|

24CJCF02649
1 AFFIDAVIT OF TONY BACA
2 IN SUPPORT OF ARREST WARRANT MADE UNDER CCP 2015.5
3 1, TONY BACA, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of
4| California, as follows: Soy ov
51 IvmrobucTion Tye
6 A. Affiant’s Training and Experience Lim omE=
7 1, your affiant, Special Agent Tony Baca, have been a Peace Officer in the Stai@of + ©
s | California since September 2003. 1 am currently employed by the State ofCalifor, Department |
o|of sustice, Division of Law Enforcement, asigned to offcer-involved shootingsfo he past thre |
10| years. Before that, was assigned to the Bureau of Firearms in the Division of Law Enforcement |
11 | fortwo years. Before transferring to the Division of Law Enforcement, I worked for the Division
12| of Criminal Law, assigned to the Bureau-of Medical Fraud and Elder Abuse for two years.
3 During my career as a law enforcement officer, have conducted a wide varietyofcriminal
14 | investigations including firearm investigations, white collar, fraud, and computer crime |
15. | investigations, person(s and property crimes investigations, parle searches, and ares, Sines |
16 | July 2021, my primary duty assignment has been to investigate matters specifically relating to
17| officer-involved shootings.
18 have successfully completed the Los Angeles County SherifP’s Department Basic Police
19| Academy, receiving a total of 880 hours of formal training on interview and interrogation
20| techniques, presentationofevidence, report writing, search and seizure, sex crimes, crimes
21 | against persons, crime scene investigation, collection of evidence, and firearms instruction. With
22| the completion of the Basic Police Academy, | am able to testify for witnesses according to
23| Proposition 115. In addition, I have completed a ten-week P.0.S.T.-certified Adult Parole Agent
24| Academy in Galt, CA. have obtained the POST Basic and Intermediate Certificates. I have
25| completeda 120-hour P.O.S.T. defensive tactics, arest and control course. | have completed
26| several classes on criminal evidence, search warrants, method of investigations, interview and
27| interrogation techniques, and criminal law.
2%
\
 |
1 Ihave attended and completed in excess of 500 hours of formal in-service training in law
2| enforcement topics, including the preparation and execution of search warrants. | have had on-
3| the-job training from experienced state investigators and prosecutors handling cases in these
4| areas.
5 Based on my training and experience, | have become knowledgeable about the methods
6| used by persons who violate state laws. During my investigations, I have extensive experience
7| conducting interviews of witnesses and suspects, working in undercover capacity, participating in
8 | surveillance operations, making consensual recordings, reviewing digital evidence such as e-mail
9| files and other data in computer systems, utilizing confidential sources and cooperating witnesses,
10| and preparing and executing arrest and search warrants.
n Your affiant has been assigned to investigate allegations that DIANA MARIA TERAN did
12| commit the offenses in violation of Penal Code section S02(c)(2). Pursuant to this assignment,
13| your affiant has obtained the following information from those who have knowledge of said
14| offenses
15 B. Summaryof Investigation
16 In February 2022, the DepartmentofJustice began investigating the Brady and Officer
17| and Recurrent Witness Information Tracking System (ORWITS) databases maintained by the Los
18| Angeles County District Attomey’s Office (LADA). The investigation commenced after an
19| LADA official who oversees the databases threatened to put a police officer in the LADA’s
20| Brady database after the officer had arrested him for disrupting a December 2021 traffic stop
21 | investigation of his fiancé. Our investigation of that official led to the conduct of DIANA |
22 | MARIA TERAN, who was an LADA Special Advisor with constructive responsibility for the |
23 | Brady and ORWITS databases at the LADA.
2% Our investigation revealed that, in 2018, DIANA MARIA TERAN, while working as a
25| Constitutional Policing Advisor at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD),
26 | accessed over 1,600 statutorily-protected peace office files as well as intemal emails and
27| documents conceming internal affairs investigations and confidential civil service proceedings.
28| Her employment ended at the LASD on November 30, 2018. After joining the LADA in January |
 1| 2021, TERAN repeatedly used data from those LASD personnel files and internal emails and |
2 | documents ina surreptitious attempt to add peaceofficer names to LADA's Brady and ORWITS
3| databases. |
4 C. Applicable California Statutes
5 1. Penal Code section 502
6 Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(2) proscribes the use of government computer data
7| without permission and is punishable as a wobbler. Specifically, any person who “knowingly
8| accesses and without permission takes, copies, or makes useofany data from a computer,
9| computer system, or computer network” is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision
10| (h) of Scetion 1170 for 16 months, or two or three years and a fine not exceeding ten thousand
11| dollars (510,000), or a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding
12| one year,by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars (55,000), or by both that fine and
13| imprisonment
1 Pursuant to Penal Code section 502, subdivision (b), “for the purposes of this section, the |
15 | following terms have the following meanings: I

16 (1) “Access” means to gain entry to, instruct, cause input to, cause output from,
- cause data processing with, or communicate with, the logical, arithmetical, or
memory function resources ofa computer, computer system, or computer network
18 (2) “Computer network” means any system that provides communicationbuts not
between one or more computer systems and input/output devices, including,
19 limited to, display terminals, remote systems, mobile devices, and printers connected
by telecommunication facilities.
20
21 n.1

2 (5) “Computer system” means a device or collectionof devices, including of

support devices and excluding calculators that are not programmable and capable
» being used in conjunction with external files, one or more of which contain computer |
programs, clectronic instructions, input data, and output data, that performs functions, |
= including, but not limited to, logic, arithmetic, data storage and retrieval,
2 communication, and control. A “computer system” includes, without limitation, any
such device or system that is located within, connected to, or otherwise integrated
2 with, any motor vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
z "..0
3
3
 1 (8) “Data” means a representationof information, knowledge, facts, concepts,
computer software, or computer programs or instructions. Data may be in any form,
2 in storage media, or as stored in the memoryofthe computer or in transit or presented
3 ona display device.
. 2. Penal Code section 832.7 |
3 Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) provides “(e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b), |
6 | the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by a state or
7| local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from these records, are
8| confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery
9| pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046ofthe Evidence Code.”
10 As of January 1, 2019, Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (b) provides for release of
11 | certain personnel recordsofpeace officers pursuant to the California Public Records Act
12| (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.00)ofTitle |of the Government Code). |
13| Currently, the following are subject to release after appropriate redactions to, among other things,
14| Safeguard the anonymity of witnesses, and provided release does not endanger active |
15| imestigtins ||
16 (A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of anyofthe
following:
7 (i) An incident involving the discharge ofa firzarm ata person by a peace |
officer or custodial officer
8 (ii) An incident involving the use of force against a person by a peace officer or
1 custodial officer that resulted in death or in great bodily injury.
(iil) A sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges2 unreasonable or
20 excessive force.
(iv) A sustained finding that an officer failed to intervene against another
21 officer using force that is clearly unreasonable or excessive.
(B)(i) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made
2 by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency thata peace officer or custodial
5 officer engaged in sexual assault involving a member of the public.
ii) As used in this subparagraph, “sexual assault” means the commission or |
2 attempted initiation ofa sexual act with a memberofthe public by means of force, |
threat, coercion, extortion, offer of leniency or other official favor, or under the color
2 ofauthority. For purposesofthis definition, the propositioning for or commission of
any sexual act while on duty is considered a sexual assault.
2% (il) As used in this subparagraph, “memberof the public” means any person
2 not employed by the officer's employing agency and includes any participant in a
cadet, explorer, or other youth program affiliated with the agency.
3
+
 1 (C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made |
by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency involving dishonesty by a peace |
2 officer or custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or |
3 proscaution ofa crime, or directly relatingto the reporting of, or investigation of |
misconduct by, another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited
4 0, any false statements, filing false reports, destruction, falsifying, or concealing of
evidence, or perjury.
5 (D) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made
4 by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency thata peace officer or custodial
officer engaged in conduct including, but not limited to, verbal statements, writings,
7 online posts, recordings, and gestures, involving prejudice or discrimination against a
person on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical |
8 disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, |
Sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military.
9 and veteran status. |
0 (E) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by |
any law enforcement agency or oversight agency that the peace officer made an
n unlawful arrest or conducted an unlawful search.
12 | IL PROBABLE CAUSE FOR OFFENSE
3 1 make this affidavit in support ofa criminal complaint against DIANA MARIA TERAN.
14| There is probable cause to believe that on or about April 26, 2021, while working at the LADA,
1s | TERAN used data from LASD's computers, computer system, and computer network that she
16 | had accessed while working there in 2018. Specifically, TERAN used data from LASD peace
17 | officer personne files and intemal LASD emails anddocuments —conceming 11 different peace |
1s| officers—that was stored in the LASD computers, computer system, and computer network, |
Lo| comprising 11 violations of Penal Code section S02, subdivision (¢)(2),
2 The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my personal observations, my training and |
21 | experience, information have received from persons with knowledge regarding relevant facts, |
22| my review of records and documents, and information provided to me by other law enforcement |
23| officers. Because this affidavit i being submitted for the limited purposeofestablishing probable
24| cause that TERAN violated Penal Code section S02, subdivision (¢)2). [have not included cach
25| ‘and every fact known to me concerning this investigation. Unless specifically indicated |
26| otherwise, all conversations and statements described in this affidavit are related in substance and |
27| inparonty |
23
s
 2 1. Pursuant tothe federal Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a prosecutor |
3| is obligated to provide exculpatory and impeachment information to the defense. (Brady v:
4|Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.) A California prosecutor's obligation to provide exculpatory and
5| impeachment information also arises under California’s Criminal Discovery Statute as codified in
6| Penal Code section 1054.1(¢).
7 2. Your affiant reviewed the LADA's Discovery Compliance Manual, dated December 9,
s | 2021. To meet Brady and statutory discovery obligations, the LADA maintains the Discovery |
9| Compliance System (DCS), ic. the Brady and ORWITS databases. DCS is comprised of the
10| Brady and ORWITS databases. The Brady database contains exculpatory or impeaching
11| informationofrecurrent witnesses. This includes some felony and misdemeanor convictions or
12 | other misconduct that has been gathered and reviewed which may reflect on the credibility ofa
13| witness. The ORWITS databasei similar to the LADA's Brady database but employs lower
14 | threshold for inclusion. Inclusion is based on “information likely o lead to potential |
15| impeachment information.” Per LADA policy, information based on mere rumor, speculation, or
16| unverifiable hearsay should not warrant inclusion in the ORWITS database.
1” 3. During al times relevant to this affidavit, Jacob Yim was a deputy district attorney for
1s| the LADA. im was assigned to the Discovery Compliance Unit (DCU) as Deputy-in-Charge
19 | from 2018 until March 1, 2022. interviewed Yim, who told me that, in 2021, the Discovery
20| Compliance Unit (DCU) maintained the LADA's Brady and ORWITS databases. Yim said that
21 | he was the head ofDCU as Deputy-in-Charge and he reported to the Head Deputy of the Post- |
22| Conviction & Litigation Branch. Yim said that that Branch was housed within the Prosecution |
23| Support Operations Bureau and that Bureau was headed by a Director. Your affant reviewed
24| LADA organizational charts dated April 19, 2021 and September 7, 2021. The charts represented
25| that the Bureau Director reported to Joseph Iniguez first as Interim Chief Deputy and then as
f
ofStaff.
26| Chie |
7 4. Yim told me that the ORWITS database is comprised of information obtained from
28| media reports, court recordsifknown, JSID prosecution declination,a branch or area office:
o
 1| prosecution declination involving a law enforcement officer, and courtroom deputy district
2| attomey referrals.
3| THE LASD'S PERFORMANCE RECORDING AND MONITORING SYSTEM (PRMS)
4 5. During all times relevant to this affidavit, Todd Bernstein was a LASD deputy sheriff
5| working with Information Technology. 1 interviewed Deputy Bemstein, who told me that peace
6| officer personnel records for deputy sheriff are stored electronically in a database in the LASD
7| computer system. Bemstein told me that from 1991 until January 2017, peace officer personnel
8| records were stored lectronically in a LASD database known as Personnel Performance Index. |
9| (PPI). The PRMS came online in January 2017.
10 6. Deputy Bemstein told me that the personnel records in PRMS were stored in 10
11 | modules: service comments, special conditions, administrative investigations, traffic collisions,
12 | civil claims, civil lawsuits, use of force, deputy involved shootings, internal commendations, and |
13| custody/inmate complaints. Berstein told me that in addition to the administrative investigations |
14| conducted by LASD, that module contained civil service proceedings concerning discipline
15 | imposed. In such circumstances, cither the LASD or the deputysheriff can request civil service
16| reviewofdiscipline. These proceedings are confidential through the hearing officer and
17| commission levels of review. Bernstein told me that there were about 15,000 civil service
18 | employees working at the LASD during all times relevant to the affidavit: bout 9,000 sworn
19| peace officers and some six thousand civilian employees. Based on his reviewofcomputer data |
20 | of the LASD in 2018, about 150 employees were in civil service proceedings at any one time. |
21 7. Deputy Bemstein told me that in February 2018, personnel from the LASD Data |
22| Systems Bureau (DSB) implemented audit software, the existence of which was only known to |
23| DSB personnel. The audit software logged every inquiry made by a department member into |
24 | PRMS and chronicled what the department member examined in PRMS. Bernstein also told me |
25| that every time a user enters PRMS, the user encounters an admonition on the log in screen. The
26| admonition warns the user that, among other things, unauthorized use is punishable asa felony
27| under Penal Code section 502 and logging into PRMS “indicatels) acceptance of these terms and
28| willingness to comply.” Bemstein told me that these security protocols were in place because the |
_. 1 cece er]
 1 | deputy sherifF personnel records contained information maintained pursuant o Penal Code |
2| section 832.5 as well as medical, financial, and other information disclosureofwhich is
3| probibited by federal aw or would cause an unwarranted invasionofpersonal privacy.
4 TERAN ACCESSED OVER 1,600 DEPUTYAND SHERIFF PERSONNEL RECORDS
s BETWEEN FEBRUARY 23, 2018 NOVEMBER 30, 2018
6 8. Deputy Bemstcin told me that he reviewed the LASD organization charts and employee |
7| roster. He said that TERAN worked as a Constitutional Policing Advisor and as a LASD
8| employee from November 2015 through November 30, 2018
9 9. At my request in November 2022, Deputy Bernstein told me that he checked the audit
10| logs for TERAN's inquiries into PRMS. Bernstein loaded the TERAN audit log for the
11| administrative investigations module of PRMS into Excel spreadsheets, which I reviewed. This |
12. tog chronicled, among other things: the date TERAN accessed a given deputy sheriffs personnel |
15| records the name, rank, nd employe umber ofthat deputy shes the date he inestigation |
14| was closed; the investigation’s case number; which tab or abs that TERAN accessed within the
15| record; and whether TERAN downloaded documents from the record in addition to accessing the
16| record.
17 10. Your afant’s review of TERAN's PRS audit log showed tha, from February 23,
18| 2018 to November 30, 2018, TERAN logged 14.867 inquiries nto the administrative
19| investigation module of PRMS, accessing over 1,600 different deputy sheriff personnel files. The |
20| administrative investigations that TERAN reviewed dated as fr back as 1988.
2 TERAN JOINED THE LADA IN JANUARY 2021 |
2 11. During all times relevant to this affidavit, Brian Schim was a deputy district attorney |
23| for the LADA. chim told me that he was Head Deputyofthe Post-Conviction Litigation and
24| Discovery Section from about 2016 until carly April 2021. Schim told me that he knew TERAN
25| from her time working for the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office, from July 2019 |
26| unit December 2020. Schim told me that, during the time TERAN worked for the Public |
27| Defender’s Office, he met with her regularly regarding Brady issues. |
2%
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1 12. Schim told me that TERAN joined the LADA as Special Advisor for the Post-
||
2 | Conviction Litigation and Discovery Section and Justice System Integrity Division (SID), and |
3| she reported to Iniguez. Yim confirmed this and said that TERAN was the constructive |
4| supervisor of himselfand the other employees in DCU. Heather Borden and Haily Singh were
5| deputy district attomeys assigned to DCU. Singh joined DCU in 2018 and worked there until
6| 2023, and Borden joined in 2019 and still works in DCU. interviewed Borden and Singh |
7 | separately. Each told me that they understood TERAN to be the constructive supervisorof the
8| employees in DCU as soon as shejoined the LADA in January 2021 |
9| TERAN PROVIDES INFORMATION CONCERNING DEPUTY SHERIFFS TO DCUTO |
“ EVALUATE FOR INCLUSION IN THE BRADY OR ORWITS DATABASES |
n 13. Schim told your affiant that shortly afier TERAN began overseeing the LADA's Brady
12 | and ORWITS databases in 2021, she would serially provide names ofa deputy sheriffalong with
13| a reason, i.c., conduct, and date for possible inclusion in the DCU databases (one or two at a
14| time). Schim said that this was the first time that a source for potential DCS information was
15| individual names providedby a supervisor. Schim said that he suspected TERAN's tips came
16| from peace officer files based on the typeofinformation TERAN provided. He did not recall any
17| specific name or conduct. Schim was transferred to another assignment in another section in |
18| carly April 2021 |
19 14. Yim told your affiant that shortly after TERAN began overseeing the LADA's Brady
20 | and ORWITS databases in 2021, she would serially provide namesof a deputysheriffalong with
21 | a typeof conduct and general timeframe for possible inclusion in the DCU databases (one or two,
22| ata time). Yim said that while he was aware ofTERAN's passion for Brady issues, this method
23| was not one of DCUs past methods for receiving tips for the Brady or ORWITS databases. Yim |
24| said that the tips could have come from peace officer files based on the information TERAN |
25| provided. He did not recall any specific name or conduct due to te fact that he had reviewed
26| thousands of such names over his years at DCU. Yim said that he had discussions with Singh and
27| Borden about how TERAN was coming up with these tps about deputy sheriffs that had escaped
28| the DCU's anention over the years: “As for me and my team [Borden and Singh], we're ike, you
5
 |

1 | Know — we're daily trying to scour or information, but we're like where are you geting this stuff |
2| because it's not coming on our radar, right?” Yim was Deputy-in-Charge over DCU until March
3] 1202
4 15. Singh told your affiant that she was only provided the names from TERAN's deputy
5 | sherifftips by Yim to research. She was not given the conduct at issue or timeframe. Singh told
6| me that it appeared to her that TERAN had information about deputy sheriffs that the LADA and |
7| DCU did not have. Singh told me that she did not know for certainifthe tips came from
8| TERAN's memory ofher time at LASD. Singh worked in DCU until 2023.
9 A REVIEW OF THE ENTRIES IN LADA'S BRADY AND ORWITS DATABASES.
REVEALED THAT EIGHT ENTRIES WERE MADE IN MAY 2021 USING
10 REFERENCES TO CIVIL SERVICE PROCEEDINGS
un 16. Your affiant obtained via investigative criminal grand jury subpoenas copies of the |
12| LADA Brady and ORWITS databases from 2021 through March 31,2022. Your affiant attaches
13| as Exhibit 1 to this affidavit, the Orderofthe grand jury court (Judge Ricardo R. Ocampo) |
14| permitting the useofthese scaled materials in any subsequent criminal prosecution
1s 17. Your affiant reviewed the 2.260 records produced pursuant to these subpoenas duces |
16| tecum. 152 entries in the ORWITS database and 35 entries in the Brady database corresponded to
17| the deputy sheriffs whose peace officer records TERAN had accessed between February 2018 and
18| November 2018 at the LASD. Notably, cight of these LADA records were ereated and/or
19| updated in May 2021 and had only references to civil service proceedings as support for the
20| entries. The other entries did not have references to civil service proceedings. Civil service
21 | proceedings are confidentially conducted for peace officers (through the hearing officer and
22| commission steps) unless oneofthe parties appeals the discipline imposed (or failure to impose
23 | discipline) to the Superior Court. Six of the LADA records at issue had a tentative Superior
24| Court decision concerning civil service proceedings attached as supporting paperwork.
25 |
2 [
7 |
23 |
 | TER A EL A FOLDED aN
2
2
CE1D en neORS Sis
PROCEEDED TO DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS AND 31 OF WHOM HAD

5 | one ofthe names on the TERAN lis. That name was a deputy shrift who hadENN
|
11 | EE Rv was incredulous and concernedoverthe fact thatshe had been
 1 IN 2018, TERAN ACCESSED THE PEACE OFFICER FILES IN PRMS OF 13 OF THE
DEPUTY SHERIFFS ON THE LIST SHE SENT REVEL

3 21. Your affiant reviewed the PRMS access logs for TERAN from 2018, the only year |

5 | on the list she later sent to Revel on April 26, 2021. TERAN also reviewed detailed internal

6| LASD documents of 32 of the deputy sheriff names and incidents. Deputy Bemstein identified
7| six of the names as being subject to Public Records Act Requests that were produced before April

at issue. The followi

o| tist she sent Revel andthe underlying conduct orproceedings ng
arethe

11 | basis of the 11 counts in the complaint, respectively |

wr
2018 PRMS |#Accessed |TERAN Use Date
7
Count No. & | Admin Inv
|
" TERAN LASD
-

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N/A 912612017 41262021
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"| FERAN ACCESSED LASD PEACE OFFICERTOFILES IN PRMS IN 2018 AND OTHER
R» DATA OF THE LASD FROM 2015 TO 2018 IDENTIF Y AND MAKE A LIST OF
DEPUTY SHERIFFS THAT SHE SENT TO REVEL APRIL 26, 2021 FOR DCU
3 ON
DATABASE INCLUSI
in 22. Based on my background, training, and experience in conducting white collar |
15 | investigations and computer crimes investigations and the methods used by persons who violate |
16| state laws, TERAN used her access to peace officer files in PRMS in 2018 and/or other data
17 | belonging to LASD from 2015 to 2018 to identify and make alist of deputy sheriffs who shared
18| in common the fact that all were subject o administrative investigations and civil service
19| proceedings in thepast. Not only did TERAN accessfiles in 2018 in PRMS (many ofwhich |
20| concemed very old actions), but your affiant’s reviewof emails and documents on TERAN'S
21| LASD computer shows that she was tracking these deputy sheriffs’ administrative investigations |
22 | and confidential civil service proceedings over a period of years before and up to 2018
zn 23. Based on my background, raining, and experience in conducting white collar |
24| investigations and computer crimes investigations and the methods used by persons who violate
25| state laws, persons who access data, especially confidential data, will often seek to obtaina later
26| source of some of the information to obscure the original source. The very low occurrence of
27| deputy sheriffs being subject to administrative investigations and civil service proceedings at any
2 |
rE —— Tr ——— SE |
 1 | one time belies Teran’s assertion that she could have otherwise identified public documents from
2| those proceedings without the information she was exposed to at the LASD. Further, TERAN
3| would not have identified so manyofthese deputy sheriffs without accessing PRMS and other
4| data ofthe LASD. TERAN was able to identify 33 deputy sherifs, all ofwhom were subject to
5| both administrative investigations and civil service proceedings, when only a very small fraction
6| ofdeputy sheriffs overall are subject to administrative investigations and civil service
7| proceedings. She also was able todo so purportedly in 2021, for events that occurred many years
8| carer, even though the LADA's DCU discovered only fourof those names or incidents over the
9| course of several years. Additionally, as mentioned, it appears that some ofthe documents
10| TERAN supplied to Revel were scanned, copied, or taken directly from the LASD data files at
11| issue.
12 | HL CONCLUSION AND REQUESTS
13 Based on the contats ofthe affidavit, and your Affiant’s aforementioned training and
14| experience, I conclude that on April 26, 2021, DIANA MARIA TERAN committed 1 violations
15| of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (€)(2). I therefore request, pursuant to Penal Code section
16| 813, that an arrest warrant be issued for the arest ofDIANA MARIA TERAN.
1” Exceuted his24day of April, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.
18 a ND
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By Special 0)
» California Deparfmer of Justice
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 1 JUSTIFICATION FOR SEALING AFFIDAVIT |
2 I request tha this affidavit and all other documents relating to this affidavit be sealed for the |
3 | following reasons. First, the warrant sought pursuant to this affidavit relates to an ongoing. |
4| investigation ofa violation of Penal Code section 502. a felony, involving a high-ranking LADA
5| offical. Disclosureofthesc facts may impede any future progress of the ongoing investigation,
6| but may also have a negative impact on the reputation of the official. Second, the LADA official
2 | has supervisory authority over three of the witnesses. Disclosureofthe affidavit may impede |
5| ongoing cooperation of these witnesses. Third, while the Order attached as Exhibit | permits the
9| use of grand jury materials for tis prosecution, an order unsealing the records obtained by grand
10 | jury subpoenas duces tecum must first be obtained. And given the inherent confidential nature of
11 | the information about the peace officers as well a the Brady and ORWITS databases, a
12 | protective order must also be obtained. Therefore, for these reasons, I recommend tha this
13 | affidavit remain scaled.
14 ORDER SEALING AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR ARREST |
WARRANT
15
16 Itis hereby ordered that the Affidavit in support of the Complaint for Arrest Warrant be
17 | sealed by the Clerk of Court until further notice of this Court or any other Courtof competent
18| jurisdic —
19 KeuikdKe $i dfadfoay
2 Judge of the Superior Court > Es te
21 KEVIN S. ROSENBERG [3 R
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3 rene . “OB

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