Jake Brancatella

Master's in Theology and Philosophy

Ash'arism: The Creed of the Ummah?

Introduction

The relationship between descriptions of God in scripture and rational theology has

been discussed considerably across different traditions, and a broad spectrum of opinions

exists. Some theologians of the Fideistic persuasion hold that faith and reason are adversaries.1

Other theologians claim faith and reason do not contradict one another, and these supposed

contradictions are superficial.2 Variations of the above views exist, but their complexities are

not crucial for current purposes.

Ash'arism, or Ash'ari theology, is one of the three primary Sunni schools of Islamic

theology. The two other major Sunni schools of theology are the Maturidi and Athari

(traditionalist) schools. In this instance, "Sunni" distinguishes these three groups from Shi'ism

and its branches. This paper will focus on Ash'arism's view of scriptural language describing God

(Allah) and how this relates to their theories of kalaam (speculative theology). Much of what

follows likewise could be said of the Maturidi school, barring rare exceptions.

1Penelhum, Terence (2010). Fideism. In Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper & Philip L. Quinn (eds.),
A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 441–447.

2El-Tobgui, C. S. (2022). "Chapter 3 On the Incoherence of the Universal Rule and the
Theoretical Impossibility of a Contradiction between Reason and Revelation". In Ibn Taymiyya
on Reason and Revelation. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
 Ash'ari theologians affirm that God can be known independently of the Qur'an, but does

this knowledge they claim to have acquired conflict with the apparent meanings of the Qur'an's

representation of God? If so-called "rational proofs" regarding the nature of God clash with the

evident meaning of the Qur'an, then why is there such a discrepancy? Why would God reveal

scripture in such a way that the plain meaning of His revelation would possess the potential to

mislead most of humanity? Another potential concern is the nature of the beliefs of ordinary

Muslims. How does the average Muslim understand scriptural language concerning God, and

what level of responsibility do they possess for holding such beliefs? This paper will explore and

answer these questions through the texts of Ash'ari scholars who have sought to address them.

The Ash'ari School

The Ash'ari school bears the name of its intellectual founder, Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari,

who was born in Basra, Iraq, in 873 CE and died in 936 CE. Al-Ash'ari was originally a follower of

the Mu'tazili school of theology but later became dissatisfied with the school.3 Al-Ash'ari

denounced Mu'tazili theology and formed a new school patterned after his predecessor, Ibn

Kullab. This project was an attempt to use kalaami (speculative theological) methods, which al-

Ash'ari learned during his Mu'tazili training, while in his mind, attempting to be more faithful to

the text of scripture than the Mu'tazila. Some notable Ash'ari scholars include al-Baqillani, Ibn

Furak, al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Amidi, al-Subki, and al-Sanusi.

3Frank, R. M. (2020). Texts and studies on the development and history of Kalam: the
Mutá zilites and Al-Ashári. Vol. II, Chapter VI, Early Islamic theology (D. Gutas, Ed.; 1st ed.).
Routledge.
 The Ash'ari school is certainly not a monolith. However, this paper focuses on a specific

aspect of the Ash'ari school's methodology concerning the interpretation of scripture and its

potentially problematic consequences. The Ash'ari school comprises the majority of Sunni

scholarship today and has for several centuries. Unquestionably, this was not always the case.4

The history and development of the Ash'ari school are complex, but its eventual rise to

dominance amongst Sunni scholars for various reasons is undeniable.

Some Athari (traditionalists) may seek to deny the claim that the Ash'ari school is the

largest amongst Sunni scholars today or at least qualify this claim. Indeed, most scholars who

proudly bear the title of "Ash'ari" do not specialize in kalaam. Consequently, they do not

understand the complexities or intricate details of kalaam.5 Nevertheless, they certainly would

not qualify as Atharis. However, the sheer number of scholars who align with a particular

theological school at one time or another is not necessarily indicative of the soundness of the

school itself. Ash'aris themselves must accept this, as there were times when they did not

constitute the majority of scholarship. If we broaden the question of which school has the most

adherents, including the 'awaam (laity/general public), the Athari school would comprise the

majority of the Muslim ummah (community). The admission of Ash'ari scholars themselves

establishes this claim.

4Makdisi, G. (1962). Ashʿarī and the Ash'arites in Islamic Religious History I. Studia Islamica, 17,
37–80.

5 See al‐Nawawi, ‫( المجموع رشح المهذب‬Al-Majmo' Sharh Al-Muhadhdhab)

َ َ ‫ن‬ ْ َ ْ َ ُّ َ َ ُ َ‫الم َت َف ِّقه ن‬ َ ِّ َ ْ ُ َّ ْ َ
‫قائ ِق الكالم‬
ِ ‫ض ِ يف د‬ ِ ‫ي والفق‬
ِ ‫هاء الكف عن الخو‬ ‫ماه ر ِي ُ ِ ر‬ ِ ‫بل الصواب ِللعوام وج‬
 Al-Sanusi on the Beliefs of the 'Awaam (Laity)

At a popular level, zealous and sometimes naïve proponents of both the Ash'ari and

Athari schools debate over which school comprises the majority of the Muslim ummah

(community). This confusion may be partially due to a miscommunication between these two

groups. What does the phrase "Muslim ummah" mean in the above claim, and what is its

intended function in the debate? If representatives of Asha'rism simply desire to convey that

most scholars today identify as Ash'ari in creed, then informed Atharis should readily accept

this fact. However, suppose the purpose of the Ash'ari claimant is that most Muslims in general,

including the laity, are Ash'ari in creed. This claim is indeed false, even according to Ash’ari

scholars.

The Ash'ari scholar Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi in his famous work of creed states,

‫ يتحقق منهم اعتقاد التجسيم والجهة‬,‫الخي‬ ‫وأما العامة ر‬,

‫فأكيهم ممن ال ن‬
‫ ومخالطة أهل ر‬,‫يعتن بحضور مجالس العلماء‬
‫ي‬

‫ ومرة يتكلم ومرة‬,‫ وكون كالمه جل وعال حرفا وصوتا‬,‫وتأثي الطبيعة‐ القول باألسباب‐ وكون أفعال هللا تعاىل معللة لغرض‬
‫ر‬

6‫عىل كفر معتقدها‬ ‫ كسائر ر‬,‫يسكت‬

‫ وبعض اعتقاداتهم أجمع العلماء‬,‫ ونحو ذلك من اعتقادات أهل الباطل‬,‫البش‬

Most laypeople exhibit a lack of engagement with scholarly gatherings and interactions

with pious individuals. This leads to a prevalence of erroneous theological concepts

among them, including anthropomorphism, assigning directionality to God, the

attribution of events to natural causes (affirming secondary causation), the belief that

6 Al-Sanusi, Sharh Umm al-Baraheen

 God's actions are purposeful, and the misconception that His speech is composed of

letters and sounds, sometimes He speaks, and sometimes He is silent, like human

speech. These notions align with the doctrines of the people of falsehood. Significantly,

some of these beliefs have been condemned as kufr (disbelief) by the ijma’ (consensus)

of Islamic scholars. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

This passage is from a standard text in Ash'ari theology, taught for centuries in institutes

around the Muslim world, particularly in northwest Africa. Al-Sanusi cannot be accused of

mincing words in the above citation. Al-Sanusi begins by mentioning that ordinary people differ

from the typical demographic who attend gatherings spearheaded by scholars. This statement

of al-Sanusi is true now more than ever, considering the fast-paced lifestyle of the modern

world, which leaves ordinary people struggling to find leisure time to engage in communal

activities.7 Al-Sanusi lists several beliefs that he believes the commoners possess. These beliefs

are problematic, to say the least, some of which qualify as kufr (disbelief) according to al-Sanusi

and the supposed ijma’ (consensus) of the scholars. Many of the beliefs attributed to the laity

by al-Sanusi are affirmed by Atharis, which apparently renders traditionalist scholars outside

consideration of the alleged consensus.

The first accusation by al-Sanusi is that the typical Muslim believes in tajseem

(anthropomorphism). More specifically, in this context, this term carries the significance of

7Finlay, J., Esposito, M., Kim, M. H., Gomez-Lopez, I., & Clarke, P. (2019). Closure of 'third
places'? Exploring potential consequences for collective health and wellbeing. Health & place,
p. 60, 102225.
affirming that God is a bodily substance. However, the next supposedly problematic belief that

the commoners possess is the belief that God is in a jiha (direction). The notion of directionality

is related to the previous claim regarding God being a body, as al-Sanusi and the Ash'aris

maintain that anything in a direction must be a body. The claim that anything in a direction

must be a body has been questioned, but that dispute is not germane to this article's

objectives.8 Next, al-Sanusi states that ordinary Muslims believe that created things have

natures or essences. In this case, al-Sanusi refers to the idea that ordinary people believe

created entities possess an intrinsic power or potentiality created by God. This position affirms

secondary causation in the world, which is contrary to the standard Ash'ari doctrine of

Occasionalism. Occasionalism can be understood as a denial of secondary causality, along with

the positive declaration of God directly creating everything in existence at any given moment.9

An illustration is required to understand why the layperson affirms secondary causation

and rejects Occasionalism. When I press down on the keys of the keyboard in front of me as I

type this article, I do so with the positive belief that my fingers contacting the keys are at least

in some sense responsible for the letters and words appearing on the screen before me. The

doctrine of Occasionalism denies this. No real relationship exists between my fingers moving

and pressing down on the keyboard and the apparent effect of these words appearing on the

8Hoover, J. (2018). Ibn Taymiyya's use of Ibn Rushd to refute the incorporealism of Fakhr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī. In A. Al Ghouz (Ed.), Islamic Philosophy from the 12th till the 14th Century (469–492).
Goettingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

9Lee, Sukjae, "Occasionalism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/occasionalism/>.
screen. The appearance of a real connection between created causes and effects in the world is

illusory. God creates the cause and the effect at each moment independent of the material

objects that seem to be involved. Ash'ari scholars typically appeal to "rational" arguments and

verses from the Qur'an, attempting to support their doctrine of Occasionalism. Those who

affirm secondary causation in the Islamic tradition, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, likewise argue

against Ash'ari Occasionalism based on verses of the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Prophetic

tradition) coupled with rational arguments.10 Weighing the arguments in detail on both sides

requires a separate article.

Another belief al-Sanusi attributes to the 'awaam (laity) is the belief that God acts for

specific reasons. Why would anyone believe that? Many people who believe in God seek to

understand why God allows certain things to happen. Sometimes, we experience difficulties

and wonder what God's purposes are behind these trials and tribulations. The very act of

pondering God's reasons for allowing these hardships presupposes that God has at least some

reasons for His actions. Muslims familiar with the Qur'an may also come to this conclusion by

reading the verses that state that Allah (God) created human beings for a specific purpose.11

More broadly, Allah is said not to have created anything aimlessly or without a reason.12 From a

10 Ibn Taymiyya, On Causality and Reliance On God, Chapter 2, Translated by Tallal M. Zeni.
ُ ُ ْ َ َّ َ ْ َ َّ ْ ُ ْ َ َ َ َ
11
ِ ‫وما خلقت ٱل ِجن و ِٱْلنس ِإَّل ِليعبد‬
Qur'an 51:56 ‫ون‬

Sahih International: And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me.
َ ُ َ َ َ ُ َّ َ ُ َ ْ َ َ َّ َ ُ ََ
12 Qur'an 23:115 ‫أف َح ِس ْبت ْم أن َما خلقن ٰـك ْم َع َب ًۭثا َوأنك ْم ِإل ْينا َّل ت ْر َج ُعون‬
rational perspective, individuals who do not act for particular reasons are viewed as lacking

wisdom for acting foolishly and recklessly.13

Ash'ari scholars are acutely aware of the previously mentioned problems with this

doctrine. Contemporary Ash'ari scholar Sa'id Foudah, commenting on this issue, agrees that

Allah cannot act without wisdom (hikmah) as this would render His acts "futile." However,

Foudah denies that Allah acts with motives (aghrad). As Foudah understands it, the difference

is that, "Wisdom is the result of an action or judgment, and it is not a motivator for a particular

thing."14 In other words, a motive (gharad) is in some sense prior to the act and informs the act

or plays an explanatory role in the equation. Wisdom (hikma) for the Ash’aris is said to be the

result of an action, but this entails that God's wisdom does not have any explanatory power.

Foudah's explanation places wisdom external to God and in His created effects instead of an

eternal, intrinsic attribute of God that informs us of God's reasons for His actions. How can God

be attributed with wisdom when wisdom is present in His created effects instead of Himself?

Ash'aris have a genuine motivation of attempting to protect God's freedom. The

rationale is that if God acts for particular reasons, then His actions would be constrained in

some sense, and He would need to fulfill specific objectives. God is entirely free and does not

need anything. Therefore, God does not act for reasons. Unfortunately, the Ash'ari "solution" to

Sahih International: Then did you think that We created you uselessly and that to Us you would
not be returned?"

13 Ward, T. M. (2020). Divine Ideas, 5. Cambridge University Press.

14 Sa'id Foudah, A Refined Explanation of The Sanusi Creed The Foundational Proofs, pg 111.
this perceived problem results in more problems than it solves. This doctrine renders God

imperfect as a being who does not act for reasons, which entails that His actions are arbitrary

and foolish. Ash'arism places God's wisdom in human beings, while human beings seek wisdom

greater than themselves to contextualize their worldly troubles. The Ash'ari account of divine

wisdom results in errantly considering God's wisdom as the explanandum instead of the

explanans.

Another difficulty with the Ash'ari rejection of God’s intentional actions relates to the

grammatical structure of the Qur'an. The Qur'an says, “And I (Allah) did not create the jinn and

mankind except to worship Me.”15 Any verse in the Qur'an that appears in the above structure

where God seems to be ascribed with reasons for His actions via the lām purpose clause must

be interpreted as a lām al-'aqiba (lām of outcome) and not lām al-ta'lil (lām of reason). Al-

Qunawi, commenting on this verse, says, "Worship is not a literal reason for the creation; it is

metaphorical."16 All apparent instances of the lām of reason applying to Allah's actions in the

Qur'an must be interpreted metaphorically, considering Ash'arism's doctrine of divine action.

This doctrine causes further difficulties when analyzing why God would send revelation that

would mislead most human beings.

ُ ُ ْ َ َّ َ ْ َ َّ ْ ُ ْ َ َ َ َ
15
ِ ‫وما خلقت ٱل ِجن و ِٱْلنس ِإَّل ِليعبد‬
Qur'an 51:56 ‫ون‬

Sahih International: And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me.

16 Sa'id Foudah, A Refined Explanation of The Sanusi Creed The Foundational Proofs, pg 112.
 The final belief al-Sanusi ascribes to the laity is that God speaks with letters and sounds.

Sometimes, He speaks, and other times, He remains silent. Upon reading the story in the Qur'an

where God speaks to Moses, common Muslims typically conclude that God speaks with letters

and sounds. Sometimes, He speaks, and other times, He does not speak. The Qur'anic narrative

describes God speaking directly to Moses in a conversational style. God speaks, and Moses

responds, then God speaks again, and Moses responds again. This story implies that sometimes

God speaks, and other times does not speak, remaining silent while Moses responds.17 This

dialogue also indicates that God speaks with letters and sounds, as the Qur'an quotes the

letters and words that God spoke, which Moses heard. Several other verses in the Qur'an quote

Allah's speech, indicating that He speaks with letters and sounds whenever He wills. 18

Laypeople are not alone in believing that God speaks with letters and sounds whenever

He wills. From the past to the present, Hanbali traditionalist scholars held that God's kalaam

(speech) consists of letters and sounds.19 One proof Hanbalis used to support this position is

that the Qur'an itself is considered the kalaam of Allah. The Qur'an, being God's speech,

comprises letters and words. Therefore, God's speech comprises letters, words, and sounds.

Ash'aris rejected the notion of God speaking and remaining silent whenever He wills because

17 Qur'an 20:9-48

18Qur'an 42:51 Sahih International: And it is not for any human being that Allāh should speak to
him except by revelation or from behind a partition or that He sends a messenger [i.e., angel] to
reveal, by His permission, what He wills. Indeed, He is Most High and Wise.
َ َّ َ ْ َ ْ ُ ُ
19 Ibn Qudamah, ‫الرش ِاد‬ ‫يل‬
ِ ‫ ل ْم َعة ِاْل ْع ِتق ِاد ال َه ِادي ِإىل َس ِب‬,The Illuminating Creed
ْ ُ
ُ‫ي َو َح ْبل ُه ال َمت ن‬ ْ ُ ‫ َو ُه َو ك َت‬،‫يم‬ ُ ‫آن ْال َعظ‬
ُ ُْْ َُ َ ْ ُ َ َ
‫ي َو‬ ‫ر‬ ِ
ُ‫اب هللا ال ُمب ن‬
‫ر‬ ِ ِ ِ ِ ‫هللا سبحانه القر‬ ِ ‫َ َو ِم ْن كال ِم‬
َ ْ ُْ َ ُ ُّ ‫ن‬ ُ َ َ ْ ُْ َ‫يل َر ِّب ْال َع َالم ن‬ ُ ‫اطه ْال ُم ْس َتق‬
ُ ‫يم َو َت نْ ني‬ ُ َ
‫يه ُم ْحك ْم‬ ِ َ ‫اح ِف ِف‬ ِ ‫ور َم ْس ُموع ِباآلذ ِان َمكتوب ِ ن يف ال َم َص‬ ِ ‫الصد‬ ‫ي… َمتلو ِباألل ِسن ِة ت ْحفوظ يف‬ ‫ر‬ ِ ِ ِ ‫ِِص‬
ْ ََ ُْ َ َ َ َ َ ُ َْ َ ََ َ َُ َ
‫ه‬ ‫اسخ ومنسوخ وخاص وعام وأمر ون ي‬ ِ ‫ومتش ِابة ون‬
they claimed it entailed ascribing new events or accidents to God. Ash'aris assert that ‫ما ال يخلو‬

‫( عن الحوادث فهو حادث‬whatever is not free of hawaadith (new events) is itself haadith

(originated).20 [Translated by Jake Brancatella] A rejection of this principle nullifies their famous

argument, which seeks to establish the existence of God via the impossibility of an infinite

regress of past events.

God speaking at different times by His will and power is one issue underneath a broader

subject relating to God's successive actions. For example, the Qur'an describes God in tensed

language, performing different actions at distinct times. Whether God acts successively or not is

not limited to acts of speech but includes distinct acts of creating, sustaining, judging, and

more. Like the lām al-ta'lil (lām of reason) topic mentioned earlier, Ash'aris must inevitably

reinterpret the verses of the Qur'an, which appear to denote God acting in succession.

However, some Ash'aris expressed doubts after recognizing the difficulty in maintaining this

position.

Al-Razi's Reservations

Major Ash'ari scholar Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in a work entitled al-Matalib al-'Aliyah

authored later in his life states,

20 al‐Ghazali, M. (1985). (Qawaʻid Al‐ʻAqaʼid‫( قواعد العقائد‬2nd ed, pg 155.). ‫عالم الكتب‬.
 ‫ إن هذا القول قال به ر‬:‫ وأنا أقول‬.‫الكرامية‬
‫أكي أرباب‬ ً ‫هل يعقل أن يكون هللا محال للحوادث؟ قالوا أن هذا قول لم يقل به إال‬

21‫وجوه‬ ‫ إال أنه الزم عليهم من‬،‫ فإنهم يدون الفرار من هذا القول‬:‫ أما األشعرية‬،‫المذاهب‬

Is it conceivable that Allah could be the locus of events? They said this was a statement

that nobody, but the Karramiyyah believed. I, however, contend that this statement has

been affirmed by most of the heads of the theological schools. As for the Ash'aris, they

try their utmost to evade this assertion, yet their own principles inevitably entail it.

[Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Al-Razi says that people claim the Karramiyyah are the only sect who accepted ascribing

hawaadith (new events/accidents) to God. Al-Razi denies this and asserts that the Ash'aris tried

to avoid this conclusion but failed. In the following section after the above quote, al-Razi then

attempts to provide arguments for why all theological schools must accept ascribing hawaadith

(new events/accidents) to God. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi expressed doubt regarding the standard

view of the Mutakallimun in another text saying,

‫ن‬
‫ و هو‬،‫ ولكن فيه إشكال‬،‫بتغي المتعلقات؟ الالئق بأصولنا أن ال نحكم بذلك‬ ‫ يف أن الصفات هل يجب ر‬:‫الفصل التاسع‬
‫تغيها ر‬
‫ن‬
‫والثان محال؛ ألن المتجدد ال بد له من مؤثر وذلك المؤثر إما أن يكون‬ ،‫تغي تلك التعلقات إما أن يكون ألمر أو ال ألمر‬
‫ي‬ ‫أن ر‬
‫ن‬ َّ ّ
‫لتغي‬
‫تغي المتعلق تابع ر‬ ‫ وإن كان ي‬،‫ فهو مطلوب‬:‫ فإن كان األول‬، ‫ أو شيئا منفصال‬،‫المتعلق أو المتعلق‬
‫ فهو محال؛ ألن ر‬:‫الثان‬

21Fakhr Al‐Din Al‐Razi, ‫( المطالب العالية‬Al‐Matālib al‐'Āliyyah min al‐ 'ilm al‐ilahī) ‫دار الكتاب العرن‬
‫ م ‐ ربيوت لبنان‬1987 ‫ ـه‬1407 ‫ األوىل‬Vol. 2, pg 106
‫ والثالث محال؛ ألن األمر المنفصل الذي ال تعلق له بذلك التعلق‬،‫لتغي المتعلق لزم الدور‬
‫تغي التعلق تابعا ر‬
‫ فإن كان ر‬،‫التعلق‬

22‫عظيمة‬ ‫ وهذا مأخذ عظيم يتنبه منه عىل إشكاالت‬،‫لتغي التعلق‬

‫تغيه سببا ر‬
‫يستحيل أن يجعل ر‬

Chapter 9: Do the Divine Attributes necessarily change with the change of their

correlates?

According to our principles, we should not assert that the Divine Attributes change with

the change of their correlates. However, there is a difficulty with this view. When these

correlations [i.e. relations] change, it must be either due to something or due to

nothing. The latter is impossible because anything that comes to be necessarily has a

cause. This cause could be either the thing to which there is correlation [i.e. God's

essence and positive attributes], the correlate [itself] [i.e. the created effect], or

something separate [and entirely different].

If it is the first, then it is what we are seeking. If it is the second, then it is impossible.

This is because the change of the correlate depends on the change of the attribute's

relation. If the change of relation depends on the change of the correlate, we fall into

circular dependence. If it is the third, then it is also impossible. This is because the

change of a separate entity that has no relation to the original relation cannot be the

cause of the change in the original relation. This is a significant problem that leads to

other great difficulties. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

22 Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Nihayah al-ʿUqul fī Dirayah al-Usul, ed. Saʿīd Foudah, vol. 2, pg 473
 ‫‪In the above passage, al-Razi discusses the difficulty of explaining the relationship‬‬

‫‪between God's attributes and things that change in the universe. After mentioning the possible‬‬

‫‪responses available to an Ash'ari, al-Razi states that he is drawing attention to these enormous‬‬

‫‪problems, which require more appropriate answers. From this passage, al-Razi was dissatisfied‬‬

‫‪with Ash'ari attempts to solve this problem and was alerting others in hopes of someone else‬‬

‫‪successfully resolving the difficulty.‬‬

‫‪Critics may suggest an alternative interpretation of al-Razi. However, the interpretation‬‬

‫‪provided above is certainly not unique. Afdal al-Din al-Khunaji/Khunji, one of al-Razi's most‬‬

‫‪prominent students,23 comments on the passage from al-Razi's al-Matalib saying,‬‬

‫ن‬
‫لغيه‬
‫يف أنه يمتنع أن يكون الباري تعاىل محال ر‬

‫اعلم أن الناس يعتقدون أنه لم يقل( يكون الباري تعاىل )‪ (۳‬محال( للحوادث إال الكرامية‪ ،‬وذلك هو قول ر‬
‫أكي الناس‬

‫عش نف األصل‪ ،‬ويبحث نف ن ن‬

‫تييه الخالق ‐ ق ‐ عن أن يكون محال ر‬
‫لغيه‪ ،‬وعىل الرغم من‬ ‫هذا الفصل هنا هو الفصل الخامس ر‬
‫ي‬ ‫ي‬
‫حن األشاعرة و ى ن‬
‫المعيلة‬ ‫أنه لم يرصح بهذا القول إال الكرامية‪ ،‬إال أن الرازي يرى أن ر‬
‫أكي المذاهب والملل نقول بهذا القول‪ ،‬ى‬

‫ىن‬
‫المعيلة‪ ،‬إال أن الرازي يلزم‬ ‫والفالسفة‪ ،‬وأقول‪ :‬إنه إذا كان القول يكونه تعاىل محال للحوادث قد ِصح به الكرامية وبعض‬

‫‪:‬األشاعرة أيضا هذا المذهب‪ ،‬ومعلوم أن الزم المذهب ليس بالزم‪ ،‬وأعتقد أن الرازي دفعه ن يف هذا لهذا القول عدة أمور‪ :‬أوال‬

‫أنه جعل بداية عرضه للمسألة ن يف صيغة سؤال فحواه‪« :‬هل يعقل أن يكون محال للحوادث؟ وهذا السؤال يجعل بحث‬
‫ً‬ ‫الموضوع من طرف الرازي نف دائرة التعقل أو اْلمكان‪ .‬ثانيا‪ :‬إظهاره معرفته ى‬
‫بشن المذاهب وأقوالها‪ ،‬وثالثا‪ :‬محاولة الرازي‬ ‫ي‬
‫رن‬
‫المخالفي‪ ،‬وإن وهو منهم كان‬ ‫الداخىل لرأي األشاعرة ‐ مما يدل عىل أن األشاعرة ليس عندهم ما يخشون ظهوره عىل‬ ‫للنقد‬
‫ي‬

‫‪23‬‬‫‪Yasin Ceylan (1980), Theology and Tafsir in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, pg 22.‬‬
‫‪University of Edinburgh‬‬
 ‫ وإنما ي‬،‫ ما ال يخلو من الحوادث فهو حادث ليست قضية بديهية‬:‫ إن قاعدة‬:‫يمكن القول‬
‫ وأمر معروف باالكتساب‬،‫ه دعوى‬

‫وبالتاىل فال يمكن القطع بتجويز تطبيقها عىل الخالق ‐ ‐ من باب قياس الغائب عىل الشاهد‬
‫ي‬ ،‫من خالل األمور المشاهدة‬،

‫ وهو أن ذاته تعاىل ليست‬،‫عقىل‬

‫ي‬ ‫ وهو مدفوع بأمر ثابت بدليل‬،‫ألن تطبيق هذه القاعدة ن يف هذه الحالة من باب الظنيات‬

24‫للحوادث‬ ‫محال‬

On the impossibility of the Exalted Creator (Allah) being a place/locus for anything else

People generally believe that only the Karramiyyah school has stated that the Exalted

Creator (Allah) cannot be a place/locus for events. And this is the opinion of most

people.

This is the fifteenth chapter in the principle, and it explores the concept of tanzih (divine

transcendence) regarding the Creator being a locus of events. Although only the

Karramiyyah explicitly affirmed this view, Al-Razi argues that most schools of thought

and religions hold this view as well, even the Ash'aris, Mu'tazilah, and philosophers.

Here, I argue that while the Karramiyyah and some Mu'tazilah explicitly stated the

Exalted Creator is a locus of events, Al-Razi also attributes this view to the Ash'aris. It's

well-known that the entailment of a position is not the actual position. I believe Al-Razi

was driven to this statement for several reasons:

24 Afdal al-Din al-Khunaji/Khunji, al-Matalib al-ʿaliya fi l-ʿilm al-ilahi

 Firstly, he frames the initial question as: "Is it conceivable that He (Allah) be a locus of

events?" This frames his discussion within the realm of reason or possibility.

Secondly, he demonstrates his knowledge of various schools of thought and their

positions.

Thirdly, Al-Razi attempts an internal critique of the Ash'ari view, suggesting they have

nothing to fear from revealing. Additionally, one could argue that the principle

"Whatever is not free from temporal events is itself temporally originated" is not a self-

evident proposition, but just a claim. Consequently, definitively applying it to the

Exalted Creator through analogy between the unseen and the seen (qiyas al-ghayb ‘ala

al-shahid) is not possible. Applying this principle here falls under conjecture, refuted by

a definitive proposition based on rational proof: the Exalted One's essence is not a locus

for events. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Al-Khunaji interprets the passage from al-Razi in the same manner argued for in this

paper. Although the Ash’aris and most other schools do not explicitly ascribe hawaadith (new

events) to God, al-Khunaji states that al-Razi argues it is the entailment of the opinions of the

various schools. The three reasons al-Khunaji provides for why he believes al-Razi took this

position are: the way al-Razi begins the topic with a question indicates that ascribing hawaadith

to God is a genuine possibility, al-Razi demonstrates his knowledge of the different schools and

provides an internal critique of the common Ash’ari response to this problem. Finally, al-Khunaji

mentions that someone could argue that the principle of ‫( ما ال يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث‬whatever

is not free of hawaadith (new events) is itself haadith (originated) is not a self-evident principle,
but simply an unsubstantiated claim. Al-Khunaji also states that someone could argue that

universally applying this principle via qiyas (analogy) from creation to the Creator is impossible

and merely conjecture. This conjecture is refuted by rational evidence. Unsurprisingly, Al-Razi’s

student was not alone in his interpretation.

Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani referenced al-Razi's statements from al-Matalib al-'Aliyah saying,

َ ِّ َ َ َ ُ َّ َ َ َّ َ ََ َ
َ ‫الف ْخ ُر ّ ُّ ن‬
‫قال إنه تعاىل ُمتكلم ِبكالم‬ ‫العال َي ِة أن ق ْو َل َمن‬
ِ ‫طال ِب‬
ِ ‫الر ِازي ِ يف الم‬ ‫وذكر‬

َ ‫َن ْقًل‬
25‫وع ْقًل‬
ْ ُّ َ َ ُ ْ َ َ ُ َُ
‫وال‬
ِ ‫يار ِه هو أصح األق‬
ِ ‫وبم ِشيئ ِت ِه واخ ِت‬
ِ ‫ذات ِه‬
ِ ‫يقوم ِب‬

And Fakhr al-Razi, in his work al-Matalib al-'Aliyah, stated that the most correct opinion,

according to both transmitted evidence (naql) and reason ('aql), belongs to those who

affirm that the Exalted One is a speaker (mutakallim) with speech (kalām) that subsists

by His Essence (dhat) and according to His will (mashee'ah) and choice (ikhtiyar).

[Translated by Jake Brancatella]

Ibn Hajar interprets al-Razi in the same manner as this article suggests, mentioning that

al-Razi claimed the correct position according to naql (scripture) and 'aql (reason) is that God

speaks with words by His will and choice. This statement may remind readers of the well-known

maxim of Ibn Taymiyyah, which states that "God speaks by His will and power whenever He

25 Ibn Hajar al‐Asaqalani, Fath al‐Bari, ١٣٧٩ ،‫دار المعرفة ‐ ربيوت‬, vol. 13, pg 455.
wills."26 This phraseology denotes God's freedom to speak whenever He wills successively.

Other scholars have also noted al-Razi's view, which is considered unorthodox according to

Ash'arism.27

Irrespective of how one interprets al-Razi's statements, at the very least, al-Razi

genuinely struggled to reconcile the Ash'ari doctrines of divine atemporality and immutability

with scripture and reason. Let us remember that al-Sanusi listed the belief of God speaking or

remaining silent whenever He wills as one of the incorrect beliefs of the laity. After listing the

supposed naïve beliefs of the commoner, al-Sanusi asserted that some of the beliefs listed are

considered kufr (disbelief) by the consensus (ijma) of scholars. This statement from al-Sanusi is

glaring, considering some Ash'ari scholars, such as al-Razi, struggled to rationalize core Ash'ari

doctrines.

God's Wisdom and Divine Revelation

In the preceding sections it has been established by Ash'ari scholars that most laypeople

are not Ash'aris in creed and the laity possess beliefs which are considered kufr (disbelief) by

26Jon Hoover, God Acts by His Will and Power: Ibn Taymiyya's Theology of a Personal God in his
Treatise on the Voluntary Attributes," in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Yossef Rapoport and
Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 55-77

27 Safi al-Din al-Hindi, Al-Risalah al-Tis'iniyya fi al-Usul al-Diniyyah

‫وب هذا يندفع ما ذكره اْلمام الرازي من أن القول بكون الواجب محال للحوادث الزم عىل جميع الفرق وإن كانوا يتيؤون منه‬
‫ثم ر ن‬
‫بي وجه اللزوم كما تقدم‬

Suleiman, F. (2023). "Chapter 9 Temporally Originating States and Acts (ḥawādith) in the Divine
Essence". In Ibn Taymiyya and the Attributes of God. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pgs 282-283
consensus (ijma’). Why would God reveal scripture with the potential to mislead most human

beings? In response to this question, some may argue that divine scripture does not suggest the

erroneous views of the laypeople. However, Al-Taftazani opposes this in the following,

‫الحي والجهة فما بال الكتب السماوية واألحاديث النبوية مشعرة ن يف مواضع ال تحىص‬
‫ إذا كان الدين الحق ننف ر ن‬:‫فإن قيل‬
‫ي‬
‫ لما كان ن ن‬:‫بنف ذلك ؟أجيب بأنه‬
‫ن‬ ‫ن‬
‫التييه عن الجهة مما تقرص عنه عقول‬ ‫غي أن يقع يف موضع واحد ترصي ح ي‬
‫بثبوت ذلك من ر‬

‫ كان األنسب ن يف خطاباتهم واألقرب إىل إصالحهم واألليق بدعوتهم إىل الحق ما‬:‫بنف ما ليس ن يف الجهة‬
‫ن‬ ‫ى‬
‫العامة حن تكاد تجزم ي‬
ً
28‫التشبيه‬ ‫يكون ظاهرا ن يف‬

"If it is said, if the correct religious belief is the negation of spatial locatedness and

directionality, why is it then that the heavenly scriptures and the Prophetic traditions

imply in countless instances the affirmation of that without a single instance of negating

it? The answer is: because exoneration from directionality is something the intellects of

the masses cannot comprehend, to the extent that they would be certain that

something that does not exist in any direction, does not exist at all. [Therefore], a

discourse with apparent assimilation (tashbeeh) was more suitable in addressing them

and calling them to the religion, and more conducive to their uprightness."29

One may recall al-Sanusi listing the idea that God is in a direction amongst the common

false beliefs of the laity. Al-Taftazani acknowledges that the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions are

permeated with countless instances of affirming God's directionality without a single example

28 Al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, 3:36

29 Hatem al-Haj, Between the God of the Prophets and the God of the Philosophers, pg 86.
of its denial. Why would God do this? According to al-Taftazani, the reason is that the ordinary

Muslim would reject God or any existing entity that lacks a direction. Instead, God revealed

scripture, the apparent meaning of which is saturated with tashbih (likening God to creation).

Al-Taftazani reasons that revealing scripture in such a manner was necessary to guide the

masses to the true religion. This problem is exacerbated by the admission that God created

human beings innately predisposed to such beliefs.30 Al-Taftazani is not alone in his

explanation, as al-Ghazali states,

ً ‫رن‬
‫األقلي وقد بعث رسول هللا صىل هللا عليه وسلم داعيا للخلق‬ ‫تييه ينتج التعطيل ن يف حق الكافة إال‬
‫خي نف المبالغة نف ن ن‬
‫ي‬ ‫وال ر ي‬

‫وأما إثبات موجود ن يف االعتقاد عىل ماذكرناه من‬...‫األكيين‬

‫ر‬ ‫رن‬
‫ كيف ينطق بما فيه هالك‬، ‫للعالمي‬ ‫إىل سعادة اآلخرة رحمة‬

31‫األمية‬ ً ‫المبالغة نف ن ن‬
‫التييه شديد جدا بل ال يقبله واحد من األلف ال سيما األمة‬ ‫ي‬

There is no good in excessive tanzih (divine transcendence) that results in negating

God's attributes for most people, except for a select few. And the Prophet (‫ )ﷺ‬was sent

as a messenger to humanity for their ultimate happiness in the afterlife, a mercy to all.

How can he (the Prophet) speak in a way that leads to the harm of most people? And as

for establishing God's existence based on the aforementioned excessive tanzih (divine

transcendence), it is extremely difficult. In fact, hardly anyone would accept it (1 out of

1,000), especially the Prophet's community. [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

30 Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Mafātih al-Ghayb

َ َ َ ُ ّ َ‫َ ْ ُ ُ ْ ُ َّ ْ َ َ ْ ر‬
‫اس تخ ِّي ُل إل ْي ِه ْم ِص َّحة‬
ِ ‫نحن ال نن ِكر أن ِفطرة أك ِي الن‬
31 Al-Ghazali, Iljam al-'Awam 'an 'Ilm al-Kalam, pgs 56-57
 Al-Ghazali asserts that the Messenger ‫ ﷺ‬did not stress the transcendence (tanzih) of

God while preaching because the Prophet understood that most people would reject this. Al-

Ghazali also claims that only one out of one thousand people would accept the Message if

God's transcendence were emphasized. Does this mean that the Messenger of God ‫ ﷺ‬did not

fulfill his duty to convey God’s authentic message? Presumably, Ash'aris would deny this and

contend that the Messenger was instructed via divine revelation to refrain from emphasizing

God’s divine transcendence (tanzih). A glaring problem results from this attempted justification.

The trouble is not merely in the weakness of the explanation for why God would reveal

scripture in this manner. The more incredible difficulty is suggesting a reason or justification for

God's action at the outset.

We must remember that Ash'aris maintains that God does not act for specific reasons or

purposes. Providing a reason for how God chose to reveal scripture or explaining why God

created human beings with the natural disposition (fitra) to affirm such wrongheaded beliefs

contradicts a foundational principle in Ash'ari theology. As previously stated, the modern

Ash'ari theologian Sa'id Foudah says that God's wisdom (hikmah) results from His actions or

judgments. God’s wisdom is not a motivation or reason for His actions. Therefore, Ash'aris

cannot consistently appeal to God's supposed reasons for revealing scripture in this fashion

because God's wisdom is not prior to God's activity. God's wisdom comes too late in the game

to play the explanatory role the Ash'ari desires.

Ash'ari Ta'weel (Metaphorical Interpretation): The Antidote?

 Due to favoring supposed necessary rational principles, Ash'aris eschew the thāhir

(apparent/obvious) meaning of religious texts for metaphorical interpretations.32 Much has

been written about this topic, especially concerning the divine attributes such as yad (hand)

and wajh (face). However, a neglected area of focus is the metaphorical interpretations

required regarding God's apparent successive actions and the verses associated with God acting

for specific reasons.33 The number of verses in the Qur'an that mention God's purposeful and

successive activity far outnumbers the verses that relate to God's hands or face. This is not

meant to belittle such discussions but to raise awareness about other important issues.

In the Qur'an, an example of the metaphorical interpretation employed by Ash'aris was

mentioned earlier concerning lām al-ta'lil (lām of reason). Instead of accepting the obvious

reading of such verses, Ash'aris place “rational” principles over the apparent meaning of the

texts.34 In this case, the same "rational principle" claims that God cannot act for reasons as this

would conflict with Him being free of need. Who determined the veracity of this principle?

32Suleiman, F. (2023). "Chapter 6 Hermeneutical Foundations". In Ibn Taymiyya and the

Attributes of God. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. Pg 192

33Suleiman, F. (2023). "Chapter 9 Temporally Originating States and Acts (ḥawādith) in the
Divine Essence." In Ibn Taymiyya and the Attributes of God, pp. 277–283. This discussion
occupies less than ten pages of this text. This comment is not meant to be a criticism but simply
an acknowledgment of the need for further research in this area.

34 An alternative position to ta’weel, held by some Ash’aris, is known as tafweed al-ma’na

(relegating the meaning to God). However, this position of tafweed is not without difficulties.
For example, Ash’ari scholar al‐Juwayni regarding tafweed states, “Avoiding ta’weel out of fear
from falling into error in belief brings about confusion and ambiguity and pushes the public into
error, and leads to misconceptions concerning the foundations of the religion, and subjects the
Book of Allah to conjecture.” (Hatem al‐Haj, Between the God of the Prophets and the God of
the Philosophers, pg 91.)
According to Ash'arism, the Prophets and Messengers neglected to explicitly proclaim this

invaluable truth to their immediate followers. Once again, we must subvert the apparent

meaning of the verses that mention God acting in succession in favor of the rational principle

that anything attributed with hawaadith (new events) must be itself originated. God cannot

speak to Moses after not speaking to him because this would contradict this rational principle.

One may insist that the explanation provided oversimplifies matters and instead assert

that Ash'aris must affirm with certainty the apparent meanings of the Qur'an and Prophetic

traditions. However, Ash’ari scholar al-Amidi could not have made it any clearer when he says,

‫ وه‬،‫ولعل الخصم قد يتمسك ههنا بظواهر من الكتاب والسنة وأقوال بعض األئمة‬

35‫عنها‬ ‫ فلهذا آثرنا اْلعراض‬.‫ وال يسوغ استعمالها ن يف المسائل القطعية‬،‫بأشها ظنية‬

Perhaps the opponent here will cling to apparent meanings from the Qur’an, the

Sunnah, and the sayings of some Imams. However, all this evidence is merely

conjecture, and it is not permissible to use conjecture in matters of certainty. Therefore,

we have chosen to disregard it (the apparent meanings if the Qur’an, Sunnah, and

sayings of the Imams). [Translated by Jake Brancatella]

According to al-Amidi, the thāhir (apparent/obvious) meanings of the Qur'an, Prophetic

traditions, or statements of the Imams are entirely spurious, and it is impermissible to utilize

35Sayf al‐Din al‐Amidi, ‫( غاية المرام ن يف علم الكالم‬Ghayat al‐Maram fi Ilm al‐Kalam), ‫المجلس األعىل‬
‫للشئون اْلسالمية – القاهرة‬, pg 200
these apparent meanings in definitive matters. Al-Amidi asserts that the Ash'aris chose to

ignore the apparent meaning of divine revelation. Ash'aris are not mistaken regarding their

claim that the apparent meaning of the Qur'an contradicts their supposed rational principles.

However, they may be mistaken concerning the soundness of these supposed rational

principles. Al-Razi himself cast doubt upon rejecting God acting in succession and ultimately

abandoned the Ash'ari principle in favor of the apparent meaning of scripture. This skepticism

from al-Razi does not mean, in this instance, that al-Razi rejected sound reason, replacing it

with scripture. Al-Razi merely reevaluated his position, recognizing that the principle itself

contradicted sound reason and scripture.

Conclusion

Ash'arism has managed to spread across the globe over centuries of its development.

However, it remains unable to penetrate the minds of ordinary Muslims around the world.

Ash'ari scholars admit this, claiming that laypeople cannot accept their doctrines. We surveyed

some of the common beliefs held by the laity that are opposed to Ash'arism: God's

directionality, His dynamic activity, His acting for reasons, and the acceptance of secondary

causation in the world. This list excludes other conflicting beliefs not discussed in this article,

such as the radical Ash'ari divine command theory and corresponding moral theories, which the

laity would typically deem problematic.36 We have witnessed that it is not just common

Muslims who oppose these Ash'ari doctrines but the apparent meanings of the Qur'an and

36Malik, Shoaib Ahmed (2021). Al-Ghazālī's Divine Command Theory. Journal of Religious Ethics
49 (3):546-576.
Prophetic tradition, too. The admission of Ash'ari scholars has established this fact. We are

informed that this is because humanity would never accept Islam if it were presented while

exhibiting pure divine transcendence (tanzih) according to Ash’ari standards. This is because

humanity is innately predisposed to believing in these supposed problematic doctrines, which

are congruent with the apparent meanings of the Qur’an.

Ash'aris typically interpret the Qur'an metaphorically to reconcile the contradictions

between the Qur'an's apparent meaning and Ash'arism's “rational” principles. However, some

of the Mutakallimun, like al-Razi, found this problematic and abandoned specious rational

principles in favor of divine revelation and sound reason. It is not merely that Ash'arism has

failed to reach the ears of the commoners, but we are told by Ash’ari scholars that the laity

would reject their doctrines even if the laypeople heard them. Unless one is fortunate enough

to be the one person out of every thousand, one will either be from those who reject Ash'arism

having never heard of it, or one of those who heard its message and continued to reject it.