Fire Manual-1

FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.

PARADIP REFINERY
Fire Protection
Manual
Indian Oil Corporation Limited

Paradip Refinery
F&S
-1- Department
PARADIP REFINERY
Fire Protection
Manual
Approved by Checked by Prepared by
B. K. Panda K. G. Pochiraju Manish Kumar

CM (F&S) SM (F&S) DM (F&S)
30th April ’2017, Rev-2.
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FOREWARD
With the advent of petroleum and its derivatives, not only have the fire hazards increased,
but also the nature of the fires has changed.
In this ‘FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL’ an attempt has been made to present the complex
phenomena of fire, in a simple and straight forward manner as possible.
The manual deals with source, prevention and abatement of the potential fire hazards. It
also contains fire water demand for two major fire incident and Standard Operating
Procedure of Fire Fighting Systems.
In the recent years, Refinery operation has become more complex with an increasing
trend of fire & explosion hazards. However, compliance to various fire prevention &
protection regulations has helped to reduce the losses due to fire. No facility / system can
help effectively, unless workmen at site are well aware of hazards and precautions to be
taken. We need to be more cautious during our day-to-day work. Hence I suggest that
every employee of Refinery should go through this manual in detail and follow guidelines
and suggestions to ensure safe construction, commissioning, operations and
maintenance activities to avoid fires & explosions.
I hope this manual will benefit all concerned towards enhancing their effectiveness in fire
protection. Suggestions for further improvement are most welcome for subsequent
updation of the manual.
(L. N. Phukan)
GM (HSE)
Paradip
30th April-2017
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INDEX
CHAPTER TITLE/ DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

1.0 FIRE PREVENTIONS REGULATIONS 6-9
2.0 SAFETY POLICY 10-18
3.0 FIRE PROTECTION IN GENERAL 19-20
4.0 OBJECTIVE 21-22
5.0 SOME DEFINITIONS 23-28
6.0 ABBREVIATIONS 29-30
7.0 THE FIRE PROCESS 31-47
8.0 DIFFERENT FIRE EXTINGUISHING MEDIA 48-54
9.0 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES AT PARADIP REFINERY 55-58
10.0 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES AT PARADIP REFINERY 59-73
11.0 FIRE WATER DEMAND CALCULATIONS 74-77
12.0 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION 78-80
13.0 FIRE ORDER & TURN OUT PROCEDURE 81-93
14.0 FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENTS AND IT’S STANDARD 94-114
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)
15.0 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES AT MAJOR UNITS OF 115-155
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15.1 BOOT – 3 Crude Tank Farm
15.2 BOOT – 3 Product Tank Farm
15.3 AVU & SR LPG Unit
15.4 DCU
15.5 Alkylation & Butamer Unit
15.6 DHDT/ HCDS/ SRR 808 Unit
15.7 NHT CCR Unit
15.8 PRU
15.9 VGO HDT Unit
15.10 CPP
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CHAPTER TITLE/ DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.
15.11 ETP
15.12 DM PLANT & CPU
15.13 COOLING TOWER - 1
15.14 AIR COMPRESSOR HOUSE
15.15 FIRE WATER PUMP HOUSE
16.0 TYPICAL FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGIES 156-166
16.1 TANK FIRE
16.2 LIQUID PETROLEUM GAS FIRE
16.3 RAIL TANK WAGON FIRE (LIQUID FIRE)
16.4 ROAD TANKER FIRE
16.5 PROCESS UNIT FIRE
16.6 FIRE INVOLVING SULPHUR
16.7 PUMP & COMPRESSOR FIRE
16.8 TRENCH OR PIT FIRE
16.9 FURNACE HEADER OR TUBE RUPTURE FIRE
16.10 SEWER FIRE
16.11 SPILL FIRES – ABOVE GROUND LEVEL
16.12 SPILL FIRES –GROUND LEVEL
16.13 LABORATORY FIRE
17.0 CASE HISTORY OF MAJOR FIRE INCIDENTS 167-191
ANNEXURES 192-200
I FIRE PUMP HOUSE LAYOUT
II FIRE WATER LINE LAYOUT
III FIRE WATER LINE WITH FIR HYDRANTS & ISOLATION
VALVES
IV SITE WIDE SIREN INSTALLATION LAYOUT
V SOUTHSIDE ROAD NO. LAYOUT
VI EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS
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CHAPTER - I
FIRE PREVENTIONS
REGULATIONS
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1.0 FIRE PREVENTIONS REGULATIONS
The regulations have been made with the objective of protecting all the men, machinery’s,
facilities & materials of Paradip Refinery from the hazards associated with petroleum oils
and vapours and with the chemicals which are used in the refining processes. For safety
of each and every person working inside Refinery, it is essential that the following
regulations are strictly obeyed.
1.1 REGULATION - 1
Carrying of safety matches, lighters, mobile phone, flash cameras or any other spark
producing instrument /gadget/apparatus inside Refinery complex is strictly prohibited.
1.2 REGULATION - 2
No fire shall be lit and no matches ignited in any part of the battery area unless a valid
Hot work Permit has been obtained from the authorized fire permit signatories of the
areas and registered at fire station.
1.3 REGULATION - 3
Smoking is prohibited in all parts of the battery area except in the smoking booths.
1.4 REGULATION - 4
Battery operated cycle lamps or accumulator type electric hand lamp or non-flame proof
torch shall not be permitted to be taken inside the Refinery area. Flameproof torch / lamp
of approved manufacturers shall only be used.
1.5 REGULATION - 5
No vehicle shall be permitted to enter the Refinery plant area without authorized entry
permit / pass. Approved type Spark arrestors shall be installed on the exhaust of these
vehicles.
1.6 REGULATION - 6
All vehicles transporting petroleum from the refinery must be fitted with only those types
of spark flame arrestor, which are duly approved by the Chief Controller of Explosives/
PESO.
1.7 REGULATION - 7
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Match boxes, if required for some specific purpose like lighting heaters within plant areas
shall be provided by F & S Dept on production of a valid Hot Work Permit / authority letter
from the area in charge where the use of matches is intended. The matchbox with unused
sticks must be returned to the fire station.
1.8 REGULATION – 8
All person engaged in the Refinery shall submit to search by the security personnel and
/or by company's officials for the possession of articles prohibited under these regulations
at the entrance of plant area and / or any place within the plant area at any time.
Persons entering the Refinery Plant area shall deposit with the CISF at the entrance gate
all articles whose entry is prohibited under these regulations. The so deposited articles
can be collected back on return.
All roads around process plant/ off site facilities shall always be kept clear for
uninterrupted movement of fire vehicles.
Firefighting equipment shall not be used for any purpose other than fire fighting without
notification to fire & safety department.
No permanent connection from fire water header shall be made for any reason other than
fire fighting.
All persons working inside refinery must know the location and use of firefighting
equipment.
Within battery limit of any declared operational area no work shall be carried out on any
electrical equipment without proper permit & clearance certificate.
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No fabrication work is allowed inside the unit. All fabrication to be done at fabrication
yards.
On noticing any leaks/perceiving any Hydrocarbon smell, report immediately to Plant In

charge. Break glass of nearby Manual Call Point. Fire Station can be contacted at 101/
5555/ 5600 (South) and 5400 (North).
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CHAPTER – II
HSE POLICY
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CHAPTER - III
FIRE PROTECTION IN
GENERAL
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3.0 FIRE PROTECTION IN GENERAL:
A Petroleum oil Refinery, being a hydrocarbon processing industry has an inherent
potential for fire from materials being handled and from process and reactions being
conducted. Response of hydrocarbon products to potentially hazardous situation
varies. LPG and other light products are highly explosive and fire involving such
products spread at a faster rate. On the other hand fire in Bitumen may remain
localized.
Since hydrocarbon is present at all time and all over the refinery, in process units,
transport lines, storage tanks etc., a situation of hydrocarbon fire can occur at any time
and any place. Such an event if not brought under control in shortest possible time,
may result in heavy loss to human life, property and environment.
It is, therefore, necessary that all employees working in the refinery must be fully
aware of fire hazards and risk associated with, fire prevention requirements, fire
fighting techniques including use of various fire fighting appliances etc.
FIRE RISK:
It conveniently defined as ‘the chance or possibility of loss due to fire’ may cause
heavy loss to the plant and life. The management of Fire-Risk, therefore, basically
deals with three aspects:
a) Prevention b) Protection c) Fire fighting
All these three distinct aspects are very closely related to each other but are
completely separate in their individual scope.
FIRE PREVENTION :
It means adoption of safe inherent design and provisions at the design stage initially
and subsequently developing safe procedure and particles and following the same in
the day to day operation. It is the concern of everybody working in the Refinery.
FIRE PROTECTION :
It involves of different facilities which shall help in immediate handling of fire

effectively.
FIRE FIGHTING :
It is the physical phenomenon of handling the fire with the use of fire protection
equipments, facilities as well as with the help of fire fighting personnel who have been
specifically trained for this job.
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CHAPTER - IV
OBJECTIVE
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4.0 OBJECTIVE :
 The objective of this manual is to lay down strategies to manage fire scenarios with
proper utilization of resources available with refinery for fire protection/fighting.
 In order to generate consciousness and fire fighting skills among the persons
working in refinery towards fire hazards, some typical fire fighting strategies inside
refinery and standard Operating Procedures of Fire Fighting Equipment have also
been included. Perfectness
 For successful handling of emergency due to fire it is necessary that the contents of
this manual are understood intelligently and put to practice faithfully by all.
Review & Update
 The fire protection manual is to be updated when any major changes occurs to
legislation or to the company policy and objectives. As a minimum requirement it is
to be reviewed every year.
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CHAPTER - V
SOME DEFINITIONS
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5.0 SOME DEFINITIONS / CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO HYDROCARBON FIRES
Flash Point:
The flash point is the minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off vapour of
sufficient concentration to form an ignitable mixture with air near the surface of the
liquid within a container.
Liquids with low flash points pose the greatest danger.
Auto-ignition temperature:
The lowest temperature to which a solid, liquid or gas requires to be raised to cause
self-sustained combustion without initiation by an external heat source.
A fire frequently occurs when a flammable liquid, heated to its auto ignition
temperature.
Pyrophoric ignition:
Spontaneous ignition of flammable vapour is caused by the presence of Phyrophoric

iron sulfide deposits when exposed to atmosphere. These deposits are generally
found in locations where hydrogen sulfide or other sulphur compounds are formed in
petroleum storage, process equipment or piping system particularly gas/flare lines.
Iron sulfide is one such pyrophoric material that oxidizes exothermically when exposed
to air. It is formed by conversion of iron oxide (rust) into iron sulfide in an oxygen-free
atmosphere where hydrogen sulfide gas is present (or where the concentration of
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) exceeds that of oxygen). When this iron sulfide is
subsequently exposed to air, it is oxidized back to iron oxide and either free sulfur or
sulfur dioxide gas is formed. This reaction between iron sulfide and oxygen is
accompanied by the generation of a considerable amount of heat. In fact, so much
heat is released that individual particles of iron sulfide become incandescent. This
rapid exothermic oxidation with incandescence is known as pyrophoric oxidation and it
can ignite nearby flammable hydrocarbon-air mixtures.
Basic chemical reactions:
Iron sulfide is one of the most common substances found in refinery distillation
columns, pressure vessels, etc. It is formed by the reaction of rust or corrosion
deposits with hydrogen sulfide as shown below:
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Fe 2 O 3 (rust) + 3 H 2 S ===> 2FeS + 3H 2 O + S
There is a greater likelihood of this reaction occurring when the process involves a
feedstock with high sulfur content. This pyrophoric iron sulfide (PIS) lays dormant in
the equipment until the equipment is shutdown and opened for service, exposing the
PIS to air, allowing the exothermic process of rapid oxidation of the sulfides to oxides
to occur, as shown in the equations below:
4 FeS + 3 O 2 ===> 2 Fe 2 O 3 + 4 S + Heat

4 FeS + 7 O 2 ===> 2 Fe 2 O 3 + 4 SO 2 + Heat
The heat usually dissipates quickly unless there is an additional source of combustible
material to sustain combustion. The white smoke of SO2 gas, commonly associated
with pyrophoric fires, is often mistaken for steam.
Boiling Point:
The temperature at which the equilibrium vapour pressure of a liquid equals the total
pressure on the surface is known as a Boiling Point. (Boiling Point increases with an
increase in pressure). The temperature at which liquid boils when under a total
pressure of one atmosphere (14.7 psi) is termed the Normal Boiling Point.
Flammable/ Explosive Limits:
The term "Lower Explosive Limit" (LEL) describes the minimum concentration of
vapour to air below which propagation of flame will not occur in the presence of an
ignition source.
The “Upper Explosive Limit” (UEL) is the maximum vapour-to-air concentration above
which propagation of a flame will not occur.
If a vapour-to-air mixture is below the lower flammable limit it is described as being "to
learn" to burn, and if it is above the upper flammable limit it is "too rich" to burn.
Explosive Range:
The explosive range is the range of concentrations between the upper & lower
explosive Limits, which will result in the propagation of flame with violence and speed.
For petroleum liquids the explosive range is of the order of 1 to 7% vapour and 99 to
93 % of air by volume. For petroleum Gases, the explosive range typically varies, from
1.6 to 9.5% gas and 98.4 to 9.5 % air by volume.
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Heat Wave Characteristics:
When heavy fuel oils or Crudes burn, the high gravity low boiling point hydrocarbons
get burnt at the surface and high boiling point hydrocarbons sink towards the bottom
forming a layer of hot oil below the surface. This layer of hot oil extents towards the
bottom of the Tank at a rate depending on the type of Oil involved. This is called a
heat wave and is very important in dealing with oil tank fires.
The temperature of heat wave is of the order of 300 Degree F to 600 Degree F. The
travel of heat wave into the bottom of the oil varies from Oil to Oil. In most Crudes oils,
the rate is from 12" to 18" per hour. Generally the heavier the Oil, the slower the heat
wave moves.
Heat wave does not form on refined oil e.g. Motor Sprit, Kerosene, Diesel, Lubricating
Oils etc. due to narrower boiling range of the refined oil below the burning surface.
Boil Over:
The heat wave, which develops in Crude Oils or heavy oils when, comes in contact
with water under the Oil surface causes the upper layer of water to convert
immediately in steam. Since water converted into steam increases in volume 1700
times, unless the steam can break out of the surface in large bubbles, it becomes
entrained in the Oil. This steam oil forth greatly increases in volume and pistons out a
wave of burning Oil out of the tank. Burning oil erupts and then falls, spreading even
beyond the firewalls of the tank.
Slop Over:
The slop over is not a violent eruption like a Boil over. It is an over flow of the contents
of the tank. This can result when a water stream is applied to the hot surface of a
burning oil provided the Oil is viscous and its temperatures exceeds the boiling point
water. The water first sinks into the heat wave and is expanded into steam. On its way
out the steam forms a vapour pressure which expands the hot oil in the heat wave to a
greater capacity than the normal scenario of the tank which results spill over the top of
the tank.
Precaution against Boil Over & Slop Over:
Down ward progress of the heat wave can be determined by the color of the paint of
the tank shell & by testing the tank shell with water stream. It extinguishment has
failed by the time heat wave has reached a point 5FT above the usual water level in
the tank, personnel in the area should immediately be evacuated from the area.
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Warming of a Boil Over is given by both increases in height & brightness of the flame
immediately prior to actual Boil over. Steps should also be taken to cut ditches or build
embankments to guide the Oil that is thrown out into suitable channels.
Warming of slop over is given by the lighter color of the smoke at top of the tank on
the windward side due to formation of steam, a sizzling sound indicates wetness in the
Oil. In the event of slop over steps should be taken to extinguish burning Oil, which
may come out of the tank.
BLEVE:
BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. It is a type of explosion
that occurs upon rupture of a vessel containing a liquid with vapour pressure well
above atmospheric pressure like LPG, Propane etc. The effects of BLEVE of vessel
containing liquefied gases are listed below:
1. Blast wave effects due to physical expansion of the gas above the liquid, flash
evaporation of the liquid.
2. A fireball will result if the escaping material gets ignited.
3. The tank shell tear and a relatively small number of fragments are produced.
The fragments may be scattered over considerable distances by the energy
that releases by the expanding gas.
Chain Reaction:
For a fire to be "Self sustaining" the oxidation process should be self-sustaining. The
ignition, which triggers the oxidation reaction between one tiny bundle of oxygen and
one tiny bundle of fuel, must produce enough excess energy to trigger oxidation
between two more tiny bundles of oxygen and fuel. This manner, the combustion
continues like a chain reaction.
Explosion:
Explosion generally occurs in situations where the fuel & oxygen have been allowed to
mix intimately before ignition. As a result, the combustion reaction proceeds very
rapidly without being delayed by the need for bringing the fuel and oxidant together.
Fires in contrast generally occur in situation where the mixing of fuel and oxidant in
controlled by the combustion processes itself. The burning rate per unit volume is
much lower in fires and the rapid increase in pressure characteristic of explosion is not
encountered.
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Therefore in the widest sense, an explosion is an effect produced by the sudden

violent expansion of gases. It is a process of a rapid physical and / or chemical
transformation of a system into mechanical work accompanied by a change of its
potential energy and may also be accompanied of shockwave and / or disruption of
enclosing materials or structures
An Explosion may result on:
1. Chemical changes such as detonation of explosive or the combustion of

premixed flammable gas mixture.
2. Physical or mechanical changes such as bursting of boiler.
3. Atomic changes.
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CHAPTER - VI
ABBREVIATIONS
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6.0 ABBREVIATIONS
API American Petroleum Institute

BIS Bureau of Indian Standards
BS British Standards
CCE Chief Controller of Explosives (now PESO)
DCS Distributed Control System
FDAS Fire Detection and Alarm System
LEL Lower Explosive Limit
UEL Upper Explosive Limit
MAC / MCP Manual Alarm Call Point / Manual Call Point
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate (Government of India)
SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SRR Satellite Rack Room
TAC Tariff Advisory Committee
LPM Liter per minute
GPM Gallon per minute
MCP Manual call point
HVLRM High volume long range monitor
LRM Long range monitor
ISMS Indian Oil Safety management System
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CHAPTER - VII
THE FIRE PROTECTION

FUNDAMENTALS
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7.0 GENERAL
Fire can be prevented to a large extent by employees through basic knowledge

and understanding about characteristics and behavior of fires. With this
awareness, effective actions can be taken to prevent the combination of events
that result in the fire. It is intended to explain basic chemistry of fires, types of fire,
properties and characteristics of hydrocarbons in relation to fire & explosion
hazards and fire extinguishment etc.
WHAT IS FIRE?
"Fire is a rapid self sustaining oxidation process accompanied by the evolution of

heat & light of varying intensity".
As Per IS: 8757, “Fire” is –
1. Process of combustion characterized by the emission of heat accompanied by

smoke or flame or both.
2. Combustion spreading uncontrolled in time and space.
Fire results from the combination of fuel, heat and oxygen. When a combustible
substance is heated to a certain critical temperature called the "ignition
temperature" or "temperature of combustion", the material will ignite and continue
to burn as long as there is fuel, the proper temperature and a supply of oxygen
(air).
7.1 THE FIRE PROCESS:
• In common language, fire is burning of matter.

• In technical terms, fire is a chemical reaction where matter reacts with
oxygen under certain conditions to release heat and light energy. The fire
process can be considered as
COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS OF
SUBSTANCE COMBUSTION
OXYGEN FIRE
IGNITION
ENERGY HEAT
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From the above, it is clear that three conditions are essential component of any fire:
- Fuel (i.e. combustible matter)

- Oxygen
- Heat (essential to start the fire initially, but maintained by fire itself once started.
These three components constitute what is known as “Fire-Triangle”.
Fig: - 7.1
From the above, it is clear that three conditions are essential component of any fire
Fuel In the form of vapor, liquid or incandescent solid.

A source of ignition Sufficient to initiate and propagate the chemical
(Heat or thermal energy) reaction of combustion.
In sufficient proportion to form combustible
Oxygen
mixture.
These three components constitute what is known as "Fire - Triangle" (Fig 7.1).
The most common sources of ignition are the heat produced by chemical reaction
(such as striking a match), by electrical energy (such as an arc) or by mechanical
energy (such as friction). Sources of ignition are described in more detail in next
Chapter. The combustion process is observed to occur in tow modes, the flaming
type (including explosions), and flameless surface type (including glow and deep-
seated glowing embers). The flaming mode is associated with relatively high
combustion rates, expressed in terms of heat energy released from the originally
bound chemical energy per unit time, which together with the weight time rate and
specific heat of combustion production determines flames temperature, it is of
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interest that theoretical temperatures attained during combustion of different gases
in air, with no excess air, do not vary appreciable despite large difference in their
heat of combustion. Most hydrocarbon flame temperatures (ideal combustion, no
access air) vary between 1926 Degrees to 2315-Degree Centigrade.
THE FIRE TETRAHADRON
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For petroleum/hydrocarbon fires understanding the sustenance of the fire is of

much importance, this can be better understood by adding the fourth element in
the basic concept of fire triangle, the fourth element is the ‘Chain reaction’ the Fire
tetrahedron.
Flammable liquids and gases only burn in the flaming mode. The flaming mode
(chain reaction) can be conceived as a Fire Tetrahedron (shown in fig-2.2) in which
each of the four sides represents one of the four basic requirements, fuel,
temperature, oxygen and uninhibited combustion chain reactions.
The fire triangle and fire tetrahedron explains the control & extinguishment of fires;
if we remove any one element from the triangle or tetrahedron we can achieve our
ultimate goal of total extinguishment of any fire. Mechanisms & extinguishing
medias have been developed to control and extinguish all fires based on this
principle.
7.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF LEL & UEL:
A vapour or gas in air mixture above its UEL should always be potential hazard
since it may acquire vapour concentration below UEL at any time due to constant
dilution in atmosphere.
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Auto ignition temp., Flash point and Explosive Limits of some of the petroleum products
are given in Table 2.2.
7.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE:
BASED ON MATERIAL UNDER BURNING -
Fires are generally classified as type A, B, C & D. They are further identified as being
two or three dimensional.
CLASS "A" FIRE
These are fires involving solid materials normally of an organic nature (compounds of
carbon), which combustion generally occurs with the formation of glowing ambers.
Class “A” fire is the most common.
The most effective extinguishing agent for this type of fires is generally water in the
form of jet or spray.
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CLASS “B" FIRE
These are fires involving flammable liquids or liquefiable solids. For the purpose of
choosing effective extinguishing agents, flammable liquids may be divided into two
groups
i) Miscible with water and ii) Immiscible with water
Depending on (i) and (ii), the extinguishing agents include water spray, foam, light
water, vaporizing liquids, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder etc
CLASS "C" FIRE
These are fires involving gases or liquefied gases such as Methane, Ethane, Propane,
Butane etc. Dry chemical powder can be used to control fire involving liquefied gas
spills. Water in the form of spray is generally used to cool the containers /line in
addition to depressurizing the system.
CLASS “D" FIRE
Fires that occur in combustible metals, such as Magnesium, Titanium, Sodium, etc. are
classified under the Class 'D. Specialized techniques, extinguishing agents and
equipments are to be used to control this type of fires.
Various classes of fire are recognized in order to rationalize the choice of extinguishing
media and device; and the precaution taken in fire fighting.
TYPE MATERIAL EXTINGUISHING MEDIA

Fire involving solid carbonaceous
materials (e.g. wood, paper, cloth, rubber,
plastics etc.) in which combustion
Fire appliances expelling
generally occurs with the formation of
CLASS 'A' water, (water gas type fire
glowing ambers. These fires require the
extinguisher).
cooling effects of water, water solutions
or the coating effects of certain dry
chemicals, which retard combustion.
Depending on the nature of
Fires involving flammable or
flammable liquid (miscible or
combustible liquids or liquefiable solids,
immiscible with water), the
greases etc. extinguishment is most
extinguishment agents
CLASS 'B' readily secured by including air (oxygen),
include water spray, foam,
inhibiting the release of combustible
light water, vaporizing liquid
vapours or interrupting the combustion
carbon dioxide, dry chemical
chain reaction.
powder etc.
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TYPE MATERIAL EXTINGUISHING MEDIA
Fire involving gases or Liquefied gases Dry chemical powder or
such as methane, ethane, propane, Carbon dioxide can be used
butane, LPG etc. The only safe way of to control fires. Water in the
CLASS 'C' extinguishing a gas fire is too shut off the form of spray is generally
supply of gas to the fire. It is also used to cool the container /
necessary to dilute the burning gas at a lines in addition to
very fast rate with an inert gas or powder. depressurizing the system.
Fires involving certain combustible metals
such as Magnesium, Titanium, Zirconium,
Sodium, Potassium etc. Powdered metals Special techniques,
like Aluminum can form explosive dust extinguishing agents and
CLASS 'D' cloud, while Sodium & Potassium react extinguishing equipments
vigorously and catch fire in contact with are to be used to control
water. The fumes from most metal fires this type of fires.
are dangerous and fumes from Lead are
extremely toxic.
ELECTRICAL FIRE:
Accordingly to the latest concepts, the electrical fires of not constitute a particular
class. Any fires involving electrical equipment must in fact be a fire of class A, B, C.
The normal procedure in such fires is to cut off the electricity and use an
extinguishing method appropriate the burning material. Special extinguishing agents
which are no conductor of electricity and non-damaging to the electrical equipments
such as dry chemical powders, and carbon dioxide should be used. Water in the form
of hose stream should in no case is used in electrical fires unless positive isolation of
electric supply has been ensured. Finally divided waters spray / fog being a non-
conductive media is considered safe for firefighting activities in the vicinity of
electrical current. Cable trays, Transformers, Switch gears etc. can be protected by
fog nozzles. Airspace's present between water droplets prevent to back flow of
current to the nozzles.
BASED ON INTENSITY -
1. Small Fire - A fire its incipient stage which is controlled by the first line fire fighting
team.
2. Major Fire - The fire which is spreading to other equipments or areas and which
threatens to go beyond the control of first line and second line fire fighting teams.
FIRE CONTROL
Fire control is the effort extended to prevent a fire from spreading from its points of
origin to surrounding areas.
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Prevention of fire spread depends upon the method adopted to extinguish the fire
timely. This method associated protection of tanks, structures and pipelines that are
affected either by direct flame impingement or by radiant heat. Proper placement of
cooling streams, with a view towards adequate water coverage with minimum water
is important to both control and extinguishment. Adequate drainage of a fire area
prevents burning oil from floating into previously in fired areas and often provides a
means of fuel removal from the fire area.
Construction of temporary drains, ditches, dikes or providing water curtain should all
be considered when there is a threat of burning oil spreading the fire to other areas.
Blanketing of nearby pools of oil with foam will reduce the possibility of fire spreading.
7.4 CLASSIFICATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AS PER OISD STD 116
As per OISD-STD-116 petroleum products are classified as follows:
1. Class A Products Flammable liquids having flash point below 23 Degree C
Flammable liquids having flash point of 23 Degree C

2. Class B Products
and above but below 65 Degree C.
Flammable liquids having flash point of 65 Degree C
3. Class C Products
and above but below 93 Degree C
Flammable liquids having flash product point of 93

Excluded Degree C & above. Liquefied gases including LPG, do
4.
Petroleum not fall under this classification but form a separate
category.
As per OISD STD -118:
Note: In the following cases, above classification do not apply and special
precautions should be taken as required:
(i) Where ambient temperatures or the handling temperatures are higher than
the flash point of the product.
(ii) Where product handled is artificially heated to a temperature above its flash
point.
As per OISD Std-116:
Classification for heated products:
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PARADIP REFINERY
At locations where the handling temperatures are higher than the flash point of the
product in circumstances where product handled is artificially heated to above its
flash point, class 'C' product shall be considered as Class 'B' product and Class 'B'
product shall be considered as Class 'A' product.
TABLE: 2.2
Auto Ignition, Flash Point and Explosive Limits of some of the Petroleum Products & their
class;
Sl. Boiling Explosive

0 Vapour Liquid Limit Flash Ignition
No Material Point C/ Limit % (V/V 0 0
Density Density Higher Point C Temp. C
DR in air lower)
Depends on
0.78- nature of Depends
1. Crude Oil - - 0.90 (15 crude (varies 19 on nature
0C) from 1% to of crude
7%)
2. Hydrogen -253 0.07 0.07 4.0 75 <-.50 585
3. Methane -161 0.55 - 5 15 - 538
4. Ethane -89 1.04 - 3 12.3 - 514
5. Propane -42 1.58 - 2.0 9.5 -104 466
6. Butane -10 2.05 - 1.5 9.0 -60 430
7. Benzene 80 2.8 0.88 1.3 7.1 -11 560
8. Toluene 111 3.14 0.86 1.2 7.2 4 480

0.69 to
9. Naphtha 35 to 205 2.5 to 4.8 1.1 5.9 -18 288
0.78
0.69 to
10. Gasoline 32 to 215 3.0 to 4.0 1.3 7.6 - 45 257
0.77
145 TO
11. ATF or SK 4.5 0.80 0.7 5.0 35 to 50 210
300
12. LDO - - - - - 66 -
150 to 0.81 to
13. HSD 3.0 to 5.0 0.7 5.0 32 to 96 256
400 0.91
66 to
14. LSHS - - - - - 316
160
65.6 to
15. HSHS - - - - - -
148.9
185 to 0.9 to 262 to
16 FO - 1 5 66
500 1.05 407
175 to 0.97 to
17 BITUMEN - - - 205 485
205 1.20
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PARADIP REFINERY
18. Raw Coke - - - - - - 315.6
19. Phenol Extract - - - 1.7 8.6 80 715
20. Slack Wax - - - - - 198.9 245

Mineral
21. - - - - - 32.2 253.3
Turpentine (oil)
22. Acetic Acid 118 2.1 1.05 5.4 16 40 427
23. Acetylene -84 0.91 0.62 2.5 82 -17.8 305
24. Ammonia -33.4 0.6 0.67 16 25 - 651

Carbon
25. 15.7 70.9 610
Monoxide
26. H2S 4.3 45.5 260
Methyl Ethyl
27. 1.8 11.5 404
Ketone
Methyl n-butyl
28. 1.2 8.0
Ketone
29. Asphalt 280
30. RCO 300
7.5 HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION
Hazardous Area (as per OISD STd-118) -
An area will be deemed to be hazardous where;
(i) Petroleum having flash point below 65 deg. C or any flammable gas or vapor in a
concentration capable of ignition is likely to be present.
(ii) Petroleum or any flammable liquid having flash point above 65 deg. C is likely to
be refined, blended or stored at above its flash point.
For classification and extent of hazardous area, refer "The Petroleum Rules - 2002".
Hazardous Area Classification for Electrical system -
To determine the type of electrical installation appropriate to a particular situation, the

hazardous areas have been classified into three zones namely zone - 0, zone - 1 and
zone - 2 according to the probability of the presence of hazardous atmosphere.
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PARADIP REFINERY
7.5.1 Zone – 0
An area in which a flammable atmosphere is present continuously or is likely to be

present for long periods.
Examples are vapour space above closed process vessels, storage tanks or closed
containers, areas containing open tanks of volatile, flammable liquids etc.
7.5.2 Zone-1
An area in which an explosive gas/mixture is likely to occur in normal operation.
Zone-1 locations may be distinguished when any of the following conditions exist:
- Flammable gas or vapour concentration is likely to exist in the air under normal
operating conditions.
- Flammable atmospheric concentration is likely to occur frequently because of
maintenance, repairs or leakage.
- Failure of process, storage or other equipment is likely to cause an electrical
system failure simultaneously with the release of flammable gas or liquid.
- Flammable liquid or vapour piping system containing valves, meters, screwed or
flanged fittings are in an inadequately ventilated area.
- The area below the surrounding elevation or grade is such that flammable liquids
or vapours may accumulate therein.
The zone-1 classification typically includes:

a. Imperfectly fitted peripheral seals of floating-roof tanks.
b. Inadequately ventilated pump rooms for volatile, flammable liquids.
c. Interiors of Sample Retention Room/ Cabinet as part of quality control
laboratories, refrigerators and freezers in which volatile flammable materials are
stored in lightly stoppered or easily breakable containers.
d. API Separators
e. Oily waste water sewer/basins
f. LPG cylinder filling and cylinder evacuation area.
g. Areas in the immediate vicinity of vents and filling hatches.
7.5.3 Zone-2
Areas in which an explosive gas/air mixture is not likely to occur in normal operation and if
it occurs it will exist only for a short time.
Zone-2 locations may be distinguished when any one of the following conditions exists:
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PARADIP REFINERY
- The system handling flammable liquid or vapour is in an adequately ventilated area

and is so designed and operated that the explosive or ignitable liquids, vapours or
gases will normally be confined within closed containers or closed systems from
which they can escape only during abnormal conditions such as accidental failure
of a gasket or packing.
- The flammable vapours accumulate to the location as through trenches, pipes or
ducts.
- Locations adjacent to Zone-1 areas.
- In case positive mechanical ventilation is used, the failure or abnormal operation of
ventilating equipment can permit atmospheric vapour mixtures to build up to
flammable concentrations.
7.6 SOURCE OF IGNITION:
Ignition in defined as initial release of energy to trigger the combustion (fire). Factors
for ignition include temperature, energy released, Volume of heat and direction of heat
application.
It is necessary to understand sources of ignition to prevent fires/explosions. Such

knowledge also enables elimination of substances which are potential sources of
ignition. A general listing of primary ignition sources follows and an effective fire
protection program should include preventive measures with respect to all of them.
Source of Ignition Examples Preventive measures

Electrical Sparks from motors, • Use of approved
equipments switches, lamps, hot equipments.
elements and electrical • Follow National electric
defects code like Indian Electrical
rules, Explosive regulation
etc.
• Proper Maintenance.
Friction Hot bearings, Preventive maintenance
misaligned or broken and proper lubrication.
machine parts,
choking, jamming or
material, poor
adjustment.
Open Flames Cutting and welding Strict Compliance of
torches gas and oil precautions stipulated in fire
burners. permit for hot jobs.
Smoking or using Smoking booths in • Smoking in permitted
Matches or other areas where areas located at safe
flames producing combustible are used distance.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Source of Ignition Examples Preventive measures
devices in to stored • Use prescribed
hazardous areas receptacles for cigarette
butts.
• Without valid permit,
matches should not be
taken inside Refinery
battery limits.
Spontaneous Pyrophoric Iron is the Flush the equipment likely to
ignition main source, besides contain Pyrophoric iron with
hot oil leakage's etc. water before opening,
keep Pyrophoric iron
wet all the time
Hammering, Sand blasting, Flushing of
Sanding, Acetylene flames, equipment
scraping, cutting cutting, brazing carrying out the operations
& the like away from combustible
materials
Hot surfaces Contact of Provide proper insulation and
combustible material air circulation
with hot surfaces,
heated lines etc.
Static Electricity Dangerous in the • Proper earthing of
presence of flammable equipment.
vapour occurs when • Do not resort to splash
there. Continuous loading is not proper
contact of two earthing, during splash
dissimilar material loading and loading at
higher velocities.
• Loading velocity should be
controlled as permissible
Lightning Bad weather such as Proper lightening arrestor
thunderstorm, cloud and earthing continuity
burst
7.7 FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT PRICIPLES:
Fire extinction usually consists of removal / limiting of one or more of three factor of
fire triangle. To extinguish a fire, at least one of the three essential elements (Fuel,
Oxygen & Ignition temperature) must be removed. However, a fourth way i.e. chemical
interference has also been identified. This converts the 'Fire Triangle' into a 'Pyramid'.
Successful fire extinguishment results from the systematic application of planned

procedures. Unplanned procedures born in panic will often add to the seriousness of
the emergency. There are four definite procedures to be considered when planning to
extinguish a fire.
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PARADIP REFINERY
The four ways to fight fire are:

1. Starvation - Elimination of fuel.
2. Smothering - Limitation of oxygen.
3. Cooling - Removal of temperature (Heat).
4. Chemical Interference - Interrupt chain reaction.
Elimination of Fuel/ Remove Fuel Supply - Starvation
This is accomplished by operational changes such as depressurizing a system

blowing down a unit, closing valves, rerouting flow, pump out vessels/ tanks etc.
The extinction of fire by starvation is brought about in the following three ways-
a. By removing combustible material from the neighborhood of the fire, such as the
transfer of fuel from burning oil tanks, taking out of cargo at a ship fire; cutting of
branches around forest fires, closing the valve on the gas/fuel line etc.
b. By removing material on fire from the neighborhood of combustible material for

instance, pulling apart a burning haystack or a thatched roof.
c. By sub-dividing the burning material to small sized isolated fires to break

continuity.
This is by far the most effective way of extinguishing process unit fires and should be
used whenever possible.
Limitation/ Remove Oxygen Supply - Smothering
This is very difficult procedure for large fires but can be quiet effective on flange fires
or other small fires where the fuel is escaping from a pressurized system.
If the oxygen content of the atmosphere in the immediate neighborhood of burning

materiel can be sufficiently reduced, combustion will ceased. Oxygen removal must be
accomplished by diluting the air with inert gas or by blanketing the fuel supply with a
gas tight barrier. Carbon di-oxide, dry chemical powder or steam is effective if the
entire fire area can be covered. The intensity of the fire can be reduced by partial
coverage but this is not the ultimate solution. Foam can be utilized effectively if the fire
of the two dimensional type on a level surface such as pool of oil. It must form a
complete blanket to separate the oil from the air in order to extinguish the fire. In the
petroleum refineries foam is effectively uses as smothering agent for fighting oil fires
(two dimensional). Foam is less effective in combating a three dimensional fire. In this
type of fire dry chemical powder and Halon are most suitable as extinguishing agents.
The principle is ineffective in the cases where the burning material contain within itself
the oxygen it required for combustion in a chemically combined form, such celluloid
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PARADIP REFINERY
Small fires, such as those involving a person’s clothing, can be smothered with a rug/
blanket. The use of sand or earth on small metal fire is also another example of
smothering.
Removal of Heat/ Cool the Material below Ignition Temperature - Cooling
If the rate at which heat is generated by combustion is less than the rate at which it is
dissipated through various agencies, the combustion cannot persist, in applying this
principle of fire extinction the first step is to accelerate the speed with which heat is
removed from the fire, thus reducing the temperature of the burning mass and as a
consequence the rate at which heat is produced. In due course the rate at which heat
is lost from the fire exceeds the rate of heat production and the fire dies away.
Water is the most effective agents to utilize for this purpose. Better results will be
obtained if water is a fine spray or fog thus providing more surface area for heat
absorption.
A major petroleum fire will very seldom be extinguished by the cooling process but it
can be utilized successfully to control the fire and protect nearby equipment from fire
damage.
The application of a jet or spray of water to a fire is invariably based on this simple but
fundamental principle.
Stop Chain Reaction – Chemical Interface
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PARADIP REFINERY
The combustion process actually takes place between free radicals and not between
molecules as is usually depicted. Fire is an example of a free radical change reaction.
Some chemicals, the bromo-fluroro-hydrocarbons, have a great affinity for free
radicals and so injecting these into the fire has the effect of preventing the propagation
of the chain reaction. In other words the fire goes out.
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PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - VIII
DIFFERENT FIRE
EXTINGUSHING MEDIA
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PARADIP REFINERY
8.0 DIFFERENT FIRE EXTINGUISHING MEDIA:
8.1 WATER:
Water is the most efficient, cheapest and readily available medium for fighting the
fires. It has the highest latent heat of vaporization. Water is used in the Refinery
fires as cooling agent and also for the production of foam required for fighting the oil
fires. To achieve this objective large quantities of water are required, for which fire
water storage tanks, pumping facilities and extensive hydrant/monitors network have
been provided in the Refinery. A variation in the application of water can be made
by means of nozzles that produce jets or sprays ranging from large size droplets
down to atomized fog effects.
Physical Properties:
Freezing point : 0 deg C

Boiling point : 100 deg C
Density at 4 deg C : 1gram/ cm3
Dielectric Constant : 78.5 at 25 deg C
Viscosity : 0.959 centi poise at 25 deg C.
Specific Conductance: 6 x 10-8 ohm-1cm-1 at 25 deg C.
Dipole moment : 1.85 debye
Heat of fusion : 0.20 KJ/mol
Heat of vaporization : 40.7 KJ/mol
Latent Heat of vaporization: 2260 KJ/Kg or 536 calorie/gram
Expansion : 1:1600
Molecular stability up to: 1650 deg C.
High surface tension : 73 dynes/cm
 Water is stable at ordinary temperature. The molecule dissociates at 1650 deg C.

 Melting point of 1 pound of ice into water at 0 deg C absorbs 1513KJ, which is heat
of fusion of ice.
 The specific heat capacity of water is 4.186KJ/KG.k.
 Latent heat of vaporization of water is 2254.8KJ/Kg at atmospheric pressure.
 At atmospheric Pressure when water is converted from liquid to vapor, its volume
increases about 1600 times. This large volume of water is called saturated steam.
 Water applied in the form of ice or snow would provide even better cooling effect
than plain water because the energy from the fire must first convert ice or the snow
to water 333.2 KJ/KG and then the energy is needed to convert the water to steam
is 2254.8 KJ/KG.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Important features of water as extinguishing media:
1. Water is non-conductor of electricity in its pure state. Water in its natural state
contains impurities that make it conductive.
2. Water has solvent capability – It dissolves ash
3. Less change in viscosity with temperature. (at 0 deg C to 99 deg C behavior is
same).
4. It has high density – It remains stick even to vertical wall better in comparison to
foam.
5. Water is 2-dimensional extinguishing media i.e. by smothering & cooling.
6. High surface tension helps in binding water molecules & hence jet is formed &
remains for longer distance as compared to other liquids
EFFECT OF WATER DURING FIRE FIGHTING:
Extinguishment by Cooling:
In most cases, if the surface of the burning material is cooled below the flash point,
the fire will be extinguished. Surface cooling is not usually effective on gaseous fuel
products and flammable liquids that have Flash points below the temperature of
applied water.
Therefore alone water is generally not recommended for cooling of flammable liquids
with a Flash points below 37.8 deg C.
Water spray cools a fire according to the following properties:
The rate of heat transfer is proportional to the exposed surface of liquid. For a given
quantity of water, the surface is greatly increased by conversion of droplets. The rate
of heat transfer depends upon the temperature difference between the water and the
surrounding air or burning material.
The rate of heat transfer also depends upon the vapor content of the air. The heat
absorbing capacity of water depends upon the distance it traveled and its velocity
near the fire (heat source) and fire plume (This factor must taken into account the
necessity for projecting a suitable volume of water to the fire. When the heat
absorption rate of water spray approaches the total rate release rate of fire, fire
extinguishment is achieved.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Droplet Size:
Calculations show that optimum diameter of water droplet is in the range of 0.3 to
1.0 mm and best results are obtained when the droplets are fairly uniform in size.
The droplet must be formed near the base of flame or be large enough to have
sufficient energy to reach the point of combustion despite.
 Air resistance.
 Opposing force of gravity.
 Air currents.
 Fire plume.
When water droplets are too small, they can be deflected by the fire plume, or
evaporate before they reach the base of fire. If combustibles absorb water, it takes
longer to ignite them because the water must be evaporated before they can get hot
enough to burn.
When water converts from liquid to vapor, its volume at atmospheric pressure,
increases about 1600 times. This large volume of water (saturated steam) displaces
an equal an equal volume of air surrounding a fire eventually reducing the volume of
oxygen available in air to sustain combustion. The process of heat absorption by
steam ends when the steam starts to condense, a change which requires heat
release from the steam. When this happens, visible clouds of water vapors form.
When such condensation occurs above the fire, it has no cooling effect on the
burning material. However the steam can carry heat away from the fire if it can
dissipate clouds of water vapor above the fire.
Smothering of fires in ordinary combustibles suppresses flames, it usually cannot

extinguish such fires. Water may be used to smoother a burning flammable liquid
when the liquid has a flash point above 37.7 deg C, a specific gravity of 1.1 or
heavier & is not a water soluble substance. To achieve it most effectively, a foam
concentrate is added to water.
8.2 STEAM:
Steam in large quantities can be used to smother a fire. It is very convenient and
effective mode of fire fighting and is generally available at various locations in the
Refinery. Steam is particularly effective against high temperature hydrogen/
hydrocarbon fires.
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PARADIP REFINERY
8.3 MECHANICAL FOAM:
To control 2- dimensional oil fires particularly storage tank fires, Mechanical foam is
used to smother the fire. Two types of mechanical foam compounds are used in
Refinery:
AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam) is synthetic foam. In addition to smothering it

gives a secondary layer of difference as it spreads very rapidly to cover the oil
surface. The foam has very good property of fast extinguishment of spillage fire &
very good life but with the limitation of less drainage time.
AR AFFF (Alcohol Resistance AFFF) is AFFF synthetic foam having a polymer

additive. It is required for fighting fires in polar solvents like Benzene, Methyl Alcohol,
it forms a polymeric membrane over the liquid surface on fire and thus prevents the
foam from mixing with the solvents.
8.4 CARBON-DI-OXIDE AND INERT GASES:
As a fire extinguisher CO 2 acts in a manner similar to vaporizing liquids and is also

non-conductor of electricity. The inert gases such as Nitrogen can be used for
tackling fires by smothering.
Caution : If CO 2 is used confined or unventilated area, precautions should

be taken so that people are not affected by lack of oxygen.
8.5 CLEAN AGENT:
Selection of clean agent should be considered from the clean agents listed in
“Standard on Clean agent fire fighting systems-NFPA2001 (2004 Edition) & the
latest”. The clean agent should also comply with the requirements of “Ozone
depletion Substances Regulation & Control Rules 2000, Ministry of Environment &
Forests, Government of India. The clean agent shall be of zero ozone depletion
potential.
Clean agents are vaporizing liquids that have zero Ozone Depletion Potential and
extinguish fire by chemical interference. In refinery, clean agent such as FE-36
(HFC-236fa) are used for fire extinguisher application whereas Argonite/ inergen and
Sapphire are used in total flooding system installed in unit control rooms.
Salient feature of clean agent based fire extinguishers –
a. Capacity: 2/4 kg.

b. Suitable for A, B, C class and electrical fires
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PARADIP REFINERY
c. Non-magnetic
d. Non-Corrosive ensuring the safety of your belongings
e. Odorless, colorless and non-residual clean agent
f. Extinguisher can be recharged
g. Easy operation and minimal maintenance
8.6 DRY CHEMICAL POWDER:
This again is a smothering agent, which extinguishes fires mainly by interrupting the
chain reaction. The basic ingredient of most chemical powders is either sodium
bicarbonate or potassium bicarbonate. Generally the chemical powder used for
refinery is potassium-bi-carbonate as extinguishing media with a little percentage of
metallic Steatite like Magnesium steatite. It prevents the corrosion of the container.
Prevents the powder from caking and also prevents the powder from moisture
absorption. This, with the addition of metallic stearate as a water proofing agent, is
widely used in extinguishers, not only in portable ones but also for general
application in large quantities. Apart from stearate, other additives are sometimes
used to decrease the bulk density and to reduce packing the cylinder.
In refinery, mainly Potassium bicarbonate based DCP is being used. Potassium

bicarbonate base powders are better than sodium bicarbonate base dry chemical
powder and about 1.44 times more effective in terms of extinguishments.
Composition of Potassium bicarbonate based DCP:

Potassium bicarbonate - 97%
Magnesium Stearate - 1½%
Magnesium Carbonate - 1%
Tricalcium Phosphate - ½%
Dry chemical is expelled from containers by gas pressure and by means of specially
designed nozzles. It is directed in the form of concentrated cloud. This cloud also
screens the operator from the flames and enables a relatively close attack on fire.
Many other dry chemical powders such as Monex, ABC type etc. are also used for
specific purposes.
8.7 SAND:
Where other smothering agents are not readily available, sand can also be use. It
prevents spreading of burning liquids. On no account should sand be used for
extinguishing fires in machineries, such as electric motors, since its use may well
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PARADIP REFINERY
necessitate dismantling the entire machine for cleaning even though the fire damage
is negligible.
8.8 BLANKETING:
Another method, by which fire may be extinguished, especially for persons whose
clothing is on fire, is by blanketing. The person should be laid down and covered or
rolled in a rug, coat, jacket, woolen /other Fire resistant blanket, etc. For dealing
with fires in small utensil, such as those containing cooking oils, the best method is
to smother the fires with a lid, blanket, or similar material such as a doormat which
has been wetted first.
8.9 BEATING OUT:
Small fires in materials such as grass, etc., may often be extinguished by beating
them out, or by rolling up the burning materials tightly to exclude the air.
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PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - IX
FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES AT

PARADIP REFINERY
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PARADIP REFINERY
9.0 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITY AT PARADIP REFINERY
Fire Water Network
48.3 KM above ground fire water network covering entire Refinery south & north side
(excluding units).
Fire Water Storage Capacity
No of Atmospheric above ground Tanks : 02

Diameter of each tank : 37.5 m
Height of each tank : 16.1 m
Water Storage capacity of each tank : 14, 000 m3
Basic Calculation for Storage Tank Capacity
Quantity of Storage Water required
= Maximum demand x 4 hours = 7000 x 4 = 28,000 m3
Water stored in 2XTanks 37.5 m diameterX15.5 m high; capacity 2 x 14,000 m3.
In the event of a major prolonged incident when all the stored firewater in both tanks is
exhausted then raw water from the Refinery raw water system can be used for
firefighting purposes. This is achieved by providing raw water directly to the firewater
tanks via the raw water transfer pumps.
The maximum water required for this site has been calculated by the method detailed in
OISD 116 Annexure -1 Clause 2.5 Alternate 1. In this clause it is specified that the
water required to a process area, with a 30 meter separation round it, shall be
calculated by applying water to the process area at 1 l/min/m2 plus a supplementary
hose stream allowance of 600m3/hr. This is to be applied to the two largest process
areas on the assumption that they both require the full calculated rate of firewater
simultaneously.
Additional fire water storage
Fire water storage at Paradip Crude Pipeline Terminal
Pipeline terminal is located east side of Paradip Refinery adjacent to boundary. In

Pipeline terminal 2 X 10, 000 KL Nominal capacity (Net capacity 9000 KL each) Fire
water storage tanks are available with 7 X 600 KL capacity Fire Water Pumps.
Raw water storage at Paradip Refinery
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PARADIP REFINERY
In Paradip Refinery 2 x 2, 65,000 KL capacity raw water storage reservoirs are available
for receiving raw water from Mahanadi river & supply raw water to raw water treatment
plant & then to treated water reservoirs (3 nos.) to meet day- to -day water demand in
the refinery as Cooling water make up, Service water, Drinking water, Fire water make
up, DM water etc.
Raw water can be diverted to fire water tanks for two hrs. (Around 6000 M3 water with 3
pumps running) without disturbing the refinery operation.
The fire water make up for tank will be taken from the service water pump & raw water
transfer pump
 Jockey pump maintain pressure of 8.0-8.6 Kg/cm2 in Fire water network.

 If Pressure drops to 8.0 Kg/cm2 second Jockey pump starts if selected in Auto
 If pressure drops to 7.5 Kg/cm2 , Main Electrical Fire water pump (P-001A) starts
and maintain pressure ( >10.0 Kg/cm2) in Header.
 Jockey pumps will stop at 8.6 Kg/cm2 pressure.
 If pump P-001A fails to start with in 5 secs of pressure drop, Main Diesel Fire water
pump (P-001G) starts and sequence of elect/diesel pump starting continues.
 If any pump is selcted in Manual the timer of this pump shall be bypassed and next
pump in sequence shall start immidiately.
Supply for Fire water Pump 001 A/C/E From S/S 339 Section -1
Supply for Fire water Pump 001 B/D/F From S/S 339 Section -2
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PARADIP REFINERY
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PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - X
FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES AT

PARADIP REFINERY
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PARADIP REFINERY
10.0 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES AT REFINERY
Fire Vehicles:
UP-85 AF UP-85 AF UP-85 AF UP-85 AF

Foam Tender
9396 9397 9490 9489
VOVLO VOVLO VOVLO VOVLO
Chassis
FM400(6x4) FM400(6x4) FM400(6x4) FM400(6x4)
BHP 400 400 400 400
Water Pump Capacity 8000 at 8000 at 8000 at 8000 at
(LPM) Single Stage, 10Kg/cm2 10Kg/cm2 10Kg/cm2 10Kg/cm2
Centrifugal
Foam Pump Capacity 500 at 500 at 500 at 500 at
(LPM) Pump - Rotary Gear 14Kg/cm2 14Kg/cm2 14Kg/cm2 14Kg/cm2
Fully Automatic Water Ring 7.5 mtrs @ 7.5 mtrs @ 7.5 mtrs @ 7.5 mtrs @
Priming system Lifting Depth 30cm/sec 30cm/sec 30cm/sec 30cm/sec
Water Tank Capacity
4000 L 4000 L 4000 L 4000 L
(Liter)
Foam Tank Capacity(Liter) 6000 L 6000 L 6000 L 6000 L
2000/1000 2000/1000 2000/1000 2000/1000
Remote Operated Monitor
LPM at LPM at LPM at LPM at
Capacity
7Kg/cm2 7Kg/cm2 7Kg/cm2 7Kg/cm2
Monitor throw (Horizontal/ 70 to 70 to 70 to 70 to
Vertical) in meter 75mtrs 75mtrs 75mtrs 75mtrs
No of Outlets 6 6 6 6
No. of inlets for hydrants 8(4+4) 8(4+4) 8(4+4) 8(4+4)
Foam Nurser UP-85 AF-9116 UP-85 AF-9117

Chassis TATA LPT-2518 TATA LPT-2518
Foam Pump Capacity (LPM) 600 LPM at 12Kg/cm2 600 LPM at 12Kg/cm2
Foam Tank Capacity (Liter) 12000 L 12000 L
No of Outlets 8(4+4) 8(4+4)
No. of inlets for hydrants 8(4+4) 8(4+4)
DCP Tender- on TATA make Chassis Reg. No – UP-85-AT-0747
DCP Vessels- 2 Vessels each capacity 2000 Kg
N2 cylinder- 28 (14+14) Nos. with 50 L. Capacity at pressure of 130 to 140 Kg/cm2
DCP Long range monitor- 01 No. discharge adjustable to 15.25 & 40 Kg/sec having
throw up to 40 m with 360° horizontal and 30 m with 100°
vertical.
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PARADIP REFINERY
DCP Hose Reel with trigger type grip nozzle - 04 Nos. 02 nos. each side with 25mm dia.
and throw 10 to 12 m horizontal & 6 to 8 m vertical.
Trailer Mounted Fire Pump - 02 Nos.

Engine – TATA make Model-497 Turbo with Open circuit indirect cooling System
Capacity- 1800LPM at 7Kg/cm2
Primer - Automatic water ring primer 7 meters @ 30cm/sec
Diesel Fuel tank capacity- 60 L
Portable Fire Pump- 1 No.

Diesel Driven Capacity : 600 LPM at 8.5 Kg./cm2
Trolley Mounted water cum Foam monitor with Foam Tank - 02 Nos
Monitor Capacity- 1000LPM Foam Tank- 900 L
Trolley Mounted water cum Foam monitor - 02 Nos

Monitor Capacity- 1000LPM
AFFF Overhead Tanks
Two overhead AFFF storage tanks to store 15,000 liters of foam concentrate each -
in South (01) and North (01) fire stations
One (1) Hydraulic Platform, Reg No.-OD-21-9051 (Chassis- VOLVO- FM400,8x4

Bronto Sky Lift- 54M Cage Height) with articulated or telescopic arm to reach up to 54 m
elevation, Foam/water monitor capacity of 5000 - 6000 LPM, pump capacity 5000 – 6000
LPM at 10 kg/cm2 g.
One (1) fire jeep with towing facility and two way radio communication capability.
One (1) Emergency Rescue Tender – with all latest F&S rescue equipment.
Communication Facilities
• Auto and P&T Telephones

• ARP Telephone System
• Walkie Talkie System
• Hotline Telephone with nearby organizations.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Fire Pump Sizing
Maximum Fire Water Demand = 7000 m3/hr and from OISD-STD-116 fire pumps
are limited in size to 1000 m3/hr. Thus for demand of 7000 m3/hr, 9 x 795 m3/hr are
required. But OISD Section 5.5.3(ii) requires 50% stand-by pumps.
Therefore total pump required 14X795 m3/hr. Also, OISD 5.5.1 requires 50% of total
number of pumps including stand-by pumps to be diesel driven. Hence, Seven (7)
nos. motor driven & Seven (7) nos. diesel driven pumps are provided capacity each
795 m3/hr.
Fire water Pumps
The main fire water pump house consists of seven (7) diesel driven pumps each
rated at 795 m3/hr plus seven (7) electric motor driven pumps each rated at 795
m3/hr. Jockey pumps are electrically driven and rated at 350 m3/hr to maintain the
pressure of fire water main header at 8 kg/cm2g.
Type of Pump Jockey Pump Main Pump (Electrical Main Pump (Diesel
(Electrical Driven) Driven)
Driven)
Total Nos. TWO SEVEN SEVEN
Tag Nos. 240-P-2A/2B 240-P-1A/B/C/D/E/F/N 240-P-1G/H/I/J/K/L/M
Driver Power 150 KW 300 KW 300KW
BKW of pump 117.5 KW 239.7 KW 239.7 KW
Pump Capacity 341 M3/hr 795 M3/hr 795 M3/hr
Discharge 9.773 kg/cm2 9.44 kg/cm2 9.44 kg/cm2

Pressure
Fire Equipment Cabinet
Fire Equipment Cabinets each containing two (2) fire fighting hoses, 63 mm
diameter and 15 m long, a water spray/fog nozzle and valve key are provided at
every third hydrant in the facility. In addition, around tank storage and process
areas, foam branch pipes c/w pick-up tube and strainer are also provided in each
fire equipment cabinet.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Pumper Truck Hydrants
Pumper truck hydrants with large connections are provided to supply high capacity
foam cannons and additional firewater capacity to fire trucks. Each pumper truck
hydrant has 4 numbers of 2½” instantaneous connections each fitted with dust
caps. They are located in tank storage areas and other high risk areas.
Mobile / Fixed High Volume Water / Foam Monitors
High Volume Long Range (HVLR) water / foam monitor capable of delivering
following variable foam / water flows at 7kg/cm2g pressure complying with IOCL
Specification are provided at critical locations within storage areas
• Remote / Manually operated 15140 / 7570 LPM

These monitors are having traversing mechanism to give 3400 in either direction in
horizontal plane and +900 and -150 in vertical plane. With pressure of 7kg/cm2g at
base flange and nozzle at 300 to 350 from horizontal, HVLR monitor is capable of
giving following performance
• Horizontal foam throw : 75 – 85 meters
• Horizontal water throw : 80 – 90 meters
Hose Reels
Hose reels are provided throughout the high risk areas in the Facility where there is
a possibility of a hydrocarbon release. It consists of 35 m of 1.25" hard booster
hose equipped with a combination of straight stream/fog nozzle and shut-off valve.
The spacing and location of hose reels are provided in such fashion that the water
streams from two hoses can reach all ground level equipment on process plots and
at pump rows. They are located between 15 m and 30 m of the equipment being
protected.
Fire Water Booster Pump inside Units
Booster pump are installed inside units for elevated Monitors/ hydrants so as to
ensure the availability of minimum 7.0 Kg/cm2 pressure at the inlet of the elevated
Monitor/ Hydrants.
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PARADIP REFINERY
The Capacity of the booster pumps are considered based on the requirement of
water requirement for Largest Water spray system in the Unit & two nos. 1000 GPM
capacity foam- cum water monitors. Minimum two booster pumps are installed in
the unit each having at least 50% of the required fire water demand for the unit.
Arrangement of “Power supply to Fire water booster Pumps" is as follows:
- Normally supplied from the emergency panel located in the Unit substation.
- Emergency panel is fed by both normal and emergency power.
- In the panel there is provision of auto switch over to emergency supply on
failure of the normal supply.
Fixed Water Deluge
Deluge systems starts water spray system automatically where located over critical
equipment and otherwise manually operated.
For deluge systems associated with Process and Utilities Units, manual operation
of deluge systems is possible from the respective control building FDAS HMI. For
deluge systems associated with Offsite Units (bullets etc) manual operation of
deluge systems is possible from the respective control room Hardwired Console
(HWC) mounted pushbuttons.
Means of local manual release is also provided from safe distance at site.
The design of all deluge systems is based on line size selection to control the
nozzle outlet pressure where possible.
Deluge systems are provided at following locations:
• Pumps handling products above auto-ignition temperature, irrespective of its

location (below pipe racks or in open area).
• Pumps handling petroleum products Class `A` under pipe racks
• Uninsulated vessels having capacity greater than 50 m3 and containing
class A or B flammable liquid
• Vessels inaccessible to fire tender/ mobile equipment, fire hydrants
(monitors)
• Air fin coolers in hydrocarbon service located above pipe racks/ elevated
location
• For columns over 45 meters high, spray rings to protect the area above 45
meters shall be installed, manually operated and fed via a booster pump,
where required, taking water from the fire main and boosting the pressure
such that the highest and most remote nozzle has a pressure of 1.4 bar.
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PARADIP REFINERY
• Oil loading/ unloading Tank Truck and Tank Wagon Gantries if not foam
protected.
In addition fixed water spray systems are also provided on above ground Storage
Tanks as follows
• Fixed and floating roof tanks storing Class A liquids
• Class B storage in floating roof tanks greater than 30m diameter; fixed roof
tanks greater than 20 m diameter.
Water Sprinkler Systems
Water sprinkler systems are provided in non-electrical buildings, workshops,

warehouses & gas bottle storage areas.
Clean Agent Systems
This type of system is installed at:-
Control room under floor areas, telecom equipment rooms, UPS rooms, rack
equipment rooms and similar areas fundamental to the safety of the facility.
Each system is provided with 100% connected reserve clean agent cylinders and
the cylinders are located indoors. The systems can be operated in both automatic
and manual release system. Automatic release system starts via smoke detection
systems.
Carbon Dioxide Systems
Fixed fire extinguishing systems utilizing carbon dioxide as the extinguishing

medium is installed to protect Gas Turbine enclosures. These systems are provided
along with an automatic fire detection system as part of the standard Gas Turbine
package.
Steam Systems
Steam can also be used to avoid the escalation of flange fires/ fire at hot surfaces
and at hot pumps. Low pressure steam are used for smothering small fires using
properly earthed steam lances located at Utility Stations.
Mobile Monitors
Trailer mounted firewater monitors are used where necessary to give cover where
the risk is obstructed by structures, pipe rack or other equipment.
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PARADIP REFINERY
First Aid Fire Extinguishers/ Mobile Extinguishers
First Aid Fire Extinguishers are being provided at following locations:
- 5 Kg DCP fire extinguishers on elevated location at technological structure,

columns, platforms & heater.
- CO 2 fire extinguishers at air monitoring stations, control rooms, Rack
rooms, laboratory, warehouse, stores, workshops & other Buildings.
- 50 Kg trolley mounted dry powder units consisting of a powder container,
expellant gas, discharge hose and nozzle on process plots, in LPG areas,
turbines and by pump rows handling petroleum products.
Detection System: General Requirements
Process plant, tank storage, pump and utility areas are provided with fire and gas
systems where the potential risk justifies their use.
• All three beacons namely Fire/Toxic/Flammable are mounted in a group at

the same location, so that it is easily identifiable and is not scattered at too
many location. Gas beacons are located in proximity to detectors, as well as
in noisy areas.
• These beacons are preferably located at 5m- 8m height from the grade level
and in non congested area so that it is easily visible not only from within the
units but also visible from some distance from outside the unit as well.
• One set of beacons and sounders (Fire/Toxic/Flammable) is also located
near/in -front of the process operator cabin and also at the main entrance of
the unit.
• Standard colour code for different beacons are as follows:
Fire – Red (Flashing)
Toxic – Yellow (Flashing)
Flammable – Blue (Flashing)
Communication and Alarm System
Manual Alarm Call Points (MAC/ MCP)
 A manual alarm call point (MAC) is located at each exit / near stair case
from all buildings.
 Manual Call Points at the unit peripheral roads are located at maximum
interval distances of 61 m.
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PARADIP REFINERY
 Manual Call Points within the units are located at Max. 60 m travel distance
from the nearest MCP.
 While considering 60 m travel distance the elevation is also considered (i.e.
for locating MCP at some working platform/ technological structure), the
total distance travelled to reach the nearest MCP is within 60 m.
Manual Call Points provided on process plots and tank storage areas are
flameproof design with appropriate ingress protection and sited at following
locations:
Site Wide Alarm/ Evacuation
A brief description of the system is given below:
There are total 7 nos. sirens at Paradip Refinery- 4 nos. at South Site, 2 nos. at
North site and 1 no. at Township. Each siren has a range of 5 km. The location of
siren on roof top of Sub- Stations given below:
1. 339 S
2. 338AS
3. 331-S
4. 337-S
5. 311-N
6. 312-N
7. Township (on sub-station near estate office)
Fire Siren Code
For Small Fires : No siren.
For Major Fires : A wailing siren for two minutes.
For Disaster : Major Fire siren three times with an interval of one
minute in between (Total 8 minutes).
For All Clear : Straight run siren for two minutes.
For Testing : Straight run siren for one minute daily at 07:45 hrs.
Note: Testing of fire siren in all modes is being carried on 1st day of each month.
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PARADIP REFINERY
CCTV
CCTV’s are being installed inside refinery covering tank farm areas and other
critical areas for visual monitoring from control rooms.
Operational Philosophy of Fire Safety Equipment
Equipment Operational Philosophy

Auto-operated and local manual stop
(manual operation also provided)
Fire Water Pumps Indication in Fire Station and Main Control
Room
Indication at local panel
Hydrants Manual by roadside
Monitors – Roadside Manual by roadside
Monitors – in Units & at Road side Manual/ Remote by roadside
Elevated monitors HVLRM Remote from base of tower
Water spray on storage
Manual from roadside valves
tanks
Auto-operated through deluge valve heat
Water spray for pump detection pneumatic system
stations and mounded tank/ Indication in Fire Station and Main Control
bullet valve locations Room
Indication at local panel
Water spray systems in Manual or automatic as per Process
process units Licensor`s recommendation
Water spray in cable Auto or manual operated through deluge
cellars valve and smoke detection system
Semi-fixed foam protection of
Manual through foam tender
storage tanks
Automatic by smoke detection systems.
Clean agent systems Manual by pushbutton and mechanically.

Indication locally and in fire station control
room.
Vendor package detection and
extinguishing.
CO 2 systems in gas
Manual by pushbutton and mechanically.
turbine enclosures
Indication locally and in fire station control
room.
Fire tender, mobile units Through fire stations on receipt of alarm
Fire alarm Fire station
Fire Siren Fire station
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PARADIP REFINERY
LIST OF FIRE DETECTION/ PROTETION/ PREVENTION SYSTEMS
A. Portable Fire Extinguishers
SN. Type - Capacity Qty

1. DCP -6 Kg 774
2. DCP-9/10 Kg 1762
3. DCP- 25 Kg 177
4. DCP- 50/75 Kg 315
5. DCP 50/75 Kg 315
6. CO2- 2 Kg 20
7. CO2- 4.5 Kg 881
8. CO2- 9 Kg 154
9. CO2- 22.5 Kg 19
TOTAL 4417
B. Manual Call Points, Fire & Gas Detection Systems
SN. Description Qty

1. MCPS 1147
2. Smoke Detectors 3,769
3. Heat & Flame Detectors 385
4. Gas Detectors( Combustible & 845+390
Toxic)
5. Fire Hooters 296
C. Emergency Communication System
SN. Description Qty

1. CCTV camera 145
2. Ex proof field telephone 75
3. TETRA hand set 380
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PARADIP REFINERY
D. Fixed System
SN Facility Nos. Remarks

1 Fire water Network @ 40 Kms ( 26 Kms in South & 14 Kms in
(Offsite) length North)
2 2 way hydrants 1597 513 in units & 1084 in offsite
area
3 4 way hydrants 291 In offsite area
4 500-1000 GPM 163 In units & offsite area
Monitors (Manual)
Monitors (Remote)
Monitors (Manual)
Monitors (Manual)
Monitors (Remote)
9 Hose reels 394 Inside units
10 Dry & Wet Risers 90 Inside units
11 Fire Escape Hydrants 89 Inside units
12 Deluge Valves 147 In units & offsite area
13 Manual Water Spray 45 In units & offsite area
14 Foam Pourer On 60 Tanks 379 chambers with 289 in let
Couplings
15 Automatic Rim seal On 22 Tanks On all Class –A floating roof
System tanks
16 Medium Expansion 62 Installed in offsite tank farm
Foam Generators area (with foam tank-54 nos.)
17 Clean Agent System In 15 SRRs 969 Main & Stand by cylinders
18 CO 2 flooding System 03 For STG at CPP
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PARADIP REFINERY
E. FIRE WATER BOOSTER PUMPS
SN Unit Nos. Type Capacity Head Tag Nos.

3
Motor Diesel (m /hr) (m)
1 DHDT 02 02 -- 410 50 13-P-19 A/B
2 VGO-HDT 02 02 -- 550 50 20-P-33 A/B
3 FCCU 03 03 -- 550 50 23-P-53 A/B/C
4 NHT-CCR 02 02 -- 454 74 42-P-101 A/B
5 PRU 03 03 -- 550 50 70-P-1057

A/B/C
6 CPP 02 01 01 1200 20 --
7 Alkylation 02 02 -- 422 83.67 24- P-28A/B
8 DCU 02 -- 02 570 80 30-P-601/602

9 AVU 04 04 -- 315 50.9 10-P-
501A/B/C/D
Total 22 nos. booster pumps installed inside various process units.
F. AREAS COVERED WITH SMOKE/HEAT DETECTORS
 Computer room, Server room, Process control rooms, Record room

 Unmanned electric substations MCC rooms
 Cable galleries Chemical Storage
 Electrical sub stations 14 nos.
 SRR 12 nos.
 Plant Buildings 26 nos.
 Non plant buildings 09 nos.
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PARADIP REFINERY
G. LOCATION OF SAFETY SHOWERS:
SN LOCATION SN LOCATION SN LOCATION

Unit -024[BUTAMER] Unit no – 230,231,235 [ETP] Unit -23[FCCU]
1. Near 024-P-14 A/B 1. Near TK-117A 1. Near PRT
2. Near 024-P-17 A/B 2. Near 235 PM-121 -B 2. Near V-11-structure -
1
3. Near 024-TK-202 3. North of UF cleaning 235- 3. Near 023-V-025
TK-124
4. Near 024-TK-102 4. Near chemical house 4. Near drain sump[023-
V-031]
5. Near 024-TK-001 5. 231-TK-009 Unit-84{ARU]
6. Near 024-TK-001 6. 230-TK-133 1. Near 084-P-006A
7. Near 024-P-023 7. Near Leachote sludge sump- 2. Near 084-P-005B
8. 024-P-12 A/B 8. Near spent caustic TK-101 3. Near -84-V-1
9. 024-TK-004 9. Near 231-PM-101B Unit -83[ARU]
10. 024-P-21A/B 10. 231-TK-103 1. Battery limit
11. 024-P-19A/B 11. Near 231-TK -104 A 2. Near 083-P-001A&1B
12. 024-V-024 & 025 Unit no 245 –[CHU] 3. Near lean amine
pump
13. 024-E-015 1. Near truck loading hopper Unit -101-[DM Plant]
14. 024-P-109A/B Unit no 10,11 [AVU & SR 1. North of 101-TK-013B
LPG]
15. 024-P-008A/B 1. Near stack – 002 [VDU] 2. North of 101-TK-013A
16. 024-P-11A/B 2. East of analyzer 3. Near -101-P-012A
17. 024-TK-003 3. North of 010-c-007 Unit no-81 [SWS]
18. Near Analyzer 4. Near Amine storage TK 1. Near 81-V-001
19. 024STR-201 5. Near 010-PM-202A 2. East of 81P-005A
20. 024-P-202A/B 6. Near CDU heater Unit no-80
21. 024-E-201 7. Near CDU stack-001 1. Near 080P-011B
22. 024-V-005 8. Near CDU column C-001 2. Near 080P-005B
23. 024-K-001 9. South of V-102 A [SULPHUR block]
24. 024-P-001A/B 10. 011-C-001 1. West of TK-085 amine
storage TK
25. 024-P-005A/B Unit no -13,14,15 [DHDT] 2. Near 086-E-007
26. 024-R-001 1. Near ABD vessel 3. Near 086-F-001
27. 024-STR-101 2. South of pipe rack 4. Near 086-V-001
28. 024-P-102A/B 3. Near KOD 5. Near 087-E-007
Unit-025[ALKYLATION] 4. Near analyzer shelter 6. Near -087-F-002
1. Near 025-002A 5. 013-V-011 Lean amine surge 7. Near 087-V-001
vessel
2. Near -025C-001 6. West of 013-Power recovery 8. Near -086-V-001
turbine-001
3. Near 025-V-004 7. Near heater Unit-89-[TGTU]
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN LOCATION SN LOCATION SN LOCATION
4. Near 025-P-001B Unit no-104[COOLING 1. Near-C-1 column
TOWER]
5 N-P-010Bear 025 1. Near chemical dosing pump 2. Near chemical pump
[CT-1]
Unit-70 PRU 2. Near H2so4 storage TK. 3. Near analyzer room
1. Near 070-V-1020 3. Near sand stream filter Unit no-30-DCU
2. Near 070-V-3105 4. Near chlorine dosing 1. Compressor house
3. Near 070-P—3105 A 5. Near chemical dosing pump 2. Near 030-C-004
[CT-4]
4. Near 070-R-1008 6. Near H2so4 storage TK. 3. Near 030-P-013A
5. Analyzer shelter 7. Near sand stream filter 4. Near analyzer shelter
Unit-100 [NEW WTP] 8. Near chlorine dosing 5. Near 030-V-045
1. Near chemical house 9. Near chemical dosing pump 6. Near 030-FD-002A
[CT-3]
2. Near chlorination house 10. Near H2so4 storage TK. 7. Under coke drum
OLD WTP 11. Near sand stream filter Unit-56[HCDS
1. South of cascade aerator 12. Near chlorine dosing 1. Towards rd 243
QC LAB Unit no-28 [SARU] 2. North of unit near DV
house-2
1. North –west corner of lab 1. Near analyzer Unit-40,41,42,43[NHT-
CCR]
2. Near Poly propylene 2. East of 28-V-6 1. Near 040-v-007
laboratory
3. Near chemical store 3. West of 28-V-003 2. Nar -041-E-005 & 006
4. South side of lab 4. Near strong acid area 3. Near 041-C-002
Unit-20,21,22 [VGO –HDT] 5. Near strong acid cooler area 4. Near -042-V-003
1. Total 13 safety showers 6. Near H2s knock out drum 5. Near west side of
are OK tower monitor
Unit no – 27 [NAPHATHA 7. Near neutralization pit 6. Near 043-v-012
TREATER]
1. Near027-V-004 8. Near week acid area Unit-109 [FGD]
2. Near 027-V-001 9. Near boiler area 1. Near 109-C-201
Unit – 26-[LPG TREATER] 10. Towards road 2. West of compressor
1. Near 026-V-004 Unit – 107 [FGD] 3. East of acid TK
2. Near compressor 1. Near train-2 4. Near 109-V-101
3. Near 026-V-002 2. Near 107-P-101-A train-1 5. Near amine blow
down
Unit no – 12 [KTU] 3. Near analyzer
1. 012-P-002A & 002B
2. Near CBD -02-01R-01
3. Near caustic TK Total 175 safety showers
4. Near caustic TK-012-TK-
002 installed inside unit.
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PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - XI
FIRE WATER DEMAND

CALCULATIONS
- 74 -
PARADIP REFINERY
11.0 FIRE WATER DEMAND CALCULATIONS
11.1 For Storage Tank Area:

Crude Storage Tanks
Flammable liquid - Class A
Tank Capacity - 60000 m3
Tank Diameter - 79 m
Tank Height - 13.5 m
No. of Tanks in Bund - 2
Distance between Tanks - 39.5 m
A. Tank on Fire
Cooling Water requirement for Tank on fire = π x D x H x 3 l/min/m2

= π x 79 x 13.5 x 3
= 10,053 l/min
= 603 m3/hr
Cooling Water requirement for adjacent Tank = π x D x H x 1 l/min/m2
= 3351 l/min
= 201 m3/hr
Foam Water requirement for Rim Seal Area
= π x D x Ht of Rim Seal x12 l/min/m2
= π x 79 x 0.8 x 12
= 2383 l/min
= 143 m3/hr
Fire Water requirement for supplementary hose stream based on (4 x hydrant
streams) + (1 x water monitor) = 4 x 36 + 2 x 228 m3/hr
= 600 m3/hr
i.e. Total water requirement for fire in 1 x Crude Oil Tank

= 603 +201 +143 +600 = 1547 m3/hr
B. Tank on Fire with Floating Roof Tank Sunk
Cooling Water requirement for Tank on Fire = 603 m3/hr
Cooling Water requirement for Adjacent Tank = 201 m3/hr
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PARADIP REFINERY
Water requirement for foam application on sunken roof
= π/4 x D2 x 8.1 l/min/m2
= 2382 m3/hr
Fire Water requirement for supplementary hose stream = 600 m3/hr
i.e. Total water requirement for fire in Crude Oil Tank with sunken roof =
603+201+2382+600 = 3786 m3/hr
11.2 For Process Areas
A. Unit: DCU
Alternative-1:
Maximum Fire area = 44501 m2.
Maximum Fire Water Demand = 44501 x 1 l/min/m2 = 44501 l/min
= 2670 m3/hr
Water for Supplementary Hose Stream = 600 m3/hr
Water Demand = 2670+ 600 = 3270 m3/hr
Alternative 2: (As per OISD-STD-116)

Consider a 10 m x 10 m portion of process unit area on fire.
Provide water cover for 30 m x 30 m at the rate of 10 l/min/m2
Water Demand = 30 x 30 x 10 = 9000 l/min = 540 m3/hr
Water Demand = 540 + 600 = 1140 m3/hr
i.e. Max Fire Water demand for DCU is 3270 m3/hr
B. Unit: AVU
Alternative 1:
Maximum Fire area = 51880 m2.
Maximum Fire Water Demand = 51880 x 1 l/min/m2
= 51880 l/min = 3113 m3/hr
Water Demand = 3113 + 600 = 3713 m3/hr
Alternative 2: (As per OISD-STD-116)
Consider a 10 m x 10 m portion of process unit area on fire.
- 76 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Provide water cover for 30 m x 30 m at the rate of 10 l/min/m2
Water Demand = 30 x 30 x 10 = 9000 l/min = 540 m3/hr
Water Demand = 540 + 600 = 1140 m3/hr
i.e. Max Fire Water demand for AVU is 3713 m3/hr.
11.3 Maximum Fire Water Demand
OISD-STD-116 requires the fire water system to be sized to provide fire water
to two separate fire scenarios or to a single fire scenario in a floating roof tank
with a sunken roof – whichever is the larger.
Water demand for fire in AVU = 3713 m3/hr

Water Demand for fire in DCU =3270 m3/hr
Total water demand for two separate fire scenarios in unit = 6983 m3/hr
Largest fire water for fire in Tank with sunken roof is in Crude Storage Tanks
= 3786 m3/hr
i.e. Largest Fire Water Demand is for two separate fire scenarios
= 6983 m3/hr, Say 7000 m3/hr.
- 77 -
PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - XII
FIRE FIGHTING
ORGANISATION
- 78 -
PARADIP REFINERY
12.0 FIRE FIGHTING ORGANISATION
12.1 Fire Fighting Organization Chart at a Glance
Degree of Fire Fire Chief Siren Code Persons Attending

Emergency
Small Fire Sectional Head on No Siren First and Second line fire
duty of affected area fighting teams
Major Fire Head of the Wailing type for First, Second and Third
Production/Operations two minutes line fire fighting teams
Department
Simultaneous In-Charge of affected No siren unless Persons already present
Fires areas it is a major fire at the scene of fire, CISF
Fire wing, CISF guards,
auxiliary fire fighting
personnel
NOTE :
The fire fighting section officers (SMFS/MFS/SF&SO/FSO) shall be available for

necessary consultations and necessary assistance to the Fire Chief and execution of fire
fighting operation to tackle the emergency effectively.
12.2 Definitions
Insignificant Fire: A smoldering or minor fire, where the potential of loss is insignificant
and which is extinguished by first line fire fighting crew without any
loss of property
Small Fire : A fire in its incipient stage which is controlled by the first line fire
fighting team
Major Fire : The fire which in spreading to other equipment’s or areas and which
threatens to go beyond the control of first line and second line fire
fighting teams
Simultaneous : More than one fire occurring at the same time at different
place Fires
Fire Chief : The fire chief to a person who is the in-charge at the scene of fire. In
case of small fire, Section head on duty of the affected area / RSM is
the Fire Chief. In a major fire, Head of the Production-/Operations
Department is the fire chief. In simultaneous fires, In-charge of the
affected areas are the Chiefs.
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Fire Call : Fire call is a message received at the Fire Station regarding
occurrence of a fire and its location. The message can be conveyed
either by telephone or by fire alarm or by walky – talky or in person.
12.3 Fire Fighting Chart for Small Fires
A small fire will be generally tackled by the first line team which would comprise of the
persons already present at the scene of fire. However, the second line fire-fighting team,
whose composition is given here, will also report at the scene of fire immediately after
receiving the fire call. The Fire Chief in this case is the sectional Read of the affected
area on duty / RSM at the time of fire.
12.4 FIRE CHIEF
First Line Fire Fighting Team
Operational/ Maintenance staff or any other refinery personnel engaged on the job
in the area
Second Line Fire Fighting Team

i) Fire Station Shift in-Charge and other CISF Fire wing along with fire vehicle
ii) Ambulance driver with ambulance from First Aid Centre
iii) Officers of Fire & Safety Division
iv) Sectional Head of the affected area
v) RSM on duty
Third Line Fire Fighting Team
i) CISF Fire wing along with F&S Officers

ii) CISF Security personnel available from barracks.
iii) AII departmental and functional heads
iv) CISF Dy. Commandant and Assistant Commandant
v) Mutual Aid Partners /Fire Brigade from nearby industries/State Fire Service
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CHAPTER - XIII
FIRE ORDER & TURN OUT

PROCEDURE
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13.0 FIRE ORDER
13.1 ACTION BY A PERSON NOTICING A FIRE
13.1.1 Will give a fire call through Fire Alarm by breaking the Manual Call Point
or through auto telephones or Walkie - Talkie
A) USE OF FIRE ALARM

 Break the glass cover of the Manual Cal Point available nearest to
the fire spot.
 Check for flashing of corresponding Red Beacon and blowing of
external hooter.
B) USE OF FIRE TELEPHONE

 Dial Fire Station no. 101/5555/5600/5516 through telephone.
 Give your identity (Do not waste time by saying "Hello").
 State the exact location of fire.
 Wait till Fire station Control Room Operator repeats the message.
13.1.2 Will attempt to extinguish with the equipment available.
13.2 ACTION BY FIRE STATION CONTROL ROOM
1. Respond the fire call on fire alarm control panel board or telephones.
A) IN CASE OF CALL THROUGH FIRE ALARM

 Acknowledge the fire alarm to silence the audio alarm (wailing tone).
 Investigate the location of fire/origin of alarm in the DCS panel.
 Give information to the in-charge of CISF fire crew.
 Inform Fire & Safety Officers.
 Check for Fire water header pressure
 Inform Power & Utility Department for operation of Fire Water Pumps
 Inform Ambulance, CISF QRT & auxiliary squad.
B) IN CASE OF CALL THROUGH FIRE TELEPHONE

 On receiving the fire call on Fire Station telephone, will lift the receiver
and say "NORTH/ SOUTH FIRE STATION. So and so.........................
Speaking"
 Will take the correct message from the caller (Identity of the caller and
exact location of fire)
 Will repeat the message for confirmation.
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 Will inform fire fighting crew for turn out.
 Will Inform P&U Department to start the electrical fire pump will inform
First Aid center for Ambulance.
 Will inform GM (HSE)/ CMFS/ SMFS/ MFS/ AMFS/ FSO/ CISF
Inspector.
 Will inform GM (HSE)/ CMFS/ SMFS/ MFS/ AMFS/ FSO/ CISF
Inspector at their residence in case of fire/ emergency during odd
hours.
13.3 ACTION BY FIRE STATION
i. On confirmation of fire call, turn out will be taken by CISF Fire crew &
F&SO.
ii. Will start fire fighting operation in consultation with the Fire Chief/
In-Charge of affected areas.
13.4 ACTTON BY CISF- Security wing AT MAIN GATE
 On hearing the hooter sound, two CISF personnel from the Main Gate will
rush to the scene of fire. They will control Traffic & prevent parking of
vehicles (except fire vehicles) near the fire hydrants within 100 meters.
 One CISF personnel will restrict the entry of visitors.
13.5 ACTION BY REFINERY SHIFT MANAGER
Will proceed to the scene of fire to help in fire fighting operations by

mobilizing other resources and /or to discharge responsibility as Fire Chief,
if required.
13.6 ACTION BY FIRST-AID CENTRE
 The Pharmacist will release the Ambulance driver to report to the scene of
fire.
 The ambulance driver with ambulance will rush to the scene of fire and will
carry the casualties, if any, to the First Aid Center and subsequently to
Hospital, if required.
13.7 ACTION DURING MAJOR FIRE
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13.7.1 SOUNDING OF MAJOR FIRE SIREN
Fire Siren will be decided by the Fire Chief. He will instruct the Fire Station
Operator to sound the Fire Siren as per defined fire siren code.
13.7.2 ACTION BY FIRE STATION CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR

a. Will take actions as described in section 6.2.
b. Will sound the Fire Sirens of Refinery and Township, wailing type for two
minutes, on instruction of Fire Chief.
c. Will inform Fire Station of nearby Factories/ organization and State Fire
Service on instruction of Fire Chief.
d. Will inform Officers of F&S Division & Inspector CISF (at residence also)
e. Will inform GM (HSE)/ ED (CG) as directed by Fire Chief, during odd

hours.
13.8 ACTION BY OM&S (BOOT-3)
a) All loading and unloading operations in TTL and LPG will be stopped.
b) Truck entry including hot jobs will be stopped.
c) LPG filling is to be stopped. After isolating, the operating personnel will
rush to the scene of fire leaving at least 3 persons at the following locations
to keep vigilance on (a) LPG Storage Area; and (b) Loading/Unloading
shed.
d) No draining of any storage tank, LPG bullets/sphere shall be carried out till
All Clear siren is given.
e) Movement of all trucks must be controlled to keep roads free from any
blockage.
f) Quick exit of loaded tank trucks to be ensured.
g) Product receipt, blending and transfer to loading point are to be stopped as
per the situation demand.
13.9 ACTION BY MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT
On hearing the Fire Siren, Maintenance Dept. (Workshop) will ensure the
following:
i. Tractor/Trailer/Crane with Operator must be made available at Garage.

ii. Service of Riggers, fabricators, welders, must be kept stand by at
Workshop.
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iii. Maintenance personnel will assist in fire fighting operation on request of
Fire Chief.
13.10 ACTION BY MATERIALS DEPARTMENT (STORES)
On hearing fire siren during off-duty hours/Sunday/holidays

 Will arrange to man the stores for emergency issue of materials.
 Will arrange to man the petrol pump.
13.11 ACTION BY HR DEPARTMENT
On hearing fire siren
a) Will report to the Scene of fire

b) Will arrange for the refreshment for the personnel involved in fire fighting on
request of Fire Chief
c) Will arrange to bring the fire fighting personnel from township on receiving
advice from Fire Chief.
d) Will take care of the press reporters, if any.
e) To coordinate with the district authority for further help.
13.12 ACTION BY CISF IN-CHARGE
Will release 20 constables from the barracks to report to the scene of fire to
assist fire fighting and traffic control.
13.13 ACTION BY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
 Will stand by at township hospital to receive the casualties, if any.

 Will send one doctor to the first-aid center in the refinery.
 Will stand by at the first aid center to receive the casualties, if any.
13.14 ACTION BY CMFS/ SMFS/ MFS/ AMFS/ FSO/ CISF Inspector
i. Will rush to the scene of fire

ii. Will take the responsibility of all fire fighting appliances and equipment,
organize fire fighting teams and guide the refinery employees and CISF
Fire wing in fire fighting operation.
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iii. Will organize fire fighting operation with the persons available at the scene
of fire.
13.15 SITUATION LEADS TO DISASTER
In case the situation leads to a disastrous condition, the Chief Coordinator in

consultation with Unit Head will declare it DISASTER. Fire Chief shall instruct Fire
Station Operator to sound disaster siren.
On hearing the disaster siren, immediately disaster control group will rush to the
respective positions and shall take over the situation and follow all the procedures as
per the approved disaster plan.
13.16 ROLE OF ED/GM
SN FIRE INCIDENT DISASTER

1. Remain in Office and got Overall co - ordinator
feedback from GM/ DGM/ Remain in Office and get feedback from
CPNM on the overall situations Chief Disaster Coordinator
2. Receive the latest status of site Advice Disaster Coordinators for
of incident from Fire declaration of Disaster
Chief/CPNM
3. In case of Major Fire, assess the Guide Chief Coordinator for necessary
situation and co-ordinate with actions for disaster control
HQ accordingly
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Fire Tender Turnout Procedure
The following fire vehicle turn out procedure shall be followed in case of all fire /
emergency calls inside Paradip Refinery:-
(1) On receipt of any fire / emergency call at Fire Station Control Room either
through Fire Call Telephone(101/5555/5600/5514) or through Fire Alarm system
or through wireless system, the control room operator will immediately: -
a) Take correct message regarding exact location, type of fire / emergency and name
of the caller.
b) Immediately inform Fire Station personnel by sounding emergency fire bell.
c) Announce on duty Fire Station Personnel regarding exact location, type of fire /
emergency etc. through PA system and wireless system. After normal office hours,
holidays and at hours, inform CMFS at 9437492701 and On Call F&SO.
d) Inform firewater pump house at 5700 for fire pump operation through fire bell/
buzzer as well as through telephone.
e) Inform RSM, First Aid Centre at (5300/5200/06722211617) for Ambulance for

mobilization at the exact location / site of fire / emergency.
g) Inform all concerned through Group Telephone Messaging system, Group SMS
System & Group Pager System regarding the fire / emergency situation inside
refinery and its exact location.
h) On receiving information on wireless from CM(F&S) / Chief Controller, call for Mutual
Aid help from M/s PPL, IFFCO & PHBPL.
i) On receiving information on wireless from HOD (F&S) / Chief Controller, call / inform
any other agency / authority as per instruction.
j) On receiving information on wireless from HOD (F&S) / Chief Controller, operate

appropriate Fire Sirens for refinery / township as per instruction.
k) On receiving information on wireless from HOD (F&S) / Chief Controller, inform all
concerned through common-group telephone messaging system regarding the
normalcy by giving “ All Clear ” message and will operate appropriate siren for “ All
Clear ” for refinery / township as per instruction.
(2) The mobilization of Fire Vehicles depending on the nature of call & the
incident area is tabulated above. The manpower for taking the turnout shall be
as below:
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a) First Turn-Out fire crew from Main Fire Station comprising of four Constables, one
DCPO, one Head Constable & shift officer of Sub- Inspector Rank will immediately
proceed to the site of fire / emergency with first turn out fire vehicle (Foam Tender)
and take position. Sub- Inspector will lead the crew and carry out fire fighting /
emergency handling activities as per instructions from area in charge.
b) Second Turn-Out fire crew from South Fire Station shall comprise of Four
constables, one Head Constable and One DCPO. Turnout crew from the North Fire
Station shall comprise three constables, One Head Constable, One DCPO and a
Sub- Inspector.
c) Designated ASI at South Fire Station & Head Constable at North Fire Station will
remain at the respective Control Rooms. On receiving of instruction from emergency
site, South Fire station control room in charge shall send special fire fighting
appliance like DCP Tender, Emergency Rescue Tender or Foam Nurser etc. as per
instruction of HOD (F&S). He will coordinate with Mutual Aid agencies and with CISF
security wing for reinforcement.
d) In case of any major fire / emergency, manpower earmarked for Standby duties (1
Head Constable & 1 Constable in each shift) shall also be utilised to mobilize fire
vehicles at site. Manpower from barracks shall be utilized for mobilizing specialized
fire fighting equipments/vehicles. Further, CISF (Security), shall also be mobilized for
assistance during any major emergency.
(4) On receipt of any fire / emergency call, Crew in General Shift ( Training & Standby
duties) shall proceed to the site of fire / emergency to extend help in fire fighting
operation as per instruction.
(5) All fire crew will return back to respective Fire Stations with their respective fire
vehicles, fire fighting equipment & appliances only after getting necessary clearance
/ instruction from In-Charge of the affected area / Fire Chief / Chief Controller at the
site of fire / emergency.
(6) On returning back ,Inspector will get all the Fire Fighting Appliances, those have
attended the fire call, inspected & refilled the contents (such as water/ foam /DCP
etc.) and other fire fighting equipments to keep it ready for turn out.
(7) In case of two fire / emergency calls, simultaneously from two different locations,
one of the calls will be attended by 2 Fire Tenders of South Fire Station and the
turnout of North Fire Station to other side. Shift officer (F&S) will simultaneously
seek help from other F&S Officers through Fire Station Control Room to reinforce
the crew.
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PARADIP REFINERY
The following table gives a sample turnout mobilization procedure at Paradip
Refinery. For the sake of convenience, the area is divided in 07 zones and the
applicable procedure for turn out in each area is detailed below:
Incident Area No. of No. of turnouts No. of Remarks

Turnouts from South turnouts
required Fire Station from North
Fire Station
Crude Tank 02- Foam 02 foam No turn out Foam Nurser to
Farm Area Tenders- Tenders be mobilised from
Simultaneously Turnout on North if required.
Demand only.
Crude Tank Specialized 01 Hydraulic 01 Foam Hydraulic Platform

Farm Area Vehicle Platform on Nurser to be mobilized
On demand demand On Demand from South Fire
Station on
demand.
Manpower from
Barracks shall be
called for
reinforcement.
Foam nurser from
South to be
placed at North.
Intermediate 02- Foam 02 foam No turn out Foam Nurser to
Tank Farm Area Tenders- tenders be mobilised from
Simultaneously Turnout on North if required.
Demand only.
Hydraulic Platform
to be mobilized
from South Fire
Specialized Station on
Vehicle demand.
On demand
Manpower from
Barracks shall be
called for
reinforcement.
Foam nurser from
South to be
placed at North.
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Incident Area No. of No. of turnouts No. of Remarks
Turnouts from South turnouts
required Fire Station from North
Fire Station
Product Tank 02- Foam 01 – Foam 01- Foam
Farm Area Tenders- Tender Tender
Specialized 01 Hyd.
Vehicle Platform on
On demand demand -DO-
01 Foam Nurser
On Demand
HGU/HCDS/H2/ 01- Foam 01- Foam No turn out
Alkylation/Buta Tender & 01- Tender & 01-
mer Bullets/GT DCP tender DCP tender Turnout on
Simultaneously Demand only
Specialized
LPG & Vehicle
Propylene On demand
Mounded
Bullets
01- Foam 01- DCP tender 01- Foam
Tender & 01- Tender
DCP tender
Specialized ERT on
Process Units Vehicle Demand Hydraulic Platform
including Utility On demand to be used on
Boilers & 02- Foam 02 foam No turn out demand at DCU &
Electrical sub Tenders- tenders FCCI-Indmax
stations Simultaneously Turnout on
Demand only
Specialized Hydraulic Hydraulic Platform
Plant Buildings Vehicle Platform for rescue from
On demand Ad. Building
01-Foam 01-Foam tender No turn out
Tender
Turnout on
Demand only
Specialized Hydraulic
Vehicle Platform
On demand
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Note :
• In case of Toxic Gas release, dismounting of Fire Crew shall be after donning B.A
Set and requisite Personal protection Equipment and ERT shall be mobilized for
attending calls on Structural collapse.
• For Simultaneous calls, 2 turnouts shall be taken from South Fire Station & 1 from
North Fire Station.
• In case of major Fire call, manpower from barracks shall be utilized for mobilizing
specialized fire fighting equipments/vehicles.
• Further, CISF (Security), shall also be mobilized for assistance during any major
emergency.
PROCEDURE FOR DANGEROUS OCCURANCE:
GENERAL
Dangerous occurrences are events, which if not handled effectively, can lead to an
emergency resulting into loss of life and property. Dangerous occurrence is
occurrence like failure of vessel, leakage of Hydrocarbon or toxic gases, collapse
of walls, explosion of any after accident where people are trapped. Fire Crew is
required to attend the above types of emergency to ensure safety of man, material
& machine.
PROCEDURE FOR FIRE PREVENTION IN CASE OF HYDROCARBON LEAKAGE:
In refineries contingencies of hydrocarbon leakage can happen in the process units

and other areas which may lead to serious fire/explosion. Suitable fire prevention
measures are required to be taken for the control of leakage's and meeting with
such contingencies. The following procedure for the prevention of fire /explosion is
recommended:
a) In-charge of the affected areas shall immediately take necessary action to

isolate / control of leakage.
b) Inform the fire station control room
c) Fire station control room will inform the shift-in-charge (fire station), RSM,
Officers of F&S Department and CISF & shall perform his activity as in case of
fire.
d) The shift-in-charge (Fire Station) will take a turn out with crew and rush to the
scene of emergency.
e) In-charge of the affected area and the fire crew will immediately stop the hot
jobs and smoking in the nearby smoking booths.
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f) CISF will cordon off the affected area and will not allow any traffic in the
affected area and keep off the unwanted crowd.
g) Fire Crew shall disperse the vapour cloud by water spray in consultation with
the in charge of the affected area.
h) In-charge of the affected area will arrange to obstruct the flow of oil from
entering the storm water channels and ensure that it does not go outside the
battery limit.
i) After controlling the leakage, the cordoned area can be opened for normal
operations and traffic, after ensuring that the area has been made safe.
HANDLING OF EMERGENCIES DUE TO STRUCTURAL FAILURES:
The following procedure is required to be followed for attending to such types of

emergencies:
a) Inform the fire station control room.

b) The fire station control room attendant will inform the fire station shift-in-charge,
medical centre, RSM/Duty Officer of Fire & Safety Department and CISF.
c) The shift-in-charge (Fire Station) will take a turn out with fire operators and
report to the scene of the occurrence. He shall guide rescue operations with
necessary assistance from concerned departments as required.
d) The ambulance driver will report to the scene of the occurrence and carry the
casualties, if any, to the hospital.
e) For any help required from CISF (Security) personnel, the officer from F&S will
co-ordinate with the CISF in-charge-on-duty.
HANDLING OF EMERGENCIES DUE TO TOXIC GAS LEAKAGE:
The following procedure is required to be followed for attending such type of

emergency:
a) Inform fire station control room & concerned section.

b) Fire Station control room operator shall act as in case of fire.
c) Total fire crew shall respond to scene with BA sets.
d) Evacuate the area, with special instruction keeping in view of the wind
direction.
e) Two CISF constables (Fire) along with one concerned area personnel, shall
enter the leaking area after wearing of BA set & try to arrest leak or
neutralize.
f) Rest Fire Crew shall keep BA set ready if required.
g) In case of major leak on site disaster plan of Paradip Refinery shall be
followed.
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FIRE FIGHTING ASSISTANCE FOR MUTUAL AID INDUSTRIES AND NEARBY

AREAS :
GENERAL
Refinery fire service may be requested to render help to neighbouring industries or

nearby areas such requested can be grouped in the following categories:
a) Nearby village, as a social obligation.

b) Fire in Township.
c) Fire in neighbouring industries.
d) Fire in nearby area, which may endanger the refinery.
e) Specific request of the State Law & Order Authorities.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE F&S SHIFT INCHARGE:
The Shift In-charge shall inform GM (HSE)/DGM (HSE)/ CM (F&S) for necessary
permission after apprising him of availability of fire vehicles.
After getting the permission one fire vehicle (Foam tender) shall be sent along with
three crew members.
In case of nearby village, shift officer shall instruct control room operator to inform,
nearby fire brigade.
He shall establish constant communication with officers of F&S Department.
He shall send a request to CMFS/CISF (Inspector)- Fire for additional manpower
from township to reinforce the fire station strength.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIRE CREW WHILE ATTENDING THE OUTSIDE FIRE :
a) He shall clearly understand the location & route.

b) He shall co-operate with other fire brigade.
c) He shall report details of fire fighting materials used and action taken at the
scene of fire to F&S Shift Officer on his return.
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CHAPTER - XIV
FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND IT’S

STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES
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14.0 FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENTS AND IT’S STANDARD OPERATING

PROCEDURES (SOP)
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Foam Branch Fire Hose Type B
SOP for Fire Delivery Hose With

Nozzle
1. Grab the nozzle with the left hand.

2. Take the right hand beneath the
hose and hold left hand elbow.
3. Spread the legs and positioned
your body such that to counter
effectively the back presser of
Delivery Hose.
4. Keep the front foot upright and
press it to the ground.
Warning: Always firm grip on the nozzle

before charging the hose.
Fire Hydrant:
Standard Operating Procedure:

1. Connect the fire hose (male coupling)
with hydrant outlet (female coupling).
2. Open the main valve of hydrant with
the help of valve key.
3. Then open the small valve slowly at
fire hose-hydrant connection point.
4. Another person at other side hold the
fire hose connected with branch in
standard operating way.
5. Close the small valve followed by
main valve of hydrant after
completion of operation.
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Fire Monitor:
Standard Operating Procedure:
1. Rotate the outlet nozzle of fire

monitor towards Fire/ Smoke.
2. Tightened the lock of the fire monitor
to prevent accidental movement while
operation.
3. Open the fire monitor valve with the
help of valve key.
4. Hold the fire monitor as shown in
photo and rotate it as & when
required.
5. Close the monitor valve after
completion of operation.
HVLR Monitor SOP (Manual)
1. Open the main valve

2. Rotate and adjust the monitor throw
with the help of hand wheel
3. Rotate the monitor front handle for
FOG/ JET
4. For foam application, open the
JRCP inlet valve.
5. After completion of operation close
the main valve of the HVLR.
Manual Call Point SOP
 Break the glass of the Fire alarm with

help of small metallic hammer hanged
near alarm.
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DCP Extinguisher (2.5/ 5 Kg) SOP
1. Bring the extinguishers at fire site

2. Keep the fire extinguishers upright
3. Pull the safety clip
4. Aim at the fire
5. Squeeze the operating levers
6. Sweep the nozzle at the base of fire
(Warning- while operation, don’t operate in confined

area or consider wind direction in open space)
CO 2 Extinguishers SOP

3. Pull the safety clip
4. Aim at the fire
5. Squeeze the operating levers
(Warning- while operation, don’t touch the Horn)
DCP Extinguisher (5/ 10 Kg) SOP

3. Remove the safety clip
4. Strike the knob
5. Press the nozzle
6. Direct the discharge at the base of fire
(Warning- while operation, don’t operate in confined

area or consider wind direction in open space)
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Fire Proximity Suit/ Entry Suit
1. Always have two people suited with fire proximity
suits to work in relays and to aid each other.
2. Put on pants and adjust suspender to proper fit.
3. Raise pant legs and put on boots, securing all
fasteners and straps for a tight comfortable fit.
Secure pant legs over top of boots with retainer
straps.
4. Put on breathing apparatus. Check for proper fit
and operation. Then put on coat.
5. Tie draw strings around hips and snap both inner
and outer set of snaps.
6. Put on hood and secure keeper straps under arms.
7. Put on gloves over sleeves for tight fit.
8. Have assistant check for snug tight fit. Make sure
no straps or ties protrude.
SOP for Multi Gas Detector (Model # QRAE II):

Turning the Gas Detectors ON:
1. Hold down the power key for 2 seconds. When starting up, the Multi Gas Detector
simultaneously turns the backlight ON and OFF, beeps once, blinks once and
vibrates. It performs diagnostics and tells you current settings. After completion of
setting (20 seconds), start the area monitoring job.
Turning the Gas Detectors OFF:

1. Press & hold the power key for the entire shut –off time (for 6 seconds).
POWER SETTINGS
GAS FILTER
NOTE: It is important to note that the Multi Gas Detector is to be used for Work
Area Monitoring, not for Gas Sampling and Analysis Purpose. You can also flip the
display by pressing SETTINGS KEY for 3 seconds.
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1. Before starting the Multi Gas Detector, it is to be ensured that the FILTER MUST
ALWAYS BE FITTED WITH GAS DETECTOR AT AIR INLET. Use of gas
detector without filter will affect the sensors life and the performance of the
detector which will result in giving wrong reading.
2. The gas detector must be switched on before entering inside the monitoring area
at least one minute before in fresh air.
3. When the detector is not in use, the Multi Gas Detector is always to be kept on
CHARGING on the charger cradle (Multi Gas detector must be turn OFF).
CHARGING
CRADLE CHARGING LED
Red charging LED: Unit

Charging
CO Gas Monitor
Turning the Gas Monitor ON:
Hold down the MODE/Power key for 2-3

seconds and release it.
When starting up, the monitor performs a self-

test preceding the warm – up. It counts down
from 60 to 1.
Turning the Gas Monitor OFF:

Press & hold the power key for the entire shut
–off time (for 6 seconds). When you see OFF,
MODE Key release your finger from the MODE key
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O 2 Gas Monitor
Hold the button down until you see the word

ON displayed, and then release it.
The monitor performs a self-test preceding the

warm – up. It counts down from 10 to 1,
beeps and vibrates.

Button
Press & hold the power key for the entire shut
–off time (for 6 seconds). When you see OFF,
release your finger from the MODE key.
H 2 S Gas Monitor
Hold down the POWER key for 2-3 seconds

and release it.
The monitor performs a self-test preceding the

warm – up. It counts down from 20 to 1.
Press & hold the POWER key for the entire

shut –off time (for 6 seconds, five beeps).
POWER
After listening five beeps release your finger
from the POWER key.
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Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SOP:
STEP 1 : Remove And Inspect SCBA

Before Donning
a. Remove unit and face mask from case.

b. Visually inspect equipment.
c. Check condition of air cylinder, mask,
cylinder valve, straps and hoses.
d. Ensure the demand valve mode
selector is in the “donning” (off)
position.
e. Checks the cylinder pressure &
calculate the Safe Operation Time by
using Formula:
STEP 2: Don The SCBA
a. Don the cylinder and backpack,

connect/adjust straps and waist belt to
ensure correct fit.
b. Open cylinder valve anticlockwise to
ON position. Whistle alarm must
sound.
c. Check to see that the lung demand
valve is in the donning or off position by
pressing the reset button
d. Ensure lung demand valve in the OFF
mode.
e. Don the face mask and adjust straps to
correct fit.
f. Attach demand valve to facemask.
STEP 3: Confirm Correct Face Seal
a. After donning the Face Mask confirm

that the mask seal is correct. A correct
seal is achieved only when there is no
sound of air leaking through the
demand valve while you hold your
breath.
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b. Start breathing.
STEP 4 : Take Off The SCBA
a. Loosen head harness straps and

remove facemask.
b. Put lung demand valve in the OFF
mode
c. Turn cylinder valve clockwise to OFF
position.
d. Remove demand valve from facemask.
e. Undo the waist belt and loosen
shoulder straps. Remove apparatus.
f. Release any air trapped in the system
by partially turning the lung demand
valve ON and then OFF again.
g. Whistle alarm must sound as air
pressure is reduced to zero.
STEP 5 : Clean And Replace SCBA Into

Carrying Case
a. Wipe out inside of facemask thoroughly

with clean cloth.
b. It is very important to disinfect the facial
contact rubber surface inside
facemask.
c. Replace facemask into protective
plastic bag.
d. Replace backpack/tank assembly and
facemask neatly into storage case and
return to stores location.
SOP of Safety Shower & Eye Wash

Unit
1. Move quickly to the nearest

Safety Shower Unit.
2. Pull the chain to activate body
shower or press the Foot Pedal
to activate eye wash unit.
3. Remove the contaminated
clothing while under the flow of
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PARADIP REFINERY
water.
4. Remain under safety shower &
eye wash unit for a minimum 15
minutes.
5. Seek medical help after 15
minutes.
Water Gel Blanket SOP:
1. Remove blanket from container. (If

bag has been opened, do not use on
burn victim).
2. For one step use on burning victim:
If possible, knock down burning
Victim down and wrap with blanket.
Mold to body to extinguish flame and
start emergency first aid. Leave
victim wrapped in blanket and seek
medical attention.
3. For protection against heat and
flames: Hold blanket as screen
between you and source of heat or
cover the material to be protected
from heat or approaching fire.
4. For extinguishment of fires: Carefully
place blanket over source of flame.
When water gel is used as a first aid
medical device, its shelf life id 3
years and when used as firefighting
equipment, shelf life is 5 years and it
can be uses more than once.
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PARADIP REFINERY
SOP for Fire Vehicles:
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CHAPTER - XV
FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES AT

MAJOR UNITS OF PARADIP
REFINERY
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PARADIP REFINERY
15.0 FIRE PROTECTION FACILITIES AT MAJOR UNITS OF PARADIP
REFINERY
15.1 BOOT-3 Crude Tank Farm
Fire Fighting Equipment – South side

SN Equipment Name Quantity
1 Double head hydrant 114
2 Pumper truck Connection 24
3 MEFG (Fixed - 140 ltr) 22
4 MEFG (Poartable -Trolly type - 140 ltr) 2
5 Foam monitor (1000-500 GPM) 13
6 HVLRM (4000 - 2000 GPM) 24
7 DV system 4
8 Clean agent system with 48 cylinder (only for 1
SRR-806)
9 Safety Shower 05
Tank Details:
SOUTH SIDE CRUDE TANKAGE

Sprinkler
Nominal system & Number Foam
Tank Dia Height Product
capacity Roof Type Rim seal of Foam pourer
No. (m) (m) Class
(Kl) fire pourer capacity
protection
201- External
TK- 79 13.6 Class - A 59555 Double deck Yes 11 300 Lpm
001 floating roof
201- External
002 floating roof
201- External
003 floating roof
201- External
004 floating roof
201- External
005 floating roof
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PARADIP REFINERY
SOUTH SIDE CRUDE TANKAGE

Sprinkler
Nominal system & Number Foam
Tank Dia Height Product
capacity Roof Type Rim seal of Foam pourer
No. (m) (m) Class
(Kl) fire pourer capacity
protection
201- External
006 floating roof
201- External
007 floating roof
201- External
008 floating roof
201- External
009 floating roof
201- External
010 floating roof
201- External
011 floating roof
15.2 BOOT-3 Product Tank Farm
Fire Fighting Equipment – North Side

2 Pumper truck Connection 23
3 MEFG (Fixed - 140 ltr) 18
4 Hose Box 118
5 Foam monitor (1000-500 GPM) 72
6 HVLRM (4000 - 2000 GPM) 28
7 DV system 16
8 Clean agent system with 02
9 Safety Shower 13
Tank Details:
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PARADIP REFINERY
NORTH SIDE PRODUCT TANKAGE
Rim
Produ Nominal Sprink No. of Foam seal
Tank Dia Height Servic Roof
ct capacity ler Foam pourer fire
No. (m) (m) e Type
Class (Kl) system pourer capacity prote
ction
External
205- Single
Class -
TK- 40.7 15.5 MS 18207 deck Yes 6 300 Lpm Yes
A
008 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
TK- 50.5 16 MS 29023 deck Yes 7 300 Lpm Yes
A
011 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
A
012 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
A
013 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
A
014 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
NAPT Class -
TK- 58 16 38284 deck Yes 8 300 Lpm Yes
HA A
004 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
NAPT Class -
HA A
005 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
NAPT Class -
HA A
006 floating
roof tank
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PARADIP REFINERY
Rim
No. (m) (m) e Type
ction
External
205- double
NAPT Class -
HA A
007 floating
roof tank
Internal
205- single
Class - 1000
TK- 49.5 17 DPK 26913 deck Yes 10 No
B Lpm
015 floating
roof tank
Internal
205- single
Class - 1000
TK- 49.5 17 DPK 26913 deck Yes 10 No
B Lpm
016 floating
roof tank
Internal
205- single
Class - 1000
TK- 49.5 17 DPK 26913 deck Yes 10 No
B Lpm
017 floating
roof tank
Internal
205- single
Class - 1000
TK- 49.5 17 DPK 26913 deck Yes 10 No
B Lpm
018 floating
roof tank
External
205- Single
Class -
TK- 49.5 15.5 SKO 26942 deck Yes 7 300 Lpm No
B
038 floating
roof tank
External
203- Single
HSD Class -
TK- 35 15.3 13215 deck Yes 5 300 Lpm No
(HDT) B
017 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
TK- 46.3 16 HSD 24303 deck Yes 7 300 Lpm No
B
019 floating
roof tank
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PARADIP REFINERY
Rim
No. (m) (m) e Type
ction
External
205- double
Class -
B
022 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
B
023 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
B
024 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
B
025 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
B
026 floating
roof tank
External
205- double
Class -
B
027 floating
roof tank
205- Un
SULP Fixed
TK- 15 13 classifi 2197 No No ─── No
HUR roof tank
051 ed
205- Un
SULP Fixed
HUR roof tank
052 ed
205- Un
SULP Fixed
HUR roof tank
053 ed
15.3 AVU and SR LPG:
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PARADIP REFINERY
Fire Fighting Equipment

2 Water monitor manual (500-1000 GPM) 12
3 Remote operated HVLRM (500-1000 GPM) 04
4 DV system 21
5 Dry Risers 09
6 Fire Hose 15 m length 58
7 Hose Reel, 35 m of 25 mm bore hose 17
8 Hose Cabinet 31
9 10 Kg DCP Extinguishers 46
10 50 kg. DCP Extinguishers 11
11 MCP 49
12 Safety Showers 10
Location of Fire Hydrants in AVU & SR LPG Unit
SL. No Tag No Location/Area

1 010-HY-001/002 North side of ISBL at 010-V-611
2 010-HY-003/004 North side of ISBL at 010-P-203 A-C
3 010-HY-005/006 North side of ISBL at 010-V-202 A
4 010-HY-007/008 North side of ISBL at 010-V-610
5 010-HY-009/010 North side of ISBL at 010-V-102 B
6 010-HY-011/012 Near to 010-V-301
7 010-HY-013/014 Near to 010-V-016
8 010-HY-015/016 Near to 010-V-018 & 010-V-614
9 010-HY-017/018 Near to 010-K-003 A/B
10 010-HY-019/020 Near to 010-P-018 A/B
11 010-HY-021/022 South side of 010-E-151 A
12 010-HY-023/024 Near to 010-P-014 A/B
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PARADIP REFINERY
SL. No Tag No Location/Area
13 010-HY-025/026 Near to 010-E-127 F/G
14 010-HY-027/028 Near to 010-E-122 A/B
15 010-HY-029/030 Near to 010-E-117
16 010-HY-031/032 Near to 010-P-003 A
17 010-HY-033/034 Near to 010-P-003 C
18 010-HY-035/036 North-West side of chemical injection Package
19 010-HY-037/038 South side of Chemical Injection Package
20 010-HY-039/040 Near to 010-P-016 A
21 010-HY-041/042 West Side of Crude Column
22 010-HY-043/044 Near to 010-P-501A/B/C/D
23 010-HY-045/046 West Side of Crude Heater Area
24 010-HY-047/048 South Side of Crude Column
25 010-HY-051/052 Near to 010-V-613
26 010-HY-053/054 Near to 010-P-025 A
27 010-HY-055/056 North East Side of Vacuum Heater.
28 010-HY-059/060 In between Vacuum & Crude Heater
29 010-HY-061/062 North East Side of Crude Heater.
Location of Fire monitors in AVU & SR LPG Unit
12 Tag No Location/Area
1 010-FFM-001 Near to 010-P-016 A
2 010-FFM-002 At ground level of 010-AC-007
3 010-FFM-003 Near to 010-P-014 A
4 010-FFM-004 Near to Off Gas Compressor Area
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PARADIP REFINERY
12 Tag No Location/Area
5 010-FFM-005 Near to 010-P-018 B
6 010-FFM-006 Near to 010-V-018 & 010-V-614
7 010-FFM-007 Near to Flare KOD (010-V-301)
8 010-FFM-008 Near to 010-V-102 B
9 010-FFM-009 Near to 010-V-202 A
10 010-FFM-010 Near to 010-E-127 F/G
12 010-FFM-011 North Side of Vacuum Heater Area
Location of HVLRM in AVU & SR LPG Unit
SL. No Tag No Location/ Area Elevation

1 010-EFM-001 At Vacuum Column Transfer Line 38.3 m
2 010-EFM-002 At Vacuum Column (010-C-007) 35.0 m

North West Side of Crude Column (010-
3 010-EFM-003 20.0 m
C-001)
4 010-EFM-004 At Crude Column (010-C-001) 39.0 m
Location of Deluge Valves in AVU & SR LPG Unit
SN DV Skid Tag No Equipment Catered Type

Atms. Residue Pump (010-P-007 A-C) Automatic
1 DVS - 1 DV-01
Top pump around Pump (010-P-004 A-C) (QB Detection)
Automatic
2 DV-03 VGO Product Cooler (010-AC-015 A-H)
(QB Detection)
Automatic
3 DV-04 VGO Product Cooler (010-AC-015 A-H)
(QB Detection)
Kerosene Product Cooler(010-AC-004)
Automatic
4 DVS - 2 DV-05 AGO Product Cooler (010-AC-005 A-C)
(QB Detection)
Stabilised Naphtha Cooler (010-AC-010 A-B)
Recontact Cooler (010-AC-008 A-B)
Automatic
5 DV-06 Naphtha Stabiliser Overhead Cooler (010-AC-
(QB Detection)
009 A-C)
C3 LPG Pump (010-P-019 A-C) Automatic
6 DV-20
C4 LPG Pump (010-P-020 A-C) (QB Detection)
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN DV Skid Tag No Equipment Catered Type
Automatic
7 DV-07 Off Gas Compressor (010-K-003 A-B)
(QB Detection)
Deethaniser Bottom Pump (010-P-002 A-C) Automatic
8 DV-18
DVS - 3 Deethaniser Overhead Pump (010-P-018 A-B) (QB Detection)
9 MV-1 Recontractoe Drum (010-V-007) Manual
Naphtha Stabiliser Overhead Receiver (010-V-
10 MV-2 Manual
008)
Automatic
11 DV-08 Vacuum Diesel Product Cooler (010-AC-014)
(QB Detection)
DVS - 4
Crude Column Overhead Receiver (010-V-
12 MV-3 Manual
005)
Crude Column Overhead Condensor (010-AC- Automatic
13 DVS - 5 DV-13
007 A-H) (QB Detection)
Automatic
14 DVS - 6 DV-10 Vacuum Column (010-C-007)
(QB Detection)
LAGO PA Pump (010-P-006 A-B)
Automatic
15 DV-02 HAGO PA Pump (010-P-030 A-B)
(QB Detection)
Kerosene PA Pump (010-P-005 A-B)
Automatic
16 DV-14 Diesel PA Cooler (010-AC-016 A-C)
(QB Detection)
HVGO Pump (010-P-023 A-C) Automatic
17 DVS - 7 DV-15
VR Pump (010-P-025 A-C) (QB Detection)
VGO Pump(010-P-022 A-C) Automatic
18 DV-16
Recycle Oil Pump (010-P-024 A-B) (QB Detection)
LAGO Product Pump (010-P-009 A-B)
Automatic
19 DV-17 HAGO Product Pump (010-P-029 A-B)
(QB Detection)
Kerosene Product Pump (010-P-008 A-B)
Automatic
20 DVS - 8 DV-09 Crude Column (010-C-001)
(QB Detection)
Automatic
21 DVS - 10 DV-19 LPG Product Pump (011-P-006 A-B)
(QB Detection)
Location of Dry Risers in AVU & SR LPG
SL. No Tag No Structure No. Location/Area

Train 1 Preheat Exchangers platform (010-E-
1 DR-001 STR-010-001
104/122/117/118/128)
Train 2 Preheat Exchangers platform (010-E-
2 DR-002 STR-010-002
204/222/217/218/228)
3 DR-003 A STR-010-003 010-V-016 & 010-V-017
4 DR-003 B STR-010-005 010-E-048, 010-E-046 & 010-V-010
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PARADIP REFINERY
SL. No Tag No Structure No. Location/Area
5 DR-004 A 010-V-007, 010-V-008, 010-V-009, 010-E-035,
STR-010-006 010-E-036, 010-E-038, 010-E-040 & 010-E-
6 DR-004 B 042
7 DR-005 STR-010-008 Ejector & Ejector Condenser Platform
8 DR-006 STR-010-007 CDU Stripper Area
011-E-001, 011-E-002, 011-V-005, 011-V-001
9 DR-003 C STR-011-001
& 011-V-006
Location of Manual Call points (MCP) in AVU & SR LPG
SN MCP No. Location of MCP

Manual Call points in AVU (010)
1 010-AFMCP-0101 Near to 010-V-611
2 010-AFMCP-0106 Near to 010-E-202
3 010-AFMCP-0201 Near to 010-P-203 C
4 010-AFMCP-0202 Near to 010-E-223 A/B
5 010-AFMCP-0210 Near to 010-E-251 A
6 010-AFMCP-0301 Near to 010-V-610
7 010-AFMCP-0305 Near to 010-E-104 A
8 010-AFMCP-0401 Near to 010-P-102 B
9 010-AFMCP-0402 Near to 010-E-151 A
10 010-AFMCP-0501 Near to 010-P-301 B
11 010-AFMCP-0502 Near to 010-E-017 B
12 010-AFMCP-0505 Near to 010-V-016
13 010-AFMCP-0506 Near to 010-V-016
14 010-AFMCP-0507 Near to 010-V-016
15 010-AFMCP-0601 Near to 010-P-021 A
16 010-AFMCP-0701 Near to 010-P-014 A
17 010-AFMCP-0706 Near to Chemical Injection Package (010-TK-
005)
18 010-AFMCP-0801 Near to 010-V-020
19 010-AFMCP-0806 Near to 010-P-001 B
20 010-AFMCP-0901 Near to 010-K-003 A
21 010-AFMCP-0904 Near to 010-V-006
22 010-AFMCP-1001 Near to 010-P-011 A
23 010-AFMCP-1002 Below 010-AC-009 C
24 010-AFMCP-1101 Near to 010-P-013 A
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PARADIP REFINERY
25 010-AFMCP-1112 Near to 010-V-007
26 010-AFMCP-1113 Near to 010-E-038
27 010-AFMCP-1114 Near to 010-V-009
28 010-AFMCP-1115 Near to 010-E-038
29 010-AFMCP-1201 Near to Vacuum column
30 010-AFMCP-1301 Near to VDU Heater Area (010-F-002)
33 010-AFMCP-1401 Near to 010-E-039 B
34 010-AFMCP-1411 At Vacuum column
35 010-AFMCP-1412 Near to 010-P-024 A
36 010-AFMCP-1413 Near to 010-E-039 B
37 010-AFMCP-1501 Near to 010-P-029 A
38 010-AFMCP-1601 Near to CDU Heater Area (010-F-101/201)
42 010-AFMCP-1701 Near to 010-C-003
43 010-AFMCP-1702 Near to 010-C-008
44 010-AFMCP-2001 Near to 010-P-007 B
45 010-AFMCP-2201 Below 010-AC-004
Manual Call points in SR LPG (011)
1 011-AFMCP-0101 Near to 011-K-001 B
2 011-AFMCP-0102 Near to 011-V-001
3 011-AFMCP-0103 Near to 011-P-010 A
4 011-AFMCP-0104 Near to 011-C-002
Location of Safety Showers in AVU & SR LPG
SN Tag No. Location of Safety Showers

Safety Showers in AVU (010)
1 010-SS-001 Near to chemical Injection Package
2 010-SS-002 Near to 010-P-033 A/B & 010-V-018
3 010-SS-003 Near to 010-P-015 A/B/C
4 010-SS-004 Near to 010-C-009 & 010-P-031 A/B
5 010-SS-005 Near to 010-V-014
6 010-SS-006 Near to 1st train Desalter Package
7 010-SS-006 Near to 010-F-002 (tag no. Repeating)
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN Tag No. Location of Safety Showers
8 010-SS-007 Near to 2nd train Desalter Package
9 010-SS-008 Near to 010-F-101
Safety Showers in SR LPG (011)
1 011-SS-001 Near to 011-C-001
15.4 DCU:

2 Water monitor manual (3785 LPM) 17
3 Remote operated HVLRM (7570 LPM) 04
4 Hose Reel, 35 m of 25 mm bore hose 13
5 Hose Cabinet 23
8 MCP 41
9 Safety Showers 07
Location of water monitors and columns protected by water monitors
SN Column No. Monitor No.
1. C-001 TO 03 TM04
2. C-02/03 TO 03 TM04
3. C-05/06 TM01 TM02
4. C-07 LRM 05 TM01
5. C-08 LRM02 LRM03
6. C-09/V-018 LRM 04 LRM 05
7. C-10 LRM 03 LRM 01
8. C-011 LRM 01 LRM 03
Location of fixed water spray system provided on equipment
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN Tag No. Equipment Name Description

1. 030-C-001 Cocker fractionators One Ring on the top of
column with 15 spray
nozzles
2. 30-C-005/006 Absorber / stripper of gas Total 5 ring with 42
section Spray nozzles in equal
space
3. 030-V-005 Fractionator overhead Two rectangular ring
drum with 42 Spray nozzles
4. 030-V-014 Compressor suction drum Two O-ring with 2
Spray nozzles
6. 030-V-016 Absorber stripper feed Total water spray
drum (Gas section) nozzles 51
7. 030-V-017 Debutanizer overhead Total water spray
drum nozzle 30
8. 030-V-027 Flare KOD Total water spray
nozzles 42
9. 030-AC-001 A-H Fractionator Overhead Total water spray
Condensers nozzles 114
10. 030-AC-002 A~H Blowdown Condenser/ Total water spray
/ Blowdown Circulating Oil nozzles 120
030-AC-003 Cooler
11. 030-AC-004 LCGO Product Cooler
030-AC-007 Lean Sponge Oil Cooler
030-AC-008 Total Naphtha Cooler Total water spray
030-AC-009 A/B Naphtha Splitter nozzles 88
030-AC-010 Overhead Condenser
Heavy Naphtha Product
Cooler
12. 030-AC-005 A~D HCGO Product Coolers Total water spray
030-AC-006 A~B Compressor Inter-stage nozzles 75
Condensers
13. 030-V-045 Acid gas flare system Total water spray
nozzle 045
14. 030-K-001 Cocker Gas compressor Total water spray
nozzles
Compressor Seals 6
Lube Oil Unit 12
15. 030-F-001 Cocker heater Total water spray
nozzles 56
16. 30-F-002 Cocker heater Total water spray
nozzles 56
17. 030-P-001A/B/C Charge pump Total water spray are
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PARADIP REFINERY
030-P-006A/B 22 , for each pump 2
030-P-008A/B HCGO Product Pump
030-P-012A/B HCGO Pump around
030-P-016A/B Coke condensate Pump
Fines Removal pump
18. 030-P-040 congealing closed drain Total Water Spray
pump nozzles 2
Location of Fire Manual Call Point (MCP):
SN MCP No. Location

1 030-AFMCP-0101 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-V-045
2 030-AFMCP-0102 NEAR PUMP NO. 030-P-030B
3 030-AFMCP-0103 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-E-016
NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-V-012 (EAST
4
030-AFMCP-0104 SIDE)
NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-V-012 (SOUTH
5
6 030-AFMCP-0106 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-TK-001
12 030-AFMCP-0205 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-E-008B/009B
14 030-AFMCP-0207 NEAR PUMP NO. 030-P-052A
16 030-AFMCP-0209 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-A-004
18 030-AFMCP-0211 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-E-002A/B
19 030-AFMCP-0212 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-E-003A/B
21 030-AFMCP-0214 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-TK-004
26 030-AFMCP-0305 NEAR EQUIPMENT NO. 030-ID-001
28 030-AFMCP-0401 NEAR 030-F-001, ANALYSER SHELTER
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN MCP No. Location
30 030-AFMCP-0403 NEAR 030-F-001 TIE-IN AREA
31 030-AFMCP-0404 BETWEEN 030-F-001 & 030-F-002
32 030-AFMCP-0405 NEAR 030-F-002, ANALYSER SHELTER
33 030-AFMCP-0406 NEAR 030-F-002 TIE-IN AREA
NEAR 030-F-001 BATTERY LIMIT (NORTH
34
35 030-AFMCP-0408 AT 030-F-001 BATTERY LIMIT (NORTH SIDE)
AT PIPE RACK DCU BATTERY LIMIT (NORTH
37
NEAR FINE SUMP MAZE-3 AT BATTERY
38
030-AFMCP-0411 LIMIT
AT PERIPHERY OF UNIT BATTERY LIMIT
39
030-AFMCP-0412 NEAR START OF CONVOYOR
40 030-AFMCP-0215 030-MSH-0001, WGC MMS Rack Shelter
41 030-AFMCP-0216 030-MSH-0001, WGC MMS Rack Shelter
Location of Safety Shower:
SN Safety Shower Tag No. Location

1 SEW-001 Near 030-A-005
2 SEW-002 Near 030-P-001C
3 SEW-003 Near 030-A-004
4 SEW-004 Near 030-A-001
5 SEW-005 Near 030-V-004
6 SEW-006 Near 030-A-002
7 SEW-007 Near 030-P-013
15.5 Alkylation & Butamer Unit:

2 Remote operated HVLRM (2000 GPM) 10
3 Remote operated HVLRM (1000 GPM) 02
4 DV system 15
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PARADIP REFINERY
5 Dry Risers 04
6 Hose Reel 10
7 Hose Cabinet 13
10 MCP 25
Location of Fire Hydrant:
SN Fire Hydrant Location

1. North side of 025-E-007
2. North side of 025-E-006A
3. North side of 024-E-017A
4. North side of 024-P-011A
5. North side of 024-TK-001
6. North-East side of 024-TK-001
7. East side of 024-TK-001
8. East side of 024-TK-102/202
9. Near B/L valve Plate farm
10. North-East side of TK-004
11. East side of 024-TK-004
12. South side of 024-TK-004
13. South side of 024-C-005
14. South side of 024-P-020A/B
15. South side of 024-TK-003
16. South side of 024-R-201
17. South side of 024-V-203
18. South side of 024-R-101
19. South side of 024-P-102A
20. South-West side of 024-P-102A
21. West side of 024-P-102A
22. West side of 025-V-13
23. East side of 485 Operator/Technician cabin
24. Near SE of 485 Operator/Technician cabin
25. SW of 485 Operator/ Technician cabin
26. South of SS-335S
30. South of SRR-807
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PARADIP REFINERY
33. South-West of SRR-807
34. West of SRR-807
Location of HVLR Water cum Foam Monitors in Alkylation & Butamer unit
SN Monitor No HVLR Water cum foam monitor Location

(2000GPM)
1. 025-SP-516 North side of 024-R-001
2. 025-SP-517 North side of 025-V-010
3. 025-SP-518 West side of 025-C-002
4. 025-SP-519 West side of 025-P-901A/B
5. 024-SP-563 North of 024-P-003A/B
6. 024-SP-564 East side of 024-V-012
7. 024-SP-565 East of 024-C-002
8. 024-SP-566 West side of 024-E-013A
9. 024-SP-567
10. 024-SP-568 North of 024-E-004
1000 GPM
11. 024-SP-561 North of Analyzer house
12. 024-SP-562 Near South of 024-K-001
2000 GPM (OSBL)
13. South of 024-R-101
14. South of 024-R-201
Location of Hose Reels in Alkylation & Butamer unit
SN Location of Hose Reel

1. Near 024-C-001
2. Near 024-P-102A/B
3. Near 025-P-001A/B
4. Near 024-E-004
5. Near 025-DR-002A/B
6. Near 024-P-002A/B
7. Near 024-E-006G
8. Near 024-K-001
9. Near 024-C-002
10. Near 024-C-005
Location of Fixed Water Deluge System in Alkylation & Butamer unit
SN Deluge Valve Service Deluge Valve Location

1. For 024-P-004A/B & 005A/B Near 025-V-004
2. For 024-P-003A/B Near 025-V-004
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SN Deluge Valve Service Deluge Valve Location
3. For 024-P-001A/B & 002A/B Near 025-V-004
4. For 024-P-102A/B Near 024-P-102A
5. For 024-P-101A/B & 201A/B Near 024-P-102A
6. For 024-P-202A/B Near 024-P-102A
7. For 024-C-002 Near 024-E-017A
8. For 024-C-002 Near 024-E-017A
9. For 024-AC-003 Near 024-E-017A
10. For 024-AC-005 Near 024-E-017A
11. For 024-AC-003 Near 024-E-017A
12. For 024-P-010A/B Near 024-E-017A
13. For 024-P-010A/B & 011A/B Near 024-E-017A
14. For 024-P-009A/B & 109A/B Near 024-E-017A
15. For 024-P-006A/B, 7A/B & 8A/B Near 024-E-017A
Location of Dry Risers in Alkylation & Butamer unit
SN Dry Riser Location

1. For 025-E-012, 025-DR-002A/B
2. For 024-E-003
3. For 024-E-006
4. For 024-E-009
Location of Manual Call Point in Alkylation & Butamer unit.

1. 024-AFMCP-0101 Near 024-V-103/024-P-102A
2. 024-AFMCP-0102 Near 024-STR-202A/B
3. 024-AFMCP-0103 Near 024-V-203
4. 024-AFMCP-0201 Near 024-R-001/024-E-004
5. 024-AFMCP-0202 Near 024-E-005A/B
6. 024-AFMCP-0203 Near 024-E-201B
7. 024-AFMCP-0301 Near 024-E-006G
8. 024-AFMCP-0302 Near 024-P-002B
9. 024-AFMCP-0303 Near 024-C-003
10. 024-AFMCP-0304 Near 024-E-014B
11. 024-AFMCP-0305 Near 024-P-013C
12. 024-AFMCP-0306 Near 024-C-003
13. 024-AFMCP-0307 Near 024-V-027
14. 024-AFMCP-0401 Near 024-E-009
15. 024-AFMCP-0402 Near 024-E-020
16. 024-AFMCP-0403 Near Tanker un-loading area (T-001)
17. 024-AFMCP-0410 Near 024-P-017A
18. 024-AFMCP-0501 Near 024-V-021
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1. 025-AFMCP-0101 Near 025-C-001
2. 025-AFMCP-0102 Near 025-RU-001
3. 025-AFMCP-0103 Near 025-P-005B
4. 025-AFMCP-0104 Near 025-V-004
5. 025-AFMCP-0105 Near 025-V-012
6. 025-AFMCP-0106 Near 025-DR-001A/B
7. 025-AFMCP-0107 Near 025-V-901
Location of Safety showers
SN Safety Shower No. Location of Safety Shower

1. 024-SS-001 At catalyst handling area near DIOS reactor 024-
R-001
2. 024-SS-002 Near 024-E-101 & 024-E-201
3. 024-SS-003 Inside the acid tank dyke near 024-TK-001
4. 024-SS-004 Near H2SO4 unloading facility
5. 024-SS-005 Inside the caustic tank dye near 024-TK-004
6. 024-SS-006 Near Reactor feed pre-filter Tr-2 024-STR-201
7. 024-SS-007 Near Reactor feed pre-filter Tr-1 024-STR-101
8. 024-SS-008 Beside neutralization pit
9. 024-SS-009 Near compressor KOD Drum 024-V-005
11. 024-SS-011 Near fresh acid transfer pump dyke 024-P-017A/B
14. 024-SS-014 Inside the caustic transfer pump 024-P-014A/B
15. 024-SS-015 Near purge water stripper bottom pump 024-P-
021A/B
16. 024-SS-016 Near Purge wash water circulation pump 024-P-
013 A/B and spent caustic 024-P-012 A/B
17. 024-SS-017 In front of acid Blowdown drum 024-V-024
18. 024-SS-018 In front of spent caustic pump 024-P-019A/B
19. 024-SS-019 Near Rx product transfer pump 024-P-202 A/B
20. 024-SS-020 Near Rx product transfer pump 024-P-102 A/B
21. 024-SS-021 Debutanizer Overhead pump 024-P-010A/B and
bottom transfer pump 024-P-011 A/B
22. 024-SS-022 Near LPG Feed Heater 024-E-015
23. 024-SS-023 Near DIOS Feed pump 024-P-001 A/B
24. 024-SS-024 Near Economizer liquid pump
25. 024-SS-025 Near 024-K-001 compressor house
26. 024-SS-026 Near NSU LPG Feed Pump 024-P-007 A/B and
Depropaniser Overhead pump 024-P-008A/B
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PARADIP REFINERY
27. 024-SS-027 Near DIB Reflux pump 024-P-009A/B and iC4
recycle pump 024-P-109A/B
S. Safety Shower No. Location of Safety Shower

No.
1. 025-SS-001 Near 025-R-001(Methanator reactor)/025-DR-
01A/B(MUG Drier)
2. 025-SS-002 Near 025-P-009A/B (Fresh caustic pumps).
3. 025-SS-003 Near 025-DR-002A/B(Liquid Feed Drier)
4. 025-SS-004 Near 025-V-004(chloride injection drum),025-R-
002A/B (Isomerisation reactor), 025-P-
006(chloride transfer pumps).
5. 025-SS-005 Near 025-C-001(Stabilizer) /025-V-003(stabilizer
receiver)
15.6 DHDT Unit:

2 Long Range Monitor 13
3 Remote operated HVLRM 07
4 DV system 13
5 Hose Reel 38
6 Hose Cabinet 46
8 75 Kg. DCP Extinguishers 24
10 MCP 26
11 Safety Showers 8
12 External Hose Reel 41
HCDS Unit:

3 DV system 4
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PARADIP REFINERY
4 Hose Reel 2
5 Hose Cabinet 3
9 MCP 12
10 Safety Showers 2
Location of High Volume Long Range Foam Cum Water Monitor (HVLRM) of
DHDT/HCDS/SRR
SN Tag Name Unit Location

1 013-HVLRM-01 DHDT At west north corner of the unit
2 013-HVLRM-02 DHDT Near 013-E-004A
3 013-HVLRM-03 DHDT North side of 013-E-001B/A
4 013-HVLRM-04 DHDT East south corner of the unit near 015-F-001
5 013-HVLRM-05 DHDT East south corner of the unit near 014-F-002
6 013-HVLRM-06 DHDT South side of the unit near 013-C-003
7 013-HVLRM-07 DHDT South side of the unit Recycle gas comp. house
8 056-HVLRM-01 HCDS At HCDS unit Battery Limit

9 056-HVLRM-02 HCDS South side of the unit near 056-K-001B
10 056-HVLRM-03 HCDS North side of the unit opposite to 056-K-001B
11 056-HVLRM-04 HCDS South side of the unit near 056-K-001A
12 056-HVLRM-05 HCDS South side of the unit near 056-K-001C
Location of Long Range Remote Operated Monitor (LRM) of DHDT/HCDS/SRR
SN Tag Name Unit Location Remarks

R.O., Tower
1 013-LRM-01 DHDT East north corner of the unit
mounted
R.O.,
2 013-LRM-02 DHDT Near 013-AC-001 Technological
Structure
East side of the unit near R.O., Tower
3 013-LRM-03 DHDT
015-F-001 mounted
Location of Double Headed Fire Hydrants of DHDT/HCDS/SRR
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PARADIP REFINERY

1 013-DH-01 DHDT Near 013-E-002 towards north
2 013-DH-02 DHDT Near Vacuum package towards north
3 013-DH-03 DHDT Near 013-P-001C towards north
4 013-DH-04 DHDT Near 015-E-001B/A/D/C towards north
5 013-DH-05 DHDT South east corner of the unit
6 013-DH-06 DHDT Near 014-F-01 towards south
7 013-DH-07 DHDT Near 013-V-003 towards south
Near RGC ( 013-K-001 ) comp. house
8 013-DH-08 DHDT towards south
9 013-DH-09 DHDT South west corner of the unit
10 013-DH-10 DHDT Near 013-GN-001
11 013-DH-11 DHDT Near 013-P-001A
12 013-DH-12 DHDT Near 013-E-001E/F
13 013-DH-13 DHDT At unit Battery Limit
14 056-DH-01 HCDS Near 056-K-001C North side of the unit
15 056-DH-03 HCDS East North corner of the unit
Location of Fire Escape Hydrant ( FEH ) at DHDT/HCDS/SRR
SN Tag Name Unit Location Elevation

1 013-FEH-01 DHDT Near 013-C-002 106.500
2 013-FEH-02 DHDT Near 013-C-002 113.200
3 013-FEH-03 DHDT Near 013-C-002 123.400
4 013-FEH-04 DHDT Near 013-C-002 126.900
5 013-FEH-05 DHDT Near 013-V-007 106.500
6 013-FEH-06 DHDT Near 013-V-007 113.200
7 013-FEH-07 DHDT Near 013-V-007 123.400
8 013-FEH-08 DHDT Near 013-V-007 126.900
9 013-FEH-09 DHDT Near 013-C-003 105.200
10 013-FEH-10 DHDT Near 013-C-003 109.900
11 013-FEH-11 DHDT Near 013-C-003 114.200
12 013-FEH-12 DHDT Near 013-C-003 121.600
13 013-FEH-13 DHDT Near 013-C-003 124.900
14 013-FEH-14 DHDT Near 013-C-003 130.300
15 013-FEH-15 DHDT Near 014-R-001 106.000
16 013-FEH-16 DHDT Near 014-R-001 115.550
17 013-FEH-17 DHDT Near 014-R-001 121.650
18 013-FEH-18 DHDT Near 014-R-001 126.850
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN Tag Name Unit Location Elevation

19 013-FEH-19 DHDT Near 014-R-001 134.100
20 013-FEH-20 DHDT Near 014-R-001 138.700
21 013-FEH-21 DHDT Near 015-R-001 106.000
22 013-FEH-22 DHDT Near 015-R-001 115.550
23 013-FEH-23 DHDT Near 015-R-001 121.650
24 013-FEH-24 DHDT Near 015-R-001 126.850
25 013-FEH-25 DHDT Near 015-R-001 134.100
26 013-FEH-26 DHDT Near 015-R-001 138.700
27 013-FEH-27 DHDT Near 013-K-001 103.800
28 013-FEH-28 DHDT Near 013-K-001 108.000
29 013-FEH-29 DHDT Near 013-V-001 105.000
30 013-FEH-30 DHDT Near 013-V-001 110.600
31 013-FEH-31 DHDT Near 013-V-001 17.850
32 013-FEH-32 DHDT Near 013-V-001 123.200
33 013-FEH-33 DHDT Near 013-V-001 126.200
34 013-FEH-34 DHDT Near 013-V-001 129.700
35 013-FEH-35 DHDT Near 013-V-003 108.700
36 013-FEH-36 DHDT Near 013-V-003 113.700
37 013-FEH-37 DHDT Near 013-V-003 117.650
38 013-FEH-38 DHDT Near 013-V-003 122.100
39 056-FEH-01 HCDS Opposite to 056-K-001A in 112.500

corridor
40 056-FEH-02 HCDS Opposite to 056-K-001C 112.500
in corridor
Location of Deluge Valves at DHDT/HCDS/SRR
Deluge
SN Tag Name Unit Location Valve
House No.
1 013-DV-01 DHDT North side of the unit near 013-V-001 8
2 013-DV-02 DHDT North side of the unit near 013-V-001 8
3 013-DV-03 DHDT North side of the unit near 013-P-001C 3
North side of the unit near vacuum drier
4 013-DV-04 DHDT package 2
5 013-DV-05 DHDT West north corner of the unit 1
North side of the unit near vacuum drier
6 013-DV-06 DHDT package 2
7 013-DV-07 DHDT West north corner of the unit 1
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PARADIP REFINERY
Deluge
SN Tag Name Unit Location Valve
House No.
8 013-DV-08 DHDT West South corner of the unit 6
South side of the unit near Recycle Gas
9 013-DV-09 DHDT Comp. House 5
Near common feed heater Flue gas
10 013-DV-10 DHDT stack 4
11 013-DV-11 DHDT South side of the unit near 013-V-002 7
12 013-DV-12 DHDT South side of the unit near 013-V-002 7
South side of the unit near Recycle Gas
13 013-DV-13 DHDT Comp. House 5
14 056-DV-01 HCDS At HCDS unit battery limit 1

15 056-DV-02 HCDS Near MMS shelter towards stair case 2
Location of MCP at DHDT, HCDS & SRR 808 Unit
SN Tag Number Unit Location

1 013-AFMCP -0101 DHDT IN CBD PIT AREA
2 013-AFMCP -0102 DHDT STRUCTURE A COLUMN AA-A2
SUPPORT STRUCTURE A ON
3 013-AFMCP -0103 DHDT
PLATFORM EL+114.300
4 013-AFMCP -0104 DHDT ON HPRT PUMP AREA
5 013-AFMCP -0105 DHDT SUPPORT STRUCTURE E EC-E3
REACTOR STRUCTURE-C-CB-C1 ON
PLATFORM EL+122.000
REACTOR STRUCTURE-C CB-C5ON
GRID ON PLATFORM EL+122
8 013-AFMCP -0108 DHDT REACTOR STRUCTURE-C-CA-C1
9 013-AFMCP -0109 DHDT REACTOR STRUCTURE-C-CA-C5
10 013-AFMCP -0201 DHDT PIPE RACK GRID B-01
11 013-AFMCP -0202 DHDT PIPE RACK GRID 03 AFC
15 013-AFMCP -0206 DHDT PIPE RACK GRID A-27
COMPRESSOR HOUSE PLATFORM EL
17 013-AFMCP -0208 DHDT
+108.000
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PARADIP REFINERY
COMPRESSOR HOUSE PLATFORM EL
18 013-AFMCP -0209 DHDT
+108.000
19 013-AFMCP -0210 DHDT ANALYZER ROOM_013-AS-001
20 013-AFMCP -0211 DHDT SUPPORT STRUCTURE B-BA-B1
SUPPORT STRUCTURE B ON
21 013-AFMCP -0212 DHDT
PLATFORM EL +121.630 (BC-B6)
22 013-AFMCP -0213 DHDT SUPPORT STRUCTURE B COLUMN B6
23 014-AFMCP -0214 DHDT FIRED HEATER 014 / 015-F-001 AREA
24 014-AFMCP -0215 DHDT FIRED HEATER 014 / 015-F-001 AREA
27 056-AFMCP-0101 HCDS East side of MMS near step ladder
28 056-AFMCP-0102 HCDS Near 056-V-002 in Corridor
29 056-AFMCP-0103 HCDS Near 056-AC-001A step ladder
30 056-AFMCP-0104 HCDS At unit battery limit
In comp. house near 056-K-001C at
31 056-AFMCP-0105 HCDS
platform ( south side )
In comp. house near 056-K-001C ( south
side )
East side of comp. house near 056-K-
001A at platform
34 056-AFMCP-0108 HCDS At 056-AC-001A platform ( North side )
In comp. house near 056-K-001B at
platform ( south side )
East south corner of comp. house near
056-K-001A (south side )
In Machine Monitoring System ( MMS )
shelter
In Machine Monitoring System (MMS)
shelter
SRR
39 013-AFMCP-ZZ01 Near air lock-1 in SRR Room
ROOM 808
SRR
40 013-AFMCP-ZZ02 Near ladies toilet in SRR Room
ROOM 809
SRR
41 013-AFMCP-ZZ03 North side of SRR Room
ROOM 810
SRR
42 013-AFMCP-ZZ04 South side of the SRR Room
ROOM 811
SRR
43 013-AFMCP-ZZ05 South side of the SRR Room
ROOM 812
SRR
44 013-AFMCP-ZZ06 North side of SRR Room
ROOM 813
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PARADIP REFINERY
SRR
45 013-AFMCP-ZZ07 Near HVAC air cooled chiller-1 in SRR
ROOM 814
Location of Eyewash and safety showers (ES) in DHDT and HCDS units
SN Tag No. Unit Location

1. 013-ES-01 DHDT At DHDT unit B/L near CBD/ABD pit in corridor
2. 013-ES-02 DHDT Between 015-E-001C/D & E/F at corridor side
3. 013-ES-03 DHDT Between 013-V-011 & 013-C-001
4. 013-ES-04 DHDT Near common Stair case to 013-V-003 & 013-V-004
south side of unit.
5. 013-ES-05 DHDT Near Analyzer shelter 013-AS-001
6. 013-ES-06 DHDT Near Stair case to 013-V-007 platform (Near 013-P-
06A)
7. 013-ES-07 DHDT Near 015-BMS-001 north side
8. 013-ES-08 DHDT Near Feed filter (013-GN-001) Stair case
9. 056-ES-01 HCDS East south corner near CBD area

10. 056-ES-02 HCDS East side of Machine monitoring system near step
ladder
15.7 NHT CCR Unit:
SN Fire Fighting Equipment Name Quantity
2 DV system 09
3 Dry Riser 09
4 MCP 23
5 Safety Showers 08
Location of Safety Shower and Eye wash:
SN Tag Location
1 040-SS-001 Near 040-P-009A/B & 040-V-007
2 040-SS-002 Near 040-R-001 & 040-V-015
3 040-SS-003 Near 041-C-002 & 041-E-004B
4 040-SS-004 Near 041-P-005A/B & 041-E-005
5 040-SS-005 Near 041-E-001A/B
6 040-SS-006 Near 042-P-001A/B & 042-P-002A/B
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PARADIP REFINERY
7 040-SS-007 Near chemical injection area

8 040-SS-008 Near CCR structure
Location of Fixed Water Deluge:
Deluge Location of Deluge Valve

Deluge Valve Location of
SN station Deluge station/ (Automatic
number Deluge valve ActivationBy)
/Skid no Skid
040-AFDV-6801 040-AC-001 Q.B detector
North of NHT 040-AC-002
1 DVS1 040-AFDV-6803 Q.B detector
040-AFDV-6804 RGC 040-V-003 Q.B detector
Flame
040-K-001
040-AFDV-6805 detector
041-AC-001 &
South of NHT
2 DVS2 041-AFDV-6806 002 Q.B detector
Stripper
041-AFDV-6807 040-P-0005A/B Q.B detector
3 DVS3 041-AFDV-6809 North of CBD 041-AC-004 Q.B detector
DRUM 2 041-AC-003 &
041-AFDV-6810 005 Q.B detector
South-East of
4 DVS4 042-AC-004 &
042-A-001
042-AFDV-6963 006 Q.B detector
042-AFDV-6958 South of 042-AC-002 Q.B detector
5 DVS5
042-AFDV-6960 Debutaniser col 042-AC-005 Q.B detector
042-AFDV-6961 South of 042-P- 042-AC-001 Q.B detector
6 DVS6
042-AFDV-6962 003 A/B 042-AC-001 Q.B detector
042-AFDV-6964 North of 042-P- 042-V-001 Q.B detector
7 DVS7
042-AFDV-6965 002 A/B 042-V-002 Q.B detector
Flame
042-K-001
042-AFDV-6966 North of 042-K- detector
8 DVS8
001 Flame
042-K-003
Flame
042-K-002
042-AFDV-6967 North of 042-K- detector
9 DVS9
004 Flame
042-K-004
Location of Manual Call Point
SN MCP No Location
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN MCP No Location
1 040-AFMCP-0301 South side of NHT FSD
2 040-AFMCP-0401 South side of NHT Heater
3 040-AFMCP-0101 In between Stripper reboiler A & B
4 040-AFMCP-0201 North side of 040-C1 & south side of 040-K-001
5 040-AFMCP-0102 North-east of 040-P-0004 A/B
6 041-AFMCP-0101 In between Rerun column reboiler A & B
7 041-AFMCP-0102 South side of 041-P-002A
8 041-AFMCP-0201 North-West of 041-P-001A
9 041-AFMCP-0202 South side of 041-E-002 A & B
10 042-AFMCP-0103 West side of 042-E-004 A
11 042-AFMCP-0104 West side of 042-E-001 B
12 042-AFMCP-0605 North side of 043-V-012
East side of 10M wide crane access way which is at East
13 042-AFMCP-0203 side of 040-V-103
14 042-AFMCP-0309 North-east of 042-K-001
15 042-AFMCP-0606 North-east of 042-C-001
16 042-AFMCP-0310 North side of 042-K-004
17 042-AFMCP-0504 East side of Refrigeration package(042-RU-001-V-03)
18 042-AFMCP-0607 South-east of Refrigeration package(042-RU-001-V-07)
19 042-AFMCP-0403 West side of 040-V-005
20 043-AFMCP-0110 South-West side of 042-R-003/004
21 043-AFMCP-0111 South-east side of 042-R-001/002
South side of fire heater package (042-F-003 interheater
22 043-AFMCP-0112 inlet)
Extreme South-East of CCR heater package(042-F-
23 043-AFMCP-0113 001/002/003/004
15.8 PRU:

2 Tower mounted Water Monitor 03
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PARADIP REFINERY
3 Fire Monitor 02
4 DV system 09
5 Hose Reel 02
8 MCP 11
9 Safety Showers 05
Location of Tower Mounted Water Monitor
SN Equipment No. Fire Protection & Fire Water Supply

070-C-1001
Tower Mounted Water Monitor (5M EL.)-2
070-C-1005
Tower Mounted Water Monitor (5M EL.)
070-C-1007 Tower Mounted Water Monitor (5M EL.)
Location of Double Headed Hydrant Valve, Hose Reel & Fire Monitor
SN Tag No. Location

Double Headed Hydrant Valve
1 DH-01 Near Closed blow down
2 DH-02 Near Flare KOD
3 DH-03 Near Caustic Package
4 DH-04 Near Fire Water Booster Pumps,P-1057
5 DH-05 Near C-1001 Reflux Pump
Hose Reel
1 HR-01 Chilled Water Circulation Pump,P-1012
2 HR-02 Near Poison Catalyst Remover,R-1008
Fire Monitor
1 WM-01 Near Compressor House
2 Wm-02 Near Battery limit
Location of Water Spray System
SN Tag No Equipment Name Flow provided (LPM)
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PARADIP REFINERY
1. 070-C-1001 Depropaniser 1580
2. 070-C-1005 Deethaniser 364
3. 070-C-1007 C3 Splitter 2879
4. 070-C-1007 C3 Splitter (Booster Pump) 11840
5. 070-V-1001 C-1001 Reflux Drum 1492
6. 070-V-1021 Flare KOD 2845
7 070-K-1001 Vapour Re-Compressor 879
8 - Lube Oil Storage 507
9 070-A-1003 CSTS Package
Location of Manual Call Point
SN Description Location
1 070-AFMA-0105 Near 070-K-1001
2 070-AFMA-0106 Near 070-P-1014B
3 070-AFMA-0107 Near 070-V-1025
4 070-AFMA-0108 Near 070-P-1015A
5 070-AFMA-0109 Near 070-P-1014A
6 070-AFMA-0110 Near 070-AC-1001
7 070-AFMA-0205 Near 070-P-1055A
8 070-AFMA-0206 Near 070-E-1001
9 070-AFMA-0207 Near 070-P-1057C
10 070-AFMA-0208 Near 070-E-1003A
11 070-AFMA-0209 Near 070-V-1010
Location of Safety Shower
SN Safety Shower Tag No. Location

1 070-SEW-01 Near DM water make-up pumps, P-3105A
2 070-SEW-02 Near Fresh Caustic Make-up Pumps, P-3104A
3 070-SEW-03 Near Poison Catalytic Remover,R-1008A
4 070-SEW-04 Near Caustic Wash Column Feed Filter,GN-1002
5 070-SEW-05 Near PTBC unloading pumps, P-1019
15.9 VGO HDT Unit:

2 Long Range Monitor, remote operated 04
4 DV system 18
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PARADIP REFINERY
5 Hose Reel 53
6 Hose Cabinet 60
10 MCP 28
Location of High Volume Long Range Foam Cum Water Monitor (HVLRM)

1 020-HVLRM-01 VGO-HDT Near 20V27 & DMDS drum area.
2 020-HVLRM-02 VGO-HDT Near 20E21 A/B
3 020-HVLRM-03 VGO-HDT Near RGC compressor house area.
4 020-HVLRM-04 VGO-HDT Near 20 C01 & 20 C04
5 020-HVLRM-05 VGO-HDT Near breech lock exchanger area.
6 020-HVLRM-06 VGO-HDT Near 21F01/ 22F02 area
7 020-HVLRM-07 VGO-HDT Near 20E07 A/B area.
8 020-HVLRM-08 VGO-HDT Near 20E05 A/B area.
9 020-HVLRM-09 VGO-HDT Near 20F01 area.
10 020-HVLRM-10 VGO-HDT Near 20 V13 /20V14 area.
11 020-HVLRM-11 VGO-HDT Near 20P01 A/B/C area.
12 020-HVLRM-12 VGO-HDT Near breech lock exchanger area.
13 020-HVLRM-13 VGO-HDT Near feed filter area.
14 020-HVLRM-14 VGO-HDT Near 22R01 area.
15 020-HVLRM-15 VGO-HDT Near 20P21 A/B area.
Location of Double headed Hydrants
SN Tag Name Location

1 020-DH-01 Near LRM pumps
2 020-DH-02 Near 20V27 area
3 020-DH-03 Near 20E05 area
4 020-DH-04 Near RGC compressor house
5 020-DH-05 Near 20P01A/B/C
6 020-DH-06 Near 20P05 A/B area.
7 020-DH-07 Near 20 E06 area
8 020-DH-08 Near 20 GM02 A/B
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN Tag Name Location
9 020-DH-09 Near 20C10 area
10 020-DH-10 Near 20C06 area
Location of Fire Escape Hydrant (FEH)
SN Tag Name Area/Location Support structure Elevation

1 020-FEH-01 Near 20-C03 and Support structure A WR-1 106
20-P14A/B area
2 020-FEH-02 Near 20-C03 and Support structure A WR-1 112
20-P14A/B area
3 020-FEH-03 Near 20-P14A/B Support structure B WR-2 105.5
area
area
5 020-FEH-05 Near 20-P14A/B Support structure B WR-2 112
area
area
area
area
9 020-FEH-09 Near 20-C-07 Support structure B WR 2A 132.75
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
15 020-FEH-15 Near 20-P11 and Support structure D WR 4 109
20-P10 area
16 020-FEH-16 Near 20-P11 and Support structure D WR 4 112.75
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
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PARADIP REFINERY
20-P10 area
20 020-FEH-20 Near 20-P11 and Support structure D WR 5 109
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
20-P10 area
25 020-FEH-25 Near 20-V06 area Support structure E WR 6 103.5
27 020-FEH-27 Near 20-V06 area Support structure E WR 6 109
30 020-FEH-30 Area close to B/L Support structure F WR 7 107.5
32 020-FEH-32 Area close to B/L Support structure F WR 7 115
39 020-FEH-39 Near 20-C04 Support structure G WR 9 107.15
44 020-FEH-44 Near 20-V01/20- Support structure H WR 10 106.2
V02 and BLE
area
45 020-FEH-45 Near 20-V01/20- Support structure H WR 10 109
V02 and BLE
area
V02 and BLE
area
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PARADIP REFINERY
V02 and BLE
area
V02 and BLE
area
V02 and BLE
area
V02 and BLE
area
Location of Long Range Remote Operated Monitor (LRM)
SN Tag Name Location Remarks

1 020-LRM-01 Near water buster pump 2000 GPM, Tower mounted
2 020-LRM-02 Near 20-C-07 Area 2000 GPM
3 020-LRM-03 Near 20-P11 and 20-P10 area 1000 GPM
4 020-LRM-04 Near 20-P11 and 20-P10 area 1000 GPM
Location of Deluge System
Deluge Valve Deluge

Protected Equipment Spray System Type
House No. Valve No.
L.O Console for 20-P- Automatic HVWS
DV House-1 DV-11
001A/B/C System
L.O Console for 20-K-001
L.O Console for 20-P-
Automatic HVWS
DV-12 002A/B
System
L.O Console for 20-P-
019A/B
DV House-2 20-V-003 Manual MVWS
DV-02
20-V-006 System
Automatic MVWS
DV-03 20-K-001
System
20-AC-001 Manual MVWS
DV-07
20-AC-002 System
21-F-001 Manual water curtain
DV House-3 DV-13
22-F-001 system
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PARADIP REFINERY
Deluge Valve Deluge
Protected Equipment Spray System Type
House No. Valve No.
Manual MVWS
DV-18 20-V-010
System
Manual MVWS
DV-04 20-V-021
System
Manual MVWS
DV-16 20-C-008
System
20-C-007
Automatic MVWS
DV-05 20-V-013
DV House-4 System
20-V-014
20-P-014A/B
Manual MVWS
DV-14 20-P-015A/B
System
20-P-018A/B
20-V-016 Manual MVWS
DV-06
20-V-022 System
DV-08
20-AC-006 System
20-AC-004
DV House-5
DV-09
20-AC-007 System
20-AC-008
20-F-001 Manual water curtain
DV-15
20-F-002 system
Manual MVWS
DV-10 20-C-004
System
20-P-005A/B
DV House-6 20-P-010A/B
Manual MVWS
DV-01 20-P-011A/B
System
20-P-012A/B
20-P-016A/B
L.O Console for 20-P- Automatic HVWS
DV-17
012A/B System
Location of Manual Call Point/ Fire Call Points
SN Tag No Location
1 20-AFMCP-101
Analyser House 20-A-002
2 20-AFMCP-102
3 20-AFMCP-103
At 28m in Structure ‘B’ near C-007
4 20-AFMCP-104
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN Tag No Location
5 20-AFMCP-105
Analyser House 20-A-002
6 20-AFMCP-106
7 20-AFMCP-107 Near Sulphiding Package 20-A-004
8 20-AFMCP-108 Near 20-C-009 Structure at ground floor
9 20-AFMCP-109 Near Compressor house
10 20-AFMCP-110 In 20-C-005 Platform
11 20-AFMCP-111 Near 20-V-002
12 20-AFMCP-112 Between 20-V-001 & V-002 on Platform
13 20-AFMCP-201 Near 20-V-022
14 20-AFMCP-202 Near 20-AC-005
15 20-AFMCP-203 Air fin cooler platform near 20-AC-003 at 18.1m
16 20-AFMCP-204 Below AC-003 at ground level
17 20-AFMCP-205 Near 20-AC-002
18 20-AFMCP-206 Air fin cooler platform near 20-AC-001 at 15m
19 20-AFMCP-207 Near Main pipe rack east end
20 20-AFMCP-208 Near
20-AFMCP-209
20-AFMCP-210
21 Near 20-F-001 Analyser Room
20-AFMCP-211
20-AFMCP-212
20-AFMCP-213
22 Near 20-F-001 Analyser Room
20-AFMCP-214
23 20-AFMCP-215 Near C-004 Platform Staircase
24 20-AFMCP-216 20-R-001 platform staircase
25 20-AFMCP-217 Near P-005 B
26 20-AFMCP-218 Near C-004 exchangers platform crane access area
20-AFMCP-219 Near 21-R-002 platform staircase
27 20-AFMCP-220 Near 22-R-001 platform staircase
20-AFMCP-221 Near 22-R-001 platform staircase
20-AFMCP-222
20-AFMCP-223
20-AFMCP-224
28 Near 21/22-F-001 Analyser room
20-AFMCP-225
20-AFMCP-226
20-AFMCP-227
Safety Showers
SN TAG NO. Position
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PARADIP REFINERY
1 020-ES-001 020-AC-002
2 020-ES-002 ON STRUCTURE 'B' NEAR 020-E-012
3 020-ES-003 ON STRUCTURE 'A' NEAR 020-C-009
4 020-ES-004 NEAR DMDS FACILITY 020-A-004
5 020-ES-006 NEAR 020-K-001
6 020-ES-014 ON STRUCTURE ‘E’
7 020-ES-008 NEAR 020-V-002
8 020-ES-007 NEAR 020-GN-001
9 020-ES-012 NEAR CHEMICAL INJECTION AND 020-A-003
10 020-ES-010 ON STRUCTURE ‘D’ NEAR 020-E-018
15.10 CPP:

SR. NO. EQUIPMENT NAME TOTAL QTY.
43
Double Head Hydrant FEH
1 64
Fire Water Monitor
 WM -09
2 11
 RWM-02
3 Number of MCP 117
4 Foam Monitor (with capacity) 3
5 Deluge Valve System 33

Clean Agent System (CO 2 , for Turbine
6 81
Room)
7 Gas Detection System (No. of Detectors) 118
Fire Detection System

 Multi sensor Detector-294
 Heat Detector-31
8 667
 Photo electric Detector-318
 Proof Type Detector-24
No. of Extinguishers (DCP & Co2 with type &

9 quantity) 24
CPP Tank Details:
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PARADIP REFINERY
SN TANK DIA HEIGHT PRODUCT / PRODUCT NET ROOF TYPE SPRINKLER NUMBER OF
NO. (m) (m) SERVICE CLASS CAPACITY SYSTEM FOAM
3
(M ) (YES/ NO) POURER
Vertical
Cylindrical
1 190-TK- 11 14.3 HSFO B 1080 Fixed Cone Yes 2
851 Roof
(Supported
cone roof
without centre
column)
190-TK-
2 852 11 14.3 HSFO B 1080 -Do- Yes 2
Vertical
Cylindrical
3 190-TK- 12 15 NAPHTHA A 1080 Fixed Cone Yes 2
853 Roof with
internal
floating roof
tank
190-TK-
12 15 NAPHTHA A 1080 -Do- Yes 2
4 854
5 190-TK- 12 15 CLEAN HSD B 1080 -Do- Yes 2

855
190-TK- CLEAN HSD
6 856 12 15 B 1080 -Do- Yes 2
190-TK- DIRTY HSD
7 857 12 15 B 1080 -Do- Yes 2
190-TK- DIRTY HSD
8 858 12 15 B 1080 -Do- Yes 2
15.11 ETP:
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
SN Equipments Name Total Qty
1 Double Head Hydrant 20
2 Fire Water Monitor 7
3 No. of MCP 14
4 Foam Monitor (With Capacity). 2
5 Gas Detection System (No. of Detectors). 11
6 Fire Detection System 8
7 Safety Showers 4
15.12 DM Plant & CPU:
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
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PARADIP REFINERY
1 Safety Shower 05
2 No. of MCP 07
3 DCP Extinguishers 10 Kg / 5 Kg 43/04
Location of Safety Shower:
• Two numbers are provided in chemical Storage tank

• One shower at chemical unloading area
• One safety shower near De-mineralizing unit
• One safety shower in CPU unit
15.13 Cooling Tower - 1:
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
1 Safety Shower 04
2 No. of MCP 12
4 CO 2 Extinguishers 9.0 Kg/ 4.5 Kg 05/01
5 Double Headed Fire Hydrant 03
6 Single Headed Fire Hydrant 02
7 Fire Equipment Cabinet 03
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
1 Safety Shower 04
2 No. of MCP 12
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
1 Safety Shower 04
2 No. of MCP 12
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PARADIP REFINERY
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
Location of Fire Extinguishers:
DCP 50 Kg - 02 nos. at Pump House area

DCP 10 Kg - 02 nos. at Cl2 shed area
01 no. at Chemical Store Room/ Operator Room
CO2 9 Kg - 02 nos. at ground level near pump house
- 03 nos. at Fan Deck level
CO2 4.5 Kg - 01 nos. at ground level near MCC room
Location of Fire Hydrants:
Double headed hydrant installed – 03 nos. (on ground level)

Single headed hydrant installed - 02 nos. (on Fan Deck level, both side)
15.14 Air Compressor House:
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
1 Safety Shower 01
2 No. of MCP 03
3 DCP Extinguishers 10 Kg 04
4 Fire Equipment Cabinets 06
5 Two way Fire Hydrants 09
15.15 Fire Water Pump House:
EQUIPMENTS DETAILS
1 No. of MCP 07
2 DCP Extinguishers 10 Kg/ 05 Kg 06
QC Lab
Safety Shower – 02 nos.
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PARADIP REFINERY
CHAPTER - XVI
TYPICAL FIRE FIGHTING

STRATEGIES
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PARADIP REFINERY
16.0 TYPICAL FIRE FIGHTING STRATEGIES
16.1. TANK FIRE
Before attempting to extinguish fire in the tank, fire in the surrounding area
i.e. in the dyke should be extinguished to reduce heat input to tank
contents. Cooling the adjacent tanks (contents of which have not ignited
but are exposed to radiation heat) by means of water spray/jet applied to
shell to prevent excessive vaporization and to reduce the danger of fire
spreading to other areas. Application of foam on seal of adjacent tank is
also required.
When burning, crude oils and asphalt develop a heat wave which travels
downwards at a rate of 15 to 50 inches/hr. Temperature of oil may reach
260 to 315 0C. When this heat wave reaches to the tank bottom, where
some settled water is generally present, it will cause a violent “Boil- Over.”
Burning oil first erupts and then falls, spreading even beyond the dyke of
the tank. The columns of the flame can be very widely spread at the base.
The beginning of a boil over is indicated by both increase in height and in
brightness of the flames prior to actual eruption of the boiling oil.
Immediate action will have to be taken to evacuate all personnel from the
affected area and nearby areas. A “boil over” is a violent eruption. A boil
over results from expansion or frothing of the heated liquid but is not as
severe as a boil-over.
Heat-Wave
In case of wide boiling range ingredients in crude oil or product tank on

fire, the lower boiling point hydrocarbons come out of the surface and feed
the fire, while the higher boiling point hydrocarbons sink towards bottom
forming a heated front to heat cold oil deeper and deeper as fire continues
to burn. This phenomenon is called “heat wave.”
In case fire is not put out by the time heat wave has reached the point, 5
feet above known bottom water level (which can be roughly judged by
peeling off/blistering of the external painting of the tank shell), it is to be
ensured that all personnel are evacuated from the area. Be on guard from
successive boil overs form a burning tank since this will often occur.
Conduct all necessary work within the dyke area during the initial stages
of the fire so that as the fire progresses, fire fighting operation can be
carried out from a safer distance. Care must be taken NOT to get water in
a heavy oil tank while fighting a fire thus reducing the possibility of boil
over.
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PARADIP REFINERY
16.1.1 Fixed roof tank fire
Light to Heavy Oils (except Asphalt)
1. Extinguish fires in the Tank dyke with foam to reduce heat input to
tank contents.
2. Actuate spray system (wherever provided)/apply cooling water
streams to tanks shell. Ensure that water does not enter into the
tank either from run-off or from the water stream since it will
destroy the foam blanket.
3. Apply foam inside the tank either through fixed foam chamber
connections or through other available equipment.
4. Apply cooling water/actuate fixed spray/deluge system to other
adjoining tanks exposed to radiation heat from fire.
5. Open tank dyke valves, as necessary, to avoid flooding of the tank
dykes. However, care has to be exercised not to spread
hydrocarbons to surrounding areas.
Asphalt tanks
Asphalt tanks are heated and operated at temperatures above 150 deg. C
and therefore foam cannot be used in these tanks. Precaution should also
be taken while using water to cool the shell so that no water enters into
the tank. Whenever possible, water stream should be directed for fighting
asphalt Fire.
16.1.2 Floating roof tank fire
Floating roof tanks are designed to eliminate open oil surfaces from which
vapours escape. Since open surfaces are eliminated in most instances,
the possibility of fire from static electricity charge is prevented as long as
the roof is floating. A few rim fires are reported to have occurred to floating
roof tanks from lightening and also when seals were in poor condition or
improper channeled contacts between the roof and the shell of the tank.
Fire around roof edge
1. Floating roof rim fires should be extinguished by applying foam

through fixed foam system or through foam branch from the top
platform. Fire fighting personnel should not go down on the floating
roof of a partially filled tank except in extreme circumstances. In
case it as absolutely necessary proper safety appliances such as
safety belt, life line, and fire suit must be used.
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PARADIP REFINERY
2. Actuate cooling water spray system/apply water jet streams on the
affected tank as well as adjacent tanks as required. However,
precaution should be taken to avoid water stagnation on the
floating roof since it may cause the float unbalanced. Avoid
directing heavy streams of water into the flammable material of the
roof edge. This may splash burning product into the roof and
increase the seriousness of the fire.
3. Open Tank dyke drain valves as required to avoid flooding of the
dyke area. Care should be taken not to spread hydrocarbons to
surrounding areas.
16.2 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS FIRE
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is kept in liquid form by its own vapour
pressure. LPG when released from this pressure rapidly becomes vapour
which in turn is mixed in the air and forms an explosive mixture (Explosive
range is 1.9 to 9.5 parts vapour mixed volume with 98.1 to 90.5 parts of
air).
A heavy leakage of the LPG may form a vapour cloud which can travel as
far as 1500m whereas vapour from the open surfaces of gasoline has not
been known to travel beyond 50m distances.
Following precautions / guidelines may be adopted to control LPG

leaks & fires.
1. Approach the fire or gas leak from upwind. All fires (Process
Heaters etc.), downwind of leak should be put off/extinguished.
2. Keep all persons out of vapour cloud area. Evacuate area which is
in the path of vapour cloud as quickly as possible.
3. In case escaping LPG is not on fire, activate ROV to cut off source
of LPG.
4. Water spray is effective in dispersing LPG vapours. Spray stream
should be directed across the normal vapour path.
5. Controlled burning of escaping LPG is normally accepted as fire
fighting practice. Application of sufficient water, to keep the shell of
the vessel and piping cool, will allow the fire to consume the
products without danger of causing failure. It is desirable where
the leakages cannot be controlled after extinguishing fire.
6. Dry chemical powder is effective for extinguishing small LPG fires.
Extinguishing agent should be directed toward point of vapour
discharge.
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PARADIP REFINERY
16.2.1 L.P.G. Storage Vessel Fire
1. Do not extinguish flame except by fuel elimination, because

accumulation of leaking gas can result in an explosion due to
accidental ignition.
2. Stop movement of product to/from the tank by activating ROVs etc.
3. Apply cooling water by activating Deluge/sprinkler system and also
water monitors.
4. In case of fire in the bottom section, apply water, stream through
fixed/mobile water monitors to piping assembly/supporting
structure. Water cooling should be done on the adjacent storage
vessels.
5. Water cooling on the affected vessel should be continued even
after flame extinguishment until all danger of the re-ignition from the
hot surfaces or other sources has been eliminated.
6. Water spray protection for fire fighters should be provided on a
continuous basis as long the danger of vapour cloud persists.
7. If possible, pump water into the vessel to float the flammable
material above the leaking point in the shell. This would extinguish
the flames if water pumping rate exceeds the rate of leakage.
8. Should a shell failure occur below the liquid level of the tank and
result in leakage which exceeds the capacity of the water pumping
facilities, several solid streams of water should be directed on the
shell surrounding the leak.
Try to form a curtain of water spray and maintain it until any flammable
material i.e. LPG has been consumed and the vessel has become gas-
free by natural ventilation or by the addition of steam to the vapour space
of the tank.
9. Before plant operations are resumed after completion of fire

fighting, gas test should be made in pits, trenches or dykes where
gas or heavy vapours might accumulate. Portable gas detectors
should be used to check presence of flammable gas. Similar
precautions and fire fighting operation is to be followed in case of
fire in LPG Recovery Unit.
16.3 RAIL TANK WAGON FIRE (Liquid Fire)
1. Stop all loading/unloading operations in the area and isolate the

respective lines.
2. Close the domes of all unaffected wagons as far as possible.
3. Isolate the tanker on fire from other tankers not involved in the fire
by using water spray through hose lines.
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PARADIP REFINERY
4. Apply cooling water spray streams through hose lines/fixed water
monitors to the fire affected wagon, adjacent wagons and other
nearby equipment.
5. Remove unaffected tank wagons from the fire areas as quickly as
possible. Use water screen for protection against radiation for
undertaking wagon removal or other operations.
6. Extinguish all ground fires before attempting to extinguish the fire
on tanker.
7. After containing the fire on the tanker, use foam or dry chemical for
extinguishment, water spray to be continued for some time after the
fire has been extinguished to prevent re-ignition.
8. Salvage as much un-burnt liquid as possible.
In case of LPG tank wagons, similar precautions as of LPG storage

vessels should be followed, whenever possible. However, DCP is to be
only used to extinguish the fire and water for cooling.
16.4 ROAD TANKER FIRE
2. Stop all pumping/loading operations.

3. Close block valves on pipelines to tanks as well as loading lines to
gantry.
4. Isolate the burning tanker from other tank trucks, not yet involved in
the fire.
5. Apply cooling water spray from fixed water monitors as well as
hose lines to cool the tank trucks completely.
6. Protect adjacent refinery equipment and other tank trucks with
cooling water stream.
7. When the fire is contained with the help of water spray streams,
apply foam to extinguish the flames.
8. Cooling streams should be maintained even after flame
extinguishment until all danger of re-ignition from hot surfaces has
been eliminated.
9. Salvage as much un-burnt oil as possible.
In case of L.P.G. tank trucks, similar precautions as under L.P.G. storage

vessels should be followed whenever possible. DCP to be only used to
extinguish the fire.
16.5 PROCESS UNIT FIRE
Process unit fires are extinguished principally by fuel removal. This is

accomplished by making operational changes to reduce pressure, by
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PARADIP REFINERY
introducing steam to the affected systems and by blowing down sections
of the unit as required.
The area and intensity of a fire will indicate the proper method of
extinguishment. Small fires can be combated with dry chemical powder,
CO 2 , steam or foam. Foam should be used only where it can blanket the
burning fuel. Water in the form of spray or high pressure fog is most
effective on large area of intense fire that threatens damage to supporting
structures and adjacent equipment. However the use of water may cause
flanges and joints to leak due to thermal shock there by adding fuel to the
fire. Adjusting the water stream to spray or fog will lessen this danger.
16.5.1 Relief valve vent fire
Make necessary operational changes particularly the following:
a. Open drain line from the vent line to make sure that all the oil is
drained.
b. Cut steam to the vent.
c. If there is evidence that a relief valve has opened and will not reset,
proceed to take the equipment out of service and depressurize.
d. If liquid hydrocarbon overflows through the vent, apply high pressure
water fog working upwards from the lowest flames.
e. Apply water spray to the entire structure engulfed in flame at point of
advantage around the base of the structure to prevent heat damage
to structural members.
16.5.2 Exchanger or transfer line fires
In most cases exchanger and transfer line fires are the result of abrupt
changes in temperature / pressure. Therefore
a. Make an effort to reestablish the normal operating temperature at

the equipment.
b. If the normal operating temperature is not operating make efforts
to reduce pressure on the equipment.
c. Apply steam, dry powder or carbon dioxide (preferably steam) to
the point of leakage.
d. If the fire cannot be extinguished by use of portable equipment,
apply high pressure water spray to the immediate vicinity of the
leak.
e. Protect structures and lines on which fire is impinging by applying
water spray from monitor/hand-lines.
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PARADIP REFINERY
f. Apply foam on ground/trenches in which burning oil may
accumulate; covering the sewer drain to prevent fire entering the
sewers.
g. Avoid working above sewer drains or near fire traps since there is
a possibility of explosion.
h. Maintain adequate drainage of fire area.
16.5.3 Electrical Machinery fires
a) Operators should start the standby machine, if possible, and

machinery on fire to be switched off.
b) CAUTION: Do not use water or foam.
c) De-energize the circuit if possible.
d) Apply carbon-dioxide or dry powder, Halon/ Halon alternatives to
extinguish the fire.
16.6 FIRE INVOLVING SULPHUR
- Use either water in the form of spray or sand.

- Do not disturb the fire by using a water jet.
- CO 2 or DCP fire extinguishers can also be used to extinguish
sulphur fire.
- For storage pit containing molten sulphur, steam or inert system is
suitable.
16.7 PUMP AND COMPRESSOR FIRE
a. Operators should start immediately the standby machines. If this is

not possible, operation should be adjusted to take the affected
machine out of service and isolate it. Drain or de-pressurize the
equipment and connecting lines, if conditions permit.
b. Apply steam or dry powder from portable extinguishers to the leak.
c. If portable extinguishers are inadequate, blanket the fire area with
water spray and direct jets of high pressure water fog into the
source of fuel until the operators have succeeded in stopping the
flow of fuel.
d. Apply foam on the ground/trenches in which burning oil may
accumulate covering the sewer drain to prevent fire entering the
sewers. (e) Avoid working above sewer drains or near fire traps.
e. Maintain adequate drainage of fire area.
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PARADIP REFINERY
16.8 TRENCH OR PIT FIRE
a. Operators should check immediately to locate and stop the source

of leakage into the trench or pit.
b. Apply steam, CO 2 or dry powder to the fire area. If this is not
successful, apply foam covering the sewer drain as possible.
c. Apply high pressure water fog or water spray to prevent damage to
adjacent equipment.
d. Avoid overflowing trenches or pits with water since this may cause
spread of fire.
e. Avoid working above sewer drains or near fire traps.
16.9 FURNACE HEADER OR TUBE RUPTURE FIRE
A header box fire is normally the result of a radical operating change.

Injection of steam into the header box will usually extinguish a fire. If it is
of significant size and cannot be extinguished with steam, this fire must be
treated as a tube rupture fire.
16.9.1 Tube rupture fire
(a) Take necessary action to remove hydrocarbon by isolating and/or

depressurizing.
(b) Inject steam into furnace tubes.
(c) Inject steam into fire box and header box.
(d) Protect structural members outside the fire box threatened by
flame with water spray.
(e) Do not use foam. It is ineffective on this type of fire and will result
only in waste.
16.10 SEWER FIRE
(a) In most cases, a sewer fire may follow a sewer explosion. In such
a case the operator should see that steam from steam hoses is
directed at sewer outlets in all gaseous areas. If there is a sewer
fire, be sure that no one is standing or working on or near the
sewer outlets.
(b) Apply dry powder at each manhole or drain from which flame is
issuing.
(c) Direct water streams into involved trenches to maintain flow
towards the fire area. If there is oil on the water in the trenches,
use foam.
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16.11 SPILL FIRES – ABOVE GROUND LEVEL
a) Operators should immediately determine the source of leakage or

spill and stop it if possible. The particular piece of equipment
involved should be taken out of service, depressurized and
steamed, if necessary.
b) Blanket small fire areas with steam or dry powder but avoid
scattering of burning material.
c) Blanket large fire areas with water spray from monitors, fire
hydrants to protect supporting structures. Maintain water flow until
operators control the flow of fuel.
d) If quantities of oil are flushed to lower levels and continue to burn
in pools apply foam to these.
e) Maintain adequate drainage of the fire area.
f) Avoid working above sewer drains or near fire traps.
16.12 SPILL FIRE - GROUND LEVEL
a) Operators should determine the source of leakage or spill

immediately and stop it, if possible. If is a continuous leakage
which cannot stopped, the particular piece of equipment involved
should be taken out of service, depressurized and steamed, if
necessary.
b) Blanket small fires with steam or dry powder but avoid scattering
burning materials.
c) In case of large spill fire, direct high pressure water fog into the
source of leakage. Protect surrounding structures with water spray.
Maintain the water flow unit the operators control the flow of fuel.
d) Apply foam to extinguish fires in oil pools or trenches.
e) Maintain adequate drainage of the fire area. Caution Avoid
working above sewer drains or near fire traps.
16.13 LABORATORY FIRE
This type of fire requires different combating procedures because of

glassware and special types of apparatus and equipment involved.
a. Use Carbon-Di-Oxide, Halon/ Halon alternatives, DCP portable

extinguishers on small fires.
b. In case of large spills of flammable material whether ignited or not,
evacuate personnel from the building and cut off fuel, air gas and
electrical services to the building. Cut off any other outside source
of fuel.
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c. Use water fog or water spray only on fires which threaten damage
to the building structure.
d. Do not enter a smoke filled area without respiratory protection.
Laboratory supplies include many chemicals which may emit toxic
vapours when exposed to fire.
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CHAPTER - XVII
CASE HISTORY OF
MAJOR FIRE INCIDENTS
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17.0 CASE HISTORY OF MAJOR FIRE INCIDENT
CASE HISTORY – 1: KEROSENE TANK FIRE
GENERAL:
A fire broke out in a kerosene storage tank. The cone roof of the tank had ripped
open for almost the entire periphery except for a small portion on the northern
side and has collapsed inside the tank.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT:
The cone roof tank (28.4 m diameter 12.8 m height) was receiving the run down
kerosene from the kerosene hydro treating plant (starting dip 270 cms) through a
6” run down line at a flow rate of about 80 KLS/Hr till the occurrence of the fire.
The flash point of the run down kerosene was 40ºC and the product run down
temperature as per shift records, was ranging between 42 and 530C. The tank
temperature was 400C, as recorded by the gauge. All the tank inlet nozzles which
are at 60 cm elevation from the tank bottom were submerged in kerosene since
the staring dip was 270 cms. The line velocity at this rate was calculated to be
1.2 meter/sec. During the second shift on previous say tank was put into
circulation through the caustic spool and jet nozzle using circulation pump. The
level in the tank at the beginning of this shift was estimated to be above 5
meters. During the third shift on previous day the circulation was continued with
water addition. The circulation was stopped. 100 KIs of treated heavy naphtha (of
12 to 15 deg C flash point) from another floating roof tank was transferred to this
tank for point correction.
The heavy naphtha flow rate into the tank was 34 KI/hr at a calculated line
velocity of 1.2 m/sec. Then the tank was put into circulation with another
circulation pump of 70 KI/hr capacity where the line velocity could have been
around 2.1 to 2.4 m/sec. The circulation of the tank was done through a jet mixer
nozzle of 1 1/2” diameter (with 300 angle to the tank was done through a jet
mixer nozzle of 1 1/2” diameter (with 300 degree angle to the horizontal) giving
an approximate velocity of 9 to 10.5 m/sec., at the nozzle tip. All along, the tank
was also receiving the product from the plant. The above operations were a
routine part of the daily kerosene tank operations and have been followed for a
long time. The kerosene run down rate at 80 KI/hr was lower than normal (90 to
95 KI/hr) during this period due to reduced throughput in the crude unit because
one crude preheat exchanger was out of service also during this period, the
heavy naphtha treating unit was down and no heavy naphtha run down was
blended in the kerosene run done line.
The operator on duty in the OM & S division was taking the routine outage dip
gauge, tank temperature and sample from the tank under reference. The normal
procedure for gauging taking tank temperature is sampling as given in the
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operating manual of the OM & S Division was followed. The operators found
nothing unusual and took the gauge by the outage method, dip temperature and
running sample as usual and came down. He then went to nearby tank & took
the mechanical gauge readings. As he was returning, he heard an explosion
immediately followed by the fire on the top of the tank.
FIRE FIGHTING OPERATIONS:
Soon after the fire broke out, fire hose water streams were used all over the shell
of the tank to cool it. Then, assistance arrived from nearby industries. The flames
were shooting towards north and frequently burning oil fell and ignited the grass
around the area. Care was taken to extinguish these fires immediately. Water
hoses and portable monitors were also used to cool the adjoining tanks and plant
area.
Initial attempts to apply foam on the tank from the ground were not successful. A
portable foam tower (generally to be used for floating roof tanks) was used and
after about 40 minutes, the flame height started coming down slowly. After about
an hour, two more foam branches were hauled to the top of the tank. Finally the
foam tower was shifted to the northern side of the tank and the fire was
completely extinguished. Foam was continued for about half an hour after the
last was seen off to completely seal the surface to prevent any re-ignition.
Cooling around the tank with water hoses continued till the next day evening.
The firm foam truck continuously worked for 9 hrs feeding foam to the burning
tank. Nearly 15000 ft. of delivery hose was used during the fire. 15,500 liters of
foam compound was continued to extinguish the fire. Around 4,000 gallons per
minute of water was used at the peak of fire fighting operations. At one time the
water level in the oxidation pond (from where fire water was drawn) was very low.
However, fresh water was introduced in the oxidation pond to raise the level. All
the three pumps at the oxidation pond were in operation during most of the
period of fire fighting. Turret nozzles were used to cool the burning tank and
adjacent areas. The two wheeler turrets were very useful and effective.
Personnel available at the scene for firefighting were very cooperative and fought
the fire bravely.
CASE HISTORY – 2: FIRE INVOLVING LPG SPHERE
A sphere with a diameter of about 13 m was one of the eight spheres containing
LPG, each about three-quarters full. The spheres were spaced about 30 m from
each other.
Four spheres of 1200 m3 capacity contained propane and the other four of 200
m³ capacity contained butane.
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A 2” valve, used for drawing off sample, was inadvertently opened too far,
causing excessive escape of gas through the fittings. The operators tried to close
the valve but this was jammed, possibly because of freezing. In the process, the
escaping gas badly burnt the operator’s hands and faces. Being unable to close
the valve they rushed for help. Soon a layer propane snow” formed round the
sphere and in the surrounding area.
The escaping gas drifted in the form of a heavy cloud towards the express way.
One of the first actions taken by the Refinery staff was to close the motor way to
all traffic to preclude the possibility of ignition.
The exact cause of ignition was never really established. However, it was
conjectured that the car on or near the motorway provided the ignition source,
either through the sparks from the exhaust or a cigarette smoked by the
occupant. Possibility of static charged as the probable cause was also mooted.
Immediately on ignition, the gas cloud flashed back to the leak at the sphere and
the burning gas under the sphere began to heat the container and built up the
pressure rapidly.
Shortly afterwards the safety valve on the sphere began to operate and produced
a jet of flame about 30 m to 40 m high. The fire brigade stations, one 11 Km
away and another 18 Km away, on receiving the fire calls, responded with the
normal first attendance turn-out for the Refinery.
The fire brigade was advised to use water for cooling neighboring vessels, in the
belief that the relief valve would protect the sphere already on fire, but those
being unapproachable; the fireman applied cooling jets from as close as
possible. The drencher system was believed to have been rendered inoperative
by the intense heat of the fire in the area. After about an hour, the sphere burst
away and a wave of burning propane drove away the fire manning the cooling
hose-lines. The fire spread unchecked on all sides and the fire fighters enveloped
in flames came running out. Even those within a distance of 300 m were burnt.
So intense was the explosion that a piece of the steel sphere weighting over 15
tones was thrown about 300 m. The sphere burst because the unwetted upper
portion was heated to a temperature the steel would not with stand. Below the
liquid level, the boiling liquid absorbed the heat and prevented the steel from
getting too hot.
A preplanned catastrophe procedure was put into action and about 1200 people
from the surrounding area were evacuated. Hospitals, doctors and Ambulance
services were alerted and fire fighting operations intensified operations
intensified with call-out for more reinforcements.
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A chain reaction caused four other spheres to explode at short intervals, to set
fire to a large petrol tank and to severely damage other crude oil tanks. Greater
disaster was averted by the favorable wind direction which drifted the flames
towards waste land and away from the main part of the Refinery. Four heavy oil
tanks also acted as a barrier to the blast and lessened the damage to the main
Refinery area.
About 36 hours after the first alarm, two large horizontal propane tanks caught
fire. These, however, did not explode as the fireman, ignoring all personnel
danger, attached pipes beneath them to draw gas away from the tanks. Two of
the firemen killed were recruits attending their first fire. At the height of the fire a
helicopter manned by the Refinery staff and two Catalina flying boats of the local
air force tried to help the fire fighters on the ground but were driven away by the
high flames. Despite all out efforts, the fire caused substantial damage to the
storage facilities. The incident caused resentment/revision of the
standards/design concepts on installation of LPG facilities.
CASE HISTORY – 3: TANK WAGON LOADING RACK FIRE
This report deals with the fire at white oil tank wagon loading rack. 32 wagons
were placed on the white oil loading gantry. Of these 29 wagons were loaded
and checking by marketing Division was in progress. Of the three wagons, two
were filled with MS and the third was in the process of being filled with HSD. The
HSD wagon was the last wagon on the southern side of the gantry. The HSD
tank wagon which was being loaded suddenly caught fire with an explosion. The
tank wagon had carried HSD on the previous trip. The wagon was being filled
with HSD at a temperature of about 44 deg. C. The by-pass valve on the pump
was partially open and only one pump was being used for lading.
After occurrence of the fire, before the pump could be switched off, the loading
point which had got displaced possibly because of the explosion and spilled HSD
on the side nearest to the gantry. The spillage on the round and the tank wagon
were on fire. The adjacent tank wagons which were containing HSD were not on
fire. The ground fire spread to the area towards pump house mainly because of
dry grass.
The fire was fought with foam and the cooling was done with water. The fire was
brought under control within half an hour which is considered very reasonable.
The other 29 filled wagons at this gantry were at a distance of about 10 ft. away
from the last wagon. These filled wagons could not be pulled out at the time of
fire because loco could not reach that spot as the other railway lines were
occupied.
Immediately after the fire, the gantry was inspected and it was found that 4 points
at the extreme end of the gantry had burnt and some electronic lamps also were
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damaged. Next morning inspection was again carried out and it was found that
the filling point at the top of HSD wagon which had caught fire had been
displaced towards gantry and the hose was missing. The hose was lying on the
other side of the gantry. The asbestos roof at the location of the HSD tank wagon
was shattered. The sound of explosion was reported to have been heard over a
long distance. It was established that the fire was due to static charges.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
a) All the wagons should have proper filling pipes and no splash filling must
be done.
b) Earthing of the railway track and the filling hoses should be properly done
and must be checked regularly. It should be the responsibility of the
loading personnel to ensure that the proper earthing to the gantry and
filling points exist before the loading operation are stared.
c) The loading hoses should be tied properly so that there is no possibility of
its getting dislodged during loading operation.
d) One track should always be left free so that in case of emergency other
wagons can be pulled out to safer places without loss of time.
CASE HISTORY – 4: FLARE AREA AND OIL CATCHER FIRE
The fire operator on fire station control room duty received the fire call saying
there was a major fire at flare area and oil catcher. He immediately sounded a
wailing alarm and the major turn-out went into action.
The fire station charge head and a fire operator rushed to the fire site in the foam
tender and in equipment/hose truck respectively.
Three laboratory personnel on duty immediately reported at the fire station and
took over the charge of the control room and allied duties pending arrival of the
appropriate management staff as spelt out in the Fire Protection Manual. Local
persons became aware of the fire by the huge glow the fire radiated on the
heavily over-cast sky, visible up to a large distance in all directions. The fire
brigade, civil defense, police and neighboring industries responded with men and
material.
The fire was tackled with 3% mechanical foam selectively with dry chemical
extinguisher. The foam blanket was frequently disrupted by sporadic, sometimes
heavy showers. Additional foam compound was requisitioned from the
neighboring industries and from the manufacturers, Sand bags were used for
blocking and bundling operation to restrict the fire spread and localising for
control/extinguishments.
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The fire was extinguished after 14 hours and the all clear signal was sounded.
Events leading to the fire:
The gland of the pump on sump vessel was leaking and in spite of running the
pump to several hours the sump pit was not getting emptied. Although, the
source of oil was not established at this stage, the leakage from the pump gland
contributed substantially to the all round oil spillage in the flare area.
The oil spared over a large area due to the presence of rain water as a result of
recent showers. There was no hot work activity in the area. Rain wetness
precluded grass fire initiation. The motor of the sump vessel pump was flame-
proof. The water seal prevented flashback possibility from the flare stack. Hence,
it was presumed that some burning liquid hydrocarbon fell from the top of the
flare, igniting the floating layer of oil on the round below. The fire involved the
man way covers of some vessels and a flange on the 19” relief line. As a result,
the covers and flanges leaked and contributed more fuel to the fire. The fire
flashed through the interconnecting storm water channel/surface drain to the oil
catch 180 m north of the flare facilities.
Fire Fighting:
The flare drainage was blocked and the oil catcher fire was extinguished within
an hour by foam application. This was made possible by the containing wall of
the oil catcher which facilitated formation of foam blanket.
At the fire area, however, there was no containing wall and the oil had weed on
the surface of the rain water. Hence, the fire spread was considerable. Further,
the formation of foam blanket was affected by intermittent showers. In the final
stages, all fires were extinguished except those at the leaky man way covers of
the vessels and the ground level flange on the 10” relief line.
These remaining fires were finally extinguished by continuous application of foam

coupled with water displacement measure to replace hydrocarbon leaks with
water.
As a precautionary measure, shortly after the commencement of the fire, the flare
was extinguished and adequate steam was introduced to facilitate vapour
disposal. This was done to preclude the possibility of flare re-igniting the
extinguished fire at the ground level.
The main crude Distillation Unit was already shutdown few earlier for planned
maintenance work. Catalyst Cracking Unit/ Platformer Unit being directly
connected to the flare system were shut down during the course of fire fighting
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operations. Bitumen blowing unit was kept running, being not connected to the
flare system.
Urgent round the clock action was initiated to repair the fire damages and this
was completed safely within 5 days.
The following operational/fire protection modifications were subsequently carried

out at the flare area.
1. High level alarms in the flare gas knock-out drum and sump vessel.
2. Water-seal in the flare area surface drain to the oil catcher.
3. Bonding of area around the vessels.
4. Provision of additional fire hydrant/monitors.
The foam compound inventory was increased from 30,000 liters to 50,000 liters.
The sand stock was also increased to 700/1000 bags for facilitating emergency
bonding operations.
The fire armory was reinforced with acquisition of two additional foam tenders.
Communication was improved upon with the establishment of VHF facilities.
Close support was developed with the neighboring industries and civil defense to
streamline the communication and response aspects and to establish proper
understanding of individual requirements.
CASE HISTORY OF MAJOR FIRES IN IOCL REFINERIES
1. MAJOR FIRE IN CDU AT HALDIA REFINERY
Date: 27.12.03 Time: 18.40 hrs.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
A fire broke out at the top of column 11-C-01 of CDU-I at heavy naphtha zone
(38 tray level). Due to leakage of naphtha the external insulation of the column
was soaked which resulted in insulation fire. The fire was extinguished within 8
minutes. On inspection of the fire affected area of the column, a pin hole leak
was noticed through the tell-tale hole of reinforcement pad of manhole (2nd
Manhole counting from top) above the 38th tray and minor damage of nearby
instrument cable was also observed.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Hot naphtha leaked through pin hole and gradual accumulation of naphtha
soaked in the insulation. The soaked insulation caught fire due to lower down of
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auto ignition temperature. Oil soaked insulation’s auto ignition temperature
comes down to 1/3 rd of auto ignition temperature of naphtha.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Elevated fire monitors in and around the column 11-C-01 are to be reoriented
with effective height to combat fire at higher elevation of the column, if required.
2. The column is to be thoroughly inspected at the next available opportunity for
deciding future course of action.
2. MAJOR FIRE IN CDU AT PANIPAT REFINERY
Date: 04.06.04 Time: 08.00hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
A major fire occurred in CDU column overhead air fin cooler no.03-EA-LP-1L.
Fire extinguished at 0900 hrs. Fire could be brought under control immediately
but controlled fire continued for one hour as the line could not be positively
isolated due to heavy leaks. There was no injury to any personnel due to the
incident.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Leakage of hot hydrocarbon (naphtha)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Consider alternate processing routes for wild naphtha.

2. Provision of water injection at CDU O/H Air fin coolers inlet.
3. Consider providing additional block valves passing in the vertical run length of
pipe to avoid corrosion deposit in the valve seat.
4. Study by external agency for resolving high velocity in tubes.
3. MAJOR FIRE AND FATAL ACCIDENT IN FCC UNIT AT GUJARAT

REFINERY
Date: 29.10.04 Time: 03.33 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
FCC unit was under planned shutdown from 10th to 26th Oct.’04. After
completion of Maintenance & Inspection jobs, the plant was handed over by
Maintenance group on 26.10.04 and start-up activities were commenced. Unit
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feed cut in with vacuum gas oil was done at 12.00 hrs on 28.10.04 and by 22.00
hrs, unit was operating at 5000 MT/day throughput level and operating conditions
were steady and normal. At around 03.33 hrs on 29.10.04, a loud explosion was
heard from the FCCU and fire was seen in the area between main fractionator
column & reactor. Fire was brought under control by 05.00 hrs and extinguished
completely at around 05.30 hrs. Mutual aid members also joined the fire fighting.
The incident resulted in two nos. fatalities of contractor employees of M/s TMK
engineers who were working on the job of rotation of slurry settler drain line spool
piece.
FATALITY NOS.: 2 (Contractor employee)
PROBABLE CAUSE:
The explosion was not in the reactor but it was the slurry settler which had
ruptured. The failure of slurry settler was due to the sudden vaporization of water
inside the vessel causing instantaneous over pressurization leading to the
rupture of the vessel. The following two water sources were identified which
individually or collectively caused water getting collected at the bottom of slurry
settler:
- Water getting settled from oil being circulated through the settler during the start
up circulation period.
- Ingress of steam through the steam connections provided at the slurry settler
bottom / bottom outlet line due to passing of isolation valves in the steam lines.
On contact with the stagnant cold oil, this steam got condensed and collected at
the bottom of settler vessel.
The intensity of fire was greatly aggravated due to release of uncontrollable large
quantity of hydrocarbon from the ruptured main column bottom line (caused by
fallen RCC pillar of slurry settler) and sheared bottom manhole of main column
(from the impact of flying splinter of slurry settler).
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. The importance of avoiding water in Slurry settler and its hazards/

implication should be explained/ highlighted to all concerned and
incorporated in operating manual. Necessary inputs in this regard should
be obtained from the licensor also.
2. With the incorporation of VSS and new cyclones in the reactor, catalyst
loss from the reactor is expected to be lower than before. In view of this
and keeping in view the operating experience with VSS, requirement to
keep Slurry settler in line on continuous basis needs to be reviewed.
Confirmation from the licensor (M/s UOP) should also be obtained in this
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regard. In case, V3 is required to be kept in line on continuous basis,
circulation facility from Slurry settler (V3) bottom (via FC 136) to Main
fractionator may be provided. This will help in water removal from V3 at oil
circulation stage during start up.
3. While the unit is in operation, procedure developed based on UOP
guidelines and specified in the Operating Manual for taking Slurry settler in
service or taking it out of service should be followed. While Slurry settler
remains in line, through ness of slurry recycle circuit should be ensured.
Also, before taking Slurry settler in line (during the start up or while the
unit is in operation) through ness of slurry recycle circuit should be
positively ensured. In the event of blockage of slurry recycle circuit or FC
136 control valve loop, Slurry settler should be bypassed to avoid further
blockage of Slurry settler bottom due to settling of catalyst fines. Before
attempting to dechoke FC-136 control valve loop/slurry recycle line, V3
content should be diluted with HCO as specified in the Operating Manual.
4. Various steam connections to slurry circuit and Slurry settler should have
provision for positive isolation and these steam connections should remain
positively isolated during normal operation. Proper condensate draining
should be ensured every time before introducing steam to slurry circuit or
Slurry settler.
5. Fire proofing of the Reactor structure should be done as per OISD
standard-164.
6. FCC control room should be made blast proof or alternatively, a blast
proof wall may be provided.
7. Although the Operating Manual covers the various important steps and
procedures to be followed during normal operation, unit start-ups,
shutdowns and emergencies, specific instructions are to be required on
case to case basis. Daily plans, specific instructions (especially during
start ups and shutdowns) should be clearly communicated to operating
personnel through written instructions by the unit in-charge with system of
acknowledgement by all concerned.
8. The existing Operating Manual should be reviewed to ensure inclusion of
various critical steps to be followed during unit operation, start up,
shutdown and emergencies. The Operating Manual should be made more
exhaustive covering all such steps.
9. Normal start up and shutdown procedures may be converted into checklist
and its use ensured in all normal start-ups and shutdowns to avoid
overlooking/ by passing of important activities.
10. Revisit of HAZOP study of FCC unit may be carried out by HAZOP trained
officers with the help of external agency.
11. A system of multi disciplinary start up clearance certificate may be
introduced prior to taking up start up activities after completion of M&I S/D.
12. Operating manual of unit should be updated to incorporate stepwise
details
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- Lineup of all circulation loops with simplified sketches. The locations of
drain points from where water draining is to be done should be specified
for all loops and equipment.
13. All operating people should undergo refresher course on the revised
manual in particular with the Start-up, Shutdown & Emergency handling
proceedings. They should thereafter be assessed and retrained if needed.
14. In case Slurry Settler is to be taken in line, the normal course of steaming,
gas-backing, water draining must be carried out and the settler should be
taken in circulation loop, both from top and bottom side.
15. All process modifications and changes in operating procedures should be
administered through a structured 'Management of Change' as per OISD
GDN-178 which include HAZOP Analysis, updation of operating manual
and training of personnel.
16. Modern FCC units do not envisage Slurry settler in the processing scheme
and IOC may consult the licensor, for the need or otherwise of retaining
this equipment.
4. MAJOR FIRE AT OUTSIDE B/L OF FCCU AT GUJARAT REFINERY
Date: 15.06.05 Time: 17.45 Hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
FCCU was under pre-startup activities at the time of incidence. The fire broke out
near the Battery limit while production people were lining up LCO circuit with slop
/ circulation header. The battery limit block valve upstream flange (6 inch dia.) in
LCO circuit started leaking and oil sprayed over the 10 inch HP steam header
shutdown valve / pressure reducing valve located next to the battery limit
manifold. The whole area was immediately engulfed in fire and there was no
opportunity to close the valve. Fire was brought under control and completely
extinguished at about 18.50 hrs. One operator who had minor burn races on his
right hand elbow was given first aid treatment at refinery hospital. There was no
injury to any person on account of this fire.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Leakage of Flushing oil from LCO flange which fell on 10 inch dia HP steam
header shutdown valve / PRDS which is about 2 meters from the battery limit
valve caused fire due to auto ignition (auto ignition temp. for flushing oil = 256
0
C). The HP steam temperature in the header is normally about 3750C. As there
was no time to close the block valve due to instantaneous ignition, operating
people had to rush out of the area with valve partly open as the operating person
who was operating the valve got drenched with oil.
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The level of flushing oil in vessel (V04) was about 45% at the time when fire
broke out. The level dropped to zero in about 35 minutes. The fire continued till
the entire quantity of flushing oil got drained from the vessel. Isolation of V04
feeding fuel to fire could not be done in absence of isolation valve between the
vessel and battery limit. The time taken for extinguishing fire was longer due to
above.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. The flushing oil leaked and spilled over HP steam SDV/ PRDS which is at
very close proximity to the battery limit, resulting in auto ignition of oil. The
HP steam line may be rerouted /reoriented and provided with Calcium
silicate insulation to avoid fire due to accidental oil spillage/ contact.
Alternatively, a segregation by providing a barrier wall can be considered
between battery limit valves / manifolds and HP Steam PRDS.
2. When fire broke out, all the running pumps were isolated at discharge.
However, the fire continued due to reversal of flushing oil from V04
through the VGO inlet line to slop header manifold to LCO valve’s leaky
flange. The valve for connecting slop header to VGO inlet line was also
under fire and hence source of fuel could not be isolated. Since the VGO
entry to V04 is through a bottom nozzle and is not having any valve near
the vessel, it is suggested to provide a valve in the inlet line or NRV, after
process study, to avoid reverse flow in such emergency condition.
3. There are a number of hook up connections in the Battery limit, which are
at a very low elevation. The operating platform provided at the backside of
Battery limit has only a single approach and is not at a single elevation.
This can lead to accidental fall during emergencies. The platform is also
narrow and needs to be modified with escape route.
4. The approved procedure of pressure/leak test should be followed to
ensure circuit tightness by ‘lining up the whole system keeping the block
valve of product rundown shut at battery limit’.
5. In case of the deviation from the approved procedure, proper approval
should be taken for executing such job as per the ‘management of
change’ procedure in line with OISD-STD-178.
6. The steam PRDS located at the grade level and in close proximity to the
battery limit valves at FCCU should be guarded suitably to prevent direct
impingement of hydrocarbon from any source of accidental leak. The
PRDS along with the associated piping should be insulated to avoid any
exposed hot surface.
7. A system of circuit checking should be introduced, wherein segments of
circuit checked in field and passed in pressure/leak test, would be marked
in colour on P&ID.
8. It may be considered to develop an Isolation Matrix for identified critical
segments of piping in a unit / area for quick control on accidental leaks.
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PARADIP REFINERY
Such a matrix will be a hand tool as ready reference of related valves
which need to be closed for emergency isolation. (The isolation valves
may be located ISBL/OSBI).
5. MAJOR FIRE AT PREP OFF-SITE PIPE RACK AT PANIPAT REFINERY
Date: 28.12.05 Time: 09.00 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
A fire occurred at the ground level below PREP offsite-1 overhead pipe-rack at
the northwest corner of crude tank no. 307. Three nos. of contract laborers of M/s
Petron Engineering Construction Limited (PECL) who were working on the pipe
rack received burn injuries. Two of the three injured contract labors, Sh. Hasim
Khan and Shri Nagina Goud succumbed to their injuries on 29.12.05 (morning)
and early hours of 01.01.06 respectively at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
The probable cause of the incident was due to presence of hydrocarbon vapours
under the pipe rack and ignition due to incidental spark during preparatory work
by the contractor person REP OWS is partly commissioned and oily water from
PREP OWS is pumped to PR OWS through the temporary pumping
arrangement. Large inflow of water to the PREP OWS system had increased the
level in the OWS. The residual oil floating on water inside OWS system escaped
through manhole cover concrete slab joints and hydrocarbon vapour might have
come out through the OWS vents.
There are two manholes under pipe rack, out of which one is a seal manhole with
two vent pipes. The height of the vent pipes below the pipe rack was not
adequate and as per OISD standard (OISD-106). Escape of hydrocarbon vapour
through the vent pipes and its accumulation below the pipe rack is also
anticipated. As the slope of the area was towards the incident site at the corner
of road junction and the area was filled with water, the escaped oil might have
accumulated at the corner below the pipe rack, which did not flow to the oil
catcher due to chokage of surface drain.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Housekeeping of the whole offsite area needs to be improved

immediately. Surface drain to be dechoked so that stagnant water flows
freely to oil catcher.
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PARADIP REFINERY
2. A dedicated operator is required to be deployed to man the temporary
OWS pumping facility till PREP ETP is completed. He should log the
levels at two hourly intervals. Any abnormal discharge to OWS from the
connected PREP facilities should be communicated (walkie-talkie,
telephone, etc) to the pump operator and recorded in the unit logbook.
3. Heights of PR OWS vent pipes below the pipe rack to be increased above
the pipe rack by 3 meters. Till the height is raised, vent pipes should be
mud plugged and covered with wet asbestos cloths for preventing any
spark entering into OWS system for doing hot job, if any.
4. EIL & Project execution groups (permittee) to ensure that all permit
conditions are complied before applying for clearance. Core Group and
Production should issue clearance after satisfying themselves that all
measures are completed.
5. Contractor supervisor to be location specific and should remain in site for
continuous supervision. Contractor supervisor and workers should be
trained for first aid fire fighting and fire call procedure.
6. PMC (M/s. EIL) should carry out engineering review and HAZOP / Risk
analysis study of the temporary facility.
7. Laying of overhead pipe racks just above the OWS manholes is not
desirable and should be avoided.
8. It is to be ensured that records of daily gas tests done at hot job sites are
recorded in the permit itself.
9. The system of assessing the safety hazard prior to undertaking hot jobs
should in place especially w.r.t the location in proximity with OWS system
where there is every possibility of presence of hydrocarbon. The
concerned persons of IOCL, EIL and Contractor should assess the safety
hazard to take adequate preventive measures before commencement of
all such critical jobs. The hazard assessment should have been done
jointly. In this connection the structured approach given in OISD-GDN-207
on “Contractor Safety” to be followed.
10. The operation of temporary pumping facility for PREP OWS liquid should
be strengthened by adequate information flow between the operator any
connected upstream units & offsite facilities and educating the operators
and also operating personnel of concerned units regarding the criticality of
this temporary facility. A suitable level indicator on the suction pit may be
provided. The openings from the suction and discharge OWS pits should
be properly sealed so as to prevent escape of OWS liquid and associated
vapours.
11. Vents of OWS systems at the Hot work site should be plugged to prevent
escape of hydrocarbon vapour in the atmosphere. Prior to commencement
of above job, Hydrocarbon gas concentration test should have been done
daily instead of doing only once in a week. The requirement of daily gas
concentration check should have been mentioned in the work permit
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PARADIP REFINERY
issued. The work permit system should be improved in line with the latest
OISD-STD-105.
12. The electrical wire extension boxes should not be located in close
proximity of OWS system and same should be placed at safe location
away from oily sewer system to eliminate the source of ignition at such
location. Electrical safety measures need to be taken during the
construction activity in line with OISD-STD-192 on “Safety practices during
construction”.
13. The house keeping in the crude tank farm area requires improvement on
priority.
6. MAJOR FIRE IN CDU AT MATHURA REFINERY
Date: 29.12.05 Time: 09.45 hrs.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
On the day of incident in the morning shift, while PNE was explaining the job to
the contractor supervisor i.e., dismantling of demarcated lines, there was a fire
and explosion in the OWS line in the pre-desalter area in CDU, leading to 2-3
more explosions and blowing up of 5 OWS manholes and dislodging one near
the desalter area. One of the manhole covers after explosion fell down on
contractor employee Shri Mehboob Khan, who was standing near the manhole,
causing serious burn injuries. Whereas the other manhole cover hit the orifice
impulse lines of overhead SR Naphtha rundown line, causing leakage of
naphtha, which also caught fire. The unit was brought to shut down and fire was
extinguished by about 10.05 AM. The contractor worker, Shri Mehboob Khan,
who was sent to Refinery hospital, was declared “brought dead” with 100% burn.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
The incident was due to presence of hydrocarbon vapours near open drain
entering an OWS manhole and ignition due to incidental spark during preparatory
work by one of the contractor personnel while the shift PNE was explaining the
job to the contractor supervisor.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Hot work permit to be issued specifying the exact location / equipment

number / line number so that the area of hot work is clearly identified in
line with Work Permit System and OISD –105 guidelines.
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2. Hot work permit to be issued only after ensuring that all the pre-conditions
mentioned in the permit are complied with. Gas test, covering / sealing of
OWS manhole covers, open drains and other openings of OWS / CRWS
etc. must be ensured before signing the hot work permit and clearance.
3. The Hot Job / Vessel entry Permit is also to include the following in line
with OISD – STD –105: i. Electrical Isolation Permit No. ii. % LEL of HC,
% O 2 and ppm of Toxic gas.
4. Hot job permission in the battery area of a running process unit is to be
given only for emergency jobs after judicious review of the requirement /
implications and special safety precautions needed. This review is to be
done at least one grade above the Fire Permit Signatory.
5. Compliance of all the pre-conditions to be strictly ensured by shift in-
charge / Gas safety inspectors before giving clearance for any hot job.
The adjoining live lines to the cutting / dismantling line to be distinctly
marked and covered with asbestos cloth or tin sheet near the hot job.
6. To further improve the effectiveness of the Structured Daily Tour
conducted by Sr. Managers / Managers, the existing checklist needs to be
reviewed. However, the following additional points to be included in the
Check List:
a) Whether sewers / manholes are properly covered & sealed against
sparks
b) Whether fire water hose / extinguisher kept near the place of work
c) Verification of gas test by explosive meter
d) Whether Portable equipment are properly grounded
e) Whether welding machines / gas cylinders / rubber tubing / cables etc.
are in safe location and healthy condition
7. Before carrying out the Gas test, healthiness of the portable explosive
meter w.r.t. battery level / Zero error etc. to be ensured. The operability of
the instrument should be cross-checked by a senior officer (either
Manager or Sr. Manager of the plant / area) at least once in a week.
8. To ensure that all contract workers are imparted safety training before
issue of gate passes and then only permit them to work at site. The Site
Engineer must impart “Safety Tool Talk” to the contract workers before
starting any job.
9. Record of all contractor workers’ entry in the Refinery on a particular date
to be maintained.
10. Feasibility of providing a vent line on the first manhole of OWS system
away from AVU battery limit may be examined.
11. Any Oily water drain line from plant area should be connected to OWS
only via designated inlet pipe leading to a sealed manhole or though a
separate catch basin designed to ensure a liquid seal for preventing
reverse flow of downstream gases from OWS. In this regard, standard
design and engineering practices must be strictly adhered to maintain
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PARADIP REFINERY
integrity of the OWS system for overall plant safety as stipulated at item
5.4.1 in OISDSTD- 109 on Blow-down and sewer system.
12. Management of change procedure should also be applicable to any
changes in OWS system in line with OISD-GDN-178.
13. The number of OWS Vent points available vis-a vis requirement should be
reviewed in line with the standard design and engineering practices and
increased to the extent practically feasible in AVU.
14. In line with the stipulations in OISD-STD-105 separate work permit must
be issued for each point-location in the operational unit. Clearance should
be issued at site after ensuring that all conditions stipulated have been
actually met for the point location.
15. Stricter supervision for compliance of safety stipulations must be ensured
by the Engineering In-charge, Permittee and the contractor supervisor to
enable safety on sustainable basis. This includes safety awareness of
contractor’s workers and supervisors in line with OISD-GDN-207.
7. MAJOR FIRE INCIDENT IN OFF-SITE PIPE RACK AT HALDIA REFINERY
Date: 17.05.06 Time: 08.20 PM
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
The major fire incident took place in the offsite pipe rack near main culvert in
between the Fuel Oil Block (FOB) & TPS causing damage to product rundown
pipelines, instruments and electrical cables & insulations. As a result FOB,
CIDW, SDU and other connected units were brought down.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
There was no hot job in that area. The cause of fire was due to auto ignition
caused by failure of the line followed by accumulation of oil underneath and
direct contact of oil with the nearby hot lines like steam etc. Cause of line failure
was attributed to external corrosion / over pressurization idle lines.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Pipe rack underneath to be cleaned with proper sloping to avoid

accumulation of oil / water.
2. Inspection of offsite lines wherever not done earlier and rectification of the
same is necessary.
3. If clamping is necessary temporarily for running of units, time bound action
plan shall be drawn in consultation with Inspection Department for early
repair of lines.
4. In idle lines, TSVs should be kept in line and proper maintenance of all the
TSVs to be ensured.
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5. Steam lines to be insulated properly along with condensate drain pipes up
to trap.
6. While laying new lines, proper spacing to be provided between the lines
as per standard engineering practices. Redundant lines shall be removed
to create space.
7. Possibility of laying steam lines through separate pipe rack at an elevated
position may also be explored so that entire steam line can be calcium
silicate insulated and the damage of the same can be avoided due to
water accumulation underneath etc.
8. MAJOR FIRE INCIDENT IN CRU AT BARAUNI REFINERY
Date: 13.06.06 Time: 11.25 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
There was an incidence of fire in Catalytic Reforming Unit (CRU) first noticed by
operation personnel. The unit was brought down immediately and fire was finally
knocked down at 13.00 hrs. Cooling was continued to prevent re-ignition. After
assessing the site conditions, cooling was stopped at around 14.20 hrs. There
was no injury to any personnel and no damage to any major equipment. On site
inspection, it was found that reinforcement pad of dia 3 inch stub joint of plant air
connection to dia 16 inch reactor inlet line of RB-03 had partially sheared off and
opened up.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Failure of weld joint from 3 inch utility point in the inlet line of reactor RB-03.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Stage wise inspection of fabrication during construction / project

execution.
2. D.P. / WFMPI test of small-bore stub joints and pneumatic test of such
critical lines in high pressure & temperature service should be done during
shutdown of the plant to ensure reliability. 3. Plant airline, which is used
during regeneration, should be connected during regeneration only.
9. MAJOR FIRE IN CDU HOT PUMP-HOUSE AT GUWAHATI REFINERY
Date: 05.03.07 Time: 21.35 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
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At 2130 hrs a thick vapor cloud was observed by the filed operator in Hot pump
house of Crude Distillation unit. He immediately rushed to field control room to
inform his shift in charge. When shift In charge along with shift crew reached the
site, he saw a big vapor cloud in hot pump house area between 01-P-02 & 01-P-
09, which caught fire. The fire continued for 35 minutes and was extinguished at
2205 hrs. Distillation Column (CL-2) bottom pump (01-P-09) and Pre-topping
column (CL-1) bottom pump (01-P-02) were affected by the fire. There was no
fatality in the fire; however, pumps 01-P-02 and 01-P-09, their related piping
were damaged in the fire. Surrounding structures, support, instruments and
electrical/ instrument cables were also damaged in the fire.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
Leakage of hydrocarbon from 01-P-09 (CDU main fractionator column bottom

pump) discharge line Pressure Gauge Tapping flange Joint and subsequent auto
ignition of the vapor.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Provision of isolation valve at the main fractionator column bottom outlet

line from CDU going to bottom pumps 01-P-9/P-9A in order to ensure
positive isolation in the event of any major exigency in hot pump house to
be examined for implementation.
2. The present positioning of CCTV cameras in the CDU area may not be the
perfect location for surveillance of the hot pump-house area of CDU,
which is hazard prone. The positioning / coverage of CCTV cameras in the
refinery may be reviewed considering the hazard potential of the location.
3. The hot pump house area is also an area of potential hazard. Possibility of
relocating / additional detector in this location may be examined.
4. While carrying out any modification in the operating units, by in-house
group, change management is to be followed. The HAZOP study of the
consultant may also be reviewed by refinery group to ensure safety and
reliability for any changes / modifications.
5. Flange joint in the small bore piping in hydrocarbon service to be
minimized to the extent practicable.
6. Health monitoring of connected joints like high pressure vents (HPV), Low
pressure Drains (LPD) should also be included in the NDT of pipelines in
critical service.
7. Provision of common isolation valve/ Remote operated Valve at suction of
main fractionation column bottom line for quick isolation during emergency
should be considered.
8. Any change in the process facility (such as removal of CL-2 bottom
common isolation valve) should be incorporated in operating manuals and
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P&IDs after closure of modification under MOC Procedure and all
concerned should be aware of these changes.
9. Response of operating crew should be strengthened through well defined
training & clear cut sequence of actions.
10. Early warning system such as CCTV should be made operational.
10. MAJOR FIRE AT THERMAL POWER STATION (TPS) OF HALDIA

REFINERY
Date: 05.01.08 Time: 06.39 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
Boiler no.1, 2, 3, HRSG-1, TG no.1 & 4 and GT-1 were operating and pre-startup
activities for boiler no.4 was going on in the beginning of morning shift and LDO
(startup fuel) pump was to be started along with many other activities. The fire
started immediately after starting up of the LDO pump. The boiler operator
working on boiler-4 firing floor noticed sudden fire from ground floor near boiler-3
main steam line header and rushed to TPS control room & alerted all concerned.
Boiler-3 and TG-4 tripped and smoke started entering into the TPS control room.
Sensing the safety hazard, control room operating personnel made emergency
shutdown of the balance operating boilers 1 & 2 and left the control room.
Electrical group switched off the operating TG-1 from electrical switchgear room
and turbine operator switched off the turbine from the hand trip mechanism
outside control room. Automatic frequency based load shedding scheme
operated up to 7th stage (out of 11 stages) and thus prevented GT tripping &
total power interruption in the refinery. The fire was brought under control at
around 07.05 hrs. The cooling activities & dispersion of smoke continued up to
07:45 hrs. Mutual aid partners also reported at site.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
- LDO line has ruptured due to wrong operation in lining up of the LDO
supply to boiler-4. The rupture of the line had taken place immediately
after the start up of the pump which is possible only when the pump was
started with discharge valve open and recirculation valve fully closed.
- Non availability of documented operating procedure for LDO pump.
- Removal of the pressure relief valve from LDO screw pump discharge line,
which has made the operation of the LDO facility unsafe.
- Reduction of the LDO pipeline thickness to 1.90 mm (normal thickness is
4.00 mm approx.) which was beyond the allowable limit was due to
external corrosion/pitting on a small length of pipeline. This part of the
pipeline was encased in an insulated galvanized iron (GI) enclosure
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provided for protection of cables due to which inspection of this section
could not be carried out in the past.
- Non-availability of fire stops/fire barriers/fire breaks in the cables entering
the control room.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) The LDO screw pump was operating without any Pressure Relief Valve.
Same is to be provided at the earliest.
2) Operating procedure for LDO pump is not available in the present
operating manual for Boilers & Auxiliaries. The same may be incorporated.
3) The portion of LDO line of Boiler-3 is covered in a box and the portion
could not be inspected in the past. It is recommended that the Hydro-
Carbon pipelines should not be enclosed with any other system.
4) Operating pressure LDO header is around 35 kg/cm2. Schedule-40
Carbon Steel pipe has been used. It appears that the existing pipe is just
meeting the applicable standard. Suitability of pipe schedule & metallurgy
may once again be reviewed considering hazards in the location of use.
5) Fire stop / Fire barrier are not available in the cable entry points of TPS
Control Room. Suitable fire barrier / fire stops are to be provided in all the
cable entry points of TPS control rooms.
6) Fixed Glass panes are provided towards boiler side wall of control room
building. Glass panes may be removed and the opening be blocked with
the parents construction material of the wall.
7) Smoke detectors have been provided in the TPS control room but there is
no auto/manual fire suppression system for the cable area underneath the
false floor. It is recommended to provide Auto/Manual fire suppression
system with “Clean Agent” or other suitable media in all such locations
likely to affect operations.
8) Safety Shut off valves in the main fuel headers of Boiler-1 & 4 are
available. However the same are not available in Boiler-2 & 3. It is
recommended to provide safety shut-off valves in all the fuel oil headers of
Boiler-2 & 3.
9) LDO header pressure to be recorded in DCS with real time & historical
trends & high/low alarm at Operators’ work station.
10) The LDO pump is operated once in a week (Wednesday) to ensure
healthiness of the pump & piping network. As per discussion with
Operation, the weekly checking is carried at a pressure of 10 Kg/cm2
(approx.) It is recommended to manualise the system & carry out the test
at the operating pressure required for boiler-2 / 3.
11) Updated/as built P&IDs of FO circuit, LDO circuit & other utilities are not
available. These are to be made available at the earliest.
12) It is apparent that a large numbers of unused / redundant Electrical &
Instrument cables are lying underneath the false flooring of Control room
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PARADIP REFINERY
& near the Boiler operating area. A review for such unused/redundant
cables (Electrical & Instrumentations) may be carried out throughout the
Refinery and be removed.
13) Painting in part of the LDO line is not visible. Painting of hydrocarbon
pipelines as per approved colour code should be done.
14) TPS shutdown job list (2007) indicates requirement of maintenance /
testing of pressure relief valve installed on the discharge header of LDO
screw pump. The job was not carried out in the shutdown and the
whereabouts of the valve is not known. A system to review such pending
maintenance / testing of critical equipments may be developed for
ensuring compliance.
15) On discussing with the operators it is observed that structured induction
training is not imparted before taking over the charge. The present
learning system of the new operators is from other senior & experienced
colleagues in their initial period. It is recommended to provide structured
training input of the facility before independent responsibility is handed
over.
16) PLC and DCS time clocks may be synchronized for proper analysis of
events.
11. MAJOR FIRE AT OHCU OF PANIPAT REFINERY
Date: 14.09.12 Time: 05.40 hrs
BRIEF DESCRIPTION:
OHCU was commissioned in April, 1999. Though, the vacuum re-boiler heater
(05-FF-503) was in operation initially but it was kept in idle condition since April,
2001 until November, 2010 as this was not required to be operated. However, its
requirement was envisaged in post P-15 revamp scenario. Fractionator column
05-C-503 bottom, containing hydrocracker bottoms and diesel components is fed
to vacuum column 05-C-506 to separate diesel component from hydrocracker
bottom. Vacuum re-boiler heater (05-FF-503) provides reboil heat to vacuum
column. Vacuum Column bottom stream also provides heat to Kero Stripper
Reboiler (05-E-502), which helps for maintaining the Flash point of the stream.
Considering this, during revamp shutdown in November, 2010 this heater was
thoroughly inspected. No abnormal observation was recorded in Inspection
history. The condition of the heater and the heater tubes was satisfactory. Heater
05-FF-503 is having 6 nos. of duel firing burners with pilots. The heater is in
regular operation since November, 2010. The schematic diagram of heater is as
follows:
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On 13.09.2012 OHCU was operating normal at 240 M3/Hr throughput. Vacuum

Column Reboiler heater was in line till 16:20 hrs., when Reboiler Heater Feed
Pump 05-P-509A lost suction and the operation in the section had to be
suspended temporarily. In night shift, it was planned to resume the operation.
The repeated attempts were made to increase the pass flow by running the same
pump, but Pass Flows could not be established up to the desired levels.
However, firing in the heater was increased to achieve the Coil Outlet Temp. In
the process, the heater 05-FF-503 caught fire in morning hours on 14.09.2012.
PROBABLE CAUSE:
1. Bypassed Safety Interlocks & Non Compliance of Interlock Bypass

procedure: The safety Interlocks were kept bypassed since August, 2012
without the compliance of established procedure of taking approvals from
management.
2. Skin Temperature High / High High Alarms : Alarm Value for High/ High
High Skin Temperature were set higher than the allowed maximum Skin
Temperature. Also alarms were found disabled since 03.09.2012.
3. No effort was made to correct the problem of pumps 05-P-509, facing
problem of lower flows since long.
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4. Firing in the heater 05-FF-503 was increased without establishing pass
flow and monitoring of skin temperature.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. A procedure needs to be developed for reviewing / checking the Alarm

Values each time after the DCS is booted. Full proof system of Alarm
management is be ensured by Instrument Dept. particularly after booting
the system. Alarms of Heater 05-FF-503 are to be enabled after review.
2. In case of breech of any Skin Temperature value, hooter/ alarm should
appear in DCS panel.
3. Compliance of Interlock bypass procedure needs to be strictly adhered.
The interlock bypass status need to be reviewed periodically at highest
level.
4. Procedure for handling tube ruptures emergency needs to be incorporated
for all heaters, in the “Emergency Handling section” of Operating Manuals.
5. Log Book of Panel officer to be modified to incorporate critical operating
parameter of heater.
6. Skin temperature should be displayed in the graphic of heater.
7. Interlock bypass status need to be recorded in DOR.
8. Vacuum column 05-C-506 need to be opened on earliest opportunity to
check the packing bed.
9. 05-PA-CF-509B –warm up line to be made functional prior the taking
reboiler heater FF-503 in line.
10. Passing air damper for 05-FF-503 is to be replaced/ repaired.
11. Internal communication and monitoring within the Production Department
need to be improved. Communication in Instrumentation Dept. is also
need to be improved.
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ANNEXURES
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PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - I
Fire Pump House Layout :
- 193 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - II
Fire Water Line Layout :
- 194 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - III
Fire Water Line with Fire Hydrant & Isolation Valves :
- 195 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - IV
Site wide Siren Installation Layout :
- 196 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - V
South Side Road Number Layout :
- 197 -
PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - VI
EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS :
Fire & Emergency Call no 101/ 5555

First Aid/ Ambulance [Plant] 5200/ 5093
Refinery Shift Manager [RSM] 5100/ 5300
South Fire station 5516/ 5600/ 06722-252111
North Fire Station 5400/ 5514
CISF Security Control Room 5990/ 06722-252069
Township IOCL V. K. Hospital 4050/ 4060/ 4082/ 06722-253286
* For outsiders dial (06722-25) before all intercom numbers
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Annexure - VII
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PARADIP REFINERY
Annexure - VIII
PDR PLOT PLAN:
- 200 -

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FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.

Indian Oil Corporation Limited

Approved by Checked by Prepared by

B. K. Panda K. G. Pochiraju Manish Kumar

30th April ’2017, Rev-2.

CHAPTER TITLE/ DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

1.0 FIRE PREVENTIONS REGULATIONS

On noticing any leaks/perceiving any Hydrocarbon smell, report immediately to Plant In

a) Prevention b) Protection c) Fire fighting

It involves of different facilities which shall help in immediate handling of fire

Review & Update

Liquids with low flash points pose the greatest danger.

Spontaneous ignition of flammable vapour is caused by the presence of Phyrophoric

Basic chemical reactions:

4 FeS + 3 O 2 ===> 2 Fe 2 O 3 + 4 S + Heat

Flammable/ Explosive Limits:

Precaution against Boil Over & Slop Over:

2. A fireball will result if the escaping material gets ignited.

Therefore in the widest sense, an explosion is an effect produced by the sudden

An Explosion may result on:

1. Chemical changes such as detonation of explosive or the combustion of

API American Petroleum Institute

THE FIRE PROTECTION

Fire can be prevented to a large extent by employees through basic knowledge

"Fire is a rapid self sustaining oxidation process accompanied by the evolution of

As Per IS: 8757, “Fire” is –

1. Process of combustion characterized by the emission of heat accompanied by

7.1 THE FIRE PROCESS:

• In common language, fire is burning of matter.

- Fuel (i.e. combustible matter)

These three components constitute what is known as “Fire-Triangle”.

Fuel In the form of vapor, liquid or incandescent solid.

THE FIRE TETRAHADRON

For petroleum/hydrocarbon fires understanding the sustenance of the fire is of

7.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF LEL & UEL:

7.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FIRE:

BASED ON MATERIAL UNDER BURNING -

CLASS "A" FIRE

CLASS “B" FIRE

i) Miscible with water and ii) Immiscible with water

CLASS "C" FIRE

CLASS “D" FIRE

TYPE MATERIAL EXTINGUISHING MEDIA

7.4 CLASSIFICATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AS PER OISD STD 116

As per OISD-STD-116 petroleum products are classified as follows:

1. Class A Products Flammable liquids having flash point below 23 Degree C

Flammable liquids having flash point of 23 Degree C

Flammable liquids having flash product point of 93

As per OISD STD -118:

As per OISD Std-116:

Classification for heated products:

Sl. Boiling Explosive

2. Hydrogen -253 0.07 0.07 4.0 75 <-.50 585

3. Methane -161 0.55 - 5 15 - 538

4. Ethane -89 1.04 - 3 12.3 - 514

5. Propane -42 1.58 - 2.0 9.5 -104 466

6. Butane -10 2.05 - 1.5 9.0 -60 430

7. Benzene 80 2.8 0.88 1.3 7.1 -11 560