Wilson 1994
Wilson 1994
Wilson 1994
It Changed
Ian Wilson
F OK MORE THAN 20 YEARS, SINCE ITS INTRODUCTION Strategic planning has changed dramatically since its
onto the corporate management scene in the early inception in the early 1970s. Having survived its original
197Os, strategic planning has been on a rollercoaster design flaws, it has evolved into a viable system of
ride. It has been, successively, a fad, an anathema, strategic management (or strategic thinking), In an
and just another management tool. It has bounced effort to be more specific abaut the nature and extent
around the corporate hiearchy in search of a of these changes, the author surveyed nearly 50
legitimate role and an appropriate home. Its corporations in a variety of countries and industries to
obsession with a succession of planning methodolo- determine their current practices and the changes that
gies has caused it to oscillate between quantitative have occurred over the past 5-7 years.
and qualitative tools in its analyses, between Among the more notable and important changes are
external and internal emphasis in its situation a marked shift of planning responsibility from staff to
assessment, between long-term and short-term focus tine managers; decentralization of strategic planning to
in its goals and measurements. In all of this, strategic business units [though corporate-level components
planning might be said to have reflected the retain key responsibilities); and vastly increased
turbulence, change, and uncertainty of the times in attention to the changing market, competitive and
which it has been evolving. technological environment.
Planning systems have become more sophisticated
in their selection of planning techniques. There is far
The Continuing Search for Planning less reliance on a single technique {such as the
growth-share matrix or the experience curve), and a
Effectiveness
greater willingness to use techniques (such as scenario
That assessment, however, is too kind. The fact planning and total quality management) that are less
remains that, in its early stages, strategic planning mechanistic in their approach and more sensitive to the
suffered from serious design flaws; and these flaws critical uncertainty of many of the variables that
came close to bringing about its early demise (see planning must address.
Box A: What Went Wrong?). By the early 198Os, Perhaps the most provocative finding, however, is
there was widespread disenchantment with the the growing emphasis on organization and cu$ure as
planning initiatives of the previous decade. The critical ingredients in the execution of strategy. This
reasons varied from company to company-over- change represents a recognition that the values,
elaborate processes and bureaucratic ‘spread’, staff motivation, and behaviour of the organization’s
preemption of the executives’ role, an emphasis on members are critical determinants of corporate
quantification over strategic insight-but focused performance-and so of success or failure in
mainly on the failure to achieve results (the so-called implementing strategy.
‘implementation gap’).
What has saved strategic planning from oblivion,
and powered the continuing search for planning process of thinking and rethinking the rapidly chang-
effectiveness, is the manifest need for a continuous ing conditions for corporate success in the light of:
PfXga111011 Long Kanp Planning Vol. 27. No. 4. pp. 12 to 24. 1994
0024-S301(94~EOOZO-5 Copyright 0 1994 Elswier Science I.td
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0024-6301194 $7.00+.00
BOX 7: STRATEGIC PLANNING: WHAT WENT WRONG?
Strategic planning enjoyed a heyday of almost unquestioning corporate popularity for nearly a decade-from the late 1960s to about
1978-during which period no self-respecting chief executive officer (CEO) would dare appear before the Board of Directors without a
strategic planning system either in place or under development. Yet by the early 1980s executive disenchantment was rampant, and
Foriune editor Walter Kiechel was delivering a series of slashing attacks on the process (e.g. his articles on ‘The Decline of the
Experience Curve’ and ‘The Real World Strikes Back: Corporate Strategists Under Fire’). Criticism focused on ‘the failed promise’ of
strategic planning: companies had set up elaborate planning systems and devised sophisticated strategies, but little or nothing had
changed in corporate performance.
Why this sudden turn-around I am convinced that a major cause was the large, and too often indiscriminant, ‘follow-the-leader’
movement triggered by General Electric’s much-heralded movement into strategic planning in 1970-1971. Having been with GE at
that time, I witnessed the steady stream of corporate visitors, notebooks in hand, intent on absorbing the design and details of the GE
model, with little thought for the model’s appropriateness to their situations or for the cultural differences involved. These oversights
later came back, all too often, to haunt them.
More broadly, however, the causes of this failure stem from what I have termed ‘the seven deadly sins of strategic planning’ (at
least as it was practised during the 1970s).
7. The staff took over the process. This situation arose partly because CEOs created new staff components to deal with a new
function, partly because the staff moved in to fill a vacuum created by middle management’s indifference to a new responsibility,
and partly because of arrogance and empire-building. As a result, planning staffs all too often cut executives out of the strategy
development process, turning them into little more than rubber stamps, and ignored the fact that strategic planning is, and must
always be, an executive-not a staff-responsibility.
2. The process dominated the staff The process’s methodologies became increasingly elaborate. Staff placed too much emphasis on
analysis, too little on true strategic insights. Analyses thus proliferated, impeding decision-making and creating the
‘paralysis-by-analysis’ syndrome. Strategic thinking became equated with strategic planning, while documentation became more
and more elaborate. Jack Welch, the chairman and CEO of GE, described the outcome graphically:
The books got thicker, the printing got more sophisticated, the covers got harder, and the drawings got better.
Such a triumph of form over substance is well known to any observer of corporate bureaucracy.
Paradoxically, however, although the planning process became overtly elaborate and bureaucratic, in many cases it relied
excessively on a single technique or methodology-the experience curve, for instance, or the growth/share matrix. Given the
range of issues and factors that strategic planning has to deal with, such reliance was manifestly misplaced: no single
methodology could fulfil all needs, and this approach was doomed to failure.
3. Planning systems were virtually designed to produce no results. Perverse though this idea may seem, it was true for many
corporate systems. The main design failure lay in denying, or diminishing, the planning role of the very executives whose mandate
was to execute the strategy. As one critic noted, the attitude of many was typified by the angry retort of one executive. ‘The
matrix picked the strategy-let the matrix implement it!’ The other design fault was the failure to integrate the strategic planning
system with the operations system, resulting in a strategy that did not drive action.
4. Planning focused on the more exciting game of mergers, acquisitions and divestitures at the expense of core business
development. This problem stemmed in part from the temper of the times. But it also resulted from the inappropriate use of
planning tools such as the growth/share matrix. Above all, it came from a radical misperception about ‘cash cows’. The biggest
problem with portfolio planning involved the treatment of these mature businesses. The matrix called for a ‘harvest’ strategy, so
companies raised profit goals, curtailed investments, and tightened controls. In due course, morale dropped, action plans
languished, and the business failed to deliver its required cash flow. The vice chairman of a major manufacturing company
summed up the problem as follows:
In the 1970s. we may not have invested enough in some of our mature businesses. We just assumed that if a business was
in a slowly growing market, it was not a very good business. Now we understand much better just how profitable such a
business can be, even though its industry is growing by only two per cent. We have redefined the cash cow conceptand
are investing a lot of money in SBUs we used to call cash cows. [emphasis added]
5. Planning processes failed to develop true strategic choices. In their anxiety to prove that they were action-oriented, too many
companies devised planning systems that fell into the ‘ready, fire, aim’ trap. Planners and executives rushed to adopt the first
strategy that ‘satisficed’ (i.e. met certain basic conditions in an acceptable manner). They made no real effort to search for, or
analyse, an array of strategy alternatives before making a decision. As a result, companies all too often adopted strategies by
default rather than by choice.
6. Planning neglected the organizational and cultural requirements of strategy. No better example of this exists than the SBU concept.
The concept is wonderful for identifying and organizing the corporate entities appropriate for doing business in defined market
segments against a defined set of competitors. This focus, however, overlooks or shortchanges the internal differences among
SBUs. Thus, the process focused, rightly, on the external environment, but it did so at the expense of the internal environment
that is critical in the implementation stages.
Z Single-point forecasting was an inappropriate basis for planning in an era of restructuring and uncertainty. Despite their emphasis
on the crucial externalities of the business, and despite the establishment of some sosphisticated corporate environmental analysis
systems, companies still tended to rely on single-point forecasting. Scenario-based planning was the exception rather than the
rule. Unfortunately, in an age of uncertainty, single-point forecasting was-and is-inherently inaccurate. Plans that relied on it
suffered increased vulnerability to surprises, which abounded in the 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed it was planning’s perceived
failure to foresee, and plan for, the sharp recession of 1982 that nearly administered the coup de g&e to strategic planning.
There was a further problem with single-point forecasting. Because planning assumptions spelled out a single future, one that was
almost always some slight variation of an extrapolation of past trends, there was an inherent bias in favour of continuing a
‘momentum strategy’, on the theory that what had worked in the past would probably work in the assumed future. Nothing,
unfortunately, could have been further from the truth.
What have been the major changes, in the past 5-7 years, in your company’s approach to strategic planning and strategic
management?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Increased role of line managers 1 5
4.22
Reduced role of staff
3.j3
Decentralization of strategic planning 4
to business units 4.b6
to the criticisms that brought strategic planning into ties and technology strategy which are more recent
disrepute a decade earlier, namely that the planning arrivals on the strategic planning scene.
models of the 1970s tended to be (a) overly con-
cerned with the manipulation of internal financial
Heightening the External Emphasis
data, and (b) largely staff-driven exercises.
Not surprisingly, in view of the radical industry and
Japanese respondents differed from their North
American and European counterparts in reporting market restructuring of recent years, more sophisti-
more change in their emphasis on core competencies cated executive attention to changing market and
and technology strategy, and less change in their competitive conditions-and to identifying and
emphasis on competitive and market analyses and in strengthening core competencies to deal with these
redefining the planning roles of managers and staff. conditions-has become the key to successful
One interpretation of this difference is that, 5 years strategic positioning. The great majority of respond-
ago, Japanese companies were already well- ents indicated that these were the two prime areas in
advanced in their market orientation, and so have which there has been the greatest change in their
devoted relatively more attention to core competen- planning systems. In most cases it has been not
What, in your opinion, are the three most critical external, and internal, challenges to successful strategic management in
your company?
Sharper focus
Improved understanding of
changing business environment
1 2 3 4 5
*Totals do not add to 46 since not all companies responded on Note: Only 36 out of the 46 companies completed this section of
each point. the survey.
Size distribution
Number of employees
(thousands)
< 25 30
25 to 50 5
50 to 100 6
> 100 5