί εχονται. ών συ, ώ
’Ίων, εις εΐ καί κατεχη εξ Όμηρου, καί επειδάν
μεν τις άλλου του ποιητοΰ άδη, καθεύδεις τε καί
απορείς δ τι λεγης, επειδάν δε τουτου τοϋ ποιητοΰ
φθεγξηταί τις μέλος, ευθύς εγρηγορας καί όρχείταί
G σου η φυχη καί ευπορείς δ τι λεγης· ου γάρ τέχνη
ουο 67τιστημτ) περί υμηρου Λβγβις α λεγεις, αΛΛα
θεία μοίρα καί κατοκωχη· ώσπερ οί κορυβαντιών-
τες εκείνου μόνου αισθάνονται, του μέλους δξεως,
δ αν η τοΰ θεοΰ εξ δτου αν κατεχωνται, καί εις
εκεΐνο τό μέλος καί σχημάτων καί ρημάτων εύ-
ποροΰσι, τών δε άλλων ου φροντίζουσιν ουτω καί
συ, ώ ’Ίων, περί μεν Όμηρου δταν τι? μντ]σθη,
ευπορείς, περί δε τών άλλων απορείς· τούτου δ’
Ο >
cart το αίτιον, ο μ βρωτας, οι ο τι συ περί μεν
\ \ >f C/5> r-s f/ \ \ \
Όμηρου ευπορείς, περί δε τών άλλων ου, δτι ου

τέχνη άλλα θεία μοίρα Όμηρου δειυδ? εΐ επαινετής.
ΙΩΝ. Συ μεν ευ λεγεις, ώ Έώκρατες· θαυμάζοιμι
μεντ αν ει ούτως ευ ε’ίποις, ώστε με άναπείσαι,
428
ION
souls of men whithersoever he pleases, making the

power of one depend on the other. And, just as
from the magnet, there is a mighty chain of choric
performers and masters and under-masters suspended
by side-connexions from the rings that hang down
from the Muse. One poet is suspended from one
Muse, another from another : the word we use for
it is “ possessed,” but it is much the same thing, for
he is held. And from these first rings—the poets—
are suspended various others, which are thus inspired,
some by Orpheus and others by Musaeus 1 ; but the
majority are possessed and held by Homer. Of
whom you, Ion, are one, and are possessed by Homer ;
and so, when anyone recites the work of another
poet, you go to sleep and are at a loss what to say ;
but when some one utters a strain of your poet, you
wake up at once, and your soul dances, and you have
plenty to say : for it is not by art or knowledge about
Homer that you say what you say, but by divine dis¬
pensation and possession ; just as the Corybantian
worshippers are keenly sensible of that strain alone
which belongs to the god whose possession is on
them, and have plenty of gestures and phrases for
that tune, but dp not heed any other. And so you,
Ion, when the subject of Homer is mentioned, have
plenty to say, but nothing on any of the others.
And when you ask me the reason why you can speak
at large on Homer but not on the rest, I tell you it
is because your skill in praising Homer comes not
by art, but by divine dispensation.
ion. Well spoken, I grant you, Socrates : but still
I shall be surprised if you can speak well enough to
1 A legendary bard to whom certain oracular verses were
ascribed.
p 429
PLATO
ώς εγώ κατεχόμενος καί μαινόμενος "Ομηρον

επαινώ, οΐμαι δε ούδ' αν σοί δόξαιμι, εί μου
άκουσαις λεγοντος περί 'Ομήρου.
2Ω. Και μην εθελω γε άκοΰσαι, ου μεντοι
Ε πρότερον πριν αν μοι άποκρίνη τάδε· ών 'Ομηρος
λεγει περί τίνος ευ λεγεις; ου γάρ δήπου περί
απάντων γε.
ΙΩΝ. Ευ ϊσθι, ώ Σώκρατες, περί ούδενός οτου
V
ου.
2Ω. Ου δήπου καί περί τούτων, ών σύ μεν
τυγχάνεις ούκ είδώς, "Ομηρος δε λεγει.
ΙΩΝ. Και ταΰτα ποΐά εστιν, ά "Ομηρος μεν
Aeyeiy eyoo oe ουκ otba;
537 2Ω. Ου καί περί τεχνών μεντοι λεγει πολλαχοΰ
"Ομηρος καί πολλά; οΐον καί περί ήνιοχείας—εάν
μνησθώ τα επη, εγώ σοι φράσω.
ΙΩΝ. ΆΛΑ’ εγώ ερα>· εγώ γάρ μεμνημαι.
2Ω. Είπε δή μοι ά λεγει Νεστώ/) Άντιλόχω
τώ υίεΐ, παραινών εύλαβηθήναι περί την καμπήν
εν τή ιπποδρομία τή επί ίΐατρόκλω.
ΙΩΝ. Κλινθήναι δε, φησί, καί αυτός εϋξεστω

ενί δίφρω
ήκ επ' αριστερά το αν άτάρ τον δεξιόν ίππον
Β κενσαι όμοκλήσας, εΐξαί τε οί ηνία χερσίν.
εν νυσση δε τοι ίππος αριστερός εγχριμφθήτω,
ώς αν τοι πλήμνη γε δοάσσεται άκρον ίκεσθαι
κυκλου ποιητοϊο’ λίθου δ’ άλεασθαι επαυρεΐν.
2Ω. Άρκεΐ. ταΰτα δή, ώ "Ιων, τά επη είτε

C ορθώς λεγει "Ομηρος είτε μη, πότερος άν γνοίη
άμεινον, ιατρός ή ηνίοχος;
430
ION
convince me that I am possessed and mad when I

praise Homer. Nor can I think you would believe
it of me yourself, if you heard me speaking about
him.
soc. I declare I am quite willing to hear you, but
not until you have first answered me this : on what
thing in Homer’s story do you speak well ? Not
on all of them, I presume.
ion. I assure you, Socrates, on all without a single
exception.
soc. Not, of course, including those things of
which you have in fact no knowledge, but which
Homer tells.
ion. And what sort of things are they, which
Homer tells, but of which I have no knowledge ?
soc. Why, does not Homer speak a good deal
about arts, in a good many places ? For instance,
about chariot-driving : if I can recall the lines, I will
quote them to you.
ion. No, I will recite them, for I can remember.
soc. Tell me then what Nestor says to his son
Antilochus, advising him to be careful about the
turning-post in the horse-race in honour of Patroelus.1
ion. Bend thyself in the polished car slightly to the left
of them ; 2 and call to the right-hand horse and goad him on,
while your hand slackens his reins. And at the post let
your left-hand horse swerve close, so that the nave of the
well-wrought wheel may seem to come up to the edge of the
stone, which yet avoid to touch.
soc. Enough. Now, Ion, will a doctor or a
charioteer be the better judge whether Homer
speaks correctly or not in these lines ?
1 II. xxiii. 335 foil.
2 i.e. one of the two white stones, set up at each end of
the course, which had been mentioned six lines before.
431
PLATO
ΙΩΝ. 'Ηνίοχο? δήπου.

2Ω. Π έτερονon τέχνην ταυτήν εχει η κατ'
άλλο τι;
ΙΩΝ. 0ΰκ, αλΧ οτι τέχνην.
2Ω. 0 ύκοΰν έκαστη των τεχνών άποδέδοτα ι
τι ύπο του θεοΰ 'έργον οια τε είναι γιγνώσκειν;
ού γάρ που α κυβερνητική γιγνώσκομεν, γνωσόμεθα
και ιατρική.
ΙΩΝ. Ου δητα.
2Ω. Ουδέ γε α ιατρική, ταυτα και τεκτονική.
D 2Ω. Ο ύκοΰν ουτω και κα τα πασών των τεχνών,
α τη έτέρα τέχνη γιγνώσκομεν, ού γνωσόμεθα τη
έτέρα; τάδε δέ μοι πρότερον τούτου άπόκριναι·
την μεν έτέραν φης είναι τινα τέχνην, την δ’ έτέραν;
ΙΩΝ. Ναι.
2Ω. τΑρα ώσπερ εγώ, τεκμαιρόμενος, όταν η
μεν ετέρων πραγμάτων η επιστήμη, η δ’ ετέρων,
οϋτω καλώ την μεν άλλην, την δέ άλλην τέχνην,
ούτω και συ;
Ε ιων. Ναι.
2Ω. Et γάρ που των αυτών πραγμάτων επι¬
στήμη εΐη τις, τί άν την μεν έτέραν φαΐμεν είναι,
την δ’ έτέραν, οπότε γε ταύτά εΐη είδέναι απ’
άμφοτέρων; ώσπερ εγώ τε γιγνώσκω ότι πέντε
εισιν ουτοι οί δάκτυλοι, και συ, ώσπερ εγώ, περ'ι
τούτων ταύτά γιγνώσκεις· και εϊ σε εγώ έροίμην,
εί τη αύτή τέχνη γιγνώσκομεν τη αριθμητική τα
αυτά εγώ τε και συ, ή άλλη, φαίης άν δήπου τη
αύτή.
ΙΩΝ. Ναι.
538 2Ω. "Ο τοίνυν άρτι εμελλον ερήσεσθαί σε,
432
ION
ion. A charioteer, of course.

soc. Because he has this art, or for some other
reason ?
ion. No, because it is his art.
soc. And to every art has been apportioned by
God a power of knowing a particular business ? For
I take it that what we know by the art of piloting
we cannot also know by that of medicine.
ion. No, to be sure.
soc. And what we know by medicine, we cannot
by carpentry also ?
ion. No, indeed.
soc. And this rule holds for all the arts, that what
we know by one of them we cannot know by another ?
But before you answer that, just tell me this : do
you agree that one art is of one sort, and another
of another ?
ion. Yes.
soc. Do you argue this as I do, and call one art
different from another when one is a knowledge of
one kind of thing, and another a knowledge of
another kind ?
ion. Yes.
soc. Since, I suppose, if it were a knowledge of
the same things—how could we say that one was
different from another, when both could give us the
same knowledge ? Just as I know that there are
five of these fingers, and you equally know the same
fact about them ; and if I should ask you whether
both you and I know this same fact by the same
art of numeration, or by different arts, you would
reply, I presume, that it was by the same ?
ion. Yes.
soc. Then tell me now, what I was just going to
433
PLATO
νυνί είπε, ει κατά, πασών των τεχνών ούτω σοι

δοκεΐ, τη μεν αυτί) τέχνη τα αυτά αναγκαίου
elvat γιγνώσκειν, τη δ’ ετερα μη τά αυτά, άλλ’
είπερ άλλη εστίν, αναγκαίου καί ετερα γιγνώσκειν.
ΙΩΝ. Ουτω μοι δοκεΐ, ώ Σώκρατες.
2η. Ούκοΰν ο στις αν μη εχη τινά τέχνην, ταυ-
της της τέχνης τά λεγάμενα η πραττόμενα καλώς
γιγνώσκειν ούχ οΐός τ’ εσται;
Β ΙΩΝ. Άληθη λεγεις.
2η. ΥΙότερον οΰν περί τών επών ών είπες, είτε
καλώς λεγει ”Ομηρος είτε μη, συ κάλλιον γνώση
η ηνίοχος;
ΙΩΝ. Ηνίοχο?.
2Ω. 'Ραφωδος γάρ που εΐ, άλλ’ ούχ ηνίοχος.
ΙΩΝ. Nat.
2Ω. 'Η δε ραφωδικη τέχνη ετάρα εστί της
ηνιοχικης;
ΙΩΝ. Nat.
2Ω. Et άρα erepa, περί ετερων καί επιστήμη
πραγμάτων εστίν.
ΙΩΝ.
Nat.
Τι δε δη, όταν ”Ομηρος λεγη, ώς τετρω-
2Ω.
C μένω τώ Μαχάονι 'Υύκαμήδη η NeVropos· παλλακη
κυκεώνα πίνειν δίδωσι; καί λεγει πως ούτως·
οίνω Πραμνεάρ, φησίν, επί δ’ atyetov κνη τυρόν

κνηστι χαλκέίη · παρά δε κρόμυον ποτώ οφον
ταΰτα είτε ορθώς λεγει "Ομηρος είτε μη, πάτερου

ιατρικής εστί διαγνώναι καλώς η ραφωδικης;
1 II. χϊ. 639-40. The quotation, as Plato indicates, is not

accurate. Machaon was the son of Asclepius and physician
to the Greeks at Troy. Nothing is known of “ Pramneian
434
ION
ask you, whether you think this rule holds for all the
arts—that by the same art we must know the same
things, and by a different art things that are not the
same ; but if the art is other, the things we know
by it must be different also.
ion. I think it is so, Socrates,
soc. Then he who has not a particular art will be
incapable of knowing aright the words or works of
that art ?
ion. True.
soc. Then will you or a charioteer be the better
judge of whether Homer speaks well or not in the
lines that you quoted ?
ion. A charioteer.
soc. Because, I suppose, you are a rhapsode and
not a charioteer.
ion. Yes.
soc. And the rhapsode’s art is different from the
charioteer’s ?
ion. Yes.
soc. Then if it is different, it is also a knowledge
of different things.
ion. Yes.
soc. Now, what of the passage where Homer
tells how Hecamede, Nestor’s concubine, gives the
wounded Machaon a posset ? His words are some¬
thing like this : 1
Of Pramneian wine it was, and therein she grated cheese
of goat’s milk with a grater of bronze ; and thereby an
onion as a relish for drink.
Is it for the doctor’s or the rhapsode’s art to discern
aright whether Homer speaks correctly here or not ?
wine.” except that it was “ thick and nutritious ” (Athen.
i. 10 b).
435
PLATO
ΙΩΝ. Ιατρικής.
2Π. It 0 €, όταν Λβγτ] Uμηρός*
D η 8e μολνβδαίνη ίκελη ες βυσσον ίκανεν,

η re κατ’ άγραόλοιο βοός κεράς εμμεμαυΐα
ερχεται ώμηστησι μετ’ ίχθυσι πημα φερουσα·
ταΰτα πότερον φώμεν αλιευτικής είναι τέχνης

μάλλον κριναι η ραφωδικης, άττα λεγει καί είτε
καλώς είτε μη;
ΙΩΝ. Δηλον δη, ώ Σώκρατες, δτι αλιευτικής.
2Ω. Σ,κεφαι δη, σοΰ ερομενου, εί εροιό με·
Ε “ επειδή τοίνυν, ώ Σώκρατες, τούτων των τεχνών
εν Όμηρω ευρίσκεις ά προσηκει εκάστη διακρίνειν,
ίθι μοι εξευρε καί τα τοΰ αάντεώς τε καί μαντικής,
ποΐά εστιν ά προσηκει αύτώ οΐω τ’ είναι διαγιγνώ-
σκειν, είτε εύ είτε κακώς πεποίηται”—σκεφαι
ώς ραδίως τε καί άληθη εγώ σοι άποκρινοΰμαι.
πολλαχοΰ μεν γάρ καί εν ’Οδύσσεια λεγει, οΐον
καί ά ό τών Μελαμττοδιδών λεγει μάντις προς τους
μνηστήρας, θεοκλνμενος·
539 δαιμόνιοι, τί κακόν τόδε πάσχετε; ννκτί μεν ΰμεων

είλυαται κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νερθε τε γυΐα,
οίμωγη δε δε'δηε, δεδάκρυνται δε παρειαί·
ειδώλων τε πλέον πρόθυρον, πλείη δε καί αύλη
ιεμενων ερεβόσδε υπό ζόφον ηελιος δε
ούρανοΰ εζαπόλωλε, κακή δ’ επιδεδρομεν άχλυς·
Β πολλαχοΰ δε καί εν Ίλιάδι, οίον καί επί τειχομαχία·

λεγει γάρ καί ενταύθα
1 II. xxiv. 80-82. The nature of this device is still in

dispute. Plutarch (Be sollertia animal. 977) supports
Aristotle’s view that the horn acted as a sheath to protect
the line from being bitten through by the fish.
436 v
ION
ion. For the doctor’s.

soc. Well now, when Homer says :
And she passed to the bottom like a plummet1 which, set
on a horn from an ox of the field, goes in haste to bring
mischief among the ravenous fishes.
are we to say it is for the fisherman’s or for the

rhapsode’s art to decide what he means by this, and
whether it is rightly or wrongly spoken ?
ion. Clearly, Socrates, for the fisherman’s art.
soc. Then please observe : suppose you were
questioning me and should ask: “ Since therefore,
Socrates, you find it is for these several arts to
appraise the passages of Homer that belong to each,
be so good as to make out those also that are for
the seer and the seer’s art, and show me the sort
of passages that come under his ability to distinguish
whether they are well or ill done ” ; observe how
easily and truly I shall answer you. For he has
many passages, both in the Odyssey, as for instance
the words of Theoclymenus, the seer of the line of
Melampus, to the suitors : 2
Hapless men, what bane is this afflicts you ? Your heads
and faces and limbs below are shrouded in night, and wailing
is enkindled, and cheeks are wet with tears : of ghosts the
porch is full, and the court full of them also, hastening hell-
wards ’neath the gloom ; and the sun is perished out of
heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad ;
and there are many passages in the Iliad also, as in

the fight at the rampart,3 where he says:
2 Od. xx. 351-57. Melampus, the ancestor of Theo¬

clymenus (cf. Od. xv. 225-56), was supposed to have been
the first mortal who possessed the gift of prophecy.
3 11. xii. 200-7.
P 2 437
PLATO
όρνις γάρ σφιν επήλθε περησόμεναι μεμαωσιν,

αίετός υψιπετής, επ' αριστερά, λαόν εόργων,
0 φοινήεντα δράκοντα φόρων όνύχεσσι πόλωρον,
ζωόν, ετ άσπαίροντα· καί ουπω λήθετο χάρμης.
κόψε γάρ αυτόν εχοντα κατά στήθος παρά δειρήν
ίόνωοεις οττισω, ο ο αττο euev ηκβ χαμαί,ε
άλγήσας όδννησι, μόσω δ’ εγκάββαλ’ ομιλώ’
D αυτός δε κλάγξας πετετο πνοιής ανόμοιο.
ταΰτα ψήσω και τά τοιαΰτα τω μάντει προσήκειν

και σκοπεΐν και κρίνειν.
ΙΩΝ. Άλrfirj γε σύ λόγων, ώ Έώκρατες.
2Ω. Και συ γε, ώ "Ιων, αληθή ταΰτα λόγεις.
lul οη καί συ βμοί, ωσττ€ρ εγω σοί εξελεξα και εξ
Οδύσσειας και εζ Ίλιάδο? όποια τοΰ μάντεως εστι
Ε και οποΐα τοΰ ίατροΰ και όποια τοΰ άλιεως, οντω
και σύ εμοι εκλεζον, επειδή καί εμπειρότερος εΐ
εμοΰ των 'Ομήρου, όποια τοΰ ραψωδού εστίν, ώ
’Ίων, και τής τέχνης τής ραψωδικής, ά τω ραψωδω
προσήκει και σκο πεισθαι και διακρίνειν παρά
τούς άλλους ανθρώπους.
ΙΩΝ. ’Eyeu μεν φημι, ώ Έώκρατες, άπαντα.
2Ω. Ου σύ γε φής,1 ώ ’Ίων, άπαντα’ ή ούτως
επιλήσμων εΐ; καϊτοί ούκ αν πρόποι γε επι-
λήσμονα είναι ραψωδόν άνδρα.
540 ΙΩΝ. Τι δε δή επιλανθάνομαι;
2Ω. Ου μεμνησαι ότι εφησθα την ραψωδικήν
τέχνην ετεραν είναι τής ήνιοχικής;
ΙΩΝ. Μεμνημαι.
2Ω. Ούκοΰν και ετεραν οΰσαν ετερα γνώσεσθαι
ώμολόγεις ;
1 φίβ Baiter: ίφ·ηs mss.

438
ION
For as they were eager to pass over, a bird had crossed

them, an eagle of lofty flight, pressing the host at the left
hand, and bearing a blood-red monster of a snake, alive
and still struggling ; nor had it yet unlearnt the lust of
battle. For bending back it smote its captor on the breast
by the neck, and the bird in the bitterness of pain cast it
away to the ground, and dropped it down in the midst of
the throng; and then with a cry flew off on the wafting
winds.
This passage, and others of the sort, are those that
I should say the seer has to examine and judge.
ion. And you speak the truth, Socrates,
soc. And so do you, Ion, in saying that. Now
you must do as I did, and in return for my picking
out from the Odyssey and the Iliad the kinds of
passage that belong severally to the seer, the doctor,
and the fisherman, you have now to pick out for me
—since you are so much more versed in Homer than
I—the kinds which belong to the rhapsode, Ion, and
the rhapsode’s art, and which he should be able to
consider and distinguish beyond the rest of mankind.
ion. What I say, Socrates, is—“ all passages.”
soc. Surely you do not say “ all,” Ion ! Can you
be so forgetful ? And yet forgetfulness wrould ill
become a rhapsode.
ion. Why, how am I forgetting ?
soc. Do you not remember that you said that the
art of the rhapsode wras different from that of the
charioteer ?
ion. I remember.
soc. And you also admitted that, being different,
it would know different things ?
439
PLATO
ΙΩΝ. Nat.
2Ω. Ούκ άρα πάντα γε γνώσεται η ραφωδική
κατά τον σόν λόγον, ουδέ ό ραφωδός.
ΙΩΝ. Πλη'ν ye ίσως τα τοιαΰτα, ώ Σ,ώκρατες.
Β 2Ω. Τά τοιαΰτα δε λέγεις πλην τα των άλλων
τεχνών σχεδόν τι· άλλα ποια δη γνώσεται, επειδή
ούχ άπαντα;
ΙΩΝ. Ά πρέπει, οΐμαι έγωγε, άνδρι ειπεΐν και
όποια γυναικί, και όποια δονλω και όποια ελευθέριο,
κα'ι όποια άρχομένω και όποια άρχοντι.
2Ω. Άρ’ όποια άρχοντι, λέγεις, εν θαλάττη
χειμαζομένου πλοίου πρέπει ειπεΐν, ό ραφωδός
γνώσεται κάλλιον ή ό κυβερνήτης;
ΙΩΝ. Οΰκ, άλλα ό κυβερνήτης τοΰτό γε.
C 2Ω. ΆΛΑ’ όποια άρχοντι κάμνοντος πρέπει
ειπεΐν, ό ραφωδός γνώσεται κάλλιον η ό ιατρός;
ΙΩΝ. Ουδέ τούτο.
2Ω. Άλλ’ οΐα δουλω πρέπει, λέγεις;
ιων. Ναι.
2Ω. Οΐον βουκόλω λέγεις δουλιρ ά πρέπει ειπεΐν
άγριαινουσών βοών παραμυθουμένω,ό ραφωδός γνώ-
σεται, άλλ’ ούχ ό βουκόλος;
2Ω. ’Αλλ’ ota γυναικί πρέποντά έστιν ειπεΐν
ταλασιουργώ περί ερίων εργασίας;
D ιων. Ου.
2Ω. Άλλ’ οΐα άνδρι πρέπει ειπεΐν γνώσεται
στρατηγώ στρατιώταις παραινοΰντι;
440
ION
ion. Yes.
soc. Then by your own account the rhapsode’s
art cannot know everything, nor the rhapsode either.
ion. Let us say, everything except those in¬
stances, Socrates.
soc. By “ those instances ” you imply the sub¬
jects of practically all the other arts. Well, as he
does not know all of them, which kinds will he know ?
ion. Those things, I imagine, that it befits a man
to say, and the sort of thing that a woman should
say ; the sort for a slave and the sort for a freeman ;
and the sort for a subject or for a ruler.
soc. Do you mean that the rhapsode will know
better than the pilot what sort of thing a ruler of a
storm-tossed vessel at sea should say ?
ion. No, the pilot knows better in that case,
soc. Well, will the rhapsode know better than the
doctor what sort of thing a ruler of a sick man should
say ?
ion. Not in that case either.
soc. But he wall know the sort for a slave, you
say ?
ion. Yes.
soc. For instance, if the slave is a cowherd, you
say the rhapsode will know what the other should
say to pacify his cows when they get fierce, but the
cowherd will not ?
ion. That is not so.
soc. Well, the sort of thing that a woman ought
to say—a spinning-woman—about the working of
wool ?
ion. No.
soc But he will know what a man should say,
when he is a general exhorting his men ?
441
PLATO
ΙΩΝ. Nat, τά τοιαύτα γνώσεται ό ραφωδός.

2Ω. Τί δε; η ραφωδικη τέχνη στρατηγική
εστιν;
ΙΩΝ. Γ νοίην γοΰν άν εγωγε ο Ια στρατηγόν
πρεπει ειπεΐν.
2Ω. ’Ίσως γαρ εΐ και στρατηγικός, "Ιων. και
γαρ ει ετύγχανες ιππικός ών άμα και κιθαριστικός,
εγνως αν ίππους εύ και κακώς ίππαζομένους·
αλλ 66 σ βγω ηρομην, ποτβρα όη τβχντ), ω
’Ίων, γιγνώσκεις τούς ευ ίππαζο μένους ίππους;
η ιππεύς οι η η κιθαριστής; ” τί αν μοι άττεκρίνω;
ΙΩΝ. τΗι ιππεύς, εγωγ’ αν.
2Ω. Ούκοϋν ει καί τούς ευ κιθαρίζοντας δι-
εγίγναίσκες, ώμολόγεις αν, η κιθαριστής ει, ταύτη
διαγιγνώσκειν, άλλ’ ούχ η ιππεύς.
ιων. Nat.
2Ω. Επειδή δε τα στρατιωτικό γιγνώσκεις,
πότερον η στρατηγικός εΐ γιγνώσκεις η η ραφωδός
αγαθός;
ΙΩΝ. Ούδεν εμοιγε δοκεΐ διαφερειν.
541 2Ω. Πώ?; ούδεν λέγεις διαφερειν; μίαν λεγεις
τέχνην είναι την ραφωδικην καί στρατηγικήν η
δύο;
ΙΩΝ. Μία εμοιγε δοκεΐ.
2Ω. "Οστι? αρα αγαθός ραφωδός εστιν, οΰτος
καί αγαθός στρατηγός τυγχάνει ών;
ΙΩΝ. Μάλιστα, ώ Ίόώκρατες.
2Ω. Ο ύκοϋν καί δστις αγαθός στρατηγός τυγ¬
χάνει ών, αγαθός καί ραφιρδός εστιν.
ΙΩΝ. Ούκ αύ μοι δοκεΐ τούτο.
442
ION
ion Yes, that sort of thing the rhapsode will

know.
soc. Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art
of the general ?
ion. I, at any rate, should know what a general
ought to say.
soc. Yes, since I daresay you are good at general¬
ship also, Ion. For in fact, if you happened to have
skill in horsemanship as well as in the lyre, you would
know when horses were well or ill managed : but
if I asked you, “ By which art is it, Ion, that you
know that horses are being well managed, by your
skill as a horseman, or as a player of the lyre ? ”
what would your answer be ?
ion. I should say, by my skill as a horseman,
soc. And if again you were distinguishing the
good lyre-players, you would admit that you dis¬
tinguished by your skill in the lyre, and not by your
skill as a horseman.
ion. Yes.
soc. And when you judge of military matters, do
you judge as having skill in generalship, or as a good
rhapsode ?
ion. To my mind, there is no difference,
soc. What, no difference, do you say ? Do you
mean that the art of the rhapsode and the general
is one, not two ?
ion. It is one, to my mind.
soc. So that anyone who is a good rhapsode is
also, in fact, a good general ?
ion. Certainly, Socrates.
soc. And again, anyone who happens to be a
good general is also a good rhapsode.
ion. No ; there I do not agree.
443
PLATO
2Ω. ΆΛΛ’ εκείνο μην δοκεΐ σοι, όστις ye αγαθός

Β ραφωδός, καί στρατηγός αγαθός εΐναι;
ιων. Π aw ye.
2Ω. 0υκοΰν συ των 'Ελλήνων άριστος ραφιρδός
€t/
ΙΩΝ. Πολύ ye, ώ Ίόώκρατες.
2Ω. ΤΗ και στρατηγός, ώ ’Ίων, των Ελλήνων
άριστος el;
ΙΩΝ. Εσ 'ίσθί, ω "Σώκρατες· καί ταΰτά ye εκ
των Όμηρου μαθών.
2Ω. Τί δη ποτ οΰν προς των θεών, ω ’Ία>ν,
άμφότερα αρίστος ών των Ελλήνων, καί στρατηγός
καί ραφίρδός, ραφωδεΐς μεν περιιών τοΐς "Ελλησι,
C στρατηγεΐς δ’ ον; ή ραφωδοϋ μεν δοκ€Ϊ σοι
χρυσώ στεφάνω εστεφανωμενου πολλή χρεία elvai
τοΐς "Έιλλησι, στρατηγού δε ουδεμία;
ΙΩΝ. Ή μεν γαρ ήμετερα, ώ Σώκρατες, πόλις
άρχεται υπό υμών καί στρατηγεΐται καί ουδεν
δεΐται στρατηγού, ή δό ύμετερα καί ή Λακεδαι¬
μόνια>ν ούκ αν με έλοιτο στρατηγόν αυτοί γάρ
ο'ίεσθε Ικανοί είναι.
2Ω. '’Ώ βέλτιστε ’Ίων, ’Απολλόδωρον ού γιγνώ-
σκεις τον Κυζικηνόν;
ΙΩΝ. Ποιον τούτον;
2Ω. "Ον ’Αθηναίοι πολλάκις εαυτών στρατηγόν
D ήρηνται ξένον όντα· καί Φανό σθένη τον ’Άνδριον
καί Ήρακλείδην τον Κλαζομε'νιον, ονς ή'δε ή
πόλις ξένους όντας, ενδειξαμενους ότι άξιοι λόγου
εισί, καί εις στρατηγίας καί εις τάς άλλας άρχάς
άγει· “Ιαινα δ’ αρα τον Έφεσιον ούχ αίρήσεται
στρατηγόν καί τιμήσει, εάν δοκή άξιος λόγου
είναι; τί δε, ουκ ’Αθηναίοι μεν εστε οι Όφεσιοι
414
ION
soc. But still you agree that anyone who is a

good rhapsode is also a good general ?
ion. To be sure.
soc. And you are the best rhapsode in Greece ?
ion. Far the best, Socrates.
soc. Are you also, Ion, the best general in Greece ?
ion. Be sure of it, Socrates ; and that I owe to
my study of Homer.
soc. Then how, in Heaven’s name, can it be, Ion,
that you, who are both the best general and the best
rhapsode in Greece, go about performing as a
rhapsode to the Greeks, but not as a general ? Or
do you suppose that the Greeks feel a great need
of a rhapsode in the glory of his golden crown, but
of a general none at all ?
ion. It is because my city,1 Socrates, is under the
rule and generalship of your people, and is not in
want of a general ; whilst you and Sparta would not
choose me as a general, since you think you manage
well enough for yourselves.
soc. My excellent Ion, you are acquainted with
Apollodorus 2 of Cyzicus, are you not ?
ion. What might he be ?
soc. A man whom the Athenians have often
chosen as their general, though a foreigner ; and
Phanosthenes3 of Andros, and Heracleides2 of
Clazomenae, whom my city invests with the high
command and other offices although they are
foreigners, because they have proved themselves to
be competent. And will she not choose Ion of
Ephesus as her general, and honour him, if he shows
himself competent ? Why, you Ephesians are by
1 Ephesus. 2 Nothing else is known of this general.
3 Captured the Thurian admiral Dorieus, 407 b.c.
445
PLATO
τό άρχαίον, καί η ’Έφεσος ούδεμιάς ελάττων

Ε πόλεως; άλλα σύ γάρ, ώ ’Ίων, εί μεν άληθη λεγεις,
ως τέχνη και επιστήμη οίός τε εί "Ομηρον επαινεΐν,
αδικείς, όστις εμοί υποσχόμενος, ώς πολλά καί
καλά περί Όμηρου επίστασαι, καί φάσκων επι-
δείξειν, εξαπατάς με καί πολλοΰ δεις επιδειξαι,
ός γε ούδε άττα εστί ταΰτα, περί ών δεινός εΐ,
εθελεις είπεΐν, πάλαι εμοϋ λιπαροΰντος, άλλ{
άτεχνως ώσπερ ο ΪΙρωτεύς παντοδαπός γίγνη
στρεφόμενος άνω καί κάτω, εως τελευτών διαφυγών
με στρατηγός άνεφάνης, ΐνα μη επίδειξης ώς
542 δεινός εΐ την περί Όμηρου σοφίαν, εί μεν ουν
τεχνικός ών, οπερ νυν δη ελεγον, περί Όμηρου
υποσχόμενος επιδείξειν εξαπατάς με, άδικος εΐ·
εί δε μη τεχνικός εί, άλλα θεία μοίρα κατεχόμενος
εξ Όμηρου μηδέν είδώς πολλά καί καλά λεγεις
περί τοΰ ποιητοΰ, ώσπερ εγώ εΐπον περί σου,
ούδεν άδικεΐς. ελοΰ ουν πάτερα βούλει νομίζεσθαι
υπό ημών άδικος άνηρ είναι η θείος.
ΙΩΝ. Πολύ διαφέρει, ώ Σιώκρατες· πολύ γάρ
κάλλιον τό θειον νομίζεσθαι.
Β 2Ω. Τούτο τοίνυν τό κάλλιον υπάρχει σοι παρ'
ημΐν, ώ ’Ίων, θειον είναι καί μη τεχνικόν περί
Όμηρου επαινετήν.
446
ION
origin Athenians,1 are you not, and Ephesus is inferior

to no city ? But in fact, Ion, if you are right in
saying it is by art and knowledge that you are able
to praise Homer, you are playing me false : you
have professed to me that you know any amount of
fine things about Homer, and you promise to display
them ; but you are only deceiving me, and so far
from displaying the subjects of your skill, you decline
even to tell me what they are, for all my entreaties.
You are a perfect Proteus in the way you take on
every kind of shape, twisting about this way and
that, until at last you elude my grasp in the guise
of a general, so as to avoid displaying your skill
in Homeric lore. Now if you are an artist and, as I
was saying just now, you only promised me a display
about Homer to deceive me, you are playing me false;
whilst if you are no artist, but speak fully and finely
about Homer, as I said you did, without any know¬
ledge but by a divine dispensation which causes you
to be possessed by the poet, you play quite fair.
Choose therefore which of the two you prefer us to
call you, dishonest or divine.
ion. The difference is great, Socrates ; for it is far
nobler to be called divine.
soc. Then you may count on this nobler title in
our minds, Ion, of being a divine and not an artistic
praiser of Homer.
1 Androclus of Attica founded Ephesus as the Ionian city
known to the Greeks of Plato’s time.
447
INDEX
Achilles, 425 Daedalus, 419
Aerope, 48 n. Deticiency, 97, 99, 105
Ammon, 5 Demeter, 67 n.
Anaxagoras, 269 n. Democracy, 125, 163, 164 a.
Androclus, 447 Desire, 283, 285, 309
Andromache, 425 Dialectic, 367
Anger, 331, 341 ; sometimes false, Diameter, 37 f.
307 Dionysus, 67 n., 379
Anticipation, 275
Antilochus, 431 Egypt, 123
Aphrodite, 207 Elements, 263, 265, 267
Apollodorus, 445 Envy, 331, 337, 339, 341
Archilochus, 411, 415 Epeius. 419
Aristocracy, 157, 163 Ephesus, 445-7
Arithmetic, two kinds, 361 ff. Epidaurus, 407
Arts, 201 Eucleides, 199
Asclepius, 407 Euripides, 421
Athena, 67 n. Excess, 97, 99, 105
Athenians, 123
Athens, 135 Family, 191
Fear, 331; sometimes false, 307
Beauty, 201, 343, 345, 389, 391, 393, Finite, 221, 243, 245, 249, 251, 253,
395 257, 259, 267
Biped, man a featherless, 71, 73, 75 Fitness, 109, 201
Bonds, divine and human, 187 ff., Forgetfulness, 279
193 Fulling, 89
Book, 299
Giancon, 409
Callias, 199, 229 Good, derived from beauty, pro¬
Captain of ship, 147 ff. portion, and truth, 391
Carding, 89, 93, 185 Gorgias, 291 n., 367, 369, 371
Cause, 91, 243, 255, 257, 267, 269, Government, forms of, 125 ff., 145,
391; contingent, 91, 111, 119; 157, 159, 161
actual, 91 Grammar, 225
Class and part, 25 f.
Cold, 273, 275 Heat, 273, 275
Comedy, 331, 339, 341 Hecamede, 435
Corybants, 421, 429 Hector, 425
Creative agent, 255 Hecuba, 425
Cronus, 49, 57, 59, 61, 73 Hephaestus, 67. 37»
Cynics, 199 Heraclea, 420-1
448
INDEX
Heracleides, 445 Musaeus, 429

Heracleitus, 315 n. Myrtilus, 48 n.
Heracles, 57 n.
Herd, herding, herdsman, 21 ff., Nestor, 431, 435
59, 69 ff., 115 Number, 251
Hermes, 4S n.
Odysseus, 425
Hesiod, 411, 415
Oligarchy, 125, 157, 163, 164 n.
Homer, 146 n., 331 n., 383, 409 ff.
Olympus (musician), 419
Homeridae, 409
Opinion, 79, 81, 201, 395; true and
Hope, 275, 303
false, 291, 305, 369, 377
Hunger, 273, 283
Orpheus, 419, 429
Infinite, 221, 225, 243, 245, 247, 249, Ρεθεο 423
251, 253, 257, 259, 267, 269, 309 Pain, 271 ff., 2S9, 309, 311,313, 317,
Ion, 403 ff. 319, 325, 343 ; caused by great
Isocrates, 404 changes, 315; true and false,
Itch, 325 289 ff, 305
Painting, 417-19
Jealousy, 331, 341
Panathenaea, 407
Judges, 173
Part and class, 25 f.
King, 2-195 passim Patroclus, 431
Knowledge, 211 f., 259, 261, 345, Pelopidae, 48 n.
346, 359, 371, 395 ; pure and im¬ Perception, 279 f., 285, 291, 395
pure, 363, 379 Perfection, 201, 395
Phanosthenes, 445
Lamb, golden, 49 Phemius, 419
Laws, 133 ff., 145 ff, 159 ff, 173, Philebus, 199-397 passim
191 Phrynichus, 423
Letters, 79, 81, 105, 223, 225 Physician, 131, 139, 141, 147 ff.
Life, of pleasure, 235 f. ; of mind, Pictures, 77; in the soul, 301 f.;
237 f. ; mixed, 239, 257, 377, 305
379 ff. ; three lives, 317 Pig, 39 n.
Limit, 253, 267 Pleasure, 201-399 passim ; kinds of,
Love, 331, 341 207 ff, 229 ; true and false, 289 ft'.,
305,306; caused by great changes,
Macliaon, 435 815; intense, 321 ft'., 347; pure
Magnet, 421 ff. and impure, 343 ff.; a process or
Man, a featherless biped, 41 generation, 351 ff.
Mean, the, 99, 101, 103 Pleiades, 48 n.
Measure, 201, 389, 393 Plutarch, 436
Measurement, 97 ff, 359 Polygnotus, 417-19
Melampus, 437 Possessions in the state, 113 ff.
Memory, 203, 279 ff, 285, 291, 299, Pramneian wine, 434-5
377 Priam, 425
Mending, 89 Prometheus, 67
Menelaus, 56 n. Proportion. 201, 389, 391, 395
Metrodorus, 409 Protarchus, 199-399 passim
Mind, 201-397 passim Proteus, 447
Mixture, of perfect life, 200, 379 ff. ;
of pleasure and pain, 325 ff., 333, Recollection, 281 f.
335 ff., 371 Revolution, of universe, 51 ff.
Moderation, 201, 395 Rhapsodes, 403 ff.
Monarchy, 125, 163, 164 n. Rhetoric, 171
Mourning, 331, 339, 341 Ridiculous, 333 ff.
449
INDEX
Sciences, division of, 9 ff. ; kingly Theodoras (sculptor), 419

science, 9-195 passim; defined, Thirst, 273, 283
43, 127, 129, 131, 133, 155, 167, Thyestes, 49
169, 191, 201 Tickling, 327
Sculpture, 419 Tragedy, 331, 339, 341
Shepherds, divine, 59, 69, 71, 75 Truth, 349, 369, 379, 387, 391
Slaves and servants, 119 If. Tynnichus, 423
Smell, 345 Tyranny, 127, 164 n.
Socrates, passim; young S., 2-195 Tyrant, 75
passim
Sophist, 2, 3, 9, 39, 101, 107, 125, Unity, 213 ff., 225
151, 165, 167 Universe, revolution of, 51 ff.
Soul, 81, 187, 275, 279, 281, 283, 2S5,
299, 309, 327, 329, 331, 341, 357, Virtue, divisions of, 177 ff.
309, 395
Sound, 223, 225 Warp, 95, 97, 187
Spinning, 93 Weaving, 83, 85 ff., 107, 111, 175,
Statesman, 2-195 passim 185, 187
Statue-makers, 75 White, whiteness, 349 ff., 369
Stesimbrotus, 409 Wisdom, 201-397 passim ; kinds of,
Stranger, Eleatic, 2-195 passim 229
Sun, change in course of, 49 ft'. Woof, 95, 97, 1S7
Syllables, 79, 81
Xenophon, 404
Thamyras, 419
Theaetetus, 2 Yearning, 331, 341
Theoclymenus, 437
Theodoras, 2-195 passim Zeus, 48 n., 59, 267, 283, 395
Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh
(164)
THE LOEB CLASSICAL
LIBRARY
VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED
LATIN AUTHORS
Ammianus Marcellinus. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols.

Apuleius : The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses). W. Adling-
ton (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee.
St. Augustine : City of God. 7 Vols. Vol. I. G. E.
McCracken. Vol. VI. W. C. Greene.
St. Augustine, Confessions of. W. Watts (1631). 2 Vols.
St. Augustine : Select Letters. J. H. Baxter.
Ausonius. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols.
Bede. J. E. King. 2 Vols.
Boethius : Tracts and De Consolatione Philosophiae.
Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand.
Caesar : Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars. A. G.
Way.
Caesar : Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett.
Caesar : Gallic War. H. J. Edwards.
Cato and Varro : De PtE Rustica. Η. B. Ash and W. D.
Hooper.
Catullus. F. W. Cornish ; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate ; and
Pervigilium Veneris. J. W. Mackail.
Celsus : De Medicina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols.
Cicero : Brutus and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and
Η. M. Hubbell.
Cicero : De Finibus. H. Rackham.
Cicero : De Inventione, etc. Η.
M. Hubbell.
Cicero : De Natura Deorum and Academica. H. Rack-
ham.
1
Cicero : Walter Miller.

De Officiis.
Cicero : De etc. 2 Vols. Vol. I : De Oratore,
Oratore,
Books I and II. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Vol. II :
De Oratore, Book III ; De Fato ; Paradoxa Stoi-
corum ; De Partitione Oratoria. H. Rackham.
Cicero : De Republica, De Leoibus, Somnium Scipionis.
Clinton W. Keyes.
Cicero : De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione.
W. A. Falconer.
Cicero : In Catilinam, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla, Pro
Flacco. Louis E. Lord.
Cicero : Letters to Atticus. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols.
Cicero : Letters to his Friends. W. Glynn Williams.
3 Vols.
Cicero : Philippics. W. C. A. Ker.
Cicero : Pro Archia, Post Reditum, De Domo, De Ha-
ruspicum Responsis, Pro Plancio. N. H. Watts.
Cicero : Pro Caecina, Pro Lege Manilia, Pro Cluentio,
Pro Rabirio. H. Grose Hodge.
Cicero : Pro Caelio, De Provinciis Consularibus, Pro
Balbo. R. Gardner.
Cicero : Pro Milone, In Pisonem, Pro Scauro, Pro
Fonteio, Pro Rabirio Postumo, Pro Marcello, Pro
Ligario, Pro Rege Deiotaro. N. H. Watts.
Cicero : Pro Quinctio, Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Roscio
Comoedo, Contra Rullum. Freese. J. H.
Cicero : Pro Sestio, In R. Gardner.
Vatinium.
[Cicero] : Rhetorica ad Herennium. H. Caplan.
Cicero : Tusculan Disputations. J. E. King.
Cicero : Veriiine Orations. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vols.
Claudian. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols.
Columella : De Re Rustica ; De Arboribus. Η. B. Ash.
E. S. Forster, E. Heffner. 3 Vols.
Curtius, Q. : History of Alexander. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols.
Florus. E. S. Forster : and Cornelius Nepos. J. C. Rolfe.
Frontinus : Stratagems and Aqueducts. C. E. Bennett
and Μ. B. McElwain.
Fronto : Correspondence. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols.
Gellius. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols.
Horace : Odes and Epodes. C. E. Bennett.
Horace : Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica. H. R. Fairclough.
Jerome : Select Letters. F. A. Wright.
Juvenal and Persius. G. G. Ramsay.
2
Livy. B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage, A. C.

Schlesinger and R. M. Geer (General Index). 14 Vols.
Lucan. J. D. Duff.
Lucretius. W. H. D. Rouse.
Martial. W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols.
Minor Latin Poets : from Publilius Syrus to Rutilius
Namatianus, including Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus,
Nemesianus, Avianus, with “ Aetna,” “ Phoenix ” and
other poems. J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff.
Ovid : The Art of Love and other Poems. J. H. Mozley.
Ovid : Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer.
Ovid : Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman.
Ovid : Metamorphoses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols.
Ovid : Tristia and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler.
Petronius. M. Heseltine: Seneca: Apocolocyntosis.
W. H. D. Rouse.
Plautus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols.
Pliny : Letters. Melmoth’s translation revised by W. M. L.
Hutchinson. 2 Vols.
Pliny : Natural History. 10 Vols. Vols. I-V and IX.
H. Rackham. Vols. VI-VIII. W. H. S. Jones. Vol.
X. D. E. Eichholz.
Propertius. Η. E. Butler.
Prudentius. H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols.
Quintilian. Η. E. Butler. 4 Vols.
Remains of Old Latin. E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols.
Vol. I (Ennius and Caecilius). Vol. II (Livius, Naevius,
Pacuvius, Accius). Vol. Ill (Lucilius, Laws of the XII
Tables). Vol. IV (Archaic Inscriptions).
Sallust. J. C. Rolfe.
Scriptores Historiae Augustae. D. Magie. 3 Vols.
Seneca : Apocolocyntosis. Cf. Petronius.
Seneca : Epistulae Morales. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols.
Seneca :Moral Essays. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols.
Seneca :Tragedies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols.
Sidonius : Poems and Letters. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols.
Silius Italicus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols.
Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols.
Suetonius. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols.
Tacitus : Dialogus. Sir Wm. Peterson: and Agricola
and Germania. Maurice Hutton.
Tacitus: Histories and Annals. C. FI. Moore and J.
Jackson. 4 Vols.
3
Terence. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols.

Tertullian: Apologia and De Spectaculis. T. R. Glover;
Minucius Felix. G. H. Rendall.
Valerius Flaccus. J. H. Mozley.
Varro : De Lingua Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols.
Velleius Paterculus and Res Gestae Divi Augusti. F.W.
Shipley.
Virgil. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols.
Vitruvius : De Architectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols.
GREEK AUTHORS
Achilles Tatius. S. Gaselee.

Aelian : On the Nature of Animals. A. F. Scholfield.
3 Vols.
Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus and Onasander. The
Illinois Greek Club.
Aeschines. C. D. Adams.
Aeschylus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols.
Alciphron, Aelian and Philostratus : Letters. A. R.
Benner and F. H. Fobes.
Apollodorus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols.
Apollonius Rhodius. R. C. Seaton.
The Apostolic Fathers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols.
Appian’s Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols.
Aratus. Cf. Callimachus.
Aristophanes. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse
trans.
Aristotle : Art of Rhetoric. J. H. Freese.
Aristotle : Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics,
Virtues and Vices. H. Rackham.
Aristotle : A. L. Peck.
Generation of Animals.
Aristotle: H. Tredennick. 2 Vols.
Metaphysics.
Aristotle : Meteorologica. H. D. P. Lee.
Aristotle : Minor Works. W. S. Hett. “ On Colours,”
“ On Things Heard,” “ Physiognomies,” “ On Plants,”
“ On Marvellous Things Heard,” “ Mechanical Problems,”
“ On Indivisible Lines,” “ Situations and Names of
Winds,” “ On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias.”
Aristotle: Ntcomachean Ethics. H. Rackham.
4
Aristotle : Oeconomica and Magna Moralia. G. C.

Armstrong. (With Metaphysics, Vol. II.)
Aristotle : On tiie Heavens. W. K. C. Guthrie.
Aristotle : On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath.
W. S. Hett.
Aristotle : The Categories. On Interpretation. Η. P.
Cooke ; Prior Analytics. H. Tredennick.
Aristotle : Posterior Analytics. H. Tredennick ; Topics.
E. S. Forster.
Aristotle : Sophistical Refutations. Coming-to-be and
Passing-away. E. S. Forster. On the Cosmos. D. J.
Furley.
Aristotle: Parts of Animals. A. L. Peck; Motion and
Progression of Animals. E. S. P'orster.
Aristotle : Physics. Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Corn-
ford. 2 Vols.
Aristotle : Poetics ; Fonginus on the Sublime. W.
Hamilton Fyfe ; Demetrius on Style. W. Rhys Roberts.
Aristotle : Politics. H. Rackham.
Aristotle : Problems. W. S. Hett. 2 Vols.
Aristotle : Riietorica ad Alexandrum. H. Rackham.
(With Problems, Vol. II.)
Ariuan : History of Alexander and Indica. Rev. E.
Iliffe Robson. 2 Vols.
Athenaeus : Deipnosophistae. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols.
St. Basil : Letters. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols.
Callimachus : Fragments. C. A. Tryp; nis.
Callimachus : Hymns and Epigrams, and Lycopiiron.
A. W. Mair ; Aratus. G. R. Mair.
Clement of Alexandria. Rev. G. W. Butterworth.
COLLUTHUS. Cf. OPPIAN.
Daphnis and Chloe. Cf. Longus.
Demosthenes I : Olynthiacs, Philippics and Minor Ora¬
tions : I-XVII and XX. J. H. Vince.
Demosthenes II : De Corona and De Falsa Legatione.
C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince.
Demosthenes III : Meidias, Androtion, Aristocrates,
Timocrates, Aristogeiton. J. H. Vince.
Demosthenes IV-VI : Private Orations and In Neaeram.
A. T. Murray.
Demosthenes VII : Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay, Ex¬
ordia and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt.
Dio Cassius : Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols.
5
Dio Chrysostom. 5 Vols. Vols. I and II. J. W. Cohoon.

Vol III. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. Vols. IV
and V. H. Lamar Crosby.
Diodorus Siculus. 12 Vols. Vols. I-VI. C. H. Oldfather.
Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vol. VIII. C. B. Welles.
Vols. IX and X. Russel M. Geer. Vol. XI. F. R. Walton.
Diogenes Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus : Roman Antiquities. Spel-
man’s translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols.
Epictetus. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols.
Euripides. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. Verse trans.
Eusebius : Ecclesiastical History. Kirsopp Lake and
J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols.
Galen : On the Natural Faculties. A. J. Brock.
The Greek Anthology. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols.
The Greek Bucolic Poets (Theocritus, Bion, Moschus).
J. M. Edmonds.
Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea. J. M.
Edmonds. 2 Vols.
Greek Mathematical Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols.
Herodes. Cf. Theophrastus : Characters.
Herodotus. A. D. Godley. Vols.
4
Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White.
Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heracleitus. W. H.S.
Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols.
Homer : Iliad. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols.
Homer : Odyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols.
Isaeus. E. S. Forster.
Isocrates. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols.
St. John Damascene : Barlaam and Ioasaph. Rev. G. R.
Woodward and Harold Mattingly.
Josephus. 9 Vols. Vols. I-IV. H. St. J. Thackeray. Vol.
V. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. Vols. VI
and VII. Ralph Marcus. Vol. VIII. Ralph Marcus and
Allen Wikgren.
Julian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols.
Longus : Daphnis and Chloe. Thornley’s translation re¬
vised by J. M. Edmonds ; and Parthenius. S. Gaselee.
Lucian. 8 Vols. Vols. I-V. A. M. Harmon; Vol. VI.
K. Kilburn ; Vol. VII. M. D. Macleod.
Lycophron. Cf. Callimachus.
Lyra Graeca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols.
Lysias. W. R. M. Lamb.
Manetho. W. G. Waddell. Ptolemy: Tetrabiblos. F. E.

Robbins.
Marcus Aurelius. C. R. Haines.
Menander. F. G. Allinson.
Minor Attic Orators. 2 Vols. K. J. Maidment and
J. O. Burtt.
Nonnos: Dionysiaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols.
Oppian, Colluthus, Tryphiodorus. A. W. Mair.
Papyri. Non-LiTERARY Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. C.
Edgar. 2 Vols. Literary Selections (Poetry). D. L.
Page.
Parthenius. Cf. Longus.
Pausanias : Description of Greece.W. H. S. Jones. 5
Vols. and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley.
Philo. 10 Vols. Vols. I-V. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H.
Whitaker; Vols. VI-X. F. H. Colson ; General Index.
Rev. J. W. Earp.
Two Supplementary Vols. Translation only from an
Armenian Text. Ralph Marcus.
Philostratus : Imagines : Callistratus : Descriptions.
A. Fairbanks.
Philostratus : The Life of Apollonius of Tyana. F. C.
Conybeare. 2 Vols.
Philostratus and Eunapius : Lives of the Sophists.
Wilmer Cave Wright.
Pindar. Sir J. E. Sandys.
Plato : Charmides, Alcibiades, Hipparchus, The Lovers,
Theages, Minos and Epinomis. W. R. M. Lamb.
Plato : Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser
Hippias. Η. N. Fowler.
Plato : Eutiiyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus.
Η. N. Fowler.
Plato : Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus.
W. R. M. Lamb.
Plato : Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols.
Plato : Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. W. R. M. Lamb.
Plato : Republic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols.
Plato : Statesman. Philebus. Η. N. Fowler: Ion.
W. R. M. Lamb.
Plato : Theaetetus and Sophist. Η. N. Fowler.
Plato : Timaeus, Critias, Clitopho, Menexenus, Epi-
stulae. Rev. R. G. Bury.
Plutarch: Moralia. 15 Vols. Vols. Ι-V. F. C. Babbitt;
7
Vol. VI. W. C. Helmbold ; Vol. VII. P. H. De Lacy and

B. Einarson ; Vol. IX. E. L. Minar, Jr., F. H. Sandbach,
W. C. Helmbold ; Vol. X. Η. N. Fowler ; Vol. XII. H.
Cherniss and W. C. Helmbold.
Plutarch: The Parallel Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols.
Polybius. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols.
Procopius : History of the Wars. Η. B. Dewing. 7 Vols.
Ptolemy : Tetrabiblos. Cf. Manetho.
Quintus Smyrnaeus. A. S. Way. Verse trans.
Sextus Empiricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols.
Sophocles. F. Storr. 2 Vols. Verse trans.
Strabo : Geography. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols.
Theophrastus: Characters. J. M. Edmonds; Heiodes,
etc. A. D. Knox.
Theophrastus. Enquiry into Plants. Sir Arthur Hort.
2 Vols.
Thucydides. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols.
Trypiiiodorus. Cf. Oppian.
Xenophon : Cyropaedia. Walter Miller. 2 Vols.
Xenophon : Hellenica, Anabasis, Apology, and Sympo¬
sium. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols.
Xenophon : Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. E. C. Mar-
chant.
Xenophon. Scripta Minora. E. C. Marchant.
VOLUMES IN PREPARATION
GREEK AUTHORS
Aristotle : Histohia Animalium. A. L. Peck.

Plotinus. A. H. Armstrong.
LATIN AUTHORS
Babrius (Greek) and Phaedrus. B. E. Perry.
DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION
■ CAMBRIDGE, MASS. LONDON
HARVARD UNIV. PRESS WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
8
.
DATE DUE
TW
oc 1 7;199!
SEP l 6 2000
_ Mi
PA 4279 .A3 1962a
S,atesman. Philebus. With an 010101 000
0 1 63 0233447 3
TRENT UNIVERSITY
1962a
Trent
University

(Loeb Classical Library No. 164) Harold North Fowler, W. R. M. Lamb - Plato - Statesman. Philebus. Ion.-Harvard University Press (1925)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Loeb Classical Library No. 164) Harold North Fowler, W. R. M. Lamb - Plato - Statesman. Philebus. Ion.-Harvard University Press (1925)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Loeb Classical Library No. 164) Harold North Fowler, W. R. M. Lamb - Plato - Statesman. Philebus. Ion.-Harvard University Press (1925)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE

t T. E. PAGE, c.n., litt.d.

t E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. f W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d.

L. A. POST, l.h.d. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.iiist.soo.

THE STATESMAN · PHILEBUS

HAROLD N. FOWLER, Ph.D.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

Printed in Great Britain

The Greek text of the Statesman and the Philebus is

B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written a.d.

The brief introductions aim merely at supplying

The text here given of the Ion is based on the

Plato was born in 427 b.c. of Athenian parents who

his master’s thought; since, fortunately for us, the

appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher

to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to

on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in

Socratic discussions among the elect of the new

feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest

brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The

culars in their rightly distinguished and connected

itself as the Many. We have here the latest

sciences than as what ~we should now call a scientist.

[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole.

The following give useful accounts of Socratic and

The following are important editions :—

The Statesman or Politicus is in form a continuation

in the world as it is, he finds three chief kinds of

π ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

u 2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2, 0ΕΟΔΩΡΟ2, ΞΕΝ02, 2ΩΚΡΑΤΗ2 Ο ΝΕΩΤΕΡ02

I. 2Ω. ΤΗ πολλήν χάριν οφείλω σοι τής θεαιτή-

soc. Really I am greatly indebted to you, Theo¬

μνημονικώς επεπληξάς μοι το περί τούς λογισμούς

your mathematics, and you are quite right in finding

B ΞΕ. Ου τα σά κοΛυειν φαίνεται, δει δε ίσως

str. There seems to be no objection on your part,

when we have found the path.

ΞΕ. At δε ye περ'ι τεκτονικήν αν και συμπασαν

str. But the science possessed by the arts relating

Y. soc. Let us assume that all science is one and

NE. 2Ω. Δίκαιον γοΰν.

y. soc. At least he has a right to be.

E EE. Τοιάνδε. λογιστική που τις ήμΐν ήν

str. Of this sort. We recognized a sort of art of

αιροΰμενοι προσείποιμεν, εμμελώς άν φαΐμεν δι·

other the judging part, might we say we had made

Y. soc. Very true.

7τασαι τό γ’ επιτάττειν εχουσιν ; ή βούλει, καθάπερ

kindred arts, all of which involve giving orders ? Or,

all that is produced into two classes.

EE. To μεν επι rat? των άψυχων γενεσεσιν αυ¬

str. By assigning one part of it to the production

ξης τδ μη σπουδάζειν επι τοΐς όνόμασι, πλουσιώτε·

διτλασ/οισί] δίπλασίοα ή ΒΤ.

of indifference to mere names, you will turn out

str. I must try to speak still more clearly,

NE. 2Ω. Ποιον ούν δη φράζεις διαιρούμενους

y. soc. What is it, then, that you say we did