G.R. No.

148106
Decision Date
Jul 17, 2006
In Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Commission on Audit (COA) had primary jurisdiction over the petitioner's money claim against the Province of
Batangas, affirming the dismissal of the complaint by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and imposing costs on the
petitioner.
(G.R. No. 148106) v0.1-beta
Facts: Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money against the
Province of Batangas.The complaint alleged that the Province of Batangas had an unpaid balance
of P487,662.80 for the purchase of Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc.The defendant admitted most of the allegations in the complaint but
denied the unpaid balance.The defendant claimed that some payments were not reflected in the
computation and that it was continuously trying to determine the true amount owed.The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the primary
jurisdiction over the money claim was with the Commission on Audit (COA).The RTC denied
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, leading to the filing of the petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:Whether the COA or the RTC had primary jurisdiction to decide on the petitioner's money
claim against the Province of Batangas.

Ruling:The COA had primary jurisdiction over the petitioner's money claim against the
Province of Batangas.

Ratio: The court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which states that if a case requires
the expertise and specialized knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be sought in
an administrative proceeding before going to court.In this case, the claim for a sum of money
against a local government unit fell within the COA's jurisdiction to pass upon money claims
against the government or any of its subdivisions.The COA's authority extends to the
examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims due from or owing to the government
or its subdivisions.The claim for a fixed amount could be determined from the receipts, invoices,
and other documents, making it suitable for COA's expertise.The claim also involved compliance
with auditing laws and rules on procurement, which were within the special competence of COA
auditors and accountants

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in
an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction.[10] It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral
of such issues to the administrative body for its view[11] or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice
University of the Philippines vs. Dizon G.R. No. 171182 Aug 23, 2012

A dispute between the University of the Philippines and Stern Builders Corporation over unpaid billing
for a construction project leads to a Supreme Court ruling that government funds are not subject to
garnishment and emphasizes the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit over claims against the
government, while also determining that the notice of appeal filed by UP was timely and within the
reglementary period.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 171182) v0.1-beta

Facts:The case involves a dispute between the University of the Philippines (UP) and Stern Builders
Corporation (Stern Builders) over unpaid billing for a construction project.UP entered into a construction
agreement with Stern Builders for the renovation of a building on its campus.Stern Builders submitted
three progress billings, but UP only paid two of them.The third billing was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).Stern Builders and its president, Servillano dela Cruz,
sued UP to collect the unpaid billing and to recover damages.The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in
favor of Stern Builders and awarded them the unpaid billing, damages, and attorney's fees.UP appealed
the decision, but the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC's ruling and ordered the garnishment of UP's
funds to satisfy the judgment.UP argued that the garnishment of its funds was not valid because
government funds are not subject to garnishment.The CA and RTC held that the funds were already
earmarked for the construction project.UP appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
garnishment violated the Constitution and that the awards of damages were excessive.The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of UP, stating that government funds are not subject to garnishment and that the
awards of damages were not supported by clear and distinct findings of fact and law.The Court
emphasized the importance of the Commission on Audit's jurisdiction over claims against the
government.The Court set aside the garnishment and deleted the awards of damages.

Issue:the notice of appeal filed by UP was timely and within the re glementary period.

Ruling:The court ruled in favor of UP.The service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon
Atty. Nolasco was invalid and ineffectual because he was not the counsel of record for UP.The counsel of
record was the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City, which received the denial on May 31, 2002.Therefore, the
period to appeal resumed on June 1, 2002, and UP's filing of the notice of appeal on June 3, 2002, was
timely.Even if the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid, the judgment of the RTC did not become final
and immutable after the notice of appeal was filed late.The court applied the fresh-period rule, which
states that the period for filing an appeal is counted from the receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.The court held that the fresh-period rule should be retroactively applied in UP's fav

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

The SANDIGANBAYAN upholds the denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss, nullifies the sequestration
and search and seizure orders against SIPALAY and ALLIED, and deems the orders automatically lifted
due to the failure to bring an action in court within the prescribed period.

denial of motion to dismiss sequestration order search and seizure order

Facts:The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), issued
sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied
Banking Corporation.

 The PCGG claimed that the shares of stock owned by Sipalay in Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corporation were part of Lucio C. Tan's ill-gotten wealth.
 The PCGG also issued a search and seizure order against Allied Banking Corporation.
 Both Sipalay and Allied filed petitions challenging the sequestration and search and seizure
orders.

Issue:
 1. Was the SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper?
2. Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed of the motion to dismiss separately?
3. Was the nullification of the sequestration order against SIPALAY and the search and seizure
order against ALLIED correct?
4. Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to
bring an action in court within the prescribed period?

Ruling:

1. The SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss was proper.

2. It was unnecessary to resolve the motion to dismiss separately.
3. The nullification of the sequestration order against SIPALAY and the search and seizure order
against ALLIED was correct.
4. The sequestration and search and seizure orders were deemed automatically lifted.

Ratio:The PCGG's motion to dismiss was filed at a belated stage of

the proceedings and the PCGG was guilty of estoppel by laches.
There was nothing left for the parties to do but to await the
judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, so it was unnecessary to resolve
the motion to dismiss separately.The sequestration order against
SIPALAY was

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that there ought to be prior exhaustion of

administrative remedies. However, this rule is not inflexible. The rule on
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to many exceptions, to
wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (ii) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice

G.R. No. 214435

Ponente

HERNANDO, J

Decision Date

Feb 14, 2022

Alo, accused of using fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license,
appeals the revocation of her license by the Board for Professional Teachers, but fails to exhaust all
administrative remedies, resulting in the Supreme Court reinstating the revocation due to her failure to
meet the qualifications and the presence of substantial evidence against her.

fraud or deceit certificate of registration professional license

Case Digest (G.R. No. 214435) v0.1-beta

Facts:

 Respondent: Dayamon Didato Alo

  Charged with unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable conduct before the Board for
Professional Teachers (Board) on July 5, 2011
 Alleged use of fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license
 Allegedly used a falsified Board Resolution No. 671 dated September 28, 2000 when she
registered as a professional teacher on September 14, 2007
 Original Board Resolution did not include her name as among those who would be registered as
professional teachers without examination
 Alo defended herself by stating that she held a degree in Bachelor of Science in Elementary
Education and had been a public elementary school teacher from 1995 to 2006
 Claimed that she applied for a Professional Teacher's License based on Section 26 (C) of Republic
Act No. 7836, which allowed certain qualifications for registration without examination
 Denied using the alleged falsified Board Resolution and argued that she never knew of its
existence
 Board rendered a decision on September 11, 2012, finding Alo guilty and revoking her certificate
of registration and professional license
 Alo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Board
 Instead of appealing to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Alo directly filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
 CA granted Alo's petition for review and reversed the Board's decision
 CA held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Alo committed fraud or falsification in
obtaining her certificate of registration and professional license
 CA ruled that the Board erred in applying a disputable presumption rule that was not applicable
to the case
 CA noted that Alo did not need a board resolution to apply for a certificate of registration and
professional license under Section 26 (C) of Republic Act No. 7836
 Board and the PRC filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
 Case was elevated to the Supreme Court

Issue:

 Whether the CA had jurisdiction over the case

 Whether Alo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
 Whether Alo was qualified to obtain a professional teaching license and certificate of
registration
 Whether Alo's right to due process was violated

Ruling:

 CA had jurisdiction over the case

 Alo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
 Alo was not qualified to obtain a professional teaching license and certificate of registration
 Alo's right to due process was not violated

Ratio:

 CA had jurisdiction over the case as there was no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by the Board
 Alo failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, and therefore her case should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action
 Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to avail themselves of all
means afforded by administrative processes before seeking intervention from the courts
 Alo disregarded the procedural rules of the PRC
CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission. Herein petitioner is
engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines
that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without
prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on
June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although
the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character.
Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the
fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other.The respondent admits that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary
rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing. The
Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make
such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In
the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner.

The Philippine Supreme Court rules in favor of Philippine Communications Satellite

Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) in their challenge against the National
Telecommunications Commission's

Facts:

 The case involves a challenge by the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT) against an order issued by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) to reduce its rates.
 PHILCOMSAT is the only company providing public utility services for international
satellite communications in the Philippines.
 PHILCOMSAT operates under a legislative franchise and has established various
installations and facilities for its services.
 PHILCOMSAT leases its satellite circuits to several international carriers, enabling them
to provide communication services such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, and
television.
 In 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed an application with the NTC for authority to continue
operating and maintaining its facilities and to charge the current rates for its services.
 The NTC granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority to continue its operations and
charge the rates it was then charging.
 In 1988, the NTC issued an order directing PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by fifteen
percent (15%) based on an initial evaluation of PHILCOMSAT's financial statements.
 PHILCOMSAT challenged the order, arguing that it violated procedural due process and
constituted a confiscatory rate reduction.

Issue:
  Whether the NTC's order to reduce PHILCOMSAT's rates violates procedural due
process and constitutes a confiscatory rate reduction.

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PHILCOMSAT.

Ratio:The Court held that the NTC's order violated procedural due process because it was issued
without prior notice and hearing.The rate-fixing power of administrative bodies, such as the
NTC, is quasi-judicial in nature and requires notice and hearing.The order, even though
temporary in nature, still required notice and hearing as it affected the revenue of
PHILCOMSAT during the prescribed period.The Court held that the rate reduction imposed by
the NTC was confiscatory and violated substantive due process.The power of the State to
regulate pub... continue reading

1.ISSUE:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the NTC's order to reduce rates is a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of procedural and
substantive due process.

2.RULING OF SC?

>The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PHILCOMSAT, declaring that the NTC's order to reduce rates
violated the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and denied
procedural and substantive due process

3. GROUNDS OF SC DECISION?

>The Supreme Court's decision was based on several grounds, including the validity of the delegation of
legislative power to the NTC, the violation of procedural due process, and the confiscatory nature of the
rate reduction

4.STANDARD REQUIRED FOR RATE FIXING POWER?

>The only standard required for rate-fixing power is that the rate be reasonable and just.
Even in the absence of an express requirement, reasonableness can be implied.

5. WHAT IS THE CLASSIFICATION OF RATE FIXING POWER AS DISCUSSED BY

THE COURT?

>The Court classified the rate-fixing power of administrative bodies, such as the NTC, as quasi-
judicial when it applies exclusively to a specific entity and is based on a finding of fact

6.IMPORTANCE OF NOTICE and HEARING in Rate Fixing Proceeding?

>The Court emphasized the importance of notice and hearing in rate-fixing proceedings, stating
that even temporary rate-fixing orders should be subject to the statutory procedural requirements
of notice and hearing.

7.Requirement of confiscatory

>A rate is considered confiscatory if it unduly deprives the utility of a reasonable return on its
property. Rates must not be confiscatory or oppressive, and what is a just and reasonable rate is a
question of fact based on sound business judgment.

8.Remedy ordered by sc
>The Supreme Court set aside the NTC's order and directed the NTC to proceed with the hearing
and determination of PHILCOMSAT's application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.

9. significance of court ruling

>The Court's ruling affirms that the delegation of rate-fixing power to the NTC is a valid
delegation of legislative power, as long as there is a standard provided for its exercise and the
manner of exercise is prescribed by the legislature

10.Impacts of court’s ruling on the NTC Rate REDUCTION?

>The Court's ruling nullifies the NTC's rate reduction order, as it was found to violate procedural and
substantive due process. The NTC is directed to proceed with the hearing and determination of
PHILCOMSAT's application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.

VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850
January 30, 1964

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission
ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net
operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the
public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to
the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the
reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus
issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function;
that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of
hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in which we
held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service
Commission — is not in point because, unlike the order complained of — which respondent claims to be
legislative in nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial
functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC?

HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service
Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional
system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters
purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government
the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is
complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern
sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to
guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said
Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted
within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be
exercised by a branch of the Government other than that 10

Case Digests in Administrative Law by Mark Anthony N. Manuel 2012 9 in which it is lodged by the
Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of
separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines —
may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact —
based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of
more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to
cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof
and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of
a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that a controversy falling

under the jurisdiction of administrative authorities be resolved by them before it can be
elevated to the courts for review.
 There are exceptions to this doctrine, such as when the case involves only a legal
question.
 In this case, the main issue is the propriety of the penalty imposed on Castro, which is a
legal question.
 Therefore, the court finds that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply.

>The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires resorting to the appropriate

administrative authorities before seeking judicial relief.

Castro v. Gloria
G. R. NO. 132174 (August 20, 2001)

FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a
complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in
Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. It was alleged that he had an illicit affair with Gutang’s wife,
petitioner’s co-teacher at the same school. Castro was dismissed by the DECS Regional Director. He then
filed a motion to set aside the decision which was ultimately denied by Secretary Gloria of DECS.
Thereafter, Castro filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC asking it to set aside the order of dismissal
and reduce it to a one-year suspension.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies since the
Civil Service Commission still has the power to review, revise or modify the Secretary’s order. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for
the dismissal of the complaint. The doctrine, however, is not absolute. There are instances when it may
be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions
are: 1) When the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when
the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when
the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 10) in quo warranto
proceedings.
 Castro vs. Gloria
A teacher dismissed for having an illicit affair with a married co-teacher seeks to have his
penalty reduced from dismissal to a one-year suspension without pay, resulting in the
court granting his petition and ordering his immediate reinstatement.
teacher dismissal illicit affair penalty reduction

Facts: (G.R. No. 132174)

 Petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher, was dismissed from the service for having an
illicit affair with his married co-teacher.
 He filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
 He then went to court and sought to have his penalty reduced from dismissal to a one-
year suspension without pay.
 His action was dismissed by the court on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as he failed to appeal to the Civil Service Commission before coming to court.

Issue: Is the penalty imposed on the petitioner proper?

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted his petition. The court held that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute and may be dispensed with in
certain cases, such as when the question raised is purely legal. The court found that the proper
penalty for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension for six months and one
day to one year, not dismissal. Therefore, the court reduced the petitioner's penalty to a one-year
suspension without pay and ordered his immediate reinstatement.

Ratio: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires resorting to the

appropriate administrative authorities before seeking judicial relief. However, this doctrine is not
absolute and may be dispensed with in certain cases, such as when the question raised is purely
legal. In this case, the main issue was the propriety of the penalty imposed on the petitioner,
which is a pure question of law.