Ratinalism

International Journal of Research in Education Humanities and Commerce
Volume 01, Issue 02 "July -August 2020"
LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME: A BRIEF SURVEY OF

EMPIRICISM
Rev. Fr. Dr. HYGINUS CHIBUIKE EZEBUILO

Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka
ABSTRACT
During the seventh and eighteenth centuries, philosophy certainly had its fair share of
rationalist thinkers, particularly of the Platonist variety. However, philosophy was soon
dominated by an alternative and more scientific view that knowledge is gained primarily
through the five senses. We see this presumption in Francis Bacon’s statement that in our
efforts to understand nature “we can act and understand no further than we have…observed
in either the operation or the contemplation of the method and order of nature.” Direct
experience, therefore, is foundational for obtaining knowledge, and this position is known as
empiricism. During the first half of the 18th century, three great philosophers namely, Locke,
Berkeley and Hume, argued for this approach, thus forming a philosophical movement
known as British empiricism. Contrary to the rationalist philosophers, these empiricists
largely denied the role of innate ideas and deduction in the quest for knowledge. Instead, they
argued that knowledge comes from sensory experience and inductive reasoning.
Keywords: Empiricism, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Knowledge, Idea
INTRODUCTION
Empiricism and rationalism are two main rivals with regards to origin or source and
justification of knowledge. An empiricist theory of knowledge holds that all knowledge arises
through and is reducible to experience, while a rationalist theory of knowledge holds that
some rationally accepted knowledge must have a sufficient reason for its existence, the
principle of sufficient reason being a priori.
As I observed elsewhere, empiricism is the view that all human knowledge is derived from
(empirical) experience or the view that all knowledge are a posteriori.1 Concepts are said to
be “a posteriori” if they can be applied only on the basis of experience, and they are called “a
priori” if they can be applied independently of experience. Beliefs or propositions are said to
be a posteriori if they are knowable only on the basis of experience and a priori if they are
knowable independently of experience. Thus, empiricism is the view that all concepts, or all
rationally acceptable beliefs or propositions, are a posteriori rather than a priori. As a theory
of justification, therefore, it views belief as depending ultimately and necessarily on
experience for its justification. In both everyday attitudes and philosophical theories, the
1
H.C. Ezebuilo, “The Rationalist and Empiricist Epistemological Strategies and their Implications in Ethics,”
Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities, vol.6, no.4, 2020.
www.ijrehc.com Copyright © IJREHC 2020, All right reserved Page 83

experiences referred to by empiricists are, however, principally those arising from the
activities of the sense organs.2
A posteriori knowledge is the knowledge that is gained through empirical experience.
Knowledge acquired by means of any of the senses is a posteriori. This includes knowledge
acquired through seeing objects, hearing sounds, tasting things, feeling something or smelling
something. Most of our knowledge is of course a posteriori. However, I have pointed out
elsewhere that the senses alone cannot furnish us with knowledge. It is reason that interprets
our sense experiences and gives them meaning before they can become knowledge. Until
reason performs this role, they are simply raw data without meaning. 3
Rather than preserve what is thought to be an inaccurate distinction, empiricism recasts the
distinction between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge into the distinction
between analytic knowledge and synthetic knowledge. Through this distinction empiricism
denies the rationalist claim that a priori knowledge is superior to a posteriori knowledge.
Indeed, the distinction provides the basis to argue the precise opposite. The statements that
the rationalists cite as paradigmatic a priori knowledge include: A triangle has three sides, 3
+ 3 = 6, and so on.4 These, empiricists see as analytic statements.
An analytic statement is one where the statement analyzes the concept in question. Thus, the
statement, “A triangle has three sides” does no more than analyze the concept, triangle; and
the statement 3 + 3 = 6 does no more than analyze the concept, six. Moreover, the empiricist
argues, these statements never do more than analyze the concepts in question. In a real sense
then these statements provide no additional knowledge, all the knowledge that analytic
statements contain is given within the original concept the statement analyzes. 5
Synthetic statements, in contrast, do provide additional knowledge – knowledge that goes
further than the original concept. Consider the statement: the temperature outside is 75 o. This
is a synthetic statement since, while there has to be some temperature outside, there is no
reason that it has to be 75o rather than some other temperature. The concepts ‘temperature’
and ‘outside’ then have no intrinsic connection to 75 o (or some specific outside temperature),
rather what the temperature depends upon are various other environmental conditions. So the
statement such as “The temperature outside is 75o,” provides us with additional (and
sometimes valuable) information. All synthetic statements then share the characteristics that,
because there is no intrinsic or logical connection between the elements of the statements,
these statements provide information about a connection or relation that is unavailable in the
original concepts themselves.
Given that analytic statements reveal no additional insights, while synthetic statements do
provide novel ideas and associations, 6 it should come as no surprise that empiricism argues
that empirical knowledge is superior to a priori knowledge rather than the reverse (or to be
more precise, that synthetic knowledge is superior to analytic knowledge). As I have noted
2
C. Umezinwa (ed.), Essays in Philosophy (Enugu: Afro-Obis Publications, 2005), p.117.
3
H.C. Ezebuilo, op.cit.
4
Thomas I. White, Discovering Philosophy (Upper Saddler River: Prentice-Hall, 1996), p.199.
5
Ibid. p.208.
6
Ibid.

elsewhere, with the focus on analytic truth, rationalism never quite reaches the real universe
in the manner that synthetic statements are able to do, according to this analysis. 7
The debate between rationalism and empiricism continues, and it is quite possible some
issues will be impossible to resolve, at least given our finite human intellect. To the degree
that it is possible to determine the correct solutions to these issues, the British philosopher
Bertrand Russell concludes that the score is even. Russell argues that while it seems clear that
the empiricists are correct that all knowledge must arise through experience, it also seems
obvious that there is some knowledge that it is impossible to reduce to experience, that is,
reason is able to use experience to produce knowledge that it is nevertheless impossible to
prove through experience.8
This work is divided into seven sections. The first is the introduction where we used the
empiricist synthetic-analytic distinction as a background of study. The section examines
empiricism as an epistemological theory. The third, fourth and fifth sections attempt a
representation of the empirical theories of Locke, Berkeley and Hume respectively. The sixth
highlights some problems with empiricism, while the last section is the conclusion.
What is Empiricism
Empiricism is the view that all knowledge originates in experience, that all knowledge are
about or applicable to things that can be experienced, or the belief that all rationally
acceptable beliefs or propositions are justifiable or knowable only through experience. This
definition accords with the derivation of the term ‘empiricism’ from the ancient Greek word
empeiria, meaning experience. Empiricism is the knowledge acquired through sense
perception, that is, through any of the five senses. Empirical knowledge is always knowledge
of an individual object rather than knowledge of a class of objects. For example an empirical
knowledge of a chair is of a particular chair – this particular chair that I am seeing or
touching, etc, or these particular chairs, but not chairs in general. This, according to
Omoregbe, is because the sense organs can only present us with particular concrete objects.9
The senses bring us into contact with the empirical world through the act of sense perception.
But are the things we perceive exactly the way we perceive them; that is, do the qualities we
perceive in things exactly exist in these things or are they products of our own minds. For
instance, when I perceive a blue object, is the blueness really inherent in that object or in my
sense of sight? According to Democritus and Berkeley, 10 the qualities we perceive in things
are not really inherent in them; they only appear to have them but in reality these qualities
come from our senses. Some philosophers (neo-realists) on the other hand have concluded
that things are exactly the way they appear to us. They believe that there is contradiction in
nature and therefore things have contradictory aspects in them – for instance, something can
be both hot and cold at the same time.
7
Ibid.
8
Cf. H.C. Ezebuilo, op.cit.
9
J. Omoregbe, Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study (Ikeja: Joja Educational Research and
Publishers, 1998), p.24.
10

Hence, Omoregbe noted that while, for example, 11 Democritus and Berkeley would say, “The
wine tastes sweet to me tastes sour to you; therefore, I do not perceive that it is sweet and you
do not perceive that it is sour, and the wine is neither sweet nor sour;” Protagoras would say,
“The wine that tastes sweet to me tastes sour to you, hence, I perceive that it is sweet and you
perceive that it is sour, and therefore, no boy can say absolutely either that the wine is sweet
or that the wine is sour, and one can say relatively that whereas it is true for me that the wine
is sweet, it is true for you that that the wine is sour.” Some neo-realists would say, “The wine
that tastes sweet to me tastes sour to you, therefore, one must say that there are contradictions
in nature; one must say of the wine not only that it is both sweet and not sweet, but also that it
is both sour and not sour.”
These are extreme positions. It is however a fact, and here we agree with Chisholm that the
way we perceive things depends to a certain extent on our own psychological and
physiological conditions. 12 We know for example that if someone is suffering from acute
malaria even sweet things taste bitter to such a one, while everything appears yellow to
someone suffering from yellow fever. Aristotle, however, criticized the extremists’ positions
when he says:
The earlier students of nature were mistaken in their
view that without sight there was no white or black,
without taste no sour. This statement of theirs is partly
true partly false. Sense and sensible objects are
analogous terms, i.e. they may denote either
potentialities or actualities. The statement is true of the
later, false of the former. This ambiguity they wholly
failed to notice.13
Aristotle maintains that the qualities we perceive in things are properties actually inherent in
them. It is because they have these properties that they appear to us the way they do. Hence a
number of people viewing a tree under normal conditions, for example, would see it as green
because greenness is one of the properties of a tree. It is in virtue of this that it appears to us
as green. On the other hand, such terms as white, black, sweet, sour refer to the way in which
things are perceived rather than the properties they have. 14 Thus, although things do really
have these dispositions (or qualities) inherent in them, their appearing to us the way they do
also depends on our psychological and physiological conditions.
This was well brought out by Omorogbe in line with Immanuel Kant. 15 For example, the
direct object of the sense of sight is simply color. When we look we can only see color. That
is all that the sense of sight can furnish us with. It is reason which tells us that what we are
seeing is a tree, a table, a blackboard, an animal, etc. again, the direct object of the sense of
hearing is sound. The ears do not tell us the sound of what it is or where the sound comes
from. For example, we hear the sound of an aeroplane, the sound of a gunshot or that of
11
Ibid.
12
Roderick H. Chisholm, “Theory of Knowledge” Foundations of Philosophy Series (Englewood, Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1966), p.72 cited in H.C. Ezebuilo, op.cit.
13
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.

thunder. It is our reason that tells us, for example, that the sound we are hearing is that of
thunder and not that of aeroplane or gunshot. Our ears only register the sound without telling
us the meaning of the sound. The sample applies to all the other senses. When a blind man
touches something the sense of touch does not tell him what he is touching. It is his reason
that interprets and tells him what he is touching. Sense perception requires the cooperation of
reason in order to produce knowledge.
Empiricism denies the rationalist distinction between empirical and a priori knowledge. All
knowledge, the empiricist argues, arises through, and is reducible to, sense perception. Thu,
there is no knowledge that arises through reason alone. It is essential to be clear here: it is not
the existence of reason that empiricism denies, or that reason has a role in knowledge
acquisition, rather it is that reason has some special access to knowledge over and above the
knowledge that experience provides. All empiricists acknowledge that human beings possess
reason; reason is the instrument that allows us to manipulate and augment the knowledge that
experience provides. Knowledge, however, has its origins in experience rather than in reason.
As Macann rightly noted, empiricism begins with the distinction between sense data and
ideas.16 Sense data represent the basic information that the senses present to the mind through
our perceptual experiences, that is, sights, tastes, textures, sounds, and odors. To illustrate,
suppose that one sees a blue glass. This sense experience is reducible to the visual act and the
sense data (i.e., the information that the visual act contains). In this case the sense data/the
information that the visual act contain are that there is a ‘blueness’ and a ‘glassness’. At this
stage there is no conscious recognition that one sees a blue glass, all there is, is the pure sense
data that the senses present to the mind through the sense experiences. The mind processes
and represents each individual sense datum as an idea, in this case the ideas are: blue and
glass. The mind then associates and combines the ideas it creates through sense experience to
create the conscious idea: blue glass.
To the empiricist, sense data represent the basic material that the mind uses to construct the
ideas that comprise all our knowledge. 17 Thus, no matter what the idea is, it is possible to
trace that idea to some sense experience(s). While the precise details differ, these are the
basic cognitive mechanisms that the principal empiricist philosophers (John Locke, George
Berkeley and David Hume) all appeal to in order to explain the process through which sense
data becomes knowledge. In this way they deny the existence of a priori knowledge.
Although empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge, as knowledge that depends
upon no experience, there is still the recognition that some knowledge goes further than
experience in the sense that it is not about experience. Nevertheless, empiricism argues that
such knowledge is still reducible to experience. 18 Again, this is the crucial notion that it is
possible to trace all knowledge, whether or not it is about experience, to some particular
experience or experiences. Indeed, some of the empiricists argue that whatever knowledge
that cannot be so reduced is nothing but nonsense. 19
John Locke
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.

One of the greatest figures in empiricism was John Locke (1632-1704). Locke wrote on a
range of subjects including politics, religion, economics and education. His fame as an
empiricist philosopher, although, rests on his 1689 work Essay Concerning Human
Understanding where he expounded the empiricist position that there are no innate ideas and
all knowledge comes from experience. We will look at this in what follows.
No Innate Ideas
Throughout the history of philosophy it was common to hold that human beings are born with
a special set of ideas – innate ideas – that guide us in our quest for truth and certainty. In
ancient times, Plato held that we have an inborn knowledge of the perfect forms of things. 20
Descartes held that we have an innate idea of ourselves and of infinite perfection. 21 It is on
this concept and long history of innatism that Locke lunched a powerful attack. For Locke,
we simply have no innate ideas, and all notions that we have come to us through experience.
There are two types of innate ideas that philosophers commonly allege, which become
Locke’s immediate concern, namely speculative ones and practical innate ideas. Good
examples of speculative innate ideas, he argues, are the foundational logical concepts that are
sometimes dubbed “laws of thought” and associated with Aristotle. Chief among these is the
law of identity which simply states that an object is the same as itself, or, in more formal
terms, A=A. Next, there is the law of non-contradiction, which Aristotle himself states as
follows: “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to
the same thing and in the same respect.”22 The point can be stated formally as “not (P and
not-P),” that is, it is not the case that P and its opposite not-P obtain at the same time. It is
impossible for the chair in front of me to exist and not to exist at the same time. The second
type of alleged innate idea involves practical ones, that is, ideas that regulate moral practices.
Locke has two main arguments against the innateness of ideas, both speculative and practical.
First, he argues that people in fact do not universally hold to these ideas, contrary to what
defenders of innate ideas typically claim. This is particularly obvious with the laws of
thought, which, according to Locke, children and mentally challenged people have no
conception of whatsoever. He said:
If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds,
with those impressions upon them, they must
unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and
assent to these truths. Which since they do not, it is
evident that there are no such impressions. For if they
are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be
innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they
be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind,
and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant
20
Plato, Five Dialogues. J.L. Blau (ed.), (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981).
21
Rene Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).
22
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford University Press, 1975), 1.2.12.

of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this

impression nothing.23
Locke’s second argument is that it makes no sense to hold that such ideas lie dormant within
us and then blossom when we reach the right age, contrary to what defenders of innate ideas
commonly claim. Again, particularly with the law of thought, he noted that children reason
perfectly well regarding identity and non-contradiction, yet at the same time, they are
completely incapable of articulating those specific ideas. If these ideas were really innate,
then children should be able to verbally express them. As Locke states it, “How many
instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any
knowledge of this maxim, ‘That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?’” 24
Also, it is obvious that many adults have reached the so called age of reason, such as the
illiterate and those from primitive societies, and yet lack these ideas, he avers. These people
“pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this and the like
general propositions.”25
Simple and Complex Ideas
According to John Locke, then, we should completely reject the theory of innate ideas and
instead look for the true source of our ideas within human experience. His basic position,
which encapsulates the entire empiricist approach, is that the mind is from birth a blank slate
(or sheet of “white paper” in his words), which gets filled with information through
experience. 26 However, the process by which we form our ideas through experience has two
main steps.27 We first acquire simple ideas through experience, and then recombine those
simple ideas in different ways to create more complex ideas.
Simple ideas are the building blocks from which all other ideas are formed, and, for Locke,
there are two main sources of simple ideas. 28 The first and most obvious source is that they
come from sensation, specifically our five senses which give us perceptions of colors, taste,
smells, tactile solidity. The color of blue, the taste of sweetness, the feeling of smoothness,
the sound of a high-pitched tune are all basic sensory experiences that are building blocks for
our ideas about the external world. Second, there are simple ideas that come to us through
reflecting on our mental processes; these are ideas of reflection or introspection as we now
call them. I can shut my eyes and think about how my mind operates: how I perceive things
through my senses, how I think about problems, how I doubt questionable ideas, how I
believe reasonable ideas, how I will to perform actions, etc. according to Locke:
This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself;
and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
James Fieser, The History of Philosophy: A Short Survey, https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/110/8-
empiricism.htm
27
J. Locke, opcit.
28
Ibid. 2.1.3.

external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly

enough be called internal sense.29
According to Locke, therefore, some of our simple ideas come to us solely through sensation
without any introspective reflection, such as our perceptions of color, sounds and smells.
Others come solely through introspective reflection. There is an especially interesting group
of simple ideas that we can get either through sensation or introspective reflection. Pleasure
or pain is good examples. I can feel physical pain through my senses as when a candle flame
burns me; I can also experience emotional pain in my mind when a loved one dies. Other
ideas that we get through both sensation and reflection are existence, unity, and succession.
According to Locke, there are innumerable simple perceptions that flood into our minds
through sensation and reflection. But as we store these simple ideas in our memories, they
combine mechanically in our minds to form new ones which he calls complex ideas. There
are three specific mental processes that form complex ideas. 30 First, some are the result of
simply combining together more simple ideas. For example, I can get a complex idea of an
apple by combining the simple ideas of roundness, redness, sweetness, and moistness.
Second, some complex ideas involve relations that we get from comparing two things, such
as the ideas (or notions) of “larger” and “smaller” that I get when comparing two apples of
different sizes. Third, there are complex ideas that result from the mental process of
abstraction, such as when I arrive at the abstract notion of “roundness” by looking at an apple
and stripping away all of its attributes except for its being round. As the mind then forms
complex ideas from simple ones, the complex ideas will be of two types, namely ideas of
substances and ideas of modes. Ideas of substances are those of individual objects such as
rocks, trees, books, etc. ideas of modes are attributes of objects that cannot exist
independently of them, such as roundness, hotness, etc.
Primary and Secondary Qualities

One of Locke’s contributions to epistemology is his development of the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities of objects. The issue involves a distinction between qualities
of objects that actually belong to the object itself, and qualities of objects that we impose on
them. Suppose, for example, that I made a list of the qualities that I perceived in an apple:
round shape, red color, smooth texture, and sweet taste. It also has a particular size and
weight. Some of these qualities are part of the object itself, and others are qualities that I am
imposing o the apple.
According to John Locke, a primary quality is an attribute of a physical body that is
inseparable from the physical body, and includes solidity, shape, motion, number. These are
components that an object retains, regardless of how we might modify the object. He
illustrates this by considering changes that we might impose on a grain of wheat:
Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part
has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide
it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so
divide it on, till the parts becomes inseparable; they
29
Ibid.
30
J. Fieser, op.cit.

must retain still each of them all those qualities. For

division…can never take away either, solidity,
extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only
makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter;
all which distinct masses, reckoned as s many distinct
bodies, after division, make a certain number.31
No matter how much we grind down the grain of wheat, the parts still retain the qualities of
solidity, shape and others which were inherent in the original grain, of course in different
ways.
In contrast with primary qualities, there are also secondary qualities that are viewer or user
dependent.32 We impose the qualities to objects, and these include colors, sounds, and tastes.
According to Locke, color resides not in things but in the person. For example, there is
something in the apple that makes it appear red to me, but the redness itself does not reside
within the apple but instead is a function of my sense organs. The phenomenon of
colorblindness is ample proof of this: while the structure of the apple itself might trigger the
perception of redness in my mind, I need to have the appropriately designed eyes to have that
perception. So too with other qualities of the apple like taste and smell: the specific
sensations of taste and smell directly depend upon the construction of my tongue and nose,33
or perhaps, upon my health and psychological conditions. 34
Locke adds that there is a third type of quality of objects, tertiary qualities, which involves
the power that an object has to produce new ideas or sensations in us. 35 For example, the
mere sight of an apple may produce a feeling of hunger within me. Being near a fire may
produce a feeling of warmth within me. Perhaps the main difference between secondary and
tertiary qualities is that within secondary ones, we often mistake them for primary qualities of
the objects themselves. For example, I might just assume that the redness of an apple is
actually part of the apple when, upon reflection, I would see that it clearly is not; but with
tertiary qualities we might be less apt to make this mistake, for example, I would never
presume that my feeling of hunger resides in the apple itself. Or, by way of distinction, we
may simply say that a primary quality imposes itself on the thing itself, a secondary quality is
imposed by us on the thing itself, while a tertiary quality is imposed by the thing itself on us.
George Berkeley
Another major figure in philosophical empiricism was George Berkeley (1685-1753). In his
twenties, he wrote his two main philosophical works upon which his fame rests today: A
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous (1713). He was later ordained into the Anglican Church of
Ireland and received his Doctor of Divinity degree. Berkeley’s empirical theory, while it
builds on that of Locke, rejects the existence of material objects outside perception thereby
31
J. Locke, op.cit. 2.8.9.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
35
Cf. J. Fieser, op.cit.

taking the empieicist principle esse est percipi very seriously. Unlike Locke, Berkeley
believed it is not material things themselves but God that feeds us sensory information.
Material Things Do Not Exist and All Reality Exists as Perception

The heart of Berkeley’s philosophy is his theory of idealism, according to which he maintains
that material things do not exist, and all reality exists as perception in the mind of the
perceiver. The term idealism comes from the word “idea” insofar as the only things that exist
are ideas in one’s mind. 36 In that sense, a term like “idea-ism” might have better conveyed its
meaning. A good way of understanding Berkeley’s position is to see it as taking Descartes’
evil genius hypothesis seriously. Consider again what Descartes suggested:
For all I know, there is no material world whatsoever,
and all of my experiences are hallucinations that are
imposed into my mind by an evil genius. It might
appear that I have a body and am sitting on a chair, but
it could be that there is no three-dimensional world at
all, and an evil genius is just making those things appear
in my mind, while my mind itself floats around without
any body.37
Descartes, we must note, did not actually believe this hypothesis, but only proposed it as a
strategy for arriving at certainty about the world around us. Berkeley, however, does take this
scenario seriously, although he rejects that there is anything sinister or deceptive about it.
This is simply the way that God constructed the world; it is a virtual reality that consists of
God continually feeding our minds sensory information in a very consistent way.
The main point for Berkeley here is the regularity and consistency with which God feeds our
minds sensory data.38 God stores all sensible perceptions in his mind and he feeds them to us
at the appropriate time. Imagine that I perceive myself to be in a room conversing with five
friends. For Berkeley, the reality is that I and five other spirit-minds are being consistently
fed similar sense data by God. Drawing from the perceptions in his mind, God feeds all of us
sense data of walls, tables and chairs within the room. I decide to speak to my friends and say
“Did you hear the President’s speech last night?” God then interjects sensory data into all of
our minds that portray the image of my mouth moving with audible words coming out. One
of my friends decides to respond and say “The President’s speech was an insult to the
intelligence of everyone in this country!” Another friend decides to say “I disagree, and think
the President properly addressed the concerns of the nation.” In each case, God reads the
thoughts of my friends and interjects sensory data into all of our minds, thus portraying them
speaking.
When we are done conversing, we decide to get up and leave the room. We might then ask
what happens to the empty room since God is no longer feeding us sense perception of it.
Does the room go out of existence? According to Berkeley, the room does not. God himself is
still perceiving the sensory information about the room and it continues to exists in his mind.
36
Ibid.
37
R. Descartes, op.cit.
38
Cf. J. Fieser, op.cit.

Insofar as God still perceives it, the room still exists.39 Berkeley expresses this point with the
idealist motto that to be is to be perceived. This is to say that external things exist only in our
minds or in the mind of God.
The idealist position of denying material objects seems ridiculous. The vast majority of us
believe that we live in a world of material objects that includes physical things. For Berkeley,
the reverse is the case; it is belief in the existence of material objects that is ridiculous. He
writes:
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men,
that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence, natural or ideal, distinct from
their being perceived by the understanding. But, with
how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this
principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever
shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I
mistake not perceive it to involve a manifest
contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects
but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we
perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is not
plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any
combination of them, shall exist unperceived?40
(Principles, 4).
His point is that when I perceive something like a table, I am not really experiencing any
physical thing, but instead, I am only receiving sensations. This sensory data is all that I
really know, and it is a colossal fabrication to assume that some physical thing is the source
of my perceptions of the table. Berkeley recognizes that there is indeed some external source
of my perception of the table, but that source is God, not anything physical. So natural is this
position, he argues, that it is backed by common sense:
I am content…to appeal to the common sense of the

world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why
he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he
shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word,
because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he
thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell
you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives
by sense, that he terms a real being, and says it is or
exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he
says, has no being…The question between the
materialists and me is not, whether things have a real
existence out of the mind of this or that person, but
39
Ibid.
40
James Fieser, op.cit.

whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from

being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. 41
Now, given the fact that Berkeley does not believe in material objects, how then can he be
classified as an empiricist? The answer is that the central point of empiricism involves
gaining knowledge through the senses, rather than through innate ideas. And Berkeley
completely believes that we do acquire all our knowledge through sense perception. The only
issue involves what the source of those sense perceptions is. Whereas Locke believes that
material objects feed us sensory information, Berkeley believed that God performs that role,
not material things.
Argument from Primary and Secondary Qualities

As always with philosophy, it is one thing to simply propose a theory, but quite another thing
to prove it. Berkeley rises to the occasion, though, offering an abundance of arguments for his
position. We will look at the two main compelling of these. The first is his argument from
primary and secondary qualities. According to Locke, the fundamental difference between
the two types of qualities is whether they are viewer dependent or not. Primary ones are part
of the external things themselves and not viewer dependent. On Locke’s view, to believe n
external material objects, then, requires a commitment to the reality of primary qualities that
exist in things, independently of what a viewer might perceive.
Berkeley denies that there are primary qualities of objects in this sense, and he argues instead
that all so called primary qualities are just as viewer dependent as secondary ones. In other
words, all qualities of objects are really secondary (in the Lockean sense) and thus viewer
dependent. Below is his main argument:
They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the
primary or original qualities do exist without the mind
in unthinking substances, do at the same time
acknowledge that colors, sounds, heat, cold and
suchlike secondary qualities, do not – which they tell us
are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on
and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and
motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take
for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate
beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those
original [primary] qualities are inseparably united with
the other sensible [secondary] qualities, and not, even in
thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it
plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I
desire anyone to reflect and try whether he can, by any
abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and
motion of a body without all other sensible qualities.
For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my
power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving,
41
Ibid.

but I must withal give it some color or other sensible

quality which I acknowledged to exist only in the
mind.42
His main point is that so called primary qualities are nothing beyond the secondary qualities
that we perceive in things. Visual perceptions of shape, for example, are just patches of color,
which are secondary.
To make his case, Berkeley examines several so called primary qualities and explains with
each one how it is viewer dependent.43 Take for example, the quality of extension, that is,
three-dimensional shape. Our conceptions of an object’s shape hinge directly on the
perspective of the viewer. The leg of an insect, for example, appears exceedingly small to us;
to the insect itself it would appear to be a medium sized thing, yet to an even tinier
microscopic organism it would appear to be huge. The texture of an object similarly hinges
on the perspective from which we examine it. From a distance insect’s leg might appear to be
smooth; through a microscope it might appear to be quite coarse. The point is that everything
that we know about shape depends upon where we stand in relation to the things that we are
perceiving; thus, all notions of shape are viewer dependent.
The so called primary quality of motion is also relative to the perceiver. 44 Imagine, for
example, that a leaf is falling from a tree directly in front of a humming bird, a human, and a
sloth. How would each of these creatures perceive the leaf’s motion? To the humming bird
the leaf’s motion might appear to be so slow as to be almost frozen in time. To the human it
would appear to be moving at a normal pace. To the sloth it might appear exceedingly rapid.
According to Berkeley, speed and time are measured by the succession of ideas in our minds,
which varies in different perceivers. 45
Argument Based on the Principle of Simplicity

Berkeley’s second argument against material objects is based on the principle of simplicity:
there is no real need for the material objects, hence would be a useless creation. Everything
we need to perceive (sensible qualities) is accounted for more efficiently through idealism:
God directly feeds us sensory information without creating the material world as a useless
middleman. He writes:
If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must
needs be a very precarious opinions; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God
has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose. 46
In theory, we might think that God could have created the material world as a middleman if
he wanted to, sort of an instrument to accomplish the task. But even that, according to
Berkeley, is inconsistent with God’s nature. Instruments are used only when there is a need.
A hammer is a useful instrument since I cannot effectively pound on a nail with my bare
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 19.

hands. My glasses are a useful instrument since I cannot see very well without them.
However, God, who has infinite powers, has no needs and thus has no use of any instrument
that might help him accomplish some task. Berkeley writes:
We indeed, who are being of finite powers, are forced to
make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument
shows the agent to be limited by rules of another’s
prescriptions, and that he cannot obtain his end but in
such a way and by such conditions. Whence, it seems a
clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent
uses no tool or instrument at all. 47
From the above, it follows that God is capable of feeding us sensory information directly
without the need for him to create the material world as an instrument.
David Hume
David Hume is a British empiricist who pushed empiricism to its skeptical conclusions.
Educated in law at his family’s direction, he quickly abandoned that career and devoted
himself to the study of philosophy. One of his most important work is A Treatise of Human
Nature (1739-1740). Hume hoped to work as a philosophy teacher at one of Edinburgh’s
universities, but the skeptical and anti-religious nature of his writings poisoned his efforts,
and instead he took on temporary jobs in government and as a librarian. 48 With a steady flow
of publications, branching out into history as well as philosophy, he became one of the most
famous and controversial authors in Europe.
Origin and Association of Ideas

In his own day, as now, Hume had a notorious reputation as a skeptical philosopher, and in
many ways he carried on the skeptical tradition forged in ancient Greece. Much of Hume’s
skepticism, though, results from pushing the empiricist agenda to its logical conclusion.
There are two main building blocks upon which his empiricist philosophy is founded. The
first of these concerns the origin of ideas. Thoughts and ideas flow through our minds
endlessly – ideas of people, houses, music concerts, scientific discoveries, God, on and on.
Where do they all come from? Hume’s answer is that all of our ideas come from two types of
experiences, or impressions as he calls them: first, outward impressions through our five
senses and, second, inward impressions through reflection on our mental operations. For
example, the idea I have of the color red ultimately came from some outward sensory
experience that I had of the color red that was stored in my memory. The idea I have of fear
similarly came from an inward feeling of fear that I experienced in the past. He writes:
Though our thought seems to possess this unbounded
liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it
is really confined within very narrow limits…When we
think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent
47
Ibid.
48
J. Fieser, op.cit.

ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were

formerly acquainted…In short, all the materials of
thinking are derived either from our outward or inward
sentiment: The mixture and composition of these
belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express
myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more
feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or
more lively ones. 49
Hume offers two proofs for his position that ideas are copied from impressions. First, he says
that if you take any idea you have and examine its components, you will find that it traces
back to outward or inward one or more sensory experience or inward feeling. Hume gives as
an example the idea we have of God a “an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being.” This,
he says, “arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind” and enlarging our human
qualities of goodness and wisdom without limit. Second, he says that, if you go your entire
life without having a particular type of sensation, then you would lack the corresponding idea
of that sensation. For example, “a blind man can form no notion of colors.”
On face value, Hume’s view is innocent enough, and he seems to just be reiterating Locke’s
position that experience is the source of all our mental contents. What Hume does with this,
though, is quite radical insofar as he transforms it into a theory of meaning. For my ideas to
have any meaning, they must be grounded in some impression that I have had. An idea is
meaningless, then, if I cannot trace it back to any impression. He writes:
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from
what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it
be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm
our suspicion. Bringing ideas into so clear a light we
may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may
arise, concerning their nature and reality. 50
For example, if I have an idea of an all-powerful divine being, but I have never had any
impression of something that is all-powerful or divine, then my idea is without meaning.
Whatever idea I do have of God – regardless of whether God even exists – it must be
grounded in impressions that I have had. It is this theory of meaning that leads Hume down
the path of skepticism as he explores one philosophical theory after another. In fact, he
believes that much of traditional philosophy and religion can be dismissed as meaningless
since it fails this test.
The second building block of Hume’s empiricism is his theory of the association of ideas.
Suppose that I sit down on a couch and let my mind wander where it will. I think about the
President, then Japan, then my car, then a telephone pole, then a railroad track, then an old
apartment I lived in. it is tempting to thin that I am conjuring up these ideas spontaneously
49
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975)
50
Ibid.

without any organization behind them. Not so, Hume argues. Our flow of ideas is connected
together by three principles of association. 51
First is resemblance, where one thought leads to another because of resembling features that
they have. For example, if I look at a photograph of a friend, I will start thinking about the
friend. Second is contiguity, that is, one thing being in close proximity to another. For
example, if someone says something about a store in a shopping mall, I might then think
about the store located next to it. Third is cause and effect. For example, if I look at a scar on
my arm, I immediately start thinking about the accident I had that caused me to get the scar.
These three principles alone, according to Hume, are responsible for all mental association
that our minds make in the normal flow of ideas.
With the above example, my thought about the President leads me to think about Japan since
he recently visited there (contiguity); Japan is where my car was built (causality); my car is
parked next to a telephone pole (contiguity); the telephone pole is covered with the same kind
of black tar that is on railroad ties (resemblance); my old apartment was alongside a railroad
track (contiguity). Hume says that “The more instances we examine, and the more care we
employ, the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the
whole, is complete and entire.” 52
Hume analyzes the traditional notion of causality in the same way. Let us begin with a simple
example of a cause-effect connection, which Hume himself uses: billiard ball A strikes
billiard ball B and causes it to move. The traditional notion of causality is that there is an
external power or force that causes ball A to strike and move ball B, independently of what
you or I might perceive when we watch the balls move. That is, there is an objective
necessary connection between the cause and effect. Applying Hume’s theory of meaning, for
this idea of necessary connection to be meaningful, we need to discover the impression which
forms the basis of it.
One possibility is that we perceive an outward impression through our five senses that forms
the idea of an objective necessary connection. But do we? Suppose that when ball A struck
ball B, it produced a flash of light and a loud boom, and, in fact, that every causal connection
we saw was similarly accompanied by a light flash and a boom. If that was the case, then,
yes, we would have a very strong outward impression that would give us the idea of an
objective necessary connection. But that is not what happens. When A strikes and moves B,
all that appears to our eyes is the motion of two balls, and that is it. He writes:
When we look about us towards external objects, and
consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a
single instance, to discover any power or necessary
connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the
cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of
the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in
fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.

attended with motion in the second. This is the whole

that appears to outward senses. 53
He next considers whether there is any inward impression that forms the idea of necessary
connection. Locke had suggested one possibility: we experience a feeling of causal sequence
where the cause is my mental decision and the effect is the raising of my arm. Since the
causal sequence is taking place within my own mind, am thus capable of directly
experiencing a feeling of causal power or necessary connection when I willfully raise my
arm. But Hume rejects this as well, since we do not have a clear experience of how or where
such willful bodily motion takes place. Indeed, I do mentally experience my willful decision
(the cause) and I do see and feel my arm move (the effect), but I do not experience anything
that links them. I do not feel a special electrical shock or anything unique to the necessary
connection by itself.
In the absence of an appropriate outward or inward impression, we must then reject the
traditional notion of necessary connection as an objective force or invisible explosion. Hume
suggests an alternative, though. There is a more moderate notion of necessary connection that
comes from an inward feeling of expectation that occurs when we repeatedly see A followed
by B. consider again the example of billiard balls: it is only after repeatedly seeing ball A
move B that our minds feel a transition from the cause to the effect. He writes:
The first time a man saw the communication of motion
by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he
could not pronounce that the one event was connected:
But only that it was conjoined with the other. After he
has observed several instances of this nature, he then
pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has
happened to give rise to this new idea of connection?
Nothing but that he now feels these events to be
connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell
the existence of one from the appearance of the other.54
In the end, it appears Hume does not completely reject the idea of necessary connection and
causality. But he does reject the traditional idea of it being something like a primary quality
within objects themselves. Instead, he suggests that necessary connection is like a secondary
quality that viewers impose onto A – B sequences when we repeatedly see A and B
conjoined. In this case, it is simply a habit of our minds, not a reality in the objects
themselves.
Merits and Problems of Empiricism

As we have seen, empiricism is the claim that sense experience is the sole source of our
knowledge about the world. According to the empiricists we have examined above, all
knowledge comes from direct sense experience. Some of the strengths of empiricism that
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.

eminent from their thought are:55 it proves a theory, gives reasoning, and inspires others to
explore probabilities in science.
The first is that it proves a theory. Empiricists believe that only real knowledge is empirical.
We learn from experiment and observation, and the direct knowledge we gain from them is
empirical. The best way to know something is to have perceived it through the senses and to
be able to prove it through repeatable observations or experiments. In fact, in this way,
someone interested in gathering knowledge in a scientific mode of thought, will come up
with ideas for observations and experiments to prove his hypotheses or to answer his
questions. He will always seek empirical evidence first and trust in it most.
The second strength of empiricism is that it gives experimental reasoning. Experimental
reasoning as well as past experiences and observations are the sources of knowledge for
empiricism. However, the experimental reasoning, which is based on cause and effect
reasoning, is not absolutely true as Hume’s writing suggests. All can be subject to revision,
just as all is subject to some doubt when predicting what would happen in an experiment.
Hume states, “That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and
implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation that it will rise tomorrow,”56 reason being
that the past is not necessarily a direct causation of a future event. Because of this, science, an
empirical tool set by mankind to explore the world around him and to learn more about
himself, is only work in probability. It is safe, based upon a posteriori knowledge, that the sun
will rise tomorrow, for it has always done so, and there has been no event to show that it
might not rise tomorrow. Without this experimental reasoning however, empiricism is
reduced to past experiences, and yet with it, one is able to make statements such as “the sun
will rise tomorrow” with a great degree of certainty.
The third strength is that it inspires others to explore probabilities in science. The exploration
of the unknown has always lured the curious. Exploring ways to improve our way of living
has been the passion of the modern world. So knowing that we could learn a trait that could
be used to uncover the unknown is a curiosity that is hard to resist. Empiricism gave the
world a direction towards understanding everything around us, even when it seemed
improbable. Indeed, we have used rational thinking and theoretical methods to ignite
empiricist methods to direct us to solutions.
There is, however, a philosophical price to be paid as I have observed elsewhere. 57 While the
empiricist gains additional insights and knowledge, there is a loss in certitude, since the
empiricist still must deal with senses that (the rationalist is correct to maintain) are unreliable.
The rationalist can be certain that 2 + 2 = 4, the empiricist, however, must accept that
empirical knowledge is at best probable, never certain. The problem is that the empiricist has
no real response to the claim that it is possible to doubt even the most persuasive sense
impressions, since it is possible to doubt them without logical contradiction.
55
Cf. William F. Lawhead, The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009),
pp.55-56.
56
Bruce Aune, Rationalism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism: An Introduction (New York: Random House, 1970),
p.43.
57

In philosophical terms, the problem is that our sense perceptions undermine their causes. 58 In
other words, a given sense perception has more than one explanation. Consider, for example,
that one sees a white rabbit. What might explain this perception? The obvious answer is that
one sees a white rabbit because there is a white rabbit there. It is also possible, however, that
one has a rare optical disease and the rabbit is some other color, rather than white. It is also
possible that one hallucinates or dreams the rabbit. As White will attest, these are all logical
possibilities and the sense experiences in themselves provide no certain means to decide
which explanation is correct.59
This suggests another potential problem that empiricism must address, namely how to explain
mathematics and logic? Remember that empiricism maintains that all knowledge is reducible
to experience. Thus, the empiricist must explain how it is possible to reduce sometimes
arcane mathematical knowledge to common sense experience. This means that, since
mathematical knowledge is thought to be certain knowledge, the empiricist must explain how
it is possible to derive certain knowledge through a process of sense experience that provides
knowledge that is, at best probable. Moreover, the empiricist must also explain how it is
possible to prove mathematical statements through experience.
There have been numerous attempts to demonstrate how it is possible to derive mathematics
and logic through experience.60 Though commendable these attempts, all have had serious
difficulties and so have met with little or no general acceptance. Even if it were possible to
reduce mathematics to experience, the questions: whether experiences whose truth is
probable can produce certain mathematical knowledge and, how it is possible to prove
mathematical statements through experience, pose rather more serious difficulties.
Perhaps the easiest, though least intuitive, solution is to argue that there is no certitude in
mathematics. This is John Stuart Mill’s tactics. Mill, a radical empiricist, argues that, as with
all other empirical statements, mathematical statements express mere possibilities. All that
distinguishes them is that mathematical statements have undergone more extensive
confirmation than other statements.61 The disadvantage to this tactics is obvious: one must
give up all claims to absolute truth in mathematics. Most philosophers (as well as
mathematicians) consider this concession to be as difficult as it is undesirable and
counterintuitive.
In contrast to Mill, less radical empiricists (like David Hume and John Locke) still want to
maintain mathematical certitude.62 This too, however, comes at a price. To preserve
mathematical truths as absolute truths Locke argues that some perceptions, and the ideas that
represent these perceptions, can be more certain than others. To be precise, he argues that,
when reason operates on experience, the ideas, and the associations between ideas that it
produces, result in knowledge that is either intuitive, demonstrative or sensitive. Locke
maintains that intuitive knowledge and demonstrative knowledge are certain knowledge. 63
58
J.B. Schneewind, “John Stuart Mill,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, p.503. https://www.2.onu.edu./-m-
dixon/handouts/rationalism%20and20empiricism.html.
59
Ibid. p.209.
60
See H.C. Ezebuilo, op.cit.
61
J.B. Schneewind, op.cit.
62
Ibid.
63

His arguments here are technical and less than a complete success. To all intents and
purposes, however, what Locke does in order to guarantee certain knowledge is rather too
similar to the rationalist’s a priori knowledge to please most empiricists.
Since empiricism argues that there is no knowledge that arises through reason alone, it should
be obvious that empiricism also denies that there are innate ideas, that is, ideas that are in the
mind prior to experience or that are built into the mind in some manner. A usual argument
against innate ideas is that were there such ideas then all rational beings should possess and
acknowledge them. Since it is obvious that there are neither universal ideas (i.e., ideas that all
human beings possess), nor ideas upon which there is universal agreement, then, there are no
innate ideas.64 The empiricist considers the pre-experience mind to be a tabular rasa – a
clean state, and it is true experience that knowledge comes to be written on this slate. Thus,
the basic credo of empiricism is that where there is (or can be) no experience there is (and can
be) no knowledge. Indeed, most of our knowledge is of course a posteriori. However, the
senses alone cannot furnish us with knowledge. It is reason that interprets our sense
experiences and gives them meaning before they can become knowledge. Until reason
performs this role, they are simply raw data without meaning. 65
CONCLUSION
This work is a survey of the empirical theories of John Locke, George Berekeley and David
Hume. We defined empiricism as the view that all human knowledge is derived from
(empirical) experience or the view that all knowledge are a posteriori. This is against the
rationalist approach which claims that certain knowledge are a priori and can be justified
independently of experience. As a theory of justification, however, empiricism views beliefs
as depending ultimately and necessarily on sense experience for their justification.
John Locke asserts that we simply have no innate ideas, and all notions that we have come to
us through experience. Locke has two main arguments against the innateness of ideas, both
speculative and practical. First, he argues that people in fact do not universally hold to these
ideas, contrary to what defenders of innate ideas typically claim. This is particularly obvious
with the laws of thought, which, according to Locke, children and mentally challenged people
have no conception of whatsoever. His second argument is that it makes no sense to hold that
such ideas lie dormant within us and then blossom when we reach the right age, contrary to
what defenders of innate ideas commonly claim. Again, particularly with the law of thought,
he noted that children reason perfectly well regarding identity and non-contradiction, yet at
the same time, they are completely incapable of articulating those specific ideas. If these
ideas were really innate, then children should be able to verbally express them. Also, it is
obvious that many adults have reached the so called age of reason, such as the illiterate and
those from primitive societies, and yet lack these ideas.
According to Locke, therefore, the mind is from birth a blank slate which gets filled with
information through experience. This is done in two ways: we first acquire simple ideas
through experience, and then recombine those simple ideas in different ways to create more
complex ideas. Nevertheless, our ideas about things are either in the things themselves
64
See John Locke’s Essays Concerning Human Understanding, and David Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature.
65
H.c. Ezebuilo, op.cit.; see also J. Omoregbe, op.cit. p.31.

(primary ideas) or they are relative to the perceiver (secondary ideas). George Berkeley
agrees with Locke that we cannot have true knowledge independently of the senses, but he
rejects the existence of the material things themselves claiming that all reality exists as
perception in the mind of the perceiver.
Given that Locke and Berkeley agree, albeit from different perspectives, that human mind is
filled with knowledge by means of ideas, David Hume centers more on the question of the
origin of ideas. According to him, all of our ideas come from two types of experiences, or
impressions as he calls them: first, outward impressions through our five senses and, second,
inward impressions through reflection on our mental operations. And he claims that our flow
of ideas is connected together by three principles of association: resemblance, contiguity,
cause and effect. He argues that this “association” has no necessary connection; it is simply a
habit of our minds, not a reality in the objects themselves.
Generally, we highlighted some of the merits of empiricism to include the fact that it proves a
theory, gives reasoning, and inspires others to explore probabilities in science. Nevertheless,
empirical knowledge lack certitude and reliability. Indeed, the human knowledge is a product
of both sense experience and reason. There is no doubt that some of our knowledge claims
cannot be accounted for by experience, similarly there can be no doubt that some of our
knowledge claims have their origin in senses experience. But even here, it should be noted
that the senses simply gather some raw data and present them to reason which processes them
and they become knowledge.
REFERENCES
Aune, Bruce. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Pragmatism: An Introduction. New York:
Random House, 1970.
Chisholm, Roderick H. “Theory of Knowledge” Foundations of Philosophy Series.
Englewood, Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966.
Descartes, Rene. Meditations of First Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
Ezebuilo, H.C. “The Rationalist and Empiricist Epistemological Strategies and their
Implications in Ethics.” Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities,
vol.6, no.4, 2020.
Fieser, James. The History of Philosophy: A Short Survey,
https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/110/8-empiricism.htm (accessed July 13,
2020).
Hume, David. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Lawhead, William F. The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2009.
Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press, 1975.

Omoregbe, J. Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study. Ikeja: Joja Educational

Research and Publishers, 1998.
Plato, Five Dialogues. J.L. Blau (ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.
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White, Thomas. Discovering Philosophy. Upper Saddler River: Prentice-Hall, 1996.

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International Journal of Research in Education Humanities and Commerce

Volume 01, Issue 02 "July -August 2020"

LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME: A BRIEF SURVEY OF

Rev. Fr. Dr. HYGINUS CHIBUIKE EZEBUILO

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of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this

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external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly

Primary and Secondary Qualities

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must retain still each of them all those qualities. For

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Material Things Do Not Exist and All Reality Exists as Perception

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I am content…to appeal to the common sense of the

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whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from

Argument from Primary and Secondary Qualities

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but I must withal give it some color or other sensible

Argument Based on the Principle of Simplicity

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Origin and Association of Ideas

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ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were

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attended with motion in the second. This is the whole

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